

Chapter 4

Discussing Philosophical semantics depicted in Raghunatha's

Ākhyātavāda

In the study of philosophical semantics, topics like *Verbal cognition*, and meaning of the verbal forms were interesting topics among epistemologists. ‘What is the exact meaning of the forms’ like *gacchati*, *pacyate*, *gamyate* etc. was a debatable issue, particularly amongst Vaiyākaraṇā (Grammarians), Mīmāṃsakās (Ritualists) and Naiyāyikās (logicians). Henceforth, both the words of these scholars have been used. This contended issue was phenomenally handled by all the scholars from the period of the 5th century to the 17th century AD.

Bhartṛhari, Kumārila bhaṭṭa, Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, Nāgeśa, Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa, Jagadīśa tarkālaṃkāra and several such scholars have immensely contributed in the field of philosophical semantics.

Raghunātha śiromaṇi is one of them who greatly participated in discussing and concluding the thoughts upon the meaning of the verbal suffixes *mukhyaviśeṣya*; chief substantive in verbal cognition. His text named *Ākhyātavāda* deals with the old Naiyāyikās view. He also supports Navya Naiyāyikās view if the old view becomes inconclusive. While establishing the Naiyāyikās view Raghunātha śiromaṇi also refutes Vaiyākaraṇā’s and Mīmāṃsakās views sometimes.

The study of *Ākhyātavāda* reveals the studies around the concepts of *Knowledge* reflected in Indian philosophy. While studying *Ākhyātavāda* in detail all the argumentation around the *meaning of the verbal suffixes* had been studied.

While studying this, the relevant subjects like *concepts of a word and sentence* according to the above-stated three schools, *Nature of the verbal cognition*, *Process of the verbal cognition*, and lastly the *Chief substantive in verbal cognition* were surveyed in this research.

Linguistic development has two different stages in respect to the notion of ‘Word’ In Sanskrit. The concepts like *śabda* and *pada* represent this above-said development. The notorious and great sage Pāṇini in his *magnum opus* work i.e. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* mentions *pada* as ‘सुप्तिङन्तम्’¹ which means *pada* is that which ends with conjugational suffixes; *tiñ* and there is a saying that, non-inflected conjugational word can not be used in the language, अपदं न प्रयुञ्जीत। In short only conjugated or inflected stems can take a place in the use of the language and not the nominal base word.

Inflected units; *subanta* and *tinanta* have the value to become a syntactical unit in the language and mere base words without having inflections can not stand as a syntactical unit and hence can not be capable of conveying any valid idea in the language. This inflected unit is recognized as the means of cognition or knowledge. Here are some glimpses about the nature of knowledge and types of knowledge intended by the Indian philosophical systems to understand the concepts like chief substantive in verbal cognition as discussed in *Ākhyātavāda*.

Nature of the knowledge-

The simple definition of knowledge can be ‘awareness’ or ‘comprehension’ of objects. The object which is to be cognised can be a thing or a quality of the thing, action or emotion. When things become objects of knowledge they are revealed to us or manifest to us. The feeling ‘I am

¹ Pāṇini, and Śrīśa Chandra Vasu. *The Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Motilal Banarsidass, 1988. On sutra no. 1.4.14, p.35

knowing' can be termed as 'knowledge'. Property of manifestation which belongs to one's own self with the help of luminous light of knowledge. We comprehend the surrounding things very clearly. Hence knowledge (*Jñāna, Buddhī*) is regarded as the ground of the behaviour of a living being.

- According to Nyāya knowledge is the attribute of one's self
- Sāṃkhya and Yoga admit that knowledge as a 'substantive mode' (वृत्ति) of the material principle.
- Mīmāṃsā and Bauddha systems admit knowledge as an activity.

'But knowledge can not be the quality of any material substance, since unlike that it does not admit of external perception. Physical properties are perceived by the external senses, but knowledge is not so perceived. Being thus fundamentally different from all physical qualities, knowledge is to be regarded as the property of an immaterial substance called Soul. Still knowledge is not an essential attribute of the soul. The soul has acquired this property in its bodily setting i.e. in relation to the body.²

Two broad divisions of knowledge -

- **Valid knowledge and Invalid knowledge-**

² Chatterjee, Satischandra. *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, 2008. pp.12-15

‘Knowledge in its strict sense, means a true belief that carries with it an assurance of its truth’³

The word knowledge has been used in both the senses are narrow and wide. The Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika school takes the word knowledge widely. They have made a distinction between true and false knowledge. Here it is proposed to use the phrase *pramā* for valid knowledge and *Apramā* for invalid knowledge. *Pramā* has been defined by the Nyāya as true presentational knowledge (*yathārthānubhava*). It is definite and an assured (*asandigdha*) cognition of an object, which is also true and presentational in character.⁷⁴ This *Pramā*; valid knowledge keeps out all kinds of invalid knowledge i.e. Doubt, Error, Hypothetical argument, etc. Memory is also considered as invalid knowledge because it is not presentational knowledge which was mentioned above.

Rest cognitions or knowledge are excluded as they are not perceived as assured and definite cognitions. So, *Pramā* should have certainty or assuredness, truthfulness and representativeness so far.

To say more correctly *Pramā* is to know the things as they are. To know the things correctly is to know the things as characterised by what is a characteristic of it.

Categorisation of valid knowledge-

³ Russell, Bertrand. *The Problems of Philosophy*. Hilltop Publications, 2023. p.217

⁴ Chatterjee, Satischandra. *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, 2008. p. 54.

Nyāya school of philosophy has considered four valid knowledge i.e. *pratyakṣa* (Perception), *anumiti* (Inference), *upamiti* (Comparison), *śābda* (Verbal cognition).

Perceptual knowledge is seeing or experiencing something and that experience will be valid if it wouldn't vary or doesn't contradict. The literal meaning of the word *pratyakṣa* is 'that object which is before one's eye.'

Perception

‘इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्।’⁵

Perception is that knowledge which arises from the contact of the sense organs with objects in the external world and which is not contradicted by words and the knowledge gained is certain. Basically perception is the knowledge which should be non-erroneous.

Inference-

‘The Nyāya system defines *Anumāna* as knowledge of direct objects derived not by direct observation but by means of the knowledge of a *Linga* or a sign and that is connected with the inferred object by a universal relationship called *Vyapti*.’⁶

⁵ Annambhaṭṭa, and Chandrasekhara S. Sastrigal. *Tarkasamgraha: With Nyayabodhini, Vakyavritti, Nirukti and Pattabhiramatippani, Tarkasangrahaddeepika, Nilakanthaprasika, Ramarudriya, Nrisimhaprasika and Pattabhiramaprasika*. The Sri Balamanorama Press, 1920. p-65

⁶Chatterjee, Satischandra. *Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*. Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, 2008. p.254

Anumāna by its name suggests that it arises from something middle term called *līnga*; similarly, it is connected with a Major term i.e. *Sādhyā*. Universal relation is the nerve of this Inference.

The presence of *līnga* in major terms or in *Sādhyā* is considered as *Pakṣadharmatā*. When the knowledge gained as *Pakṣadharmatā* is qualified as universal relation; *vyāpti*, then it is called *parāmarśa*. Annambhaṭṭa in his text tarkasaṅgraha says ‘व्याप्तिविशिष्ट पक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः।’⁷

Inference is nothing but the knowledge gained by *parāmarśa*. The universal relation is nothing but the connection of a *Līnga* and a *Sādhyā*. In, famous examples like ‘पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात्’⁸ i.e. Hill has a fire because of the smoke, as we know that smoke has a universal relation with fire. If we see smoke on the hill then we conclude that there must be fire. From the existence of the smoke on the hill which is qualified by the universal relation with fire as wherever there is smoke, there is a fire we try to infer if it is having smoke the fire must have existed on the hill.

Therefore, *Anumāna* or inference is knowledge gained by some sign or mark about a thing that has certain characteristics. Hence one might say that *Anumāna* knowledge presupposes other cognition i.e. *pratyakṣa*. All systems of Indian Philosophy agree in holding that *Anumāna* is a process of arriving at truth not by direct observation but by the means of knowledge of *vyāpti* or ‘the universal relation between two things.’ Both Perception and Inference are equally valid methods of knowledge. The major difference between the two is that perception is independent and inference depends on previous perception. When we observe two things that are always related; that is from a perception of one we infer another one.

⁷ Annambhaṭṭa, and Chandrasekhara S. Sastrigal, p.75

⁸ *ibid.*p.78

Comparison-

The word *upamāna* means ‘ the knowledge of the similarity’ which comes from the word *upa* meaning *sādrśya* or Similarity. And *māna* means a source of cognition. Annambhaṭṭa’s *Tarkasaṅgraha* gives the definition as ‘संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धज्ञानम् उपमितिः’⁹

Basically *upamāna* is the source of knowledge about the relation between a word and its meaning. When we are first told by some person that a particular word denotes the class of objects and these objects have some peculiar description. When we find some objects with that description we recognize those objects with that word easily. When a man goes to the forest not knowing what an ox is. He may be told by some forester that it is an animal like a cow. He then goes to the forest and sees some animal and recognizes it as an ox.

Analysing the process of reasoning in *upamāna* we get the following steps.

- We have an authoritative statement *atideśavākya* that a word denotes objects of a certain description, e.g. ‘the Gavaya is like the cow’
- Secondly when one observes any such object he has the knowledge that it answers to the given description *sādrśyadhīh*.
- Thirdly there is a recollection of the descriptive statement received from authority *vākyārthasmṛtī*.

