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THE

PADĀRTHADHARMASANGRAHA

OF PRAÇASTAPĀDA

WITH THE NYĀYAKANDALĪ OF ÇRĪDHARA.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA

GANGANATHA JHA, M. A., D. LITT.,

Professor of Sanskrit, Muir Central College,

ALLAHABAD.

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

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DEDICATORY ÇLOKA.

पित्रोस्तीर्थलतातीर्थनाथयोः पादयोरिदम् ।
भ्रातुः श्रीविन्ध्यनाथस्यार्पितं लक्ष्मीश्वरस्य च ॥

INTRODUCTION.

According to the custom current among modern writers, it should be my duty here to deal with the date of the work here translated. But the most unfortunate thing is, as I have often said, that I have no faith in the methods of reasoning employed in fixing the dates of old writers. I shall therefore make no attempt at this unncongenial task. I might have supplied my readers with what other people have said on this subject. But this has been already done—and done in a manner very much better than I could ever do—by the learned translator of the *Vaishesika-Sutras* in the 'Sacred Books of the Hindus' series.

I shall therefore content myself with brief notes on some of the ideas that have struck me in course of my work on Praçastapāda's *Bhāsya*.

The first point to notice in this connection is the exact nature of the work. It is known, and has been known, as the '*Bhāsya*' on Kanāda's Sutras. But the name 'Bhāsya' has been explained as :—

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते येन पदैः सूत्रानुसारिभिः ।
स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यन्ते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

'The *Bhāsya* is that which explains the meaning of the Sutra by means of words in accordance with the Sutra, and which also offers explanations of its own statements'.

Judged by this definition, Praçastapāda's work is not entitled to the title of 'Bhāsya.' It does not explain the Sutras at all; in fact it does not deal with the several subjects in the order of the Sutras. It has the form of an independent manual; it re-arranges the whole system, and adopts its own arrangement of topics. And yet we find that it has always

been regarded as '*Bhāsya*'. We find Vardhamāna Upādhyāya—who lived at least 500 years ago—in his *Nyāyanibandhaprakāça*, propounding the following definition of 'Bhāsya'.

सूत्रं बुद्ध्यिस्थीकृत्य तत्पाठनियमं विना तद्व्याख्यानम्भाष्यम् । अतएव सूत्रपाठं विनाऽपि तद्विवरणं वैशेषिके प्रशस्तकराचार्यग्रन्थो भाष्यम् । यद्वा सूत्रव्याख्यानान्तरमनुपजीव्य तद्व्याख्यानम्भाष्यम्, व्याख्यानान्तरमुपजीव्य सूत्रव्याख्यानं वृत्तिरिति ।

The *Bhāsya*, according to this, is that which gathers the topics dealt with in the Sūtras and explains them, without taking into account the order of the Sūtras.—Or it may be defined as an explanation of the Sūtras not depending upon any other explanation; and thus differing from the '*Vṛtti*' which is an explanation dependent upon another explanation.

Vardhamāna cites the name of *Praçastakara*, who is the same as our author *Praçastapāda*. And it is clear that Vardhamāna has propounded those definitions simply with a view to bring Praçastapāda's work under the category. However that be, this quotation shows that at least 500 years ago, our author's work was known as '*Bhāsya*.'

One other point that has struck me in this work is the bold and confident manner in which the *Bhāsyakāra* has propounded his explanation of the processes of Creation and Dissolution. Writers as a rule are either silent on these topics, or deal with them in a halting half-hearted manner.

We cannot do better than refer the reader to Sec. 40 of the translation for a graphic account of the processes of Dissolution and Creation.

Hindus have been taxed with postulating five 'elements'. It seems that the charge is not well founded. People who make this charge apparently use the term 'element' in the chemical sense of a substance that cannot be further analysed. Are the 'Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāça' of the *Vaiçesika* such

unanalysable substances? On refering to any Vaiçēsika manual it will be clear that what is ordinarily known as 'Earth' is not regarded by the Vaiçesika to be an 'element' in the technical sense; if it were so regarded then alone could the Vaiçēsika view be stygmatised as primitive and unscientific? The touch of 'Earth' in its pure state is said to be 'neither hot nor cold,' so also the touch of 'Air,'—and when asked why the ordinary Earth and ordinary Air are found to be very far from 'neither hot nor cold,' the Vaiçesika explains that this is due to the Earth and Air being mixed up with particles of fire or water, which make them feel hot or cold. From this it is clear that what is regarded as 'element' is not the Earth &c, as we know and see them; but as they exist in their pristine and pure state, unmixed with any other substances; that is to say, in their atomic condition. Is it, then very unscientific to regard the atoms of Earth, Fire &c., to be 'elements'? What is the 'atom of Earth' but an ultimate material substratum of odour? Can this be analysed further? Further the name that the Hindu gives to these substances is only '*bhūta*'; and it is not fair to translate 'bhuta' as 'element' and then tax him with being unscientific. What the Vaiçesika means by saying that these are the 'five *bhūtas*,' is that there are five states of matter—*solid* (Earth), *liquid* (water) *gaseous* (Air), *Luminious* (Fire) and *Etheric*(?) (Ākāsha). Is this division absolutely unscientific?

Having thus briefly indicated a few of the points that occurred to me in course of my study, I now record my gratitude towards my venerable *Guru*, Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Shivakumara Miçra of Benares, without whose help readily accorded, the *Bhāsya*, and still more the *Nayāyakandali*, would have remained unintelligible; and then to my friend Babu Govinda-Dasa of Benares and to Pandit Vindhyeshvari Parsad Divivedin, who have done much, and are doing still more, towards bringing to light the long lost treasures of Indian philosophical literature; and last, but by no means least, to my late honoured colleague,—Dr. G. Thibaut, at whose instance this translation was undertaken, and who, if alive, would have rejoiced at its completion.

One word of apology is due to the reader. The time that the printing has taken—more than 10 years—and the vicissitudes through which my health has passed during all these years—have made it impossible for any careful revision of the work, either in manuscript or in course of proof-reading; and I am afraid the work abounds in many a crude and vague expression and endless inaccuracies, which could have been avoided with a little more care.

GANGANATHA JHA,

MUIR COLLEGE, ALLAHABAD:
December 24th, 1915.

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF THE
PADĀRTHA-DHARMA-SAṄGRAHA

Praçastapāda's Bhāshya on the Vaiçeshika Sūtras of Kaṇāda along with the Nāyayakandalī

[*Çrīdhara's Commentary on the Bhāshya.*]

—o—

CHAPTER I.

Introductory.

SECTION (1)—BENEDICTION.

Text:—Having bowed to Īçvara, the Cause, and then to the sage Kaṇāda, I am going to describe the nature of things (or, compose the work called 'Padārthadharmasangraha.') leading to the best of results.

Commentary.

I take my refuge in God, the beginningless, endless, effulgent, cause of the world, whose will ever comes true, and whose body consists of eternal consciousness.

Salutation to the blessed Purushottama, whose essence is pure knowledge, and who has shaken off all bondage,—to Him, stainless and without a second, whom only those see who have their minds centred in deep meditation and whose wanderings (in the cycle of metempychosis) have come to an end!

At the commencement of the work, the Author offers a salutation to his Deity, as also to the original founder of the system of philosophy, by means of the first half of the *çloka*—'*Praṇamya &c.*' It is a usage common among people that before beginning any action due obeisance is offered to the Deity and to one's Teachers. The effect of such obeisance lies

in the removal of obstacles in the way of the due accomplishment of the desired work. It could not be absolutely fruitless; as in that case, no intelligent person could ever have recourse to it. Nor could it have any other result save the due accomplishment of the contemplated work; as in that case it would not necessarily be used at the commencement of that work. Then too, in as much as what is uppermost in the person's mind at the time that he takes up a work is the due accomplishment of that work there is no other result approximate enough to be accepted as following from the salutation in question.

Objection :—"Does the removal of obstacles result from "salutation only, or from something else also? There is no "such necessary rule as that it follows from salutation only; "because, even in the absence of such salutation, we find two "such *Bhāshyas*, as that on the *Nyāya* and the *Mīmānsā sūtras* "in their complete forms. Then again, if it resulted from other "things also, then there would be no reasonable ground for a "necessary recourse to this particular course only."

To the above we make the following reply:—The cessation of obstacles results from salutation only; as we find all good men having recourse to it, at the commencement of all actions. Nor is it a fact that the authors of the *Nyāya* and the *Mīmānsā Bhāshyas* did not offer any salutation; because they too must have done it.

Question :—"How do you know that?"

Answer :—We infer it from the fact of the authors being good and wise persons. Let the case of the wise rest; even among the *Mlecchas* we find that they do not engage themselves in any action unless they have saluted their own divinities. Under the circumstances, it cannot be for a moment believed that two such extremely good and godly persons, as *Pakshila Svāmi* (the author of the *Nyāyabhāshya*) and *Çavara Svāmi* (the author of the *Mīmānsābhāshya*), should not have offered due salutation.

Page 2.] We now proceed to explain the words of the text: "*Praṇamya*"—the prefix '*pra*' denoting *intensity*, the word '*praṇamya*' denotes such salutation as is accompanied by intense devotion and confidence; as it is such a salutation alone which, creating a merit, destroys the very seed (possibility) of obstacles. It is for this reason that in the case of such works as *Kādambarī* and the like, we find that they were left incomplete, even though salutation had been offered at the beginning; and the reason for this lay in the fact of the salutation in these cases not having been offered with due faith and devotion,—the absence whereof is inferred from this very fact of the works being left incomplete.

In the present case, the salutation, though being done at the *present* time, is yet, in reality, meant to precede the composition of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgrahaḥ;* and it is for this reason that we have the sequential affix '*ktvā*' (in '*pranamya*'); but this affix is used only with a view to establish a syntactical relationship between the two (the salutation and the composition), and not merely for the purpose of indicating the said sequence; as there would be no useful purpose served by such indication.

'*Hētum*'—by means of this word '*hētu*' without any qualifications, the author points to the fact of God being the cause of all created things.

'*Īçvaram*'—this word denotes a particular deity; as it is only in this sense that the word is used in ordinary parlance; and this system of philosophy is meant to be a mere compilation of things ordinarily known to men.

'*Munim*'—denotes a particular person of austere pennance, who has had the darkness of ignorance destroyed by the pure knowledge of Self, and who is possessed of a complete knowledge of the whole truth regarding all things; as it is only in this sense that this word is generally found to be used.

'*Kaṇādam*'—this name was given to the sage, on account

of his subsisting, like a pigeon, upon grains fallen on the road (the word being explained as *kaṇān atti iti*) Consequently, there can be no room for the taunt—'may you eat mere grains &c.' The revered Praçasta-dêva has used this word, simply because it formed the name of the sage; and not as a reason for the excellence of the system as composed by such a person (as lived on mere grains picked up from the road); because such excellence is directly cognisable by the fact of the acceptance of the system by great men, just as is the case with the declarations of Manu and other sages. Nor is any useful purpose to be served by making the system known as *'kaṇāda-çāstra.'* It might be urged that, "by this means would be indicated the excellence of the author's own work, as based upon the work of Kaṇāda." But it is not so; for it is true that the precedence of such an authority adds to the excellence of the author's own work; but it is quite possible for such a work being open to the suspicion of being a statement of false doctrines; this suspicion being based upon certain well known discrepancies in the character of the author of the work. It might be argued that, "no human frailties could ever be suspected in the revered Praçastapāda whose veracity is universally acknowledged." But, in that case, just as in the case of *Kaṇāda's* own work, people who saw him, as also the direct disciples of these, accept it, only through their confidence in the author, and the other persons follow in the same path through finding the declarations compatible with those of other persons,—so, in the same manner, in the case of Praçastapāda's work also, his disciples and other persons would accept it; and as such there would be no use of declaring the fact of the latter work being based upon the former.

As for the question—"why should there be a salutation of the sage?"—we have already said that such salutations are meant to remove obstacles, just like the salutation to God. Nor can the salutation of God also be taken as indicating the fact of the work being based upon the work of God; because this would not be in

keeping with facts. A person is found to begin all actions after having saluted his own particular deity; and he does not thereby mean that the actions are such as have been previously performed by that deity; specially as salutation is wholly the outcome of devotion and faith. As for instance, we find that the author of the *Mimāñsā-vārtika* has saluted the moon-bearing God, and certainly the Mīmāñsā philosophy has not been composed by that God.

'Anu'—this particle indicates the fact of the salutation to Kaṇāda coming after that to Içvara, the meaning being—'having in the beginning saluted Içvara, and then saluting Kaṇāda &c. &c.'

Until the connection and the purpose of a particular work are fully understood the student does not pay any attention to it; as the activity of all intelligent persons is always preceded by a full recognition of the purpose to be fulfilled by that act; and if a work do not give rise to such activity, it would be as good as non-existent; consequently, the author, at the very beginning of his work, lays down, by means of the second half of the verse, the connection and the purpose, both of which are necessary factors in the activity of the intelligent pupil.

'Padārthadharma &c.'—*'Padārthas'* are the six categories, Substance and the rest; the *'dharmas'* are the common and specific properties of these; and that work which collects, or brings together, or explains these is the *'Padārthadharmasangraha.'*

'Pravakshyatē'—the promise of the author is that he will propound an excellent work which will briefly explain the properties of the categories. The excellence of the work lies in this, that the properties of things which in other works, are explained very extensively and at random, are, here, explained briefly and in one place; this is the motive that has led the author to the composing of the work, while there already existed other works treating of the same subject.

Obj. "A collected treatment of the properties of things is "the cause of the due knowledge of these properties; but such "knowledge cannot be the desired end of man; as the sole end of "man lies either in the obtaining of pleasure or in the avoiding "of pain. Consequently the work not accomplishing any desire "of man, cannot be a fit object for acquiring".

In reply to this we have the word '*mahodayah*,' which indicates the fact of the work effecting the desired end of man. The word means—*that work from which results the highest result, in the shape of Deliverance.* This also implies that the work bears to the Properties, the relationship of the *Denoter and the Denoted*, and to the Highest Result, that of the Cause and Effect.

Question: "Well, what is this *highest result?*"

In answer to this, (1) some people (the *Bauddas*) declare it to be the cessation of all knowledge along with all impressions, tendencies and longings. But this is not correct; because no intelligent person could ever act towards the total destruction of the self which is the dearest of all things; also because the word '*mukti*, (Deliverance), which is synonymous with the *destruction of bondage*, does not mean the said cessation or destruction.

(2) Others (the *Vedāntis*) explain it as the appearance of pure knowledge free from all objective taint, following on the destruction of all impressions &c. This too is not right; as this could not be possible in the absence of an efficient cause. The cause of such knowledge consists in an augmentation of Retentiveness; and the nature of this is such that, in the absence of a permanent substratum, it cannot produce any particular effect; and if at every moment, it were to appear as something new, then, in as much as it would be undergoing a total destruction at every moment, like the practice of leaping, it could not have gained in power; and as such it could not be able to produce any clear cognition; and hence there would be no possibility of such a

cognition; specially as of the conditions of the mind as tainted (by objectivity), the inborn capability of producing homogenous, or like, effects and the incapability of producing unlike ones, could never be set aside. Then again, in as much as all the previous states of the mind are naturally evanescent, the state that is herein spoken of would be something quite different from these. Nor is there any such single 'series' wherein both of these could exist; and yet Bondage and Deliverance both belong to one and the same substratum; and these two, according to you, would refer to two distinct objects, while, as a matter of fact, that state of mind which *ceases* is the same that has been *functioning* before.

(3) Others (the *Sānkhyas*) hold that after the difference between Matter and Spirit has been duly perceived, the functioning of Matter ceases, and the Spirit rests in Its own nature; and it is this that is Deliverance. This also is not correct; because Matter, being by its very nature active, could never rest idle (indifferent, without functioning). It might be argued that—' the functioning of Matter is caused by the purpose of the Spirit; and this purpose being none other than the perception of the said difference, as soon as this perception appears, Matter, having accomplished its purpose, would cease to function." But this could not be; as Matter being un-intelligent, could not function with any such discrimination (as would be necessary in accordance with the Sānkhya theory). In fact, we find that even when it has duly brought about a certain perception,—of sound, for instance—, it still goes on functioning towards the same perception; and in the same way, even after it will have brought about discriminative knowledge, it would go on with its functioning towards the same end; as its active nature will not have been set aside (by the said knowledge.)

(4) Others (the *Yogis*) again hold Deliverance to consist in an experience of ever-lasting and unsurpassed pleasure. But this view also has nothing to recommend itself; as we shall show later on.

(5) For these reasons, we conclude that the "highest result" consists in the *absolute cessation of pain.*

Question : "What is the proof of the existence of this *cessation of pain?*"

In reply to this, the *Naiyāyikas* put forward the following syllogism: 'The series of pain, being something qualified, is destroyed absolutely, because it is a series,—just like the series of light rays emitted by the lamp.' But this is not satisfactory; as the argument is directly contradicted by the case of the series of the colour &c. of the *atom* of earth and other substances (which are never destroyed). Therefore we maintain that the proof of the said cessation lies in such *Upanishat* texts as 'Him without a body, pleasure and pain do not touch.'

Objection:—"All these *Upanishat* passages refering merely to the natural state of things cannot have any evidential authority."

Reply :—Not so; as the same might be said against the authority of Sense-perception (which also pertains to the natural state of things).

Obj. : "What we mean is that sentences describing the natural state of things would be merely descriptive, and as such devoid of evidential authority; because these would depend upon the authority of something else; as such a description in itself could never be the efficient means of any correct cognition."

Rep :—A passage cannot be regarded as *descriptive* simply because it speaks of things in their fully accomplished states; as in that case even Sense-perception would have to be regarded as merely *descriptive.* In fact it is only when it speaks of something that is already known, that a passage is regarded as *descriptive.* And as a matter of fact we find that the matter dealt with by the *Upanishat* passages in question is such as is never cognised by Sense-perception or the other means of knowledge; and under the circumstances, how could these passages be regarded as merely descriptive? How too could they ever stand in need of the

coroboration of any other means of knowledge? Specially as in the case of these passages, the cognition produced by them is not found to be necessarily preceded by any other cognition of the same object, as we have in the case of Remembrance (which for this reason is not regarded as an independent means of knowledge). In fact it is on this ground that human assertions are regarded as authoritative. These human assertions too do not bring about the cognition of things, through an indication of the trustworthiness of the speaker; but they do so independently of the speaker, depending upon the speaker only for their own appearance (and not for their faculty of producing cognitions), as the capability of expressing things is inherent in the word, and inherent also, in these expressed things, is the capability of being related to one another, either by mutual requirement, or by proximity, or by capability. Consequently, just as in the case of the Veda, the word is accepted as producing the cognitions of things, independently of any other means of knowledge,—so in the case of ordinary human assertions; as, according to the maxim—'*yē laukikā vaidikāsta ēva*' ('the words of the ordinary human assertion are the same as those in the Veda'), the potency of the word must be the same in both cases. As for the inquiry into the trustworthiness of the speaker, it is simply meant to set aside the possibility of error with regard to facts; just as in the case of Sense-perception also, we look out for the purity and soundness of the sense-organ, simply for the sake of setting aside all doubts as to the erroneous character of the cognition.

We have briefly dealt with this here; for a detailed treatment of the subject, we refer the reader to the *Advayasiddhi.*

Page 5.] *Objection :*—"The authority of words is restricted "to something that has to be accomplished, and not to the mere "nature of things as they exist; specially as in the case of all "usages of old experienced people, we find that words have "their expressive potency only when there is something to be

"accomplished, and not otherwise. Consequently the *Upanishat* "passages cannot be taken as referring to the natural state of things."

Reply:—This is not admissible; as in ordinary parlance we often find a sentence applying to the natural state of things,—*e. g.* the assertion, 'the mango produces good effects, and the jack fruit brings undesirable ones.'

Objection:—"In the case of this sentence also, what it does "is to *lay down* the eating of the mango, and the avoiding of "the jack fruit, the meaning of the sentence being—'eat the "mango which produces desirable effects, and avoid the jack fruit "which leads to evil consequences' (hence in this sentence also "there is no mere description of the natural state of things)"

Reply:—It is not so; as any such *laying down* would be useless; because the man is naturally attached to the eating of the mango; by the mere cognition of the fact of its producing good effects; similarly is he repulsed from the eating of the jack fruit by the cognition of the fact of its leading to evil consequences. And as such, what would be the necessity of any injunction in this case, where the necessary attraction and repulsion are acomplished by the nature of the things themselves? specially as an injunction has its use only in a case where its object has not been accomplished by some other means.

Objection:—"The sentence must be regarded as used for the "purpose of laying down the said attraction and repulsion, as "it is with the purpose of such attraction and repulsion that it is "always found to be used."

Reply:—True; the sentence does serve the purpose of attraction and repulsion; but it does this only as the originator of these, and not as their (verbal) *denoter;* and the evidential authority of words rests only with accomplished things. If, from the mere fact of the sentence being used for the purpose of the said attraction and repulsion we were to infer the fact of these two being verbally denoted by the sentence,—even though they are not

cognised as directly expressed by the words,—then, in that case, even such things as the feeling of satisfaction following on the eating of the mango, and its digestion, would also have to be regarded as expressed by the sentence; and in the case of Sense-perception also, when its object would be such as is desired for the sake of the fulfilment of a certain purpose, it would be this *fulfilment* that would have to be regarded as the object of that sensuous cognition. As for the fact of the sentence being the originator of activity, even the *Upanishat* texts in question are such originators; as when one has recognised the true nature of a thing by means of these, he has recourse to the practice of meditation &c., which brings about a pure knowledge of the Self, free from all doubts and uncertainties; from which knowledge proceeds final Deliverance. Nor is it necessary that the operation of all means of knowledge should always end in activity or cessation from activity; as these being dependent upon the wish of the agent, even when they are not brought about, we have a distinct perception resting in the thing itself.

Nor is the denotative potency of words restricted to only such objects as are related to some action; as we often find words applying to things not so related; *e. g.* in the sentence "*iha prabhinnakamalodarē madhūni madhukarah pibati* (within this full blown lotus, the bee is drinking the honey)", which describes an occurence at the *present* moment, we find that one who knows the meaning of the other words, but does not know that of the word '*madhūkarah*', comprehends this word as denoting that insect which he finds drinking the honey (and in this case, the word does not denote anything that is related to an action.)

Objection:—"In this case also, there is an indirect relation-"ship with an action; as the person who utters the sentence has "known the meaning of the word '*madhukarah*' only by notic-"ing the *actions* of older people".

Reply:—Not so; as there can be no certainty with regard

to this; that is to say, there is no certainty as to whether the man who utters the sentence had obtained the knowledge of the meaning of the word, with reference to the object as related to a certain action of older people, or from its co-extensivness with other words known to him, or from the direct teaching (of an older person) with regard to the thing by itself (independently of any action); specially as there is no knowing which of these factors enters first into the comprehension of the meaning of a word. Then, in accordance with what you hold, the speaker of the sentence would have his comprehension with reference to the object as related to the action, while the hearer would have it with reference to it as not so related; and as one person does not comprehend the meaning of a word by means of the comprehension of another person, the word *'madhukarah'* would have the two mutually inconsistent characters of having its denotation related, as well as not related, to an action, as with reference to the two persons.

Objection :—"The mutual relationship among the meanings of words in a sentence is based upon the requirements of the verb denoting an action; and hence there could be no such relationship in the case of the quoted *Upanishat* text which is devoid of verbs."

Reply :—All *Upanishat* texts are not devoid of verbs; and even in the case of those that have no verb, there is a distinct relationship among the things that are denoted by the words as connected with one another, and are qualified by capability and proximity (to other words).—such relationship being based upon the mutual requirement of these denotations. For instance, in the sentence—— *'kānchyāmidānīm tribhuvanatilako rājā'*—we are fully cognisant of a connected meaning of the sentence, though there is no Verb. Or, in such cases the relationship may be said to be based upon such verbs as *'asti'* or *'bhavati'* which may be either distinctly mentioned or only inferred indirectly.

This by the way; to return to the original subject: A collection of the categories is obtained only by means of a due knowledge of the properties of the categories; as there could be no collection of the properties by themselves alone.

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SECTION (2)

PURPOSE OF THE SCIENCE.

Objection :—"A treatise that deals with the properties of things can never lead to the highest bliss; as words cannot accomplish anything besides the denoting of the verbal meanings."

In reply to this we have the following, wherein it is shown that a treatise that supplies a knowledge of the properties of things helps, indirectly, in the fulfilment of the highest end of man.

Text (1) :—*A knowledge of the true nature of the six categories—Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Individuality and Inherence—through their similarities and dissimilarities,—is the means of accomplishing the highest bliss.*

Commentary.

The 'nature' of a thing is that which constitutes its character. 'Similarity' consists in properties common to many things; 'Dissimilarity' consists in the property peculiar to a certain thing. The knowledge leading to the highest result is that of the true nature (of the six categories) as manifested through their similarities and dissimilarities.

The pleasure born of the experiencing of sensuous objects disappears in a moment, and abounds in pain; and even when enjoyed in Heaven and such other places it is not lasting, and is subject to varying grades; for instance, some people enjoy the pleasures of heaven alone, others enjoy those of the Kingdom of Heaven. Consequently even this pleasure,—mixed as it is with a

constant dread of falling off from it, as also with the heart-burning caused by the superiority of another person,—is found to be shrouded with pain; and as such cannot be called 'absolute *bliss*.' It is only the absolute *cessation of pain*, which consists in the disappearance of all pains hard to be borne, that can be called such *bliss*; specially because it does not allow of the return of those pains. And it is this bliss that is brought about by the knowledge of the true nature of Substance and the other categories.

The above meets the following declaration of Mandana's: "The theory that Deliverance consists in the cessation of a particular quality does not differ from the theory that it is nothing more than annihilation." Because the cessation of a particular quality enables the Self to enjoy its own independent natural state; and it does not mean its annihilation, which could not be possible for the Self, which is eternal.

Nor can such deliverance be deemed to be desirable for man; as the cessation of all pain is the highest end that can be desired by him.

Page 7.] *Objection:*—"In as much as such deliverance as you put forward would mean the absence of all pleasure, it could not be desirable."

Reply:—Not so; because ordinary pleasure also is included in pain for the following reasons; (1) because it is not lasting; (2) because having many contradictory forces, it is accompanied by the trouble of bringing together the endless accessories necessary for its accomplishment; (3) because it is always connected with pain, and as such ressembles the honey that is mixed with poison.

The text "*of substance &c.*" supplies the answer to the question as to the knowledge of the similarities and dissimilarities of what things is the means of final beatitude.

The compound "*dravyaguṇa &c.*" is to be expounded as a *Dvandva*—'*Dravyāṇi ca &c.*', in accordance with the fact of each of these being mentioned distinctly in the *sūtra*, where they

are enumerated separately. Because the mention of these in the present context is with the same view as their enumeration in the *sūtra*.

Dravya, Substance, is mentioned first; because, being the substratum of all the rest, it is the most important of all. *Guṇa*, Quality, is mentioned next, because its number is larger than that of *Karma*, Action. *Karma* is mentioned after *Guṇa*, because it always follows in the wake of this latter. *Sāmānya*, Generality is mentioned next, because it is connected with *Karma*. In as much as *Samavāya*, Inherence, inheres in all the other five, it is proper that it should be mentioned last; it is for this same reason that *Viçēsha*, Individuality is mentioned before *Samavāya*.

Abhāva, Negation, is not mentioned separately, simply because it is dependent (for its conception) upon *Bhāva* (the six categories enumerated), and not because there is no such category.

The genitive (in '*dravya...samavāyānām*') denotes general relationship.

Here also the declaration that the knowledge of similarity &c. is the means of highest beatitude implies that such beatitude is brought about by a true knowledge of the categories themselves; as there could be no knowledge of the said similarity &c. independently of the categories.

NOTES.—(1) The enumeration of these categories is meant to be a complete analysis of the entire universal scheme, including God Himself. The first three of these have real objective existence, and as such form one group; the last three are the products of our conception.

(2) The word '*padārtha*' literally means "meaning of a word'; hence "anything capable of being spoken of by means of a word', 'nameable'. Some writers have rendered it as 'knowable,' 'predicable.' Thus though 'nameable' would be the most appropriate rendering of the word, yet, in as much as the introduction of such a word in the course of a discussion would create confusion, the word 'category' has been retained, though its use is open to objection. The word '*padārtha*' is used very loosely, often in the sense of 'theme.'

(3) "Nyāya writings do not explain the process by which the sevenfold division of *padārthas* was first obtained; but, if we make a guess, the process must have been something like this: A notion is either positive or negative, and so the external object of a notion might be *bhāva* or *abhāva*. *Bhāva* things again, are of two kinds, properties and a common substratum in which they reside. The latter is *dravya*. Of the properties again, some reside in many objects conjointly, others in individual things singly. The first is *Sāmānya*; while the latter class is again divisible into properties that are stationary, and those that are evanescent—*i. e. guṇa* and *karma*. The remaining two *padārthas* are accepted to account for special facts." (Y. V. Athalye).

SECTION (3)

SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Text (2)—This knowledge proceeds from dharma manifested by the injunctions of the Lord.

Commentary.

Objection:—"If the knowledge of truth be the means of final beatitude, then *dharma* could not be the means of it; and this would involve a contradiction of the *sūtra*, wherein it is declared that *dharma* is that which leads to final beatitude."

It is in reply to this objection that we have the present text. The sense of this is that the said beatitude results from *dharma* alone; the knowledge of Substance and the rest being regarded as the means to it, only in so much as such knowledge brings about *dharma*. That is to say, when all objects, internal and external, have been duly known, the man comes to notice the evils connected with them and hence acquires an aversion to them; his desire for such things having thus ceased, the man who has obtained a knowledge of the self ceases to perform action for the acquiring of those objects, and betakes himself, without any desire for results, to the practice of those means that are laid down in the scriptures as calculated to bring about the due renunciation of those objects; and continuing the due practice of self-knowledge, he accumulates an excellent *dharma* conducive to the said renunciation; and the self-knowledge being thereby fully accomplished, it becomes possible for him to be severed, absolutely and permanently, from the shackles of the body. Even in ordinary life we find worldly people renouncing or avoiding such undesirable things as a serpent, a thorn and the like,—such avoidance resulting from an effort on his part, which is due to a determination arising from the recognition of the evils following from those things. In the same manner, the absolute renunciation of the body &c. can proceed only from a similar property of the self (*i. e.* its efforts) arising from a determination resulting from the person's recognition of the evils attendant upon those things. This we shall explain under the section on '*Moksha*.'

Dharma too, by itself, does not accomplish final beatitude, until it is aided by the wish of God; it is for this reason that we have the text—*Only from dharma manifested by the injunctions of the Lord*: '*Codanā*' (Injunction) is that whereby things are led or urged to their respective functionings. '*Içvaracodanā*' is a particular desire or a wish of God. *Abhivyavti*' (manifestation) is the turning towards the fulfilment of the effect. '*Içvaracodanābhivyaktāt*' means 'manifested *by* the injunction of the Lord.' The sense of the sentence thus comes to be that 'final beatitude results from *dharma* which is turned towards fruition by a particular wish of the Lord.'

The particle '*ca*' indicates that it is this *dharma along with* the knowledge of the similarity &c. that brings about final beatitude.

NOTE:—The Kiranavali takes '*Içvara—codana*' in the sense of 'Veda,' which according to the *Naiyayika* and the *Vaiceshika*, is a work of God, and not an 'independent,' eternal entity, as held by the *Mimansaka*.

CHAPTER II.

SECTION (1).

ENUMERATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF CATEGORIES.

Having understood the fact of the knoweldge of the six categories being the means of the accomplishment of the desirable end of man, the disciple puts the following question, in order to know the difference among the six categories themselves:—

Text (3) Question:—"*Which are the categories, substance and the rest*'? *And what are their 'similarities and dissimilarities'*?"

Answer:—*Among these the Substances are—Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether (Ākāca), Time, Space, Self and Mind. These, mentioned in the sūtra by their general as well as specific names, are nine only; as besides these none other is mentioned by name. (I—i—5).*

Comentary.

"*Which are the categories &c.*—*i. e.* which are the substances, which the properties, which the actions, and so forth. And in as much as the cognition of the object does not necessarily include the congnition of its qualifications, the further question is added—"*What are their similarities &c.*" Herein also the particle '*ca*' has the collective force.

The Text supplies the answer to these question : *Among these*—*i. e.* among substance and the rest—the substances, Earth and the rest, have been mentioned by the *sūtra*, by their general name of 'Substance,' as well as by their specific names, 'Earth," 'Water,' &c.

Then there arises the question as to whether these are the only substances, or there are others also; and the Text declares that *they are nine only*.

Objetion:—"The very fact of only nine substances being defined would have shown clearly that there are only nine substances; and hence the addition of 'nine only,' appears quite superfluous."

Reply:—It is not so; as even though only nine would be defined, yet there would remain the doubt as to whether the omission of others was due to the fact of there being no others, or to that of their being of no use (though existing). Specially as all that the definition does is to aid ordinary usage by the differentiation of the like from the unlike, and as such it could not establish the non-existence of anything (besides the nine substances) : it is for this reason that we have the text restricting the number of substances to 'nine only.'

This specific mention of things that have been once mentioned by means of a generic term is what in other systems is called '*Vibhāga*' (Division), or '*Nirdēca*' (Indication).

Question.—"How is it known that there are *only nine* Substances ?"

Answer.—*As besides these none other is mentioned by name.*—That is to say, besides these nine, the great Rishi, Kaṇâda, who was giving out his teaching with regard to all things, has not mentioned (in his *sūtra*) the name of any other.

Page 9] *Objection*—"There is a distinct substance in the shape of *Darkness* (*Tamas*), which is endowed with the qualities of colour, number, dimension, isolation, distance, proximity, conjunction and disjunction."

To this some people make the following reply:—'If Darkness were a substance, then a person walking in the dark would be obstructed by it; as a substance that has colour and form can never be devoid of touch; and a substance that is large and is endowed with touch is sure of offering an obstruction. Then again, just as in the case of the Earth-globe, people are cognisant of its constituent parts so should they also be of those of Darkness.'

This answer is not quite satisfactory; because in the case of the light emitted by a lamp, we find that when certain rays of light are thrown out from it, they give rise, through the force of a certain unseen force, to an unimpeded circle of diffused light, whose constituent parts are not perceived, and which is not perceptible to the touch; and in the same manner would the substance of Darkness be constituted by the atoms of Darkness (and would not be tangible).

For this reason, we offer another reply to the above argument (in favour of Darkness as a distinct substance) : Are the atoms of Darkness endowed with touch, or devoid of it ? They cannot be regarded as endowed with it, as we never come across any such products of it as would be perceptible by touch. It might be argued that the said atoms do not produce any such substances, because of the absence of an unseen force tending towards such production. But, in that case, it would be equally reasonable to accept Air to have colour; the absence of coloured products of it

being explained as being due to the absence of the action of an unseen force favouring such production. Or, we might even assume all the four effects (Earth, Water, Air and Light) to be produced from a single atom, through the peculiar actions of the unseen force.

It might be argued that, "the existence of atoms is inferable only from their products; and as such being inferred from them, they cannot differ from these products; specially as there would be no reasonable ground for admitting of such difference."

But in that case, the atoms of Darkness also being devoid of touch, how could they produce any such substance as *Darkness*? as it is a fact of common experience that that which is without touch never produces any substances.

Objection:—'When we come across an effect, we naturally assume the existence of a homogenous cause; and it is not right to upset or deny the character of the product to that which is actually seen, simply because of some discrepancy in the nature of its cause."

Reply:—We do not deny the existence of Darkness; all that we assert is that, in as much as we do not find any productive cause for Darkness as a substance, and as all that we actually see in Darkness is mere *blackness*, it cannot be regarded as a *substance*.

Obj: "In that case, Darkness would be cognised as mere *absence of* light."

Reply: Not so; because any such mere *absence of light* could never appear as *black*, endowed with the positive quality of *black* colour; while as a matter of fact, even at mid-day we see darkness as *black* and moving and pervading over things. Then again, in the case of all perception of *negation* (or absence), we find that it is perceived only when its counter-entity is perceived, and then too, through the negation of its contrary, and as qualification something connected with that

counter-entity; and no *absence* is ever cognised independently by itself. In the case of Darkness on the other hand, we find that at the time that it is cognised, there is no cognition of anything else as its counter-entity; nor is its cognition in the form of a negation. Consequently it cannot be regarded as the mere *absence* of light.

Nor can its preception be regard as one of *light* only; as it is always outwardly cognised as 'darkness' and 'shadow', and *black* in colour (which can never apply to *light* which is by its very nature *white*). For these reasons, we must regard darkness as a particular *colour* (or form) which pervades on all sides, when there is no light. And during the day too, the blackness that is perceived is that enclosed above the eye-ball—as we shall explain later on.

In a case where the absence of light occupies a fixed position, the blackness attaching to that place is cognised as 'shadow.' It is for this reason that we have ideas of *long*, *short*, *large* and *small* with reference to *shadows*; as that which is cognised is the *blackness* extending over the place (and as such capable of being spoken of as 'long' &c)

In case darkness be regarded as mere *absence* (of light), it would be impossible to explain the application of such positive epithets with regard to it. It is with a view to this that we have the declaration—'Experienced people do not regard darkness as mere *absence of light*; specially as the Puranas have spoken of the *blackness of shadow*, as a qualification of the earth. Then again, in regard to *shadows*, we find that it follows in the wake of the body (casting the shadow), and appears as *distant* and *near* *large* and *small*, *moving* and *standing*,—all which would not be possible unless it were a *positive* entity.' It would also be difficult to explain the fact of the shadow being mistaken as a *black snake*; and so also would be the notion of 'moving', which is caused by the cognition of colour; in places where there happens to be an absence of light, the idea of *motion* is due to the moving of the substance that shuts off the light (and casts the shadow).

Similarly the ideas of Distance, Proximity, &c. in connection with Darkness may be explained away (without necessitating the assumption of an independent substance).

In this perception of Darkness, which is a particular form manifested by the absence of light, the perceptive potency must be regarded as resting in the eye independent of the action of any external light; as such perception is always found to be concomitant with such an organ; just in the same way as you regard the *absence of light* as the cause (of the perception of Darkness).

Objection: "Such a theory would be contrary to the *Sūtra* which declares that *darkness must be regarded as the absence of light*, because of the *difference in the manifestation of its substance, quality and action.*"

Reply: There is no contradiction; as Darkness has been spoken of (in the *Sūtra*) as the 'absence of light simply because it is only in the absence of light that it is perceived.

(Mere difference in the number of qualities cannot justify the admission of darkness as a distinct substance by itself; (as God also being endowed with *buddhi*, is accepted as 'self'; and the self with six qualities (*i e.* the supreme Self) is not regarded as wholly distinct from the self with fourteen qualities (*i. e.* the supreme Self) is not regarded as wholly distinct from the self with fourteen qualities (*i.e.* the human self); as any such distinction would be unreasonable in view of the *released human self* (which having become merged in the supreme Self has only six qualities).

NOTES.—Kumarila and his follower *Darkness* (Tamas) to be a distinct substance They argue that the most general and accurate differentia of Substances is that they are endowed with some properties and have some sort of action; and this definition applies to darkness, which being black has the distinct quality of *colour*, and *moves*, thus having a definite action. It cannot be included in any of the nine substances accepted by the *Vaiceshika*. *Vaiceshika* writers in general regard Darkness as mere *absence of light*, and base their rejection of the Mimansaka the theory on the ground that if Darkness had any real colour it would require *Light* for its manifestation. This objection though very plausible on the surface loses its force when we come to look into the matter a little deeper, and find that no Darkness can be percieved unless there is light somewhere to set it off. But it is true that the Eye does not need the aid of light in the perception of darkness. That is the reason why our Commentator has declared it to be a positive quality, perceptible by the eye independently of the aid of light, The *Prabhakaras* hold that Darkness is the *absence of the knowledge of light*. Some extremists have gone to the length of denying Light as a substance and holding it to be an absence of Darkness, which latter they accept as a substance. Some people have put forward *cakti* 'Force' as a distinct substance (*Vide Nyayamuktavali*).

Text (5):—*The qualities are*:—*Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort; these are the seventeen that are directly mentioned in the Sūtra. The word 'ca' (in the Sūtra) however indicates the other seven: viz: Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Faculty, the two-fold invisible Force and Sound. These make up the twenty-four qualities.* (I-i-6).

Commentary.

The seventeen qualities, Colour and the rest, have been distinctly named in the *Sūtra*, and the word '*ca*' indicates the others, Gravity &c., which are ordinarily recognised as 'qualities.' Thus the number of Qualities is twenty-four only. As for the qualities of Bravery, Magnanimity, Compassion, Cleverness, Vanity and the like, all these are included in the aforesaid twentyfour. For instance, Bravery is nothing more than an inclination twards the subjugation of an enemy, even if he be stronger than oneself; Magnanimity consists of the Intellect as always tending towards the right path; Compassion is the desire to alleviate the sufferings of others; Cleverness lies in the Intellect directed towards the real state of things; Vanity consists in an exaggerated idea of one's own greatness; and so forth. The word '*adṛshta*' (*Invisible* Force) includes virtue and vice *dharma* and *adharma*). The word '*Saṁskāra*' (Faculty) includes speed, memory and elasticity.

Obj: "If these words were to include all these qualities, then the number of Qualities would exceed twenty-four."

Reply: Not so; because all these three—*viz.* speed memory and elasticity—belong to the same class of Faculty, and are regarded as one only.

Objection : " In that case, the number of qualities would not be twenty-four; as both Virtue and Vice belonging to the same class of '*Adṛshta*' would also be regarded as one only."

Reply : Not so ; as there is no such class as '*adṛshta*'

Though the Qualities themselves are devoid of qualities (and as such they could not be *qualified* by the number 'twenty-four'), yet they are spoken of as 'twenty-four,'—the number being applied to them indirectly, by reason of their being capable of having distinctive features of their own (the number really belonging to these features, and through them transferred to the Qualities themselves).

NOTES—(1) Quality is defined as 'that which, being neither substance nor action is capable of generalities ; or, that which, while inhering in substances, is devoid of quality and action. Kanada (*Vaiceshikasutra* I-i-16) has defined it as that which inhering in substances, is devoid of qualities, and is an independent cause of conjunctions and disjunctions. It differs from Substance in that, while the latter is capable existing independently by itself. Quality can never exist apart from Substance And though Quality and Action both inhere in Substance, the former is a permanent factor in substances, while the latter is evanescent. "We understand by Quality that which truly constitutes the nature of a thing—what it is,—what belongs to it permanently as an individual or in common with others like it,—not that which passes which vanishes and answers to no lasting judgment. A body falls : it is heavy, that, is *quality*".

(2) We meet with extensive discussions in various works as to the properiety of the twenty-four—fold classification of qualities. But there is a general agreement on the point that all qualities are included, in one way or the other, in those enumerated among the twenty-four.

(3) Qualities are divided—(*a*) into Eternal and Evanescent (*b*) into General and Specific and (*c*) cognisable by one sense, by two senses, or not cognisable by sense organs.

(*a*) Those belonging to eternal substances are eternal, and those in transient substances, evanescent.

(*b*) The General qualities are those that subsist conjointly in two or more substances while the specific quality is that residing in only one substance.

(*c*) The qualities apprehended by single sense-organs are colour, taste, odour and touch ; those cognisable by two sense organs are dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, fluidity and viscidity ; the supersensuous are gravity, adharma, dharma and faculty.

Text (6) :—*Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contracting, Expanding, and Going—these are the only five actions, because of the mention of Going : all such actions as Gyrating, Evacuating, Quivering, Flowing upwards, Transverse Falling, Falling downwards, Rising and the like, being only particular forms of Going, and not forming distinct classes by themselves.* (I-i-7).

The author divides actions ; and lays down their number as *five only.*

In anticipation of the objection that, " there being other actions in the shape of *Gyrating* &c. the limitation of the number to 'five only' is not proper,"—the author adds : '*Going includes &c.* That is to say, by the mention of '*going*' the number of actions becomes limited to five only : In support of this we have the next sentence—'*Gyrating*' *&c.* The sense of this is that in as much as *Gyrating* and the rest also are mere forms of 'Going,' and not distinct classes by themselves, all these become implied by the mention of 'Going'; and as such it is only right that the number should be restricted to 'five' only.

NOTES.—(1) *Karma* has been defined by Kanāda (sutra I-i-17) as that which 'resides only in one substance, is devoid of qualities, and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunctions and disjunctions.'

(2) The five-fold division of Actions is thus explained: " Motion is primarily divided into three kinds according to its direction, namely, *vertical, horizontal,* and *slanting* or *miscellaneous.* " The Vertical Motion may be from below upwards (*utkshepana*), (1) or from above downwards, (*avakshepana*) (1). Horizontal Motion also may be two-fold, motion nearer to one's self (*akuncana*) (3) or motion further from one's self (*prasarana*) (4). All other motions are relegated to the comprehensive class of '*gamana*' (5) [Y. V. Athalye].

Text (7) :—*Of Generality, or Community, there are two kinds ; the Higher and the Lower ; and it serves as the basis of inclusive or comprehensive cognition. The Higher (or Highest) Generality is that of 'Being'; as it is this that extends over the largest number of things ; and also because it is this alone that is a Generality pure and simple, always serving, as it does, as the basis of comprehensive cognitions. The Lower Generalities are 'Substance' and the rest, which exctend over a limited number of things. These latter, being the basis of inclusive as well as exclusive cognitions, are sometimes regarded as Individualities also.* (I-ii-1 to 5).

The author proceeds to explain 'Generality' (*Sāmānya*) :—*It is of two kinds, the Higher and the Lower.* The word '*ca*'

has the restrictive sense, indicating that there are *only two* kinds. The form or nature of Generality is next explained: *It serves as the basis of inclusive cognitions.* That is to say that which leads to the inclusion, in one form, of various totally different objects, is '*Sāmānya*', *Generality* or *Community.*

The Highest Generality is put forward as 'Being'; and the reason for regarding it so is that it extends over and includes a number of things, larger than those included in the Generalities of 'Substance' and the rest. Then again, always forming the basis of inclusive cognition, and never that of exclusive cognition (as there is nothing that is not included in 'Being'), it is 'Generality' always; 'Substance' and the rest, on the other hand, also serving the purpose of the *excluding* or differentiating of things other than those in which they themselves inhere, are Generalities, as well as Individualities. But 'Being' always serves the purpose of inclusion'; and as such it is always Generality. Though it is true that 'Being' differentiates itself from such entities as 'Generalities' and the like, yet it cannot, in any case, exclude or differentiate, from these, the things wherein it inheres: as these—Generality &c.—also are often recognised as 'being' or having an existence in themselves.

Page 12.] It is with reference to positive entities that 'Being' is spoken of as forming the basis of 'inclusive cognition'; hence even though it serves to exclude *non-entities*, that does not in any way militate against its said character.

Some people maintain that we speak of that alone as 'being' which is recognised by the means of cognition, and never of that which is not so recognised; and as such 'being' must be regarded as cognisable by means of the 'means of knowledge.'

But this is not right; as in that case the object in question would have to be regarded as 'without being' (*i.e.* non-existent) before the appearance of the means of cognition; and then, in as much as that which would be non-existent, being like the 'hare's

horn', could never be cognised (by any means), there would be an interdependence between 'being' and the functioning of the means of cognition (as neither could be in operation without the other); and lastly, in as much as it is only an *existing* means of cognition that could apprehend (an object), if *existence* (or *being*) were regarded to be that which is apprehended by these means of cognition, then we would have to postulate an *apprehender* for the apprehending means of cognition also; and this would have to go on *ad infinitum.*

Some people may argue thus: "We do not mean that "*Being* consists in the connection of the means of cognition; "what we mean is that it consists in that form of things "which is capable of connection with the means of cognition. "He also who holds *Being* to be a Generality, will have to "accept the natural form or state of things; as in formless "things, as the hare's horn *f.i.*, *Being* is not found to inhere. "Under the circumstances we might as well rest with the "*nature of things*; what is the use of postulating a '*Being*'?"

To this we make the following reply: The nature of each thing being different from that of the rest, how could there be, on that basis alone, any idea inclusive of them all, or any notion of 'singularity' with regard to them; specially as we could never comprehend any relationship subsisting among an endless number of things? If you admit of any one factor, such as is common to them all, then that is all that we wish.

Obj: "In the case of the cow we find that one who has "seen a cow once, if he happens to see another cow, there "appears in his mind an idea which ressembles his previous "conception of the cow; but in a case where one who has "seen the mountain happens to see a grain of mustard, "certainly the idea appearing in his mind does not in the "least resemble his previous conception of the mountain; "consequently, how could there be any *Generality* (such as "'Being') in the latter case?"

Reply: In the case of the mountain and the mustard, do

you deny all *Generality or Community* because of the absence of an *absolute* similarity between the two objects, or of that of even a *partial* similarity? If the former, then, you should deny the Generality or genus 'cow' also; as in the case of two cows also, there never is an *absolute* similarity,—one, for instance, being black and the other of a chequered colour. If you deny even partial similarity between the mountain and the mustard,—then that is scarcely tenable; as all such objects are always recognised as *similar*, on the ground of their being different from a non-entity. The only difference however is this: in the case of two cows, the idea of their belonging to the same generality or genus comes to the mind quickly, on account of the similarity of many parts of the two bodies; while in the case of the mountain &c., the idea of Generality takes some time to appear,—as the similarities being very slight, the common character is not so easily perceptible; as for instance, when we see a water-jar, it takes some time for us to realise that the earthenware cup belong to the same class of 'Clay' as the jar.

The above sets aside the theory that 'Being' consists in the '*capability of doing some action for a definite purpose*' (*Arthakriyākāritva*). Because that which does not exist having no action, if it were to have an existence on the sole ground of its having an action—in as much as the existence of that *action* would also depend upon another action, there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*,—and then that would mean the non-existence of all things.

'*Substance*' *and the rest constitute the lower Generality.* That is to say, 'Substance,' 'Quality,' and 'Action' are the lower Generalities or classes,—their extensions being smaller in their scope than that of 'Being.' In the same manner, in comparison with 'Substance,' 'Earth' &c. are the lower classes; and still lower down we have the classes of 'jar' and the rest. In comparison with 'Quality,' the lower communities are those of 'Colour' and the like; and similarly 'Throwing

Upwards' is lower in comparison with the more general class of 'Action;' and so forth.

Some people bring forward the following objection: "As a "matter of fact we find that when one perceives fire after "having seen water, he is never cognisant of any sameness (or "similarity) between the two; and as such we cannot admit "of any such class as 'Substance' (to which both of them are "held to belong)."

Page 13.—*Reply*: There is not much weight in this argument; as both fire and water are capable of being cognised by themselves; and the character of 'substance' consists only of this capability of independent cognition. Even in the case of Throwing Upwards &c. we recognise them as *motion*; and it is in this that the cognition of 'Action' consists. In the case of *Colour &c.* also, one, who has subscribed to the convention of naming them, 'Quality' cannot escape the conviction that all of them are included in the term 'Quality'; and this inclusive conviction makes a denial of the class 'Quality' an impossibility. The basis of this conviction lies in the due comprehension of the conventional name, as well as the perception of the particular individual quality; just as for the cognition of *Brahmanahood*, we have a basis in the recognition of the parentage. In the case of this latter, even though the Brahmanahood of one born of pure Brahmana parents is interlaced with his very birth, yet it is not perceptible, as any thing particularly distinguishing him from the Kshatriya and the rest,—by means of the senses alone; because the slight difference is not apparent, being lost in the extreme similarity between the two individual bodies (of the Brahmana and the Kshatriya); but when one comes to know, through tradition, of the pure Brahmana parentage to which the person belongs, then the Brahmanahood comes to be recognised even by the senses (*i. e.* when one's parentage is known, whenever he is *seen*, he is at once *seen*, as a *Brāhmana*). Similarly it is

only a person versed in the science of Generalities who perceives by his senses, the several kinds to which the genus belong, which cannot be done by an ordinary person; but that does not prove that there are no different *kinds* of Generalities; nor can the perception of the learned be denied the character of Perception. Against the recognition of Brahmanahood, some people bring forward the fact of women being naturally unsteady in their virtue, which would make the parentage of the child open to doubt. But this is not right; as the characters of women being duly guarded by all intelligent persons, it could not be at all difficult to ascertain the parentage. Many are the ways that have been laid down for protecting the chastity of women. We desist from any further profitless discussions and counter-discussions.

These classes of 'substance' and the rest, serving the purpose of *differentiating* their own substrates from those of other classes, come to be known as 'Individualities' also, and are not regarded as mere 'Generalities' serving as the basis of inclusive cognition alone. The sense of '*api*' in the Text is that while they are known as 'Generalities,' they are known as 'Individualities' also. The sense of all this is that the name of 'Generality' applies directly to these, as they are all capable of serving as the basis of inclusive cognition, and as such naturally amenable to the definition of 'Generality,'; while the name of 'Individuality' applies to them only *indirectly* (or secondarily, figuratively),—this application being based upon the etymological meaning of the word '*Viçesha*' ('Individuality,' or 'species')—*viz*: that which *differentiates, or specialises,* its substrate from all other things. It may be noted that this etymological meaning applies to the final Individualities or species also.

(1) '*Samanya*' is the abstract noun formed from the word '*Samana*.' 'equal or 'similar'; and thus it stands for the property that tends to make certain things to be regarded as 'Similar'; hence the common characteristic belonging to many individuals. It is for this reason that the word can be rendered only by such words as 'generality' or 'commonality.' The latter word would, perhaps, have been preferable; but it would be an uncommon word to use; hence we have adopted the word 'generality.'

(2) Kanada (Sutra 1—ii—3) has declared that Samanya is '*Buddhyapeksha*,' *i. e.* it depends upon our conceptions; if we conceive of a certain property as belonging in common to many objects, then it becomes a '*Samanya*'; while if we think of it only as an individual property, it becomes a Vicesha or *Specific* property.

(3) Samanya is that which while being eternal *resides in many things*. Thus is has come to be used as synonymous to *Jati*, commonly rendered as 'Class or Genus'; but '*Jati*' is only one form of Samanya which has been called the '*Akhanda*', as distinguished from the '*Sakhanda*,' *Samanya*. The '*Sakhanda Samanya* is also called '*upadhi*' which is distinguished from '*Jati*' in that, while the latter is related to the individual object *directly*, the former is related to it only *indirectly*, or through something else.

(4) All common characteristics do not necessarily constitute so many *Jatis* The conditions which invalidate a *Jati* or said to be these: (*a*) when the object is one only, it cannot be regarded as a 'Class'; *e. g. akaca*, (*b*) mere verbal difference does not constitute difference in class; f. i, '*Ghatatva*' cannot be regarded as a class different from '*Kalacatva*' (*c*) Overlapping cross-division f. i '*bhutatva*' and '*murtatva*,' cannot be accepted as distinct *classes*, (*d*) a *Jati* cannot be regarded as constituting another, '*Jati*'; as that would lead to an endless series of assumptions. F. i. '*Naratvatva* cannot be regarded as a *class*.' (*e*) Qualities that are by their very nature *specific* cannot be regarded as a *class*; as that would be contrary to the nature of things. (*f*) want of proper relationship invalidates any such class as '*Samavayatva*' as the *Samavayas* could not bear the relationship that subsists between the class and the individuals. These therefore are not regarded as *Jatis* but only as *upadhis*.

(5) The difference between '*Jati*' and '*upadhi*' comes to be that while the latter name may be given to any property that belongs to a number of things, one or many, the former can apply to only such as belongs to things more than one, and which is eternal. It is thus that while '*Jati*' can belong to Substances, Qualities and Actions only, '*Upadhi*' can reside in all the six categories The *Jati* of a thing is natural, inborn and hence eternal; while the *Upadhi* is adventitious, circumstantial, and hence evanescent.

Text (*8*): *The ultimate specialising factors inhering in eternal substances are the Individualities. In as much as they serve the purpose of absolute exclusion, they are Individualities, pure and simple.*

Commentary.

Those that are *sure to inhere*, and *in eternal substances alone*, are the Individualities. The qualification '*inhering in eternal substances alone*,' serves to exclude Substance, Quality, Action and Generality; as the former three of these inhere in *substances alone*, but not in *eternal substances only*: and as for Generalities, they are not such as inhere *in substances alone*. The qualification '*sure to inhere in eternal substances alone*' serves to exclude Intellect, Sound and the rest; as these are not such as *must exist in eternal substances alone*; specially as they do not pervade over all eternal substances.

Question.—"Are these Individualities pure and simple, or are they both Individualities and Generalities, like 'Substance' and the rest?"

In answer to this we have the next sentence—*In as much as &c.*—*Khalu* = 'certainly' ; The sense of this is that these Individualities that inhere in eternal substances are always 'Individualities,' and do not ever become Generalities ; and the reason for this is that the only purpose that they ever serve is the exclusion of their own substrates from other things. How this is will be explained later on.

(1) *Vicesha*, Individuality, has got to be postuloted as a distinct category as without some such category there would be nothing whereby we could distinguish one atom from another, or such idividual substances as Time, Space and Akaca from one another, It thus serves the purpose of differentiating one individual substance from another, and also distinguishing itself from all other things. Thus '*Vicesha*' cannot be translated as 'differentia,' ; because while the latter can reside in many substances also, the former can belong to *Individual* substances alone.

(2) The postulating of the *Vicesha* forms a distinguishing feature of the *Vaiceshika* Philosophy, from which the latter derives its name. This theory obviates the necessity of assuming a self-differentiating faculty for each individual substance by providing a common name for all such ultimate differentia.'

(For further discussion, see the section at the end of the book).

Text (9) : *Inherence is the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the character of the container and the contained,—such relationship being the basis of the idea that 'this is in that.'*

Commentary.

The author proceeds to explain the nature of *Inherence*. '*Yutasiddi*' is separate existence, the existence of two relative things apart from each other ; those that have no such separate existence are '*ayutasiddhas*' ; and it is the relationship of these that is known as '*Inherence*' ; *e. g.* the relationship between the Cloth and the Yarns composing it ; though the Yarns have an independent existence of their own, apart from the Cloth (lit inhere in substrates other than the Cloth), yet the mutual relationship between the Yarn and the Cloth is such that they do not bear the relationship of the container and the contained to anything else (*i. e.* have no existence apart from each other). It is only when the two factors are so related that each bears to the other the relationship of the container and the

contained to something other than the other factor, that we have what is known as '*yutasiddhi*'; *e. g.* the relationship between the organ of Touch and the Body, where we find that the Body has an existence in its other parts, apart from the organ of Touch. Consequently the relationship in this latter case, would be one of *Conjunction*, and not of *Inherence*.

In the case of two eternal substances, '*yutasiddhi*' would mean *separate existence, the capability of moving or going separately* ; and those that are devoid of this capability would be '*ayutasidda*' ; and the relationship of these would be what is known as 'Inherence;' *e. g.* the relationship between *Ākāra*, and the general character of 'Substance.'

If Inherence were defined merely as the relationship subsisting between two things that are incapable of separate existence, then the relationship between *Virtue* and *Pleasure*—which is one of cause and effect,—would also become 'Inherence'; as neither of the two has any existence apart from the self wherein both of them inhere. Hence with a view to exclude this, the Text adds—'*standing to one another in the character of the container and the contained*',—which is not added (as some people have supposed) for the purpose of excluding the relationship of *Ākāça* and the *flying bird*; as the latter is excluded by the expression of '*Ayutasiddhi*' (the *Ākāça* having an existence independently of the bird).

In the same manner, the relationship between *Ākāça*, and the word '*Ākāça*'—which is one of the denoter and the denoted—would be mistaken as 'Inherence'; hence with a view to exclude this, the Author adds : 'the basis of the idea of that *this is in that.*' In the case of the relationship of the denoter and the denoted, the idea that we have is that *this word expresses such and such a meaning*, and not that *it is in this.*

In as much as the two qnalifications, '*Ādhārādhāryabhūtānām*' and '*ihapratyayahētuh*,' could not exclude the relationship

between the pit and the fruit fallen in it,—the author has added *'ayutasiddhānām.'*

Some people put forth two alternative explanations of the word *'ayutasiddhi'* (in order to show that its use is not admissible); what they say is this: "Does the word mean that the *two things* are *not recognised as joined together*, or that they are *recognised as not joined together* (but one and the same)? In the former case, what could be their relationship, they themselves being *not recognised?* and in the latter also, what could the relationship be, when they would not be distinct from each other? As it is only when two objects are distinct that they are related, *e. g.* in the case of the *fruit* and the *pit* wherein it falls."

Others do not accept this; and this is what they say: *'Uçutam na siddhan'* does not mean that they are not *fully accomplished* objects; because we do not admit of any Inherence between nonentities. Nor does the compound mean 'recognised as not joined together;' as if the two things were identical, there would be one object only, and not two; as *duality* consists in the negation of identity between two things. In the case of Inherence, the two things are not *one* in reality; as their forms are always recognised as distinct from each other; and "Difference' only consists in the cognisability by two distinct ideas; otherwise there would be no proper differentiation between Difference and Non-difference. Consequently *'Ayutasiddhi'* cannot mean 'identity.'

What the word *'ayutasiddhānām'* actually means is *those that have no substratrum apart from the other correlative.* In this case there would be no discrepancy in the relationship; as there would always be a certain difference in the forms of the two objects; and as between two distinct objects—*e. g.* in the case of *fire* and the *ball of iron*—no mutual contact would be possible, without some sort of a relationship. The only difference however between ordinary relationship and Inherence is this:

It is after it is produced that the fire becomes related to the ball of iron; while in the case of Inherence, it is during the process of production that one thing becomes related to the other by the peculiar nature of the potency of its cause; *e. g.* in the case of the *action of cutting* and the *object cut.* We cut short this discussion here.

Question:—"How is it that only six catagories are mentioned, and not others?"

Answer:—Simply because it is only these six that exist, and no others—this non-exitence being ascertained from the fact of their not being known by any of the means of knowledge exactly like the horns of a hare.

Thus then the general definition applying to the six categories is the *capability of being predicated*; and the following are the specific definitions of each of them: (1) Substance is the substrate of Qualities; (2) Quality is that which has a general character, is devoid of qualities, and which never appears as the independent cause of conjunction or disjunction; (3) Action is that which resides in one substance, is devoid of qualities, and which is the independent cause of Conjunction and Disjunction; (4) Generality is that which serves as the basis of inclusive cognition; (5) Individuality is the basis of absolute differentiation (or exclusion); and (6) Inherence is the relationship of the container and the contained subsisting between two things that have no existence apart from one another.

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(1) The relationship of the container and the contained must be *natural* and not *adventitious* says the *Kiranāvalī.*

(2) "*Samavāya* etymologically means the act of coming together closely, and is therefore used to denote a kind of 'intimate union' between two things which are rendered inseparable". But as the word 'union' conveys the idea of conjunction, and not of inseparability, it has been thought fit to use the word 'Inherence' for '*Samavāya*', specially as this word and its cognates are found convenient in places where the word '*Samavēta* or '*Samavāya*' occur in compounds.

(3) The word '*Ayutasiddha*' means that which is *known* (*siddha*) as *not separate* (*a-yuta*)—the word '*yuta*' being derived from the root '*yu*' to separate.

(4) Though Kanāda (Sutra VII.—ii–26) has defined *Samavāya* as that re-

lationship between the cause and its effects, whereby the one is cognised as residing in the other,—yet later writers have developed the theory to a great extent, applying the name to the following five relationships : (*a*) That between the whole and its parts ; (*b*) between the quality and the substance it qualifies, (*c*) the motion and the moving; (*d*) the individual and the class to which it belongs ; (*e*) the Individuality and the eternal substance wherein it resides.

(5) *Samāvāya* is regarded as eternal and non-producible in order to guard against the *regressus ad infinitum* that would be caused by admitting its productibility which would necessitate the assumption of an endless series of *Samavāya* upon *Samavāya*.

(6) The doctrine of *Samavāya* is very important and may in one sense be said to be the corner-stone of the Nyāya Philosophy. It is the Samavāya that explains the phenomenon of causality as conceived by the Naiyāyikas ; and it is this theory that makes them so intensely realistic in marked opposition to idealistic schools like the "*Vēdānta*" (Athalye).

The Bhātta-Mimansakas, the Vedantis and the Sānkhyas are all opposed to the Samavāya-theory. Çankarācārya in his Bhāshya on the Brahmasūtras II.—ii.—23 in course of his refutation of the atomic theory of the Vaiçēshika which is a necessary corrollary to the Samavāya theory, has found in this the weakest point of the theory and has very strongly put forward the reasoning that there can be no finality in the theory, as it would always be necessary to assume a relationship whereby the *Samavāya* would reside in the *Samavāyi*, the thing related in the *Samavāya* relationship. The Vedanti admits of no union except that of *Sanyoga*, Conjunction, and the relationship between the cause and effect they hold to be one of *identity*. Kumārila has dealt with the theory briefly in his *Çloka-Vartika* (Trans. p. 94); and in one of the *Karikas* he says—"If *Samavāya* is something different from the *class* and the *individual* (that resides in the class by *Samavāya*), then it (that Samavāya) could not exist in them as a relation ; on the other hand if it be identical with them, then these two would be identical—by the law that things that are identical to the same thing are identical to themselves."

Text (10) : *So far we have mentioned the objects without saying anything as to their properties.*

Commentary.

In as much as a treatment of the properties could not be commenced before the objects themselves had been described the Author now proceeds to explain the properties ; and with a view to this, he shows the connection of what has gone before The sense is that in the foregoing portion of the work, we have simply mentioned by name, the objects, without saying anything as to their properties ; and it is these latter that we are going to speak of now.

Though Substance and the rest have had their several subdivisions mentioned, yet, in as much as these too have been mentioned merely by name, these also become included in the "mere mention."

The *Kiraṇavalī* says that the text is in answer to the objection as to why only so many categories have been mentioned, no mention having been made of such others as 'Potency,' 'Similarity' and the like ; the sense of the text being that it is only the *objects* that have been mentioned ; while 'Potency, and the rest are mere properties.

CHAPTER. III.

Similarities and Dissimilarities among Categories.

Text *(11) To all the six categories belong the properties of being-ness, predicability, and cognisability.*

Commentary.

Though the properties are nothing beyond the six categories, and it is these themselves that become objects and properties with reference to another,—yet, in order to show the categories in the character of *objects*, that the text refers to them as 'to all the six categories.'

'*Being-ness*'—*i. e.* the property of existing in a particular form—is common to all the six categories ; as it is the natural form of an object that constitutes its '*being*.'

'*Predicability*'—capablity of being predicated or spoken of also is a form of the thing itself; as it is only the positive form of an object that, under certain circumstances, is known as 'cognisability,' and under others as 'predicability.'

Astitva—Beingness—consists in the fact of the thing being an object of positive cognition, that is to say, in its capability of being perceived independently of any counter-entity.

Predicability—is the capablity of being expressed in words. '*Cognisability*'—capablity of being known.

Though the last two belong to *negations* also, yet all that is meant here is that these belong to the six categories, and not that they do not exist anywhere else. (*Kiranavali*).

Though 'beingness' would seem to belong to Abhāva also, and as such the mention of 'six' categories only would appear incorrect,—yet when we bear in mind the fact that our author has enumerated only six categories, the incongruity ceases ; as to mention 'six' categories, as having 'beingness' is as much as to say that it belongs so *all things*. And any thing that exists is also capable of being 'predicated.'

Text (12): *The character of being dependent (upon some thing else) belongs to all things except the eternal substances.*

Commentary.

By '*āçritatva*'—*being dependent*—is meant the fact of the thing being always perceived as depending upon something else; and this 'dependence' is not of the character of 'inherence.' (That is to say it does not mean that the thing is always found to be *inhering* in something else); because as a matter of fact this character of '*āçritatva*' does not belong to *Inherence*.

"*Except the eternal substances*"—That is to say the character does not belong to the four kinds of atoms, or to *Akāça*, *Time*, *Space*, *Self* and *Mind*.

There are certain people who hold that properties are something absolutely distinct from the objects in which they inhere. For these people, after they have once postulated the property of '*Astitva*' (existence) as the one basis of the single notion of 'being' including all things in the world, it would be absolutely useless to speak of '*sattā*' (Being) as the common property of Substance, Quality and Action alone (as is done below).

As it is not these three alone that have *existence*, and *existence*, as a property, is held by these people to be as distinct from these three as from any thing else,—*Samavāya f. i.*—and the '*astitva*' having afforded the necessary comprehensive notion,—there would be nothing left for which *sattā* could be postulated. If the '*astitwa*' should be distinct with each individual then, there would be no necessity of postulating any such all-comprehensive form as '*astitva*'; as the idea of 'existence' (that a certain thing 'is') could be got at from '*sattā*' (being), and also from the particular '*sattā*' (of each individual thing).

For those however, who hold '*astitva*' to consist in a particular form of a *positive entity*, *sattā* would not be useless; as no *particular form* could ever afford any comprehensive notion of all existing things. Nor would it be unnecessary to postulate

'*astitva*'; as *sattā* could not inhere in anything devoid of a positive form (and it is this positive form that is '*astitva*). And thus in accordance with this view both '*sattā*' and '*astitva*' are found necessary.

Samavāya is a particular form of relationship; and as such being an abstract entity, is one only: and hence it can have no plurality. Nor does it reside in any thing by the relation of inherence. As any such residence would involve the postulating of endless "Inherences."

Text (13): To the five, Substance and the rest, belong the characters of inherability and plurality.

Commentary.

The author now points out the simlarity among Substance, Quality, Action, Community, or Generality and Individuality.

"*Inherability*" *i. e.* existence in a thing by the relation of inherence.

"*Plurality*"—the character of being distinct from one another,—that is to say, having forms differentating them from one another.

If the Author had said merely 'of Substance and the rest it would have included *Inherence* also; hence he restricts the number to '*five*.' If he had said only 'five,' it would not be clear what particular categories were meant, hence he specifies them as '*substance and the rest*.'

That which would be dependent upon some thing else would not be eternal; as to be eternal a thing must be self-sufficient. Hence the character of being dependent upon something else would be common only to noneternal Substances.

Text (14): To the five, Quality and the rest, also belong the character of being devoid of qualities, and that of being without action.

Commentary.

The author now points out the points of simlarity among Quality, Action, Community, Individuality and Inherence.

"*Being devoid of qualities*"—*i. e.* being qualified by an absence of qualities.

"*Being without action*" *i. e.* being qualified by an absence of action.

(As to how *absence*, a negative entity, can be a qualification of a positive entity) a negative entity can serve as the qualification of a positive entity, simply on account of its bringing about a qualified cognition, exactly in the same way as a positive entity can qualify a negative one; *e. g.* we have such an idea as '*aghaṭam* bhūtalam' [the '*jar-less* place,' where '*jarlessness*,' a negative entity, qualifies the positive entity 'place'.]

Question: "As there is no relationship between a positive and a negative entity, how could a negative entity serve as the qualification?"

Answer: There is no doubt that we have such a qualified cognition (as '*aghatam bhūtalam*'); and on the strength of this notion we could assume the necessary relationship, if you consider it absolutely necessary for the qualification to be related to the qualified.

According to the *Vaiçēshikas*, a quality can reside in Substances only. At first sight it appears difficult to see the correctness of this notion; as we often make use of such expressions as 'bright colours,' 'pleasant taste' &c. where qualifications of *brightness* and *pleasantness* are found to be spoken of with reference to *Colour* and *Taste*, which are qualities. But what the Vaiçēshika will say is that the lightness or pleasantness has for its substrate, the bright-coloured *Substance*, and not the *colour*.

By 'Action' here is meant chiefly *motion*; and there can be no motion apart from a Substance.

Text (15): To the three, Substance and the rest, belong the relationship with Being, the character of having Communities and Individualities, that of being denoted by the word 'artha' as a technicality of the Vaiçēshika system, and that of being the cause of virtue and vice.

Commentary.

The three, Substance, Quality and Action, are related to the class 'Being,' by the relationship of Inherence (*i. e.* the three inhere in that class); and this constitutes one point of simlarity among them. As to how these are related to Being, we have

already explained that under *Text* 7. What we have got to deal with here is the following. —

Question: "Is the *relationship with Being* with something that *is*, or with that which *is not*? If the former, then, in as much as this thing will already have an *existence* (*a being*) before the relationship of 'Being,' there would be no use for this latter; while in the other case, the thing being non-existing we could have *Being* even in such non-existing things as the hare's horn."

The reply to this is that in the case of eternal things we do not admit of any *precedence* or *sequence* (and hence there can be no such specification as '*before* or *after* the relationship of Being with regard to eternal objects; while in the case of non-eternal (transitory) things, it is actually the *previous non-existence* that serves as the (instigative) cause of the *being* (or coming into existence of that thing) [*i. e.* it is only what does not exist at all that can be brought into existence].

Nor could this apply to the case of such absolute non-entities as the 'hare's horn' and the like; as we do not know of anything having the power of *bringing into existence* any such thing (so in the case of these the *previous non-existence* could have no causal efficiency).

There is another point of similarity among Substance, Quality and Action; *It is the character of having communities and individualities*: In as much as the generic classes of substance and the rest serve as the basis of inclusive (or comprehensive) as well as of exclusive cognitions, they are spoken of as 'Communities' and 'Individualities;' and it is to these three classes of 'Substance,' 'Quality' and 'Action' that belong the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action.

The character of being denoted by the word 'artha' as a technicality of the Vaiçēshika system. The doctors of the Vaiçēshika system have a conventional technicality among themselves, that the word '*artha*' should be taken as

denoting Substance, Quality and Action; and it is for this reason that these three are also spoken of by means of the word '*artha*' without any prefix or affix.

The character of being the cause of Virtue and Vice. These three are the causes that bring about virtue and vice. For instance, earth (Land which is a substance) when given away becomes the source of virtue, while when taken away (forcibly) gives rise to vice; similarly *Conjunction* or Contact (which is a *Quality*) is a source of virtue (or purity) when appearing in connection with the cow, and a source of vice (or impurity) when happening in connection with dead human bones; so again 'going' (which is an *Action*) is a source of virtue (purity) when it is towards a sacred place, and a source of impurity, when tending towards a grogshop. Other similar instances may be cited. In the expression *Dharmādharmakartṛtvam*' the affix '*tva*' indicates that substances have an inherent faculty in themselves, of producing Virtue and Vice.

It might be argued that in this way 'class' (which is *Sámanya*) also could be shown as the cause of vritue and vice. But the function of a class is restricted to the differentiation of its substratum from those of other classe ; and its existence being fully justified by this, we do not refer any other to it.

For the distinction made between '*Astitva*,' '*Sattāsambandha*' and '*Svātmasattva*'—see note under Text (19).

(Text 16):—The character of being an effect and that of being non-eternal, belong only to those (Substances, Qulities and Actions) that have causes.

Commentary.

Those things that have a productive cause,—such for instance as Substance and the rest—have the common character of *being an effect* and *being non-eternal.*

Some people have defined *'being an effect'* as *inherence in the cause* or *inherence in 'Being' prior to non-existence.* But none

to these is correct; as of none of these would apply to 'Destruction' which is as good an *effect* as anything else. Hence we must define the character of *effect* as consisting in the fact of its having its existence (manifestation or appearance) dependent upon the action of a cause: as this is the definition that is found to apply to all effects.

'*Non-eternality*' has been defined by some as *existence qualified by previous non-existence and subsequent destruction.* But this is not correct; for the simple reason that 'non-eternality' is never known in this form; in ordinary parlance what people understand by 'non-eternal' is *destructible*; and they do not understand it as qualified by any sort of *existence.*

Others again define it as *liability to production and destruction.* But there is not much in this definition either; as *Prāgabhāva* (Previous non-existence, which is *non-eternal)* is never *produced.*

For these reasons we must accept *non-eternality* to consist of the *destruction of the particular form of the thing;* as has been declared elsewhere—"Non-eternality is said to be the action of destruction in general." Though there is no destruction at the time that the thing is actually existing, yet (there could be nothing objectionable in having *destruction* as its qualification, as) we do admit of *destruction* as the qualification of a thing, when its possibility is proved by other means of knowledge than direct perception (even though it may be not actually perceptible at the time). And as a matter of fact we do find one and the same man cognising the *jar* (an entity) *as non-eternal*; similarly also, such notions as—'the destructible body,' 'the unpermanent objects'—are very common. [In all these cases the object itself is what is directly perceived, the qualification being always recognised by other means of knowledge.]

Text (17) :—*The quality of being the cause belongs to all* (Substances, Qualities and Actions) *except the 'atomic measure' &c.*

Commentary.

The *etcetera* includes—(1) the dimension of the diad, (2) the omnipresence of *Ākāça*, Time, Space and Self, (3) the 'final' sound, (4) the dimension of the mind, (5) Posteriority and Priority, (6) Dual Separateness, and (7) Dimension of the ultimate bodied substance. Barring these, to all Substances, Qualities and Action, belongs the character of the cause material and non-material.

Though Substance is never the *non-material* cause, and Qualities and Actions never appear as *material* causes,—yet the similarity spoken of consists in the fact of these appearing as causes *other than the Instrumental.*

NOTES :—Under '*Pārimāṇḍalya*,' the *Kiraṇāvalī* includes the following :—(1) The Largest Dimension, (2) The colour, Taste, Odour, Touch and Dimension, of the ultimate bodied substance, (3) Dual separateness, (4) Distance, (5) Proximity, (6) The Conjunction, Disjunction, Speed and Action of substances in the state of destruction, (7) The Final sound, (8) The Final Faculty, or potency.

Parimāṇas : Dimensions have the nature of causing or bringing about a *parimāṇa* or dimension of a degree higher than themselves ; and it is for this reason that no ultimate *Parimāṇas* can ever be causes.

Cause.—That is the cause, on the existence of which something else exists, and on the non-existence of which this latter does not exist. (*Nyāyavārtika* p. 24.) Causes are of two kinds—Principal and Secondary. To the former kind belong the three classes of cause—*viz.* (1) the *Samavāyi* or material cause, as the atoms of the universe, (2) the *asamavāyi*, or non-material cause, *e. g.* the *conjunction of the atoms*, and (3) the *nimitta* or Instrumental cause, *e. g.* God's wish to create. This according to the *Naiyāyika* and the *Vaiçeshika*.

The Vedānti admits of only two kinds of cause—(1) the *nimitta*, *e g.* Brahma of the universe ; (2) the *upādāna* or material cause *e. g.* the atoms directly, and Brahma indirectly. According to the Sānkhyas, Prakrti is both the *nimitta* and the *upādāna kāraṇa* of the universe. It may be remarked in passing that the *nimittakāraṇa* includes the 'efficient' 'Formal' and 'final' cause of Aristotle, as the *Upādāna* or *Samavāyi Kāraṇa* includes his 'material' cause.

Text (18) : The character of subsisting in substances (belongs to Substances, Qualities and Actions) *with the exception of the eternal substances.*

Commentary.

Question.—"It has been said before that *dependence* belongs to the six (categories); and as such the present sentence would appear to be a useless repetition."

In answer to this some people explain that what is spoken of here is *dependence on, or subsistence in, substances.* But this explanation is not satisfactory; as such existence in substances would belong to Generality and the rest also ; and hence the sentence in question could not be rightly taken as showing a point of similarity between Substance, Quality and Action only.

Hence we must explain the sentence in the following manner : In the clause '*anyatra nityadravyēbhyah*', the word '*dravya*' should be taken as including also the ultimate Individualities of these ; the sense of the sentence thus comes to be this : the character of subsisting in Substances *alone* is common to the three (Substance, Quality and Action), with the exception of the eternal substances and the Individualities of these.

NOTES :—The '*Subsistence*' here spoken of indicates that these have Substance for their inherent or material cause. And the meaning is that this is a character that is common to all substances, qualities and actions, except those substances and qualities that are eternal. The presence of '*ca*' in the Text indicates another common character, which consists of their having qualities for their non-material causes ; this character also is common to all substances, qualities and actions, except those that are eternal, and also the first conjunction and disjunction. *Kiranāvalī.*

Text 19 : *The three beginning with Generality have the character—of having their sole being within themselves, having Buddhi or the Cognitive Faculty as their sole indicator, of not being an effect, of not being the cause, of having no particular generalities, of being eternal, and of not being expressible by the word* '**artha**.' (I—ii—10,12,14,16,3; VII—ii—26).

Commentary.

The existence of Generality, Individuality and Inherence, lies in their own individual specific forms, and not in any relationship to any such generic entity as 'Being.' What is meant by this is that these three categories have the common character of being devoid of any generalities. This is accepted because of the absence of any notions to the contrary. Nor can there be any such Generality as 'Being' in Generality itself, as the consequences of such a postulate would be very undesirable (as the presence of a Generality in Generality would lead to an un-

necessary *regressus ad infinitum*, an endless series of Generalities.)

In the case of Individualities (Ultimate Individualities) also, if we had any Generality applying to them, in as much as there would always be a doubt as to the particular Generality to which a number of Individualities with similar properties would belong, it would be necessary to follow up the series of Individualities, step by step; and this would lead us to an endless series of these individualities.

So also in the case of Inherence, if we accepted any such Generality as 'Being' applying to it, we would have to postulate another relation of inherence by which the Inherence would be related to that Being; and so on and on it would be necessary to postulate Inherences *ad infinitum*, which would be far from desirable.

In the case of the classes '*Gotva*' and the like, the connection of 'Being' naturally ceases, on the cessation of the connection of these classes with any sub-classes under them; as any connection with 'Being' would only form part of a connection with these sub-classes.

Question: "If what is said above is true, then, how is it that with regard to Generality &c., we have the notions of 'Being' (*sattā*) [*i. e.* How do you account for the notion that the *Generality exists* ?]"

Answer: This notion is due to the fact of *sattā* (Being) being imposed upon them, through their common character of having their existence in themselves.

"Well, in that case, the imposition would be a false one."

Certainly; who says it is not so? Any notion of singleness with regard to a number of distinct things cannot but be false. What is not false, is the perception of the form of the thing; as this is always real.

"In that case, even in the case of Substance &c. we might take the inclusive generic notions of singleness as being due to an unreal imposition of *Being*."

That cannot be; as we cannot accept a thing to be indirectly imposed, when we find it applying directly; nor can this connection with 'Being' be said to apply *directly* to the case of Generality &c. (and indirectly to the case of Substance); as we have distinct notions to the contrary precluding such a connection; while there are no such preclusive notions in the case of Substance &c.

Having Buddhi as their sole indicator: *i. e.* their only proof lies in the Intellect; that is to say in a matter of dispute as to whether or not Generality &c. exist, our only criterion lies in the Intellect; whereas for the existence of Substance and the rest, we would have other grounds for our belief—in the shape of the effects brought about by these, for instance.

Some people explain '*buddhilakshaṇa*' as that *these are cognised by means of Buddhi alone*. But this is not right; as Substance and the rest are also cognised by means of *Buddhi*; and as such this could not be a point of dissimilarity between Generality &c. on the one hand and Substance and the rest on the other.

Not being an effect—i. e. having an existence independently of any causes. This character, in the case of Generality, is recognised, like invariable concomittance, by means of sense-perception itself,—which perceives the existence of that Generality, before, after and also during the continuance of the Individual,—which is also found to help in the non-perception of any cause,— and which is aided by a faculty or tendency of the mind brought about by the frequent perception of the said facts. Inherence also is recognised as a non-effect, because with regard to it we have no notions as to its appearing before, or after, or along with (the thing related to it). If the Inherence of the cloth were possible before the cloth, then, in as much as one member of the relationship (*viz.* the cloth) would not be existing at the time, wherein could the relationship (*viz.* Inherence) abide? If it were to be produced along with the cloth, then, in that case, the cloth would lose the character of being

the substrate of that relationship (of Inherence). If it appeared after the cloth, then too the cloth would not be its substrate. Nor would it do for the effect (Inherence) to be without a substrate. For these reasons, it must be admitted that Inherence is *not caused*. As for the Individualities, their non-causedness is proved by the argument that they are uncaused, because they are entities other than Substances, Qualities and Actions,—like Generality and Inherence.

Not being the cause : *i.e.* they never appear as either material or non-material causes. This negation does not apply to the Instrumental cause, as Generality &c. are accepted to be the Instrumental causes of Buddhi (Cognition).

Having no particular Generalities i. e. having no Subclasses. There is no further Generality in the case of *Generality* itself; as the acceptance of any such would lead to an endless number of Generalities. Then as for Individuality and Inherence, we have already shown how there can be no generalities of these.

Question : "In that case how is it that we have the single inclusive notion of 'Generality,' applying to all Generalities ?"

Answer : This notion is due to the fact of the inherence, in one Generality, of many individuals,—a fact which is quite extraneous to the real character of a Generality.

The use too of the word 'one' with reference to Individualities is due to the possibility of every thing being capable of giving rise to notions of exclusion.

Eternality.—Indestructibility. This too, in the case of Generality is ascertained, like invariable concomittance, by pure sense-perception, which is found to function frequently with regard to the presence of the generality among a number of appearing and disappearing individual things. As for Inherence, its eternality is inferred from the presence of its effects everywhere, and also from the fact of its being *uncaused*.

Not being expressible by the word 'artha'—i. e. by the word as used technically in the *Vaiçēshika* system.

NOTES :—"*Buddhilakshaṇatva*"—The 'buddhi' here meant are the notions of *exclusion* and *inclusion*. *Kiranāvali*.

It will be noted that the author makes a distinction between '*Astitva*,' '*Sattāsambandha*' and '*Svātmasattva*.' He says that '*Astitva*' belongs to all the six categories (*Text*. 2); '*Sattāsambandha*' to Substance, Quality and Action only (*Text*. 15); and '*Svātmasattva*' to Generality, Individuality and Inherence. The difference is not very easy of comprehension. Udayanācārya in his *Kiranāvali* says that, (1) '*Astitva*' consists in the capability of being cognised as a positive entity by itself,—not being dependent upon the cognition of the counter-entity ; for instance, a negative entity, the absence of the jar, can only be cognised as the negative of the jar ; (2) '*Sattāsambandha*' consists in the subsistence of 'being' by the relation of *inherence* ; and (3) '*Svātmasattva*' is existence by itself, self-sufficient existence, not dependent upon the subsistence of 'Being.'

This distinction appears to be merely verbal. Çankara Miçra is a little more clear, in his *Upaskāra* : '*Sattāsambandha*' he explains as destructibility, capability of producing products out of its own material, producibility. From this it would seem that—(1) '*Astitva*' is what we mean by 'existence' in general—this naturally belongs to all the six categories ; (2) '*Sattāsambandha*' is that existence which is due to the presence of the Generality of 'being,' induced by some other cause, and liable to destruction,—this by its very nature can belong to only such of the categories as are transient ; and these as we know are Substance, Quality and Action; (3) '*Svātmasattva*' is self-sufficient existence, independent of all other things,—and this can belong only to the eternal categories.

Text (20) *All the nine, Earth and the rest, have the character of*—(1) *belonging to the class 'Substance,'* (2) *self-productiveness or bringing about effects in themselves,* (3) *having qualities,* (4) *being not destructible by their causes and effects, and* (5) *being connected with ultimate Individualities.* (I-i-9, 10, 12, 15, 18, 5 ; X-ii-1, 2.)

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to point out the points of similarity among the substances.

It is Earth &c. alone that have a connection with the generic class 'Substance.' The particle '*api*' shows that all the nine Substances have this character. This qualification also serves as the character differentiating the category of Substance from the other categories, and it also shows the actual denotation of the word 'Substance.'

Objection : "'*Dravyatvayoga*' (Connection with the class 'substance') means 'inherence in the class *substance*'; and in as much as this *inherence* belongs to all the five categories (of Substance, Quality, Action, Generality and Individuality), how could it serve as the differentia of Substances alone ?"

To this, some people make the following reply: Though Inherence in all places, is one and the same, yet in as much as in the case in question, it is qualified by the *class 'substance,'* it serves as the differentia of Substance. As for instance, we find that in the case of Ākāça, which is one and all pervading, different functions are attributed to it, as conditioned by the limitations of the Ear and the like.

But both the question and the reply given are equally unsatisfactory. The 'connection' (of the class *Substance*) is not the differentia of Substance, in the same way as *Ākāça* is of the *Ear*; in fact it is the *class 'Substance'* (*Dravyatva*) which is the differentia; and the word '*yoga*' (connection) has been added simply because the class, when unconnected, could not serve as the differentia; and all that is meant by this is that the *existence* (or presence) of the character ('substance') in the object (substance) is pointed out. Thus then the differentiation indicated would be thus expressed: 'The Earth and the rest differ from other things, because they belong to the class *Substance*,—those that do not differ from those things are not found to belong to that class,—*e. g.* Colour etc. Hence we conclude that both the objection and the reply are equally untenable.

Page 21.] The author points out another similarity among the substances: *Bringing about effects within themselves*—*i. e.* producing such effects as inhere in themselves.

Having Qualities—*i. e.* being related to qualities.

These last two characteristic are the points of dissimilarity between Substance and Quality etc. as they are not found anywhere else except in substances.

Being not destructible by their causes and effects,—in the case of Qualities we find that the first sound is destroyed by the second sound; sometimes it is destroyed by the cause *e. g.* the last sound by the last but one sound; Action too is sometimes destroyed by an effect,—*e. g.* (motion is destroyed) by

a subsequent contact with something else; Substances however are not thus destroyed, either by their cause or by their effect; and hence they are spoken of as *not destructible by their causes and effects*. As for the eternal substances, there is no cause; nor is there any destruction; hence for these there naturally is no destruction by the cause; and as for the transient substances, though for these, both cause and destruction are possible, yet their destruction is not by their cause, but by something altogether apart from themselves.

NOTE:—We may regard this Text as supplying the Praçastapāda's definition of 'Substance.'

Not destructible by causes and effects—

In the case of Qualities, of sound for instance, we find that when one sound produces another it is destroyed by this latter; and in the case of Action also we find that when it brings about its effect in the shape of the contact of its substratum with another point in space, it is destroyed by this contact. Substances on the other hand are never destroyed by any of their effects or causes; whenever they are destroyed, their destruction is due to the destruction of their causes.—*Kiranāvalī prakāça*.

'Guṇavattva'—Western philosophers have also defined 'Substance' as "the existence to which qualities belong.' Aristotle defines it as the substratum. Says Locke—"The idea to which we give the general name *Substance*, being nothing but the supposed and unknown support of these qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist .....without something to support them, we call that support *Substantia*. (*Essay*—II-xxiii—2).

Berkeley denies the existence of any such support or substratum for qualities which, being mere sensations, require no other support than the mind that perceives them. Kant admits the validity of this argument; but while denying the notion of *Substance* as the substratum of qualities, he regarded it to be necessary as a category of thought, providing for the unity of the qualities themselves, he proves its existence as one of those Categories without which no experience would be possible.

The Scottish Philosophers reassert the dual Substance of Descartes, and hold the existence of a *Spiritual* and *Material* Substance. The Vaiçeshikas, rightly regarding the Soul as a Substance—a substratum of qualities—appear to be the originators of this dual conception of *Substance*.

Text (21):—The character of not being dependent and that of being eternal, belong to all (Substances) except those that are made up of certain constituent parts.

Commentary.

'Not being dependent' is *not inhering in anything*. *'Eternality'* is *'Indestructibility.'* These two are the points

of similarity among substances; but not among all substances; as they belong to all '*except those that are made up of certain constituent' parts.* That is to say, barring such substances, all substances have the character of being endowed with ultimate Individualities, of being independent, and of being eternal.

The implication of the particle '*ca*' is that Earth etc. have for their common characters, not only those pointed out in the last text, but also the two mentioned in the present one.

Text (22):—*To Earth, Water, Fire, Air, *Soul and Mind, belongs the character of being many, and also that of having lower or less extensive generalities.*

Commentary.

The author shows the points of similarity and dissimilarity among the various Substances.

Being many i. e. having many individuals, each distinct by itself.

Having lower or less extensive generalities i. e. having suc series of classes as 'Earth', ('Jar') and so forth.

NOTE:—The Kiranāvalī remarks that another property common to these is the capability of having *Sanskāra* or faculty.

Text (23):—*To Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Mind, belong the character of having actions, being corporeal, having distance and proximity, and having speed.* (V-ii-1 to 7, to 14; V-1-17; VII-2 21.)

Commentary.

Action i. e. such actions as *Throwing up* and the like.

Being corporeal i. e. having limited dimensions.

Distance etc. i. e. Presence of Distance, Proximity and Speed or Momentum.

Objection: "In as much as all ideas of *Distance* and *Proximity* would be explained as following from the largeness

* Henceforth we shall translate the word 'ātmā' by the word 'soul'; as in the sense of the *Jivātmā* at any rate, 'soul' is more easily intelligible to English readers than 'self.'

or smallness of the extent of the conjunction of connected things, there can be no ground for postulating any such independent qualities as 'Distance' and 'Proximity'."

Page 22] *Reply*:—This cannot be; because as a matter of fact, we have no idea of 'Distance' and 'Proximity,' even when, in the case of two things connected with two separate directions, there are comparative largeness and smallness of the conjunction of connected things; and even where there is an appearance of the ideas of distance and proximity with reference to the body of the looking person. (That is to say where the person is in the middle and the two things on two sides of him.)

"But we have such a notion when the two things are on one and the same side of the person."

True; but even in that case, there is something over and above the mere largeness and smallness of the extent of conjunction; as until there be some such distinct object, no distinct and new idea would be possible.

Speed is a distinct quality, and not a mere series of actions, as we have no idea of *Speed* in the case of slow motion (though even in this latter case the series of actions remains just the same).

It might be argued that the idea of Speed is based upon the extremely quick appearances of the moments of action. But it is not so; as in the case of the whirling fire-brand, where the moments of motion are appearing and disappearing very quickly, we have no perception of the moments of the action; and yet we have the notion of Speed. Even in ordinary parlance we find people making a distinction between *speed* and *action*; *e. g.*, we find people saying 'he goes with speed.'

NOTE:—The *Kiranāvalī* takes 'action' to be the act of *motion* (*spanda*); and 'corporeality' to consist in the presence of limited extension in space. If this latter explanation were not added, it would be difficult to see how water, air and mind are corporeal. The mind is *atomic*, and as such of a limited extension in space. If no motion belonged to mind, no perception would be possible; as in all acts of perception, the mind *moves* up to the particular sense-organ concerned.

Text (24) :—*To Ākāça, Time and Space, belong the characters of—being all-pervasive, having the largest dimensions, and being the common receptacle of all corporeal things.*—(VII-i-22, 24, 25.)

Commentary.

The context shows that by '*all*' in *all-pervasive* are meant all composite material substances, mentioned above. Hence 'all-pervasive' would mean that *Ākāça* etc., have connection with all composite material substances, and not that they '*go*' *everywhere;* because these are devoid of all motion.

'*Largest dimensions*' *i. e.*, they have dimensions that cannot be measured ; *i. e.*, they are illimitable.

'*Being the common receptacle of all corporeal things*,' that is to say, *Ākāça* is the one receptacle or substratum of all composite material substances.

The same explanation will apply to the case of Space and the rest.

Though as a matter of fact *Ākāça*, etc., do not actually appear as the receptacle of material things, yet, being the receptacle of all *conjunction*, they are figuratively spoken of as the receptacle also of all *conjunct* (material, composite) things. It is on this account that this qualification differs from 'all-pervasiveness'—which means that they have a *connection with all things* ; while what the last expression means is that they are the *receptacle* etc.

NOTE :—The Kiraṇāvalī says that '*ca*' indicates the absence of *Action, Distance, Proximity* and *Speed.*

Text (25) :—*To the five beginning with Earth, belong the characters of—being material, being the main material principle of the sense-organs, and being endowed with such specific qualities as are each perceptible by each of the external organs of perception.*—(VIII—ii—5, 6).

Commentary.

The author now shows the points of similarity among Earth, Water, Fire, Air and *Ākāça*, with a view to differentiate them from the other substances.

"*Being material*"—*i. e.*, being expressed by the word *bhūta*' ('material substance'). This single word '*bhūta*' is applied to these Earth etc., even in the absence of any common ground for such denotation ; just as the word '*aksha*' which denotes a *dice*, the *sense-organs*, the *bibhītaka* fruit and many other things, simply through the general characters of these things,—in the same manner the word '*bhūta*' is made by convention to apply to the Earth etc ,—such application being based upon the general characters of "Earth," "Water," etc ; as for *Ākāça*, which is one only, the application of the word is based upon the individual alone ; and the denotability (of *Ākāça*) by this word is due to certain limiting conditions (of verbal convention) ; just as the idea of the word '*aksha*' is with regard to the *dice* and other things.

Page 23]. *Being the main material principle of the sense-organs* : that is the Earth etc. form the main principles of the particular organs of sense.

Objection :—" The sense-organs cannot be said to have the material substances for their main principles ; as these organs are found to operate without getting at the objects of perception, while it is a characteristic of all material things that they can operate upon an object only when they *get at* it, and not otherwise ; as we find in the case of the Lamp."

Reply :—This is not right ; as the sense-organs do not perceive things that are hidden from them (*i. e.*, things lying behind certain obstructions). If the sense-organs were operative without actually getting at the objects,—then they could perceive things behind the wall also, as non-approach in this would exactly be similar to that in the case of a thing directly in contact with the organ.

Objection :—"The non-perception of the hidden object may be said to be due to the absence of capability, either in the sense-organ or in the object to be perceived."

Reply :—As for the sense-organ, its capability, in the shape of an ability to perceive objects, is already present, as is shown by the fact of its perceiving, at that very time, things that are not hidden. Then as for the object, its capability consists in its largeness, in its being made up of many constituent substances; and the presence in it of a particular form and colour, does not cease to exist, on its being hidden; and as for its being *before the sense-organ*, this too remains the same, (even on the interception of the wall).

The following argument may be brought forward: "*The absence of obstruction* forms one of the causes of the perception of an object; just as the *absence of conjunction* is in the case of *falling*; and certainly when there is an obstruction (in the shape of the wall), *the absence of obstruction* would naturally cease to exist; and as such, the cause of perception being wanting, there would be no perception."

But there is not much in this argument either, as an obstruction is found to retard the perception of only such things as are perceptible to the touch. For instance, an umbrella is found to retard or throw off only the falling drops of water or the rays of the sun; and it does not merely remove its own absence.

Thus then, we easily get at the following inference: The eye illumines that which it gets at,—(1) because it does not illumine that which is hidden, as we find in the case of the lamp; or (2) because it is an external sense-organ,—like the organ of touch.

Question—"In that case how is it that we have a perception of distant objects."

Answer—That perception is due to the proximity (or contact) of the object with the rays of light. That is to say, the

rays of light proceeding from the eye, which have no manifested colour or touch, reach to a certain distance and there apprehend the object. And thus the sense-organ being found to be the illuminator of things large as well as small, why should not they be accepted as *material*? specially as such illumination is quite possible by means of the rays (proceeding from the eye) just as in the case of the lamp. The fact is that in a case where many particles of the rays come in contact with the object and its many particles, we have a clear perception of the object, because of the sense apprehending the object along with all its peculiarities; on the other hand, in a case where the rays come in contact only with certain parts of the object, the perception is not quite clear, as what is apprehended in this case is the object qualified only by its generic character.

Objection—"That which moves (as you hold the rays to do) is always found to get at things near and remote, gradually (i. e. one after the other); how is it, then, that we have a perception, at one and the same time, of the branch of a tree, and also of the moon?"

Reply—As a matter of fact, there is no actual similiarity in the perception of the tree and the moon; the gradual stages are not perceived on account of the extremely swift functioning of the sense-organ; just in the same manner as we are not cognisant of any gradual stages of time in the piercing, by means of a needle, of a hundred lotus leaves of the lotus flower; so the notion of simultaneity in such cases must be regarded as a mistake.

Objection :—"If the sense-organs be held to get at the objects, there could be no such perception as that *this is separated or removed* (at a distance)."

Reply :—Not so; as this perception is capable of another explanation. The relationship of the senses being imperceptible by the senses, the ideas of separation or non-separation, cannot be due to the presence or absence, of that relationship; they must be due to the presence or absence of the relationship of the

body. Thus then, in a case where we have the perception of an object that is in contact with the body, we have the idea that *the object is not separated from (near) us;* when however the perceived object is not in contact with the body, wehave the idea that *it is separate* (at a distance).

Page 24.] *Being endowed with etc.*, That is to say the Earth &c., are endowed with such specific qualities, like *Colour* and the rest, as are capable of being perceived by each of the external sense-organs, the eye &c., In as much as these qualities are all perceived by the internal organ (mind), they could not be spoken of as perception by each *one of the organs*; hence the word 'external' has been added (which excludes the internal organ). The expression 'each one' has been added with a view to describe the real forms of the qualities.

NOTE:—"*Indriyaprakṛti*" is explained by the *Kiraṇāvalī* as being the material cause of the sense-organs.'

Text (26):—*To the four belong the characters of—being the material or component cause of substances, and of being perceptible by touch.*—(II—i—1 to 4; I—i—23)

Commentary.

Earth, Water, Fire and Air, have the property of being the material or component cause of things; and this is a natural capability inherent in these.

NOTE:—The *Kiraṇāvalī* points out other similar properties, in the shape of—(1) the amenability to elasticity, (2) the capability of producing the body and the senseorgans &c. But the latter does not seem to differ from what we have in the text, spoken of as '*dravyārambhakatā*.'

Text (27):—*To the three, the characters of—being perceptible by the senses, having colour, and having fluidity.*—(II—i—1, 2, 3, 6. 7).

Commentary.

The three, Earth, Water and Fire, have—the character of being perceived by the means of cognition operating through

the sense-organ. This is what is meant by '*perceptible by the senses*,' which does not mean that they are endowed with such causes of perceptibility as *grossnes* and the like; as in that case the mention of 'colour' would be a useless repetition.

Objection:—"Peceptibility belongs to the Soul also (and then why should only three be spoken of as as *perceptible*)"?

Reply:—True; but only three have been spoken of as *perceptible*; as what is meant here is perceptibility *by the external organs* of sense (while the Soul is perceived by the internal organ only).

Text (28):—*To the two, the character of having gravity and taste.*—(II—i—1, 2; V—i—7, 18; V—ii—3).

Commentary.

The 'two' *e. g.* Earth and Water in as much as these alone have gravity they are spoken of as 'heavy.'

The '*ca*' means that it is common to them, along with the quality of having Taste.

Text (29):—*All material substances and the Souls have the character of having specific qualities.*

Commentary.

The "material substances" *i. e.*, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and *Ākāça*.

"*Specific qualities*" are thoss qualities, of colour &c., which tend to specify or distinguish their substrates from other things. Such qualities are present only in the five material substances and in the Souls.

Page 25.] Text (30):—*Earth, Water and the Souls have the fourteen qualities.*—(II—i—1, 2, 6; IV—i—11; V—i—17, 18, 7; III—ii—4, 20, 21; II—ii—5, 2; V—ii—1, 3 to 6, 8, 11; IX—ii—6; VII—i—2.)

Text (31):—*Ākāça and the Souls have such specific qualities as last only a single moment and exist only over certain parts of their substrates.*

Commentary.

In as much as specific qualities in general belong to Earth &c., also, the author, with a view to preclude these, has added—'*such as exist only over certain parts of their substrates.*' Then again, these specific qualities are such as are quickly destroyed; and it is this character of these that is expressed by the word '*Kshaṇika*' (lasting only a single moment).

NOTE :—*Have the fourteen qualities* :—The similarity here meant is only one in the number of qualities. It only means that the things spoken of have only *fourteen* qualities, and not that each of them has the same qualities; that is to say whatever the qualities may be, the number of these cannot be more or less than fourteen—(*Kiraṇāvalī*).

The specific quality of *Ākāça* is *sound*, and that of Soul consists of Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire &c. &c.

Text (32):—*Space and Time have the common character of having five qualities, and that of being the instrumental cause of all that has an origin.*
(II—ii—8, 12, 9; II—i—31; VII—i—24, 25; VII—ii—22)

Commentary.

To Space and Time belong the five qualities—Number, Dimension, Isolation or Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction.

The similarity of these two does not rest only in the possession of these five properties; another point of similarity consists in the fact of both of these being the instrumental cause of all such things as have an origin (*i. e.* all products).

Objection:—"How are we to believe that Time and Space are the instrumental cause of all caused things? If this idea be based simply on certain popular assertions (as that 'this thing was produced *in such and such a place* and *at such and such a time*'), then this would be too wide a reason; as we come across even such assertions as—'this was born *at home*, and that was born *in the stalls*'—where such things as 'home' &c., which cannot be the instrumental cause, are spoken of as such."

Reply:—As a matter of fact, we find the origination or production of all things invariably restricted within particular points of space and time, in the same manner as the production of the cloth is restricted within such causes as the thread and the like (while there is no such invariable relationship between the *birth* and the *home*). If the peculiarities of Space and Time were not operative towards the production of things, then causes would bring about their effects, at any time and in any place, at random.

Objection:—"The effect could not be so produced at random because the cause would not be present at all places and times."

Reply:—It must then be admitted that effects are produced only at such *time* and *place* when and where the causes exist, and not otherwise. And thus particular points of space and time must he regarded as integral factors in the causes of things; specially as all causes are found to be dependent upon the peculiarities of these, in the point of their due efficacy. And all that we mean by saying that Space and Time are the instrumental causes of things, is that while these latter are produced in one place and at one time, they are not produced at any other time or place.

NOTE :—In as much as the soul also is the instrumental cause of all things, the common character here spoken of has been found to consist in the fact of Space and Time being such instrumental causes as are the *receptacle* (container) of all things; the soul, though the instrumental cause, is not the *container*.—(*Kiraṇāvalī*).

Text (33):—*Earth and Fire are possessed of only such Fluidity as is brought about by extraneous causes.*
(II—i—6, 7.)

Commentary.

This declaration is based upon the fact that Butter, which is of the nature of Earth, and Gold, which is of the nature of Fire, are found to melt under fire.

Objection:—"Such Fluidity may be held to belong to the Earth only; and that which is found to be present in the gold set on fire, may be only that which inheres in something (the

particles of Earth) present in (or connected with) the particles of Fire (in the gold)."

Reply:—This cannot be; as the Fluidity of earthy things is found to disappear and to be burnt to ashes, on the application of extreme heat; while such is not found to be the case with the Fluidity of gold (which is found to remain as fluid as ever, even on the application of greatest heat). It is this very argument that sets aside the view held by some people that Gold is of the nature of Earth; because if Gold were earthy, then its fluidity would entirely disappear, on the application of great heat, as is found to be the case with Butter and other such earthy substances.

Another argument put forward in support of the earthy nature of Gold is this: "Gold and other metals are of the nature of Earth,—because while being devoid of natural Fluidity, they are endowed with Gravity,—like a piece of stone." But there is not much in this argument; because it has still to be ascertained whether the gravity that is perceived in the Gold is a quality belonging to the Gold itself, or it is due to the contact (of the gold particles) with something else (the earth-particles) to which that gravity belongs,—as we find in the case of Butter, whose viscidity is due to the element of water that is mixed up with the earth-particles.

Another reason brought forward in support of the earthy nature of gold is that—"it is illuminable by extraneous sources of light (like a piece of stone) (while Fire is self-luminous)." But this illuminability by extraneous sources of light may be due to the fact of the gold having a colour that is not manifested; and as such it cannot prove its earthy nature. It is only a few arguments that we have shown here in support of the fiery nature of gold.

The author now proceeds to show that in the above manner, other points of similarity among other things may be shown; and so also, by the contrary method, may be shown the points

of dissimilarity with a view to differentiate one thing from another.

Text (34):—*In this way we may describe the similarities of all things, and contrariwise, also their dissimilarities; and thus there would be no intermixture (or confusion) among the various substances.* (I—i—13, 14; V—ii—21.)

Commentary.

So long as the things have not been mentioned, there can be no definitions of these; as these could have no objectives till then; and on the other hand, until the things have been defined, people have no definite ideas of them. Hence a science that seeks to describe the nature of things, operates both ways; it points out the things and gives their definitions. With regard to the *examination* or inquiry (into the nature of things), the following rule has to be observed: In a case, where when the definition has been put forward, the real nature of the thing defined is not ascertained, on account of such ascertainment being interrupted by the disturbing element of another definition,—we have to take recourse to the method of enquiry and examination, for the setting aside of one of these contending theories (definitions); when however, the mere mention of the definition, gives a due idea of the nature of the thing defined, then an enquiry or examination is useless, and as such is not taken up.

Some people hold that a science should operate in all three ways (of *statement, definition* and *examination*.) These people also do not examine such things as the *purpose* &c. (of the science); and their only reason for desisting from such examination is that these (purpose &c) are found to be duly recognised on the mere putting forward of their definitions. Such being the case, the operation of science, which is always for the purpose of a due recognition of the nature of things, cannot be said to be threefold only.

(1) The '*uddēça*' or *statement* of a thing consists in its *being spoken of by its name.* (2) '*Lakshaṇa*' or *Definition* consists in the property that serves to differentiate the homogeneous or like things from the heterogeneous or unlike ones. (3) *Parīkshā* or *Examination* consists in an enquiry into the nature of the thing, in view of the said definition. (4) The *subdividing* of the mentioned thing does not constitute a distinct method of operation; as this operation is included in the explanation that we have given of the '*statement*' of a thing. And these subdivisions are mentioned separately, only with a view to restricting the mention of these, and also for the purpose of the putting forward of the definition of each of these subdivisions. (5) When the things have been subdivided, then we have the particular definition of each of these; otherwise such definitions would be wholly devoid of their objectives.

Thus then, we have found that *Substances* have been *mentioned* in the *Sūtra*—'*Substance Quality &c. &c.*'; they have been subdivided in the *Sūtra*—'Earth, Water &c. &c' and hence we now take up the next chapter where we shall put forward the specific definition of each of the nine substances; mentioned above.

NOTE :—The *Kiraṇāvali* enumerates a few of these 'similarities' and 'dissimilarities.' (1) All the Substances except the Soul, are for the sake of others, and are unconscious. (2) All except water are devoid of viscidity and fluidity. (3) All except Fire are not—hot and incapable of burning. (4) Space, Time and Mind are devoid of specific qualities &c.

CHATER IV.

Of Special Substances.

INTRODUCTORY.

Page 27.] *Text (35):—We now proceed to describe the dissimilarities or distinctive features of each one (of the substances).*

Commentary.

What we have finished above is the description of the point

of dissimilarity of two or more things from other sets of two or more things; in this chapter we are going to point out the distinctive features of each one of the substances. The '*ças*' affix in the expression *ekaikaçah*' makes the repitition of the word '*eka*' indicative of the inclusion of many things.

SECTION (1).

THE EARTH.

The author proceeds to point out the distinctive features of the Earth, which is the first of the substances mentioned above :—

Text (36):—Earth is that which is comprised in the class 'Earth.'

It has the qualities of—Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Isolation, Distance Proximity, Gravity, Fluidity, and Faculty. These qualities have been described in the section (of the Sutras dealing with the distribution of qualities) For instance, the word Cākshusha.' (perceptible by the eye) (in the Sutra) indicates the seven qualities beginning with 'Number'; the mention of 'patana' (falling) implies 'Gravity'; the mention of the Earth as possessing certain points in common with Water indicates 'Fluidity'; and the mention of one action (of earth) following upon another indicates Faculty (II—i—1, 6; IV-i—"; V-i—16,—17, 18, 7, II—ii—2; V—ii—1) *As for odour it belongs to the Earth only.* II-ii-i) *The colour of Earth is of various kinds viz:—white and the like.*

Taste is of six kinds—sweet &c.,
Odour is of two kinds—good and bad.
Its touch is neither warm nor cool, and is brought about by cooking. (VII—i—6).

Earth is of two kinds: Eternal and Evanescent, that in the form of the atom is enteral; and that which is in the form of products is evanescent. The evanescent earth is qualified by such an arrangement of its component particles as tends to make it solid or rigid; it comprises many sub-classes; and supplies many useful things, in the shape of beds, chair and the like. (IV—i—I; II—iii—4, 5; VII—i—20. 21)

The products of Earth are three-fold,—in the form of the Body, the Sense-organ and the Object of of perception. (IV—ii—1)

The body is of two kinds: that which is born of the womb, and that which is not so born. (IV-ii-5) *Such of the latter kind as belong to the Gods and the Ṛishis are born independently of the semen and the ovule, out of atoms acted upon by certain meritorious deeds; while those that belong to the little insects &c., which serves as bodies fitted for the experiencing of certain punishments, are born out of atoms acted upon by non-meritorious deeds. The Body born of the womb is produced from the semen and the ovule. This again is of two kinds: Viviparous and Oviparous. The former belongs to the man, the cow and other quadrupeds; and the latter to birds and reptiles.* (IV-ii-6 to 11

The Sense-organ, that which makes odour perceptible is the olfactory organ; this belongs to all animals, and is made up of earth-molecules not affected by the molecules of water and other substances. (VIII-ii-5)

The Object, appearing in the order of the Dual and the rest, is of three kinds: the clay, the stone and the vegetable. To the first kind belong the various parts of the earth's surface, and such products of clay as bricks and walls. To the second belong the minerals, the various kinds of stones and gems, the diamond and the like. And of the third kind are the various grasses, herbs, trees with their flowers and fruits, creepers, spreading plants, such trees as bear fruits without flowers, and so forth. (IV—ii—1)

Commentary.

"*Earth is that which is comprised in the class 'Earth.*' This statement points out the distinctive feature of Earth for one who though knowing the general character of Earth is, through some delusion, disabled from making use of the word,—with a view to enable him to speak of it by itself, independently of the connection of other things. The sense is that we can use the word 'earth' with regard to that which is found to have the general character of 'earth'; as that which is not spoken of as 'earth' is never found to have that general character; *e. g.* water and the like, which are not found to have the generic character of 'earth' Hence we must use the word 'Earth' in a definition of Earth.

Or, the definition may be taken as put forward for the sake of the person who has often heard the word 'earth' used, but does not know what the general form of earth is,—in order to point out to him that character of earth which differentiates it from all other things. The sense of the text thus comes to be that a certain thing is spoken of as 'Earth' in the world because of its having the general form of Earth. In fact Udyotakara has defined a *definition* as that which serves to differentiate a thing from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things. This sets aside the argument that—"if a thing is well known it need not be defined, and if a thing is not known, it cannot be defined." As the function of the definition consists in—(1) enabling it, when known in its generic form, to be used specifically, and (2) in pointing out its specific features, when it is known in a general way.

Objection :—"If such be the case, then there would be no end to it; as like the object that is defined, it would, in the end, be necessary for the definition also to be defined and explained."

Page 29] *Reply :*—Not so; as a definition is needed only when the thing is not duly known or comprehended; and certainly it is not possible that there would be an equal want of comprehension in all cases. For instance, when a learned person receives the injunction: '*gauh anubandhyah*' (the cow should be tied—for being killed at a sacrifice), he wants to know which part of the cow's body is to be tied; and when he is told that it is to be tied either in the head (neck) or the leg, he does not stand in need of any further instruction as to what these two (*head* and *leg*) are. In fact, a person who is wholly ignorant does not require any instructions; and no instructions are meant for him; as he would not be entitled to the performance of any actions, like the infant or the dumb and the like.

The Author next proceeds to show that another distinctive feature of Earth consists in its having fourteen definite qualities, along with its specific quality of Odour. The possessive affix '*matup*' at the end of the *Dvandva* compound shows that each of the qualities mentioned is by itself related to the earth.

The author then proceeds to show that these qualities as belonging to the earth have been indicated in the *Sūtras* also.

'*Guṇanivēçādhikara*' is that Adhyāya (the second) of the *Sūtras* which deals with the distribution of the qualities among Substances; and in this *Adhyāya* we have the *Sutra*—'the Earth is endowed with Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch,'—which distinctly points to the presence of these qualities in Earth.

"*The word 'cākshusha' &c.*"—this refers to Number, Dimension, Isolation, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance and Proximity,—and also Action (though this is not a quality, yet it is laid down here as belonging to Earth). All these are '*cākshusha*,' *visible*, as they inhere in such substances as have Colour; hence the meaning is that all these qualities belong to

the Earth, which has Colour. If these did not exist in coloured substances, then the author of the *Sūtra* could not have spoken of them as 'visible' on account of their inhering in such substances.

"*The mention of falling* &c."—We have the *Sūtra*—"When there is no attempt at conjunction, we have *falling* due to gravity"; and this *Sūtra* distinctly indicates that the Earth, which is capable of falling, has gravity; as if gravity did not co-exist with falling (in the Earth), it could not have been the cause of this *falling*.

"*The mention of the Earth &c.*"—we have the *Sūtra*: "The earthy substances, Butter, Lac, and Beeswax become fluid on contact with fire; and in this lies their similarity with Water;" and this distinctly shows that to Earth belongs such fluidity as is due to extraneous causes.

"*The mention of one action &c.*'—We have the *Sūtra*: "The first action in the arrow is produced by the momentum imparted to it, and its subsequent motions are due to the faculty or force produced in it by that action,"—which distinctly mentions the fact of there appearing in the arrow, which is an earthy substance, a faculty brought about by action; and this shows that Earth has speed (a particular form of faculty); as if it did not exist in the arrow it could not be the cause of its subsequent actions. We shall show later on how there is a single Faculty caused by Falling.

"*Odour belongs to the Earth alone.*"—That is to say, it is Odour alone that forms the specific distinctive feature of Earth.

Objection :—"We have such ideas as *the water is sweet-smelling, the Air is fragrant*, and this distinctly shows that we have odour in other substances (Water, Air) also."

Reply :—Not so; as in Water, Air &c., the odour that is perceived is that inhering in the Earth molecules mixed with those substances.

Question : "How do you ascertain this?"

Answer: Simply from the fact of there being no odour in the absence of Earth-particles.

Though Colour belongs to the three substances (Earth, Water and Fire), yet it is spoken of as a distinctive feature of Earth alone, as it is in this alone that we have the various kinds of colour (Water and Fire having each one colour only).

Page 30.] "*The colour of Earth is of various kinds*"—The expression '*kshitāvēva*' (in the Earth alone) has to be taken along with this sentence also. The sense is that the several kinds of colour—white, yellow and the like, belong to Earth alone, and not to any other substance That is to say, in the single class "Earth" we find inhering many kinds of individual colours. In certain cases however, we find even an individual earthy object having many colours, where the object is made up of particles of various colours.

We now proceed to explain how this is: Just as the particles go to make the composite whole, so the colours of the particles go to make up the colour of the whole; and the particles have not a single colour *white*, but various colours, such as black white, green &c. Nor is there any such restriction as that it is only a single colour of these particles, and not the other, that produces the colour (in the object made up of these particles); as we find else-where each of these colours having the capability of producing its like. Nor is it right to assert that none of these colours can produce their likes, on account of their mutually contradictory character. Because we do actually see objects with variegated colours; and it is not possible for colourless objects to be seen. It might be argued that in such cases what is seen to be *variegated* is the aggregate of the several colours of the component particles; and that it is through this aggregate that the whole object is seen. But this may be said with regard to all cases (even the case of objects of single colour); and then it would be necessary to deny the presence of colour in all objects. Hence it must be admitted that the variegated colour of the object is produced conjointly by the

several colours of its component particles; and in as much as this colour would be produced by causes of different natures (*i. e.* the several colours), it could not but consist of the black, white and green colours; and it is this that is called "*citra*," 'variegated.' It may be argued that it is not possible for a single object to have a variegated character; as is declared by a popular saying—'That a *single* object should be of a variegated colour is extremely wonderful.' But wherein is there any contradiction in this? as certainly, the various colours, Blue and the like, are not of the nature of the negation of one another (as held by the Bauddha); as they are held to have a positive (and not a negative) character; and also because if they were held to be the negations of one anothor, there would be a most objectionable interdependence.

"The contradiction lies in the fact of the difference in the form."

True; such a contradiction does exist; yet it is not wrong to admit of the *variegated* colour; specially as its existence is directly perceived by all men, as originating from various coloured materials.

Objection:—"In the case of a multi-coloured piece of cloth, in which colours appear only on one side of the cloth, there would, in accordance with what you say, be a possibility of the perception of the variegated colour even on the plain side of the cloth; as the colour belongs to the *cloth*, which is perceptible on that side as well, and which is one only."

Reply:—This could not be; because what is known, on the ground of invariable concomitance and non-concomitance, as the basis of the perception of the veriegated colour, is the perception of the various colours belonging to the constituent parts of the coloured object,—a perception which is recognised as one of the causes of the perception of the *variegated colour*; and as the constituent parts of the cloth on the plain side are devoid of any colours, there could be no perception of the *variegated* colour on that side.

"In that case there could be no perception of the variegated colour in any substance; as all such substances would be made up of the diads of various colours; and these diads having the *invisible* atoms for their constituent parts, the colours in question could not be perceived; as there could be no perception of the colours of these atoms that go to make up the diads."

Who says it is not so? It is quite true that we cannot distinguish the colours of extremely subtle things; it is only in the case of those substances whose colour can be distinguished, that we have a perception of the colours of their constituent parts.

There are some people who hold that in the case of the multi-coloured object, what we see are the *several variegated* colours extending only over certain parts of the object; but for these people there would be no colour in a cloth where the two threads are yellow and blue; as the colour of neither of these two constituent threads could bring about the '*variegated*' colour. It might be argued that in this case the two colours give rise to a single 'variegated' colour. But then, this could be said of all cases equally: For instance, we can say that 'the substance of variegated colour, that forms the subject of discussion, is related to a single-coloured object, because it is a substance, like other substances': and again, 'the colour of that substance is *one* only because it is the colour of a material object, like the colour of other material substances,'; and hence the multicoloured object cannot be said to have *several variegated* colours, each extending over a portion of the object certain.

Taste is of six kinds—to be explained as before.

Page31.] The pointing out of the various kinds of odour would be an indirect mention of the forms of Earth; hence the Author says: *Odour is of two kinds.* These two kinds are—*the Good and the Bad.* What is meant by '*Asurabhi*' (Lit: *non-good-smell*) is not a mere *negation of good* smell, but a distinct odour, contrary in its nature to good odour, inhering in certain substances, and perceived as something undesirable; because it is always perceived in a positive form, in its varying grades.

The odour that is unnoticeable is that wherein the goodness or badness is not manifested; and hence this has not been mentioned as a distinct kind of odour; or, this also may be included in '*Asurabhi*,' this word being explained as '*not-surabhi*' (and certainly the odour that is neither good nor bad may be spoken of as 'not good.')

The author now proceeds to point out the kind of Touch that serves to differentiate the Earth from other Substances. The peculiarity of its touch is that it is brought about by cooking, and is neither cool nor warm. Though like Touch, the Colour and Taste also of Earth have the peculiarity of being brought about by cooking, yet this peculiarity has not been mentioned in connection with these; because these (Colour and Taste) have other peculiarities also, and all that is wanted here is to show the points wherein these differ from those in the other substances. In the case of such Earthy things as the pillar and the like, the fact of their Touch being due to cooking, though not directly perceptible, is to be *inferred* in the following manner: 'the touch of the pillar is due to cooking,—because it is a Touch belonging to the Earth, like the Touch of the Jar.' The fact of the Touch of the Jar being due to cooking is to be inferred from the fact of its being such a property of the Jar as is perceptible by a single sense-organ,— like the Colour of the Jar.'

The author proceeds to show the subdivisions of Earth:—*Earth is eternal and non-eternal*—The two 'ca's are added with a view to indicate that these two divisions are wholly inclusive, and no third kind is possible. He next points out the two kinds: That in the shape of atoms is eternal and and that in the shape of products is non-eternal. The word "*lakshana*" in both cases signifies *nature* or *form.*

Question: "What are your proofs for the existence of earth in the shape of "atoms"?

Answer: It is Inference: The varying grades in the scale of minute dimensions must have an end somewhere, — because it is a scale of dimensions,— like the scale of large dimensions. And that point wherein that scale ends, further than which there is nothing minuter, is the *Atom* (Lit. the *most minute.*) For this very reason, the atom is eternal, on account of its being a substance without constituent parts, like the *Ákáça.* If it had any constituent parts, it could not be the *atom*, the "most minute;" as the parts would be minuter than the compound product; and in that case these parts would be the *Atoms*; and if this part too were not so, on account of this too having its constituent parts, then there would be no end of these parts, and we would have a *regressus ad infinitum.* And under the circumstances, in as much as all material things would be the products of an equally endless number of constituent parts, there would be no actual difference in the dimensions of things; as there would be no difference in the numbers of the constituent factors of things, which difference is the sole basis of the differentation of things into those of larger and smaller dimensions. That there is such a differentation cannot be denied; hence it must be admitted that there is a certain thing wherein we have the *minutest* dimension; and it is this minutest thing that is the *Atom*, and this is eternal. A single *Atom* is not productive; for if an eternal thing were singly productive, there would be an unceasing production of products, as there would be no time at which any factor could be wanting: and this would necessitate the admitting of the indestructible character of the products also. As there would be no destruction of either the substratum or the constituent parts of these products,— and it is the destruction of these alone that can bring about the destruction of things. Nor could the combination of three atoms be regarded as productive. Because as a rule we find that a gross material object is the product of such factors as are of a smaller dimension than that object (a jar is made of peices smaller than itself;) and then

the Triad must be regarded as the product of something that is itself a product,— because it is of a gross dimension, like the ordinary jar. Thus then the productiveness of a single atom, as well as of three atoms having been rejected, it must be admitted that it is only two atoms that are productive; and it is this product, the *Diad* (two-atoms) that produces all things. Of Diads, it must be more than two, and not two only, that can be regarded as productive; as on account of the presence of the productive cause of the minute dimension of the Diad, it would be a product of minute dimension that would be produced, and as such the production would be absolutely useless. This would not be the case when there would be more than two Diads. Some products are made up of three diads and these are called "Triads;" some of four or five atoms, and so forth. Nor are these graduated products absolutely useless; as the number of the productive Diads goes on increasing, there is a corresponding increase in the dimension of the product. Nor would this theory necessitate the belief that all things—such as the jar—are produced out of diads alone; as when the jar is broken we find it reduced to parts of varying dimensions; and it is in accordance with these that we attribute the causality of the *jar.* Thus then we find that the Earth in the form of its products, is produced from the diad downwards. And in this form the Earth is non-eternal; as we find in it present the two causes of non-eternality, in the shape of the disruption of the constituent cause, and the destruction of its substrate.

