

CHAPTER - V :

CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS
IN EDUCATIONAL PLANNING

=====

- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Operation of a Dual Polity
- 5.3 Planning in the Constitution
- 5.4 The Process of Planning
- 5.5 Plans in Education
- 5.6 The Process of Planning and
Centre-State Relations
- 5.7 The Linkages in Planning
- 5.8 The Centre-State Relationship in Plan
Formulation
- 5.9 The Policy-Output: Outlays on State Plan
- 5.10 Conclusion

Notes and References

5.1 INTRODUCTION

After having examined the Centre-State financial relationships in education during the first four Five-Year Plans in the previous chapter, attention will now be turned to Centre-State relations in the procedures and practices of educational planning. In this chapter some issues such as the following will be discussed :

- (a) Operation of a dual polity
- (b) Planning in the Constitution
- (c) The Process of Planning
- (d) Plans in Education
- (e) The Process of Planning and Centre-State Relations
- (f) The Linkages in Planning
- (g) The Centre-State relationship in Plan Formulation
- (h) The Policy-Output: Outlays on State Plans.

An attempt will be made in the Chapter to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the procedures of plan formulation in education from the perspective of Centre-State relations.

5.2 OPERATION OF A DUAL POLITY

The advantages of a federal polity in the case of a country like India are obvious. Economically, it helps in the pooling of resources, in the effecting of economies of

scale in production and provides an extensive and ready-made market.¹ But, in education, as in many other areas of life, a dual polity creates serious problems, particularly when it is of people scattered over an area of continental dimensions, with a population running into millions and living in political units so unlike each other in their social organisation, economic resources and level of development.² The most formidable of these problems is the problem of policy-making at the national level, and planning.³ An incidental, but interesting illustration of the problem comes from the Committee of Members of Parliament appointed in 1967 to consider the report of the Education Commission (1964-66) and "to prepare the draft of a statement on the National Policy on Education for the consideration of the Government of India. The Committee had thirty members and almost every third member wrote a minute of dissent.⁴ It is well-known that the government itself was of not one mind on the issue and it took several months before it could finally bring out a statement. The content of the statement itself is perhaps ample indication of the difficulty of delineating, in the federal context, a national policy on education. The statement hardly is an adumbration of principles that would underlie governmental effort in education; it is only a prosaic listing of programmes.⁵ The impression is unavoidable that

the statement has cleverly circumvented the difficult problem of formulating and giving articulation to a national policy in education. It is not argued that the government at the Centre is not keen on a national policy in education. What is implied is that it is not often easy to transcend the limitations of a dual polity within which the Central government has to operate.

5.3 PLANNING IN THE CONSTITUTION

Though, as Santhanam rightly points out, planning did not figure largely in the discussions of the Constituent Assembly,⁶ the Indian Constitution does envisage considerable governmental planning. The 'Directive Principles of State Policy' embody certain broad national objectives and lay down that the state should strive to achieve them.⁷ Almost every one of the 16 Articles that constitute the 'Directive Principles' has planning implications. They also define the basic nature of the polity that the state will seek to promote :

"The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall

inform all the institutions of national life.⁸ (Emphasis added)

There are also several provisions in the Constitution that imply planning in the field of education. It is not necessary here to make a reference to all of them.⁹ Suffice it to say that in Part IV ('Directive Principles of State Policy') itself educational planning is implied in three articles. There are Articles 45 and 46 which relate to free and compulsory education, and the promotion of the educational interests of the weaker sections of the people. Then there is Article 41. This Article enjoins, among other things, that "the state shall within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right... to education..." It is, therefore, quite legitimate to claim that educational planning in India is not entirely without a constitutional basis.

The only explicit provision regarding planning that the Constitution embodies is, however, to be found in the Seventh Schedule. The Entry 20 of the Concurrent List reads: 'Economic and Social Planning'. The ambit of the provision is obviously so wide that it includes all planning, including educational planning which is the concern of the present chapter.

The wisdom of including planning in the Concurrent List of legislation is sometimes questioned. But, it should be remembered that planning is not a chunk of social arrangement like agriculture or industry. It is a global activity that cuts across all sectors of national life irrespective of the locus of legislative jurisdiction over them. The Study Team on Centre-State Relationships of the Administrative Reforms Commission is conscious of this fact when it says :

Planning involves a consideration not only of administration but of policy and this effort is therefore best undertaken against a national perspective, for what happens in one part affects the other parts and the whole must be viewed together for the sake of coherence and coordination.¹⁰

The Team goes on to say that the insertion of the entry 'economic and social planning in the Concurrent List recognises this 'necessity'.

But the fact that the entry cuts across boundaries of legislative jurisdiction, however, imparts to it parameters which, if the Constituent Assembly discussions are any indication, the founding fathers might not have even suspected: it gives the government at the Centre a lien over what

other provisions of the Constitution clearly set apart as state subjects. It is true that there has been no Central legislation under the entry so far; nor indeed any legal conflict between the Centre and the States on its basis.¹¹

But, the lien has been vigorously pursued as is evident from the fact that 60 to 70 per cent of the total expenditure on plans 'relate to matters exclusively assigned to the states, like education, health, forests, agriculture, irrigation, electricity etc.'¹²

THE PROBLEM

This then is the crux of the problem. While planning is a subject of Concurrent jurisdiction, with the centre possessing a priority lien¹³ in the matter and with the 'sinews' of planning mostly concentrated in the centre, as we saw in an earlier chapter,¹⁴ most of the subjects to be planned - the developmental heads - belong to the State List. What is more, the Centre has not exactly hesitated to put in its oar in planning. This has, in the field of education, as indeed in many other fields of state jurisdiction, added new dimensions to Centre-State relations.¹⁵ The burden of the present chapter is to identify, albeit broadly, these new dimensions in the Centre-State relations in education and also some of the problems emanating from them.

The Centre-State relations in planning can be stated, at the risk of a tautology, to be the 'style', the modus vivendi, of inter-governmental operation in planning in a dual polity. This 'style' has to be extracted from a process which is a continuous and complex one. The Quinquennial and Annual Plans are only visible end-results of this process which involves almost day-to-day contact and communication, both formal and informal, between a wide variety of governmental and semi-governmental agencies. Hanson describes the process in the following words :

There is a formidable flow of correspondence from the Planning Commission to State governments from Central ministries to State ministries, from a variety of central ad hoc organisations, directly or indirectly, to their state counterparts, and vice versa. There are regular meetings of Finance Ministers, Development Commissioners, Ministers of Industry, Ministers of Agriculture, and the like. There are the visits to, the state capitals of the ^(Planning) Commission's peripatetic Programme Advisers. There are innumerable journeyings of official personalities from New Delhi to the states, and from the states to New Delhi. There are 'trouble-shooting' missions in both directions, and conferences in great abundance.¹⁶

It is in the course of this flux of activities that the Centre-State planning relations take shape. To extract the latter from the process of which these activities are only components would necessarily involve describing the process. Such a description is what is first attempted below. It should, however, be kept in mind that an exercise of this kind would inevitably mean a certain degree of over-simplification and perhaps, like all over-simplifications, some distortion.

In the present account, one cannot confine oneself entirely to educational planning which is the main concern of this chapter. Educational planning is a sectoral exercise. This has necessarily to follow a certain range of broad decisions at the global and macro level.¹⁷ As a matter of fact, in sectors in which detailed plans are drawn up by the States and responsibility for implementation rests with them, sectoral plans do not finally emerge until plans at the regional level have been considered and broadly agreed upon.¹⁸ By this time, a great deal of major planning decisions have already been taken and these decisions have far-reaching implications for the detailed sectoral planning to follow. Thus, if it were possible to limit the attention to educational planning per se, in the narrow sense, it would not be desirable to do so for obvious reasons.

Another caveat also may not be out of place at this stage. The First Five Year Plan (1951-56), as the researcher had occasion to observe in another chapter, was not more than an aggregation of schemes many of which had been started earlier by various Government Departments. The only process involved in the First Plan, therefore, was one of conglomerating. Since then regular procedures of Plan formulation have been developed, basically as a logical result of the specialised agency of planning- the Planning Commission - that had been called into existence by now trying to allocate itself a specialised role. But, these procedures have not been static. They have been in a process of evolving, mostly as a result of problems that arose and pressures that were built up around these problems,¹⁹ but sometimes also as an outcome of conscious stock-taking. To the latter category belong changes that were made in procedures following the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission.²⁰ The present account is not focused on these changes, unless incidentally. This, however, should not give the impression that the planning process and the planning procedures in the country have been a non-changing quantity.

5.4 THE PROCESS OF PLANNING

Five Year and Annual Plans

The formulation of a Five Year Plan, as can be expected and as the Administrative Reforms Commission has pointed out,²¹ is a time consuming process.²² It is particularly so in a country where it involves the orchestration of the activities of not only two tiers of government, but also a large number of planning and policy-making agencies. The work of planning is, therefore, set afoot well in advance of the commencement of a new plan, which evolves gradually through a series of stages.

A new plan is on the anvil even before the current plan is mid-way through. Normally, work on it starts about three years in advance. The first stage²³ of the task is consideration of the general approach to the formulation of the plan. This involves an examination, at the macro level, of the state of the economy. Studies are, therefore, undertaken of past trends in production and the rate of growth of the economy in relation to long-term goals. An attempt is made on the basis of these and similar studies, to identify social, economic and institutional inadequacies. This leads to the formulation of tentative conclusions regarding the general

'approach' to the next Five Year Plan. The conclusions are submitted by the Planning Commission to the cabinet at the centre and then placed before the National Development Council (NDC), which, as we shall see in a later chapter, is constituted as a broad federal, decision-making forum. It must be mentioned that at this stage no attempt is made to suggest magnitudes for the plan; the 'approach' concerns itself only with questions of the socio-economic framework of the plan and the direction of advance.

The first stage of work in the formulation of the plan ends with the NDC indicating tentatively the rate of growth to be assumed in the next plan and the objectives and considerations which should receive special emphasis. In the second stage, effort is directed at working out the general dimensions of the plan, in the light of this 'mandate' from the NDC. This involves detailed technical studies, within the Planning Commission, of the physical contents of the plan, their inter-relationships and their financial implications.