⁹ *ibid*.p.82

□ Lastly, there is the resulting knowledge that this kind of object is denoted by the word in question.

Verbal cognition -

Linguistic development has two different stages with respect to the notion of śabda or word and the sentence or vākya in Sanskrit. The knowledge generated by this word or śabda is known as śābda or śābdabodha i.e. *verbal testimony or verbal cognition*. For a valid verbal testimony or valid verbal cognition ‘a sentence of a trustworthy person is the primary thing.’ ‘आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः।’¹⁰

A word is that which has signifying power i.e. *śakti*. ‘अस्मात् पदात् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्यः इति ईश्वरेच्छा शक्तिः’.¹¹ These words can be means of knowledge which are uttered by the trustworthy person, who is having the knowledge of objects which will be helpful to the listeners to decide what is beneficial and what is harmful. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the understanding of the other person.

¹⁰ Annambhaṭṭa, and Balwant Narhar Bahulikar. *Taraka-Sangraha of Annambhatta: A Compendium of Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy with the Author's Dipika, an English Translation and Notes*. Gungadhar N. Bahulikar, 1903, p.251

¹¹ *ibid*.p.256

Linguistic expressions (śabda) are the means of verbal understanding. And only valid or well grounded utterances can cause verbal cognition. ‘The concept of validity as it pertains to linguistic utterance or rather sentence is a complex concept and it involves different kinds of problems. The validity of a linguistic utterance may be viewed from the point of view of the linguistic structure of that utterance as well as from the point of view of the truth value of the cognition generated by that utterance.’¹²

Henceforth it is known that the śabda or *verbal cognition* is the knowledge of words of a sentence uttered by a trustworthy person. When one listens or there is a spoken sentence then one may have an auditory perception and when it comes to written sentences one may have a visual perception of a sentence and its parts i.e. constituent words. After this one must have an understanding or knowledge of the meaning of the words perceived by him then he may reach to the final step which is known as verbal knowledge.

‘पदज्ञानं तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः शाब्दबोधः फलं तत्र वृत्तिधीः सहकारिणी’¹³ The great work, *Nyāya siddhānta muktāvalī* explains this process of verbal cognition very acutely-

That knowledge is a truth about worldly objects ‘ thus the karaṇa or the special cause of śabda or valid verbal knowledge is the knowledge of words padajñāna which leads to the knowledge of objects through its function vyāpāra of recalling to our minds the meanings connected with words or sentences’.

¹² Vide- Deshpande, Madhav. “Sentence-Cognition In Nyāya Epistemology.” *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. 20, no. 3/4, 1978, pp. 195–216. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24652857>.

¹³ Bhaṭṭācārya, Viśvanātha Pañcānana, and Sāstri C Śāṅkara Rāma. *Karikavali: With Muktavali, Manjusha, Dinakariya, Ramarudriya & Gangarama Jatiya...* Sri Balamanorama Press, 1923. p.135

‘According to the Navya Nyāya, the cognition of a word padajñāna is karaṇa (Special instrumental cause) and the memory - cognition of a referent of a word is vyāpāra (operation) of the understanding of the sentence. But according to the old Nyāya the karaṇa is the cognised word or the word’s cognition; jñāyamānapada. There is an important difference between the cognised word and the cognition of a word. In the former case the word is qualificand (viśeṣya) and the cognition is its qualifier viśeṣaṇa. Sometimes memory cognition of words is due to inscriptions, gestures or postures. For this reason, the Navya Nyāya considers the cognition of a word as karaṇa.’¹⁴

This concept of verbal cognition is more closely related to word meaning and sentence- meaning than the individual lexical or morphemic units.¹⁵ Here is a brief survey that has been done in regard to the ‘*concept of a word*’ and ‘*concept of a sentence*’ offered by different Indian philosophical systems, especially by Nyāya vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā school. Similarly, the various opinions regarding Sentence- Meaning; *vākya- vākyārtha vicāraḥ* have been keenly observed.

Concept of a word dealt with by 3 Indian philosophical systems-

- **Logician’s theory -**

There are two different opinions that are seen in Nyāya view in regard to *śābda* or word. The old view or the early school of thought proposes words directly can be the instrument of verbal

¹⁴ SHAW, J. L. “Conditions For Understanding The Meaning Of A Sentence: The Nyāya And The Advaita Vedānta.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 28, no. 3, 2000, pp. 273–93.

¹⁵ Linguistic form or Monosyllable.

cognition. While the thinkers come from the new school of thought or Navya Naiyāyikā proposes the knowledge of the words can be the cause of *verbal cognition*.

According to early thought, if words are understood correctly and those are uttered by the trustworthy person then verbal cognition can take place. These words can get the position of the unique cause; *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*. ‘This theory can be explained in view of the fact that the listener comprehends the meaning of a sentence only after correctly understanding the functional relation; *vṛtti* between words such as ‘pot’ (*ghaṭa*) and also its meaning such as an entity having shell neck’, etc. (*kambugrīvādimān*). Thus, the old school of thought concludes that words are those from which the valid verbal cognition arises.’¹⁶

Navya Naiyāyikās oppose the view and state that knowledge of the words is the cause of verbal cognition. According to this theory, they propose that verbal understanding is quite possible from the words uttered by a silent person or through bodily gestures. This theory presupposes that the listener can recollect the words and get the meaning. ‘ Thus, navyās such as Gaṅgeśa define words as those which are produced from the correct understanding (i.e. knowledge) of the exact nature of the referents which, in turn, produce the utterance ‘*प्रयोगहेतुभूतत्वज्ञानजन्यशब्दः*’.¹⁷

Grammarians’ theory-

¹⁶ Bhatta, Vinayak P. “THEORY OF VERBAL COGNITION (Śābdabodha).” *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute*, vol. 49, 1990, pp. 59–74. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42930269>

¹⁷ *ibid*.p.60

Grammarians propose the theory that words are merely syllables that are everlasting or eternal i.e. Nitya varṇās. However, syllables take the forms of various words as a result of the reflection of various forms of words in them. These reflections are possible whenever there is an impression of various sequences of syllables. When syllables take the form of a particular word then the same holds true for the revealing power of the meaning. When this revealing power is clearly understood by the user of the language then meaning is easily understood by everyday usages like listening to the elders etc. words are then used in order to produce verbal cognition.

Dr. V.P. Bhatta in his scholarly article mentions Grammarian's view on the concept of words especially quoting the Bhartrhari says 'However, Bhartrhari and his followers hold a quiet different view: that the word which alone has the capacity to reveal the meanings, should be accepted to be verbal essence (arthabodhakaśabdaspṛṣṭāḥ). And such a 'sphota', which bursts forth or is manifested from syllables; (varṇābhivyaṅgya) and is eternal; (nitya), must be viewed to be quite different from syllables (varṇātmaka). This theory is necessitated by the fact that otherwise every individual member of a cluster of syllables, considered to be words, is momentary and therefore cannot be perceived. Consequently, the recollection of referents, which is the primary cause of verbal cognition, becomes impossible to explain from such a word'.¹⁸

Ritualist's view-

¹⁸ Bhatta, Vinayak P. "THEORY OF VERBAL COGNITION (Śābdabodha)." *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute*, vol. 49, 1990, p.60. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42930269>

Ritualists hold the view that syllables are eternal. From those eternal syllables, eternal words are manifested. They propose that the *vṛtti* which is the functional relation between words and meanings is eternal. Henceforth, the relation is eternal because of that theory words are also eternal in nature. That eternal relation helps to signify the generic property of the word which is known as *jāti*. for e.g. Potness resides in all the pots. This property is common in all the pots available in the world. Ritualists claim that this generic property is the meaning of the words that are in the reference of the meaning.

Concept of a Sentence-

The author of the *Nyāyasūtra*; Gautama states that ‘आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः’¹⁹. The word *upadeśa* conveys the meaning of communicating. Vātsyāyana in his commentary²⁰. The sutra states that ‘Sentence consists of two or more words’. Thus, a correct word or *śabda* is that which leads to valid *verbal cognition* or *śābdabodha*.

¹⁹ Gautama, et al. *Nyāyadarśana: Nyāyasūtra - Nyāyabhāshya*. Bhāratīya Dārśanika Anusandhāna Parishad Evaṃ Ḍī. Ke. Priṇṭavarīḍa, 2015.

²⁰Gautama, et al. *Nyāyadarśana: Nyāyasūtra - Nyāyabhāshya*. Bhāratīya Dārśanika Anusandhāna Parishad Evaṃ Ḍī. Ke. Priṇṭavarīḍa, 2015.

Basically, a notion of a sentence comprises the fact that the particular linguistic chain should convey the whole meaning or idea or concept as intended by the user. Etymologically, a sentence expresses what is felt or thought (*sentir*)²¹

Status of a sentence-

In Sanskrit, the definition ‘वाक्यं पदसमूहः’²² conveys the idea that, ‘a sentence is considered to be a group of words. These words can be group of nouns for e.g. trayo asya pādāḥ, trayah śṛṅgāḥ etc. in such examples, two nouns such as trayo pādāḥ make a sentence. In these cases, the verbs ‘Santi’ is assumed. And another form of a sentence which is well versed by the users of the language where one word plays the role of subject one plays as an object and remaining plays as a verb. For e.g. ‘rāmaḥ grāmaṃ gacchati’, ‘caitreṇa taṇḍulaḥ pacyate’ and so on. Hence, a group of words can be considered as a sentence. Words which fall within the scope of a single cognition are called sentences. Although various views are given on the concept of *vākya* or sentence in the philosophical systems. Dr. V.P. Bhatta in his article mentions four fold divisions of sentence.