The Author next points out another property of Earth products, that appears along with their noneternality: *This is hard or rigid etc.* "Etc." refers to such properties as *Looseness* (Softness) and the like. It comprises many sub-classes—such as the "cow" and the like. Though there are no sub-classes in the atoms, yet we have to admit of such conglomerations of these, due to the unseen force of destiny as come to produce the sub-classes of things made up of those atoms.

Objection: "The creation of all things is due to the influences of the unseen force of the Destiny of a human agent; and what useful function for man does the Earth product perform that it should have been produced by his destiny?"

Reply: *It supplies the many useful things, in the shape of beds &c.*

The author points out other useful purposes that the Earth serves for man: *Its products are threefold, as consisting of the Body &c.* The *Body* is the receptacle of the experiences of the conscious agent; the dead body is called a "body" because of its *past* capability of being such a receptacle. The "*Sense-organ*" is that substance in the body which is the means of the direct perception of the cogniser. The "*Object*" is the substance that serves as the subject of the agent's experiences.

The author next shows the different kinds of bodies related to the Earth: *It is of two kinds: oviparous (that born of the womb) and non-oviparous.* By "womb" (ovum) here is meant the admixture of the man's semen and the woman's ovule; and the 'oviparous' is that which is born out of that; and that which is not so born is the 'non-oviparous;' and this latter is born independently of the semen and the ovule. This kind of body belongs to the Gods and the Sages.

Objection: "As a matter of fact we find that there is an invariable concomitance between the production of the Body, and the presence of the semen and ovule; how then, could anybody be produced in the absence of such semen and ovule?"

Reply: Such bodies are produced out of atoms aided by particular kinds of virtues. The sense is this: The atoms, and not a mixture of semen and ovule, are the origin from which the body is produced; as even in the case of the oviparous body, what the body is directly produced from are the atoms wherein have been produced by a process of cooking (modification) certain qualities, following upon the disruption of the semen and the ovule,—this disruption being due to the law

that everything is to be regarded as destroyed after it has performed its function. Nor is there any real difference between the semen and the ovule, and the atoms; as all these belong to the Earth. In case of such effects, the cause that regulates the character or kind of each body, lies in an unseen agency (Destiny.) Under the circumstances there can be nothing unreasonable in the theory that the non-oviparous body is born out of atoms aided by certain particular virtues.

Objection: "As a matter of fact we find that the production of all bodies is preceded by an admixture of semen and ovule."

Reply: True; but that fact does not show definitely whether the sequence of the production of our body to semen &c. is absolutely independent of all unseen agency, or it is the mere arrangement of the material particles that follows from the semen &c. This same fact also sets aside the opposite syllogistic argument put forward above; as its basic premises (that the production of the body is invariably proceded by an admixture of semen and ovule) is open to doubt. We shall deal with this matter further, on the occasion of dealing with the sensuous perception of *yogis.*

There is a kind of the non-oviparous body which is due to particular sins. Such is the body of the smaller animals— viz. insects, moths and the like. These bodies are meant to be punishments for the ensouling *Jīvas*: and as such are brought about by atoms as aided by the effects of particular kinds of sin. This fact is well known to all people.

The author now proceeds to describe the oviparous body. It is the body produced out of the mixture of the semen of the father and the ovule of the mother. When these two become mixed up in a particular way, the mixture comes to be acted upon by the digestive fire of the mother; and this fire having destroyed the qualities of colour &c. of the atoms making up that mixture, there appear in it other homogenous qualities, and the atoms giving rise to the diad, the diad to the

triad, we have finally the appearnce of the embryonic body; the mind enters into the body at this stage, and not while there are mere semen and ovule in their own forms; because it is only a *body* that can serve as the substratum for the mind. A portion of the essence of the food eaten by the mother is transferred to the fœtus. Then this comes to be acted upon by the unseen force (of the ensouling *jiva's* deeds.) And the further action of the internal fire leads to a further dismemberment of the atoms due to their functioning, which brings about the differentiation of the embryonic body; and then there appears another body produced out of the atoms costituting the embryonic body— these atoms acquiring in themselves certain qualities due to 'cooking', and congregating themselves with the atoms of food eaten by the mother, which latter begin to function by reason of the aforesaid unseen force. This process goes on every day in regard to all bodies.

Page 34.] *Question:* "What are your proofs for supposing two distinct bodies (the *embryonic* and the *ordinary*)?"

Answer:— We have a proof for this in the difference in the dimensions of bodies; and certainly a body of larger dimensions could not be contained in another whose dimensions are smaller (*i. e.* the ordinary body of the child could not be contained in the fœtus.)

Objection:— "It would be quite possible for the larger dimension to be contained in the smaller body, after this latter has undergone certain modifications."

Reply:— Would this modification be brought about by the particles of the smaller body helping the action of the particles of food, or by the body as helped by these latter? In either case, we would in the end, have a number of bodies of varying dimensions; just as we have in the case of pieces of cloth produced out of yarns. (As a piece of cloth is found to consist of several smaller pieces.) As a matter of fact, however, we do not come across such bodies. Hence it must be admitted that the

body of the fœtus is destroyed, aud another body is produced (out of the particles of the former;) specially as the dimensions of the bodies must be regarded as different, on account of one dimension being larger than the other, like the dimensions of the jar and the saucer; and then again the dimension in question (of the fœtus) also is destroyed along with its substratum, because it is a dimension, like the dimension of the jar broken by a stroke of the stick.

Objection:— "The body must be regarded as one only; as it is actually recognised to be the same."

Reply:—Not so; because the recognition of sameness can be explained as being due to similarity. There is always a chance of such recognition of identity between certain things when these appear immediately after one another, and when they are extremely similar to one another; as we find in the case of flames rising from the fire; and even though there be no such cognition to the contrary, as that 'these are not the same,' yet the notion of identity may be rejected on the ground of well-founded reasoning.

The kinds of Body are now shown: *It is of two kinds.* '*jarāyu*' is the *placenta*; and that which is born surrounded by it is the '*jarāyuja*'; and that which is born encased within the two discs of an egg is the *eggborn*, '*andaja*'. These two kinds of bodies are pointed out. The body of men, like ourselves, of *paçus* (by 'paçu' here is to be taken the *goat* because of such sentences '*agnishomīyam paçum &c.*' and '*saptadaç prājāpatyān paçūnālabhēta*' where the word means 'goat',) of *mṛgas* (in the *kṛishnasāra* and other species of deer,) and also of other quadrupeds, belongs to the class of the '*jarāyuja*'; and to the class of '*andaja*' belong the bodies of birds and serpents, and fishes.

The author next points out the sense-organ related to the earth. In all animals the organ that brings about the cognition of smell is made up of earth-particles. In order to

show that there is no such hard and fast rule that the organ brings about the cognition of smell only, and not of any other things related to the earth, the author says:— *It is made up of earth molecules not affected by the molecules of water &c.* That is to say, this organ, through the agency of an unseen force, is made up, in a way that distinguishes it from others, of earth-molecules, whose energy is not weakened by the presence of the molecules of water and other substances; thus having its production of a peculiar character, it is this organ, and none other, that is capable of making smell perceptible. The name of this is *'ghrāṇa'* 'olfactory organ' (nose;) the word being etymologically explained *'jighratyanēna'*— i. e. that by means of which the self smells or perceives odour: the existence, of this organ is proved by the preception of smell,—every action being accomplished only by means of a certain instrument (and the action of smell-perception has its instrument in the olfactory organ); specially as we do not find any smell-perception resulting from the operation of the visionary and other organs. And the fact of the olfactory organ being of the earth is proved by its manifesting smell only from among colour, taste &c. (and smell belongs specifically to the Earth.) As a corroborative instance, we have the perceptibility of the smell of *Kunkuma* brought about by butter. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the butter manifests the smell of the *Kunkuma* only as accompanied with the smell of the butter itself, and in the same manner the olfactory organ can be an organ of smell only when it itself has some sort of a smell. It is for this reason that the nose does not perceive its own odour, as it could not perceive itself. As in the case of this organ, so in the case of other organs of Taste &c. also, as we shall show by means of other instances, that they can have the character of *organs* only when endowed with taste, colour &c. And as such they are not capable of perceiving their own qualities. As for the Ear, it is an organ having sound for its quality (and sound does not

enter into its constitution, as smell, taste &c. do in regard to their respective organs.) and hence it is by means of the Ear alone that sound is perceived.

The author next points out, by means of the word *'tu'*, the difference of *Object* from *Body* and *Organ*: *appearing in the order of the dead &c.*— This describes what is common to all earth objects. *In the shape of clay, stone &c.*—i. e. having the character of clay, *stone*, animals and vegetables. Of these the different forms in which clay is found are the various portions of the earth's surface, in their various depths &c., walls, bricks, &c. The forms of minerals are stones, gems (like the *sūr akānta*,) and the diamond. (The vegetables are) grasses, the cereal grains, (e.g. the wheat) the trees with flowers and fruits (like the *kovidāra*,) creepers, spreading plants (like the *kētakī*,) and those trees that have fruits without flowers (e.g. the *audumbara*.)

Objection: "The name *'sthāvara'* implies the *absence of self-initiated motion;* and this applies to the minerals as well as vegetables (why then should the name be applied to these latter only?")

Reply: True, it is so; but in as much as *stone* &c. have other characteristics also, they are not spoken of by that name.

NOTES:—(1) *Pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt pṛthivī*— In this sentence the most general definition of *Pṛthivī* has been attempted. 'Earth is that which is related to and belongs to the generality or genus *earth*; though this does not add anything to our knowledge of earth, yet it cannot be denied that this is the most universal definition possible.

(2) *Pākaja*—*Lit.* produced by cooking or baking; according to the Vaiçēshikas, the touch of earth and all earthy things, is 'produced by baking'; and so also are their *colour* and *taste*. What appears to be meant by this is that the touch, colour and taste of all earthy things are *changed* by fire-contact; while of all other substances these qualities remain constant. This is the only explanation possible; otherwise it is not very easy to understand how the colour or touch of a clod of earth lying in the fields can be regarded as *produced by fire contact*.

SECTION (2).

OF WATER.

(37.) *Water is that which is comprised in the class 'water'. It has the following qualities: Colour, Taste, Touch, Fluidity, Viscidity, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunc-*

tion, Distance, Proximity, Gravity and Faculty. These also are indicated by the sūtra in the same way as the quatities of Earth.

The colour of water is white; its taste is sweet; its touch is cool. Viscidity belongs to the water alone; as also does natural Fluidity. (II—i—2; IV—i—11; II—ii—5; V—i—17; V—ii—3 to 6; 8, 11.)

Page 36.] *Like Earth, Water also is of two kinds—eternal and noneternal. Its products are threefold, in the shape of the Body, the Sense-organ and the Object. The Body (of water) is one that is not born of the womb; and is known to exist only in the regions of Varuṇa. These aqueous bodies however are made capable of experiencing pleasure, pain &c., by the admixture of Earth-molecules. The aqueous sense-organ is the organ of Taste, which serves to make Taste perceptible by all living beings, and is made up of aqueous atoms only, without any part of the molecules of other substances. The aqueous Object exists in the shape of Rivers, Oceans, the Moon, Hails and the like.* (IV—i—1 to 5; IV—ii—1, 6 to 11; VII—i—20,21; VIII—ii—6; V—ii—8; IV—ii—1.)

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to define Water. Here also the purpose of the definition lies in the fulfilment of the purposes to be served by the word, or in the differentiation of the thing defined from all other things, like and unlike.

The following objection might here be urged: "A person "could explain a thing for another person by means of a defini- "tion, only when he himself knows the distinguishing features "of the thing; as one who does not know a thing himself could

"not explain it to another. The difference of one object "from another however lies in their mutual negation; and "this negation could be cognised only when both members of the "negation have been cognised; otherwise we could have no "such negation as 'the cow is not a horse', where the character "of one thing (the horse) is denied of another thing (the cow). Now "then, we ask—Is this mutual negation cognised by a mixed "cognition of both these things, or by a cognition of each of "these as distinct? In the former case, we could have no such no- "tion as 'this is not that;' and in the latter case, the said notion "of negation would involve a mutual interdependence; as the cog- "nition of negation would be due to the cognition of each as dis- "tinct from the other, and the cognition of each as distinct from "the other would be due to a perception of their mutual negation "as *negation* is the same as *distinction*."

To the above we make the following reply:—As a matter of fact, there is a mutual negation between two things that are distinct from each other, and *distinction* is not the same as *mutual negation;* as the distinction of a thing consists in its own specific form; and certainly a cognition of this latter does not depend upon the perception of any other thing,—proceeding, as it does, from direct sense-contact; and this specific form of each object is cognised as distinct by itself. For instance, when a man is in search of the cow, he does not proceed to take the horse if he happens to see it; nor does he recall to his mind (necessarily) the word 'cow'; consequently there would be nothing incompatible in the cognition of the mutual negation between the cow and the horse, as brought about by a due recognition of the distinctive features of the cow and the horse, each independently by itself. Nor could it be urged that in that case, we may totally deny *mutual negation*, and admit only of the difference in the distinctive features of each thing. Because we do have a distinct cognition of *mutual negation*, in the negative form, (while the cognition of the distinctive features of each thing is always in the positive form).

Page 37.] It is not *aqueousness* alone that constitutes the distinctive feature of Water, and the author proceeds to show that it is distinguished by the presence of fourteen qualities accompanied by fluidity. The compound *'rūparasa'*, *etc.* must be first explained as a *Dvandva*, and then the Possessive affix added. The mention of these in the *sūtra* is to be shown in the same way as in the case of the qualities of Earth. We have the *Sūtra—'Rūparasasparçavatya āpah, dravāh, snigdhaçca.*" As for number etc. belonging to Water, this is to be found in the same *sūtra* that has been shown to apply to the case of Earth.

In as much as on the occasion of pointing out the distinctive features of each substance, it would not be proper to mention colour &c. in these general terms,—these being common to the earth &c. also,—the author points out the particular forms of these qualities that belong specially to Water. The colour of Water is white, its taste is sweet, and its touch is cool. As for the appearance of other colours in water, it must be regarded as due to the colour of the receptacle of the water: because when the water is thrown upwards, it is always perceived to be of a distinctly white colour.

Objection: "Water cannot be regarded to have the sweet taste, as it is never found to be sweet in the same way as sugar &c. are."

Reply: Not so; Water is found to have a taste quite different from any of the other five tastes—the Acrid, Astringent, Bitter, Saltish and Acid; and as for the sweetness not being perceived as in sugar &c. that must be regarded as being due to the absence of any excessive degree of sweetness.

By the declaration—'Viscidity belongs to Water alone'—is meant that unqualified Viscidity is found in Water only. It might be urged that Viscidity is found in earthy substances also, such as in milk, oil and butter. But as a matter of fact we find that no Viscidity is present in such purely earthy substances as stones, bricks, dry fuel &c; and hence the Viscidity

that is found in a few Earthy Substances like oil, butter &c. must be regarded as belonging to the Water with which the earth particles are mixed up; just as is the case of the natural fluidity that we meet with in milk and oil. The fact of Viscidity being a quality of Water is proved by the one being always found with, and never without, the other. It is for this reason that we find a certain degree of smoothness in the trees and shrubs growing in the vicinity of human habitations, and dryness and roughness in those growing in the forest,—this being due to the fact of the former having their roots always watered with the water thrown about by the people, while the latter have no such supply of water.

Natural Fluidity also belongs to Water alone; that is to say, it is not Viscidity alone, but natural Fluidity also, that belongs specifically to Water only. As for milk and oil, their Fluidity must be regarded as due to the proximity of their substrate (*i. e.* the water in which they are contained); because under certain circumstances they are found in the solid form.

Like the Earth, Water also exists in a twofold form the eternal and the non-eternal; that in the shape of atoms being eternal, and that in the shape of the various products being non-eternal.

The products are of three kinds. The explanation of this is as in the case of Earth-products; that is to say, as in the case of Earth we have products in the shape of the Body, the Organ and the Object, so we have in the case of Water also.

The aqueous body is never born of the womb—of earthy bodies some are born of the womb and some are not so born; while the aqueous body is always such as is never born of the womb.

Question: "An earthy body we find in the case of man,—this being regarded as earthly because endowed with the quality of smell; where do we find the Aqueous body?"

Answer: *In the regions of Varuṇa.* The existence of this body is to be believed in on the strength of scriptural texts pointing to the existence of such bodies.

Page 38.] *Question*: "In as much as Water has the character of a single substance, the Aqueous body would always be in the form of the *Bubble* &c.; and as much how could such a body be capable of bringing about the ordinary experieneces.?"

Answer: The aqueous body is capable of bringing about experiences, by reason of its containing particles of earth also. In the production of the aqueous body the particles of Earth serve as the instrumental causes; and the natural fluidity of water having been controlled by these earth-particles, there is brought into existence a peculiar body, not in the shape of mere watery bubbles &c.

Some people define the Body as something that is made up of the five elementary substances (*lit.* having these for its material cause). But if it were so, then, *firstly* the body could not have any odour; because such odour could only be produced by the odour in one of its material causes, which is not possible. *Secondly* the body would have a variegated colour and touch; in as much as its five constituent causes would have distinct colours and touches; and as a matter of fact we do not find this to be the case; hence the Body can not be rightly regarded as made up of the five elementary substances. For similar reasons it can not be regarded as made up of Earth and Water; nor could it be held to be made up of Earth, Water and Air; and if it were made up of Earth, Air and *Akāça*, then it would be wholly devoid of colour, taste and odour (as the *Akāça* is devoid of these); if it were made up of Fire, Water and *Akāça*, then it would be without Odour and Taste; and so forth. *Thirdly*, if the body had the five elementary substances for its material cause, then it could not be *one* only; as a diversity of causes must bring about diversity in the effect. Therefore we must admit that the human body is made up of earth,—because it has odour—like the Earth in the atomic state. As for the presence of the properties of Water and other substances that we meet with in the Earth, they must be regarded as belonging to the Water &c. mixed up with the Body.

The Sense-organ is that which renders Taste perceptible to all living beings. That is to say, that sense-organ which makes Taste perceptible for all living beings is one that is made up of Water-molecules. In order to account for the fact of that organ alone, and no other aqueous object, making Taste perceptible, the author adds: The water molecules of which the sense-organ is made up is not affected (or accompanied) by any heterogenous molecules, such as those of the Earth and other substances. That is to say, these latter do not in any way weaken the effeciency of the aqueous molecules making up the organ in question. This is the reason why this organ is wholly distinct in character from all other substances; and thus having its production of a character distinct from everything else, it is this organ alone that brings about a perception of Taste, which can not be done by any thing else; as nothing else is produced in the same way as the organ under consideration. All this is assumed on the ground of our actual experience, which shows that taste is perceived by the organ of Taste, and by nothing else.

The existence of the organ of Taste is proved by the perception that we have of Taste; as every action must be brought about by some instrumental cause. And the fact of this organ being aqueous in its nature is inferred from the fact of its bringing about the perception of Taste only, from among colour and the rest,—like the saliva which is evaporised in the mouth.

The aqueous objects are—the Rivers, the Oceans, Snow, Hail and other such things,—which are enjoyed, and as such become the means of the accomplishment of the experience of the agent.

SECTION (3).—Of Fire.

Text (33). Fire is that which belongs to the class of 'Fire.' It is endowed with—Colour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Fluidity, and Faculty.

Page 39.] *The fact of these belonging to Fire is to be shewn, as before, to be indicated in the sūtras. Its colour is white and brilliant. Its touch is hot only.* (II—i—3, 7; IV—i—ii; V—ii—8; II—ii—4; V—i—17). *This also is twofold, in the form of the atom and the products. These products are threefold, in the shape of the Body &c.,* (IV—i—1 to 5; VII—i—20, 21; IV—ii—1). *The Body of fire is such only as is not born of the womb, existing in the regions of the Sun (Āditya); and it is made capable of experience by the admixture of earth-molecules.* (IV—ii—6to11). *The Sense-organ is the Eye which makes colour perceptible, by all living beings, and which is made up of fire-molecules unaffected by the molecules of any other substance.* (VIII—ii—6).

This object is fourfold: Earthly, Heavenly, Stomachic (organic) and Mineral. The Earthly fire is that which consists of Flames produced by wooden fuels, and is capable of accomplishing cooking, burning, softening (according to the Kandalī) sweating &c. The Heavenly Fire is that which is produced by watery fuel, and exists in the form of the Sun, the Lightning and the like. The Stomachic Fire is that which brings about the digestion of the food that is eaten. The Mineral Fire exists in the form of Gold and other metals. (IV—ii—1; V—ii—13).

The experience of taste &c. in these minerals belongs to another substance compounded with the Fire-molecules.

Commentary.

Fire is &c.—To be explained as before. Like the generic character of 'Fire', the eleven qualities, colour &c. also, are its distinctive features. The mention of these in the *Sūtras* may be shown as before, in the case of Earth and Water. For instance, we have the *sūtra*—*'Fire also is endowed with Colour and Touch.'* As for *Number* and the rest, the same *Sūtra* points out these as belonging to Fire and Earth &c.

The colour of Fire is *white* and *brilliant*. The *white* colour belongs to Earth and Water also; but in these latter it is not *brilliant*; that is to say, a colour bright enough to be self-luminous belongs to Fire alone; hence it serves as the distinctive feature of this latter. The red or yellow colour that is sometimes seen in Fire must be regarded as being due to certain extraneous conditions; as it is only the white colour that is seen in all cases of Fire; as we find in the case of the light of a lamp, and hat emitted by the Sun and the Moon.

Its Touch is *hot* only. The Touch of Earth, Water and Air is 'neither –hot—nor—cold,' 'cold' and 'neither—hot—nor—cold' respectively; while that of Fire is 'hot' only, which serves as its distinguishing feature.

Page 40.] Like Earth and Water, Fire also is twofold, in the shape of the Atom and its Products. The Product is threefold—in the form of Body, Sense-organ and Object. The Fiery body is such as is not born from the womb, and is known to exist in the Regions of the Sun only.

Objection: "Fire being of a burning nature, any body made of it would be like a mass of fire, and as such, incapable of any business operations; and hence it could not be the substratum of any experiences."

In reply to this we have the statement that it is by reason of the admixture of Earth-molecules that the molecules of Fire bring about the Fiery Body; and the body could not be a mass of Fire pure and simple.

The Sense-organ that helps to make colour perceptible to all living beings is made up of Fire molecules. In support of the theory that colour is rendered perceptible only by this particular product of Fire, and not by any other products of Fire,—we have the following reasons: This sense-organ is made up of such Fire-molecules as are not affected by the particles of any other substance; *i. e.* in this organ of vision, the Fire-molecules do not have their potency weakened by the admixture of any heterogeneous molecules of Earth or Water; and hence having an origin peculiar to itself, it is this organ alone that is capable of manifesting colour; and that nothing else is produced in the same manner, being a well recognised fact, must be attributed to an unseen (superphysical) force; and its proof lies in the fact of the character of the products themselves. Then, the fact of the sense of vision being fiery in its nature must be inferred from the fact of its manifesting colour alone from among other qualities,—like the lamp. This organ of vision is without any manifested colour or touch; and it is for this reason that it does not burn its physical substrate, and is itself not seen (for want of a perceptible colour).

The Object of Fire is fourfold—the *Earthly &c.* The particle '*tatra*' means 'from among these.'

The *Earthly* is that which is produced from such Earthly things as the fuel of wood,—fire not being produced without some such substratum. 'Wood' includes *grasses* &c. also, in as much as these also are found to be productive of fire. This Earthly Fire has the nature of *flaming upwards*; it is capable of accomplishing the actions of *cooking, sweating, softening* &c. The action of '*cooking*' consists in bringing about properties (*or* conditions) not present in the thing before; and '*sweating*' or '*softening*' consists in the destroying of the hardness of things. '*Etc.*' includes such other actions as 'producing cracks.' This points out the useful actions accomplished by Fire.

The *Heavenly* Fire is that which is produced from watery

fuel; and exists in the form of the Sun, the lightning, the meteor and the like.

The *Stomachic* or Organic Fire serves the purpose of *digesting* the food that is eaten; that is to say, it tends to change the food into the condition of certain juices, excreta and other substances.

The *Mineral Fire* is found in the form of Gold &c. The fact of Gold &c. being fiery in their nature is proved by scriptures. The argument in favour of this view has already been shown. **(Com. Page 26.)**

Question: "Gold &c. being fiery, (and as such having a hot touch and being devoid of Odour and Taste), how is it that they are found to have odours and tastes, and to have a touch that is neither hot nor cold?"

Answer: By reason of the unseen agency of the destiny of the experiencing persons, Gold &c. are produced in the solidifiable form, endowed with a touch that is neither hot nor cold—by reason of the admixture of particles of Earth; and the taste &c. that are perceived belong to these Earth-particles.

Page 41.] *Objection*: "We cannot admit of the declaration that Gold has no manifested touch &c., as there are no Substances apart from the colour, touch &c. that are perceived (*i. e.* the qualities are the only real entities, and there is no such thing as a substance independent of the qualities perceived). Consequently, in the case of the Gold we cannot admit of the existence of any unseen and untouched particles of Fire, or any other thing, except that of the yellow colour and the particular Touch &c.; and as such Gold cannot be regarded as Fiery in its nature."

Reply: It is not so; because in ordinary experience, we find the same colour (of whiteness) and other qualities existing in various substrata, in the shape of the 'pillar,' the 'jar' and the like; and if there were no Substance apart from the qualities, what would constitute these various substrata of the same qualities? That is to say, we have the notions—'this is a pillar', 'this is a jar'—that pertain to the different *shape* of each of the things

cognised, without any (necessary) idea of their colour &c.,—the character of *being coloured* &c. belonging equally to all objects.

Objection: "The different cognitions that we have with regard to each object is due to the difference in the previous ideas or impressions that we may have in our mind, with regard to the material masses observed (and hence the cognitions must be admitted, in all cases, to be of the same colour, and the notion of the difference in substrata must be regarded as being due to the previous impressions in the mind of the observer.)"

Reply: In that case the different cognitions that we have of the various colours &c. may also be attributed to the differences in the previous ideas that we may have; and as such we might deny the existence of the different colours &c. (admitting the existence of only one colour, explaining the variety of colour-perception as being due to existing impressions in the observer's mind.) [And this would lead us to Idealism pure and simple.]

Objection: "If no such thing, as the Blue colour *f.i.*, had a real existence in the external world, then the ideas or impressions of these would depend, for their appearance, solely upon their own *series* (*santāna*, which is endless); and as such it would not be possible for these impressions to appear at certain times only and not at all times; and hence if the differentiation of *Blue* &c. depended upon these impressions only, then it would not be possible for these colours to be perceived at certain times (*i.e.* the impressions having a continuous existence, the perception of Blue would also be continuous); and in as much as we do not find this to be the case in ordinary experience, the differences of Blue &c. cannot be regarded as due to those Impressions; and it is for this reason that we postulate a variety of colours."

Reply: In the case of the different cognitions with regard to the pillar &c. also, if they did not depend upon some object having an existence in the external world,—there would be no possiblity of their appearing at certain times only; and

hence with regard to each object we should assume a particular material form *apart from the qualities of colour* &c., which would be the instigating cause of the impressions in connection with each objective mass perceived. It is thus alone that we could explain the fact of a *single* object being perceived by means of the two actions of *seeing* and *touching* (both these actions applying to the said *shape*). This would be impossible if an object consisted solely of *colour* and its other properties; as each of these would be perceptible by a distinct sense-organ (and we would in such cases have the idea of two 'objects', as there would be nothing in the shape of a material object that could be amenable to a combined perception by two or more sense-operations). Then again, as a matter of fact, Colour and the other similar qualities belonging to the atoms, would be supersensuous; and as for you there is no *objective mass* (independent of the atoms with the said colour &c), what could be the object of the said *seeing* and *touching*?

Objection: "Though each atom by itself is supersensuous, yet, when there is a certain operation of the mind in connection with the sense-organs, the atoms are rendered *capable* (of accomplishing certain purposes); and then they become amenable to sense-perception."

Reply: This could not be; because the *becoming capable* cannot set aside the inherent subtile (imperceptible) character of the atoms; and if the mere *becoming capable* could make a thing perceptible by the senses, then the *operation of the mind* and the *sense-organs* themselves would also become perceptible (as these also are made capable of serving some useful purpose, and it is a universally admitted fact that the *sense-organs* themselves are imperceptible, being extremely subtile in their character, and only nominally material).

Objection: "Though atoms individually are subtile and imperceptible, yet when they aggregate together, then they acquire a certain degree of grossness, like a mass of hair (each

singly being invisible); and as they become visible, they appear as one only."

Reply: Does the gross form become actually produced in these many atoms, at the time you speak of? or, is it as in the case of hair, the grossness being only imposed upon the aggregate, and not existing in reality? If it is *produced* in the atoms themselves, then that aggregate gross form would be what is regarded as the composite '*substance*' (apart from the qualities that may belong to them.) While if it be not really existent in them, but be perceived only as imposed upon them, then such a perception could only be a misconception. But then, every misconception must have a counterpart reality somewhere in existence; consequently it would be necessary for you to admit of the *real* existence of even a single gross *objective mass* somewhere. This reality of grossness could not belong to an Idea; as we do not find any such idea appearing as that 'I am gross;' and secondly because in that case there would be no gross object that could be perceived in common by more than one person (the idea of each person belonging to him and him alone).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that there is a *single* gross substance (and it is not a mere collection of qualities): because the object is always perceived as having the same gross form (while its qualities are adventitious and variable); and because it is found to operate towards the accomplishment of definite useful purposes (which could not be done by mere qualities). And thus the existence of the material Substance (independently of the qualities of colour &c.) is established.

Objection: "It is only when a cognition is not subsequently followed by a notion to the contrary, that it is accepted as true, and the object cognised regarded as having a real existence; in the case of the *composite Substance*, however, we find its cognition followed by a contrary notion:—*viz.* 'when the hand is shaken, the body related to it does not shake, and when the leg is shaken the body is not found to shake; and (if the

Body were a composite whole made up of the hand &c.) then one and the same *body* would have two contradictory conditions (of shaking and not shaking) (and so the notion of the composite apart from the constituent atoms and qualities must be regarded as a misconception)."

Reply: This is not right; as there is no such hard and fast rule as that when the hand shakes the body must also shake; as a matter of fact, we find that when there is cause for the shaking of the hand only, it is the hand alone that shakes, and not the body, for the simple reason that there is no cause for the shaking of this latter; and when there is a cause for the shaking of the body also, then this also shakes; where is there a contradiction in this?

Page 42.] *Objection* "If the body does not move when the hand moves, then there would be an *absence of inherent inseparable* relationship between them."

Reply: Not so; because, what is meant by the absence of such relationship is that the two have an existence apart from each other; and not that while the one moves the other does not move; for we find that while the Substance moves the qualities inhering therein do not move (though the relationship between the Substance and its qualities is universally recognised to be inseparable). And as for having an existence apart from each other, this can never be the case with the whole and the part, even though these be totally different from each other. Consequently in the case in question there could be no absence of inseparable relationship.

Another contrary notion that is put forward by the opponent is this:—"In any object, if a part of it happens to be covered up, (and we touch the object), there is no touching of the object wherein the covered up part inheres, while there is a touching of that wherein inheres the uncovered part; and thus (if the object wherein the two parts inhere were a single composite whole) then we would have a touching and not touching of the same object and at the same time."

There is not much weight in this objection either; because, the covering of the part does not make the whole covered up; and the reason for this is that the single whole inheres in its many parts; and as such even when a number of its parts are covered up, if it happens to be touched in the uncovered parts, it also becomes touched through them; specially as it is the same in all its parts.

As for the non-recognition of the gross form of the object, as also the non-perception of the larger number of its component particles,—that is due to the absence of the perception of the aggregations of the several component particles, which perception is the basis of the recognition of the varying degrees of dimension. That is to say, in a case where a larger number of component particles are covered up, and only a smaller number of them visible, there is no perception of the component whole; as for instance, when a man is immersed in water, with his head above the water, we, seeing the head only, are not said to see the *body*. Then again, when one part of an object is red, the object is red in that part only, while over the rest of it it is *not-red*; and thus we find that there is nothing absurd in a single object being both *red* and *not-red*. And the reason is simple: *redness* consists only in a conjunction with reddening materials, while *non-redness* consists in the absence of such material; and it is quite possible for both of these to belong to the same object (in its parts); as conjunction is not an all-pervading quality (but exists only in parts of objects).

Objection; "There is yet another objection to the idea of the complete whole: The whole could exist in each of the parts either in its complete form or partially only; for certainly, there is no third way. As a matter of fact however, it could not exist in them only partially; as it has no parts of it apart from the component parts themselves. Then, if it existed in each of them in its complete form, then it could not exist in any but a single component particle; as the whole of it being taken up by the conjunction of that single particle, there would be no room for the other particles, specially as the whole has no other form save that which would be existing in that single particle."

In this connection, we should think over the following points: You declare that a thing can exist either wholly or partially:—well, do you make this declaration as accepted by yourself, or as admitted by your opponent? As for yourself, you the Bauddha donot admit of the existence (or inherence) of a thing in any other thing. While as for your opponent, he does admit of the said total and partial existence; because *totality* and *partiality* are not, according to him, the methods of existence; nor are these the basis of the said existence. As a matter of fact, that which exists, does so either by itself, or in the relationship of the container and the contained, with something else; and certainly there can be no absurdity in a single thing having more than one connection; as for instance, we actually find, in the case of an object of variegated colour, the connection or relationship of yellow and the other colours in objects possessed of the blue colour also; nor in this case does the object differ with each distinct colour; and if you did not consider it possible for a single object to have various colours, then it would not be possible for you to have any cognition of the variegated colour. Nor can the fact of the cognition or idea of the object being one only be urged as a ground for the singleness of its colour only; as this would be in direct contradiction to the well-known perception of the variegated colour. And just as in the case of a composite whole, made up of a number of component particles, there is room for other particles, even though the object is connected with one particle, as is perceived by the senses,—so, in the same manner, we also perceive the connection of many particles in a single object of the gross form. As for the declaration that we see the connection of many things in a single object, and not the connection of one with many things,—that is a mere point of difference between the nature of the two; as the factor of the connection of many things (one

way or the other) is common to both cases. Thus then, we have refuted both of the following statements: (1) that "that which is one can exist in a single point of place, as for instance a single colour, and a single composite whole", and (2) that "that which exists over a number of points in space must be many and diverse,—*e.g.* the palm fruits contained in a number of vessels, and the composite whole existing over a number of component parts.

Then again, the premiss brought forward by you is incapable of being established either for yourself or for your opponent. As for yourself, you hold that a single Idea, by its very appearance, exists in a number of things, such as the object, the sense-organ, and the operation of the mind. And as for your opponent, he too believes in the fact of a single thread being in conjunction with a number of beads (strung on to it). And in the same manner, the composite whole can very well exist by inherence in a number of component parts,—without, thereby, becoming diverse.

Thus then, the very basis of your objection having fallen off on all sides, the objection itself falls to the ground unsupported; as if there were no composite whole, and the whole world consisted of atoms alone, then there could be no chance of the cognitions of the subject, the common character and the instance (of your inferential argument); and hence the argument would have no existence. Consequently any such argument cannot set aside the existence of the composite whole, which is perceived directly by the senses.

Objection: "This sense-perception may be a misconception, in as much as it is found to be subsequently set aside by a contrary notion."

Reply: If it were so, then you would fall into the vicious circle of mutual interdependence—the falsity of sense-perception being proved by the presence of the contrary notion; and the correctness of this contrary notion being dependent upon the

falsity of the sense-perception. As a matter of fact, the ordinary rule (of being set aside by contrary notions) does not apply to the case of sense-perception, which is independent of all other considerations. Nor is it proper to declare, as false or mistaken a cognition (of sense-perception) which is found to be compatible with the useful functioning of things, which is universally accepted as true, and which is manifest to all people; as in that case, such ordinary sense-cognitions as those of the blue colour would also become false. In this way is our theory freed from the danger of being set aside by any contrary notions.

Though the existence of atoms is only inferred from the grosser products, yet certain usages of the world must be based upon them.

Objection: "[The process of the appearance of gross products has been described by you as beginning with the aggregate of *three* diads—which would consist, of six atoms.] This simultaneous conjunction of the atom with six atoms would make the atom consist of six parts, (each part being connected with each of the other atoms, and this would do away with the *atomic* character itself."

Reply: What do you mean by this 'simultaneous conjunction'? Does it mean that one atom is produced simultaneously, along with six other atoms? or does it mean that the one atom becomes simultaneously connected with the six atoms? As for simultaneous production, if there be such a production of even an impossible thing, through the simultaneous operation of the productive cause,—what absurdity would there be in this? As for simultaneous conjunction, that too is not incompatible. (1) As the conjunction of substances does not refer to its parts, as even an impartite substance, like *Ākāça* has conjunction; and (2) if there were parts also, then the conjunction existing in the final atom only, no conjunction would be perceptible. The conjunction of substances is actually found to lie in the forms of the substances themselves. Such being the case, as in the

case of the partite substance, so in that of the impartite atom also, when there would a simultaneous conjunction of a single atom with several others, whenever there would be sufficient cause for this; and there would be nothing objectionable in that.

NOTE.—Ever since Vaiçēshika philosophy became known to the western world, it has continued to be laughed at for holding that Gold, and all other metals, are in their very essence, of the nature of Fire. No attempt has yet been made to refute the argument that they put forward in support of this view. Melted gold continues in the molten condition, even on the application of extreme heat; it does not become entirely dissipated, as all other non-fiery things are, by the contact of fire. Even at the present day, in an age of electric arc-lights and furnaces it is not very easy to determine whether the application of any degree of it will entirely dissipate the gold; and it is no wonder that it was regarded as non-dissipating by the philosophers of old. And when once this fact is admitted there can be no escape from the conclusion that gold is fiery in its essence.

SECTION (4)

OF AIR.

Page 44.] *Text (39) Air is that which belongs to the class 'Air.' It has the following qualities: Touch, Number, Dimension, Isolation, Conjunction, Disjunction, Proximity, Distance and Faculty.*

The touch of Air is neither warm nor cool, and is not due to 'baking.' This is indicated by the sūtrā which lays down Touch as the quality of Air.

The existence of the seven qualities, beginning with number, in the colourless Air is indicated by the declaration in the sūtrā that 'of colourless substances the number and other qualities are not visible'—The existence of faculty in Air is indicated by the mention (in the sūtrā) of the shaking of grasses (being due to the contact of Air.) III-i-4; IV-i-12; V-i-14.)

Air also is of two kinds; in the shape of atoms and their products. The Products are fourfold,

in the shape of the Body, the Sense-organ, the Object and Breath. (IV-i-1 to 5; II-i-11 to 13; IV-ii-1; VII-i-20, 21.)

The Airy Body is not born from the womb, and is known to exist in the region of the Maruts; it is made capable of experiencing sensations by reason of the admixture of Earth-particles. (VIII-ii-6.)

The Airy Sense-organ pervading all over the body, is that of Touch, which enables all living beings to feel touch. Is is made up of Air-molecules exclusively, and is free from the molecules of all other substances. II-i-9, 10, 16.)

The Airy Object is that which is actually perceived as Air, the substratum of all Touch; its existence is indicated by Touch, Sound, Steadiness and Shaking. It moves horizontally, and is capable of moving and holding the clouds and other things.

Though Air is not visible, yet its numerousness is inferred from the collapse of winds,—this collapse being due to the collision of two contrary winds blowing with equal velocity; this collision is inferred from the upward motion of Air,—which upward motion again is inferred from the fact of tufts of grass and other things being seen to rise in the Air (whenever there is such a collision). (IV-i-17; II-i-14, 5.)

Breath is the Air in the body; it serves the purpose of moving about the various fluids, secretions and other materials in the body. This Air in the body comes to be known as 'Prāṇa' 'Apāna', 'Samāna', 'Udāna' and 'Vyāna', on account of its various functions (of moving up, down &c.)

Commentary.

Having dealt with the three visible Substances—Earth, Water and Fire—the author now deals with Air, specially as he has been treating of such Substances as are both eternal and non-eternal. &c. &c. &c.

Page 45.] The Touch of Earth is due to the baking of the atom; and in the products it is due to the touch produced in the atom. The touch of Air on the other hand is not due to any baking; and it is this that constitutes the difference between the touch of the two Substances; and the fact of the Touch of Air being neither warm nor cool differentiates that Touch from the Touch of Water and Fire.

The existence of Touch in Air is pointed out by the *sūtrā*—'Air has Touch,' in the second *Adhyāya*. Then again, we have a *sūtrā* pointing out that the substances devoid of colour have their number &c. invisible; and this indicates the existence in Air of the seven qualities beginning with 'Number.' For if such existence were not meant to be indciated, then the mere mention of such invisible qualities would be useless. Then we have the *sūtrā* that the shaking of grass is due to the contact of Air,—which shows that there is Faculty, (*i. e.* of velocity or speed) in Air; for the conjunction of a Substance without speed is never found to give rise to any action.

'*That Air*'—the word 'That' (*sa*) points to something spoken of before and subsequently recalled to the mind—after which it comes to be referred to by 'this,' '*ayam*'. The particle '*ca*' indicates that it is not Earth, Water and Fire only that are of two kinds, but Air also.

The Airy Product is found in the shape of the Body, the Sense-organ, the Object and the Breath. Of these, the author points out the Body in its generic form:—The Airy body is such as is never born of the womb, and it is not like the Earth-body, which is both womb-born and non-womb-born. The region where these Airy bodies are found is that of the Maruts. The Airy body becomes capable of experiences, by reason of the admixture of Earth-particles which, coming into contact with the Air molecules, tends to solidify them into a conglomerate whole.

The Sense-organ is that which leads to the experiencing of Touch by all living beings; and this organ is made of Air-molecules, independently of all contact with Earth-particles; and thus being produced in a manner peculiar to itself, different from that of the rest of the Body, it becomes an organ of perception. The existence of this organ is known from the feeling of Touch that we have. And the fact of its being Airy is proved by the fact of its manifesting Touch alone from among the qualities of colour &c.—*e. g.* we find in the case of the Air that renders perceptible coolness of the water on our body. This organ exists all over the body, as is shown by the fact of touch being felt all over the body. The organ is called '*Tvak*' ('skin') as it is found to exist in the *skin*, the name of the container being applied to the contained.

To this name some people object as follows: "The Bodily position of all sense-organs is found to be pervaded over by skin; for as a matter of fact we find that where there is skin there alone are colour &c. perceived, and not otherwise; and hence the name of 'skin' should apply to all the organs, and not to the organ of Touch alone."

This is not right; as in that case no blindness &c. would be possible; and then, if you were to admit of a diversity of potencies as due to the particular substratum of each, apart from the common element of the skin, the blindness being held to be a cessation of that potency, then that would amount to an admission of a diversity of the *sense-organs* themselves.

The Airy object is that which is the substratum of the feeling of Touch perceived by us. The existence of the object is proved by Sense-perception.

Page 46.] As an example of this sense-perception some people point to the direct cognition that we have through the tactile organ, of the *blowing of Air*. But that is not right, as in all direct perception that we have through the Tactile organ, it is

only Touch that is felt, and nothing else. As for the cognition of the *blowing of Air*, it is got at by means of Inference, which through the force of habit, appears even in the absence of any remembrance of Invariable Concomitance and other factors necessary in the Inferential process; just we perceive apparently by the eye (though really infer) the shaking of trees &c. In the perception of the difference in the feeling of coolness and warmth, the recognition of Air that we have proceeds from an Inferential process which leads to a recognition of the Substance (Air) that brings up the Substratum of the Touch in question; and as for the Tactile organ, that cannot give us any idea except that of the feelings of coolness and warmth. The Inferential reasoning—that 'Air' is *perceptible* by Touch, because it is the substratum of the Touch that is perceived, like the jar'—is set aside by the actual non-perception of the Air; just like the Inference that 'the hare has horns because it is an animal.' As a matter of fact, we find, in the case of such substances as the jar and the like, that all cases of the tactile perceptibility of substances are cases also of visual perceptibility; and we also find that Air is not visible to the eye; consequently from this we could safely infer the absence of tactile perceptibility in it.

The non-perceptibility of Air having been thus established, the Author now proceeds to adduce an inferential argument to prove its existence—*Its existence is indicated by &c.*, When we feel a touch without perceiving any colour, or taste &c., we at once conclude that it must have some substratum of its own, because it is a touch, like any other touch; nor could it have the Earth for its substratum, because it is not accompained by colour, (while Earth is never without colour). It might be urged that even in the case of touch, there exists some colour, though it is not manifested. But that would not be right; because the perceived touch *of the Earth* is invariably found to be accompanied by the *perceived* colour of that Earth. In the case in question however, there is no perception of Colour; consequently the Touch cannot be regarded as belonging to the Earth. Nor could Water and Fire be regarded as the necessary substratum;

because the touch felt in the Air is neither hot nor cold, like the touch of the jar (while the touch of Water and Fire are distinctly cool and warm). Nor lastly, could the Touch be regarded as belonging to the incorporeal Substances,—*Ākāçā*, Time and Space; because Touch is always found to exist in corporeal substances. Then, if the touch belonged to the Mind, then like the atoms, Mind would have the character of producing products homogenous to itself; as a matter of fact however we find that Mind has not produced any touch products. Consequently, the Touch could not belong the Mind. Thus then, the only substance that could be regarded as the substratum of Touch is Air, and Air only.

Similarly too, Sound also an is indication of the existence of of Air. For instance, we often hear of a rustling sound appearing, all on a sudden, among the leaves of trees; and we conclude that the sound must be primarily due to the conjunction of a substance that is endowed with touch, because it is an initiative sound related to a substance whose component particles are not separated, like the sound proceeding from the drum struck by a stick. That which has this Touch is the Air; as *Ākāça* and the other substances have no Touch. And if the sound were due to the coloured substances,—Earth, Water or Fire—then it would be visible to the Eye. We have added the proviso—'that which is related to a substance of which the constituent particles are not separated'—with a view to set aside the sound produced by disjunction. Similarly, the existence and continuance, of leaves and other things in the sky must be regarded as due to the conjunction of a substance capable of tactile perception,—because it is a *continuance* in the absence of any such impelling agency as that of effort or speed—just as we find in the case of leaves floating on the Water. This substance capable of tactile perception cannot be either Earth or Water or Fire; because the Touch is not visible. Hence this substance must be regarded as something totally distinct from these three. We have added the proviso—'in the absence of effort and speed'—with a view to differentiate the existence or continuance of the arrow and the bird. Then again,

the peculiarly qualified Shaking of trees must be due to the conjunction of a substance capable of being perceived by the organ of Touch,—because it is a qualified Shaking,—like the shaking of the *vētasa* tree caused by the swift current of the river. It might be argued that the premiss does not apply to the case of the trembling of the Earth during Earth-quakes. But it is not **Page 47.]** so; as Earth-quakes are due to a different cause altogether; and it is only a *qualified* shaking (*i. e.* shaking of substances found to be qualified by the connection of something else) that can be regarded as a reason for the existenee of a conjunction with a tactile substance.

Objection: "The substance inferred from sound and the other indications, is the same as that inferred from Touch, and there is not a distinct substance inferred from each of the indications enumerated; under the circumstances what are your proofs for asserting that the existence of Air is indicated by Sound, Steadiness and Shaking?"

Reply: The proof for this lies in the fact that, in as much as Sound, Steadiness and Shaking can be reasonably attributed to the substance that has been inferred from Touch, there can be no reason for the assumption of other substances.

The author now points out the property of Air:—*It has the character of moving horizontally.* It is capable of moving the clouds from one place to the other, of keeping them suspended and of counteracting the force of their gravity, and also of making them rain. It is Air again which moves chariots and boats.

In as much as there is always a doubt as to the singleness or multiplicity of such inferred substances as the *Ākāçā* and the like, with a view to remove this doubt in the case of Air, our author adds—*though it is imperceptible &c.* He points out where "collapse" is perceptible; whenever there is a collision of two winds operating in opposite directions, they stop each other's motion; and it is this collision tending to deaden their velocity that is called "collapse." And it is this from which we infer the

fact of the wind being many; as there could be no collision (which is a kind of conjunction) of a single thing by itself. In as much as two winds blowing in the same direction, one after the other, do not collide,—the text adds—*blowing in different directions with contrary action.* And as there would be no actual collision between the two if they were of unequal force—the stronger forcing its way over the weaker and blowing in its original direction—the author has added; *blowing with equal velocity.*

In as much as the conjunction in question would be as imperceptible as their multiplicity, the text proceeds to show that the collision too is inferred from the upward going of two corporeal substances in the shape of the Air rising up, the process of reasoning being that—the rising of the winds must be due to their stiking against each other, because it is an upward motion of substances naturally having a horizontal motion, and no other cause for such upward motion is possible under the circumstances, just like the rising of the waves of water striking against one another. Instead of using the expression '*avayavinoh*' ('substance made up of certain constituent parts'), the author has used the expression '*sāvayavinoh*' ('the things made up of partite substances'), with a view to include the Air in the gross perceptible form only—the epithet '*sāvayava*' ('partite') being applicable to the subtile constituents of Air (f. i., the diad of Air, which also is made up of constituent atoms and hence as such can be called '*sāvayava*' though it is not perceptible); specially as a substance that is atomic in its dimensions cannot have the power of moving such things as the tuft of grass and the like. As the upward rising of the winds would also be imperceptible, the author adds that the rising is inferred from the rising up of tufts of grass &c.

The author now describes the real form of '*Prāan*' which is known, by ordinary men and also in the works on yoga, as something totally distinct from Air in the shape of ordinary objects. The Breath exists within the body.—that is to say

'Breath' is the name that is given to the Air in the body. The useful purpose served by this Breath is that *it moves about the liquid and solid materials, as also the refuse substances of the body.* By the word 'liquid' here is meant the particular substance that is produced out of the digested food; 'refuse' refers to the excreta; 'solid' refers to the skin, the flesh, the bones **Page 48]** and the blood &c. These substances are moved about and brought together—by the Breath. There may be a doubt as to the multiplicity of this Breath; hence it is added—*while being one &c.* It might be urged that we have many scriptural passages speaking of the Air in the Body being *five* in number with a view to this our author add;—*By reasons of the diverse functions &c.* The Air is called '*apāna*' ('downward'); by reason of its moving down the refuse materials of the body; when it expands the liquids among the arteries it is called '*vyāna*' ('expansive'); by raising up the foods and drinks it comes to be called '*udāna*' ('upward'); and that which is breathed out of the nostrils and the mouth is called '*Prāna*' ('outward'); and which distributes equally the stomachtic heat over all parts of the stomach, for purposes of digestion is called '*Samāna*' ('equalising'). Thus we find that we have got five distinct Airs; but the number 'five' is only assumed (on the basis of its different functions) we conclude this from the fact of the impossibility of many corporeal substances existing in a single substrate (*i. e.* the five Airs could not inhere over the whole of a single Body.

CHAPTER V.

Of the *Mahābhūtas* or the Ultimate Material Substances or States of Matter.

Text (40): We are now going to describe the process of the creation and destruction of the four ultimate Material Substances.

When a hundred years, by the measure of Brahmā are at an end, there comes the time for the delive-

rance of the Brahmā existing at that time; and then, for the sake of the resting at night, of all living beings wearied by their 'wanderings,' there arises in the mind of the Supreme Lord, the Ruler of all worlds, a desire to reabsorb (all creation); and simultaneously with this desire, there comes about a cessation of the operations of the unseen potential tendencies of all souls that are the causes of their bodies, sense-organs and gross-elements. Then out of the supreme Lord's desire and from the conjunction of the souls and the material atoms, there come about certain disruptions of the atoms constituting the Bodies and sense-organs. These disruptions destroy the combinations of those atoms; and this brings about the destruction of all things down to the atoms. (II—i—18, 19; V—ii—1; VII—ii 10).

Then there comes about a successive destruction or reabsorption of the ultimate Material Substances, Earth, Water, Fire and Air, one after the other. (V-ii-1, 12; VII-ii-10.)

After this, the atoms remain by themselves in their isolated condition; and simultaneously with these there remain the souls permeated with the potencies of their past virtues and vices.

Then again, for the sake of the experiences to be gained by living beings, there arising in the mind of the supreme Lord a desire for creation, there are produced, in the atoms of air, certain actions or motions, due to their conjunctions under the influence of the unseen potential tendencies that begin to operate in all souls. These motions bringing about the mutual contact of the air atoms, there appears, through the Diad,

Triad &c. finally the "Great Air," which exists vibrating in the sky. (V-ii-12 ; VII-ii-9 ; X-ii-2.)

Page 49.] *After this, in this Great Air, there appears, in the same order, out of the atoms of water, the Great Reservoir of water, which remains there surging.* (X-ii-2 ; VII-ii-9.)

In this Reservoir of Water, there appears, out of the Earth-atoms, the Great Earth which rests there in its solid form. (V-ii-1 ; X-ii-2 ; VII-ii-9.)

Then, in the same Water-reservoir, there appears, in the same order, out of the Fire-atoms, the Great Mass of Fire ; and not being suppressed by any thing else, it stands shining radiantly.

The four gross elements having thus been brought-in'o existence, there is produced, from the mere thought (mental picturing) of the Supreme Lord, the Great Egg, from out of the Fire-atoms mixed up with the atoms of Earth ; and in this egg having produced all the worlds and the Four-faced Brahmā, the Grand-father of all creatures; the Supreme Lord assigns to him the duty of producing the various creatures. Being thus engaged by the Supreme Lord, Brahmā, endowed with extreme degrees of Knowledge, Dispassion and Power, having recognised the ripeness for fruition of the Karmic tendencies of the living beings, creates, out of his mind, his sons, the Prājāpatis, as also the Manus and the several groups of the Gods, Ṛshis and Pitṛs,—and out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet, the four castes, and the other living beings of all grades high and low,—all these having their knowledge and experience ordained in acordance with their previous deeds ; and then he connects them with Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion and Powers, according to their respective impressional potencies.

Commentary.

Having explained in detail, the fact of the four ultimate elements being *products*, the author now proceeds to consider the question of their having a Creator.

Page 50.] We have got to consider the production and destruction of the four elements, Earth and the rest ; if we were to consider these separately under the section dealing with each of them, there would be an unnecessary prolonging of our work ; consequently our author takes them collectively in this section; specially as the facts apply to all of them equally.

We now proceed to describe the processes of &c. Though the creation and destruction of all these four is described collectively, yet this should not be regarded as a point of similarity among them ; as the production and destruction of each is found to be described as distinct from those of another.

If we had only the word '*Mahābhūtānām*' ('of the gross elements'), then that would apply to the *three* gross elements only, as in accordance with the *Kapinjalanyāya* (vide *Mimānsā-sūtra* Adh xi-i-38 &c.), the plurality (in '*Mahābhūtānām*') would indicate '*three*' only. In order, therefore, to include all the four elements, we have the word '*Caturṇām*'

Then again, if we had one word '*Caturṇām*' only, then that would apply to the four 'Air'-products just mentioned—*viz* : the Airy Body, the Airy Organ, the Airy Object and Breath ; hence with a view to preclude these we have the word '*Mahābhūtānām.*'

Objection :—"In that case, as the production and destruction described are of the *four gross-elements*, alone, the process would not apply to the production and destruction of the Dyads, as these are atomic in their nature (and not *gross.*)"

Reply:—Not so; as we have the word ('*vidhi*' 'process'); the sense of our author being that he is going to describe the *process* by which the elements are produced and destroyed; and we know that this process begins with the production of the Diads, and ends with the atoms; and so this would necessarily include the production and destruction of the Diads also.

As what the author has in view is the description of the two processes, irrespective of the order in which they are dealt with, he begins with the process of destruction first, though this has been referred to last.

By the measure of Brahmā &c.

5	*Nimēshas* (Twinkling of our eyes)	...	1 *Kāshṭhā.*
30	*Kāsthās*	...	1 *Kalā.*
15	*Kalās*	...	1 *Nāḍikā.*
30	*Kalās*	...	1 *Muhūrta.*
30	*Muhūrtas*	...	1 *Ahorātra* (day & night.)
15	*Ahorātras*	...	1 *Paksha* (Fort-night.)
2	*Pakshas*	...	1 *Māsa* (Month.)
2	*Māsas*	...	1 *Ṛtu* (Season.)
6	*Ṛtus* or 12 *Māsas*	...	1 *Samvatsara* (Year.)
3	*Ṛtus* or 1 *Uttarāyaṇa*	...	1 Day of the Gods.
3	*Ṛtus* or 1 *Dakshiṇāyana*		1 Night of the Gods.
360	Days and nights of the Gods or 360 of our years	..	1 Year of the Gods.
1200	Years of the Gods	...	The Four *Yugas.*
1000	Four Yugas	...	1 Day of *Brahmā.*

Page 51.] After the lapse of a hundred years—each year made up of 360 such days of Brahmā—there comes the time for the final deliverance of the *Brahmā* of the time; and then there arises, in the mind of the Supreme Lord of all worlds whose powers are never repressed, a desire for the re-absorption, for purposes of

allowing them during the night a little rest from metempsychic troubles, of all living beings, who, during the cycle coming to an end, have been undergoing ceaseless troubles attendant upon birth and death.

Immediately after this, there comes about a cessation of the functionings of the unseen potential tendencies inhering in all the Souls, which tendencies are the productive cause of the body, sense-organ and gross elements (related to each Soul). On this cessation, there remains no chance for the production, of any further body &c. And as for those that have already appeared, for the destruction of these, there appear certain actions or motions, out of the Supreme Lord's destructive wish and from the conjunctions of the Souls and atoms. From these actions there comes about a disruption of the atoms that form the direct or indirect material causes of the Bodies and the Sense-organs. This disruption leads to the destruction of the conjunction of these atoms; and thus there comes about the destruction of the Body and all other Gross Substances, all these body &c., becoming destroyed down to the diads, the atoms alone being left behind.

"If the created things were destroyed suddenly, then the God would be known as 'merciless' and 'doing things without any motive'."—In order to guard against this our Author adds that all this process of destruction and re-absorption is for the purpose of allowing the beings a rest at night, as it were.

Some people urge the following objection: "There being "endless Karmic tendencies of an endless number of Souls these "tendencies would operate one after the other (and not all at "once); consequently while some souls would be desisting from "all experiences on account of their Karmic tendencies having "all become spent up in fruition) others would be still under-going their experiences, and others still would only be turning to-"wards future experiences; and thus the objects of experience "functioning on all sides, there could not be any simultaneous "cessation of the bodies and sense-organs &c."

This objection is met by the declaration that *there is a cessation of the operations of the Karmic tendencies.*

The *time of the final deliverance of Brahmā* has been figuratively spoken of as '*night*,' because of that time ressembling the night in the point of the cessation of the experiences and perceptions of all living beings (who go to sleep at night, and also into a long sleep of unconsciousness at the time under consideration).

The Gross-Elements also become destroyed in the same manner. That is to say, just as there is a destruction of bodies and sense-organs, down to the very atoms, so in the same manner, we have the destruction of the Gross Elements also. That is to say, by the process of the action and disruption of the atoms, there is a successive destruction of the Gross Elements, one after the other :—*viz* : while Water is still existing, the Earth is destroyed ; and Water is destroyed before Fire ; and this latter is also destroyed before Air.

After this the atoms continue to exist in their isolated state; and also the Souls permeated with the faculties or tendencies left upon them by their previous good and evil deeds, continue to exist during the same period of time, *i. e.* during 100 years of *Brahmā*. Though Time and Space &c, also exist during this time—as these also are eternal—yet the author speaks of the existence of the Souls and atoms alone, as if these did not exist at the time, then the atoms could not be developed into the product though the Karmic tendencies of the Souls ; as such it is these that are by far the most important factors deserving notice.

Page 52.] Having thus described the process of destruction, the Author proceeds to describe the process of creation : *Then again* &c. Though during that time the Souls are not endowed with life, yet they have been spoken of as '*Prāṇis*' ('living beings,') because of their capability for being endowed with it. There arises, in the mind of the Supreme Lord, a desire to

bring about the creation, for the purpose of bringing about the experiences of pleasure and pain by those Souls. Then the Karmic tendencies of the Souls regain their operative powers.

Though the creative desire of the Supreme Lord, in the shape of an active potency, is one only, and eternal, functioning towards the appearance of numberless effects that are simultaneously brought into existence,—yet, at one time it tends to bring about destruction, and at another creation, on account of the differences in the nature of the particular time and other auxilliary circumstances. At the time that it tends towards destruction, the Karmic tendencies of the Souls cease in their operation, and assume a position of indifference (inactivity or latency). And when it tends towards creation, the tendencies regain their activity towards the bringing about of their effects.

The compound '*Vṛttilabdhāh*' is to be explained as, '*Vṛttih labdhā yaih tē*' ('those by whom activity has been regained'.) This compound is found mentioned along with such compounds as '*āhitāgni*' &c., with regard to which the position of the two constituent words is laid down to be optional; (Panini II-ii-37) just as we have the compound '*daṇḍajāta*'; consequently no objection can be taken to the order of the two words in the compound.

Thus then the meaning is that there appear certain actions or motions in the air-atoms, on account of the conjunctions of these atoms with Souls, brought about by the active Karmic tendencies inhering in these latter. Thus in the appearance of the action in the Air-atoms, the air-atoms are the *material* cause ; the conjunctions of the atoms with Souls whose Karmic tendencies have begun to be active, constitute the *immaterial* cause; and the Karmic tendency is the *instrumental* cause.

These actions bring about the mutual conjunction of the air-atoms. From these conjunctions, the Air-diads appear ; then the Triads, and so on up to the Gross-Air, which exists vibrating in the sky, not having its speed interrupted in any way.

Then, in this Air, there appears the Great Reservoir of Water, produced, in the same manner as above, out of the Water-atoms, through the Diad, in the same order of triad &c. and this remaining, flowing over the whole universe, not being stopped.

After the production of this great Water-reservoir, in this same Reservoir, there appears the Solid Earth, out of the Earth-atoms.

Then in this Water-reservoir, appears the Great Mass of Fire, produced, in the same manner as described above, out of the Fire-atoms; and not being suppressed by anything else, this mass of fire remains shining radiantly.

Though there is a natural opposition between Fire and Water, yet it is on account of the force of the unseen agency that it becomes possible for one to be the substratum of the other.

Thus the four Great Material Substances having been produced in aforesaid manner, there appears, by reason of mere volition or contemplation on the part of the Supreme Lord, out of the atoms of Fire mixed up with the atoms of Earth, the Great Egg. It is because this Egg contained particles of Earth, that it could not appear as a Mass of pure fire.

Page 53.] In this Egg, the Supreme Lord produces the four faced *Brahmā*, the primeval ancestor of all people (and regions), along with the several worlds; and assigns to him the duty of producing the creatures. Being thus appointed by the Supreme Lord, *Brahmā*, endowed with extreme degrees of Knowledge, Dispassion and Powers, comes to recognise, by means of his knowledge, the Virtues and the Vices of all beings; and on account of his Dispassion he does not act with any partiality; and through his Great Power, he makes them experience e results of their deeds.

Having come to know the fruition of the deeds of living beings. Having come to know that such and such should be

the results of their previous deeds, *Brahmā* produces his mental sons, Daksha and the rest, whose knowledge, experiences and lives are in accordance with their previous deeds—'mind-born sons' because produced out of mere volition,—and also the Manus, the Gods, and the Ṛshis, and the hosts of Pitṛs; and then out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet, he produces respectively, the Brāhmaṇa, the Kshatriya, the Vaiçya and the Çūdra; and then the other beings, high and low. He connects all these with such duties (*Dharma*), Knowledge, Dispassion and Power, as are in due accord with their previous deeds. [The word 'Açaya' means '*āçētē*', *that which lies latent* in the self, until the experiencing of the result]. He does not deviate one jot from this universal law.

Some people have asserted that the action of an intelligent agent is always for accomplishing some desirable end (to be served by that action), or for the removable of something that is undesirable; and as none of these motives—either of obtaining something desirable, or of avoiding something undesirable—could apply to the case of the Lord who has all his desires fulfilled, it cannot be possible for Him to act in any way towards the creation of the world.

To this we make the following reply: *It is for bringing about the experiences of all living beings &c.* That is to say, the action of the Lord towards creation is for the sake of others, and not for the fulfilment of any desires of his own.

Objection: "In that case He should have created the world abounding in pleasure alone, and not one mixed with pain; as the Lord would be moved to create by pure mercy."

The reply to this is as follows: *He recognises the fruits of the deeds of living beings.* That is to say, though He is moved to act for the sake of others, yet He does not create a world of pleasures alone; as His creative operation is regulated by the variegated Karmic tendencies of living beings. Nor is this incompatible with His mercifulness; as pain serves the Man's

useful purpose of producing in his mind a non-attachment to the things of the world. Nor is the fact of His acting in accordance with the previous good and bad deeds of beings incompatable with his independent and Supreme Godly character; because it is He that joins them to such 'duties, knowledge, dispassion and power' as are in due accord with their own Karmic tendencies. That is to say, how could He cease to be the Supreme Lord, by awarding to each being results in accordance with his respective deeds? For certainly, the master does not cease to be a master by making awards to his servants in accordance with their merits.

Page 54.] To this process of creation the following objection is raised; "At the beginning of creation, the living beings would not know the meaning af any words, as no convention (on which the denotations of words are based) could have been fixed upon till then; and hence at that time there could be no use or words."

The basis for meeting this objection is supplied by the text: "*Mental Sons &c.*" It is the soul with a body born of the womb that, on account of the great pains suffered in the womb, loses all memory of previous experiences; The Ṛshis, the Prajāpatis and the Manus, on the other hand, being produced from the mind, have such bodies as are not born of the womb; and as such there being no reason for their losing their memories, they are found to be directly connected with their Karmic tendencies, and duly endowed with the reminiscenses of previous experiences; and hence these Beings recall all their verbal usage of the previous creation; juut as a man after sleep remembers things seen before he went to sleep; and having recalled these words, these Beings carry on the usage among themselves; and from this usage, the living beings of that cycle come to know the meanings of those words; and these on their turn carry on the usage, and hand it on to future generations.

Question: "What are the proofs for the existence of God?"

This proof is in the form of Scriptural Authority and Inferential Reasoning.

This Inferential Reasoning is—The four Great Elementary Substances are preceded by some one having a knowledge of them, because they are effects,—anything that is an effect is preceded by one having a cognition of it, as for instance, the jar (which is always preceded by the potter),—and the four Great Elementary Substances are effects,—hence they must be preceded by one having a knowledge of them.

Objection: "The premiss of this inference (that the Elementary Substances are effects) is not duly cognised by any means of right motion,—f. i. the fact of the Earth being an effect cannot be regarded as duly established."

Reply: This is not right; as the Earth &c. are made up of parts; and everything that has parts is an effect, as for instance the jar; the Earth &c. have parts,—hence they must be effects.

Objection:—"An Inferential Reasoning is operative only when "the invariable Concomitance (upon which it is based) has been "duly recognised; as for the invariable concomitance of the *charac-"ter of an effect* and *that of being preceded by one having know-"ledge* of it, this can never be known from the case of the jar and such "other substances; as in the case of the sprouting of the seed we "find that the sprouting appears *at the same time* as the cognition "of the sprout by the person who had sown the seed; and hence in "this case we do not find any *precedence* of the doer with the know-"ledge of the effect over the appearance of the effect. Nor could "the sprout &c. be included in the subject of the inference in ques-"tion; as it is only after the invariable concomitance has been duly "cognised, and the Inference has begun to operate, that we pro-"ceed to distinguish the Subject and Predicate &c. of the Inference, "for the benefit of the opponent; while in the case in question "(of the sprout) it is found to be always included in a cognition "contrary to the concomitance; and as such, there could be no "cognition of the necessary concomitance."

Reply: If there be no recognition of the invariable concomitance simply on account of there being no perception of duality or difference (between the time of the appearance of the sprout and the knowledge thereof by the sower),—then, in that case, we could never rightly arrive at the *Sāmānyatodṛshta* inference of the moving of the sun, which has been put forward by the author of the *Bhāshya* on the *Mīmānsā-Sūtras*. As therein also, we find that it is merely the fact of the stars &c. having assumed different positions, and not that of their having *moved*, that is perceived at the same time as the cognition of their other positions preceded by the movement of Dēvadatta (the observer) from one place to another.

Objection: "In the case of the stars, in as much as the "non-perception of *moving* could be possible on account of the "difference in the position (or the great difference in space) be- "tween the observer and the stars, or the difference in their "positions, (the one being on the Earth while the others are in "the sky),—this non-perception could not set aside the effect of "the repeated seeing of the sun, which is unconditionally effective "towards bringing about a cognition of the necessary concomi- "tances; specially as the two do not pertain to the same subject."

Reply: In that case, in the case in question also, the non-perception of the cognition of the sprout (before its actual appearance) may be due to the difference in nature between that and the doer (the Sower), who is bodiless (while the sprout is bodied); and hence the affectiveness of the repeated perceptions operating unconditionally could not be set aside by the said non-perception.

Page 55.] *Objection*: "Then again, does the above Inferen- "tial Reasoning establish only the Creator, or a Creator capable of "creating the Earth &c.? If it prove a mere creator, then what "is desired is not accomplished. As what you seek to prove is not "a mere agent, like ourselves; as any such person having a limited "vision could not create the Earth &c. Then as for an agent

"capable of creating the earth &c., such a one cannot be "proved to exist,—as there could be no (cognisable) concomitance "with such a one; and through concomitance too, we could only "prove the existence of an agent similar in nature to the one "perceived in the case brought forward as the corroborative "instance."

Reply: This objection does not apply to the case; as what the Inference is sought to prove is not any particular kind of creator. All that the premiss put forward proves is the fact of the Substances under consideration being preceded by an intelligent being in general; and this necessarily establishes his particular character in the shape of the capability of creating the Earth &c.—as the existence of no general entity can be proved without the accompaniment of a particular characteristic.

Objection: "Let the existence of the general entity be not established; what of that?"

Reply: Not so; because the concomitance of the general entity is not set aside along with its *causedness*. If an Inference did not establish that which is invariably concomitant with the Reason or *Probans*, then the sight of smoke too would not prove the existence of Fire in general; as in this case too the existence would not be established of the particular Fire, which has not yet been perceived to be in any way related to the smoke seen; and no Universal Essence of Fire could have an existence apart from a particular Fire.

Objection: "An Inferential Reasoning has two factors—one "consisting of the recognition of invariable concomitance between "the *Probandum* and the *Probans* (the Major Premiss); and "another in the cognition of the relationship between the Subject and "the *Probans* or middle term (the minor Premiss); and the Major "Premiss establishes the existence of the generality, and the "Minor Premiss establishes that of the particular, in the form of "the Fire located in the mountain (where from the smoke is seen "a issuing). If it were not so, wherein would lie the use of the

"Minor Premiss? And where could be the validity of that "Inference which applies to something that has been previously "cognised?"

Reply: If such be the case, then, the same may be said with regard to the inference of God's existence also. As apart from 'attachment' all other characterestics of the 'Actor' in general are present in God also.*

The objector's standpoint may be thus summed up: "An "Inference establishes the existence of a particular entity also, "when there is no means of right knowledge pointing to the "contrary; as for instance, in the case of the Smoke and Fire, we "find no incongruity in the inference, from smoke, of the parti-"cular fire located in the mountain side; specially as we often "find the individual particulars (of generalities) occupying differ-"ent points in space and time. In the case of the inference of God "however, we cannot have any individual particular proved, as we "have means of right knowledge pointing to the contrary. For ins-"tance, the inference cannot prove the fact of the effects (Earth "&c.) being preceded by a Body (of the God); because if there "be a body, it would necessarily contain the Sense-organs; and "having these organs, the God could not have any knowledge of "the material causes (atoms), the accessories (in the shape of the "Karmic tendencies of Souls) and the potencies of various ins-"trumentalities—all of which are supersensuous,—in the matter "of the creation of Earth &c.; and as such He could not be the "creator of these. Then as for the creation not being preceded "by a Body (of God), it is absolutely impossible to prove this; be-"cause, as a matter of fact, we find that what a *doer* (of any act) "does is—1) to ascertain the power or capability of the instru-"ments, (2) to desire to fulfil the particular act by means of "those instruments, (3) to put forth an effort, (4) to put the "body into action, (5) to supervise over the various causes

* This sentence as it stands in the printed text is not intelligible; Nor has the translator any *MS.* by him; so he has translated the sentence in accordance with the only possible interpretation of which it was capable.

"(material and others), & (6) to do the act; and if he does not "*ascertain*, or desire, or put forth his effort, or put his body into "action, he does not do the act. And from these affirmative and nega-"tive universal instances (of the *acting* with the *ascertaining* &c.) "we conclude that like the Intelligence, (of God) the Body also would "be a necessary means to the production of effects,—as indicated by, "the same means by which the invariable concomitance is recognised "after a due recognition of all conditions and limitations; and hence "we cannot discard this notion of the necessity of the previous exis-"tence of the Body; just as in the case of the inference from smoke, "we do not discard the notion of the capacity in Fire of being pro-"duced out of (or of changing the condition of) parts. Even with all "this, if you discard the notion of the existence of the Body, then "you can as reasonably discard the notion of that of Buddhi "also. It might be argued that—'God, being possessed of great "powers, would bring about the creation, even without having a "body or intelligence for Himself; but He could not do so without "a *knowledge* of the nature of the material and accessory causes; "as no such action is met with in ordinary experience.' But "in that case my purpose also has become fulfilled; as mere "desire not being operative without the intervention of effort, it "is not as capable of bringing about effects as the Body which "operates directly by itself.

Page 56.] "It may be asked—where, in that case, would "there be room for the general precedence of an intelligent "creator?' But as a matter of fact, there could be no room for "it; as such a creator could not rightly be regarded either as "bodied or bodiless; and the existence of a mere 'generality, 'without the specifications (in the shape of corporeality or other-"wise), cannot be established. It may be asked—what is the "flaw in the inferential argument put forward in support of such "a being?' We reply that there is no actual flaw; but the man "who in the absence of any specific character, would put forward "an argument to prove the unprovable existence of the mere "generic entity, which, in such a case, would be as much an ab-

"surdity as the hare's horn,' would stand self-condemned; just "like a man who would take up a sharp sword to strike at empty "space. If you should not be satisfied without my showing "some flaw in your inference, then we would point out that it is "open to the fallacy of *Kālātyayāpadishta*,' in as much as the "inference of the precedence of a bodiless being is set aside by "the means whereby the invariable concomitance (of cause and "effect) is recognised; and the invariable concomitance thus con- "tradicting the desired character of bodilessness, the Inference "becomes open to the fallacy of '*Viçēshaviruddha*,' which is only "a particular from of the fallacy of '*Viruddha*'."

To the above we make the following reply: Does the nature of the *actor* necessarily consist in being bodied? or does it consist in the character of being the operator of instruments recognised as capable of bringing about the necessary effects? The former alternative could not be accepted; as in that case a person in deep sleep, or one who is not doing anything towards an action, would also have to be regarded as the 'actor' (as even in these conditions he would have his body all the same). We must then accept the second alternative; as it is only when this character is present that we find the effect coming about. This charecter can belong to a bodiless being also; as we find in the case of the Soul (which is an immaterial thing) operating towards the moving of the body. It might be argued that the body belongs to the soul, who has obtained it through its previous deeds (and as such the operating Soul cannot be regarded as strictly bodiless). True, the body belongs to the Soul; but it is not the body that supplies the force impelling itself; as any such impulsion by itself would involve a contradiction. It may be urged that the body may be regarded as the means of impulsion, in as much as it is the object of the impelling. But in the case of God also we have the atom as the object to be impelled or operated upon.

Objection: "The impelling of the Soul's body is found to be brought about by desire and effort; and not when the body

does not exist; and from this we infer that the body is the means or author of its own impelling, through the said desire and effort."

Reply: Not so; as the body can be only accepted as impelling or giving rise to desire and effort (and not to its own operations). After the desire and effort have been brought about, and when these begin to operate towards impelling (the body to a certain course of action), the body ceases to be the impelling agent; as the body being the *object* of this impelling could not, at the same time, be its *doer*. And thus we find that there is no similarity between the action of the soul and that of the body. Then again, we often meet with cases where certain inanimate things are moved to action by an intelligent being, merely through his own desire and effort, independently of all actions of the body. On the other hand, we never find any action apart from an intelligent being. All these facts go to establish the existence of God.

Objection: "The body would be necessary for the production of desire and effort also."

Reply: The body may be required for the appearance of such desire and effort as are adventitious; where however these are natural, the body would not be necessary. Nor is there any inconsistency in believing the Intellect, Desire and Effort to be eternal; as we have seen, in the case of Colour &c,, that they are of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal; and the same could very well be the case with Intellect &c., also.

This is the ultimate point at which the discussion with regard to the existence of God must rest. We now proceed with the discussion as to the details of the process (of creation).

Page 57.] *Objection*; "The atoms themselves presided over by the Souls would operate towards creation (and as such there would be no need of an extraneous God.)"

Reply: This cannot be; because the Souls depend for their cognitions upon the sense-organs obtained in accordance

with their previous deeds; and as such before they have obtained the physical body, they could not have the cognition of any thing (and hence they could not superintend the operations of the atoms).

Objection: "The Souls also are endowed with a natural intelligence pervading over all things (and hence there could be no absence of cognition)."

Reply: If the (cognitive) intelligence of the soul were natural to it (and remained with it always), then, by what agency could this intelligence have been deranged, whereby when the soul comes to have a body (after birth), he looks upon all things as wholly new. (If the intelligence had remained with the soul permanently nothing would be new to it).

Objection: "On account of the disappearance of the bodily covering (at death), the Intelligence turns inwards into the soul itself, and does not operate outwards (towards cognitions)."

Reply: In as much as the Intelligence is all-pervading, it could never cease to be connected with cognisable objects; and being eternal, its character of illuminating (making cognisable) objects could never cease to exist; and as such what could be the meaning of the said 'disappearance'.?

Objection: "What we mean by 'disappearance' is the *stopping of the functioning* (of Intelligence)."

Reply: If such be the case, then how could the souls have any cognition of objects?

Objection: "In certain cases the functioning of the Intelligence does not cease (and in these cases the Soul would have the cognitions)."

Reply: Whence this diversity.?

Objection: "It is due to the peculiarities of the proximity of sense-organs."

Reply: In that case, the functioning of Intelligence towards objects of cognition would be dependent upon the sense-organs, and would not be brought bot bayu mere proximity of the object to the Intelligence. Then again, as even though the Intelligence is all-pervading, yet it is not found to operate upon (make cognisable) all things in the world,—and as if all cognitions were brought about by the Intelligence independently by itself, there would be no use for the sense-organs,—it is only reasonable to hold that the Souls, so long as they have no bodies, do not have the cognitions of objects. In support of this, we have the declaration: 'The self-born One sent forth the senses outwards, hence it is that one perceives the outside and not the inside.' [*Kaṭhopanishat.* IV—i.] And not having any cognitions, the Souls could not be the superintenders or controllers of the senseorgans; consequently it is necessary to assume a certain controller above these Souls, who would have the character of the Creator, and who would be omniscient and full of pure inherent knowledge; specially as no operation of non-intelligent things could be possible without the agency of an intelligent controller.

We are now going to explain whether this controller is one or many. If there were many of them, then if they were not omniscient, they would be as powerless as ourselves; and if all of them were omniscient, then in as much as one such omniscient controller would be enough for all purposes, there would be no use for the others. Nor would there be any cause for a constant unanimity among many persons, all of whom would be equally independent and important; and this want of unanimity would, at times, interfere with the production of the desired effect. If all of them were to act in accordance with the wish of any one of them, then the character of the Lord would belong to this one, and not to the others, as we find in the case of a number of persons acting as trustees of a temple, that, in as much as there is a unanimity of purpose among them with a view to their business, each of them is not regarded as the 'Lord' or 'Master.'

Thus then the Creator,—whose existence has been proved by the peculiar character of his creations,—being omniscient, He could not be without specific cognition with regard to any object. And hence he could have no misconception (false knowledge), which is always due to the non-recognition of the peculiarities of objects. There being no misconception, He would have no attachment or aversion, both of which proceed from misconception (Ignorance). In the absence of attachment and aversion, He would have no activity, which proceeds from these; and as such He would have no virtue or vice, which are produced by actions. There being no virtue and vice, there would be no pleasure and pain, which proceed from virtue and vice respectively. And as He would always be directly perceiving all things, He could never have mere memories or Impressions; and hence the Supreme Lord is held to possess only eight qualities.

Such is the opinion of some people. Others however hold that to God belongs pure and unimpeded Intelligence alone, which constitutes His creative power; and these people do not admit of the existence in Him of Desire and Effort; and so according to them God has only six qualities.

Page 58.] Is this God also bound (like the other Souls), or is He free? He cannot be bound; as he is without *klēsha* and other things, which are the causes of being bound, and which are called '*Bandhana*' ('Bondage'). Nor could He be regarded as free; as 'liberation' is synonymous with the removal of bondage (and as such could not belong to one who has had no bondage). He may however be regarded as 'ever free',—as has been declared by the revered Patanjali: 'God is the particular person who is untouched by troubles, actions with their fruitions and residua' [*Yogasutras.* I—24.]

SECTION (6).

ĀKĀÇA.

Text (41)—Ákáça, Time and Space, having no lower

species, these are three technical names given to the individuals themselves. II-i-27, 29-31.

Of Ákáça the qualities are—Sound, Number, Dimension Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction., VII-1-22.

Sound cannot be the property of those substances that can be touched.—(1) because, being perceptible, its production is not preceded by any quality in the material cause of the substance (to which it belongs); (2) because it does not pervade over, and is not coeval with, the substance to which it belongs; (3) because it is perceived elsewhere than in the substratum wherein it is produced. I cannot be regarded as belonging to the Soul, because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ; (2) because it is perceived by other souls; (3) because it is not found to inhere in the soul; and (4) because it is perceived as apart from all idea of 'I.' It cannot be the quality of Space, Time and Mind, (1) because it is perceptible by the Ear, and (2) because it is a 'Viçēshaguṇa' (a specific quality). And thus the only substance to which it could belong as a quality, and be a distinguishing feature of, is Ákáça. (II-i-24 to 27).

As the distinguishing feature of sound is common to all Ákáça, this is regarded as one only. II-i-30,29.

From this unity follows its individual separateness or isolation. II-i-31.

Ákáça being spoken of as 'vibhu' (omnipresent or all-pervading), it points to its Dimension being the largest or highest. VII-i-22.

In as much as Ákáça is spoken of as the cause of sound, it follows that it has Conjunction and Disjunction. II-i-31.

Thus then, being endowed with qualities, and not being located in any thing else, it is regarded as a substance. And in as much as it has no cause, either homogenous or heterogenous, it is eternal. II-i-18.

Page 59.] *In the shape of the Auditory sense-organ it is the cause of the perceiving of sound, by all living beings. The Auditory sense-organ again is the name given to that part of the Ákáça which is called the 'Cavity of the Ear'; it is aided by the virtue and vice (of souls) that bring about the experiencing of sound. This sense-organ being eternal (as a portion of Akáça), deafness is caused by a derangement of its accessories.* II-ii-21.

Commentary.

For the sake of brevity, the author points out, in a single place, the differentiating qualities of Ākāça, Time and Space. Each of these being one only, there are no lower genuses of these; as a genus always resides in a number of individuals, and there being no lower genus, the names,—'Ákāça,' 'Time' and 'Space'—must be regarded as merely conventional, and not as based upon any genuses, like the name 'Earth' &c. That is to say, these names also are mere differentiating qualities. That name is called 'conventional' (or 'technical'), which without any reason, is agreed upon as applying to a certain thing pointed out from among a number of things,—*e. g.* '*this* is *Dēvadatta*'; on the other hand, that name is called '*naimittika*' which is agreed upon on the basis of a certain reason.

The author next proceeds to take each of these separately. Among these three, *Ákáça* has the distinguishing feature of having the qualities of Sound &c.

Objection: "What proof is there for the existence of *Ákáça*? Some people urge that it is Perception; as is evinced by the fact of our having an idea through the eye, of a flying bird

being at a certain point, and not at another. But this is not correct; as a substance which (like Ákāça) is devoid of form and colour cannot be amenable to visual perception, and as for the idea, in the case of the flying bird, of the substratum or place in the sky at which the bird is seen, this substratum appears to be nothing else besides the extended field of light."

In view of this the Author proceeds to show that Sound cannot be the property of any other substance,—thereby seeking to establish the existence of *Ákáça*, by a *Paricēsha-Inference.*

(1) Sound is not preceded by (an outcome of) any quality in the material cause of its substratum; as like the colour of the cloth &c. it appears after its substratum has been produced.

(2) Then again, like pleasure &c., it cannot be a specific quality of such things as can be touched. Nor should one think that this negativing of the fact of Sound being a *specific* quality of such things indicates that it is a *generic* or ordinary property of these. As Sound is a quality which, alike in its specific and generic forms, is perceptible by a single external sense-organ; and hence, like colour and the rest, it is only a *specific* quality (and hence the negativing of specific sound means the preclusion of *all* sound). The Colour and other qualities of the atoms of earth &c. are the specific qualities of such substances as can be touched; and they are such as are not preceded by any quality in the material cause of their substratum; for the simple reason that atoms (which are their substratum) are not caused entities; hence in order to preclude these colour &c, (which are not perceptible), our author has the qualification added 'while being perceptible' to Sound.

(3) Then again, Sound is not coeval with the substance in which it is produced; as for instance, we find that the conch still exists though the sound produced in it has long disappeared. For this reason too, like pleasure, etc. it cannot be the specific quality of things that can be touched. Herein also, the same being the case with the colour of the Earth-atom

which, even while the atom still exists, is destroyed by contact with fire,—and as such the argument being found to be defective, as being too wide, we must connect with this also, the words 'while being perceptible' (which qualification includes the colour of the atom).

Page 60.] (4). Another reason is put forward—*As it is perceived elsewhere than in its substratum.* If Sound were the quality of things that can be touched, then we should have to speak of the Conch and such other things as its substratum; and the sound proceeding from the conch is perceived elsewhere than in these things—*i. e.* in the drum of the Ear; and because as a rule the quality of one thing could not be perceived apart from it, we cannot regard Sound as the quality of any such substance.

Objection: "The sound that is perceived is in the same place as the conch, and (the perception is made possible by the fact that) the sense-organ pervades all over the world."

Reply: This can not be; for if it were so then the sound near us, as well as that at a distance from us, would be perceived equally well.

Objection: "Though the sense-organ is all-pervading, yet, in as much as it would be moved to activity only by the purpose of the person (to whom it belongs) it would apprehend its objects only when it would move out from its resting place (in the body), with an operative energy in keeping with the character of the apprehension of the object concerned; and as such there would be no absence of restriction (as to the perceptibility of near and distant sounds)."

Reply: The sense-organs are for the purpose of the perception of objects; the perception of the object is dependent upon the operative energy (of the organs); but as a matter of fact, the sense-organ too is nothing apart from these operative energies; as anything apart from these would be useless, and would have no evidence for its existence. Now then, the operative

energy of the Ear does not, as a matter of fact, go to the place where its object is situated, and then apprehend it; as if it were so, then as in the case of visual perception, so in that of auditory perception also, there could be no doubt as to the direction from which the sound proceeds. Nor could the quality itself come out of its own substratum (to the places of the sense-organ); nor can the sound in the conch be said to produce other sounds in the interval (between the conch and the Ear); as in the case of all qualities of tangible substances, we find, it is only in another substance produced out of those substances, that the specific qualities of these latter are found to produce like qualities in these produced substances; while in the case of the couch, we do not find, in the interval between the conch and the Ear, any substance produced out of the conch (wherein the sound of the conch could produce another sound); nor can there be an apprehension of that which does not *reach* the sense-organ; as otherwise there would be many absurd possibilities; hence it must be admitted that if the sound were a quality of the couch, it could never be perceived (heard). As a matter of fact however we do find it being perceived; hence it is this perception that proves the fact of its being the quality of a substance other than any such as the conch and the like;—this other substance being one that pervades over the space intervening between the conch and the Ear, and wherein the sound proceeding from the conch would produce successive sounds, till the proximity of the Ear is reached, and its perception duly accomplished.

The author next proceeds to show that Sound cannot be the quality of the Soul.

(1) *Because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ.* The Ear is an external sense-organ; because it always manifests (or makes perceptible), external objects, like the Eye. Then again, Sound is made perceptible by that organ, as its perception is found to appear only so long as the organ exists. And that which is perceptible by the external sense-organs cannot be a quality of the Soul; as we find in the case of Colour and other

qualities (perceived by the external sense-Organs). Hence it must be concluded that Sound cannot be the property of the Soul.

(2). For the following reason too, Sound cannot belong to the Soul: *Because it is perceived by other Souls—i. e.* it is perceived by many cognising Souls. In the case of the sound proceeding from the lute, we find that the same sound that is heard by one man is also heard by another person at the same place, through the series of sound-vibrations (emanating from the lute). Such is not found to be the case with Pleasure and other such internal qualities (belonging to the Soul). Hence differing in this important point from the recognised qualities of the Soul, Sound cannot be regarded as a quality of that.

(3). *Also because it is not found to inhere in the Soul,*— in this ressembling the qualities of Colour etc. (which do not belong to the Soul).

Objection: "It has not been proved that Sound does not inhere in the Soul."

Reply: Not so; because, as a matter of fact we find that Sound like Colour &c., is perceived as something *external*, while all the qualities of the Soul are perceived as *internal*.

(4) Sound cannot be a quality of the Soul—*because it is always perceived as distinct from all notions of 'I'*—that is to say it is not perceived as existing in the same substratum as the idea of 'I'. It is a well-recognised fact that, that which is a quality of the Soul is always perceived as being in the same substratum as the notion of 'I.'—*e. g.* 'I am happy,' 'I am unhappy' and the like, (where happiness is cognised as existing in the Soul which is also spoken of as 'I.)' Sound is never found to be perceived in the same manner; hence it cannot be a quality of the Soul.

Objection: "We have such a notion as 'I am a man of pleasant words' ('*priyavāgaham*' where the 'word' is expressed as existing in the same substratum as the notion of 'I'."

Reply: True; but in this assertion the 'I' is spoken of as one capable of giving utterance to pleasant words, and not as the sustratum of these. As for instance, in the case of the Sounds proceeding from the drum, we never recognise the drum as the substratum of the sound (but only as emitting it.)

Page 61.] In order to show that Sound cannot be a property of Space, or of Time, or of the Mind,—the Author adds the reason *because it is perceptible by the Ear.* The sense of this is that the qualities of Conjunction and the like, which are accepted by both parties as belonging to Space, Time and Mind, are never found to be perceptible by the Ear; while Sound is found to be perceptible by it; hence Sound cannot be a quality of these.

Then again, the very fact of Sound being a *Specific quality* proves that it cannot belong to Space, &c., which do not possess any specific qualities. This is what is meant by the expression *because it is a specific quality*—which embodies the argument: Sound is not a quality of Space, Time and Mind,—because it is a specific quality,—like Pleasure &c.

Objection: "For proving a single fact, it is useless to bring forward a large number of arguments."

Reply: The uselessness of other proofs in a matter proved by one proof—is this uselessness due to the fact of there being no good arising from them, or to the fact of no further arguments being needed by men? It cannot be the former; as we find that the later proofs are also found to actually serve a useful purpose, just like the first proof. Nor is it that men do not need further proofs. As we find that, in the case of a thing that is exceptionally sweet in its nature, and which gives additional pleasure at each sight or experience of it,—there is a desire to see it again and again, even after it has been seen once; *e. g.* in the case of a dear child. Even in a case where men should not require further proofs, we find that the man is urged to activity as much by the later, as by the former proofs; and as such none could be rejected as altogether useless. Specially as they

are found to serve the distinctly useful purpose of all pointing out the same object.

Objection: "When there is a pounding of what has already been pounded (doing of what has already been done), there can be no cessation of activity in the same line; and this will lead to no useful result. As what the former proof does is also to point out the object with a view to which the other person is urged to activity towards a useful purpose; and when this object has been once pointed out by that proof, any other proof for the same effect, could not have the same degree of operative instrumentality (towards the same end)."

Reply: Not so; because towards its own object the latter proof has the same degree of operative instrumentality as any other If it were not so, there would be no validity for the cognitions appearing in a continuous series; as every one of these refer is to the same object; and even the slight differences in the point of time of each of these are not quite perceptible. Nor would this lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*; as the series would naturally stop when there would be no means for the appearance of the cognition.

Question: "Even though Sound may not be a quality of Earth and the other seven substances, yet what has that got to do with the existence of *Ākāça*?"

The Author supplies the answer—'*Pariçēshāt*', (by 'exclusion'). That is to say, Sound is a quality; a quality could not exist without something in which it would subsist; it does not subsist in Earth and the other seven substances except *Ākāçā*; hence that in which the quality of Sound subsists is *Ākāçā*; this is the reason which, by exclusion, proves the existence, and gives us an idea, of *Ākāçā*. The proper form of the inferential argument would be this:—Sound is a quality of a substance other than the Earth &c.—because while being a quality, it is not found to subsist in the Earth and the other seven substances; that which is not a quality of some other

substance can never be a quality and yet not subsist in the Earth and the other seven substances,—as a corroborative instance we have the case of Colour &c. which proves the proposition by the law of contraries.

The fact of Sound being a quality of *Ākāça*, has been pointed out by means of the argument brought forward to prove the existence of *Ākāça* itself; and the author now proceeds to point out other qualities of *Ākāça*, such as Number and the rest.

Page 62] *The distinguishing feature of Sound being common* &c. Sound is the distinguishing feature of *Ākāça*; and as Sound is common to all *Ākāça*, it proves that *Ākāça* is one only;—that is to say, in the absence of any proof for any diversity or multiplicity thereof.

Objection: "Sounds are many, in the shape of the loud, the louder and so forth."

Reply: True; but it is not in this form of loud &c. that sound is the distinguishing feature of *Ākāça*, to which it belongs only as a quality; and certainly the *quality* of sound is one only, and being common to the *Ākāça*, it could not in any way be indicative of the diversity in its substrate; and as for the diversities of 'loud' &c, it is quite possible for these to proceed from a single substratum, through the diversities in the originating cause.

From this singleness follows its individual isolation:—In as much as there are no proofs for the diversity of *Ākāça* it is universally recognised as one only; and this also proves its Isolation or separateness.

Some people hold that unity is not a particular number, but is only the specific form of the object. But for these people, there could be no such expression as 'one jar,' as the two words being synonymous, it would be tautological.

Others hold Isolation or separateness to be natural to all things. But these people would have a cognition of the separate-

ness of a thing without any idea of the other thing (from which it is separate),—just as we have of unity. As a matter of fact, however, this is not possible; as the idea of separateness that people have is always in this form—'this is separate *from that*' (which involves an idea of both things). Therefore Unity and Separateness cannot be regarded as one and the same.

Ākāça being spoken of as all-pervading, it indicates the fact of its Dimension being the highest. The fact of *Ākāça* being a substance having proved that it has Dimension, the *Sūtra*—'The Ākāça is great because of its all-pervading character' shows that it is endowed with the highest Dimension. Whatever is all-pervading has the greatest Dimension,—*e. g.* the Soul,—and *Ākāça* is all-pervading;—therefore this too has the greatest Dimension.

Question: "How is the all-pervading character of *Ākāça* proved?"

Answer: This is proved by the fact of sound being produced at all places. If *Ākāça* were not all-pervading, then sound could not be produced everywhere; as without its material cause, no effect can be produced (and *Ākāça* is the material cause of sound). All the sound that is produced, in heaven, in the sky, or on the earth, must be regarded as inhering in one and the same substrate,—because they all belong to the class of 'sound', like the sound that is heard, and that which is produced in the starting; the fact of the sound as it is heard, and as it is produced in the beginning, inhering in one and the same substratum must be inferred from the relationship between them of cause and effect; (*i. e.* the sound in its initial stage is the cause of the same in the condition in which it is heard); because nothing that is not in the same substratum as the effect can ever be the material cause of this latter.

The sūtrā laying down the fact of Ākāça being the 'cause of Sound' indicates the presence in it of Conjunction and Disjunction. We have the *Sūtra*—'Sound is produced by Conjunction, Disjunction and Sound'; and this *Sūtra* distinctly indicates that Conjunction and Disjunction are the cause of Sound, a quality of *Ākāça*; and this shows that these—Conjunction and Disjunction—belong to *Ākāça*; as if they did not subsist in the same substratum (with sound), they could not be its material cause.

Thus then, being endowed with qualities, and not subsisting in any other substrate Ākāça must be regarded as a substance. As *Ākāça* has qualities, it is a substance, like the jar &c. Nor for this reason alone is *Ākāça* a substance, but for another reason also,—*i. e* on account of its not subsisting in any other thing,—being in this, like the Atom.

In as much as it is without cause, either homogenous or heterogenous, it is eternal. A 'homogenous' cause is the *material* cause, and the 'heterogenous' cause is the immaterial cause and the instrumental cause; the absence of these, in the case of *Ākāça* proves that it is eternal.

It is the cause of the perception of sound by all living beings.

Objection: "If it were so then all beings would hear all sounds, *Ākāça* existing everywhere equally."

Page 63] *Reply: In the shape of the Ear; and the Ear also &c.* '*Cravaṇa*' ('Ear') is that whereby something is *heard* ('*Crūyatē-anēna*'). The meaning is that the sense of Audition is that portion of *Ākāça* which is called by the name of '*Cravaṇavivara*' ('Ear-cavity'); this is proved by the fact of there being no perception of Sound when this cavity is closed.

The author points out the qualifications of this organ: *It is aided &c.* The 'experiences caused by Sound' are those of pleasure and pain; and the organ is aided by such Virtue and Vice as bring about the pleasures and pains due to Sound. The sense of this is that the exterior sense-organ which apprehends the specific quality of a substance is itself endowed with the same

quality; *e. g.* the Eye which apprehends Colour is itself a substratum of Colour; similarly in as much as the Ear apprehends the Sound described above, it must be regarded as having Sound for its quality; but we have proved that Sound can be a quality of *Ākāça* only; hence we conclude that the Auditory organ is *Ākāça*; and though, as such, it is all-pervading in its character, yet it does not bring about the perception of *all* Sounds everywhere; as it is only when the *Ākāça* is limited within the tympanum of the Ear that it acquires the character of the 'sense-organ.' Just as though the Soul is all-pervading, yet it is only when it is confined within the body that it has the character of the 'Cogniser'; and the reason for this is that the only purpose served by the body is that it brings about the experiences of the Soul, otherwise the body would be altogether useless.

Objection: "If such be the case, then the deaf person would also hear Sound, as he has the tympanum inact."

Reply: Though the *Ākāça* of the Ear is eternal, yet *deafness* is produced by the discrepancies in the accessories, in the shape of Virtue and Vice.

SECTION (7).

On Time.

Text (42). Sound as it is heard, and as it is contrary* notions of coming, inhering in..., *Time is the cause of the con...* and inferred fro... (i. e. ... *'Priority' 'Posteriority,' of 'simultaneity' 'succession,' and of 'late' and 'soon.' In as much as there is no other cause or basis for these notions, as appearing with regard to these objects,—notions which differ in character from all notions described before,—we conclude 'Time' to be the basis of these.* II-ii-6.

* Note.—The translation follows the rather forced interpretation of the *Kandali*. It appears better to take 'vyatikara' in the sense of *relationship*; Time in that case would be the basis of the notion of such relationships as those of 'Priority' and Posteriority.'

Time is the cause or basis of the production, persistence and destruction (or cessation) of all produced things; as all these are spoken of in terms of time. It is also the basis of such conventional usages as 'kshaṇa,' lava,' 'nimēsha,' 'kāshṭhā,' kāla,' 'muhūrta,' 'yāma,' 'ahorātra,' 'ardhamāsa,' 'māsa,' 'ṛtu,' 'ayana,' 'samvatsara,' 'yuga,' 'kalpa' 'manvantara,' 'pralaya' and 'mahāpralaya.' II-ii-9.

Its qualities are—Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction. Its unity is proved by the fact of the distinguishing feature of 'time' being common (to all periods of it). From that follows its Separateness. The declaration 'the name kála applies to the cause' in the Sūtra indicates the presence in Time of the greatest Dimension. The declaration of the 'posteriority and priority of the cause causing the notions of posteriority and priority' indicates the presence of Conjunction; [Page 64] and there would be Disjunction as the destroyer of this Conjunction. II-ii-8 II-i-31 VII-i-25 VII-ii-22.

The fact of time being a substance, and that of its being eternal are proved as in the case of Ākāça. II-ii-7.

Though from the uniformity of the distinguishing character of Time, Time is directly by itself, one only, yet, it is indirectly, or figuratively, spoken of as manifold, on account of the diversity among the conditions afforded by the production, persistence and cessation of all produced things; just as we have (diversity) in the case of the Gem or the Cook.

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to describe Time. The notions

of the 'Posteriority' and 'Priority' of time are spoken of as 'contrary,' with reference to the same notions as regarding Space. That is to say, that which is 'prior' in point of space is 'posterior' in point of time, and *vice versa*. This notion, as well as of those of 'succession' &c. &c. is based upon time.

Objection: "Time is imperceptible; hence there could be no recognition of its invariable concomitance with the notions of 'priority' and 'posteriority'; how then could it be regarded as the distinctive cause of these notions?"

Reply: We infer this from the fact of there being no other cause for the notions of succession &c., with regard to their respective objects;—these notions being totally different in character from those described before. That is to say, it is a well recognised fact that with regard to such objects as Substances and the rest, there appear the notions of 'priority,' 'posteriority' and the like. Substance and other things themselves could not be the cause of these notions; as these are wholly different from the notions of substance &c; nor could any effect be produced without an adequate cause; hence we conclude that that which is the cause of these, is Time.

Some people hold that the notions of 'priority' and 'posteriority', in the case of the 'old' and 'young' respectively, is based upon the greater and lesser number of the revolutions of the Sun.

This is not right; as the revolutions of the Sun are not in any way related to the young and old; and if that which is not related were to be regarded as the cause, then that would mean a total confusion (anything could be regarded as the cause of anything).

Others regard 'simultaniety' to consist in mere 'Sahabhāva' (existence together, Association or co existence). This too is not right; as unless we accept the existence of Time, the word *saha* ('together') in this connection would have no meaning.

Objection: "The meaning of '*saha*' would consist in the simultaneous mutual preclusion of things, with regard to a certain action."

Reply: This cannot be; as there can be no such mutual preclusion among things that are not such as have been produced, have existed, and have ceased to exist. If the mutual preclusion be held to belong to things that *exist together*,—then that would be an admission of 'Time.'

Similar explanations may also be given of the notions of 'non-simultaneity' ('Succession') &c. also.

Question: "Time being one and the same always, whence the diversity of notions with regard to it?"

Answer: This diversity is due to the diversity in the accessory circumstances. For instance, when we have a simultaneous apprehension of the *production* and *persistence* of two objects, by one and the same cognition (notion or idea),—then it is that the Time, accompanying these (production and persistence) gives rise to the notions of 'later' and 'sooner' (as 'posteriority' and 'priority'). We have the notion of simultaneity brought about by a single cognition of the productions and operations of many things; while the notions of 'quick' and 'slow' are brought about by the cognition of the greater and less number of the active moments intervening between the production and functioning of the objects under consideration; and so forth we explain the other ideas in regard to Time.

Objection: "We may attribute the various notions to the circumstances peculiar to each case; and thus there would be no need of postulating any such thing as Time."

Page 65.] *Reply*: This cannot be; as if there were no Time, nothing could be produced. That is to say, there can be no production for *Ākāśa* which has an absolute existence; nor of the 'man's horn' which is absolutely non-existent; and hence the only production that would be possible would be that of something

not having a *previous* existence; and if there were no Time, the word 'previous' would have no meaning; and as such the said qualification of the non-existence (of the object to be produced) not being available, there would be no peculiarity that would make it an object of production as distinguished from *Ākāça* and 'man's horns'; and thus we would have no production at all.

Question: "How could any actual cognition be qualified by Time, which is an imperceptible entity?"

To this some people make the following reply: The action of Time in the bringing about of a qualified cognition, is in the manner of a cause, like the sense-organs,—and not in the way of a mere accessory, like that of the stick (in the making of the jar.)

But this is not correct. As a cognition, consisting as it does of pure consciousness, can have no peculiar cause, apart from the relationship of the object. Hence we offer another reply to the above question:

In the old and the young we find that there is a difference in their bodily conditions; as a cause of this difference we infer the connection of Time; and it is after this inference that we have an idea of their being *qualified* by Time; and in as much as the cogniser of both (the young and the old) is one and the same person, there can be nothing incongruous in the fact of the qualifying adjunct (Time) being cognised by means of cognition (Inference) other than that of the objects (old and young) themselves. As instances of diverse means of knowledge coalescing in their functions, we have such notions as 'this sandal is fragrant' (where the *sandal* is *seen* by the Eye, and the fragrance is inferred); or the notion 'this earth is without the jar,' in which, according to the Mimānsaka, the absence of the jar is cognised by Negation, while the spot is perceived by the Eye. In the case of such objects as the jar and the like, on account of their being corporeal (material or bodied) substances,—or on

account of these having various conditions,—we infer the relationship of the bodied substance with Time; and then there follow the notions of simultaneity &c., as qualified by that Time. And these notions (of simultaneity &c.) are put forward as the pointers of Time, only against one who denies the fact of these being the effects of Time. And certainly, there can be nothing wrong in this.

The author gives a reason for this. *'Tadvyapadēçāt'*—('As all these are spoken of in terms of Time')—That is to say, the productions &c. are spoken of in terms of Time, *e. g.* 'the *time* of production,' *'time* of destruction,' and so forth. And from this fact we infer that Time is the cause of all these.

He points out other effects of time—*'kshaṇa &c.'* 2 *kshaṇas* make one *Lava*, 4 *kshaṇas* make one *nimēsha*—which is the time taken by a single wink of the Eye; and so forth the various divisions of Time treated of in Arithmetical works.

The Substance Time having been proved to exist, the author proceeds to point out its qualities. *'Tasya guṇāh &c.'* Time being a Substance, it must have the qualities of Number &c.; and so the Author with a view to explain the particular forms of these, says—*'kālalingāviçēshāt.'* That is to say, the distinguishing features of Time, in the form of the notions of simultaneity and the rest, being common to all Time, it is regarded *as one* only; specially as there is no proof for believing in a multiplicity of Time.

Objection: "The notions of simultaneity and succession &c. are themselves diverse; and these distinctly point to the multiplicity of Time."

Reply: It is not so; because even when Time is one only, the diversity of the notions can be explained as being due to the diversity of other attendant auxilliary conditions.

From this follows its separateness—That is to say *unity* is always accompanied by *separateness*; hence the unity of Time proves its *separateness* also.

Kāraṇē kālam &c.—This refers to the sūtrā *kāraṇē kālākhyā.*' The meaning of the sūtrā is that the name 'Time is applied to the cause of the notions of simultaneity &c., and this shows that Time is *all-pervading*; as these notions are present everywhere (which would not be possible if their cause were not all-pervading).

Page 66.] *Kāraṇaparatvādivacanāt &c.* This refers to the sūtrā—*'Kāraṇapratvāt kāraṇāparatvāt ca paratvāparatvē,'*—in which the expression *'kāraṇaparatva'* denotes the conjunction of Time with the material object; and this proves that Time has the quality of *Conjunction.*

Tadvināçakatvāt &c.—*i. e.* the Conjunction being caused and as such necessarily destructible, the destroyer of this could be nothing else save *Disjunction*; as the destruction of the substrate (of the Conjunction) does not always precede the destruction of the Conjunction (*i. e.* the two things conjoined together continue to exist, even after they have been disjoined from each other). This proves that Disjunction is a quality of Time; because the Disjunction destructive of a previous Conjunction could not exist without a substratum.

Like *Ākāça*, Time is a *Substance* and is *eternal.* That is to say, just as *Ākāça* is a substance, on account of its having qualities, and not having any other substratum,—so in the same manner, is Time also; and just as *Ākāça* is regarded to be eternal, on account of its having no homogenous or heterogenous cause,—so is Time also.

Question: "If Time is one only, whence, then, does it come to be spoken of as *manifold*?"

Answer—Kālalingāviçēshāt That is to say, though the denoters of Time—such as the notions of *priority, posteriority* and the like—are the same in all cases, and as such properly speaking, primarily Time is one only, yet it is spoken of as diverse, through diversity being imposed upon it indirectly. That is to say, it is spoken of as manifold on account of the diversity of such

conditions as the *beginning or production, continuance or persistence,* and *disappearance or destruction,* of all things. Just as a single piece of crystal comes to be spoken of as blue, yellow &c., through the diversity of the coloured objects in its proximity,—so in the same manner, though Time is one only, yet on account of the diversity of the said conditions, it comes to be spoken of as the 'time of production,' 'time of persistence,' 'time of destruction,' and so forth.

In view of the fact that the connection of the crystal with the coloured objects is not real (but merely imposed from without), while that of Time with the said actions is real,—the author cites another example: *Pāchaka &c.*; just as one and the same person comes to be spoken of as a 'cook' and a 'reader' through the diversity of his actions, so in the same manner, with Time also. Nor can the actions of *beginning* &c. themselves be said to be Time, as they are recognised as something wholly different.

SECTION (8).

On Space.

Text (43):—*Space is the cause or basis of the notions of East, West &c. That is to say, it is that from which arise the ten notions—of East, South-East, South, South-West, West, North-West, North, North-West, Below and Above—with regard to one corporeal (material) object considered with reference to another material object as the starting point or limit.*

Specially so, as there is no other cause available (for these notions).

Page 67] *Its qualities are: Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction. The presence of these in Space are to be shown as indicated by*

the Sūtra, in the same way as in the case of Time. II-ii-12, II-i-31, VII-i-24, VII-ii-22.

Though the character of Space by itself is uniform and one only, yet, for the sake of the usages of the Çruti, the Smṛtis and the ordinary people the Great Ṛshis have coined the ten literal names—'Prācī' (East) and the rest—which pertain of the contacts of the Sun, revolving round the Meru, with the ten points of Space presided over by the ten Deities. Thus then it is only indirectly or figuratively that we speak of the 'ten quarters'. To these quarters is given another set of names based upon the names of the deity presiding over each of them—viz: 'Māhēndrī' (East), *'Vaiçvānarī* (S. E.), *'Yāmyā'* (S.) *'Nairṛtī'* (S. W.), *'Vāruṇī'* (W.) *'Vāyavyā* (N. W.), *'Kaubērī'* (N.), *'Aiçānī'* (N. E.), *'Brāhmī'* (Above,) and *Nāgi* (Below.) II-ii-13 to 16.

Commentary.

Just as the distinguishing feature of Time lies in the fact of its being the cause of the notions of simultaneity &c., &c., so that of Space lies in the fact of its being the basis of the notions of East, West &c. This same fact is further explained. For an immatarial object there is no boundary or limit, and as such the ideas of east, west &c. cannot apply to it; for the simle reason that their dimension is not limited; hence the author has said—*'taking a material object for the limit'*; that is to say, Space is that from which there arises with regard to material objects, the idea that, 'this is to the East of that,' and so forth. In the sense of 'this is to the East of that,' we have the form *pūrvēṇa'* as in the case of this word the Instrumental is laid down as signifying the sense of the basic noun.

Objection: "The notions of East, West &c., being effects justify simply the inference of a Cause; but whence do you conclude that it is Space that is this cause?"

Reply: *There being no other cause.* For the notions in question, a mere substance could not be the cause; for in that case, in whatsoever position the substance would be, it would give rise to the notions in question, which is absurd. We would have the same absurdity, even if the notions were held to originate from two substances as related to each other; and in this case there would be the further absurdity if the absence of both of the notions in question were attributed to Actions and Qualities, as in that case, there could be no such notions in the case of substances having similar Actions and Qualities. For these reasons it must be admitted that that which is the cause of these notions is Space. And this is also shown by the fact of the direction being expressed by such words as *'idam ētasmāt pūrvam'* '(this to the East of that)', where we have the Ablative (in *ētasmāt*); if this did not originate from Space, then the Ablative would be meaningless.

Page 68.] It might be argued that the Ablative would denote *limit*. True, it would; but *limit* also is with reference to Space, and not with reference to any and every substance; as in the latter case, it would be the same in all cases.

Though Space is itself imperceptible, yet it must, like Time, be regarded as the cause of certain particular notions.

The author now proceeds to show that Space has the character of a substance, in that it is endowed with qualities:—*Tasyāstu* &c. The existence of these is established as in the case of Time. That is to say, as Time is one only on account of the common character of Time in all points of it, so in the same manner, the character of Space being common to all points in Space, it is one only. And from this singleness follows its Separateness. And as in the case of Time, its Great Dimension is indicated by the sentence *'Kāraṇē Kālah'* so is the Great Dimension of Space indicated by the sentence *'Kāraṇē dik,'* specially as the effect of this, in the shape of the notions of East, West &c., is present everywhere. Then as the presence of the quality of

Conjunction in Time is indicated by the expression '*Kāraṇa-paratvāt*,' so also its presence in Space would be similarly indicated; and as in the case of Time the quality of Disjunction was proved to exist as the destroyer of Conjunction, so would it be in Space also.

Objection: "The fact of the distinguishing feature of Space being one only is not established; as we find the notions of East, West &c, differing from one another; and thus it is only proper to hold that there is a multiplicity or diversity of Spaces."

Reply: Not so; because we find that with reference to one and the same object we have all the notions of East, West &c., as taken with reference to its position in regard to different substances If the notions of East &c., were based on so many different spaces, then the thing that would be recognised as 'to the East,' could not, at that same time, be known as 'to the West.'

Objection: "The object may be in relation with all spaces."

Reply: In that case every object in the world would be regarded as to the East, West, North and South, of every other thing. As a matter of fact however we do not find any such idea with regard to any object. Hence we conclude that Space is one only, and the diversity of notions is due to the diversity in the accessories. For instance, 'East' is the name given to that extent of Space which happens to lie between the place of the rising sun, and the object in a straight line with it; and the name 'West' to that which lies between the place of the setting Sun and the object in a straight line with it; and the names 'North' and 'South' is applied to that where the Sun is never seen, as considered with reference to an object that is in a position that would lie in a line with the meridian point; and the intervals between these come to be known as 'South-East' and the like. The diversity of the notions is thus very easily explained as being due to the accessory circumstances.

Nor can all these notions be taken as being due to the connection of the Sun (and as such not indicative of any such distinct substance as Space). Because the Sun is not found to be in direct contact with any material object; and that which is not so connected could not be the cause of the notions in question. This is what the author means to show by the clause *diglingāviçēshāt*. That is to say, Space being found to be one only, the ten names of 'East' &c., were formed by the Great Ṛshis. And these names were '*anvartha*'—'*literally applicable*' to those conjunctions and disjunctions of the Sun with the points of Space presided over by the ten Ruling or Protecting Divinities, Indra and the rest. For instance, the point of Space where the Sun *appears first of all* (*prathamam anati*), was named '*prāchī*' ('East'); that which the Sun *touches as'ant* (*avāk ancati*) was named '*Avāchī*' ('South'); that which the Sun *touches last* (*Pratyak ancati*) was named '*pratīchī*' (West); and that which he touches high (*udak ancati*) was named '*Udīchī*' (North). All these positions are those that the Sun takes while revolving round the mount Meru. These names were made by the Ṛshis for the sake of the proper performance of the *Vedic*, *Smārta* and ordinary actions. As an instance of (1), we have the sentence 'one should not sleep with his head *towards the West*,' of (2) 'one desiring long life takes his food, facing the East'; and of (3), such assertions as 'Go to the East,' 'look to the South,' and so forth.

Page 69] In as much as the Ṛshis coined ten names, Space is figuratively divided into ten forms. As for the names '*Māhēndrī*' and the like, they do not belong to any other things; they are synonymous with the names given above, but are based upon other conditions (than that of the Solar contact). This is what is meant by—*Tāsāmēva* &c. 'Māhēndrī,' is that which belongs to Mahēndra; and that which belongs to Vaicvānara is the '*Vaiçvānarī*' (South); and so forth.

SECTION (9).

On Ātmā.

Text (44): Ātma, Self, is that which belongs to the class 'Ātmā'; VIII-i-2. III-i-2.

In as much as it is extremely subtile in its character, and as such imperceptible, its cognition is brought about by means of the organs of hearing &c., as inferred from perception of Sound &c;—aided by the fact of such instruments as the axe and the like being always operated by a doer or agent.

In the cognitions of sound &c., also we infer a 'cogniser.' This character cannot belong to the Body, or to the Sense-organs, or to the Mind; because all these are unintelligent or unconscious. Consciousness cannot belong to the body; as it is a material product, like the jar; and also as no consciousness is found in dead bodies.

Nor can consciousness belong to the Sense-organs; because these are mere instruments, and also because we have remembrances of objects even after the sense-organ has been destroyed, and even when the object is not in contact with the organ.

Nor can it belong to the Mind; because if the mind be regarded as functioning independently of the other organs, then we would have perception and remembrance simultaneously presenting themselves (and if the mind be regarded as functioning through the other organs, then it would be the same as 'Ātmā'); and also because the mind itself is a mere instrument.

And thus the only way thing to which consciousness could belong is the Self, which thus is cognised by this consciousness.

As from the motion of the chariot we infer the existence of an intelligent guiding agent in the shape of the charioteer, so also we infer an intelligent guiding agent for the body, from the activity and cessation from activity appearing in the body, which have the capacity of acquiring the desirable and avoiding the undesirable object. III-i-19.

The intelligent agent is also inferred from the actions of breathing &c. "How?" (1) When we perceive a variegated functioning of the Air contained in the body, (we infer the existence of a guiding agent), who would act like the blower of the wind-pipe. (2) From the regular action of winking up and down, we infer the existence of the agent, who would be like the puller of a pulley. (3) From the fact of the wounds of the body being healed up, we infer the existence of the agent who would be like the master of a house repairing it. (4) From the action of the mind towards the contact of the sense-organs apprehending desirable objects, we infer the existence of the agent, who would be like the boy in a corner of the house throwing a ball (to another ball stuck in the ground). (5) When we see an object by the Eye, and then recalling the taste of that object, we find a certain modification appearing in the organ of taste; from this we infer the existence of a single guiding agent for the two operations, like a person looking through two windows. (6) Then again, from the qualities of Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort, we infer the existence of one to whom these qualities belong. These qualities cannot belong either to the Body, or to the

Sense-organs; (a) because these are found to be coexistent with the notion of 'I';' (b) because these qualities exist only in certain parts of the object to which they belong; (c) because they are not coeval with their substratum; (d) because they are not perceptible by the external organs of perception. (7) The existence of the Self (as a distinct substance) is also proved by the fact of its being spoken of by means of the word 'I' which is wholly distinct from the words 'Earth,' 'Water' &c. III-ii-4 to 13.

The qualities of the Self are, these: Intelligence, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Virtue, Vice, Faculty, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction. The Sūtra, dealing with the distinguishing features of the Self has mentioned the qualities, from Intelligence down to Effort. The presence of Virtue and Vice is indicated by the mention of the fact of the qualities of one Self not being the cause of the appearance of a quality in another Self. The existence of Faculty is indicated by the mention of this as being the cause in the bringing about of remembrance. The presence of Number is indicated by the mention of 'Restriction'; and from that follows Separateness. The Greatest Dimention of the Self is mentioned in the Sūtra 'so is the Self also.' The fact of Pleasure &c. being due to contact proves the existence of Conjunction in the Self; and Disjunction is the destroyer of that Conjunction. III-ii-4, 20, 21. VI-i-5. IX-ii-6 VII-i-22.

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to describe that, for whom the knowledge of truth brings the highest good, and false knowledge leads to birth and rebirth, and for whose purpose are all the things (in the world).

Ātmatvābhisambandhāt &c.—'*Ātmatva*' is the name of a generality or class; and the relationship or presence of this generality makes the substance known as 'Ātmā;' and it is the fact of belonging to this class that differentiates the Self from all other things.

Objection: "As a matter of fact we find that the existence of a perceptible objcet is always accompanied by a cognition of its shape or form; in the case of the Self we find there is no cognition of the shape of the Self; and hence not finding its invariable concomitant, we cannot but reject the existence of the Self; and under the circumstances why should any attempt have been made towards the ascertaining of its distinguishing features?"

Reply: There is no reason for setting aside the notion of the existence of Self; because the absence of the sense-perception of it is implied in its very nature. On the other hand for its existence we have a proof in the shape of Inference. And the author proceeds to show this: *Tasya &c., Subtility* consists in the incapability of being perceived by the senses; and this subtile Self is cognised by means of the Inference based upon the Senses of audition and the rest whose existence, as belonging to the imperceptible Self, is proved by means of Inference; *e. g.* 'The perception of sound &c., are brought about by means of certain instrumental organs,—because it is an action,—like the action of cutting (which cannot be brought about without an instrument in the shape of the axe)' How these organs prove the existence of the Self is next shown: *In the case of such instruments as the axe and the like, we find that they are always moved or worked by an intelligent agent.* That is to say, whatever Instrument there is in the world, it is found to be worked by an intelligent agent, as we find in the case of the axe which is

worked or operated by the carpenter; and the organ of audition &c., are all instruments; and as such they must be worked by something else; and that by which these are worked is the Self. Though the organ of audition, which is of the nature of the *Ākāça* has no direct relationship with the Self, as *Akāça* is all-pervading, yet it has the capability of being worked or operated by the Self, through the substratum of the internal organ (mind); just as the hand is in contact with the red hot ball of iron, through the pincer.

The fact of the organs of audition &c., being instruments is proved by the fact of their illumining, or manifesting, or rendering perceptible, definite objects, like the lamp.

Though it is by the mind that we cognise the Self as 'I' and 'mine,' mixed up with the notions of the *doer* and the master, brought about by the limitting conditions of the body and the organs acquired by it by reason of Its previous deeds,—yet it is spoken of as 'imperceptible by the senses,' on account of its being imperceptible by the external sense-organs.

Çabdādishu prasiddhyā &c. In as much as there is a cognition of sound and other things, we infer from that the existence of the *cogniser*. For instance—'Cognition must inhere in something, because it is an action, like the action of the axe; and that wherein it inheres is the Self.'

Objection: "The cognition cognises the object by itself and not as inhering in something else."

Reply: Is this cognition eternal, or does it change with every moment? If it is eternal, then there is a mere difference of name (as what we call 'Self' is nothing more than an eternal cogniser); while if it be momentary, then there could be no remembrance of something perceived a long time before; as the cognition that remembers is something wholly different from that which had perceived it on the previous occasion.

Objection: "In as much as there is a causal relationship between the previous cognition and the subsequent remembrance, the former cognition would be remembered by the latter; the reason for the son not remembering that which was perceived by his father lies in the fact of there being no causal relationship between the cognition of the father and that of the son; though there is such a relationship between the bodies of the two persons (father and son), yet in as much as the bodies are unconscious things their relationship can have no bearing upon their cognitions."

Relpy: This is not right; because if there be no Self, there would be no idea formed of any causal relationship; as at the time that the cause would be cognised, there would be no cognition of the effect, which will not have come into existence at that time; while at the time that the effect would be perceived, the cause will have disappeared in the past, and hence there would be no cognition of it; and according to one who denies the Self, there would be no one perceiver of both; and as such who could ascertain the causal relationship between these two things appearing one after the other?

Objection: "The previous cognition cognising itself also brings about the idea of its causal character, which is nothing apart from itself. The subsequent cognition cognising itself, also cognises its character as an effect, which is not distinct from its own nature. And the character of the cause and that of the effect, apprehended by each of these cognitions, come to be cognised by a simple idea brought about by the single Impression produced by the two cognitions conjointly."

Reply: These are simply absurd assumptions. How could the two cognitions, which would be confined within themselves, have any such idea as that 'I am the effect or the cause of that cognition;' as certainly they would be wholly ignorant of the conditions of each other. And that which they would not cognise could not be apprehended by them; as apprehension always follows in the wake of cognition.

Objection: "We grant that cognition inheres in something else; and the substrate of cognition we would have in the Body,

or in the sense-organ, or in the Mind."

Reply: *It does not belong to the Body, the Sense-organ or the Mind,* What does not belong to these is 'consciousness', '*caitanya*' mentioned in the next sentence. That is to say, consciousness does not belong to the Body, or to the Sense-organ, or to the Mind; because these are '*unconscious—i. e.* they are not the material cause of cognition.

Objection: "This argument involves a begging of the question, the premiss being the same as the conclusion."