While these studies are underway within the Planning Commission, a number of working groups are set up for different sectors of economic and governmental activity. The groups

usually come to be constituted around two years before the commencement of the new plan. They assess past performance in the sector concerned, identify inadequacies in policy and suggest future strategies and programmes. In the formulation of the Fourth Plan, the working groups were also asked to formulate their proposals in the perspective of the requirements for the next fifteen years. The groups, which the Administrative Reforms Commission has called 'the most important instrument developed by the Planning Commission to assist it in the formulation of the Five Year Plans',²⁴ consist mostly of experts drawn from the concerned Ministries and executive agencies at the Centre. Simultaneous with the setting up of working groups at the Centre, the States are also advised to set up their own working groups which are expected to remain in touch with their counterparts at the Centre. While the studies of the two sets of working groups are in progress, the Commission also seeks the advice of leading non-official experts on various aspects of policy. This is done through a number of panels and advisory committees.²⁵ The idea behind the groups obviously is to 'bring together the experience and expertise of persons specialising in different fields' and to associate in the formulation of the plan 'those who are charged with the task of implementing it.'²⁶

The second stage of plan formulation ends with the preparation by the Planning Commission of what is called the Draft Memorandum on the plan. This is done on the basis of technical studies undertaken by the Planning Commission itself and the discussions in the various working groups and panels. The Memorandum is essentially a broad magnitudinal and directional exercise and poses the main policy issues requiring consideration at the highest level.²⁷ It does not attempt a regional break-down; this is postponed to a later stage when a 'considered basis for the formulation of the State Plans is available.²⁸

The Draft Memorandum is submitted to the Central Cabinet. The discussion in the Cabinet is considerably detailed this time, for, there is hardly a Ministry which is not deeply concerned with the adequacy and, to a lesser extent perhaps, the direction of the proposals relating to the field of its operation. After the discussion, the document is placed before the National Development Council.

The deck is now clear for the next stage in plan formulation. Work at this stage is directed towards the preparation of the Draft Outline of the Five Year Plan. The Outline basically is an elaboration of the Draft Memorandum.

In preparing it the suggestions or comments made by the NDC on the Memorandum is taken into account. An innovation of some political significance was introduced with the Third Plan. The Prime Minister, who is also the chairman of the Planning Commission, met the representatives of the main political parties in the Parliament several times and discussed with them some of the major issues involved in the Plan.²⁹

The purpose of the Draft Outline of the Five Year Plan is to give the plans envisaged in different sectors and broadly indicated in the Memorandum fuller content and "to bring out the main issues of policy and objectives and the approach which is proposed to be adopted".³⁰ The outline is made available to the various Central Ministries and the State Governments in draft and is commented upon by them. It is considered in the Central Cabinet and then submitted to the NDC. With the approval of the latter, it becomes a public document and is published. From now on the outline is subjected to the widest possible discussion. State Governments make arrangements for it to be discussed at lower levels of state administration. At the national level, both the Houses of Parliament discuss the outline. This parliamentary scrutiny is continued in greater detail in a series

of Parliamentary Committees which individual members are free to join. Comments are also invited from all sections of public opinion.

While the Draft Outline is, thus, under discussion throughout the country, the Planning Commission, in association with the Central Ministries, is engaged in another exercise: 'plan discussions' with the States. These discussions relate to 'estimates of resources likely to be available and the measures of mobilisation of additional resources as well as proposals for sectoral programmes of the States.'³¹ They are held, in the case of each State, both at the official and at the political levels. The final conclusions, however, are reached in consultation with the chief ministers of individual States. The conclusions so reached are regarded as understandings between the Planning Commission and the States for the size and composition of each State's plan, the main targets and programmes to be fulfilled, and the obligations undertaken by the Centre to provide a given quantum of financial assistance and by each State to find its share of resources and observe the agreed priorities³².

The Planning Commission now prepares a fresh memorandum. The basis of this second Memorandum is the plan discussions

with the States, the comments received from various sources and the detailed recommendations that the working groups and panels have by now formulated. The document delineates the basic features of the plan, the emphases in policy directions and the issues which may require further consideration before the plan is finalised. It is submitted to the Central Cabinet and the National Development Council, where it is discussed. The conclusions reached during these discussions constitute the basis for the final Report on the Five Year Plan.

The preparation of the Report on the Five Year Plan is the last stage of the long, and in many ways arduous, task of plan formulation. The Report outlines the objectives of the plan, the policies underlying it and the programmes through which they are sought to be implemented. As in the case of the Draft Outline, it is also made available to the Central Ministries and the State Governments in draft for their last-minute consideration and comments. The final Report is prepared in the light of these comments and is submitted to the Central Cabinet and the National Development Council. The Report is finally presented to the Parliament for discussion and approval.

The medium-term quinquennial plan provides only a rather diffused framework for the day-to-day implementation of a plan. It is also necessary to 'feed' the Five Year Plans into the annual budgets of the Central and State Governments. Though this phasing is broadly indicated in the Five Year Plan itself, review and adjustment became necessary as the plan progressed, particularly in a situation of scarcity of resources, goods and personnel. Annual plans³³ are, therefore, vitally important, for, the effective implementation of the Five Year Plans depend upon them.³⁴ Annual plans, in fact, are the main operational instruments of the Five Year Plan.³⁵

The preparation of the Annual Plan begins in the Planning Commission about August-September each year. An Annual Plan has naturally to be based on the unfinished tasks of the Five Year Plan. The different Divisions of the Commission, therefore, undertake an assessment of the achievements of the Plan so far and the progress anticipated during the current year. As the tasks that lie ahead have to be tailored to the resources available, the Economic Division of the Commission simultaneously undertakes a study of such resources. A similar exercise is also made in the Ministry of Finance. The two estimates of resources are compared against each other

so that an agreed picture of the resource position for the relevant year is available. A broad agreement on the quantum of the Central assistance to the States is also arrived at.

On the basis of these financial studies and the assessment of the development tasks ahead in the framework of the Five Year Plan, the Planning Commission prepares 'guidelines' for the States for the formulation of their Annual Plans for the following year and communicates them to the States. These guidelines stipulate the general considerations to be borne in mind in formulating the Annual Plan and also indicate the quantum of the Central assistance available.³⁶ The States, on their side, are asked to furnish along with their Plans the estimates of their financial resources and also details of proposals for mobilisation of additional resources.

The next stage in the formulation of the Annual Plan consists of 'plan discussions' between the Centre and the States on the Annual Plan proposals of the latter. These discussions generally start around November-December every year and the time is usually indicated in the guidelines itself so that the States may make their preparations³⁷ well in advance.

Plan discussions take place in a special working group on resources and in a number of sectoral working groups. These groups consist of officers of the Central Ministries concerned, the Planning Commission and of the State the proposals of which are under consideration. The special working group on resources meets and thrashes out the resources position a day in advance of the meetings of the sectoral working groups. The sectoral groups first meet together under the chairmanship of the concerned Programme Adviser of the Commission. The latter gives the groups an idea of the financial resources that would be available to the State for the next year's Plan. The groups then meet separately to finalise the proposals with respect to each sector. The proposals are submitted to the Programme Advisers who forwards them to the Planning Commission along with his comments. They are then discussed in a meeting of the Planning Commission which is also attended by the Chief Minister of the State concerned. Final decisions regarding the State's Annual Plan for the next year, the quantum of the Central assistance to the State and the order of the State's own financial effort are taken in this meeting.

The preceding account does not make any specific reference to the process of planning in the States, but it

should, though incidentally, give some idea of that process, such as it is. The task of planning in the States as it is organised to-day is (lamentable though this may be) mainly one of coordination. Departmental (and in some cases district level) Plans are called for at the appropriate time. On the receipt of these plans, they are checked for internal consistency, and for conformity to the Planning Commission's directives. Since the total cost of the Departmental and District Plans are invariably way beyond the ceiling prescribed for the State by the Planning Commission, some pruning also is attempted, though often without much success. This is generally done in a meeting of the ministers and secretaries of the Departments of Planning and Finance and of the department concerned with the subject. The proposals are then submitted to the Cabinet sub-committee for planning or, where such a committee does not exist, to the cabinet. From here the plan goes to the State Planning Advisory Committee. In the case of the Five Year Plan, the state legislature may also discuss the proposals at this stage.³⁸ With the approval of the State Planning Advisory Committee, the state's Draft Five Year Plan is ready and it is forwarded to the Planning Commission and the central ministries.³⁹

5.5 PLANS IN EDUCATION⁴⁰

The description of the planning process given in the previous section has been general, but the picture that emerges gives one an idea of the process of plan formulation also in the educational sector.⁴¹

Before an attempt is made here ^{to} underline the educational components of that picture, one general observation about the nature of educational planning may be in order. A broad distinction is generally made 'between sectors in which... plans are formulated in terms of physical possibilities or the requirements of the economy, and those in which the resources that can be made available rather than the measure of development that can be achieved constitute a major determining consideration'.⁴² Education which is even now included in 'social services' belongs to the second category. Technical and professional education may be a partial exception.⁴³ In this area some long-range manpower planning has been attempted and useful work is being done by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research.⁴⁴ In the field of general education, planning is guided mainly by the broad social desideratum of providing free and compulsory education to the 6-14 age group.⁴⁵

The preliminary memorandum on the Fourth Five Year Plan of West Bengal, a state ruled by a non-Congress government highly critical of the planning procedures evolved by the Congress government at the Centre, illustrates the distinction made here. The document outlines the strategy of the State Plan as follows :

- (a) Maximum efforts in primary sectors like Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Forestry and Fishery - investment in these sectors will be limited only by their capacity for useful spending in quick yielding schemes;
- (b) Maximum investment out of the balance of resources available in industrial sector including generation of power with emphasis on schemes having the highest employment potential and producing (the) largest volume of goods in the shortest possible time; and
- (c) Maintenance of Social Services at the existing level of efficiency and expansion to the extent practicable consistent with the basic and long term needs of the community and dictates of the Constitution.⁴⁶

One unfortunate outcome of this 'social desideratum-cum-residual resources' strategy in the planning of education is

that the initial macro exercises in the assessment of the economy that precede plan formulation proper are largely, though not wholly, as it will be seen later, irrelevant to educational planning. The linkage between planning in education and other sub-systems of the economy are, therefore, rather tenuous.

To revert to the process of educational planning, the researcher had an occasion to mention that sectoral plans in State subjects including plans in education do not finally emerge until State Plans have been broadly considered and agreed upon. Work on the educational component of the Five Year Plan begins with the setting up of the working groups or task forces in education at the Centre. This usually takes place about two years in advance of the beginning of the plan. (As an example, the order setting up the groups for the Fifth Plan, which is not included in this study, was issued on the 11th of February 1972.⁴⁷). The Working groups in education are generally large in number and usually relate to the various levels of education and major problem areas.⁴⁸ To cite the Fifth Plan again for illustration, the order referred to above in parenthesis set up some eleven task forces. They were on :-

1. Elementary Education
2. Secondary Education
3. University Education
4. Vocational and Technical Education
5. Adult and Out-of-School Education
6. Programmes and Problems of Youth
7. Education and Employment
8. Art and Culture
9. Language, Development, Book Production and
Libraries
10. Educational Finance
11. Machinery for Educational Planning and
Implementation

Each of the working groups also constitutes sub-groups which undertake studies 'in depth' of specific problems like curriculum reorientation, teacher preparation and financing of education. A steering Group on Education appointed along with the working groups and including the chairman of all of them,⁴⁹ 'guides and coordinates' the work of the groups.