He says, ‘1. Sentence is a verb consisting an indeclinable, kāraka and adverb (*ākhyātaṃ sāvayava kārakam viśeṣaṇam*). For instance, consider the sentence, ‘odanaṃ mṛdu saviśadaṃ

²¹ Manajali, Franson ‘Dynamic semiotics or the case for actantial case,’ *Semiotiques*, 6:7, 85-97 1995

²² Annambhaṭṭa, and Kuppusvāmi S. Śāstrī. *A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhatta’s Tarkasamgraha*, Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mylapore, Madras, 1961. p.145.

pacati' (He cooks rice soft and non-sticky). This constitutes a sentence, as it is a verb *pacati* consisting of an indeclinable 'mṛdu', kāraḥ 'odanaḥ' and adverb 'saviśadaḥ'.

2. A sentence is a verb consisting of an adverb (*ākhyātaḥ sakriyā viśeṣaṇam*). For instance, consider 'suṣṭhu pacati' (He cooks well). Here this constitutes a sentence, as it is a verb *pacati* consisting of an adverb 'suṣṭhu'.

3. Sentence is a verb or action consisting of a gerundive (*ākhyātaḥ saviśeṣaṇam*). For instance, consider *devadattena śayitavyam* (Devadatta should sleep). Here this constitutes a sentence as this constitutes the verb constituting a gerundive *śayitavyam*.

4. A sentence is what consists of one single verb (*ekatiṅ vākyaḥ*). Here what consists of one verb means what consists of verbs of the same sense. Consider, for instance, 'brūhi brūhi' (Please speak). Here this constitutes the sentence, as it consists of the verb(s) of the same sense of speaking.²³

Nature of a sentence according to Nyāya Darśana

²³ Bhatta, V. P. "Sentence (Vākya) And Sentence Meaning (Vākyaṛtha)." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, vol. 92, 2011, pp. 27–43. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43941270>.

Naiyāyikās offer a definition of a sentence in the view of *Verbal Cognition*. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* proposes that a sentence is a combination of words that are intended to generate qualificative cognition.

Neo logicians i.e. Navya naiyāyikās right from the Annambhaṭṭa, define *vākya* or sentence in a different manner. They used semantic and syntactic criteria in order to settle what is a sentence. This theory can be explained with the help of some examples. *Rāmo grāmaṃ gacchati* is a sentence for them as it consists of words but mere *gramam* also can be a sentence for them as per their theory of ‘वाक्यं पदसमूहः’ because this accusative form is made up of two constituents: the root word *grama* and the suffix *am* as this suggests objectness. Further, the notion of *vākya* has been extended. And neologicians defined a sentence as-

‘वाक्यं तु आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता सन्निधिमतां पदानां समूहः.’²⁴ It is a sentence that meets these three criteria: mutual expectancy, semantic competency, and proximity. Annambhaṭṭa, the author of the text *Tarkasamgraha* also suggests this idea of a ‘sentence in the same manner saying a valid sentence is a cluster of words which satisfies these three conditions.’ ‘आकाङ्क्षा योग्यता सन्निधिश्च वाक्यार्थज्ञाने हेतुः।’²⁵

From this, we get to know that Naiyāyikās used a specific criteria or Jargon to define a sentence. When that group of words is grammatically and semantically accepted then their special jargon will decide whether this sentence will generate cognitive meaning or not. To produce valid cognitive meaning or valid verbal cognition in the listener's mind he must have the cognition of

²⁴ Keśavamiśra, et al. *Tarkabhāshā: Sāskṛta Mūḷa, Arthabodhaka Ṭipāśahita Marāṭhī Bhāshāntara*. Manohara Chāpakhānā, 1904. p.89.

²⁵ Annambhaṭṭa, and Kuppusvāmi S. Śāstrī. *A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha*, Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mylapore, Madras, 1961. p.149.

mutual expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) of all the words present in the sentence. Another necessary criteria is the cognition of semantic competency (yogyatā). And the cognition of contiguity (*sannidhi*) and maybe the cognition of the speaker's intention (tātparya).

Here are some briefing of the texts which deals the concept of a sentence

Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* sutra no. 3.13, states that, ‘वाक्यादपि। संसर्गभेदप्रतिपादकत्वं ह्यत्र वाक्यत्वमभिप्रेतम्। तथाच यत्पदकदम्बकं यत्संसर्गभेदप्रतिपादकं तत् तदनपेक्षसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकं, यथा लौकिकम्। तथा च वैदिकमिति प्रयोगः’²⁶

He states that, sentence is only a combination of its constituents i.e. words. In addition, he asserts that, sentence is merely a collection of words.

Udayana also put their views and conveys as-

‘एतानि पदानि स्मारितार्थसंसर्गवन्ति तत्स्मारकत्वात्, एतानि पदानि स्मारितार्थसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकाणि, आकाङ्क्षादिमत्वे सति तत्स्मारकत्वात्’²⁷

1. Because words evoke the recollection of the meanings they convey the relation between recollected meanings.
2. In order to recall their meanings they are preceded by the cognition of the relation between their meanings because they have syntactic expectancy etc. and they elicit recollection of their meanings.

²⁶ Udayanacarya, and T. Viraraghavacharya. *Nyayakusumanjali. with Commentary of Kusumanjalivisthara*. Srinivasa Press, 1941. p.114

²⁷ *ibid.* p.125

By using the word 'पदानि' which is in plural form, one can assume that he considers a sentence as a group of words which is fulfilling syntactic expectancy etc. words that do not possess this prerequisite can't contribute towards the verbal testimony.

B) Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* too states that, 'अथ शब्दो निरूप्यते। प्रयोगहेतुभूतार्थतत्त्वज्ञानजन्यः शब्दः प्रमाणम्। गामभ्याज दण्डेनेति पदानि, वैदिकपदानि वा तात्पर्यविषयस्मारितपदार्थसंसर्गज्ञानपूर्वकाणि आकाङ्क्षादिपदकदम्बकत्वात्, घटमानयेतिवत्'।

A group of words would be a sentence. Whether the words of the sentence 'Bring the cow' or the words of the texts like Veda, they are preceded by a cognition that their meaning constitutes a group that is syntactic expectant of one another just as the words in a sentence 'Bring the pot' Gaṅgeśopādhyāya supports vaiśeṣika's view of all words fall under Anumāna and the state of being a group of words is the *Hetu*. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya refutes the theory of anvitābhidhānavādaḥ. He affirms that words are considered as instrumental cause; they help to recollect the intermediate cause i.e. word- meanings. The fruit of this process is the Anubhava of their relation among the recollected word- meanings. With the help of auxiliary causes such as syntactic expectancy etc. In this discussion, he tries to set up the theory that words are the constituents of sentences which is the cause of *verbal cognition*.

C) Vācaspatimiśra in his *Tātparyaṭīkā*²⁸ while commenting upon the NS - 1.1.7 states,

²⁸Vācaspatimiśra, and Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga Mānavallī. *The NYĀYAVĀRTTIKATĀTPARYAṬĪKĀ*. E.J. Lazarus, 1898. p.105

‘तस्मात् पदानि कृतसङ्केतानि स्वार्थं स्मारयित्वा-----अदृष्टपूर्वं वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्ति इति। पदानामेव पदार्थस्मरणावान्तरव्यापाराणां वाक्यार्थप्रमां प्रति करणतया प्रमाणत्वात्, इति। तस्मात् पदान्येव पदार्थस्मरणद्वारेण तत्संसर्गं लक्षयन्ति’

If the words are comprehended with their significance, the memory of the meanings gets brought back. That memory led to the creation of unknown of words is what constitutes śabdapramāṇa. That is being the instrumental cause of the cognition of the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, words themselves represent the relationship between them and their meanings by triggering the memory of their meanings.

D) The work *Nyāyakośa* also refers to the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and affirms that²⁹ ‘वाक्यं पदसमूहः। वाक्यत्वं च विशिष्टार्थपरशब्दत्वम्।’

Sentence is a combination of words and the condition of a sentence resides in leading to the cognition of the relation among the word- meanings.

E) The author of *Tarkabhāṣā*, Keśavamiśra states that, ‘आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निधिमतां पदानां समूहः प्रमाणवाक्यम्, यथा गामानयेत्यादि।’³⁰

Words which possess syntactic expectancy, congruity and proximity make verbal cognition or verbal testimony. Any group of words such as horse, cow, man etc. does not lead to verbal cognition but the group of words such as ‘Bring the cow’ can give rise to *verbal cognition*. Group of words possesses these above said auxiliary causes.

F) In a text *śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*, the author Jagadīśa explains,

²⁹ NK- p.n.730

³⁰ Keśavamiśra, et al. *Tarkabhāṣā: Saṃskṛta Mūla, Arthabodhaka Ṭīpāśahita Marāṭhī Bhāṣāntara*. Manohara Chāpakhānā, 1904. p.55

‘अनुभवहेतुः सकले सदयः समुपासिता मनुजे।

साकाङ्क्षासन्नाच स्वार्थे योग्या सरस्वती देवी॥’³¹

A sentence is a combination of words which do have syntactic expectancy etc. That sentence should be helpful to give rise to collective awareness of the inter- related meanings of those words in a Verbal cognition.