With a view to this objection, the author adds '*na çarīrasya &c.*' That is to say, Consciousness does not belong to the Body, because like the jar, the body, is a material product; as a matter of fact we find that whatever is a material product is not conscious, as the jar; and the body is a material product: therefore it cannot be conscious. He adds another argument:— *Because it is not found in the dead body;* the puting forward of the fact of there being no consciousness in the dead body, is with a view to show that the property of Consciousness is not coeval with its substratum; the argument thus comes to this: Consciousness is not a specific quality of the Body, because it is not coeval with (does not exist as long as) its substratum, like Conjunction. From this it follows that Consciousness does not belong to the material constituentsof the Body; as if these constituents were conscious, their product would also be so; and there would be numerous cognisers (conscious beings) in one and the same body; and the conscious entity not being one, there could be no adjustment of the activities of the body, in accordance with the motive or purpose of any one of those numerous conscious beings (in the body).

Consciousness does not belong to the sense-organs, because they are of the nature of instruments. That is to say, the sense-organs are unconscious, because they are instruments, like a stick (in the making of the jar). He adds another argument:— *When they are destroyed &c.* That is to say, as a

matter of fact we find that even when a sense-organ has been destroyed we have distinct remembrances of things previously perceived by its means; and certainly no remembrance would be possible if the cogniser had been destroyed (in the shape of the sense-organ); hence Consciousness cannot be a quality of these sense-organs. Then again, we find that we have the remembrance of an object even when the object is not before us (and not in contact with the sense-organs); (which would not be possible if consciousness belonged to these organs); nor could the remembrance be attributed to to these organs); as these operate over objects only by going over to them (which would not be possible in the case of the absence of the object). Hence Remembrance cannot belong to the sense-organs; and the absence of Remembrance would also prove the absence of cognition in these: as remembrance cannot belong to any other thing say that to which the previous cognition belongs.

It is for this same reason that Consciousness cannot belong to the Objects; as if it were so then there could be no remembrance of the Object after it had been destroyed. For the following reason also Consciousness cannot belong to the object: Because we do not find the object having any idea either of its position or of the pleasure &c., brought about by it; and because we do not find it ever moving at all with any degree of intelligence. Then again, if consciousness belonged to the Sense-organ, or to the Object, then we could have no such notion as 'I saw the colour, perceived the taste, and am feeling the touch.' which unifies in itself the several cognitions of colour &c; Colour &c., and Eye &c., are distinct from one another (*i. e.* Colour is distinct from Taste, and the Eye from Tongue, and so on).

Objection: "Consciousness may be a quality of the Mind; as it applies to all objects, and is eternal; and as such the unification of cognitions just spoken of would be quite possible in this case."

Reply: *It cannot belong to the Mind.* If the Mind be believed to cognise, by the help of some organ of perception other than the Eye &c., then your theory differs from me only in name (you applying the name 'Mind' to what we call 'Self').

Page 73.] As what this other organ would be is the Mind; and the Mind which you hold to be the substratum of consciousness would be what we call 'Self.' If the Mind does not need the help of any other organ save the Eye &c., then, in the case of an object with a colour, taste &c., being before us all these would be perceived simultaneously, as there would be a simultaneity of the causes of their perception. It is only when there is a need of some other organs that, this organ of the Mind being atomic in its nature cannot be in touch with all the ordinary sense-organs at one and the same time, and hence there is no possibility of any simultaneous cognition of Colour, Taste &c. And if there were no such organ (in the shape of an eternal organ, Mind), then there would be simultaneous remembrances; as there would be no want of any necessary element. Whereas if there be a need of such an organ, as there could be no simultaneous contact with this organ, the remembrances could only be gradual.

It has been held by some people that the Mind, being a single eternal entity, cannot bring about any remembrances either simultaneously or successively (as in the latter case the remembrances would go on *ad infinitum*; and as such it could not be regarded as having any instrumentality in the bringing about of remembrances). But this is not right; because as regards the *simultaneous* bringing about of remembrances, this is not possible, then as regards the *successive* bringing about of them, when one has been brought about, there can be nothing left to be brought about after that; but this does not mean that at this latter Time, the Mind does not exist; as we do admit of an existence other than that which consists in effective activity.

For the following reason also consciousness cannot belong to the Mind; *Because the Mind is itself of the nature of an*

instrument. That is to say, 'Mind is not conscious, because it is an instrument of consciousness, like the jar.'

Objection: "The fact of the Mind being an instrument has not been accepted (by both parties) as it is held to be the *doer* or *agent*."

Reply: If the Mind were the *doer*, then for the perception of pleasure &c., we should find some other instrument, like the Eye for the perception of colour; as no action can ever be produced without an instrument. And if you agree to accept the existence of some such organ, then there would be a difference in name only; as you would also admit the existence of a *doer* (calling it 'Mind' while we call it 'Self), and a distinct instrument (calling it something else while we call it 'Mind')

Another reason, why the Mind cannot be regarded as conscious lies in the fact of its being a material substance, like a piece of stone.

Question: "If consciousness does not belong to the Body, or to the Sense-organ, or to the Mind, what does that prove with regard to the Self?"

Answer; *Pariçēshāt* &c.—That is to say, Consciousness being an effect, must be the effect of some cause in which it would inhere; It has been proved that it cannot inhere in the Body, Sense-organs or the Mind; and will be shown later on, nothing else has the power to be the cause of consciousness; and hence the only thing that remains, to which Consciouness could be attributed, is the Self. In as much as it is a product of the Self, it is by means of Consciousness that the Self is cognised.

Objection: "All this is wholly irrelevant; as both the "Self and the Consciousness having but momentary existence, "there could be no such relationship between them as that of "the substratum and the contained. Specially as 'Sattva,' "'Existence,' consists in the doing of some action towards a cer- "tain end; and this action could be either simultaneous of "gradual; as there is no third method which is both gradual

"and simultaneous. What is gradual consists in the fact of "several useful actions being done at different times; and simul- "taneity consists in these being done at one and the same time; "and between two such mutually contradictory things (as *gra- "dual* and *simultaneous*), the absence of one would necessarily "imply the presence of another. If the actions and things had "not a merely momentary existence, there would be no gradual "succession; as succession would mean the cessation of one and "the appearance of another; and if the previous thing had "not a mere momentary but a continuous existence, then it "would not be possible to set aside its existence (and as such "both continuing to exist, there would be no gradual succes- "sion). On the other hand, if the existence (by which is meant "the capability of doing a useful action) did not belong to "the thing at any time, then it could never have that capability "at any time.

"It might be argued that the gradual succession of the "action would be due to the aid of gradually operating auxilliaries. "But against this it is alleged that if the auxilliary does not "add something to the thing itself, then it would not be required, "being a useless accessory; and if it does add something, then "we ask—is this 'something' distinct from the thing itself, or "not distinct from it? In the former case, the effect in question "may be regarded, through invariable concomitance, to have "been produced by this something that comes afterwards; and "so there could be no causal efficiency belonging to the thing "which had been believed to have no momentary (but a con- "tinuous) existence. It might be argued that the causal effi- "ciency belongs to this thing as accompanied by the additional "something brought about by the auxilliary. But if this addition "itself made any further addition on its own account, what "form of aid would it give? On the other hand, if it were "to make a further addition, we would have additions *ad "infinitum*; and how would you avoid this? Then again, to "assert that the addition is brought about by auxilliaries, and

"yet belongs to the momentary thing, affords an instance of rare "intelligence! Nor would it be quite right to assert that the "addition brought about by auxilliaries is non-different from "mere *existence*,—there being no relationship between that "which is not helped and that which does not help. Because "the existence that has already been brought about once before "cannot be brought about again. It must be admitted that the "previous existence, not consisting of the addition, ceases, and "another existence comes about, partaking of the addition. But "this would be an admission of momentary existence.

"*Question*: 'What do the auxilliaries do for the momen- "tary thing?'

"*Answer*: Nothing at all.

"*Question*: 'Then why does it stand in need of them?'

"*Answer*: Who says that they are in need of them? As "a matter of fact, every one of the moments having an existence "only in its last throes, has the capability of producing its own "peculiar effect; and as such why should they stand in need of "themselves? That they approach one another is due to the "necessity of there being some cause for the disappearance of "each of these, and to the existence of any combined causal "efficiency in them. And the necessity of the cause of dis- "appearance too is due to the very nature of things.

"*Objection*: 'All the causes being capable of bringing "about the effect, each of these would bring about a single "effect?'

"*Reply*: You must put this question to these causes them- "selves, which, as a matter of fact, appear to be unable, in- "dividually, to accomplish the effect. What we do is simply to "explain what we actually find to be the case; and for this we "cannot be censured.

"*Question*: 'Do the others produce the same effect that "has been produced by one of these causes?'

"*Answer*: It is not that each of them that produces what "*has been produced* by another; but they produce what *is* "*being produced* by the other.

"*Question*: 'When each of them is equally capable of pro- "ducing the effect,' what is the use of the others?'

"*Answer*: True; but they are not intelligent agents; and "as such none of them could desist from activity seeing that "the effect had been already produced by something else.

"*Objection*: 'That many causes bring about a single effect "is hard to prove; as a diversity of causes would always bring "about a diversity of effects.'

"*Reply*: It is not so; as the difference in the effects is "due to the difference in the attendant concomitants, and to "that in the auxilliaries. Because it is the very fact of pro- "ducing (conjointly) a single effect that constitutes the fact of "a number of things being 'auxilliaries.'

"Thus then it is only when Entities are momentary, and "have a successive existence, one after the other, that they can "produce any effect; and it is absolutely impossible to explain "the gradual and successive causal operation of things having "more than a merely momentary existence. Nor could there "be any simultaneous operation of these latter; as the causal "efficiency could not cease even at any subsequent time (and "would continue to operate as long as the cause would exist).

"*Objection*: 'There can be no production of what has al- "ready been produced; nor is there anything to be done by "the cause, after the effect has been produced; as the whole "mass of effect has been brought about all at once; and hence "there would be no causal operation and no production of the "effect at any subsequent moment.'

"*Reply*: In that case this cause would be as good as non- "existent; as there would be a total absence of useful actions "(wherein lies the *existence* of things).

"Thus then there being no possibility of either simultaneity or "succession which are both of an all-pervading character (*i. e.* "exhaust between themselves all possible contingencies),—the "*existence* becomes precluded from all that may have a more "than momentary existence; and as such it becomes centered "in only momentary things. And such being the case, the "inference of the momentary character of things becomes very "easy: *viz.* That which exists is momentary, and the twelve "*Āyatanas* (*vide Sarvadarçanasangraha*, Cowell and Gough:— "'The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the "Common sensory and the Intellect are the twelve 'Seats' or "'*Āyatanas*') exist; (therefore these are momentary)."

Page 75.] To the above we make the following reply:—The momentary character of things cannot be proved by the mere fact of their existence; as in the case of such an inference we could form no idea of the absence of the *Probans* ('existence') in the contradictory of the Subject.

Objection: "We have the notion that 'that which is devoid of simultaneity and succession is non-existent as for instance, the horns of the horse,' and also that 'that which has more than a momentary existence, is devoid of succession and simultaneity.' And this contrary notion setting aside simultaneity and succession from 'non-momentary' entites,—we have the notion of their absence or *negation* of existence."

Reply: Not so; the mere non-cognition of the non-momentary thing does not necessarily bring an idea of the preclusion of 'existence' from it; as it is only when we perceive the existence of water, that we have the idea of the non-existence of Fire and Smoke. In the same manner an idea of the absence of *existence* could follow from the absence of succession and simultaneity, only when there would be a perception of the *non momentary thing*. For you, however, there is no 'non-momentary' thing.

Objection: "In the case of the ghost, we find that though the ghost is not actually perceived, yet we have an idea of its

preclusion from something else,—in the form that *the post is not a ghost*; and so we could also have in the case in question (even though we may not perceive the non-momentary object)."

Reply; That could not be; because preclusion is cognisable only by means of *negation*; and the Negation (of one thing) consists of the perception of something different from it; as it is not possible without the perception of its counter-entity. And if there were a total difference in the forms of the *ghost* and the *post*, the "ghost" could not be precluded from the 'post.'

Question: "How then have we the idea that the *post is not the ghost*?"

Answer: In this idea we have a negation, not of relationship, but of identity; and this could be possible only if we admitted the visibility of the *ghost* which was suspected to be indentical with the *post*,—not otherwise. As has been declared: 'all negation of identity is due to an admission of perceptibility.' The idea of the *post* restricted to the one form of the *post*, serves as the basis of the preclusion of all things not identical with that *post*. If the *post* were the *ghost*, then it would certainly be cognised in that character; as a matter of fact however we find that the idea of the *post* does not include any idea of the *ghost*, as it does that of the '*post*'; and hence we have the idea that *the post is not the ghost*.

Objection: "There is nothing, either momentary or non-
"momentary, apart from such objects as the *blue* and the like.
"As a matter of fact when the 'blue-moment' perceived by a
"previous cognition is wrongly supposed to be identical with the
"'blue-moment' perceived by a present cognition, then that
"'blue-moment' is spoken of as 'non-momentary;' and when
"the two are recognised as distinct, then they are known as 'mo-
"mentary'; and the cognition of the absence or negation of exis-
"tence is with reference to the 'blue,' this negation being brought
"about by the preclusion of simultaneity and succession. And

"if what is cognised is only the 'moment' perceived before, then it
"would either do the present useful action on the previous occa-
"sion, or the past useful action on the present occasion; and
"there would be no gradual performance of actions; as the contra-
"dictory natures of the 'doer' and the 'non-doer' could not belong
"to one and the same. Nor could it do all the actions on the
"previous occasion; as in that case having no useful actions on
"the present occasion, it would have no existence at the present
"time."

Reply: But in this case too, has any real contradictory of the *Probans*, or of the *existence*, been shown? Or, has such contradictory been proved to be such as is only imposed by imagination? In fact there is no actual contradictory; as the *non-momentary* 'Blue' &c., have no real existence. Then one who wishes to obtain from Inference a real knowledge of things, should,—for the sake of the ascertaining of the threefold form of the middle term, as in the case of the Inference from 'smoke,'—show that it has a such an existence in the Subject (*Paksha*) of the Inference, as is only cognised by the recognised means of knowledge, and not as a mere imaginary imposition. As a matter of fact, there is nothing *non-momentary* that has such a character, and hence there is an impossibility of the negation (of the middle term). And this not being established, there could not be an affirmation of it either, as an affirmation (or positive existence) is always preceded by a negation. And thus the *Probans* becomes open to the fallacy of *Asādhāraṇa*

Page 76.] Then again, what has been proved by the contrary cognition is the absence of existence, from *non-momentary* things; but how do you establish the concomitance of *momentariness* and *existence*? The mere preclusion of existence from the contrary of *momentariness* can not prove that concomitance; as in that case, even an *asādhāraṇa Probans* would prove the conclusion. The negative inference—*i. e.* the inference of mere negation—cannot be desirable for you.

Objection: "When it is proved that *existence* cannot belong to the *non-momentary*, it follows as a necessary corrollary from this that *existence* belongs to the *momentary*."

Reply: Not so; as the mere assertion of its following as a corrollary does not contain a statement of the reason for existence (*i. e.* it does not constitute the necessary Minor premiss); and that of which the invariable concomitance with the Minor term ('existence') has not been established can never serve as the right *Probans*.

"*Objection*: "The contrary cognition itself will have the "double function of proving either another proof or the invari- "able concomitance (necessary for it) and of proving the con- "trary); and it would prove this with regard to the 'twelve "*Āyatanas*;' as no invariable concomitance could be cognised, "except with reference to a certain object; and there is no object "apart from the twelve '*Āyatanas*;' and when the concomitance "of *existence* with these has been recognised, there is cognition "of *momentariness* also; as the cognition of relationship always "accompanies the cognition of that which is related; and thus we "have the purposelessness of existence in the subject (major "term) of the inference; and this would constitute a cognition "of invariable concomitance of *existence in general*, and would "make the *specific existence* the middle term in the inference."

Reply: Not so; because there can be no cognition of the generality devoid of individuals. And as for the generalities of 'momentariness,' and 'existence' inhering in specific individuals, that are cognised,—we find the momentariness of such things as 'blue' and the like duly cognised; (and these having existence), it is well said that there is a purposelessness of 'existence'!

Objection: "From the aforesaid contrary cognition we have the cognition of the invariable concomitance of the *preclusion of non-momentariness* and the *preclusion of existence*; and from *existence* follows the cognition of the momentary character of all that has the character of a substance."

Reply: Not so; because there can be no identity between two preclusions that have been assumed to be distinct from each other, on the ground of the difference of the objects precluded; and it has already been explained that it is *identity* that forms the basis of Inference.

Objection: "In as much as there is an identity between *momentariness* and *existence*, both of which form the integral parts of all things, there would be an identity between these *preclusions* (of *non-momentariness* and *non-existence*), that have been recognised as identical with those."

Reply: Not so; as the identity between the two things has not been proved by any other argument. If such identity were already established, then there would be no need for the contrary cognition that has been brought forward. Nor can any thing be proved (or deduced) from the cognition of a concomitance between mere preclusions; for the simple reason that the *thing that is* is wholly distinct from *that which is not;* and there can be relationship between these.

Dharmottara (a Bauddha writer the author of the *Nyāya-bindu*) has declared thus: "Having, by means of the contrary cognition, established the necessary concomitance, (between *Existence* and *Momentariness*), in the case of the jar, we prove the momentariness of Sound, from its *Existence*; and thus there is a distinct use for both (the contrary cognition, and the concomitance); as both have distinct objectives (one refering to the Jar and the other to Sound)."

To this we make the following *reply*: As in the case of the jar, so in that of *sound* also, there could be no cessation of the operation of the contrary cognition also; and as such the employment of any other argument would be absolutely useless.

Nor is it impossible for a non-momentary thing to have a useful action; as the *existence* of a thing consists in its capability of action whenever there are auxilliary attendants, and not in being active independently by itself. And just as its

auxiliaries, having their capabilities ascertained by negative and positive concomitance, fall in,—its action duly appears; and hence it is quite possible for a permanent (non-momentary,) thing to have an action appearing gradually; specially as from a single thing (existing at only one moment) no appearance is possible of such an action as depends upon a number of causes. Nor would it be right to assert that, if the thing were dependent upon auxiliaries, then the action would appear by reason of the peculiar capability of these auxiliaries, and hence the activity could not be said to belong to the thing itself. Because an action is found to be always accompanied by the idea of the appearance of the form of a certain thing doing that action.

Page 77.] If the action did not belong to the *thing*, then the seed of barley could bring about the sprout of paddy; as the auxiliary attendants of soil and water, are common to both(the barely and the paddy); and there would be nothing to restrict (the appearance of the paddy-plant to the paddy-seed). Nor do the auxiliaries add any capability to the thing; all that they do is merely to help it in its action. The only addition to the capability of the thing consists in the proximity of the auxiliaries; and the absence of these would constitute its weakness (or incapability of action); as the action appears whenever there is a proximity of these, and not otherwise. As for the theory that certain moments are productive and others are not productive (of action), this is negatived by the direct perception of continued existence.

Objection: "This perception of continued existence is a mistaken one, being due to the fact of the non-perception of the difference among the successive moments, that are very much like one another."

Reply: You prove the mistaken character of the said perception, on the strength of the momentary character of things; and the momentary character of things you prove by the mistaken character of the said perception; and thus you fall into the vicious circle of mutual interdependence. Nor is it right to

assume the production or destruction of a thing, when there is an absence of what have been recognised, by negative and positive concomitance, to be the causes of such appearance and destruction. And this would lead to the absurdity of a destruction without cause, and also of the seed being the direct cause of the seed. As a matter of fact the seed producing the seed is not produced directly from the seed,—for the simple reason that it is a seed,—like the seed that is still upon the stalk of the paddy plant.

It has been asserted that the thing being impartite, it could not possibly be both active and inactive.

But this is nothing; because a single thing in the shape of Fire is active towards *burning*; and at the same time inactive towards bathing; nor does this dual character make any difference in its form. In the same manner, a single thing could be active, when the necessary auxiliaries would be present; and inactive when they would be absent.

Question: "How can the proximity of one thing make something else active? and if such activity were possible, why should the activity brought about be of only a few things, and not of all things?"

Answer: You can not rightly take objection to the nature of things. As for ourselves, whenever we find an activity appearing at the presence of a few things, and disappearing when these things are not present, we infer that these things constitute the auxiliaries in the appearance of that activity; and certainly there can be nothing objectionable in this process of reasoning. According to you also, in as much as the plant grows out of the seed and the damp soil, it is these and not anything else, that are regarded as the aids; and for you also in this what other reason have you except the nature of things as they are?

Objection: "Each of these things—the seed, the soil and the water—is capable of bringing about the action of sprouting;

and they cannot be regarded as mere auxiliaries to one another."

Reply: How then is it that the farmer after having prepared the soil, sows the seeds, and waters it?

Objection: "He does it for the purpose of bringing about the moment of the production of the sprout, by each of these three (soil &c.), as guiding the action of the other."

Reply: If the seed alone were to appear from its cause as fully capable of bringing about the 'moment of the production of the sprout',—what would be the use of the Soil and the Water? And if the seed were absolutely incapable of bringing it about, then the proximity of these too would be of no avail; as this could not make it lose its nature (natural incapability).

Objection: "What the soil and the water do is to stop the efficiency of the seed to produce another incapable 'moment,'—such efficiency existing in the 'moment-series' of the seed itself."

Reply: There may be the *non-production* of the *incapable* 'moment'; but any production of the capable 'moment' would not be possible, on account of there being no cause for this production. As a matter of fact however, there can be no stopping of the efficiency that constitutes the very nature of the thing. As in that case there would be a cessation of the thing itself; and destruction comes to be brought about by a cause (and not uncaused as the *Bauddha* holds all momentary destructions to be).

Then again, it is not possible that there should be produced in the seed, an efficiency or capability of bringing about a particular kind of 'moment;' because it is momentary. And if the efficiency thus produced were not something apart from the very nature of the thing,—then that would come to the producing of what has already been produced.

For these reasons, there can be only two alternatives: (1) If what is produced is inefficient, then there can be no action, and (2) if it is efficient, then it must act immediately after its production; and the action cannot be attributed to the proximitiy of any other thing; as this other thing could not be of any use in this matter (as shown above).

Page 78.] It might be argued that, "in as much as the effect is not found to be produced from a single cause, while it is found to be produced from a number of causes combined together,—we must attribute causal efficiency to all these combined, and as such why should you wander away from us who hold this view?"

But in that case your premiss becomes inconclusive, in as much as it is quite possible for a non-momentary thing to operate towards a useful end.

Objection: "Of all such things as are produced, or brought about by some cause, destruction is absolutely certain; and from this we can infer their momentary character. For instance, in all things we find that that which is sure to be does not stand in need of any cause to bring about that; *e. g.*, the fact of the arrow and the sword being made of iron does not stand in need of any other cause; and the destruction of all things is sure to be; and from this we can infer that the destruction of things does not stand in need of any other cause (save their very being); specially as those circumstances that are found to be due to other causes are not such as are sure to be,—such for instance as the colouring of clothes; so also if things were, for their destruction, to stand in need of causes other than those that bring them into existence,—then, in as much as there might be certain discrepancies in those other causes or some obstacle in their operation, it might so happen that some *produced* thing might not be destroyed at all. Whereas things being produced by their causes as *amenable to destruction*, they become destroyed as soon as they are produced; and this establishes the momentary character of all things. Then again, if a thing were not destructible by its very nature,

then its destruction could never be brought about; it would be as impossible as the cooling of fire: and if it be destructible by its nature, there would be no need for any causes for its destruction. Nor can destruction, which is non-different from the thing itself, be ever regarded as brought about by another cause; as a difference in causes would make a difference in the effects (and hence destruction would not be identical with the thing). If the Destruction were something different from the thing, and were brought about by a different cause, then we would have the absurd possibility of a negation being perceived; and in as much as the appearances of one thing (Destruction) could not do away with the form of another thing (the thing believed to be destroyed), we could have no such declaration as 'the jar is destroyed,' with a positive thing for its Nominative; instead of that we should have the assertion, 'Negation is produced.' And then if a question of fact be put to us, as to what became of the 'jar,'—though we would really have its cessation, yet in what way could we assert it? For these reasons we conclude that things are destructible by their very nature."

To the above we make the following reply: when a thing is produced, does it stay for a single moment, or does it stay for any other moment also? In the latter case, its momentary character disappears, as it would stay for more than one moment. And in the former case, it would have no existence at any other moment save the one at which it is produced; and hence there would be no identity between its *existence* and *non-existence*, as they would exist at different points of time.

It might be urged that what is meant is not that a thing is its own destruction, but that the second moment is the destruction or non-existence of the preceding moment.

Page 79.] But there is not much in this theory either; because even though one moment differs from another moment, as an individual unit of time, yet there is no actual contradiction or opposition in their nature. Just as one jar exists along

with another jar,—*i. e.*, in your phraseology, the jar of one "series" exists side by side with the jar of another "series"—so might it also exist along with another jar of the same "series." Specially as the means of cognition pertaining to the second moment having served its purpose with regard to the positive form of that moment, it could not have any efficiency towards the negation of the previous moment. As for 'Negation,' it only consists in the *negation of a certain positive thing*, as it is always comprehended in the form, 'the *jar* is not.' Hence its appearance means the cessation of that thing; its continuance or existence means the discontinuance of the thing; as the two—the jar and its negation—are mutual contradictories. Such being the case, momentary character cannot belong to any *thing*; specially as its negation or absence, which always appears after sometime, and is dependent upon some other cause, is always found to come after the thing itself. As for *existence* we find that when the jar has been produced, it is long before it is destroyed by the stroke of the stick. Nor does it stand to reason to assert that, "the destruction of the jar is of a positive character, and what the stroke of the stick does is to produce the 'series' of broken pieces of earthenware (into which the jar is reduced)." Because the thing (jar) having bound together within its own series, the potency of producing like things of the same series,—as long as this potency is not destroyed, there can be no production of a heterogeneous series; and if you admit of the destruction of that potency by the same stroke of the stick, why should you object to the destruction of the thing itself?

Even though a negation be brought about by a cause, that fact alone would not make it an entity; as it is directly perceived by the senses to have the character of a negation of entity. Its very nature is such that even though caused, it is not destroyed, like a positive entity; as that which has been destroyed is never again perceived (and it would be this perception that would constitute the destruction of that destruc-

tion). And if the nature of things, cognised by the right means of knowledge, were to be set aside, simply on the ground of its similarity with something else,—then the diversity of the universe would also have to be set aside.

The argument—"how can the production of one thing make another thing lose its character?"—would not be a proper one to bring forward; as the statement, 'the jar has been destroyed,' is due to the production of its negation, through the action of its constituent parts; hence it is a negation of the jar alone, and not of all things; For this negation there is no material cause; and for this reason it has no non-material cause either. As to the question—"where have you seen any effect without a substratum?"—we see such an effect in this very case; as the negation cannot inhere in the jar, which has been destroyed; nor does it inhere in the Earth; as being a property of something else it could not inhere in it.

Question: "How then is it that it is found to be perceived in a definite place?"

Answer: That is due to the definite place being occupied by its counter-entity. It is its nature that on the negation of something connected with it, it appears as this latter thing; and that on the negation of something inhering in it, it appears in the form of the latter; its qualification also is such; and it has no conjunction or inherent relationship; as these two latter belong to positive entities.

Thus has been proved the existence of Negation. There is no such thing cognisable by the intellect as is contrary in its nature to *Bhāva* (positive existence), and which could bring about a contradiction between Ice and Fire. As a matter of fact, the only contradiction that exists between Ice and Fire consists in the absence of Fire in Ice, and *vice versa*; and there is no contradiction between their forms; as a positive entity can never have another positive entity for its contradictory.

Page 80.] It has been urged that negation being sure to come about it could not stand in need of any other cause. But we find this argument failing in the case of the rising and setting of the Sun: and if these did not depend on any causes, then there would be no diversity of Time. The same objections would also apply if we were to make the negation concomitant with the appearance of any one accessory detail; in the case of the cloth we find that there is a definite cause of colouring, which also appears at a definite time; and in this case the mere non-proximity or absence of that time would necessarily mean the non-production of colour. In the case of negation however we find that there are endless causes for bringing it about, and all are timed to appear at particular points of time; and it being impossible for every one of these causes and points of time to be absent, and one or the other of these is sure to appear; and appearing at any other time, it at once, in a moment destroys the positive Entity; and thus negation comes to be produced. And even though the destruction is *caused*, yet it is permanent.

Then again, all the above arguments brought forward to prove the momentary destruction of all things, are open to the fallacy of "*Kālātyayāpadishta*"; as we find that what has been once seen is again cognised, in the same form, by the recognitive perception.

Objection: "This cognition cannot prove the fact of the positive entity having an existence before and after—*i. e.* a continuous existence; because the cognition of the object (now, and that after sometime) cannot be regarded as one and the same cognition; as there is no cause for any such continuous cognition; because the sense-organ operating upon objects that are near us, could not be said to belong to the past time; and as for the impression produced by a previous cognition, it is restricted to that particular cognition, and does not apply to any other time; and apart from these two there is nothing pertaining to both times, which could produce the cog-

nition in question. Then again, for the following reason too, the cognition cannot be one and the same; because they are of totally different natures; the object perceived by the senses is known as "this," while that which is not so cognised is spoken of as "that"; and the character of *sense-perceptibility* is directly opposed to that of *imperceptibility;* and as such they could never be regarded as one and the same cognition; hence we must accept the two cognitions—being as they are of the nature of *direct perception* and *remembrance*—to have wholly distinct objectives."

To the above we make the following reply:—We distinctly recognise the fact of there existing a certain positive entity extending over the present as well as the past and the future; and then, to deny that that object is not the objective of the two cognitions would be a contradiction of direct cognition; as in that case the object of remembrance would not be the same as that which had been previously perceived. For these reasons the whole must be regarded as a single cognition, which, on the strength of our distinct cognition, should be accepted as having both (the past and the present) for its object. For a distinctly cognised effect learned people always assume adequate causes, even though these latter be not distinctly cognisable; and they never conceal or set aside the slightest or the most undesirable effect, on the ground of the non-perception of its cause; as if they were to do so, then there would be a setting aside of the whole worldly phenomenon, (the cause whereof we are never able to directly perceive). Hence, though the Sense-organ, or the Impression, each by itself, is incapable of bringing about the said combined cognition, yet when combined, the two together would bring about the single effect in the shape of *recognition*. And on account of the capabilities of the two causes, this *recognition* would have both (the past and the present) for its object; and it would attain the character of 'sensuous' cognition, because of its following upon the efficiency of the sense-organ and the capability of the object.

The mere fact of each of the two causes being separately incapable of bringing about a particular effect cannot be a ground for denying the capability of these also when combined; as for instance, though we find each of the three causes, the soil, water and the seed singly incapable of bringing about the sprout, yet they do bring it about when put in touch with one another. It is a well-recognised fact that in a case where we have peculiar auxiliaries to the cause, the effect produced is also of a peculiar character.

Consequently there would be nothing incompatible in one and the same object being both perceptible and imperceptible, according as it happens to be or not to be, in proximity to the person perceiving. It is for this reason that even when there is no actual contact with the sense-organs, the cognition of something in the past is always 'sensuous' cognition, as it has for its object a cognition brought by the sense-organs (on the previous occasion); and because 'sensuousness' lies only in that (being produced by the sense-organs). The sense-organ cognising that which is not before us, cognises the fact of its having occurred at some time past, and that which is to appear in the future; as in the case of this latter, the Sense-organ is without the aid of the accompanying *Impression* (which is present in the case of the cognition of the past). Nor is there any incompatibility in the same cognition applying to both points of time (the present and the past); and as such there can be no reason for attributing to such a cognition the character of '*Kalpanā*' (assumption or imagination). Because we have often seen a single thing having many qualifications; *e. g.* in the case of a person, Caitra, being qualified by (possessing) an *umbrella* and a *book*. Nor would there be any difference between the two cases, on the ground of the relationship of the *umbrella* and the *book* appearing at one and the same time, and that of the two points of time being gradual, appearing one after the other; as the fact of one thing being cognised as having two qualifications would be common to the two cases.

Thus then, we find that *Recognition* comprehends an object extending over diverse points of space and time; and as such it does away with the idea that all things are undergoing momentary productions and destructions. Nor can this recognition be regarded as *mistaken*; as we cannot find it being set aside by subsequent cognition to the contrary. It might be urged that it is set aside by all those arguments that have been brought forward to prove the momentary destruction of things. But all these arguments being inferential in their character could have a footing only when the contrary sensuous cognition would be set aside; and you seek to set aside this sensuous cognition by means of those same arguments; and certainly this affords an example of a curious mutual interdependence. This is not the case with Sense-cognition, which is independent of other forms of knowledge. In the case of such things as the Flame and the like, the sense-cognition that we have has for its object the generality 'Flame'; while the Inferential knowledge is that of an *individual* fire; and as such there being no contradiction between the two, in such cases the sensuous cognition is not an obstacle in the appearance of the Inferential cognition.

Some people with extreme boldness have declared that the fact of all things undergoing momentary destruction is directly perceptible by the senses. And against these people we bring forward the very fact of there being no such cognition at all. That is to say, the cognition that we have is in the form of 'this is blue,' and not as 'this is *momentary*.'

Objection: "The momentariness of the blue object is concomitant with its *blueness*; and it has got no separate functioning (and existence); consequently when *blueness* would be perceived, *momentariness* would also be cognised along with it, and the reason why it is not always recognised as such is that we do not always perceive the differences between the successive moments of the thing's existence (and hence we regard the thing itself as having a continual existence)."

Reply: What a wonderful stretch of philosophic insight! You are explaining a fact of actual cognition, and yet you say *it is not perceived!* The hope that that which is not perceived is cognised is as false as a mirage; and no one admits of any other necessary condition in the sense-perceptibility of an object, save the cognition brought about by the force of sense-perception. And when of two things we find that the cognition of one does not mean the cognition of another, the assertion of an identity between these is a misnomer.

Objection: "The Sensuous cognition is momentary; and as "such it could apply to only such existence of the object as "would be coeval with itself; it would also set aside the fact "of that object being not related to that point of time; as also "the relationship of that object, which is concomitant with "that point of time, with any other point of time; and thus that "momentary cognition must be accepted as apprehending the "fact of that object having existence only for that time,—which "means that it is momentary."

Reply: In putting forward this argument you show yourself to be in a sorry plight similar to the drowning man catching at a straw. How could the cognition apprehend the fact of the object being coeval with itself, when it does not apprehend itself? Or, even granting that it does not apprehend it, then too no sense-cognition would apply to the notion that the object did not exist before, and will not exist after, the moment at which it is perceived; because Sense-cognition is never found to operate towards either the past or the future; applying as it does to the *present* time, it could not preclude all time that is not present; as there is a distinct contradiction between the *present* and the *non-present*; but the fact of cognising an object as *present* does not necessarily preclude its relationship to any other point of time; as there is no incompatibility in a single object being related to various points of time, in the same manner as a single thread is connected with a number of beads.

This has been explained by us in detail in the *Tattvaprabodha* and the *Tattvasamvādini*; and hence we do not repeat here what we have already explained there.

Page 82.] Then again, if all entities were momentary, to whom would birth and rebirth belong?

Obj: "They would belong to the 'series of cognitions."

Reply: This cannot be; because the 'series' can have no existence apart from that of which the series is formed.

Objection: "Birth-and-rebirth does not consist in any one thing (Soul) becoming connected with many bodies; what is meant by it is the *non-cessation of the series of cognitions*; and this would be quite compatible with the momentary character of things."

Reply: There is not much to recommend in this explanation either; because there is no proof for accepting the cognitions of the child in the embryo as having their cause in the cognitions of the previous birth; as it is not necessary that the effect must proceed from a cause which is of the same kind as itself; as we find *smoke* arising from fire, which is not of the same kind as the smoke.

Objection: "When of two things we find that the existence or non-existence of the one depends upon the existence or non-existence and other peculiarities of the other, then we regard this latter to be of the same kind (homogeneous) with, and the material cause of, the other. And as a matter of fact, we find that cognition has the peculiar characteristic of being of the nature of consciousness; this characteristic we find absent in the material substances, Earth &c; hence the homogeneous cause of cognition must be something possessed of this characteristic nature; and from this we infer that the cognition of the child in the embryo must be due to another preceding cognition; otherwise if the effect were not necessarily concomitant with its cause, then it would appear in a hap-hazard manner."

Reply: There is not much in this either; as we find the burning characteristic of fire appearing out of the rubbing of two pieces of stick, which are not possessed of that characteristic; and from the unconscious Eye we find appearing cognitions having the character of consciousness; and hence we have no ground for necessarily postulating such a cause for cognition as would have the characteristic of consciousness; and hence the existence of a previous birth could not be established if all things were regarded as momentary.

Nor would it be possible to prove the existence of future birth; as there would be no ground for believing that the last cognition of the body would bring about, or transmit, any further cognition.

Objection: "That which necessarily brings about the effect is the cause in its fully developed condition; as we find in the case of the seed which always produces the sprout, when its causal efficiency is complete; and in the same manner, in as much as the last cognition of the body would have its full efficiency of producing further cognitions, it would surely bring about further cognitions;—in this we have got very good grounds for admitting of a continuous series of cognitions."

Reply: Not so; because we do not find any such efficiency in the final flickering of the flame, (which is not found capable of bringing about any further flickerings).

Objection: "In the case of the flame the absence of the efficiency is due to the destruction or expansion of the oil and the wick (which circumstances are not present in the case of the Cognition)."

Reply: In the case of the last cognition also, its causal efficiency would be destroyed by the pangs of death. And hence no birth or rebirth would be explicable in accordance with the momentary character of things.

The author brings forward other arguments to prove the existence of the Self:—*Śarīrasamavāyinībhyām &c.* That is to

say, from the activity and cessation from activity of the body, we infer the existence of an intelligent Guider or Master of the Body, who makes the necessary effort. In order to preclude the activity of the Creeper &c., the author has added—'*inhering in the body*'; and for the purpose precluding the moving and not-moving of the dead body in a current of water, he has added—'*Capable of acquiring and avoiding the desirable and the undesirable respectively*'; the 'desirable' is Pleasure; and the 'undesirable' is Pain; and the acquiring of Pleasure and the avoiding of pain indicate such activity as is prompted by intelligence.

Page 83.] The author cites an instance—"*Just as we infer the guiding charioteer from the motion of the chariot.*" That is to say, (1) the activity, capable of acquiring and avoiding the desirable and undesirable, through the accepting and rejecting of the means leading to those experiences, must be regarded as due to a preceding effort,—because it is a particular kind of activity,—like the activity of the chariot; (2) or, the Body is controlled by an intelligent agent,—because it has a peculiar action,—like the chariot.

'*Prānādibhiśca*'—The connection is that from the actions of Breathing &c., also we infer the existence of the intelligent controller. This refers to all such actions as, Breathing up, Breathing down, the closing and the opening of Eyes, living, mental activity, and the modifications undergone by the sense-organs; as also Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort,—all of these being indicative of the existence of the Self.

With a view to show in what way these are indicative of the Self, the author proceeds to show, first how Breathing up and down is indicative of it: *Śarīraparigṛhītah &c.*—Air has the character of blowing horizontally; but in the case of the Air, enclosed in the body, however, we find it moving up and down vertically,—in a manner contrary to its ordinary nature; and from this we infer the existence of a controller of the Body,

who makes the Air move in that manner; as otherwise we could not account for such an action of the air, contrary to its natural modes of motion. The instance cited is that of the *blower of the bagpipe*. The argument may be simply stated thus: The Body is controlled by an intelligent agent,—because it is the receptacle of such air as has its action modified by the desire of some one,—just like the bagpipe. The qualification '*Çarīraparigṛhītah*' indicates the precedence of intelligent desire; and hence the argument is not invalidated by such instances as those of the '*Dvivāyuka*' and the like. ('*Divāyuka*' is the name given to the phenomenon of the rising up of the whirlwind caused by the collision of two contrary winds).

The closing and opening of the Eyes indicates a controlling agency, of the same kind as the propeller of the pulley. That is to say, the action bringing about the conjunction of the upper lid with the lower is called '*nimēsha*'; and that which brings about their separation is called '*unmēsha*'; and from this action we infer a controlling intelligent agent for the Body who would act like the propeller of the pulley. In as much as the propelling up and down of the pulley could be brought about by the action of the wind also (as in the case of the wind-mill).—in order to preclude this, the author has added '*niyatēna*' *in a fixed manner*, which implies *dependence upon someone's desire*. The argument may be thus stated: The body is controlled by an intelligent agent,—because it has as its constituents such parts as are moved up and down by desire—like the pulley.

The author next puts forward an argument that proves the existence of Life: *Dēhasya &c.* '*Vṛddhi*' is *growth*; this and the filling up of wounds being due to some intelligent controller, we infer the existence of such an intelligent controller or mender for the Body, who would be similar to the master repairing his house. That is to say, the growth of the body and the filling up of its wounds must be regarded

as being brought about by an intelligent agent,—because they have the character of *growth* and *filling up of* wounds,—like the growing or increase and repairing of the house. Nor would the growing of trees &c., invalidate this argument; as the growth of these also is brought about by God.

Such things as the tree and the like have no souls; as in the case of these we do not find any connection with souls with the qualification of producing the various functionings of the Intellect &c.

The author now puts forward the inferential argument based upon mental activity—*Abhimata &c.* That is to say, the existence of the Self in the body is indicated by the action of the mind that brings about its connection with the eyes and the other organs of perception, which apprehend objects desired to be perceived. The urger or propeller of the Mind is inferred to be like the boy propelling one ball against another fixed in a corner of the room, (the fixed ball resembling the Eye, the propelled ball the Mind, and the Boy the Self). That is to say, the Mind is propelled by an intelligent agent,—because it is the substratum of an action bringing about the connection with a desired object,—like the ball in the boy's hand. That which would be propelled by non-intelligent agencies of the wind and the like, would bring about connection with undesirable things also.

Page 84.] "*Nayanavishaya &c*',—as a matter of fact we often find that after the perception of colour, the object of vision, we find certain modifications in the organ of taste, following upon the remembrance of the taste of the object seen; and from this we infer that there is a single agent who cognises both Colour and Taste, by means of the two organs, resembling a person looking through two openings in the window. That is to say, when we see the colour of a nice fruit which we like, we have a remembrance of its taste perceived on some previous occasion; this remembrance produces in us a desire to eat the fruit; this is followed by an effort towards obtaining it; and this effort,

through the contact of the self and the mind, produces a modification in the organ of taste, in the form of making saliva flow from the roots of the teeth; this flow of saliva could not be due to any intelligence in the sense-organ itself; as each of the two organs concerned perceives only the colour and the taste respectively; and hence the seeing of Colour could not bring any remembrance of the Taste; as a matter of fact however we do find this modification appearing in the organ of Taste; and hence there must be some one apart from the organs, who cognises both, and who on seeing the Colour, remembers the Taste (perceived by himself on a previous occasion). Nor could the body itself be taken as the cogniser of both; because the young body being universally recognised to be different from the old body, on account of the difference in size, any thing perceived in boyhood could not be remembered in old age.

Not for the above reasons alone, but also because of the properties of the Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort, which lead to the inference of something to which these properties belong,—all these qualities are cognised as co-extensive with the notion of 'I'—being always cognised as 'I am pleased,' 'I am pained' and the like, where we find that it is the object 'I' which is characterised by Pleasure. The notion of 'I' could not refer to the body; because it is not found to apply to the body of another person. Nor could it be said to apply to *one's own* body alone. Because one body, as a body, does not differ from another body. If the notion of 'I' referred to the Body, then just as another's man's body being as perceptible as our own body,—the notion of fatness appearing equally with reference to both,—the other man's body would also be capable of being spoken of as 'I'; specially as in both, the shape is the same. If it be held that there is a difference between the two on account of the characters of things related to them,—then the notion of 'I' would come to apply to these things, and not to the Body. Then again, if the notion of 'I' referred to the Body, it could not appear in our consciousness as something internal.

For the same reasons the notion of 'I' could not refer to the Sense-organs; as these organs are themselves beyond sense-perception; while the notion of 'I' is of the nature of Sense-cognition,—being independent of inferential marks as well as of verbal expression.

For the same reason, Pleasure &c., also could not belong either to the Body or to the Sense-organs. Then again, it is a fact known by all men that to him alone who is the experiencer or cogniser, belong Remembrance, Desire, Aquiring of the means of pleasure, Feeling of Pleasure, Avoidance of Pain, and so forth; and it has already been proved that Cognition and Remembrance do not belong either to the Body or to the Sense-organs; and hence it follows that Pleasure &c., also cannot belong to them.

Page 85.] The author brings forward another reason: *Pradēça-vṛttitvāt.* That is to say, we actually see that the qualities of Pleasure &c, exist only over a part of their substratum,—for instance, we have such ideas as 'I feel pleasure in my feet,' 'I feel a pain in my head;' and from this it follows that they cannot be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs; as it differs essentially from the specific properties of these latter, which are found to pervade over the whole of their substrates. The argument may be thus simplified in the form of a negative Inference: Pleasure &c., are not the specific properties of the Body or the Sense-organs,—because they exist only in parts of their substrates, while the specific properties of the body and the sense-organs have always been found to pervade the whole of their substrates,—*e.g.*, Colour and the rest;—Pleasure &c., however do not thus pervade over the whole of their substrates,—and hence they cannot be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs. Nor could the case of Sound be an exception invalidating the above premiss; as though Sound is a property of *Ākāça* (over the whole of which it could not pervade), yet it appears as the property of that portion of *Ākāça* which is

enclosed within the cavity of the Ear, over the whole of which it certainly pervades.

For the following reason also Pleasure &c., could not be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs:—*Because they do not last as along as their substrates.* The case of Colour may be cited as an instance to the contrary. In fact this argument could not apply to the case of the sense-organs; because the premiss would be invalidated by the case of the organ of hearing, which has its property, sound, such as does not exist as long as the organ itself.

Another reason, why Pleasure &c., could not be properties of the Body or the Sense-organs, is that they are not perceptible by any of the external Sense-organs. The qualities of the Body and Sense-organs are of two kinds—(1) some, like gravity and the like, are imperceptible, and (2) some, like Colour &c., are perceptible by the external sense-organs. In the case of pleasure &c., however we find that they do not come within any of the two categories (being *perceptible*, but not by any of the external Sense-organs); and hence these cannot be the properties of the Body or the Sense-organs.

And thus it being proved that Pleasure &c., cannot belong to the Body and the Sense-organs, the Self is the only substance left to which they could belong.

Objection: "Pleasure and Pain are modifications; and as such could not belong to the Self which is eternal (and hence unmodifiable). And even if they could belong to it, then that Self (being modifiable) would become non-eternal, like the skin."

Reply: Not so; because the production and destruction (appearance and disappearance) of these could not cause any disturbance in the form of the Self. In the case of all eternal things, we do not admit of any destruction or change of its form; and as for the disappearance of one quality (Pleasure)

and the appearance of another (Pain) in connection with it,—there would be no incongruity in this.

Question: "What do Pleasure and Pain do to the eternal Self?"

Answer: They afford to it an experience with regard to themselves.

Question: "What good could this experience do to one that is free from all addition or substraction (*i. e.*, want and its supply)?"

Answer: The good done consists in this that it is on the strength of such experience that it becomes an enjoyer or experiencer of Pleasure and Pain.

Tathāhamçabdenāpi.—That is to say, just as the Self is inferred from Pleasure &c., so also is it inferred from the notion of 'I.' We find the word 'I' used in the Veda as well as in ordinary parlance, by learned persons; and this word could not be without something that it would denote. Its own form could not form its denotation, as that would involve the incongruity of its operation bearing upon itself; as has been well declared—"no word ever denotes itself." And hence that something which is denoted by the word 'I' would be the Self.

Objection: "The word 'I' may be regarded as denoting the earth etc."

In reply to this our author says—*Pṛthivyādiçabdavyatirēkāt.* That is to say, that which denotes one thing is always found to be co-extensive with other words denoting the same thing, as we find in the case of the words 'Substance' ('*Dravya*') 'Earth' ('*Pṛthivī*') and the like. **Page 86.**] In the case of the word 'I' however we find that it is not co-extensive with the other words denoting the Earth &c.; as we never come across such expressions as '*aham pṛthivī*' ('I am Earth'), '*aham udakam*' ('I am water') &c.; hence the word 'I' could not be taken as applying to the Earth &c.

Objection: "The word 'I' is found to be applied to the Body; in such expressions as '*Sthūlōham*,' 'I am fat.'

Reply: Not so; because we find it used in such expressions as '*Aham jānāmi*' ('I know'), '*aham smarāmi*' ('I remember'); and it has been shown that *knowledge* and *remembrance* do not belong to the Body. Hence its use with regard to the Body must be regarded as secondary or figurative, based upon the fact of the Body being a useful instrument for the Self; in the same way as the master says of his useful servant—'he is my very self.'

The existence of the Self having been thus established, the author next proceeds to point out its qualities—*Tasya ca guṇāh &c.* He then points out the authority of the *Sūtras* on the point of Intellect &c., belonging to the Self; *Ātmalingādhikārē &c.*, which refers to the *Sūtras-Prāṇāpāna &c.*

Dharmādharmau &c.—That is to say, the existence of *Dharma* and *Adharma* in the Self is indicated by the declaration in the *Sūtra*—'*Dharmādharmau ātmāntaraguṇānāmakāraṇatvāt.*' The sense of this is this: Some people hold that the *Dharma* of giving, inhering in the given thing, produces a *Dharma* in the receiver of the gift; and this view the author of the *Sūtra* has repudiated in the Sutra—'*Ātmāntaraguṇānāmātmāntaraguṇēshvakāraṇatvāt.*' That is to say, in the case of pleasure we find that the pleasure of one Self does not produce such qualities in another Self; and hence the Dharma and Adharma of one Self could not be the cause of the like qualities in another Self; and this distinctly indicates the fact of *Dharma* and *Adharma*, being the properties of the Self; as otherwise the said non-productiveness of these could not be asserted on the ground of their similarity to Pleasure and other qualities of the Self.

Saṅskārah smṛityutpattau. This refers to the *Sutra* dealing with Remembrance—'*Ātmamanasoh saṅskārat.*' That

is to say, what is remembered is something cognised before; but the cause of this remembrance could not be that previous cognition, which will have been long destroyed; nor could the *absence of that cognition* be the cause of remembrance; as 'absence' being equally present everywhere, there would be no such diversity as 'strong' and 'weak' in the cause of remembrance; and there would be no need for repitition (as the means of bringing about Remembrances). Hence it must be admitted that the previous cognition produces a certain faculty in the Self, which gives rise to the Remembrance; and hence the postulating of this Faculty or *Saṁskāra*.

Some people hold the cognition itself, even though it has ben destroyed, to be the cause of Remembrance; and in the opinion of these people, the *Jyotishtoma* and the like also would bring about the results in the shape of Heaven, without any intervening agency, in the shape of *Adṛshta*, of which thus there would be no need at all.

Vyavasthāvacanācca saṁkhyā—We have the *Sūtra Nānatmānō vyavyasthātah'*: this *Sutra* points out the multiplicity of Selves; and that shows that *multiplicity* of number is one of its properties.

Now what is meant by this '*Vyavasthā*'? It means the non-recognition of the cognitions and pleasure &c. belonging to several persons. That is to say, in the case of our own pleasure &c. we have the recognition, in old age, of our experiences of the past, as our own; as we often have the idea—'I enjoyed such and such a pleasure' and the like; and if the experience were one and the same in all bodies, then we could have a similar idea with reference to the experiences of other persons: as a matter of fact however we have no such recognition; and from this we infer that there is a distinct Self in each body.

Page 87. *Objection*: "Just as in the case of *Ākāça* we find that though it is one only, yet on account of the diversity of the limitations in the shape of the Ear-cavities, we have a

diversity in the sound-experiences—so, in the case of the one Self also we may explain the diversity of experiences as being due to the diversity in the limitations of the body &c."

Reply: The instance is not quite analogous; the diversity of sound-experience might well be explained as due to the diversity of sound-comprehending agencies of the Ear-cavity and the rest which have been brought about by the *Dharma* and *Adharma*, which again are restricted to each individual person. In the case of the One Self on the other hand, there would be no diversity in the *Adharma* and *Dharma* (since all these would belong to one and the same Self); and as such there being no diversity in the bodies (which are brought about by the *Dharma* and *Adharma* of the Self ensouling the body),—what would be the cause of the diversity of the pleasure and pain experienced by different persons? specially as the Self being one, the contact of the Mind also would be common to all persons. For one however, who admits of many Selves, even though all Selves, being omnipresent, would be present in all bodies, yet his experiences would not be common to all of them; as each of them would experience only such pleasures &c., as would appear in connection with the particular body that will have been brought about by the previous *Karma* of that Self,—and not those belonging to the other bodies. And the *Karma* also belongs to that Self by whose body it has been done. Hence the restriction of body is due to the restriction of *Karma* and *vice versa*,—the mutual interdependence going on endlessly (and hence not objectionable.)

It might be held that though the Supreme Self is one only, the human Selves being many and different from one another, that would account for the diversity in question.

But this would not be right, as if the human Selves would be different from the Supreme Self, then that would mean an abandonment of the Monistic *Vedānta* theory; and also because such a theory would go against the identity of the human Selves with the Supreme Self, as laid down in the Çruti passage—'may

I differentiate names and forms by entering with this Jīva *which is my own self.*'

It might be argued that, "the difference between the Supreme and the human Selves may be explained as being due to Ignorance; and the differentiations of Ignorance with regard to the human Selves are beginningless."

But whose 'Ignorance' is this? Is it of Brahma, or of the human Selves? It could not belong to Brahma; as That is by Its very nature *pure* and *intelligent*. And if it belonged to the human Selves, then there would be an interdependence,—differentiation of human selves being due to Ignorance, and this latter belonging to the differentiated human selves.

Objection: "The differentiations of Ignorance and human Selves would be endless, like the differentiation of the seed and the tree; and as such the said interdependence or reciprocity would not be objectionable."

Reply: There is a real difference between the seed and the tree; whereas the difference between Ignorance and the human Self is not real; so the cases are not quite analogous. And the reciprocal causability also in the case of the seed and the tree is due to the real difference among the several seeds and trees, (one seed being the cause of one tree, which brings forth another seed, and so forth); the human Self however is one and the same through all the states that it passes through in its course of metempsychosis—*viz*: the states of the bird, the quadruped and the man; as in each of these we find that no sooner is the infant born than it evinces a desire for the kind of food suited to the species in which it happens to be born; and such desire could only be due to the series of experiences of its previous births; this shows that its Self has had a beginningless connection with bodies; and in this case, it would not be quite reasonable to hold the differentiation of Selves to be due to Ignorance, and this Ignorance to belong to the human Self.

Objection: "The human Self also, like Brahma, is beginningless and endless, being a mere reflection of Brahma; and hence on the strength of the text—'all things shine after that shines, and all this shines by Its light' &c., we hold that it is the endless and beginningless essence of Brahma that appears in all bodies."

Reply: That is not right; as if such were the case, then the diversity in question would be absolutely inexplicable. Hence it was quite right for the author of the *Sūtra* to declare—'*Nānātmāno vyavasthātah*'; and as for the texts laying down the non-difference of Selves, they must be taken as figurative.

Page 88.] According to the theory of the multiplicity of Selves there would be no such absurd contingency as the cessation of the worldly process, on the emancipation of all human selves. As the number of such selves being endless, there would be no end of them; nor any decrease or increase of their number. As has been declared by the revered author of the *Vārtika*:—"Thus then the knowing ones being continuously emancipated, there does not become a void (of selves), in as much as the number of these in the universe is endless; if there were an end, or an increase and decrease in their number, then alone could such a void be possible,—as in the case of things of limited dimensions; when however the thing is illimitable, there is no possibility of these (end &c.)"

Prthaktvamapyata ēva. That is to say, the assertion '*nānātmāno &c.*' also indicates the 'separateness' of Selves; since Separateness always follows from Number.

The assertion in the *Sutra* '*Tathā cātmā*' indicates the Greatest Dimension as belonging to Selves. That is to say, having said that *Ākāça* is all-pervading, the *Sutra* adds 'so is the Self also;' and this clearly indicates that the Self like *Ākāça*, is all-pervading; and hence its dimension must be the

greatest possible. The all-pervading character of the Self is inferred from the upward flaming of fire, and the horizontal blowing of Air; since both of these must be due to certain unseen forces; nor could this unseen force be wholly unconnected with the receptacle of these (Fire and Air); as in that case there would be no restriction in such actions (*i. e.* anything or everything would flame upward and blow horizontally). Nor is it possible for the unseen force inhering in the Self to be directly connected with any other substance; hence it comes to this that the Fire and Air are connected with that (body) which is connected with the substratum of the unseen force; and this establishes the fact of the Self being connected with all material substances; this constitutes its all-pervading character.

Objection: "The upward flaming of the Fire, is due to its nature, and not to any unseen forces."

Reply: What do you mean by this 'nature of the Fire'? Is it '*baknitva*' (*fireness*), or '*dāhakatva*' ('burning character') or 'a particular colour'? If it were any of these, then we would have this nature in the red hot iron also (and this would also, be flaming upwards). If the 'nature' be said to consist in 'being produced out of a particular kind of fuel,' then we would have no upward flaming in the case of lightning, and such other fires, which are not produced by any kind of fuel. If the 'nature' be regarded to be something imperceptible, existing in certain fires whom we see flaming upward,—then why object to this peculiar nature being a property of the Self? Any action that is not caused by gravity, fluidity or speed, must be regarded as produced from some specific quality of the Self; as we find in the case of the action of the hand which is produced by the effort of the Self; and the said *upward flaming* and *horizontal blowing* we do not find to be brought about by gravity &c; as none of these properties exist in Fire and Air, and also because the actions in question are incompatible with these properties, (of gravity &c.); hence the two actions must also be regarded as produced by some specific quality of the Self; the argument being put in this form: *Upward flaming* and *horizontal blowing* are due to a specific quality of the Self,—because being actions, they are not produced by such causes as Gravity and the like,—like the actions of the hand caused by the man's effort.

In as much as such properties of the Self as Pleasure &c., are produced by the contact of the Mind with the Self,—this clearly indicates that Conjunction is a property of the Self; as if Conjunction did not belong to the Self, then it could not be the immaterial cause of the properties of that Self; but this also proves that Disjunction, which is destructive of the said Conjunction, also belongs to the Self; specially as both the Mind and the Self being eternal, the destruction of Pleasure &c., could not be due to the destruction of any of the two substrates of the Conjunction.

Page 89.] *Objection*: "The Self being eternal, there would be no Emancipation for one who perceives or recognises this eternal Self; as being always affected by a longing for pleasure he would have an attachment to the means of pleasure, and aversion to those of pain; and these two, attachment and aversion, would give rise to constant activities and cessations from activity; and these in their turn would give rise to *Dharma* and *Adharma* (and these would lead to a further birth) and so on. Whereas if one did not believe in the existence of the Self, he would be imbued with the idea—'I myself *am not*, to whom could any pain belong?'; and thus he would become indifferent to all pleasures and pains; and thereby becoming freed from attachment as well as aversion, he would have no activity or cessation from activity; and this would lead to Emancipation."

Reply: Not so; because for one who recognises the eternal Self also, there would come about due dispassion, produced from a recognition of the evils inseparable from the objects of enjoyment; and this dispassion would, in due course, bring about Emancipation.

SECTION (10)

MIND.

Text (45).—The Mind is so called, because of its belonging to the class 'mind.' III.—ii.—1.

Even when there is a proximity of the object to the soul and the sense-organ, we find that Cognition, Pleasure &c., do not appear, and from this we infer the necessity of an instrumentality other than the aforesaid proximity. Then again, we find that due remembrance appears even when there is no functioning of the organs of Hearing &c.; and that the objects of this means or instrument are pleasure &c. which are not cognisable by the external sense-organs: and from these two facts we infer the fact of that instrument being internal. III.—ii.—3. VII.—i.—23. V.—ii.—17.

The qualities of the mind are—Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority and Faculty.

The Sutra asserts the non-simultaneity of effort and knowledge; and this proves that there is one mind to each body. From this follows Separateness. The Sūtra speaking of the 'absence' in the mind, of that (Largeness) indicates its atomic dimension. The mention of moving to and moving away indicates the presence in it of Conjunction and Disjunction. Its corporeal or material character indicates Priority and Posteriority, as also Faculty. VII.—ii.—21.

The mention of the absence of Tangibility indicates its being unproductive of substances.

Having action it must be corporeal or material. It must be regarded as unconscious; as otherwise the whole body would be the common ground (of all experiences or sensations). Being an instrument it must be subservient to the purpose of something else. III.—.ii.—22.

Having qualities it must be regarded as a Substance. And it must move quickly, in as much as it includes within itself all effort and the unseen forces (of the soul's) actions.

Commentary.

Page 90.] Having dealt with the Self or Soul, the most important of the Substances, the author next proceeds to describe the Mind: *Manastvayogāt &c.* This is to be explained as before. The generality 'Mind' is inferred from the diversity among individual minds. All individuals of similar properties and actions we find inclusible in a certain single Commonality or Class,—as in the case of such things as the jar and the like; and Minds are individuals having similar properties and actions; hence they are inclusible in a single Class.

Until the existence of the Mind has been proved, any description of its properties would be improper; hence the author puts forward proofs for its existence. *'Satyapi &c.* The Soul is at one and the same time, in contact with all the sense-organs; the sense-organs too have contacts with objects in proximity to themselves; and yet we find that while we cognise one of the various objects in contact with the various sense-organs, we have no cognition or pleasure &c., with regard to others; hence it follows that for such cognition &c., there is some means or instrumental cause other than the contact of the object, the sense-organs, and the soul;—the proximity of which other cause brings about the Cognition &c., which do not appear otherwise. The argument may be put forward thus: The contacts of the objects, the sense-organ and the Soul depend upon some other cause, in the bringing about of the due effect,—because even when the former contacts exist, the necessary effect does not appear,—as in the case of the threads &c. And this instrumentality upon which they depend is that of the *Mind*.

Objection: "What is your proof for holding that at the time that one thing is perceived, there is a contact, with the sense-organs, of another thing which is not perceived ?"

Reply: Our proof is the distinctly perceived proximity (to the object) of the body wherein the organ inheres. That is to say, at the time that the Colour of an object is perceived, its smell also is in contact with the organ of smell,—because of its being in proximity to the body containing that organ,—like the smell that is perceived.

The author puts forward another argument—*Crotrādyavyāpāre &c*, that is to say, Remembrance is brought about by means of the sense-organs,—because it is a cognition,—like the cognition of smell; but it cannot be regarded as brought about by the organs of hearing and the like,—because we find it appearing in the deaf and blind also, in whose case there could be no operation of the organs of hearing or of vision; consequently the organ by means of which it is brought about cannot but be the Mind.

The author now proceeds to show that the inference of a distinct organ is not based upon the above argument alone; it is to be inferred also from the existence of such perceptible things as pleasure and the like, which are wholly different in character from Colour and other such perceptible things, and which cannot be perceived by means of the external organs of sense. This is what is meant by the sentence *Vāhyēndriyaih &c.* The sense of this is as follows: The perception of pleasure &c., must be regarded as brought about by sense-organs,—because it is direct perception,—like the perception of colour. And the sense-organ by which they are perceived cannot but be the Mind; as the organs of Vision &c. are not found to have any operation in these cases.

Objection: "Being born of no senses apart from themselves, Pleasure &c., could not be regarded as having the nature of Cognition; and the Cognition of pleasure could not be apprehended by any other means (in the shape of the Mind)."

Reply: If Pleasure and Pain were both of the nature of cognition pure and simple, then there would be no difference between them. And if they were distinct from each other, then both could not have the nature of pure cognition. Though the form of 'experience', or 'feeling' is common to both of them, yet the forms of Pleasure and Pain are altogether distinct from each other. Nor can these two be regarded as produced by a means non-different from cognition; as cognition is produced from the form of the object perceived; and it is from this cognition, as helped by tendencies, that Pleasure and Pain are produced. If it were not so, then there could never be any feeling of Indifference. Nor has it been established that cognition is self-cognisable; specially as we have no instances of one and the same thing (cognition *e. g.*) being both the objective and the instrument.

Page 91.] The case of the self-luminous lamp might be brought forward as an instance. But the lamp too, is *cognised by the man*, is *made cognisable by the Eye*; and Cognition only constitutes its action; and this itself could not be the *Instrument*, as well as the *action*, the *agent* as well as the *objective*.

Objection: "As, for the upholders of the Self (the *Vedānti*,) the Self, in its own cognition, is the *agent* as well as the *objective* at one and the same time,—so too could the various characters of the Instrument &c. belong to cognitions also."

Reply: Not so; because the diverse characters are not incompatible in the case of the Self; as the objectivity of the Self consists in its being the object of the action of cognition; and as in this action the Self is independent (of all other things), it has the character of the *agent* also; and certainly there is no incompatibility between *objectivity* and *independence*. On the other hand, the character of *Instrument* and that of *Action* are not compatible; in as much as the instrument is

an accomplished thing while an action is something yet to be accomplished; specially as there could be no identity between the effect and the cause. Between the characters of the Agent and the Instrument also there can be no compatibility, as the character of the agent consists in *not being urged or used by some thing else*, while that of instrument consists in *being employed by others*,—and thus one is positive while the other negative; and as such the two are wholly incompatible with each other; and hence they could never coexist in any substratum.

Objection: "What we mean by the 'self-cognisability' of a cognition is, not that it has no means or instruments,—but that when it is produced, it is self-cognisable by its very nature."

Reply: What is it that is illumined in the case of cognitions? Is it the object cognised, or the cognition itself? If the former, then, the cognisance would be that of the object, and not that of the cognition 'itself;' and hence there would be an uncognisability of the cognition. If the illumination consisted in the cognition itself, then the cognition itself would be the *object* as well as the *action* of illumination; and thus there would be an identification of the action and the instrument. Nor is there any instance to show that the appearance or production of the cognition constitutes its own operation with regard to itself.

In support of the self-cognisability of cognitions, the opponent has brought forward the following argument: "A thing that depends for its illumination or appearance upon something else, always appears or becomes illumined on the appearance of this latter; just as the jar which depends for its appearance upon the lamp, and as Colour &c., depend for their manifestation upon Cognition."

But if the cognition itself constitutes the illumination or appearance of the object,—then the assertion that *Colour* &c., have their appearance dependent upon cognition would be

asiddha (not established), and also *Anaikānta*, doubtful, in view of the Sense-organs (on which the manifestation of Colour &c., is found to depend). If it be held that the manifestation of the object is brought about by cognitions, and not that the cognitions themselves constitute the manifestation of objects,—then, there could be no coroborrative instance in support of this view; as what the lamp does is only to bring about the cognition of the object; and not a manifestation of it.

This also meets the declaration that "one who has no direct perception is never known to see an object." As the seeing of an object does not consist in the directness of the cognition; it consists only in the production of an Idea. And hence even though the cognition may not be cognised, yet as soon as it would be produced, the object would become duly cognised.

Question: "How could the production of one thing constitute the cognition of another?"

Answer: What can we do, when such is the actual nature of the things themselves? But this would not mean that the production of one thing would bring about the cognition of all things. Because the cognition of any thing is restricted by its auxilliary causes; because what is produced is the cognisance which has the character of the cognition of certain definite objects, and which is cognisable by definite persons.

Others (*the Prabhākaras*) propose the following explanation: The object having become manifested by its relationship with cognition,—the cognition having the nature of light, becomes self-luminous, like the lamp; and the soul also, being the substratum of the cognition becomes manifested, like the wick of the lamp light; and thus in all cases there is a threefold cognition (of the object, of the cognition and of the soul.)

But this is not correct; because as a matter of fact, we find that in the cognition, 'this is a jar,' there does not enter any

idea of the cogniser or the cognition. In a case where the ideas of these do enter,—*e. g.* in the cognition 'I know the jar'—there too we find that when the cognition has been produced, we have a direct mental cognition of the object as qualified by the cognition and the cogniser; and the ideas of the cogniser and the cognition do not enter into any visual cognition; as if they did, then these two also would be visible by the Eye.

(Page 92.) Having proved the existence of the Mind, the author next proceeds to describe its qualities:—*Tasya guṇāh* &c. That is to say the presence of the eight qualities of Number &c., constitutes a differentiating peculiarity of the Mind.

The author points out the existence of Number in the Mind. *Prayatna &c.*, There arising a question as to whether there is one mind with each body, or there are many minds in each body, we declare that there is only one mind with each body, "because of the non-simultaneity of efforts and cognitions," as put forward by the author of the *Sutra*. If there were many minds, there would be a multiplicity of the contacts of the self and the mind; and as such we would find the same man having many cognitions and putting forth many efforts at one and the same time. As a matter of fact however we find these appearing only gradually, one after the other; and while the man is engaged in one cognition of one thing, he has no cognition of any other thing; and when he has ceased to cognise the former object, then he has a due cognition of the latter. Similarly efforts too are found to appear gradually, one after the other; as when a man is putting forth his effort in one direction, he does not put forth any in another direction; and when the former action has been finished, then he does put forth his efforts towards another action. For these reasons the Mind must be regarded as one only. And the mind being one only, there is only one contact of it at a time; and hence it follows that at one time, there is a single cognition, and a single effort.

In certain cases we have a notion of more than one cognition appearing at one and the same time; but that is due to the fact of the cognitions following each other very quickly (and hence having the intervals between themselves not perceptible); just as in the case of the whirling of a fire-brand, we have the idea of a *circle* of fire, though in reality it is a single flaming point revolving so swiftly as to give rise to that notion. And in such cases too there is no actual symultaneity; specially as from perceiving a gradual succession of effects of the instrument in one case, we infer the fact of other effects also of the same Instrument (Mind) to have the same capability (of appearing in a gradual succession).

Objection: "In that case, how would you explain this cognition 'the trees are in flower,' where we find a simultaneous cognition of two objects, the *tree* and the *flowers*? How too would you explain the simultaneous actions of *moving* and *supporting* one's own body?"

Reply: In the case of the cognition in question, we have a *single* cognition comprising a number of objects; and this we do not deny; when however the cognitions are distinct (of the flower and the tree) then we have no cognition in the form put forward; as every one of the cognitions is restricted to a single object.

In the same manner, the moving and supporting of one's body also are accomplished by a *single* Effort; just as we have a single cognition with regard to many objects,—so also would its causes, Deisre and Effort, apply to more than one action; and hence there is nothing that cannot be explained in due accordance with our theory.

From this follows its Separateness—that is to say, the quality of Separateness follows from the presence of Number in the Mind.

Tadabhāvavacanāt &c. That is to say, the Sutra declares the Ākāça and the Self to be all-pervading and very large,

and then adds 'on account of the absence of these characters in the Mind, it is atomic in its nature. And hence it is proved that the Mind is atomic in its dimension; specially as an eternal substance, which is not all—pervading, could not but be atomic. (all intervening dimensions belonging to transient things) The absence of the all-pervading character in the Mind is inferred from the nonsimultaneity of Cognitions; as if the Mind were all-pervading, then it would be in contact with all the sense-organs, at one and the same time; and hence there would be simultaneous cognitions of Colour and Taste &c.,—everything that might happen to be in contact with the sense organs.

Objection: "How is it that in a case where many objects, each of which is cognisable by a single sense-organ, are in contact with the eye as controlled by the mind,—we have no simultaneous cognition of all these objects? for certainly in this case there is a simultaneous contact of the Self, the Sense-organ and the Object. It might be argued that from the very fact of there being no such simultaneity we would assume an incapability in the contact of the Mind and the Self to bring about more than one cognition, at one and the same time. But then, the same explanation might be given of the non-simultaneity of cognitions, even in the case of the Mind being regarded as all-pervading. In view of this, you must put forward some other reasons for denying the all-pervading character of the Mind."

We put forward the following reasons: The Mind and the Self both being all-pervading, there would be no contact between the two (as the contact of two all-pervading things would produce a dimension that would be *twice-all-pervading* which would be an absurdity); and hence there would be no production of such properties of the Self as cognition, pleasure &c.; as these have the contact of the Self and the Mind for their immaterial cause; and this would be absent. **(Page 93.)** If the contact of the Self and the Object were to be the immaterial cause of the production of these qualties, then the cognition

would appear in the locality where the Object exists; as all qualities existing in space are found to be produced in such a way as not to be separate from their immaterial cause. If the contact of the Self and the Sense-organ were the required immaterial cause, then there would be no production of the cognition of sound; as the Self (which is all-pervading) could have no contact with the organ of hearing, which is of the nature of *Ākāça* (which again is all-pervading). As a matter of fact we find that neither the cognitions appear outside the body, nor is there a non-production of the cognitions of sound; and hence we cannot accept either the contact of the Self and the Object, or that of the Self and the Sense-organs, to be the immaterial cause (of Cognitions, and Pleasure &c.); and so we cannot but accept the contact of the Self and the mind to be that immaterial cause; and as this would not be possible if the Mind were all-pervading, there would be no appearance of Cognition etc., if the Mind were so. As a matter of fact however, we do find Cognitions and Pleasure &c. appearing; and this fact precludes all possibility of the Mind being all-pervading.

Apasarpaṇa &c. That is to say, the *Sutra 'Apasarpaṇa &c.'* distinctly indicates the fact of the Mind moving away from one (the dead) body and into another body (that the soul takes), through the agency of the unseen potency of the soul's actions; and those motions indicate the presence in the Mind, of the qualities of Conjunction and Disjunction.

Murtatvāt &c. That is to say, the absence of all-pervading character in the Mind proves its corporeality (or materiality); and from this it follows that like the jar, the Mind has Priority, Posteriority and Speed.

Aspṛçwattvāt &c.—The absence of touch in the Mind is proved from the fact of its being, like the Self, something different from the Body, and yet being productive of the cognitions of all things. And from this it also follows that like the Self, the Mind is not productive of any other homogeneous substances.

Kriyavattvāt &c.—Though the materiality of the Mind

has been already proved by showing that it is atomic, yet the author has added this in order to make it still clearer.

Sādhāraṇavigraha &c.—If the Mind were the *cogniser*, then, the Body would become a common ground of experiences (of all kinds of sensation; or of the Mind and the Self the two being two Distinct cognisers.) As a matter of fact however we donot find this to be the case, in as much as the activity or inactivity of the body is found to follow the purposes of a single agent (or the motive of a single sensation.) Hence the Mind cannot be regarded as conscious. Though the fact of the Mind being conscious has already been denied, yet the author has put it forward again, as opportunity presented itself for its reiteration.

The unconsciousness of the Mind having been proved, the author adds: *Karaṇabhāvāt &c.*—That is to say, it is the means of bringing about the experiences of something other than itself.

Being endowed with qualities the Mind is a substance, like the Earth &c. And on account of its containing within itself efforts and unseen forces (of actions), the Mind must be regarded as quick in motion. That is to say, being taken up by efforts, that precede *living*, and also by attachment and aversion, we must admit that the mind quickly moves from one place to another; and seeing that it contains the unseen potencies (of actions) we must regard it as quickly moving from one body to another, at death.

May this Ocean of Substances be duly studied,—the Ocean which is the receptacle of pearls in the shape of pure and various reasonings, and which is full of clear conclusions in the place of corals.

CHAPTER VI.

On Qualities.

(Page 94.) *Text 46: To the Qualities, Colour and the rest belong the (common) character of belonging to the class 'Quality,' of inhering in substances, of being devoid of qualities, and of being devoid of action.*

Commentary.

All obeisance to one who is blue like the clouds, lying upon the bed of Çēsha, delighting in the embrace of Lakshmi,—the destroyer of the Asuras!

Having described the category of Substance, the author next proceeds to describe the next category of Quality. *Rūpādīnām &c.* The fact of belonging to the generality of 'Quality' is the common quality among these; and it is this that differentiates them from all other categories. The existence of this generality in Colour &c. is perceived directly by the senses, as aided by instruction,—just like the generality of 'gem.'

That this category is, at first, not distinguished from Action &c., is due to the extreme likeness between these, consisting in the fact of both (Qualities and Actions) inhering in other substances.

The expression '*Rūpīdinām guṇānām*' only serves the purpose of mentioning the form of these.—"*Sarvēshāṁ*" has been added with a view to include *all* qualities.

'*Dravyāçritatva*'—being subordinate to substances. This only points out a property of Qualities; and it does not point out any thing peculiar to these; as this character is found to belong to actions and substances also.

Similarly *the absence of qualities* is mentioned by way of pointing out the character of the Qualities; as Qualities are not capable of producing in themselves other qualities. This non-productiveness is learnt from the non-perception of the fact of any other colour being produced in one Colour; and also from

the fact of the admission of such productions landing us in a *regressus ad infinitum*. In view of this such assertions as 'one colour' (when the quality of Colour is spoken of as having the quality of Number), or 'Sound is atomic.' and the like must be regarded as figurative. Because Number &c. could not inhere in Colour, because it is a quality, like Colour.

The author points out another character of the Qualities:—*Absence of actions*. It might be argued that when the substance moves, its Colour &c. also move along with it (and thus the action of moving belongs to the quality of Colour). But it is not so; because as a matter of fact we find that no action is produced in the sky by the contact of swift wind-currents; while an action is produced in such things as the branches of a tree; which shows, by negative and positive concomitance, that *action is* always concomitant with *materiality* or *corporeality*; and hence as qualities have no material bodies of their own, it follows that they can have no action.

(Page 95.) As for the ordinary notion of motion with regard to Qualities, this is due to the action of their substratum; just as is the case with 'Being,' '*Sattā*': this 'Being' never moves along with its substratum; as if it did move then ('Being' being common to all things) when one thing would move, all things would move with it.

Text (47) Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity, and Speed are qualities that belong to corporeal objects.

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to show the similarities and differences among the Qualities themselves. *Rūpa &c.* These qualities belong only to corporeal objects, and never to incorporeal (or immaterial) objects.

For instance, Colour, Taste, Touch, Priority, Posteriority and Speed belong to Earth, Water and Light; all these except,

Colour belong to Air; all save Colour and Touch belong to Mind; Taste and Gravity to Earth and Water; Fluidity to Earth Water and Light; Viscidity to Water; and Odour to Earth.

Text (48). Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Virtue, Vice, Faculty and Sound belong to immaterial things.

Commentary.

All these qualities except Sound belong to the Self; and Sound belongs to *Ākāça*.

Text (49) Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction belong to both.

Commentary.

These qualities belong to material as well as to immaterial things.

Text (50). Conjunction, Disjunction, Duality, Dual Separateness and the rest inhere in more than one object.

Commentary.

An individual Conjunction, and an individual Disjunction always exist in two things; and hence are they spoken of as 'inhering in more objects than one.' Similarly too with Duality and Dual Separateness.

"And the rest" includes *Three*, and the Separateness of three, and so forth;—all of these inhering in more objects than one.

The word '*anēka*,' meaning 'not one' is applied in common to two and more things.

Text (51): The rest inhere in single substances.

Commentary.

One Colour exists in one object; and it cannot like Conjunction, to two objects in common.

Text (52):—Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Viscidity, Natural Fluidity, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion Effort, Virtue, Vice, Faculty and Sound are the 'Vaiçēshika' ('specific') qualities.

Commentary.

(Page 96.) These are called '*Vāiçēshika* (specific), because they serve the purpose of *specifying* or differentiating the substances to which they belong from other substances. This purpose is not served by Number or other qualities; because they have got no specifications of themselves, all the specification that they have being due to the peculiarities of their substratum.

Text (53):—Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posterority, Gravity, Caused Fluidity and Speed are the 'Sāmānya,' ('Generic') Qualities.

Commentary.

These are qualities that serve the purpose of *similarising* (reducing to a common basis) their substratum; and they do not serve to specify or differentiate them. It might be argued that the *Atomic Dimension* serves to differentiate the Atom from other things. But this Dimension too is common to the atoms of the several substances. As *Natural* Fluidity is the specific quality of Water, we have Fluidity here qualified as 'caused.'

Text (54):—Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Smell are each perceptible by each one of the external sense-organs.

Commentary.

The organs of vision &c., are called 'external,' as they bring about the perception of external objects. Each of these perceives Colour &c.

Text (55):—Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Fluidity, Viscidity and Speed are each perceptible by two sense-organs.

Commentary.

These are perceptible by the organs of vision and touch. Just as by the Eye we perceive a thing to be viscid, so also we perceive by the organ of touch: and hence like Number &c. Viscidity also is perceived by the two sense-organs.

Text (56):—Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort are perceptible by the Internal Organ.

Commentary.

Intellect &c., are cognised by the Mind alone. Some people hold that Intellect is an object of Inferential Knowledge and is not perceived by the Mind. But this is not right; as there would be no distinguishing mark—middle term—by which Intellect could be inferred. 'Allo bjects' could not serve as that term; as in that case the premiss would be too wide. Nor could 'cognised object' serve as the term required. Because *cognisedness* consists in relationship with cognition; and this fact of being an objective of cognition is never found to be perceived until the cognition is known; as the perception of the relationship depends upon a knowledge of the members bearing that relationship. Hence how could an object qualifying or determining that (cognition) serve as the 'mark' or 'middle term'? Specially as, like the cognition, the qualification of the cognition also, aids in bringing about the inferential cognition, only when it is itself known.

Objection: "After the cognition has been produced, there is produced in the object a peculiar condition known as 'cognisedness,' just as the action of cooking produces, in the Rice, the condition of *cookedness*. And this *cognisedness* being a property of the object is known along with the object itself."

Page 97.] *Reply*: There is not much in this theory; as such is not found to be the case in ordinary experience. That is to say, in the case of the Rice, we distinctly perceive its *cookedness* in its being changed from *Tandula* (uncooked rice) to *odana* (cooked rice); but in the case of the object in question we do not perceive any such *cognisedness*. As for the character of its having a directly perceptible form, and also its capability of being acquired or rejected,—these also consist in its relationship to cognition; and they are not distinct properties of some other properties (of that object). Then again, just as when the object is cognised, there is produced *cognisedness* in it, so in the same manner when this *cognisedness* is known, there would be a *cognisedness* produced in that *cognisedness* also; and so on we would go on *ad infinitum*. If *cognisedness* be regarded as self-luminous (in order to avoid this *regressus ad infinitum*)—then, we ask, why should you object to this self-luminosity (self cognisability) in the cognition itself?

"Though as a matter of fact, the object has an existence extending over all three periods of time, past, present and future, yet when it is cognised it is cognised as belonging to the *present*. And the condition of the object determined by the present time is what constitutes its *cognisedness*; and this being an effect of the cognition, serves as the 'mark' for an Infuence of Cognition."

But there is not much to recommend in this theory either. Because what the 'condition of the object determined by the present time' means is its condition *qualified* by that time; and this belongs to the object by its very nature; and by cognition, this condition is not produced, but only *known*.

One who holds that cognition is *inferable* from the knowledge that we have of objects, should be met by the following arguments: Does the 'knowledge of objects' inhere in the self, or in the object? It could not be regarded as inhering in the object, as it has been shewn that consciousness cannot belong to objects.

If it be regarded as inhering in the self, then what cognition is there besides this, which would be inferred from that knowledge?

It might be argued that what would be inferred from this 'knowledge' would be its cause, in the shape of the action of the cogniser. But we ask—Is this 'cause' eternal, or transitory? If it be transitory, then we should have to find a cause for that also. It might be put forward that the cause of this would be the *contact of the Mind and the cogniser*, which aids in the contact of the Sense-organ with the object. But in that case we might have all this cantact as the cause of the 'knowledge;' and what would be the use of having an intermediate cause in the form of the 'cogniser's action'? If on the other hand, it be held that, "the said action' is eternal, and that the appearance of the knowledge of objects only at certain times (and not always) is due to the fact of the accessory causes, (in the shape of sense-contact &c), being operative only at certain times,"—then, the production of 'knowledge' being found to be duly brought about by means of these incidental agencies (of sense-contact &c), the postulating of that 'action' would be absolutely useless; specially as the cognition of the object, as also all subsequent usage based thereupon, could be accomplished by means of the said 'knowledge' itself.

Objection: "How could the cognition produced by the object, the sense-organ &c., be regarded as inhering in the Self alone, if the Self did not consist in natural consciousness coeval with itself? Specially as if the Self were unconscious, then its causal efficiency with regard to the cognition not in any way differing from that of sense-contact &c., the cognition might be regarded as inhering in the Sense-organ &c."

Reply: It is not so; because the required restriction would be the result of the peculiar nature of the things concerned. As for instance, even though the threads are not the *cloth*, yet on account of the restriction of the class 'Thread,' the cloth inheres in them, and not in the shuttle (and other implements

of weaving); and so, in the same manner, though the Self consists in pure consciousness, yet on account of the restrictions accompanying the class 'Self,' it would be in this that the cognition would inhere.

This also meets the theory held by some that the cognition of itself constitutes the self's 'conciousness.' As if it were so, then there would be a correct cognition of the Self even during the ordinary state of man. It might be argued that during the ordinary state the consciousness is hidden by Ignorance; but we ask—Is there Ignorance in Brahma also? How too, could that which is self-luminous and eternal could be spoken of as hidden? Then again when it would be hidden, then there would be no cognition of any thing else; because of the scriptural text—'all this shines by the light of that (consciousness).' If on the other hand, any other cognition does appear, then there would be universal liberation; as the appearance of *Vidyā*, Knowledge, would destroy all *Avidyā*, Ignorance. If it be held that Ignorance does not disappear, then, the light of knowledge not being the cause of the destruction of Ignorance, no liberation would be possible. Nor could we even think of the *partial* manifestation of that which is without parts.

Text (57): *Gravity, Virtue, Vice and Faculty are beyond the sense-organs.*

Commentary.

These qualities are not perceived by any of the sense-organs.

Text (58):—*The Apākaja Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Dimension, Singleness, Single Separateness, Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity and Speed are preceded (or originated) by (like) qualities in the cause (of the thing to which they belong.)*

Commentary.

That is to say, these qualities are preceded by (originates from) like qualities in the material cause of the substances to which they belong; for instance, the colour of the cloth originates from the colour of the threads constituting it; as it is this latter that it is found invariably to follow. If it were not so, then any and every quality might appear in the cloth, there being no restrictive cause.

This sets aside the view that in all things, there is a single colour of whiteness which is always recognised as such. Because if such were the case then, there would be no varying shades of colours. Hence the said recognition must be regarded as pertaining to the generality of 'whiteness.'

The colour &c., of the earth-atom is produced by a process of *cooking* (or baking) by contact with fire; and in the atom they are not due to any similar qualities in a material cause of the atom. Hence it is with a view to preclude such quality &c., that the author has added the qualification '*apākaja*.' It is only when the *production* of the qualities has been established, that there can be any consideration as to whether they are due to similar qualities in the cause, or they are not so due; hence as there is no production of the colour &c., of water &c., (which are natural to these), the case of these could not be brought forward against the statement of the text.

The fact of the qualities being preceded by like qualities in the cause has been asserted simply by way of pointing out this character, and not for defining strictly the qualities thus preceded; because *caused fluidity* and *speed* are such as could appear even without the precedence of like qualities in the cause. In the case of these two qualities, the character of being preceded by like qualities in the cause must be regarded as referring to such of these qualities as inhere in substances produced out of things having *speed* and in those having water for their constituent.

Text (59) :—*Intellect Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Virtue, Vice, Faculty and Sound are not preceded by (donot originate from) like qualities in the cause.*

Commentary.

These qualities are not due to like qualities subsisting in the material causes of the substances in which they inhere.

Text (60) :—*Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Virtue, Vice, Faculty, Sound, Aggregate-dimension, Secondary Conjunction, Caused Fluidity, Priority and Posteriority are not produced by cooking; they are produced by Conjunction.*

Commentary.

Page 99] From Intellect, down to Faculty, all are produced by the Conjunction of the Self with the Mind. Sound is, produced by the Conjunction of *Ākāça* with the sounding drum. Aggregate-dimension is produced by the conjunction of many things, one after the other. Secondary Conjunction is produced by conjunction. Caused Fluidity is produced by the conjunction of fire. Priority and Posteriority are produced by the conjunction of the object with Time and Space. And the Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch of the Earth-atom is produced by the contact of Fire.

Text (61) :—*Conjunction, Disjunction and Speed are produced by actions.*

Commentary.

That is to say, the primary or initiatory Conjunction and Disjunction are produced by Action, (the subsequent Conjunctions being the effects of previous Conjunction.)

Text (62) :—*Sound and Secondary Disjunction are produced by Disjunction.*

Commentary.

The first sound is produced by disjunction *also*; while the secondary disjunction is produced by disjunction alone.

Text (63) :—*Priority, Posteriority, Duality, Dual Separateness, &c. are dependent upon the Intellect.*

Commentary.

That is to say, the Intellect is the instrumental cause in the production of these qualities.

"*Etc.*" includes the Separateness of *Three* and the rest.

Text (64) :—*Colour, Taste, Smell, Non-hot Touch, Sound, Dimension, Singleness, Single Separateness and Viscidity are productive of their likes.*

Commentary.

The Colour of the cause produces the colour of the effect, its Taste produces the taste, its Smell the smell, Touch the touch, Viscidity the viscidity, and Large dimension the same dimension, in the effect. As for Sound, it produces another sound in its own substratum.

By 'cause' is meant *cause in general*, and not merely the non-material cause; otherwise it would not be proper to preclude the hot touch of the instrumental cause of unlike qualities brought about by cooking.

Objection :—"If such be the case, then how could Colour be the cause of Cognition (which is not like, or cognate with, it)."

Reply :—The restriction—in the shape *the productiveness of their likes*—has been made, barring the productiveness of cognition.

Text (65) :—*Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are productive of their unlikes.*

Commentary.

That is to say, Pleasure is productive of Desire, Pain of Aversion, Desire and Aversion of Effort, and Effort of Action.

Objection: "The Pleasure of the son must be regarded as producing its like, in the shape of the Pleasure of the father; otherwise, there could be no explaining of the delight that the father feels at his son's happiness."

Reply: There is not much in this; the process in such cases is that the father notices certain marks in the face and general countenance of his son, from which he infers the existence of Pleasure in him; and then there is a Pleasure produced in himself. And in the production of this Pleasure, the cause is not the son's pleasure, which does not last all this time; in fact its origin must be the purely inferential knowledge of the son's Pleasure.

Page 100] *Conjunction, Disjunction, Number, Gravity, Fluidity, Hot touch, Knowledge, Virtue, Vice and Faculty are productive of likes as well as unlikes.*

Commentary.

From Conjunction there proceeds a like quality in the shape of the secondary conjunction,—and also an unlike quality in the shape of the Dimension of the *double layer* of cotton (which is produced by the conjunction of the two layers).

From Disjunction is produced the like quality of another Disjunction, and the unlike quality of Sound.

From the Number *one* in the cause is produced the like quality of the number *one* in the effect; and from the Numbers two and *Many* are produced the unlike qualities of the *Atomic* and *Large* Dimensions.

From Gravity is produced a like quality in the shape of further Gravity, and also an unlike one in the shape of Falling.

From Fluidity follows another fluidity, as also the action of *flowing*.

From Hot Touch is produced another Hot Touch, and also the Colour &c., of the Earth-atom.

From Knowledge is produced knowledge, as well as Faculty.

From Virtue follows another Virtue, as also Pleasure.

From Vice follows Vice, and also Pain.

From Faculty follows Faculty, and also Remembrance.

Text (68):—Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Dimension, Viscidity, Effort, are productive (of qualities) in other things.

Commentary.

The Colour &c., inhering in the constituent parts produce, as far as possible, Colour &c., in the whole made up of those parts. The effort inhering in the Self is the cause of the action of his hands.

Text (69);—Conjunction, Disjunction, Number, Single Location, Gravity, Fluidity, Speed, Virtue and Vice are productive (of qualities) in both.

Commentary.

That is to say, these produce qualities in their own substrates, as well as in other things. For instance, the conjunctions existing in the threads produce in *themselves* the cloth; while the conjunction of the object and the sense-organs produces knowledge in the Self. The Disjunction of the bamboo fibres produces sound elsewhere, in the *Ākāça*; and the Disjunction of the bamboo fibre and the *Ākāça* produces sound in the *Ākāça* which is also a substrate of the Disjunction. The Number *one* inhering in the constituent parts produces the same Number in the *whole*, and also, the Numbers *two* and the rest *in themselves*. The single separateness in the parts produces similar separateness in the whole, and the double and treble separateness in their own substrates. The Gravity, Fluidity and Speed of the

cause produce like qualities in the Effect, and also action in their own substrates. Virtue and Vice produce Pleasure and Pain in the Self, and also the action of burning &c., in the Fire (kindled at sacrifices).

Page 101] *Gravity, Fuidity, Speed, Effort, Virtue, Vice and Conjunction of a particular kind, are the causes of actions.*

Commentary.

From Gravity follows the action of falling; from Fluidity, flowing; from speed, the consecutive actions of the shot arrow; from Effort, the actions of the body, limbs &c.; from Virtue and Vice the actions of fire &c.; and from the particular kind of Conjunction, in the form of *moving* and *striking*, is also produced action, as will be explained later on.

Text (71):—*Colour, Taste, Smell, non-hot Touch, Number, Dimension, Single Separateness, Viscidity, and Sound are non-material causes.*

Commentary.

The "Immaterial cause" is that which is in touch with the material cause, and has a well-known efficiency (towards the effect). This 'touch' consists in *inhering in the material cause*, and also in *inhering in the same substratum in which the material cause inheres.* For instance, the material cause of Pleasure &c., is the Self; and therein inheres the contact of the Self and the Mind; and this contact is the Immaterial Cause of Pleasure &c.

Objection: "If such be the case, then Virtue and Vice also would be Immaterial causes.'

Reply: Not so; because they are never duly recognised as having any causal efficiency towards the production of the specific qualities of the whole Self; that is to say, Virtue does not produce Vice and Pain; nor does Vice produce Virtue and Pleasure.

In the same way it may be shown that the definition does not apply to Cognition &c. As for the contact of the Cogniser and the Mind, it is recognised as having a universal causal efficiency; and it is this peculiarity in this contact that makes it the "Immaterial cause."

Then again, we find the *Colour of the Threads* inhering in the Threads, wherein also inheres the cloth which is the material cause of the *Colour of the Cloth*; and thence the Colour of the Threads is recognised as the Immaterial cause of the Colour of the Cloth. And of this latter Taste &c., could not be the immaterial cause; as it is the Colour of the Threads alone which is found, by positive and negative induction, to have the necessary causal efficiency.

Similarly we may explain the case of Taste &c. Hot Touch is also the Efficient or Instrumental cause of the qualities produced by cooking; hence the author mentions only the *non-hot* 'Touch.'

Colour, Taste, Smell, Non-hot Touch, Dimension and Viscidity are such Immaterial causes as inhere in the same substratum as the material cause; as it is only when these subsist in the material cause that they produce, in the effect, their likes. Sound is an Immaterial cause that inheres in the material cause; as it is when subsisting in Ākāça that it produces another Sound, and that too in the *Ākāça* itself. Number and Separateness can be the Immaterial cause of both kinds: when subsisting in the (material) cause, they produce, respectively, in the cause, *singleness* and *separateness*; while in their own substratum, they produce *duality* and *dual separateness*, repectively.

[Page 102] *Text* (72):—*Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Virtue, Vice and Faculty have the character of efficient* (or *instrumental*) *causes.*

Commentary.

These can be efficient causes alone, (and not Material or Immaterial causes.)

Text (73):—Conjunction, Disjunction, Hot Touch, Gravity, Fluidity and Speed have the character of both kinds of causes.

Commentary.

These qualities act as immaterial as well as instrumental (or efficient) causes. For instance, the conjunction of the drum and the stick is the instrumental cause of the production of sound; while the Conjunction of the Drum and *Ākāça* is the immaterial cause of that production. Similarly the Disjunction of the bamboo fibres is the instrumental, and that of the fibres from *Ākāça*, the immaterial cause of the production of sound. Hot Touch is the immaterial cause of hot touch, and the instrumental cause of the qualities produced by baking. Gravity is the immaterial cause of the falling of the substance in which it inheres, and the pressure due to gravity is the instrumental cause in the production of action. Similarly with Fluidity and Speed.

Text (74):—Priority, Posteriority, Duality, Dual Separateness and the rest have no causal efficiency.

Commentary.

These qualities are neither immaterial nor instrumental causes. "And the rest" has been added with a view to include Treble Separateness and so forth, as also the Atomic and Infinite Dimensions.

Text (75) :—Conjunction, Disjunction, Sound and the Specific Qualities of the Self have a partial existence.

Commentary.

These qualities donot extend over the whole of their substrates; that is to say, they exist (in parts) and also do not exist (in other parts) of their substrates.

Objection:—"This is not proper; because one and the same thing can not both exist, and not exist, at one and the same time, in a single substrate."

Reply:—There is nothing incongruous in this; as this is actually found to be the case, by the ordinary means of knowledge. For instance, when a man gets upon a tree, his conjunction with the tree is present at the top of the tree, but is absent at its base; and though all men perceive the tree at its base, they donot perceive there the said conjunction. It is not that we have presence and absence of the Conjunction at the *top* and *base* respectively (and hence not in the same thing). Because what we cognise is that the man is present and absent in the tree itself, as considered with reference to its two parts. If the conjunction belonged to the particular part, and not to the whole to which that part belongs, then, in as much as that part also would be a whole with reference to its own parts, the conjunction would finally come to belong to the atom. But the conjunction existing in the atom could not be perceived by the senses, and hence there would come to be a total non-perception of conjunction; and just as a single object, though having various colours, does not cease to be a single object, so, in the same manner, it would not cease to be one, by reason of the presence and absence of conjunction in different parts of itself; and in connection with those of these (presence and absence), the object is distinctly perceived to be one only. Though conjunction belongs to both the things (conjoined), and as such is perceived on the perception of both of these, yet, in as much as it is not found, like Colour &c., to pervade over all the parts of the object perceived, it is regarded as non-pervading (partial).

[Page 103] Similarly Sound also does not pervade over the whole of *Ākāça*; as it is quite possible for it to exist as well as not exist in the various of parts of *Ākāça*.

Intellect etc. are non-pervading, because they are perceived inside and not outside.

Objection :—"How then do Virtue and Vice (*i. e.*, Adṛishṭa) produce action in the fire ? For these do not exist in any part of the fire."

Reply :—Not so ; though they do not exist there, yet they operate as instrumental causes, merely by the proximity (to the fire) of their substratum. Just as, for instance, when one end of the cloth is touched by a *chāṇḍāla*, it produces an uncleanliness in the man of the three higher castes, who may be touching that cloth at the other end.

Text (76) : *The other qualities extend over the whole of their substrates.*

Commentary.

Qualities other than those enumerated above extend over the whole of their substrates, and do not, like Conjunction etc., exist in certain parts of them only.

Text (77): *Colour not produced by baking, Taste, Smell, Touch, Dimension, Singleness, Single Separateness, Natural Fluidity, Gravity and Viscidity exist as long as the substance (to which they belong).*

Commentary.

So long as the substance lasts, its Colour &c. also last. As for the Colour &c. produced by baking, they are destroyed while other substrates still exist ; hence the author adds '*apākaja*' (not produced by baking).

Text (78): *The rest are not coeval with the substance.*

Commentary.

The qualities other than those just enumerated, do not last as long as their substrates exist; i. e. they are destroyed while their substrates still exist.

Text (79): *All the qualities, Colour and the rest, being each related to a lower generality, come to be named as 'Colour' &c.*

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to point out the dissimilarity of each of the Qualities from another. Each of these Qualities is related to the Generality of 'Colour' &c., and as such they come to be known as 'Colour', 'Taste' &c. That is to say, the names 'Colour,' &c. constitute the point of dissimilarity of each of the qualities from the rest.

Some people hold that there is no such generality as 'Colour'. But this is not right. Because as a matter of fact, we find that with regard to every one of the colours of *blue, red* and the like, there is a common notion of 'Colour,'—every one of them being known as 'Colour.'

Objection: "This common notion may be due to the common character of being perceptible by the eye."

Reply: Not so ; that these are 'Colours' is not perceived by the eye. If the notion of colour were due to the fact of their being perceptible by the Eye, then that notion would appear after their perception (while as a matter of fact, we find them known as *Colours* at all times.)

Objection : "What is meant by 'perceptibility by the Eye' is the *capability of being comprehended by the Eye*; and this capability continues to exist in *Blue* at all three points of time (past, present and future)."

Reply : That may be ; but as for that *capability* too, if it were different with each individual Colour, then we could not have any such comprehensive notion of them all as 'Colour'; as there would be no ground for any such comprehensive notion. And if that capability be held to be common to all colours, then there is only a difference in names (between our theory and yours).

The same argument holds as regards Taste and the other qualities.

Page 104] *Of these, Colour is perceptible by the Eye.* VIII-ii-6, IV-i-8.

It exists in Earth, Water and Light (Fire); it brings about the seeing of objects, and serves as an aid to the Eye. II-i-13, IV-i-6.

It is of various kinds, 'White' and the rest.

It is eternal in the atoms of Water &c. VII-i-3, 4.

In the atoms of Earth, it is opposed to contact with fire. In all material products, it is preceded (brought about) by a like quality in the Cause; and it is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum.

Commentary.

The author proceeds to describe Colour first, as it is Colour that is the direct cause of the manifestation or appearance of all things.

Among Qualities, Colour is perceived by the Eye alone, and not by any other sense-organ.

Objection: "In as much as the generality '*rūpatva*' also is perceived by the Eye, how could *perceptibility by the Eye* be regarded as the distinguishing quality of Colour?"

Reply: All that we mean is that the said perceptibility serves to distinguish Colour *from all other qualities*; as the word '*tatra*,' '*of these*', distinctly refers only to the Categories under consideration (*i.e.* Qualities, and '*rupatva*' is not a quality). As for generalities (like '*rūpatva*'), Colour is distinguished from these (which have no generalities) by the fact of its having a generality.

Colour subsists only in Earth, Water and Light (Fire). It makes perceptible the substance wherein it subsists, also the Qualities, Action and Generalities pertaining to that substance. The colour of an object aids the Eye in the perception of that object.

Colour is eternal in the atoms of Water and Light. In the atoms of earth it is destroyed by the contact of fire, as we shall show later on.

The colour of all products is preceded (brought about) by the colour of the object which is the material cause of those products. The destruction of the Colour of the product is due to the destruction of the object in which it subsists.

Objection: "We cannot admit that the destruction of Colour follows upon the destruction of the object wherein it subsists; because as a matter of fact we find that the destruction of the substance and its Colour is simultaneous."

Reply: It is not so; because there is (at that time) no cause for the destruction of Colour. In the case of the substance, the jar for instance, we find that when it is struck by a club, there is produced a certain action among its constituent particles, and this action brings about the destruction of the conjunction or cohesion of the particles forming the object; and then follows the destruction of the object formed by that cohesion, from the destruction of its cause (in the shape of this cohesion). For the destruction of the Colour of that substance, however, we find no cause at that time. If the destruction of the Colour were to follow upon that of the cohesion of the particles of the object, which cohesion is not the cause of that Colour,—then, there would be a destruction of the Colours of the earthenware fragments also. Hence we consider it right to hold that it is the substance that is destroyed *first*, and after this destruction there follows the destruction of the Colour subsisting in that substance; and the interval between the two destructions is so small that people are led to regard them as simultaneous.

Some people regard the Colour and the Substance wherein it subsists to be identical, and hence they hold the cause of the destruction of Colour to be the same as that of the destruction of the Substance. To these persons the following

questions should be put :—Does the colour of the atom produce another Colour or not? When producing it, does it produce it within the Colour itself, or in its substratum, the atom? If it does not produce it, or if it produces it within itself, or in the atom only,—then no Colour could be produced in the Diad: and hence the whole world proceeding from that Diad, would also be colourless.

Page 105] If on the other hand, the atom produces the Colour in the Diad, then in as much as nothing that has not itself been brought into existence could be the substratum of that produced Colour, this latter could be produced only after its substratum, the Diad, had been produced; as no effect could ever be produced without a substratum. Under the circumstances, how could there be any identity between the two,—the two appearing one after the other? Then again, you hold that it is only while the jar is existing that its Colour is destroyed by the contact of fire, and that it is while the jar exists that the Colour is produced in it (by the contact of fire). And there can be no identity between two things, when the production of the one does not mean the production of the other, and the cessation of the one does not mean the cessation of another. Nor is it necessary that if the two were different there would be a chance of their being perceived apart from each other (which is not found to be the case). Because Colour is always found to subsist in a substance. And as for this, it is the nature of things, and hence there is no good urging any serious objections against it.

Text (81): Taste is perceived by the Tongue. It subsists in Earth and Water. It is the cause of the sustaining of life, of developing the body, producing strength and bringing about health. It aids the Tongue. It is of several kinds: Sweet, Acid, Saltish, Bitter, Hot and Pungent. The eternality and noneternality of this also is like those of Colour. IV-i;-VIII-ii-6, II-i-1, 2; VII-i-1, 2 to 7.

Commentary.

In the course of the treatment of each of the specific qualities of perceptible substances, as are perceived by each of the external organs of perception, it was necessary for our author to describe Taste and Odour, after he had dealt with Colour, which has the peculiarity of subsisting in more than one substance; and he now proceeds to describe Taste.

Among qualities it is Taste alone that is perceived by the Tongue; and it is by the Tongue alone that it is perceived. It subsists only in Earth and Water.

'Jivana' is the substance of life. By *'pushti'* is meant the increase in constituent materials. *'Bala'* is a peculiar Energy. *'Arogya'* is *freedom from diseases.* Of all these, Taste is the cause, as may be learnt from works on medicine.

The Taste subsisting in the Tongue aids in the perception of the Taste outside itself. It is of six kinds, sweet and the rest.

Just as the Colour of the Earth-atoms is non-eternal being produced and destroyed by the contact of fire; while that of the Water-atom is eternal; and the Colour of the product is preceded by a like Colour in the material cause; and is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum,—so exactly is the case with Taste also.

Text (82) Odour is perceptible by the nose. It subsists in Earth. It aids the nose. It is good and bad. The production &c. of this also are as explained before. IV-i-9, VIII-ii-5, II-i-1, II-i-1, II-ii-2, VII-i-2 to 7.

Commentary.

[**Page 106.**] Odour alone is preceived by nose, and it is

perceived by the nose alone. This restriction is based upon the nature of odour. That is to say the nature of odour is such that it is this alone that is perceived by the nose; there being no declaration, either affirmative or negative, with regard to such as are either seen or inferred.

The odour subsisting in the nose aids it. It is of two kinds—*good* and *bad* odours. And just as Taste is produced and destroyed in Earth-atoms by the contact of fire, and in the product it is preceded by the Taste in the material cause, and is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum,—so exactly is the case with odour also. No eternality belongs to odour.

Text (83): Touch is perceptible by the Tactile or Cutaneous organ. It subsists in Earth, Water, Fire and Air. It aids the Tactile organ. It follows upon Colour. It is of three kinds—cold, hot, and neither-hot-nor-cold. The eternality and non-eternality of this is as before.

Commentary.

Tactile or Cutaneous organ means the Sense located in the Skin. It is by this alone that Touch is perceived.

It must exist in Earth &c. Touch helps the Cutaneous organ in perceiving its object. It follows upon Colour—that is, wherever there is Colour there is Touch also.

It is of three kinds. 'Hardness' and 'Looseness' are particular forms of conjunction of particles, and not any distinct kinds of Touch.

Its eternality is *as before*—i. e, as in the case of Taste, and not as in the case of Odour; as this latter has no eternality.

Text 84.—The process whereby the colour &c. are produced in the atom of Earth by baking is as follows:—When the unbaked jar and such other things are put into contact with fire, the strokes of the fire, or the motion given rise to (by it) bring about certain actions among the atoms composing that jar.

These actions bring about disjunctions. (VII—ii—10).

From these disjunctions proceed destructions of conjunctions (IX—i—2.)

These destructions of the conjunction of component atoms bring about the disruption of the composite substance (jar.) On the destruction of the composite substance, the dark colour of the atoms rent asunder becomes destroyed by the contact of fire by the aid of its heat.

[**Page 107**]. *Further contact of those same atoms with fire, aided by its heat, produces, in those atoms, the colour which is said to be produced by baking.* (VII—i—6.)

After this, the contact of the selves with these atoms, as aided by the adrista (destiny) of the selves destined to experience (the effects of the jar), produces action in the atoms in which the colour has been produced by baking. This action brings about the conjunction of the atoms; and from this conjunction proceed all the composite substances from the Diad downwards.

In these component substances, the qualities of Colour &c. are produced in accordance with like qualities in the cause (component atoms). (VII—i—6, 7).

The destruction of the Colour &c., or their production, cannot take place in the composite substance itself; as (without disruption) the fire cannot pervade over the whole of the substance, over all its component particles inside and out. Nor would pervasion by fire be possible by its entering into the atoms; as this would mean the disruption or destruction of the component substance. (IV—iii).

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to explain the process by which the Colour &c. of the Earth-atom are produced and destroyed. Though the 'Earth' itself is nothing apart from the atoms, yet the atoms are called 'pārthiva' (of the earth), as compared with the composite earthy substances (which alone are here intended to be called *'prithivī'*, 'Earth'); the expression 'atom of Earth' would thus be explained as the *'atoms which are the cause of the Earth;'* and the author proceeds to explain the process whereby Colour &c. are produced in these atoms, by baking.

Objection :—"If such be the intention, then this would not "imply the presence of an intention to explain the process of the "destruction of certain colours—the dark colour of the unbaked jar for instance."

Reply : This is not right. This destruction also is implied in the 'process;' as what the author does is to explain the process which consists in the destruction of one set of qualities and the production of another set, by baking.

The jar and such other things—the 'other things' being Earthenware cups and saucers and so forth.

The fire-contact produces certain actions in the *component particles* of the jar,—and not in what is only in temporary contact with it, such for instance, as the water contained in the clay. As the 'component particles' of the jar are the atoms, it is these latter that are the cause (substrate) of the actions produced by the fire-contact.

By the strokes of fire or by the motion &c.—The Earth-atoms are struck by the fire, or are set in motion by it—as we shall explain under the section of 'Action' (Text, pp. 290-311.) *Thence follow disjunctions; from disjunction, the destruction of conjunctions or contacts, from whence proceeds the destruction of the composite substance.* That is to say, the actions set in among the atoms bring about disruption among them, which leads to the destruction of the *diad* and other composites. These

being destroyed, the atoms are rent asunder, the dark colour is destroyed, and the red colour produced by baking.—that this is so is proved by the fact that in all cases colour &c., are found to be produced in a substance only when it is not hampered by its effects,—*i.e.* when it exists in its own positive form. This argument may be thus formally expressed :—'The qualities of Colour &c. of the atoms are produced while they are in their non-composite state,—because they are such qualities as are *produced*,—like the colour of the yarns.' That the former colour is destroyed is proved by the appearance of another colour; it being a well-recognised fact that a substance that already has one colour, cannot have another colour produced in itself; the argument being formally stated thus :—'The red colour is not produced in substances which is already endowed with a colour, because it is a colour,—like the colour of the yarns.' The destruction of the former colour of the atoms being thus proved, the fire-contact, which was the cause of that destruction, still persists; as it is only while this is present that the consequent destruction could take place; none else being possible. But from this it should not be inferred that what was the cause of the destruction of one colour is also the cause of the production of another colour; as in the case of the colour of the yarns, we find, as a matter of fact, that what produces the new colour is something entirely different from what destroyed the former colour. From this we conclude that the destruction of the colour of the atom is by something entirely different from what produces the other colour. The reasoning in support of this may be put in this form :—'The destruction and production of the colour in the atom cannot be due to the same cause,—because they are such destruction and production of colour,—like the destruction and production of the colour in yarns.'

After this &c. The persons to experience are those persons who would experience the pleasure and pain due to the production of the jar; the *'adṛishṭa'* of those people are their merits and

demerits; these aid the action of the conjunction of the atoms with the selves of these persons, in bringing about certain actions among the atoms in whom the fresh colour &c. have been produced by fire-contact. These actions bring about the conjunction or aggregation of the atoms; and from the aggregation of atoms is formed the Diad; by the aggregation of three diads is formed the Triad; and so forth the composite substance, jar, is produced.

The colour &c. in this jar are produced in accordance with the colour &c. of the atoms composing it.—The colour of the two atoms producing the colour of the Diad; the colour of the two Diads the colour of the Triads and so on, is the colour &c. of the jar produced.

Number &c., are not produced by baking; as they are not of diverse character.

Objection: "We do not perceive any difference in the character of the various kinds of Touch either."

Reply: True; but still it is by Inference that we ascertain the fact of Touch being produced by baking;—as we have shown in the section on 'Earth;'

The conjunctive action in the atoms begins after the production of the qualities by baking, and not at the time of the destruction of the previous qualities; as it is only in a substance with colour that we find an action productive of another coloured substance; and hence the action of the atoms must be regarded as appearing only in coloured atoms,—because it is an action productive of a coloured thing,—like the action of the threads productive of such combinations as bring about the Cloth.

Question: "Why cannot you assume the fact of fire-contact bringing about the destruction and production of Colour &c., in the products themselves (and not in the constituent atoms)? For certainly in the case of the baking of the jar we distinctly see, when looking through a hole in the oven, that

the jar remains the same; and even after the baking, it is recognised to be the same jar that had been put into the fire."

[**Page 109**]. *Answer*: *Na ca &c.* The author proceeds to prove this: *Sarvāvayavēshu &c.* If the fire outside the object were to pervade over the object inhering as a whole in every one of its component parts,—then, in as much as there would be no contact pervading all over the object, there would be no certainty as to the production or destruction of the products; and hence there would be no baking of the inner particles; it is with this view that the author has added—*Sarvāvayavēshu* etc.

Objection: "All composite substances being porous, even if the fire could not enter inside the object, it could pervade over its atoms."

Reply: *Anupravēsādapi &c.* The atoms are not porous, (have no interstices), because they have no component parts; hence if the diad had interstices it would not be produced at all, as there could be no combination between the two atoms, if there were any interstice between them; and if the two atoms combine, then there could be no interstice between them. As it is only when two composite substances combine that there are interstices due to their combining in parts only; in the case of two non-composite substances, like two atoms, however, there could be no such thing. Then again, in a gross material substance we do not perceive any such interstices or pores; in the Triad alone there could then be such an interstice; and yet that too is not perceptible. Hence the assumption of the opponent proves to be much too complicated.

Thus then the jar having no interstice, the atoms of fire could not enter within these, until there were a disruption of the Earth-particles composing that jar.

In the case of a tangible object being struck by another tangible object, its component particles become disjoined, and in accordance with the process of disjunction &c., there appears

the destruction of that Conjunction which keeps the object in its composite state ; and on this there inevitably follows the destruction of that object. And hence whence could there be any manifestation of it, by the entrance of the atoms ? In all products, there is no other destruction of its properties of Colour &c., save in the destruction of the substances to which they belong ; nor is there any production of these save out of like properties in the material causes of those products. For this same reason, we do not hold the destruction and production of Colour &c., to be due to the contact of the jar with fire. As the Colour &c., of the jar are destroyed by the destruction of the jar,—because they are such Colour &c., as belong to products,—like the Colour of the jar destroyed by a stroke of the stick ; and similarly, the Colour &c., of the jar are produced from like qualities in the material cause of the jar,—because they are such Colour &c., as belong to products,—like the Colour &c., of the Cloth.

Then again, in the case of the jar we find that before baking its component particles are lose and disjointed,—and they become hardened after baking ; nor is there coexistence possible, of *looseness* and *hardness*, like that of *pressure* and *urging* ; as the two are mutual contradictions. Hence it must be admitted that the former composite object has been destroyed, and a new one produced in its place ; and thus the previous substance having been destroyed, the new substance must be regarded as brought about by some cause. As for the baked jar being recognised to be the same as the unbaked one, this must be regarded as being due to their extreme similarity ; just as in the case of the flame. Then as for the fact of the jar being always perceived as a complete whole, during the time that it is being baked,—this must be due to the fact of the jar being destroyed gradually ; that is to say, the jar is not a mere aggregate of atoms ; and as such it is not destroyed all at once, as soon as there is a disruption of the atoms ; as a matter of fact it is

made up of atoms, through Triads and Diads &c.; and hence it is only after the numberless diads and triads have been destroyed, that the jar is destroyed ; and hence so long as it has not been destroyed, there is a perception of it. Then again as the previous particles go on being destroyed, in their places there go on being produced other particles having the qualities produced by the baking ; hence what we see during the time of baking, is the jar made up of baked and unbaked particles.

[Page 110.] At the same time that the previous composite object becomes destroyed by the destruction of the component particles,—there is a production of new component particles; and the former composite object having been destroyed, there is a production of a fresh composite object ; and thus there would be a restriction of the substratum of the new object. That is to say, as many are the component particles of the previous object, so many are the particles entering into the constitution of the resultant object ; and the magnitude and number of particles in the latter are the same as those of the former.

The process involved in this may be thus traced in its detail:—the (1) destruction of the Diad, (2) the destruction of the Triad; (3) the destruction of the Dark Colour (of the unbaked jar), (4) the production, in the active atom, of a disruption due to disjunction, (5) the production of the fire-contact productive of the red Colour,—all this forming one point of time;—then (6) the destruction of the Triad, (7) the destruction of the product of the Triad, (8) the production of the disruption due to disjunction, (9) the destruction of the conjunction, (10) the production of the fire-contact productive of the red Colour, (11) the production of the red Colour, and (12) the destruction of the fire-contact destructive of the Dark Colour,—these six forming another point of time ;—then (13) there is the destruction of its product, (14) the destruction of the product of that product, (15) the production of the subsequent conjunction, (16) the pro-

duction of the red Colour &c., (17) the destruction of the fire-contact destructive of the Dark Colour, (18) the appearance in another atom, of the action productive of another object,—these six constituting another point of time; (19) then the destruction of its product, (20) the destruction of the product of this product, (21) the production of the subsequent conjunction, (22) the destruction of the action, the disjunction and the disruption produced by this disjunction, (23) the production, in the second atom, of the disjunction from *Ākāça*, (24) the destruction of the conjunction with that,—these six forming one point of time;—(25) then the destruction of its product, (26) the destruction of the product of this product, (27) the production of the subsequent conjunction of one atom with another, (28) the production of the Diad, (29) the destruction of the disjunction and the action, these five forming another point of time;—(30) then the destruction of its product, (31) the destruction of the product of that product, (32) the production of the Diad, (33) the production of the Colour &c., of the Diad, (34) the destruction of the disjunction and the action, (35) at the next moment, the production in the Diad of qualities in accordance with the qualities of its constituent atoms.

The same process may be applied to all the Diads composing an object. In the production of the Triad &c., we need not take into consideration any actions or operations; as these are produced from combinations born of conjunctions, by the following process: many atoms combine with one another at one and the same time; and thus the atom composing one Diad combines with that composing another Diad; and one Diad comes into contact with the atom composing another Diad; then there comes about the combination of two Diads, and so on.

All this we have explained as we have been taught, so far as we have been able to understand the process.

Page 111.] *Text* (85). *Number forms the basis of such usages as 'one' and the rest. It inheres in one and in many substances. The number inhering in one substance has its eternal and transient manifestations in the same manner as those of the colour &c. of the atom of water and the rest. The number inhering in many substances begins with 'Two' and ends with 'Parārdha'* (100,000,000,000,000,000). *This number proceeds from many unities as accompanied by the ideas of more than one object, and is destroyed by the disappearance of all distinctive notions (of one object as distinct from another). To explain: when the eye of the cognising person is in contact with two substances, be these either homogeneous or heterogeneous, then there arises a notion of unity subsisting in the quality of singleness which exists in each of the objects that are in contact with the Eye; and then there appears the single idea of the two singlenesses subsisting in the two objects,—this idea proceeding from the notions of the genus 'unity' and its relationships (to the objects in question). Then with regard to this idea, these two singlenesses bring about the Duality of their substrates; and with reference to this Duality, there appears the generic idea of 'Duality'. This generic idea of 'Duality' leads to the destruction of the distinctive notion (with regard to each of the two substances taken individually); and simultaneously with this destruction there appears the idea of the quality of Duality, proceeding from the generic 'duality', its relationship, and its cognition. Then the disappearance of the distinctive notions (of*

each of the substances) leads to the destruction of the quality of Duality; as the notion of the quality of Duality is the cause of the destruction of the generic idea of 'Duality'; and simultaneously with this destruction of the quality of Duality, there arises the idea of the substances, as 'two substances,' out of the quality of Duality, its cognition and its relationship. Then there arises the actual cognition of Substance, as 'two substances,' and the disappearance of Duality, which leads to the idea of Duality as a quality; and simultaneously with this there arises this impression out of the cognition of the Substance. Then from the cognition of the Substance there follows the destruction of the idea of Duality as quality; and that of the idea of Substance also, from the Impression (left by the previous conceptions).

Page 112] *The same process would also apply to the case of the notions of "three" and the rest. As these also proceed out of unities as accompanied by the idea of many substances; and disappear on the disappearance of the distinctive conception of each object.*

In certain cases these notions (of 'Duality' &c.) are destroyed by the destruction of the substrates themselves. To explain:—When a certain action has commenced in that particle which is the substratum of unity, and there arises a generic idea of 'unity', the said action serves to disjoin that particle from the other particle, whence there arises the distinctive idea (of each of the particles). Hence, at the very time that there is a destruction of Conjunction by the said Disjunction, there

appears Duality, and the destruction of Conjunction leads to the destruction of the object (as a whole), and the appearance of the generic idea. At the very time that the generic idea destroys the distinctive idea, it is only natural that there should be a destruction of Duality, on account of the destruction of its very substrate.

All this is quite compatible with the theory that whenever an idea appears it always destroys the idea that preceded it. In case however the incompatibility between two ideas consisted merely in the improbability of their coexistence, there would be no appearance of the cognition of the Substance. Because the distinctive idea having been destroyed simultaneously with the idea of quality, and leading to the destruction of Duality, there would be no possibility of any such cognition of Substance as 'two substances'.

Objection: "*As in the case of inferential cognition, so here also (we would have the cognition of the substance) from mere cognition. That is to say, it has been explained under the Sūtra 'Abhūtam bhūtasya' (III-i-II) that in certain cases we have inferential knowledge, even in the absence of a definite Middle Term, from mere cognition; in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the quality (Duality) may have been destroyed, yet from the mere cognition of that quality there would proceed the cognition of the Substance (as 'two substances').*"

Reply: *Not so; because the cognition in question is of the Substance as qualified (by Duality); and in as much as the qualification enters into the very*

essence of the qualified object, there could be no cognition of the latter without some connection with the qualification. This is what has been declared by the author of the sūtra, under VIII-i-9: 'The cognition of the white object proceeds from the cognition of the whiteness inhering in that object; and these same stand in the relation of cause and effect.' The case of inferential knowledge is different, as in that the knowledge produced is not such as makes the subject of the conclusion identical (with the mark or Middle Term). It cannot be argued that at the time of the cognition of the substance there is no actual destruction of the idea of the quality (of duality) because of extremely quick appearance. That is to say, just as in the case of the notion 'the Ākāça (1) is endowed (2) with sound (3)' we find three distinct cognitions appearing quickly one after the other, so could it as reasonably be in the case of the appearance of the cognition of Duality &c., (i. e., in the cognition 'two substances,' the idea of 'substance' appears after that of 'two' has disappeared; but it appears so quickly upon the wake of the other, that the sequence is scarcely perceptible, and gives rise to the idea that the two are simultaneous).

Objection: "The objection that you bring forward would apply equally in the case of your own theory of one cognition destroying another. That is to say, in that case also, there would be no cognition of the Substance. Because simultaneously with the generic idea of 'duality,' there appears the Impression, which destroys all distinctive idea."

Reply: Not so; because what brings about the impression is the collective post-cognition (of all the factors concerned) and not the mere perceptive cognition (which alone is held to disappear as soon as it is produced). Consequently the said objection (of the impossibility of the cognition of Substance) cannot apply to our theory.

Objection: "In that case there would be a simultaneity of cognitions, if the incompatibility of cognitions consisted in the fact of one of them being the destoyer of another."

Reply: Not so; because what is denied by the Sūtra 'jñānāyaugapadyāt') is the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two such cognitions as donot destroy each other; that is to say, what is denied is the idea that two cognitions can appear simultaneously and that they can coexist, without the one destroying the other; and in the case of the theory of one cognition being the destroyer of another, there is no possibility either of the simultaneous appearance of two cognitions, or of the coexistenee of these, without the one destroying the other. (Hence this theory is quite in keeping with the declaration of the 'non-simultaneity of cognitions').

Commentary.

Though the form and existence of Number are well-known, yet there are some people whose intellects are clouded by utterly mistaken views, and who deny its existence. And it is with a view to these that the author says *ékádi &c.*, '*Vyavahāra*' may be taken as equivalent to '*vyavahṛti*', 'Use' 'knowledge of what is to be known;' and it may also be taken as '*vyavahriyate anéna,*' 'that by means of which usage is carried on,' *i. e.*, the word expressing the idea. Hence

the word '*Ekādivyavahāra*' would mean the idea or knowledge as well as the words, of '*éka*', 'one' and the rest; and the basis of this is what is called 'number.' The argument may be thus stated: The idea of 'one' &c, is due to a qualification, because it is a qualified idea, like the idea of 'the man with the stick.' In the same manner, we can substitute 'word' for 'idea' in this same argument; and the reason would be stated in the form 'because it is a qualified word.'

Objection :—"The ideas in question are only ideas of Colour and such other properties, (and not of any distinct quality in the shape of Number)."