The result. It was stated elsewhere that as working groups are got up at the Centre, the Planning Commission

advises the States also to establish their own working groups. State working groups in education, therefore, come into existence almost on the heels of the working groups at the Centre. These groups, like their counterparts in other state sectors, are supposed to keep in touch with the working groups in education at the Centre. This they do with varying degrees of efficiency.

To help the States formulate their proposals in education, the Education Division of the Planning Commission, in consultation with the Ministry of Education prepares 'guidelines' which are sent to the State. These guidelines are focused on strategies and programmes, tend to be exhaustive⁵⁰ and do not, naturally, enter into the question of sectoral resources. They also indicate the kind of data-base that should accompany the educational plans of the states.⁵¹

The States prepare their 'Draft' Plans in education according to the guidelines from the Centre. When they are received at the Planning Commission, the Education Division of the Commission examines them from the point of view of the strategy and priorities suggested by the Commission, past performance of the states concerned, special features that may have to be taken into consideration in the case of

individual States and the feasibility of the suggested programmes. They are then discussed along with the comments of the Education Division on them, in working groups set up for this purpose, consisting of representatives of the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Education, the University Grants Commission and the State concerned. The report of the working group for each State is submitted to the Programme Adviser concerned. The latter sets out his own views in a note and sends up the report, along with reports relating to other sectors of the state plan, to the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. A final decision regarding the state plan programmes and outlay in education, as also in other sectors, are taken in a high level meeting between the Deputy Chairman and the state chief minister assisted by appropriate officers on both sides. The state government revises its educational plan in the light of these decisions.

In the foregoing account, no attempt was made to draw pointed attention to the process of planning in those areas of education for which the Centre is constitutionally responsible. This does not mean that there are no problems of Centre-State relations here. The study Team on Centre-State Relations of the Administrative Reforms Commission had occasion to refer to these problems in other sectors and

cite the 'tugs and pulls of the States for locating the Central public sector industries' as 'a prominent and well-known example' of these problems.⁵² Such 'tugs and pulls' are not entirely unknown in the field of education, though they may not be as clamorous as in prestigious and economically more rewarding sectors like industry. It is no secret that some States were far from happy about the location of the four Regional Colleges of Education in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Mysore. (That one State in the North, which was offered one of these colleges, declined the offer, only strengthens the point that is being made here.)

Demands, therefore, have been raised at authoritative quarters for the participation of the States in the planning of the Central Sectors of developmental activities also. The argument that the Rajamannar Committee adduces in support of the demand is interesting and bears reproduction :

...We may point out that the States are as much concerned with the so-called central schemes, as with the State schemes... It is neither desirable nor expedient to exclude the States from participation in them. The schemes are situated within the State and as the scheme progresses in its implementation, the State has to take upon itself certain responsibilities

such as acquisition of site, measures regarding public health and more important than any thing else, maintenance of law and order.⁵³

The Committee has by no means exhausted the factors that make for problems of federal relations in the planning of the Central Sector of developmental activities. In the field of education, for example, it is a common complaint in the States that the Central Schemes located in them exert an unhealthy upward pull on the salary structure of sections of state functionaries in the area. There is also the complaint that, because of the far better reward system operating in the Central Schemes (in terms of pay scales, opportunities for egress, wider professional recognition, transnational contacts, etc.) they cause a brain drain which leaves the states poorer in talents and professional competence.⁵⁴

These problems, serious as they may be, are however neither so difficult nor so far-reaching in their implications for central-state relations in the federal context of the Indian polity. We have therefore, not focussed attention on them and the planning transactions that give rise to them.

5.6 THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS

The process of planning in general and planning of education in particular that was broadly outlined above constitute a series of 'policy-making transactions'. One is not interested here in these transactions per se. The federal context demands that these transactions are based on a process of consultation between the Centre and the States. It is with this process that one is concerned here.

The case for such consultation has been forcefully made out by the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission on Centre-State Relationships and one can do no better than quote the Team :

The nation is more than the Centre, and indeed very much more than any State and a national endeavour like the five year plans must encompass both the centre and the states calling for a coordinated effort from all of them. It may be that in a national endeavour of this kind the Centre becomes the king-pin, playing of necessity the role of initiator, guide, coordinator and watch dog of the execution of the national will, but the will, if it is to be honestly and earnestly implemented throughout the country, must be national and therefore nationally determined. This asks for a

process of consultation with the states in which all the basic issues confronting the nation are given full and frank consideration. Such a process... becomes imperative when we consider that it is at the expense of their jurisdiction that the plans comprehend development activities falling within the States' sphere. Decisions which imply a discipline on them that the law does not enjoin must... secure the imprint of their acceptance through synergetic collaboration rather than passive acquiescence.⁵⁵

Such 'synergetic collaboration' obviously means dialogue and consultation in: (i) The enunciation of the goals and objectives of the plan and its strategy, (ii) the formulation of the plan proper and (iii) the determination of priorities in different sectors and of priorities with respect to each state plan.

The process of consultation between the States and the Centre must, thus, begin at the beginning—that is, at the stage of identifying the goals, the objectives and the strategy of the plan. This is when the general approach to the plan under formulation is considered. It has been seen earlier that this is done on the basis of studies made on certain macro aspects of the economy and that the latter are undertaken by the Planning Commission at the Centre. For

The point need not be laboured here that these studies constitute the primary basis of the plan. The assumptions that they make and the framework of perspective development that they postulate determine the final shape of the Five Year Plan and the orientation and dimensions of its sectoral components including the component of education. If substantiation of this claim were needed, it has come from the 'Minhas episode'.

Dr. B.S. Minhas' position in the well-known controversy regarding the current plan is reflected in the pre-plan policy document Towards Self-Reliance: Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan, of which he was the chief author.⁵⁶ The document made an early and tentative enunciation of the assumptions of the Fifth Plan in the offing and was based on studies in the Planning Commission undertaken under the inspiration of Dr. Minhas.⁵⁷ The basic assumption made in Towards Self-Reliance was the need for 'social justice' which was given precedence over economic growth. "Economic development during the last two decades", said the document, "has resulted in an all-round increase in per capita income."⁵⁸ It went on to claim that 'the economy now has reached a stage where larger availability of resources makes it possible to launch a direct attack on unemployment, under-employment and poverty and also assure adequate growth'.⁵⁹

Having said that, the document, true to its assumptions and emphases, did not even mention the problems involved in ensuring adequate level of economic growth, but proceeded to dwell at great length on the programmes of 'social justice' laying stress on, as one observer put it, 'welfarism, programmes of virtual dole-giving and creating jobs for the sake of jobs'.⁶⁰

If these assumptions had been worked into the Fifth Plan, this would have meant transfer of more resources from the Centre to the States for programmes making for 'social justice' including programmes in education. In fact, the report of the Sixth Finance Commission, which clearly bears the imprint of Dr. Minhas' thinking sought to find ^{the} raison d'etre for its proposals for enlarged financial devolution to the states on the basis of the perspective of 'social justice'. The Commission stated: "When the emphasis is on social justice, there is no escape from a realignment of resources in favour of the States, because services and programmes which are at the core of a more equitable social order come within the purview of the States under the Constitution".⁶¹

A later document on the Fifth Plan, Approach to the Fifth Plan 1974-79, prepared under the stewardship of Shri

D.P. Dhar, based again on studies undertaken in the Planning Commission, made different assumptions. The new approach was founded on the understanding that 'social justice' should be woven into the strategy of economic development. Towards Self-Reliance, we have seen, had made a rather buoyant assessment of economic development in the country in the past. The new document, however, stated: "One reason for the failure of planning to make a major dent on poverty has been the inadequate rate of growth."⁶² Economic growth, therefore, become the main plank of planning under the ^{new} dispensation and 'social justice' only to the extent it was consistent with such growth. It is an open secret now that this approach has meant a heavy slashing of allocations originally proposed in the Fifth Five Year Plan for 'Social Services'. In Education, the 'Blue-Print' had mooted a plan expenditure of the order of 3,200 crores,⁶³ but the final allocation, according to the all available indications, is not likely to be much more than half this figure. The Draft Fifth Plan figure is slightly higher; it is, however, common knowledge in Shastri Bhawan that this figure is only notional and is on the optimistic side.⁶⁴

This digression into the Minhas episode was meant only to show that: (i) The so-called 'technical studies' in the

Planning Commission that constitute the first exercise in the process of plan formulation are not 'policy-specific'. Their policy implications, depend upon the valuations that are brought to bear on them; and (ii) though these studies may seem remote to the process of planning in education, compared to planning in sectors like agriculture and industry, yet, in the final analysis, education also is subject to their impact.

A plan, to quote Myrdal, 'is fundamentally a political programme'. 'It has to be produced in terms of the government's valuations'.⁶⁵ These valuations, as the researcher has tried to show, start operating right at the stage of the initial macro-studies conducted by the Planning Commission. In the planning arrangements to-day there seems to be an inadequate recognition of this fact; for, the 'valuational base' of the primary exercises in plan formulation - primary, not only temporally, but also in their significance - are provided entirely by the Planning Commission at the Centre. The states play no part here. It may be added in passing that this applies, mutatis mutandis to 'technical studies' undertaken by the Planning Commission at ^{the} later stages of plan formulation also.

5.7 THE LINKAGES IN PLANNING

It has been seen that initial macro-studies in the Planning Commission lead to the formulation of the 'approach' to the plan. It is only after the 'Approach Paper' is ready that the formal 'linkages'⁶⁶ between the States and the Centre get into operation. These 'linkages' as can be seen from the account of the planning process given earlier, are mainly three: (a) the National Development Council (NDC), (b) the Central and State Working Groups and the (c) plan discussions at the Centre. The first of these linkages, the National Development Council is not fashioned, in the main, to operate sectorally. The other two largely operate sectorally; upon them depend finally the dimensional and directional characteristics of the sectoral plans. More so in a field like education, where plan specifics can not be deduced directly from macro policy decisions.

earlier
The account of the planning process shows that the NDC is consulted several times during the formulation of the plan which is placed before it at certain well-defined stages. The approach paper, the Draft Memorandum and the Draft outline go before it. Another memorandum is also presented to it at the penultimate stage of plan formulation. The recommendations of the Council on all these are incorporated in the final plan.

The National Development Council

The NDC, as it will be seen in another chapter is clearly conceived as a federal forum⁶⁷ and is charged with, among other things, the responsibility of guiding the process of formulating the National Plan.⁶⁸ There is a widespread complaint that it has not been able to discharge this responsibility adequately, inspite of the plan being placed before and discussed by it at several stages of its formulation. The ARC Study Team on Centre-State Relations has said :

The degree of consultation has increased with every succeeding plan and so steadily has the influence of the Council. And yet a study of the planning documents and an examination of the planning procedures reveal a paradoxical situation in which, while consultation with the Council on certain basic matters of policy has been inadequate, the attention bestowed on them by the Council when opportunity has visited it has been even more so.⁶⁹

Inadequacy of consultation obviously does not lie in any paucity of occasions for dialogue between the Planning Commission, the Central Cabinet and the NDC (During the first ten years of ^{its} existence, the Council met eighteen times. The frequency has only increased since then). The inadequacy

lies in the body's constricted freedom to choose. As one hypercritical observer has done, one might paraphrase Herbert Spenser and almost say that the NDC could choose as it pleased, but it could not please as it chose.