G) Annambhaṭṭa proposes a theory of significative power resides in the words. He states that the word is that which has a significative power.³² A sentence is a combination of such signified words. Such sentences uttered by a trustworthy or authoritative person will generate Verbal testimony. To form a sentence, words must fulfil the condition of having mutual expectancy etc. Words which are devoid of these conditions do not count as verbal testimony. He says in *Tarkasaṅgraha* as-

‘शक्तं पदम्। वाक्यं तु पदसमूहः। आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः। आकाङ्क्षादिरहितं वाक्यं न प्रमाणम्।’³³

The above- stated views of Naiyāyikas can clarify the idea of a sentence i.e. A sentence is a group of words and words are the articulated alphabetic phonemes which must possess significative power and they should accomplish the necessary conditions to be used in a sentence which will give rise to valid verbal cognition.

³¹ Jagadīśatarkālaṅkāra. *Shabdashakti Prakashika. A Treatise on Nyaya Philosophy*. Siddheshwara Press, 1904. p.13

³² शक्तिः- ‘अस्मात् पदात् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्यः इति ईश्वरेच्छा।’

³³ Annambhaṭṭa, and Kuppusvāmi S. Śāstrī. *A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha*, Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mylapore, Madras, 1961. p.152

Nature of a Sentence according to Vyākaraṇa Darśana-

Vaiyākaraṇās find the final utterable linguistic unit is indivisible in the sentence.

The great scholar Kātyāyana (c.3rd B.C), defines a sentence as a group of words which has at least one predicate or verb in it. He explains 'एकतिङ् वाक्यम्'³⁴. A literal translation of this definition is 'A sentence is a single inflected verb- form'. This definition can be extended as 'A sentence is a cluster of words which contain a single inflected verb form.' When a user of the language wants to open up a speedy and effective communication he may use a single verb to convey his thoughts and in majority of the cases the listener of that language can understand from the utterance of the mere verb. Whenever this situation occurs then a mere verb can convey the whole idea of the intended meaning. The hearer connects these all intended meanings with the central verb.

Vākyapadīya, a text of Bhartrhari in kāṇḍa ii has given eight various hypothetical definitions which sets forth eight different views regarding the nature of the sentence. Here is the glimpse of those definitions-

- 'आख्यातशब्दः सङ्घातो जातिः संङ्घातवर्तिनि एकोनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो बुद्ध्यनुसंहतिः।

पदमाद्यं पृथक् सर्वं पदं साकाङ्क्षमित्यपि वाक्यं प्रति मतिभिर्न्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम्॥³⁵

1. The verb 2. The close group of words 3. The universe which resides in the close group of the words. 4. The one indivisible utterance which can not be devoid of parts. 5. The definite arrangement of words. 6. The unique meaning which resides in the speaker's mind. 7. The

³⁴Patañjali, and Franz Kielhorn. *The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patanjali*. Government Central Book Depôt, 1880. Sutra no.2.1.1.p.235

³⁵ Bhartrhari, and Subramania Iyer K A. *Vakyapadiya*. Deccan College, 1963.p.64

very first word of any of the utterance 8. Any word in the sentence which has the mutual expectancy with other words in the sentence. Here is a glimpse of those definitions-

A) आख्यातशब्दः-

A word which has a verbal suffix at its end is considered as a sentence. A word with a verbal suffix can be considered as a sentence. But, this thought does not mean that a mere single verb can comprise a sentence. But, sometimes a mere single verbal unit can convey the intention of the speaker. E.g. the word 'shut'. In such cases, without having nominal expressions; one can understand the intention of the speaker, i.e. 'Shut the door'

B) पदसंघातो वाक्यम्-

When the word is uttered with the combination of other words then that becomes a sentence. Only the verb itself can not be called a Sentence. In sentences like 'Shut the door', the mere noun 'Door' is not a sentence as the activity of shutting is not related to the utterance of the word 'Door'.

C) एकोनवयवः-

When letters or words conjoin together and become a sentence then, they don't have real existence as such. They become one single unit. This single unit is devoid of parts; as per this view.

D) क्रमः वाक्यम्-

As per this view, word order is considered as a sentence.

E) बुद्ध्यनुसंहतिः-

According to this view, division of words is a conceptual structure which resides in our intellect. The real structure of a sentence is indivisible.

F) आद्यं पदं वाक्यम्-

According to this thought, a sentence is not undivided but it is divisible and formed by a group of words. The other parts i.e. words of the sentence are helpful in denoting the significative relation of the very first word with its meaning. In the sentences, like साक्षात् क्रियते first word is enough to convey the meaning as perception - pratyakṣa but the word क्रियते is used only to indicate a significative relation of the first word to its meaning.

G) पृथक् सर्वम्-

Every single part of a sentence, having syntactic expectancy, can contribute a sentence. Jaimini also in his aphorism 2.4.46 clears this idea that a combination of words which are interdependent to convey one single meaning is considered as a sentence.

H) आख्यातं साव्ययकारकम्-

Kātyāyana, an author of Vārtika, explains a definition of a sentence in two ways-

A Sentence which has a verbal suffix which is connected with Avyaya and Kāraka and a sentence which contains a single verb.

Among these 8 definitions, जातिः सङ्घातवर्तिनी, एकोनवयवः & बुद्ध्यनुसंहतिः treat sentence as an indivisible unit and other definitions consider sentence as divisible unit. Puṇyarāja in his commentary on *Vākyapadīya* considers that, according to Bhartṛharī, Grammarians treat sentence

as a nature of Sphoṭa which is indivisible. Sentence- meaning is Pratibhā and the relation between a sentence and its meaning is superimposed identity; adhyāsa.

As per this view, word order is considered as a sentence.

‘The final emphasis of Bhartr̥harī is on the concept of indivisibility of the sentence and its meaning. He says that both are indivisible in ‘reality’, and that all the analytical divisions and isolated forms in grammar are but functional fictions. For him the cognition of sentence -meaning is an instantaneous flash, with no real internal structure.’³⁶

- ‘आख्यातं- साव्यय -कारक- विशेषणं-वाक्यम्।’

‘A sentence is a cluster of words which carry a verb form along with kāraka, indeclinables and qualifiers.’

- ‘आख्यातं सविशेषणं वाक्यम्।’

‘A sentence is a group of words which accommodate a verb form with all the qualifiers’. This definition provides the logical and simplified structure of a sentence as a cluster of various words where the verb is at the central position and other words help to specify or to qualify the semantic content of the verbal form.

Nature of a Sentence according to Mīmāṃsā Darśana-

³⁶ Deshpande, Madhav. “Sentence-cognition in Nyāya epistemology.” *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. 20, no. 3–4, 1978, pp. 195–216, <https://doi.org/10.1163/000000078790080317>.

Mīmāṃsakās generally agree with the view of Naiyāyikās that the combination of articulated sounds which are alphabetical are words is a sentence. But, according to Mīmāṃsa these words are eternal and Naiyāyikās do not accept them as eternal.

Śabara in his commentary on the Jaimini sutra³⁷ states that, words which convey combined and unitary senses constitute one sentence. - He says ‘यावन्ति पदानि एके प्रयोजनं अभिनिवर्तयन्ति तावन्ति पदानि एकं वाक्यम्’। While explaining a sentence Jaimini also gives a definition of a sentence as अर्थकत्वाद् एकं वाक्यं साकाङ्क्षं चेद् विभागे स्यात्।³⁸ While commenting upon this sutra we come to know the clear idea that a sentence is a group of words.

A sentence is a cluster of words that signifies a single self-contained concept. Mīmāṃsakās propose a theory of samabhivyāhāra; connected utterance words. They are mainly concerned with the idea of a ritual injunction in the Vedic texts, and they want to interpret every sentence or injunction according to the ritual aspect reflected in the Vedic texts. Thus, they do not necessarily follow the notion of a sentence grammatically.

Nature of a Sentence according to Vedānta Darśana-

³⁷ Jaiminī, and Kāśīrāma. *Jaiminīyasūtrāṇi*. Śrīveṅkaṭeśvara Śṭīm Presa, 1987. P.63. 2.2.26- अतुल्यत्वात् तु वाक्ययोः गुणे तस्य प्रतीयते।

³⁸ Ibid.75 2.1.46

A) The Advaita vedāntins do not accept the theory of Sphoṭa. According to their opinion, a word or sentence is a recollection that's a result of latent impressions formed during the cognition of each letter. śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on Vedānta Sūtra states that,

‘सत्यपि समस्तवर्णप्रत्यवमर्शे यथा क्रमारोधिन्त्य एव पिपीलिकाः पङ्क्तिबुद्धिमारोहन्ति। एवं क्रमारोधिन् एव हि वर्णाः पदबुद्धिमारोक्ष्यन्ति’³⁹ ‘Despite the cognition of all the letters in a word, the letters generate in us the concept of a word through their sequential arrangement.’

B) Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins affirms that, letters demonstrated in a single apprehension constitute a word. And words demonstrated in a single apprehension can constitute a sentence. Vedāntadeśikā in his *Tattvamuktākālāpa*⁴⁰, set forth this view saying-

‘न ह्यक्षैः केपि वर्णाभ्यधिकमिह विदुर्वाचकं सावधानाः शब्दादर्थं प्रतीमस्त्विति च जनवचो नैकमन्यद् व्यनक्ति सामग्र्यैक्यादिनीत्या भवति मतिरियं तादृशे वर्णसङ्घे सम्भेदे वा पदानामिति न तदधिकः कोपि शब्दोपरोक्षः इति।’ Same view is given in *sarvārthasiddhivyākhyā* by him-

‘एकार्थप्रतिपादकत्वेन व्याकरणादिव्युत्पन्ना एकबुद्ध्युपग्रहेण संघातभावमापन्ना वर्णा एव पदम् । एवमेकार्थप्रतिपादनरूपकार्यावच्छिन्नानि पदार्थप्रतिपादकानि पदान्येव वाक्यम्। अत्र ऐक्यम् एकबुद्ध्यवस्थितानां सङ्घातभावविषयम्। अतो न विरोधः’।

C) The Dvaitins too ascribe to this view that words are made up of letters and sentences are made up of words. In the text, *Tarkatāṇḍava*, the author Vyāsatīrtha says that,- ‘पद्धतौ निर्दोषशब्दत्वं निर्दोषवाक्यत्वं वा आगमलक्षणम्। अत्राद्यं निर्दोषः शब्द आगमः इति

³⁹M., Srinivasa Chari S. *The Philosophy of the Vedāntasūtra: A Study Based on the Evaluation of the Commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva*. Munshiram Manoharlal, 1998,.p. 111 on 1.3.28

⁴⁰ M., Srinivasa Chari S. *Fundamentals of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta: A Study Based on Vedānta Deśika's Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa*. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, 2016. P.231 on verse no. 85.

प्रमाणलक्षणानुसारि। द्वितीयं तु आगमोद्दष्टवाक्यं च इति ब्रह्मतर्कानुसारि। अत्र वाक्यग्रहणं शिष्याणां पदवाक्यादिस्वरूपज्ञापनार्थम्। अत एव पद्धतौ द्वितीयपक्षे विभक्त्यन्ताः वर्णाः पदम्। आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधिमन्तिपदानि वाक्यम् इत्यादीनां पदादीनां लक्षमुक्तम्।⁴¹

Nature of a Sentence according to Sāṅkhya Darśana-

According to Sāṅkhya thought, letters with no eternal meaning are denotative of those meanings. In this connection, they do not accept the theory of Sphoṭa proposed by Grammarians and theory which proposes that letters are eternal which is accepted by the Mīmāṃsākās. They agree with the Naiyāyikās, Sāṅkhya school accepts that the group of letters is a word and the group of words in a sentence. There are two Sāṅkhya sutra put forth this thought such as-

‘प्रतीत्यप्रतीतिभ्यां न स्फोटात्मकः शब्दः, न शब्दनित्यत्वं कार्यताप्रतीतेः’⁴²

Nature of a Sentence according to Yoga Darśana-

⁴¹ Vyāsaśrītha, et al. *Tarkatāṇḍavam*. Printed at the Government Branch Press, 1932, p.78

⁴²Kapila, and James Robert Ballantyne. *The Sāṅkhya Aphorisms of Kapila: With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries*. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963. P.312 on sutra 5.78.

In the Yoga system, words, their objects, and the ideas they convey are falsely equated. Each letter is uttered in a certain order according to the conventional meaning, and they form a single thought which constitutes a single unit which is known as a word. There is no reference to the sequence of letters in the word; it appears to be indivisible.

The Nature of the Sentence- Meaning (vākyārthavicāraḥ) according to Indian philosophy-

- **Nature of a Sentence- Meaning according to Nyāyadarśana-**

- A) Vātsyāyana while commenting upon the sutra⁴³ in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* says ‘सम्बद्धांश्च पदार्थान् गृहीत्वा वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यते।’ Vātsyāyana states that, cognition of a sentence- meaning takes place when cognition of a word- meaning arises subsequently.
- B) Vācaspatimiśra in his text *Tātparyāṭīkā* collects the views of the Vaiśeṣikās. They assert that verbal testimony is the basis of inference to sentence meaning. They put some affiliable arguments. Vācaspatimiśra has recorded those as follows-

⁴³ Gautama, et al. *Nyāyadarśana: Nyāyasūtra - Nyāyabhāṣya*. Bhāratīya Dārśanika Anusandhāna Parishada Evaṃ Ḍī. Ke. Priṇṭavarīḍa, 2015. On Nyayasutra 3.2.62

‘पदैः स्मारिता पदार्था गुणप्रधानभावेनावस्थिताः संसर्गवन्तः, आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासत्तिमत्त्वे सति पदैः स्मारितत्वात्। अयं पदकदम्बकविशेषः स्मारितपदार्थसंसर्गवान् आकाङ्क्षादिमत्त्वे सति पदकदम्बत्वात्।’⁴⁴

1. The word- meanings which are recollected through the words are associated with each other. They are recollected because they have syntactic expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), semantic competency (yogyatā), and proximity (sannidhi).
2. Because of its syntactic expectancy, etc., and because it is an aggregate, this aggregate of words has the relationship between word meanings.

He himself also indicated that, relation among the word meanings is nothing but the Sentence-meaning. He agrees with the fact that words in the sentences give rise to sentence meaning. They help to recollect their meanings. Hence, he clutches the view that the sentence- meaning is nothing but the word- meaning in the form of recollection. He states as- ‘तस्मात् पदान्येव पदार्थस्मरणद्वारेण तत्संसर्गं लक्षयन्ति वाक्यार्थं प्रमाणम्।’⁴⁵

C) Jayantabhaṭṭa in his text *Nyāyamañjarī* states that, word -meaning contributes the sentence-meaning.

D) Udayana in the book, *Nyāyakusumāñjalī* while commenting upon the 6th and 16th Kārikā of the 5th Stabaka affirms that, word meanings which are interrelated to each other can contribute to sentence meaning. He says- पदवाक्ययोः पदार्थसंसर्गो विहाय प्रतिपाद्यान्तराभावात्। संसर्गभेदप्रतिपादकत्वं ह्यत्र वाक्यत्वमभिप्रेतम्।

⁴⁴ Bhaṭṭa, Umbeka, et al. *Ślokaṅgīyāyārtikavyākhyā Tātparyāṅgīkā*. 1971, on sutra- 2.1.52, p.371

⁴⁵ Ibid. 2.1.52, p.378

E) Gaṅgeśopādhyāya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* also declares that, cognition of the words became instrumental cause and it helps to generate the recollection of their meanings. Recollection of inter-relation of the word-meanings is the result of the process. He says,⁴⁶ ‘तस्मात् पदं करणम्, पदार्थस्मरणं व्यापारः आकाङ्क्षादिसहकारिवशात् स्मारितार्थान्वयानुभवः फलम्।’

F) Gadādhara in his *Vyutpattīvāda*, affirms that, relation between the identity or difference among all the word meanings which gives rise to sentence meaning and can be manifested on the basis of the syntactic expectancy. He says in very first sentence that- ‘शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्थे अपरपदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते।’

Here, It is noted that Nyāya school does not accept the sentence meaning as the primary or secondary meaning of a sentence. It's because that school does not acknowledge either the primary or secondary significance. Sentence meaning is the content of the verbal cognition which gets from sentences. Those sentences are a group of words. And the ultimate resultant Verbal cognition arises from syntactic expectancy.

While overlooking the various definitions of sentence, it is noted that Naiyāyikas, affirm that, sentence has significative power with regard to their respective meanings. When this significative power resides in words; they consider the combination of such words as a sentence. In this argument, we got to know that, each word having Prakṛti (Root) and Pratyaya (Suffix) have different meanings of their own. Hence, unitary components of any sentence if they are with suffixes can be considered as a sentence. For e.g. in sentences like, ‘द्वारं पिधेहि, घटम् आनय’ etc. Naiyāyikas give separate affirmation as a sentence to the components such as

⁴⁶Upādhyāya, Gaṅgeśa, et al. *The Tattva-Chintāmaṇi*. Baptist Mission Press, 1888. p..548

‘द्वारम्’, ‘घटम्’, ‘आनय’ ‘पिधेहि’ etc. From this, one can assume that Naiyāyikas give position to sentences when they are complete as a single unit; when they have mutual expectancy; when they are merged into each other; when they convey individual meaning; and after they have given rise to understanding the relation between meanings. In short, when two components show one-sentence ness.

- **Nature of a sentence meaning according to Mīmāṃsā school-**

A) According to Mīmāṃsākas, when one word meaning is related to another word meaning then sentence meaning arises. Śābara in his śābarabhāṣya, while commenting upon sutra 1.1.7 says ‘अनेकपदार्थानुरक्तो वाक्यार्थः, स च पदार्थमूलः, न निर्मूलः, न च सङ्केतमूलः।’⁴⁷

Sentence-meaning is the cluster of the various word meanings. This meaning is dependent upon word meanings, it is not without any base, and it is not based upon significative power.

Again in his commentary on sutra ‘अर्थाभिधानसामर्थ्यात्’ 3.2.1.1⁴⁸ he states that, ‘अथ वाक्यार्थोयमित्युच्येत, नैव शक्यं, न हि अनन्वितः पदार्थो भवति वाक्यार्थः’ - Sentence meaning is not the purport of the words. There is no such thing as a sentence meaning based on the meaning of a word unrelated to another word meaning. He also states while commenting upon the sutra

⁴⁷ Mimāṃsāka, Yudhisthira *Mīmāṃsā Śābarā Bhashya* Ram Lal Kapoor Trust, 1987, p. 190

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 345

उत्पत्तौवावचनाः स्युरर्थस्यातन्निमित्तत्वात्। 1.1.24⁴⁹ - 'न च पदार्था एव वाक्यार्थः, सामान्ये हि पदं वर्तते, विशेषे वाक्यम्। अन्यच्च सामान्यम् अन्यो विशेषः।'.