Reply :—Not so; because the ideas of 'one' &c., are found to be totally different from those of Colour &c. That is to say; the ideas of Colour are in the forms of 'blue,' 'yellow' &c., and not in those of 'one,' 'two' &c.

Objection :—"Then we may regard these ideas to have no corresponding substratum; and we donot know of any objects apart from these, Colour &c.

Page 114.] *Reply* :—We ask—Whence then come the specific forms of 'one' 'two' &c., ?

Objection :—"They are due to the fruition of the *Vāsanā* (Tendencies or Impressions) encased in the *Ālayavijnāns*, or Receptive Consciousness of the person having those ideas."

Reply :—In that case we may attribute the ideas of 'Blue' &c., also to the same source; for we do not perceive any difference between the *blue, yellow* &c., on the one hand, and one,' two' &c., on the other,—as forming objects of cognition; and hence we can have no grounds for believing the one to be based upon a real substratum, and the other to have no such substratum.

Objection :—"There is this difference between the two: While the form of 'blue' is real, that of 'number' is unreal and mistaken."

Reply :—There is not much in this argument; as there are no grounds for believing the form of *blue* also to be real; as there can be no corroboration of any such idea; as that particular form belongs (according to you) to that idea alone, and lasts a single moment (and as such it does not stay long enough to be corroborated). For the same reason, no effective action could belong to such a form. Nor do we ever recognise any similarity between the form of one idea which is restricted to that idea alone, and those of other ideas; and hence it is not possible to have the necessary corroboration based upon such similarity; specially as in all cases we donot always perceive similar forms; there are many instances of our perceiving forms that are not similar at all.

Nor again, can the unmistaken character of 'form of blue' be said to be due to its being born of an 'object'; because so long as the object itself is not duly cognised, there can be no certainty of its being born of an 'object'; and if the object were to be cognised by other means of knowledge, then the assumption of a 'form' from another source would be absolutely useless; and if the object were held to be established from the cognition of the 'form' alone, then, in that case, the object could be accomplished on the strength of the cognition of the unmistaken form, and the fact of this cognition being born of or based upon the object would be dependent upon the accomplishment of the 'object,'—and this would involve a most undesirable interdependence.

As for *not being set aside*, this belongs to the *blue-form*, as well as to the *form of number, as imprinted upon the cognition*. Any *setting aside* would be impossible, as regards the object itself (this setting aside being of the cognition alone); and as such it could never be conceived of with regard to the *blue colour* itself, as all such Colours are very far removed from the cognition,—between which and the Colour there is the intervening *form* (of the Colour). Hence it is

that in all cases what is cognised is one *form* (or shape). And because any one cognition might be found to have originated from a *non-object* (*i. e.*, an object having no real existence) it does not necessarily follow that all other cognitions are the same. Thus then the real existence of the Blue &c., could not be proved.

Objection :—"There being no external object, the fruition, or development, of the tendencies (*bhāvanā*) would be dependent solely upon their own series (*santāna*) ; and as such there would be no restriction as to their appearence only at certain times, and not at all times ; and hence the *blue-form* itself which (according to the Idealist) depends upon these same developments (in the form of cognitions), would not have any such restriction ; and this would justify the assumption of the Blue &c."

Reply :—If the forms of *one, two* &c., did not depend upon external objects, there could be no restriction as to their being cognised only at certain times ; and hence it would be necessary to assume the existence of Number also ; as the reasons for such assumption in this case are exactly the same as those in the case of *Blue* &c.

Some people have held that Number has no existence apart from Substances. But this is not right. Because in the case of a number of trees close to one another, seen from a distance,—even though their *oneness* &c., are not perceived,—their shape is distinctly preceived (and Number is nothing different from these *shapes perceived as distinct*). It would also be perceived along with a real existence. This same argument would also prove the fact of Number being something distinct from the Substance ; even when we cannot see the *Colour*, we distinctly see the *object* as a *substance*.

The form of Number having thus been proved to have a real existence, the author proceeds to describe its various kinds *Sā punah &c.* '*Ekadravya*' is that number which inheres in a single substance ; '*anekadravyā*' is that inhering in substances more than one ; the particle '*ca*' serves to indicate that these two are the only kinds of *numbers*.

Page 115.] Out of these two, the number belonging to one Substance may be shown to be eternal and non-eternal, in the same manner as the Colour &c., of the atoms of water &c. That is to say, just as in the water-atoms, Colour, Taste and Touch are eternal, so also is the number 'One' (belonging to such an atom); and just as the Colour &c., of aqueous products are non-eternal, being destroyed at the destruction of their substratum, and being produced in accordance with the Colour &c., of the originative aqueous substance,—so also is the number 'one' (as belonging to such products).

The number inhering in more than one substance includes all numbers from *two* to the highest conceivable number. 'Parārdha' is that at which all limitation of number ceases. The particle 'tu' is added with a view to show that 'duality' differs from 'unity' in point of belonging to more than one substance.

This second sort of number is not a mere aggregate of the quality of many *unities* ; it is produced out of many *unities* as accompanied by the notion of many objects ; and it disappears on the destruction of the 'distinctive notions.' '*Khalu*,' is meant to lend force to the declaration. We must explain '*ekatvebhyah*' as equivalent to '*ektave ca, ekatvāni ca, tebhyah*' ; otherwise the assertion would not include the origin of *duality* (which proceeds from *two unities* only, which would be expressed by the word '*ekatve*' and not by '*ekatvāni*') So also, in the] clause, *accompanied by the notion of many objects*, the word '*anēka*' must be taken in this literal sense of '*not one*,' as applying to *two* as well as to *more than two*.

The author now proceeds to prove the aforesaid assertion by means of a discussion, beginning with the question "How ?"

At the time that there is a direct contact of the perceiver's eye with two like things, as two jars, or with two unlike things, like the jar and a piece of cloth,—then there arises a knowledge of the *unity* inhering in the two unities belonging to the two objects; as the knowledge of the qualified object is always brought about by the knowledge of the qualifications; and '*unity*' is the qualification of the properties of the two *units*; we take into consideration the knowledge of the singleness. But a visual cognition is never possible without proximity; and hence we have shown that *unity* is related to the sense-organ (of vision) by the relationship of inherence in that (*unit*) which inheres in the thing (jar) which is in direct contact with the organ.

The knowledge of 'unity' having thus been produced, that *singleness* becomes related to the two qualifying *unities;* and from the said knowledge there follows a single idea with regard to the two qualifying *unities*; the organ (in the case of visual perception) is one only, because of the impossibility of both Eyes being simultaneously enlivened by the internal organ; and thus in all cases, the perceiving being done by one organ only, the presence of another eye would be wholly useless. Consequently it is held that the two eyes together constitute the *organ of vision ;* and in all cases of visual perception, it is from both eyes that rays of light proceed; these rays of light come into contact with the object perceived ; in the same way as the rays of light emanating from a lamp in the house strike the outside object through two apertures in the wall. What is enlivened and guided by the Internal Organ is the Visual Organ directly by itself, and not through its relationship with the object; as the Internal Organ never moves out of the body; and as such it gives rise to the cognition only by means of its relationships established through the Visual Organ. And thus it becomes possible, through the power of the causes of perception, to have a simultaneous cognition of more than one object. Though the

power or potency of the causes is such, yet it gives rise to only one cognition at a time; because the contact of the Soul and the Internal Organ (which is a necessary element in the cause of cognition) is capable of producing a single cognition at a time.

Page 116.] It is on account of this fact, that we have 'determinate' or 'concrete' cognitions as well as 'non-determinate' or 'abstract' ones; because there come up, in such cases, a number of impressions of several objects of verbal conventions; these impressions becoming operative give rise to certain remembrances; and then through the force of the contact of the Soul and the Internal Organ, there appears a single cognition accompanied by the remembrance of several objects.

Question : "Granted that there has appeared a single idea with regard to several qualities;—what then?"

Answer : Then on the basis of this idea, the two *unities* the qualities of 'one,' produce, in their substrate, *duality.* In this, the two substrata constitute the *material,* and the two qualities of 'one' the *immaterial,* and the idea of several objects, the *instrumental* or efficient, cause.

When there appears a single idea with regard to the two qualities of 'one,' then the two *unities* produce *duality;*—this is spoken of as constituting one point of time *viz.* the *'lava'* made up of two *moments* or '*kshaṇas.*' If we calculated in terms of the *moment* alone, then the time involved in the production of *duality* could not be spoken of as *one*; as the cause (the ideas of two unities) and its effect (the duality) appear at distinct *moments.*

Nor is there anything very uncommon in the production of an *object* (duality) from an *idea* (of two *unities*); because we find such *objects* as pleasure and pain proceeding from ideas. Nor can it be rightly argued that we have never found any external object being produced by Ideas. Because whether the effect is internal or external is a mere minor detail; the fact of being invariably concomitant with Ideas is common to both cases (of internal and external effects).

Objection: "It having been fully established that Duality is manifested by the substratum of the two qualities (of *unity*), it could not be proved that Idea is the immediate antecedent (cause) of that (duality)."

Reply: Not so; because that would lead to an absence of all restrictions. That is to say, if Duality were not born of Ideas, then, like Colour &c., it could be perceived by other persons also, as there would be no restricting cause; whereas when it is born of Ideas, it can be perceived by that person alone by whose ideas it is produced. The argument may be stated in this syllogistic form:—Duality is born of ideas,—because it is always cognised by a single person—that which is always cognised by a single person is always born of ideas *e. g.* Pleasure &c.,—Duality is always cognised by a single person,—hence it must be born of ideas.

The production of Duality having been explained, the author next proceeds to describe the means of cognising it—*Tatah punah &c. i. e.* after the production of Duality, there arises a cognition of Duality *in general* (*i. e.* the generic form of Duality). Herein also the cause of cognition lies in the inherence of something inhering in a thing that is in contact (with the cognitive organ). The expression '*punah*' has been added with a view to distinguish 'Duality' from 'Unity' in general. The generality 'Duality' is a qualification of the quality of Duality; and so long as the *qualification* is not cognised, there can be no cognition of the *qualified*. It is for this reason,—for the purpose of explaining the means of cognising the qualified (quality of Duality),—that the author has begun with pointing out the means of cognising the qualification, the generality 'Duality.' That this generality exists is also evidenced by the idea of 'Duality' qualified by the idea of the generality 'Duality'; and the idea of Duality again is proved by the idea that we have in the form '*two objects.*' The argument may be thus stated:—The idea of 'two objects' is preceded by the idea of

the qualification *Duality*,—because it is an idea of a qualified thing,—like the idea 'man with the stick.' And the idea of the qualification having been thus inferred, the idea also being in its turn found to be one of a qualified thing (the quality of Duality as qualified by the generality of 'Duality'), comes to be inferred as being preceded by the idea of that qualification.

Page 117.] Some people hold that both the *qualification* and the *qualified* form the substrates of a single idea. But, say others, what would these people say with regard to the case of the idea of 'fragrant sandal-wood'? For certainly the Eye (organ of visual cognition) cannot comprehend odour (fragrance); and the nose (the organ of odour-perception) cannot *see* the object (sandal wood); and hence these two organs cannot be accepted as comprehending or perceiving the relationship between *fragrance* and the *sandal-wood*, as the perception of relationship would depend upon the perception of the two factors related. As for instance, direct perception of recognition, produced by sense-action and Impression (respectively) is found to pertain to the past and the present, simply on account of the power of the two causes (Sense-action and Impression). In the same manner, the cognition 'fragrant sandalwood' must be regarded as brought about by the joint action of the Eye and the Nose; and the fact of its pertaining to two objects (odour and sandalwood) is due to the power of the two sense-organs.

This however is not quite right; as a Cognition or Idea is not a thing made up of parts; if the Idea were something made up of several parts, then alone could there be any possibility of one part of it being produced by the Nose and another by the Eye. As it is however, the Cognition is one impartite whole, sensed by means of the two organs, and comprehending the odour as well as the substance possessing the odour. From this it would follow that the odour is cognisable by the Eye, and the substance by the Nose; for the simple reason that the cognisability of a thing by an organ depends solely upon the fact of that thing being the object of cognition produced by that

organ. But the Mind being atomic, it could not operate upon two senseorgans at one and the same time. Hence it must be admitted that what occurs in the case in question is that the odour is at first perceived by the Nose; and then what the Eye does is to bring about the cognition only of the substance qualified by that odour; and thereby it aids the previous cognition of the odour. This must be admitted by all disputants, whether they like it or not.

Such then being the case, with regard to all cognitions of qualified things, we may lay down the following principle: 'The cognition of the qualified thing in question refers to the qualified thing alone (and not to the qualification),—because it is a cognition of the qualified thing, obtained by means of the senses,—like the cognition of the 'fragrant sandal-wood?' We have added the qualification 'obtained by means of the senses' in order to exclude inferential knowledge.

Objection: "If the mere form of the substance be the substratum of the cognition of a qualified thing, then such a cognition could be possible even when there would be no qualification. It might be argued that, in as much as the qualification would be the originative cause of the cognition in question, the said contingency of the cognition of the qualified thing appearing in the absence of qualifications would not be possible. But in any case the cognition of the *qualified* substance would not differ from that of the substance itself independently of the qualification, because when there would be no difference in the objects cognised, there could be none in the cognition."

Reply:—All this is not possible; because we do not admit of the supposition you put forward. That is to say, we do not hold that the cognition of the qualified thing has for its substratum the form of the thing alone; what we hold to be that substratum is the *qualified thing;* and certainly the character of being qualified is something distinct from the mere form of the thing; for instance, in the case of the idea of 'man wielding a stick',

what is cognised is not the form of the *man* alone, nor the mere *presence of the stick*; but a man differing from other men; and this difference lying only in the fact of his carrying a stick. It is for this reason that the qualification is called the '*differentia*' (that which differentiates); for instance the *stick* bringing about the cognition of its subserviency (or belonging) to the *man*, serves to differentiate him from other men. It is in this point that lies the difference of the *viçeshaṇa* (Differentia, Inseparable or Inherent Property) from the *upalakshaṇa* ('some feature purely accidental'). This latter also serves to distinguish the object to which it belongs, but it does not bring about the cognition of its own subserviency. For instance, in the case of the word '*daṇḍin*' (man with the stick) the idea produced is that of the stick being subservient to the man; but in the case of the expression '*jaṭābhistāpasah*' (the ascetic marked by the matted locks), the presence of the locks is not recognised as necessarily subservient to the ascetic. What is meant by the *subserviency* of the stick is that the 'man is the predominating factor'; in view of his effective actions, wherefrom the fruits of experiences accrue to him.

Objection: "In that case the character of the *qualification* and the *qualified* is not absolute, but only relative."

Reply: Not so; do not you know that the character of the Agent and the Instrument also is absolute as well as relative? All this we have explained in detail in the *Sangrahaṭīkā*.'

Page 118.] *Dvitvasāmānya-jñanāt apékshā-buddhērvinaçyattā.* By *apekshābuddhi* is meant the cognition of the two *Unities*; and this cognition is destructible by the knowledge of the generality of 'Duality'; *i. e.* the cognition is brought into contact with its destructive cause by this generality. And in as much as this generality is related to the quality of *duality*, and is cognised as along with this quality, from it originates the cognition of the quality of *duality*; which is brought into close proximity with its productive cause by that generality.

Thus the cognition of the generality 'Duality' is destructive of the *Apekshā-buddhi* and productive of the cognition of the quality of Duality,—both of these, the destruction and the production, being simultaneous.

Thus then, the destruction of *Apekshā-buddhi* becomes the cause of the destruction of Duality; as while the former is present, the latter is never found to exist. Hence the destruction of the *Apēkshā-buddhi* constitutes the destructibility of Duality. We often find a thing being destroyed by its instrumental or efficient cause; as when the last Perception of the Truth is destroyed by the destruction of the body, on the occasion of final Deliverance.

Then again, the cognition of the quality 'Duality' is the cause of the destruction of the cognition of the generality 'duality'; because one cognition is not compatible with another cognition (that is to say, two cognitions cannot coexist simultaneously). And the cognition of the quality would also be the cause of the cognition of the substance to which the quality belongs. And thus the appearance of the cognition of the quality would mean the destruction of one cognition, and the appearance of another.

Dvitvaguṇajnānasambandhēbhyah—i. e. From out of (1) *the quality of duality*, (2) *the cognition*, and (3) *the relationship*, there follows the cognition, in the form 'two substances'; and this appearance of the cognition of the substance means the destruction of Duality, which in its form means the destruction of the cognition of quality,—all these three occurring at one point of time. Though at the time of the appearance of the cognition of 'two substances' there is no Duality, yet that is its cause; and certainly there is no use in the actual continuance of the cause at the time of the production of the effect; specially as the potency of the cause lies only in its bringing about an operation tending towards the production of the effect; and hence if this has been done by the

cause, what would be the use of its continuance actually at the time of the production of the effect? For it would act as the cause through its operation (even when it would have disappeared after having set up that operation). Nor would this reduce the cause to the position of the secondary cause, the real causal efficiency belonging to the said operation. Because the causal efficiency cannot be regarded to have ceased merely with the intervention of the action of that same cause. If it were so, then in a case where a man has shot an arrow, and has been immediately struck dead by a stroke from behind, the man would not be regarded as the cause of the shooting of the arrow.

After that the cognition of the substance brings about the destruction of the cognition of the quality, and appearance of the "*sanskāra*" (Faculty or Impression). Then the appearance of this *sanskāra* means the destruction of the cognition of the substance. And at the next moment the *sanskāra* destroys the cognition of the substance. The fact of the *sanskāra* being the cause of this destruction of the cognition of the substance is inferred from the said destruction appearing only when the *sanskāra* is present, and never otherwise.

The above explanation of the production of Duality, holds good with regard to the production of 'three' &c. These also are produced out of many *singlenesses* accompanied by the notion of 'many' and destroyed by the destruction of the *Apekshābuddhi*.

Page 119.] The same explanation may be applied to the cases of the numbers 'hundred' and the rest also. That is to say, when each *unity* has been cognised by itself, these cognitions give rise to impressions in the same order as themselves; and after the last unity has been cognised, there becomes manifested an unseen potency tending to establish the usage or idea of 'hundred'; and the contact (of sense) being one only, there appears a single remembrance of objects more than one; and

then these two *Apekshābuddhis*, in the forms of direct cognition and indirect remembrance, produce the number 'hundred' in reference to their own substrate. This Number is affected by the impressions of all the substances (included in that number) and this must be regarded as perceptible directly by the senses, in as much as it forms the object of the cognition produced by the sense-organ coming into contact with the last (hundredth) substance.

Objection : "In many cases it so happens that we have the collective idea of a number ('hundred' for instance) after the things to whom the number belongs have been destroyed; e. g. we have the notion—'I have killed a hundred insects.' In this case, how would you explain the production of the number 'hundred'? As in this case there is no substratum wherein the number could be produced?"

Reply: In such a case the number is not produced, for want of the necessary substratum. As for the use of the word 'hundred', it must be regarded as secondary or figurative, just as in the case of Colour &c. Such is the explanation given by some people.

Others again hold that the idea of the number is exactly similar in both cases (i. e. when the things exist, as also when they are destroyed); and as such it is not right to take the use of the word to be secondary or figurative. Hence they told that the substratum of the number consists in the things destroyed which existed in the past, and which are recalled by remembrances of them. It is only such things as are absolute non-entities—like the 'sky-flower' and the like—which cannot serve as the required substratum. As for those that have existed in the past though they are not connected with the present time, and their forms also are not present at the time in question, yet they become the material cause of the *number*, by being brought over to the present by means of memory, as aided by auxilliaries, the nature of which is quite compatible with reason. Nor would this theory entail the absurdity of

the possibility of such number being produced in any and every place. Because the said assumptions are made only in accordance with (and for the purpose of explaining) directly perceptible facts (which themselves cannot be denied).

It might be argued that if the past things could be the cause (of the number), then, in as much as direct cognition would be the cause of the necessary remembrance, there would be no use of assuming a *saṅskāra*.

But it is not so; because the direct cognition is utterly destroyed; and as such it could not have any causal potency unless it were recalled (by means of some such agency as that of *Saṅskāra*); and hence for the sake of its recalling, it becomes necessary to postulate the *Saṅskāra*. In the case of a Word, at the time that the last letter of the word is heard, though the preceding letters have all been destroyed, yet they are recalled to memory, and as such serve as the efficient cause in the denoting of the meaning of the whole word. In the same manner, such recalled things may serve as material causes also. Then too, just as the mind aided by the *Saṅskāra*, has the capability of remembering external things, so, in the same manner, it must be admitted, on the ground of palpable facts, that it has the power of bringing about direct cognition. Nor would this involve the impossibility of deafness, blindness &c; because the operation of the mind depends upon the functioning of the external organs of perception.

In a case where Duality is produced with regard to two things, one of which has been totally destroyed, and which is recalled by memory,—its destruction is due to the destruction of the *Apēkshābuddhi* in the form of remembrance. And in the case where Duality is produced while the substratum is extant, it is destroyed, not only by the destruction of the *Apēkshābuddhi* itself, but, in some cases, by the destruction of the substratum also; because there can be no notion of 'two' when either one or both of the two objects are destroyed. This is what is meant by the assertion *Kvacidāçrayavināçāt*.

The author proceeds to explain this in answer to the question—'how?'—put by an ignorant person;— *Yadā* &c. at the time when an action is produced in a part of the substance qualified by singleness, there arises the cognition of the generality 'Unity' inhering in the quality of singleness. And at the next point of time the said action separates that part from another part, and the cognition of the generality of 'unity' brings forth the *Apēkshābuddhi*; and then, at the very time that the disruption of the composite substance brings about the destruction of the conjunctive adhesion of the substance, there is produced Duality out of the *Apekshābuddhi*; and the destruction of the conjunction destroys the substance, and there is produced the cognition of the generality of 'Duality'; —all this constituting one point of time.

[Page 120.] When the cognition of the generality of 'Duality' destroys the *Apēkshābuddhi*, then the destruction of the substratum, leads to the destruction of Duality; and the cause of this latter destruction is not the destruction of the *Apēkshābuddhi*; because the two are found to co-exist.

Though there is no useful purpose served by the production of Duality which is destroyed without having given rise to the idea of 'two substances',—yet the production of the effect is such as is sure to come about whenever there is an efficient cause, and it is not necessary that there should be a useful purpose to be served by it; and hence what we have considered is only the production of the effect (Duality).

By means of the above process of the production of Duality, it has been shown that one cognition destroys that which has gone before it; this destruction is possible only when there is an opposition between the two cognitions; and this opposition some people hold to be of the same nature as that between the killer and the killed; while others regard it to be of the nature of mere *incompatibility* of co-existence; and the author accepting the former view, says—*Çobhanametad-vidhānan. Etadvidhānam* refers to the aforesaid process of the production

of Duality. In accordance with the theory that the opposition between two cognitions is of the same nature as that between the killer and the killed,—the second cognition having been produced at the next moment destroys the cognition of the previous moment; and this is quite proper. In accordance with the other view of 'opposition' however, the production or appearance of one cognition would be the destruction of another cognition (the appearance of the one constituting the destruction of the other, both of which therefore would never be simultaneous); and in accordance with this view it would not be possible for the idea of 'two substances' to be produced; and as such this theory cannot be right. This is what the author means.

He further explains this same thing—*Katham* &c. In accordance with the second theory, the *Apēkshābuddhi* would be destroyed at the time of the appearance of Duality; and this would lead to the destructibility of Duality; and the destruction of Duality would be simultaneous with the cognition of the quality; and hence at the second moment of time there could be no production of the cognition of 'two substances', which requires Duality; as there would be no cause for that production.

Objection: "*Liṅgikavat &c.* This is further explained "*Syānmatm &c.* Your view appears to be that, just as in a "case where the man is inferred from a particular kind of sound "or voice that is heard, it is only when the distinguishing "feature of the sound is known that it becomes a means of infer- "ence of the man existing at the present time, even though it "is itself destroyed and does not exist at the time of the infer- "ence; and hence it is the mere idea of the distinguishing "mark which, even though the 'mark' itself be not existent, "is enough for bringing about the inferential knowledge "— so also even though Duality were destroyed at the time "of the Cognition of the quality, the mere idea of Duality could "bring about the cognition of 'two substances'."

"Some people offer the following explanation: The action "of rain which does not appear becomes the inferential mark of "the past contact of the wind and the cloud; (and proves that "the clouds have been driven adrift by the wind); and in this "case even though the rain does not exist yet it is the mere "idea that serves as the inferential mark."

"But this explanation is not satisfactory; because in the "case of this inference, it is not the action of rain that is the "inferential mark; but it is the *absence of rain* which leads "to the inference; and certainly this absence is present at the "time; as while the thing (rain) has not been brought about "its *prior negation* remains intact. Hence the argument that "we have put forward above is what should be brought for-"ward here."

The above objections are answered thus:—*Not so; because the cognition in question is of the Substance as qualified (by Duality).* It is not a fact that the cognition of 'two substances' proceeds from mere cognition pure and simple; because, as a matter of fact, the cognition involves the idea of the Substance also. Another question:—"Even granting that the cognition is that of the *Substance*, why cannot the cognition in question be regarded as proceeding from the mere cognition (independently of the substance.)?" The answer to this is—*It is not* &c. The sense is that the qualification constitutes the very form of that which it qualifies; it is the very source of the idea of its own subserviency to that thing which it qualifies; and that which does not exist cannot *qualify* another thing; as that which does not exist cannot be the *source* of any idea; consequently no cognition of the *qualified* thing can be possible without its involving the cognition of the *qualification* also. The author adds the corroboration of Kaṇāda to his interpretation:—*This is what has been declared &c.* Kaṇāda has declared that the cognition of the 'white object' proceeds from the cognition of the *whiteness* inhering in that object; and that for this reason there is the

relation of cause and effect between the cognition of the qualification and that of the qualified object; and this causal relation cannot subsist between non-existing things; hence the qualification cannot be regarded as absolutely absent (in the cognition of what it qualifies.) By the particle *'tu'* the author proceeds to show the difference between inferential cognition and cognition of the qualified substance: *Na tu* &c. Inferential cognition conceives of the inferential 'mark' (middle term) as subordinate to the Major term and as such does not point to an idendity between these two (as the qulified cognition does with regard to the qualification and the qualified); and hence the instance cited is not quite appropriate. That is to say, the case of Inferential knowledge is not at all akin to the cognition of "two substances."

Objection: "At the time of this latter cognition, even Duality does not exist; and then how could the cognition be qualified by it?"

Reply: Not so; because at the moment immediately preceding the cognition Duality does exist; and in all cases the direct cognition of Duality has for its object something existing at the previous moment and as a matter of act, immediately before the congnition of 'two substances,' Duality does exist; and as such it is sure to form part of the following cognition. It might be added that, just as the *substance* appears in the cognition of "two substances," so also does the Duality belonging to it. Nor is it possible for the Duality to appear, if it did not exist at all; hence it must be admitted that this Duality is not destroyed, and continues to exist and form the substratum of the qualified cognition; specially as the character of such substratum consists in the fact of its appearing in the cognition. This is what is meant by—*'na, āśūtpattēḥ'*—That is to say, it is not that Duality is not destroyed at the time of the substance; but what happens is that the cognition of the quality of Duality, and also the cognition of the substance, are produced so close upon each other that we are unable to notice any sequence between the two, and hence we come to think that both Duality and the substances to

which it belongs, form objects of one and the same cognition; in reality however it is Duality that is cognised first, and then the substances.

The author cites a corroborative example: *Yathā* &c. In the idea 'the Ākāça has sound in it,' there are three cognitions coming one after the other,—(1) that of sound, (2) that of *Ākāça*, and (3) that of Ākāça being qualified by the sound; and similar is the case with the cognition of Duality &c. That is to say, just as in the case of the cognition of sound &c., in as much as the cognitions follow closely upon one another, we are unable to perceive any sequence in their appearance, and come to regard them as simultaneous,—in the same manner we have in the case of the cognitions of Duality and Substance.

Some people have urged that the appearance of the cognition of the substance is not possible in accordance with the theory of one cognition destroying another; and it is with regard to this that the another raises the question: *Badhyaghātaka-pakshē &c.* That is to say, the following argument may be urged:—"If the cognition of the substance do not appear on the "destruction of Duality, simultaneously with the cognition of "the quality, then it could not be produced, in accordance with "the theory of one cognition destroying another. Because just "as the *Apēkshābuddhi* on appearing produces Duality, so also "would it produce the Impression or Faculty, *'Sanskāra;'* and "this latter is the destroyer of that *Buddhi*; hence at the ap-"pearance of the *Sanskāra* and Duality, there is an appearance "of the cognition of the generality of 'Duality'; and also the "production of the idea of quality, and the destruction of the "*Apekshābuddhi*, and the destructiblity of Duality,—all this "constituting one point of time; and then at the next moment, "we have the appearance of the idea of quality and the destruc-"tion of Duality; and in as much as thesel atter are at a distinct "point of time, we could not have the cognition of 'two substan-"ces,' which depends upon the appearance and destruction; and "hence the objection applies also to the theory of the destruction "of one cognition by another."

Reply: *Na, samūhajnānasya sanskārahētutvāt.* That is to say, what produces the *sanskāra* is the collective cognition of the substance qualified by the quality of Duality, and not the mere indeterminate or unqualified cognition, the *Apēkshābuddhi:* and hence this latter is not destroyed by the *sanskāra.* The fact of the *Apekshābuddhi* not being the cause of the *sanskāra* is proved by the remembrance of the two *unities* as distinct from the substances.

Objection: "When one cognition on appearing destroys the previous cognition, then, in accordance with this view, we must have the two existing together (in order for the one to be able to destroy the other); and this would be a contradiction of the *Sūtrā* speaking of the 'non-simultaneity of cognitions.' The sense of this objection is further explained—*'Syānmatam* &c.,' and then again by *'nanu &c.'*

Reply: *Na &c.* That is to say, there is no incongruity in the simultaneity of two such cognitions as are destructive of each other. The 'non-simultaneity' spoken of in the *sūtra* refers to such cognitions as do not destroy each other,—two such cognitions cannot exist at one and the same time. That is to say, what is meant to be denied by the mention of 'non-simultaneity' is the simultaneous appearance of two cognitions, and also their simultaneous existence without destroying each other. In accordance with the theory of one cognition destroying another, however, there is no simultaneous appearance of any two cognitions; nor is there simultaneous existence of any two cognitions; as soon as one appears the other atonce assumes the destructible form. This is what is meant by *'na hi* &c.' The particle *'iti'* indicates the end of the discussion.

(A fresh Discussion is started).

Objection: "Well Sir, all this description of the process of "the production &c. of Duality is wholly irrelevant; as there is "no proof of the existence of Duality itself.

Question: "We have an evidence for it, in the shape of the 'cognition of *two 'Substances.'*

"*Answer*: Not so; because Duality is devoid of the mark "of cognisability. That is to say, any object when cognised, be- "comes so either as produced or as not produced; in any case "the cognisability could not belong to Duality; as when it is "produced it does not exist and when it is not produced it can "have no continuance.

Question: 'The object in the past is what is cognised, as it is such an object that brings about the cognition.'

"*Answer*: Not so; because this explanation is not con- "patible with the fact of all things being cognised as *in the pre- "sent*; and also because if such were the case then the organs of "sense (which are causes of the cognition) would also be cog- "nisable or perceptible (which is not admitted).

Page 123.] *Question*: 'It may be that the character of the "thing is so modified by its cause and its accessories that even "though both the thing and the sense-organs are equally the "cause of the cognition, yet it is only the object, and not the "sense-organ, that becomes the *cognised*. And as for the notion "of the cognised thing being in the present, that may be explain- "ed as being due to the fact of the cognition appearing im- "mediately after the object."

"*Answer:* What do you mean by this 'cognisability'?

"It may be said that cognisability consists in being the *cause "of cognition*.

"But in that case the sense-organs also, being the causes of "cognition, would have to be regarded as *cognisable*.

"*Objection*: 'The self-cognition of the cognition would constitute the cognisability of the other (*i. e.* of the object cog- nised).'

"*Reply*: It is very queer that the cognition should be of "one thing (cognition), and cognisability should belong to some- thing else (the cognised object).

"*Objection:* 'There is nothing queer in this; as surely you "cannot object to the nature of things. A cognition by its very

"nature is so constituted as to comprehend an object; and hence "it is the cognising of the cognition's own self that constitutes "the comprehension of the object; and this comprehension is "only of that object which has brought about the cognition, and "of no other object; and as such there can be no irregularity.'

"*Reply*: Not so; because of the singleness of the object. "The meaning of the cognition being *arthaja*, is that it is pro- "duced from it; and certainly this production is one only. And "because it is a property of the cognition and the object, that "would be no reason why it could not restrict the object.

"It might be argued that, in as much as the cognition is a "property of something else, it could not belong to the object. "But, as a matter of fact, it is the mutual restriction or limita- "tion of these that constitutes their relationship of the *apprehen- "der* and the *apprehended*, and this relationship is not due to "the restriction of only one of the two members related. Nor "has the past or future object any causal potency towards the "cognition, for the simple reason that they do not exist at the "time.

"*Question*: 'Cannot the relationship of the object and the "cognition of that object be the basis of the relationship of the "Apprehender and the Apprehended?'

"*Answer*: That could not be; because of non-difference; "that is to say, the character of the *apprehended* does not in any "way differ from *that of being the object* of the cognition, and "that of the *apprehender* is not different from that of being the "cognition of that object; and hence when we ask you the cause "of the mutual limitation of these two, you name these very "characters as the basis,—and certainly it passes beyond the "limits of all answering intelligences.

"*Question*: 'It is the very nature of cognition that it ap- "prehends only certain definite things.'

"*Answer*: If this nature be not due to any cause then "there can be no restriction of the object; and if it be due to

"some cause, then please tell me what this cause is; what is the "use of trumpetting about the 'nature' of the thing? And as a "matter of fact, we cannot think of any other cause save the "*production* or *appearance*.

"*Objection*: 'It is only that which brings about the cogni-"tion, and gives form to it, that can be apprehended by it, and "nothing else. It is absolutely necessary to admit that in cog-"nition the form is that of the object. Otherwise cognition, being "of the nature of pure consciousness, without any form, could "pertain equally to all things, and there could be no such speci-"fication as that *this is the cognition of blue*, and that the *cogni-"tion of yellow*; and then cognition would never afford any idea "of particular things. It is for this reason that the form of the "object is regarded as the evidence or authority of the cognition. "And it is this form of the object which connects the cognition "with a particular object. And as the sense-organs are common "factors, they cannot lead to the specification of cognitions, "and as such cannot be regarded as *apprehended*. To this "effect it has been said that, in as much as it is the form of the "cognised object that connects the cognition with its object, and "as it does not renounce that form of the object, it is that form "alone that constitutes the evidence or authority of the cognition "of that object; and then again, we have another declaration to "the effect that, the mere being of the consciousness cannot be "rightly regarded as *cognition*; as that is a factor common to "all cognitions; and it is only that which would turn the cogni-"tion into its own specific form that could impart its form to "that.

"To this the following reply is made: What is it that is per-"ceived by the cognition with a form? Is it the object, or the "form of the cognition itself, or both? It could not be both; because "what is apprehended is in a single form, of the 'blue' for ins-"tance. Nor is it right to assert that the object is cognised by "the cognition; because at the time of the existence of the

"object in its own pure form, the cognition does not appear; "and at the time of the cognition, the object having been re-"legated to the past, could never be apprehended as existing in "the present. If it be asserted that the idea of the *present* that "enters into the cognition pertains to the moment of time con-"comitant with the time of the cognition,—this would be an "instance of extreme credulity and faith in your own doctrines; "as the moment of time is never found to form the object of cogni-"tion. What too is the reason that a cognition brings about the "apprehension of only a particular object, and not of all objects? "There is no identity between the object and the cognition; nor "could the appearance of the cognition be the means of the "restriction,—as has already been shown above.

"*Objection*: The cause of restriction would lie in the fact of "the cognition having the form of that particular object.'

"*Reply*: How is it that one moment (individual) of the "*blue* does not apprehend another *blue* (the blue form being "the same in both cases)?

"*Objection*: 'The apprehensive potency belongs to the cog-"nition alone, and not to the object.'

"*Reply*: Yet, any one cognition of *blue* would apprehend all "moments (individuals) of the blue; as the blue form would be "common to all.

"Even if it be argued that apprehensibility belongs only to "that moment or condition of the object which brings about "the cognition, and which imparts its own form to it,—then "in that case, apprehensibility would belong to the sense-organ, "and also to the cognition appearing immediately before it; "as these two also serve to bring about the cognition; and the "cognition also bears their respective similarities, in that it per-"tains to the apprehension of an object (thus resembling the "sense-organ) and is of the nature of consciousness (thus "resembling the preceeding cognition).

"*Objection*: 'You say that the cognition resembles the sense-

"organ in that it pertains to the apprehension of objects, and also "the preceeding cognition, in that it is of the nature of conscious- "ness; but both these resemblances are common to all cogni- "tions. What is peculiar to each cognition is only the similarity "that it bears to the object cognised; as the form of *blue* can "be present only in that cognition which is produced by the *blue* "object. And it is only that property which is peculiar to a thing "that can serve as the restrictive agent. And it is on account "of this that what the cognition particularly apprehends is the "*object*, and not the *sense-organs* or the *preceding cognition*.'

"*Reply*: There is not much in this; as there would always "be a likelihood of the apprehension of such preceding cognition "as may have the same object.

"*Objection*: 'That blue object which imparts to the cogni- "tion the *blue* form, is what is apprehended by it; and in the "case of a serial cognition, the blue form of the cognition is due, "not to the blue form of the preceding cognition, but to the blue "object; as it is only the object with whom the appearance of "the *blue* form is found to be invariably concomitant—always "existing when it exists, and never when it does not exist; and "as for consciousness, it is found to have a power of bringing about "a form of consciousness alone.'

"*Reply*: Whose commands have you received to the effect that "what is apprehensible is only that which imparts the form, blue "f. i., to the cognition? If the apprehensible character of that "same object were to be the means of such a restriction upon "apprehensibility, then, the restriction might be taken as due "to the peculiar nature of things only. As a matter of fact, it is "found that when the cognition appears, it does so in the form "of the cognizance of such an object as to which the auxilliaries "of the cognition appertain; and the object also is cognised only "in that particular form in which it is cognisable; and the sense- "organ &c., are not cognised. Consequently the *form* of the "object need not be taken as the cause of the cognition. As "certainly the relation of the action of *cutting* to the *tree* is not

"due to the fact of that action possessing the form of the tree "(that is cut); nor is it through the axe; but the fact is that "the nature of the action, and also that of the tree, is such that "the action is restricted to (pertains to) the tree only, and to "nothing else. Then as for the restricted notion that *this is* "the *cognition of that*, this is due to the character of the *cogni- "tion* (appearance) itself; and for the sake of this too we need "not look for any *form*.

"It might be urged that the object is not apprehended by "the cognition which has a form,—the cognition apprehending "only its own form. But, in that case, there would be absolutely "no proof for the existence of the object, as there would be "neither the *apprehension* nor the determination or (ascertain- "ment) of the fact; what would be possible would be a mere "fancy of it; and though this fancy is the effect of mere "imagination, yet, in as much as it follows on the wake of sense- "perception, wherever we have sense-perception, there the fancy "renounces its own function, and taking up the functions of the "cause it renders the thing in question perceptible; but in a "case where sense-perception itself is not present, the fancy also "is wholly incapable; as the cause (of its functioning) is absent.

"*Objection*: 'The form of the cognition becomes a proof "for the establishment of the object, by tending to restrict the "operations of a cause similar to itself.'

"*Reply*: Then is it that there is, in the external world, "something that imparts the gross form (to the cognition). I "wonder what would be the fate of such an assertion!

"For these reasons, we conclude that the appearance of the "gross form in the cognition is not due to the object; because "any thing of this nature has been proved above to be absent "in the case of one cognition (that of *Duality*); and it is equally "impossible in the case of other cognitions."

"If this cognition (of the gross form of objects) were not "due to an object, and were to be brought about at times by "some cause or other, then, it would be conceived of either as

"non-existing, or as having any other form than the one in "which it is perceived; or it might always be conceived of as "non-existing; as it is as good as proved that it is not very easy "to differentiate between the correct and mistaken forms of "cognitions. Then again, at the time of cognising, the form of "the cognition points to a similar object as its adequate and "efficient cause, specially when it is understood that the form "of the cause of a cognition is similar to that of the cognition "itself. But this understanding is not possible when the object "is not what is cognised; because any firm conviction, of one "thing being similar to another and being its cause, depends "upon the due cognition of both the things concerned. Hence "we conclude that the existence of the object is not proved by "the form of the cognition. For this reason too the fact of the "object being the *cause* of the cognition cannot be accepted as "constituting its *apprehensibility*; nor is the causal efficiency "of the object capable of imparting its form to the object. "Hence it is only right to assert that on account of any object "not having the apprehensible character, there is nothing be-"sides the cognition itself, which makes it conceivable.

"For the following reason also, there is no object apart "from the cognition. The object being inaminate and non-"intelligent, it could not manifest itself; nor can we find any "other manifester for it; as in all cases there is the same one "form of the object that is cognised. Even if there were any "such manifester, unless that manifester itself were self-mani-"fest it could not manifest the object. That which has its "manifestation or appearance not manifest, cannot but be re-"garded as *unmanifest*, just as things behind a wall; and for "you the external object is such as has its appearance not "manifest; and then too that which would be the manifester "of another, must, like the lamp, be independent, for its own "manifestation, of anything else like itself; and as for cognition, "it is clearly the manifester of something else; and under the "circumstances it would be most unreasonable to asssert that the

"self-manifest cognition has the *object* for its manifester. If such "were the case, then on the ground of the two always being "found together, as between the omniscient and non-omniscient, "so between the cognised and the cogniser also, there would be "non-difference. Because wherever there is difference, there "is no possibility of the two things being *always* found together; "as for instance, we find that *blue* and *yellow* are never per-"ceived simultaneously at one and the same place; and the "fact of two things being always found together is the very con-"tradictory of their not being found together; and thus on ac-"count of the presence of something concomitant with its con-"tradictory, the certainty of *difference* becomes precluded "and tends to prove the certainty of *non-difference*; and thus "is established the premiss of our argument.

"*Objection*: 'The word *'saha'* (in *'sahopalambha'*) means "either *help* or *simultaneity*: and as these are always concomi-"tant with *difference*, the above argument is self-contradictory.'

"*Reply*: Not so; because what we have put forward as "the reason is not an assumed companionship; even in the "stock example of the 'two moons,' there is no real companion-"ship; as the moon is one only.

"*Objection*: 'The moment cognised by the omniscient "person apprehends, along with itself, all living beings; and "yet these latter are not non-different from the cognition of "omniscience; and thus your argument becomes inconclusive.'

"*Reply*: Not so; because there is no such absolute neces-"sity as you imagine. Those things, whose companionship is with "reference to moments of time, for them there is such an absolute "necessity as you say; because the two moments are never again "perceived individually; but this is not the companionship that "we mean; what we mean is with reference to the *series*; and cer-"tainly there is no companionship or concomitance between the "'series' of the omniscient mind with that of an ordinary mind; as "for the former it is possible, at certain times, to rest within

"itself; and at these times also he does not cease to be omniscient; "as the power remains in him; *e.g.* the cook, even when he is "not actually cooking, retains the character of the cook. Hence "we conclude that what is known by a cognition does not differ "from that cognition; as for instance, the cognition's own self; "and then we find that *Blue* &c. are known; if these were "different from cognition, they could not be known by it; as the "*non-difference*, which is the very necessary condition of such "cognisability, would be absent; the very appearance of the "cognition not being the necessary condition; and then too, if "any one thing were to be cognised by something wholly "different from it, and not bearing any relationship to it, then "there would be a total disorder. And further, in as much as "in difference we cannot find the necessary condition, nor the "all-pervading invariable relationship, this would preclude cog- "nisability from *difference*, and relegate it to its contradictory, "*non-difference*; and this establishes the premiss of our "argument.

"The above also proves the non-difference of the form of 'I' "(the cogniser), from cognition. As for the distinct notions that "we come to have of the *cognised*, the *cogniser* and the *cogni- "tion*—these are only instances of misconceptions, like that of "the 'double moon'; and the cause of this misconception, as of "all misconceptions, lies in the *vāsanā* of the beginningless and "unceasing flow of *non-difference*. To this effect we have the "declaration: *In all unmistaken cognitions the notion of "difference is like the notion of two moons.*

"*Objection*: 'If there be no external object, then what would "be the cause of the cognition appearing in the form of the *blue* "(f. i.)? It has been well said that the idea of the object is of "the form of the object; and the Idea has got that form as its "qualification; and it deserves to be considered whether that "cognition follows from the external world or from elsewhere.'

"To this the following reply is made: Even if the external "object exists, what would be the cause of the cognition in

"question? The *blue object* could not be that cause; because "this object is not what is *seen*,—the object being always beyond "the reach of the senses. It might be urged that from the "effects we could deduce and assume the object (to be amenable "to the action of the senses). But in that case why cannot you "assume a diversity of potencies in the preceding cognition it- "self, which is quite perceptible? And this latter assumption "would also explain the diversity of forms in Dream-cognition, "which could not be attributed to the potency of objects be- "longing to different places and times, as none of these objects "are extant at the time.

"*Objection*: 'Well, in that case, there could be no variegated "cognition; as cognition being one only, all cognitions, being "nondifferent from it, would be one only; and if there were "distinct cognitions, each with a distinct form, then, in as much as "each of the cognitions would be restricted to its own form, there "would be no cognition apart form these, which would appre- "hend all the forms concerned.'

"To this we make the following reply: It is not that a "variegated form is never manifested; as any such assertion "would be contrary to a fact of direct cognition. It is well "known that a non-intelligent thing cannot be manifested; hence "this variegated form also must be of the nature of *cognition* "alone (which being intelligent would be easily manifestible). "Nor does the diversity of cognitions depend upon the diversity "of forms; as in the variegated form, there is no diversity of "forms; just as in the blue substance, the blue character is the "only form, so also in the variegated object, the *variegated* is the "only form. And this being of the nature of cognition, when "the cognition would operate towards itself in that form, it "would operate either in its entirety, or not at all; and it would "never operate partially; as the cognition has no parts. As for "the parts that appear to us as distinct from one another, these "do not constitute the 'variegated' form; and hence there is no "incongruity in our view of the case.

"The *gross* form also may be explained in the same manner. "There can be no single gross *whole* made up of a number of "subtile parts; as it would have to be regarded as many, on "account of its inhering in each of the many constituent parts. "As for the form of the cognition however, in as much as it "exists in a single cognition, it could very well be the one gross "cognition. And as for the contradictory characteristics of "trembling and non-trembling (as belonging to the gross object "and the cognition respectively),—this some people are inclined "to reject as contrary to real perception. While others hold "that in as much as the form of the cognition appears only by "the force of beginningless *vāsanās*, it transcends the limit of our "thinking; and as such its essence must be regarded to lie in its "*falsity*. That is to say—that which is a cognition is not based "upon something in the external world, like the cognitions in a "dream—the waking cognition of the post is a *cognition*—(and "hence it could not be based upon any thing in the external "world.) The *Nirālambanatā—i. e. the not being based upon "an eternal object*—is found, in the case of dreams, to pertain "to all cognitions; and the waking cognition also is a cognition; "hence if it were to renounce the character of *not being based "upon external objects*, then it would renounce its own very "nature.

"*Objection*: 'If all cognitions were to be devoid of substratum in the external world, then the cognitions of the Major "term, the Middle term and the Instance of an inferential argument would also be devoid of such a substratum; that would imply the non-existence of these; and then there could be no Inference; "and if these cognitions be accepted to have real substrata, then "these would invalidate the reason given for holding all cogni- "tions to be devoid of such substrata.'

"*Reply*: Not so; these cognitions also have no substrata in "the external world; they come to help in the appearance of the "inference, through their *samvriti* (assumed) reality. We often "find real knowledge following false things; for instance, we

"have the cognition of the real letter from the marks on pape "(which marks are not the real letters).

"*Objection*: 'But the marks forming the letter are quite real in themselves.'

"*Reply*: True, they are real; but they are incapable of giving any meaning in the form of the *marks*; they afford mean- "ings only when the character of letter-sounds (which do not "exist in them in reality) are *imposed* upon them; and as such "the usefulness of these marks lies in the *unreal* form thus im- "posed, and not upon the real form (of the mere lines)."

The above embodies in brief the *Pūrvapaksha*, in reply whereto we have the following:—One of the arguments put forward by the opponent is based upon *the absence in the object of the marks of apprehensibility*. But this argument cannot prove the non-existence of the object. It may be that the external object may not be apprehensible; but that does not prove that it does not exist; specially as non-apprehensibility or non-perception might be due to the form of the object being remote (that is too far removed to be directly perceptible), as is the case with ghosts.

Objection: "If a thing that is perceptible is not perceived, that certainly proves that the thing does not exist."

Reply: True; but how have you ascertained the fact of the external object being 'perceptible.'? Its perception (according to you) has never occurred: If it has occurred, then the marks of perceptibility cannot be said to be absent from it. Then again, the perception of a thing depends upon the percipient; and the percipient cognition is limited to itself; so if this in itself is enough to prove that all else is imperceptible,—and the non-perception is due to the absence of anything that could be perceived,—then your reason or premiss becomes the same as your conclusion.

Page 127.] Then, again please explain this that you are asked—What is the 'perceptibility' of the *form* of cognition? It is not

the cause of the cognition, as the two are non-different. Nor can this perceptibility be regarded as consisting in the imparting of the form to the cognition; as we do not perceive two forms in any cognition. Nor can 'perceptibility' be said to consist in the cognition itself; as in the state of deep sleep, though the nature of the cognition continues, like the series of cognitions, yet it is not perceived or apprehended.

Objection: "Perceptibility may consist in *appearability* or manifestibility."

Reply: What do you mean by the 'appearance' of the form of cognition?

Objection: "It is the capability of rejection or acceptance as following upon cognition."

Reply: This capability is present in the external object also. For instance, by the cognitions 'this is blue,' 'this is yellow' what one accepts, rejects or treats with indifference is the external object, and not anything within himself. And thus it is not proved that the object is devoid of the marks of perceptibility.

Objection: "How can the production of one thing (cognition) constitute the capability (of rejection or acceptance) of another (the external object)?"

Reply: The peculiarities of the nature, the cause and the auxilliaries of the cognition produce, in the object, the character of being used in accordance with those (form &c.); and as such there is not much force in the objection.

This same argument disposes of the arguments of the *Pūrvapakshin* in regard to 'cognisability'; as that too is produced by the peculiarities of the nature, cause and auxlliaries of the cognition; specially as this cognition serves the purpose of precluding all doubts and contrary notions with regard to the object.

Then, it has been argued that what is non-intelligent is incapable of manifestation or appearance. But if this incapability refer to such an object as has not *manifestation* itself for its very nature;—then the argument becomes redundant (as no one admits of the manifestation of such an object.) If however it be meant to refer to *relationship* and connection then it cannot be proved; because there is no royal command to the effect that the non-intelligent can have no relationship with manifestation. Just as the action of *cutting* becomes related to the *object that is cut*, and is yet distinct from it—so in the same manner, the action of *cognising* would be related to the *cognised*, and yet be distinct from it. Then, as for the invariability of the concomitance of the cognition with the cognised (which the apponent brings forward as proving the identity of the cognition and the cognised), it cannot absolutely prove the negation of the opposite conclusion (that is to say, that concomitance does not prove that the object is non-existent); as the simultaneity of the apprehension of the *blue object* and the *cognition of blue* could be possible even when cognisability belonged to something besides itself.

Objection: "But there being no external object, the cognition can not be percipient of anything besides itself."

Reply: The preclusion of the conclusion opposite to yours could follow only upon the establishment of the non-existence of the external object; and the non-existence of the external object again you seek to prove by the negation of the opposite conclusion; this involves a mutual inter-dependence.

Objection: "Even if there is this inter-dependence—what of that?"

Reply: But as a matter of fact also, the invariability of concomitance between the *cognised* and the *cognition*, is not established; as whenever we have a cognition of the blue object, what is cognised as 'blue' is perceived as something *external*, while the cognition is perceived as something *internal*.

Objection: "The concomitance is proved by the self-apprehensibility of the cognition."

Reply: What is the evidence for this self-apprehensibility?

Objection: "Whatever is manifested does not depend upon anything else, for its manifestation; as we find in the case of the lamp."

Reply: The function of the lamp consists in the removing of the darkness from the place to which it is brought; and this operation having been done by itself, it does not, for that purpose, stand in need of another lamp; but for its own perception it does need the eye and other organs of the person who would see or feel it; and thus your instance becomes totally devoid of the character you seek to prove by it.

If by 'manifestibility' you mean the *character of cognition*, and from that you deduce its independence of all other things,—then your premiss becomes *asādhāraṇa*, 'individualised' or 'specialised' (and cannot prove anything).

Then again, it has been urged by the *Pūrvapakshin* that, that thing whose manifestation or appearance is not manifest, is itself unmanifest, *e.g.* a thing hidden under a cover. But the unmanifest character of the hidden thing is not due to itself, but to its negation or absence; and as such this instance does not prove the required concomitance (of non-appearance and non-self-manifestibility).

Another reason put forward is—'because it is cognition (therefore it is devoid of eternal substratum, like dream-cognition.)' But there is not much in this argument either; as the instance is not quite established; Dream-cognitions also have their substratum in assumed external substances, and do not rest wholly within themselves; as during dreams what are cognised are only such things as have been perceived during the waking state, which appear in consciousness on account of the impressions left by them upon the mind. If it were not so, then it could not be that only such things are dreamt of as have been seen or heard of or otherwise perceived before.

Page 129] Then again, if the external object did not exist, what is it that is cognised as having a definite from—'this is *blue*'?

Objection: "It is the form of the cognition that is cognised."

Reply: Not so; as what is cognised is something outside the cognition. If the cognised were of the form of the cognition, then the cognition would be in the form '*I* am blue' and not as '*this* is blue.'

Objection: "As the form of every cognition is distinct and peculiar to itself, some cognitions are apprehended in the form of 'I,' and others in that of 'this'."

Reply: But no particular cognition is formed to be appearing always in the form of 'I', as we have those pertaining to the form of 'blue' &c. (which always appear as *blue*). Because that which one person will perceive as 'I', another person will perceive as 'you'.

Objection: "It is only when one cognises himself then the cognition is in the form of 'I'."

Reply: Then, is there a cognition of 'something else' also? (this the Pūrvapakshi denies as all cognitions are only self-cognisable according to him).

Objection: (No; but) it often happens that one's own form is, by mistake, cognised as 'something else'."

Reply: When this difference is directly perceived, why do not you accept it as real?

Objection: "Well, the direct perception is a mistaken one, as has been well said: 'after a cognition there appears a factor existing outside the cognition; and this idea of difference, with regard to cognition which is one and identical, must be regarded as mistaken.'"

How do you prove this?

"The identity of the cognition is proved by means of Inference."

Reply: An inference could be possible only after the sense-perception has been proved to be true and not false.—and the

sense-perception you would prove to be mistaken, by means of Inference,—this would certainly be a case of queer inter-dependence. We grant, for the sake of argument, that the distinction is mistaken; but how is it that it is cognised only at particular places and at definite times? There certainly is no cause for restricting the assumption or imposition to a particular time and place.

Objection: "The restriction of the assumption would be due to the peculiarities of the *vāsanā* (of the cogniser)."

Reply: This is not possible; as there is no reason for restricting the operation of the *vāsanā* to any particular time or place. If however, there is an external object, then in whichsoever place that object would exist, at that place we would have its perception; and to that place would pertain the *vāsanā* preceding that cognition. When there is no object however, then to what would be due the restriction of the place? Nor, without a particular cause, is a particular effect possible.

Objection: "As there would be no external object, the diversity could belong to the *vīsanās* alone; and this diversity is due, as in the case of your 'object', to the diversity of the causes of these *vāsanās*; and this process is beginningless."

Reply: If the diversity of *vīsanās* were something other than the form of the cognition, then what would be the difference of one *vāsanā* from another? If however it be something other than the cognition, then why should you be so perverse to the existence of the *object* (something distinct from the cognition) and thereby upset the common notions of all men? By what too this form (of *vāsanās*) imposed outside? By cognition? Does this exterior imposition consist in the apprehension in itself of the form? Or is it something else? If the former, then it would come to this that, that which is its *right* apprehension is also the *wrong* apprehension! As the apprehension of the form as pertaining to the *cognition* would be right; while that pertaining to the *outside* would be wrong. If however, it were something else, then there could be no sequence in the appearance

of the two; as the cause, in the shape of the cognition, would be momentary (according to the *Pūrvapakshi-Bauddha*); nor could one and the same thing, *at one and the same time*, be perceived as *right* and *wrong*. And yet there is no other way save those of *sequence* and *simultaneity*, wherein existing, the cognition could apprehend the form in itself and also impose it outside.

Then again, if the *blue object* were only in the form of the *cognition*, then that cognition alone could apprehend it, of which this *blue* would be the form; and it could not be perceived by another person. As a matter of fact, however, we often find a single object being perceived by many persons, whenever all these persons have their attention turned towards it. We often find people saying 'I have seen that which you have seen.' From this we conclude that the object is not in the form of the cognition.

Page 130.] There are some extremists who deny even this idealistic form to the objects of perception, all of which they regard as unreal. But for these people there could be no restriction as to particular effects following only from particular causes, or that as to definite purposes being served only by certain definite objects. Because when there is no object, there is nothing that would be the cause of another, or everything would be the cause of everything; nor could there be any analogy, or want of analogy, in useful poses to be served, because of the absence of any differences. This has been well said by the revered teachers—'Those that are satispurified with imaginary sweets, and those that have tasted real sweets that they have obtained,—would both have in their body the same organic changes (if the sweets had no real existence)."

Objection: "The distinction in such cases would be due to the differences of *vāsanā*."

Reply: If the *vāsanā* were the cause of the particular purposes served in the world, then your theory differs from ours only in name—what you call '*vāsanā*' we call '*artha*,' '*object*.' If the *vāsanā* be said to be of the nature of a cognition, then, in the

absence of an object, any peculiarity in it would be without cause, baseless; as the only factor of 'cognition' would be common in all cases. And if you admit of peculiarities in the form of cognitions, as well as in some other shape, then that would amount to the admission of 'objects.'

Then too, in accordance with this theory, the cognition of *blue* could not appear at certain times only, and not at all times; as the series of moments capable of producing it would continue always and everywhere. If they did not continue, then the cognition would not be possible at any future time.

Objection : "The cognition not standing in need of anything besides itself, and the fruition of the cause appearing only at particular times, it would follow that the effect of these also should appear only at particular times."

Reply : The "fruition" of the cause is nothing else save its tending towards the production of the effect; and this too would depend only upon self-apprehension; and as such it could not appear only at certain times. As a matter of fact, a direct perception is always such as appears only at certain times. And this perception applies to the external object, which is cognised as pertaining to definite points of place and time; and hence it is this perception which sets aside all arguments brought forward to prove the non-existence of that object. And thus your premises become open to the fallacy of being '*kālātyayāpadishṭa*.'

Thus has Number been explained.

Text (86).—Dimension is that which forms the basis of all measurement. It is of four kinds : (1) *Minute,* (2) *Large,* (3) *Long and* (4) *Short. (vii-i-*8, 17*) The Large again is of two kinds : eternal and non-eternal. To the eternal kind belongs the highest extensiveness of the* Ākāça, *Space, Time and Self; while the non-eternal exists in the Triad and the rest. (vii-i-*22, 24, 25, 16*) The Minute again is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is that in the Atom and in the Mind; and this is what is known as* 'Pārimāndalya' *(the atomic measure). The non-eternal is the Diad. (vii-i-*11, 13, 17*) Though such things as the Lotus, the myrobolan fruit, the Bēl and the like, are spoken of as* minute *and* large, *yet the idea of minuteness can be applied to these only indirectly (or figuratively), being based upon the existence in them of greater or less dimension as compared with something else.* Longness *and* Shortness *cohere with such* Largeness *and* Minuteness *as are caused. In the case of such things as a piece of fuel, a sugar-cane and the bamboo, even though they are found to be distinctly* long, *yet they are figuratively spoken of as 'short,' in view of their greater or less length as compared with that of something else. (vii-i-*9, 10, 17*)*

Of the non-eternal Dimensions, all the four (the Long, the Short, the Large and the Small) are caused by (1) *Number,* (2) *Dimension and* (3) *Aggregation.*

(1) *The plurality of number appears in the atoms and the diads, according to the will of God; and when these atoms and diads bring about the effects in the shape of the triad and the like, the said plurality creates in these a certain* length *and* largeness, *simultaneously with colour and the other qualities.* (2) *In a case where the created object is caused by two large components, as also when it is caused by many large components, the* largeness *of the object is due to* largeness *of the*

component parts, and not to their plurality; *as even in a case where the number of the components in two objects is the same, we find a difference in their magnitudes (if there happens to be a difference in the volumes of the components of those objects).* (3) *As for Aggregation, we have it in the case where two balls of cotton are rolled into a single ball,—where what the Conglomeration produces in this single double ball, is, not* plurality *and* largeness, *but* largeness *only, by means either of conjunctions of the loose particles composing the balls of cotton, or of the mutual conjunction of the particles of one ball with those of the other. We infer this from the fact that even in a case where the number, the largeness (or magnitude) and the dimension of the components of two objects are the same, there is yet a difference in the magnitudes of the objects themselves (i. e. in two objects where the conglomeration of particles is loose and closely compact.)*

It is the duality of two atoms which produces the minuteness in the diad. In the triad, its length *is produced, just like its* largeness, *by means of the* plurality, *the* largeness *and* homogeneous conglomeration, *of its material cause (the component molecules). In the Diad,* shortness *is produced, just like its minuteness, through the duality of number.*

Question: "*What is the difference between* largeness *and* length *as belonging to triads, as also between* minuteness *and* shortness *belonging to diads?*"

Answer: There is a vast difference between the said largeness *and* length; *as is apparent from the fact that we find people, saying with regard to a* large substance—"*bring a* long *thing (and not this* large *one'), and similarly, with regard to the* long *thing—'bring the* large *thing (and not this* long *one)'—where a clear distinction is made between the two. As for the difference between* minuteness *and* shortness, *it is clearly perceptible to those* (yogis) *who are capable of directly perceiving them (in the* atom *and the* Diad, *which are not perceptible to the ordinary man).*

All these four kinds of Dimension are caused; *and as such, come to be destroyed on the destruction of their substratum.*

Commentary.

Page 133.] The author now proceeds to describe Dimension *Parimāṇam &c.*, 'Measurement' consists in the recognition of the minuteness, largeness, length or shortness of a thing, and in an expression of these qualities by words; the basis of this 'measurement' is what is called 'Dimension.' By this declaration the author means to assert and prove, by showing its effect, the existence of this quality, for one who would deny its existence. As we have already shown above how an idea or cognition proves the existence of what is cognised, which is its substratum.

Objection: "But how can the words ('aṇu' &c.) prove the existence of the quality; for certainly the word is not of the nature of an *object*; if it were so, then the uttering of the words 'food,' 'fire' and 'sword,' would lead to the *filling, burning* and *cutting*, respectively, of the mouth. Nor can the word be said to be born of an object; as it is a well known fact that words are produced by the air within the body striking against the throat and other parts of the organ of speech. And certainly, that which is not of the nature of the *object*, nor is born of it, could never be a *Prātipadika*, the basic noun denoting a certain object; if it could be so, it would lead to a deal of disorder."

Reply: The above reasoning is not right; if the word were produced entirely by the inner air striking against the walls of

the throat, then its utterance could not even prove the existence of the *desire to speak*, on the part of the speaker; as it would not originate from any such desire; and this would justify such an assertion as that words do not indicate a desire to speak on the part of the speaker—which would be like the incoherent mumblings of a drunkard.

Objection: "The *desire to speak* may be regarded as the remote cause of the word, operating through the striking of the inner air; and as such the word would point to the existence of such a desire."

Reply: In the same manner would the word also indicate the cognition of the object expressed by the word; as a desire to speak is always preceeded by a perception of the object desired to be spoken of.

Objection: "In the case of a cheat we find that he has a desire to speak of objects which he has never perceived."

Reply: We find that even though a man may not have the desire to speak of a certain object, yet, through a mistake, he gives utterance to words expressing that same object. This has been well described by the teachers thus: 'In the case of deluded or mistaken persons we find a word really expressive of one object being used with reference to a totally different object (and the concomitance of desire with utterance is as invariable as that of the utterance and the perception of the object expressed).'

Objection: "It is not possible for words expressive of one object being uttered through a desire to speak of a totally different object. As if there were any such irregularity in the concomitance of a thing with what has been universally recognised as its necessary and invariable cause, then there would be an utter irregularity and disorder in the whole world process. Hence even in the case of the mistaken person, even though the desire to speak of a certain thing (of which he unconsciously speaks) may not be quite perceptible, yet it must be admitted that it does appear quickly, in an indistinct form,

resembling the unfelt touch of a passing straw,—this fact being assumed on the strength of the effects perceived."

Reply: Then in the case of the cheat also, we could assume the perception of the object, on the strength of his desire to speak of it; as we find that unless a man has perceived an object, he has no desire to speak of it.

Objection: "But at the time that he is going to cheat, the person has had no perception of the object."

Reply: That may be; but it is possible that he may have a remembrance of it; as all that the cheat does is to speak of something that he has perceived before, as something else; and hence his desire to speak of it is distinctly a product of its recollection of it; and through that recollection, it may also be said to be due to his previous perception of that object; and as such there is no want of concomitance between *perception* and *desire to speak*.

Even such *desire to speak* as is due to a wrong perception, is indirectly the product of a correct perception; and perception is always concomitant with the object perceived; hence the existence and utterance of a word must be accepted as proving the existence of the object expressed by it. If it were not so, when a sentence would be heard, the hearer would not have any idea of the objects spoken of thereby; and all that he would be conscious of would be the *desire to speak* on the part of the speaker; and as this cognition would not serve any useful purpose, all verbal usage would become impossible. Nor would there be any ground for deciding as to the victory or defeat of disputants; as the desire to speak would be equal in both, and as such judged by that contention alone, both would be equally right in their disquisitions.

Page 133] It has been declared by some that the Dimension is nothing apart from the substance; as so long as the substance is not perceived we have no idea of the Dimension.

But this is not true; because we often find that when a substance is seen from a distance, its particular dimension is not

known; and hence it is that even a large substance is mistaken for a small one.

Dimension having been thus proved to exist the author now proceeds to describe its various kinds; *Tat chaturvidham &c.* He next points out the way in which it is of four kinds *Aṇu &c.* The square or other shapes of things are due to the particular arrangements of constituent molecules, and they do not constitute so many different kinds of Dimension.

Objection: "The same may be said of Length &c., also."

Reply: Not so; because even when we do not perceive the arrangement of the parts of an object at a great distance from us, we do have distinct notions of its Length &c.

Objection: "Well Sir, the dimension of the Diad must be minute; as there is no cause in it of the production of any larger Dimension; then again the Dimension of the atom must be smaller than that of the Diad,—as the Dimension of the cause is always found to be smaller than that of its effect; and hence the Dimension of the atom must be totally different from that of the Diad. Thus also the Dimension of the *Ākāça* reaching up to the highest upward limit is wholly different from that of the jar and other substances; and then we have the long and short Dimensions; and thus there are *Six* dimensions (1 Minute atomic, 2 Minute Diadic, 3 Large ordinary, 4 Largest, 5 Long and 6 Short); why then should it be said of *four* kinds only?

In reply to this the author says: *Tatra* &c. That is to say, from among these four Dimensions, the *Large* is of two kinds—Eternal and Transient. The Eternal Large Dimension is that found in *Ākāça*, Time, Space and Self; it is this that is called '*paramamahattva*;" "greatest largeness;' and the Transient Large Dimension belongs to the Triad and other substances, and not to *Ākāça* &c.

As the Large Dimension, so the Minute Dimension also is of two kinds—Eternal and Transient. In both cases the particle '*cha*' is added with a view to deny the existence of any other

kind of Largeness or Minuteness. The eternal Minute Dimension belongs to the Atom and the Minds, as in these there are no causes for either producing or destroying the Dimensions. By '*Pārimāndaly*' is meant the smallest dimension possible. The transient Minute Dimension belongs to the Diad alone, and to nothing else.

The sense of all this is that the Dimension of the atom is only one form of the *Minute* Dimension, and the 'Largest Dimension' is only a form of the *Large* Dimension. If it were not so then it would not be qualified by the word 'parama'. The word '*Mahat*' 'Large' is applied to that Dimension which helped by colour, renders its substratum perceptible; and that which is incapable of making its substratum perceptible is the 'Aṇu', 'Minute.' From this it does not follow that the Triad also is *Minute*, because it is perceptible; its perceptibility being inferred from the fact of its being made up of material causes, like the jar; in fact it is that composite substance which, though itself perceptible, has its constituent particles such as are not perceptible. As for the Dimension of the *Ākāçā*, even though it is not perceptible, yet it is 'Large'; because its extension is larger than that of the Dimension of the Diad (which is the outermost limit of the *Minute*),—like that of the jar.

Page 134.] *Objection:* "It has been said above that the transient Minute Dimension belongs to the Diad alone: but this is not quite correct, as we find the lotus, the āmalaka and the Bēl spoken of in terms denoting that one is *minuter* than the other (which would show that the minute Dimension belongs to these substances also)."

To this the author replies—*In the lotus &c.*—That is to say, the use of the word 'minute' with regard to the Āmalaka must be regarded as secondary, or figurative, being based upon the fact of absence in the Lotus of the *Largeness* of the *Bēl*. The word '*bhākta*' is derived from '*bhakti*', 'division' *i. e.*, the 'possession of something as common between two things;' hence,

'Similarity;' and that which is due to, or based upon mere similarity, is '*bhākta*' or 'secondary.' Similarly the absence of the *largeness* of the *Āmalaka* in the Lotus, leads to this latter being spoken of as 'minute'—this minuteness thus being only comparative. Absolute minuteness (transient) however exists in the Diad alone; and in this, therefore, is a total absence of *Largeness*. The *largeness* existing in the Bēl is absent in the Āmalaka, and hence the application of the word 'minute' to this latter is also only indirect or figurative.

The author next proceeds to show the peculiarities *Length* and *Shortness*: *Dīrghahrasvatve &c.* These two qualities inhere respectively in the same substances as the produced (non-eternal) Largeness and Minuteness. That is to say, in a substance where the Largeness is produced, as in the Triad, the Length is also produced; and in a substance wherein Minuteness is produced, we have *shortness* also produced. Some people say that the *atom* being a *parimandala*, it has no *Shortness*; and that *Ākāça* being all-pervading, it has no *Length*; others hold that like the usage of 'Extreme Atom' and 'Greatest Largeness', we also find the usage of 'extreme shortness' and 'extreme length', and hence it must be admitted that the former belongs to the Atom, and the latter to *Ākāça*;—the argument being stated thus: *Ākáça* is the substratum of *Length*, because it is the substratum of *Largeness*, like the pillar &c.; and again, the Atom is the substratum of *shortness*, because it is the substratum of the *minuteness*, like the Diad.

Question: "If *shortness* is co-substrate with *produced minuteness*, then how is it that we have the quality spoken of as residing in other things?"

Answer: Samit &c. That is to say, though in reality, all such things as the piece of fuel, sugarcane and bamboo &c. are in reality possessed of *Length*, yet they are spoken of as 'short', the epithet being applied to them secondarily, on account of the absence, in the sugarcane, of the lengthy dimension possessed by the bamboo, and so forth; and so also with the piece of wood as compared to the sugarcane. It is only the Diad

that is absolutely *short*; as therein *Length* is wholly absent; and hence the sugarcane comes to be spoken of as 'short', on account of the *absence in it of the length of the bamboo.*

Objection: "Why should not the application of the epithet 'short' to these substances be regarded as direct and true?"

It is not so regarded, for the simple reason that that same thing is found to be possessed of *Length* as compared with something else; and certainly one and the same thing could not *in reality*, be both *long* and *short.*

Objection: "In that case we might regard the epithet 'long' as applied secondarily, and that of 'short' as real."

Reply: We do not find any cause for the production of the usage of 'long.'

Objection: "Then why should not we regard all usage of 'short' as indirect and unreal?"

Reply: Not so; When the principal or direct thing is possible there can be no possibility of the secondary or indirect.

The author now proceeds to show the cause of that Dimension which is *produced*, not eternal: *Anityam &c.* The four kinds of transient Dimension, viz., Long, Short, Large and Minute—originates from the aggregations of Numbers and Dimensions. He proceeds to explain how they are produced from aggregations of number. The Diad is produced by two atoms; being called 'two atoms;' and when three of these Diads combine, the number 'three,' made up of the unities inhering in each of the Diads, is produced in them through the intervention of the Divine will; and this number ('three') produces, in the Triad, which is a product of three Diads, *Largeness* and *Length*, simultaneously with the production of its Colour &c. The word '*iti*' is aded with a view to preclude the cause of the Large Dimension; and the word '*ādi*' in '*Tryaṇukādi*' is meant to include the *Quarternary* and other products.

Page 135.] *Question*: How do you know that the Dimension of the Triad &c., has for its immaterial cause, the plurality of number inhering in the component Diads?"

Answer: By seeing that no other cause is possible. For instance, the said dimension could not be brought about by such qualities of the Diads as Colour, Taste, Odour, Singularity, Separateness, Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity; as all these whenever productive are found to be productive only of like properties; and hence if the minute dimension of the Diads was to produce the Dimension in the Triad, then the Dimension of this latter also would be *minute* only and not *large*; as a Dimension always produces its own like. As a matter of fact however, we find that the Triad is endowed with *largeness*; as is evinced by the fact of its being composed of many component particles like the jar. Nor could any effect be produced without an adequate immaterial cause; and we have owned elsewhere that when two products are made up of parts of equal dimensions, if the number of such parts be different in the two, that difference makes a difference in the dimensions of the products; and it is for this reason that in the case in question we regard Number to be the required cause.

We might have regarded the conjunctions of the Diad to be the cause of the Largeness of the Triad; but then too, all that we could say, would be that the conjunction of *many* component particles is the cause; and thus by distinguishing the *known* (*prāpta*) from the *unknown*, we would arrive at the same conclusion,—that it is *manyness* or *multiplicity* that is the cause of the Dimension.

Then again, that number Three which is dependent upon the will of God, could be destroyed, only at the destruction of the unseen potency that holds it intact; and its destruction could not be due to the destruction of its substratum; as the will of God (which is its substratum) is eternal.

The author next proceeds to explain how *Largeness* is produced out of *Largeness*: *Dvibahubhih &c.* In a product produced our of two and many component particles, the Largeness is produced by the largenesses of the components. Thus then, in a case where the product is made up of two *large* particles not combining into a single aggregate (but merely combining together), the production of the largeness of that product is by the largenesses of these two component particles; as in this case we have neither plurality of Number nor an Aggregation. In cases however where the product is made up of many component particles, the largeness of the product is due to the largenesses of these particles, and not to the plurality of Number. In a case where made up of an equal *number* of particles, but the particles in them are minute while those in the other large,—we find a distinct difference in the Dimensions of the two things, and this would not be possible if the Dimensions were due solely to *number*; as the number of particles in both is exactly the same. But in a case where two things are made up of particles of the same Dimensions, but the number of particles in one is larger than that in the other, and hence there is a distinct difference in their dimensions,—in such cases Number must also be regarded as a cause of Dimension; otherwise the difference would be inapplicable in the case in question. In a case where the products are made up of an *equal Number* of particles, *of the same size*, the production of Largeness must be taken as due to both Number and Dimension, as each of these singly has been found to have the power of producing Largeness; and in this latter case we do not perceive any difference in the powers of the two, both being found to be equally capable of producing the largeness. This is the explanation offered by some people; others hold that Dimension alone is the cause; as long as we can find an homogeneous cause for an effect, it is not right to accept a heterogeneous cause.

Page 136.] The author next proceeds to explain *Aggregation*: '*Prachaya*' or 'Aggregation' is a peculiar kind of loose conjunction or combination, giving rise to particular products. When two lumps of cotton go to make up a single Double Lump, it is an *aggregation* that is present; it stands in need of productive conjunctions or contacts in both of the original lumps, or of the mutual intercontacts among the component particles of both those lumps; and by means of these the said *aggregation* produces the largeness in the Double Lump. In a case where the contact of the two lumps is itself loose, and

the contacts of their respective component particles are also loose, then, on the two lumps producing a product, we find a dimension greater than that of the substance that might be produced by the firm contacts of the two lumps with their component particles also in close adhesion; and in this case the cause of the largeness produced lies in the loose contact of the two lumps as depending upon the loose combination of the component particles of those lumps. In a case however where the contact of the two lumps is loose, and the mutual contacts of the component particles are also loose,—but the constituents of the lumps are not loose,—then, in that case, in the substance produced out of these two lumps, we find a largeness greater than that the substance produced by a firm contact of the two lumps which too have their component particles in close adhesion; and this leads us to conclude that in such cases the cause of the largeness lies in the loose contact of the lumps depending upon the mutual contacts of the component particles of both.

Question: "How is it that in the instances just cited you do not accept the Largeness to be due to Plurality and Largeness, which have been proved above to have the power of producing it?"

Answer: It cannot be due to any Pluralities or Largenessess. That is to say, in a case where the cognition of a particular dimension is recognised as being due to Aggregation, we cannot regard Plurality and Largeness as the cause—and the reason for this lies in the fact of there being a difference of dimensions in two things made up of equal numbers of component particles of equal dimensions and weights. If Number were the only cause, then there would be no difference between two things, both of which are made up of equal number of component particles, even though the compact of particles in one were looser than that in the other (but as a matter of fact this latter circumstance is found to make a difference), as the number in both would be exactly the same. Similarly if Largeness were the

sole cause, then there would be no difference between two things made up of equally large particles, even though these latter were more compact than those in the other. As a matter of fact however, in both these cases, we do find a difference; and from that we conclude that in such cases neither Number nor Largeness is the cause.

In certain cases we find that one thing is made up of non-aggregated minute particles, and another is made up of aggregated large particles; and the cause of the difference in the largeness or bulk of these two must be regarded as due to both Largeness and Aggregation. Then again, in a case where one thing is made of certain aggregated particles, and another is made of large number of equally large particles but non-aggregated, we find an excess of bulk in that produced out of a large number of aggregated particles; and the cause of this is Number, as well as Aggregation. In a case where one thing is made up of a lesser number of non-aggregated minute particles, and the other of a large number of aggregated bulky particles, the difference in bulk must be attributed to all the three causes—Number, Largeness and Aggregation.

Page 137] Some people think that in the case of substances capable of being weighed by means of a balance, the production of the bulk in the product is due to the weight-measures inhering in the cause, and not to the Large Dimension. And it is in view of this theory that the author has denied the causal potency of this 'weight-measure', in the case of aggregated products. Properly speaking, in accordance with the author's view, no such causal potency ever belongs to weight measures.

It is the number 'Duality' inhering in the two atoms that produces 'minuteness' in the Diad. Some people hold that the Dimension of the Diad is produced by the Dimensions of the component atoms. But if such were the case then the Diad too would be as 'minute' or 'atomic' as the atom itself,—an argument we had brought forward before and which we repeat in the present connection. There is yet another reason, based upon the fact of the unproductive character of the Dimension of an eternal

substance. That is to say, the Dimension of the atom cannot be productive of anything,—because it is the dimension of an eternal substance, like the dimension of Ākāça,—or, because it is a minute dimension, like the dimension of Mind.

The author proves the production of *Length—Mahattvavat. i. e.* Just as Largeness or Bulk is produced by the plurality of component particles, from the homogeneous bulk of the cause, and by Aggregation,—so also is Length, which in all these points is similar to Bulk.

Aṇutvavat &c. That is to say, the *shortness* of the Diad also has got the number 'Duality' for its non-material cause.

Question : "How is it that from a single cause there come about diverse effects?"

Answer : It is due to the difference in the unseen potencies which are auxilliary to all causal operations.

An objection is raised, based upon the conception that *Length* is only a particular kind of Bulk or *Largeness*, and so too is *shortness* a mere form of *Minuteness.*

The reply given to this is—*Tatrāsti* &c. If there were no difference between *Length* and *Largeness*, then we could have no such specification with regard to a 'long' thing, as that 'being a *large* long thing;' as we do not specify a coloured substance as 'coloured'. As a matter of fact however, we do have such specification with regard to *long* things; and hence the two cannot but be regarded as distinct.

Objection : "The dimension of a substance pervades all over it; and hence it would not be possible for one and the same substance to have two dimensions (*largeness* and *length*)."

Reply : There is no incongruity in such existence of two unlike dimensions.

Objection : "But even though the sub-class 'blue' differs from the sub-class 'yellow,' yet we do not find these two inhering in the same substance."

Reply : Those qualities whose co-existence we have never seen, may be regarded as never co-existing; but in the case of '*Largeness*' and '*Length*' all men are conscious of their co-existence, which, for this very reason cannot be denied.

Then as for the Minuteness and Shortness of diads, these are directly perceptible to the *yogis.* In the case of our own perceptions, we are able to perceive the difference between what we indirectly or secondarily speak of as 'Minute' and 'Short'; and from this we conclude that these must differ in the primary usage also.

All these four kinds of Dimension are destroyed only by the destruction of their substratum, and by nothing else. The word '*utpādya*' 'producible' in the text is meant to exclude the minutest atom, the extreme short, the extreme long, and the extreme large.

Objection : "As a matter of fact, Minuteness and Largeness, and Length and Shortness, are brought about relatively to each other (*i.e.* they are only relative qualities); and they have no absolute reality."

Reply : As a matter of fact we find that the Dimension of an object is measured by various such measures as the *cubit* and the like, even when taken by itself, and also when taken in comparison with the dimension of another object; and we do not perceive any difference in the two cases; and if it were only relative, there could be no idea of Dimension in the previous case. Then the use of comparison lies in this that, when two dimensions are cognised on the cognition of their substrate, then alone can it be ascertained whether one is greater or less than the other, which could not be done until the two were brought together and compared.

Page 138] *Text (87). Isolation is the basis of all notions of separateness. It inheres in one as well as in many substances. Its eternal and non-eternal manifestations are in the same way as those of Number; the only difference lies in this: that of*

Isolation, there are no such subdivisions as 'Individual Isolation' and the like, as there is in the case of 'unity' &c. (of number); but Isolation is always qualified by number; as we often come across notions of Isolation qualified by number. (vii-ii-2).

Commentary.

Isolation or separateness is the cause or basis of all such idea and expression as 'this is separate from that.' It cannot be rightly urged that this usage based upon mutual negation only —Because that which is of the nature of pure negation cannot form the subject of affirmation as well as denial.

This Isolation pertains to one as well as to many substances. The word *'punah'* implies that Isolation, which belongs to one as well as many substances, is distinct from *parimāṇa* which exists in one substance only. That is to say, while Parimāṇa, (Dimension) belongs to a single substance, single Isolation belongs to one as well as to many substances.

The eternality, non-eternality and production of this should be taken to be the same as those with regard to Number. That is to say, the number 'one' is eternal when belonging to atoms, and transient or non-eternal when in products, in which case it is brought about by a cause, and is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum; and similar is the case with single Isolation belonging to a single substance; and in the same manner, just as the numbers 'two' &c. belonging to many substances are produced by the *apēkshābuddhi* based upon many qualities, on the destruction whereof again they also are destroyed, as also on the destruction of their substrata,—so also the dual Isolation &c. inhering in many substances &c.

The affix *'tva'* in *'nityānityatva'* is to be taken along with both *'nitya'* and *'anitya'*, as it appears at the end of the *Dvandva* compound. In this sentence also the particle *'tu'* is meant to indicate a distinction or peculiarity,—the sense being that it is the eternality &c. of this Isolation, and not those of *Parimāṇa*, that is to be taken as analogous to those of Number.

Having thus pointed out the similarity of Isolation with Number, the author proceeds to show the points of difference between these two.—*Etāvān &c.* Isolation differs from number in the following point. In the case of Number we have the sub-classes 'one', 'two', &c. under the one general class of 'number'; but in the case of Isolation we have no such sub-class as 'single Isolation' under the general class of 'Isolation'.

Question: "How is it then, that there are intermediate class-notions with regard to the 'single Isolations' belonging to many substances?"

Answer: 'This one is separate' 'these two are separate',—in all these cases when separateness or Isolation is spoken of, it is always spoken of as qualified by Number. The Isolation inhering in a single substance is qualified by the number 'one'; and it is a peculiar form of this number which appears to be spoken of as a 'sub-class'; and as for the comprehensive notion of 'Isolation', it is due to the class or generality of 'Isolation', and not to any sub-classes of it.

In the same manner we should also deny any such generality or class as *'atom'*, inhering in all atoms; as also universal usage may be explained as based upon the generality 'aṇu' as qualified by the epithet *'parama'*.

Question: "Why do you not admit that a single Isolation exists in all substances, and that the diversity of notions is due to the qualifying number, 'one', 'two' &c.?"

Answer: We do not admit this for the simple reason that in the case of substances produced one after the other, we do not perceive any inherence of qualities, as we do that of the Generalities. Nor could it be a Generality or Class itself; as until ideas of other substances are present, there is no notion of Isolation, just as there is none of any Generality.

Text (88). Conjunction forms the basis of the idea of two things being 'joined together.' It is the cause of Substances, Qualities and Actions. In the pro-

ducing of Substances, it functions independently; as is declared in the Sūtra.—'Sāpēkshēbhyo nirapekshēbhyaçcha'. *In the producing of Qualities and Actions however it is dependent upon other things; as declared in the* sūtra—'Samyuktasamavāyāt agnērvaiçeshikam' (X—ii—5 to 7; I—i—27, 29, V—i—1 to 6, 10, 14, 17, V—ii—1, 5, 6, 8, 15).

Question: *What is the nature of Conjunction, and how many kinds of it are there?*

Answer: *Conjunction consists in the coming together of two things that were lying apart from one another. It is of three kinds:* (1) *Brought about by the action of one of the two things coming together;* (2) *brought about by the action of both, and* (3) *brought about by another Conjunction. That of the first kind is possible only in the case of an active object coming in contact with an inactive one;* f. i. *the contact of the pole with the kite alighting upon it; and that of material objects with the omnipresent substances. As an instance of Conjunction of the second kind we have the collision of two things moving in opposite directions and with contrary actions*—f. i. *the coming together of two wrestlers, or of two fighting rams. Conjunction of the third kind we find in the case of an object that has just been produced, or that which has been in existence for a long time, coming in contact with its immaterial causes, which latter are in contact with the material cause,—this Conjunction being that of the effect with the cause, preceded (and brought about) by the Conjunction of the material and immaterial causes. This Conjunction proceeds from one or two or many Conjunctions. As an instance of one born of one Conjunction, we have the Conjunction of the double thread with the*

vīraṇa, *brought about by that of the single thread with the* vīraṇa. *The Conjunction born of two Conjunctions is that of the double thread with* Ākāça, *produced by the two Conjunctions of the threads with the* Ākāça. *As the Conjunction born of many Conjunctions is that of the cloth with the* Turī, *produced by the Conjunctions of the several threads with the* Turī. *A single Conjunction also, in certain cases, gives rise to two Conjunctions;* e. g. *when there is a contact of the atom of earth with that of water, and there comes about a contact of that earth-atom with another earth-atom, and also of that water-atom with another water-atom, then these two Conjunctions simultaneously bring about two diads—one of earth and another of water; and then, at the time that there appear, in the two diads, their respective Colour &c., in accordance with those residing in their cause, there appear, simultaneously, the two Conjunctions inhering in the cause and effect, from out of the mutual Conjunction of their material and immaterial causes.* (VII—ii—9.)

Question: *"What is the reason for all this?"*

Answer: *Even with that which is not a cause, if it happen to be in contact with the cause, the effect becomes connected,—such is the law; And it is for this reason that the Earth-Diad becomes connected with the Aqueous Diad in contact with the cause of the former,—and so also does the Aqueous diad become connected with the Earth-diad.*

Question: *"The two diads being connected with the each other's cause and non-cause, how do they come to be related to each other?"*

Answer: *Their relationship is due to the Contacts produced by Contacts. There is no Contact or Con-*

junction that is not born of a cause; as no such eternal unborn thing as Conjunction has been separately postulated, like the parimandala. *That is to say, having spoken of the four kinds of Dimension as 'produced', the author has added—'the* parimandala *is eternal'; and so if he had meant the same in regard to Conjunction, he must have spoken of as 'produced by the action of one or other of the things in contact'; and then he should have mentioned the 'eternal' Conjunction separately. This however he has not done; and hence we conclude that there is no unborn, eternal, Conjunction.*

The Conjunction of atoms with Ākāça *&c. exists only in one portion of those latter, and is brought about by the action of one or the other.*

There is no mutual Conjunction among all-pervading things themselves; as they have no separate existence (apart from one another). 'Separate existence' consists in one or both members having separate motion or distinct receptacle.

The destruction of all conjunction is brought about by Disjunction inhering in one of the members: and sometimes also by the destruction of the substratum.

Question: *"How?"*

Answer: *When two threads are in contact with each other, if a certain action appear in any one part of either thread, this action disjoins that part from the other part of the thread; this disjunction destroys the contact (of the thread particles) that went to make up the thread; the destruction of this Conjunction destroys the thread; and the destruction of the thread brings about the destruction of the contact of the two threads, which inhered in the thread destroyed.*

Commentary.

The author proceeds to prove the existence of Conjunction—*Samyogah* &c. Ordinary men have such a notion as 'this is joined to that'; this notion cannot be based upon any such quality as Colour and the like; as the notions of these latter are wholly different from the one in question; hence that which is the basis of this notion cannot be any thing else but Conjunction.

Objection: "The notion may be due to absence of intervening space between the two objects concerned."

Reply:—What do you mean by this 'absence of intervening space'? Do you mean *close contact*, or the *absence of any separateness*? If the former, then what you say is nothing different from our view; as it is only this *close contact* which we call 'Conjunction.' If the latter, then you should explain what else besides Conjunction is there that could eliminate the separateness of two separate things.

Objection: "That which for you is the cause the Conjunction of non-conjunct substances, will, for us, be the cause of the absence of the separateness of separate substances."

Reply: It may be as you wish; but this 'cause' of yours—does it transport its substratum to another place, and then eliminates the separateness, or does it do this without transporting the substratum? In the latter case, *the absence of separateness* would be hardly obtainable; as the object would be stationery in its former position (and as such the separateness would remain constant). If however the substratum be held to be transported to another position, then what besides that very cause, is Conjunction, that you seek to deny?

Page 142.] *Objection*: "We talk of *Conjunction* only in a case where a substance is produced in a place not separate from another substance."

Reply: It is not the mere production of an object that we speak of as 'Conjunction'; but the word is applied to the close contact or nonseparate existence of two such substances as have been produced.

This conjunction is the cause of Substances, Qualities and Action. For instance, the contact of threads is the cause of the Cloth, a *substance*; the contact of the Soul and the Mind is the cause of Buddhi and other such *qualities*; similarly the contact of the drum and *Ākāśa* is the cause of Sound, a *quality*; the contact of the hand and the exerting Soul is the cause of *Actions*; and the contact of Air with velocity is the cause of the *action* (motion) of the tuft of grass; and so forth.

The author next proceeds to show in what manner Conjunction produces Substances, and Qualities and Actions—*Dravyārambhē &c.* What is meant by its 'functioning independently' is that, in the producing of substances, Conjunction does not stand in need of anything else save its own substratum, and efficient cause; and it does not mean that it does not stand in need of a subsequently appearing cause; as if it were so, then we would have no* possibility of the independent (without any other cause) operation towards the production of properties born of 'cooking' (baking), of the final *contact* of the fire and the atom, appearing after the destruction of the dark colour of the (unbaked jar).

Question: "How do you know that in the producing of substances, Conjunction functions independently?"

Reply: *Tathā bhavati &c.* In the *Sutra* we have the words '*Tathābhavatīti sāpekshēbhyo nirapēkshēbhyaçcha*'—occurring after the author has explained that we have an idea that the Cloth *will be produced* from out of the threads which will be aided in their operation towards the accomplishment of the cloth. The sense of this is that, just as we have the notion

* The reading noted in the foot-note is decidedly preferable; that given in the text gives no sense.

that the Cloth *will be produced* out of the threads as aided, so also have we the notion that *it is produced* out of threads that are dependent and independent. If this were not the sense of the *Sūtra* the present tense used would not be possible; that is to say, when some of the threads would be in contact, and others would be still far apart, then we would have the notion the 'cloth is produced' (which is an absurdity). The sense of all this is that, in the *Sūtra* in question, the threads are spoken of as the cause of the notion with regard to the *present* (in connection with the production of the Cloth); and the word 'independent' is used with regard to such threads as are in mutual contact; which shows that in the production of substances, *Conjunction* is independent of all else; but in the production of Qualities it is dependent upon other aids—this difference between the two processes is indicated by the particle '*tu*.'

Question: "How do you make this out"?

Answer: *Samyuktasamavāyāt*—The words '*Agnērvaiśeshikam*' (in the *Sūtra*) refers to the heat of fire; and when this inheres in the fire that is in contact with the atom of earth, it becomes the cause of the production of Colour &c.; and this declaration in the *Sūtra* therefore may be taken as showing that, in the production of the Qualities (of Colour &c.) the contact of the fire and the Atom stands in need of the *heat* of fire. For if it were not so, then the *touch* of fire could not be spoken of as a cause of the production of Colour, which is found to be produced by the *Conjunction* of fire. In the production of *Buddhī*, the Conjunction of the Soul and the Mind requires the aid of *Dharma* &c., even though these latter are totally different from its substratum and its efficient cause. Similarly too, as a case of the production of Action, we find the action of the tuft of grass produced by the Conjunction (of wind).

Page 143.] *Objection*: "As a matter of fact, we find that the

sprout is produced after the destruction of the seed, and the jar is produced after the destruction of the lump of clay; and from this we infer that substances are produced out of Negations, and not out of Conjunctions."

Reply: This is not right; as substances are distinctly found to be produced out of particular Conjunctions and combinations of the particles that enter into their constitution. And as Negation would be equally applicable to all things there could be no restriction upon the production of particular things only at definite times.

A discussion is here started as to whether it is only a previously existing entity that is produced by causes, or it is something that did not exist before, which is produced.

The Sankhyas hold the following view (*Sānkhya-Kārikā* 9):—"It is a previously existing thing that is produced by causes. "(1) *Because of the non-production of the non-existent*; That "is to say, that which does not exist, for instance the 'sky-"flower,' cannot be brought into existence by any means; on the "other hand, it is quite natural that that which is already an "entity should be brought into existence; as 'existence' cons-"titutes its very nature. In ordinary experience we find that "when the seasamum seed is pressed, what is produced is the "oil that already existed in the seeds. We have no instance "of a nonentity being produced.

"(2) *Because of the causes.* That is to say we find definite "causes taken up by, and related to, definite effects; and this "shows that the effects are entities; as otherwise they could not "have any such fixed relationship. Nor can it be rightly held "that it is an unconnected effect that is brought by an unrelated cause. As *it is not possible for all this to be produced.* That "is to say, *absence of relation* would pertain to all effects "and causes equally, and hence all effects would come out of

"all causes; as a matter of fact however, this is not the case; "hence it must be admitted that prior to its production the effect "existed and bore a definite relationship to its cause. This "is what has been declared in the following verse: 'Causes "connected with entities have no connection with non-entities; "one who would hold the production of unrelated effects would "have no resting ground.'

"(3) Then again, does causal afficiency belong to that "which has the necessary potency? or to that which is devoid of "this potency? If the latter, then you have the same absurdity "as before (anything being produced of any cause). If the "former, then, does this potency pertain to all things or only "to certain things? If everywhere, then the same absurd con-"tingency arises. If only in certain things, then it will have "to be explained how, in the absence of the effects, the potency "of the cause could be restricted to these? As a nonentity can "not be the object of anything. Hence on account of the "efficient cause bringing about that for which it is potent, it "must be admitted that this latter had prior existence.

"(4) *Because of the identity of the effect with the cause.* "That is to say, the effect is found to be of the same nature "as the cause. Because the whole is nothing apart from its "parts,—as it is found to occupy the same space as these parts; "and different things we find always occupying different places "or having different extensions; and it has been proved that a "thing that occupies the same space as another is nondifferent "from this latter. And as the cause has been proved to be "an entity, the effect cannot but be the same.

"These arguments have been summed in the *Sánkhya-Kārikā*—9. '*Asadakaraṇāt*' &c."

To the above we make the following reply: If even before the operation of the cause, the Cloth already exists in the threads, then how is it that we do not see it, even when we seek for it, and our organs of vision are all right? It might be said that

we donot see it because of its not having become manifested. But, what is this 'non-manifestation'? If by this you mean merely 'want of perception,' then it is this very want of perception that we have put forward as inexplicable in accordance with your theory; and hence that same fact cannot be accepted as a right explanation of itself. If however by 'non-manifestation' be meant 'the absence of such form as would be perceptible and capable of effective action,' then this would amount to an acceptance of the non-existence of the Effect (prior to causal operation); as what this means is that something, in the shape of that form, which did not exist before, is brought into existence by the operation of the cause.

Page 144.] *Objection*: "For the perception of the Cloth, we need the aid of such accessories as the action of the weaver, and the like, just as much as that of the organs of perception; and hence as long as these have not functioned, the Cloth, even though extant, is not perceived."

Reply: This can not be; because the action of its causes would always be possible (and hence the Cloth should be always perceptible).

Objection: "Yes; but even this action of the causes which remains unmanifested at first, comes to be manifested by means of causes; and then alone does it serve to render the cloth perceptible."

Reply: If this 'manifestation' of the cause were non-existent before, then (according to you) how could it be brought about by any causes? And if it were existent, then the thing would also be always perceptible. Hence the perception of something not perceptible before could not be possible, until some peculiarity, that did not exist there before, were produced in it.

Then, it has been argued above that, that which does not exist cannot be produced by any causes,—e. g. 'sky-flowers.'

But this is not right; as there is no analogy between the two cases. That is to say, 'sky-flowers' are of the nature of non-entity pure and simple, while the things in question, jar and the like, are such as have the dual character of entities and non-entities; as prior to the operation of their causes they remain non-entities, and when the causes operate duly, they become entities.

Question: "How could these two contrary characters of 'entity' and 'non-entity' cohere in the same thing?"

Answer: The coherence becomes quite explicable, when the two are taken as existing at different times.

Question: "As prior to its production, the object Cloth would (according to you) be non-existent, how could 'non-existence,' a property, be postulated to it when it does not exist?"

Answer: 'As the demon, so its offering'—i. e. our answer will be of the same nature as your objection, exactly in keeping with your way of arguing:—it is only 'existence' that could not belong a non-entity; as for 'non-existence' it is only proper that it should belong to a non-entity.

Question: "If the thing were non-existent before, then how does it come to have *existence*?"

Answer: By the force of the operations of the Causes. There is a peculiar power in the shuttle &c. on account of which, whenever they come together and function in unison, there appears some thing that did not exist before—viz., the cloth.

Objection: "If something not existing before, and hence not in any way connected with the causes, were to be produced by these, then there would be a great disorder confusion (any causes giving rise to any effects)."

Reply: This could not be; as the cause in the form of the (thread) has its efficiency restricted to the effect in the form of 'Cloth' alone.

Question "How can that be?"

Answer: How would that be, in accordance with your theory also?

Objection: "Well, in accordance with our theory, it is the threads alone, and nothing else, that have the nature of, and are nondifferent from, the Cloth,—such being the nature of things."

Reply: The same might be said in our case also. In fact it is for this reason that there is a limitation or restriction as to the natural causes of definite things;—the potency of one class of things towards a certain definite class of things being ascertained by means of invariable concomitance, both positive and negative.

Then again, it has been argued above that, the effect being nondifferent from the cause, the existence of the cause would mean the existence of the effect also. But this is far from proved; and it is sought to be proved by a fact that itself has not been duly established. As it is a patent fact that the effect differs from the cause, in point of form, potency and position. Then too, if the effect were in every way nondifferent from the cause, then the whole world, which is held by the Sánkhya to be a product of Primordial Matter, would be imperceptible, as Primordial Matter is held to be so.

Then, as for the fact of the effect occupying the same extension in space as the cause, this idea is merely due to the fact of the effect resting in, having its receptacle in, the cause. This will be enough, and we need not press the "old people" (the Sánkhyas) any further.

We now proceed to consider—what is 'Potency,' Śakti?' Some good people have declared that it is something supersensuous, imperceptible by the senses. But that is not right; as there can be no evidence for the existence of any such supersensuous Potency.

Objection: "We find fire under certain conditions producing the effect of burning; and at another time we find "that the same fire under the same conditions does not produce "any such effect, when brought into close touch with certain "incantations or medicinal herbs; and if the visible form of "the fire were the cause of the burning, then as the visible form "of fire remains the same in the latter case also, there could "not be an absence of burning. As a matter of fact however "we do find this absent; and this clearly shows that there is "some sort of incapacity in the invisible form of the fire; and "thereby proves the fact of potency itself being something "quite imperceptible, a potency the suppression or destruction "whereof is brought about by the incantation &c. In cases "where counter-remedies are found to revive the potency "there has been a mere suppression, whereas when there is an "absolute absence of the necessary effect, there is destruction of the potency.

[Page 145.] "*Objection*: 'The incantation is neither in contact "with, nor inherent in the fire; and as such how could it destroy "the potency that existed in a wholly different substratum from "itself? If it does destroy such things, then it would destroy "anything and everything.'

"*Reply*: But the fact is that the incantation is aimed "at the potency of the fire. Just as the 'murderous rites,' "even though having no material connection with any person, "kill only that person against whom they are aimed, and no "other person,—so, in the same manner, the incantation would "destroy the potency only of that individual fire against which "it would be aimed, and not of all fires.

"*Objection*: 'If Potency is of the nature of Substance, "then it could be destroyed only by the destruction, either of "its material or of its immaterial cause; and if it be held "to be of the nature of Qualities, then it could be destroyed

"either by the destruction of its substratum, or by the produc-
"tion of another Quality of a contrary nature.'

"*Reply:* We do not admit of these conventional laws of
"yours. Whenever we find the destruction of one thing
"following from something else, we always regard this latter
"to be the cause of that destruction; and we do not accept
"any such hard and fast rules as you speak of; as all such
"rules are condemned by facts of direct perception. Even if
"it be absolutely necessary to accept your laws, we might accept
"them as applicable only to the destruction of those Substances
"and Qualities wherein they are found to be operative. Potency
"however is something like Similarity, wholly different from
"Substance, Quality and the other categories; and as such it
"could be open to other modes of destruction also.

"*Objection*: 'The potency of fire is inferred from the pro-
"duction or non-production of its effects; but how is it that you
"assume its existence in all things?'

"*Reply:* Having in one case, that of fire, assumed its
"existence on the strength of its effects, we infer, from similar
"circumstances, its existence in other things, whenever we find
"these latter also producing definite effects."

To the above we make the following reply:—The absence of the proper effects (of fire), in the presence of incantations &c, does not indicate any invisible form. Because, just as of *burning* we regard fire to be the cause,—inasmuch as it has its power of burning fully known by positive as well as negative concomitance,—so in the same manner is also the *prior non-existence of obstacles in the shape of incantation &c.* accepted as the cause (of burning); and when this 'non-existence' would be set aside by the reciting of the incantation, it is only natural that there should be no burning, for the simple reason that the necessary accessory circumstances in the shape of the non-existence of obstacles would not be present,—and the absence of

burning thus would not be due to the absence of due '*potency*' in the fire.

Objection: "A positive effect is always found to proceed from a positive cause,—and as such no positive effect (like *burning*) could have a negative cause (in the shape of the *non-existence* of obstacles')."

Reply: Not so; because we find sin (a positive thing) being produced by the *non-performance* of the necessary religious duties; if it were not so, then the laying down of expiatory rites for such omissions would be absolutely useless and superfluous.

Objection: "The sin, involved in the non-performance of necessary duties, is produced by the *performance* of some other acts (at the time for which the necessary duties are laid down),—and it is not due to the mere non-existence, or absence, of the performance of those duties."

Reply: The non-performance of the necessary duties must be regarded at least as an aid in the producing of the sin,—specially as Sin is always found to appear when there is such a *non-performance*.

Objection: "In regard to the case of the burning by fire when there are counter-incantations, you have said that when the obstacle (to burning) in the form of the incantation is put forth, the absence of this obstacle ceases, and hence there is burning. But in that case, when the obstacle would be set aside after having been brought in once, then too there could be no *burning*; as there would be no *prior* non-existence of the obstacle (which will have disappeared after having come in); and it is such non-existence that you hold to be the cause of the burning. As a matter of fact however, we find that when obstacles to burning are set aside by means of counter-incantations, *burning* does appear. And hence we conclude that no negative entity can be the cause; and it is only positive Potency

that could be accepted as the cause; and even in a case where after the burning has been stopped by one incantation, and revived again by means of another incantation, we can safely assume that the former incantation held the potency in check, and the latter let it lose and made it operative again."

Reply: This is not admissible; because so long as a visible explanation is available, we cannot rightly have recourse to any invisible factors. As causes of certain effects (put forward above) we may have certain circumstantial accessories aided sometimes by the absence of preventive incantations, at other times by the presence of favouring incantations; and what objection have you got to this explanation that you seek to assume the existence of invisible substances? As a matter of fact we often find that a single effect has got various kinds of circumstantial accessories for its cause. For instance, Fire is produced out of the rubbing together of two sticks as well as from the solar gem. This is the secret of the Logican's theory. The secret of the Mímánsá theory I have explained in the *Tattvaprabodha*.

[Page 146.] *Question*: "We have understood that Conjunction is the basis of the notion of two things being *joind together*; but what is the form of this Conjunction? and what are its varieties? In the text we have the expression '*kathamlakshaṇah*'; and here '*katham*'=*kim*, 'what;' as in the expression '*ko dharmah kathaṁlakshaṇakah*' *(Sābara-Bhāshya)*; and '*lakshaṇa*' is '*Svarūpa*,' 'form.'"

The author gives the answer to this question; and in doing this, he supplies the definition of Conjunction: *Conjunction is the coming together of two things that were apart from each other.* The qualification 'apart from each other' is added with a view to distinguish Conjunction from Inherence.

The author next proceeds to point out the different kinds of Conjunction: *It is of three kinds only.* (1) *Anyatarakarmaja*—the conjunction brought about by the action of one of the two substances in contact; (2) *Ubhayakarmaja*—that brought about by the action of both substances, and (3) *Sanyogaja*—that due to another Conjunction. To the former kind belongs the conjunction of an active or mobile,—substance with another substance which is inactive or immobile,—e. g. the conjunction of the fixed post with the flying kite alighting upon it; and also that of all-pervading substances with corporeal substances,—the all-pervading substances being immobile and inactive, and the corporeal substances being mobile and of limited extension.

Objection: "In the case of two things or persons, both of which are moving, though with different degrees of speed,—we find them coming in contact with each other; and in this case the Conjunction is surely due to the action of any one of the two things; why then should the first kind of Conjunction be specified as that between an *active* and an *inactive* substance?"

Reply: True; but what is meant by 'inactive' is only that one of the two substances is devoid of the action that tends to bring about the Conjunction (and not that it has no action at all).

Some people say that in the case of the Conjunction of the kite with the post, there is first, the Conjunction of the atoms of the kite's feet with the head of the post; and then that of the whole substance *kite* with the whole substance *post*; and here the former Conjunction of the parts is 'due to action' *Karmaja*, and the latter Conjunction of the two *wholes* is 'born of Conjunction,' *Sanyogaja*.

But this is not admissible; specially as the Conjunction is between one active *whole* with another *whole*. If this be not accepted, then, inasmuch as the parts also would be *whole* in comparison with their own constituent parts, the Conjunction 'born of action' among *wholes* would become altogether im-

possible. And then it would become necessary to deny the activity of all *wholes*; or to set aside the definition of *Action*, as 'the independent cause Conjunction and Disjunction,'—at-least in so far as the action of wholes is concerned. How many of such pitfalls shall I point out in the way of those people who renounce the paths of reasoning and the teachings of great masters!

[Page 147.] As an instance of the Conjunction of the second kind we have the collision of two things moving in opposite directions. By 'opposite directions are meant those directions, by moving towards which two things come finally to obstruct each other,—e. g. North and South, East and West. The compound '*Viruddhadikkriyayoh*' is to be taken as '*Karmadhāraya*' in the first instance—'*Viruddhē diçāu*' 'opposite directions,'—and then as *Bahuvrīhi*—'*Viruddhadiçoh kriyā yayordravyayoh*' 'of the two substance whose actions are towards opposite directions.' The collision of two substances—e. g., that between two wrestlers or two fighting rams—is cited as an instance of '*ubhayakarmaja*' Conjunction, because it is due to the action of both the things concerned.

The third kind of Conjunction—the '*Sanyogaja*' kind,—is produced by one, two or many Conjunctions. As an example of Conjunction produced by a single Conjunction, we have the *Conjunction of the shuttle with the duplicate-thread*, brought about by the Conjunction of the same shuttle with one of the threads. In this case we find that from the previous single Conjunction of the shuttle and the one thread, there proceeds the Conjunction of the thread-duplicate, with that same shuttle, which is in contact with the single thread that forms the material cause of that 'duplicate,'—which in its turn, is without any action of its own, and is the product of that thread which being in contact with the shuttle is conjoined to the other thread. This kind of Conjunction is also called 'one brought about by the contact of the cause with the non-cause,'—the

thread being the 'cause,' and the shuttle the 'non-cause,' of the 'thread-duplicate', and the Conjunction of the shuttle with this 'duplicate,' inhering in both of these.

Of this Conjunction we accept the previous Conjunction to be the cause, as we cannot lay our hands upon any other cause; and as such this declaration is based upon the law of '*Pariçesha*,' and the '*pratyāsatti*,' or 'proximity' in this case, will be in the form of the co-inherence of the cause in the same substance as its effect,'—in as much as the cause, the contact of the shuttle with the single thread, would inhere in the shuttle, wherein would also inhere the effect viz: the contact of the shuttle with the 'thread-duplicate.'

Objection: "If one Conjunction were to produce another Conjunction, then this would be something opposed to the *Sūtra* '*guṇāçcha guṇāntaram ārabhante*,' wherein it is said that '*Qualities*' (in the Plural) produce another *Quality*."

Reply: Not so; the objector apparently does not understand the sense of the *Sutra* referred to; as what the *Sutra* means is that even Qualities have the causal efficiency of producing a quality; and it does not mean that it is only *many* Qualities,—and not one or two of them—that can produce another quality. Some people hold that the *sutra* does specify more than two Qualities as being productive of a quality, and that this specification is with reference to those Qualities that belong to the cause—and produce, in the effect, qualities homogeneous to themselves, and it does not refer to all qualities; (and that as such there is no contradiction of this *Sutra* by the assertion that one Conjunction produces another Conjunction). Such explanations can suit only exceptionally clever people who can invent unheard of explanations; it can never satisfy us.

As an instance of Conjunction produced by two Conjunctions we have that of the 'thread-duplicate' with *Ākāça*, brought about by the contact of each of the two threads with *Ākāça*.

As soon as the 'thread-duplicate' is produced there immediately comes about a contact of this with *Ākāça*,—because *Ākāça* is in contact with the causes (the single threads) of this 'duplicate,' like the shuttle in contact with the material causes of the 'thread-duplicate.' There is no other cause for this contact, save the contact of the *Ākáça* with the two single threads that go to make up the duplicate; and hence the contact of the duplicate with *Ākáça* cannot but be regarded as produced by this contact of the *Ákáça* with the constituent threads.

[Page 148.] As an example of Conjunction produced by many Conjunctions we have the *contact of the Cloth with the Brush*, which proceeds from the many contacts of the Brush with the many threads that make up the Cloth.

The threads are productive of the Cloth through many intervening wholes—that is to say, some threads combine to make up a certain substance, which forms an intervening link between the threads and the fully prepared piece of cloth. In regard to corporeal substances, there is no chance of any such anomaly as that of two wholes occupying the same point in space; as we do not admit of any whole inhering over exactly the same number of constituent parts as another whole; for instance the Thread Duplicate—which is a whole made up of two threads, inheres in two threads, while the Thread Duplicate inheres in these two threads and also in a third; how then could these two occupy the same point in space? It is for this very reason that when a large piece of cloth has been torn, we have notions of several piece-wholes of varying dimensions; and when these are destroyed, then, if we were to begin to make a cloth out of the same threads, it would be a well nigh impossible task.

Objection: "If such were the case, then the constituent particles of the child's body, accompanied by the particles of food eaten, would produce quite a new body, even while the previous body has not been destroyed."

Reply: Yes, they might so produce it; if all the previous bodies were perceptible while the old body existed, or even when it is destroyed,—as we find in the case of the pieces of cloth which are quite perceptible while the entire piece exists, as well as when it is torn to pieces. If however, the previous bodies be not thus perceptible, then the same process could not rightly be applied to their case; as we apply processes only in accordance with the facts as we actually perceive them in ordinary experience.

This same reason meets the assertion that, 'in accordance with the theory of the production of the producible, there would be no perception or comprehension of the universe in the atomic state';—as we have shown in the section on 'Earth,' that atoms have the nature of producing such perceptible things as the Triad and the like. Or even if the atoms were to produce the Diads, and then along with these Diads the Triads, and along with the Triads, other substances,—then too, how could there be any imperceptibility in the universe? As in any case, there would be present such conditions of perceptibility as *largeness, multiplicity of constituent molecules, the presence of particular colours*, and so forth. If even when these would be present, the Universe were imperceptible by the senses, on account of its having an imperceptible and supersensous substratum in the shape of the atom, then, in that case, in accordance with your theory also, the Triads made up of Diads (which are imperceptible) would be imperceptible, and thence the whole universe also, made up of these Triads, would become imperceptible. Hence the objection cannot apply to the case in question. And as for the Triads not being made up directly of atoms themselves, we can only refer to the arguments we have put forward in the section on 'Earth.'

A question is here put by the ignorant: "How can *two* Conjunctions proceed from a *single* Conjunction."

In reply to this the author says—*Yadā* &c., when there is a conjunction of two atoms of Earth and Water, there comes

about simultaneously a conjunction of this Earth-atom with another Earth-atom, and that of this water-atom with another water-atom; and from these two Conjunctions there result simultaneously the two diads of Earth and Water; as the Conjunction of two homogeneous things always rusults in a third substance. And at the same time that there are produced, in the Earth and Water diads, the Colour &c., in accordance with the Colour &c. of these respective causes,—at that very time, there are produced, out of the conjunctions of material cause and non-causes, conjunctions of the effects of each of those two. The 'two' meant here are the Earth and Water Diads; and the 'material cause and non-causes' of these are the Earth and Water atoms in contact with each other.—the Earth-atoms being the cause of the Earth-Diad, and the non-cause of the Water-diad; and similarly the Water-atoms being the cause of the Water-diad, and the non-cause of the Earth-Diad; and from the Conjunction of these 'two,' there results the conjunction of the Earth-Diad,—which is the effect of the Earth-atom—with the Water-diad which is the non-effect of the Earth-atom; and similarly also the conjunction of the Water-Diad, which is the effect of the Water-atom, with the Earth-diad, which is not an effect of the Water-atom; and thus from a single Conjuction we have two Conjunctions.

[**Page 149**.] *Question:* "What are your proofs for accepting the Conjunction of two heterogeneous atoms, in the Earth and Water Diads?"

The author says in answer: *Kāraṇasanyoginā &c.* That is to say the Earth-atom becomes related to the Water-diad,—because it is in contact with its cause,—like the Cloth in contact with the Brush (through its cause, the Threads). The same argument may be applied to the case of the Water-atom also. In as much as the effect is always in contact with whatever may be in contact with its material cause,—the Earth-diad becomes conjoined with the Water-atom which is in contact with the Earth-atom constituting that Earth-diad; and similarly

the Water-diad becomes conjoined with the Earth-atom which is in contact with the Water-atom constituting that Water-diad.

Question: "How can there be any connection between the Earth and the Water Diads, which may be in contact with the cause and non-cause of each other? That is to say, how can there be any connection between the Earth diads [which may be connected with the Water-atom which is the cause of the Water diad and the non-cause of the Earth diad] and the Water diad [which may be connected with the Earth-atom which is the cause of the Earth diad, and the non-cause of the Water diad]?

In answer, the author says: *Tayorapi &c.* That is to say, between the Earth-diad and the Water-atom, and also between the Water-diad and the Earth-atom, there is the '*Sanyogaja*' Conjunction (i. e. Conjunction produced by Conjunction); and from these two Conjunctions of the Earth and Water-atoms follows the mutual Conjunction between the two Diads. In this case too we have the same law as before—viz., that the effect is in contact with something which, though not its cause, is in Conjunction with its cause.

Objection: "It is not right to say that Conjunction is of three kinds only; because there is a possibility of a Conjunction that may be eternal (and this would not be included in any one of the three kinds enumerated above)."

With a view to deny this, the author adds that there is no Conjunction that is not *produced*; and this fact we deduce from the fact of the omniscient sage, in course of describing all things in the universe, not having mentioned any such eternal Conjunction, as he did with regard to the "atomic" dimension. On this we can safely assert that an unproduced (eternal) Conjunction is as great an impossibility as the 'sky-flower.' To explain this further: what we mean is that *Conjunction is never unproduced*, and not that *there is no unproduced Conjunction:* as the latter form of the proposition would involve the

fallacy of an *impossible (non-existent) major term* ('unproduced Conjunction.')

Objection: "The Conjunction of the atom with *Ākāça* is eternal: as both of them are eternal, and they are never separate from each other. As for Kaṇāda not having spoken of this, that may have been mistake on his part; and to err is but human."

To this the Author replies—*Paramāṇubhih* &c. The Conjunction and Disjunction of the atom with the all-pervading *Ākāça* is only partial (at least as regards the latter), and are *produced* by the action of the atom; just as the conjunction and disjunction of a man with the banyan tree (which extends all over from the roots to the top), are due to his movements up and down the tree. Consequently there can be no eternity for the Conjunction of the atom with *Ākāça*.

[**Page 150.**] *Objection*: "This you have succeeded in proving; but what have you got to say to the Conjunction of two all-pervading substances? This Conjunction cannot be produced by the action of any one of the two, for the simple reason that both are devoid of action. Nor could it be produced by any Conjunction, as a Conjunction born of Conjunction is possible only when an effect is in contact with something that is not its cause, but is in contact with this cause; and no such contact is possible in the case of omnipresent things; as they are all eternal, and as such can have no causes. There is however a Conjunction among omnipresent things; as can be proved by the following argument—*Ākāça* is in Conjunction with non-corporeal things also, because it conjoins with corporeal things,—like the Cloth. And as there can be no cause for this Conjunction it must be regarded as eternal; and hence we cannot admit that there is no unproduced Conjunction."

Reply: *Vibhūnām &c.* As a matter of fact, we find that Conjunction exists only among substances that have had separate existences; in the case of all-pervading substances there can be no such separate existence; and hence the condition of greater extension (i. e., separate existence) is not found to exist in these substances; consequently the resultant condition of lesser extension cannot possibly exist. As for the argument the opponent has put forward, that does not prove anything; as it applies equally to both sides of the question. That is to say, just as it lays down the Conjunction of omnipresent things, so also does it prove their Disjunction also, by the very same premiss and example.

Objection: "It may be so; and so we must accept both, as proved by convincing arguments."

Reply: That cannot be; as between Conjunction and Disjunction, if one is eternal, the other is absolutely impossible; and as the two are contradictory, and the argument applies equally to both, it cannot be accepted to prove either.

Question: "What is this 'separate existence,' on the absence whereof in omnipresent substances, you base your denial of Conjunction in them?"

Answer: *Sā punah &c.* By '*yutasiddhi*,' 'separate existence,' is meant the moving apart of one or both of the things concerned, as regards eternal substances; as regards non-eternal substances, what is meant by it is the having of a receptacle or substratum apart from that of the other. And none of these two kinds of 'separate existence' is possible in the case of *Ākāça*.

The destruction of all Conjunction follows from the Disjunction inhering in the same substrata as the Conjunction. That is to say, whenever there is a disjunction of two things, Conjunction is destroyed forthwith. Though at the time of the Disjunction the Conjunction exists, yet the two are never found to co-exist; and this may be due either to the destruction of the Conjunction appearing very quickly (after the Disjunc-

tion), or to the fact of the perception of Conjunction being obstructed by the Disjunction.

In some cases Conjunction is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. As for instance, when two threads are in contact, if there appears, by some cause or other, an action in any part of one of the two threads, then there arises Disjunction of that part from another part; and this disjunction destroys the contact of the parts, which means the destruction of the thread (to which those parts belonged); and then there follows the destruction of the Conjunction that had this thread for one of its substrata; as a Conjunction can never exist without two substrata; and hence when one of these substrata is destroyed, it cannot be found to exist.

[**Page 151.**] *Text (89): Disjunction is the basis of the idea of two things being 'disjoined.'*

It consists in the separation of two things that have hitherto been in contact. It is of three kinds: (1) *Produced by the action of any one of the two things,* (2) *by the action of both, and* (3) *by another Disjunction. The first two are like the similar kinds of Conjunction; and that produced by another Disjunction is of two kinds; as proceeding from the disjunction of causes and from that of the cause and the non-cause. The former of these we find when there appears an action in the cause as possessed by the effect, then that action brings about the disjunction of that cause from its other parts, and from the place occupied by Ākāça &c.; and when it does bring about its disjunction from the place occupied by Ākāça &c., then there is no disjunction from its other parts. Such being the case, the action of the part must be regarded as producing the Disjunction from another part only. From this Disjunction follows the destruction of the Conjunction that serves to keep the substance intact. And on the destruction of this, the substance as a composite whole is destroyed, as the effect could not survive the destruction of the cause. Then the Disjunction present in the two causes brings about the disjunction of the active part, from that point of Ākāça—which may be in contact with the effect,—with reference either to the time qualified by the aforesaid destruction of the effect, or to the part independently by itself. This Disjunction could never be that of a part that would be inactive; as in the case of such a part there would be no cause for such disjunction; and further, no further Conjunction appearing after this, the disjunction would become altogether purposeless. The said action of the part however does not bring about a Disjunction from the point of Ākāça &c.; as that action is past before the bringing about of any such disjunction. But that action does bring about the conjunction of another point of space; as no action ever becomes lost in time until it has produced some sort of a Conjunction.*

Question: "*How can Disjunction proceed from the Disjunction of the cause and non-cause?*"

[**Page 152.**] Answer: *When an action takes place in the hand (as when the hand is waived) and without disjoining the hand from any other part of the body, it disjoins it from a particular point in Ākāça and joins it to another point in it,—then we have such 'Disjunctions of the cause and the non-cause' as bring about the 'disjunctions of the effect and the non-effect,' with reference to that point in space towards which the action is*

prone to produce its effect. After this that same action produces, out of the conjunctions of the cause and the non-cause, the conjunctions of the effect and the non-effect. And if after the Disjunction of the cause there appear the disjunction of the effect, then after the Conjunction of the cause there would be the Conjunction of the effect.

Objection: *"This would involve the absurdity of the whole and its parts having existences apart from one another."*

Reply: *Not so; as apparently you do not understand what is meant by 'separate existence.' In the case of eternal things it only means 'separate or distinct movement or action'; and in that of the transitory things, it means the 'inherence or existence in distinct substrata.' In the case of the Organ of Touch and the Body there is no 'distinct movement;' but they are 'inherent in distinct substrata'; and it is for this reason that the relationship between these two is that of Conjunction (and not of 'Inherence' which would have to be admitted if 'separate existence' meant only 'distinct motion,' as there would be absence of this in the case in question, and it is only this absence that is the necessary condition of Inherence). In the case of the Atom and the Ākāça however, even though they have no other substrata (and as such the two would appear to bear the relationship of Inherence,) yet in as much as each of them is capable of independent action or motion (there can be no Inherence), and Conjunctions and Disjunctions between them become possible. In the case of the Yarn and the Cloth however, both of which are transient, in as much as they do not inhere*

in distinct substrata (and are not capible of separate action or motion), there is no possibility, of Conjunction and Disjunction (and the relationship is that of Inherence). In as much as all Disjunction is momentary, and exists only till the next Conjunction, its destruction also is momentary. In the case of Conjunction we have found that it is destroyed by the disjunction of those very things that have been in conjunction; such is not the case with Disjunction; it is not destroyed only by the Conjunction of the two things disjoined; because the idea of two things being disjoined is not continuous like that of their being conjoined (i. e., the idea of Disjunction appears only at the moment of separation, while that of Conjunction continues as long as the Conjunction itself lasts.) Hence Disjunction is regarded as momentary only on account of its existence being executed by the next Conjunction. In some cases Disjunction is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. 'How?' When in a part of one of the yarns of a 'duplicate yarn,' an action is produced, it brings about its disjunction from another part of the same yarn; and at that very time an action is produced in the other yarn also. This Disjunction leads to the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance; and the action in the yarn produces a Disjunction from the other yarn. This constitutes one moment of time. Then, at the time that the Disjunction brings about the destruction of the Conjunction of the yarns, there also follows from that destruction of the Conjunction, the destruction of the yarn. And this being destroyed, there follows the destruction of the Disjunction of the other yarn, which has the former yarn for its substratum.