The range of alternative choices placed before the NDC, when the plan is brought before it at the various points of its long gestation, is rarely very large. But, this omission is never so 'tingle' or so obvious as at 'the primary and most important stage of the formulation of goals and objectives and the adumbration of the strategy of planning'.⁷⁰ The goals, objectives and strategy of the plan, it may be recalled, are enunciated in the Draft Memorandum. These are based on the studies conducted in the Commission (some matters relating to which the researcher had occasion to discuss earlier), and formulated within the framework of a fifteen-year perspective. Now, requirements of a considered and rational choice would call for making available to the Council, when it discusses the Memorandum, findings of the studies conducted in the Planning Commission, the policy alternatives indicated by them, and the perspective plan within the ambit of which these policies have to be considered. But, this is never done. To quote the Study Team on Centre-State Relations again :

But, the perspective plan document is never taken up in the Council. The overall projections are indeed summarily mentioned in the Memorandum but the basis on which they are arrived at is not revealed. Alternatives within a given framework may be discussed and these take the form of readjusting, seldom more than marginally, inter-sectoral priorities and outlays, but alternatives to that framework are not presented to the Council.⁷¹

The other side of the paradox that the ARC Study Team speaks of - the inadequacy of attention bestowed by the National Development Council on vital matters that are brought before it - is perhaps inherent in the situation.⁷² The Council is composed of busy men and, as Gadgil points out, is hardly a deliberative body.⁷³ It has no systematic and stream-lined conferencing procedures and cannot have, with State chief ministers sitting on it, prolonged meetings. The usual duration of the Council's meetings is two or three days. The agenda is generally long and the issues to be considered important and complex. The effort to compress a long agenda into a two or three-day meeting has led to the wide-spread complaint among the States that the discussions are hustled through, 'rendering any free and frank exchange of views impossible'.⁷⁴ On the other hand, not infrequently, the

Chief Ministers, many of whom come from distant States, bring with them to the capital a wide assortment of other briefs, both official and political, so that they are not able to give their undivided attention to the Council.

The 'organisational' part of the meetings of the National Development Council is not calculated to improve matters. The issues that come up before the Council are such that they require, in most cases, advance study and thought. But, as the investigations made by the ARC Study Team show, the agenda papers of the meetings of the Council are, 'as a rule, circulated so late that it is virtually impossible for Chief Ministers to go through them with care'.^{74a} There have been at least some cases in which the supporting papers of the agenda were circulated in the meeting itself.

The conclusion that emerges is obvious. The National Developmental Council is 'consulted' a number of times during the formulation of the Five Year Plan. But, the 'consultation', for various reasons falls far short of being substantive or 'critical'. Indeed, to an outside observer it might often seem that NDC does not do much more than affix its seal of approval to the labours of the Planning Commission.⁷⁵ The political 'ethos', if one may use that word in this context of the august body, does not quite help matters. But to this

and other aspects of the functioning of the NDC, the researcher shall have occasion to revert in the next chapter.

The Central and State Working Groups

The second 'linkage' between the States and the Centre in the process of plan formulation is the Central and State working groups. Such groups have been a feature of plan formulation in the country right from the inception of planning, but since the Third Plan they have been employed much more consistently and systematically.⁷⁶ This does not mean that all the States take the working groups equally seriously or operate the device with equal efficiency. Madras has tended to treat them rather contemptuously. Maharashtra, on the other hand, gives them considerable importance and has gone to the extent of printing their reports for official circulation. This is true also in the case of Gujarat State which drew up, in 1972, a Perspective Plan for the State for 1974-1984 through its working groups. The working groups in education in Maharashtra and Gujarat, incidentally, have usually shown more sense and greater perspicacity than their counterparts in any other State.⁷⁷

The ARC Report on Machinery for Planning has identified

several defects in the functioning of the working groups.⁷⁸ They seldom work to the time schedule laid down for them and generally fail in submitting their reports in time. In many cases they do not meet more than a few times.⁷⁹ They do not get adequate technical support and their contact with the Planning Commission at the ~~Centre and the Planning agencies~~ in the States (such as they are), is neither continuous nor very close. Because of all this, they have 'failed to be as useful as was expected of them'.⁸⁰

These defects are common to both the Central and State working groups and they are indeed serious. They in a way belie their name which suggests (and was perhaps intended to suggest) a deliberate opting out of the 'committee culture',⁸¹ which inhibited business-like functioning.

Since the present concern is to have a look at the decision-making process in planning from the federal point of view, in a subject which constitutionally falls within State jurisdiction, what is of immediate interest here is, for obvious reasons, the working groups at the centre. The federal logic would require that the latter, in their composition and functioning, should reflect the 'collaborative endeavour' that federal planning should be. This is also necessary from the point of view of implementation. 'Even the most expert plan will fail', says

Lewis, 'if it is not acceptable. The best way to ensure acceptance is to bring into the formulation of the Plan representatives of those who have to carry it out.'⁸²

This was the thrust of the ARC recommendation that 'the groups dealing with subjects falling in the State List should also have some specialists from State Planning Boards and State Governments'⁸³ (Emphasis added). The Commission had earlier observed that there had been very little representation of experts from the states.⁸⁴

It is, however, obvious that the Commission had not considered this as anything more than a concession to political propriety, propter honoris respectum, as it were. An adequate recognition of the federal logic should have led the Commission to make its recommendation on the point import into the working group structure a federal character. The recommendation would have, in that case, called for a more systematic and more extensive participation by the States in plan formulation at the working group stage than is indicated by the grudging and half-hearted phrase 'should also have some specialists' - particularly so in education and other subjects in the State List.⁸⁵

The ARC recommendation regarding State representation

in Central working groups dealing with State subjects was not difficult of implementation. The following table which makes an analysis of Fifth Plan working groups in education would serve as an illustration of the extent to and the manner in which this has been done.⁸⁶

Table 5.1 : State Representation in Task Forces/Working Groups in Education-Fifth Five Year Plan.

Sl. No.	Task Force/Working Group	Total Membership	Number of Members from					Level of State representation		
			Central Govt.	Planning Com-mission	Out side Ex-pts	To-tal of 1,2, & 3	State Govt.	HL	ML	LL
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
1.	Elementary Education	13	4	2	2	8	5	5	-	-
2.	Secondary Education	17	5	2	5	12	5	5	-	-
3.	University Education	16	6	2	7	15	1	1	-	-
4.	Vocational & Technical Education	18	9	2	5	16	2	2	-	-
5.	Adult & Out-of-School Education	14	4	2	5	11	3	3	-	-
6.	Programmes & Problems of Youth	21	5	2	10	17	4	4	-	-
7.	Education & Employment	16	8	2	3	13	3	3	-	-
8.	Art and Culture	16	9	2	5	16	0	x	x	x
9.	Language Development, Book Production & Libraries	12	4	3	5	12	0	x	x	x
10.	Educational Finance	14	4	2	6	12	2	2	x	x
11.	Machinery for Educational Planning & Implementation	13	3	1	4	8	5	4	-	1
	Total	170	61	22	57	140	30	29	-	1

Note: HL(High Level) = Secretary, Joint Secretary or equivalent

levels; ML(Middle Level= Deputy Secretary, Under-Secretary or equivalent levels; LL (Low Level)= Levels lower than the above.

The table shows that the 11 Task Forces had a total of 170 members. Out of these, only 30 were drawn from State Governments. In several groups State representation was extremely feeble. In the Task Force on university education, for example, there was only one State representative. The Planning Commission in constituting this group seems to have almost proceeded on the assumption that education at the tertiary level is a Central subject. State representation was only slightly better in several other groups. In two of them (the Task Forces on Art and Culture, and Language Development, Book Production and Libraries) State representation is conspicuous by its absence, though the subjects they dealt with had pronounced regional dimensions and there were specific entries in the State List relating to important aspects of them.⁸⁷ The only gratifying aspect of state representation in the Task Forces in education for the formulation of the Fifth Plan seems to be its 'level'. Except in one solitary case, where an Inspector of Schools represented a State Government in a Task Force, the officers who represented the State Governments were high ranking. They were usually of the level of a Secretary or a Joint Secretary.

An interesting aspect of State representation in these Task Forces is its 'scatter'. There seems to be a tendency or representation to 'bunch' so that some States get into several of them while others tend to be completely left out, for get a stray access into one of them. The following table shows the distribution of representation among the States.⁸⁸

Table 5.2 : Table showing Distribution of State Representation in Fifth Plan Task Forces in Education

Sl. No.	State	Number of Task Forces Represented
1.	Andhra Pradesh	1
2.	Assam	-
3.	Bihar	3
4.	Gujarat	2
5.	Haryana	2
6.	Himachal Pradesh	-
7.	Jammu & Kashmir	-
8.	Kerala	3
9.	Madhya Pradesh	-
10.	Maharashtra	5
11.	Manipur	-
12.	Meghalaya	-
13.	Mysore	1
14.	Nagaland	-
15.	Orissa	1
16.	Panjab	1
17.	Rajasthan	2

contd...

Table 5.2 : (contd.)

Sl. No.	State	Number of Task Forces Represented
18.	Tamil Nadu	1
19.	Tripura	-
20.	Uttar Pradesh	1
21.	West Bengal	1
No. of States Represented		13

The table shows that only 13 States are represented in the Task Forces, so that the 'rate of participation', if one may use that term in the present context, is less than 60. Seven out of these, that is over 50 per cent of the 'participating' States do so only in one Task Force. But, Maharashtra gets into five which is nearly half the Task Forces. Kerala and Bihar are represented in three, and Gujarat, Haryana and Rajasthan in two each. These six, out of the 21 Indian states existing at the time, thus, seem to have been the 'hot favourites' for representation in the Task Forces. Another fact which is not reflected in the table strengthens this impression. Three of these states not only get into more than one Task Force, but also, in some cases, have more than one representative in the same Task Force. Maharashtra, for example, has more than one representative in three Task Forces.

No packing of Task Forces is suggested here. But, the six States which have dominated nominations to the Fifth Plan Task Forces are not excluding Kerala where there has been a marked shift in political postures in recent years in the direction of more positive attitudes towards the Centre-known to be usually rather 'pliant' in their outlook regarding Central leadership in education. This, in any case, is the prevailing impression in the Yojana Bhawan. If there is any truth in this, there seems to be a seeking after of 'assent'^{and} acquiescence in the process of Centre-State consultation in plan formulation. The implications of this for a sprawling federal polity like ours with marked social, economic and political differences among the federating units, are too obvious to be dilated upon.