Word meanings are unable to be considered as a sentence meaning. Because, the word conveys the universal (sāmānya) and the sentence delivers the particular (viśeṣavyakti). Śabara explains that, when word meanings are related to each other, that is called Sentence meaning. The cognition of the sentence- meaning is the result of the sentence. He repeats that, the word is general and the sentence is particular. He says 'सर्वत्र बोधिते पदार्थे वाक्यार्थ उपपद्यते नान्यथा। सामान्यवृत्ति हि पदम्, विशेषवृत्ति वाक्यम्। सामान्येनाभिप्रवृत्तानां पदार्थानां यत् विशेषेवस्थानं स वाक्यार्थः।'⁵⁰

B) Prābhākara's view on sentence meaning is explained by śālikanātha in *Prakaraṇapañcikā*; sentence is a cluster of words. And the meaning of words constitutes the overall sentence-meaning. And one primary word meaning is related to another secondary word meaning then it is sentence meaning. He says-

‘प्रधानगुणभावेन लब्धान्योन्यसमन्वयान्।
पदार्थानेव वाक्यार्थान् संगिरन्ते विपश्चितः॥’⁵¹

● Nature of a sentence- meaning according to vaiyākaraṇās-

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.219

⁵⁰ Jaiminī, and Kāśīrāma. *Jaiminīyasūtrāṇi*. Śrīveṅkaṭeśvara Sṭīm Presa, 1987.p.112 on sutra 3.1.12

⁵¹ Śālikanāthamiśra, et al. *Prakaranapanchikā*. Vidya-Vilasa Press, 1904, p..337

A) Kaiyata in his *Pradipa*⁵² states while commenting upon the aphorism 1.2.45, sentence is an indicator of sentence- meaning which has the relation of word- meanings. He says- 'न वै पदार्थादिति। स्वं स्वमर्थं प्रतिपादयन्ति पदानि वाक्यम्। पदार्था एव तु आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निधिवशात् परस्परसंसृष्टा वाक्यार्थः। न तु वाक्यं वाक्यार्थो वा पृथगस्तीति भावः।'

He wants to convey that, only the sentence is mukhyaśabda and the sentence- meaning is mukhyaśabdārtha. Nāgeśa in his *Udyota* explains that there is a specific relation of identity between sentence and sentence- meaning. This identity is known as śakti.

B) While explaining various definitions of a sentence it is noted that जातिः सङ्घातवर्तिनी, एकोनवयवः & बुद्ध्यनुसंहतिः treat sentence as an indivisible unit and other definitions are divisible unit. Grammarians affirm that, the sentence meaning according to the view that a sentence is an indivisible unit is *Pratibhā*. And the other definitions are covered under *Anvitābhīdhāna* theory.

- **Discussion on the instrumental cause for cognition of a sentence- meaning.**
(वाक्यार्थधीकारणविचारः)
- In *Tattvabindu*, Vācaspatimiśra observes five opinions in regard to the instrumental cause of the cognition of the sentence-meaning.

⁵² Patañjali, et al. *Pātañjalī Mahābhāṣyam: Nāgojibhaṭṭaviracitamahābhāṣyapradīpoddyotodbhāsitena Kaiyaṭaviracitena Pradīpena Virjītaḥ*. Vanivilas Prakashan, 1987. p.167

1. Vaiyākaraṇās consider sentence is the instrumental cause for sentence-meaning. Sentence being partless it only consists of words and letters which are illusory projection. He says- अनवयवमेव वाक्यम् अनाद्यविद्योपदर्शितालीकवर्णपदविभागमस्याः निमित्तम् इति केचित् (वैयाकरणाः)
2. Śabara and Naiyāyikās propose the theory that, awareness of the last letter related to unrevealed expression born out from perceptual cognition of the prior words and their meanings which are factual, is considered as the instrumental cause. Vācaspatimiśra says- पारमार्थिकपूर्वपदपदार्थानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहितमन्त्यवर्णविज्ञानमित्येके (शबरस्वामिनः नैयायिकाश्च)
3. Prābhākara notes that words themselves are able to show their meanings being related to the meanings manifested by the other words which possess syntactic expectancy, semantic competence and proximity. Vācaspatimiśra affirms this by saying- पदान्येव आकाङ्क्षितयोग्यसंनिहितपदार्थान्तरान्वितस्वार्थाभिधायीत्यपरे (प्राभाकरमीमांसकाः)।
4. Kumārilabhaṭṭa asserts that the meaning carried by the words providing the syntactic expectancy, semantic competency and proximity are the cause in creating cognition of the relation between words and the meanings among themselves. This relation is the meaning of the sentence. Vācaspatimiśra says that, पदैरेव समभिव्याहारवद्भिः अभिहिताः स्वार्थाः आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासत्तिसधीचीनाः वाक्यार्थधीहेतवः इत्याचार्याः।
5. Some affirm that, a group of morphemes which help in the recollection of the unrevealed impression of the occurrence of the letters, words and their meanings considered as an instrumental cause. Vācaspatimiśra denotes प्रत्येकवर्णपदपदार्थानुभवभावितभावनानिचयलब्धजन्मस्मृतिदर्पणारूढावर्णमालेत्यन्ये।

Vācaspatimiśra critically observes above five views and supports Kumārilabhaṭṭa's view.

- In Nyāyaratnamālā, Pārthasārathīmiśrā also observes five views⁵³ regarding instrumental causes of awareness of sentence-meaning. Those are as follows-

1. A sentence is indivisible. Since the tone of the sound varies, it appears as if it contains letters and words. Pārthasārathīmiśrā observes as- तत्र केचित् तावत् अविभागमेव वाक्यं व्यञ्जकध्वनिभेदात् तेन तेन वर्णपदविपर्यासात्मानावगम्यमानं तस्य तस्य वाक्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकमिति मन्यन्ते।
2. When one cognizes words and letters which are illusory then it is an instrumental cause for the cognition of the sentence- meaning. Pārthasārathīmiśrā notes अन्ये तु एवंविधमेव ज्ञानं वाक्यम्। तदनन्तरं चानेकजातिगुणद्रव्यक्रियासंसर्गावभासं जायमानं विज्ञानमेव वाक्यार्थः। कार्यकारणभाव एव च वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोः सम्बन्ध इति प्रतिजानते। उभयस्मिन्नपि पक्षे काल्पनिकपदपदार्थसम्बन्धव्युत्पत्तिरभ्युपायः।
3. A sentence provided by the awareness of word-meanings which appears from words itself is the instrumental cause for the cognition of the sentence- meaning. Pārthasārathīmiśrā denote this as- अपरे तु पदवत् वाक्यमपि पूर्वपूर्ववर्णसंस्कारसचिवः अन्त्यः वर्णः वाचकः इत्यादिना मार्गेण सावयवमेव प्रतिलब्धसम्बन्ध- अवयवभूतपदजनितपदार्थसंविदुपायसहायं वाक्यार्थस्य वाचकं संगिरन्ते।
4. Words convey their own meanings by themselves as related to other word meanings. Pārthasārathīmiśrā here notes that, पदान्येव पदार्थान्तरान्वितं स्वार्थमभिदधतीति टीकाकारपादाः।
5. By conveying the word- meanings, the sentence- meaning can be communicated. Pārthasārathīmiśrā observes that, पदैरभिहिताः पदार्थाः एव वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपादयन्तीत्याचार्याः।

⁵³Ramanuja, et al. *Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathīmiśra: With the Commentary of Rāmānujācārya Entitled the Nayakarātna*. Oriental Institute, 1937.p.92

Pārthasārathīmiśrā adopts the last view on the instrumental cause for the cognition of the sentence- meaning.

Nyāya and Vyākaraṇa explain two different modes of semantic analysis with respect to sentences. Nyāya views that connected sentence meaning structure has been **ruled by the nominative (prathamā)**.

But **Vaiyākaraṇās** on the contrary explain that the **verbal phrase is the principal element** and other words of the sentences are subsidiary to it. These meanings are interrelated hence they qualify the principal meaning element.

After exploring and surveying all the views of epistemologists in brief it can be very clear that grammarians give greater significance to the action expressed by the verb.

In their view, a sentence can be defined as a syntactical unit consisting of one verb or predicate. While Mīmāṃsāṅkā contemplate sentence as a syntactical connection. Furthermore, logicians explore sentences with the viewpoint of *verbal cognition (śābdabodha)*. A quick study of verbal cognition in the light of understanding the mukhyaviśeṣya is done in the following sections.

- **Nature of a verbal cognition-**

A sentence becomes meaningful when it is heard by a native language user. Whenever that native language user listens to any sentence it is framed that he knows the language in a good manner

and he must know how to do things with language. When he listens to a sentence that is grammatically and semantically correct, then he reacts to the sentences very judicially and spontaneously. This judicial and spontaneous reaction is the product of the utterance which generates immediate cognition in the listener's mind. This reaction in Indian theories is explained as a sentence- cognition or verbal cognition or *śābdabodha*.⁵⁴ If that listener gets the sentence meaning correctly then that utterance has generated verbal cognition or *śābdabodha*.