Objection: "*If such were the case then there would be "no chance of the coming about of any subsequent "Disjunction; as there would be no Disjunction "present that could serve as the cause of any "subsequent Disjunction. Hence, in as much as "there would be no Conjunction in a thing in "contact with another point in space, the action "(in the yarn) would continue for a long time, "specially as no contrary quality (in the shape of "another Conjunction) would be appearing; and "that action which would be inhering in an "eternal substance would be eternal; and all this "could never be admissible. 'How so?' When an "action appears in the atom of the Water-diad, "and brings about its Disjunction from another "atom,—at that very time there appears an action "in the other atom also; and hence at the time that "the disjunction gives rise to the destruction of the "cohesive conjunction of the substance, at that very "time the action of the other atom brings about "the disjunction of the atom from the Diad; and "then, at the time that Disjunction produces the "destruction of the Conjunction of the Diad and "the Atom, at that very time from the destruction "of the Conjunction follows the destruction of the "Diad. And this being destroyed, the Disjunction "of the Diad and the atom resting therein is also "destroyed. And then, there being no possibility "of the appearance of any contrary quality, "there would be an eternality of the action "inhering in the eternal substance (Atom)."*

[Page 154] Reply:—*In as much as the Disjunction would follow from the Disjunction of the yarn from its other part, there would be none of the absurdity urged above. The destruction of the substratum destroys only the Disjunction of the two yarns and that of the yarn and its other parts; and from this latter Disjunction would proceed other subsequent Disjunctions; just like the Disjunction of the Body and ākāsa following from that of the finger-tip and ākāsa; and as the action brings about the Conjunction and becomes destroyed, there is no anomaly in this. Or, simultaneously with the appearance of the Disjunction of the yarn from its other part there appears in that same yarn an action; and then from the Disjunction of the yarn from its other part there follows the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the yarn; and the action of the yarn brings about its Disjunction from another yarn; all this forming one unit moment of time. Then from the destruction of the Conjunction there follows the destruction of the yarn; and this destruction brings about simultaneously the destruction of the Disjunction and the action inhering therein. Or, when (during weaving) there is a Conjunction of the yarn with the Brush, as (at that point of time) no substance is produced, we would have the destruction of the Disjunction of the yarn and the brush, brought about by the destruction and Conjunction of the substratum,—all this occuring in the same process as explained before.*

Commentary.

As Disjunction is always preceded by Conjunction the author having dealt with the latter, proceeds to explain the former: The verbal explanation of the first sentence is in the same manner as that of the similar sentence in the preceding section.

Objection: "The notion of 'disjoined' is present only when there is an absence of Conjunction (and hence Disjunction cannot be anything apart from such absence)."

Reply: Until there is a Disjunction, whence could the absence of Conjunction arise?

Objection: "It is brought about by action."

Reply: That cannot be; as no action is ever found to have the power of destroying a quality. It is qualities alone that are found to be destructive of qualities; and hence for the destruction of Conjunction also we must postulate a distinct quality as the cause.

And further, in the case of the "absence of Conjunction," the notion that we have is in the negative form—'these two things are *not joined*,' and not in the positive form 'these are *disjoined*'; and the reason for this is that a negative entity ('absence of Conjunction') could not be conceived of in the positive form.

Obj: "The form of the notion may be said to be figurative (the positive form could figuratively apply to a negative entity)."

Reply: Then that would not mean a denial of Disjunction; for unless there be some positive thing to which the form of the notion could apply directly, it could not have any mere figurative implication.

[Page 155]. The effects of Disjunction are next shown:—*Śabda-vibhāga etc.*, Disjunction is not merely the basis of the notion of *disjoined*;' but it is also the basis of the production of sound. As for instance, when a bamboo is torn, the sound that proceeds must be regarded as due to another quality,—because it is a sound, like the sound born of the conjunction of the stick and the drum; the sound in question however could not be due to a Conjunction; as no Conjunction is found to be present in the case; hence it must be accepted to be produced from the separation or Disjunction of the bamboo-fibres; as it is found to be invariably concomitant with this. How Disjunction can be the cause of a further Disjunction we shall explain later on.

The definition of Disjunction is given in the form—'*Prāpti-purvikā &c.*' Just as the negative word '*Adharma*' is applied not to the mere absence of *Dharma*, but to a distinct quality, the opposite of Dharma; so in the same manner, the negative word '*aprāpti*' is applied, not to the mere absence of *approach* or *contact*, but to a distinct quality, the opposite of *approach* or *contact*; and it is to this quality that the name 'Disjunction' is given.

Question: "Is the '*prāpti*' you speak of a mere antecedent of the Disjunction, or has it any causal efficiency towards the bringing about of the Disjunction?"

Answer: We hold that it is only an antecedent. If Conjunction (which would be the same as '*prāpti*') were the cause of Disjunction, then as soon as the two constituent molecules of a substance would come together, this Conjunction, being endowed with the causal efficiency towards Disjunction, would bring this latter about, and thus there being a disruption of the molecules, no existence would be possible for the whole composite substance.

Objection: "It is not mere Conjunction by itself, but Conjunction aided by certain actions, which must be regarded as the cause of Disjunction."

Reply: Then we can have for the requisite cause, this action itself with which the Disjunction may be found to be invariably concomitant; (and no causal efficiency need be admitted in the Conjunction) specially as Disjunction is not found to follow always when Conjunction is present. Hence we conclude that, as in the case of the production of Destruction, we regard 'existence' as a mere antecedent, so in that of the production of Disjunction also, Conjunction can be regarded as only

preceding it in time; as Disjunction is a quality of a nature contrary to that of Conjunction.

Disjunction is of three kinds only:—the limitation of the number being indicated by the particle '*cha*.' The three kinds are—(1) that brought about by the action of any one of the two things concerned; (2) that brought about by the action of both, and (3) that brought about by Disjunction. The first two kinds are similar to the corresponding two kinds of Conjunction. That is to say, just as the Conjunction of the mobile with the immobile object is of the first kind, so also is the Disjunction of the mobile from the immobile object. And as to the second class belongs the Conjunction of two fighting rams or wrestlers, so also does the Disjunction of those belong to the second kind.

The third kind of Disjunction is of two kinds: (it is this difference from the first two kinds that is meant to be indicated by the particle '*tu*'): There is one Disjunction due to the Disjunction of the causes, and another is due to that of the cause from the non-cause. The Disjunction due to the Disjunction of causes is thus explained: when an action is produced in the cause pervaded by the effect, then it produces in it a Disjunction of one of its component particles from another, a Disjunction that tends to the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of that substance; and at that time that action does not bring about any Disjunction of the substance from the point of space occupied by it; and at the time that this latter Disjunction is brought about, there is no trace of the former Disjunction of the parts. Hence it is on account of this general rule that the action of the component part brings about the Disjunction from another component part and from the point of space &c.

[**Page 156.**] The sense of all this is as follows: The power, in the action, of bringing about the Disjunction from *Ākāça*, is pervaded by (*i. e.* is always concomitant with) its power of not bringing about any such Disjunction as would be incompatible with (*i. e.*, destructive of) the cohesive Conjunction of the Substance;

and this latter power is opposed by the power of bringing about a Disjunction that would be incompatible with the cohesive Conjunction of the Substance; consequently, wherever this last power would be present, there that other power of not bringing about such a Disjunction would naturally become excluded; and the exclusion of this would mean the exclusion of its concomitant, the power of bringing about the Disjunction of *Ākāça*; just as the exclusion of fire means the exclusion of smoke.

Objection: Between the power of bringing about the Disjunction of Ākāça, and that of not producing a Disjunction incompatible with the cohesive Conjunction of a substance,—there is mere concomitance, and not an absolutely invariable concomitance, (as between Fire and Smoke) (and hence the exclusion of the latter would not necessarily involve the exclusion of the former)."

Reply: It is not so; because we never find these two powers apart from each other. It is only when we, in some cases, perceive two things apart from each other, and in other cases, together,—that we conclude that there is mere occasional concomitance between them;—*e. g.* the *Earthiness* and *scratchibility by Iron* are not found together in the Thunderbolt, though we find them together in a piece of wood; in the case of the two powers in question however, we never find them apart from each other. Even then we might have been led to suspect that they may have separate existence, only if their concomitance were due to certain external conditions, as we find in the case of the meeting of the pupil and the teacher; as a matter of fact, however, such is not the case; as we do not find any such external conditions. Then if such a concomitance,—independent as it is of all external conditions, and unfailing as it is actually found to be—were not accepted as absolutely *invariable*, then there would be no invariable concomitance between Fire and Smoke either; and thus all Inferential processes would be done away with at a single stroke.

Question: "Even if the action of the part were to bring about Disjunction from another part, and not from the *Ākāça* what would that prove?"

Answer: *From the Disjunction follows the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance.* That is to say, if it were to bring about Disjunction from *Ākāça*, then, as no specific disruption within the substance itself would be brought about, there would be no destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance.

Question: "What would follow from the destruction of this Conjunction?"

Answer: The Conjunction, which is the non-material cause of the substance, having been destroyed, and no effect being possible when there is no cause,—there would follow the destruction of the composite whole. And the composite substance having been destroyed, the Disjunction of the component parts would bring about the Disjunction of the active part from that point in space which had been in contact with the composite substance,—this Disjunction being either with reference to the particular point of time, qualified by the destruction of the substance, or to the part itself independently of all other things. So long as the composite substance is not destroyed, there is, in the component part, neither independent existence, nor any capability of moving to another place by itself; and hence till then there is no possibility of any Disjunction from the point of space occupied by the part. It is for this reason that we have said that what is needed is either the point of time, qualified by the destruction of the substance, or 'independent existence.'

Question: "What reason have you got for asserting that the present Disjunction of the component particles brings about the Disjunction of the active part only?"

Answer: *It could not be that of the inactive part, because of the absence of the requisite cause.* In the production

of Disjunction from Disjunction, we have *Action* (Motion) also as the efficient cause; and as in the inactive part, this cause would be absent, there could be no Disjunction of that part.

Another reason for the same is all that action or motion appears for the purpose of bringing about a subsequent Conjunction; as it always tends to fulfil the desirable ends of a man by means of the substance that will have reached another point in space. Then, if there were no Disjunctoin of the active or mobile part from such point in space as would be in contact with the component substances, then there would be no cessation or removal of the preceding Conjunction, which is an obstacle in the way of the subsequent Conjunction; and thus no subsequent Conjunction appearing, the original action would become wholly futile; and this would be far from desirable. Hence it must be admitted that the Disjunction is that of the mobile or active part only. Nor is it possible for the action or motion of the two component parts to bring about the Disjunction from *Ākāça*, simultaneously with the Disjunction of the component whole.

[**Page 157**.] *Objection*: "We grant that the action does not bring about the two Disjunctions simultaneously; but what would be the objection to its bringing them about, one after the other? It is only on account of some such objection that we could be justified in precluding this action, which has been found to be possessed of the capability of bringing about a Disjunction, and admitting the fact of the Disjunction (from *Ākāça* &c.) being due to another Disjunction which has never been found to be endowed with the said capability."

Reply: *The motion of the part does not bring about Disjunction from the point in space, because of the passing off of the time of its production.* The nature of actions is such that they produce, immediately after their own appearance, the Disjunction which is being produced by the actions themselves as the non-material cause. And the time of the production of

this Disjunction becomes past at the time of the appearance of another Disjunction; and hence this latter can never be said to be produced from those actions.

Objection: "In that case, how does the action bring about the subsequent Conjunction? As certainly there are many intervening moments of time between the appearance of the action and that of the Conjunction."

Reply: It brings about the Conjunction of another place. Just as the point of time immediately after the appearance of the action is the moment for its bringing about Disjunction, so, in the same manner, the point of time immediately after the previous Conjunction is the moment for the appearance of the Conjunction of another place. Specially as the substance located in the former place cannot possibly reach another place. Nor is the time for the appearance of the Conjunction past; as the time would have become past if the action had previously brought about the Conjunction of another place; as a matter of fact however, it is not so; hence in as much as the action will not have brought about any Conjunction, the time for its bringing about a Conjunction, will not have passed off; and hence the action would bring about a Conjunction, but not a Disjunction. If the Conjunction were not brought about by the action, then,—in as much as there would be no other action, and as nothing could be brought about without a non-material cause,—the only thing that could be regarded as the cause of the Conjunction would be the Disjunction inhering in the same substance with itself. The word '*iti*' indicates the end of the process.

Having thus understood Disjunction of a thing brought about by the Disjunction of its Material cause, the Enquirer wishes to understand the character of that Disjunction which is brought about by the Disjunction of the Cause and Non-cause. And with this view he puts the question—"How &c.?"

The answer is—*When &c.* When, by some cause or other, an action or motion is produced in the hand, it does not disjoin the hand from the other parts of the body; but it does bring about its Disjunction from certain points in space, as also its Conjunction with other parts in space; and then we have what has been called the "Disjunction of the cause and the Non-Cause";—there being the Disjunction of the *hand* (which is the component *cause* of the Body) from the points in space (which are *not the cause* of the Body); and this Disjunction brings about the Disjunction of the Body (which is the effect of the Hand) from the point in space (which are not its effects); all these Disjunctions being brought about in that same direction towards which the disjunctive action (or motion) tends, and towards that same point in space where this succeeding *Conjunction* is to be brought about; when, for instance, we find the Hand being disjoined from a point in a wall, we have the Disjunction from that point in the wall, of the Body also (to which the Hand belongs); and yet this latter Disjunction is not the effect of the action or motion of the Body,—the Body at that time being absolutely at rest; nor can this Disjunction of the Body be the effect of the action of the Hand; because we have never seen an action producing a Disjunction elsewhere than the substratum in which it itself appears; and it is for this reason that we postulate, as the cause of this Disjunction, the aforesaid Disjunction of the Cause and Non-cause.

The word '*ādi*' in the expression '*ākāśādi*' is meant to include other omnipresent things; and it is for this reason that we have the plural ending in '*vibhāgān*'—the Disjunctions of such omnipresent things are of an endless number.

Some people argue thus: "As a matter of fact we find that the Disjunction of the Body from the wall, is simultaneous with that of the Hand from it; and as such it is contrary to a perceptible fact to assert that these two Disjunctions bear to each other the relation of cause and effect."

But this is most unreasonable; because at the time of the Disjunction of the Hand, there is no cause present for the Disjunction of the Body; as an effect is not possible without its cause; and we have already said above that the action of the Hand cannot be its cause. Hence it must be admitted that the said idea of simultaneity is a mistake.

Objection: "The fact of the Disjunction of the Body appearing *after* that of the Hand can be proved only by Inference; while their simultaneity is perceived directly by the Senses; and so long as a contrary fact of Sense-perception is present, no Inference can be effective; as any such Inference would be negatived and set aside by the Sense-perception and as such would not fulfil the only condition of validity. Under the circumstances, how can we regard the fact of Sense-perception to be a mistake, on the sole strength of an inferential fact?"

Reply: How do you find Inference operative in the case of the piercing of the many petals of the lotus—where though the piercing is perceived to be simultaneous, yet such simultaneity is universally regarded to be not true.

Objection: "An Inference contrary to Sense-perception ceases to operate only when the matter is decisively pointed out by the latter to be of a character contrary to that pointed out by the Inference; in the case of the lotus-petals however the matter is doubtful; as it is quite possible that the perception of simultaneity may be due to the extremely quick succession in which one petal is pierced after the other. On the contrary however we have the decisive premiss universally recognised that the needle pierces an object only when it is in direct contact with it and not otherwise (and as all the petals cannot be in contact with the needle at one and the same time, the piercing cannot be simultaneous); and hence even though there is a perceptible fact to the contrary, yet, as it appears to be doubtful, there is every room for the operation of this contrary Inference which is fully decisive on the point."

Reply: The evidential strength of the proposition that, 'an action does not bring about any Disjunction apart from its own substance,' being quite unimpeachable, and the perceptible fact being capable of being explained away differently, the Inferential reasoning about the sequential Disjunctions becomes fully established. And it is on this account that it is regarded as setting aside the aforesaid perceptible fact. Specially as the Inference has a distinct object to operate upon; whereas the perception has no basis, being, as it is, due to the extremely quick succession in which the two Disjunctions appear; and that means of knowledge which has an objective basis, is on account of the aid of that basis, stronger in its authority than another which is weaker on account of its being devoid of such objective basis. Then again whenever a perceptible fact is said to be set aside by an inferential conclusion, the setting aside is done, not by Inference, but by another perceptible fact upon which the premisses of the inference are based. For instance, we find such settings aside in the case of a man having mistaken notions of the directions,—this being admitted by all experienced persons, who declare that in such cases Inference is more authoritative than perception. In the case of such perceptions however, as that of the heat of fire, we find that it is not capable of being in any manner explained away; and hence when the object has been once cognised by means of it, it can never be set aside by any Inferential reasoning.

[**Page 159.**] *Question*: "On what ground do you assume the fact of one cognition being set aside by another?"

Answer: Because we find that while bearing upon the same object, they contradict each other. For instance, a single object is apprehended by one Cognition as *Silver*, and by another as *Shell*; and it is not possible for one and the same thing to be both; as we always find *Silver* to be something distinct from the *Shell*. Thus then, there being a contradiction between the objects of the two cognitions, we conclude that the cognitions

also are contradictory; and as such one should naturally set aside the other.

Question: "What do you mean by this 'setting aside,' '*Bādha*'?"

Answer: It consists in *the taking away (or depriving) of the object*.

Objection 'In the case of the *shell*, even after it has "been recognized as *shell*, there still continues the object that "was illumined by the previous Cognition of *silver*; and as "for actual *silver*, that never existed; and as such what is it "of the previous cognition of *silver*, that has been 'taken away' "by the succeeding cognition of the *shell*? For certainly 'taking "away' can be nothing more than *destroying the connection* "of one thing with another.

"*Objection*: 'Though the *silver* did not exist, yet it did "appear in the cognition (and hence it can very well be taken "away by the subsequent cognition).'

"*Reply*: True it did appear in the cognition. But this "*appearance in the cognition* cannot be taken away; for the "simple reason that it is a fully accomplished fact; certainly "that which has once appeared, can never be reduced to the con- "dition of the *non-appeared*.

"*Objection*: 'Though in reality the silver did not exist, "yet it was shown, by the cognition, as existing; and the "*separation* or *removal* of this as manifested by cognition "would consist merely in the putting forward of the contradictory "of that cognition.'

"*Reply*: In that case, all that the *setting aside* would do "would be to prove the *non-existence of silver*; and in what way "could that affect the *cognition of silver*? This cognition only "manifested the silver and made it cognisable; it did not bring "it into existence; and this manifestation was duly effected by "the mere appearance of the cognition; and then what is there "that could be set aside by the subsequent cognition of the *shell*?'

Reply: When the *absence of silver* has been cognised, it becomes patent that the previous *cognition of silver* was one that had no basic objective reality,—*i. e.* it was false; and it is in this way that the idea of the non-existence of silver affects the *cognition of silver*.

Objection: "In this way then, what is taken away from the cognition is its *phala* (the resultant activity of the cogniser), and not the *object* as said before; because whenever a cognition is regarded as false, it does not give rise to any activity."

Reply: Not so; because the taking away of the *resultant activity* is concomitant with that of the *object* itself. It is not always that a cognition rests in its resultant activity; as this activity is always dependent upon the will of the person; and we often find a cognition ending in mere indifference, and not leading to any activity at all. Even in cases where it does lead to a resultant activity, this latter is tied down to the object; and the object being in its turn tied to the cognition, any setting aside of the cognition would invariably mean a deprival of the object, and of the resultant activity; as the deprival of the latter would naturally follow upon that of the former. We desist from further details on this point, which we have explained in the *Sangrahatīkā*.

In as much as what follows after the 'Disjunction born of Disjunction,' is the 'Conjunction born of Conjunction' of the substance that has long been produced, the author now proceeds to explain this Conjunction, which he had promised to do before (in the section on 'Conjunction'):

After that &c. After the 'Disjunction born of Disjunction' the action of the Hand having given rise to the Conjunction of the Hand, which is the component cause, with its non-causes, the points in space,—from this Conjunction follows the Conjunctions of the inactive Body, which is an effect of the Hand, with its non-causes, the points in space; and this latter Conjunction is not brought about by the action of the Hand; as all that this action can do is to carry its own subs-

tratum (the Hand) to another point in space. The particle '*iti*' indicates the conclusion of the subject.

[**Page 160.**] An objection is started; "If &c. That is to say, if from the Disjunction of the Cause, the Hand, there follow the Disjunction of the Effect, the Body,—then, if from the Conjunction of the cause were to follow the Conjunction of the effect, and there would be no simultaneity in that case, we would have the whole and its parts having a separate existence; and they would be independent of one another. That is to say, if the Body really inheres in the Hand, then whenever the Hand would move the Body should also move along with it; and in that case there could be no sequence in the appearance of their Conjunctions and Disjunctions (as described above); and on the other hand, if their Conjunctions and Disjunctions were to appear one after another, then that would mean that the Body would not move when the Hand would move, and the two would be independent of each other."

Reply: *Not so*; there could be no such anomaly of "separate existence." Because, apparently you do not seem to understand what "separate existence" means: what it means is the capability, in the two things concerned, of initiating or containing an action calculated to bring about Conjunction and Disjunction between themselves. "Separate existence" in the form of "separate movement" applies only to eternal substances, e. g., in the case of two atoms of Ākāça for instance. The particle '*tū*' meaning *only*, should be construed with '*nityānām*,'—the sense being that this kind of 'separate existence' belongs to *eternal substances only*. As for transitory substances, on the other hand, their "separate existence," consists in their 'inherence in separate substrates;' that is to say, they are regarded as having 'separate existence' when it is found that one or both of them inheres in substrates different from the other—'Inherence' here meaning *having distinct relationships of the container and the contained*. As for instance, in the

case of the Bird and Space we find that one of them, the Bird, is not the substratum of space, and as such has a distinct "inherence." Though in this case we also find one of the two having a *distinct motion* also, yet we take no account of this, as this has been explained as pertaining to eternal substances only.

Question: "How is it that you do not define the 'separate existence' of transitory substances also as consisting in *separate movement*?"

Answer: In the case of the Organ of Touch and the Body, we find that there is no *separate movement*; and yet they inhere in distinct substrates; and hence the relationship between them is one of Conjunction, and not of Inherence; while if among transitory substances also "separate existence" were to consist in 'separate movement,' then as these two are never found to have 'separate movement,' they would be regarded as 'inseparate' or 'inherent;' and hence the relation between them could not be one of mutual Conjunction; as this latter relation is invariably concomitant with 'separate existence.' For this reason in the case of transitory substances, 'separate movement' cannot be regarded as constituting 'separate existence.' As for the eternal substances, in as much as they have no substratum or receptacle, they could never be said, to have any 'separate substratum;' and their Conjunctions and Disjunctions would only be due to separate movement; and consequently in their case it is 'separate movement' that constitutes 'separate existence.' The sense of all this is that in the case of the organ of Touch and the Body, though, in the first instance, there is no separate existence, yet when it is found that they have distinct substrates, their Conjunction becomes possible; and hence it is concluded that in the case of transitory substances, 'separate existence' is in the form of 'having separate substrates,' and not in that of 'having separate movement.'

With a view to further strengthen the same view, the author proceeds to show that in the case of the Cloth and the

Yarns (in it)—between which all parties recognise the relationship of Inherence—there is no possibility of Conjunction and Disjunction, even though they are incapable of 'separate movement'; and the sole reason for this lies in the fact of their not having distinct substrates.

In the case of all-pervading substances, in as much as there is no 'separate existence,' there can be no Conjunction among them; nor Disjunction, as this latter always follows from Conjunction; hence in the case of these there is mere 'continuance in their own forms.'

[Page 161.] The upshot of all this is this: The mere fact of the Body not moving when the hand moves does not constitute 'separate existence'; if the two had distinct substrates of their own, then there might have been 'separate existence'; as a matter of fact however such is not the case, as the hand is inherent in the body (and has no distinct substrate).

All Disjunction is destructible, being momentary in its character. The author proceeds to show how all the three kinds of Disjunction—that caused by action, that existing in the cause, and that existing in the cause and the non-cause—are momentary, being liable to quick destruction:— The limit of all Disjunction lies in the subsequent Conjunction; and as the two things disjoined become immediately conjoined to some other things, the Disjunction can have but a momentary existence.

Question: "How do you know that this subsequent Conjunction is the limit of Disjunction?"

Answer: *Disjunction is not like Conjunction.* That is to say, in the case of Conjunction we find that it is destroyed only by the Disjunction of the two things that have been in contact; while Disjunction is destroyed by the Conjunction, not only of the two things disjoined between themselves, but of these things with other things also. For instance, the Disjunction of a man form the tree at its root is destroyed by his Conjunction with that particular point of the tree, and also by

his contact with another part of it. And thus it becomes established that Disjunction has its limit in the subsequent Conjunction; all the more so as the action, that brought about the Disjunction, does not cease until it has brought its substratum into contact with another place.

Objections: "Your argument involves the fallacy of '*Sādhyasama*,' in as much as you assert that the Disjunction ceases by Conjunction."

Reply: In the case of the notion of two things being 'conjoined,' in contact, we find that the idea continues for sometime (all the time that the things remain in contact); in the case of Disjunction on the other hand, we find that as soon as the things concerned have come into contact with another place, the notion of the two things having been 'separated' or 'disjoined' ceases; and hence it is only right to say that Disjunction ceases with Conjunction.

In some cases Disjunction ceases with the destruction of its substratum.

Question: "How?"

Answer: An action originating in one part of the yarn that forms part of a 'duplicate yarn,' brings about the disjunction of that part from another part of the same yarn,—at that very time an action appears in the other yarn: and the resulting disjunction brings about, in the part of the yarn, the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the yarn; and then the action of one yarn brings about its Disjunction of the other yarn,—all this constitutes one point of time. Then at the time that Disjunction brings about the destruction of the Conjunction of the two yarns,—there is also the destruction of the conjunction of the parts of the yarn; and this leads to the destruction of the yarn composed of those parts. And this yarn having been destroyed, there follows the destruction of the 'Disjunction from another yarn' inhering in the former yarn; and in this case we find that the only cause of the destruction

of the Disjunction is the destruction of the substratum, no other cause being available.

[Page 162.] The Opponent comes forward again with the following objections: "Thus then, the destruction of the Dis-"junction of the yarn is simultaneous with the destruction of "the 'yarn duplicate.' The *'subsequent Disjunction'*—that "of the mobile yarn from points in space—is brought about by "such Disjunction as is born of Disjunction, (and this would "not be possible) *because of the absence of its cause, viz*: the "Disjunction of the two yarns.

"And when the 'subsequent Disjunction' would not be "brought about, then there would be no cessation of the "'Conjunction of the yarn and Ākāça,' which acted as an "obstacle to it; and then there can be no conjunction of it "with any other point in space. Thus then no contrary quality, "in the shape of this subsequent Conjunction, being present, "the Action would continue at other times also, in fact it "would continue as long as its substratum would not be "destroyed, or as some other cause for its cessation would not "appear, and thus there would be the anomaly that the action "of all eternal substances would be eternal (as the substratum "of such an action would never cease to exist).

"*Question*: 'How so?'

"*Answer*: When action appears in the atom compos-"ing the Water-diad, it brings about its disjunction from "the other atom; and at that time there appears an action in "the other atom composing the Diad. And hence at the time "that from the Disjunction of the atoms there follows the des-"truction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance, there "appears the Disjunction of the atom from the Diad, brought "about by the action in the atom; and then at the time when "there follows from the Disjunction of the Atom and the Diad, "the destruction of the conjunction of the Atom and the Diad, at "that very time there follows, from the destruction of the con-"junction of the atoms, the destruction of the Diad formed by

"that Conjunction; and this Diad having been destroyed, the "'Disjunction of the atom from the Diad,' which inhered in "that Diad, would also be destroyed; and thus this Disjunction "having ceased to exist, there could not appear its effect, in "the shape of the Disjunction of the atom from the points in "space; and thus the previous Conjunction continuing to exist, "and there being no possibility of the subsequent Conjunction "which would oppose and destroy it, the action inhering in the "eternal atom would continue for ever."

The author offers the following reply to the above: *The disjunction of another part of the yarn &c.* That is to say, as a rule when an action appears in the cause as containing the effect, it disjoins its own substratum from another part of the substance, and not from the points of space &c., specially as the capability of bringing about Disjunctions from points in space is invariably concomitant with the non-capability of bringing about any specific disjunctions. And yet the said action does bring about the Disjunction of the part in contact with its own substratum from another part; as there could be no incongruity in this. Thus then, when an action is produced in one of the two yarns composing the 'yarn-duplicate,' it is simultaneous with the disjunction of that yarn from the other yarn; and this action also brings about the disjunction from the part of the yarn. And this disjunction of the yarn from the part of the other yarn remains intact (and is not destroyed by the destruction of this latter yarn, which was the substratum of its own disjunction from the other yarn); for the simple reason that even on the destruction of the yarn, its part remains intact, and so does also the other yarn. This is what the author means by saying—*by the destruction of the substratum it is only the Disjunction of the yarn that is destroyed, while that of the part of the yarn from the other yarn remains intact.*

Question: "Yes; but what then?"

Answer: *Etasmāt &c.* The sense of the example is that, just as from the action-born Disjunction of the finger from the

Ākāça we have the Disjunction of the Body from the *Ākāça*, so, in the same manner, from the action-born Disjunction of the yarn and its part, we have the Disjunction of the yarn from the *Ākāça*.

Objection: "It is quite right that from the Disjunction of the Hand and the *Ākāça* there follows the Disjunction of the Body from *Ākāça;* but it is not right that this latter Disjunction should follow the Disjunction of the finger from *Ākāça*; as the Finger is not the (direct component) cause of the Body."

[Page 163.] *Reply*: If this argument be accepted, then the Hand also is the direct component of the *arm*, and not of the Body; and as such how could any Disjunction from the Body follow from Disjunction from the Hand? If the Hand be regarded as a component of the Body, on the ground of this latter pervading equally over all its parts,—then, on the same grounds, the Finger would also be a component of the Body; as it is the aggregate of all the different members, the Hand, the Finger &c., that is recognised as the "Body."

The Disjunction of the Yarn from Ākāça having thus come about, the previous Conjunction (which was an obstacle to further Conjunctions) having ceased, the action in the Yarn brings about another Conjunction, and then ceases.

The author next proceeds to explain another manner in which Disjunction is destroyed by the destruction of its substratum. Simultaneously with the Disjunction of the other part of the Yarn, there appears an action in the disjoined part of that same Yarn; and then from that Disjunction follows the destruction of that Conjunction of the parts of the Yarn which constituted the Yarn; and the action of the Yarn brings about the Disjunction of that Yarn from another Yarn—all this forming one point of time. After that, from the destruction of the Conjunction there follows the destruction of the Yarn formed by that Conjunction; and from that there follow simultaneously the destructions of the Disjunction and the action.

We have seen above that the opponent had brought forward an objection based upon the "anomaly of the eternality

of the action inhering in eternal substances." This particular phrase of the objection the author did not choose to take the trouble of repudiating, as it was found too absurd for any serious consideration. As a matter of fact, we find that when an action appears in the cause as containing the effect, it does not bring about the Disjunction from the points of space, simultaneously with the Disjunction from other parts of the substance; and the reason for this is that the capability of bringing about disjunctions from *Ākāça &c.*, is not compatible with the capability of bringing about a disjunction opposed to the cohesive Conjunction of a substance. But an action in the atom, which is in contact with the Diad, into whose composition that atom does not enter, does bring about its Disjunction from the points in space, simultaneously with the disjunction from the Diad; and that Disjunction having brought about the cessation of the previous Conjunction of that atom with *Ākāça*, there appears another Conjunction of it with the same; and then the previous action in this atom certainly ceases (and thus the action in the eternal atom need not necessarily be eternal).

It has been explained how, when there is a Conjunction of homogeneous substances a substance is produced, and then the substratum having been destroyed, we have the destruction of the Disjunction and the initial action. The author now proceeds to show how when there is Conjunction of heterogeneous substances, a substance is not produced, there is a destruction of the Disjunction, following from the destructions of the Conjunction and the substratum (of the Disjunction.) *There being a Conjunction of the Yarn with the shuttle &c., &c.* The sense of this is that, at the very time that the action appears in the part composing the Yarn, there appears an action in the shuttle; and then the action of the part of the Yarn brings about its disjunction from another part of the Yarn; and the action of the shuttle brings about the disjunction, from *Ākāça*, of the Yarn whose parts had been thus disjoined; and then from the

disjunction of the parts of the Yarn there follows the destruction of the Conjunction of these parts; and from the disjunction of the shuttle, follows the disjunction of the yarn from the shuttle and also that of the shuttle from *Ākīça*. And then from the destruction of the Conjunction of the parts of the Yarn there follows the destruction of the Yarn; and another Conjunction of the shuttle. And thus from this subsequent Conjunction, and from the destruction of the substratum (the yarn), there follows the destruction of the disjunction of the shuttle from the Yarn.

[Page 164] *Text (90): Distance and Proximity form the basis of the notions of 'prior' and 'posterior.' They are of two kinds: (1) Due to space, and (2) Due to time. Those which are due to space afford ideas of particular directions; and those are due to Time affords ideas of age.*

We proceed to explain the production of those due to space; when two things exist in the same direction (of the seer), then the number of Conjunctions with contacts in the case of one thing would be larger than that in the case of the other; and then judging from the point occupied by the seer, we have with regard to the thing wherein 'distance,' would have its substratum, the notion that 'it is further removed from him;' and then on the basis of this notion, the contact of the thing with the further point in space, produces the quality of 'Distance.' Similarly taking the further removed object as the limit, we have the notion, that 'this is nearer than that,' with regard to the nearer object, which is the substratum of 'Proximity;' and on the basis of this notion, the contact of the thing with the nearer point in space produces the quality of 'Proximity'?

Question: *"How do you apply this process to the Distance and Proximity of time?"*

Answer: *(It is thus:) when we come across two men, both existing at the present time, though occupying any points in space; though one of them is youthful and another older,—then we ourselves, as observers, find in one of them (the latter) such characteristics as a growing beard, roughness of the skin, wrinkles and a general looseness of skin; and then taking the younger man as the limit (standard of comparison) there arises in us, with regard to the older person, the notion of the other being further removed in time; and on the basis of this notion, the contact of that person with the further point in time produces the quality of 'Distance;' and when we take the older man as the standard we have the notion of his being nearer in time; and on the basis of this notion, the contact of the person with the nearer point in time produces the quality of 'Proximity'*

The destruction of these is due to the destructions of (1) 'Apekshābuddhi' (idea of comparison), (2) Conjunction and (3) the Substance. To explain how it follows from the destruction of (1). When the quality of 'Distance' has been produced, as soon as there arises a notion of 'commonality' (of 'Distance'), the apekshābuddhi becomes liable to destruction and the idea of the quality of 'Distance' becomes liable to production from the notions of the said commonality and its relationships,—these two liabilities occurring at one point of time. Then there comes the destruction of the apekshābuddi, and the production or appearance of the idea of 'quality'; and from the destruction of the apekshābuddhi there follows the liability of the quality to destruction; and from the idea of quality and its relationships

follows the liability of the idea of 'substance' to production,—all these occupying one point of time. Then we have the appearance of the idea of 'substance,' and the destruction of the quality (of 'distance').

Question: *"In what way does the destruction of this quality follow from the destruction of Conjunction?"*

Answer: *Simultaneously with the apekshābuddhi there arises an action in the substratum of the quality of 'Distance'; that action brings about the disjunction of the object from space; and from the apekshābuddhi follows the quality of 'Distance,' all this occupying one point of time. Then there arises the idea of 'commonality'; then we have the destruction of the Conjunction of the object and space; and then at the time that there arises the notion of the quality, we have the destruction of the quality (of 'Distance') following from the destruction of the Conjunction of the object and space.*

Question: *"How does the destruction of the qualities in question follow from the destruction of the substance?"*

Answer: *When an action appears in that part of the substance which is the substratum of the quality of 'Distance,' at the very time that this action brings about the disjunction of that part from other parts of the substance, there appears also apekshābuddhi; and at the time that Conjunction is destroyed by that disjunction, we have the appearance also of 'Distance'; and then from the destruction of the Conjunction (of its particles) there follows the destruction of the substance; and from the destruction of the substance follows the destruction of the quality (of 'Distance)' inhering in it.*

Question: *"How does the destruction of the quality follow simultaneously from the destructions of the substance and the apekshābuddhi?"*

Answer: *When an action appears in that part of the substance which is the substratum of 'Distance,' at that same time apekshābuddi is produced; the action brings about the disjunction of that part from the other parts; and then we have the appearance of the quality of 'Distance;'—all this occupying one point of time. Then, at the time that we have the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance following from the disjunction of the particle there appears the notion of the commonality (of 'Distance'), and after that from the destruction of Conjunction follows the destruction of the substance; and from the notion of 'commonality' follows the destruction of apekshābuddhi,—all this occupying one point of time. And then from the destruction of the substance and the apekshābuddhi follows the destruction of the quality of 'Distance.'*

Question: *"How does the destruction of the quality follow from the destruction of the substance and Conjunction?"*

Answer: *When the action, produced in that part of the substance which is the substratum of 'Distance,' brings about the disjunction of that part from the other parts of the substance, at that same time there is a simultaneous production of the action of the mass and the Apekshābuddhi; and then at the time that the quality of 'Distance' appears, we have the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance following from the disjunction of the particles; and the action of the mass brings*

about the disjunction of it from the mass of space,—all this forming one point of time: and then, at the time that the idea of 'commonality' appears, the mass is destroyed on account of the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the substance; and from the destruction of the mass follows destruction of the conjunction of the mass; and then simultaneously with the notion of 'quality,' we have the destruction of the quality of 'Distance' following from the destruction of the conjunction of the mass of substance from the mass of space.

Question: *"How does the destruction of the quality follow from the simultaneous destruction of Conjunction and the apékshābudhhi?"*

Answer: *When the quality of 'Distance' is produced, and then an action in the substance wherein that quality inheres,—then at the time that there appears the notion of the commonality 'Distance' the action of the object (wherein 'Distance' inheres) brings about its disjunction from space; and then from the notion of commonality follows the destruction of apekshābuddhi; and the disjunction (of the object and space) brings about the destruction of the conjunction of space and the object—all this forming one point of time. Then from the destruction of the Conjunction and apékshābuddhi follows the destruction of the quality of 'Distance.'*

[Page 167.] Question: *How does the destruction of the quality follow from the simultaneous destruction of its three kinds of causes—the material, the non-material and the efficient?"*

Answer: *When apékshābuddhi appears, there follows*

action in a part of the mass; and then at the time that the action brings about the disjunction of that part from another part, and we have the appearance of apékshbuddhi and the quality of 'Distance,'—at that same time there is an action in the mass; and then the disjunction of the parts brings about the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the mass; and the action of the mass brings about the disjunction of mass and space, and also the notion of the commonality,—all this forming one point of time. Then the destruction of Conjunction brings about the destruction of the mass; and the disjunction brings about the destruction of the conjunction between space and the mass; and from the notion of commonality follows the destruction of apekshā-buddhi,—and thus have we the destruction of the quality of 'Distance' following from the simultaneous destruction of its three causes, material, non-material and efficient.

Commentary:

'Distance' forms the basis of the use of the word 'Distant,' as also of the idea of 'distance;' and so also with 'Proximity.' The effects of the two are mentioned as evidences of their existence. Though *Ākāça* and the conjunction of *Ākāça* with the throat, &c., are the cause of the use (utterance) of the words 'distant' and 'near,'—and so also the contact of the soul with the mind is the cause of the idea,—yet the existence of causes other than these is indicated by their peculiarities. That is to say, the causes mentioned are common to all *utterance*, and all *idea*, hence for the particular utterance of the words question, and also for the particular ideas of them, there must be more specified causes, as without special causes no special effects would be possible.

The two qualities are put together, because they are dependent upon each other; they are relative qualities.

They are each of two kinds, due to Time and Space. The latter is due to the contact of the mass of substance with particular points in Space, and the former to the contact of the mass with points in Time. These differences are evidenced by the effects they bring about. The 'Distance' due to space produces ideas of *distance in space*, and the 'Proximity' produces those of *nearness in space*; and similarly 'Distance' and 'Proximity' due to Time give rise to ideas of *distance and proximity in time.*

[**Page 168**] The author proceeds to explain the process of the origination of the quality of 'Distance' due to Space.

There is no idea of 'distant' or 'near' when the two things are on two different sides of the person; hence the author says—'*existing on the same side*'—meaning that both of them should be either to the east of him or to the west. In such cases we find that one person is in contact with one point of the earth, this latter is in contact with another point; and that with another; and so on and on, till one of the objects is reached; and so on to the other. Thus then, the number of such contacts with reference to the latter object being more than that of those with regard to the other, when we take the nearer object as the standard, there arises in our mind, an idea of *remoteness* with reference to the object in regard to which the number of contacts is greater; and it is this object which is to be the substratum of the quality of 'Distance' to be produced later. And on the basis of this idea of remoteness (as the efficient cause), there arises the quality of 'Distance,' in the *object* which is its 'material' cause, out of the non-material cause in the shape of the Conjunction with the point in space which has the larger number of the aforesaid contacts. And when we take for the standard the object remote from the observer, the number of contacts with regard whereto is greater,

then there arises the idea of '*nearness*' with regard to the object in connection with which the number of contacts is smaller; and on the basis of this idea of nearness as the efficient cause, there arise, from the non-material cause in the shape of the conjunction with the point in space in connection wherewith the number of contacts is smaller, the quality of 'Proximity' in its material cause, the object which is nearer to the observer.

Objection: "The notions of *nearness* and *remoteness* being relative, the one depending upon the other, there would be a negation of both."

Reply: Not so; because we do not admit of any such necessary relativity, as that the notion of one thing as *remote* is always preceded by that of another as *near*, or *vice versa*; what happens is that the notion of remoteness arises on the ascertainment of the fact of the number of place-contacts being greater than in the case of another object; and similarly the notion of *nearness* arises on the ascertainment of the fact of the number of place-contacts being smaller than in the case of another object; and thus there is no actual interdependence between the two notions.

The production of the two qualities due to Space having been explained, the author proceeds to describe that of those due to Time. *Of two things existing at the present time &c.* If one or both of the objects did not exist at the time, no 'Distance' or 'Proximity' would be possible; and hence this specification. *Occupying any points in space*,—*i. e.* existing either on the same side or on different sides of the observer. When two persons, one young and another old, are, under the above conditions, observed, and in one of them are found such marks as the *growing beard, &c.*, which are indicative of greater extent of time,—the observer taking for his standard the man in whom the absence of these marks indicates the fact of his having passed through a lesser extent of time, has the

notion of *remoteness of time* with regard to the person with the beard, &c., and on the basis of this notion (as the efficient cause), from the non-material cause in the shape of the conjunction with the point in time which has been in contact with a larger number of the revolutions of the sun, there arises the quality of 'Distance,' in that older man who is thus the material cause. Similarly taking the older man as the standard, there arises the notion of *nearness* with regard to the younger person; and on the basis of this notion, from the non-material cause in the shape of the conjunction with the point of time, which has been in contact with a lesser number of the sun's revolutions, there arises the quality of 'Proximity' in the younger person, who is its material cause.

The greater or less number of contacts with the points of time, in the older and the younger person, is with reference to the series of changes that their bodies are undergoing every moment; and not with reference to them as individual personalities; as the personalities are undergoing changes every moment, and as such could not be regarded as having any contact with more than one point of time.

Anything that is brought about by a cause must be liable to destruction; and there could be no destruction without a cause; hence the author proceeds to describe the cause of the destruction of the qualities of 'Distance' and 'Proximity.'—The destruction of these follows from the following seven causes—(1) the destruction of *apékshābuddhi*, (2) the destruction of conjunction, (3) the destruction of the substances, (4) the destruction of the substance and *apékshabuddhi*, (5) the destruction of the substance and conjunction (6) the destruction of Conjunction and *apékkshābudhhi* and (7) the destruction of *apékshābuddhi*, conjunction and substance.

(1) To explain the destruction of 'Distance' and 'Proximity' due to (1): *'Distance' having been produced &c.* In *'tatah'* the affix *'tasil'* is used in the sense of the Locative. At this

time the *apékshábuddhi* becomes 'liable to destruction'—*i. e.* comes into touch with its destructive cause. The notion of the quality of 'Distance' aries from the community of 'distance,' the cognition of this commonality, and the relationship of the quality of 'distance,'—all this making up one point of time. The notion of the commonality of 'distance' is the cause of the destruction of *Apékshábuddhi*, and also of the production of the notion of 'quality'; and hence it is that as soon as it is produced the *apékshábuddhi* becomes liable to destruction; then at the moment we have the destruction of *apékshabuddhi*, and also the production of the notion of 'quality'; and from this destruction of *apékshábuddhi* the quality becomes liable to destruction. From the quality, the cognition of the quality, and its relationships, the notion of substances becomes liable to production, and this constitutes one point of time. The destruction of *apékshábuddhi* is the cause of the destruction of the quality; and the cognition of 'quality' is the cause of the cognition of 'substance.' The destruction of *apékshábuddhi* and the production of the cognition of 'quality' are simultaneous; thence the destructibility of quality and the producibility of the conjunction of substance would also be simultaneous; and then there is the production of the notion of the substances as qualified by the quality of 'Distance,' and the destruction of the quality itself.

(2) The destruction due to the destruction of Conjunction is next described:—Simultaneously with the *apékshābuddhi*, there appears an action in the object wherein the quality of 'distance' inheres; and at the next moment, that action brings about the disjunction of space and that object; and then there appears the *apekshābuddhi* and the quality of 'distance,'—this occupying one point of time. This quality having been thus produced, we have the appearance of the notion of the commonality of 'Distance;' and from the aforesaid disjunction, there follows the destruction of the Conjunction of Space and the object:—all this occupying one point of time. Hence at the

time that there appears the notion of 'quality' from the notion of 'commonality,' at that same time we have the destruction of the quality of 'Distance' following from the destruction of the conjunction of space and the object, and not from *apékshā-buddhi*; as this latter also is destroyed at that very time.

(3) The destruction of the qualities by the destruction of the substance is next described:—The 'substance' or 'object' is the substratum of the forthcoming quality of 'Distance;' when in a part of this there arises an action, which brings about its disjunction from another part,—at that same time there appears *apékshābuddhi*; and at the time that the disjunction brings about the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the object, the *apékshībuddhi* brings about the quality of 'Distance;' and then from the destruction of Conjunction we have the destruction of the object; and from that the destruction of the quality inhering in it; and that same time we have the destruction of *apékshābuddhi* following from the notion of the commonality of 'Distance'; the destruction of the substratum (*i. e.* the object) brings about the destruction of the Conjunction of Space and the object; and hence these two cannot be the cause of the destruction of the quality in question; as they are concomitant and coeval with it.

(4) The destruction of the substance and *apékshībuddhi* is accepted the cause of the destruction of the quality of 'Distance;' as each of these has been found to bring about its destruction elsewhere, and in the particular case cited, as we cannot very well determine to which one of the two the destruction is due, we attribute it to both.

[Page 171] (5) In this case the destruction of *apékshībuddhi* cannot be regarded as the cause; as it is only at that very time that it is possible for its destruction to be brought about by the notion of 'commonality.'

(6) As at this time the substance is not destroyed, its destruction cannot be regarded as the cause.

(7) The substance is the 'material' cause; the Conjunction is the 'non-material' cause, and the *apékshābuddhi* is the 'efficient' cause.* All the process herein mentioned come about simultaneously because of the simultaneity of the causal operation that brings them about. And thus it is that the destruction of the three causes brings about the destruction of the quality of 'Distance.'

All that has been said with regard to the destruction of 'Distance' applies equally to the case of the destruction of the quality of 'Proximity' also.

Text (91):—The words 'buddhi,' 'upalabdhi' 'jnána' and 'pratyaya' are synonymous.

Commentary.

It has been shown above that 'distance' and 'proximity' are born of *buddhi*, and the author now proceeds to consider what this *buddhi* is.

On this point the theory of the *Sānkhyas* is as follows: A modification of *Pradhána* is the inner organ called '*Mahat*' another name for which is '*Chitta*'; and this same is also called '*Buddhi*' (1). Through the sense-organs the *Buddhi* comes into contact with, and is affected by, the external object; and thereby it comes to have a peculiar 'function,' which, taking the form of that same object, and being based upon the attribute of *sattva*, becomes known as '*jnána*' (2). The faculty of consciousness, reflected in the *buddhi* that has become affected by the form of the object thus approached by the sense-organ, comes to imitate the aforesaid 'function' of *buddhi*; and this imitation comes to be known as '*upalabdhi*, (*aprehension*) (3). Says the revered Patanjali (the sentence actually occurs in the *Yogabhashya* of *Vyasa*, and not in the *Sūtras* of *Patanjali*): "The faculty of the *bhoktri*, the enjoyer, the conscious agent, is modifying, untransferable, and

* The commentary has a long extract from the text here.

appears as if transferred in the modifying object, and comes to perceive or cognise its functioning." In this passage, the 'faculty of *bhoktri*' is none other than the Self; the 'modifying object' is the *principle of buddhi*; and 'transferred' is *reflected*; and 'comes to perceive its functioning' means that being reflected in *buddhi*, it becomes a mere shadow cast in *buddhi*, and thereby comes to imitate its functioning; and the objectives of *buddhi*, in the forms of pleasure or pain, constitutes what is called '*pratyaya*' (4). Says the same author: "The *purusha*, though pure, comes to perceive the *pratyaya* belonging to the *buddhi*; and while perceiving it, he appears to be identified with it, though in reality he is wholly distinct from it."

[Page 172] With a view to deny this *Sānkhya* theory, (in which distinction is made between *buddhi*, *upalabdhi*, *jnāna* and *pratyaya*) the author has said: *The words Buddhi &c.* The sense is that '*Buddhi*' is nothing but synonymous with the other words mentioned. The process of cognition put forward by the *Sānkhya* is denied for the simple reason that no such process is ever perceived. That which is in keeping with the *acceptance* and *rejecting* of the object, and which, in this, appears to have the character of *acquisition* and *expenditure*, is one only (and this is *Buddhi*); and there is another (Self) *i. e.* the substratum of this *buddhi*; it is this latter on whom which there appear activity or cessation from activity, in accordance with the character of the *buddhi* appearing therein. Both these entities are cognised by all men, no other process is ever known to take place. As regards the 'function' of *buddhi* postulated by the *Sānkhya*, we ask—Is this 'function' something distinct from *buddhi*, or absolutely identical with it? Distinct from *buddhi* it cannot be, because it is held that there is an absolute identity between the 'function' and that wherein the function appears. If however it be absolutely identical with it, then, in as much as *buddhi* is one only, its functions too, bearing the forms of objects, could not but be one only; and then any idea of three, or 'four' &c., with regard to the 'function' would be absolutely impossible; specially

as there could be no cognition of any distinct forms among them; and also because what on the *purusha* cognises is only that form which is imprinted on *buddhi*; as has been declared: "purusha is the counter-cogniser of *buddhi*." On the other hand, the number of 'functions' being many, *buddhi* also would become many; and this would be opposed to the idea of its singleness. These and many other such like objections against the *Sānkhya* theory may be put forward.

Text (92);—Buddhi has various forms, as objects are endless, and it appertains to each individual object.

Commentary.

The author proceeds to point out the various kinds of *buddhi*, and shows the reason for its endless varieties. The clause 'and it appertains etc.' has been added in order to show the reason why the endlessness of objects leads to the endlessness of buddhic forms. The meaning is that our '*buddhis*' are found to appertain to, and be restricted to, each individual object of cognition; and the number of objects is endless; consequently the corresponding *buddhis* too must be endless. Though there may be cases where we have a single cognition with regard to many objects, yet, even in such cases the cognition is restricted to the objects cognised, and as such it cannot but be regarded as distinct from the cognition of objects other than these; and hence even these instances do not vitiate our theory of the number of *buddhis* being many.

Text (93):—Though there are many kinds of buddhi, yet briefly it is of two kinds, in the form of vidyā 'knowledge' and avidyā 'non-knowledge' or 'Ignorance.' Of these avidyā is of four kinds, in the shape of (1) sançāya, 'doubt' (2) viparyaya 'misconception.' (3) anadhyavasāya, 'indefinite or indistinct cognition and (4) svapna 'dream.'

Commentary.

Though there are as many *buddhis* as there are objects in the world, yet it may briefly be said to be of two kinds. *Vidyā* or knowledge is a cognition of the nature of a definite idea free from all doubts and discrepancies (literally, not rejected as false); and *avidyā* is of the opposite character. As on the present occasion the author has got only to show the two kinds of *buddhi*, he proceeds to describe *avidyā* first though it was the last to be mentioned.

This *avidyā* is of four kinds, in the forms of Doubt &c.

(**Page 173.**) *Objection*: "It is not quite right to limit the number to four only; as we have a well-known form of *avidya* in the form of *tarkajnāna*, 'suppositional or argumentative cognition or idea,' appearing between Doubt and Certain cognition. For instance, some people hold that the Self is liable to production while others hold that it is not producible; and between these two contradictory views, there arises the doubt as to whether the Self is liable to production, or not; and then there comes in a cognition in the argumentative form in some such way as this—if the Self were liable to production, then it could not be subject to the cycle of births and rebirths, which consists in the connection and disconnection of the Self with many bodies, one after the other; nor would it be capable of final deliverance from that cycle; while, on the other hand, if it were not liable to production, then being the one cogniser it would be open to the cycle of births and also capable of final deliverance; and hence the Self cannot but be regarded as incapable of production. As for the purpose to be served by such suppositional cognition, it is none other than the knowledge of truth; because the premiss that leads to the true conclusion is rendered as much futile by a doubt to the contrary as by a distinct contradictory cognition; for the simple reason that no object has two forms (as appear in all doubts). This has been thus declared by the revered Bhatta (Kumārila): 'So long as there is even the hundredth part of suspicion with regard to the truthfulness of the contrary proposition, how can there be any conclusive strength in that premiss?' Thus then having, by the previous argument, set aside the producibility of the Self, and having ascertained its non-producibility, when the person comes to ponder over the subject, he finds the course of inference free from all contravening agencies; and it is then that the inferential process becomes duly operative. Thus then *Tarka* or argumentation leads to the knowledge of truth, through the due pondering over of the nature of things concerned; and as for the means of knowledge its end is served only by the aid of the argumentation which embodies the *procedure* leading to the final result in the shape of the knowledge, in which the means of knowledge comes in as the *means*; as an axe even though extremely sharp-edged, is not capable of cutting a wood, when held strongly in the hand, of a person not wishing to cut by it; as has been well said—'there is no instrument, either in the case of ordinary actions or in that of vedic ones, which does not stand in need of the help accorded by the *procedure*.' Then again, if Argumentation be not admitted to exist, then it would be equally proper to reject 'prasanga'—which consists in the bringing about of something undesirable for the opposing disputant; as in reality, this too does not differ in nature from *Tarka* or Argumentation. And yet the Vaiśēshikas also admit of *Prasanga*, when they assert that *Prasanga* is not a proper premiss or *hetu*, because it is open to the fallacies of *Āçrayāsiddhi* and the like.

To the above we make the following reply: what is this *Tarka*? Does it consist of the cognition of the negation of the opponent's proposition? or of the likelihood of one's own proposition? In the former case, it would be of the nature of true cognition (and as such not a fifth mind of *Avidyā*); because if the cognition that, 'if the cogniser were transient then there would be no possibility of the metempsychosis or deliverance,' were not of the nature of 'true cognition,' then it would not establish the negation of the opponent's view; as any cognition

that is not itself true cannot serve any purpose ; and so in this case it would be wholly imperative ; as there would not be any discrimination of the nature of things. If however the negation of the opponent's view be regarded to be established by it, then it cannot but be 'true cognition'; and as such would come under one of the kinds of 'true cognition,' in the form of 'sense-perception' and the rest ; as apart from these there is nothing that can bring about any conviction. All this will have to be admitted by you, however much against your wish it may be. As for *Prasanga*, it consists in the putting forward of a contradiction involved (in the opponent's proposition) ; and this is nothing else save the bringing up of an authoritative proof contrary to that view. Then we ask—what is *Tarka* save this contrary proof, and the words giving expression to this proof ?

[**Page 174.**] If, on the other hand, *Tarka* be held to consist in the putting forward of the likelihood of one's own view of the case, then,—we ask, what would be the cause of the production or appearance of this ? A proof supporting one's own view cannot be this cause, as no such proof is operative at the time ; for if the proof were to operate after the nature of things has been duly discriminated by means of *Tarka*,—and then if that same proof were to be the cause of this *Tarka*,—we would have a distinct case of mutual inter-dependence.

Objection : "When the negation of the opponent's view has been cognised, then there appears the cognition of the likelihood of one's own view ; and as such the former cognition may well be regarded as the cause of the latter."

Reply : In that case, this would be nothing more or less than an inference based upon the negation of the opponent's view ; as between two contradictions, the negation or absence of one is invariably concommitant with the presence of another.

Objection ; "It would have been so if we had a definite cognition of the Self having any one of the two characters ; as it is however, there is no definite cognition ; nor is it of the nature

of a Doubt ; as it does not partake of both possibilities ; hence having moved one step forward from Doubt, and yet not having reached the stage of Definite Cognition, the idea of likelihood must be accepted as something wholly distinct from either; it is for this reason that we find people saying—'thus do I *argue* or think.'"

Reply : It is not so, because wherever, on account of natural possibilities, there is a definite cognition of the negation of the opponent's view, we have proof of one or other of the two contending views ; where however we have a notion of the likelihood of the opposite view, there is no proof or authority for the other view. When the intelligent person, having this concomitance in view, comes to recognise the negation of the opposite view, he is led to think that the Self is non-producible ; and then he comes to recognise the natural possibilities of the thing concerned (*i. e.*, the Self) as the proof of that idea of his ; and this is nothing but a case of inference. Thus then, the recognition of the natural possibilities of things aiding the process of the proof, it comes to be regarded as the cause of the operation of that proof ; if it were not so, then, the cognitions of mere likelihood would be absolutely useless ; as not being of the nature of the definite cognition, it could not aid either in any accomplishment or in any perception ; and as for the discrimination of the nature of the thing, it is accomplished by the negativing proof which proves the negation of the opposite view.

Others hold that *Tarka* is only one kind of 'Doubt' ; as in that also there is no certain or definite cognition.

Text (94) : As for Doubt,—when two objects possessed of well-known distinct specific characteristics, are seen, and we perceive only the similarities between them, then we recall to our mind the peculiarities of the objects ; and from this cause, and

also by reason of a certain adharma, there arises in our mind a pondering, in the form of 'whether it is this or that'; and it is this pondering that constitutes Sançaya, 'Doubt.' II-i-17-20.

It is of two kinds, internal and exteral. Where, an astrologer made certain predictions from certain circumstances, which turned out to be true in one case, but false in another,—if this same person makes for the third time similar predictions from similar conditions, with regard to past, present and future events, there arises in his mind a doubt as to whether his predictions would turn out true or false; and this is an example of Internal Doubt. External Doubt is of two kinds, as pertaining to perceptible and imperceptible objects. In the case of two imperceptible objects we find that when we come across a 'mark' common to both of them, we remember their peculiarities, and then from a certain adharma there arises a Doubt; e. g. when in a forest we see the horns only, we doubt whether the animal seen is a cow or a gavaya. In the case of two perceptille objects, like the post and the man, when we perceive only the tallness that is common to both, and do not notice the crookedness and other marks peculiar to each, there is no manifestation (in our mind) of the class 'post' or 'man'; and then when we come to remember the peculiarities of each, the Self has its conviction swinging from the one to the other, and falls into a doubt as to whether the object seen is a post or a man.

Commentary.

The particle '*tāvat*' is added in order to denote the sequential order of the subject taken up for consideration; the meaning being that we now proceed to describe Doubt. The 'two objects'—*i. e.*, the post and the man—having various such distinctive features as are well-known from before, such *i. e.* as the presence of crookedness and cavities,—having only their similarity—*i. e.*, the qualities common to both—perceived, and then there appearing a remembrance of the said well-known distinctive features,—and from a certain *adharma*, there arises a *doubt* &c. &c., which while touching both the man and the post does not touch anyone of them definitely; and this cognition partaking of two contradictory objects is what is called '*Sançaya*' or 'Doubt.'

From the perception of mere similarity.—The addition of the word 'mere' indicates the non-apprehension of the distinctive features; the word '*darçana*' here means *apprehension* and not direct *sense-perception*; as even inferential cognitions or apprehensions are found to give rise to doubts. The 'cognition of similarity' implies the cognition of one object wherein the similarity exists; as in the absence of the cognition of the object, there could be no cognition of the similarity belonging to it. The Doubt too pertains to the object and not to mere similarity, which latter is distinctly and definitely recognised; and with regard to which thus there can be no doubt. The word 'similarity' indicates only the possession of common properties; and it is not something inhering in many objects; because with regard to the single object, Self, we have a doubt as to whether it is *subtile* and small or large,—the doubt being due to the fact of the nontouchability (which is found in the Self) being found in the *extensive Ākāça* as well as in the subtile and small internal organ.

The upshot of the whole thus is this:—When a person perceives in any object a certain property that is common to it with another object,—and by some reason or other fails to perceive the distinctive feature of that object,—and then remembers the two objects as perceived on some former occasion,

as possessed of mutually contradictory properties, and yet does not perceive the likelihood of these properties existing in any single object, by reason of their contradictory character,—nor does he perceive their nonexistence, as he actually perceives the common properties concomitant with it,—then, at that time he having definitely cognised the object as possessing the common properties, there arises in his mind an uncertain feeling as to that object being possessed or not of its distinctive features; and this uncertain feeling is what we call 'doubt.'

Objection: "To say that it is a 'cognition,' and yet to call it 'uncertain' is a contradiction in terms; as the very nature of cognition lies in the fact of its *ascertaining* the object."

[Page 176] *Reply*: Not so; since both are possible. The cognition in question is produced by the apprehension of an object qualified by a property in common with another object, aided by the remembrance of the distinctive features of both, which would be contrary to the perception of the particular (common) property; and thus pertaining to the object qualified by the common property, the cognition cannot definitely ascertain which one of the two objects, *post* and *man*, it is; and it is for this reason that it is called 'uncertain'; though still retaining the character of *cognition*. It is a fact of common experience that peculiar accessories bring about peculiar effects; as in the case of 'recognition.'

Doubt is *Avidyā*; and this is an undesirable thing; and as such an effect of *adharma*; this is what is meant by '*adharmāt*.

Objection: "In a case where after having perceived a commonality (the common property), the man remembers a peculiarity (the distinctive features of the objects),—in as much as, on the occasion of this latter remembrance, the previous perception of the commonality will have been destroyed, it could not serve as the cause of Doubt."

Reply: It is not so; in as much as the single remembrance of the distinctive peculiarities of the two objects is brought about by the *impressions* of these peculiarities, awakened simultaneously, there is every chance, at that time, of the existence of the disappearing cognition of the commonality.

Doubt is of two kinds.—External and Internal. These include the five kinds of Doubt put forward by other Vaiçeshika writers,—these five kinds being: (1) due to the perception of common properties, (2) due to the perception of many properties, (3) due to contradiction or disagreement, (4) following from the indefinite character of the perception, and (5) following from the indefinite character of non-perception.

To give an example of Internal Doubt: An astrologer, having consulted the positions and motions of the planets and stars, makes certain calculations as to a certain event having happened, happening or likely to happen (in the past present and future); and he finds them true; on another occasion however he finds his deduction from the same causes turn out false; and then when on a third occasion he makes similar predictions from the same causes, he has his doubts as to whether it would turn out true or not.

The *external* Doubt is of two kinds—that pertaining to perceptible objects, and that to imperceptible ones &c. &c. As instance of the latter kind we have the case where on seeing the horn only &c. &c. &c. In this case the object is hidden from view behind some large tree like the banyan; and its character is only inferred from the sight of the horn; and hence the object of Doubt on this case is said to be *imperceptible*. As an instance of the former kind we have the well-known case of the *post* and the *man*; in which case we see the *object* and therein perceive and cognise definitely only the *tallness* that is common to the *post* and the *man*. The distinctive features not perceived are those of *crookedness* (in the case of the post) and the presence of hands, feet &c. in

the body of the man. The word 'etcætera,' in the sentence "there being no manifestation of the class 'post' &c" is added to include the class 'man.' The 'crookedness' &c., are the causes of the manifestation of the class 'post,' and the presence of 'head' 'hands' &c. is the causes of the manifestation of the class 'man'. And when these distinguishing features are not perceived in the object before the person, the class 'man' or 'post' is not manifested (i. e. recognised) and then the observer happening to remember the characteristics of the man and the post, when he is inclined to conclude that the object before him is a post, he is met by the characteristics of the man that present themselves to his mind; and when he wishes to conclude it to be *man* he is met by those of the post; and thus being drawn from the one to the other, he finds his cognition 'swinging,' 'inconstant,' moving from one to the other. The similarity of the swing lies in the unsettled character of the conviction, which is in the form—'is this a post or a man.'

Text (95).—Misconception also pertains to objects of Sense-perception and Inference only. As an instance with regard to perceptible objects, we have the case when of two objects possessed of many well-known qualifications, it so happens that the real thing is not perceived by the person who has his sense-organs deranged by such causes as bile, phlegm and wind; and then the impression on the mind, left by the previous perception of the thing not before the observer, comes to effect the contact of the Self with the mind; and from this contact, and also from a certain adharma, there appears an idea of something which the thing is not; and this idea is a misconception; e. g. the idea of 'horse' with regard to the cow. Even when there is no actual perception, there is an impression or semblance of it; as for instance we have such notions of perceptions as that when the clouds have passed off, the sky appears like the calm ocean; and the night's darkness appears as dark as a mass of colyrium dust. As regards inferable objects, we often find that vapour is mistaken for smoke, and from that the existence of fire is inferred; and also the sight of the horns of the gavaya leads to the inference that the animal is a cow. With regard to the tenets of the Buddha and others opposed to the Vedas, some people have the idea that they are conducive to actual welfare; and this also is an instance of wrong idea, a misconception. So also are the following—the notion of 'self' with regard to the body, the organs and the mind; the idea of eternality with regard to caused things; the idea of the appearance of effects in the absence of adequate causes; the idea of 'evil' with regard to persons advising what is really good for us; and the idea of 'good' with regard to these who counsel evil ways.

Commentary.

[**Page 178.**] After Doubt, the author proceeds to deal with Misconception. Misconception also pertains to objects perceived and inferred, like Doubt. This declaration is due to the fact of there being (according to the *Vaiçeshika*) no third means of true knowledge.

As for misconception with regard to perceptible objects:—we find *e. g.* in the case of the cow and the horse, of whom many such peculiarities as the presence of the dewlap and the mein respectively, are well known, that we have with regard to the cow the idea that it is a horse which it is not, and *vice versa*; and this is a case of misconception.

Objection: "When such distinctive features of the cow as the class 'cow,' the presence of the dewlap &c., are duly recognised, there can be no misconception; for if even after the due perception of these a misconception be possible, then there would be no end to such misconceptions."

In reply to this the author adds—*the real thing not being perceived*; *i. e.*, there is no such definite cognition as that 'this animal with the dewlap &c., that I see is a cow'; and it is for this reason that we have the notion with regard to a thing, of something that it is not. This means that the cause of misconception consists in the non-perception of characteristic properties.

Question: "What is the reason that when the object before the observer is the cow, what he cognises is the class 'horse,' an individual whereof is before him, and not the class 'cow'?"

Answer: The sense-organ being deranged &c. That is to say, the misconception arises only in such persons as have their sense-organs deranged by the disorder of the three humours of wind, bile and phlegm,—a disorder the power whereof to bring about the perception of something not before the eyes, and to obstruct the perception of that which is before the eyes, has thus been indicated.

Objection: "If it were solely on account of the power of the derangement that something not before the eyes were to be perceived, then everything in the world would be perceived everywhere; as there would be nothing to limit the force of the derangement."

Reply: From the contact of the mind and the self, affected by the impressions of the previous cognition of the thing not before the eyes &c. Such a thing, in the case in question is the *horse*; this having been seen on some previous occasion, the observer has impressions of it on his mind; and when this impression affects the contact of the mind and the Self at the

time in question, there arises the misconception or mistaken idea of the *horse* in the *cow*. The meaning of all this is this: The sense-organ (eye) in contact with the cow, perceives, not the 'cow,' but the *body* as qualified by a similarity with the cow,—every object having various factors of itself, the eye perceives only certain factors of it; this cognition of similarity awakens the impression of the *horse* that is there in the observer's mind; and when the remembrance of the horse has been brought about, the said impression brings about the cognition of the *horse*, by reason of the similarity of the horse in the cow which is in direct contact with the sense-organ,—this being due to a certain derangement in the perceiving organ concerned. And thus it is that everything is not cognised everywhere, the necessary restriction being done by similarity and by previous impression. It is for this same reason that the teachers of old have called this misconception 'sense-born.' It could not be 'sense-born,' if it were to take cognizance of the 'horse' only, which is not before the eyes, and if this cognition were due solely to the impression; or if it belonged to a person who had all his sense-avenues closed. As a matter of fact however, we find that it takes cognizance of the 'horse' in the body of the cow which is in contact with the fully active eye; and even then, if it were not 'sense-born,' what other misconception could be 'sense-born'?

[**Page 179.**] It is for this reason that we hold the case of misconception to be one of *Viparítakhyāti*, 'the cognition of the contrary'; because one thing appears as what it is not; and hence even in a case where a misconception arises without any sort of objective substratum, it is something *not existing* which is cognised in the 'contrary' form, *i. e.*, as *existing*. And this cannot be a case of *asatkhyāti*, 'cognition of the non-existing'; as the form of the object is always likely to exist, and it is not possible for the non-existing to be cognised. In a case where we have the misconception appearing in a certain objective substratum, we have similarity as its cause; while in a

case where there is no objective substratum, and where the misconception is due solely to mental derangement, there is no possibility of any cognition of similarity; as for instance, when a man infatuated with love for a woman perceives the semblance of his beloved here, there and everywhere. Impression is the cause only in cases where the misconception is determinate and concrete; when it is indeterminate and abstract the cause lies in the derangement of the sense-organ; as the misconception is always found to be accompanied by some such derangement; as for instance, when we have the notion of *yellowness* in the conchshell.

The author proceeds to cite another instance of misconception—*Even when there is no sense-perception &c., &c.* A man desirous of looking at the sky directs his eyes upwards, and the light-rays shot out from the eye having gone to a great distance upward become slackened in their speed; and then being struck by the powerful light-rays from the sun shooting in an opposite direction downwards, they are turned back; and render perceptible the basisless blue quality of the occular orbs; and then it is that they produce the cognition that 'the sky is free from clouds and appears like the calm ocean,'—a cognition wherein we have what appears like a sensuous perception of colour in the sky which is really imperceptible. That the sense-organ (of vision) makes the quality of its own orb appear as inhering in the sky is proved by the peculiar character of the cognition which is found to follow the qualities of the organ. For instance, a man with the jaundiced yellow eyes sees the sky as besmeared with molten gold; and the man under the influence of cold and phlegm having his eyes whitened perceives it to be like silver. Then again, when a man looks upon the extreme darkness of night, he perceives what he thinks to be a mass of collyrium, though in reality there is absolutely nothing there; and this is a case of perceiving as perceptible what is absolutely imperceptible.

In the case of inferable objects also it sometimes happens that we mistake for smoke, such things as vapour, rising dust and the like; and from the idea of this smoke we often form the notion of the existence of fire in a place where there is no fire at all. Similarly from the seeing of the horns of the *gavaya* we infer the existence of the cow. Both these are instances of Misconception.

The author proceeds to show that misconceptions also arise from the constant study of false philosophical doctrines—*Trayidarçana*, &c. The word '*trayi*' means the three Vedas, Rig, Yajush and Sāma, which include also the Atharva Veda; '*darçana*' means *that whereby the means of attaining heaven and final deliverance are known.* In the philosophical systems of *Śākya, Bhikshu, Nirgranthaka, Sansāramochaka* and the like, which are all opposed to the Vedic philosophy, we find many teachings as to what is truly *good* and desirable; and the notion that these teachings are authoritative is a misconception; as is shown by the fact of their being accepted by very few people, of their being deprecated by, and deprecatory of, all castes and conditions of men, and of their being contrary to all proper reasoning.

[Page 180.] Similarly, the idea of Self with regard to the body, the sense-organs and the mind, is a misconception; because the real cogniser has been proved to be something wholly distinct from these. The *Mimānsakas* have the misconception of eternality with regard to the Veda, which is 'caused' or composed (and as such cannot be eternal). The *Laukayatikas*, true disciples of the *Mimansakas*, have the misconception that diversities of pleasures and pain appear without any such cause as *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Then we have such misconceptions as that the salutary teachings of the Veda—that 'living beings should not be killed,' and that 'one should not bear on his body dirt, mud and such other impurities,'—are harmful; and that such teachings, as that 'animal-slaughter is the highest virtue,' and 'the

bearing of dirt, &c., tends to good,' emanating from *Kshapaṇakas* and *Sansāramochakas*, are salutary.

In connection with misconception some people (the Praāthākaras) urge the following objections: "There can be no misconception, as there can be no cause for it; as is evidenced by the fact of the sense-organs having by their very nature, the character of bringing about correct cognitions. It is not right to assert that by reason of derangements the sense-organs often bring about wrong convictions. Because all that a derangement can do is to destroy the efficiency of the organ; as for instance, in the case of the shell & the silver, the disordered eye coming in contact with the shell is *not able to perceive the shell*; and it can, in no case, perceive the silver which is not present before it; for if it could do so, then derangements would have to be regarded as having the power of adding fresh efficiencies (which is absurd). If the eye were to render perceptible what is not perceptible, then what would be there to avert the possibility of all men perceiving all things. Then again, the assertion that the '*shell* is the substratum of the idea of *silver*' contains a self-contradictory conception. Because that object alone which appears in an idea is its substratum, and none other; it is *silver* that can appear in the idea of silver, and not the *shell*; and until one has perceived the *silver* he cannot mistake the shell for silver; hence it must be admitted that in the case in question we have a dual conception: (1) the idea of 'this' with regard to the piece of shell before the eyes is a direct perception, and (2) the idea of 'silver' is produced by the mere impression of silver awakened by the perception of a certain degree of similarity between the shell and the silver; and thus there is only a *remembrance of silver*; and the notion of 'this' is due to the derangement of the sense-organ."

To the above we make the following reply: If there were no idea of *silver* with regard to the *shell*, and if it were only a remembrance of *silver*, then at the time that a person wanting silver mistakes the shell for silver, he would not be moved to

take up the *shell*; in fact he would move to take the silver that he might have seen elsewhere on some previous occasion; as a remembrance always moves the person to the place where its original perception had occurred.

Objection: "It is that form of silver which it has in common with the *shell* that is perceived by means of the senses, which do not perceive the form peculiar to the *shell*; and what the remembrance of silver does is to bring up to the mind the idea of mere silver, being as it is, devoid of any notion of 'that,'—this silver being unconnected with any definite point in space; and there being a similarity between the *perceived* shell and the *remembered* silver, as also between the *perception* and the *remembrance*;—and there being no apprehension of the difference between them,—the observer fails to discriminate and (being desirous of obtaining silver) moves up to the shell, and comes to form a notion of identity between the shell and the silver, in the form 'this is silver.'"

Reply: This is not right; as there is no perception of non-discrimination either. It is the non-perception of the distinction from silver in the shell, and not the perception of similarity, that serves to urge the seeker after silver to move towards the shell; and what leads him to desist from it is the perception of the difference between the two. And as in accordance with your view, there would be the perception of neither difference nor non-difference, he could not move either towards, or away from, the object before him; and there would be no particular reason for his moving towards it. And thus there would be no co-extensiveness between the two, as there would be every likelihood of the non-perception of non-difference, which would be a ground for the diversity of substrates. And then there would be no possibility of any such subsequent preclusive conception as that 'this is not silver,' as the difference between the silver and the shell is not cognised; nor is there any perception of absolute identity between them, which would be set aside by the preclusive conception.

Objection: "The negation is of the use of the shell as silver, a use that is made possible by the non-perception of the difference between the two."

[**Page 181**] *Reply*: Not so; because the non-usage of shell as silver would be possible also by reason of the non-perception of an identity between them. As a matter of fact, we find that the seeker for silver is found to move towards the shell; and there is also the notion of the co-extensiveness (or identity) between the two—in the form '*this* is *silver*;' there is also a negativing conviction to the effect that the thing cognised as 'this' has not got the character of silver: and from this we infer that the notion of silver in the shell was brought about by the eye in contact with the shell, led to the mistake by a derangement in it,—helped also by an impression of silver, and an apparent similarity between the shell and the silver.

It has been argued above that the assertion of the idea of silver having the shell for its substratum involves a self-contradiction. But there is not much in this argument; as it is the piece of shell, occupying a definite position and qualified by a certain degree of brightness, that appears as 'this.' What is meant by a thing being the substratum of an idea is that it is that which will be acquired or rejected by the person having that idea, and this, in the case in question, is possible only in regard to the shell; and as for one who, not perceiving the difference of the shell from silver, desires to use the former for the latter, he too will admit of the existence of *misconception*; as misconception is nothing else except the using of one thing as something which it is not.

Then again, it has been urged that derangements only serve to deprive the organ of certain powers. But there is not much in this argument either; because we find that the humours of the body when affected by the disorders of wind, bile and phlegm, bring about fresh diseases.

As for the chance of all men knowing all things, this contingency is set aside by the restriction upon and limitation of the potentialities of derangements.

Then again, the mere fact of a cognition not tallying with the object cannot make it absolutely untrustworthy and false; as when we do not find its negativing cause in the shape of derangements, we conclude that there is no negativing cause; and as a misconception is always followed by a negativing cause, the absence of the latter leads us to conclude that the cognition is not a misconception, and to believe it to be true.

If misconception be not admitted, then, how would you account for the cognition of *two moons*?

The opponent says: "In this case what happens is that the lightrays from the eye disarranged and diverted on account of the disorder, move out of it separately, and falling upon the moon, produce two perceptions; and hence what we cognise is the quality of the cognition; *i. e.* we have *two cognitions* of the same moon, and not the single cognition of *two moons*."

Reply: This cannot be; because a property (duality) of the cognition could not be perceived by means of the eye. If it be argued that 'the quality of *cognition* perceived as belonging to the *cognised* object, can be so perceived only by means of the organ that perceives the object,'—then the existence of misconception becomes admitted; as in that case the quality of one thing would be cognised as belonging to another; and so we shall desist from further angering the learned *çrotriya brahmanas* (the *Mimansakas*, holding the opposite view).

Some people (the *Vedantis*) hold that in the case in question, what is perceived, in the cognition of silver, is a real silver beyond the pale of the physical; and on this ground they deny that there is any misconception. But for those people the cognition could not give rise to any activity; as a super-physical object is never found to give rise to any effective action.

[Page 182.] *Text (96)*: *Anadhyavasāya, 'Indefinite or Indistinct cognition', also appears in regard to perceptible and inferable objects. As regards perceptible objects, whether well-known or not, we find a mere idea appearing in the form 'what may this be,' due either to the absent-mindedness of the observer, or to the fact of his desiring to know (further details) with regard to it; and this idea is what we call 'indefinite cognition.' As for instance, a Vāhika (an inhabitant of the Daksha country) has such a cognition with regard to the jack fruit. In this case there appear definite cognitions with regard to the fact of the object being—(1) an entity, (2) a substance, (3) a modification of Earth, (4) a tree, (5) having a distinct colour, (6) and branches. As for the generic character of the 'jack fruit,' that too-including all jack fruit trees, and excluding the mango and other trees, is distinctly perceptible; but it is only the particular name 'jack fruit' which is not duly recognised, in the absence of a teaching to that effect (from an older person). As regards inferable objects, the inhabitants of the 'Nārikela' continent, on seeing the dewlap, have an indefinite cognition as to what the animal having the dewlap may be.*

Commentary.

The word 'also' is meant to indicate that like Misconception, Indefinite Cognition also appears with regard to both kinds of objects. And the word '*Avat*' means that we shall deal with inferable objects in due course, and we are considering perceptible objects for the present. *With regard to objects &c., &c.*,—the 'well-known objects,' are those that are known from

beforehand. With regard to such object we find that, on account either of absent-mindedness, or a desire for further knowledge, the observer has the idea 'what may this be?' *e. g.*, when a well-known king has passed by the road, one has not been able to observe him, has only an indefinite cognition that 'somebody has passed by this way,' not knowing the character of the particular person. As regards objects that are not well-known, Indefinite Cognitions appears on account of ignorance; *e. g.*, an inhabitant of the *Daksha* country has no definite idea of the 'jackfruit tree.' He has many definite cognitions with regard to it,—such as (1) 'this exists' (2) 'this is a substance,' (3) 'this is a modification of earth,' (4) 'this is a tree,' (5) 'this has such a colour,' and (6) 'this has branches.' The generic character of 'jack fruit' also he perceives in the abstract (indeterminately); it is only the fact of its bearing the name of 'jack fruit' that he does not know, until some one mentions it to him; he has only the idea that it must have a name. And this cognition, devoid of the idea of the particular name, is what we call, 'indefinite Cognition.'

[Page 183.] As regards inferable objects, it often happens that an inhabitant of the Nārikela continent.—where there are no cows,—who does not known what a 'cow' is, having gone to another continent, sees the dewlap, and having inferred from certain circumstances that the mass before him is an animal, has no definite idea as to the particular class or species to which it belongs, and the only idea that he has is the indistinct one—'this is some sort of an animal'; and this is ''*anadhyavasāya*,' 'indistinct cognition,' which expression denotes the *negation or absence of definite distinct cognition.*

Objection: "This idea being indefinite is none other than Doubt."

Reply: Not so; because the origin as well as the form of an Indistinct Cognition differs entirely from that of Doubt. Then again, we have seen that a doubt arises from the remem-

brance of the peculiar characters of the two objects; while there is none such in the case of 'Indistinct cognition,' which often arises from mere absence of a distinct cognition of peculiarities; and secondly, Doubt wavers between the two extremes, touching sometimes the one and sometimes the other, which is not the Case with Indistinct cognition. Nor is this latter *Vidyā*; in as much as it is not found to give rise to any activity.

Text. (97): *When the sense-organs have ceased to function, and the mind has retired, then there come about certain mental cognisings through the sense-organs; and it is these that constitute "Dream Cognition."*

Beings tired by their exertions during the day caused by their conscious bodily actions, retire at night with a view either to rest or to enable their food to be digested; and then the connection of the self and the internal organ, brought about by an effort due to the force of certain unseen agencies, causes certain functionings in the mind; and then the mind retires peacefully into the heart which is the organless region of the self; and then it is said to have "retired." The mind having thus "retired," the organs of the man cease to function. In this state the processes of inbreathings and outbreathings going on profusely, from such causes as, (1) "sleep" which is the name of a particular state of contact of the self with the mind and (2) impressions of previous cognitions,—there appears, through the sense-organs, a dream-cognition, resembling direct sense-cognition, with regard to objects that have no real existence.

[Page 184.] *This dream cognition is of three kinds: (1) Due to the strength of impressions left by previous cognitions, (2) Due to the disorders of bodily humours, and (3) Due to unseen forces.*

(1) As for that due to the strength of impressions, it often happens that when a man, having a strong desire for something and thinking constantly of that thing, goes off to sleep, that same series of thoughts and mental images appear again in the form of sense-cognition.

(2) As regards that due to the disorders of bodily humours, we find that a man in whose constitution, wind is the predominating humour, or in whose body wind has become disordered, he often sees (in a dream) that he is flying in the sky, and so forth. Similarly a man whose constitution abounds in bile, or whose bile is disordered feels as if he were entering into the fire, and sees mountains of gold and such other things. And one in whom phlegm predominates or is deranged, sees such things as crossing rivers and oceans, and mountains of snow and so forth.

(3) That due to unseen forces. Very often there appear in dreams certain cognitions—of objects previously perceived and also those never perceived before, those known as well as those that are not known; and among these there are some, such as the riding on an elephant, the obtaining of an umbrella and such other things—which betoken the coming of some thing desirable; and these proceed from previous impressions and Dharma. Of the opposite kinds are the rubbing of oil and the riding of asses and camels &c.; and these proceed from previous impressions and Adharma.

Those however that pertain to things absolutely unknown, proceed wholly from unseen forces.

As for "dream-end" cognition, though this also appears in one whose sense-organs are inoperative, yet, in as much as in this we have the recalling of a past cognition, it is only a form of "remembrance."

These then are the four kinds of Avidyā. (ix 2. 2-8.)

Commentary.

The author proceeds to describe dream-cognition. The sense-organs are said to "cease to function" when they are not in contact with and apprehending their respective objects. "*Pralinamanaska*,"—"the mind retired"—means that the mind has fully retired within itself. The man in this condition has through his senses, a certain cognition, which is independent of his previous cognitions (and hence not a mere remembrance), and of a definite character (hence not of the nature of *nirvikalpaka* cognition); and this is 'mental,' proceeding from the mind alone; and this cognition is what is called "dream."

He proceeds to show how the mind of man retires, and how the sense-organs cease to function: The man during the day carries on many such bodily actions as going about from place to place; and being tired by these he retires at night, with a view to rest from the fatigue, or for the purpose of the proper digestion of the foods and drinks he has taken, and the effort caused by unseen forces, effecting the contact of the mind and the self, brings about a series of actions in the mind; and on account of this, the mind rests unmoving within the heart, which is the region of the self devoid of the external organs of perception; and it is during this condition that the man is said to be "*pralīnamanaska*," 'with his mind retired.' When the mind has thus retired, the sense-organs cease to operate; for the simple reason that unless guided by the inner organ (mind,) these organs cannot appre-

hend their objects. During this 'retired' state of the mind the process of the inner and outer breathings going on,—from such causes as *sleep*, which is a particular state of contact of the mind and self, and *impressions* of things perceived before, there proceeds a dream cognition, which ressembles direct sense-cognition with reference to objects that do not exist:—that is to say, those that do not exist at that particular time and place.

He proceeds to show how Dream Cognition is of three kinds:—

(1) *That which is due to the strength of impressions.* When a man who is in love with a woman, or when he is very angry with his enemy, thinks constantly of his beloved or his enemy, and while thus thinking goes to sleep, then the series of thoughts or mental images appear, by the strength of the impressions left on his mind, in the form of the direct sense-cognition of some thing directly in contact with his organs of perception.

(2) The 'humours of the body' are serum, flesh, fat, marrow bone and semen; and these are called '*dhātu*' because they *hold* or *support* the body (*dhāraṇāt*); and when these are deranged by disorders of wind, bile and phlegm, then there appear certain misconceptions. To explain—a man in whose constitution wind is the predominating factor, or one in whom wind has been much disordered by some cause or other, perceives as if he were floating in the sky or running about here and there. One who is of a bilious temperament, or one in whom bile has been developed abnormally, perceives as if he were entering into fire, and sees such things as mountains and orbs of gold, the solar dise, and so forth. One of phlegmatic temperament, or with his phlegm disordered, feels as if he were crossing rivers and oceans, and seeing mountains of snow &c.

(3) Then, there are certain things which are not known to others; other things which the person himself has never perceived, and which are not known to others; of this kind are

such things as the riding of the elephants, seeing of umbrella and the like, a vision of which presages something good; and the dream of these is brought about by impressions and *dharma*. That which is of the contrary character,—*i. e.* which forebodes evil—such *f. i.* as the rubbing of oil, the riding of asses and camels &c.—are produced by impressions and *adharma*. Whereas with regard to such things as are wholly unknown to the man himself as well as to others,—such *f. i.* as the eating ef the sun and the moon and the like—these ideas are produced by unseen forces alone; as with regard to such things there can be no impressions.

Though all dream cognition, proceeding either from the strength of impressions, or from the disorders of humours, or from unseen forces, consists of the false imposition of external form upon something that is wholly internal,—and as such, being the cognition of some thing as what it is not, it is only a particular kind of misconception,—yet as it occurs only during a particular condition of the body, it is classed separately.

It often happens that a man recalls *in dream* what he has been dreaming of,—in the form. 'I have been dreaming of such and such a thing';—and this being the 'end' of the preceding 'dream,' is called 'dream-end' cognition: and as this also appears in one whose sense-organs have ceased so function, people might take this also as 'dream cognition' proper; hence with a view to set aside this doubt, the author adds that though this cognition also appears when the sense-organs are not functioning, yet, being only the recalling of a previous cognition, it is of the nature of 'remembrance.'

He sums up the whole by saying—*These are the four kinds of Avidyá.*

[Page 186.] *Text (98): Vidyā also is of four kinds: (1) Directly sensuous, (2) Inferential, (3) Recollective and (4) Superhuman.* (III-i-8; IX-ii-1,6,23).

Commentary.

The author proceeds to classify *Vidyā*, 'Knowledge.' Not only Ignorance, but Knowledge also is of four kinds. He mentions 'direct sensuous' knowledge first, because it is the cause of 'inferential' knowledge which comes after it; then he mentions 'recollective' knowledge, because we have remembrances of only such things as have been previously known either by the senses or by Inference. The 'superhuman' knowledge is mentioned at the end of the ordinary forms of knowledge, because it belongs only to superhuman beings.

Text (99): Of these, that which proceeds from the sense-organs is 'directly sensuous.' The sense-organs are six—the nose, the tongue, the eye, the skin, the ear and the mind.

This knowledge appears with regard to substance and the other categories. As regards substance, it appears with reference to three forms of it, in the gross form; and proceeds from such causes as the existence of many parts, the appearance of manifested colour, and the presence of the contact of four things, aided by such auxiliaries as dharma and the like; in this the knowledge is in the character of 'mere perception of form.' From the contact of the mind as qualified by (1) *generalities,* (2) *specialities,* (3) *substances,* (4) *qualities and* (5) *action,—there proceeds a 'directly sensuous' knowledge,—f. i., in the form, 'the* (1) *existing,* (2) *substance,* (3) *earthy cow,* (4) *white and with horns,* (5) *is moving.'*

With regard to colour, taste, odour, and touch the sensuous knowledge is brought about by means particular sense-organs, and proceeds from such causes as—their inherence in composite substances, peculiarities in the qualities themselves and the contact with the substrates of these qualities. The knowledge of sound proceeds from

threefold contact; and inhering in the ear, it is known by the ear alone. Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Viscidity, Fluidity, Velocity and Action are perceived by the eye and the skin, through their inherence in perceptible substances. Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion and Effort are perceived by the contact of both mind and self. Bhāvatva (the character of 'being'), guṇatva (the character 'quality') karma (the character of 'action') and others—when inhering in cognisable substrates—are perceived by means of those sense-organs that perceive their substrates. This is the case with our ordinary 'sensuous' knowledge.

As for persons unlike ourselves—e. g. yogis in the ecstatic condition—there appear precisely true cognitions of the real forms of such things as their own self as well as the selves of others, ākāça, space, time, atoms, wind, mind,—the qualities, actions, generalities and individualities inhering in these,—and inherence; and the cognition of these is brought about by the mind as aided by properties or faculties born of yoga. In the case of Yogis out of the ecstastic condition, direct sensuous knowledge appears with regard to subtile, hidden and distant objects, by means of the mind through fourfold contact, by the force of faculties born of Yoga.

With regard to generalities and individualities, the only means of direct sensuous knowledge is the perception or cognition of the mere form; the cognisables are substance and other categories; the cogniser is the self; and the cognition is the knowledge of substance, etc.

In the appearance of the cognition of generalities and individualities, the means of direct sensuous cognition consists in mere 'āloeana' (contact of the sense-organ and the object); for this there is no other means of knowledge; as it is not in the form of resultant cognition.

Or, the means of direct sensuous cognition may be defined as any and every true and undefinable cognition of all objects, following from fourfold contact; substance and other categories are the cognisables: the self is the cogniser; and the recognition of the good pleasant), bad (unpleasant) and indifferent character (of the things perceived) is the cognition.

Commentary.

The author proceeds to explain the definition of 'sensuous perception'—The meaning of the definition is that, that which is produced after reaching the sense-organs is 'sensuous perception'; the peculiar character of its cause also serves to differentiate a thing from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and as such serves as its definition. For instance, the fact of being produced out of the barley-seed serves as a definition of the barley-sprout; by which reason too this latter name is given to it.

Objection: "In as much as pleasure, pain and impressions are also produced by the sense-organs, this also would be 'sensuous perception' (according to the definition given)."

Reply: Not so; because the definition occurs in the section on 'Buddhi'; and is thereby so qualified as not to extend to pleasure, &c. That is to say, the sense of the definition is that that '*cognition*' which appears after contact with sense-organs is 'sensuous perception.' And it is a well-known fact that pleasure &c., have not the nature of 'cognition'; and as such, how could the definition apply to these?

Objection: "If such be the case, then there could be no '*prāmāṇya*,' 'evidential authority,' or 'character of means of

knowledge,' in the *contact* (of the sense-organs).

Reply: True; such a character is not shown by the sentence under consideration; but as a matter of fact such character of the contact is really meant; as the word '*pramāṇa*' is interpreted as *pramiti-karaṇa*, 'the instrument or means of true knowledge,' and certainly the contact is such a means.

As for Doubt and Misconception, these are excluded by the very fact of the section being one of '*Vidyā*' (while Doubt and Misconception are forms of *Avidyā*).

The declaration, 'that that which is born of the contact with the sense-organs is sensuous perception,' might lead some people to think that it is only the congition born of the external organs that is such a perception; as it is only these organs that are ordinarily known as 'sense-organs;' and with a view to guard against this the author has repeated the word '*aksham*' which is thus made to include all sense-organs, internal as well as external.

The compound in the word '*pratyaksha*' is in accordance with the *sūtra* '*kugatiprādayah*' (Pāṇini II-ii-18); and the word literaly meaning '*pratigatam aksham*' ('that which has approached the sense-organs') the word becomes an adjective, and as such its gender is regulated by the gender of the noun it qualifies,—and we have such expressions as '*pratyaksham jnānam*' (neuter), '*pratyakshā buddhih*' (feminine), and '*pratyakshah pratyayah*' (masculine).

In as much as the word '*aksha*' is known to have many meanings, the author proceeds to specify the meaning desired to be conveyed in the present context. *The word 'aksha' here is used in the sense of Indriya, 'sense-organs.'*

The Sānkhyas speak of eleven sense-organs; and with a view to deny this, the author names six only—Nose, Tongue, Eye, Skin, Ear and Mind'—by which they mean to exclude the other five mentioned by the *Sānkhyas*.

The assertion that, 'cognition born of the sense-organs is *sensuous*'—would bring Remembrance also under the category of 'sensuous knowledge'; hence with a view to show that this latter has no real object extant at the time, the author points out the object of 'sensuous knowledge.' It is only with regard to substance, &c., that we have sensuous knowledge; that is to say, it appears only with regard to substances, qualities, actions and generalities, and never with regard to Individualities and Inherences. Among these too, inasmuch as Substance is the most important, he proceeds to describe the process by which sensuous knowledge is produced with regard to it—*In regard to substance &c.* The word '*tāvat*' is meant to denote *sequence*. He explains the reasons whereby sensuous knowledge is produced with regard to gross substances, in the forms of Earth, Water and Fire: (1) '*anekadravyavattva* which means the fact *being a composite of many particle*, (2) the appearance or manifestation of colour—such appearance being a property of colour, the absence of which makes the fire or light in the water imperceptible; (3) *the presence of contact of four things—viz: (a)* that of the self with the mind, *(b)* of the mind with the sense-organ, and *(c)* that of the organ with the object perceived. When all these causes are present; and there is present also the proper auxiliary in the form of *dharma*, *adharma* and particular points of time and space, then alone sensuous knowledge is possible. In asmuch as there is no perceptibility in the atom and the diad, we have the qualification 'gross.' The 'fact of being a composite of many parts' is a cause of perceptibility, because the presence of large number of component particles, as also the excellence or otherwise of these particles, serve, to bring about distinctness or indistinctness and largeness or smallness of the composite whole Even when there is *grossness* and the presence of many component particles, in Air, yet this is not perceptible; and this is due to the absence of manifested colour in it, whereby the *presence of manifested colour* is also regarded as a cause of perceptibility.

Inasmuch as all cognition is the cause of some sort of pleasure or pain, and is found to appear at definite places and times, it is regarded as brought about by peculiarities of *dharma*, *adharma*, time and space. In the absence of the contact of the self with the mind, of that of the mind with the sense-organ, and of that of the sense-organ with the object, we have no sensuous perception; hence the contact of these four is regarded as the cause of such perception.

Objection: "If the contact of the sense-organ with the object be the cause of perception, then, like Generalities, Individualities also would have to be perceptible, and that would make Doubt and Misconception impossible."

Reply: Not so; as it is not absolutely necessary. That is to say, the Generality consisting of many Individual objects, is perceived merely by the contact of its substratum with the eye; as for the Individuality on the other hand, inasmuch as its extent is very small, it stands in need of the contact of its substrate and its many parts, with the eye as a whole and the several parts of the Eye; hence it is not absolutely necessary for the perception of Generality to be accompanied by the perception of Individuality; specially as the accessories vary in the two cases. It is for this same reason that there is only an indistinct perception of objects at a distance,—the reason for this being the fact that the parts of the outgoing rays of light from the eye get diffused in the intervening space, and hence fail to get at the object in the proper manner.

In connection with sensuous knowledge, some people hold the following view: "The *savikalpaka* or 'determinate' is the only sensuous knowlege; because a thing is capable of being used only when it is in the character of action (and this can pertain only to objects of determinate cognition); and even animals who are devoid any comprehension of the meanings of words, turn to action only after they have a distinct determinate cognition."

Against this view, the author says—*The perception of the mere form* etc., That is to say, there is simple perception, devoid of qualifications, of the form of the thing. If the indeterminate cognition of the form of the thing be not admitted, then, inasmuch as in that case there would be no remembrance of the word denoting it, there could not be a determinate cognition either. Hence one who would wish for determinate cognition must admit of indeterminate cognition also.

This indeterminate cognition does not pertain to the Generality only; because the factor of *distinctness* or *difference* or *peculiarity*, also enters into that cognition. Nor does it pertain to the mere 'specific individuality' of the thing (as held by the *Bauddha*); as the factor of generality is also present in it; and also because it is distinctly recalled on the subsequent perception of another individual of the same class. As a matter of fact, it pertains to the Generality as well as to the Individuality; though it is true that there are no distiinct notions such as 'this is the Generality and that the Individuality', yet this is due to the absence, at the time of the perception, of another object of the same class. It is only when one thing is cognised as having the same general character as another that we have an idea of 'Generality' as distinct from the Individuals; and when one thing is cognised as having a character different from that of another that there is a distinct cognition of the 'Individuality.' At the indeterminate stage of the cognition of an object, as there is no cognition of another object, there is no cognition either of *inclusiveness*—the property belonging to Generality,—or of *exclusiveness*—the property belonging to Individuality; and as these properties are not cognition, there are no distinct notions of Generality and Individuality. As for the cognition of the form of the thing however, this is present; as the cognition of mere form is not dependent on any other property, etc. It is for this reason that an indeterminate cognition is not cognisant of the qualificatory relationship among the Generality, the Individuality and the

specific individuality of an object; as the cognition of this relationship is always preceded by the cognition of distinction among these three factors, which is absent in Indeterminate cognition. It is after this cognition that there appears the determinate cognition which is cognisant of the generic and individual character of objects; because when a man, at the time of cognising an object, recalls another object, he has distinct cognitions of the fact of the former being in certain respects inclusive (agreeing with and similar to), and in others exclusive of (dissimilar to) the said latter object; and it is only then that there appear the notions of Generality and Individuality.

The *Bauddhas* put forward the following argument: "It is only the indeterminate cognition which is unmistaken with regard to its object, having its cognizance invariably in keeping with the 'specific individuality' of things. And for this reason that alone, and not determinate cognition, can be regarded as 'sensuous knowledge'; because determinate cognition has its appearance dependent upon dispositions and tendencies (of the observer); and having its cognizance not always in keeping with the objects, is mistaken with regard to its object; as in the case of 'tufts of hair' (seen when the eye is closed)."

With a view to refute this view of the *Bauddhas*, the author lays down the fact of the character of 'sensuous knowledge' belonging to 'determinate cognition' also—*sāmānyas etc.* It proceeds from that contact of the self and the mind which is dependent upon, and conditioned, by such qualifications as those of Generality, Individuality, Substance, Quality and Action. The cognition that 'the substance *is*,' is qualified by generality; that 'it is earth,' is also qualified by the generality 'earth;' that 'it has horns' is qualified by substance; that 'it is a white cow' is qualified by Quality; that 'it is moving' is qualified by Action,—and every one of these is a 'sensuous cognition.' The 'contact of the self and the mind' being already included in the 'contact of four,' the repitition of it is

with a view to show that what is spoken of now (*i. e.*, determinate cognition) is something different from indeterminate cognition. How can you assert that determinate cognition is not a right form of knowing an object, in face of the fact that what is cognised by the cognition 'this is a jar' is a distinctly definite object with a peculiar neck and so forth?

Objection: "*Vikalpa*, 'definiteness' or 'qualification,' is a cognition or ideation born of nothing; and hence the definite or determinate cognition of an object cannot but be mistaken as has been well said—'definiteness consists of the manifestation of nothing, and as such not keeping with the real state of things it is only a case of misconception."

Reply: It is not so; because in actual action, the cognition is found to be quite in keeping with the real state of things.

Objection: "What really happens is that the definiteness is born of observation (and not directly of the object); and imposing its semblance in the form of the object, it hides from view the difference between the 'specific individuality' of the object and its mere semblance; tends to make the man turn towards the point of space occupied by the 'specific individuality;'—and also brings about an agreement (between the cognition and the real state of things); just as the brightness of the gem does with regard to the gem; and the real object is got at by reason of the indirect relationship or concomitance (between the *semblance* and the *object*, through the *specific individuality*).

Reply: If *definiteness* did not touch (pertain to) the real object, then how could it ever impose its own semblance in the form of the object? As until the rays of the sun emanating from sandy surface is seen we donot cognise the resemblance of water imposed upon it."

Objection: "The definiteness follows upon the wake of sensuous cognition, and taking up the function of the instrument tends to make manifest, or cognised, the object capable

of some effective action; if it were not so, one desiring some effective action could not be brought to act by definite cognition; as has been declared—'from the definiteness too the action is towards the object."

Reply: If such be the case then *definiteness* becomes a right form of cognising the object; as it is found to give rise, with regard to the object, a cognition in keeping with the real state of things.

[Page 191.] *Objection*: "That point of time which is perceived by means of sensuous cognition is not cognised by the definite cognition; and that which is perceived by the definite cognition is not got at by the subsequent activity (of the observer); and thus there is no agreement in regard to the point of time; as all the factors concerned have only momentary existence (like all things). So what we mean is that the point of time that all perceived by the definite cognition is *similar* to that perceived by means of sensuous cognition; and that which is got at by means of subsequent activity is *similar* to that cognised by definite cognition; and thus the *agreement* is merely with regard to the exclusion of contraries, without any regard to the differences of points of time. And in this, as the definite cognition would only be cognising what has already been perviously cognised by sensuous cognition,—it cannot be regarded as a right form of cognition; as for the definite cognition born of an inferential mark, however, it is regarded as a right form of cognition, because of the fact that it cognises, or comprehends, the specific individuality of a fresh object not already cognised by any other means of cognition."

Reply: There is not much in all this argumentation. As what is cognised by means of sensuous cognition is neither the *exclusion of the contrary of the moment of time*, nor its negative form in general imposed with regard to the exclusion of other things, which exclusion too is of a negative character; what is actually cognised is something having the

character of the cause (towards effective action); and that which is a mere negative entity is wholly devoid of all effective action. As for the point of time itself, it is the object of sensuous cognition, as it is a real entity; being quite capable of effective action; and it has been said that this point of time does not fall in with the time of the definite cognition. Under the circumstances, how can the Sensuous Cognition and the Definite Cognition be regarded as having one and the same object? (and hence the latter cannot be said to have an object that has been already cognised). Or, we may grant (for the sake of argument) that both these cognitions have one and the same object, in the form of *something* without any definite form, which is capable of being in keeping with the subsequent activity of the cogniser. Even then the Definite Cognition cannot lose its character of being a right form of cognition; because like a *serial cognition* it is independent of previous cognitions, in the matter of its own objective; and also because it is capable of leading the cogniser to what is cognised by itself. The character of the right form of cognition being thus assured to Definite Cognition, it could be none other than 'Sensuous' in its character; because there are no such factors as that of the inferential mark and so forth; and also because it is found to follow always upon the contact of the sense-organ and the object. It is true that though born directly of the object, it does not, like indeterminate cognition, follow immediately after the contact of the sense-organ with it; but that is due to the fact of the observer not remembering, at that moment, the expressive word (denoting the object), which is a necessary aid to the object and the sense-organ (in the bringing about of definite cognitions).

Objection: "The definite cognition, following as it does upon the *remembrance* (of the expressive word), cannot but be regarded as *born of the remembrance*, and not of the object and the sense-organ; as between these two and the cognition there is the intervening factor of the remembrance."

Reply: Well sir, does an auxiliary hide away the potentiality of an object? If it does so, then what have you to say to the case of the seed being productive of the sprout, when the seed will have its potentiality hidden away by the auxiliaries, earth and water?

Objection: "In what way does the remembrance of the word help the object and the sense-organ, that it could be regarded as their *aid* or *auxiliary*?"

Reply: Just as the definite cognition needs, for its production, the contact of the object and the sense-organ, so also does it need the said remembrance; and hence the help that is given by this remembrance to the object and the sense-organ is only this that while these latter are not by themselves capable of bringing about the effect (in the shape of Definite Cognition), they become so capable when they obtain the aid of the remembrance. The view, that those things that do not add something to the form of the thing cannot be regarded as 'auxiliaries,' we have refuted while refuting the theory of the momentary character of all things (see above).

Objection: "Sensuous cognition is devoid of *kalpanā*, ('definiteness' or 'determinateness,' verbal or objective); and the cognition of definiteness is determinate; and as such this cannot be a right form of knowing things."

Question: What is this '*kalpanā*'?

"There are two kinds of *kalpanā* cognising the *qualified* object: (I) Verbal, consisting of the connecting of the object with a word, and (II) objective, consisting of the connecting of the object with (other) objects."

Reply: This is not right; as the theory does not stand the test of an examination of its alternative forms. For instance, as for the *cognition connecting with words*, (*a*) does this connect the word with the object? (*b*) or does it itself become connected with the object? If the former, then too, we ask—(1) does it reduce the object to the character of the word? (2) or does it cognise the object as tainted by the form of the word? (3) or does it call the object by name of the word?

[Page 192.] The first of these is not possible; because in Determinate cognition also the object appears exactly in the same form as in Indeterminate cognition; and also because it is found to accomplish an effective action (which could not be done by a mere word). If it were not so, then there could not be a simultaneous activity, with regard to it, of the person knowing the meaning of the word and another who does not know it.

In the case of (2) it is not right to assert that the Determinate cognition cognises the object as tainted by the form of the word; because such is not found to be the case; as what actually happens is that when the object has been comprehended by means of the Indeterminate Cognition, the previously known word denoting that object is remembered at the sight of its counterpart (in the form of the object); and the well-known word being remembered qualifies the object with regard to its own denotation; and it is not that the object is cognised as tainted by the form of the word, in the same manner as the rock-crystal is tainted with the blue colour (of the object placed near it); because the word is not visible; and it is the object only that is cognised as 'such and such a thing' (by name); just as in the case of Indeterminate Cognition. Nor is it that when the expressive word is remembered, there is any harm done to the form of the thing denoted by it; and hence the contact of the object and the sense-organ being present, the mere remembrance of the name cannot deprive the cognition of its 'sensuous' character; as has been well said: 'the name, even though remembered, does not set aside the sensuousness of the object to which the name belongs; because the name is absolutely indifferent, and not capable of concealing the form or character of an object.'

(3) Nor can we believe that the cognition names or mentions the object as connected with the word. Because it is the intelligent Self which, through its power of recalling impressions, remembers the expressive word he had come to know at the time of the convention determining its meaning; and then names or speaks of the object by means of that word—*e. g.*, 'this is *a jar*;' this cannot be done by the Cognition which, being unintelligent, is devoid of the faculty of recalling impressions. Hence it is proved that the Cognition cannot connect the object with the word.

(*b*) Nor does the object by itself become connected with the word; because the Cognition as well as the form that is inseparable from it, being momentary, is each independent by itself; and hence no word being capable of belonging to a number of these in common, they are incapable of any convention; and hence they cannot become connected with words; and also because the word which denotes the *object* cannot be used to speak of either the *object* or the *cognition of that object* which is something wholly different from the *object*.

Objection: "Determinate cognition has its object such as is connected with words. And the object becoming connected with the word comes to be spoken of by means of that word; and it is with reference to this that we have the conventional denotation of the word. This convention too pertains to that which is non-momentary in its character, and is common among many things; and neither the 'specific individuality,' nor the cognition of the specific individuality, nor the form of the cognition, is either common or non-momentary. As for the externality of the form of cognition, that too is something distinct from the form of the cognition, and is something wholly uncommon or specific. Then as for Generality, there is no such real entity; as that has been shown to be incapable of standing the test of examination. Consequently, there being no comprehension of difference among the particular

forms of the cognition, each of which in its external character is imposed upon it by the determinate cognitions, and singleness also being imposed upon it through the exclusion of all that is other than that cognition,—there follows the convention with regard to the word. This being proved by proper evidence cannot be denied. Thus then, the determinate cognition, functioning towards the unreal object connected with the word, brings about the cognizance of an object that has no existence; and this is what is meant by '*kalpanā*' or '*jnāna*,' 'cognition.' As has been well said: 'In any *kalpanā* the form, that appears as one, coming as it were from elsewhere, and being something excluded from other things,—has no real essence (or existence): because it does not form a factor in actual (sensuous) cognition."

[Page 193] *Reply*:—If the nature of *kalpanā* lies in the comprehending of something qualified by the generality, there being no such real entity as generality by itself,—then it would consist in something having for its object that which has no existence; and not in the comprehending of something connected with word. Under the circumstances, if we succeed in proving the existence of generality, then, even though Determinate Cognition might be comprehensive of objects connected with words, it could not but be regarded as 'Sensuous,' inasmuch as it is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ; specially as that which contains a direct and distinct manifestation is 'Sensuous,'—as we find in the case of Indeterminate Cognition; and Determinate Cognition is one that contains a direct and distinct manifestation. Cognitions are indirect whenever they are not produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organs; as we find in the case of inferential cognition; and the fact of being produced by such contact of the object with the sense-organ, which is the contradictory of the fact of not being produced by such contact, is distinctly cognisable in Indeterminate Cognition; and hence your theory would involve the 'contradiction of the *vyāpaka*' (*i. e.*, in

determinate cognition we find the character of *being produced by sense-contact*, and this character is contradictory to the character *of not being produced by sense-contact*; this latter is always accompanied by *indirectness*; hence the attributing of *indirectness*, which would necessarily imply the presence of the character of *not being born of sense-contact*, to Determinate Cognition would involve a contradiction).

Objection: "We can bring forward a similar argument in support of the opposite view: That cognition which is preceded by remembrance is non-sensuous,—as inferential cognition; Determinate cognition is preceded by remembrance; (hence it is non-sensuous)."

Reply: If *sensuousness* is ever perceived, it is only in determinate Cognitions; and hence it cannot be denied; as all denial is preceded by the previous *presence* of (that which is denied).

Objection: "*Sensuousness* is cognised in Indeterminate cognitions by an inference based upon the fact of the appearance of Indeterminate Cognitions being invariably concomitant with the contact of the object with the sense-organs."

Reply: If you once admit the truth of the inference of *sensuousness* from invariable concomitance (of sense-contact), then (as this concomitance would be present in the case of Determinate Cognitions also) the Inference whereby you seek to negative the sensuousness of these cognitions would be operating against that former inference; and as such would be negatived by that same inference, just like the proposition 'sound is not perceived by the ear."

Thus then *kalpanā* cannot be a cognition consisting in the *connecting of word*.

II—Nor can *kalpanā* be the cognition of a qualified object, and consist in the *connection of objects*; as the qualification, the qualified, and the relationship between these two of the differentium and the differentiated,—are all real (and as such cannot be called '*Kalpanā*' which by its very nature, must be unreal).

Objection: "A Cognition consists in the comprehension of an object; and it appears from sense-contact, exactly in accordance with the character of the object as it presents itself at first sight; and it does not operate after any deliberation. A determinate cognition however is deliberate in its character, involving many such deliberations,—'this is the qualification,—that the qualified,—such and such is the relationship between them,—the ways of men are such that they speak of the *man with the stick*, and not of *the stick with the man*' and so forth; and the observer having considered all these facts collates them and then arrives at the determinate cognition that 'this is the man with a stick.' If the qualified character of the object were real, then at the very first sight it would be cognised as such. And as it is not so cognised at first sight, its qualified character cannot be regarded as real; it must be unreal and adventitious. Hence we conclude that the cognition of the qualified character of an object is *Kalpanā*."

Reply: Ill argued has this been by you, my good Sir! It is the intelligent self who, having comprehended each one of the qualification etc., and thought over them, comes to cognise, by his sense-organs, the qualified character of the object; and this is not done by the Cognition, which is unintelligent and as such incapable of thinking over the qualifications; specially as it does not operate intermittently. As for the object, it is always *qualified*, on account of its connection with qualifications; and the fact of its not being perceived as qualified by the sense-organ is due to the absence of the necessary aids in the form of the comprehension of the qualifications; and as soon as thes equalifications are comprehended, it at once becomes cognised as qualified. Thus then, even in presence of the indubitable fact of the qualified cognition being born of sense-contact, if sensuous character be denied to it, merely for the fault of being qualified,—then such

a reasoning is too clever to be refuted! So we close this discussion here.

[Page 194]. The author proceeds to describe the causes of the sensuous cognition of Colour &c.—*Ruparasa etc., etc.* The word '*anekadravyam*' means that *substance* which inheres in, is made up of, many component parts. The '*svagata viçesha*' is the *character of taste* in Taste, *the character of odour* in Odour, *the character of touch* in Touch, and so forth. From the contact of their substrates with the cognitive sense-organs, appears a distinctive cognition brought about by each one of the sense-organs—*viz*: the cognition of colour is brought about by the Eye, that of taste by the Tongue, that of odour by the Nose, and that of touch by the Skin. As the specific character of each is also a cause of perception, there is a restriction as to the operation of the sense-organs; otherwise, if there were no difference, there would be a confusion in the sense-operations. As for sound, which inheres in the Ear, its perception is brought about by the 'contact of three'—*viz*: of the self, the mind and the sense-organ; as for the contact of the object (sound) with the organ, this is implied in the qualification 'which inheres in the Ear' (sound inhering in the ear, there is no need of contact); it is perceived by that same organ'—*i. e.* by the Ear.

Number etc. down to Action, when inhering in perceptible substances, are perceived by the Eye and the organ of Touch.

Objection: "We cannot allow that Action is perceptible; as when a substance moves, we do not perceive anything else except certain conjunctions and disjunctions (and these are only Qualities, while Action is a distinct category). As for the notion 'it moves,' it pertains to an act inferred from the said conjunctions and disjunctions."

Reply: In this argument there is nothing to recommend itself. If Action were imperceptible, and only to be inferred from conjunctions and disjunctions, then, inasmuch as these

conjunctions and disjunctions always belong to two substrates (*f. i.* the moving object and the ground it moves upon), the action (of moving) could be inferred (and believed) to exist in the other substrate (ground) also. As a matter of fact, however, we find that when the monkey moves from the top of the tree to its root, and again from the root to the top, we have no such notion as that 'the tree moves,' though the tree also is the substrate of the conjunctions and disjunctions (of the monkey).

Objection: "The non-inference of Action in the tree is due to the fact that in the case in question the monkey has certain other conjunctions also, as for instance those with the points of space and the like, and these other conjunctions are not known to be bought about by any action *of the tree*."

Reply: If such be the case then, for the sake of these other conjunctions of the monkey with the points in space, we might assume another action of the monkey; in any case the assumption of action in the tree would not be set aside. There is a general law to the effect that the substratum, of the cause (action) is the same as the substratum of the effect (conjunction and disjunction) and if this law were rejected in one instance, how could we believe in it in other instances?

Objection: "When we have assumed the action of the monkey (on the strength of inference from conjunctions and disjunctions), that is found enough to explain all such conjunctions of the monkey as those with the tree and with the points in space; and as such there is no ground for assuming the action of both (the monkey and the tree)."

Reply: It is not so, as all that is needed for inference is that whenever the *pervaded* (or less extensive) *mark* is perceived, it points to the presence of its *pervasive* (more extensive) concomitant. And in what way could such an inference be disturbed, as Apparent Inconsistency is, by other explanations (of the premisses)? Nor is the Inference an intelligent being like man, that it should operate with due regard to

certain purposes in view. If you seek to assume the conjunctions and disjunctions of any one point in space as the cause of the inference of action,—then we say that such an assumption cannot be made; because of the imperceptibility of the conjunctions and disjunctions of space which is beyond the reach of the senses. If, then, the action be sought to be inferred from the series of conjunctions and disjunctions of a certain portion of the Earth-globe, then the action of the flying bird would be absolutely inexplicable and incomprehensible. If the inferential mark in this case were sought to be found in the conjunctions and disjunctions of the light overspreading the atmosphere,—then there could be no basis or explanation for such notions as 'my arm is throbbing,' 'my eyebrow is moving';—notions born of the sense of touch as controlled by the invisible internal organ,—actions which appear, in dense darkness, by reason of the action of disordered wind in the body; how too could you explain the notion of moving that we have, in an intensely dark and cloudy night, with regard to the lightning flash which lasts for a moment (and is not perceived as having any conjunctions or disjunctions)?

The perception of *buddhi* and other qualities belonging to the self is due to its inherence in something in conjunction with the sense-organ. As for *sattā*, 'being,' *dravyatva* and other such (abstract) qualities, these are perceived by the same sense-organ by which their substrates are perceived.

(1) The perception of Substance is due to Conjunction (direct contact of the sense-organ); (2) that of Quality &c., is due to their inherence in something in direct contact with the sense-organs; (3) that of '*guṇatva*,' 'the character of quality' is due to their inherence in something inhering in that which is in direct contact with the sense-organs; (4) that of sound is due to inherence (in the sense-organ); (5) that of '*çabdatva*' is due to its inherence in that which inheres in the sense-organ; (6) and that of negation is due to its qualifying that which is related to the sense-organs; these are the six kinds of

'sense-contact'. There are certain perceptions of negation,—such for instance as (*a*) the perception of the absence of taste &c., in colour, which is due to its qualifying that which inheres in a thing in contact with the sense-organ; (*b*) that of the negation of '*rasatva*' &c., in '*rūpatva*,' which is due to its qualifying the qualification existing in something inhering in that which is in contact; (*c*) that of the absence of the letter '*kha*' in the letter '*ka*,' which is due to its qualifying that which inheres in the sense-organ; and (*d*) that of the absence of '*khatva*' in '*katva*,' which is due to its qualifying that which inheres in something inhering in the sense-organs. All these sources of perception however are included in the 'qualifying of that which is related to the sense-organ' (which has been mentioned as the cause of the perception of negation in general).

Some people regard either Conjunction only or Inherence only as the cause of perception; and they deny the intervening relationships mentioned above.

The nature of things is such that they are perceived only through contact with something else (the sense-organs); as for the possibility of confusion and uncertainty of perception, it is obviated by the restriction or limitation due to the proximity of their substratum.

Recapitulation: Such is the perception of us, who are not *Yogis*. The author proceeds to describe the 'sensuous cognition' of the *Yogis*: *As for those that differ from us &c.*, by '*yoga*' here we mean 'ecstacy;' and it is of two kinds the Conscious or Concrete and the Unconscious or Abstract. The 'concrete ecstacy' consists in the contact of the mind, which has been controlled and concentrated upon a portion of the self, with the self in whom there is a desire for knowledge; and the 'Abstract ecstacy' consists in the contact without any end in view, of the controlled mind with a part of the self arising from 'non-rising' or undisturbed state of the mind.

Of these two, the latter belongs to the seeker after deliverance, and serving the purpose of dissipating ignorance, comes to be fully developed in the last life of the *jīva* upon earth; it does not add any *dharma*, because of the absence of the necessary accessory cause in the shape of a longing or desire (for either acquiring *dharma* or avoiding *adharma*); nor does it tend towards any external object, being centered in the self alone; the former (concrete) ecstacy on the other hand, is always aided by a certain desire, and as such brings about *dharma*; and it always illuminates that external object with regard to which there is in the mind a desire to know the truth. These are the two kinds of ecstacy or yoga; and those who have once experienced this ecstacy, are called '*yogis*' even when they have fallen of from that condition; because of the capability in them (of returning to the same condition).

Inasmuch as the yogis have no perception of supersensuous objects, until the covering of impurities have been removed from thier minds, the author adds that while in the state of ecstacy, by means of their minds helped by *dharma* born of *yoga*, they obtain perfectly true conceptions with regard to their own selves as well as to those of others, and also with regard to *akāça* (space), time, air, atoms, minds, the qualities belonging to the last two, and inherence. By ourselves the self is always cognised in the character of the *doer* and the *possessor* as expressed in the notions of 'I' and 'mine'; both these characters however are due to the connection of the self with such limitations as those of the body &c., and they are not natural to the self; whereby both these notions are called 'false perception,' in all systems of philosophy; simply because they contain conceptions contrary to the true state of things. The natural form of the self is perceived by the *yogis* alone. When the *yogi* makes up his mind to know the true character of the self as taught in the *Vedāntas* (*Upanishats*), he withdraws his mind from the external sense-organs, and fixing it upon a definite part of the self he continues one-pointedly to practise

meditation upon the self; and then there coming into manifestation such of his *dharma* as tends to the accomplishment of his true knowledge, there clearly appears before his mind the real self free from all impositions of the 'I' or the 'mine.' When however he practises meditation with a view to learn the truth with regard to other selves or with the regard to space, time &c. then there comes about a *dharma* of considerable force helping his acquisition of true knowledge with regard to those things; and by the force of this, his internal organ shooting out of his external body, comes into contact with those other selves &c., and then brings about the due cognition of these through contact, of their qualities through the inherence of these in something in contact with the internal organ, of the *guṇatva* of the qualities through inherence in something inhereing in that which is in direct contact, and of the absence of Inherence through the qualification of that which is related to the internal organ. Even in the case of the sciences and the arts we find that even when there is no proper knowledge of these, when due attention is paid and the mind fixed in constant meditation upon those subjects, the knowledge comes in due course.

These arguments have elsewhere been put in the form of the following inferential reasonings:—(1) The collective force of constant contemplation of the self, *ākāça* and such things, is the cause of the true knowledge of these,—because it is a particular kind of practice,—like the practice of learning the sciences and arts; and (2) the varying grades of the intellect (involved in the practice) have a certain limit beyond which it does not go,—because they are varying grades,—like the varying grades of dimension. [And the true knowledge of self &c. would be those limits].

Objection: "In the case of water that is being heated we find that there are varying grades of heat; and yet we never find it ever reaching the highest limit of heat by being turned into fire itself (and from this it is clear that the mere presence of varying grades does not necessitate the reaching of the

highest limit); nor do we ever perceive any limit upon the practice of jumping; as there is no man that can jump over all the three worlds (and until this limit is reached there would always be varying grades of jumping)."

Reply: When a property that has a permanent substratum produces a peculiarity in its subtratum, a practice or repitition which would be of the nature of such a property would, gradually, reach the highest limit of excellence; as for instance when gold is repeatedly heated and treated by the method of '*puṭapaka*,' its purity gradually reaches the highest limit in acquiring the character of the *rakṭasāra* (?). As for the *heating of water*, it has got no permanent substratum, wherein reptetion could bring it up to the highest limit; this absence of the permanent substratum is proved by the fact of the water entirely disappearing on the application of great heat. Then as for the practice of *jumping*, it is not productive of any peculiarity in its substratum; because the first jumping having been totally destroyed, leaving no traces behind, the second and subsequent jumpings might be the effects of other forces and efforts, like an altogether new jumping (and hence any susequent excellence of jumping need not necessarily be attributed to the previous jumping). It is for this reason that we find that when the man is tired by three or four jumps, his limit of jumping begins to decline, on account of the decrease of strength (and this could not be if practice brought about gradual improvement). As for *buddhi* on the other hand, it has a permanent substratum, and brings about peculiar characters in its substratum; as we find that though something may not be comprehended at first, it becomes duly comprehended, when the *buddhi* is repeatedly applied to it. And thus the previous repitition always producing a higher peculiarity in it at each step of the practice, when the practice is kept up continuously and with great care for a long time, the *buddhi*, having obtained fresh force due to *dharma* born of *yoga*, must reach its highest limit; and there is nothing unreasonable or improbable in this.

Then again it has been argued that, 'yogis cannot perceive supersensuous things,—because they are living beings—like ourselves'; and if this has been argued with regard to all men, then it becomes superfluous (as we too do not admit it of all men); and as for any particular kind of men, our opponent does not admit of any such (as they do not admit of men acquiring any powers by *yoga*); if he should know of any such man, then his argument would become contrary to the means of knowledge whereby such a person (who would form the subject of his conclusion) would be known (as the argument is meant to deny the existence of any such person with peculiar powers &c.).