5.8 THE CENTRE-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN PLAN FORMULATION

One aspect of the functioning of the Central and State working groups which is of great interest from the point of view of Centre-State relations in plan formulation is the relationship between them. The ARC has lamented the lack of close contact between them and has said :

A major deficiency in our plan formulation procedures is the inadequate communication between persons engaged in planning work in the States and at the Centre. When the work on the Fourth Plan began, it was envisaged that the Working Groups at the Centre and their counter-parts in the States would keep a close touch with each other. This, however, did not come about.⁸⁹

In making this observation the Commission had perhaps based itself on evidence of vertical contacts of a formal nature between the Central and State working groups, for, such contacts are indeed few and far-between, though not entirely non-existent. Hanson's case study of the Third Plan working groups of Maharashtra shows that the working groups of that State concerned with Agriculture and Animal Husbandry had first to submit tentative proposals, through the Central Ministry of Food and Agriculture to the Central working groups on Agriculture, and then revise them in the light of discussions held in New Delhi.⁹⁰ The Third Five Year Plan report of Uttar Pradesh shows that during the formulation of that plan, there was regular 'exchange of views and information' between the State and the Central working groups.⁹¹ In many States, the working groups seem to have been actually instructed to draft their proposals for the Third Plan in 'close consultation' with their Central counterparts.⁹² There is,

however, a tendency, as Hanson has pointed out, to deny the existence of vertical contacts between the Central and State working groups.⁹³ It is perhaps this tendency that is reflected in what the ARC says.

Vertical contacts of an informal nature between central and state working groups, however, are very common. Chairmen of State working groups have complained of 'oscillating' between the state capital and New Delhi.⁹⁴ In education itself, those who have had close official contacts with the Ministry of Education, like the present investigator, knows that the report of at least one State working group on education for the abortive Fourth Plan was actually drafted in New Delhi. The circumstance under which this transpired is, however, not usual. It happened that planning work in the Ministry of Education at that time was being done under the supervision of a well-known educationist and 'educational planner' who, while working in the Ministry in an honorary capacity, unofficially guided the educational fortunes of the State concerned. The educationist belonged to the State and had won his spurs in education there. Though such 'ghost-writing' of State working group reports at the Ministry of Education in New Delhi is rare, the State working group proposals emanating from there is not so. Whether the source

of emanation is the Ministry of Education or the Central working groups is a question of tweedledum and tweedledee and is immaterial. Gadgil, in his Memorandum on the Approach to the Third Five Year Plan, submitted to the Panel of Economists, Government of India, had occasion to ^{adversely} comment on the educational authorities at the Centre, for handing down plan schemes to the States.⁹⁵ Referring to the problem in general, the ARC Study Team on Centre-State Relationships has said :

The departmental working groups in the states do not quite fulfil the expectation that they will formulate their own schemes to suit local requirements, keeping in view of course, the guidelines provided by the corresponding working groups at the Centre. In practice, they tend to adopt wholesale the schemes suggested by the Central working groups. An examination of the Third Plan of three states, selected at random, shows that in the programmes under "agriculture" 80 to 90% schemes suggested in the central group reports were adopted while "health" and "education" plans were almost totally built upon the centre's thinking.⁹⁶
(Emphasis added)

Nayar, who has made a case study of the process of planning in two States - Andhra Pradesh and Kerala - has detailed the baneful effects on state planning of this

'client relationship' that the State working groups tend to establish with their counterparts at the Centre; Schemes are adopted without any consideration of their relevance to the needs and problems of the State and without any feasibility or cost-benefit analysis of them.⁹⁷ The ARC Study Team ~~has~~ just quoted had itself pointed out some of these deleterious consequences of the open vassalage of State working groups to the Centre.⁹⁸ But, the final outcome of it all is that it reduces State planning groups, in Hanson's words, to an 'elaborate pantomime'. What makes it more so is the fact that neither the Central nor the State working groups are given, at any stage of their work, any indication of the resources likely to be available for plan proposals in their sector.⁹⁹ These groups, therefore, function in a kind of financial vacuum which makes their proposals extremely unrealistic and their work an academic exercise. If the decision-makers were, for example, to go by the proposals made by the working groups for the Fifth Plan, 'the plan would have inflated to over Rs.90,000 crores'.¹⁰⁰ The proposals of the Central working groups get 'cut to size' first by the Steering Group, which as it was seen/^{earlier} is a committee mainly of senior officers of the Ministry of Education and its autonomous and 'attached' organisations, and finally by the Planning Commission. itself. The Steering Group, it may be

added, may, unlike the Planning Commission, go about this chopping business with some 'tenderness', for, as Hanson again says:

While the Planning Commission is doing its best to inculcate a feeling of corporate responsibility, both as between groups and as between their constituent departments, the central ministries are doing just the opposite. For the struggle over the share-out of the scarce resources in the states is paralleled by a similar struggle in the centre.¹⁰¹

As for the proposals from the State working groups, they are put to the procrustean bed during the plan discussions, the last of the main 'linkages' between the centre and the states in plan formulation that we had set out to examine.

The purpose of plan discussions, in the case of the quinquennial plans, is to fit the State plans into the overall financial and other framework of the national plan. This is not easily done, for, it is usually preceded by a great deal of hard bargaining, though in the final crunch, as Malenbaum has pointed out, the decision is likely to be 'reasonably close to the centre's position'.¹⁰²

Discussions take place in three stages, as has already been indicated in the course of our description of the process

of plan formulation in education. First, there is a general discussion in which the State representatives, headed by the State Chief Secretary and the members of the Commission reach a broad 'agreement' on the financial dimensions of the plan and the quantum of central assistance that the state is to receive.¹⁰³ This is followed by detailed discussions of the various aspects and sectors of the state's plan in a series of working groups where, as seen earlier, the State's representatives sit together with representatives of the Planning Commission and of the relevant Central Ministries, usually under the chairmanship of the secretary of the Central Ministry most immediately concerned. Lastly, there is another general discussion at the highest level between the Commission and the State where final decisions are taken. In between, there may be sectorwise or even sub-sector-wise informal meetings between officers of the Commission and their counterparts in the state.

According to the present practice, the entire exercise, in the case of one State, does not take more than three days. Commenting on this aspect of State plan discussion, the ARC has said :

The whole process is crammed into three days for each state and two days for each Union Territory, and

is a race against time. Decisions are taken in a great hurry... There is an attempt to cover too wide a ground and in too much of detail... The time and the money spent on the whole exercise are hardly commensurate with the results achieved.¹⁰⁴

Many would contend and, perhaps with some justification, that this is carping criticism, a small complaint about an unimportant matter. After all, once agreement is reached about overall dimensions of a State plan, which is done in the first general meeting, the subsequent operation should generally consist only in matching the priorities of the state plan to national priorities. This should not be difficult, if these priorities are not left 'amorphous', as is perhaps the case all too often,¹⁰⁵ and are clearly defined. In any case, there are limitations to the time that the Planning Commission can be held in virtual siege and the activities of the state and central ministries suspended at the top-most ranks.

What is important, at least from the point of view of the Centre-State relations in planning in general, and in sectoral planning is not the number of days the Centre and the States spend at the conference table during State plan discussions. To accord this undue significance is only yet

another instance of the traditional Indian faith in verbalisation. What is of real importance is what transpires in these discussions and that depends to a great deal on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the central and state teams participating in the discussion.

From the point of view of professional competence, the State team, by and large, is rarely a patch on the central team. This is not a phenomenon peculiar to this country; administrative as well as political competence has a tendency to gravitate towards the centre. "The best politicians", says Lewis, "tend to go to the central parliament, and the best officials tend to work in the Central agencies".¹⁰⁶ In India, where the reward systems at the Centre and in the States are so disparate, this is even more true. That this is only an over-view and needs to be modified in the case of individual States (there may be half a dozen such States, at the outside) does not alter the general picture. In most cases, it is two unequal teams that face each other on the conference table during the State plan discussions.¹⁰⁷

The informational repertoire of the two teams also is widely unequal. By the time plan formulation reaches the stage of state plan discussions, the Planning Commission has a great deal of planning data at its disposal. Through

its Programme Advisers¹⁰⁸ and through a wide network of other formal and informal contacts, it has followed the progress of planning in the States.¹⁰⁹ In the course of its work on the Draft Outline it has greatly added to its information on the States. It has given considerable thought to their resource position, estimated the availability of Central aid and formed a fairly clear idea as to the size and the nature of the plan that each State can reasonably be expected to undertake. The Draft Plans of the States also have been received at the Commission. Its various Divisions have carefully looked into the sectoral plans envisaged in them, have prepared well-considered notes on the important aspects of these sectoral plans and have got together and mastered all the relevant facts. Thus, when the State representatives converge on the Union capital for plan discussion, the Planning Commission is in a position to accord them an appropriate welcome.

The other side on the conference table is not equally well-equipped. A reference has already ^{been} made to the better professional competencies of the Central team. The higher echelons of bureaucracy every where, as it was seen, exhibit a high degree of vertical mobility. State bureaucracies in India are no exception to this so that there is always a

depletion of competence at the State level. The administrative climate in the States is not generally such that the depletion is soon recouped. In comparison to the Centre, therefore, the State usually find themselves saddled with a lower level of administrative competence. What is more, this competence, for reasons into which one need not go here,¹¹⁰ is at its lowest ebb in the area of planning. This is what the ARC had in mind when it observed :

It need hardly be emphasised that the different units of the State Planning Boards would have to be manned by carefully selected personnel capable of formulating well-coordinated and integrated plans. The existing position in this regard is not satisfactory... There is paucity of persons with specialised knowledge or experience of planning.¹¹¹

Nor do the State Teams come to the Union capital adequately equipped with planning information. Such information is sadly lacking in the States. One of the three main factors to which 'defective' State planning was ascribed in the interviews conducted by Nayar in connection with his study was 'the lack of statistical data'.¹¹²

The reports of State plan discussions were not available for this study. But, the investigator was informally able to

sit through the Fourth Plan discussions of two states. These discussions showed how the States, many a time, found themselves in the wrong box due to being weak on facts. One of these two States had postulated a certain rate of increase in enrolment at the first level of education, and had set up an achievement target in enrolment on that basis. The state had perhaps done this on the basis of a global extrapolation of past trends in enrolment at the level. The Education Division of the Planning Commission had not only made a district-wise study of enrolment trends in the State but also a study of the demographic structure of the districts. It transpired from this study that the backlog of non-enrolment in the State at the first level was concentrated in a few districts where the population had a very large tribal component and where the rate of increase in enrolment had been considerably lower than in the State as a whole. The Central team was, therefore, able to show that the enrolment target set up by the State was unrealistic, and the strategy it had evolved for improving the participation rate at the level not articulated to the real problem which was bringing into school the tribal children, some of whom were always on the move. The other State had based its calculations in connection with a project on the basis of a certain pay scale at the relevant level of education. The Planning Commission

records showed that this scale was only 'imaginary' and did not exist in the State. The Commission was ultimately proved right and the State which was supposed to ^{operate} the pay scale had to admit that there had been some mistake, unwitting of course, in calculations! Needless to say, the advantage that the Central team gained out of these and other factual faux pas was persistently pressed home with telling effect on the final outcome of the discussions.