‘आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः। आप्तस्तु यथार्थवक्ता। पदसमूहः वाक्यम्। शक्तं पदम्। अस्माद् पदाद् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्यः इति ईश्वरेच्छा शक्तिः। Etymologically, sentence cognition or *verbal cognition* is explained as cognition of a sentence- meaning.’⁵⁵ The sentential structure uttered by the authentic person (*āpta*) is considered as *verbal cognition*. The person who speaks the truth is considered as *āpta*. And

⁵⁴ B.K. Matilal in his paper, Matilal, B. K. “Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (Vākya).” *Foundations of Language*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1966, pp. 377–93. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000245>. quotes that, ‘The Nature of the Sentence (Vākya)’ explains, the Indian theorists called this cognition a *śabda bodha* of the sentence concerned. This cognition or understanding is a result of the utterance and hence should not be confused with the speaker’s cognition which is the speaker’s private property and which might have prompted the utterance originally.’

V.P. Bhatta in his, Bhatta, Vinayak P. “THEORY OF VERBAL COGNITION (Śābdabodha).” *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute*, vol. 49, 1990, pp. 59–74. *JSTOR*, explains, ‘Theory of Verbal cognition’ also puts his thoughts as Verbal cognition can be defined as cognition that has the knowledge of words and such cognition should be distinguished from perception, analogical understanding, etc.

⁵⁵ Annambhaṭṭa, and Chandrasekhara S. Sastrigal. *Tarkasamgraha: With Nyayabodhini, Vākyavritti, Nirukti and Pattabhiramatippani, Tarkasangraha Deepika, Nilakantha Prakasika, Ramarudriya, Nrisimha Prakasika and Pattabhiramaprasika*. The Sri Balamanorama Press, 1920. P.67

Bhatta, V. P. “Sentence (Vākya) And Sentence Meaning (Vākyārtha).” *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, vol. 92, 2011, pp. 27–43. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43941270>.

Bharṭṭhari refers to six different theories of sentence meaning which adhere to the two diametrically opposite views that sentence is a group of words *khaṇḍapakṣa* and sentence is indivisible whole *akhaṇḍapakṣa*. They are- i). Sentence meaning is semantic relation (*samsarga*.) ii) It is syntactically non-expectant word meanings (*nirākāṅkṣa padārtha*.) iii) It is semantically related meanings (*samsaṣṭārtha*.) iv) It is action (*kriyā*) v) it is objective or purpose (*Prayojana*) and vi) It is wisdom or intelligence (*pratibhā*).

words should have potency which is the ‘desire of the God’ (śakti) - from such a word such meaning should be conveyed.

Some significant points can be drawn from the above discussion such as

1. When a reliable person utters then that sentence becomes authentic.
2. Words possess a special property to denote a particular meaning.
3. Collective special property gives rise to sentence meaning or *śābdabodha*.

The *śābdabodha*; Naiyāyikās accept this knowledge as ‘Qualificative knowledge’ Savikalpaka jñāna. Qualificative cognition can also be termed as ‘Determinate cognition’; viśiṣṭa jñāna. This knowledge is analysed under two broad concepts i.e. Qualificand (viśeṣya) and Qualifier (viśeṣaṇa or prakāra).⁵⁶ ‘Through *śābdabodha* a successful communication holds between the speaker and the hearer when a sentence is uttered. But how do we understand the meaning of a sentence? A sentence when uttered can deliver its meaning only when it conforms to certain norms. They are the auxiliary conditions which make a sentence semantically acceptable. When a sentence is uttered an attentive listener cognizes the words and understands the meaning of the sentence, not directly but coalesced. The word meanings must be mutually connected. This required there must be syntactic relation (saṃsarga). This at the outset differentiates *śābdabodha* from other types of valid cognition.’⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Vide. Matilal, B. K. “Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (Vākya).” *Foundations of Language*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1966, pp. 377–93. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000245>. A cognition of this type can be roughly described as knowing something(i.e. The qualificand) as something (i.e. qualifier).

⁵⁷ Bhattacharya, Gopika Mohan. “Śābdabodha As A Separate Type Of Pramāṇa.” *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 5, no. 1/2, 1977, pp. 73–84. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23438781>.

Thus, in the cognition of the sentences like *sundaram mukham*, ‘Beautiful face’ or *nīlam puṣpaṃ*, ‘Blue flower’ etc, the word beautiful is a qualifier of the word face. The qualifier expresses more about the thing mentioned in the sentence. For the expression of *śābdabodha*, and to provide structural description of the sentences, a certain metalanguage and paraphrase of *śābdabodha* has been developed by Indian philosophers. These concepts are more often used in analysing the *śābdabodha* and explaining it with the help of Paraphrasing⁵⁸.

Description of a verbal cognition-

Annambhaṭṭa in his work *Tarkasaṅgraha* explains *verbal cognition* as awareness of ‘Sentence meaning.’ (*vākyārthajñāna*). He offers this description of verbal cognition in the light of Syntactico-Semantic relation (*samsargamaryādā*)⁵⁹ between all the words of the sentence. From the sentence it is not only intended to transfer the sentence meaning but it is the import of the speaker or writer which is to be transferred. Intentional activity or intended meaning of the speaker is encoded in the sentences through the use of the words. When a listener hears such encoded words or sentences he decodes the sentence -meaning which is primarily based upon the words frame in it. When this completes successfully; then the verbal awareness gets successful or communication gets established. If it's not then erroneous communication may occur.

⁵⁸ Description of the same utterance in a suitably chosen corresponding metalanguage.

⁵⁹ ‘Gadādharaḥaṭṭācārya, et al. *Vyutpattivādaḥ*. Mithilāvidyāpīṭha, 1977. P.79 ‘शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्थे अपरपदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते।’

Ways of learning the meanings of the words.

When this transfer takes place then the context is more important. As already noted, words do possess the potency (śakti) i.e. the desire of God. It is the context which decides what meaning is to be taken to grasp the intended meaning of the speaker. This potency is grasped through several ways which is explained by viśvanātha in his *Muktāvalī*-

‘शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोप्तवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च।

वाक्यस्य शेषाद् वितृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतःसिद्धपदस्य सिद्धाः’⁶⁰

I. vyākaraṇam-

In Sanskrit, meaning is already embedded in the word itself. If we understand the meaning scholars say’ from the sentence सिद्धाः वदन्ति। Meaning कर्तृ is already embedded in the word वदन्ति। Similarly, this word itself gives the meaning of प्रथम पुरुष, बहुवचन. To grasp the potency of the words through grammar.

II. upamānam-

It means Similarity. The person who is not familiar with the object can identify and understand the meaning from the familiar objects or known words. Whenever a base of resemblance is uttered by the authentic person, a similar object gets recollected.

⁶⁰ Bhaṭṭācārya, Viśvanātha Pañcānana, et al. *Nyāyasiddhānta Muktāvalī: “kīranāvali” Samākhyaavyākhyopetā.*

III. kośah-

The most reliable and often used device to look upon the meaning of the words which are unknown to the listener or to the reader. The meaning of the Kosha is thesaurus. This gives the perfect illustration and elucidation of the words present in the language.

IV. āptavākya-

Sometimes the words are grasped when they are uttered by the authentic person.

V. vyavahārah-

It's a usage of the users of the particular language. This usage tells the association. When one observes the usages of the native speakers of the particular language then they understand the association.

VI. vākyaśya śeṣāh-

This is a residual sentence. The context or the remaining portion of the sentence can give the clarity of the ambiguous words.

VII. vivṛtiḥ-

This referred to Description. The potency of the words can be grasped through the description of words or phrases included in it.

VIII. siddhapadasānnidhyam-

Proximity of known words. Its close association of two words. Uncommon or unfamiliar expressions could be grasped through the close association of known expressions.

It is observed through so many theories of Vaiyākaraṇās and Naiyāyikās, that, any sentence is a group of words or it is a cluster. But, what is the main constituent of these clusters is the matter of discussion. The thinkers of Indian philosophy had great discussions over this issue. Only piles of words can not be considered as the sentence. Words like gauḥ aśvaḥ hastī puruṣaḥ are not capable of conveying any meaning until there is any verb such as *asti* or *santi*; which are the forms of the root ‘to be’. Later Naiyāyikās accepted this fact that if there is a semantic criteria then only words can convey one whole meaning which is contrary to Vaiyākaraṇās view which accepts the view that verbal element is the main part of the sentence. The use of nouns and adjectives side by side is the general practice in Sanskrit. E.g. śyāmo bhaktaḥ, sundarī yuvatī; having semantic criteria can convey the meanings without having any finite verbal element. This idea must lead Naiyāyikās to think over this matter.

Do sentences really need any verbal phrase to become meaningful sentences or any other element of the sentence can be an important part of the sentence to picture the idea of the sentence. The same view has been taken forward in the discussion of the theories of verbal cognition.

In verbal cognition, components i.e. words are grasped through *anvaya*; (relations of words with each other) hence the awareness generated by the components of the sentence is also known by the word *anvayabodhaḥ*. While analysing and interpreting the main component of the sentences is been discussed by the three schools of Indian philosophy mainly. To understand this idea of a chief substantive which is the main subject matter of AV, the discussion over this idea is given in the subsequent portion of this chapter. The view of Raghunātha depicted in *Ākhyātavāda* is also given here briefly.

Primary substantive in a verbal cognition / Chief substantive or principal in

Verbal cognition-

There are three main competent views involved in verbal understanding which point out different factors in a sentence as a prominent element. In the Nyāya view, the meaning of the noun in the nominative case is the primary substantive or principal factor in every sentence. While other Indian theorists propose different chief substantives in paraphrasing the *śābdabodha*.