Objection: "Your argument is an instance of '*prasangasādhana*' (the proving of an undesirable contingency); and such an argument is rightly brought forward, never for the establishing of one's own position, but for the showing of an undesirable element in the opponent's view of the case. But this undesirable element also can be rightly brought home to the opponent only when proved by means of such *dharma &c.* as are admitted by him; and it is not necessary that the person putting forward those should know and believe them to be true himself. For the opponent can never come forward with the assertion—'these *dharma* &c. are not admitted by you; and I cannot understand them even though they are admitted by me'."

Reply: Is this '*prasangasādhana*' an Inference or something else? If it is something other than Inference, then it should be shown to which 'means of knowledge' above described it belongs; or a distinct definition of it should be given. If, however, it is only an Inference, then it can operate only as based upon a previous cognition of the person bringing it forward; as a '*parārtha anumāna*' (inference for the sake of others) is always put forward with a view to produce in the mind of the other person a firm conviction similar to that in the mind of the speaker himself. If it were not so, then it would be possible to admit the evidential authority of such inferential arguments as—'the sky-lotus is sweet-smelling, because it is a lotus, like the lotus

in the tank ;'—even though it has a subject whose existence is not admitted by the propounder of the argument.*

Then as for the fact of yogis being 'living beings' (which has been brought forward by the opponent as a reason for denying their supersensuous vision), and such other facts, these are cases of doubtful concomitance. If the great man under consideration were to have the character of a 'living being' he might also have omniscience,—what inherent improbability could there be in this? Certainly no inconsistency has ever been found between 'omniscience' and the character of 'living being.' But omniscience being cognisable by other means of knowledge, its concomitance with the character of 'living being' would always be doubtful; as it cannot be definitely ascertained whether our want of omniscience is due to our character of living beings, or to the absence of the *dharma* born of *yoga*, which is recognised as the cause of the knowledge of all things. Consequently the 'character of living beings', having its concomitance doubtful, cannot prove the inferential conclusion (that the yogi can have no supersensuous cognition).

Objection: "It is not yet proved that *dharma* born of *yoga* is the cause of superseusuous cognition; and under the circumstances, how can our want of omniscience be suspected of being due to the absence of that *dharma*?"

Reply: To us the fact is well-known and fully established; hence it is that we suspect it. Thus then, the invariable concomitance (of 'the character of living beings' and 'want of supersensuous knowledge' is not one that is accepted by both parties; how then could there be any right inference based upon it?

Page 198.] Having described the sensuous perception of yogis in ecstacy, the author proceeds to describe that of those out of the ecstatic condition. Persons who have accumulated a store of *dharma* by yoga, even when not in the state of *samādhi*

* The reading '*bhyupagatasiddhā*' does not give good sense, hence the translation has adopted the reading given in the footnote.

or ecstacy, do perceive things beyond the ordinary range of the senses; and it is these persons in this state that are called '*viyukta*', 'non-ecstatic.' When these persons, having before them all the best of objects, and having none of the effective causes dulled in any way, come to have the contact of the four things,—self, mind, sense-organ and the object,—and this contact is aided by the *dharma* born of their yogic practices,—then, through the said contact thus helped, they come to have direct sensuous perception of subtle things, like the mind, the atom &c., of things hidden from ordinary view (though close to us) like the nether region of serpents, and of distant things like the region of Brahmā and the like.

Sensuous perception has been fully described; and the author next proceeds to distinguish the 'result' of this means of knowledge. In regard to Generalities,—like '*sattā*', '*dravyatva*', '*guṇatva*', '*karmatva*' &c.,—and also with regard to Individualities, the 'means of knowledge' is in the form of the mere '*ālocana* of form', free from all qualifying definiteness, '*vikalpa*'; as it is this 'cognition' that forms the most efficient means of the right knowledge of the thing; this exceptional 'efficiency' being inferred from the fact of its having the peculiarity that when this is present the person desiring knowledge is sure to have it. The character of the *cogniser* and the *cognised* is such that when these are present, knowledge is possible, and not that it must appear; but the nature of the 'means of cognition' is such that when it is present, in the form of the abstract cognition of the *qualification* &c., it is absolutely certain that the cognition or knowledge of the *qualified* object will duly appear.

The *prameyas*, 'knowables,' are the four categories substance &c., That is to say, when cognition has appeared, it is with regard to these that the action of rejection or acceptance follows. The *pramātā*, 'knower', is the self, as it is in this that the knowledge inheres. *Pramiti*, 'knowledge' is the

knowledge of substance &c. That is to say, when the *abstract cognition* of Generalities and Individualities is the *pramāṇa* 'means of knowledge,' then the *qualified cognition* of the substance &c. is the *pramiti*, 'knowledge'; when, however, the *abstract cognition* of Generalities and Individualities also has the form of 'knowledge', being as it is of the nature of 'cognition of objects', then with reference to that the 'means of sensuous knowledge' is in the form of the mere indistinct *ālocana*. The word '*ālocana*' means *that whereby a thing is perceived*, which is the contact of the object with the sense-organ; and it is this mere sense-contact independently of any actual cognition, that forms the 'means' of the knowledge of Generalities and Individualities. Even for the cognition of the qualified object, this sense-contact is the 'means', because of its inherent character of being the 'means' of cognition; but with this difference that, in this latter it acts as the 'means' only as helping the cognition of the *qualification*, and not independently by itself; while in the case of the abstract cognition of Generalities and Individualities it operates by itself, independently of actual cognition.

Page 199. The author proceeds to show how mere 'contact' is the 'means of knowledge' in this case, and not actual cognition. For the cognition of Generalities and Individualities there is no other 'means', in the form of cognition,—because the cognition of Generalities and Individualities has not the character of a 'result', and as such it cannot be the result of any cognition; the 'cognition of the qualified' is the result of the 'cognition of the qualification'; and this latter cannot be the result of another cognition; as, if it were, then there would be no end of such cognition upon cognition. Hence it must be admitted that for the 'cognition of qualification' the only 'means' that there can be is the contact of the sense-organ with the object.

Thus then, it has been shown that when the abstract cognition of Generalities and Individualities is the 'result'

then the contact of the object with the sense-organ is the 'means'; and when the concrete cognition of the qualified is the 'result' then the mere abstract cognition of the Generalities and Individualities is the 'means'; and the author next points out that when the idea of 'acceptance' or 'rejection' is the 'result', then the cognition of the qualified is the 'means'. With regard to all things the '*pratyakṣha* means of knowledge' is that cognition born of the contact of four, three or two factors, which is 'not false'—*i.e.* free from doubts and mistakes—and which is *avyapadeçya*, 'not produced by words'.

Doubt, while showing an object as having two fleeting characters, lands the observer upon it as if it had a single fixed character; and hence bringing about a contrary conviction it is regarded as *vitatha* 'false'; and as such is precluded by the word '*avitatha*.' When a man, who does not know the meaning of the word 'cow,' has his eyes turned towards an object near him, and when he hears the word 'cow' uttered in its connection, he has the cognition of the 'cow'; and for this cognition the sense-organ of the Eye is also a means; as otherwise he could not have any cognition of each line (on the cow's body). But even then it is not 'sensuous,' because the most effective means of its appearance has been the word uttered between the sight of the animal and the cognition in question; and the sense-organ has acted merely as an aid. Hence it is that when asked, the man says—'this animal has been spoken of by means of the word *cow*,' and not that 'I have perceived by means of the senses that it is a *cow*.' And it is with a view to preclude this verbal element in the cognition that the author has added the word '*avyapadeçya*.'

Cognition consists in the perception of the goodness, badness or indifferent character of the object. The *perception of goodness* constitutes the cognition of the thing as something to be acquired; the *perception of badness* constitutes the cognition of it as something to be rejected or avoided; and the *perception*

of the indifferent character constitutes the cognition that the thing is neither to be acquired nor to be avoided. Whenever the form of an object has been duly cognised, we remember the help or otherwise accorded to us by it in the past; then we come to form definite notions as to whether it is a source of pleasure or pain; and then we have the cognition as to its *acquirability* or otherwise; and this last cognition cannot but be the result of the 'cognition of the form of the object'; the remembrance of pleasure &c., only being intervening agencies; as has been well said—"that which occurs in the interim is the action of the original cause."

Others hold the following view: "The cognition of the thing as a *source of pleasure*, is the same as the *cognition of its goodness*, and also the same as the *cognition of its being an object fit to be acquired*; and similarly the cognition of it as a source of pain is the same as the cognition of its badness, as also the cognition of it as something to be avoided.* And all this appearing as it does as 'direct cognition,' is the 'result' of 'sensuous cognition' which is aided by practice, which perceiving the mere form of the object, is free from any notion of distinguishing marks, and which is independent of all idea of invariable concomitance.

Page 200] *Text* (100)—*The* laingika, '*inferential*,' *cognition is that which proceeds from the sight or perception of the* linga, *mark* or '*probans*.'

Commentary.

By the word '*darçana*' here is meant 'comprehension,' and not 'sight' or 'visual perception;' as we often have chances of infering what has been inferred (and in this case the inference would be based upon a previous inference and not upon actual perception). When one sees or perceives the *linga*, an impression also is produced in his mind, of that linga;

* Four lines have been wrongly inserted here as rightly noted in the foot-note on page 200.

but this is not what is meant here; as it happens to be mentioned in connection with *Buddhi* (which precludes the possibility of the sentence refering to any mere *impressions*).

The prefix '*sam*' (in *sanjāyāmānam*') expressing *true* or *real* serves to exclude doubts, misconceptions and remembrances. The sentence thus comes to mean that the 'inferential is that which truly, really or rightly proceeds from the cognition of the *linga*.' That this cognition belonging to the class of 'true cognitions' is produced as pertaining to a real object is due to the fact of such pertaining to reality being in the very nature (the 'family trait') of all cognitions. Doubt and Misconception pertain to that state of the object in which it never exists. Remembrance also does not pertain to the object, being, as it is, dependent upon a previous cognition, as we shall show later on.

Other people declare that Doubt and Misconception are excluded by the fact of the definition appearing under the heading of '*Vidyā*' (while these two are forms of *avidyā*); and with a view to exclude Remembrance which is not produced from real objects in the present, they repeat, in the present connection, the sentence 'it appears with reference to substance and other categories.'

But this is not right; because so long as we can get at the desired thing (the exclusion of Doubt &c.) by the *sentence* itself, we need not have recourse to the indications of the *context*. Then again, if remembrance were excluded simply on the ground of its not pertaining to real objects in the present, then we would also have to exclude such inferences as pertain to past and future objects.

The author proceeds to supply the definition of *linga*.

Text (101):—*The* linga *is that which is related to the object to be inferred, and is known to exist in that which is connected with that object, not exist-*

ing in that wherein that is not present,—such a linga *is the means of inference.* (IX—ii—1).

That which is otherwise than this, being devoid of either one or both of these characteristics, is either contradictory,' or 'unknown' or 'doubtful'; and is not a linga *; so said Kāçyapa.*

Commentary.

The 'object to be inferred' is that object which is qualified by the property meant to be proved (by the inference) as existing therein. '*Which is related to*' means *which exists in.* Just as the *linga* existing in a part of the *vipaksha* (that wherein the Probandum is known to be absent) is called '*vipakshavṛtti*' (existing in the *vipaksha*), so, in the same manner, that which exists in a part of the *paksha* (the subject of the inference) is said to be 'related to the object to be inferred.'

Objection: "If it be so, then, the reason involved in the argument—'the four kinds of atoms are transient, *because of their being odorous.*'—Even though partially *unknown* (odour not being present in any atom except those of Earth), will have to be regarded as true reason (because of *odour* existing in a part of the *paksha*, 'four atoms')."

Reply: Not so; because of dissimilarity; that is to say, a *vipaksha* is that which forms an object (substratum) of the exclusion of the *sādhya* (the factor to be proved by the inference) and the *sādhana* (the Reason or Probans); and this exclusion is possible, not from the atoms taken collectively, but from each of them singly; and hence it is each of the four atoms to which belongs the character of *vipaksha.* The *paksha* on the other hand, is that where in the arguer wishes to establish the existence of the property to be proved. In the case of the argument in question, what the arguer wishes to prove is the transient character, not of the Earth-atom alone, but of all the four atoms; and thus, all the four atoms collectively having the character of the *paksha*, the 'partially unknown' reason be-

comes excluded in the same way as the 'unknown,' because the former also is not related to the 'object to be inferred.'

'*Is known to exist in that which is connected with that object.*'—by 'that object' here is meant the property that has to be proved by the inference; and the clause thus means 'that which is known as existing in the *sapaksha*, which is the object possessed of the property sought to be proved.' This qualification is meant to exclude such reasons as are *viruddha* and *asādhārana* (faults of reasoning explained below).

'*Not existing in that wherein that is not present*'—here also the latter 'that' refers to the property to be proved; and the clause means that it may not be existing even in a part of it; and hence the *anaikāntika* reason is excluded.

'*Such linga is the means of inference*'—*i.e.* it is the means of knowing the object to be inferred.

Having described the *linga*, the author proceeds to describe the *lingābhāsa*, the 'semblance of reason,' the 'false or invalid reason,'—'*That which is otherwise than this*'—*i. e.* That reason which is devoid of one or both of the characteristics pointed out before, and is thus either 'contradictory,' 'unknown' or 'doubtful,' has been described by the son of *Kaçyapa* as '*alinga*,'—*i. e.*, not a means of obtaining a right knowledge of the object to be inferred; as the 'unknown' reason does not exist in that object; the *anaikāntika* or 'Doubtful' reason is not wholly preclusive of the contradictory of the substratum of that object; hence these two fallacious reasons are precluded by the first qualification of *linga* (in the above definition); and as for the 'contradictory' reason, it does not exist in the *sapaksha*, the substratum of the object to be inferred; nor is it preclusive of its contradictory; and hence it is precluded by the second qualification in the definition.

Text (102) :—(1) *That which is concomitant, either in time or place, with the 'object to be inferred,'*—(2)

which is known to exist either in the whole or in a part of something endowed with the property of the inferred',—and (3) *which is authoritatively known to be non-existing in the whole of that which is contrary to the 'object to be inferred',—serves to bring about the inference of the unknown object, and it is* 'linga' (*Inferential Indicative*).

Commentary.

The author proceeds to explain the above verses. (1) That which is concomitant or related with the object to be inferred,—*i. e.*, the object possessed of the property to be proved,—in regard to particular points of time and place; (2) which is known, by the right means of knowledge, to exist in another object (the *sapaksha*) which is endowed with the property of the inferred, either in the whole of it or in a part of it only, and (3) which is known also to be non-existent in an object which is contrary to that to be proved,—*i. e.*, that which is the substratum of the negation of that object;—such a thing becomes the *linga*, serving to bring about the inferential knowledge of the unknown object as possessing the property to be proved.

[**Page 202**] '*Concomitant either in time or place*'—This has been added with a view to show that the *linga* brings about the inferential knowledge of the 'property to be proved' as belonging to the 'object to be proved,' in regard to only that point of time and place with regard to which the invariable concomitance of that property with the object put forward as the corroborating instance may have been shown.

In the whole or in a part, &c.'—This is added with a view to show that the character of the true Reason belongs to that which extends over a part of the *sapaksha* (the object known to possess the property to be proved), as much as to that pervading over the whole of it.

'*Non-existing in the whole &c.*'—This is added for the purpose of showing that the character of the true Reason can-

not belong to that which exists in a part of the *vipaksha* (the object wherein the property to be proved is found to be non-existing); in as much as to that existing over the whole of it.

Certain irresponsible babblers assert as follows: "For the "due accomplishment of the means of right knowledge (Infer-"ence), it is not necessary that we should perceive or recognise "an instance of dissimilarity (that is a case of the Reason not "existing in the *vipaksha*); because (even without the recogni-"tion of any actual instance), it would be enough if we were to "say simply that 'where this (the property to be proved) is not, "that (the *reason*) is not,'—which would suffice to show that "the exclusion of the property to be proved is a sure indicative "of the exclusion of the Reason. To this effect they quote the "following: 'For this reason an instance of similarity is not "necessary as a basis in this connection; as even in the absence "of this the cognition may be obtained by the assertion that "*in the absence of this that does not exist.*"

With a view to deny this, the author says—'*authoritatively*'—*i. e.*, that which is really recognised *by the due means of cognition*, and *not by mere words*, as not existing in the contrary of the 'inferred,' is the *linga*. Mere words, without due authority, would be available in all cases; and hence if conclusions were to be drawn on the strength of mere verbal assertion, then there could be no difference between the *true* and the *fallacious* Reason.

Objection: "The above definition of *linga* is too wide; as it applies to such fallacious reasons also as the '*Prakaraṇa-sama*' and the '*Kālātyayāpadishta*' (see below)."

To this some people make the following reply: These two fallacious reasons are actually included in the '*anaikāntika*' (Doubtful) Reason; because the *Prakaraṇasama* reason exists in such an object with the property to be proved as is liable to being doubted to be a *vipaksha*; and the *Kālātyayāpadishta* exists in that which is absolutely recognised as the *vipaksha*.

For instance, the '*Prakaraṇasama*' reason is that which gives rise to the idea of the context '*prakaraṇa*' which is that which *is introduced* (*prakriyate*); *i. e.*, the *paksha* (subject) and the *vipaksha* (its contrary); and giving rise to ideas of these, the '*prakaraṇasama*' reason, when put forward for the purpose of getting at a certain and definite conclusion, cannot lead to any such conclusion, as it affords ideas of the subject as well as its contradictory; and as such, it could not lead to any conclusion one way or the other. *E. g.*, in the case of the reasonings: (*a*) 'sound is eternal because we do not perceive in it any transient property,' and (*b*) 'Sound is transient, because we do not perceive any eternal quality in it,'—we find that the non-perception of eternal and transient properties in sound having given rise to a doubt as to its eternality or non-eternality, there was a consideration of the question; as the perception of any of the two classes of properties would have decided the question one way or the other, and there would be no consideration or discussion over the matter. The 'non-perception of eternal properties' is put forward as a reason for infering its *non-eternality*; and the 'non-perception of non-eternal properties' as proving its 'eternality.' And so long as the one supersedes and suppresses the other it cannot lead to the requisite conclusion; as the other is an obstacle to such a conclusion. And thus while a contrary reason is possible, the subject cannot get to any *one* (*eka*) definite *end* (*anta*); and this is only an instance of the 'Anaikāntika' reason, from which therefore the '*Prakaraṇasama*' cannot be regarded as different. In the same manner the *Kālātayāpadishṭa* also is only a form of the '*Anaikāntika*'—as 'causedness' exists in Fire which is the *vipaksha* having been perceptibly known to be possessed of *heat* (see below, under '*Kālātayāpadishṭa*').

The above explanation however is not satisfactory. If the indicative or inferential potency of the Reason lies only in the fact of its existing in the *sapaksha* and not existing in the *vipaksha*, while it pervades over the whole of the *paksha*,—

then there might be the possibility of an opposition or contradiction in the object possessing the property to be proved; but even then, the '*prakaraṇasama*' reason, by its very power, could not but prove what it is meant to prove. If it is unable to prove it, by reason of the suspicion of its contradiction, then the Reason cannot be rightly considered sufficiently indicative solely by reason of the three facts (of its existing in the *sapaksha* &c. &c.). And it would be necessary to lay down another necessary condition for the Reason—*viz.* that it should be *asatpratipaksha*, 'without opposition or contradiction'; as so long as there is contradiction, the Reason is not a true Reason, and when there is no contradiction, then it is a Reason. The same may be said with regard to the '*kālātyāyāpadishṭa*' reason also. If the three facts mentioned were the only conditions of the true Reason, then where would be the '*anaikāntika*' character of the Reason in the argument—'Fire is not hot, because it is caused' (as the Reason fulfills the three conditions)? If it be urged that even though the Fire is *caused*, it cannot be believed to be *not hot*, because of its being directly perceived to be *hot*,—then, the Reason in question could prove its conclusion when there would be no opposition of direct sensuous cognition, and never in the presence of such opposition; and as such it would be necessary to lay down another condition for the true Reason—that it should have its objective such as is not set aside or negatived (by a superior means of knowledge).

For these reasons, we proceed to meet the objection in a different manner: '*Paksha*' (subject) is only another name for '*sādhya*' (object to be proved); and a *sādhya* is that which is fit to be proved, which deserves *proof* or *reason*; that for which an opposition or contradiction is possible cannot deserve proof; and a thing cannot have two contradictory characters. Hence the possibility of opposition must be regarded as a property of that which is not *Paksha*. In the same manner that which is contrary to direct sensuous perception &c. cannot be *Paksha*; because being known in one form (by means of sensuous cognition) it

can never deserve to be proved to have another (contrary) form Hence we conclude that the '*prakaraṇa-sama*' and the '*kālātyayāpadishta*' reasons have been both excluded by the qualification 'that which is related to the object to be proved;' as both those reasons are based upon something that has merely a false semblance of the character of the 'object to be proved.'

Objection: "Thus too the definition becomes defective, being too narrow. The Reason is of three kinds—(1) the *anvayī*, universal affirmative, (2) the *vyatirēkī*, universal negative, and (3) the *anvayavyatirēkī*, affirmative-negative. As an instance of (1) we have—'The *viçēsha* is nameable, because it is knowable, like the *Sāmānya*'; in this all things, existing or not existing, besides the *paksha* (*viçēsha*) is *sapaksha*; as whoever the cogniser, and whatever the means of cognition, there is nothing that is either unknowable or unnameable; that which is unnameable and unknowable for every man, is in absolute non-entity, like the 'horns of the horse'; and any such thing could not be either *sapaksha* or *vipaksha*, as it could have no character at all; anything that exists however would be the *sapaksha*; and as the Reason could not exist in anything that would not be *sapaksha*, the definition that 'that which does not exist in its *abhāva*' would be too narrow; as in the case of the argument in question, no negation would be possible; and as such the Reason would not fulfil the condition '*tadabhāvē nāsti*' and hence would cease to be sufficiently inferentially indicative."

Reply: It is not so; as the Reason does not fail to fulfil, the condition of affirmation (laid down in the former half of the definition). In the case of the existence of one thing being inferred from the existence of another, the Reason lies in *affirmation* (positive existence); and such a Reason can be set aside only by the cognition of an instance contravening this affirmation. In the case of the argument in question we find an 'affirmation' (positive co-existence) between 'knowability' and 'nameability'; as the one is always found where the other exists.

We have never met with any case where this invariable concomitance is found to be wanting; in fact no such case is ever suspected; as whichsoever case of a failure here is called up, or meant to be put forward by the opponent, is always found to have both *nameability* and *knowability*. Nor is there any difference; it is only when there is a *vipaksha* that the *absence of failure of concomitance* (*i. e. non-existence in the Vipaksha*) can be regarded as the condition of the Reason, and not when there is absolutely no *vipaksha*; hence *knowability* is a sure indicative of nameability.

[**Page204.**] As an instance of the (2) *vyatirēkī*, Inference, we have—'the living body is endowed with the self, because it has life &c.' In this case every thing besides the *paksha* is the *vipaksha*; and the Reason is a true one; because of the absence of any connection (of the reason) with the absence (of the *paksha*). In all such substances as the jar and the like, we have found the *absence of life* concomitant with *the living body*; and the cognition of this *non-presence* (of the absence of life) indicates and leads to the inference of the non-presence of *the absence of self* (which latter absence is concomitant with the *absence of life*).

Objection: "If a thing is not known, then its negation or absence also is not known; as a negation always pertains to some previous affirmation; and the self is something that has nowhere been known; under the circumstances, how can we ever be cognisant of its absence in the jar and other things?"

Reply: This argument is not right; because the opponent, who holds that all things are devoid of the self, is certainly cognisant of its absence in the *jar* also; then as for ourselves, we have found that the self has the due causal efficiency with regard to such effects as *Buddhi* &c., only in living bodies; and hence finding the effect, *buddhi* &c., absent in the jar, we naturally conclude the absence in it of the self which is capable of

producing those effects; just as the absence of smoke leads to the inference, in certain circumstances, of the absence of fire capable of producing smoke.

Objection: "If such be the case, then the self also is well known to exist in living bodies, as there can be no cognition of the relationship without the cognition of the member bearing that relationship; and thus there would be no need for the *vyatirēki* inference in question; as when an action has been duly accomplished, any means for accomplishing that action, appearing subsequently, ceases to have the character of the means."*

Reply: Not so; as though the self is fully known by us, it is not known to the opponent, for whom it becomes necessary to prove it by means of reasons.

Objection: "Nor is there any such restriction as that it is only the non-failure of affirmation, and not the non-failure of negation, that can prove a conclusion. Consequently in as much as the negation also has the character of the Reason, the definition—'known to exist in that which is endowed with it'—becomes too narrow."

In reply to this, some people assert that the definition includes the purely affirmative as well as the purely negative Inference, by reason of both being equally known and accepted in the same system of philosophy. Others explain the definition, taking the various qualifications in it in different combinations; pointing out that the qualification 'that which is related to the object to be inferred and is known to exist in that endowed with it' applies to the affirmative Inference; while 'that which is related to the object to be inferred and does not exist in its contrary' applies to the negative Inference; and the whole definition applies to the Affirmative-Negative Inference. The character of 'proving what is to be proved' applies to all the three kinds of Inference; and it serves as the common

* The reading given in the foot note is apparently the better one.

definition of all Inference, just as of all means of right knowledge the common definition is laid down as 'that which affords the cognition of the true object.'

Text (103): *That which differs from the above-mentioned 'linga' in one or both points is not a 'linga' (means) in the comprehension of the object to be inferred; this is what the author of the Sūtra has declared in the Sūtra 'aprasidhho'napadeço'san digdhaçca'* (*Vaiçeshika-Sūtra* III-i-15).

Commentary.

[**Page 205.**] In the *sūtra*, the word '*anapadeça*' means 'no Reason,' the word '*apadēça*' meaning '*hetu*.' The word '*aprasiddha*' is meant to include the *viruddha*, 'contradictory' and *asādhāraṇa* 'too special,' Reason; in as much as both these not being known to be concomitant with the *property to be proved*, they cannot have the character of the true Reason. '*Asat*' includes the *asiddha*, 'not proved' Reason; because, even though such a Reason is known to be concomitant with the *property to be proved*, yet it does not exist in the *Subject* having that property; and as such it cannot be regarded as the true Reason. The word *Sandigdha*' means the *anaikāntika*, 'doubtful' Reason; though this is found to exist in the subject, yet it is doubtful whether it is concomitant with the *property to be proved*, or is devoid of it; and as such it cannot indicate or bring to view any one only of these two characters; as it is found to have both these characters.

That with regard to which we have no such notion as that 'this is invariably concomitant with that,'—in reference to such a thing the 'property' could not be regarded as a true 'linga,' even though it were invariably concomitant with the 'Subject'; for this purpose the remembrance of invariable concomitance is a necessary accessory in the inferential cognition of the *object to be inferred*; the author next proceeds to explain this.

Text (104): *The process (of inference) is as follows: 'Whenever there is smoke there is fire; where there is no fire there is no smoke'—one who is cognisant of this concomitance, when he has an absolutely certain vision of smoke, he recalls to his mind its concomitance (with fire), after which comes the cognition of the presence of fire.* (IX-ii-1).

Thus in all cases when one thing is invariably concomitant with another in point of time and place, it becomes its 'linga.' (IX-ii-2).

In the Vaiçeshika Sūtra, the author has mentioned 'effect and the rest,' only with a view to exemplification, and not for the purposes of restriction. 'How so?' Because we find (Inferences) apart from those therein specified. For instance, the fact of the Adhvaryu priest repeating 'om' is indicative of the presence of the Hotr priest; the rise of the moon is indicative of the rise in the sea, and also of the blooming of the water-lily; the clearness of water in the autumn is indicative of the rise of the constellation of Agastya.

These and such other inferences are all justified and pointed out by the expression 'asyedam' (in the Sūtra) which denotes mere relationship (of concomitance). (III-i-9 to 14, 7 and 8).

This Inference is of two kinds: (a) the Dṛshta and (b) the Sāmānyatodṛshta.' The 'Dṛshta' inference is that where the 'prasiddha,' that which is already known (as concomitant with the 'linga,'), and the 'sādhya,' whose presence has to be proved, belong absolutely to the same class. As for instance, when one has seen the dewlap only in the body of the cow, whenever, on any subsequent occasion, he happens to see the dewlap, he infers the existence

of the cow. When, however, the 'prasiddha' and the 'sādhya' belong to absolutely different classes, the inference follows only from the concomitance of the 'generic form' of the 'linga' with the 'generic form' of the 'object to be inferred'; and this inference is called the 'Sāmānyatodṛshta.' As for instance, having found the activity of such persons, as the farmer, the trader and the servants of the king always leading to certain results, we infer the fact that, of persons observing the rites of their respective castes and conditions also, the activity, which is not found to have reference to any visible purpose, must tend to definite results.

In Inference, the 'means of knowledge' is the perception of the 'linga,' and the 'knowledge' is the cognition of fire; or the cognition of fire itself may be regarded as the 'means,' and the 'knowledge' is the cognition of the good or indifferent character of the fire.

Such is the inference that serves the purposes of one's own definite cognition. (*II-i-8*).

Commentary.

The process of inferential cognition may be thus explained; When a man has become cognisant of the fact of fire existing wherever there is smoke, and there being no smoke when there is no fire, if he, on any occasion, has a definite and doubtless cognition of smoke,—as that 'this is smoke, and not vapour or any such other thing'; and at the same time if he happens to recall the aforesaid invariable concomitance of fire and smoke,—then he is led to the inference of fire.

Objection: "If such be the process, then in this we do not meet with the second premiss (the minor premiss) (the

conclusion being deduced from the single proposition 'wherever there is smoke there is fire')."

Reply: It does not matter if we do not find the minor premiss; as a matter of fact we do not need it; an inferential cognition of the subject of inference follows only from the perception of the *linga* and the remembrance of its invariable concomitance. The fact of inferential cognition following after remembrance does not make it uncertain as to the points of time and place; as the perception of the *linga* would restrict it to a definite point of time and place. Nor would the '*upanaya*' (Minor Premiss) be absolutely useless; as it would always have to be brought forward in the case of inference for the sake of others, wherein it would serve the purpose of pointing out the fact of the *linga* belonging to the '*paksha*,'—a fact not indicated by any other factor in the process.

Objection: "Well Sir, what is this '*avinābhāva*' (Invariable Concomitance)?"

Reply: It is '*avyabhicāra*' (non-failure of concomitance).

Question: "From what cause does this proceed?"

To this question, the *Bauddhas* offer the following answer: "Invariable concomitance follows from—(*a*) identity or connate-"ness, and (*b*) 'origination,' (*i. e.* 'from the characteristic "features of the thing, and from the relation it bears to its "cause).

"That is to say, (*b*) a chance relationship is such that it "may or may not be, there being no restrictive cause. If a cer-"tain property is seen in the *sapaksha*, and not seen in the "*vipaksha*, these two facts alone are not enough for the recogni-"tion of an invariable concomitance between the two; as sus-"picions as to its existing in the *vipaksha* will not have been "altogether set aside; When however, its 'origination' is duly "ascertained, those suspicions are set aside; as in the absence "of the cause, the effect cannot come into existence. The ascer-"tainment of its origination is a cause in the case, having for its

"instruments the five 'perceptions and non-perceptions.' Thes "five are—(1) the non-perception' of the effect prior to its origi-"nation; (2) the 'perception' of the effect on the perception of "the cause; (3) the non-perception of the perceived effect due to "the non-peception of the cause (thus of the effect there are "two 'non-perceptions' and one 'perception);' (4) the 'percep-"tion' of the cause and (5) the 'non-perception' of the cause. "By means of these five 'perceptions' and 'non-perceptions', "is ascertained the fact that 'smoke exists only where fire exists, "and where fire does not exist smoke does not exist.' The very "nature of the effect lies in this that it exists only when the "cause exists, and not otherwise.

[Page 207.] "(*a*) The cognition of 'identity' also brings about "the ascertainment of invariable concomitance. Any positive "entity can never fail to have its characteristic feature; if it "did, then it would be devoid of any such nature; as for the "ascertainment of identity, it is brought about by the due "operation of the negativing means of knowledge with regard "to the *vipaksha*; until there is this operation, even hundred "cases of concomitance cannot set at rest the suspicion that "the property in question might exist in the *vipaksha*. To this "end it has been declared—'the ascertainment of invariable "concomitance follows from such restrictive agencies as the "relationship of cause and effect, and the characteristic feature "of the thing, and not from non-perception,'—*i. e.* not from the "'non-perception' of the property in the *vipaksha*, nor from its "'perception' in the *sapaksha*."

Against the above view of the *Bauddha*, we make the following observations: Do you mean that—(*a*) there is 'invariable concomitance' where there are 'identity' and 'origination'? or (*b*) that there are 'identity' and 'origination' when there is 'invariable concomitance'? (*a*) The former cannot be true; as even though the smoke 'originates' from fire, yet we find certain properties of this smoke—such as its

Earthiness and the like—not concomitant with fire; and even though the particular tree is identical with (has the nature of) the generic character of the 'tree,' yet there is no invariable concomitance with the particular tree (*çiṅçapā*). (*b*) In the case of the latter alternative, on the other hand, the two conditions of 'identity' and 'origination' would be indicative only when the invariable concomitance would be there already; and under the circumstances, the concomitance by itself might well be regarded as indicative; what would be the use of 'identity' and 'origination'? Specially as what an 'effect' indicates is not merely that 'such and such a thing is an effect'; nor does the 'nature' of the thing indicate that 'it is its nature,'; what both of these do is to indicate that, such and such a thing does not fail in its concomitance with such another thing'; and thus the only cause of indication lies in the 'invariable concomitance,' and not in 'identity' or 'origination; specially as the causal efficiency of these latter has not been found to be always effectual. Nor does it appear reasonable to assert that it is only smoke itself that is produced by fire, and not the properties of smoke—*earthiness* &c; because a thing is impartite (and cannot be separated from its properties). Nor have we ever had any cognition to the effect that the 'çiṅçapā tree' is identical with (of the same nature as) the 'tree (in general), and that the 'tree' is not identical with the çiṅçapā on account of the 'tree' in general pertaining to the çiṅçapā as well as to the other trees, the *Dhava* the *Khadira* and the like; because there is no real difference between the 'tree' and the 'çiṅçapā.' For if the generic character of the 'tree,' being common to the *Dhava*, were not identical with the character of the 'çiṅçapa,' then the two could not be one, as a difference in nature is always indicative of real difference; if however there be no difference between the two, then, just as the generic character of the 'tree' is common to all trees, so would also be the general character of the 'çiṅçapā.' Nor could any restriction be accomplished by the fact of 'connateness' being

the basis of the relationship of the indicator and the indicated; as 'connateness' is based upon 'non-difference'; and if on the perception of the generic character of the 'çiṅçapā,' there were no perception of the generic character of the 'tree,' then where would the necessary 'connateness' be perceived? And on the other hand, if the perception of the latter were to follow on the perception of the former, then where would be the 'inference'?

It might be argued that,—"the object as it exists, the generic character of the 'çiṅçapā and the generic character of the 'tree,'—all these are connate (of one and the same nature); and hence when the object would be perceived, the two generic characters would also be necessarily perceived; as has been declared:—'When an object is seen, all its qualties are seen; and which part of it would be unseen that could be taken up by other means of knowledge?' That this becomes a determinate cognition of the *çiṅçapā*, and not of the *tree*, is due to the fact of the non-remembrance of the word 'tree'; as the determinate cognition of the çiṅçapā, brought about by the impression or recalled idea of the word 'çiṅçapā,' leads to the *Exclusion of the 'non-çiṅçapā,'* and not to the *Exclusion of the 'non-tree,'* If it were not so, then all determinate cognitions would become identical. As for the relation of the indicator and the indicated this also belongs to the two *Exclusions* of Contraries (*apohas*), and not of the things themselves, as there can be no affirmation (or positive cognition) with regard to the thing itself. Then as regards the exclusions of the '*non-tree*' and the '*non-çiṅçapā*,' these are distinct from each other, as is shown by the fact of the *excluded* negations being in the two cases distinct; and hence there is no room for the objection put forward against the *Bauddha* theory."

[Page 208] *Reply*: How excellent is the ingenuity of the learned in reconciling what has gone before and what is said afterwards!! It has been said before that 'identity' and 'connateness' are the root of inference, and subsequently it is said that there is a difference between the two *Exclusions* that respectively form the

'object' and the 'means' (of inference)! What may this wonderful magic be?

Obj: "There is a 'connateness' between the generic characters of the 'tree' and the '*çiṅçapā*,' and while these remain 'connate,' even though there is a difference between the *Exclusions* of the 'non-tree' and the 'non-çiṅçapā,' the 'connateness' is accepted in accordance with the cognition or idea that we have of them."

Reply: When the 'identity' has been established, then alone the 'exclusion of the non-tree' in the 'subject of Inference' can be cognised by the 'exclusion of the non-çiṅçapā'; and then the 'exclusion of the non-tree' having been cognised, the 'identity' could be established, in accordance with that cognition; and this would involve a most undesirable interdependence.

Obj: "At the time of the comprehension of the invariable concomitance, the two *Exclusions* are cognised as of the same nature; and this establishes their 'identity' or 'connateness'?

Reply: Then, in that case, the 'identity' of the ascertained or cognised exclusion becomes a mere assumption; and if the inferential process were to be carried on by means of mere assumptions, then there would be nothing that could not have the character of the true 'Reason'; as even for two such terms as 'knowability' and non-eternality,' it might be possible to be recognised as having one and the same nature, and thereby to be regarded as 'identical' in accordance with that cognition.

Obj: "In the case of these two terms, in as much as there is no 'exclusion of existence in the *vipaksha*,' there can be no identity between 'knowability' and 'non-eternality.'"

Reply: True; there can be no true identity between the two; but there does certainly always exist an *assumed* identity; and it is such an assumed identity that you would have as the means for the accomplishment of inferences; and under the circumstances, the 'non-exclusion from the *vipaksha*' is as good

as non-existent (*i. e.*, of no avail in the fulfilment of the inference).

Then again, between 'identity and origination,' whichever happens to be cognised, it is the absence of that which is cognised, through the cognition of the non-existence of the 'Reason' in the *vipaksha*; because of its non-perception when it would be otherwise quite perceptible. And the non-perception (in the *vipaksha*) constituting a factor in the inferential process, operates either by the cognition of 'identity' with, or the cognition of its 'origination' from, the 'absence of the Reason' in the *vipaksha*, which 'absence' too would be provable by the said non-perception. Then too, the ascertaining of the 'identity' and 'origination' of that non-perception,' in connection with that which would be proved by it, would be possible only by means of the cognition of the fact of its non-existence in the *vipaksha*; and the cognition of this 'absence' would depend upon another 'non-perception;' as every negation is regarded to be an object of non-perception; and thus there being an infinite series of these *non-existences* and *non-perceptions*, the necessary negation not being established, the 'identity' and the 'origination' are not established; and hence either 'nature' or 'effect' (correlatives of 'identity' and 'origination') cannot be the 'Reason.'

Then again, we find that in certain cases, even in the absence of any 'identity' or 'origination,' there is a relation of the inferential indicator and indicated; as for instance, between the setting of the asterism of *Kṛttikā* and the rising of that of *Rohiṇi*.

For these reasons, we conclude that the assertion that, "concomitance is due either to the causal relation or to the nature of things," is an ill-considered one. Because the relationship of a certain thing with a certain 'nature' is permanent, not being due to any adventitious circumstances; it is only an adventitious relationship that ceases to exist with the disappearance of the adventitious circumstance; which cannot be said of the natural

relationship. If the relationship of smoke with fire were adventitious, then the adventitious circumstances would certainly be perceived; just as the act of *learning* following on the proximity of the teacher and the pupil. When we have perceived more than once, the smoke and the fire, there would be no cause for the non-perception of the adventitious circumstances (if any did exist); nor is it necessary that of an object that is perceived, the adventitious circumstances are always imperceptible. If these adventitious circumstances existed in the mere forms (of the objects concerned), then too, the concomitance would be duly established; as relationship based upon that also would exist as long as the objects themselves existed. Even if the adventitious circumstances were such as would come about subsequently, then too, the causes leading to them would be cognised. As for the circumstances as well as their causes being all supersensuous (and hence imperceptible), this would be too gratuitous an assumption. That smoke which has no adventitious circumstances would, at certain times, be cognised independently by itself. In the case of fire we find that having been cognised as related to smoke through an adventitious circumstance in the shape of a particular kind of fuel, it is thought of as 'smokeless' when found supplied with dry fuel (which does not give rise to smoke); but it is not so in the case of the smoke which is never perceived as *fireless* (apart from the fire). Thus then, the adventitous circumstances being of a perceptible character, when they are not perceived they are taken as non-existent; and the particular subsequent conditions of the fuel that would be perceived at that time, when seen over and over again, would show that there is no concomitance; and that would prove that the character of the true Reason is not present in the case in question; and hence all points of time and place having been brought into the case, there is no harm done by the perception of the absence of adventitious circumstances. Having ascertained the concomitance, based upon their very nature, of the generality

of 'smoke' with the generality of 'fire' by means of the final sensuous cognition, from which all doubts and contradiction have been set aside, and which is aided by the impression left by the previous perceptions of concomitance,—we come to form an idea of the invariable concomitance of the two things, in the form that 'this is invariably concomitant with that.' Though mere concomitance is cognised at the very first sight of the two objects, yet the necessity or invariability of their concomitance is not recognised by a single perception. Because the invariability does not follow from mere concomitance; it follows from such concomitance as is independent of all adventitious conditions; and the independence from such conditions is recognised only by means of repeated perceptions (of the two objects); hence we conclude that the invariable concomitance is ascertained by the determinate sensuous cognition appearing by the force of the perception of concomitance.

This explanation meets the following question also: "Sensuous cognition pertaining to such objects as are perceived at the present time, how could we perceive any invariable concomitance in the case of past and future objects?"

This invariable concomitance we do not hold to inhere in any particular individual only; it is only when we do not take any account of any particular individual, and cognise the invariable concomitance as referring to the 'generalities' of the objects concerned, that we have a certain cognition of the concomitance in all cases; the reason being that the generality is in all cases of one and the same form.

[Page 210] *Question*: "Then particular individuals do not enter into the invariable concomitance?"

Answer: Who says they do not enter into it? All that we mean is that they enter into it in their generic, and not in the individual forms. It is for this reason that whenever a man sees smoke, he has in his mind the idea of fire in

general; and hence it is fire in general, and not any particular fire, of which he has the inferential cognition.

The invariable concomitance having in all cases, been ascertained in the generic form, if persons were to raise doubts without any authoritative reasoning, then, in the case of your theory also, even though the individual smoke and fire would be directly perceived by the eye, and the causal relationship between the two would be duly comprehended,—even then, (at the time of inference) the difference of time and place (from those of the previous perception of smoke and fire) might give rise to doubts, which would certainly put a stop to the operation or functioning of the inferential process.

Says the *Bauddha*: "What is ascertained by repeated observation is the *causal relation* (and not invariable concomitance) (between fire and smoke); as a single perception would not set aside the suspicion of the smoke being due to certain adventitious conditions (and not to the fire itself); and the repeated observation pertains to the Generality; as individuals have but momentary existence, and as such could not be seen more than once. Hence we conclude that the causal relation, ascertained in one instance with reference to the generalities of the 'exclusion of non-smoke' and the 'exclusion of non-fire,' comes to be recognised as universal, the generality being one only."

But it is in similar manner that we explain the cognition in all cases of the universal character of the invariable concomitance; and what are the reasons for your dislike of our way of explanation? In reality, in the case of your theory, the two objects that are amenable to sensuous cognition could never have the causal relation pertaining to their generalities, as the objects are (according to you) non-entities. That is to say, the individual objects (according to you) are mere non-entities; and it is in connection with individuals that all relations are directly perceived by the senses; nor is it possible for all past

and future individuals to be recalled to the mind; because if the mind were to operate towards external objects independently by itself (without the help of the sense-organs), then there would be no blindness or deafness &c. Thus then, the causal relationship being recognised with reference to the individuals that are seen, there could be no resultant inference with regard to those that are not seen; as certainly those that are not seen are different from those that are seen. Nor again is any relationship of the proof (means) and the proved (the object) possible among individuals; as individuals as such are not related to one another (by any such relationship as would establish an invariable concomitance between them). Nor can the individuals be comprehended under a single generality; as there can be no relation between that which is a real object (the generality) and that which is not (the individual, according to the *Bauddha*); and if unconnected things were to be comprehended or included, there could be no restriction, and anything might be included in anything.

For these reasons, we do not know what is the objective of the ascertainment of 'origination'—the ascertainment brought about by sensuous cognition,—on which would be based the inferential process (as explained by the *Bauddha*).

Thus then, we see that one thing is the 'linga,' or inferential indicative, of another when the two are invariably concomitant in time and place. E. g. Smoke is the *linga* of fire. The sense of this is that when a thing is found to be invariably concomitant, in time and place, with the 'property to be proved,' it becomes the inferential indicative of this latter. As for instance, the guarding of barley fields in Kāshmira, by persons in charge of gold, is indicative of the fact of gold being produced in the waterways in barley fields (this is an instance of concomitance in place). Similarly as an instance of concomitance in time, we have the morning songs and music in the houses of the *Prāgjyotishas*, which are indicative of the rising of the king.

Objection:—"If the indication be only by concomitances of time and place, then this would be contrary to the declaration of the *Sūtra* to the effect that—'such things are indicative as are either effects, causes, conjuncts, contradictories and inherents of another thing.'"

[Page 211.] *Reply: In the Sūtra &c.* The 'causes' &c. are mentioned in the Sūtra only by way of showing of what character '*lingas*' generally are; and it does not mean that there are only so many kinds of '*linga*' and no more.

To the question—'how do you know this?'—the author replies—*Vyatirēkadar-çanāt.* That is to say, we cannot regard the enumeration as exhaustive, because we find inferences independent of the relationships enumerated. The author cites instances of such inferences.

(1) *The Adhvaryu priest &c.* It is laid down that the *Adhvaryu* priest should repeat *'om'* to the Hotṛ priest and to none else; hence one who is cognisant of this, when he hears 'om' repeated by the *Adhvaryu*, he infers the presence of the *Hotṛ*, who may be behind the walls; and here the Adhvaryu is neither the 'cause', nor the 'effect', nor the 'conjunct', nor the 'contradictory' nor the 'inherent', of the *Hotṛ*.

(2) Another instance is cited: *The rise of the moon &c.* When the moon rises, the sea rises in tides, and lilies bloom; and one who knows of these natural phenomena' always infers the rise of the sea and the blooming of the lily, whenever he sees the moon appear; and the rise of the moon is not the effect of the rise of the sea &c; as the 'rising' of the moon consists only in its contact with a particular point in space, and this contact is only the effect of a certain action of the moon, and not of any action of the sea. Nor is it the cause of the rise of the sea, or of the blooming of the lily; because the 'rising of the sea' consists only in the rising of the waters, and the blooming consists in the separating of the petals of the flower; and both these acts can be due only to the action of certain causes that may be in

close proximity to the objects concerned (*i.e.*, the water and the lily).

(3) *The clearness of water in the autumn is indicative of the rise of Agastya;* because it is never found at any other time.

Objection: "If we have *lingas* even apart from the 'effect' &c., then the *Sūtra* cannot be said to apply to or include all "*lingas*."

Reply: These and others are justified &c. That is to say, all such *lingas* as we find in the instances just cited, are included in the clause *'asyaidam'* in the *Sūtra*, which denotes mere relationship. The another of the Sūtra has said *'asyaidam'* in view of the objection that, "one object cannot be the *linga* of another, as that would lead to a great confusion;" and what he means is that it does not matter whether one thing (the linga) is the same as, or different from, the other (the subject), all that is necessary is that the one should be related to the other; and thus there can be no confusion; as it cannot be that every thing would be the *linga* of any thing; but only that which is related to the other thing would be its *linga*.

It has been said that that which is invariably concomitant with something else in point of time or place, is its *linga*; and obversely, that which is invariably nonconcomitant with another cannot be indicative of it; as it would be possible for it to exist in other places.

We do not mean that the words of the Sūtra *'Asyaidam kāryam etc.* do not denote the fact of the two being related to each other; all that we mean is that the relations mentioned in the Sūtra are simply by way of examples and are not meant to be exhaustive; it is necessary for the teacher to explain a general law always with reference to certain concrete instances; and it is as a few concrete instances that the *Sūtra* has spoken of the relations of "cause" and the rest.

[Page 213] The author next proceeds to describe the different kinds of Inference. *It is of two kinds* etc. The word *'ca'* has a restrictive force, meaning that Inference is of two kinds *only*. (1) Of those two, the '*dṛshṭa*' is that which follows upon the absolute identity, in kind, of that which is known from before as concomitant with the *linga*, and that which has to be got at by means of the inference in question. E. g. having seen the dewlap in the cow only, we have the inferential recognition of an animal with the dewlap seen on some future occasion being a *'cow'*. In this case we see that on the former occasion the dewlap was seen to exist in an animal that belongs to the class *'cow;'* and that leads us, on the subsequent occasion of our seeing the dewlap, to infer that this dewlap too must belong to an animal that belongs to the same class; and this kind of inference is called '*Dṛshṭa,*' seen,—the name being due to the fact that the generality of 'cow' that is inferred, on the latter occasion in the forest, from the sight of the dewlap, has had its specific individuality 'seen' in the city on the former occasion.

(2) The *Sāmānyatodṛshṭa* inference is that where that which is already known as concomitant with the *linga* and that which has to be inferred belong to two distinct classes; that is to say, that Inference is the *Sāmānyatodṛshṭa* which follows from the invariable concomitance of the generality of the *linga* with the generality of the Object of Inference. For instance, having seen that the activity of the farmer, the trader and the king's servants always bring about certain results, we infer that the activity of such persons as perform the rites and duties of their castes must also lead to definite results. We find that the activity of the farmer brings about the result in the shape of a rich harvest; and that of the trader and the King's servants brings to them a mass of gold and jewels, horses and elephants; and this leads us to infer that the performance of the rites etc., also brings about results in the shape of heaven and the like.

The followers of Brhaspati (the Atheists) hold that we have never found any such result as Heaven necessarily following after any action; and hence the result of these rites etc., must be held to be the mere obtaining of a living. In opposition to this, the author adds—*the activity which is not found to have reference to any visible purpose etc.* It cannot be doubted that there are some people who, without the least desire for any visible results, betake themselves to such observances as those of the '*Vānaprastha*' and the like; and what we seek to prove by the inference in question is the fruitful character of such observances; and as such it cannot be regarded as a mere repetition of the former inference.

The word '*Pramāṇa*' has been explained as that which *is the means* towards a certain end; and as this character could not be complete without a definite result, the author proceeds to distinguish the means from the *result*——*The 'perception of the linga' is the means of knowledge.*' That it is to say, it is the perception of the linga *by means of which* the inferential cognition is obtained, and the 'cognition,' brought about by that *means* is the 'cognition of fire' (in the case of the inference of fire from the presence of smoke). Though in regard to the origin of the cognitions of the *linga* and the *lingi* (that which is concomitant with the *linga*), there is a difference in the objectives of the two cognitions, yet, inasmuch a cognition of the *linga* has a certain action towards the bringing about of the cognition of the *lingi*, that can in any way, be said to have the *lingi* for its objective; and hence the 'means of knowledge' and its 'result' remain co-extensive (pertaining to the same objective).

[Page 212] Another explanation is given: Or the cognition of fire may be regarded as the 'means of knowledge;' and in that case, the character of the 'result' would belong to the cognition of the (1) good, (2) bad or (3) indifferent character of the fire—the 'goodness' of fire consisting in its being a cause of pleasure,

badness in its leading to pain, and that of indifference in its being a source of neither pain nor pleasure ; the idea of these is the 'result' because they appear only after the cognition of fire.

All this refers to inference for the sake of one's own definitive cognition. In the word '*niçcita*' the affix has the abstract signification.

Text (105) *Word, and the other means of knowledge, are included under 'Inference'; because of the process of those being similar to that of Inference. Just as for one who is cognisant of the invariable concomitance, there arises, from the perception of an undoubted 'linga' and the remembrance of another concomitance, an inferential cognition of supersensuous things,—so in the same manner, does cognition arise from Word &c. also. Scripture even in the form of Çrutis and Smṛtis depends upon the authoritative character of the speaker; as the authority of the scripture rests upon his authority. And that Word is non-eternal is proved by inference:—'the creation of a sentence is due to an intelligent action,' and 'the word dadāti in the Veda is preceded by intelligent action because of its being spoken of as dadāti (Vaiçeshika Sutras VI-i-1 & 3).*

Commentary.

Question : "Philosophers have spoken of other means, or forms, of knowledge—such as Word (or Verbal) and the like—(besides Sensuous cognition and Inference) ; how then is it that these others have not been mentioned here ?"

In answer to this, the author proceeds to show that these other means of knowledge are not mentioned for the simple reason that they are all included in the two that have been described. 'Word' and the rest do not differ from Inference, because the process of cognition by those means is similar to the process of inferential cognition. That is to say, just as the Inferential process functions through invariable concomitance so do Word &c., also ; the verbal cognition is inferential in its character,—as it takes cognizance of objects by means of invariable concomitance—like smoke.

The author proceeds to show the similarity of the inferential and verbal processes of cognition. When the man who knows the invariable concomitance (of smoke with fire) happens to see smoke rising in a certain place, and then comes to recall in his mind his previous knowledge of the concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire also,—then he has an inferential cognition of the thing (fire) not directly perceptible to the senses ; and the process is the same in the case of verbal and other cognitions also. As a matter of fact, we know that a word never denotes anything until it is known for certain that it never fails in its concomitance with such denotation ; and when it does denote an object after the unfailing concomitance has been ascertained, it becomes an inferential 'indicative' pure and simple.

Against the above, some people put forward the following objection : "In inferential cognitions what is cognised is a certain object qualified by the 'property to be inferred' (the "*sādhya*). What would be such an 'object' in the case of "the inference of the denotation from the Word ? The "denotation itself could not be this 'object,' as it is not "known at the time. If the Word be regarded as that 'object,' "then what would be its '*sādhya*' ? Mere 'denotability' "could not be this '*sādhya*' ; as between the Word and its "denotation we cannot detect any such relationship as that of "Conjunction or Inherence, which is perceptible in the case of "the mountain and the fire ; and hence the word as qualified by "the denotation could not be the object to be inferred, as the

"only relation that there is between the Word and its denota-
"tion is that of the 'denoter and the denoted'; and this comes
"after the word has signified the object, and not before that
"signification. Nor is there any strict unfailing concomitance
"between the word and its denotation, as there is between fire
"and smoke; for the simple reason that we do not find both
"appearing at one and the same place and time [the word is
"often heard without the hearer having any idea of the object
"signified by it, and the object is known even without its
"significant word being known]. For instance, even though
"there is no *Yudhiṣṭhira* living in the present Kali age, yet we
"find the word 'yudhiṣṭhira' being used (this with regard to
"*time*), and even though there is no Lankā in *Jambudvīpa*
"(India), yet we find the word '*lankā*' used in India (this with
"reference to *place*). Thus then, in as much as we find the
"accessories of verbal cognition to be of a character quite
"different from those of inferential cognition, the two cannot
"be regarded as one and the same.

"Then again, verbal cognition cannot be regarded as the
"same as inferential cognition, because of the fact that in differ-
"ent countries one and the same word signifies different things;
"and thus there is no such invariable concomitance between the
"word and its denotation, as there is between smoke and fire;
"for instance, the word '*cora*' is found among the people
"of the south, to be used as a name for *cooked rice*, though
"among the people of Āryāvarta (India to the north of the
"Vindhyā range) it is used for *thief*. If verbal cognition were
"the same as the inferential, then it would, like the latter,
"be duly cognised only when there would be present the three
"conditions of Inference (described in Text 104), and it would
"not be based upon the cognition of the fact of its having
"been uttered by a trustworthy person. As, however the
"authority of verbal cognition is based solely upon the fact
"of its originating from a trustworthy source, it cannot but

"be regarded, on account of this very dissimilarity, as wholly
"different from inferential cognition."

To the above we make the following reply: When the fore-finger is raised, there appears an inference of number *ten* with regard to things not present at that time and place. And in this case too, the number is not the 'subject' (*dharmī*), as it is not known; nor can the particular position of the fore-finger be regarded as the 'subject; as it is something that is being made cognisable at the time, and as such having no other relationship with the number *ten*, could not indicate anything qualified by that number. Nor is there any coevality or co-extensiveness between the raising of the finger and the ten things. How then do you account for the process of inference in this case? And yet we find that in the usage of tradespeople there is an unfailing concomitance between that particular position of the forefinger and the desire of indicating the number *ten*.

Obj: "The gesture becomes indicative of the number *ten*, through the recognition (on the part of the observer) of the intention of the person (making the gesture) to convey an idea of that number (and this concomitance is the basis of the inference)."

Reply: The same may be said with regard to verbal cognition also. As in the first instance, when the word '*gō*' is uttered, we come to recognise the fact that the speaker wishes to indicate a certain animal with the hump &c;—this recognition being due to our having found that the utterance of the word '*gō*,' in its own turn, is preceded (originated) by an intention of speaking of that animal; and this intention leads to the inference of the animal. The inferential argument would be in the following syllogistic form:—'The *subject*, man, is endowed with the intention of speaking of the animal with the hump &c.,—because he is the pronouncer of the word '*gō*,'—like myself.'

Obj: "In the case of the untrustworthy person, we find that they often have the intention of speaking of things that have no real existence; and hence the mere presence of the intention cannot indicate the existence of the object (there being no actual unfailing concomitance between the two)?"

Reply: How too could there be an indication of the object by means of the word itself? As words are often used by mistake, or with the intention of cheating (hence there can be no certain relationship between the word and any object).

Objection: "The object is cognised only when the word is uttered by a trustworthy person (in whose case there is no chance of either mistake or an intention of cheating)."

Reply: This comes to the same thing as to assert that the cognition of the object is due to the *intention* of the trustworthy person to speak of that thing.

[**Page 215**] It has been urged by the opponent that, "even though the word may be indicative of the object, yet the concomitance between the two (as we find when one and the same word is used in different countries) is not quite unfailing, as there is that between the smoke and the fire." In reference to this we have the following reasoning: As for the smoke, it is indicative of the fire by its natural (inborn) relationship to it; as for the word, on the other hand, it becomes indicative, like a gesture, only when used in accordance with a certain convention made by the wish of the persons concerned; and as such it becomes, through the 'intention of the person to speak' of the thing, indicative of only that thing with regard to which the said convention has been fixed; as the object having been definitely cognised, as in the case of Gesture etc., only in accordance with the word as used by trustworthy persons, it is only when the word is used by the trustworthy that it has an unfailing concomitance with the object; just as it is only when the smoke is found to rise upwards in a continuous volume that it is indicative of fire.

Objection: "Why cannot you assume the fact that the word denotes the object by direct denotation (without the intervention of conventions or notions of concomitance etc)?"

Reply: For the simple reason that there is no such direct relation between the two; and if a word were to be denotative of an object without any relation, then there would be no restriction as to the denotations of words (any word) denoting anything).

Objection: "But there is a natural relationship between the word and its denotation."

Reply: It is not so; as one and the same word is used, in different countries, in the sense of different things (which could not be if the word had an inborn relationship with any one denotation).

Objection: "The word may be regarded as *denotative* (*vācaka*) of that thing with regard to which it is used by the Āryas; while as regards other objects, in as much as it is dependent upon convention, it can only be regarded as *indicative* (*linga*)."

Reply: Not so; as we find that the word *cora*' is as expressive of the *thief* as of *cooked rice* (as used among the *Āryas* and the Southern people respectively); and we have no reason for making any such distinction as that in regard to the former, the word is *denotative* while with regard to the latter it is only *indicative*. Then again, even among the Āryas the verbal cognition of what is denoted by the word '*cora*' is preceded by a definite inferential indicative,—because it is a cognition produced by the word '*cora*',—like the cognition produced by the word '*cora*' among the people of the south, in which latter case both opponents admit the fact of its following upon an inferential indicative. Nor is there any evidence for an inborn relationship between the word and the object denoted

by it. You hold that the only relationship consists in the inborn *denotativeness* of the word as pertaining to that which is *denoted*, as it is this that pervades over both (the *denoter* and the *denoted*); as has been declared—" relationship lies in potency ; " and the denotative potency of the word existing naturally in the denoted object, this object would be cognised by the man ignorant of the meaning of the word, just as well as by the person who knows the word ; as in both cases, the word, the object and the relation between them would be equally present.

Objection : " It is only when the relationship is duly known that it becomes the means of the verbal cognition of the object, and not when it merely exists (and is not known). As has been declared : ' The relationship being the cause of the cognition, stands in need of its own cognition ; and hence even when it exists, if it is not known or recognised, it does not lead to the cognizance of the object (denoted)."

[Page 216.] *Reply* : Of what sort is the knowledge of the relationship ?

Objection : " It is in the form that, ' such and such a thing is the *denoted* of such and such a word '."

Reply : Whence does this knowledge proceed ?

Objection : " From the usage of old experienced persons."

Reply : This same knowledge based upon the name and the named, when appearing in the boy sitting near older people talking among themselves, is known as ' *sankēta* ', ' convention ' or ' *vyutpatti*,' ' knowledge of the word ' ; and this, through impressions left on the mind, would be the cause of the verbal cognition of the object (denoted by the word) ; and under the circumstances, what would be the use of assuming any other relationship ? The inborn potency of the word constitutes its ' *çabdatva*,' verbal character ', and the adventitious (or caused appearing subsequently) potency constitutes the ' *sankēta*

' convention ' with regard to it, and also the particular order (in which it occurs in a sentence) ; and as the cognition of its denotation would be quite explicable through this twofold potency, there would be no necessity for the assumption of another relationship ; specially as so long as a thing can be explained on perceptible facts, there is no room for assuming imperceptible ones.

Objection : " If a word were significant only through the ' intention of speaking ' on the part of the speaker, then there could be no significance in the words and sentences of the Veda in which case there is no speaker (on whose intention the signification could be based)."

In reply to this the author says—*the Scripture also in the form Çrutis and Smṛtis depends upon the authority of the speaker.* That is to say, it is not only ordinary assertions that signify their meanings on the strength of the trustworthy character of speakers ; but the assertions in the form of *Vaidika* and *Smārta* scriptures also are similarly significant ; and the weakness or faultiness of these is due to the deficiencies in the speaker, and is not inherent in them, like the evil odour of foul smelling things ; as has been thus declared : ' In a word, the discrepancies of the origin, the letter and the rest are due to the person pronouncing it ; and the word is not deficient by its nature, like the evil smell of malodorous substances.'

Objection : " The Veda being eternal, and as such there being no speaker in its case, there can be no room for any discrepancies, and thus alone is its absolute authority established ; while if it were the work of an author, we could never get at an absolutely undoubted authority for it ; as we find men often making use of false assertions, under the influence of certain likes and dislikes."

Reply : *The authority of the scriptures rests upon his authority.* The word ' his ' refers, by the ' law of provision,' to

a speaker superior to ourselves, as described under the *sūtra* '*asmadbuddhibhyo lingamṛshēḥ*. Thus the meaning comes to be that the authority of the Veda is due to the fact of its having been composed by a person superior to ourselves. That is to say, its authority is due to the *absence of discrepancies*, and not to *eternality* : for instance, we find in the case of the ear and the mind, that though both of these are eternal (the ear being eternal because it is only *ākāça*), yet they often lose their authoritative or truthful character by reason of the subsequent advent of discrepancies ; and obviously in the case of the eye and the other organs we find that even though they are not eternal, they have authority only when all their deficiencies have been removed. And we have already proved that there are no faults or discrepancies in the "superior person" ; hence the scripture that is composed by him, must be regarded as authoritative, even though it be the work of a personal author. It is never suspected that one who sees the reality of things, and is free from likes and dislikes, when moved by mercy to instruct the people of the world, could impart wrong or false teachings.

Page 217] *Question* : "How is it known that the Veda is the work of a superior person ?"

Answer : It is inferred from the fact of its sense being indisputably accepted by all men of various castes and conditions. If it were the work of an ordinary person, it could not be indisputably followed in practice by all intelligent persons ; as we find in the case of the scriptures composed by *Buddha* and others ; there would always be some people who would not accept it as authoritative, and as such not regulate their conduct in accordance with it. But that with regard to which all men are agreed (on the point of its authority), cannot but be accepted as an authoritative means of knowledge ; as we find in the case of sensuous cognition. The argument may be thus stated :—The Veda is authoritative, as it is always found to give rise, in all men, to non-contradictory cognition, like Sense-perception.

Though it is true that, in the case of certain actions laid down in the Veda as bringing about a visible result, we often find that even when the action is duly performed, the result does not appear,—yet this fact does not set aside the authoritative character of the Veda ; as this failing is always due to the deficiencies in the auxiliaries leading up to the result ; as is proved by the fact of the due result always appearing when these auxilliaries are present in full force.

Objection : "It is not right to say that the Veda is composed by a trustworthy person ; as at the time that the action laid down therein is performed, even the most learned of the performers have no idea of any such author, who would be most likely to be remembered."

Reply : That that is non-eternal is proved by Inference. In as much as it is the 'Veda' or 'scripture' that has just been spoken of as having its authority based upon the fact of its having been composed by a superior person, we must take this 'non-eternality' as referring to the same ; and the meaning of the sentence thus is that, that the Veda is noneternal is inferred from inferential indicatives.

The author formulates the necessary inferential arguments : (1) The creation or composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by, or due to, an intelligent action,—because it is a composition of sentences—like the composition of ordinary sentences. (2) The word '*dadāti*' in the Veda is due to an intelligent action,—because it is spoken of as *dadātiḥ*'—like the word '*dadāti*' used in ordinary parlance.

As for the argument that the Veda is not composed by a human author, as no such author is remembered,—it is not based upon sound premises, (1) because the Veda itself has spoken of an author in such passages as—'Prajāpati alone existed, there existed neither day nor night ; he did pennance ; and from that pennance the four Vedas were born &c. &c.'; and (2) because we find the premiss failing, in the case of an old

well for instance [people have no idea of the actual person who sank the well, and yet that is not taken as a reason for accepting it as not done by human hands].

The non-eternality of the Veda having been thus proved, we are met with the following difficulty: "In as much as we often find human assertions to be both (true and false), there would always be a doubt as to the authoritative or truthful character of a declaration in the Veda; and under the circumstances, though people might be led by them to activity towards some visible end, with regard to which he may have no doubts; but as regards imperceptible (supersensuous) objects, which are laid down as capable of being attained only by a vast amount of expenditure and bodily exertion, no intelligent person would ever betake himself to any activity on their account, until he will have fully ascertained the authoritative character of the declaration pertaining thereto. And in ordinary parlance we find that the authoritative character of an assertion is always ascertained upon the recognition of certain good qualities in the speaker; and this leads us to think that in the case of Vedic declarations also any activity in accordance with them would be resorted to with a firm conviction only after the agent will have become cognisant of the good qualities of the author of the Veda."

Some people (the Mīmānsakas) meet this difficulty by holding that, "the authority of an assertion is not due to the fact of its being spoken by a trustworthy person; all means of cognition are self-sufficient in their authority."

But to these poople we put the following question: What, in the first place, do you understand by 'authoritative character' or 'validity' of the means of cognition, *prāmāṇya*? Does it consist in the *unfailing concomitance with the real state of things*? or in the *bringing about of the cognition of the real thing*? It cannot be the former; for even though smoke is invariably concomitant with fire, yet we find that a man who

is not in his senses does not have any idea of fire (at the sight of smoke), and in this case thus there would be no 'authoritative character' for the inferential indicative (smoke);—and also because in the case of the eye we find that though it is not 'concomitant' with any one of the colours, blue, yellow etc., yet it is sufficiently 'authoritative' in that it brings about the cognition of real things. If then, 'authoritative character' be held to consist in the bringing about of the cognition of real things, then we ask (what do you mean by saying that it is 'self-sufficient'?) Does it mean—(1) that it is *known* by itself? or (2) that it is *produced* by itself? or (3) that it *operates* by itself? If the authoritative character of the means of cognition be *known* by itself, in the form that, 'I am the bringer about of the knowledge of the real thing,'—then, with regard to no means of cognition would there ever be any doubt as to whether its objective is true or otherwise; nor would there be any activity following upon mistaken cognitions. And, if, on account of the incongruity of the means of cognition operating within itself, it were not to cognise itself, and hence not to cognise the fact of its bringing about the knowledge of the real thing, then for the cognition of this, something else, apart from the cognition, would be needed; as without a means of cognition, no cognition of the 'cognisable' is possible; and hence when the 'authoritative character' of a means of cognition would be the *object to be cognised*, it would certainly need something apart from itself as the means for its cognition; and thus the authoritative character would be due to this something else.

Obj. "If the authoritative character of one means of cognition would have to be cognised by another means, then this latter would have to be cognised by another, and so on and on, there would be an unending infinite series of means upon means."

Reply: There would not be any such *regressus ad infinitum*; as it is not absolutely necessary that there should

always be a desire to ascertain the authoritative character of the means of cognition. The means of cognition points to its objective, by its mere appearance, and not only after its own authoritative character has been ascertained. And *in certain cases* it so happens that when the objective has been duly pointed out, there arises, from some cause or other, a doubt as to whether the means of cognition is valid or invalid; and this doubt as to its validity giving rise to a doubt as to the reality of the object pointed out, the resultant activity towards that object does not come about. And for the sake of the due accomplishment of this activity there arises a desire to ascertain the authoritative character of the means of cognition: as until this has been ascertained, the doubt does not disappear. In a case however, where, either on account of the force of habit or of the due comprehension of all details in connection with the object, the means of cognition appears free from all taint of suspicion,—the mere appearance of this means brings about the full cognition of the object; and the cogniser having all his needs thus fully satisfied, there does not arise in his mind any wish for ascertaining its authoritative character; and hence there would be no need of having recourse to another means of cognition. One who would still fix some suspicion upon the cognition, on the ground of both sides of the question being perceived, will not be able to attach any such suspicion; for the simple reason that all suspicion has been set aside by the fact of the object having been definitely cognised; as has been declared by Mandana Miçra in his *Brahmasiddhi*: 'A suspicion with regard to the cognition is set aside by the cognition itself.'

It may be that the validity or authoritative character of the means of cognition would be sought after for the sake of the requisite activity; but in a case where the activity was due to a doubtful idea of the object in the mind of the agent who had not ascertained the authoritative character of the means of

cognition, when he would be fully satisfied as regards the character of the object itself, he would no longer have any desire for ascertaining the validity of the means.

Question: "Is then, the usefulness of the means of cognition ascertained on the strength of the resultant activity?"

Answer: No; as in that case also the activity would be for the purpose of the testing of the validity of the means of cognition, just like the testing of the seed by the farmer; and in such cases there would always be a desire for ascertaining the said validity. When one has doubts as to the validity of the means of cognition, and having doubts as to the true nature of the object, betakes himself to activity for the sake of the due comprehension of that object,—if he gets at this object he has his purpose fulfilled;—and as for the ascertainment of the validity of the means of cognition, even though such ascertainment would not be quite at hand, yet it would be accomplished by the force of the object itself; specially as the force of the resultant activity does not fail in its concomitance with the validity of the means of cognition.

Thus then, the validity of the means of cognition is neither *known* nor *produced* by itself. Then alone could we accept the 'self-sufficiency' of the validity of the means of cognition, if the cognition, on having been produced, were subsequently to produce in itself the character of bringing about the cognition of the real object. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the cognition appears from its cause in full possession of the character of the knowledge of the real object; and as such we regard its validity to be dependent upon something else, apart from itself.

[Page 219.] *Objection*: "By saying that the means of cognition is 'self-sufficient' in its validity, we do not mean that it produces its own validity; what we mean is that for the sake of the production of its validity the cognition does not stand in need

of anything besides those causes that produce the cognition itself."

Reply: This too is not the correct view; for if the only cause of the validity of a means of cognition consisted in the accessories bringing about a cognition that is neither more nor less than the exact object,—then whence could we have any mistaken cognitions?

Objection: "It is in the very nature of the causes in question that they bring about cognitions in exact accordance with objects, and when this nature is disturbed or set aside by the presence of discrepancies, then the causes produce cognitions not in accordance with objects,—while when the discrepancies that tend to disturb the nature are not present, then there remains the character of bringing about cognitions in due accordance with objects."

Reply: Then, does the *correctness* of a verbal assertion follow merely from the preceding cognition of the speaker? In that case all assertions would be correct. If however the correctness of an assertion were to be produced from the comprehension of the means of knowledge, then in that case the validity would be based, not upon the nature of the causes, but upon their efficiency; that is to say, the cause of the word would be the knowledge of the object signified by it; and correctness is the efficiency, and incorrectness the deficiency, of this latter cognition; consequently if correctness were the cause of the validity of an assertion, then this validity would be based upon the efficiency of the cause, and not upon the very nature of the cause itself; and if the validity of verbal cognitions were based upon an efficiency, then the same would be the case with the validity of the other kinds of cognition; as all cognitions under consideration must be regarded as having their validity based upon the quality of these causes,—because they are cognitions of the valid means of knowledge,—like the cognition of the means of verbal cognition.

Objection: "In the case of verbal cognition also the quality of the cause may operate towards the removal of discrepancies and not towards the production of validity."

Reply: Not so; as what the quality leads to is the stopping of the way of the coming in of discrepancies.

Objection: "We grant that (in the absence of discrepancies) there will be no appearance of the incorrect cognition which is the result of discrepancies; but whence would the *correctness* of the cognition proceed? What follows from the absence of the cause, is the absence of the effect, and not a contrary effect; as this contrary effect consists in the mere form of the cognition."

Reply: Not so; as there would be no difference. That is to say, the only peculiarity that there is in a cognition is its relation to its object; and if this, being fully taken up in the stopping away of the discrepancies, were no help in the bringing about of *correctness*, on account of there being no difference in the forms,—then there would be no sentence restricted to any particular object, because of 'nondifference;' *i.e.* on account of the non-accomplishment of anything particular. If it be held that the cognition pertaining to an object produces a sentence pertaining to that same object, then it would be the correctness of the cognition, and not its mere cognitional form, that would be the cause of the correctness of the sentence; and this would come to the same thing as to hold the validity to be due to the presence of certain efficiencies.

Even if we grant that the presence of the efficiency operates towards the absence of discrepancies; even then, that would not in any way affect the theory of the 'validity' of the means of knowledge being due to something apart from itself; because whenever this 'validity' would appear we would always find by negative and affirmative concomitance, the active operation

of the 'absence of discrepancies,' which would be something quite distinct from the 'nature of the cause.'

Objection: "The absence of discrepancies is the cause of the absence of mistaken cognitions; while the validity in question is dependent upon the character of the sense-organ and the other channels of cognition."

Reply. Why cannot you say that the presence of discrepancies acts as an obstacle to the production of validity, and mistaken cognitions are dependent upon the character of the sense-organ etc.?

[Page 220.] *Objection*: "We do not admit this, because as a matter of fact we always find mistaken cognitions following in the wake of discrepancies."

Reply: It would be equally reasonable to hold that, in as much as we always find validity following in the wake of the 'absence of discrepancies,' we cannot assume otherwise. As a matter of fact, there is no valid means of knowledge which does not stand in need of the previous non-existence and the utter destruction of discrepancies.

In the same manner it may be proved that the action of the means of knowledge in bringing about such effects as the agent's activity etc., also is due to something apart from itself, and not due to its own mere form; as in the bringing about of the said effects it is always found to be controlled by certain external aids and obstacles.

(1) By saying that the Veda is the composition of a superior person, the author does not ascribe the authorship of the Vedas to any ordinary man; he holds God himself to be the author. The *Mīmānsaka* on the other hand holds that the Veda is coeval with God himself, and has no author at all. The latter rests his belief upon the fact that no person has ever, since time out of mind, had any idea of any author of the Veda, as they have had in regard to such other ancient books as the *Mahābharata*, the *Dharmasūtras*, etc. The Naiyāyika holds that consisting of a number of sentences, like any ordinary work, the Vedas could not but have been the work of an intelligent author; and as the character of the work precludes the possibility of its having originated from any

ordinary man, they conclude that the author of the Vedas could have been no other person than God himself. The two views are very ingeniously reconciled by the Vedānti who holds that though the *form* of the Veda as we have it is noneternal, and as such, like all things in the world, the creation of God, it is in its essence a mere copy of something that has always existed, and as such absolutely eternal as to its substance. The non-eternality of the Vedas is a collolary to the more general theory of the non-eternality of all sound.

(2) The Vaiçeshika view of the inclusion of Verbal, under Inferential, cognition has been refuted by Udayanācārya in his Kusumānjali under the *Kārikā* '*Anaikāntaḥ paricchēdē, sambhavē ca na nirṇayaḥ*'; that is to say an inference, like the one in which verbal cognition is sought to be involved, is not possible; as the conclusion of such an inference could be either a *definite cognition* or a mere *possibility*; in the former case, the character of the premisses would not be such as to be able to lead to the desired conclusion; and in the former as the conclusion would be doubtful, it could not lead to any *certain* definite verbal cognition. (Vide *Kusumānjali, in loco*).

(3) The question as to how we are to ascertain that a certain piece of knowledge is true or false has given rise to much discussion. The different views have been thus summed up in the *Sarvadarçanasangraha*. (1) The Sānkhyas hold that validity, as well as invalidity, is inherent in the cognition itself; (2) the Nāiyayikas regard both to be proved by something apart from the cognition; (3) the Bauddha holds that while invalidity belongs to cognitions by their very nature, their validity is proved by something apart from themselves; and (4) the *Mīmānsaka* declares that it is validity that belongs to the very nature of the cognition; and invalidity is due to external causes; *i. e.* a cognition must always, be regarded as true until it is proved to be otherwise. The Naiyāyika contends that if a cognition were by its nature valid and true, then it would always be recognised as such; and there would never be any doubt as to whether a certain cognition is correct or incorrect; then again in ordinary experience we find that whenever we have a certain cognition, all that we feel is that *it may* be true and if, when acting in accordance with the piece of knowledge afforded by that cognition, we find that it corresponds with the real state of things, then alone do we conclude that it is *true*; otherwise it is *false*; f. i. when the thirsty man perceives water and moves up to it to have a drink; if he does come upon real water he thinks his cognition to be true, while if he meets with sand instead, he concludes it to have been a misapprehension; and thus we find that the validity or otherwise of the cognition is established by external evidence. And so the truthfulness or otherwise of verbal cognition also is proved in accordance as it may or may not be found to be in harmony with the real state of things. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the validity of a cognition is due to the presence of a certain efficiency, in the organ concerned; while its invalidity is due to the presence of a discrepancy chiefly in it.

Importance has been attached to this discussion because of the way in which it affects the question of the self-sufficient authority of the Vedas ; the Bauddhas denying all authority for them and the Naiyāyika and the Vaiçceshika admitting their authority only in so far as they are the work of the all wise God.

Text (106) : *In as much as we find that it is only one to whom the signification of the gesture is known who has a cognition by means of the gesticulation, that cognition must be regarded as inferential.*

Commentary.

We find that when the fingers of the hand are drawn within, it signifies that the man who makes the gesture is calling someone to himself; and when the fingers are put forward it means that the man is sending someone away from himself; and some people regard this gesticulation to be an independent means of knowledge. Against these people the author says : when a man knows that such and such a gesture of the hand—*e. g.*, its contracting or expanding—is meant to convey such and such a meaning, he comprehends these gestures whenever made as signifying *calling, sending away* and the like ; and as it is only the person cognisant of the meaning of the gesture who has the comprehension, and no other person, we must regard this cognition by gestures as purely *inferential.*

Ceshā, 'gesture' is regarded as an independent means of knowledge, by the *Tāntrikas.*

Text (107) : *In as much as in the case of analogical cognition a trustworthy person describes the gavaya to one who does not know it, through the cow,—this must be regarded as a case of Trustworthy Assertion.*

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to show that Analogy is only a form of Inference. The word '*āpti*' means the *direct reaching—i. e.*, correct cognition ; and one who has this is called '*āpta*' one who has direct cognition of such transcendental things as *dharma* and the like, and who is a teacher or instructor of things which he may have rightly known. When such a person,—in the present instance, a forester knowing the *gavaya*—is asked by the cityman who does not know that animal—'what sort of an animal is the *gavaya*?'—he describes the animal through its similarity to the cow (which is known to the cityman), by saying—'the *gavaya* is like the cow ;' and it is the recognition of this fact of the gavaya being like the cow that constitutes Analogical Cognition ; and certainly this is nothing more or less than a trustworthy assertion ; as the cognition, that '*the gavaya* is like the cow,' is based upon the authoritative character of the speaker (if the speaker is not known to be a reliable person, the said cognition fails to appear) ; and trustworthy assertion is only a form of Inference (as shown above). And hence Analogy also is only a form of Inference.

Some *Mīmānsakas* maintain that it is the assertion of the forester (that 'the gavaya is like the cow') that constitutes *upamāna*, 'Analogy ;' and for these also the cognition in question comes to be purely *inferential.*

[**P. 221**] The followers of Çavara Svāmī (the author of the *Mīmānsā Bhāshya*) hold that when a man who knows the cow sees the *gavaya* in the forest, he remembers the cow, and then he has the idea—'my cow is similar to this animal' ; and it is this knowledge of similarity that constitutes Analogical Cognition. And this would be only a case of Remembrance.

Similarity, like Generality, rests in its entirety in each individual, and it does not extend over both members, like Conjunction ; because as a matter of fact we find that even

when the cow is not before us, we have the idea of the *gavaya*, which is before us in the forest, having the *similarity* of the cow (and if similarity extended over both members this would not be possible as only one of the two is before us); as has been said by the teachers of *Mīmānsā*: 'Similarity, like Generality, rests in its entirety in each individual, as, we find that even when one correlative is not seen, its similarity (in the other) is duly recognised.' (*Çlokavārtika*).

Even if the similarity always rested in each of the correlatives (the cow and the *gavaya*), so long as the *gavaya* had not been seen the man could not have any notion of its similarity in the cow; and yet it is only right that similarity should be cognised at the time of the proximity of its substratum (to the person); just as, though while the other member of the comparison is not perceived there does not appear any such idea as that 'this is longer or shorter *than that*,' yet as soon as the object with a certain dimension comes before the person, he perceives the dimension all right; if it were not so, then how could it be that meeting with the other correlative at another place, the man should have the idea that 'this that I see now is longer, or shorter, than the object I had seen before?' If the similarity *in the cow* were not cognised, on the previous occasion, by the mere action of the senses, and if, on the present occasion too, it were not cognised in the *gavaya*, then there could be no such restriction as that, on the perception of the *gavaya* its similarity to the cow should be remembered; as there would not be any peculiarity in the cow or the *gavaya* whereby the sight of the one should recall the similarity of the other.

Objection: "The restriction of the remembrance is due to the perception in the *gavaya* of the same general characters of possessing hoofs, and tail etc., as have been perceived in the cow."

Reply: 'Similarity' consists only in the possession by both of certain limbs of the same kind; and if these commonalities of limbs are perceived by the perception of each of the substrates, then similarity would also be cognised; hence on the perception of the *gavaya*, the cognition of the similarity as belonging to the cow, not before the eyes at the time, could not but be a case of Remembrance, born of the impression aroused by the perception of another object (the *gavaya*) similar to the cow; and being of the nature of Remembrance, it could not be regarded as a distinct form of knowledge. We have seen that even that which is perceived only by non-determinate abstract perception becomes an object of remembrance; as an ignorant person (not knowing the word whereby the perception of the object could become determinate) having seen one of the correlatives on a previous occasion, when he comes to see the other, he recognises in the latter the commonalities that he had perceived in the former.

Some people regard Analogical cognition to be of the nature of the cognition of the relationship of the *name and the named* (the denoter and the denoted),—holding that the man who has heard the declaration that 'the *gavaya* is similar to the cow', on seeing the *gavaya* and finding it to be similar to the cow, he comes to the conclusion that 'the word *gavaya* is the name of this animal.'

In accordance with this view also, the declaration the '*the gavaya* is like the cow' is a sentence; and as it is this sentence that is held to give rise to the cognition, that 'that which is heard of as *gavaya* is similar to the cow,'—this cognition cannot but be regarded as purely *verbal* in its character. And as for the cognition of the denotability, of the animal similar to the cow, by the word '*gavaya*'—this is purely *inferential*; on account of the use of that word; that is to say, it could be reduced to the following inferential form: 'A word becomes expressive of that with reference to which it is advisedly used by all learned persons,—the word '*gavaya*' is so used with reference to the animal similar to the

cow, by the forester,—therefore that animal is denoted by the word '*gavaya*.'

The cognition of similarity in the *gavaya* is distinctly *sensuous* in its character. Then as regards the cognition of the animal as apart from all other things in the world, that too is a resultant of sensuous cognition. As for the recognition of the relationship of the name and the named, that is a case of Remembrance, being born of the impression left by the cognition of the denotability by the word '*gavaya*' of the animal similar to the cow, brought up by the previously born commonality, manifested by the comprehension of similarity; just like the recalling of the denotability by that word, of another object of the same class as the one with regard to which the conventional signification, by the word, of the commonality has been cognised in one instance,—and the impression left by which cognition is the cause of the said *recalling*; as the recalling is in the following form: 'it was of the same animal that I had comprehended the denotability by that word, on the previous occasion;' and in this there would be no room for Analogy (and as such this cannot be regarded as an instance of Analogical Cognition).

As for Presumptive Cognition, it is based upon the apparent inconsistency of some fact that is directly perceived or heard. The opponent (the *Mīmānsaka* who regards Presumptive Cognition as an independent form of knowledge) has proved the usefulness of the separate mention of the word 'heard' in this connection; and has thus shown that there are two kinds of Presumptive Cognition—the *Drshṭārthāpatti*, based upon the apparent inconsistency of what is directly perceived, and the *Çrutārthāpatti* based upon that of what is *heard*. That is to say, where a thing that is perceived is found to be inconsistent without something else, it indicates or leads to the presumption of this latter; and this is a case of the former kind; *e.g.*, in the case of the information that 'Caitra who is alive is not in the house,' the absence of Caitra in the house is cognised by means

of 'Negation;' and the information as regards his being alive indicates the possibility of his presence in the house, as a living person is generally found living in houses; but it is not possible for the same person at the same time to be both absent and present in the house; as presence and absence are mutually contradictory and exclusive; and thus the *absence* would be wholly inconsistent with the information regarding the man being alive, if he did not exist somewhere outside the house; and as a rule that which is inconsistent implies that whereby it ceases to be inconsistent; and as the absence in the house of the living Caitra would never cease to be inconsistent unless he existed outside the house; the inconsistency of the absence in the house is in view of the fact of his being alive; and this inconsistency ceases when Caitra is recognised as existing outside; in this case there are two cognitions—(1) 'Caitra lives,' and (2) 'he is not in the house, being outside'; of these one has some room elsewhere while the other has no room; and when these two are found to be mutually contradictory, the inconsistency of that which has no room leads to the other being taken as pertaining to something else; and the removal of their inconsistency constitutes the basis of Presumptive Cognition. Sometimes it so happens that on seeing one correlative which pertains to a definite place, etc., we remember the relationship which brings about the cognition of the other correlative; and this cognition is purely inferential, differing from Presumptive Cognition in the process of its appearance; as has been declared: 'In Inference the necessary condition lies in *being born from concomitance*, while Presumption is totally different, operating solely through negation.'

We have an instance of the other kind of Presumptive Cognition, the Çrutārthāpatti, where the inconsistency of one assertion indicates another assertion. *E. g.*, the assertion that 'fat Devadatta eats not in the day' leads to the presumption that 'he eats at night.' which sentence takes the place of the latter half of the former sentence.

The author now proceeds to show that the *Dṛshṭārthāpatti* is only a form of Inference :—

[Page 223] *Text* (*108*) : *The Presumptive Cognition of a thing based upon a fact of perception is only 'Inference per contraries'; and that based upon verbal cognition is an 'Inference per Inference.'*

Commentary.

The expression '*dârçânārtha*' means *that which is directly perceived* by means of the five means of knowledge (the sense-organs); and the *arthāpatti*,' the 'presumptive cognition' of a thing based upon such direct perception is a case of 'Inference per contraries.' That is to say, the character of the 'inferential indicative' is in accordance with the nature of the invariable concomitance (upon which the inference may be based); and in the case in question what is invariably concomitant with the thing to be inferred is what is *contrary* to the cognitions by other means of knowledge; and hence in this case the 'inferential indicative' is what is contradictory. For instance, if *absence from the house* were to indicate *existence outside* by mere 'inconsistency,' then it might as well indicate other things also; as there would be nothing to limit the scope of this indication.

Objection: "But it is for the sake of establishing its consistency that *absence from the house* indicates something else; and nothing else except *outside existence* could make it consistent (and hence it could not indicate anything but the *outside existence*)."

Reply: By whom has it been asserted that *absence from the house* is made consistent by *outside existence*? In fact we declare that even when there is *outside existence*, *absence from the house* is as inconsistent as ever.

Object: "We have often seen that when a thing is of a limited extent, if it is in one place, it is not in any other place; *e. g.* when the sun is seen either in the east or in the west, it is not seen on the other side; and similarly from a directly perceived fact we learn that the *absence from the house* of the living Devadatta is possible or consistent only when he exists somewhere outside of it."

Reply: Well in that case the cognition of *outside existence* is preceded by, and follows from, a cognition of invariable concomitance; and thus Presumptive Cognition being born of invariable concomitance would be purely inferential. Then, as for the assertion that it is an inference that operates by contraries, it is only meant to show the distinctive feature of the inference in the case. The inferential argument would be stated in this form; 'Dēvadatta exists outside,—because though living, he is not found in the house,—like ourselves.'

The author next proceeds to show that the Presumptive Cognition based upon verbal cognition is also included in Inference: The cognition that *Dēvadatta eats at night*, following from the verbal cognition of the assertion 'fat Dēvadatta eats not in the day,' is a case of 'inference per inference'; as in this case the assertion, serving as an 'inferential indicative,' leads to the inference of *fatness*, which, in its turn, leads to the inference of its cause in the form of 'eating at night.'

The sense of all this is as follows: The 'inconsistency' of a means of knowledge lies in its incapability to bring about the cognition of its objective; and the assertion 'he eats not during the day' is found to be quite capable of expressing what it is meant to express; and as such where would lie its 'inconsistency' (on which you seek to base the presumptive cognition of *eating at night*)?

Objection: "*Fatness*, the effect of eating, would not be possible without *eating in the day*, because of there being no cause for the fatness; and this impossibility would make the assertion in question also inconsistent; as it is not in keeping with the real state of things."

Reply: Then, in that case, the 'inconsistency' of the assertion would lie in the improbability of its meaning, and its 'consistency' in the probability of its meaning; and there would be no 'consistency' or 'inconsistency' in the assertion itself; and the 'meaning' or object of *fatness of one who does not eat in the day*, being an effect of *eating*, becomes 'consistent' or probable by reason of the '*meaning*' or object in the form of *eating at night*, and not by reason of the assertion that 'he eats at night;' and thus what the 'inconsistency' or improbability of the object needs, for the justification of itself and its expressive sentence, would be an *object*, and not a *sentence*; as a sentence could not justify the inconsistency of an *object*. And the object that is justified is cognised by means of an object; as, in the case in question, the object in the shape of the *fatness of one who does not eat in the day* is found to be unfailing in its character of being the effect of *eating at night*; and hence there can be no *Arthāpatti* (presumptive cognition) amenable to verbal expression.

Objection: "It is quite true that an *object* is justified by an *object*; and it is by this justification of the *object* that the word expressive of it is also justified; but a *verbal object* is justified only by a *verbal object*; as anything cognised by other means of knowledge could have no concomitance with a *verbal object*; for instance, when the verb '*pacati*,' 'cooks,' is uttered, tis deficiency due to the absence of the objective is not removed by the *sensuous perception* of the cooked grain; as even though this grain is perceived, the verbal deficiency of an objective for the verb 'cooks' remains just the same. When however the objective is brought forward by means of a word, ('*kalāyam*') the definite cognition comes forward in its entirety, in the form '*kulāyam pacati*' (cooks the *kālaya* grain) or '*çākam pacati*' (cooks vegetables). In the case of the sentence—'fat Dēvadatta eats not in the day'—also we have the deficiency or inconsistency of what is expressed by the sentence; and hence this deficiency could be removed only by means of a *verbal object*

and hence what the 'apparent inconsistency' in the case needs is a *sentence* expressing the fact of *eating at night*; otherwise, in as much as the denotations of the words composing the sentence expressive of *non-eating in the day* could have no connection with the *eating* at night, and as the apparent inconsistency would rest in the *sentence* (verbal expression), the *object*, in the shape of *eating* at night, could never become an object of *Presumptive Cognition*; specially as it would form an object of verbal cognition (by means of the *sentence* 'he eats at night'). Nor can it be argued that, 'the sentence (expressive of *eating at night*) could not be indicated either by the sentence expressive of *non-eating in the day*, or by this *non-eating* itself,—as there would be no proximity between these and that sentence.' *

"Nor would it be right to argue that—'in as much as neither the sentence *eats not in the day*, nor its meaning, has any kind of proximity to the sentence *eats at night*, the former two could not in any way indicate this latter?' Because through the proximity to them of the *meaning* of the latter sentence, there would be a proximity of this latter *sentence* also. Nor is the proximity absolutely necessary, in *presumptive* cognition, as it is in the *inferential*; as the former operates through (is based upon) mere *inconsistency*. To this effect it has been declared—'The meaning (that *the fat person eats not in the day*) does not directly indicate the other meaning (that *he eats at night*); for the simple reason that while the former is an object of verbal cognition (by means of the sentence uttered—*the fat person eats not in the day*) the latter is not amenable to any expressive operation of that sentence. That such is the case is apparent from the fact that until the person has a conception of other words ('he eats at night') he has no idea of the words uttered ('the fat person eats not in the day') having any significance (with regard to the meaning that *the person eats at night*)

* The reading appears to be corrupt; as it is, the reading '*vākyam*, does not give any sense.

"Thus then, in as much as a verbal need can be supplied only by words, as shown above, the *meaning* or fact *of eating at night*, which is not in any way signified by the sentence pronounced, could not supply the need of removing the inconsistency of *fatness accompanied by absence of food during the day*, which is distinctly signified by the words uttered; and hence that *fatness* could not indicate the fact of *eating at night*."

"And for this reason the presumptive cognition (*arthāpatti*) must be regarded as always pertaining to words."

"That is to say, in the case in question, the presumptive cognition, due to the sentence *the fat person eats not in the day*, must pertain to, and bring about the cognition of, the *sentence—he eats at night*."

"And it would be this latter sentence which, being thus comprehended (by presumptive cognition), would indicate its *meaning* (the fact of his *eating at night*.)*

To the above we make the following reply: Words are used for the purpose of expressing the meanings of sentences; and each word singly is not capable of expressing the *meaning of the sentence*, which consists of the relationships between the words composing the sentence; and thus having their final end still unaccomplished, and while fulfilling a single purpose, the word stands in need of the other words. And in a case where the words have fully expressed the meaning of the sentence, they do not stand in need of any other words; as their function has been

*The reading of the whole page of the text is very corrupt. On line 13, for यं we must have यम्. On line 15 for च there should be च्च. In l. 17 for सा, सो. In l. 18 'च्चात् तत्तिरोहित,' we must have शेषाद्वृत्तिरोहितः In l. 18 for सामर्थ्यं we should have ःसामर्थ्यं In l. 19 for तेनैषां.....गोचराः, there should be तेनैषा.....गोचरा. Without these changes the whole page before अत्रोच्यते in l. 21 would be unintelligible.

fully served. Nor can it be argued that "the meaning expressed by these words is not consistent." Because the function of the word does not lie in the removal of inconsistences as to *facts* (objects),—its function resting in mere expression of the fact. And this *expressing* (of the fact of fat Devadatta not eating in the day) is fully accomplished by the sentence under consideration, even when the sentence expressive of *eating at night* is not near it; as we find that from the sentence ('fat Devadatta eats not in the day') we fully cognise the fact of his not *eating in the day*; and this cognition is free from all doubts and discrepancies; specially as if it were not so, then there would be no active force for the 'apparent inconsistency' either; as it is only when we have a definite and correct cognition of the man being *fat*, and yet as fully known to be one who does not eat in the day, that an 'inconsistency' with regard to it can be considered undesirable, and a removal thereof sought after. On the other hand, if the cognition derived from the sentence were either doubtful or known as mistaken, then where would be the necessity of *presuming* a fact for the justification of such a cognition? Nor is it necessary that when two facts are mutually contradictory, the *cognition* of these should become a *non-cognition*. Consequently, the word having its inconsistency removed by the cognition of a new fact, it would not stand in need of any other words; as there is nothing else left to be done by it; and in reality it is the fact signified by the sentence ('fat Devadatta etc.,') which, being inconsistent in the absence of another fact, seeks this latter for its own justification. And thus there can be no objection to the declaration that in the case of *Çrutārthāpatti*, there is an 'inference upon inference.'

[**Page 225.**] *Text* (109): *Probability also, following from invariable concomitance, is a form of Inference* (IX-ii-5).

Commentary.

Some people hold that the cognition of a *thousand* gives rise to the cognition of the *hundred*; and this is due to a dis-

tinct *means of knowledge*, in the form of 'Probability,' based upon the probable existence of the 'hundred' in the 'thousand.' In opposition to this view the author has declared that this is a case of Inference; as 'thousand' is invariably concomitant with 'hundred,' as this latter always precedes the former; and hence the cognition of 'hundred' from that of 'thousand' cannot but be regarded as purely *inferential*.

[P. 225.] *Text* (110): *Negation also is mere Inference; just as the appearance of the effect becomes 'indicative' of the existence of the cause, so also does the non-appearance of the effect become 'indicative' of the non-existence of the cause.* (IX-ii-5).

Commentary.

Some people hold that for the cognition of the *absence* of a thing there is a distinct means in the shape of Negation, which consists in the non-appearance of sense-perception and the four means of knowing the *presence* of things. With a view to set aside this view the author says—*Negation also is mere Inference.* In proof of this assertion he adds: *Just as etc.* He also who regards Negation as a distnict means of knowledge, does not maintain that the cognition of the absence or non-existence of a thing follows from mere non-appearance of its cognition; as if it were so then, a thing that is at a great distance from the observer (and is *not cognised*) would come to be cognised as *non-existent* (there being an absence of its cognition). What he would hold is that, when all causes and conditions of cognising it are present, if there is non-appearance of the due cognition of an object which is cognisable, then its non-cognition would lead to the cognition of its non-existence. There is however no difference in nature between the non-cognition of the cognisable and that of the non-cognisable object; as there are no varying grades of negation; and hence a negation cannot, by itself, like the sense organs, bring about the cognition of anything; what constitutes a difference between the two however is that *the non-cognition of the cognisable object* is never found to fail in its concomitance with the *absence or non-existence* of that object;

whereas the *non-cognition the non-cognisable* object is found to fail in such concomitance; as even when the non-cognisable object, *exists*, there is *non-cognition* of it; and it is on account of this difference that it is the non-cognition of the cognisable object, and not that of the non-cognisable object, that brings about the cognition (of the non-existence of the object). And thus negation becomes merely an 'inferential indicative,' as it would stand in need of the due recognition of invariable concomitance; if it did not require this invariable concomitance, then there would be nothing to prevent the undesirable contingency that all negation is equally liable to bring about the cognition (of the absence of things; which the opponent cannot admit).

[P. 226] Then again, we find that when an empty spot of earth has been seen by the eye, there comes about the cognition of *absence* also, in the form that 'this spot of earth has no jar on it;' and in this case why should not the cognition of this absence of the jar be regarded as *sensuous*, just like the cognition of the spot of earth?

Objection "The sense-organ is connected only with the positive factor in the conception (*i. e.* with the *spot*), which alone is capable of being thus connected."

Reply: This cannot be accepted until it is proved; all capability is inferred from certain effects; and just as in the case of the *existence of* objects we find the effect (cognition) regulated by the presence or absence of the operation of the sense-organs, so do we also perceive in the case of that same effect with regard to the *non-existence* of objects; and hence *non-existence* also is as capable of being perceived by means of the sense-organs as *existence*. And the connection also of non-existence with certain sense-organs might be assumed on the strength of the nature of the effects produced (in the shape of cognition).

Objection: "No non-existence is ever cognised without a "substratum; as its action or want of action is always found to "be in reference to definite points of place and time, etc., and

"the operation of the sense-organs pertains to the substratum "of the non-existence, and not to the non-existence itself; as is "shown by the fact of the cognition of non-existence appearing "even after the operation of the sense-organ has ceased; "as for instance it so happens that a man having seen a house "goes to another place; and there on being asked by some one "as to the presence of Dēvadatta in the house, he has aroused "in his mind, at that moment, the desire to learn the where-"abouts of Dēvadatta; and then having cognised the fact of his "non-existence in the house, he replies—'he is not in the house,' "(and here we find that the non-existence has been cognised "while the man is away from the temple, and he has none of his "sense-organs in contact with the non-existence). Nor can it "be rightly urged that, this non-existence of Devatta in the "house had been cognised, indeterminately, at the time that the "house was seen; and it is remembered at the subsequent "time;' because the indeterminate cognition of such objects as "the jar and the like is all very well, on account of their being in "contact with the sense-organs; specially as the forms of these "things are independent of all other things; as for non-existence "on the other hand, in as much as it is of a negative character, "its very form depends upon that of which it is the negation; "and thus there being no other form for non-existence than the "negation of that thing, any comprehension of it is impossible, "without the comprehension of that thing which is its counter-"entity. The only difference between *existence* and *non-exis-*"*tence* is that, while the former is cognised as a positive entity by "itself, the latter is cognised only as the negation of something "else; as has been declared by the author of the Nyāyāvartika.

"The difference between *existence* and *non-existence* "is due to the fact of the former being by itself the cause of its "own cognition and non-cognition, and the latter depending "upon something else for both; that is to say that which *exists* "is by itself the substratum of the means of cognition, while "that which does not exist is so only in the form of the nega-

"tion of something else.' If *non-existence* also were cognised "independently by itself, then it would in no way be different "from *existence*; hence there can be no indeterminate cognition "of *non-existence*. Then it has been argued that,—'in the case "cited above, was the cognition one of the house along with "Dēvadatta, or that of the house apart from Dēvadatta? "If the former, then the subsequent recalling could not be of "the house alone; and if the latter, then the non-existence (of "Dēvadatta) also will have been already perceived; and as "such would only be remembered at the subsequent occasion.' "But there is not much in this argument; because even though "there be no cognition of the existence or non-existence of "Devadatta (in the house), the house by itself could very "well be cognised; hence there could be no cognition of the "non-existence on the previous occasion; and in the absence "of the previous cognition, the subsequent one could not be a "case *of remembrance*. Nor is there any other means of know-"ledge available at the time. Consequently even though the "counter-entity be not in close proximity, when this would be "recalled by memory, there would be a cognition of *non-*"*existence*; and the means of this cognition could only be in "the form of the *absence of sense-perception and the other four* "*means of knowledge*. The cognisability of non-existence by "negation having thus been proved in one case, the same "reasoning might be applied to all other cases (of the cognition "of *non-existence*); and thus it must be admitted that Negation "is a distinct means of knowledge."

[Page 227.] To the above we make the following reply: When the man has gone away from the house to some other place and is questioned as to the existence therein of Devadatta, does he cognise the non-existence of Devadatta at the time of the question, by means of his non-perception at the same time? Or does he cognise his non-existence at the previous time—in the form 'he did not exist in the house at the time that I saw the house,

—by means of his non-perception there at that time? As for the 'non-perception at the present time' (of the questioning), this would not be the 'non-perception of the perceptible' (which is regarded as the means of cognising non-existence); because of the house being hidden from view by the intervening space. And as for the non-existence of Devadatta in the house at the time of the question, it would be doubtful; as he might have come into it in the mean time; and as for the previous 'non-perception,'—which alone could indicate his non-existence on the previous occasion, it could not continue up to the time of the question; as the conditions will have changed in the meantime. And when that 'non-perception' is not present at the time of the questioning, it could not bring about any cognition (of present non-existence); nor could it operate through being recalled to memory; as it has never before been cognised. That is to say, 'non-perception' is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge, being, as it is, of the nature of 'non-existence' or 'negation'; and if it were to depend upon another 'non-perception,' (for its cognition), then there would be an endless series of 'non-perceptions;' and it is for this reason that it is maintained that like the sense-organs, 'nonperception' also brings about the cognition of its objective without being itself cognised. And such being the case, as it would never be *cognised*, how could there be any *remembrance* of it (as all *remembrance is* based upon a previous *cognition*)?

Objection: "The non-perception of Devadatta in the house is set aside only by his perception; but the man who has gone away from the house does not have a perception of him (in the house); and hence the previous non-perception would remain. It is true that the conditions of the observer will have changed (since he visited the house); but no change of conditions can alter the nature of things."

Reply: This may be so in the case in question; but in a case where the non-existence of a thing has not been apprehended, on account of there being no remembrance of its counter-entity,—and later on that thing is met with in the place,—then there arises the idea that 'this thing did not exist here before,' with regard to its *previous* non-existence; what explanation will you have of this? As in this case the previous non-perception' will have been set aside by the later 'perception.' Nor will the mere fact of its previous existence enable the 'non-perception,' even though non-existent at the subsequent time, to bring about any cognitions; as if this could be possible, then sensuous cognition also would be possible for one whose sense-organs have been destroyed.

Objection: "The presumption to-day does certainly set aside the non-perception of the same day: as for the previous non-perception, that remains; and this would be capable of pointing to the *previous non-existence*, which would be duly cognised by its means."

Reply: What a wonderful learning and philosophic insight you display! 'Non-perception' is the *previous negation of perception*; and this is one only, extending up to the time of the *appearance of the thing* (when the non-perception ceases); and it does not become different with the difference in time, being the same to-day that it was yesterday; and then, who would be the clever person who could assert that the *previous* non-perception has been set aside, and that of to-day still remains,—an assertion that indicates an extreme nicety of discriminative faculty!

For these reasons then, we cannot understand how non-existence can be rendered cognisable by negation; and we conclude that on the previous occasion (in the house) the observers apprehended the mere form of *non-existence*, and then on the subsequent occasion, having gone to the other place, he has the cognition of that same non-existence, following upon the remembrance of its counter-entity (Devadatta); and this would be a case of purely *inferential* cognition,—the process of inference involved

being this: when a thing is such as is capable of being remembered at the remembrance of another thing, if the former is not remembered even though the desire to remember it is present (and the remembrance of the latter thing is also present), then it must follow that it did not exist at the time of the perception of the other thing; as for instance, when the *mere* place is remembered, there is remembrance of the jar whose non-existence had been previously cognised; and in the case in question even though the temple is remembered, we do not remember Devadatta, even though he is quite capable of being remembered, and the desire to remember him is also present; and from this it follows that he did not exist at the time that the temple was perceived; and this is a case of *inference* based upon non-rememberance.

[Page 228.] *Objection:*—Of two things perceived together, it so happens that, on account of the impressions of one being stronger than those of the other, while one is remembered, the other is not; for instance, when a *Çloka* is learnt, it so happens that when recalling the *Çloka* to the mind, while we distinctly remember one line of it, the other line is not remembered at all; and in this case, one line being remembered, how could there be any inference of non-existence from the fact of the non-remembrance of the other line? Any such inference under the circumstances would not be conclusive."

Reply: Even when two things may exist together, it may be that, owing to the nature of the causes (leading to perception), while one of them is perceived, there is no perception of the other. How then could the mere *perception* of the ground prove the *non-existence* of the jar (as it may be that while the causes for the perception of the former are fully operative, those for the perception of the latter may not be equally efficient, even though it may be existing all the same)?

Objection: "When two things are related to one and the same cognition (*e. g.* the *ground* and the *jar*), then, if in any case only one of these happens to be perceived, the non-perception of

the other and not all non-preception—proves that this latter does not exist; *e. g.* the cognition that apprehends the ground, apprehends also the jar in contact with it; the accessories for the perception of the jar are the same as those for the perception of the ground; hence if the jar existed on the ground, then it would certainly be perceived when the ground is perceived; as the conditions for the perception of both are exactly the same; as a matter of fact however, in the case in question, the jar is not perceived; and hence it follows that it does not exist there; as its non-perception could not be otherwise possible."

Reply: If it be so, for us then also, of two things related to the same cognition, if one is remembered and the other is not, then this non-remembrance would prove the non-existence of this latter; in the case in question, the conditions of the perception of the house are the same as those for the perception of Devadatta who is its correlative; and similarly the conditions of the remembrance of the house are the same as those of the remembrance of Devadatta; hence in as much as the house and Devadatta would both be related to the same cognition, if Devadatta had existed in the house at the time that the house was perceived, he would certainly have been remembered when the house was remembered; because of the conditions of the remembrance of both being the same; as a matter of fact however we find that he is not remembered; and hence we conclude that he did not exist in the house at the time; as his said non-remembrance, could not be otherwise explained. And this process of reasoning would be exactly similar to your own.

As for the *Çloka*, for the sake of proper pronunciation its words are read one after the other; and as such they are not connected with one and the same cognition; and those words whose impression may be stronger than that of others would be remembered, while the rest would not; and there would be nothing incongruous in this.

Thus then, even when an object is perceived at the present time, the cognition of its *previous* non-existence—in the form

that 'it did not exist before,'—is purely *inferential*, being based upon the non-remembrance of its existence at the time when the previous existence of its counter-entity is remembered.

Some people hold that the *absence of remembrance* also is only a form of 'Negation' as a means of knowledge. But this view would be opposed to such declarations of the *Bhāshya* as—'Negation is only the absence of the other means of knowledge' and also to the *Vārtika* which declares that 'Negation is that where the five means of knowledge are not operative.' So here we drop this subject.

Others again maintain that, "in as much as there is no knowable thing of a negative character, it is not right to enter into any discussion as to the means of knowing it."

[**Page 229**.] To these people should be put the question—What is the substratum of the notion 'this is not'? If it has no substratum, then a great lending hand is given to the *Mahāyānikas* (Bauddhas) who hold all notions to be without substratum. If then, the ground be regarded as the necessary substratum,(of the notion 'this is not') then even when the ground would be studded with thorns, we would have the notion that 'the thorn is not;' and this would lead to our fearless passing and repassing over the ground; as there would be nothing to restrain us from doing so.

Objection: It is with regard to the *bare* ground that we have the notion 'it is not'; and as the presence of the thorns would set aside the *bareness* of the ground, there could be no such notion as 'the thorn is not'; nor could there be any activity in accordance with this notion."

Reply: Does *bareness* constitute the very form of the ground, or is it a distinct quality of it? If the former, then it could not be set aside even when the thorn would be cognised; and hence the absurdity of the said notion and activity would remain as before. If it be regarded as a distinct quality, then

that would be admitting a distinct objective (as we regard *negation* to be).

Objection: "It is *existence* (*i. e.* an existing thing the ground *f. i.*) itself that has the two states of *being alone*, and of being *with a second*; and it is in the former state that it is known as 'itself' or 'bare'; and when there is a desire to apprehend the jar &c., that are the counter-entities of the 'bare' ground, then the cognition of this *bare* ground brings about the notions and activities pertaining to the *non-existence* of these, *jar* and other things."

Reply: What denotation of the word 'alone,' apart from the ground wherein the jar &c. are non-existent, have you established which you seek to make the substratum of the negative notion 'it is not'? As a rule, unless there is a peculiarity in the object cognised, there can be no peculiarity in the cognition; nor till then can there be any change in the activity of the agent.

Objection: "What we mean by *alone* is the *singleness* that is natural to all things."

Reply: What is this 'singleness'? Is it the *absence of* the *counter-entity*, or the *number* 'one'? As for the number 'one,' it will remain as long as its substratum exists, and as such would continue to exist even on the occasion of the object being accompanied by a second. If the *natural* 'singleness' be regarded as the *absence of the counter-entity*,—then the existence of a distinct object of cognition becomes admitted.

Objection: "Even for one who accepts *negation* as a distinct cognisable thing,—it is the apprehension of the bare *ground* that becomes the cause of the cognition of negation; as until the ground has been apprehended, there can be no cognition of any negation or non-existence therein. But the cognition that 'the thorn does not exist' cannot be due to the apprehension of the *ground as devoid of thorns*; as if the apprehension of the *ground qualified by non-existence* were the cause of the cogni-

tion of the 'non-existence,'—then it would come to this: the apprehension of the non-existence (of thorns) would bring about the apprehension of the ground as qualified by that non-existence; and the apprehension of the ground as qualified by that non-existence would lead to the apprehension of the non-existence; and thus this latter cognition would become its own cause. For these reasons, it must be admitted even by you that of the ground there is a certain condition of 'being alone,' which is independent of all touch with the counter-entity, and which is distinct from 'negation' or 'non-existence'; and that the apprehension of that condition brings about the cognition of *non-existence*; and it is this that for us brings about the notion 'this does not exist'."

Reply: This is not right; as it is the apprehension of the form of the ground itself that is the cause of the cognition of *non-existence*. Nor would there be any chance of the cognition of this non-existence even when the ground would be perceived along with something else; as like the apprehension of the ground, the direct contact of non-existence with the sense-organs also is a necessary condition of the cognition of non-existence; and when there would be any such thing as thorn and the like on the ground, then, in as much as there would not be non-existence, there would be no contact of the sense-organs with that non-existence; and hence even though the apprehension of the ground would be there, there would be no cognition of non-existence. As for instance, even though such aids to vision as the eye and the proper amount of light are present, yet a thing that does not exist in the place is never cognised.

Thus the fact of 'Non-existence' being a distinct object of cognition has been established.

[Page 230.] This 'Non-existence' is of four kinds: (1) *Prāgabhāva*, 'Previous non-existence,' (2) *Pradhvaṅsābhāva*, Destruction, (3) *Itarētarābhâva*, 'mutual negation,' and (4) *Atyantābhāva* 'Absolute non-existence.'

(1) As an instance of 'Previous non-existence,' we have the non-existence of the effect in the cause, prior to its being produced. Prior to the appearance of the effect, there is its non-existence, and this Previous non-existence, even though without beginning, is yet transient; as it is destroyed by the appearance of the effect; as if it were not destroyed then the effect would not be produced.

Question. "What would be the *destruction* of Previous non-existence?"

Answer: It would consist in the appearance of the effect.

Obj.: "In that case, when the object will have ceased to exist, there would be a likelihood of perceiving its 'Previous non-existence.'"

Reply: Not so; because like the object, its constituent particles also, when operating towards their effects, constitute the 'destruction' of the *Previous non-existence*.

(2) 'Destruction, *Pradhvansābhāva*, consists in the *falling off of the object* from its real nature. And even though this has a beginning, yet it is eternal; as the object (that has under-gone destruction) is never again perceived.

Question: "The 'beginning' of a thing consisting in its coming into existence from previous non-existence,—what would be the 'previous non-existence' of Destruction?"

Answer: The 'previous non-existence' of Destruction would consist in the normal condition of the existence of the object of which it is the destruction. And just as the appearance of an object is the disappearance of its 'previous non-existence,' so the appearance of Destruction would constitute the disappearance or cessation of its 'previous non-existence.' It would not be right to urge the objection that, "that which is a non-entity, how could there be a 'non-existence' of that?"—as no objection can rightly be taken to what is in the nature of things.

(3) The negation of the *cow* in the *horse*, and *vice versa* constitutes 'mutual negation.' And this is one and the same everywhere, and is eternal; as even when one object is destroyed, it is recognised just the same in another object,—just like "generality." That is to say, just as 'generality' becomes connected with whatever object may be brought into existence by unseen forces, and its externality belongs to it by its very nature,—just so does 'mutual negation,' also; but there is this difference: the generality is cognised on the mere apprehension of the object, whereas the apprehension of the mutual negation of an object stands in need of the cognition of the counter-entity (the correlative); as it is comprehensible only in regard to the form of another thing.

(4) 'Absolute non-existence' consists in the negation of what has no existence at all.

Objection: "'Absolute non-existence' is nothing other than mutual negation."

Reply: It is a wonder how you go astray even on a high road! While 'mutual negation' consists in the negation of identity between two such things as the cow and the horse, each of whom has a well-known form of its own,—in 'absolute non-existence' we have a negation, not limited by space or time, of something that has no existence at all, and which is only imposed upon the mind; *e. g.* there is no other object of cognition apart from the six 'categories;' and if 'absolute non-existence' were not admitted, then it would be absolutely impossible to arrive at any such restriction as that 'there are only six categories.'

Text (III): Similarly Tradition also, when true, is only Trustworthy Assertion. (IX—ii—5).

Commentary.

The conjunct *nipāta* in the form of *'iti ha'* is used in the sense of *continued tradition*; and the affix *'shyañ'* (in the word *'aitihya'*) has the reflexive sense. As for *false* Tradition, it cannot be a means of *right* knowledge; and true Tradition would only be a form of 'Ttustworthy Assertion'; and 'Trustworthy Assertion' has been shown to be a form of 'Inference'; hence Tradition, when true, does not differ from 'Inference.'

[**Page 231.**] *Text (112)*: *Inference 'for the benefit of others' consists in the expounding of something known to the person himself, by means of a 'five-membered' sentence. That is to say, when by means of the five-membered sentence a man expounds what he himself knows to be absolutely true, to other persons, who have either a doubtful or a mistaken idea about the thing, or have no knowledge of it at all,—then we have what is called 'Inference for the benefit of others.'* (*X1-ii-1.*)

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to describe the other kind of Inference, that for the benefit of other persons: When a fact is to be proved by means of a sentence made up of certain words,—those words that are necessary to convey the idea of the fact are known as *'avayava*, 'Members' in reference to the sentence as a whole. That is said to be 'known to the person as true' which he knows for certain to be concomitant with the subject in question; *i. e.* the 'inferential indicative' which he knows to be invariably concomitant with the subject; and the expounding or putting forward of such an 'indicative' by means of the five-membered sentence—that is to say, the pronouncing of the five-fold sentence capable of bringing about the due cognition of the 'indicative'—constitutes what is known as 'Inference for the benefit of others.'

The five-fold sentence expounds as many forms or characters of the 'Inferential indicative' as tend to point out its invari-

able concomitance with the subject. And it is the Inferential indicative as expounded by means of the 'sentence' that proves the subject; and the sentence itself does not express the subject; as if it did, the cognition would be *verbal*, and not *inferential*. It is for this reason that 'Inference for the benefit of others' is said to consist in the pronouncing of the sentence expressive of the inferential indicative as concomitant with the subject.

Other people hold the following view: "The denotation of a word extends as far as the word may be meant to convey; and in the case in question the 'sentence' is meant to convey the idea of the *conclusion*, as it is for that purpose that the sentence is pronounced. Then as for the pointing out of the 'inferential indicative, this must be regarded as an intermediate (accessory) operation, made necessary by the fact that the opponent would not be convinced of the conclusion, by a mere verbal declaration."

These people put forward the following definition of 'Inference for the benefit of others':—"'*That which is known to himself*' is the *sādhya*, the Subject; and this is proved by means of the 'five-membered sentence,' through the intermediate process of pointing out the 'inferential indicative'; and the putting forward of that 'sentence' constitutes 'Inference for the benefit of others.'"

The author explains his own assertion—*That is to say &c.*

Some people hold that the sentence in question has only two members; others maintain that it has three; and with a view to set aside these views, the author lays stress on the number *five—it is by means of the five-membered sentence.*

The man who entertains doubts with regard to the subject to be proved is called '*sañçayitā*'; he who entertains ideas contrary to the true one is '*viparyastā*'; and one who has neither doubtful nor mistaken ideas, and has absolutely no knowledge of the subject, is called '*avyutpanna*' 'ignorant'; all these kinds of men are persons for whom the sentence in question

is meant; as all of them are devoid of correct ideas on the subject.

We perceive, in our-selves, the fact that, when a person uses a number of words together, he has always the intention of expressing a certain relation among the denotations of the words he uses; and when we have once come to know the necessary character of this fact, whenever, subsequently, we find a number of words used, we at once understand that the person who has uttered the words has the intention of expressing a certain relationship among the denotations of those words; and having come to understand this, through this we come to *infer*, from the words, the meaning of the sentence; and the meaning of the sentence is not cognised directly by means of the denotations of the words composing it. Because for the Mīmānsaka, there is no such distinct means of knowledge as the "denotations of words;" nor does there appear any power or capability of expressing the meaning of the sentence, in the 'denotations of words,' each of which is singly expressed by each of the words composing that sentence; because the operation of the means of knowledge rests wholly in the bringing about of the cognition of the knowable object; and it does not add any potency to that object. For these reasons, the 'denotations of words,' in expressing the meaning of the sentences could express it, either as an 'inferential indicative,' or by apparent inconsistency; and in any case the cognition of the meaning of the sentence could not be *verbal*.

[**Page 232.**] *Objection*: "Does each word of a sentence, while expressing a distinct meaning, become the 'inferential indicative' of the meaning of the sentence? Or, the words express their meanings as related to one another (and this connected signification forms the meaning of the sentence)?"

In answer to this some people hold the following view: "The signification of the meanings by words is in accordance with the knowledge that people possess of the words and their

meanings; and this knowledge is always either in regard to things related to certain actions, as found in the case of such assertions of experienced person as 'bring the cow,' 'tether the cow' and the like,—or in regard to an action as related to certain things; and it is never in regard to the mere form of the words; and for this reason it must be admitted that words denote only such meanings as are related among themselves."

In connection with this subject we make the following observations: In the case of the sentence 'bring the cow,' if the word 'cow' alone were to signify its own denotation as related to that of the word 'bring,' then the addition of the word 'bring' would be absolutely useless; as its denotation will have been signified by the word 'cow.'

Objection: "The fact is that when the word 'bring' has signified its meaning, then it is that the word 'cow' signifies its own as related to that meaning; and hence the word 'bring,' is by no means superfluous."

Reply: In that case you admit that the word 'bring' at any rate signifies its own meaning alone independently of its relationship to the meaning of any other word; and as this word would signify its own meaning free from all relationships, so would any other word do; and thus the theory of *Anvitābhidhāna*, 'signification of the related' becomes abandoned (*lit.* 'taken for dead').

If it be held that the word 'bring' also signifies its own meaning only as related to that of the other word,—then, it would come to this that, until the former word ('cow' has not signified its meaning, the latter word 'bring') would not signify its own as related to that of the former; and the former word also could not signify its meaning as related to that of the latter word, until this latter will have signified its meaning; and this would be a case of most undesirable mutual inter-dependence.

Obj.: "There is no such inter-dependence; in as much as what the words do at first is only to *remind* us of their meanings; and it is only later on that they actually *signify* their own meanings as related to the reminded ones of the other words."

Reply: There is not much to recommend in this view either; as (according to you) all words would have their concomitance recognised only with such 'meanings' as are *related* (to some other 'meanings'); and as such no word could remind us of any meaning unrelated (to other meanings); as all remembrance is in accordance with previous cognitions.

Obj.: "From the usage of old experienced people we learn that the word 'cow' is always concomitant with a certain animal with a hump and other peculiarities, and not with any *actions* or *instruments of action*; because we find that even though these latter go on changing, the former remains constant, and is one with reference to which alone the word 'cow' is used. And hence whenever the word 'cow' is heard, it reminds us only of the *animal with the hump* &c.; its concomitance with which has been found to be unfailing,—and not of any *actions* or *instruments of action*."

Reply: If such be the case, then, a word would have its denotation restricted to that particular thing with which its concomitance may be found to be unfailing; not to any other thing; and this would be all right in accordance with the *Abhi-hitānvaya* theory (the theory that each word in a sentence signifies its meaning independently of the meanings of the other words). And as for 'remembrance,' it is not easily perceptible that its appearance is only in accordance with an unfailing concomitance; as it is found to be produced by mere impressions left on the mind; and as such appears at the mere sight of a correlative or associate (of the thing remembered). For instance, when we see smoke, we remember not only fire, but also such places as the culinary hearth and the like. Thus then, if the word 'cow' were to remind us of the cow only through the recognition

of its concomitance therewith,—then it might, at times, remind us also of other objects that would be correlatives of the cow. But as it *always* reminds us of the *cow*, it comes to have a *denotative* potency with regard to that animal; as thus alone could the necessary character of the *reminding* be possible (and hence the word would *denote* the object, and not only *remind* us of it,)

Then again, you hold that as in a sentence the words signify meanings only as related to one another, so in a word also the *base* and the *termination* would signify meanings related to those of each other; and then, if these two will have signified mutually *related* meanings, what other meaning (object signified) besides these would there be, which would subsquently be remembered by means of the whole word? So we shall leave alone the assertion (of '*Anvitābhidhāna*'), which falls into the category of the 'Views of the Nagnāṭaka; and return to the main subject under consideration.