The researcher has not gone here into the political 'strengths' and 'weaknesses' of the State Governments and their bearing on plan discussions. That will require a study in itself. There was, however, occasion a little earlier to refer to an instance of political pull in plan discussions. If a State is politically strong, it may be able to get away with a great deal. Both dissent and conformance may bring 'strength'. A State ruled by a well-entrenched party prone to separatist postures, for example, cannot be taken lightly. It can be over-ruled only when the logic both of available resources and accepted national priorities is on the side of the Centre. But, at the same time, all dissent may not receive the same treatment. Discrimination in plan allocation on political grounds, as is ^{well} known, has been a common complaint with State Governments led by opposition parties. It will be interesting to test some of these hypotheses through careful

case studies. But, this is beyond the scope of this study.

5.9 THE POLICY-OUTPUT : OUTLAYS ON STATE PLANS

The 'policy-output' of plan discussions is reflected in the total outlays on state plans and their sectoral share-out which indicates the priorities. A comparison of the outlays suggested by the States, the outlays recommended by the working groups and the Programme Advisers, and those finally approved by the Planning Commission should give some idea of the direction in which the device of plan discussions operates. The following table¹¹³ makes such a comparison with respect to the Fourth Plan :

Table 5.3 : Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-1974): Outlays Proposed and Approved

		(Rs. in crores)						
Sl. No.	States	Outlays proposed by States	Recommended by Working Groups	Recommended by Prog. Adviser (PA)	Outlays approved in the Draft Plan (April 1969)	Col. (6) as %age to Col. (3)	Final outlays on the basis of Resources (Mar-1970)	Col. (8) as %age to Col. (3)
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	Andhra Pradesh	660.64	651.17	360.00	360.55	54.5	420.50	64
2.	Assam	394.81	260.17	225.53	225.50	57.1	261.75	66
3.	Bihar	493.74	597.60	441.00	441.61	89.4	531.28	108

...cont.

Table 5.3 (contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
4.	Gujarat	565.90	562.58	390.00	450.22	79.5	455.00	80
5.	Haryana	262.00	293.59	190.00	190.49	72.7	225.00	86
6.	Jammu & Kashmir	225.46	184.36	145.00	145.00	64.3	158.40	70
7.	Kerala	466.75	400.21	257.37	258.40	55.3	258.35	55
8.	Madhya Pradesh	552.80	554.34	355.00	355.96	64.3	383.00	69
9.	Maharashtra	1000.22	1030.88	810.97	811.80	81.2	898.12	90
10.	Mysore	440.00	446.15	355.00	327.10	74.3	350.00	80
11.	Nagaland	58.66	42.88	34.00	35.00	59.6	40.00	68
12.	Orissa	321.49	303.22	179.16	180.50	56.1	222.60	69
13.	Punjab	325.00	401.28	250.00	271.40	83.5	293.56	90
14.	Rajasthan	313.00	349.73	236.70	238.96	76.3	302.00	96
15.	Tamil Nadu	623.68	604.82	501.00	502.00	80.5	519.36	83
16.	Uttar Pradesh	1350.00	1235.80	950.00	951.00	70.4	965.00	71
17.	West Bengal	654.74	639.41	324.00	320.51	48.9	322.50	49
Total		8708.89	8558.31	6004.73	6066.00	69.6	6606.42	76

The table shows that except for Bihar, no State was able to secure the outlay it asked for. In one case the outlay approved was as low as 49 per cent of the outlay the State had proposed.

If Bihar is not considered, only 1 State got more than 90 per cent and 5 States more than 80 per cent of the outlay their plans had suggested.

Comparable data on sectoral outlays are not readily available. Such data, apart from confirming the general trend reflected in Table 5.3, would also have shown the change in State priorities effected through plan discussions. The following table,¹¹⁴ which compares the sectoral outlays proposed by Tamil Nadu for its Third Five Year Plan with outlays recommended by the Programme Adviser and the working group, and the outlay approved by the Planning Commission should serve as an illustration.

Table 5.4 : Outlays Proposed and Approved

Third Five Year Plan: Tamil Nadu (Rs. in crores)

Head of Development	Proposed by the State	Proposed by Programme Adviser (P.A.)	Recommended by Working Groups	Finally Approved
1	2	3	4	5
Agricultural Production	10.34	NA	11.07	10.82
Minor Irrigation	17.00	NA	12.80	12.80
Animal Husbandry	4.95	NA	3.52	3.52
Dairying & Milk Supply	3.81	NA	2.75	2.75
Forests	3.20	NA	2.12	2.12
Soil Conservation	3.83	NA	2.75	2.50
Fisheries	3.62	NA	2.22	2.22
Marketing & Warehousing	2.75	NA	0.25	0.25
TOTAL	49.50	35.48	37.48	36.89

cont...

Table 5.4 (contd.)

	1	2	3	4	5
Cooperation		2.54	3.75*	4.71*	4.71*
Community Development		26.00	20.00	20.47	20.47
Total		28.54	23.75	25.18	25.18
Irrigation		40.00	27.00	27.42	27.42
Power		118.10	100.00	100.19	100.19
Total		158.10	127.00	127.61	127.61
Large & Medium Industry		10.00	4.00	3.35	3.35
Village & Small Industries		28.17	19.50	20.16	20.16
Total		38.17	23.50	23.51	23.51
Roads		13.77	10.00	11.00	11.00
Tourism		0.40	10.00	0.25	0.25
Total		14.17	10.00	11.25	11.25
GENERAL EDUCATION		35.03	24.00	25.43	25.43
TECHNICAL EDUCATION		9.17	6.00	6.73	6.43
HEALTH		30.92	20.00	19.00	29.50
Housing & Urban Development		13.56	7.00	7.00	7.00
Welfare of Backward Classes		15.85	4.00	2.76	3.26
Social Welfare		0.84	0.84	0.52	0.52
Labour & Labour Welfare		2.91	1.50	1.33	1.33
Total		108.28	66.34	64.77	65.77
Statistics		00.30		0.24	0.24
Publicity		0.56	2.50	0.35	0.35
Aid Local Bodies		0.77	1.20	-	-
Total		2.06	2.50	0.59	0.59
Grand Total		398.82	288.34	290.39	290.89

N.A. = Not available.

* Includes provision for Marketing and Warehousing

The State, as the table shows, had asked for a total outlay of Rs.398.82 crores, but it was able to get only 290.89 crores. There is, however, no significant change in the priorities of the state. The percentage of cut in the outlay on education is only slightly higher than that in the total outlay proposed by the State. This is unusual, for, the axe, when it comes, is generally harsher on education and other items under the developmental head 'social services'. It must, however, be remembered that Tamil Nadu, for various reasons, some of which must be clear from the foregoing discussion, is not a 'typical' state. Apart from everything else, the state is, as Hanson has rightly pointed out, one of the 'better-planned' ones in the country.¹¹⁵ Similar data on other states, however, is not easily available.

5.10 CONCLUSION

The question regarding the position regarding Centre-State relations in educational planning in India can now be answered. The answer, however, unpalatable this may be to many students of education seems to be this: the Centre is the fons et origo, the very fountain and source of that planning.¹¹⁶ This is indeed true about all planning in the country. Gadgil put it mildly when he said: "There is little

independent thinking exercised in relation to this (planning) in the States."¹¹⁷ Many would go to the extent of suggesting that planning 'has deprived the division of legislative power between the centre and the state of all reality'.¹¹⁸

Central influence on planning in education at the State level starts at the very beginning of the process of plan formulation - the working out of the global framework of the ensuing plan. It works towards its stifling end of conformity through the working groups whose schemes are, as Barve put it, often 'doctored',¹¹⁹ and through plan discussions where the dices are highly loaded.

It may not be out of place here to add that this centralisation in planning in India is in strange contrast with some other planning countries which ideologically, one would expect, should be more prone to centralisation. Among the East European countries, decentralisation has been firmly established in Yugoslavia. This country, in fact, has been for some time now an ardent champion of decentralisation. Poland, since 1956, has also introduced a large measure of decentralisation in planning and administration. But, the Russian case, in many ways, would be the one the most relevant to India. With the developments in the post-Stalin era,

Russia to-day has more than a hundred planning regions.¹²⁰

In the next chapter, the Centre-State consultative machinery in education will be critically examined. This will be with a view to obtaining^a fuller picture of the Centre-State relationship in educational planning.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 H.K. Paranjape, "Centre-State Relations in Planning", The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol.XVI, No.1, January-March, 1970, p.47.
- 2 The researcher have had occasion to refer in detail to this diversity in another chapter. See Chapter III, "The Indian Constitution and the Constitutional Basis of Centre-State Relations in India", passim.
- 3 There have indeed been frequent suggestions to the effect that federalism hampers national planning. (See A.H.Hanson, The Process of Planning: A Study of India's Five Year Plan 1950-64), London, Oxford University Press, p.15.) But, obviously, this is a problem that does not admit of any doctrinaire approach. The planning process in a federation and problems be setting it depend upon the 'balance of authority' in the federation. This balance is largely a function of the political culture, the political system and the chosen mode of economic development (On this point, see Iqbal Narain and Arvind K. Sharma "Balance of Administrative Authority in a Dual Polity: The Case of Food Administration in India", Indian Journal of Public Administration; Vol.XVI, No.3, July-Sept.1970, p.296). The relation between the three, however, are complex and our knowledge of it meagre. A useful advance towards hypotheses in the area is made by Prof. David E.Apter in his widely discussed essay, "System, Process and Politics of Economic Development" (See Bert F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore (Ed.) Industrialisation and Society, 1963, The Hague ; Also see David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations" in ...

Clifford Geertz (Ed.), Old Societies and New States, 1971, New Delhi, Amerind Publishing Company).

- 4 There were nine minutes of dissent. The main report ran into 26 pages. The minutes of dissent, collectively, were shorter only by 3 pages! See Ministry of Education, Government of India, Report of the Committee of Members of Parliament on Education, 1967.
- 5 See Ministry of Education, Government of India, National Policy on Education, 1968.
- 6 K. Santhanam, Union-State Relations in India, 1963, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, p.44.
- 7 Article 37. The Administrative Reforms Commission has cited this to argue that 'the Central Government cannot.. itself of the overall responsibility for seeing that the divest/relevant constitutional provisions are observed' and, therefore, for planning, See Report on the Machinery of Planning, p.27.
- 8 Article 38.
- 9 For a detailed reference to some of these Articles, see Trilok N. Dhar, The Politics of Manpower Planning, 1974, Calcutta, Minerva Associates (Publications) Pvt. Ltd., pp.74-76.
- 10 The Administrative Reforms Commission, Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relations,^{hips} New Delhi, p.91.
- 11 This, of course, is no guarantee that such conflicts cannot occur. The factors for conflict not arising so far has to be sought in the economic and political situation that has prevailed in the country. For a brief reference to them, see Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relations,^{hips} loc. cit.
- 12 K. Santhanam, op.cit., p.45.