There are such examples in Sanskrit language where finite verbs are not required. Then what analysis does Naiyāyikas do and what analysis Vaiyākaraṇās accept is the matter of interest. A brief summary and their discussion about chief substantive/primary substantive i.e. the meaning of the verbal suffix considered in the text *Ākhyātavāda* is surveyed below after discussions of these three schools over the idea of chief substantive; mukhyaviśeṣya.

Nyāya view-

As discussed above Naiyāyikās gives importance to the fact that a sentence should be grammatically and semantically correct. The sentence will generate a cognitive meaning in the ideal⁶¹ listener if he has the cognition of semantical competency or yogyatā. Similarly if he has

⁶¹ B.K. Matilal uses this word in his article, Matilal, B. K. "Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (Vākya)." *Foundations of Language*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1966, pp. 377–93. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25000245>.

the cognition of mutual expectancy or ākāṅkṣā also if he has the cognition of congruity or āsattī. If any sentence meets these conditions and a listener is an ideal listener then verbal cognition arises. In that case, what he understands from the sentence is the question dealt by these thinkers. They say that any listener who understands the meaning of the sentence, he or she understands the nominative element from the sentence. Because this theory holds that the word in the nominative case is the prime element of the sentence. As they accept that verbal element or verbal suffix denotes effort. And the substratum of the effort is an agent in the sentence. Hence the important part in the sentence i.e. chief substantive or mukhyaviśeṣya is the Kartā. That means the agent or Kartā expresses the chief qualificand or substantive of the sentence. Effort is not the actual action but it is a readiness of the mind. Basically one can say it's a psychological factor. ⁶² In Nyāya terminology, effort is defined as kṛti or yatna.

Here are a few examples and their paraphrasing shown.

‘Caitro annaṃ pacati’ - The Nyāya school considers the meaning of this sentence as the word Caitra is the centre of interest and chief substantive which is called as a *Mukhyaviśeṣya*. Here, perhaps Nyāya follows Vaiśeṣika's notion of dravya (Substance). All the other categories (padārtha) are to be considered as qualifiers to the centre. Hence the verb also has two parts- the root *pac* and the suffix *tip*. The root *pac* means ‘cooking’ and the suffix denotes ‘effort; kṛti.

Verbal awareness of this sentence in Nyāya explanation would be-

⁶² *Vide*, Introduction of the book Effort is coupled with an attempt towards performing that action, such as when a dying person makes an effort to speak, but cannot do so owing to a failure of his power of speech.- टिप्पनीसहितः आख्यातवाद नञ्वादः च, critically edited by Sanjit kumar Sadhukhan. See introduction.

‘The meaning of the effort is connected with the meaning of Caitra as a *prakāra* or qualifier. Effort produces the ‘activity of cooking.’ The meaning of the root *pac* is connected with *kṛti* through the relation of conduciveness. The *kṛti* or effort produces the activity of cooking.

Pradip Kumar Muzumdar put forth authoritative analysis on this point in his ‘Philosophy of Language’: ‘the necessity of inserting this psychological factor has been explained by Krushanamitra, the author of *kuñcikā* commentary on Nāgeśa’s *Laghumañjuṣā*. A person may decide not to cook even after enkindling the fire in the oven. The fuel is left burning and the water is left boiling without any other effort on the part of the cook. We then say that the cook does not cook. The burning of fuel and boiling of water undoubtedly belong to the operational process of cooking. Yes, it is said that the cook does not cook, because of his lack of effort or exertion. Again a person struck down by paralysis makes efforts to rise but cannot rise. We say he does not rise despite efforts’⁶³

As discussed above in the ways to grasp the potency of the words (*śaktigrahopāya*) the meaning of the verbal suffix can also be understood through one of these ways such as from *vivaraṇa*. The verbal form *gacchati* can be elaborated as *gamaṇam karoti*. Here, *gamaṇam* stands for the root *gam* and *karoti* for the meaning denoted by the verbal suffix *ti*. Nyāya says in this way all the verbs and verbal suffixes can be elaborated or paraphrased such as *pacati -pākaṇam karoti*, *svapiti -svāpaṇam karoti* etc. So it can be analysed that the meaning of the verb *kṛ* denotes effort.

If we see the verbal cognition of the sentence, ‘caitra cooks rice.’, *caitra* is the location of an effort advantageous to the action, which produces the act of cooking. This action has the object,

⁶³ Mazumdar, Pradip Kumar, *The Philosophy of Language in the Light of Pāṇinian and the Mīmāṃsaka Schools of Indian Philosophy*. Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1977 p. 95

rice. Traditionally, the *śābdabodha* of this sentence is paraphrased as -‘अन्नकर्मक पाकानुकूल व्यापारानुकूल कृत्याश्रयः कर्ता (चैत्रः)।’

To say this in short, Nyāya explains the meaning of the *mukhyaviśeṣya* has the superiority over other meanings of the words. That word is inflected by the nominative case ending (prathamānta). Hence, in a traditional way of explaining verbal cognition, it is said that ‘प्रथमान्तार्थमुख्यविशेष्यक शाब्दबोधः।’

In the passive constructions such as *rāmeṇa gamyate devadattena pacyate* etc. where no word is in nominative case but it does contain a doer of the action which is in the instrumental case. That doer or agent will be a chief substantive of this sentence. In above statements paraphrasing would be *rāmakartṛka gamanam, devadattakartṛka pācanam*.

One more example can be taken in this instance, ‘*śruṇu megho garjati*’ in this sentence there is no such prathamānta; a nominative case ending word. Then how do Nyāya school paraphrase this sentence as per their theory? They would explain this as ‘*garjanākartṛ megham śruṇu*’. So, here the nominative word megha got importance in analysing the *śābdabodha*. In the next section Vyākaraṇa view of the same sentence is given.

Raghunātha’s *Ākhyātavāda* as discussed before is the text that deals with the old Naiyāyika’s view; regarding what is the possible meaning of the verbal suffix in the view of *Verbal cognition*. This view many times left inconclusive. Hence it is supplemented by the Navya Naiyāyikās view. This text then further discusses the views of Vaiyākaraṇās and Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsakās. Sometimes, the author refutes their opinions in this regard. Here are some glimpses of their views and arguments.

Vyākaraṇa view-

Vaiyākaraṇās put forth a theory that a chief substantive or a primary substantive in verbal cognition is an action or the meaning which is specified by the verbal root. Hence, in the sentence ‘*Rāmo grāmaṃ gacchati*’, the action of going is specified by the verbal root *gam* (to go). This action of going is considered as the *mukhyaviśeṣya* or chief substantive of all the relations.

This can be said that a verb is all influential in a sentence and it holds all the other elements of the sentence together as its properties or qualifiers. The Grammarians give importance to the function of finite verbs; that's why the verb is described as the chief substantive in verbal cognition. In the sentence, ‘*Rāmo grāmaṃ gacchati*’, the root *gam* refers to an action of going which is the chief substantive of the sentence. Hence, this sentence is paraphrased in a traditional way as ‘एकत्वविशिष्टपुंस्त्वविशिष्टकर्त्रभिन्ना गमनक्रिया, ग्रामनिष्ठकर्मत्वजनिका च।’ This *śābdabodha* shows the importance of a verb or action in the sentence hence it is considered as ‘धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधः।’

Grammarians’ theory is based on *Nirukta*’s theory, ‘*Bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam*’, roots are referred by the verbal phrase. Verb contains meanings of the roots which are the principal factor in the sentence. Hence in the sentences like *Devadattaḥ annaṃ pacati*, *caitraḥ grāmaṃ gacchati* etc. meanings of the roots such as *gam*, *pac* etc. are the chief in any sentence. This theory also

shows the importance of a kāraka theory. As all the components of the sentence are directly or indirectly connected with the verbs.

Mīmāṃsā view-

On the other hand Mīmāṃsakās support the theory that meaning of the the verbal suffix is impelled by the inner force which is known as *Bhāvanā*. This inner force is the reason to undertake an action. This force makes the person take action after listening to imperative statements. Unless there is any inner impellent force available there would not be an action of doing oblation or sacrifices etc. in vedic sentence; being apauruṣeya there would not be any human prompting. Hence it is the inner force that makes humans make oblations or do sacrifices etc. Since there are verbs like *yajeta kuryat* etc. which convey the meaning as ‘one ought to make oblation’ or ‘one ought to make sacrifices, they consequently suggest the meaning of the general impellent force which is understood by the action. Finally, this force becomes the main or prime element of the understanding of the sentence's meaning. All the other components of the sentence are connected with the impellent force which plays a vital role in the cognition of the sentence. Hence, in sentences like *jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta* it is said that the verbal suffix or ākhyāta suggests that one ought to make sacrifice if he wants to achieve the heaven. The idea behind the theory is that from the verbal suffix, one understands the inner impellent force. That force makes one perform the action. Hence the theory which propose the prime substantive is *Bhāvanā* theory is known as ‘भावनामुख्यविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधः’. These views are analysed in detail in the text AV.

Conclusion-

The theories proposed by the author of *Ākhyātavāda* are convincing. For in sentences like ‘śruṇu megho garjati’, the paraphrase of this sentence would be ‘garjanā kartṛ meghaṃ śruṇu’ or ‘meghakarṭṛka ‘garjanām śruṇu’. In both the paraphrases the theory is different. But in fact, we do not hear clouds but we do hear the roaring. But if we go in deep then we may understand that we hear the cloud only but it will not be unnatural to say that we hear a roaring cloud. Hence, such cases prove the theory of naiyāyikās that cognition arises from the nominative word. Such cases would be further examined and analysed.