Says the opponent: "We grant that the signification of meanings by words is in the manner you suggest; but it does not stand to reason that the cognition of the meaning of a sentence is a case of 'Inference for the benefit of others.' Because an Inference consists either in the 'inferential indicative', or in the cognition produced thereby; and neither the indicative nor the cognition is 'for the benefit of others.' If Inference be said to be 'for the benefit of others' on account of the words expressing the inference being 'for the benefit of others', then Sensuous cognition also would come to be called 'for the benefit of others'; as the words expressive of that also are 'for the benefit of others'; as has been well said in the following verses: 'The character of inference belongs either to the cognition or to the means of that cognition; and neither of these two is known, either in ordinary parlance or in the Veda, to be *for the benefit of others*; and if the mere fact of the expression being for the benefit of others were to make the inference also *for other's benefit*, then wherefore should not sensuous cognition

also, for the same reason, be regarded as being for the benefit of others.' "

To the the above we make the following reply: What we mean is, not that the expression being 'for the benefit of others,' the Inference also is so, but that the 'five-membered' sentence is for the benefit of others; and in as much as that sentence, through the cognition that it affords of the 'inferential indicative,' becomes the cause or basis of Inference, it is *inferential* in its character.

Obj: Thus too, the inferential character will have to be attributed to that sensuous perception which affords cognition of the 'inferential indicative.' "

Reply: It will not have to be thus attributed; as in the case of sensuous perception we do not find any known word employed.

Note—(1) '*Anvitābhidhāna-vāda*'—The sense of this theory which was propounded by Prabhākara may be thus summarised: The first recognition of the conventional denotation of a word is obtained only from *usage*. This usage can be only in form of the younger man carrying out the instructions of the older. This instruction is conveyed by means of a sentence, and never by means of a single word. The denotations of the words composing a sentence are necessarily related to one another. Hence it must be admitted that the recognition of the conventional meaning of a word appears only with regard to certain objects, such as are related to certain other objects. Thus then, this relationship being cognised by direct denotation, there can be no need of admitting of a distinct verbal process in the form of *Tātparya* or Import, as representing the meaning of a sentence as apart from the parts composing it.

(2) *Abhihitānvayavāda*. This theory is held by Kumarila Bhatta and others. The sense of this view is that each word of a sentence denotes its own specfic meaning and then on account of the threefold cause—of (1) *Ākānkshā*, 'Requirement,' (2) *Yogyatā*, 'Capability,' and (3) *Sannidhi*, 'Proximity,'—there follows a recognition of the relationship among these words. And thus this recognition of the *relationship*, which would constitute the 'meaning of the sentence,' cannot be regarded as denoted directly by the words themselves, which can be accepted only to bring about the cognition of the meaning of the sentence, through processes other than that of Direct Denotation; and to this may be given the name of 'Tātparya,' 'Import.'

The author next proceeds to describe the five 'members' of the sentence spoken of above—

Text (113): *These members are*—(1) *Pratijnā*, '*Declaration*' *Proposition to be proved* (2) *Apadeça, Statement of the inferential indicative or 'middle term,'* (3) *Nidarçana, 'Statement of the Major Premiss,'* (4) *Anusandhāna, 'Statement of the Minor Premiss,' and* (5) *Pratyāmnāya, 'Reiteration of the Conclusion'.*

Of these (1) *the Conclusion is the statement of what is to be proved by means of the Inference, and which is not incompatible with facts. That is to say, it consists in the mere statement of the 'subject' endowed with the property sought to be proved, with a view to point out the substratum of the 'indicative.' As an example of this we have the proposition 'Wind is a substance.'* (IX—ii—1),

The qualification 'not incompatible, &c.' serves the purpose of excluding such propositions as may be contrary to (1) *Sense-cognition,* (2) *Inference,* (3) *Scriptures regarded as trustworthy by the speaker,* (4) *that which would involve a self-contradiction,; e. g. the proposition 'Fire is not hot,' would be contrary, to sense-cognition* (1); (2) *that 'ākāça is dense would be contrary to Inference*; (3) *that 'the Brāhmana ought to drink wine' would be 'contrary to scriptures'; and that 'the effect is ever existing' would, for the Vaiçēshika, be contrary to his own theory; and* (4) *that 'word is not expressive' would involve a self-contradiction.* (III—i—15).

Commentary.

The word '*punah*' is put in simply by way of ornamentation of speech. Having named the 'members' he states the definition of the 'conclusion,' and then proceeds to explain that definition. The object which is qualified by the property sought to be proved, is the 'object to be inferred,' also called the '*paksha*,' 'subject' or 'Minor term;' and the mere statement of this, without the mention of any reasoning, is what is called '*Pratijnā*,' 'Conclusion.' As has been declared by the learned—'the statement constitutes the *pratijnā*, and its subject is the 'paksha.'

Obj: "If mere statement of the proposition, without any reasonings, were the *pratijnā*, then as it would not in any way contribute towards the proving of what is to be proved, it should not deserve being mentioned in the statement of an inferential argument; as say the *Bauddhas*: 'The *hētu* or the inferential indicative, is that which indicates what is capable (of being indicated); and the assertion of the minor term, being incapable (of proving anything), is not capable of proving what is to be proved, even indirectly by the mere mention of what is sought to be proved."

In view of this objection the author has added—'*apadēçavishayam &c.*' the '*apadēça*' is the *hētu*, the inferential indicative, the 'middle' term; and the conclusion is stated for the purpose of making the 'minor' term the subject, the substratum of the 'middle' term; as wherever that middle term may be used for the purpose of proving what is to be proved, it is always known to exist in the 'subject' of the conclusion. Further, as the 'inferential indicative' is invariably found to inhere in a certain 'subject,' until this subject is mentioned, the 'indicative,' being without substratum, would not be operative; and the indicative being inoperative, what is sought to be proved could not be proved; hence in as much as the *Pratijñā* serves the purpose of pointing out the 'subject,' it helps by bringing up that which is the substratum of the 'indicative;' and thus by supplying the substratum for the 'indicative,' it makes this latter operative, and thus becomes a necessary accessory towards the proving of what is sought to be proved. To this

effect, the *Nyāyabhāshya* says: 'If there were no *pratijñā*, the indicative &c. being without substratum would not be operative.'

[Page 235.] *Obj*: "The substratum of the 'indicative' is learnt from the *Upanaya* (and hence the statement of the *Pratijñā* cannot be a necessary factor.)"

Reply:—This is not right; as until there is a statement of the *Pratijñā*, the *Upanaya* also is inoperative. What the *Upanaya* does is to point out the capability of the 'indicative' to qualify the 'subject;' and the person seeking knowledge does not, in the very first instance, require the 'indicative' (or the means of proof); but in as much as it is the most important factor in what is to be proved, when this latter is sought after, the 'indicative' also is sought after for the purpose of proving it; and the capability of this indicative is sought after at the end of all; and hence it becomes necessary first of all to put forward the statement of what is to be proved; and the capability of the indicative does not come to be mentioned first; as at that time it is not wanted.

Obj.:—"The assertion *of the 'subject' being qualified by the property sought to be proved* is self-contradictory; as that which is not yet known (and is sought to be learnt by means of the Inference) cannot serve as a qualification."

Reply:—True; that which is not known cannot be a qualification; but the 'property to be proved' is already known as existing in (qualifying) the *Sapaksha* (the *arrow* in the case in question); and it is put forward in the *Pratijñā* with a view to point out the fact of its qualifying the 'subject,' to the person who denies such qualification. It is for this reason that this 'subject' has the real character of the '*paksha*,' the 'minor' term; specially as even though by itself it is already well known, yet as it is not so well known as qualified by the property sought to be proved, it becomes capable of being pointed out in that character (i. e. as qualified by that

property). Thus too have we the fact of the 'indicative' being a property of the 'subject.' For instance, (in the case of the argument 'Word is evanescent because it is *caused*)' if it were mere *evanescence* by itself (and not as qualifying, *word*) that was sought to be proved, then the 'causedness' qualifying the word could not be a property of the 'subject'; while this discrepancy ceases when the 'evanescence' *of the word* is made the object of to be proved. This has been thus stated by the great teachers: 'This consists in both—the *indicative* and the *indicated*; without either of the two, it would be the *indicated*, and not the *indicative*.'

An instance of *Prātijñā* is next cited: '*Wind is a substance*';—in this we have the statement of the conclusion in the above form, wherein *wind* is spoken of as qualified by the character of 'substance,' which is sought to be proved for the benefit of one who, while knowing the wind, does not know that it is a substance.

He proceeds to explain the sense of the qualification '*avirodhi*,' '*not incompatible*' *&c.* That which the debater wishes to prove is the '*sādhya*'; and it often happens that by mistake he may often wish to prove something that may be contrary to well-recognised facts of sense-perception; and hence if the *Prātijñā* were defined only 'as the particular statement of what is to be proved,' then the character of '*Pratijñā*' would apply even to such statements as would be contrary to well-recognised facts of sense-perception &c.; as a matter of fact nowever no such statement can ever be a *Pratijñā*; because such a statement would be impossible to prove; and it is with a view to preclude such statements that the author has added the qualification in question. And thus the definition of *Pratijñā* comes to be that it is *the statement of such object to be proved by inference as is not incompatible with well-recognised facts of sense-preception &c.*; and when any object to be thus proved is not found to be so compatible then its statement is not *Pratijñā*.

The sense of all this is that the character of the real *sādhya* does not depend upon the mere whim of the debater; it belongs only to that which *deserves* proof; and that alone is the '*paksha*' the 'subject' or the 'minor term;' and others are only *false pakshas*.

Examples of incompatibility with facts of sense-perception &c:—(1)'*Fire is not hot*'—'not hot' means a negation of heat; and what is negatived is that which is known, and not what is absolutely unknown; as a matter of fact however *heat* can not be found anywhere else except in fire; and the cognition of heat in fire is not *inferential*; as when there is no sensuous cognition, Inference is not operative. And if what is known by sensuous cognition is sought to be negatived by an inference which can be based only upon a fact of sense-perception, then such an inference, being opposed to the fact of Sense-perception, would be set aside by it; because of the objective having been taken up by the sensuous cognition.

Question :—"What do you mean by the objective being *taken up*."

Answer :—What is meant by the objective of Inference having been taken up by the sensuous cognition is that this latter indicates the object in a manner contrary to that indicated by the former.

Question :—"What happens to the Inference when its objective has been thus taken up?"

Answer :—It cannot appear at all. That is to say, when the sensuous cognition, which appears before any inference on the subject, being of a character that does not make it negatived or mistaken,—has pointed out the *heat* of the fire,—and this heat being thus taken up by this Sensuous Cognition, there can be no correct cognition of the *absence of heat* in it. Any 'rea[illegible]' that may be brought forward in support of such a 'conclusion' will be set aside by the very fact of its being brought forward to support such an absurd conclusion,

being incapable of bringing about any rightful cognition thereof, on account of its incompatibility with sensuous cognition; As has been declared—'In a case of opposition between sensuous and inferential cognitions, there can be no room for the latter; as before the very foundation of the latter came into existence, the objective is taken up by the former.'

Obj:—"As there is mutual contradiction between the said *Negativing* (of Inference) on the one hand, and the invariable concomitance (on which the Inference is based) on the other —that which is invariably concomitant cannot have any negation (cannot be negatived)."

Reply :—If by 'invariable concomitance' here you mean the tripartite character of the argument, then it is not impossible for it to be negatived; as for instance, we find in the argument —'fire is not hot, because it is caused.' If however you mean 'invariable concomitance' to consist in that tripartite argument whose objective is not negatived; and to hold that invariable concomitance is not negatived,—then we quite agree with you. But it is for the purpose of indicating the fact of the objective not being negatived that the author has added the qualification of *compatibility with facts of sense-cognition &c.*

Question :—"To what does incompatibility with sense-cogntion &c. pertain? Does it pertain to the 'subject' or to the 'reason'? It cannot pertain to the 'subject;' as this always retains its character; nor can it pertain to the 'reason;' as the 'reason' is always capable of proving its own objective; and as for other objectives, all things would be equally incompetent. So the incongruousness must pertain to the propounder of the argument; as it is he who brings forward the Reason for proving something that does not form its objective."

Answer :— If the 'inoongruity' be meant to consist in—(1) the absence of the *capability of being cognised* of the fact put forward in the conclusion to be proved, (2) in the pro-

pounding of the argument in support thereof, and (3) the absence of capability (to prove),—then it would apply to the objective (i. e. the 'subject'—to which the first form of the incongruity would apply) and to the instrument (*i.e.* the 'Reason' to which the third form would apply) (as well as to the propounder who would be amenable to the second form).

That 'Ākāça is dense' would be contrary to Inference: that very means of knowledge whereby *Ākāça* is cognised always proves its *eternality* and *nonpartite character*; hence to assert that it has its constituents densely packed would be contrary to the Inference pertaining to the very form of the 'subject.'

That the Brāhmaṇa should drink wine would be contrary to scriptures. The meaning of this proposition would be that wine-drinking by the Brāhmaṇa is not sinful. In support of this conclusion 'milk' would be brought forward as the corroborative 'instance.' And the non-sinful character of *milk-drinking* is cognisable by means of the scriptures cousisting of Çrutis and Smṛtis; and hence the same scriptures that would prove the *non-sinful* character of *milk-drinking* would also prove the *sinful* character of *wine-drinking*; and thus the declaration of the propriety of wine-drinking for the Brāhmaṇa would be contrary to the means of knowledge pertaining to the instance brought forward in its support.

If the *Vaiçeshika* were to make the declaration that the effect exists before it is produced by the cause, he would be contradicting his own philosophical tenets. The *Vaiçēshika* engages in all discussions, resting upon the authority of the *Vaiçēshika* philosophy. And if he were to make the above declaration, it would be contrary to the *Vaiçēshika* theory that prior to its production by the cause the effect has no existence.

That the word is not expressive would involve a self-contradiction. If the word is not expressive of meaning,

then it would be impossible to make use of any *words* to express the idea that *words* are not expressive. If such words are used to this effect, then by this very use would the expressiveness of words become admitted; and hence the said declaration would be self-contradictory.

Objection: "The 'scripture' being nothing more than the statement of truths cognised by means of sensuous and inferential cognitions, a contradiction of it would only be a contradiction of sensuous and inferential cognitions; and the expressiveness of words being only an inference based upon concomitance (of the word and the meaning expressed by it), a negation of this expressiveness would only be a contradiction of Inference; and such being the case, why should the author have made separate mention of the contradiction of 'scriptures' and 'self-assertion'.?"

Reply: Scriptures are often found to be based upon mere semblance of truth; as we find in the case of the scriptures of the Buddha and others. And if the Buddha were to declare that all things are not momentary, what he would be contradicting would be his own scriptures, and not any truth (of perception or inference). As for one's own assertion that too may some times be based upon an untruth; and hence its contradiction need not necessarily involve a contradiction of, truths (of perception or inference).

Text (114): The 'Apadēça' consists in the statement of the 'inferential indicative.' That which is concomitant with the 'subject' of inference, being known to be so concomitant at all times, and with all individuals of the class to which the 'subject' belongs,—and which, at all times, is never concomitant with the contradictory of that subject,—has been spoken of as the 'inferential indicative'; and it is the statement or putting forward of this that constitutes 'apadēça.' As for instance,

(in the same argument) the assertion—'because wind has an action and is endowed with certain qualities.' Here we find that 'action' and 'quality' exist in the 'subject' (the wind), and the latter in all individuals of the class to which it belongs, and the former not in all of them; and both of these are never found in anything that is 'not substance.' Hence the statement as to the presence of these in wind constitutes the 'apadēça' (in the argument cited). (IX. ii. 1).

Commentary.

Of the declaration that 'wind is a substance,' the *apadēça* consists in the assertion 'because it has action,' which puts forward the 'inferential indicative'; and so also is the mention of 'presence of qualities,' which is another 'inferential indicative.' The author has cited these two instances, in order to show that the character of 'hētu,' 'reason' or 'inferential indicative' belongs to such a thing as exists only in a part of the *sapaksha* (*i. e.* in the case in question the '*sapaksha*' consists of all such substances as are known to be active; and 'action' is found only in a certain part of this class, *i. e.* all substances are not always active; but action can never exist apart from a substance), as well as to that which pervades over the whole of it (*i. e.* one quality or another is *always* present *in all* substances).

The author shows that the aforesaid definition of the 'inferential indicative' applies to the instances cited. 'Presence of qualities' belongs to the 'subject,' as also to all members of the class 'substance' to which that subject belongs, and which is the '*sapaksha*'; and 'presence of action' while belonging to the subject, belongs only to some members of the class 'substance'; *i.e.* to those substances alone that have material bodies; and yet both of these—'action' and 'quality'—are never found in anything that is *not a substance*, which 'non-

substance' would be the '*vipaksha*' (that wherein the inferential indicative is universally acknowledged to be non-existent). And the putting forward of both of these by means of the assertion—'because it has action,' or 'because it has qualities'—constitutes what is known as '*apadēça*,' or the Reason for the Declaration, being as it is free from all discrepancies of reasoning.

Text (115): By this it is implied that such statements as are either (1) 'asiddha' (unknown, unproved), or (2) 'viruddha' (contrary), or (3) 'sandigdha' (doubtful), or (4) 'anadhyavasita' (unascertained), have not the character of the true 'reason' (or 'indicative').

(1) Of these the 'unknown' is of four kinds—(a) 'unknown to both,' (b) 'unknown to one of the two,' (c) 'unknown in the form wanted, and (d) 'the unknown—subject-of-inference.' (a) The 'unknown to both' is that which is not known to both the arguer and the person to whom the argument is presented; e g., the argument—'sound is evanescent, because it is made up of parts.' (b) As an example of the 'unknown to one of the two,' we have—'sound is evanescent because it is an effect.' (c) We have the 'unknown in the form wanted' when what is meant to be indicated is fire by the presence of smoke, but what is put forward as the 'reason' is steam, which is not known in the form of smoke. (d) We have the 'unknown—subject-of-inference' in the argument—'Darkness in an earthy substance, because it is black in colour.'

(2) That which, while not subsisting in the subject of inference, does not subsist in any individual of the same class, and subsists in its contradictories,—is what is known as the 'viruddha,'

'*contrary*' *reason, as it proves something quite contrary to the desired conclusion; as an example of this we have the reasoning—*'*This animal is a horse, because it has horns.*'

(3) *That which, while subsisting in the object of inference, subsists in things of the same kind as that as well as in those of other kinds, is what is known as* '*sandigdha,*' '*Doubtful;*' *as it creates a doubt in the mind; e. g.,* '*this animal is a cow, because it has horns.*' *Some people hold that when in any subject there is a collision of two* '*contrary*' *indicatives explained above, there arises a doubt; and this is another kind of the* '*Doubtful*' *reason; as for example in regard to the mind we find that the two reasons—*(*1*) '*because it has motion*' *and* (*2*) '*because it cannot be felt by touch*'*—are put forward as indicative of its corporeal and non-corporeal character respectively.*

Objection: "*This would be a case of the* '*asādhāraṇa*' *reason; because the two reasons cannot reside together either in the* '*subject*' *or in its contradictory,—just like* '*non-visibility*' *and* '*perceptibility.*'"

Reply: *We shall explain later on that for this very reason the reasoning in question is what is known as the* '*anadhyavasita,*' '*unascertained.*'

Objection: "*In the scriptures (the Sūtras) we find it mentioned in many places that two contrary cognitions constitute the cause of doubt.*"

Reply: *Not so; as doubts always arise from the dual perception of objects. That is to say, a Doubt is always produced by the perception of the dual character of an object; and when both factors of the duality would be of equal authority, they would contradict each other; and as such would not give rise to any definite cognition; but they could not be the cause of any doubt; as a matter of fact, in the instance cited, there is no equality of authority in the two factors of the duality; as one of the two conclusions of the inference would always be such as is denied by the scriptures; and hence this (that has been put forward as an instance of another kind of the* '*doubtful*' *reason) would be only another kind of the* '*contrary*' *reason.*

(4) *That which subsists in the* '*subject*' *of the inference, but not in any other object either of the same kind or any other, is one that is not recognised by either party; and as such, giving rise to uncertainty, it comes to be known as the* '*unascertained*' *reason; as for instance—*'*the effect is an entity, because it is produced. This is implied in the sūtra—*'*aprasiddhónapadēçaḥ.*'

Objection: "*This distinctive feature has been spoken of in the scriptures as the cause of doubt; and the reason for this is that the distinctive feature of a thing serves to distinguish it from like as well as unlike objects (and hence the* '*unascertained,*' *comes within the sūtra that speaks of the* '*sandigdha,*' *and not within that which speaks of the* '*aprasiddha*' (*'unknown'*)."

Reply: *Not so; because of the meaning (of the sūtra) being different. That is to say, (the author of the sūtra having made the declaration that there arises a doubt as to whether the audible object, sound, is a substance, or a quality or an action)'—the opponent has retorted that, in as much as the distinctive feature (of audibility) is found*

in sound alone, there can be no doubt; and to this the author of the sūtra has replied by pointing out that the distinctive feature of 'audibility' does not belong specifically to either the Substance alone, or to the Quality alone, or to Action alone; in fact, it is common among all these; as in each of these three (substance, quality and action) we find distinctive features that distinguish them from like as well as unlike objects; (and for this same reason, 'audibility' also would be a feature that would belong in common to substance, quality and action; and hence it would not give rise to a doubt); and thus what the sūtra has done is to point out (that in the said manner, 'audibility' might very well be regarded as leading to an uncertainty or doubt) and not that a distinctive feature becomes a cause or source of doubt. For, if it were not, then, there would be doubts with regard to all the six categories. For these reasons we conclude that Doubts always arise from the cognition of features common to more than one thing.

Commentary.

The above definition of *apadēça* serves to set aside such false "reasons" as the '*asiddha*' etc. The qualification 'concomitant with the subject of inference' shows that the *unknown* reason is not a true 'reason;' the qualification 'known to exist in an object of the same kind as the subject' shows that the '*contrary*,' and the '*unascertained*' are not true 'reasons'; and the qualification 'that which never exists in that which is the contradictory of the subject' sets aside the 'Doubtful' from the category of true 'reason.'

(1) Of the four false reasons, the author proceeds to describe the 'unknown.' The 'unknown' or '*asiddha*' is of

four kinds—(1) 'Unknown to both' etc. (1) The 'unknown to both' or '*ubhayāsiddha*' is that which is not known either to the propounder of the argument or to one for whose benefit the argument is put forward; as an example of this we have the reasoning—'sound is evanescent, *because it is made up of parts*'; as the fact of sound being made up of parts is not known either to the person putting forward the argument, or to his opponent.

(2) As an example of that which is 'unknown to one of the two' or '*Anyatarāsiddha*,' we have the reasoning—'Sound is evanescent, *because it is an effect*,' where though in reality (according to us) Sound has the character of an effect, yet this fact is not known or recognised by the *Mīmānsaka*, who denies the evanescent character of sound, and against whom the argument is brought forward; such a reason cannot establish any conclusion, until it has itself been proved (by some other reasoning).

(3) The 'unknown in the form wanted' or '*Tadbhāvāsidhha*' we have in the argument where the presence of *steam* is put forward as the reason for proving the *existence of fire*, which was really meant to be proved by the mention of the presence *of smoke*; as 'steam' is not known in the form or character of 'smoke.'

(4) The 'unknown subject of Inference' or '*anumēyāsiddha*' we have in the argument—'Darkness is an earthy substance, *because it is black in colour*;' where as a matter of fact there is no such substance as 'Darkness,' as what is perceived is mere blackness impressed upon some substance or other; consequently the reasoning that 'Darkness is an earthy substance because it is black in colour' affords an instance of the 'unknown-subject,' the '*anumeyāsiddha*' or '*āçrayāsiddha*;' the compound '*anumēyāsiddha*' is to be explained as *Bahuvrīhi*' 'that (reasoning) of which the subject (*anumēya*) is not known;' and as such though the proper form would have been '*asiddhānumēya*,' yet, in as much as the compound belongs to the

same class as '*āhitāgni*,' the precedence of the participial factor becomes a matter option (*vide* Pāṇini II. ii. 37). Just as the Reason is 'unknown to any one of the two' or 'unknown to both,' so in the same manner the 'unknown subject' also may be of two kinds—*i. e.*, unknown to one or both of the disputants. Secondly, just as the 'Reason is unknown' by one or both disputants either not knowing it, or having a doubtful knowledge of it, or having a mistaken idea of it,—so in the same three ways would the 'subject' also be 'unknown.' Thirdly, in the case of the 'Reason' we find that—(1) it is 'unknown to one disputant who is not uncertain about it, simply because he has no conception of it, while to the other disputant it is 'unknown' because of his having only a doubtful knowledge of it,—(2) or that to the former it is 'unknown' simply because he has no knowledge of it, while to the latter it may be 'unknown' on account of his having no right conception of it,—(3) or that to the former it is 'unknown' as he has no certain knowledge of it, while to the latter it is 'unknown' because of his having no knowledge of it,—(4) or that to the former it may be 'unknown' because of his having a mistaken knowledge of it, while to the latter it is 'unknown' because of his knowledge of it being uncertain; and all these diversities would be found in the case of the 'unknown subject' also.

As for the 'unknown' qualification' &c., these are included in the 'unknown to one or to both'; and hence our author does not mention them separately.

(2) The author proceeds to describe the 'contrary' false Reason: '*Contrary*, &c., &c.' Sometimes it may so happen that a man seeing a certain animal in the forest would infer thus: 'this animal is a horse because it has horns;' and in this case, we know that horns are, in reality, found to belong, not to any horse, but to animals other than the horse; *viz.*, the cow, the buffalo and the like; and by reason of this concomitance the *presence of horns* would prove something totally different from the 'horse'; hence proving something quite contrary

to the 'subject' of the syllogism, the 'reason' is called the 'contrary' reason.

[**Page 241.**] The example cited is one of such 'contrary reason' as resides in one part of the 'contrary of the subject;' as the horn is not present in all that is 'not-horse,'—for instance, it is not found in the pillar (which also is as much a 'non-horse' as the cow or the buffalo). An example of the 'contrary reason' pervading over *all* that is the contrary of the 'subject,' we have in the argument—'Sound is eternal *because it is produced*.' (Where the *character of being produced* belongs to all that is *non-eternal*).

(3) That reason which, while subsisting in the 'subject,' subsists also in things of the same as well as of other classes, is called the 'Doubtful'; as it always gives rises to uncertainty. As an example of this, we have the argument—'this is a cow, *because it has horns*.' In this case we find that the horn exists in the cow as well as in the buffalo; and hence the 'presence of the horn' would leave it uncertain whether the animal is a cow or a buffalo; and as such this would be a 'Doubtful' reason. This is the instance of a reason which subsisting in the subject as well as its contraries, subsists only in a few of these contraries; and this reason is called the '*anaikāntika*,' 'Inconclusive.' Another reason of the same class would be that which pervades over the whole range of the subject and its contraries; an example of this we have in the argument—'Sound is eternal *because it is cognisable*' (where cognisability belongs all things eternal as well as non-eternal). An example of that which subsists only in parts of the subject and its contrary, we have in the argument—'*Ākāça* is eternal, *because it is incorporeal*' (where 'incorporeality' is such as subsists in a few eternal and also a few non-eternal things). A reason that subsists only in a portion of the 'subject,' and pervades over the whole of its contrary, we have in the argument—'Sound is a substance, *because it is not made of constituent parts* (where it

is only a few substances that are not made up of constituent parts, while all non-substances are so constituted).

In the text we read 'that which is *common (sādhāraṇa)* to the things of the same kind &c. &c.'; and the author explains the meaning of the word 'common' by the words 'samēna' &c., "Just as a certain property, being found in the 'subject' as well as its contrary, would give rise to an uncertainty with regard to the object to which it belongs, and would thereby become a 'Doubtful Reason,'—so, in the same manner, when we find, in the same subject, two mutually contradictory 'reasons' (of equal validity), tending to two contradictory conclusions, we have another kind of the 'Doubtful' Reason, consisting of the collision of two contradictory reasons." Such is the view held by some people; and the author proceeds to refute it: '*Some people, &c.*' With a view to this, he cites an example of this kind of reason: *In regard to the mind we find the two reasons—(1) 'because it has motion' and (2) 'because it cannot be felt by touch'—put forward as indicative of its corporeal and incorporeal character respectively.* These reasonings may be thus amplified: (1) 'The mind is corporeal, because it has actions, like the arrow,' (2) 'the mind is incorporeal because it is not felt by touch, like *Ākāça*.' Here we find a collision of the two reasons, mobility and intangibility, leading to two mutually contradictory conclusions; and this gives rise to a doubt as to whether in reality the mind is corporeal or incorporeal. And certainly both reasons could not be equally valid; as one and the same thing could not have two such contradictory characters (as *corporeality and incorporeality*). And as the two reasons are mutually contradictory, both could not be invalid either, as there could be no third character for the mind, apart from both *corporeality* and *incorporeality*. But we can find no reason whereby we could feel certain of the validity of either one of the two reasons. Hence on account of the two reasons—'mobility' and 'tangibility'—there arises a doubt as to the mind being

corporeal or *incorporeal*. The *Viruddhāvyabicāri* reason differs from the *Prakaraṇasama* reason only on this point that, while the former creates a doubt in the mind, the latter simply fails to remove the uncertainty for the settling of which it is brought forward.

Objection: "*This would be a case of the 'Asādhāraṇa' reason &c.* That is to say, each one of the two reasons—'mobility' and 'tangibility'—does not create any doubt in our mind, as each leads to a definite conclusion. Then as for the collision of the two, it would be nothing more than what is known as the '*asādhāraṇa*' reason, as the two together do not subsist in any 'subject' (*sapaksha*) or 'contra-subject' (*vipaksha*), apart from the mind. Just as in the case of the two qualities of *invalidity* and *perceptibility*, we find that though each of them is not an incompatible quality, yet conjointly they cannot exist anywhere apart from the mind. Though it is the *collision of two such properties as are not incompatible and yet mutually contradictory* that constitutes the '*Asādhāraṇa*' reason, yet such a reason would only be a source of uncertainty. As for the 'negative' (*vyatirēki*) reason it is certain that it is excluded from the 'contra-subject' (*vipaksha*) alone; and as such it leads to a definite conclusion. The '*Asādhāraṇa*' (uncommon) reason, on the other hand, is such that its exclusion is never absolutely certain; as it is as likely to be excluded from the 'subject' as from the 'contra-subject.' As, if 'odourousness' being excluded from non-eternal things' would prove 'eternity,' it would, as reasonably, prove 'non-eternality' also, as excluded from the 'eternal thing,' *Ākāça*. But as a matter of fact, both cannot be rightly proved, as any one thing cannot have the two contradictory characters of eternality and non-eternality. Nor could both be not proved, as the two being mutually exclusive, there can be no intermediate stage (between 'eternality' and 'non-eternality'). Consequently the fact of the Earth being 'odorous' leaves it doubtful whether the Earth

"is eternal or non-eternal; as has been declared by the revered "Kumārila Bhatta: 'Where we have a certain property which "is *asādhārana*, in as much the negation of both could not "subsist in any subject, its negation becomes a source of doubt.' "(*Çlokavārtika—Anumāna*, Çloka 88-89); and the author "of the *Nyāyavārtika* also has thus declared: 'In as much "the character of *being born of a disjunction* which consists "in having for its substantial cause a disjunction born of another "disjunction—is not possible apart from Sound, the reason "(*being born of a disjunction*) being precluded from all things "becomes a source of doubt or uncertainty'."

To the above, our author offers the following reply: *It is for this reason that we shall explain later on that such a reason is what we call the 'Anadhyavasita' 'unascertained.'* That is to say, we shall point out later on that the collision of two contradictory properties constitutes the '*Asādhāraṇa*' reason, and being '*Asādhāraṇa*,' it becomes the '*anadhyavasita*.'

The author having shown that the character of the 'Doubtful Reason' does not belong to that reason which is *Viruddhāvyābhichāri*' (not incompatible with the 'contrary'), the objector brings forward the objection that such a view would be against what has been taught by the scriptures on the subject (*i. e.* the *Sūtras*)—"*Nanu &c.* '*ubhayathā darçan-*"*am*—'what is meant by this is that in the scriptures it has been "declared in many places that when a certain 'subject' is "found to be accompanied by two mutually contradictory "properties, there always arises a doubt in the mind of the "observer; and such is also the common experience of many "people; and when we see something that resembles what "we have seen, there arises a doubt. For instance, in the case "of the *self* we have found 'incorporeality' accompanied by 'in-"tangibility'; and we have observed the same in the case of "the *mind* also; then again, in the *mind* we also find 'activity

"or mobility,' which we have seen, in the *atom*, to be accom-"panied by 'corporeality'; consequently observing that in the "*mind* we have 'intangibility'—which we have found to be "accompanied by incorporeality,—as well as 'mobility'—which "we have seen, is accompanied by 'corporeality, there arises a "doubt in our mind as to whether the *mind* is corporeal or "incorporeal (material or immaterial). The *sūtra* bearing on "this point is as follows: '*yathādṛshṭamayathādṛshṭamubha-*"*yathādṛshṭatvāt samçayaḥ*; and the meaning of this that, "as in the case of *mind* we have seen that it has the property "of 'mobility,' which we have found (in the *atom*) to be not "incompatible with 'corporeality'; (this would be '*yathādṛshṭa)*'; "—so also we have seen, to the contrary ('*ayathādṛshṭa*') we "have found (in the *self*) that it has also the property of "intangibility which, in its turn, is not incompatible "with 'incorporeality'; and from this twofold observation "('*ubhayathādṛshṭatvāt*) there arises the doubt as to whether "the *mind* is 'corporeal or material' on account of its 'mobility,' "or it is 'incorporeal or immaterial' on account of its intangibi-"lity. Thus then, if you reject the fact of the *Viruddhāvya-*"*bhicāri*. Reason being a source of Doubt, you distinctly con-"tradict what has been declared in the *sūtra*."

To the above objection, the author replies as follows: *Not so; as doubt always arises from the perception of a duality of objects.* That is to say, there is no such contradiction as you point out. because a Doubt arises only when there is a dalu perception of objects. This the author proceeds to explain further: *That is to say &c.* The meaning of this is that the source of Doubt lies in the dual perception of objects. For instance, in regard to a tall object like the wooden post, there arises a doubt as to whether it is a post or a man standing; and the reason for this lies in the previous 'dual perception' of *tallness—viz*: as found in the *post* and in the *standing man*; and the doubt is not due to the collision, in one and the same object, of two contradictory properties. And hence the *sūtra* cannot be

taken to mean that doubt arises from the collision of two contradictory properties not incompatible with the object in question.

Similarly, the meaning of '*dṛshṭañca dṛshṭavad dṛshṭvā*' may be thus explained :—'*dṛshṭa*' is the object, the *man* or the *post*, seen on a previous occasion, to be similar to another man and another post ('*dṛshṭavat*') ; and when, by some cause or other, we happen to see that *man* or *post*, at some other time and in some other place, and are not able to exercise a proper discrimination,—there arises the doubt as to the object before us being a *man* or a *post*; the particle '*ca*' after '*dṛshṭam*' is added with a view to indicate that even though the object before us may not have been seen by us before, if it only happens to resemble the *post* and the *man* (which are the 'seen' and similar to 'the seen'), the doubt arises.

There is another *sūtra*—'*yathādṛshṭamayathādṛshṭamubhayathādṛshṭam*' &c.; and this points out the *doubt* that arises from the remembrance of a particular object (having the appearance of the object before the eyes). For instance, we see a man in a certain condition—with shaven hair or with matted locks f.i. ; and then after sometime we see the same man, in a condition other than the one observed on the previous occasion ; and then not seeing the previously seen conditions, and yet recalling to our mind both the conditions, we may have the doubt as to whether the man, on this latter occasion, has his head shaven or is wearing matted locks.

Then as for the *Viruddhāvyabhicārī* reason, it can never be the source of doubt ; as it is never put forward. That is to say, when the 'reason' put forward first has been recognised to fulfil the aforesaid conditions (of the true reason), then the subject in question is duly ascertained to be of the character indicated by that reason ; and hence there can be no occasion for the other contrary reason to be put forward ; as its way is blocked by the accomplished cognition (afforded by

the former Reason). And if the previous reason fails to bring about a definite cognition, then it becomes open to this same charge (of not leading to a definite conclusion); and there is no necessity for the bringing forward of the counter-argument (based upon the 'contrary reason').

Objection : "The previous reason becomes '*viruddhāvyabhicāri*' by reason of *its not being incompatible with,—of allowing of the appearance of*—the counter-argument ; "and the objection or fallacy to which such a reason is open lies "in this very possibility of the counter-argument ; because "when the contrary conclusion is brought up by the contrary "reason, the previous reason fails to establish the conclusion "it was put forward to prove."

Reply : If like the second argument, the first argument were also a properly equipped inferential reasoning, fulfilling all the conditions of a valid argument,—then, if it were found to fail in its purpose of establishing the conclusion, what confidence could we have in any inferential reason (as the mere fact of fulfilling all the conditions would no longer be sufficient security) ?

Objection : "The first reason fails to establish its conclusion for the simple reason that the subject in question is not possessed of the dual character (indicated by the two contrary reasons)."

Reply : Who has told you that an object cannot have a dual character ? The essence or character of an object consists in whatever is indicated by a means of right knowledge. If the fact of any one object not having a dual character, be such as is established by a stronger and more authoritative means of knowledge, and as such, cannot be set aside,—then, in that case, the two reasons (one indicating the single and another the dual character of the object) would not be of equal strength and validity ; and under the circumstances, how could there be any doubt ?

Objection: "Though in reality both are not true, yet the fact of neither of the two having any points perceived in its favour would lead us to think of them as of equal validity or reality or both."

Reply: It may be so; but even then, just as the equal validity of both would lead to one being set aside by the other, so too would it make us reject the latter by the former; and thus there being a mutual rejection, neither of the two would be capable of proving the conclusion it may be sought to prove; but this would not make them produce any doubt in the mind of the observer. Specially as in such a case what happens is that there is no definite cognition at all, and not that two mutually contradictory cognitions are brought up (and a doubt would arise only in the latter case). This is what our author means by the sentence—'*when both factors of the duality would be of equal authority &c.*'

Objection: "That which is an object must be either material or immaterial; there can be no third alternative; hence in the case of mind, when we perceive neither its materiality nor immateriality, we might presume the absence or presence of both; and this presumption would certainly give rise to a doubt in our minds as to whether it is material or immaterial."

Reply: It is quite true that the doubt arises; but it arises, not from the collision in the *mind* of two mutually contradictory *properties*, but from the very nature of the *thing* itself,—that thing which, having been perceived to be concomitant with materiality and immateriality, is cognised as subsisting in the *mind*, and hence brings to us the recollection of those two properties.

Our author has rejected the theory that the *viruddhāvyabhicāri* reason is a source of doubt, after having admitted the fact of two contradictory reasons having equal validity. As a matter of fact however, the validity of the two is not of equal strength. As the conclusion that 'the mind is immaterial,' which is indicated by one of the two reasons, has the disadvantage of being negatived by the scriptural text of the *sūtra*, '*the mind is atomic, by reason of the absence &c.*' If (in order to avoid this predicament) it be argued that this *sūtra* is not authoritative, then the mind would be something omnipresent; but as there is no evidence for the existence of such a mind, the argument that 'the mind is immaterial, because it is intangible' would be totally without a basis (as there would be no mind in which the properties could inhere). If the existence of mind be sought to be proved by the fact of all kinds of sense-cognition not appearing at one and the same time, then the reason in question becomes such as is set aside by the means of cognising the 'subject' (mind); as the simultaneous appearance of all sense-cognitions can be impossible only if the mind be atomic; as if the mind were omnipresent, then, in as much as all the sense-organs would all at once be in contact with it, there would be nothing to prevent the simultaneous appearance of all kinds of sense-cognition.

Question: "If the subject of Inference be such as is opposed to scriptural authority, what kind of fallacy would that be?"

The author says in answer to this: *This would be another kind of the 'contrary' reason.* That is to say, such a reasoning being contrary to scriptures would be only one kind of the 'wrong conclusions' that are opposed to well-recognised facts of Sense-perception, Inference &c.,—all such conclusions having been precluded from 'true reasoning' by the mention of '*avirodhi*,' 'non-contradictary' or 'not incongruous,' in the definition of the *Pratijñā* or 'Declaration of Conclusion;' *i. e.* it would not be a 'doubtful reason;' being only a kind of the 'contradictory' or 'incongruous' reasoning.

The '*anadhyavasita*,' or 'unascertained' is the name given to that false reason which has elsewhere been called the '*asādhāraṇa*' 'uncommon;' and the author now proceeds to

explain it: *That which subsists* &c. For instance, with a view to prove that 'the effect had an existence even before the operation of its cause,' we find the reason 'because of its production,' brought forward by the Sānkhyas. And here we find that the reason does not subsist in the *ākāça* which is an entity and which therefore is *sapaksha*; and yet it is not found to subsist in the 'sky-flower' which is a recognised non-entity, and which therefore is a distinct *Vipaksha*; and thus the reason cannot prove either the conclusion or its contradictory.

The reason in question,—'because it is produced'—cannot be called '*asiddha*' or 'unknown;' because it is not so for the *Sānkhyas*, who hold that 'production' is only the 'manifestation' of something not manifested before.

Question: "In which sentence of the *sūtra* is this '*Anadhyava-ita*' or Unascertained Reason indicated?"

[Page 245.] *Answer*: It is indicated by the *sūtra* '*ayamaprasiddho-napadēçah.*'

Objection: "Like the *Anaikāntika*-or 'Inconclusive' Reason, the *Asādhāraṇa* 'or 'Uncommon Reason' only creates a doubt in the mind; and hence it would be more correct to say that it is indicated in the *sūtra* '*sandigdhaçcānapadēçah*',—and not in '*ayamaprasiddho*' *napadēçah.*' This objection is what is meant when our author says—*nanu ca* &c. The Locative ending in '*bhūtēshu*' has the sense of the Ablative; as the distinctive feature of things serves to distinguish them *from* things of the same kind, and also *from* those of another kind; *e. g.* the distinctive feature of the Earth, 'Odorousness,' serves to distinguish it from other members of the same class of 'Substance,' as well as from Qualities and Action (which are *not-substance*). In Sound we find the distinctive feature of 'audibility'; and there arises a question as to whether this feature serves to distinguish Sound from Colour and other things *of the same kind as itself*, or it serves to distinguish it from things of different kinds? But it is clearly seen that if Sound is a Quality,

then the said feature distinguishes it from Colour &c., which being Qualities are of the same kind or class as itself; but if it is a Substance, or an Action, then it would distinguish it from Colour &c., which, being Qualities, would be 'things of a different kind or class'? And thus the 'audibility' of Sound, if brought forward as a 'reason,' would leave it *doubtful* whether Sound was a Substance, or a Quality or an Action."

The opponent having thus brought forward the charge of contradicting the *Sūtra*, our author offers the following reply: *Not so*; because *of the meaning of the sūtra being different.* That is to say, the meaning of the sūtra is not that 'the *asādhāraṇa* reason is the source of *doubt*,'—as the objector has explained it; it means something wholly different; and our author proceeds to explain this true meaning: *Çabdē viçēshadarçanāt &c.* Having shown that that which is comprehensible by the sense of audition is *Sound*, the author of the Sūtra has said that *with regard to this sound there arises a doubt as to whether it is a Substance or a Quality or an Action*; and the sense of this is that, with regard to that *audible thing*, there arises the doubt as to whether it may be a Substance, or a Quality or an Action.

On this the opponent comes forward with the following argument: "When you declare that there is doubt with regard to Sound *which is perceived by the sense of audition*, you clearly imply that 'perceptibility by the sense of audition,' or 'audibility,' constitutes the source of doubt. But 'audibility' is a distinctive feature of Sound; and the recognition of such a feature could never make any doubt possible; as a doubt is always due to the remembrance of two mutually contradictory properties; and such remembrance would never be possible when a distinctive feature of the object in question has been duly recognised; specially when the distinctive feature perceived is such as has never been perceived along with any other property."

The opponent having put forward this argument, the author of the *Sūtra* has given his reply to it; and the sense of the

reply is that 'audibility' is not a distinctive feature of any one of the three larger categories, Substance, Quality or Action; in fact it comes to be common to all of these. Because in each of these three we find distinctive features that distinguish them from like as well as unlike objects; 'Bheda'=that which is differentiated, different thing; hence '*dravyādibhedāḥ*'—Substance and other things, *viz.*, Substance, Quality and Action and in everyone of these such distinguishing features are found; as for instance, in the Earth we find the distinctive feature of *the character of earth*—which distinguishes it from its like objects other Substances—along with the *character of Substance*; in Colour we find the *character of colour*,—which distinguishes it from other *Qualities*—along with the *character of quality*; in Throwing Upward, we find the *character of throwing upward*—which distinguishes it from other Actions—along with the *character of action*; and similarly in Sound also the distinctive feature *of Audibility* is found along with the *character of Quality*. Consequently this distinguishing feature also becomes common to Substances, Qualities and Actions; and as such it is only right to regard it as the source of doubt; as for the *individuality* (or the specific feature of Sound) that could never give rise to any doubt; as it would not bring to the mind any distinguishing characters. It is with a view to all this that the author says—*It would not give rise to a doubt*. We deduce all this meaning from the fact of the Sūtra having used the Locative ending in the words '*Tulyajātīyēshu arthāntarabhūteshu*,' instead of the Ablative. The construction of the sūtra may be thus explained:—On the recognition of the distinctive feature of *audibility* in Sound there arises a doubt as to whether it is a Substance or a Quality or an Action; and the reason for this lies in the fact of everyone of these three having distinguishing features that reside in their like objects *(Sapakshas)* and also in the unlike ones (*Vipakshas*).

The upshot of all this comes to be this: A distinctive feature we have found in Substance, in Quality and in Action;

and in Sound also we find a distinctive feature in the shape of *Audibility*; hence the mere presence of a distinctive feature gives rise to a doubt as to which of the three things, possessing distinctive features, Sound is. But if the individuality, or the specific form, of an object also were the cause of doubt, then there might be doubts with regard to the six Categories as well; as everyone of these possesses a distinct individuality; and in this way there would be no end to doubts. With a view to this our Author says—'*If it were not &c.*'

He recapitulates the whole thus:—'*For these reasons &c.*' That is to say, the 'common' property is found along with mutually contradictory properties; and the remembrance of these latter can always give rise to a doubt; hence it is the perception of the 'Common' property, and not that of the 'Uncommon' property, that creates doubt.

Text (116): *The Nidarçana, Instance, is of two kinds—that which corroborates by similarity or affirmation, and that which corroborates by dissimilarity ro negation. The former kind consists in the recognition of the concomitance of the 'indicative mark,' in general, with the 'subject' in general. E. g. (in the argument cited before) we have the statement—'that which has action or motion has always been found to be a substance, as an arrow.' The other kind of Instance consists in the recognition of the absence of the 'indicative mark' wherever there is absence of the 'subject;' e. g. (in the same argument) the statement—'anything that is not a substance has no motion, as Being.'*

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to explain the character of 'Instance.' *The Instance is of two kinds, &c.* That statement which points out the concomitance of the Reason with the Sub-

ject of the Inference is the *Instance corroborating by affirmation*; whereas the statement indicating the absence of the Reason from everywhere where there is absence of the subject, is the *Instance corroborating by negation*; herein lies the difference between the two kinds of Instance. The rest is quite clear.

Text (*117*): *The above definition of 'Instance' sets aside all false or wrong Instances. For instance, we have the argument—'Sound is eternal, because it is immaterial'; and in corroboration of this we meet with the 'Instance'—'whatever is found to be immaterial is also eternal,—e. g.,* (1) *the Atom,* (2) *Action,* (3) *the Dish,* (4) *Darkness,* (5) *like 'Ākāça,' and* (6) *'that which is a substance has always been found to have action or mobility.' Here we have examples respectively of the six kinds of the 'false Instance by affirmation:' viz.* (1) *the 'unknown indicative'* (2) *the 'unknown subject'* (3) *'unknown indicative and subject'* (4) *not applying to its own substratum,* (5) *the unconnected or incoherent, and* (6) *connected with the contrary.' Similarly we have—'that which is noneternal is material,'—as* (1) *action,* (2) *atom* (3) *'like ākāça,'* (4) *darkness,* (5) *like the jar,* (6) *'that which is immobile is not a substance'—as examples respectively of the six kinds of the 'false instance by negation by contraries': viz:* (1) *not excluded from the 'indicative'* (2) *not excluded from the 'subject'* (3) *not precluded from both,* (4) *not applying to its own substratum,* (5) *Non-preclusive and* (5) *Precluded from the contrary.*

Commentary.

There are some instances which, though not really corroborating the conclusion, *appear* as if they were corroborative;

and as such they are *like* Instances; and these 'false instances' become excluded by the aforesaid definition of the Instance;' as no 'false instance' can satisfy the conditions therein laid down. In as much as we could neither avow the wrong Instance in our own arguments, nor detect them in those of others, unless we knew the form in which such instances generally crop up, the author proceeds to show some examples of these: *Sound is eternal, &c.*' Here, in this argument we have examples of six kinds of 'False Instance':—(1) In the argument 'Sound is eternal because it is immaterial *like the atom*,' we have an example of the Instance not applying to the 'indicative mark;' as the 'atom' (the Instance) is devoid of 'immateriality' (the indicative put forward). (2) In support of the same argument the citing of 'action' as the corroborative instance would be an example of the 'Instance not applying to the Subject;' as 'action' is devoid of 'eternality.' (3) The citing of the 'dish' as an instance corroborating the same argument would be an example of the 'instance not applying to either the Indicative or the Object;' as the 'dish' has neither 'eternality,' the 'subject,' nor 'immateriality,' the 'indicative.' (4) The case of 'darkness' cited in the same connection would be the example of the Instance not applying to its own substratum;' as in reality there is no such thing as 'darkness;' and as such, wherein could the concomitance of the Subject and the Indicative be shown? (5) If the Instance were cited in the form' *like ākāça* (without an accompanying general statement.) It would be an example of the 'unconnected or incoherent Instance;' though in *ākāça*, there are both 'eternality' and 'immateriality,' yet all that the arguer says is 'like *Akāça*,' and not 'that whatever is immaterial is eternal;' and until the person to whom the argument is addressed, has comprehended the peculiar relationship between the 'subject' (eternality) and the 'inferential indicative' (immateriality), he could not (from the words 'like *Akāça*') recognise the fact of the existence of the two in *Ākāça*'; and hence this would be a case of the 'Unconnected Instance.' (6) The

declaration that 'whatever is a substance is found to have mobility' would be an example of the 'Instance connected with the contrary;' as in the argument 'Air is a substance because it is mobile' we have found all cases of *mobility* to be pervaded by *substantiality*; and all *pervasion* is so constituted that it is restricted to *that which is pervaded*, and it does not belong to both the *pervader* and the *pervaded*, like Conjunction, which extends equally to both members of the relationship: and the reason for this peculiarity of *pervasion* lies in the fact that the *pervader* is not always accompanied by the *pervaded*. Even in a case of 'equal pervasion'—*e. g.* in the case of 'noneternality' and 'causedness'—where the relation of pervasion is interchangeable (both being of equal extension), though the *pervaded* also has the character of the *pervader*, yet the *pervasion*, in either case, would rest in that which would be represented as the *pervaded* in that case, and not in that which would be put forward as the *pervader*; and it is always possible for this latter (as the *pervader*) to exist where the other (as the *pervaded*) is absent. This has been thus declared by the Teachers: 'Though inreality the *pervaded* is taken up by the character of the *pervader*, yet the *pervader* could not prove the *pervaded*, as it is found in cases of the absence of the latter, and as such would be incompatible.' Hence the *pervasion* should always be put forward as resting on the *pervaded*—*i. e.*, in the case in question we should have it stated in the form 'that which is mobile is a substance' (where 'mobility' is the *pervaded*' and 'substantiality' the *pervader*)—and not as resting on the *pervader*,—i.e. in the form 'thatwhich is a substance is mobile;' because the *pervader* 'substantiality' is not always accompanied by the *pervaded* 'mobility.'

The compound '*liṅgānumēya* &c.'=those of which the 'linga' and the rest are '*asiddha*,' 'unknown' or 'unrecognised.'

The author proceeds to describe the 'false instances of negation:' *That which is non-eternal, &c.* (1) In connection with the argument—'Sound is eternal because it is immaterial

as that which is material is non-eternal, as action,' the citing of, 'action' constitutes an example of the 'Contrary Instance not precluded from the Indicative;' as *Action* is not *material* (2) In regard to the same argument, the citing of 'atom' would be an example of the 'Contrary Instance not precluded from the Subject;' as the 'subject' *eternality* is not precluded from the *Atom* (which is eternal). (3) The case of '*Ākāça*' would be a 'contrary instance not precluded from either the Indicative or the Subject;' as neither 'immateriality' nor 'eternality' is precluded from *Ākāça*. (4) The case of 'Darkness would be a 'contrary instance not applying to its own substratum;' as in reality there is no such thing as 'Darkness;' and as such wherein could the preclusion of the 'Subject' and 'Indicative' subsist? (5) The case of the 'jar' would be the 'non-precluded Contrary Instance;' though in the *jar* we have the preclusion of both the 'Subject' (*eternality*) and the 'Indicative' (*Immateriality*), yet, as long as the arguer does not accompany the citing of the instance with the general statement—'that which is non-eternal is material,'—the preclusion of the 'Subject' and the 'Indicative' can not be duly comprehended by the person to whom the argument is addressed; and as such the Instance is called 'non-precluded.' (6) The statement 'that which is immobile is not a substance' is an example of the 'Contrary Instance precluded from the contrary.' Just as the 'Subject' is the *pervader* and the 'Indicative' the *pervaded*, so in the same manner is the 'negation of the Subject' the *pervaded* and the 'negation of the Indicative' the *pervader*; so has been declared—'the relationship of the *pervader* and *pervaded* perceived in two positive things, will be found to be reversed in the case of their negations or contraries.' In accordance with this law, when we have the argument—'Air is a substance because it is mobile,' if we mean to show an instance of the 'concomitance of contraries,' we should put forward the statement—'that which is not a substance is immobile;' but the instance cited above is not in this form, but in the form—

'that which is immobile is not a substance;' but as a matter of fact, there is no such invariable concomitance (between 'absence of mobility' and 'unsubstantiality)' as is implied in this assertion; as we find in the case of *Akāça* that, though it is *immobile*, yet it is a *substance*; hence the instance in question is the 'Contrary Instance precluded from Contraries.'

The compound '*lingānumēya &c.*,' means *those of whom the Indicative &c., are not precluded*; '*āçrayāsiddha*' *is that of which the substratum is unknown*; and among the other members we have the *Dvandva* or the Copulative Compound.

Text (118): *The reiteration of the concomitance of the 'Indicative' in general with the 'Subject,' after the former has been perceived, in the 'Instance,' along with the 'Subject' in general,—constitutes the Anusandhāna. That is to say, the 'Indicative' in general is put forward (in the Premiss) as a qualification of the 'Subject,' not as having any potencies; and in the 'Instance,' it is pointed out as perceived along with the qualification of the Sādhya' (object of Inference) in general; and the statement that reiterates the fact of its existence in the 'Subject,' is what is called the 'Anūsandhāna' (the Minor Premiss.) E. g., in the same argument, the statement that 'Air is mobile'; and also the statement that 'the Air is not immobile' which follows from the recognition of the fact of the 'indicative' not being concomitant with the absence of the 'subject.*

Commentary.

The *Nidarçana* literally is that statement wherein *is shown* ('nidarçyatē') the ascertained concomitance of the *sādhya* (the object of Inference) and the *sādhana* (the Inferential Indicative the *Hētu*); it is this 'Instance' that has been described above; and the statement that points out the existence, in the 'subject'

as qualified by the *sādhya*, of the *hētu* or (the indicative) in general, which latter has been found in the Instance to be concomitant with the 'subject' in general,—is called the '*Anusandhāna*,' in view of the fact that it *reiterates* or recalls (*anusandhīyatē*) the existence, in the *paksha* ('subject'), of the *hētu* ('Indicative') which has been shown in the Instance to be invariably concomitant with the *sādhya* (the 'object').

The author proceeds to explain his own meaning: *That is to say &c*, after the *Pratijñā* (Declaration of the Conclusion) we had the statement of the 'Indicative;' and the latter statement served the purpose of showing that it existed in the 'Subject' as apart from all other things, and as such had the character of the 'hētu;' and it said nothing as to its existence in the 'subject' *as its qualification*. The power of the 'Indicative' to prove the '*sādhya*' consists in its negative and positive invariable concomitance, as also in the fact of its qualifying the 'subject;' and this latter fact is not expressed either by the *Pratijñā* (the Declaration of the Conclusion) or by the statement of the 'Reason;' and thus the 'Reason' has not its necessary potency fully established; so that in the Instance it is pointed out as concomitant with the general qualifications of the *sādhya*; and after that it has to be shown again to exist in the 'Subject;' and the statement that does this is called the '*Anusandhāna*.'

The sense of all this may be thus explained: Words are used by one person for the sake of another person; and hence their use would follow the bent of the desires and wants of the person to whom they are addressed. And when this person has heard the *sādhya*, 'what has to be proved,' (put forward in the Declaration), he wants to learn the *sādhana*, the 'Reason'—'by what this is proved;' and he can not yet want to know the potency or capability of the Reason; as a desire for the knowledge of the capabilities of a thing can arise only after the thing itself has become known. When this desire

has been evinced, the other person mentions the 'Reason,' (in the 'apadēçā'); but this statement merely mentions the Reason, and does not say anything as to its subsisting as a qualification in the 'Subject;' for the simple reason that the same word could not signify two things (the mere form of the Reason, as also the fact of its subsisting in the Subject). When the person knows the Reason, there arises in his mind a desire to know its capabilities; and upon his evincing this desire,—in as much as a due cognition of the *sādhya* would not be possible without the recognition of its *invariable concomitance*, this concomitance is expressed by means of the *vyāptivacana* (the statement of invariable concomitance), between the *sādhya* and the *hētu*, put forward in the 'Instance'; and the capability of the 'Reason' being thus known, the man next wishes to know if the Reason, endowed with this capability subsists in the 'subject.' After the 'Instance' has been cited, it becomes necessary to recognise the fact of the 'Reason' subsisting in and qualifying the 'Subject'; and it is in the *Upanaya* or *Anusandhāna*, the 'Minor Premiss,' that this fact is put forward.

Objection: "The fact of the Reason subsisting in the Subject is implied by its very capability of being put forward as a 'Reason'; as a Reason subsisting in another substratum (and not in the Subject) would not prove anything, and as such be no 'Reason' at all."

Reply: For the matter of that the mere capability of the Reason to be put forward as such also implies the 'invariable concomitance,' the 'major Premiss;' as anything not so concomitant cannot be a true 'Reason'; hence in accordance with your reasoning, it would not be necessary to put forward the 'Instance' either.

Objection: "It is quite possible for the *Asādhāraṇa* Indicative to be put forward, through some misconception, as the 'Reason'; and hence the mere fact of an indicative having been put forward as such would not necessarily imply the necessary

'invariable concomitance'; and hence it is necessary for this latter to be put forward by means of the 'Instance.'"

Reply: We often find that even when the Indicative does not subsist in the 'Subject,' it is put forward, by mistake, as a 'Reason'; and hence the mere fact of the Reason being put forward does not necessarily imply its subsistence in the 'Subject;' consequently it becomes necessary to point out that the 'Indicative' cited in the 'Instance' does subsist in the 'Subject'; and to this end the statement of the '*Anusandhāna* becomes necessary.

Objection: "We often find that the '*Asiddha*' or 'Unknown' Indicative is, through some misconception, put forward in the '*Anusandhāna*' also; and as such, how could this absolutely prove the fact of the Indicative subsisting in the 'Subject.'?"

Reply: So far as that is concerned, we find the 'Asiddha' Indicative often put forward, through some mistake, as being 'invariably concomitant'; and under the circumstances, how could the mere 'statement of invariable concomitance' absolutely prove that there is a real concomitance?

Objection: "The 'concomitance' is ascertained, in the 'Instance,' in accordance with the *means of knowledge* affording the cognition of the 'Major Premiss'; and it is not ascertained by the mere 'statement' (of this Premiss); as mere statement could be made with regard to any thing and every thing (and as such it could not prove anything."

Reply: In the case of the '*Anusandhāna*' also, the fact of the Reason subsisting in the 'Subject' would be ascertained in accordance with the *means of knowledge* affording the cognition of the 'Minor Premiss'; and not by the mere statement of the premiss.

Objection: "But the integrity of the *means of knowledge* affording the cognition of the Minor Premiss is duly kept up

by the mere fact of the putting forward of the 'Reason' not being otherwise explicable or possible."

Reply: In the same manner the integrity of the 'means of knowledge' affording the cognition of the Major Premiss' would be preserved by the same fact of the putting forward of the 'Reason' not being otherwise explicable.

Objection: "In as much as the Statement of the Reason is for a totally different purpose, it has not the capability of putting forward or indicating the 'invariable concomitance' (Major Premiss; and hence it is that this putting forward is done by means of the 'Instance.'"

Reply: If it be so, then in the case in question please apply the same course of reasoning; and there is no need for making unnecessary assumptions.

Objection: "All right; let there be the *Anusandhāna* but, in that case the putting forward of the Reason would be absolutely useless."

Reply: Not so; if there is no 'Statement of the Reason, there can be no idea of the 'Indicative' as proving the conclusion (and hence having the character of the true 'Reason') and as such there being no possibility of any desire on the part of the enquirer to learn of its capabilities, there would be no room for the putting forward of the 'Instance' &c. Says the *Nyāyabhāshya*: 'When the Reason does not exist Whose indicative character would be shown?'

The Author cites an instance of the '*Anusandāna*': '*E. g. in the same argument &c.*' Having cited the instance of the *positive* '*Anusandhāna*,' he cites one of the *negative* '*Anusandhāna*'—'*Also the statement &c.*'

Text (119): *The 'subject' having been mentioned as the object of Inference, and yet not being fully ascertained as such, we have a reiteration of the Conclusion (Pratijñā) for the purpose of bringing*

about certainty in the mind of the other person; and this Reiteration is called the 'Pratyāmnāya.' That is to say, something is at first pointed out as to be proved; and when it is not known quite for a certainty to be such as is wanted to be proved, then—for the sake of such persons as have acquired the faculty of recognising the truth, by means of the 'Reason' and other aforesaid 'Factors' of the syllogism,—we have a reiteration of the conclusion; and this is what is called the 'Pratyāmnāya.' E. g. (in the same argument) the statement 'therefore Air is a substance.'

As long as this reassertion is not made, none of the other 'Factors' either individually or collectively has the power to express what is meant to be expressed by it.

Objection: "*But what is expressed by it may certainly be implied by the other members.*"

Reply: *Not so; as if it were so, then we would have many undesirable irregularities. As, (if we were to depend upon implications), then after stating the conclusion (in the Pratijñā) it would be necessary to assert the 'Reason' only; as the learned are sure to remember the necessary 'invariable concomitance' (sought to be put forward in the 'Instance'), and thence to deduce the necessary premisses and conclusions.*

For these reasons the argument must be regarded as ending with the 'Pratyāmnāya' (*or 'Nigamana'*).

Question: '*How so?*'

Answer: *For instance, in the first place we have the 'statement of the conclusion' in the form—'Sound*

is evanescent,'—wherein we have only 'sound' mentioned as having the uncertain qualification of 'evanescence'; secondly we have the statement of the 'Reason' in the form—'because it always follows from effort,'—wherein we have the mere mention of a property calculated to prove the 'evanescence'; thirdly we have the 'statement of the Instance' in the form—'in the world all that is found to follow from effort is also found to be evanescent, as the jar'—wherein we have merely the mention of the concomitance of the 'Reason' ('following from effort') with the 'Object of Inference' ('evanescence') in general; and similarly we may have the 'statement of the negative Instance' in the form—'the eternal is never found to follow from any effort, as the Ākāça,'—wherein is pointed out the absence of the 'Reason' in the absence of the 'object'; fourthly we have the statement of the 'Anusandhāna' in the two forms of affirmation and negation—'sound is found to follow from effort' and 'sound is not found like Ākāça to be independent of effort,'—wherein we have the reiteration of the 'Reason' in general, whose powers have been ascertained by means of affirmation and negation, in 'sound'; and then alone fifthly and lastly have we the certain conclusion (the Pratyāmnāya') in the form—'therefore sound must be evanescent.' And thus we find that it is only in this way that we find the last 'member' affording the desired final conclusion; and hence we find that it is only by means of the 'five-membered' argament that something known for certain by the speaker can be proved to another person.

Such then, is the Inference 'for the sake of others.' (IX-i-1, 2.)

Commentary.

The author proceeds to describe the '*Pratyāmnāya.*' The statement of the '*Pratijnā*' having pointed out the 'property or character of the *Sādhya,*' as the thing whose existence in the Subject is to be proved by the members of the argument,—the presence of this Sādhya in the Subject remains uncertain, until it is reiterated as subsisting in the 'Subject;' and this reiteration is what is called *Pratyāmnāya,*—the word meaning literally *that statement whereby there is a repeated mention* (of the *sādhya*) And this 'reiteration' of something already mentioned before is for the purpose of *bringing about a certainty in the mind of the other person.* That is to say, in putting forward an argument we state merely the 'object of Inference' the '*sādhya,* as subsisting in the 'subject;' but there cannot yet be any certainty with regard to the subsistence; as the mere statement of the conclusion does not prove it; but when the 'Reason' has been stated, and the capabilities of the Reason duly pointed out (in the 'Instance,' the 'major premiss, a certainty as to the conclusion is broughtabout by means of the '*Pratyāmnāya*;' and herein lies its usefulness. That is what the author means by the explanation—'*that is to say &c.*' At the beginning of the argument the person to whom it is addressed is not convinced of the subsistence of the 'object' in the 'subject;' but when the threefold potentiality of the 'Reason' has been shown to him by means of the three 'members'—the 'Reason,' the 'Instance' or 'major premiss' and the '*Anusandhāna*' or the 'minor premiss'—and this is followed by the 'reiteration' of the 'object' now become real, along with its apprehension and potentialities,—the argument becomes complete in all its details, and thus brings about the desired conviction. It is for the purpose of bringing about this conviction that we have the reiteration of the conclusion. The example of this is—"therefore Air is a substance'

as closing the argument referred to in connection with the members.'

In answer to the question—"When the conclusion is proved by the 'Reason' and the other three 'members,' what is the use of the '*Pratyāmnāya*'?—the author says: '*as long as this reassertion is not made &c.* That is to say, everyone of the three 'members,' *Prātijnā* and the rest, is complete and rests within itself; and until the *Pratyāmnāya* is put forward, they do not combine towards the indicating of any single idea; for the simple reason that each of them has a distinct sphere of its own; when however, the *Pratyāmnāya* has been stated, there is in the mind of the listener a feeling of necessity of connection, whereby he tends to combine all the 'members,' which, thus coming into the relationship of mutual subserviency, are enabled to indicate the one conclusion wanted; and thus the *Pratyāmnāya* must be regarded as a necessary factor in every inferential argument.

Another objection is put forward: "*What is expressed by, the Pratyāmnāya might be implied by the other 'members.* That is to say, the accessory details in the 'Inference for the sake of another' are the same as those in that for one's own sake; and the only difference is that in the case of the latter the whole argument is recalled to the mind by the person himself. while in that of the former, it has to be made intelligible to the other person; and for ourselves we find the conclusion to be duly indicated and proved by the comprehension of the potentialities of the Reason; and for another person also this alone should be sufficient to indicate the conclusion; and the statement of the argument has its sole end in the pointing out of the 'Indicative' (as the Reason); and it has already been shown that the 'Indicative' as subsisting in, and being invariably concomitant with, the 'Subject,' is put forward by the 'Reason' and the other three 'members'; and this being enough for the due comprehension of the conclusion, there remains nothing to be done by the '*nigamana*' or *Pratyāmnāya*."

The author replies to the above objection: '*Not so &c.*' What the argument does is to point out merely the potentiality of the Indicative and not the Object: but its potentiality does not consist merely in 'invariable concomitance' and 'subsistence in the Subject'; as even when these two characters are present, we find—in the case of the '*Prakaraṇasama*' and '*Kālātyāya-padishṭa* Reason—that it does not prove the conclusion; the 'potentiality' in addition to the aforesaid two characters, must also consist in its 'being such as (1) has not its cognition set aside by a more valid means of knowledge, and (2) has no equally valid Reason to the contrary; and so long as the presence of these two characters is not duly proved, there always remains the suspicion of there being a Reason to the contrary; and so long as this suspicion remains, even though the Reason may be shown to subsist in the Subject, there would be no conviction with regard to the desired conclusion; and it is for this reason that the *Pratyāmnāya* is put forward by way of indicating the absence of any 'reasons to the contrary;' and when the absence thereof has been proved, it follows that the Reason is free from the fallacies of '*Prakaraṇasama*' and *Kālātyayā padishṭa*;' and then it is that the Reason, whose potentialities have been mentioned before, comes to establish the conclusion; and thus is the usefulness of the '*Pratyamnaya*' established.

As what the author means to controvert is the view that the 'potentiality of the reason,' even though not explicity mentioned, would be implied,—it becomes necessary for him to support his view by examples. And to this end he declares that, as soon as the 'Reason' will have been put forward after the *Pratijñā*, the learned would at once, without any further statements, remember the 'invariable concomitance,' and therefrom deduce the necessary conclusion. That is to say, the 'Inference for the sake of another person' is not put forward for the person who already knows what is to be proved; as for a such person the argument would be absolutely useless; then again, it is not possible for us to know how much of the matter is known, and how

much not known, to the person to whom we address the argument; as the state of the mind of one person can hardly be known to another. Nor too could each argument be framed in accordance with the capacity of each person to whom it may be addressed; as each person may be possessed of peculiar capacities. Consequently when a man should want to convince another person, it becomes necessary for him to put forward as many statements as would establish the indicative validity of the Reason in the natural course of things; and he should not mind the idiosyncracies of the person whom he may seek to convince. Thus has this been declared: 'A fact is to be put forward to be proved only in the form that it is known to exist in, and not in accordance with the ideas entertained about it by the persons to whom it may be addressed; as who could ever properly follow the bent of the mistaken ideas of the thing entertained by others?'

The author now sums up the whole subject: '*For these reasons &c.*' That is to say, as it is only when the *Pratyāmnāya* has been stated that the full significance of the 'Reason' incomprehended, the argument must be regarded as fully comprehended only after that statement. Or, we may construe the sentence thus: In as much as without the statement of the *Pratyāmnāya* there is no recognition of the absence of reasons to the contrary, the thing— *i.e.* the full significance of the 'Reason'—must be regarded as ending with that statement.

Having described each of the 'members' separately, the author proceeds, by means of a question, to show their nature collectively: '*How &c.*' The question as to sound being evanescent or otherwise having arisen, there comes in the mere statement of the 'conclusion'—'sound is evanescent'—which speaks of sound as qualified by the as yet uncertain character of *evanescence*. Then there arises, on the part of the enquirer a desire to know the 'reason' for this conclusion; and to satisfy this want we have the statement of the 'reason'—'because it follows after effort,' i.e. 'not existing before the effort

to utter it, it comes into existence after this effort has been put forth;' and in this what is pointed out is *only* a property that would prove the evanescence. What is meant by this 'only' is that this statement says nothing, either as to the fact of the 'Reason' subsisting in the 'subject' sound, or as to its 'invariable concomitance' with 'evanescence.' When the enquirer has learnt the 'reason,' he wishes to learn in what way that reason indicates the conclusion; and in order to satisfy this wish we put forward the 'Instance' in this form—'in this world, everything that has been seen to follow after an effort has also been found to be evanescent,'—which points out the *mere* fact of a general concomitance between the 'thing to be proved' (*evanescence*) and the 'reason;' here the word 'mere' is meant to indicate that the 'instance' says nothing beyond the general concomitance. Side by side with this we have the negative 'Instance,'—'all that is eternal is never found to be brought about by an effort,'—which shows that wherever the 'thing to be proved' is absent the 'Reason' is also absent. After this, the enquirer says—'well, I understand that anything following after an effort is evanescent, but I do not yet know whether or not the character put forward belongs to sound;' and in answer to this, we have the statement of the *Anusandhāna*,'—'Sound is a thing that follows after an effort;' that is to say, just as the jar follows after effort, so does Sound also; and Sound is not like *Akāça* which is not the effect of any effort; and this *Anusandhāna* serves the purpose of indicating the fact of the subsistence in *Sound*, of the *character of being produced from effort*' the negative and positive concomitances of which character have been pointed out before. Even after all this, the enquirer might reason thus: "In the case of the Instance, 'all that is produced is not hot, e. g. the jar,' we find that even though some sort of an external invariable concomitance is possible, yet a fiery substance, though *produced*, cannot be regarded as *not-hot*, because of such a conclusion being contrary to other means of right knowledge; and in the same manner, it may be

that though there may be such an external invariable concomitance as that, 'whatever follows after an effort is evanescent, yet it may be that *Sound*, though *following after an effort*, may not be *evanescent*, in view of arguments to the contrary.' In answer to this suspicion of a contrary reasoning and conclusion,—a suspicion that would shake the indicative character of the 'reason,'—it becomes necessary to reiterate, by means of the Pratyāmnāya, the conclusion that, 'Sound is evanescent;' which means that, 'in as much as there is no means of knowledge indicating the eternality of sound, it must be regarded as evanescent.'

Thus then, what the *Pratyāmnāya* does is to point out the ground for believing in the absence of any valid means of cognising the contrary of the conclusion,—this being done by its precluding all possibility of a contrary conclusion. And when this absence has been pointed out, and proved, all suspicion to the contrary is set aside; and the 'Reason,' whose invariable concomitance has been shown before, being summed up as subsisting in the 'Subject,' leads the enquirer, through the valid means of cognising the necessary concomitance, to a full recognition of the conclusion, free from all doubts and uncertainties; and he does not want anything more for the purpose of being convinced. And thus it is by means of the '*Pratyāmnāya*' that we get at the finale of the conclusion desired to be proved —*viz.*, 'Sound is evanescent.'

The *Sādhyavākyārthavādis* explain the usefulness of the *Pratyāmnāya* in the following manner: "The 'producedness of *Sound* is of a totally different character from the 'producedness' of the *jar*; hence finding that the 'producedness' of the *jar* is pervaded by or invariably concomitant with, 'evanescence,' one may be bewildered as to whether, by analogy, the same might be the case with Sound also; and even when to such a bewildered person it has been shown that the 'indicative' ('producedness') subsists in the 'Subject' ('Sound'), and

that it is invariably concomitant with 'evanescence,'—he is not sufficiently convinced of the conclusion that 'Sound is evanescent'; hence to this end is put forward the '*Prātyāmnāya* —'*Therefore* (*tasmāt* sound is evanescent'; wherein the pronoun '*tasmāt*' serves the purpose of reminding the enquirer of the means of cognising the invariable concomitance previously cognised in a general way, and also of proving the required 'evanescence of *Sound*.' Thus then, the sense of the *Pratyāmnāya* comes to be that because the fact of *producedness* being accompanied by *evanescence* cognised before did not refer to the *producedness* of any particular thing, but to *producedness in general*, therefore *being produced, Sound* is *evanescent*."

In accordance with this view the Minor Premiss itself serves to set aside the fallacies of *Prakaraṇasama* and *Kālātyayāpadishṭa*; as the very character of the true 'Minor Premiss' consists in its being free from *satpratipaksha* and *Bādha*.

Others again hold that the word 'tasmāt' (in the *Pratyāmnāya*) has a threefold signification, its full implication being thus stated: (1) *Because* all that is *produced* is found to be *evanescent*, (2) *because* sound is *produced* and (3) *because* there is no possibility of 'contrary reasons' or 'negation,'—*therefore* on account of its *producedness*, Sound is *evancesent*."

The author sums up the whole section: '*For these reasons* &c. That is to say, in as much as it is only when all the five 'members' have been put forward that there is a full recognition of the potentialities of the 'Reason,' tending to due conviction with regard to the conclusion,—and as nothing more is needed for this purpose,—it follows that a desired conclusion is proved by us by putting forward an argument composed of 'five members,' neither more nor less; and thus it becomes proved that the 'Inferential argument for

the sake of another person' consists of the statement of the aforesaid five 'members.'

There are some people who hold that 'Sense-perception is the only *means of right knowledge*; and hence deny this character to 'Inference.' To these people we put the following question: Does the character of the valid means of knowledge belong to the single sensuous perception that is experienced at the particular time, or does it belong to all sensuous perceptions? The said validity could not belong to the one perception only, as there can be no reason for denying the validity of other perceptions brought about by similar means and under similar circumstances. If then, validity be attributed to all sensuous perceptions, the past and the future, as well as that experienced by other persons,—then we should like to know how the validity of all these come to be recognised.

"We regard all these perceptions to be valid because we find them to be exactly similar in kind to our own perception, of whose validity we are fully convinced."

By this you admit the evidential authority of Inferences with regard to the nature of things [That is to say, the reasoning. 'The perception of another person is valid because it is of the same kind as our own perception' is purely inferential].

The evidential authority of Inference may also be proved by putting forward the following alternatives: For whom is the validity of Sense-perception sought to be established—for one who already knows it and admits it? or for one who does not know and admit it? It cannot be for the former; as in his case the proving is not needed. Then as for one who does not know it, how do you come to know the ignorance of another person? Certainly it is not cognisable by means of any sense-organ.

"We infer his ignorance from his declarations."

Then you admit the evidential authority of the inference

of effect (from its cause). [The man's acting in a certain manner is taken as the *effect* of his ignorance, which is thus *inferred* from its effect].

Then again, by what means do you seek to prove that Inference is not a valid means of knowledge?* As for Sense-perception it has always a positive entity for its objective and is hence always of an affirmative character; and as such it could not prove the *negation* or *absence* of Inference as a means of knowledge.

"We conclude that it is not a means of cognition, simply because we do not perceive it."

In that case you admit the authority of Inferences based upon *Non-perception*. All this has been thus summed up by the *Bauddhas*: 'The existence of another means of knowledge is proved by.—(1) its similarity to another means of knowledge universally recognised, (2) the fact of our being cognisant of other people's ideas and cognitions and (3) by negation also at times.' That is to say, for these three reasons, it must be admitted that apart from 'Sense-perception' there is a distinct means of knowledge, in the shape of Inference, based upon the 'nature of things,' on 'Effects' and on 'Non-perception.'

Text (120): *A definite cognition brought about by the due perception of the special features, is called 'Nirnaya'; and this is opposed to Doubtful Cognition. It is only this definite cognition that can be either 'perceptive' of 'inferential.' That which is produced by a sensuous perception of the special features, and sets aside all doubts, is the 'perceptive judgment;' e.g. when we see a certain object standing before us, we may perceive only the tallness, which is a pro-*

* The printed reading is evidently wrong: '*Aumānam pramāṇam* &c.,' does not give any sense.

perty common between the pole and the man, and not perceive any of the features belonging specifically to either; and then recalling to our mind the (other) features common to both, we have the doubtful cognition as to whether the object before us is a pole of a man; after a time, perceiving that the object has a head and hands &c., we come to the definite cognition that it is a 'man;' and this is a case of the 'perceptive Definite Cognition. Then again, seeing only a pair of horns in a thicket (and not any other parts of the animal's body), we have the doubtful cognition that it is a cow or a Gavaya; and then noticing the presence of the dewlap, we have the Definite Cognition that it is a 'cow'; and this is a case of the 'inferential' Definite Cognition.' (IX-ii-12; X-i-3.)

Commentary.

Some people regard Definite Cognition to be a distinct means of knowledge; and in regard to this view the author says: '*A definite cognition, &c.*' That is to say, in a case where the non-perception of specific features has given rise to a doubtful cognition, the subsequent perception of such features brings about a definite cognition, which is called '*Nirṇaya*,' 'Definite Cognition.' It is called the 'opposite of Doubtful Cognition,' because as soon as it appears, it removes the previous 'doubtful cognition. As Maṇḍana Miçra has declared in his *Vibhramaviveka*,—'As soon as the *pole* has been definitely cognised' there is no longer any doubtful cognition based upon mere *tallness*.' Though every definite cognition may be called '*Nirṇaya*,' (no matter whether it does or does not set aside a previous doubt), yet in as much as a *certainty* is generally known to follow after an *uncertainty*, the author has called it 'opposed to Doubtful Cognition.'

With a view to explain his own general statement, the author next shows that *Nirṇaya* is included in Sense-perception and Inference. The definite cognition with regard to objects perceived by the senses is 'Perceptive *Nirṇaya*,' and that with regard to inferable objects is 'inferential' *Nirṇaya*.

NOTES.—(*a*) When we perceive the horn, the doubtful cognition is due to the following inferential reasoning: 'The animal before us is either a cow or a Gavaya, as it has horns.' And then the perception of the dewlap leads us to the following Inference. 'It must be cow, because it has dewlap.' This is called 'inferential definite cognition,' as the entire animal is not actually seen.

(*b*) It is not quite clear who regard 'Nirṇaya' as a distinct means of knowledge.

SMRITI-REMEMBRANCE.

Text (121): *From the contact of the soul and the mind as aided by such causes as the perception of an 'Indicative,' 'desire' (for remembering) and 'associated ideas,' and the like, and from a faculty produced by distinct cognition, by repetition and by an impressive regard (for the object concerned),—there arises a Remembrance of objects seen, heard or experienced (inferred) in the past, which becomes the cause of the recalling of what remains (of a previous cognition), of desire, of associated or secondary remembrance, and of aversion.*

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to describe knowledge in the form of Remembrance: The expression '*and the like*' has been added with a view to include *Praṇidhāna*, 'Close Attention' and others enunciated in the *Nyāyasūtra* (Adh. III *Āhnika II, Sūtra* 43). The 'contact of the soul and the mind' aided by these constitutes the cause or source of Remembrance. For this 'Contact' the peculiarity that makes it a cause of Remembrance consists in the 'perception of the Indicative' &c.; as a mere contact of the soul and the mind cannot bring about any Remembrance.

The author next points out that like the 'perception of the Indicative,' 'Faculty' also is an instrumental cause of Remem-

brance. Remembrance follows from a peculiar faculty of the mind; and this faculty is produced —(1) by distinct cognition; as from the cognition of the touch of blades of grass in motion; (2) sometimes it happens that even a distinct cognition does not produce any perceptible impression on the mind, as we find in the case of a chapter of the Veda read for the first time; but in this case when there is a repetition of what has been cognised once, a distinct impression is produced on the mind, which fixes the chapter in the memory; (3) sometimes when we see a strange object, the cognition produced is so impressive that even though the object is seen but once, it is remembered for all times to come.

'With regard to objects seen &c.,' This points out the objects of Remembrance. '*Seen*'=cognised directly by the senses; '*heard*' =cognised only through hearing from others '*experienced*'=Inferred.

'*Becomes the means &c.,*' This serves to point out the effects of Remembrance. '*Çēsha*' is *that which remains* behind. '*Anuvyavasāya*' *is functioning afterwards*; and by the compound '*Çēshānuvyavasāya*' (where '*çēsha* qualifies '*anuvyavasāya*'), which literally means the 'recalling of what remains behind,' is meant the cognition of the 'object of the Inference, which is not included in the first cognition of the inferential Indicative;' and the meaning of this is the '*remembrance*' of the invariable concomitance (of that object with that Indicative). The '*remembrance*' of a certain object having afforded pleasure in the past becomes the means of a 'desire for that object. The '*remembrance*' of the first word of a sentence becomes the means of the 'associated remembrance' of the second word. And the '*remembrance*' of an object having produced pain in the past becomes the cause of an 'aversion' to it.

And remembrance also appears in the form of 'that' ('That thing which I had seen &c.,'). And in as much as in

all Remembrance the object is recognised as having been known *in the past*, Remembrance is called '*atītavishayā*,' 'pertaining to past objects.'

It is for this same reason of its pertaining to past objects, that Remembrance is not regarded as a 'means of knowledge;' as all that it does is to point out an object as *known in the past*; and as such it depends, in the matter of making its objective known, upon previous cognitions (and as such only making known an object that is already known, it cannot be regarded as a 'means of knowledge,' which is a name given only to such means as afford knowledge of things not otherwise known). As for Inferential Cognition, though that also depends upon another cognition for its accomplishment, yet in the matter of bringing about a knowledge of its own objective it is wholly independent; *i. e*, though the Inference is based upon the previous knowledge of concomitance &c., yet it always leads to a conclusion the matter of which is wholly unknown, until pointed out by that same Inference, which thus, with regard to this latter, does not merely recall a previous cognition, as is done by Remembrance. This has been thus declared in the *Tantravārtika* by the superhumanly intelligent Teacher: 'It is only the cognition of some previous cognition that is called *Smṛti*, Remembrance, and hence we can never accept it as true, in the absence of such previous cognition' [I-iii-1, Translation Page 105]. This same idea has been also expressed in the following *Kārikā (Çlokavārtika)*: 'There (in the case of Remembrance) to the previous cognition (which is the origin of the Remembrance) belongs the character of the correct means of knowledge; and the purpose of Remembrance lies in the mere recalling of that previous cognition' [*Anumāna* Verse 158, Translation. Page 204]. Some people hold the non-evidential character of Remembrance to be due to the fact of its not being directly produced by a real object: but for such people there would be no evidential authority for Inferences with regard to past and future objects (which cannot be regarded as *real* at

the time of the inference) and they cannot escape from this objection.

NOTES :—(1) The *Nayāsūtras* referred to in the commentary are स्मरणं त्वात्मनो ज्ञस्वभाव्यात् । ४२ ॥ प्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यविरोधाश्रयसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयार्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्यः ॥ ४३ ॥

The first of these Sūtras simply states the fact that Remembrance belongs to the self ; as it is the self alone that is endowed with consciousness ; and in the next Sūtra Gautama declares that Remembrance follows from such causes as *Prāṇidhana* and the rest ; and here we find stated in detail the various grounds of association leading to Remembrance. Each of these is thus explained by Vātsyāyana and Vāchaspati Miçra ; (1) '*Praṇidhāna*' is the steadying or concentrating of the mind with view ro recall something to the mind ; that is to say, when we wish to remember something, we withdraw the mind from all other objects and concentrate it on the various distinguishing features of the one object intended to be recalled ; and this concentration is called '*Praṇidhāna*.' (2) '*Nibandha*'—When a number of things are treated of in the same *work* ('composition'), the association thus established among them makes each one of them bring the other to the mind. (3) '*Abhyāsa*'—is the name given to that peculiar character of the Self, which in the form of a faculty or Impression is produced by a constant repetition or repeated pondering over the same idea. This faculty thus becomes a means whereby the idea and its object is remembered easily. This *Abhyāsa* includes '*Ádara*' (great regard and '*Pratyaya*' Impressive cognition) also; as these also tend to create in the self a faculty that becomes the means of remembering; when we have a great regard for a certain thing, or when the cognition that we have of it is of a character that leaves a lasting impression on the mind, there appears a certain faculty that fixes those objects in our memory. (4) '*Linga*'—An indicative or distinguishing mark ; everything has certain features whereby it is more easily remembered. This Indicative mark is generally of four kinds : (*a*) A thing is often remembered by the help of something where with it may have been found to have been in contact,—

f. i., having seen a cart with a particular horse, on a former occasion, seeing that horse, we remember the carriage ; (*b*) it is remembered by means of something wherein it has been found to inhere ; for instance, having seen the yarn along with the piece of cloth, whenever afterwards we see the yarn, we at once remember the cloth. (*c*) When two things have been found to inhere together in the same object, the perception of one calls the other to the mind ; *f. i.*, having found *whiteness* and *coolness* together in a piece of ice, whenever we see *whiteness* it brings an idea of *coolness* to the mind ; or having seen the hands and feet of a man, when we see his hands we remember his feet also. (*d*) One thing is often found to bring about the idea of its contradictory ; for instance, on experiencing extreme heat, we are at once put to mind of extreme cold. (5) A certain distinguishing feature fixed by convention often serves to bring to the mind the name of the family to which one belongs, *f. i.* having found by experience that the animals belonging to a certain family are marked by a particular kind of mark on the forehead, whenever we see an animal bearing that mark, we are led to remember the family. (6) Of two similar things, one reminds us of the other ; for instance, the picture of a man reminds us of the man himself. (7) By ownership a thing is remembered ; for instance on seeing the servant we remember the master, *or vice versa* (8) Of two things related to one another one reminds us of the other ; as the sight of the son reminds us of the father. We often remember a thing through immediate sequence ; *f. i.*, finding that the railway train leaves immediately after the whistling, as soon as we hear the whistling we are reminded of the leaving of the train ; or being accustomed to take our food immediately after bath, the bath reminds us of the food (10) The *Separation* from a man reminds us of him. (11) The identity of function is another cause of action ; *f. i.*, finding that a certain set of eleven men forms a football team, on seeing any one of them we remember the rest. (1) Of two persons opposed to each other, the sight of one reminds us of the other opponent. (13) An excellence of some sort becomes a means of rememberance ; *f. i.*, a student wishing to learn a certain subject remembers the teacher famous in that branch of learning. (14) The likelihood of gain from a certain person puts

us in mind of that person. (15) The covering of a thing reminds us of that thing, *f. i.*, the sight of the scabbard leads us to remember the sword. Similarly pleasure and pain, affection and aversion, fear and want put us in mind of their respective objects, the action of a man reminds us of the man, as the moving of the chariot reminds us of the driver: and Virtue and Vice also remind us of their effects. These are a few of the special instances of the general law of association, which is enunciated as—
एकसम्बन्धिज्ञानमपरसम्बन्धिनं स्मारयति ।

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(2) (*a*) Patanjali in his Yoga-sūtra has defined it as the *non-abandonment by the mind of the object that has been once cognised* (I-ii). This definition puts us in mind of the declaration of Bishop Hall, that, "memory is the great keeper of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been."

The Vedantis hold that Remembrance does not depend upon our will; it is in this that it differs from Reflection. Their opinion is that no sooner the necessary conditions present themselves than the Remembrance appears, whether we wish it or no (*Vivaraṇa pramēyasamgraha*, p 151).

Remembrance is not regarded as one of the '*valid* means of knowledge,' *Pramāṇa*. And on this point the Nyāyamanjarī says—'The invalidity of Remembrance is due, not to the fact of its pertaining to an object that has already been cognised before, but to the fact of the object whereof it affords the knowledge not having a real existence at the time that we have the Remembrance. Soon this point we find a difference of opinion between our commentator and the Nyāyamanjari. Remembrance enters as a necessary factor in all Inferential and Verbal cognitions; and as such we cannot regard it as absolutely invalid; all that is meant is that it is not an independent *Pramāṇa*.

Some writers hold that the direct cause of remembrance does not consist in the *sanskāra*, which thus stands in the same relation to Remembrance as *sense-contact* does to Sense-perception. Çankara Miçra in the *Upaskāra* (on sutra IX-ii-6) says that a particular kind

of conjunction is the non-material cause, sanskāra the instrumental cause and the Self the material cause, of *Remembrance*.

(3) It will be of interest to notice what some of the western philosophers have got to say in this connection.

Professor Fleming says—"Consciousness testifies that when a thought has once been present to the mind, it may again become present to it, with the knowledge that it has formerly been present; when this takes place we are said to *remember*, and the faculty of which *remembrance* is the act is *memory*." [It is for this reason that 'smirti' cannot be rightly translated as 'memory'].

"This faculty (of memory) implies two things: a capacity of retaining knowledge, and a power of recalling to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use" (Stewart, *Elements* VI-i).

[This is opposed to the Vedantic conception that Remembrance is wholly independent of our effort].

"The next faculty of the mind (after perception), whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge is that which I call *retention*. This is done in two ways: first by keeping the idea which is called *contemplation* [the '*praṇidhāna*' of the *Nyāyasútra* explained above]. The other way of *retention* is the power to revive again or our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared" (Locke *Essay* II-x-i).

In connection with the 'invalidity' of Remembrance, on which so much stress has been laid above, we may note the opinion of Hobbes who holds that memory is a *decaying* sense. Professor Bain regards it as a wholly independent faculty of the mind; as the phenomena thereof cannot be included under those of any other power; or as the Sanskrit writers would put it, the cognition produced by that faculty cannot be classed under the cognition due to any other 'means of knowledge.'

Western psychologists lay down Vividness, Attention and Repitition as the conditions facilitating remembrance. These three are the same as *Ādara*, *Praṇiddāna* and *Abhyāsa* of *Vātsyāgana* (see above). In relation to the mention of '*sukha*' and '*duhkha*' &c. in the Nyāyasutra, we may note the following from Herbert.

"The things which are best preserved by the memory are the things which *please* or *terrify*, which are *great* or *new* &c., &c."

On the question of Remembrance being independent of our will, strongly put forward in the *Vivaranapramēyasaṅgraha*, the following statement of Professor Fleming's helps to clear the difficulty "In its first manifestations, memory operates spontaneously, and thoughts are allowed to come and go through the mind without direction or control. But it comes subsequently to be exercised with intention and will, some thoughts being sought and invited, and others being shunned and as far as possible excluded. *Spontaneous memory* is *remembrance*, *Intentional memory* is *recollection* or *reminiscence*. Sully calls the former *passive* and the latter *active* memory.

Text (122) *In the case of the sages whose acts are in full accordance with the Vedas, we find that from the contact of the Soul and the mind, as aided by a peculiar virtue, there appears an intuitional cognition true in all its objective details,—with regard to objects past, present and future, as also to Dharma and other (supersensuous) objects, such as are spoken of in the scriptures, as well as those that are not so mentioned; and this intuitional cognition is called 'Ārsha' or 'sagic.'*

This cognition as a rule belongs to the Divine Sages; and only in rare instances to human beings also; as when we find a little girl saying 'my heart tells me that my brother will come tomorrow.'

Commentary.

The author now proceeds to describe 'sagic' cognition. With regard to all objects, sensuous as well as supersensuous, the sages have infallibly true intuitional cognitions, free from all doubt and mistake; and this is called '*Ārsha*' or 'sagic.'

The name '*prātibhā*' is given to that form of consciousness which appears (*prātibhāti*) independently of sense-organs and

inferential indicatives. And the 'aṇ' affix in '*prātibham*' has the reflexive sense; where '*prātibha*' is equivalent to '*pratibhā*'

An objection having been raised as to there being no causal agency that could give rise to such a cognition, and as such its appearance being impossible, the author adds:—*Aided by a peculiar virtue. Dharmaviçēsha*=the peculiar character of the virtue of the sages; this peculiar character being due to their special learning, austerities and meditation; and this is what produces in the sages an 'intuitional' consciousness.

This form of consciousness belongs as a rule only to the Divine Sages &c., &c. The case of the girl saying 'my heart tells me that my brother will come to-morrow' cannot be called one of 'Doubtful cognition,' as we do not find the two contradictory factors (necessary in all Doubt); nor can it be called a case of 'mistaken cognition'; as it is found to turn out true.

NOTE.—This 'intuitional cognition' cannot but be regarded as *valid* and *true*. It has an objective that has a real existence; and being a valid form of cognition it must be regarded as a kind of 'sense-perception,' and not an independent Pramāṇa; it cannot be regarded as 'inferential,' as it is not produced by the cognition of any inferential indicatives; nor is it 'verbal'; nor 'analogical,' not being based upon any form of similarity. Though it is not produced by any of the external sense-organs, yet we regard it as 'sensuous,' because it is produced directly by the *Mind*, which is as much a 'sense-organ' as any other organ of perception. (Page 107, *Nyāyamanjari*.)

The word *prātibha* has been translated as 'intuitional,' this latter word being taken in the sense of 'immediate,' independently of such agencies of cognition as the external sense-organs, inferential indicatives, words and analogy or similarity.

Text (123): *Occult perception is not a distinct form of Knowledge. "Why?" Because the perception of subtle, hidden and remote things, that the perceivers of things have,—through their exerting of such occult powers as are obtained by the application*

of certain unguents to the eyes and to the feet, and by the use of the 'sword' the 'pill' and the like,—is purely 'sensuous.'

Then as for another kind of cognition that is regarded as 'occult'—viz., the cognition of the fruition of past virtues and vicious deeds in the experiences of the living beings, of the heavens, the atmosphere and the Earth, as indicated by the movements of plants and asterisms,—this also is only inferential.

As for the cognition of virtue &c., independently of inferential 'indicatives,' this would be included either in 'sensuous' of in 'Arsha' cognition.

Such then is Buddhi. (IX-ii-13).

Commentary.

[Page 259.] Some people regard 'occult perception' to be a distinct form of knowledge; and with a view to setting aside this view, the author says—'*occult perception is not a distinct form of knowledge*'; and this he next proceeds to explain further. Those people are called '*siddha*' ('endowed with occult powers') who are capable of perceiving such things as have definite forms and are capable of being perceived; and those perceivers who have obtained their occult powers by means of unguents &c. have perceptions of such things as are too fine or *subtle* for ordinary perceptions, or are hidden from ordinary vision, or are too remote for ordinary perception; but this perception also is dependent upon the functioning of the sense-organs (aided by the applications &c.); and as such it cannot but be regarded as purely 'sensuous.'

The other kind of cognition put forward is distinctly 'inferential,' being due to the perception of the planetary movement &c., which, thus, serve as 'inferential indicatives'.

en as for the cognition of virtue &c., independently of the cognition of any such 'indicatives,' it is either 'sensuous'

or '*ārsha*'; for instance, when the cognition would be brought about by the agency of the sense-organs it would be 'sensuous;' and if independently of such agencies, it would be '*ārsha*.'

The author sums up the section. Thus, in the above manner has *Buddhi* been described.

Text (124): *Pleasure is of the nature of 'favour' or agreeableness. When there is proximity of such desirable things as a garland and the like, there being a commingling of that thing, its perception and the senseorgan capable of taking cognizance of it, the contact of the soul and the mind, aided by the agency of Dharma etc., brings about a feeling which produces such effects as 'favour', 'affection', brightness of the eyes etc.; and this feeling is what is called 'sukha' or 'pleasure.'*

In regard to past objects, it is produced by memory; in regard to future objects it is brought about by reflection; and that which is felt by the wise, independently of all such agencies as the remembrance of the object, desire and reflection, is due to their knowledge, peacefulness of mind, contentment, and the peculiar character of their virtues. (*X-i-1 to 6, and V-ii-15*).

Commentary.

Page 260.] In as much as pleasure is a product of *Buddhi*, the author proceeds to describe it after having dealt with *Buddhi*. *Pleasure is of the nature of 'favour'*. Pleasure having the character of something desirable or favourable, when bringing about the experiencing of its objective, *favours* the person as it were. The author explains this further: *When etc.*, when such desired things as a garland, sweet unguents, the woman one loves and so forth, are within his reach, there being a commingling of the object, its preception and the organ percepient of it, this gives rise, through the

help of the agency of virtue etc, to a feeling which is called 'pleasure'. Even when the desired object is within our reach, if our mind is taken up by some other object (and we fail to perceive the former), we do not feel any pleasure; hence we conclude that a *perception* or cognition of the object also is a factor in the cause bringing about pleasure. By '*etcetera*' in the expression '*virtue etc.*,' are meant such other concomitant circumstances as good health and the like.

'*Which produces such effects etc.*,' In this the author points out the effects of the feeling described. '*Anugraha*', 'Favour' is the experiencing or feeling of pleasure; '*Abhishvanga*,' 'Affection,' is the feeling of attachment or attraction towards the object; '*Nayanādiprasāda*,' is the brightness of the eyes and face. These indications are the effects of pleasure. When pleasure appears, it produces an experience of itself in the mind of the person; and this is the 'favour' to the experiencing soul; and when pleasure is experienced, the face becomes bright. Pleasure also gives rise to an affection or attraction to wards the objects affording the pleasure.

In regard to past objects the pleasure is produced by memory or *remembrance.* That is to say, after we have once derived pleasure from an object, at any subsequent time, whenever we remember that object, we experience a sort of re-trospective pleasure. And in regard to future objects, pleasure is produced by the reflection or anticipation—'such and such an object will be mine.' In the case of the 'wise,' that is persons who have realised the true nature of the self, we find that, even when there is no object to afford the pleasure, no remembrance of any such object, nor again any reflection of it, a pleasure is actually felt; and this is due to their knowledge, the peaceful nature of their minds, their contentment, and the peculiar nature of their virtues. (1) The 'knowledge' here meant is the *realisation of the self*; (2) The 'peaceful nature of their minds' consists in the fact of their senses being

under proper control: (3) contentment consists in their not desiring any thing beyond what may be absolutely necessary for the keeping of the body; (4) the 'peculiar character of their virtues' consists in tending towards withdrawing the mind from the objects of sense. These four are the causes of the pleasures of the 'wise.'

There are some people who hold that 'pleasure' consists in the *absence of pain*; but this view is not compatible with the well-known experience of bliss in a *positive form*; nor would it be possible to explain, in accordance with this view, the two-fold action of persons with the-two fold motive (*a*) 'I shall obtain this pleasurable thing' and (*b*) 'I shall avoid that which is undesirable.'

Text (125): *Pain is of the nature 'harm.' When there is proximity of such undesirable objects as poison and the like, there being a commingling of the object, its perception and the organ percipient of it, the contact of the soul and the mind, aided by 'adharma,' brings about a condition of the mind which gives rise to the feeling of 'anger,' idea of 'harm' and a depression of spirits; and this condition of the mind is called 'Pain.' In regard to past objects, such as snakes, tigers and thieves, experienced on some previous occasion, the pain is due to remembrance; and with reference to future objects it is produced by reflection.*

Commentary.

'Pain' being the opposite of 'Pleasure,' the author proceeds to describe it next: *Pain is of the nature of 'harm'* '*Upaghāta*' is that whereby one *is harmed (upahanyatē)* **Page 261**] As soon as pain appears it produces a cognition of its objective as something undesirable, and thereby 'harms'

the soul. The author explains this further. Pain is the cause of *anger etc.* The rest is to be explained as in the previous section.

Text (126): *Desire, 'Icchā' consists in the wishing for something not already obtained, either for one's own sake or for the sake of another. It proceeds from the contact of mind and soul, through pleasure &c., or through remembrance. It is the source of effort, remembrance, virtue and vice. Lust, Hunger, Affection, Aspiration, Compassion Aversion, Disposition to impose, Inclination and so forth are the various forms of desire. Lust is desire..... .....; Hunger is desire for food; Affection is desire for the repeated experiencing of an object; Aspiration is desire for bringing about something not near at hand; Compassion is disinterested desire for the removal of other's troubles; Disinclination is the desire for renouncing an object, after finding something wrong in it; Disposition to impose is the desire for deceiving others; Inclination is unexpressed desire. 'Desire to do,' 'Desire to take away' and so on are the various desires in reference to various actions* (VI-ii-10 to 14; I-i-6).

Commentary.

An object that a man does not already possess, he wants, either for his own sake, or for the sake of another person; and he has the wish in the form—'may this be mine,' or 'may this be his;' and this is what is known as 'desire.' *This proceeds from the contact* &c., &c.

When a pleasure-giving object is such as is not present before us, we have still a desire for it; and the cause of this

desire lies in the *pleasure* afforded by it, which, though not actually felt at the time, is yet recalled to the mind; as has been declared by the author of the *Nyayāvartika*—'the result is the motive cause': And when the pleasure-giving object has passed off, the desire that we have for it is due to our remembrance of the pleasure afforded by it.

Desire is the cause of effort &c.—When we desire an object (the cause of pleasure) we make an effort calculated to bring it to us; when we *desire* to remember, we have remembrance; a man acting towards the fulfilment of the *Jyotishtoma* and such other acts prescribed in the scriptures, acquires *Dharma*; and when performing such acts as are prohibited, he acquires *Adharma.*

In anticipation of the question.—"We have many such desires as Lust and the like, wherefore has the author not mentioned these?"—it is added that Lust and the rest are only the general forms of desire, and are not anything distinct from it. This is further explained:—*Lust is desire for sexual intercourse*; *i.e.*, the word 'Kāma' without any qualifying adjuncts is used in the sense of 'desire for sexual intercourse;' in the case of all other desires the word 'Kāma' is always accompanied by another qualifying word; *e.g.* we find in the sentence *Svargakāmo yajeta*.....Sometimes we desire to remove the troubles of other persons, without thinking about our own interests; and this desire constitutes what is called 'Kāruṇya', 'Compassion'.....The desire that is not expressed, and is only inferred from certain signs is called 'Bhāva,' 'Inclination' or 'Disposition'.....The wish for going is '*Jigamishā*,' and so on with every one of the actions, we have a distinct desire.

Text (127):—*Aversion (Dvesha) is of the nature of heart-burning or irritation. It is the feeling that makes one think himself 'burning' or being ir.it-*

ated. It proceeds from the contact of the soul and the mind, aided either by pain or by remembrance. Its effects are Effort, Remembrance, Dharma, and Adharma. Anger, Ill-will, Resentment, Jealousy, and Indignation are the forms of Aversion (VI—ii—10 to 14 ; I—i—6).

Commentary.

When a pain-giving object has passed off, the aversion towards it is born of the remembrance of the pain caused by it. .....The affort or determination—'I will kill him'—proceeds from Aversion. The aversion towards men seeking to upset the purpose of the Veda produces *dharma;* it constitutes a virtue in itself. And aversion towards persons seeking to keep up that purpose constitutes a sin. Remembrance also sometimes proceeds from Aversion; *f. i.* a man always remembers the person whom he hates.

'*Krodha*,' 'Anger' is that aversion which produces certain physical changes in the body and quickly disappears.

'*Droha*' 'Ill-will' is not perceptible by any outward signs, it always leads to a deep-seated inclination resulting in harm which continues for some length of time.

'*Manyu*' 'Resentment' is the aversion that lies hidden in the mind, the man not being able to retaliate upon the person who may have harmed him.

'*Akshamā*,' 'Jealousy' is a feeling of aversion against the presence of good qualities in another person.

'*Amarsha*,' 'Indignation,' is the feeling of aversion arising from the fact of one's own good points being surpassed by those of other people.

Page 263 Text (128) :—'Prayatna' '*Effort*' *is synonymous with* '*samrambhā*' *and* '*utsaha*'. *This is of two kinds*: (1) *that proceeding from*

mere living, and (2) *proceeding from desire and aversion. The former is that which in the sleeping man carries on the upward and downward breathings* (*inhalation and exhalation*) *and at the moment of awakening brings about the contact of the mind with the various organs of perception. This effort is the direct result of the contact of the soul and mind, aided by Dharma and Adharma. The second kind of effort is the cause of activities leading to the obtaining of the desirable and the abandoning of the undesirabl object ; and it also conduces to actions calculated to keep the body in a state of steady equilibrium; this effort proceeds from the contact of the sou and mind, aided by desires and by aversions* (vi-ii-14 ; v-i-i ; v ii-14 ; I-i-6).

Commentary.

Effort &c.,..... When the embodied soul, accompained as he is by the residual effects of his past deeds, comes into contact or close relationship, with mind, he is said to 'live;' and there is an effort that is preceded by, proceeds from, this act of living ; and the actions of outward and inward breathing are the effects of this effort,—because they are actions. At this time we have no such other sources of Effort, as Desire and Aversion hence this Effort giving rise to the said actions must be regarded to be that which proceeds from the mere act of living. Then again Effort due to the mere act of living is not only the cause of the actions of up and down breathings; in fact at the moment of awakening,—when the man is just waking up—it also serves the purpose of bringing about the contact of the mind with the other organs of perception. This fact is proved by the following arguments:—The contact of the mind with the organs of perception (which is inferred from the appearance of the sensuous perception of objects) must be regarded as brought

about by such an action of the mind as is produced by some Effort,—because it is a contact of the mind with the organ of perception,—like a similar contact during the waking state.

This Effort proceeding from the act of living proceeds directly from the contact of the soul and the mind, aided by *Dharma* and *Adharma*; that is to say, 'life' is only the contact of the soul with the mind brought about by reason of the virtuous and vicious deeds of the soul in his previous life; and it is chiefly from this that the Effort in question proceeds.

The other kind of Effort proceeds from Desires and Aversions; and it gives rise to activities calculated to obtain the desirable and avoid the undesirable object; and also to those tending towards the steadiness of the body; that is to say, that the body being heavy does not fall off is due to an effort on our part, due to desire; and such efforts thus follow from the contact of the soul and the mind aided by desire and aversion,—the effort tending towards the obtaining of the pleasure giving object being due to *desire*, and that tending to the avoiding of the painful objects to aversion.

Text (129): *Gravity resides in Water & Earth, and is the cause of the action of falling; it is imperceptible; it is inferable from the action of falling; and it is neutralised by Conjunction, Effort and Faculty. The Eternality and Evanescence of this are in the same manner as those of the colour of the atoms of Water and other Substances.* (V-i-7 to 18; V-ii-3).

Commentary.

Page 264. *Gravity* is &c. This sentence points out the substratum of Gravity. Its effect consists in the form of the *falling* of substances. That it is imperceptible is its peculiar characterestic; it is a quality that is not perceived by any of the senseorgans.

Some people hold that Gravity is perceptible by the organ of touch. But if it were so, then we could perceive the Gravity of an object upon which we would be sitting, exactly in the same way that we perceive its warmth or coolness to the touch; specially as in the perception of its objective, the organ of touch does not stand in need of any other condition save its own proximity or contact. As for the fact of our cognising the gravity of objects upon our head or on our hands, that cognition is due to the quality being *inferred* from the lowering down of our hand &c. (caused by the weight put upon it.) Hence in anticipation of the question—"if the quality is supersensuous how is it cognised?"—the author has added—*'it is inferable from the action of falling:'* That is to say, according to us Gravity is only that material cause of *falling* which subsists, with this *falling*, in the composite object that falls. This sets aside the following declaration made by others: "Gravity does not reside in the composite object (but in the component parts), as in the object we do not perceive any *lowering down* which is the peculiar effect of Gravity;" as if it were so, then there would be no falling of composit objects:

It might be argued that "the falling is due to the Gravity of the component parts"; but then the Gravity and the consequent falling of these parts also will have to be regarded as being due to the Gravity of their constituent parts; and so on and on we would come to have Gravity in the component atoms alone; and thus there would be no Gravity in any products at all!

Objection: "We assume the existence of Gravity in the component parts themselves, because the falling of these could not be due to the gravity of the constituents of these parts; as any such gravity would not be co-existent with the action of falling (the gravity asiding in the parts, and the falling in the parts made up of these parts)."

Reply: Exactly the same reasoning would lead us to assume the existence of Gravity in the composite object itself. As for the fact of our not perceiving any effect of the Gravity of the composite object, apart from that produced by that of its component parts,—this is due to the difference between the Gravity of the objects and that of its parts taken together being infinitesimal. As for instance, when a large object is raised, we do not perceive any effects of the Gravity of the smaller objects that may be lying on the larger object.

Gravity is neutralised by conjunction, effort and faculty (in the form of speed); as when obstructed by these it does not bring about its effect. For instance, there is no *falling* of the man in the *palki*, because of his contact with this latter object; the body of man does not *fall*, because Gravity is counteracted by the effort of the man to keep standing; the arrow shot out does not drop down, as its Gravity is neutralised by the speed or momentum imparted to it.

The eternality &c.—That is to say, just as the colour etc. of the atom of Water are eternal, so is the Gravity of the atom of Earth and Water eternal; and as the colour etc., of the aqueous products are evanescent, being produced by the colour etc., of the component molecules, and being destroyed by the destruction of their substrates,—so also is the Gravity of products (evanescent, being produced by the Gravity of the component molecules, and destroyed by the destruction of its substractes).

Text (130):—*Fluidity is the cause of the action of 'flowing.'* (V—i—4)

It resides in three substances. It is of two kinds: Natural or Intrinsic and Incidental or Extrinsic. Intrinsic Fluidity is the specific property of Water; and extrinsic fluidity belongs in common

to Earth and Light. The eternality and evanescence of intrinsic fluidity would be like those of Gravity. (II—i—2, 6, 7).

Objection—: "*In as much as we find Water in the form of solids, we cannot regard fluidity to be its intrinsic property*".

Reply:—*Not so; because what happens in the case of solidified water in the form of snow and hail, is that fluidity is absent, on account of the fluidity of the aqueous atoms composing them having been counteracted by the mutual combination of these atoms which are in contact with the subtle supernatural fire —this combination being productive of the substance and thus being named 'solid.'*

The extrinsic fluidity of Earth and Light is produced by contact with fire. For instance, in the case of such things as butter, and the like, what happens is that their component atoms coming in contact with fire, and acquiring a certain amount of speed favouring the operation of this contact, there arises in them a certain action; and this action bringing about the disjunction (or disruption) of the atoms, the cohesive conjunction of the substance is destroyed; and the gross object having thus disappeared, there appears, in the atoms thus disjoined, a fluidity, produced by heat generated by the contact of fire. Then again, through the force of the desti ies of persons concerned, the atoms combining again, this combination gives rise to a certain action, which produces certain combinations, bringing about such aggregate products as the Diad and the rest. In these pro-

ducts, simultaneously with the production of colour and other qualities, there appears the quality of fluidity, following from the fluidity of the component atoms.

Commentary.

That property which gives rise to the action of *flowing* is Fluidity. *It resides in three substances*—Earth, Water and Fire. *It is of two kinds*, while Gravity is of one kind only, Fluidity is of two kinds—it is this difference that is indicated by the particle 'tu.' The two kinds of Fluidity are (1) the Natural or Intrinsice and (2) the Incidental or Extrinsic. The word '*naimittika*' means that which is due to some *nimitta* or cause, which in the case in question, is contact with fire; where as the '*sāmsiddhika*' is that which belongs to the thing by its very nature, and is not produced by such extraneous agencies as contact with fire.

Intrinsic Fluidity is the *specific* property of Water; as it does not reside in any other substance; while extrinsic Fluid pity is a property common also to Earth and to Light.

The eternality and non-eternality of intrinsic Fluidity would be like the eternality and non-eternality of Gravity. That is to say, just as Gravity inhering in eternal substances is eternal, and that inhering in evanescent substances evanescent, being as it is, due to a like property in the component cause of those substances, and being destroyed by the destruction of those substances,—so exactly is the case with intrinsic Fluidity.

Objection: "In as much as we find Water in such solid forms as the snow, hail and the rest, we can never believe that Fluidity is the intrinsic quality of Water."

Reply: As a matter of fact, we find Water everywhere in the liquid state; and thence we become certain of the fact of Fluidity being the intrinsic quality of Water; then, as for such apparently solid aqueous substances as snow and hail,

where Fluidity is found to be wanting,—the fact is that the Fluidity of the atoms composing these substances is counteracted by the cohesive conjunction of the aqueous atoms due to the contact of heat; this fact of the fluidity of atoms being counteracted by the contact of heat we infer from such well-recognised facts as the destruction of the liquid form of salt-water by heat; and the fact of salt being aqueous is inferred from the fact of its melting in due course of time into water, just like snow and hail; the melting of snow and hail must be regarded to be due to the heat of the Earth; as the melting of all solid substances is found to be due to the contact of heat; as we find in the case of gold for instance; and the liquifaction of snow and hail is also a kind of *melting*; hence as a cause of this also we accept the contact of heat, the melting power of which we have seen in more than one instance.

Having described *intrinsic* Fluidity, the author proceeds to describe *extrinsic* Fluidity. *The extrinsic Fluidity residing in Earth and Light is produced by contact with fire.* The ignorant enquirer having put the question—'how is it produced?'—the author says:—*For instance, in the case of such substances as butter etc., etc.* When the component atoms of such earthy substances as butter, lac and wax come into contact with fire, there appears in them a certain action; this action brings about a disjunction of the atoms, and thereby their cohesive combination being destroyed, the original substance of the butter etc., ceases to exist; and the atoms being let loose, their contact with fire produces in them the property of Fluidity; and then these atoms, now endowed with Fluidity, coming into contact with certain embodied souls, the peculiar destiny of these souls produces in the atoms a certain action; and this action bringing about a combination of the fluid atoms, we have the products in the order of the Diad, the Triad and so forth; and simultaneously with the production, of the properties of colour etc., we have in them the

quality of Fluidity also, proceeding from the Fluidity of the component atoms.

This same reasoning applies to the melting of such substances as snow, hail and the like.

Text (131) :—*Viscidity is the specific quality of water; it is the cause of cohesion and smoothness. The eternality and evanescence of this also would be in the same manner as those of Gravity.* (II—i—2).

Commentary.

By 'cohesion' is meant that property wheredy flour and such other things are turned into the form of a lump; and 'smoothness' is the clearness of the skin of the body, following frcm a good wash and rubbing; the 'etc.,' is added with a view to include 'softness' and such other qualities as are due to Viscidity.

Viscidity, like Gravity, in the atoms is eternal, and in the products it is produced from a like quality in the component atoms, and is destroyed by the destruction of the object in which it resides.

Text (132): *Faculty is of three kinds:* (1) *Speed or momentum* (2) *Mental impression and* (3) *Elasticity.*

(1) *Of these, speed is produced in the five corporeal substances, by an action or motion through some cause; it is the cause of a series of motions in a definite direction; it is counteracted by the conjunction of tangible (solid) substances; and in some cases, it is preceded by a like quality in the component parts of the substance.*

(2) *The faculty called 'mental impression' is a property of the Self; it is the cause of the remembrance and recognition of things previously seen or heard, or experienced; and is counteracted by contrary cognition, intoxication and extremes of pain &c., It is propuced by* (a) *forcible cognitions,* (b) *by repeated cognitions and* (c) *by impressive cognitions produced by special efforts.*

(a) *The contact of mind and soul under the influence of a forcible cognition, brings about a peculiarly forcible faculty or impression with reference to an object of wonder to the observer; as for instance when a man from the south happens to see a camel.*

(b) *When study, arts, physical exercises and such other things are repeatedly practised, then in regard to them the mind—soul contact aided bythe impression produced by one repitition brings about the next repiition; and so on and on, a peculiarly forcible faculty or impression is produced.*

(c) *The mind being with, special efforts, applied to the visual organ, with a view to see an interesting object never seen before,—there appears a perception which is as impressive as the perception of the flash of lightning; and the mind-soul contact under the influence of this impressive cognition, gives rise to a peculiar faculty; as for instance, when one happens to see silver and golden lotuses in the (Celestial Lake).*

(3) *Elasticity, on the other hand, resides in such substances as have their component molecules solidly packed together; and [when at a certain point of time]* the object in which it resides*

* *The word* कालान्तरावस्थायिषु *appears to be misplaced; as it does not quite fit in with the rest of the sentence. The Kandali does not make any mention of it.*

happens to have its position changed, it tends to bring it back to its original position. Effects of Elasticity are seen in such objects as a bow, the branches of trees, horns, teeth, threads, cloth and the like,—all of which are products from certain animate and inanimate objects—whom we find to contract and expand.

The eternality and evanescence of this (Faculty or Elasticity) are like those of Gravity.

Commentry.

Faculty, *samskāra* is of three kinds ; in the forms of (1) speed, (2) mental impression and (3) elasticity. Of these, Speed is produced by action or motion in the five corporeal substances, Earth, Water, Light, Air and Mind ; and in no other substance. Action or motion cannot be regarded as producing Speed by itself, as we do not find any speed proceeding from slow motion ; hence it is only when the Action or Motion is aided by such accessory causes as pushing, striking and the like, that it gives rise to Speed. *It is the series of actions in a definite direction* ; that is to say, it always gives rise to a series of actions or motions towards that direction in which the Speed is produced. Speed is destroyed by the peculiar contact of a tangible or solid object, the contact being with the extremely solid particles of that object ; this peculiar solidarity of the particles is necessary in this object only when the Speed also is particularly forcible ; as for slow speed, it is destroyed by the contact of any solid object. As for instance, in the case of the arrow that has been shot, as long as it retains the great momentum imparted to it, it can be obstructed only by coming into contact with a sufficiently solid and hard object ; while when it has slowed down and lost its momentum its career is stopped even by the calm air of the atmosphere.

As a rule Speed is produced by motion in the object itself ;

but in some cases, as in the case of a mass of water composed of water molecules endowed with a certain momentum, we find it to be produced by the momentum of the component particles.

(2). The Faculty known as 'mental impression,' *Bhvanāā*, is a property of the Self. Its effects are described as the remembrance and recognition of things that have been seen, heard or otherwise known on a previous occasion. Under 'otherwise known' we must include even mistaken cognitions ; as we find that we have remembrances of even such objects as may have been wrongly perceived.

This Faculty is destroyed or counteracted—(1) by contrary cognitions, as when what we have learnt we forget when our mind is under the influence of such excitements as those of gambling and the like ;—(2) by intotication, as a drunken man loses all memory ;—(3) by such extremes of pain &c., as are caused by death for instance ; it is the extreme pain suffered in the womb and in the birth process that makes us lose the memory our past lives. Extremes of pleasure also are found to deprive us of our memory ; as also do extreme anger &c.

Mental Impression is produced—(1) by forcible cognitions, (2) by repeated cognitions and (3) by Impressive cognitions. (1) We find a forcible mental impression produced when the mind-soul contact is influenced by the forcible cognition of an object that excites the wonder of the observer ; E. G. the man of the south having never seen a camel, it is for him a wonderful object ; hence when he happens to see it, his cognition of it is so forcible as to leave on his mind a lasting impression ; and it makes him vividly remember it in his after life. (2) In regard to such things as 'study'—learning of the scriptures etc. ; 'arts'—the painting of pictures etc. ; and 'physical exercise'—the exercises with weapons etc. ;—we find that when they are regularly practised, with reference to one and the same object, the impression is made on the mind over and over

again for a long time; and thus the memory due to this is extremely vivid; this memory cannot be regarded as produced by only the first of the series of cognitions; as we find that a simple cognition leaves no lasting impression and we have no memory of the object; nor can it be attributed to only the last cognition of the series, as if this alone were able to produce the vivid memory, then there would be no use for the repeated exercises; hence we conclude that memory is produced by the last cognition aided by the last but one impression, which in its turn is aided by the impression left by the previous cognition, and so on backwards, the whole series being aided by the impression made by the first cognition.

In this connection we consider the following question: when a certain scientific work is being studied, are the facts signified directly by the words, or by *sphota*?

Question. "Why should there be any such doubt."

Answer. For the simple reason that there is a difference of opinion on the point: some people hold that what expresses the meaning is, not the word, but the *sphota*; while others hold that meanings are expressed by the sentences (and words) themselves; and amid all this diversity of opinion, it is only natural that the enquirer should have his doubts. On this question then we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

"What expresses the meaning is the *sphota*. If the word "had no existence apart from the component letters, and the "sentence no existence apart from the words composing it, then "there could be no comprehension of the meaning at all. That "is to say, as a matter of fact we find that no single letter "brings about any cognition of the meaning; as if it did, "there would be nothing to be done by the remaining "letters; and as for a collective aggregate of all the letters

"composing a word, no such aggregation is possible; as at the "time that we hear the last letter of the word, the previous "letters have ceased to exist."

Page 269.—"It might be argued that all letters being "eternal, an aggregation of these would be quite possible. "Even if we admit this existence of the letters, yet our cognition "of these can not be everlasting; and hence at the time of our "cognition of the last letter, the cognition of the preceding "letters will have ceased to exist; and if an uncognised letter "were to express any meaning, then all meanings would be "always comprehended; as in reality as regards the matter "under consideration, there would be no difference between that "which is not cognised after having been once cognised and "that which is not cognised at all.

"It may be urged that the letters previously cognised "become fixed in the memory, and this becomes the means of "these being remembered at the time of the cognition of the "last letter. But then, as for the remembrance of the letters, if "this too is only gradual, the letters being remembered one "after the other, then too any aggregation of these would not "be possible; as at the time that we could cognise or hear the "third letter, the remembrance of the first letter will have "ceased to exist; and there is no possibility of the remem-"brances of all appearing simultaneously; as the simultaneity "of cognitions has been shown to be impossible.

"The opponent may put forward the following view: "What happens is this—(1) First of all we hear or cognise the "first letter; (2) then we have an impression of the same; "(3) then we cognise the second letter; (4) this is followed by "the impression left by this cognition; (5) then we hear "the third letter, and (6) this brings about an impression of "itself but qualified by, and containing within itself, the "impression of the preceding letters; and thus we find that "what we have in the end is a combined impression of all the

"letters composing the word; and this impression brings about "a simultanious remembrance of these letters as one composite "whole.'

"If you admit this view of the case, then the orderly "sequence ceases; as the sequence consists in one letter coming "after the other; and this sequence could be with regard either "to time or to space; and neither of these would have any place "as regards letters; as each letter is omnipresent and eternal "(and there could be no sequance of time or place with regard "to such an object; as 'sequence' implies that one ceases to "exist when the other appears). The only sequence that would "be possible in the case of words would be the one based "upon the cognitions that we have of them; and if all the "letters were to appear in a single remembrance, then even this "cognitive sequence would not be possible; and thus express-"iveness would have to be attributed to letters devoid of all "sequence; and there would be no difference in the "cognition of the meanings of the words '*sara*' and '*rasa*', "'*vana*' and '*nava*', '*nadī*' and '*dīna*'; as each pair contains "exactly the same letters (though in different orders); and "sequence has no bearing on the cognition of meanings!! As "a matter of fact however, we do cognise a difference in the "meanings of words containing the same letters in different "orders of sequence; and as this would not be otherwise ex-"plicable, this Apparent Inconsistency proves the existence "of some other agency in the cognition of word-meanings, than "the letters composing the words; and it is this agency to "which we give the name of '*sphota*'.

"*Objection.*—'The *sphota* also, unless it is itself manifested, "cannot express any meaning; as otherwise every meaning "would be cognised at all times. And as for the manifestation "of this *sphota*, it could not be done by the letters; as in "accordance with the reasoning brought forward by yourself, "it could not be done by the letters either singly or col-

"lectively; and thus the expression of meanings by *sphota* "becomes as impossible as that of letters or words'.