- 13 This is embodied in Article 254 of the constitution. The Article reads in parts: "If any provision of a law made by the legislature of a state is repugnant to... any provision of any existing law with respect of one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then... the law made by Parliament... shall prevail..."
- 14 See Chapter IV: "Centre-State Financial Relations in Education", Passim.
- 15 Agriculture is another important state field where this has happened. For an interesting study of the phenomenon in agriculture, see P.S. Puri, "Union-State Relationship in Agricultural Administration", The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol.XVI, No.3, July-Sept.,1970, pp.333-340.
- 16 A.H. Hanson, op.cit., p.348.
- 17 On the 'logical priority' of macro-planning, see A.H.Hanson, Planning and the Politicians and Other Essays, 1969, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p.193.
- 18 Planning Commission, The Planning Process, 1963, New Delhi, p.27.
- 19 ^{were seen} Instances of this/in an earlier chapter
See Chapter IV: Centre-State Financial Relations in Education, passim.
- 20 For an account, though not very satisfactory, of the changes, see H.K. Paranjape, The Reorganised Planning Commission: A Study in the Implementation of Administrative Reforms, 1970, New Delhi, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, pp.33-35.
- 21 See Report on the Machinery for Planning, p.4.
- 22 For a succinct yet lucid account of the process, see

Planning Commission, op.cit. For a critical evaluation of the process by an authoritative body, see Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on Machinery for Planning, op.cit. There is hardly any study of the process with focus on educational planning. T.N. Dhar has a chapter on 'The Process of Educational Planning' (Trilok N. Dhar, op.cit., pp.112-135). But his concern mainly is higher education.

- 23 The Administrative Reforms Commission identifies four stages in plan formulation in India (See Report on Machinery for Planning, op.cit., p.4). It is interesting to compare these with the stages in planning postulated by Jan Tinbergen. Tinbergen, in his Central Planning (1964, New Haven, Yale University Press, pp.88-89) identifies four stages of plan formulation - the macro stage, the sector stage, the project stage and the final stage. He, however, modifies his categories slightly in a later work (Development Planning, 1967, New York, McGraw-Hill, p.76) and reduces the stages in plan formulation into three: the macro phase, the middle phase and the micro phase.
- 24 Report on the Machinery for Planning, op.cit., p.13.
- 25 Thus, in relation to the Third Plan, apart from a panel of economists and another of scientists, there were panels on the following: agriculture, land reform, education, health, housing and social welfare. There were working groups to study financial resources, agriculture, irrigation, power, steel, fuel, general education, technical education, scientific research, health and family planning, housing, and urban and rural planning, and the welfare of the backward classes. See Planning Commission, op.cit., p.45.

- 26 Ibid. This strategy of pooling experience and expertise and of associating those who are responsible for plan implementation with planning is a widely accepted one. Lewis, for example, is one of its advocates. See W.Arthur Lewis, Development Planning, 1966, London George Allen and Unwin Ltd., p.246.
- 27 The Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on the Planning Machinery, op.cit., p.4.
- 28 The Planning Commission, op.cit., p.46. See also, Trilok N. Dhar, op.cit., p.114.
- 29 Planning Commission, loc.cit.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on the Planning Machinery, op.cit., p.5.
- 32 Planning Commission, op.cit., p.47.
- 33 For the introduction of the practice of annual planning, see H.K. Paranjape, the Planning Commission: a Descriptive Account, 1964, New Delhi, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, pp.51-53.
- 34 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on the Planning Machinery ^{for planning,} op.cit., p.5.
- 35 Ibid, p.21. Also, Planning Commission, oppcit., p.51.
- 36 The guidelines for the Annual Plan of 1976-77, for example, says:

The economy is showing signs of stabilities (sic) but it is too early to assess resources for 1976-77. For the purpose of this exercise, however, it may be assumed that the total annual outlay is likely to be of the same order as for 1976-76 (D.O.No. PG(P)2/75 dates September 30, 1975)

- 37 These are time-consuming. Apart from preparing the plan (a large number of copies of which are usually asked for), the States have also to be ready with the 'data base' which is filled into several performance that usually accompany the guidelines.
- 38 A State legislature discusses the Annual Plan only after it has been incorporated into the State budget.
- 39 For a fuller account of State planning, see P.K.B.Nayar, Leadership, Bureaucracy and Planning in India, 1969, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, pp.24-34.
- 40 For a brief discussion on the process of formulating sectoral plans in general, see Planning Commission, op.cit., pp.30-35. This publication is now more than a decade old, but there has not been any substantive change in the process of sectoral planning during this period. The discussion also makes a specific reference to the bases of establishing targets in the fields of technical and professional education and general education.
- 41 It may not be out of place to mention here that the process that we have tried to delineate relate, in the main, to programmes of development undertaken by the central and state governments. This is because the Indian plan is not comprehensive in the sense that every sector of development is planned in detail, a point that the Planning Commission itself emphasises (See Planning Commission, op.cit., p.15). This is true about education also. The only 'planning' that is done with respect to the private sector in education consists in extrapolating, on the basis of past trends, the financial contribution that non-government sources will make to educational expenditure (See Trilok N. Dhar, op.cit., p.133n). Educational plans also do not include educational

activities undertaken by the central and state governments outside the ministries of education. (Some idea of the extensiveness of such activities can be had from: Ministry of Education, Government of India, Educational Activities of the Government of India, 1963, New Delhi)

- 42 Planning Commission, op.cit., pp.33-34.
- 43 Partial because, apart from the inhibiting factors specific to the Indian case, a thorough exercise in manpower planning is not easy. Manpower planning entails an extrapolation of a sectoral distribution of the economy and calculating back from this the skill requirements ahead. This sounds a very attractive and plausible strategy, but the difficulties besetting it are obvious. (For these difficulties, see John Vaizey, Education in the Modern World, 1967, London, World University Library, pp.60-61, and, Trilok N. Dhar, op.cit., pp.39-48)
- 44 Other institutions which have done valuable work in the field of manpower forecast in India are: The Planning Unit of the Indian Statistical Institute, ^{The} Perspective Planning Division of the Planning Commission and the Unit for Economic and Statistical Studies on Higher Education of the London School of Economics.
- 45 What the only reference to education in the Fifth Five Year Plan approach paper says is illustrative of this :

The constitutional directive is that children upto the age 14 should be provided with free and compulsory education within a period of ten years of the commencement of the Constitution. That date was passed in January 1960... The problem being basic to our objective of creating a socialistic society,

special attention will be required for devising a set of measures that will improve enrolment and reduce wastage at all levels.

See Planning Commission, Towards Self-Reliance: Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan (2), 1972, New Delhi, pp.9-10.

- 46 Government of West Bengal, Development and Planning Department, Preliminary Memorandum on the Fourth Five Year Plan, 1965, Calcutta, p.5.
- 47 See Order No.17/5/71-Edu., Education Division, Planning Commission, dated 11th February, 1972.
48. In the case of the Fifth Plan, the terms of reference of the groups were :
- (1) To take stock of the position as is likely to be reached by the end of the Fourth Plan; to identify bottlenecks and to suggest remedial measures.
 - (2) To suggest a perspective of development from 1973-74 to 1988-89 in the light of the overall development envisaged in the Fourth Plan.
 - (3) To formulate proposals for the Fifth Plan in the light of the perspective indicating priorities, policies and financial costs.

See order cited at footnote 47, para 2.

- 49 As illustration, an analysis of the membership of the Steering Group on Education of the Fifth Plan is interesting. It had twenty members. Of these fourteen were senior officers of the Government of India including three from the Planning Commission. From among the non-officials, one headed a working group- the one on Adult and out-of-School Education (perhaps because the Directorate of Adult Education in the central Ministry of Education happened to be

headed by a junior officer of the level of a Deputy Secretary).

The chairman of the group was Dr. Mohan Singh Mehta the president of the Indian Association of Adult Education and a retired vice-Chancellor.

- 50 The text of the guidelines for the Fifth Plan in education runs into 23 foolscap pages of typed material and a six-page summary giving 'Points Needing Emphasis under each sub-head'. There is no educational programme it does not touch upon. (See Letter No.PC(P) 1(5)1/72, Education Division, Planning Commission, dated April 21, 1973).
- 51 In the data-base for the Fifth Plan information on the following was asked for: (i) Enrolment (Level-wise for boys and girls and with participation rates for relevant age-groups; At the collegiate level, subject-wise enrolment and enrolment in correspondence courses); (ii) Teachers (Number level-wise, sex-wise and at the collegiate level institution-wise); (iii) Institutions (Number level-wise; Teacher Training institutions with intake and output); (iv) Technical education (Number level-wise; intake and output; details about faculty development programmes); and (v) Progress of expenditure on Education in the Fourth Five Year Plan (Year-wise and sub-head-wise). (See annexures to letter cited at footnote 50)
- 52 Report of the Team, op.cit., p.91.
- 53 Government of Tamil Nadu, Report of the Centre-State Relations Enquiry Committee, 1971, pp.107-108.
- 54 This brain drain problem is a fall-out of any large-scale central scheme irrespective of whether they are located in a state or in the capital. The National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi, is a good example.

In the early sixties when the N.C.E.R.T. was established, there was a veritable exodus of educational competence from the states and many states, particularly those in the northern region, felt the pinch. With increasing mobility and the 'work force' becoming national in character, the problem is only likely to aggravate.

- 55 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relations,^{nips} 1968, p.100.
- 56 It is also reflected in a recent book published by him. see B.S. Minhas, Planning and the Poor, New Delhi, Chand & Co., passim.
- 57 Dr. Minhas, it is well known, was the most influential member of the Planning Commission during this period. He had the patronage and confidence of Shri C.Subramanyam Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission at the time. Both were votaries of what, among economists, is known as the 'new economies'.
- 58 Government of India, Planning Commission, Towards self-Reliance: Approach to the Fifth Plan, p.3.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Economist, "Clash Between Two View points", Mainstream, January 5, 1974, p.13.
- 61 Government of India, Report of the Finance Commission, 1974, p.21.
- 62 Government of India, Planning Commission, Approach to the Fifth Plan, 1974-79, p.1.
- 63 Ministry of Education and Social Welfare^l, Government of India, Proposals for the Development of Education and Culture in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79), p.113.

- 64 A personal communication (dated 11th November, 1975) from the Joint Director (Education), Education Division, Planning Commission, to the present researcher says: "The final allocations approved by the Planning Commission tentatively for the Fifth Plan are Rs.16782.77 crores for the total plan, and Rs.1226 crores for education Programmes. These are state allocations. We have not been able to get the draft proposals of the Central Ministries."
- 65 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations (abridged by Seth S. King), 1974, London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, p.363.
- 66 In institution-building models, like the one developed by Milton J. Easman and Hans C. Blaise at the University of Pittsburg, the term 'linkage' is sometimes used in a special sense. It is used in its common connotation here. But, the term in its special sense has values even in the context of our present discussion. For an explication of the term and connected concepts, see P.K.B. Nayar, Leadership, Bureaucracy and Planning in India, 1969, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, pp.152-157.
- 67 For a brief account of the origin and constitution of the NDC, see H.K. Paranjape, "Centre-State Relations in Planning" in S.N. Jain et al (Ed.), The Union and the States, 1972, Delhi, National, pp.210-211.
- 68 Government of India Resolution (Cabinet Secretariat), No.65/15/CP-67, dated October 7, 1967. This resolution redefined the functions of the NDC following acceptance of the recommendations of the ARC in this regard by the government.
- 69 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report of the Study

- hips
- Team on Centre-State Relations, op.cit., About the increasing influence of the Council there seems to be general agreement, See, for instance, A.H. Hanson, op.cit., p.61.
- 70 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relations, op.cit., p.103.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 The Team has documented its observation which makes interesting reading. In one of its appendices (appendix 17) it shows how, faced with the gap between the expenditure and taxation for the Third Plan and with specific proposals for bridging it, the Council tended not to confront them squarely and preferred to prevaricate. The National Plan was approved without any clearly agreed national policy on the fiscal measures required to underpin it.
- 73 D.R. Gadgil, op.cit., p.299.
- 74 See Shriram Maheshwari, "The Centre-State Consultative Machinery in India", The Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol.XVI, No.3, July-Sept., 1970, p.440.
- 74a Report of the Team, op.cit., p.105. See also Appendix 18.
- 75 One is reminded here of the controversial Dr. Minhas, who is not exactly an 'outside' observer. Writing about the Council's meeting on the 8th and 9th of December, 1973, held to consider the Draft Fifth Plan approved by the central cabinet, Dr. Minhas exclaims as if in exasperation: 'How right was the Chief Minister who is reported to have said at this meeting that the economists might differ but 'we always approve the Plan'. ".B.S. Minhas, op.cit., p.xv.
- It is obvious however, that dissent will ultimately enter the NDC, making it, perhaps, a more effective partner

in plan formulation. The first instance of such dissent was witnessed towards the end of the last decade when the Draft Fourth Plan was being discussed. EMS Namboodiripad from Kerala and Ajoy Mukerji and Jyoti Basu from West Bengal put forward alternatives to policies for development suggested by the Draft. The latter could not, again for the first time in its history, secure the unanimous approval of the NDC. See Times of India, New Delhi, April 20 and 21, 1969.

76 A.H. Hanson, op.cit., p.355.

77 Comparing the report of the working group in education appointed by Maharashtra for the Third Plan with the reports of ^{the state} working groups in other sectors, Hanson says: "Slightly more moderate in its demands, the Education Group nevertheless proposed schemes costing exactly three times the Second Plan outlays; it did, however, produce a sensible and reasoned list of priorities". (Ibid, p.360) As a footnote to this, one might add that 'Maharashtra is one of the few states in the country which has taken educational planning seriously and developed considerable expertise in the field. In the mid-sixties, the state prepared an excellent report on educational development in the state from 1950-51 to 1965-66, based on extensive statistical information, with the purpose of providing a comprehensive base for planning for future educational development. The state followed this up, in 1968, with the publication of a White Paper which outlined the broad policies that would direct that development. These were steps that were later to be recommended to all states by the Working Party on Educational Planning, Administration and Evaluation. See Government of India, Planning Commission, Report of the Working Party on

Educational Planning, Administration and Evaluation;
Educational Planning, Administration and Evaluation in
Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74), p.29.

- 78 Report, op.cit., pp.13-14.
- 79 Hanson who made a case study of the Third Plan working groups of Maharashtra reached the conclusion: "In general the groups did not meet frequently enough to enable them to do much original or detailed work". A.H.Hanson, op.cit., p.357.
- 80 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on Machinery for Planning, op.cit., p.13.
- 81 A light-hearted, yet meaningful, neologism from Professor V.V. John, which in more than one way seem to describe aptly the 'work style' of the working groups. See V.V. John, "Bane of Committee Culture: How Educational Reforms are stiffed", Times of India, New Delhi, October 8, 1975.
- 82 W. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy, 1966, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., p.246.
- 83 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on Machinery for Planning, op.cit., p.14.
- 84 Ibid.
- 85 The states are conscious of the inadequacy of the recommendation of the ARC. A high-ranking official from Kerala, ruled by a coalition government which also includes the Congress, suggested, in the course of a discussion, that at least fifty percent of the members of the working groups in state subjects should be from the states.

- 86 The table has been tabulated on the basis of information provided in Order No.17/5/71-Edu., Government of India, Planning Commission (Education Division) dated 11th February 1972.
- 87 Entries 12 and 33, for example. These entries say: 12. Libraries, museums, and other similar institutions controlled or financed by the State; ancient and historical monuments and records other than those declared by or under law made by Parliament to be of national importance. 33. Theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of List I; sports, entertainments and amusements.
- 88 Tabulated on the basis of the document cited at footnote 86.
- 89 Report on Machinery for Planning, p.14.
- 90 A.H. Hanson, op.cit., p.357.
- 91 See Report, p.14.
- 92 See A.H. Hanson, op.cit., p.362.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 See D.R. Gadgil, op.cit., p.212. In the course of a tour together of Maharashtra, in the latter months of 1970, along with a team of educationists under a programme sponsored by the Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, ^{New Delhi,} /to which he was then attached, the present investigator had occasion to broach this problem with a state Joint Secretary of Education who has now risen to be the Secretary of Education in his State. In the Chester-tonian vein typical of him, the Joint Secretary said:

"I cannot accuse at least my State of wasting any precious time on the formulation of plan schemes. We import them cheap from the union capital"!

96 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relationships, p.135.

97 P.K.B. Nayar, op.cit., pp.91-92.

98 Report, loc.cit.

99 Speaking about the resources position, the draft Fourth Plan of West Bengal says: "... The indications from the Planning Commission are no less indeterminate. All that they have said is that the Central assistance is not expected to go beyond existing levels and attempt to obtain a clarification has not been successful". See Government of West Bengal, Development and Planning Department, Draft Fourth Five Year Plan Proposals, Calcutta, 1968 (mimeographed), pp.I-II.

The National Seminar on Educational Planning and Administration (held in Srinagar in June 1967) considered this failure of the centre to indicate to the states the resources position early enough in the course of plan formulation 'the greatest difficulty in formulating educational plans'. See Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, Final Report of the National Seminar on Educational Planning and Administration, 1967, New Delhi, p.13.

100 Economist, Editorial, Mainstream, January 5, 1974, p.14.

A.H.
101 Hanson, op.cit., p.361. Paranjape says in the same connection: 'Apart from regional pressures, sectoral pressures tended to inflate the size of State Plans. In subjects like

- community development, education, health and social welfare, the concerned Central Ministries suggested programmes and schemes to the states which tended to unduly inflate the proposed State outlays in these sectors". H.K. Paranjape, "Centre-State Relations in Planning", op.cit., p.51.
- 102 Wilfred Malenbaum, "Who Does the Planning", in R.L. Park and I.Tinker (Ed.), Leadership and Political Institutions in India, 1959, princeton, p.305.
- 103 In this meeting and the agreement it leads to, the views of the Programme Adviser concerned, who also attends the meeting, have an almost determinative weight.
- 104 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on Machinery for Planning, op.cit., p.21. See also Government of India Planning Commission, Report of the Working Party on Educational Planning, Administration and Evaluation, op.cit., p.8; and Final Report on the National Seminar on Educational Planning and Administration, op.cit., p.13.
- 105 See D.R. Gadgil, 'Planning Without A Policy Frame', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.II, Nos.3,4, and 5 (Annual Number), February 1967, pp.253-264. Gadgil contends that the outstanding feature of the 'planned' Indian economy has been the total absence of a policy frame, which basically is a 'system' of priorities.
- 106 W. Arthur Lewis, op.cit., p.253. Having made it to the Centre, the Central personnel have also greater opportunities of sharpening their conferencing skills through wide Centre-State and international contacts.

- 107 Interestingly enough, professional competence of a state service, may not always be matched by the political weight of the State Government, so that the performance of a state team on the conference table may sometimes become irrelevant to the outcome of plan discussions. Hanson's sympathetic study of the performance of the Madras Team during the Third Plan discussions is interesting from this point of view. (See A.H. Hanson, op.cit., 366-69). In contrast is the case (reported to the investigator by a high-ranking official of the Education Division of the Planning Commission) of the North Indian State, a next door neighbour to the capital city, which was not able to get its pet scheme of a sports school approved by the working groups during the Fifth Plan discussions. But, in the Final meeting, the Chief Minister of the State, who is known to be close to the Prime Minister had only to broach the question of the school before it was approved!
- 108 In its letter of Oct 3, 1962 (PCCP) 2/62 the Commission said: "The Commission is arranging for its Programme Administration Advisers to visit the states with which they are concerned for preliminary discussions and exchange of views in advance of the discussions on the Annual Plan. On matters requiring special attention, State Planning Secretaries may communicate with the Programme Administration Advisers at an early date". Cited by A.H.Hanson, op.cit., p.265.
- 109 Almost every State has a liason office in New Delhi, generally headed by a fairly senior officer. Not one of these offices that the investigator contacted could supply him with a copy of the Five Year Plan of the state which it represented. He was able to get several of the State plans in the Planning Commission.

- 110 For some reasons of a general nature, see P.K.B. Nayar, op.cit., pp.1-3.
- 111 Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on the Machinery for Planning, op.cit., pp.46-47.
- 112 P.K.B. Nayar, op.cit., p.95.
- 113 Source : Programme Administration Division, Planning Commission.
- 114 A.H.Hanson, op.cit., p.367 (appropriately modified).
- 115 A.H.Hanson, op.cit., p.371.
- 116 Centralisation of educational planning is not peculiar to India. In a survey of nine Asian countries made by the Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration New Delhi, it was found that most of the countries studied had a highly centralised system of educational planning. The countries surveyed, however, are not comparable to India in their political structure, size or socio-cultural plurality. See Veda Prakasha, "Shifting Emphasis in Education from Planning to Plan Implementation", Educational Planning and Management, 1972, New Delhi, Asian Institute of Educational Planning and Administration (mimeographed), p.249.
- 117 D.R. Gadgil, op.cit., p.235.
- 118 See, for example, Dr. Bimanbehari Majumdar, "A Study of the Use of Union Powers to Influence the State Governments", paper presented at the Seminar on Union-State Relations in India (May 18-31, 1969) organised by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study (Typescript).
- 119 S.G. Barve, With Malice Towards None, 1962, London, p.210.
- 120 D.R. Gadgil, op.cit., p.214.