"To this objection, the following reply is made:—Each of "the sounds produced in the air by the efforts of the speaker gives "rise to an indistinct *sphota* corresponding to each individual "letter; and having, in the first instance, acquired a corres-"pondence to the object sought to be expressed by the word, "they subsequently bring about the manifestation of the *sphota* "in its distinct form. And it is thus that at the close of the "utterance of the word, we have the distinct cognition of the "expressed object as one composite whole, altogether free from "any notions of sequence in the order of the letters composing "the word.

"If the word were nothing apart from the letters com-"posing it, then, in as much as a number of letters could never "be included in any single cognition, there would be no idea "of the word as a single whole; and thus the idea of the word "would be without any real substratum; and the assertion 'we "cognise the meaning by means of the word' would become "meaningless.

"For these reasons we conclude that apart from the letters "composing the word, there is some single entity which makes "the meaning clear, '*sphuta*' (and this is what we call the "'*sphota*.')

In reply to the above, we have the following.—

SIDDHĀNTA.

In such sentences as '*Guṇaratnābharaṇaḥ kāyastha-kulatilakaḥ pāndudāsaḥ*' ('Pāndudāsa, the best of Kāyasthas is endowed with excellent qualities'), we do perceive the letters one after the other; but in the end we have no idea of anything apart from the letters we have heard. It could be so only if the word were in the first instance cognised as consisting of

letters, and then subsequently in its true character, which was something different from the letters, and hence this latter cognition falsified the former; as we have in the case of the shell and the silver, (where the shell is at first cognised as silver and then subsequently as the *shell*, and hence we accept the latter to be true and the former to be false). In the case in question we have no such idea as that 'this word is not one made up of letters, but it is in the form of *sphota*.' As for the idea that we have of the word as a *single* whole, that too does not point to any distinct object (apart from the component letters); in fact it points only to those same letters taken collectively; exactly as we have the idea of 'forest' pointing to the trees contained in it collectively, so also the assertion 'we comprehend the meaning form the word' refers to the aggregate of the letters taken collectively.

And as we do not directly perceive any such thing as *sphota*, it could not be cognised by any of the other means of knowledge; as none of these would have any means of applying to such a thing.

Objection—"The apparent inconsistency of the cognition of meaning, which could not be otherwise explained, would be the means pointing to such a thing."

Reply: The *sphota* which you hold to be the means of the cognition of the meaning,—is this *sphota* itself known or not known? If an unknown thing were to bring about the cognition, then we would have the cognition at all times. And as for its being known, we have already shown that there can be no cognition of it. As a matter of fact, we find the cognition of the meaning to have the relation of invariable concomitance with the component letters themselves; and hence it is far more reasonable to formulate a certain means whereby these letters themselves would, through their expressive power, denote the meaning,—than to assume a thing that has absolutely no existence, being exactly like the 'sky-flower.'

Nor would it be right to argue that,—"if the letters were expressive of the meaning, then it would be possible for us to comprehend the meaning of the word, even when the order of the letters would be changed, or when the letters would be pronounced with long intervals of time between them." Because the letters cannot be regarded as the means of the comprehension of meaning, when their order is changed, or when they are pronounced by different persons, or when they are separated from one another in time or space. As the potentialities of things have to be inferred from the effects they produce; that is to say, when we find certain effects to be produced by a thing, we infer the existence in this latter of a potency or power capable of bringing about that effect; this has been thus declared by great writers.—'As many letters, endowed with as many qualification, as are found to be capable of expressing a certain meaning,—so many and such letters alone can be regarded as expressive of that meaning.' (*Çlokavārtika*—chapter on '*sphota*,' verse 69).

Then again, for the simple reason that letters are not omnipresent and not eternal (according to the *Naiyāyika*), there is sequence among them; and it is this difference in the sequential order of letters that makes the meaning of the word '*dīna*' different from that of the word '*nadī*'. Nor would it be right to argue that—"no sequential order belonging to the words, no such order could be regarded as having an effect on the signification of words"; as we find the letters actually to be liable to production, and to have limited existence in space; and as such it is only natural that they should be affected by sequence both of time and space.

It has been argued above that the expressive power cannot belong to the letters either individually or collectively. But this assertion was made without understanding the position of the other party. Though it is true that letters have no permanent existence, yet the impressions of all the letters composing

a word combining together do actually bring about the cognition of the meaning of the word; or the meaning may be regarded as expressed by the last letter of the word, as aided, either by the impressions or by the actual remembrance of the preceding letters. As to how many impressions combine to bring about a single idea,—this we have shown while dealing with Duality.

Objection: "It is not right to hold the comprehension of the meaning to arise from the impressions of the letters composing the word; as an impression can bring about the remembrance of only that thing the cognition whereof gave it birth, and not of anything else; as has been declared by Mandana Miçra in his *Sphotasiddhi* :—

Page 271] Impressions give rise to the ideas of only those things by the character whereof they are themselves impressed; and hence it is not right to accept the idea of any other thing to be brought about by them."

Reply: This argument also is not quite sound; as the *impression* of each letter produced by its cognition is such as is endowed with the faculty of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning of the word (composed of those letters), —this faculty having potencies different in nature from those that serve to bring about the *remembrance* of things. That it is so we infer from the nature of the effects produced. But even granting that the impressions in question are of the same nature as the *bhāvanās* (that produce remembrance),—it is quite possible for them to bring about the comprehension of word-meanings; that they bring about this comprehension can be inferred from the fact of the comprehension appearing only when we have the impressions. The person who would postulate the *sphota* will find it necessary to assume certain potentalities in this *sphota*, tending to bring about the comprehension of the word-meaning; and as such it would be necessary to make more assumptions in this case; whereas in our case the Impression is admitted by both parties. and it is necessary for us only to assume the peculiar faculty in them spoken of above; and this would certainly be a much simpler matter. To this same effect we have the following declaration of the learned.—"Though an Impression has certainly the faculty of bringing about remembrances, yet that fact does not preclude it from having a faculty tending to produce other effects' (*Çloka-Vārtika*—Chap. on 'Sphota' verse 102.)

Thus then we conclude that the comprehension of the word-meaning being quite explicable through the agency of the impressions, there can be no ground for the assuming of *Sphota*.

The author now proceeds to describe the Faculty produced by impressive cognitions. When a man puts forth special efforts to perceive an objeet never seen before, the cognition that he has is as impressive as the perception of the lightning-flash; and it is such a cognition that is meant by the expression *ādarapratyaya*'; and when the mind-soul contact is aided by such a cognition, there appears a peculiarly forcible faculty; this character being indicated by the fact of its not disappearing even after the lapse of a long time.

Example: 'On the full moon day of the month of Caitra,—when the moon is in the asterism of Citrā,—at midnight are seen silver and golden lotuses in the Dēvahrada'—having heard this many people congregate on that day on the banks of the lake, with a view to witness the phenomenon; and when the middle of night is about to arrive, they fix their eyes and their minds intently on the lake; and the lotuses actually appear; even though they are seen but for a moment, the sight is so impressive that the impression left on the mind is very strong; and tends to the scene being remembered very distinctly ever afterwards.

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(3) Our author next describes the faculty in the form of

Elasticity: The particle '*tu*' serves to distinguish the faculty known as 'Mental Impression'—which resides in non-tangible substances—from Elasticity which subsists in tangible substances. The quality of Elasticity, residing in such tangible substances as have their component molecules solidly packed together, tends to bring back its substratum to its own final straight position after it has swerved from that position.

There are some people who deny the existence of Elasticity on the ground of its not being perceptible by the sense-organs; and for the sake of these persons, the author proceeds to show certain effects that cannot be due to any other cause save Elasticity: In certain things we find that they are often contracted, and then they expand again to their original position: and this could be due to nothing else save the existence in these objects of the quality of elasticity. For instance, in the case of such objects as the bow, the branch of a tree and the like, we find that when they are bent and let go again, they revert to their original position; and the immaterial cause of this reversion lies in a certain faculty that inheres in the objects along with the action that caused the *bending*; and to this faculty we give the name of 'elasticity;' and no other cause is possible.

Some people regard the expression '*bhugnasanvartitēshu*' as qualifying '*stūravastrādishu*;' and explain it as 'the contracted threads &c., that are expanded &c., &c.'

Just as Gravity is eternal in the atom, and evanescent in the products, so is Elasticity also.

NOTES.—There is no reason why our commentator should have introduced the discussion of Sphota in the present section. It would be in its proper place under the chapter dealing with words and their meanings.

To the objection brought forward on the strength of Mandana Miçra's Karika our comentator has missed a strong point, in that he has not based his reply on the argument that the fact of the impression bringing about the remembrance of the letters having been admitted by the opponent, the remembrance of the letters could bring about the comprehension of the meaning also; and this would obviate the necessity of assuming a *sphota*.

Text (133).—*Dharma is the property of Man; it brings about to the agent happiness, means of happiness and final deliverance; it is supersensuous; it is destructible by the experiencing of the last item of happiness; it* (a) *is produced by the contact of the Man with the internal organ, by means of pure thoughts and determinations; and with regard to the different castes and conditions of men there are distinct means of accomplishing it. (I—i—2; VI—ii—1; VI—i—5; X—ss—8.*

The means of Dharma consists in various substances, qualities and actions, laid down, in the Veda and the Law-Books,—some as belonging in common to all men, and some as pertaining specially to distinct castes and condiions. Among the common ones we have the following: Faith in Dharma, Harmlessness, Benevolence, Truthfulness, Freedom from desire for undue Possession, Freedom from lust, Purity of Intentions, Absence of anger, Bathing, use of purifying substances, Devotion to Deity, Fasting, and Non-neglect (of duties). (VI—ii—2, 5, 8, 9, 3, 4).

The Dharma common to the Brāhmaṇa, the Kshattriya and the Vaishya, consists in the following:—Performing of sacrifices, study, charities; and the specific Dharma of the Brahmana consists in—the receiving of gifts, Teaching, officiating at sacrifices and the due performance of the rites and ceremonies laid down for the Brahmana. Of the Kshattriya, the specific Dharma consists in—Proper care of the people under him, Punishing of Criminals, not fleeing from battle, and the due

(a) *The Com. breaks this compound into separate parts* पुरुषान्तरसंयोगज *and* विशुद्धाभिसन्धिज; *but it appears better to combine the two as has been done in the translation.*

performance of the rites and ceremonies prescribed for the caste. For the Vaishya, buying and selling, agriculture, Tending of cattle, and the due performance of the rites laid down for the Vaishya. For the Shudra,—submission to the other castes and the performance of rites and ceremonies without any mantras.

The specific Dharma of the various states of a man's life is as follows:—For the 'student,' living at the house of his teacher, attendance upon the teacher and the Fire, Fetching of fuel, living on alms, in the manner prescribed in the scriptures, the avoidance of such things as wine, meat, sleeping during day, painting of the eye, the use of unguents and so forth. For the student who, having finished his studies and closed the religious life of the student with the final 'bath', has taken a wife to himself and settled as a householder,—(A) the morning and evening offering of the five 'great sacrifices',—called (1) the 'Bhūtayajna (sacrifice to animals), (2) the 'Manushya yajna (sacrifice to men), (3) 'Dēvayajna' (sacrifice to divine beings), (4) 'Pitriyajna' (sacrifice to the Fathers), and (5) 'Brahmayajna' (sacrifice to the Brahma or Veda),—by means of wealth acquired by such methods(a) as the 'Çālīna' and the 'Yāyāvara'; (B) the taking of the Ekāgni Fire and the offering into it of the absolutely necessary 'Pakayajna' sacrifices, and also, if possible, of such sacrifices as those of the 'Agnyādheya', the 'Haviryajna', the 'Agnishtoma' and the

(a) Foot Note:—*Th accepting of only so much of the gift as would fill a certain vessel calculated to contain enough for a fixed number of days, constitutes the 'Çālina' method of livelihood; and the begging of alms from house to house forms the 'Yāyāvara' method of livelihood.*

'Somayajna'; (C) and begetting of children, and the avoiding of intercourse at other times For the 'Student' as well as the 'householder' it is laid down that when he goes away from the village inhabited by him, and betakes himself to the life of the 'Vānaprastha' (Recluse), he lives in the forest, wears only skins and bark of trees, never shaves his hair or beard, and never pares his nails, lives only upon wild things, and those also only such as are left after the sacrifices have been performed and the guests duly fed. A man having passed through all these three states, or one being in any one of the states, being moved by the proper amount of faith, takes the vow of universal benevolence and takes to the life of wandering; he should then renounce the specific duties of his previous state, and while not neglecting the internal and external duties of 'Yama' and 'Niyama', he should acquire the true knowledge of the six Categories and thereby try to accomplish 'Yoga' (Union' with the Supreme).

The contact of the mind and soul, when aided by all the accessories detailed above, followed without a desire for gaining thereby any visible results and by the utmost purity of motives, tends to bring about 'Dharma'.

Commentry.

What is known as 'Dharma' or 'Merit' is a property belonging to Man; and it is not a potency residing in the action performed.

Dharma is the direct cause of happiness, of the means of happiness and also of final Deliverance,—this last consisting in the absolute destruction of all fresh specific qualities of the Self.

This sentence is to be taken as a definition of 'Dharma':—'That which, for the performer, is the cause only of happiness is dharma,' and not that 'Dharma is that which brings happiness to the performer only'; because we find it laid down in the scriptures that the satisfaction, which is the effect of such Dharma as the performance of the Srāddha, accrues to the Father, while the actual performer is the Son; and so also when a man desiring rain performs the Kārīrī sacrifice (which is laid down as the sacrifice bringing about rain), its effect, in the form of rain, causes happiness, not to him alone, but to all the other men that may be living in the place.

Objection:—"Such Vedic declarations as—'one desiring heaven should perform sacrifices', which means that 'he should accomplish heaven for himself by means of the sacrifice'—tend to show that actions are the means of accomplishing desirable ends; and that which unites a man with something good and desirable is *Dharma*. Consequently it is the *action*, of sacrifice for instance, which is Dharma; and hence Dharma cannot be regarded as a property of the Self; and a person who performs such actions is called 'Dhārmika' ('righteous')."

Reply:—This is not right; because the *action* having but a momentary existence, could not be the direct cause of the result which appears at some other time.

Page 274.] *Objection*:—"It is true that Action, of sacrifice *f. i.*, has a momentary existence; and the result in the shape of heaven appears at some other time; and no effect could be produced from the cause that has been destroyed; and yet we find the Veda declaring that such actions as sacrifice and the like are the causes of results appearing at other times. This Apparent Inconsistency can be reconciled only by postulating that in the action there is a certain potency continuing to exist for a long time, and capable of bringing about the result. This theory keeps intact the fact of Actions leading to results, as declared in the Veda. And as this

'potency' is not amenable to any other means of knowledge, it has been called '*Apūrva*' (Lit. 'not previously extant'. 'Something new'). This has been thus declared in the following *Kārikā*.—'The momentary action being laid down as bringing about a certain result appearing after a long time, this would not be possible except by the assumption of the *Apūrva*.' (*Tantravārtika*—Text p. 360, II-i-5)."

Reply:—This is not right; as the said potency could not inhere in the action itself, which has only a momentary existence; because when the substratum is not there, the potency can not remain without a substratum. As for the result, in the form of heaven for instance, it does not exist at the time that the action is destroyed; and hence the potency could not inhere in the result. If, on the other hand, it be assumed that the result appears immediately after the performance of the action, then in that case, there would be no necessity for assuming any such potency; and there would be nothing to postpone the actual experiencing of the result at that same time. If might be argued that,—"at that time the performer is not endowed with the particular kind of body and organs necessary for the actual experiencing of the result." But then in that case the result is as good as not appeared; as 'heaven' is nothing more than a particular kind of experience. And as for the assumption of a form of pleasure that is not experienced, this would be an assumption of something not actually perceived. Hence the *Apūrva* cannot be regarded as inhering in the result.

Nor could any result accure to the Self, from a potency inhering in such eternal substances as *Ākāsha* and the like; in as much as being a reality, it could not subsist without a substratum. Hence it must be admitted to be produced as inhering in the Self. And hence it could not be regarded as a potency of the Action; as the potency of one thing (action) can never subsist in another thing (the Self).

Objection: "We might, on the strength of actual facts, assume the subsistence of the potency of one thing in another thing; as has been declared in the following *kārikā*: 'A potency is always to be inferred from the effects produced; and as such it must be regarded as subsisting in that thing wherein it may be found to exist,—in the same thing or in a different being thing.' (*Tantravartika*—II-i-5, Text—Page 372)."

Reply: This is not admissible; as when the substance (Action) to which the potency actually belongs, has been destroyed, the potency can not (even though subsisting in another substance, the Self) bring about the result, independently of the former substance.

This same reasoning sets aside the declaration made by Mandana Miçra in his *Vidhivivēka*, to the effect that—"the potency, having been originated by the action, must subsist in the same." Because the fact of the potency having been originated by the sacrifice would only make it an *effect* of that sacrifice; and this would not mean that the potency belongs to, or subsists in, that same sacrifice; as the result is not found to appear from the *action* as aided by the potency (as the action does not exist at the time of the appearing of the result).

Thus then, it must be admitted that the action having long ceased to exist, the result follows from the *Apūrva* as aided by the peculiarities of time, place and other attendant circumstances; and thus it is the *Apūrva* that comes to be the means for the accomplishment of the desired end. And as for the Vedic declaration of sacrifices being the means of accomplishing desirable ends,—the causal efficiency of sacrifices must be taken as applying to them, not directly, but through the intervening agency of the *Apūrva* produced by them.

For these reasons it is only right to hold that Dharma is a property of the person.

As for the fact of the sacrifice and such other actions being called '*Dharma*', this name also is due to the fact of their being the direct cause of the production of the *Apūrva*; just in the same manner as the name 'heaven' is applied to that which produces happiness.

Page (275). That is to say, we find that the Jyotishtoma, which is laid down as accomplishing 'heaven', is always eulogised in the valedictory passages of the Veda as the means of happiness; then again, in the case of such substances as sandal-paste and the like, we find that the name 'heaven' is applied to them only when they afford pleasure, and not otherwise; and this leads us to think that the application of the name 'heaven' depends upon the production of happiness. And in this case we find that even though the word 'heaven' actualy denotes only happiness, yet it is used in the sense of 'that which affords happiness;' and hence the word generally has come to afford the sense of the 'cause of happiness'; but as this meaning could be explained as being due to the secondary signification (Indication) of the word, it is not at all necessary to regard the word as having the double *denotative* potency. Exactly in the same manner, the word '*dharma*' may be used, indirectly or figuratively, in the sense of 'that which produces *dharma*'; and thus the single denotation of the word being enough to explain its double signification and usage, we can have no justification for assuming the twofold denotation.

Such in brief, is the reasoning propounded by the Logicians or Rationalists.

Dharma is supersensuous—i. e. it cannot be perceived by means of any organs of perception, except by Yogis.

Dharma is destructible by the experiencing of the last item of happiness. In as much as Dharma is an effect, it must come to an end; nor can anything be destroyed without adequate cause; hence its destruction being sure, it would continue so long as its results would be appearing. The results of Dharma

are such as can be experienced, in some cases, during thousands of years; and under the circumstances, if such a Dharma were to be destroyed by its very first result, there would be nothing left to produce the remaining factors of its result; nor is it possible for Dharma to be destroyed in parts; as it is an absolutely impartite entity. It is for these reasons that Dharma is held to be destructible by the last item of happiness resulting from it.

Dharma is also destroyed by True Knowledge. Some people hold Dharma to be absolutely indestructible; but for these people there could be no Final Deliverance; as there would be no end of Dharmas and Adharmas (and hence of the results of these in the shape of worldly experiences).

It is produced by the contact of the Man with the internal organ—because it is a specific quality of the Self, like pleasure &c. Then again, Dharma is produced by such means as pure thoughts and determinations,—*i. e.* such thoughts and ideas as are free from deceit, hypocrisy &c.

With regard to the different castes and conditions of men there are distinct means of accomplishing Dharma. The 'castes' are the Brāhmaṇa, the Kshattriya, the Vaiçya and the Shūdra. The 'conditions' are those of the 'Student', the 'Householder', the 'Recluse' and the 'Renunciate'. And with regard to each of these, Dharma is produced by such means as are prescribed for each by the Scriptures.

Question: "Whence could we learn the means of accomplishing Dharma which is imperceptible by the senses?"

Answer: *The cause of Dharma consists in the various substances etc., etc.*, 'Çruti' (Veda) is that which is learnt, with due ceremony, only from the mouth of the Teacher, and is never written down and then learnt (from books);—'Smṛti' (Law) consists in the declarations of Manu and others. The Substances, Qualities and Actions laid down in these two—the Veda and the Law-books—are the general means of Dharma.

The author now proceeds to point out those means of accomplishing *Dharma* that apply in common to all men, of whatever caste and condition of life. (1) *Faith in Dharma*,—i. e., openness of mind in matters relating to Dharma. (2) *Harmlessness*—i. e., determination never to do any harm to any living being; mere desisting from doing harm would only conduce to the unappearance of *Adharma*, and it would not produce any positive *Dharma*; but the determination to desist constitutes a positive virtue also, and being prescribed as such, would be conducive to *Dharma*. (3) *Benevolence* towards all beings—a kindly feeling towards them. (4) *Truthfulness*—saying what is absolutely true. (5) *Freedom from desire for undue possession*—i. e., the determination that I shall never take anything belonging to another person, except in a way sanctioned by the scriptures and not the mere negative action of not taking anything belonging to another. (6) *Freedom from lust*—determination to avoid being too much addicted to sensual pleasures. (7) *Purity of Intentions*—when an action is done with pure intentions it conduces to Dharma. (8) *Absence of anger*—determination to renounce anger. (9) *Bathing*. (10) *Use of purifying substances*—i. e., the constant use, on stated occasions, of such purifying substances as the seasamum seed and the like. (11) *Devotion to the Deity*—i. e., to any one of the Deities spoken of in the Vedas. (12). *Fasting*—determination to eat anything on such days as the *Ekādashī* and the like. (13) *Non-neglect* (of duties)—i. e., the performance of the daily and occasional duties without fail. All these are the duties or virtues pertaining in common to all men.

(1) *Performing of sacrifices*—i. e., the offering of sacrifices and the pouring of oblations. (2) *Study*—of the Veda. (3) *Charities*—i. e., the determination to transfer to the possession of another person something belonging to oneself; as Charity is a virtue for a *Çudra* also, the form of charity that is meant here is that which is given at sacrifices and such other occasions. These are the duties pertaining to the three higher castes.

The special duties pertaining to the Brahmaṇa are next described:—(1) *Receiving of gifts*—i. e., from duly qualified persons. (2) *Teaching.* (3) *Officiating at sacrifices.* These belong to the Brahmaṇa alone; as he can perform Dharma by means of the wealth acquired by these means only. (4) *Due performance of the rites and ceremonies prescribed for the caste*—the forty-eight purificatory rites duly performed make the Brahmana fit for the performance of the Vedic rites and ceremonies; and as such become conducive to Dharma (acquired by such rites and ceremonies).

The special duties belonging to the *Kshattriya* are these—(1) *Proper care of the people under him*—i. e., the due protection of such of his people as are good and law-abiding. (2) *Punishing of criminals*—i. e., the inflicting of due punishment prescribed in the scriptures upon the wicked among his people. (3) *Not to fly from battles*—i. e., continuing to fight till victory is attained or he is killed. (4) *The performance of the rites and ceremonies necessary for the Kshattriya.*

Of the *Vaiçya*, the specific duties are:—(1) *Buying*—the taking of something belonging to another person after giving due value for it. (2) *Selling*—giving to another person something belonging to himself after receiving due value for it. (3) *Agriculture*—the sowing of seeds in well-tilled soil, and the transplanting of seedlings. (4) *Tending of cattle*—the proper care of cows, goats, sheep and other useful animals. These are the specific duties of the *Vaiçya*, as for him it is only the wealth acquired by these means that can rightly help in the due performance of his religious duties.

Of the çūdra, the specific duty consists in subservience to the three higher castes; and his religious rites are performed without mantras.

The author next proceeds to describe the duties pertaining to the various conditions of life. *For the student living at the house of his Teacher &c.* The proper 'teacher' is one who initiates his pupil and then teaches him the Veda with all its subsidiaries and esoteric explanations; and for the student living (as a boarder) at the house of such a Teacher, the duties laid down in the scriptures are—(i) *Attendance upon the teacher—i. e.*, serving him in many ways; (2) Attendance on the fire—*i. e.*, daily offering of oblations into it; (3) *Fetching of fuel*—from the forest, for the sake of the sacrificial fire; and (4) *Living on alms.*

The duties of the Householder are next described. A student while he is learning the Veda leads a life in which he keeps certain observances and follows certain rules of life and conduct; and when he has finished his studies he renounces these vows and restrictions; and it is such a person who is called the '*Vidyāvratasnātaka*' (who has closed the religious life of the student by having taken the 'Final Bath'); and it is such a person who on taking a wife becomes a 'Householder'; and for him the duties prescribed are—(A) Morning and evening offering of the five 'great sacrifices' by means of the wealth acquired by such methods as the *Çālīna* and the *Yāyāvara.* When a man receives from the person who comes to make a gift to him, only so much as fills a certain vessel and is enough for his food for one or three days, this is called the '*Çālīna*' method of livelihood; and when he does not receive gifts from any definite person, but begs his living from house to house, in due rotation, this is called the '*Yāyāvara*' method; and the Dharma of the Householder is duly accomplished by his performing in the morning and in the evening, the five great sacrifices with what he acquires in the aforesaid manner; these 'great sacrifices' are—(1) *Sacrifice to animals—i. e.*, making of offerings meant to be eaten by animals; (2) *Sacrifice to men*—attending upon and feeding of guests; (3) *Sacrifice to divine beings*—in the shape of *Homa*; and (4) *Sacrifice to the*

Fathers—performance of the *Çrāddhas*; and (5) *Sacrifice to Brahman*—regular study and recitation of the Veda. (B) The taking or kindling of the *Ekāgni Fire*—also called the 'Aupāsanika Fire' at the time of marriage; and the offering, in accordance with his capacity, into that Fire, of the *Pākayajnas*—*i. e.*, such sacrifices as the '*Ashtakā*' (performed on the eighth day of some months), the '*Pārvaṇa*' (performed on the day on which the moon is absolutely invisible), the '*Caitrī*' (performed on the fullmoon day in the month of *Caitra*), the '*Açvayujī*' (performed on the fullmoon day of the month of *Açvina*), and such others as are laid down as absolutely necessary, and also the performing of such sacrifices as the *Agnyādhēya*'—*i. e.*, the laying or kindling of the fire by the Brāhmana, at spring-tide—, the *Haviryajnas*—the sacrifices of the *Darçapūrṇamāsa*, the *Cāturmāsya*, the *Āgrāyaṇa* and the like,—and the '*Agnishtoma*,' sacrifices—*viz.*, the seven *Soma* sacrifices named '*Ukthya*,' '*Shodaçin*,' '*Vājapēya*,' '*Atirātra*,' '*Āptu*' and '*Aryamā*.' (C) Avoidance of sexual intercourse except at stated times is also conducive to *Dharma*; and the begetting of children is conducive to *Dharma* as declared in the Veda—'by means of the son one wins desirable worlds.'

The duties of the 'Recluse' are next described. It is laid down that the student may retire into the forest on the very day that he may like to do so; hence the student, without passing into the life of the Householder, can become a Recluse all at once; but some people pass through the intermediate state of the Householder before retiring into the forest; and for both kinds of Recluse, the following duties are laid down: Wearing of the bark of trees and skins only, the non-shaving of hair and beard &c., and the non-paring of nails; living upon only wild fruits and roots,—and that also only those that may be left after the offerings have been made into the fire, and the guests have been duly fed. A person who having performed the *Prājāpatya* sacrifice makes a gift of all his belongings, takes the sacrificial fire into himself and leaving to his wife the

care of his son goes away as a Recluse—for him there are no offerings, and no serving of guests. But one who retires into the forest taking with him his wife and the sacrificial fire, for him it is laid down that he should live upon the remnant left after the performance of sacrifices and the serving of guests.

Page 278. The duties of the Renunciate are next described. With regard to the life of Renunciation also there is no such hard and fast rule that it can be entered only by a man who has passed through the other three states; in fact even one in the earliest stage of the student,—or even a Householder,—if he is endowed with strong faith and due earnestness, he can betake himself to that life; and when entering this life, the man takes the vow of unstinted benevolance towards all beings; renouncing all such actions as are performed with personal motives, he remains firm in the observance of all internal and external duties of *Yama* and *Niyama*. '*Yama*' consists in Harmlessness, Truthfulness, Freedom undue Possession, Celibacy and Non-acceptance of gifts, as laid down by Patanjali in his *Yogasutras* (II-30); and '*Niyama*' consists in the Keeping of Observances, Cleanliness, Contentment, Study, Contemplation of the God-head, as laid down by Patanjali in his Sutras (II-32). The author of the *Nyāyabhsāhya* (PP. 220-21) has laid down special duties for each of the four conditions of life. When the person is careful in the observance of these rules of life, he acquires the true knowledge of all the six categories, and then tries to attain '*Yoga*,' which is a particular state of meditation that brings about the knowledge of the Self. This constitutes the *Dharma* of the Renunciate.

The author proceeds to show in what manner these are conducive to *Dharma*:—When the duties detailed above are performed with the purest of intentions, without any regard to personal gain in the form of riches or wealth, then theybring about the mind-soul contact, which brings about *Dharma*.

When the man finds himself daily hampered by pain, he in due time comes to the conclusion that objects of the world

are the sole source of all pain; and thus he becomes disgusted with the objects; and desiring a cessation of pain, the only unfailing means that he has is the realisation of the true nature of his Self. And this realisation is brought about by meditation. Knowing this, the man gives up all actions that have a personal end in view, and gives himself up to meditation; but finding that living among men in a village stands in the way of proper meditation, he relinquishes the village and other haunts of men and goes away into the forest; there having purified himself by the internal and external rules of life, he acquires *Dharma* by the practice of meditation which tends to the cessation of his troubles. By constant practice he goes on progressing towards higher and higher stages of meditation during a number of lives, till during his last life on earth, he attains to that stage of perfect meditation which cannot be disturbed by the slightest notion of duality (*i. e.*, he thinks of nothing else). In ordinary experience we find that when we are thinking very intently on an object, we become so absorbed in it that even very attractive objects fail to attract us; as for instance an archer having his mind fixed by practice on the arrow, does not notice the king who may pass by him. Says Patanjali: 'The controlling of the functioning of the mind follows from exercise and dispassion' (*Yogasutra* I-12). When in this manner meditation has reached the most perfect state, there appears a full cognition of the true character of Self. Say the *Sankhyas*—'Thus it is that by the practice of truth wisdom is attained, which is complete and incontrovertible (and hence) pure, and absolute; (by means of which the idea is obtained that) *I am not, naught is mine* and *I do not exist*' (*Sānkhyakārikā* 64). It is for this reason then that the Renunciate who desires the true knowledge of Self takes to the performance of Yogic practices.

Objection: "A knowledge is always found to lead to the attainment of the object known; and hence the knowledge of Self obtained from the mere teaching of a teacher would make the true nature of the Self attained; what then would be the use of seeking a direct perception of it through Yogic practices?"

Reply: Not so; as an indirect means can never bring about a direct perception.

In reality the Self is neither the *doer* nor the *enjoyer*; it is wholly indifferent. And it is only when it becomes connected with such limitations as those of the body and the sense-organs, that it comes to have such notions, as 'I' and 'mine,' of its being the *doer* and the *enjoyer*; and such notions cannot but be regarded as false; as they represent things as what in reality they are not. From these notions of 'I' and 'mine' follow an affection for the pleasant, and aversion to the unpleasant thing; these affections and aversions give rise to activity and cessation form activity; thence follow *Dharma* and *Adharma*; and this lands the Self into the cycle of birth and rebirth. This has been thus declared by the Bauddhas: 'In the ever-existing Self, the idea of difference comes in when there is a distinction made between the *I* and the *not-I*; thence arise affection and aversion; and it is as affected by these two that all conditions are brought into existence.'

That every Self in earthly life is under the influence of beginningless tendencies and impressions, and as such is by its very nature as it were 'bound'—is a directly perceptible cognition that has a very firm hold on the minds of the people. The knowledge of Self, however, that is acquired by mere verbal teaching, has but a momentary existence, and is not tested and found compatible with actual experience, and is indirect. An idea that has at least the semblance of being a direct cognition can never be set aside by that which at its best is only indirect. For instance, even though all the other means of knowledge might indicate to a man that sugar is sweet, yet if his organ of taste happen to be perverted, making the sugar taste bitter to him, he would never be able to get rid of this idea, and the consequent dislike for the object.

Hence with a view to acquire the direct knowledge of Self,

it becomes necessary to have recourse to meditation; and when meditation has reached the perfect stage, the true nature of the Self, preclusive of all notions of its being the *doer* or the *enjoyer*, becomes distinctly cognisable; and as with regard to one and the same object Knowledge and Ignorance are contradictory and mutually exclusive, there comes about a cessation of all ideas of 'I' and 'mine'; and when this stage is reached the phenomenal world, even though existing, ceases to affect that Self. This is thus described by the *Sānkhyas*,—'Possessed of this true knowledge, the Soul, as a spectator at leisure, at ease and pure, free from all taint of *Rajas* and *Tamas*, beholds Nature which has now retired from its seven forms (Dharma, Knowledge Dispassion, Power, Adharma, Ignorance, Absence of dispassion and Absence of Power) on account of her prolific fruition (tending to bring about experiences to the Soul), under the force of true wisdom' (Sānkhyakārikā-65).

Page 280. Though the delusive tendencies of the Self are beginningless, and true knowledge has beginning in time, yet the latter sets aside the former; as in the perception of truth lies the greatest strength of the intellect.

Text (134): *Adharma also is a quality of the Self; it is conducive to sin and undesirable results; it is imperceptible; destructible by the congnition of the last item of pain (resulting from it). Its causes are—(1) the doing of actions which are prohibited in the scriptures, and which are contrary to the causes of Dharma; e. g., Harmfulness, Untruthfulness, Undue Possession; (2) the Nonperformance of actions enjoined in the scriptures; and (3) Neglect. These, along with impurity of motives,—tend to the mindcontact bringing about Adharma (VI-ii-3, 4, 6, 7; VI-i-5, 7, 8).*

Commentary.

Not only Dharma, but Adharma also is a property of the

Self; it brings about 'sin', which is a source of future trouble and also 'undesirable results' in the form of actual troubles. It is destroyed by the full experience of the last item of pain resulting from it. It is brought about by such actions as are prohibited in the scriptures; and also by the conscious nonperformance of those that are laid down as 'necessary' duties; as also by 'neglect' *i. e.*, the unconscious transgression of duties. In a case where an immoral act is done with a set purpose we have what is called an 'impurity of intentions'; and this is conducive to *Adharma*; when however it is done without any motive, then it becomes included under 'Neglect.'

Text (135): *When the man does not attain true knowledge, and is still under the influence of affections and aversions, the doing of excellent vituous deeds endowed with great motive power, accompained by a slight taint of sin, leads him to contact with desirable bodies and sense-organs and consequent experience of pleasures &c., in accordance with the impressions (left by his previous actions).—in such regions as those of Brahmā, of Indra, of Prajāpati, of Pitṛs, or of Men. Similarly the performance of bad sinful acts, accompained by a slight touch of virtue, brings about his contact with bodies and sense-organs and consequent experience of pains &c.,—in such regions as those of ghosts and of the lower animals. And thus by the performance of such virtuous deeds as are in the form of out-going activity (of the soul), accompained by sin, the man passes through the various divine, human and animal regions, again and again; and this is what constitutes his 'wheel of bondage.' (VI—ii—15).*

Commentary.

Page 281. Having described the causes of *Adharma*, the author proceeds to explain its affects, One who thinks himself to be the *Doer* and the *Enjoyer*, and who takes the external and internal objects of experience (*i. e.*, the objects and the experiences produced by them) to be real sources of pleasure,—though in reality they are sources of pain and trouble,—is called 'ignorant,' 'without true knowledge;' such a person being hemmed in on all sides by desires for his own experience, becomes attached to such objects as he considers to be conducive to pleasure to him; and acquires an aversion to those whom he considers to be obstructive of his pleasure; and when such a man performs certain acts productive of *Dharma* with the motive of being born again as a divine being or a *Gandharva*, he actually becomes connected with—*i. e.*, obtains—the body, the sense-organs &c., in due accordance with the impressions and effects of the acts he has performed. But there is a touch of pain even in the regions of Brahmā himself (to say nothing of the regions of the lower gods); and as pain is never produced except by *Adharma*, the author has added the qualification—'*accompained by a slight taint of sin.*' One whose *Dharma* is of the ordinary kind, obtains a good enough body and organs; whose *Dharma* is of a better kind has a better body;—and he who has *Dharma* of the best mind has the best of bodies &c.;—this is what is meant by the qualification *in accordance with the impressions left by his previous actions.*' The word '*ishta*' 'desirable' is to be construed with each of the things mentioned, body and the rest; as it appears at the end of the *Dvandva* or copulative compound.

Similarly by an excess of *Adharma* one goes to the regions of ghosts and lower animals, being equipped with undesirable bodies and sense-organs &c. But there is some slight pleasure in these regions also; and this could only be due to *Dharma*; hence the qualification—'*accompained by a taint of* virtue.'

Text (136): *When a man with due knowledge (intelligently) performs acts of Dharma without any thought of the result to follow therefrom, he comes to be born in a pure family; and being thus born he has a longing for finding out the means for the absolute removal of pain; and with this end in view, he betakes himself to a properly qualified teacher, and obtains from him the true knowledge of the six categories, which removes his ignorance; then having acquired thorough dispassion, he becomes free from all affections, aversions and other such like feelings; and the absence of these puts a stop to the production of any* Dharma *or* Adharma; *the* Dharma *and* Adharma *of his previous lives being exhausted, by his experiences of pleasures and pains, and all affections &c. having ceased, all his actions henceforth are only such as are of the nature of pure 'Dharma,' tending forwards 'cessation' or 'peace'; and these actions produce in him the happiness of contentment and a *disregard for the body; and having brought about happiness due to the vision of highest truth, this Dharma also disappears. And thus there being a complete cessation, the soul becomes 'seedless'; and the present body falling off, it takes no other bodies, and this cessation of equipment with bodies and organs, being like the extinguishing of fire on all its fuel being burnt up, constitutes what is called 'Moksha,' 'Final Deliverance.' (VI—ii—16; V—ii—16, 18).*

Commentary.

Page 282. Having described the process of birth and rebirth though *Dharma* and *Adharma*, the author proceeds to describe Final Deliverance. A man has the knowledge that he

* 'Parikhedam' is the decidedly better reading; 'paricchēda' does not give much sense.

in reality is indifferent to all things external and internal, all of which are sources of trouble; and then he comes to lose all longing for the pleasures arising from perceptible and imperceptible causes (the latter being those laid down in the scriptures); that is to say, he ceases to have any such desire as 'may it be thus,' 'may such and such thing be mine,' and so forth; and thus having no desire for results, he performs only those actions that are laid down as leading to 'cessation' or peace, or those that are prescribed as absolutely necessary duties; and these actions, performed with due knowledge, lead to the person being born, on his next birth, in a pure and noble family; a man not well born is never endowed with true faith; a man devoid of true faith is never moved by a desire to learn the truth; and without such desire one cannot attain true knowledge; and one devoid of true knowledge can never attain deliverance. Consequently actions performed without any desire for results, and tending to deliverance, make the man born in a noble family.

Being born in a noble family the man finds himself daily suffering from a number of troubles; and is moved to find out some means for the removal of such troubles. Moved by this desire he betakes himself to a duly qualified teacher, who imparts to him the true knowledge of the six categories; having thus acquired a *verbal* knowledge of these, he goes through the practice of '*çravaṇa*' or 'listening to the teachings,' '*manana*' or 'reflecting over the things learnt,' and '*nididhyāsana*' or 'constant meditation over it'; and thereby acquires the *direct* knowledge of the categories.

Having acquired this True Knowledge, he becomes free from 'Ignorance'—*i. e.*, from all mistaken cognitions, along with the impressions and longings resulting from these; and thereby becoming endowed with dispassion,—*i. e.*, freedom from the effects of affection and aversion,—he becomes free from all affections and aversions; and thenceforth he produces no *Dharma* or *Adharma*, which are the product of those affections and aversions. That is to say, the activities of a man are productive of *Dharma* and *Adharma* only when accompained by the '*Klēshas*' (Ignorance, Egoism, Affection, Aversion, Attachment) and impressions; just as the seed of rice can sprout up only when it is covered with the husk; hence when the *Klēshas* have been destroyed, the actions being like unhusked rice, ceases to produce *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Says Patanjali: 'It is only when the seed is there that we can have the fruits in the shape of birth, life, and other experiences' (*Yogasūtras*—II—13), and also Gautama: "Activity is not productive of effects for one whose *Klēshas* have been destroyed' (*Nyāyasūtras*, IV—i—64).

Page 283. The *Dharma* and *Adharma* left by the previous actions of the person come to be destroyed by his experiences during present life; and thenceforth his actions tend to produce only such *Dharma* as are conducive to '*nivṛtti*' *i. e.*, 'cessation,' of birth and rebirth; and this *Dharma* appearing in its purest form, being free from all affections and aversions, brings about happiness of contentment and disregard for the body; and having produced happiness born of the perception of the true nature of the self, it disappears.

Thus then, when *Dharma* disappears after having brought about self-knowledge, the self becomes free from such 'seeds' of future birth as *Dharma* and *Adharma*; and the body occupied by the soul during the time ceasing to exist, on the exhaustion of all the effects of its previous activity, and there being no cause left for the taking by the self of other bodies, there is a complete cessation of these *embodiments*; just like the extinguishing of the fire that has burnt all its fuel (the *Dharma* and *Adharma* being the 'fuel' in the present instance); and it is this cessation that constitutes 'Deliverance.'

In connection with Deliverance we have to consider the following question: Does Deliverance follow from Knowledge alone, or from the combination of Knowledge and Action?

We hold that Deliverance follows from the combination of Knowledge and Action. Even when a man has ceased to have any other desires, and has ceased from the performance of actions for results, he does not become free from the obligation to perform the 'necessary' duties, as also those that are prescribed for certain definite occasions. For instance, there are certain duties laid down for *all* Brahmanas; and the man desiring Deliverance would be as much a Bráhmana as any other,—his caste remaining the same; and hence if while having the obligation, he should omit these duties, he would be daily committee a sin, which would lead to the most undesirable of bondages for him. This has been thus declared:—'These actions that are performed for the sake of certain results, and those that are prohibited, bind the soul; and the necessary and occasional duties also have a tendency to bind when their performance is neglected.

Objection: "The non-performance of the prescribed duties would be a negative entity; and a negative entity could never produce any positive entity in the shape of Sin."

Reply: The sin would be produced by other causes, set in motion by the non-performance of prescribed duties. We do not accept the causal efficiency of a negative entity by itself; but no one can deny such efficiency of it when it subserves itself to a positive entity. Then again, as a matter of fact, the soul is never wholly inactive physically, verbally or mentally, in the morning and evening (for which times certain acts of meditation &c., are prescribed as necessary for the Bráhmana), as the very act *living* is an action. To this end we have the following declaration:—

Page 284. 'The *previous negation* of actions that we have at the time of the non-performance of necessary duties does not lose its negative character by the mere fact of its being productive of Sin; as what produces the Sin is not actually the *non-performance* of those duties, but the *performance* through

foolishness of other acts at a time for which other duties are laid down in the scriptures; so that the sin in this case is not produced by the *nonperformance* only.

Objection: "Sin follows from the doing of that which is prohibited; the act of living in the body is not one that is prohibited; so if a man were to *live in the body* but omit the performance of the evening and morning meditations, what harm could there be in this?"*

Reply: In as much as the duties prescribed are such as must be performed at the appointed time it follows that at that time the performance of the act of *mere living* is prohibited; and hence a man who would be merely living, (and not performing the meditations in the morning and in the evening) would be doing something that is prohibited, and thereby acquiring sin.

Objection: "The Knowledge of Self, brought about by a long course of contemplation, carried on strenuously and unceasingly, while destroying affection and aversion from their very roots, would certainly destroy the sin accruing from the non-performance of the prescribed duties."

Reply: This is not right; as when practice is carried on favourably, then the Knowledge of truth that appears destroys all doubtful and mistaken cognitions; and this knowledge has never been found to have the power of setting aside anything else. If the Knowledge of self were to destroy actions, then it would destroy those actions that would be undergoing fruition (*i. e.*, whose results will have been begun to be experinced by the person); and if this were the case, then the state of *Jivanmukti*—'Deliverance while living'—would be an absolute impossibility; as no sooner would the person obtain the knowledge of truth than his actions having been destroyed, his body would fall off. As a matter of fact however, we find this state in actual

* A 'na' is ovriously required in the text: as even the Siddhanti does not hold any sin to follow from the performance of the necessarp duties while living in the body.

experience, as we find that a man, though having his ignorance destroyed by true knowledge, still continues to live awaiting the falling off of his body, looking upon the world as a mere imaginary picture, and not having his affection fixed upon even a single thing of the world, but undergoing the experiences resulting from such of his previous actions as have their productive force limited to his present life; his body continuing to exist by reason of the unexhausted forces of his previous actions, though the impelling force of fresh actions has been withdrawn, in the manner of the potter's wheel, which continues to revolve even after the operation of the potter has ceased, by reason of the momentum already imparted to it. That such is the case is declared by the Veda itself—'The wise man *while living* becomes free from pleasures and pains.' To the same end we have the following declaration of the Sánkhyas: 'True knowledge having been obtained, Dharma and other agencies become deprived of their productive efficiency; and yet the soul continues to exist in the world, being endowed with the body through the force of previous actions, just like the revolving of the wheel' (*Sánkhyakárká*—67). What is meant by *Dharma becoming deprived of its productive efficiency* is that the tendencies and the *Kleshas* (Ignorance &c.) having been destroyed by the knowledge if truth, *Dharma* and the other agencies become deprived of their necessary causal force.

It might be regard that,—"The knowledge of truth destroys such actions as have not actually begun to function towards fruition." But this would not be possible; as these actions also would be incapable of being destroyed by that knowledge; just as much as those actions whose fruition has already commenced. As for the teaching that—'the Supreme One having been perceived, all his actions are destroyed,'—all that is meant by this is that when the man has obtained the knowledge of truth, all new actions cease to appear; and not that the actions already done are destroyed. This is borne out by another declaration of the scriptures: 'An action, until its result has

been experienced, is not destroyed even in millions of years.'

Objection: "If knowledge does not destroy actions, then, how are the actions accumulating through many lives, destroyed? If they were destroyed by the experiencing of their results, and also by the performance of actions prescribed for that purpose (of destroying previous actions),—then, how could innumerable actions he destroyed during a single life?

Reply: There is no restrction of time as to the destruction of actions;; just as fresh actions are being accumulated during each life, so also are certain previous actions destroyed in each life by the fact of their results having been experienced during that life. And those that may not have been destroyed before the man obtains true knowledge, are destroyed by actual experiencing of their results in the order of the forces set in motion by those actions, and also by fresh actions performed to that end. This has been thus declared:—'The man knowing the true nature of the soul has got to destroy all his actions; and it is for this reason that after millions of years we have a soul attaining Deliverance.'

Thus then, the omission of necessary duties being productive of sin, and sin being a source of bondage, from which there is no freedom by any other means,—if the man wishes to avoid sin, and attain Deliverance, he should perform such of the prescribed duties at their proper times, as may not be incompatible with his practice of meditation,—just like the actions of *begging food* and *eating it*; and this he should continue until he clearly perceives the true nature of the soul. And even for one who has realised the true nature of the soul and who is thus a '*jívanmukta*', it is necessary to perform the necessary duties so long as he lives in the world with his body. When however he withdraws himself within the Self, and has his final Delivernece near at hand, then, all his actions being nearly destroyed, they are as good as totally destroyed; as there is no external consciousness of the few that might still remain. And at this time what appears is only the internal

cognition of the true nature of the soul,—a cognition which is purified by the force of perfected meditation, which closes the range of experiences by force of accumulated Dispassion; and this resolves all things into one which uproots all tendencies towards ignorance, and concentrates the inner organ towards the single point of soul-perception; this perception is wholly internal, the operation of the external organs having entirely ceased. Under such circumstances, whence could their be any possibility of further actions? Says the *Çruti*; 'When he does not hear, he is said to have become *Unified* &c.' At this time there is no sin accruing form the non-performance of prescribed duties—as all duties cease to exist for him who is no longer conscious of distinctions of time—as that 'it is evening now' (and 'I must say my evening prayers,') and so on—or of castes and conditions as that 'I am a Bráhmana' and so forth. This has been thus declared: 'How could the man devoid of such self egotism as that *I am a Brāhmana* perform any acts.' For such a person again who has ceased from all activity, and who exists like a log of wood, could not have any such sin accruing to him, as follows from the killing of animals.

As for the continuance for a short time of the body of the person who has perceived what was to be perceived and has destroyed what had to be destroyed, having his mind wholly under his control, who is beyond the reach of pleasures and pains caused by the perception, remembrance and reflection of sensual objects, and who has his meditation securely fixed in Brahman,—this is due to the non-destruction of that much of his action which goes to limit his life-period which keeps his body in the world; and as soon as this time-limit has been reached, the said Action having its work finished, disappears; and immediately after this its effect, the Body, also drops off; and when the Body has dropped off, along with all the organs, internal and external, the knowledge of truth (which is an effect of the internal organ) also ceases; and what is left is the Self alone in its isolated grandeur.

Thus then, we have found that the *Knowledge of the true nature of Self* and the *Performance of Prescribed Duties* operate conjointly towards the setting aside of those actions that tend to Bondage. The man knowing the Self to be something distinct from the body &c., does not regard the favours and disfavours towards these latter to be his Self; and thus all notions of 'I' and 'mine' having ceased, he ceases to have any affection towards that which is favourable, or aversion towards the unfavourable; this indifference puts a stop to his further activity; and there is no further accumulation of fresh actions; the previous accumulations become gradually exhausted, either by actual experience, or by other actions (tending to counteract the force of the previous actions); then, as for the sin accruing from the non-performance of prescribed duties, this is avoided by the actual performance of those duties; and thus all kinds of Actions having been exhausted, when his present body falls off, there are no causes left for the appearance of another body for him; and hence his Self remains left in its own isolated position (free from the limitations of the body &c.,). To this end we have the following declaration:—'The man destroys all his sins by the performance of all necessary and occasional duties, and purifies his Knowledge by practice, and makes it perfect; and having his Knowledge perfected by practice, he attains Isolation.' Even philosophers of opposite schools of thought have accepted the same view of the matter: 'By action the nature is purified; by Knowledge is the true nature of the Self ascertained; by practice follows Deliverance from the combination of the other too.'

Question: "What is the *true nature of the Self*, the resolution where unto would constitute Deliverance?"

Some people hold that the nature of the Self consists in bliss. But this theory is not correct; as it will not bear an examination of the possible alternatives.

For instance, is this *bliss* actually experienced in the state of Deliverance, or not? If it is not experienced, then, even though extant it is as good as non-existent; for the simple reason that it is not enjoyable. If it is experienced in the state of Deliverance, then it becomes necessary for you to point out the cause of this experience. You cannot find any such cause, in the absence of the absolute disappearance of bodies and organs. It might be argued that the contact of the internal organ would be the cause of this experience; but this would not be possible; as the internal organ or mind aids in this manner only when it is influenced by *Dharma* and *Adharma*; and when the mind is such as has all seeds of good and evil rooted out of it, it can never function towards any purpose of the Self. It might be urged that the mind favours the Self by the force of *Dharma* born of Yogic practices. But even such *Dharma* being a product, should be transient; and when this would be destroyed, what would be there to help the mind?

Page 287. *Objection:* "If the Self were unconscious, then it would be like a block of stone which experiences neither pleasure nor pain; and if the Self also were to experience neither of these, what would be the difference between it and a block of stone? For this reason we must regard *consciousness* to belong to the Self by its very nature; and when this consciousness is drawn outwards by the sense-organs, it tends outwards; but when the sense-organs have ceased to exist, then it becomes merged into the Self itself, whose nature consists of pure bliss. The nature of bliss is such that it must illumine or manifest (render cognisable) something. Hence during the state of Deliverance, if it were to remain inactive (without bringing about any experiences), it would be as good as non-existent. And under the circumstances, it is far better to regard the Self to be an unconscious being."

Reply: Does Consciousness consist in bliss by its very nature; or is bliss produced in it by some other cause? In the

state of deliverance there can be no such cause for the bringing about of the experience (of bliss); as the body and the sense-organs, which alone could be such causes, will have wholly disappeared; as we have already explained above. Then if bliss be held to belong to Consciousness by its very nature, then this bliss would be experienced during the metempsychic or worldly state also, (even without Deliverance). It might be argued that during the worldly state, the bliss, though extant, is not experienced, on account of its being hidden or obstructed by Ignorance. But then, if bliss constituted the nature of Consciousness, in as much as this latter is eternal, it could never be separated from what constitutes its very nature; and under the circumstances, what would be the meaning of the 'hiding' or 'obstruction' that you speak of? If again, such deprivation of its very nature were possible, what would be the eternality of such consciousness? Hence bliss must be regarded as eternal; and as such being enlivened by the equally eternal Consciousness, it would be experienced equally in the 'worldly' and in the 'delivered' state. As a matter of fact however, we do not find this to be the case; as during the 'worldly' state, until 'Deliverence' is attained, the bliss or pleasure that the man experiences is only that which can be cognised through the external objects and the sense-organs.

For these reasons then, there can be no eternal bliss for the Self; and hence the experiencing of bliss cannot constitute the state of Deliverance. We must therefore regard Deliverance to consist in the subsistence of the Self in its own pristine condition, marked by the cessation of all the specific qualities pertaining to it (during the 'worldly' state). And how this is the supreme end of man's existence we have shown above (*Text-pp.* 6 and 7).

SOUND.

Text (137) : *Sound is the property of Ākāça (II-i-27).*

It is perceptible by the ear (II-ii-21). It is momentary; and counteracted by its effect, by its cause and by both; it is produced by Conjunction, Disjunction and another sound; it has a limited existence; and is brought about by homogeneous and hetrogeneous causes (II-ii-25-to 32).

It is of two kinds—(1) in the form of letters and (2) in the form of noise in general; the former is in the shape of 'a' and other letters, and the latter in the shape of the noise produced by the blowing of the conch and such things. Sound of the former kind proceeds from the contact of the mind and soul as influenced by remembrance:—First of all there is desire for pronouncing the letter; this is followed by an effort on the part of the speaker; and when this effort brings about the conjnuction of the soul with air, there is produced in this air a certain action (motion); this air moving upwards strikes such places as the throat and the like; this contact of the 'place' and the air brings about contact of the 'place' with Ākāça; and this contact produces the letter-sound. Sounds of other kinds also are produced by the contact of Ākāça with such substances as the drum and the like, this contact being brought about by the contact of the drum and the stick. Then again, sound is produced by such Disjunctions as the splitting of the joints of the bamboo, and that of Ākāça and the bamboo; and also from other sounds that may have been previously produced by certain conjunctions and disjunctions. Sound is always produced in a series, like the series of water-ripples; and when sound, appearing in the form of waves, reaches the ear, it becomes perceived. As the Ear is

not found to go to the sound (where it is produced), and the sound is not found to have actually come to the Ear, and as there could be no perception of sound by the Ear, unless there were some sort of an approach of the one by the other—one cannot but accept the fact of sound being produced in the form a line or series of waves. (II-ii-32).

Commentary.

Sound is the property of Ākāça.

Objection: "In as much *Ākāça* has other properties also, in the shape of number and the rest, how could *sound* be defined as the 'property of *Ākāça*?"

Reply: What is meant by the definition is that, the quality which, while being perceptible by the ear, belongs to *Ākāça* is Sound.

With a view to set aside the opinions of others it is added —*It is momentary—i. e.* It is quickly destroyed, as is proved by the fact of its not being perceived the very moment after it has been produced. As there is nothing to prove that sound continues to exist, there can be no room for the assumption that the non-perception of it is due to the absence of proper manifesting agencies; then, as for the recognition that 'this is the same sound that I had heard yesterday',—this can be explained as being due to similarity; as in the case of the flame (which is regarded to be the same, while as a matter of fact there is only a series of continually appearing and disappearing series of distinct flames); specially as the fact of each sound (though similar) being distinct is proved by the difference in the degree of loudness or faintness of each individual sound.

It is counteracted by its effect, by its cause and by both. That is to say, the first sound that is produced is 'counteracted' by its effect (which destroys it); and the last sound is 'counteracted' by its cause, the last but one sound (which is destroyed by it and

destroys it), the last sound having no other cause for destruction; the intervening sounds are 'counteracted' by both (cause and effect).

It is produced by Conjunctions, Disjunctions and Sound. The first sound is produced by Conjunction as well as by Disjunction; while the sounds appearing after that are produced by sound.

It is limited in existence; *i. e.* it is not all-pervading, as we have proved already.

It is brought about by homogeneous and heterogeneous causes. For instance, the sound produced by sound is brought about by an homogenous cause; while that which is produced by conjunctions and disjunctions is brought by heterogeneous causes.

It is of two kinds—(1) in the form of letters and (2) in the form of noise in general &c., &c. The manner of the production of sound of the former class is described:—From the contact of the soul and mind, as influenced by the remembrance of the letter-sounds heard before, there arises a desire to pronounce a letter-sound similar to that sound; then follows the effort on the part of the man; and by the instrumentality of this effort (which serves as the instrumental cause) as affecting the *contact of the soul and air* (which contact serves as the non-material cause,) there is produced a certain action or motion in the Air within the stomach; and this Air moving upwards strikes such sound-producing points in the body as the heart, the throat, the palate and the like; then by the instrumentaliy of the contact of the Air with these points, as affecting the *contact of Ākāça with the points* (which serves as the non-material cause), there is produced the letter-sound.

The sound that is not in the form of letters is produced in the following manner: When the stick strikes the drum, the force of the stroke affecting the contact of the drum and *Ākāça*, the sound is produced from this contact; and in thisthe contact

of the drum and *Ākāça* serves as the non-material cause, and the drum-stick-contact and the force of the stick serve as the instrumental cause. Sound is also produced by the splitting of bamboo joints, and also by the disjunction of the *Ākāça* and the bamboo.

Sound is produced by sound in the following manner: When a sound is prodnced by Conjunctions and Disjunctions, in the aforesaid manner, there appears a regular series of sound-waves as it were; that is to say, just as a ripple of water gives rise to another ripple in immediate contact with itself, and so on and on there appears a regular series of ripples,—so also in the same manner when one sound has been produced it produces another sound in close contact with itself; and so on and on a regular continuous series of sound-ripples is produced; and when the line of ripples reaches the ear, the last unit of the series reaching it, comes to be perceived by it.

[There is an obvious interpolation in the reading here, all the words from *tato* up to *bdhiriti* have no connection with the present context.]

Question:—"How do you prove this theory of yours?"

Answer:—As a matter of fact, we find that the ear does not go up to the place where the sound is produced; nor does the sound produced in one place go up to the Ear; as both of these are immobile things; and yet there can be no perception by the Ear of that which is not reached by it; as we have shown above that the organs of perception can operate over objects only when they actually get at them; nor could we explain the perception of sound in any other manner; and in the case of waves we actually find that though the first ripple is itself destroyed, it produces another in close proximity to itself, and so on and on producing a regular series of waves, it finally reaches a distant point; and from this analogy we assume a similar series of sound waves. Nor would there be any *regressus ad infinitum* in this case; as the sound-waves would continue only so far as they could be carried by the air of the stomach set in motion by the sound-producing effort. It is for this reason that when a sound

is produced against the direction of the wind, it is not heard very far; the reason for this being that the Air proceeding from the mouth is opposed and stopped by the contrary wind.

This theory has been fully discussed by the Rationalists; hence all that we have done here is to explain the sense of the *Bhâshya*, and have not put forward any further arguments.

May this treatise on Qualities (strung to a string), produced out of reasonings (the pearl-producing shell) and bright-be born in the heart (worn over the chest), like a necklace of pearls?

Thus ends the chapter on Qualities.

CHAPTER XI.

ON ACTIONS.

Text (138): *Throwing upwards and the other four are all related (belong) to the genus 'Action' (I-i-7).*

They belong to a single substance (at a time) (I-i-17); they are momentary (II-ii-25); they reside only in corporeal substances (II-i-21); are without, qualities (I-i-17); are produced by gravity, fluidity, effort and conjunction (I-i-29); are counteracted by conjunction produced by themselves (I-i-14); are the independent causes of conjunctions and disjunctions (I-i-17, 20, 30); they serve only as non-material causes (X-ii-3); are productive of effects inhering in their own substrates as well as in the substrates of others; they never produce effects of the same kind as themselves (I-i-11, 25, 31); they are not productive of substances (I-i-21, 22, 31); they belong to distinct well-defined classes. The distinctive feature of each of the five kinds of Actions, consists in the direction in which its effect is produced.

Commentary.

Salutation to the Wearer of the Moon-crescent on His Head! He who is the seed of the worldly tree, the Bridge in the Ocean of metempsychosis, the Moon pouring out the nectar of true knowledge!

The author now proceeds to describe the points of similarity among the five kinds of Action, and also those points by which these are distinguishable from other categories of thought.

There is a certain genus by the name of 'Action'; and it is only *throwing upwards* and the other four that belong to this genus.

They belong to a single substance—i. e., in any one substance at one time there is only one action, and one single action exists in only one substance at a time. If in any one substance two different and contrary actions existed at one and the same time, then, in as much they would counteract each other, none of them could produce conjunctions and disjunctions in any definite direction; and as such they would fail to fulfil one of the necessary qualifications of 'Action'—viz the character of being the independent cause of conjunctions and disjunctions. If the two actions inhering in the same substance were not mutually contradictory, then as any one of the two would be enough to explain the particular conjunction and disjunction in a definite direction, there would be no need for admitting the existence of the other.

Similarly, one and the same action can not exist in more than one substance; because as a matter of fact, we find that when an action makes one substance move in a definite direction, it does not set into motion any other substance.

Actions are momentary—i. e., quickly destructible.

They exist in corporeal substances—*i. e.*, only in such substances as have limited dimensions.....*They are counteracted or destroyed by the conjunctions produced by themselves* —and not by the *Disjunctions ;* as if they were destroyed by the disjunctions, then we could not have another contact following after that disjunction. *They are the independent cause of conjunctions and disjunctions,*—in producing *Speed,* Action stands in need of the help of particular propulsions and strokes; but not so in the production of conjunctions and disjunctions.

They serve only as non-material causes—and not, like Qualities, as intsrumental causes also.

Page 291.] They are productive of effects—in the shape of Conjunctions and Disjunctions—pervading over their own substrates, as also over the substrates of others. *They never produce effects of the same kind as themselves* ; if one action were to produce another action like itself, then when one man would move, there would be no stopping for him,—one motion giving rise to another motion *ad infinitum.*

It might be argued that the motion would cease by the cessation of his desire to move and that of the effort put forth by him. But in that case this desire and effort, and not the Action, would be regarded as the cause of the subsequent motions ; and in support of this we have the argument—'one Action cannot be the cause of another action,—because it is an action—like the ultimate Action ;' or, 'The action in question is not producible by action,—because it is an action,—like the first action.'

They are not productive of substances ;—as a substance is produced only after the Action has been stopped by the subsequent Conjunction produced by it.

Each of the five—*Throwing upwards &c.*—belong to distinct well-defined classes, like 'utkṣepaṇa' and the like.

All the above constitute the points of similarity among the five Actions ; and what distinguishes each of these from the others is the direction towards which its effects tend. This the author proceeds to describe in the following texts :

Text (139) : *As regards the action of throwing upward, it is that action which brings about the conjunction of the parts of the body and things in contact with these parts, with points of space above them, and also the disjunction of these from those below them ; this action is produced by Gravity, Effort and Conjunctions. (I-ii-7).*

Commentary.

Throwing upward brings about the conjunction of the hand &c., and the stick held by it, with points of space above them.

Text (140) : *That action which brings about conjunctions and disjunctions in directions other than those just mentioned, is Throwing Downward. (I-ii-9).*

Commentary.

Throwing Downward brings about conjunction with lower things and Disjunction from lower things.

Text (141) : *Akunhana or Contraction is that action by which a straight object becomes curved by reason of its particles at one end becoming disjoined from their original position and coming in contact with the points of space occupied by the particles at the other end. (I-ii-7).*

Page 292 Text (142) : *Prasārana or Expansion is that action whereby the object becomes straightened*

by reason of the bringing about of conjunction and disjunctions in directions opposed to the aforesaid. (I-ii-7.)

Commentary.

That is to say, disjunctions from the points of space occupied by the root-end and conjunction with those occupied by the top-end.

Text (143) : *Gamana or Going is that action which brings about conjunctions and disjunctions with points of space in diverse directions.*

All these five kinds of Action appear in connection with parts of the body and things in contact with it, and is 'conscious' as well as 'unconscious.' Any other action that appears in the aforesaid things and also in other things, without consciousness (on the part of any person), is only a form of 'Going'.

Objection : "*It is not right to divide Actions into five classes; because they are all of the form of 'Going'. Every momentary action appearing in the form of 'Going' brings about the conjunctions and disjunctions of its substrate with even the minutest points of space either above, below or on one side of it; and every such action is equally regarded as 'Going'; and all actions are only in the form of Going.*"

Reply : *It is not so; as we are distinctly conscious of each class of actions as inclusive of the like and exclusive of the unlike actions; for instance, we have such ideas as that 'here we have the action of Throwing Upwards, and there of Throwing Downwards'; and it is on the basis of these*

notions that we become cognisant of the various classes and subclasses of Action. Then again, the presence of the particular prefixes 'ut' and the rest distinctly indicates that each of them produces effects in distinct directions; and thus also is established the distinct characterestic genus of each set of actions.

Objection : "*Then too it is not quite correct to say that "there are only five kinds of action; as in regard "to such actions 'entering' 'coming out' and "the like also, we have exclusive and inclusive "notions with reference to each set of them. "Hence if in the case of 'Throwing Upwards' "and the rest mentioned by you we have to "admit of distinct classes by reason by our "having inclusive and exclusive notions with "regard to each set of them, then, for the same "reason, we may have such distinct classes as "'coming out', 'entering' and the like also. "If might be argued that in the case of Throwing "Upward &c, the notions of exclusion and "inclusion are due to the fact of their producing "distinct effects. But then, in the case of 'enter-"ing' and 'coming out' also, we may attribute "like notions to the same cause. And when the "notions of exclusion and inclusion are found "to be present equally in both cases, we find no "special reasons whereby we might admit dis-"tinct classes in regard to 'Throwing Upwards' "&c., and not in regard to 'coming out' &c.*"

Reply : *Not so; as any such distinction as you propose would give rise to a cross-diversion of classes. That is to say, if on the mere ground of exclusive and inclusive notions we were to regard*

'coming out' and the rest to be distinct classes, then we would have a cross-division or intermixture of classes. For instance, when two men are looking at a man 'coming out' from one room and 'entering' the other, the two men simultaneously have the notions of the actions, 'Coming out' and 'entering',—one of them, having the notion 'he comes in or enters', and the other the notion 'he goes out'; but if the two men are behind a curtain, and on the removal of the curtain they find that the man is not in the room where he was before, but in another room, then they have no notion either of 'coming out' or of 'entering'; the only idea that they have is that of the man having 'gone' form one to the other—a notion of 'going' only. Similarly, when the leaf of the bamboo falls in a whirlpool of water, and many men are looking on it, then it so happens that at one and the same time they have the notions of 'whirling', 'falling and 'entering'; hence if these were regarded as distinct classes, we would have a 'mixture' of classes (a cross-division).

In regard to 'throwing upward' &c., on the other hand we find no intermixture of notions. And it is for this reason that we regard these latter only as forming distinct classes, and thereby giving rise to notions of exclusion and inclusion; while as regards 'Coming out' &c., these notions are regarded as being due to the dintinct effects produced by them.

Question: *"How can there be distinct notions at one and the same time (with regard to the same object)? That is to say, if you hold that in the case of 'throwing upward' &c., just as we have no cross-division, so too we have no inclusion of many actions,—then we ask how, with regard to one and the same action (the falling of the leaves in the whirl-pool), people could have such distinct notions as those of 'whirling' 'falling' and 'entering'?"*

To the above we make the following reply: What you say is not quite correct; as the different actions are due to the difference in the conjunctions and disjunctions of the whole object and its parts, with distinct points in space.

[Page 294]. *That is to say the person, who will be looking on the object and will perceive the gradually appearing and disappearing conjunctions and disjunctions of its parts on several sides of it with the points of space, will have the notion of 'whirling' with regard to it; while one who observes only the disjunction of the object as a whole from the points of space above, and its conjunction with those below it, will have the notion of 'falling' with regard to it; while lastly he who observes its conjunction with the inner part of the whirlpool, and its disjunction from the outer parts, will have the notion of 'entering.' And thus it is established that the distinct notions that we have with regard to 'Coming out' &c., are due to the difference in the effects produced by them. Hence it is that we regard the distinct notions with regard to 'throwing upwards' &c., to be due to distinct 'classes', while those with regard to 'Coming out' and the like to be due to the difference of these effects.*

Commentary.

"Conscious" action is that which is preceded by a certain effort on the part of one to whom the action belongs; and 'unconscious' action is that which is not preceded by any such effort. In such substances as the parts of the body and the stick &c., in contact therewith, or in substances other than these, whatever action appears, which is not preceded by any effort or consciousness on the part of any person, has to be regarded as a form of 'going.'

An *objection* is raised: "You have declared that there are five classes of Actions, in the form of 'Throwing upward' and the rest; but this is not right, as all these actions do not in any way differ from 'going.' To explain further,—In regard to 'Throwing upward' we have the notion of the thing *going up*, and in the case of 'Throwing downwards' that of its *going down*; and so on, which leads us to conclude that all these are only different forms of 'Going?"

Reply: What you say is not right; *as we are distinctly conscious* &c., &c. That is to say, in the case of the cow, we find that we have a notion inclusive of all cows, and also a notion exclusive of all other animals, the horse &c.; and this leads us to assume the *class* 'Cow;' and in the same manner, in regard to 'throwing upwards,' also we have an inclusive notion with regard to such actions, and another notion exclusive of all other kinds of action, and as such we are fully justifying in assuming the *class* 'Throwing upward.' This is easy to understand.

Then the author proceeds to show that there is, in the case of these five classes of actions, a difference of their characteristic marks also. [The word '*api*' is to be construed next to the word '*karyārambhāt*.'] The word '*upalakshaṇa*' is here used in the sense of that which markes the individual; and this mark is the one that is imprinted by the *class* to which the individual belongs. What the author means is that in regard to the actions in question we have not only distinct exclusive and

inclusive notions as establishing distinct *classes*, but also a difference in the effects produced by each class of these actions,—these effects being in the form of conjunctions and disjunctions with different points in space, as expressed by the prefixes '*ut*' &c. Some people explain the word '*upalakṣaṇa*,' in the present passage as meaning 'signification'; the meaning in this case being, that the words '*utkṣēpaṇa*,' '*avakṣēpaṇa*' &c., have distinct *significations*; and as such each one of these must be regarded as distinct. If all of these were identical then 'Throwing Downward' also would, like 'Throwing upward,' be the cause of conjunctions and disjunctions with points of space above (and this is not really the case.)

Page 295]. Another *objection* is raised: "If in the case of 'Throwing upward' &c., distinct classes are accepted on account of our having inclusive and exclusive notions with regard to them, then, in as much as we have such notions with regard to such actions as 'Coming out,' 'Entering' and the like, we must regard these latter also as constituting distinct classes; and in that case, the restriction of the number of Action-classes to five only would not be right. If the difference of our notions with regard to the latter set of actions be regarded as due to the difference in the effects produced by them, then the same may be said to be the case with 'Throwing upward' and the rest also.

Reply: If we regard 'coming out' &c., as distinct classes then we shall have a 'Cross-Division'; *i. e.*, the anomaly of one and the same action belonging to various mutually contradictory classes. This the author proceeds to explain further—In a case where a man goes out of one room into the other, with regard to this same man and the same action, the man in the room from which he has gone has the notion of his 'going out,' while another man in the room wherein he goes has the notion of his 'coming in.' And if

these notions of 'coming in' and 'going out' were due to distinct *classes*, then we would have the absurdity of one and the same action (the 'going' of the man) being included in two such contraditory classes as 'Coming in' and 'Going out.' But when the two observers are behind a curtain, and on the curtain being removed they find that the man is not in the room where he was before, the only idea that they have is that of his having 'gone,' and not that of 'coming in' or 'going out.' Hence we conclude that the action in question is a form of 'going' only; and as for the difference in the idea that we have, this must be regarded as due to the difference in the attendant circumstances (the effects produced, and so forth). Another instance is cited—that of the *whirlpool*.

The following question is raised—"How could there be notions of many actions with regard to one and the same substance,—when in any one substance, there cannot be more than one action, at one and the same time?'

And in answer to this the Author says—The *different notions* etc. This is easily understood. When the actions of the component parts are found to bring about conjunctions and disjunctions of the sides of the object, we have the notion of 'whirling'; and the difference in the effects produced in regard to the object as a whole, gives rise to the notions of 'falling' and 'entering?

Page 296] Text (144): Question: "*Is the class 'going' identical with the class 'Action,'? or, is it a distinct class*"?

Wherefore does this question arise in your mind?

"*In regard to all such actions as Throwing Upwards*
"*and the like we have the idea of 'going' or 'motion'*
"*in the same way as we have that of 'Action'; and*
"*from this it seems that the two are identical;*
"*and in as much as we final 'going' or 'motion'*
"*mentioned separately, just like 'Throwing*

"*Upwards' and the like, it seems as if it formed*
"*a distinct class by itself.*"

Answer: *It is not so; because 'motion' is synonymous with 'Action.' Just as the classes 'Atmā' and 'Purusha' are identical, so are also 'motion' and 'Action.'*

Question: *In that case, why has 'motion' been mentioned separately?*"

Answer: *That mention is not useless; as it serves the purpose of including such actions as 'walking' and the rest. That is to say the name 'going' or motion is separately mentioned for the purpose of including such actions 'walking,' 'falling' 'flowing' and the like, which are not included in 'Throwing Upward' and the others that are mentioned. If it were not thus, then only the four actions mentioned specifically would have to be regarded as the objectives of those special names as well as of the general name ('Action').*

Or, we may regard 'going' as a distinct class by itself including only such actions as 'walking' and the like, which are the causes of conjunctions and disjunctions of diverse points of space. Then as for the application of the word 'going' to 'Throwing Upwards' &c., this must be regarded as secondary or indirect (or figurative),—being due to the fact of the character of being the cause of the conjunctions and disjunctions of their substrates being common among them.

Commentary.

The question having been put, the Siddhānti argues that the question is not reasonable, and then the opponent explains why the question arises:—"We have the notion of 'going' with "regard to all such actions as 'Throwing Upwards' and the like

"on account of all these consisting of some kind of *motion*,—"for instance, in regard to Throwing upward' we have the notion "this *goes up*,' 'this goes to the top'; and with regard to "throwing downward,' the notion 'this *goes down*,' this *goes* to "the bottom,' and so forth; and from this it would seem that the "action of 'going' is synonymous with the class 'Action'; "as it includes all the various kinds of Action. On the other "hand, we find *going* also mentioned as a specific form of "action, just like 'throwing upward' and the rest; and from "this it would seem that it forms a class distinct from 'Action' "as it is mentioned along with the sub-classes of Action."

The opponent having thus justified his question, the Sage replies—No such doubt should be entertained; as 'going' is synonymous with 'Action.' That is to say, just as the class 'Purusha' is synonymous with the class 'Ātmā,' on account of its including all particular ātmās, so, in the same manner, 'Going' is synonymous with Action.

Question: "If 'going' is synonymous with 'Action,' then why should the author have mentioned 'Going' separately, as a particular form of Action?"

Answer: In as much as 'walking' &c, are not included in any of the four, 'throwing upwards,' &c., they could not be classed under 'Action,' if 'Going' were not mentioned as a particular form of it; and in that case the name 'Action' would apply to those four only. As a matter of fact however 'walking' &c. are also usually known as 'actions'; and hence it is with a view to include these that the author has mentioned 'Going.'

Or, we may regard 'Going' as a distinct class; and as regards the question as to what actions are included under this class, the author says that it applies to 'walking &c.' which are the causes of conjunctions and disjunctions &c., &c.

Question:" How is it then that we have the notion of *going* with regard to 'throwing upwards' &c.'

Answer: The application of the word 'Going' to these must be regarded as secondary or figurative; and the ground of this secondary application lies in the fact that 'Going' brings about the conjunctions and disjunctions of its own substrate, exactly in the same manner as 'throwing upwards' and the other three do with regard to their own. It is on account of this similarity that the word 'going' is applied indirectly to those Actions.

Question: "On the strength of this similarity, why are the names 'throwing upwards' &c., not applied to 'Going'?" In answer to this we ask—how is it that, in the case of the initiated Boy and Fire, the similarity of *yellowness* and *redness* does not lead to the name 'Boy' being applied to the Fire? In answer to this you might urge that,—'We cannot assume indirect significations on the ground of causes; it is only when we have an indirect signification which we cannot otherwise account for, that we can assume or find out causes for such usage or signification."

Exactly the same arguments would serve our purposes also.

Text (145): *We proceed to explain the process of 'conscious' Action:—When one wishes to perform such acts as sacrifices, study, giving, land-cultivation and the like,—if he wishes to 'throw up' his hands or 'throw it down' then there arises an effort in the soul occupying the regions of the hand; and the 'contact of the soul and the hand,' aided by that effort and gravity, produces an action (motion) in the hand; and similarly in the case of the other limbs of the body, the leg &c., (V-i-1).*

Question: "*How is it with regard to the things connected with the hand &c?*"

Answer : *Taking up the stick, the man has the desire to 'throw it up' by means of the hand; then follows an effort on his part; and when this effort influences the contact of the soul with the hand, there appears in the hand the action of being 'thrown up' or raised; and simultaneously with this, there arises a like action in the stick, following from the contact of the hand and the stick, as affected by the said effort. (V-i-1, 2).*

Then again, when the stick has been thrown up to a certain point, the desire for throwing it up disappears; and there appears a desire to 'bring it down'; this is followed by an effort which, affecting the aforesaid contact, brings about the simultaneous bringing down of the hand and the stick; and the last of the series of downward motions of the stick brings about the particular kind of conjunction, called 'abhighāta', 'thumping' (or 'striking'), of the stick with the mortar; this conjunction influenced by the momentum set up in the stick produces in this latter an 'unconscious' action in the shape of an upward rebound. (V-i-3).

This last action and the aforesaid thumping set up in the stick a certain faculty or momentum; and by the help of this faculty, the contact of the hand with the stick produces in the hand also an 'unconscious' action in the form of the upward rebound. Even though the previous faculty (of the stick) is destroyed, (by the thumping) yet the contact of the stick and the mortar, being capable of producing a forcible action, becomes capable of producing and other faculty, by reason of the peculiar character of the contact. (V-i-4, 5).

Or, it may be that the previous faculty itself being forcible, continues to exist, not being wholly destroyed by the thumping. And hence when an object has a faculty present in it already there is no other faculty produced in the same; hence at the time when the thumping aided by the faculty produces in the stick the 'unconscious' action of the upward rebound, that same faculty helps the hand-stick contact to produce in the hand also the unconscious' action of the upward rebound. (V-i- 3 to 5).

Commentary.

The author means to say that he is now going to describe the process of conscious' action,—*i. e.*, such action as is preceded by an effort on the part of the human agent.

Being asked as to how it is, he proceeds to explain. When one wishes to perform any such action as a sacrifice and the like; when he wishes to raise his hand, then there ariss, in that part of the soul which occupies the regions of the hand, an effort; and by the instrumentality of this effort the hand-soul contact acts as the nonmaterial cause in bringing about an action in the hand. Even though there were an effort, if the object in question had no gravity, any *raising* or *bringing down* of it would be absolutely impossible; hence gravity also is mentioned as one of the causes.

So also in the case of other limbs &c. An action of the feet is produced by the instrumentaily of the effort of the soul occupying the regious of the feet; and the nonmaterial cause of this is the contact of the feet and the soul. The same may be said with regard to the production of action in other limbs of the body. In the production of an action of the body also, the body-soul contact is the nonmaterial cause, and the effort produced in the soul occupying the regions of the body the instrumental cause.

Quesiton: "How is action produced in things connected with the limbs of the body?"

Answer: Taking hold of the stick, when the man has the desire to raise it with his hand, this desire for the simultaneously raising of the hand and the stick produces an effort which is peculiarly fitted for bringing about the joint raising; and by the instrumentality of this peculiar effort, the hand-soul contact serves as the nonmaterial cause to bring about the raising of the hand; and simultaneously with this, by the instrumentality of the same effort, a similar action is produced in the stick also, by the hand-stick contact as the nonmaterial cause; the simultaneity of the two actions being due to the simultaneity in the operation of their causes.

Thus then when the stick has been raised to a certain point, the desire for raising it ceases; and there appears a desire for bringing it down; this is followed by an effort; which, like the effort in the case of *raising*, appears endowed with a double force; and by the instrumentalty of this peculiar effort, the hand-soul contact and the hand-stick contact serves as the nonmaterial causes in bringing about the bringing down of the hand, and that of the stick respectively. And the final action of the stick thus brought down in this case brings about the conjunction of the stick with the mortar—this conjunction being called '*abhighāta*,' or 'thumping;' and this thumping produces an 'unconscious' action in the stick, in the shape of an 'upward rebound,' by the instrumentality of the momentum imparted to the stick; and thus of this 'upward rebound' the momentum is the instrumental, and the stick the material, cause.

This action of the upward rebounding, through the thumping, produces in the stick a certain faculty, in the form of a force or momentum; and by the instrumentality of this force, the hand-stick contact serves as the nonmaterial cause in the bringing about in the hand also the action of upward

rebound, which is 'unconscious'—*i. e.*, not produced by any effort on the part of the human agent.

Objection: "The faculty that was produced in the stick by the action of bringing it down is destroyed by the thumping—*i. e.* by its striking the mortar; and in the absence of this faculty, how can the unconscious rebound of the stick produce any such faculty or force as has been described? There would be no auxilliary cause available."

Answer: Though the previous faculty is destroyed, the stick-mortar contact is capable of bringing about a 'forcible action'—*i. e.* an action capable of producing a faculty; and this is by reason of the peculiar nature of the contact.

[**Page 300.** *Question*: "What if it is so?"

Answer: That contact becomes capable of helping in the production of the faculty in question. In accordance with this view, the rebounding of the hand and the stick would come one after the other, and not simultaneously; and the notion of simultaneity would be due to the one following very soon after the other.

Another explanation is given: The previous faculty itself may be regarded as strong enough not to be destroyed by the *thumping*; that is, because of its having been brought about by peculiarly forcible causes, the faculty in the stick would not be destroyed by its coming into contact with a tangible object (in the shape of the *mortar*), and thus the previous faculty in the stick, which is already possessed of this faculty, being not destroyed, no other faculty is produced. At the time that the faculty helps the thumping to produce the unconscious action of upward rebound in the stick, there is also produced the unconscious upward rebound of the hand, by the instrumentality of the same faculty helping the hand-stick contact. In accordance with this view there would be an actual simultaneity between the rebounds of the hand and that of the stick.

Text (146): *We now proceed to explain the process of Motion in the case of things shot by the hand:*

When there arises in man a desire to take hold of the mace by his hand and hurl it, this is followed by an effort on his part; and by the instrumentality of this effort, from the aforesaid two contacts there arises stimultaneously in the hand and in the mace, the action of 'contraction' or 'drawing'. (V-i 1,2).

When the arm is extended again, the effort put forth towards the contraction ceases. After this there arises in the man a desire to throw the mace either horizontally or vertically, to a distance great or small; this is followed by an effort in accordance with this desire; and by the instrumentality of this effort, is brought about the hand-mace contact which is called 'nodana' or impulsion; and this 'nodana' brings about an action in the mace, in the form of 'impulsion' (V-i-9, 10).

This impulsion produces in the mace a certain faculty; and from these two, Impulsion and Faculty, a number of actions go on being produced until the mace is released from the hand. When this release makes the impulsion cease, and the faculty continues to produce a number of actions tending either upward or aslant, near or far,—according to the nature of the effort put forth by the person,—until the mace falls on the ground (V-i-17, 18).

Commentary.

Page 301]. The question having been put as to the manner in which action is produced in things shot by the hand, the author goes on to explain the process. The action of 'drawing'

appears, as without such withdrawing or contraction of the arm, there can be no *throwing*. The effort put forth in the drawing in of the arm and the mace ceases by reason of the appearance of another effort tending towards the contrary action of *expanding*. After the expansion, as the man wishes to throw the mace either upwards or aslant, to a great distance or to a point near at hand, so is also the effort put out by him. That is to say, if he wishes to show it aslant, he puts forth an effort to that end; if he wishes to throw up, he puts forth an effort tending to that; if he wishes to throw it to a great distance, he puts forth a great effort; and if he wishes to throw it to a point near at hand, the effort he puts forth is comparatively weaker. This is what is meant by the word '*anurūpa*' .....The contact of the hand with the man is called '*nodana*' because it is the cause of the simultaneous moving of the hand and the mace. From this '*nodana*' or Impulsion, as aided by the aforesaid effort put forth in accordance with the man's desire, there arises an action in the mace, and this action, through the impulsion, produces a faculty; and until the mace falls down, there continues to be produced a series of actions, by the force of and in accordance with this faculty.

Text (147): *We proceed to explain the process of Motion in the case of objects shot from certain instruments*

The man who is strong and has taken physical exercise, takes up the bow with his left hand; then taking with his right hand the arrow and applying it to the string of the bow, catches hold with his fingers the arrow alongwith the string,—and then there arises in his mind a desire to draw the bow along with the string and the arrow; this is followed by an effort on his part; and by the instrumentality of this effort, the hand-soul contact brings about in the hand the action of 'drawing';

and at the same time, by the instrumentality of the same effort, the hand-arrow-string contact brings about an action in the string and also in the arrow; and simultaneously with this again, by the instrumentality of the hand-arrow-string contact as qualified by the said effort, the contact of the strings with the two ends of the bow, produces two actions in the two ends of the bow. Thus the bow being drawn as far as the ear, there appears in the mind of the person the idea that it cannot be drawn further; and this idea destroys the effort that had been put forth for the purpose of drawing the bow. Then there follows a desire for releasing the bow; this is followed by another effort on the part of the person; and by the instrumentality of this effort, the soul-finger contact produces an action in the finger, which brings about a disjunction of the string from the fingers; from this disjunction follows the destruction of their contact; this contact having been destroyed, as there is no longer any obstruction to the operation of the elasticity of the bow, which now makes the circular bow revert to its original condition; and by the instrumentality of this force of elasticity, the bow-string contact produces an action in the string and in the arrow. This action, by the instrumentality of its own cause, produces a faculty in the string; and by the instrumentality of this faculty, the arrow-string contact brings about an 'impulsion'; and thence the first action in the arrow, by the instrumentality of this impulsion, produces a faculty or force in the arrow. From this faculty as helped by the impulsion, follows a series of motions which

continue to appear until the arrow becomes disjoined from the arrow. This disjunction having put a stop to the impulsion, the further series of actions (motions) of the arrow is due to the faculty or force (momentum) imparted to it; and these motions continue until the arrow falls on the ground.

Question: "*How is it that so many motions appear, one after the other?*"

Answer: *It is due to the fact of there being many conjunctions. In the interim (between the impulsion and the falling on the ground) there is a single faculty (momentum) produced; as the action (productive of the faculty) is not accompained by its auxilliaries. (V-i-1, 2, 17, 18, 18)*

Commentary.

A man who has performed regular exercise with the bow takes up the bow in his firm grasp; and having applied the arrow to it &c.,.....and then a desire appears in him in the form:—'May I draw this bow along with the string and the arrow.'.....All these actions, in the arrow &c, are simultaneous, because of the simultaneity of the operation of their causes. When the bow has been drawn as far as the ear, the man has the idea that his hand cannot go any further; and this idea puts an end to the effort that he had put forth for the drawing of the bow... .....The disjunction of the fingers is from the arrow and the string:—this disjunction puts an end to the contact of the fingers with the arrow and the string; ... .The action produced in the arrow and the string, by the instrumentality of its own cause—*i. e.*, through the contact of the bow and the string—produces in the string the faculty or force of speed or momentum. Through this faculty the contact of the arrow with the string brings about the impulsion which becomes the cause of the combined motion of the string

and the arrow. Through this impulsion the first action in the arrow produces a faculty; which faculty, aided by the said impulsion, brings about a series of actions continuing until the arrow falls down, by reason of the exhaustion of the force that counteracts the action of gravity.

An objection is raised:—"Beginning from the moment that the arrow becomes disjoined from the string (till the arrow falls) there appear many actions, one after the other; but from whence do you derive this assumption? Why do not you assume the whole thing to be due to a single action?"

Reply: It is a well known fact that an action continues till the next contact (resulting from it) is brought about; and when the arrow has been shot, we find that in the interval (between the leaving of the arrow and its falling on the ground) many contacts have appeared; and hence we assume that there are many actions (which are the direct cause of the contacts).

The faculty produced during the interval is one only; as it is only when an action is aided either by impulsion or by striking, that it produces a faculty, and never by itself alone; as in mere action there is no speed; and as a matter of fact we find that during the interval in question, there is neither impulsion nor striking; and hence the only one faculty produced is that which proceeds from the action of the arrow as influenced by the contact of the arrow with the string; and it is this peculiarly forcible faculty that continues till the falling of the arrow; and as the active efficiency of this faculty goes on diminishing, the consequent actions become weaker and weaker; and it is thus that we have many actions, just in the same manner as the fruits of the young tree go on improving, while those of the old one go on deteriorating.

Text (148): *Thus have we described the 'conscious' and 'unconscious' actions of things under the guidance of the soul. In the four external substances, not guided by the soul, we have only 'unconscious' action; and this is in the form of 'motion' proceeding from impulsion and such other causes. 'Impulsion' is that particular kind of conjunction which is brought about by the instrumentality of gravity, fluidity, speed and effort, functioning either collectively or singly; (impulsion is a kind of conjunction, as) it is the cause of that action which brings about the non-disjunction (of the impeller from the impelled); as we find in the case of Earth in the shape of clay* (V-ii-1, 12).*

Commentary.

In the case of the four substances not guided by the specific relationship of any particular Soul, the only action possible is that of 'Motion' brought about without any effort on the part of an intelligent being; and there are no such actions as 'Throwing Upwards' and the rest enumerated above.

Page 304.] It has been declared that in the said four elements, action is produced by impulsion &c.; and the question arises—"What is this *Impulsion*?" The answer is that Impulsion is that particular kind of conjunction which &c., &c.

Question: "How do you know that Impulsion is a kind of conjunction"?

Answer: Impulsion is the cause of that action which brings about the non-disjunction of the impeller from the impelled (and hence it must be regarded as a *Conjunction*). That is to say, it is only by means of the Conjunction in the form of *Impulsion*, that the impeller impels the impelled; and it is for this reason that it is called 'Impulsion' '*Nodana*.'

Question: Where do you find Impulsion to be the cause of Action?"

* *Yathā pakākhyāyām prithivyām* apparently forms part of this paragraph; though it has been printed along with the next.

Answer: We find it in the case of the clayey earth; that is to say, we find that when a small piece of stone is gently put upon a lump of clay, it gradually disappears into the clayey lump; and in this case the impulsion is in the form of the conjunction of the stone and the clay, brought about by gravity (weight of the stone). In a case where the lump of clay is struck with great force from a distance by the piece of stone, we have impulsion in the form of Conjunction brought about by gravity, effort and speed. And lastly, when the clay is struck by water, we have Impulsion in the shape of Conjunction brought about by all the four causes (gravity, fluidity, effort and speed.)

Text (149): *'Abhighāta' or 'Striking' is that particular kind of conjunction which is produced by speed, and which is the cause of that action which brings about disjunction. From this also there arises action in the four elementary substances. As for instance, when such things as the stone and the like fall upon a solid body. When the clayey earth is impelled and struck by the feet,—the conjunction that follows from 'impulsion' and 'striking,' either singly or conjomtly, is of the nature of 'samyuktasamyoga' ('conjunction with the conjoined'); and this conjunction also produces actions in the earth &c. (V-ii-1, 12).*

In those points in space also that are neither impelled nor struck, actions are produced. In the case of earth and water, when there is no conjunction, effort or speed counteracting the effects of gravity, there is a 'going down' of the object, caused by gravity; as we have described in the case of the stick and the body &c. In the case of these things, the first action (towards falling) is due to gravity, and the subsequent ones to gravity and faculty (produced by the motion). (V-i-7 18; V-ii-3).

Commentary.

Page 305.] *'Abhighāta' or 'striking' is that conjunction &c., &c.* That is to say, that action which brings about the disjunction of the object striking from the object struck at has for its cause a certain 'conjunction'; and to this conjunction we give the name of '*Abhighāta*' or '*Striking*', and by this also there are produced actions in the four rudimentary elements. *As for instance, when the piece of stone &c., &c.*

That Impulsion is the cause of the action that brings about the mutual non-disjunction, and not of that which brings about disjunction—we have already explained; as also that striking is the cause of that action which brings about mutual disjunction. And the author now proceeds to explain '*Samyuktasamyoga*,' '*Conjunction with the conjoined*': *When the clayey &c.* When the earth is impelled by the feet at any one point, then those other points also that are neither impelled nor struck, are found to have actions (motions) produced in them (by that impulsion); and the cause for the production of these actions lies only in the conjunction of these other points with certain other points that are in direct contact with the points impelled and struck. In a case where the striking object having struck the earth, carries it a little lower, and then turns back upwards,—the action that is produced in another point of the earth is due to a 'conjunction of the conjoined' that is due to both (Impulsion and Striking).

The author next proceeds to describe how Gravity produces actions:—*In the case of Earth and Water &c.* That is to say, in the case of the stick, when there is no hand-contact present to counteract the effects of gravity, the stick falls down; and this falling down is due to gravity; in the same manner when there is no effort on the part of the man to hold his body erect—an effort that would counteract the effects of gravity,—the body falls; and so also does the arrow fall when it has no speed (or momentum); and all this is due to gravity. In these cases

however it is only the first action towards falling, that is directly due to gravity; and as for the rest of the series of actions ending with the falling,—they are due to the faculty or force set in motion by that first action; and thus these must be regarded as brought about by Gravity and by Faculty; as each one of these by itself has been found elsewhere to be productive fo actions.

Text *(150)*:—*When water in the form of a current moves from a certain place downwards, this action is called 'Flowing'; and it is due to Fluidity.*

Question: "*How so?*"

Answer: *(Before the water flows) its inherent fluidity is kept in check by its contact all round with the high earth-banks; and as for the fluidity of its component particles those that are in direct touch (with the banks),—that also is kept in check by the same contact, by reason of its inhering in the same substrate (with this contact); and the fluidity of the other particles is checked by the 'contact of the conjoined.' When however, there is the slightest breach in the surrounding embankment, then, though the fluidity of the whole volume of water is still kept in check on all sides, and hence it does not become active, (begin to flow) yet the fluidity of the particle in direct contact with the opening becomes active; and this activity is transfered gradually to the fluidity of the other particles also, as the obstruction goes on disappearing; there is a gradual moving of these particles in conjunction with one another, and the original volume of water having been destroyed (by the destruction of its co-hesive*

conjunction), the water particles adhering to one another produce another, an elongated substance (an elongated volume of water); and in this fresh substance the quality of fluidity is produced in accordance with the similar quality in its originative component particles. And thus when these originative component particles continue to move in conjunction, there is produced a like action in the composite whole also; and to this action we give the name of 'Flowing.' (v-ii-4).

Commentary.

The author proceeds to explain how fluidity produces action:—The moving down or flowing of water from the upper to the lower surface of the earth is action produced by fluidity.

Being asked as to how this comes about, the author proceeds to explain. The water being hemned in on all sides by an embankment of earth, its inherent fluidity is held in check; and hence there is *flowing* of the water. As for the fluidity of the component particles of water, that belonging to the particles touching the embankments, is checked by reason of its inhering in the same particles that form the substratum of that contact; and that belonging to the other particles is checked by reason of these partieles being in contact with particles in direct contact with the embankments; and so on.

When, however, there is a slight breach in the embankment, though in the begining, there is no flowing activity of the whole volume of water,—because its dimensions are large, and it is hemened in by an embankment of larger dimensions, and a large volume could not move out of the small opening in the banks,—yet the particle of water in proximity to the breach is enabled to move out by reason of its small volume; and when this particle has moved out, it removes the obstacle to, and makes room for, the functioning of the fluidity of the other particles. And thus there is moving of the water particles in

contact with one another; the particle near the embankment is the first to move; then the particle that is close to it; and then that which is in contact with this latter; and so on, all the particles move on. Though when moving, these particles do not move from their respective places, yet when they move they do so in such a manner as to remain in contact with one another. This is what is meant by their *moving in conjunction*; which does not mean that they have their previous contacts undisturbed; because we find the shape changed. Thus then, the previous contacts having been destroyed, the substance—the original volume of water as a whole—becomes destroyed; and the particles adhering to one another produce an elongated substance; and in this substance fluidity is produced in accordance with the fluidity of its component particles. Thus, when the component particles move out in close adherence to one another, a like action is set in the composite whole, which thus, by reason of its fluidity, flows out.

And thus we find that when fluidity is produced in the new volume of water, and the component particles move out in a continuous line, not deviating from their original position in the volume, the fluidity of the whole volume produces in it an action which is called 'Flowing.'

Text (151):—*Action produced by faculty we have already described in the case of the arrow &c. And similarly, in the case of such things as the potter's wheel and the like, we find that the component particles undergoing a series of conjunctions and disjunctions with definite points of space on its sides, there is produced, in the wheel as a whole, an action, produced by faculty, by the instrumentality of conjuctions and disjunctions with points of space not restricted to a single place; and this action is what is called 'Bhramaṇa,' 'Revolving.' Such are the particular forms of 'Going' or 'Motion'.*

Commentary.

The word '*tathā*' stands in need of a corresponding '*yathā*'; hence the construction of the sentence is—'*as* in the case of the arrow, *so* in that of the wheel &c., &c.'

This the author proceeds to explain.....The conjunctions and disjunctions of the wheel as a whole are not restructed to any particular points of space; as it moves on all sides. The process is thus:—The contact of the turning stick produces an action (motion) in the wheel as a whole; and the subsequent actions are produced by the faculty that is produced by impulsion, striking, and Actions; and thus the speed (or momentum) producing the first action in the wheel-particle in direct contact with the stick, the action of the other particles is due to their contact with the particle which is in contact with the stick; and the subsequent actions of the former particle are due to the faculty, impulsion and striking; and those of the others are produced by faculty, as also by the contact of the particle which is in contact with the stick; when the stick is removed, the continuance of the motion is due to faculty only.

The author finally sums up the various kinds of 'going' or 'Motion'.

Page 308] Text 152:—*Action is produced in the Air called 'Breath' by the Soul-air contact, by the instrumentality of efforts originating from desires and aversions; and this we learn from the fact of the 'breathing' of the waking man following the bent of his desire, and that in the sleeping man being due to the instrumentality of the effort involved in the mere act of 'living.' (v-ii-12).*

Ākāça, Time, Space and Soul—though having the character of 'substance'—are devoid of action (motion;) because like Generality &c., these

are incorporeal. 'Corporeality' implies a non-pervading (limited) dimension; and action is concomitant with corporeality; hence as corporeality is absent in Ākāça &c.; they have no actions (v-ii-21; II-i-21.)

Commentary.

In the case of the different kinds of Breathing—*Rēcaka* &c.,—we find the action of breathing regulated by the will of the man; when dust gets into our nostrils, we breath out with a force in order to blow out the dust; this breathing follows from aversion; and from these facts we are led to the conclusion that breathing is produced by effort.

In the case of the sleeping man, the action of breathing must be regarded as following from the air-soul contact, by the instrumentality of the effort involved in the mere act of living; and in proof of this we have the following argument: The breathing of the sleeping man is a product of effort,—because it is an action of breathing,—like the breathing of the waking man. The breathing of the sleeping man could not be due to desire or aversion; as these are not present in the sleeping man; hence we conclude that it must be due to the mere act of 'living'; as the act of holding life is due to that.

A question having been raised as to why nothing has been said with regard to action (motion) in *Ākāça*, Time, Space and Soul, as in the four elements (Earth &c.),—the author says:—Action is always accompained by corporeality; and as this latter is not present in *Ākāça* &c,, these could have no action.

Text (153): *In the mind that is in the body, there is an action, during the waking state of the man, for bringing about the contact of another organ of*

perception; and this action is brought about by the mind-soul contact, through the instrumentality of efforts proceeding from desires and aversions; this fact we infer from the fact that the perception of different objects by the different organs follows the bent of our wishes. During the sleeping state, the action of the mind at the moment of waking is produced through the instrumentality of effort due to the mere act of living. (v-ii-14).

The action of 'apasarpaṇa' or 'out-going' and also that of 'upasarpaṇa' or 'Incoming,' of the mind, proceeds from mind-soul contact, through the instrumentality of the unseen agencies (of dharma *and* adharma).

Question: *'How so?"*

Answer: *Life has for its auxiliaries* dharma and adharma; *and when these have become exhausted by actual experience, or when they have been suppressed by each other,—the Life being deprived of its auxiliaries and also of the effort due to these, the Breathing becomes stopped; and the mind becomes separated from the dead body by mind-soul contact, through the instrumentality of a fresh set of dharma and adharma set into activity; and that action of the mind which brings about this separation is what is called* 'apasarpaṇa' *or 'Outgoing.' Then the mind going out of the body comes into contact with the transportive or etheric body (of the soul) produced by the same dharma and adharma; and while in this body, it proceeds to heaven or to hell, and there comes into contact with a body that appears in accordance with the residual tendencies (of the soul's past*

deeds), and the actions of the mind that bring about this last contact is what is called 'upasarpaṇa' or 'Incoming' Of this same kind are the out going and incoming of the mind of Yogis, which is thrown out by them and transported for a time to any desired place. Similarly too, the action of the mind that brings one into touch with the new body at the time of action, is also brought about by the unseen agencies (of dharma and adharma (v-i -17).

In the same manner those actions that we find appearing in the rudimentary elements are produced, and for which we cannot find any cause either by sense-perception or by inference, and which are yet found to be useful or harmful to us,—must be regarded as produced by these unseen agencies. For instance, the action in the atoms at the begining of creation, the upward motion of fire, the horizontal motion of Air, and the moving of the elements, the going of the consecrated stone to the place of the thief, and the attraction of iron by the magnet. (v-ii-2, 13, 12, 17, 7).

Commentary.

.....In the waking state we find that we never have any sensuous perception except those that are in keeping with our wish ; that is to say, we see colour only when we have the wish that we should perceive colour ; and so on with Taste and other things ; and as a matter of fact we know that the extenal organs of perception have no perceptive power without the connection and help of the internal organ ; consequently we conclude that the action of the mind, whereby it comes in contact with the external organs, proceeds from effort, due to certain desires and aversions of the person.

Page 310]. When the man is sleeping, then at the time of waking there is an action in the mind, for the purpose of bringing about its contact with other organs ; and this action must be regarded as proceeding from the mind-soul contact, through the instrumentality of the effort due to the act of living.

'Living' consists in a particular kind of mind-soul contact ; and this contact, in bringing about its effects, is aided by *dharma* and *adharma* ; hence when these two are exhausted and cease to produce effects, either by reason of all the results having been duly experienced, or by that of the two having nullified each other,—then, the said contact becomes deprived of these aids, and hence also of the efforts due to these aids ; and then there is a cessation of the action of breathing ; the body falls dead ; and at this point of time there are set in to activity such *dharma* and *adharma* as are to have their results experienced during the coming life ; that is to say; that set of *dharma* and *adharma* which did not bring about its results during the past life on account of the body of the soul during that life being framed with a view to the experiencing of the results of a distinct set of *dharma* and *adharma* ; but when these latter have become exhausted, then it is only natural that the other set of *dharma* and *adharma* should become active which is to have its results experienced by means of another body ; as now there is nothing to obstruct this activty of the new set. The mind-soul contact now being aided by this fresh set of *dharma* and *adharma*—which is totally distinct from that which regulated the experiences of the previous body,—the mind becomes separated from the deal body ; and the action of the mind that brings about this separation is called 'Out-going.' Thus then, in the production of this action of 'out-going,' the mind-soul contact is the non-material cause, the mind the material cause, and the newly active set of *dharma* and *adharma* the instrumental cause.

After this, the mind having gone out of the dead body, it becomes joined to an etheric body, which is the effect of the same *dharma-adharma* ; and along with this etheric body it goes to heaven or to hell, and there becomes joined to bodies in accordance with the residual tendencies of the man's deeds. That is to say, the body that the soul takes in heaven or in hell must be connected with his mind ; otherwise there could be no experiences in those regions ; and as the mind is not omnipresent like the soul, it could not become connected with these other bodies, without actually *going out* to them ; then again, its going to such a distance would not be possible by itself ; as the mind without a body cannot possibly have any action except during the state that follows immediately after Universal Dissolution ; hence it is for this reason that we assume the existence of a subtile and inperceptible body which is close to the dead body, and which is produced from atoms, upwards, set into motion by the unseen agencies ; and as this body serves to transport the mind from the dead body to the regions of heaven or hell &c., it is called the 'transportive' body. In support of our view we may put forward the following argument. :—

Between death and the next brith, the action of the mind must be such as is due to its contact with a body,—because it is an action of the mind other than that at the point of time immediately after the Great Dissolution,—like the action of the mind in the body that we see. This view is also supported by the scriptures.

Page 311]. The action then that brings about the contact of the mind with this other body is called '*Upasarpaṇa*' or 'In-coming' ; which thus comes to be that action of the mind whereby it becomes joined to fresh bodies produced in heaven or hell.

Of the yogis &c., &c......Then again, the action of the mind that brings it into the other body at the

next birth of the soul, is due to unseen agencies ; so also are the actions of the rudimentary elements &c., &c., &c., &c. For instance,..... .....the Vibration *of the elements*—e. g. the motion of the Earth ; when a person is being examined for theft, a stone over which certain *mantras* have been pronounced, actually moves to him (if he is really the thief).....all this is due to unseen agencies.

Fix in your hearts the great truth that Action is the cause of the obtaining of the desirable, and the avoiding of the undesirable, experiences. ! !

CHAPTER VII.

On Sāmānya—Community.

Text (154): *Community is of two kinds—'higher' and 'lower.'*

It pervades over all its objectives ; has identically the same form (in all cases) inhering in many individuals ; it brings about the idea of its own form in one, two or many things ; and it is the cause or basis of the notion of inclusion, inhering as it does in all its substrates simultaneously.

Question : "*How so ?*"

Answer : *It is so because as a matter of fact we find that when we cognise each individual objects as belong simultaneously to a particular class, and we have such cognitions repeatedly, then there is produced in our minds an impression ; and when in view of this impression we review those past cognitions, we come to recognise a certain factor that inheres in every one of the objects cognised ; and it is this factor that constitutes the Community.* (I-ii-3).

The Community of 'Being' is the highest; in as much as it is the cause of inclusive cognitions only. In the case of a number of totally different things, such, for instance, as pieces of leather, of cloth, of blanket and so forth,—if all of them are possessed of the same quality of 'blueness,' with regard to each one of these we have the notion that 'it is blue'; and in the same manner, in the case of the totally different categories, Substance, Quality and Action, we find that with regard to each one of them we have the notion that 'it exists;' and this all-inclusive notion could not but be due to something apart from the three categories themselves; and this something is what we called 'Sattā' or 'Being.' And it is by reason of the presence of 'being' that we have the inclusive notion of a number of things as 'existing'; hence this 'Being' cannot but be regarded as Community. (I-ii-4, 7 to 10, 17).

The Lower Communities are, the classes of 'Substance' 'Quality' 'Action' and so forth. As these give rise to inclusive as well as exclusive notions, they are regarded as Communities as well as Individualities. For instance 'Substance' is a Community, in as much as it serves as the basis of an inclusive notion with regard to such mutually different things as earth, water and the like; and it is an Individuality in as much as it serves as the basis of notion exclusive of Qualities and Actions. Similarly 'Quality' is a Community by reason of its giving rise to a notion including all qualities such as colour and the rest; and it is an individuality, on account of its serving as the basis of a notion exclusive of substances and actions. In the same manner, 'Action' is a Community by reason of its serving as the basis of a notion inclusive of all the several actions of 'Throwing Upwards' and the rest, and it is an individuality, in as much as it is exclusive of qualities and actions.

In this same manner, in the case of such Communities as 'Earth' 'Colour,' 'Throwing Upwards' 'Cow,' 'Jar' 'Cloth' and so forth,—which inhere in animate and inanimate beings,—we find that they serve as the basis of inclusive as well as exclusive notions; and as such these also are Communities as well as Individualities, Such classes however as 'Substance,' 'Quality' and 'Action' include many individuals; and as such they are primarily regarded as Communities; and it is only indirectly or secondarily that they are regarded as Individualities, by reason of their serving to exclude their substrates from other similar Communities. (I-ii-5).

Commentary.

May the High-souled Brahmā, Vishnu and Mahēswara, the causes of the origin the continuance and destruction of the universe,—be ever victorious!

The author proceeds to describe Community: *It is of two kinds &c.*—these we have already explained before in the section wherein these several categories to be mentioned by name.

Some people hold that all Communities are all-pervading; and with a view to deny this view the author proceeds to explain the nature of Community.

Page 313.] *It pervades over all its objectives.* When a certain Community resides in a certain object, this latter becomes its 'objective'; and over all such objectives it pervades. That the Community does not exist in all things (its

objectives as well as other things) is proved by the simple fact of its not being perceived to be so.

It has identically the same form—that is to say; the form in which it resides in one object is the same in which it resides in another object also; and that such is the case is proved by our having exactly the same notion of the Community in both cases. Then again, the fact of the Community inhering by the same form in many objects can be proved by our own experience. Nor can there be any incongruity in this, when it is distinctly cognised by some means of right knowledge; in fact we find such things as 'duality' and the rest inhering in many objects at one and the same time.

It might be argued that if such were the case then there would be no difference between Duality &c. and Community. And in order to remove this misconception the author adds,—*It brings about the idea of its own form &c, &c.* For instance, whether we see a single cow, or two cows or many cows, we have the notion of the "cow" in all cases. Such however is not the case with Duality &c. (Each of which exist only in a definite number of objects).

Thus the definition of 'Community' comes to be this:—*That which, while inhering in many objects, brings about the idea of itself in one, two or many objects,—is 'Commuuity.'* This the author proceeds to explain:—*And it is the cause or basis* &c., &c. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the form that is in one object is present in another object also; and hence the Community comes to be the cause of the inclusive notion of the sameness of its form inhering as it does, in exactly the same form, in a number of objects, simultaneously—*i.e.*, when it subsits in one, it subsists also in the other.

A question having been put as to how it is known that Community inheres in many objects at one and the same time, the Author explains:—*When we cognise &c* That is to say, having cognised the Community as subsisting in one object, when at

some future time, we happen to see another object and find the same generality in it, recognise it to be the same as the one cognised in the previous object,—then we distinctly recognise the fact of the Community inhering in many objects. And as this is a distinctly perceptible fact, it sets aside all notions to the contrary.

The author now proceeds to describe separately the Higher and Lower Communities spoken of above:—*The Community of 'Being' is the highest &c., &c* Even though 'Being' is distinctly perceived, yet there are some people who deny that they perceive any such thing; hence for such people the author brings forward an inferential argument:—*In the case of a number of totally different things &c., &c.* This is quite clear; the argument being thus stated formally:—The inclusive notion that 'it exists,' which we have with reference to substance &c., must be regarded as based upon the cognition of something apart from these things themselves,—because we find a common inclusive idea extending over different things,—like the notion of 'blue' with regard to the leather, the cloth &c. And as 'Being' serves to bring about only the inclusive notion of substance &c., and not any notions of exclusion, it must be regarded as a Community only, and not an Individuality.

Page 314.] *The Lower Communities are the classes of 'Substance' &c., &c.* and these are the cause of notions of inclusion as well as exclusion.....

Question: "Are the classes 'substance' and the rest then *in reality* Communities, or individualities, or both?"

Answer: Such classes as substance &c., include many individualities &c., &c. That is to say, the word '*Sāmānya*' indicates the character of *being common*; and as the classes of 'substance' &c., have this character of being common to many individuals, the name '*Sāmānya*' or 'Community' applies to them exactly; as for the name '*Viçēsha*' or 'individuality'

however, this could not apply to them exactly; as a *Viçēsha* is that which distinguishes its substrate from all other things (and the classes in question do not distinguish any *one* of their substrates from *all* other things). For this reason it is only the name 'Community' that can apply to these classes, primarily; and the name 'individuality' is applied to them only secondarily or figuratively,—this application being based upon the similarity that the class, 'substance' &c, also serve to distinguish their substrate from the objects *of other classes*,—just as the *Viçēsha* distinguishes its substrate from all other things.

Text 155:—*That these Communities belong to a category distinct from Substance, Quality and Action, is proved by the fact of their having a character totally different from these latter. For this same reason too they are eternal. These again are different from one another, by reason of each of them residing in a different set of things,—substances, qualities and actions,—and also by reason of people having a distinct notion with regard to each of them.*

Each of these is regarded as one in all its substrates, because its character in all remains the same, and also because there are no marks of difference. Though Communities do not have their extension limited, yet they are regarded as extending over all their objectives; because of the definitely restricted character of the distinguishing features of the objects, and also because of the fact of these objects having definitely distinct causes of their own. As Communities do not exist, either by conjunction or by inherence, in the intervals (of space between two individuals of the same classes), they are not spoken of as existing (in those intervals) (I-ii-11 to 16).

Commentary.

Page 315.] *Objection.* "The *class* 'substance' is nothing distinct from the *individual* substance; and hence it is not proper to describe the functions of the two as if they were distinct."

In reply to this the author says—*That these Communities &c., &c.* That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the class 'substance' is cognisable by such cognitions as are inclusive or comprehensive in their character, while the *individual* substance is cognised by a cognition that is wholly exclusive in character; and in as much as this constitutes a difference in their character, the classes cannot but be regarded as belonging to a category distinct from that to which the individuals belong.

For the same reason is the class eternal. That is, in as much as the class is different from the individual, it must be eternal; if it were not so, it would be produced when the individuals are produced, and destroyed when these are destroyed (which is not found to be the case); this predicament is avoided when the two are regarded as distinct.

Some people hold the following view:

"The Community serves to bring about a comprehensive "or inclusive notion of diverse things. As a matter of fact, "in the case of each individual thing, it does not bring about "the cognition of two distinct entities,—one in the form of "Community and another in that of an individuality,—indepen- "dently of each other, as we have in the case of the man and "the stick; nor is there any relation of qualification "possible between the two entities; as it is not that, when ever "we see a cow, we have the idea that 'this is *qualified* by, "or possessed of, the general character of the *cow*'; in fact "the cognition that we have is that of the two being identical,

"in the form 'this is a cow'; an expression wherein the "general character of the *cow* is spoken of as identical with "the individual cow seen by the eyes; specially as the two "have no forms apart from each other. As for 'inclusiveness', "this is a character that belongs to the Community of the 'cow', "as also to all other Communities; and as for 'exclusiveness' "this belongs to the individual cow, as also to all other "individual things; but there is no doubt that the form of "the Community of 'cow' is distinct form the forms of "all other Communities; just in the same manner as the form "of the individual cow is different form the form of other in- "dividuals; and all this could not be possible unless the two "(the class 'cow' and the individual cow) were identical. Nor "is it possible for one and the same thing (the Community) to "be spoken of as the *form of* another thing, and also as "something only related to it; as anything that has no form "can have no relationship. Hence it must be concluded that "the real truth is that the generality and the individual are "both identical.

"It is this reasoning that serves also to prove the theory of "'difference-identity' (*i. e.* the theory that the two are different "as well as identical). For instance, just as we have the "cognition of the 'piebald cow', so also we have that of the "black cow.' Nor do we have any such notion to the "contrary, as that, 'it is the piebald one only that is a *cow*, "and not the black one'; in fact with regard to all cows "we have the same notion that 'this is a cow,' 'that is a cow,' "and so forth. And thus the Community 'cow' in the form "of the *piebald cow* being found in this cognition to be "identical with the *black cow*,—that Community comes to be "different from the individual piebald cow; specially as the "only point in which the Community differs from one individual "object is that it is identical with other individual objects also "(which the individual object is not); and the distinguishing

"feature of the Community also consists only in its being identical "with both (all) individual objects.

"*Objection*: 'To say that one and the same thing is both "different and non-different is a contradiction in terms.'

"*Reply*: It is not right for you, versed as you are in the "art of reasoning, to say this. That alone can be regarded "as contradictory and absurd which is not found to be in "keeping with the real state of things; and in regard to that "which is always in keeping with the nature of things as "cognised by the valid means of knowledge, the mention of "absurdity itself would be an absurdity.

Page 316] "*Objection*: 'We have nowhere else found "two things to be both different and non-different.'

"*Reply*: Is it necessary for sensuous perception to follow "in the wake of another perception, as it is in the case of "inferential cognition? Well, if it were so, then it would "be necessary to postulate an unending series of perception "after perception. If then, sensuous perception were to "operate by its own inherent capability, then the nature of a "thing must be accepted exactly as it happens to be perceived; "and this cannot be denied on the mere ground of its not "being seen elsewhere; as if this were to be negatived, then "all perceptions would become open to negation.

"Thus we conclude that Community is not only eter- "nal, but both eternal and transient; because it is pro- "ducible and destructible by the production and destruction of "individuals, and it continues in another individual (even on "the destruction of one individual)."

To the above arguments, we make the following reply:—

(1) Is the perception cognisant of the Community and the individual, exactly in the same form? (2) or is it cognisant of a non-difference between them? (3) Or, does it cognise them in different forms? In the case of the first alternative, there would be only one thing (and not two things in

the shape of the Community and the Individual); and it would not be that there are two things with one and the same form; as the non-difference of any two things only consists in their being cognised in one and the same form In the case of the second alternative, there is a self-contradiction; as the *cognition of difference* is nothing more than the *cognition of different forms*; and when such a cognition is possible, there can be no cognition of non-difference; and as such, how could you ever establish the non-difference of two different things? If it is asked—"how then have we the idea of non-difference"?—we reply—we can have no such idea in any way. Thus then, if we are cognisant of only one form, then there is a single thing, and not two things; and if both forms are cognised, then there is no possiblity of the cognition of non-difference. As for the universally accepted cognition of the 'cow' in regard to all cows, this must be attributed to the *inherence* (of all individuals in the same Community). In the case of *conjunction* there would be a distinct cognition of somesort of actual contact; while the character of *inherence* is such that in its case the two members related are perceived together in a single lump, just as we find in the case of the fire and the redhot ball of iron. The Community itself cannot be regarded as the form of the individuality; the fact is that though the two are really distinct, yet the individual is never perceived apart from the Community to which it belongs,—just as the plum in a ditch is not visible apart from the ditch; though the two are distinctly perceptible as different from each other; for instance, from a distance, even if we do not cognise the Community 'cow' we are cognisant of the individual cow; and even though any particular cow is not seen, we perceive the Community 'cow' in another cow that we see.

For these reasons we conclude that Community is something wholly different from the individual. Such is the process of reasoning adopted by the Logicians.

These again are different from one another &c., &c. The Communities of 'Substance' 'Quality' and 'Action' reside only in substances, qualities and actions respectively; and with regard to each of these we have a distinct cognition; for these reasons they must be regarded as distinct from each other.

It has been stated before that Community is of the nature of non-difference; and this same fact the author proceeds to prove by means of reasonings:—*Each of them is regarded as one &c., &c.* The word '*lakshana*' 'character' means that whereby a thing is distinguisted; hence, in the present instance, the notion of inclusion (a comprehensive notion of one Community as extending over many individuals); this comprehensive notion is found to be exactly the same in each individual of a Community; nor are there any 'marks' or reasons for regarding them as different in different individuals; and from these two facts it is clear that the Community is one and the same in all individuals that are included in it.

It has also been stated before that the Community inheres in all its objectives only, and not in any other thing; and the auther now proceeds to bring forward reasons in support of this:—*Though Communities &c.* As a matter of fact it is found that a Community is related to many individuals appearing at all sorts of places; and hence its extension is by no means limited; yet in as much its manifesting cause, in the shape of the peculiar shape of the objects included under it, is one of particular kind, the Community itself becomes restricted in its scope; and then again, by reason of the limited character of the causes productive of the objects, the Community inheres only in its objectives, and in all of these. That is to say, the Community of the 'cow' is manifested or rendered perceptible by a body which consists of the dewlap and such other limbs; and the Community of the 'horse' is manifested by the body consisting of the mein and so forth; the Community of the 'jar' is manifested by a body having a peculiarly shaped neck; all this we infer from the fact of our idea of such and such

things being restricted to such and such forms. These various kinds of bodies too are not found to be common to more than one class of objects; in fact each of them is restricted to one set of objects only; thus then, though every Community is capable of being connected with all such bodies as are its objectives, whenever and wherever such bodies might be produced,—yet it can inhere only in such an object as it happens to be endowed with the body manifesting that Community. In the same manner the scope of the Community would be limited by reason of the particular nature of the causes tending to produce that particular shaped body; for instance, such is the nature of the *yarns*, that in a thing produced out of these only the Community of 'cloth' can inhere; and such is the character of the *lump of clay* that the generality of the 'Jar' can inhere only in objects produced out of them.

Some people hold the following view:—"The Community being absolutely inactive, could never move from one place to another, and thereby become connected with different objects; hence in the case of an object that did not exist before, when it is brought into existence, the Community could not come to inhere in it; and yet as a matter of fact we find that whenever and wherever the individual object is produced the Community is always present in it; and this leads us to conclude that all Communities exist everywhere (are omnipresent or all-pervading)."

With a view to refute this view, the Author adds,—*As Communities do not exist either in conjunction &c., &c.* The 'interval' here spoken of may be either (1) *Ākāça*, or (2) the substance Space, or (3) Air not in motion, or (4) absence of corporeal substance; and in any of these the Communities do not exist either by conjunction or by inherence; nor is there any evidence for believing that they exist without any sort of relationship; consequently it is said that they do not exist in the 'intervals'; and yet they become connected with the

objects that happen to be brought into existence at these intervals,—this being due to the peculiar force of the causes. Conjunction comes about only when one object comes, from another place, and into contact with the other thing; or a thing remaining in its place could have conjunction with another thing that would move up to it. Inherence however is of a different character; and hence wherever the requisite causes are set going towards the producing of the object, there in that object we have the inherence of the Community which does not come from anywhere else, and yet which had no existence at that point of space before the appearance of the object; and this peculiarity we cannot take objection to; as we cannot object to the nature of things as they exist.

The *Bauddhas* hold that there is no such thing as 'Community'; as we are never actually cognisant of anything as inhereing in a number of individuals, in the manner of the thread passing through all the beads strung on it.'

But this is not right; because as a matter of fact we are cognisant of something that exist in all individual cows, and serves to distinguish them from all other animals, such as the horse and the like. If there were no such common character possessed by all the various kinds of cows, then one individual cow would be cognised to be as different from another individual cow, as it would be from an individual horse; or conversely, the cow and the horse would be regarded to be as like each other, as two individual cows; as there would be no difference in the two cases. As a matter of fact however, we find that all individual cows are perceived to be alike; and this distinctly points to a certain factor which is present in all cows, and is not present in horses and other animals; specially as this factor is found to serve one and the same useful purpose (that of differentiating the cow from other animals), and as it has one and the same cause (in all cases).

It might be argued that the unity is that of the *individual* cows. But this is not possible ; as if there were no *Community*, there could be no unity either among the Individuals, or of the causes of these Individuals ; as all these are distinct from one another. Then again, if the unity were to be due to the mere unity of the cause, then there would be no sort of unity in the case of those individuals that have diverse causes. As a matter of fact however, we find that there are different causes for things of the same kind ; for instance, fire is produced from such diverse sources as the rubbing together of two pieces of wood, electricity, the rays of the sun falling on the *Sūryakānta* gem and so forth. So also if unity of many things were due to the fact of their producing the same effect, then such unity would have to be admitted in the case of totally different objects ; for instance milk is found to be produced from the cow, as from the buffalo ; and thus the cow would be the same as the buffalo ; and the non-milch cow would not be a cow at all !

Then again, if there were no Community, what would be the object of denotation by a word ? The 'specefic individuality' of any thing could not be such an object ; as having a momentary existence and being excluded form all things, it could never form the object of any verbal convention (on which the denotations of words chiefly depend). Nor could the *vikalpa*, or 'determinate concrete qualification of a thing', be the object of denotation ; as this also has only a momentary existence, and is not common to any number of things. It might be argued that "the denotation of the word would be of the form of the 'concrete qualificatian." But in that case, is the 'form of the concrete qualification' something different from that 'qualification', or is it non-different from it ? If it is different, then is it common to all such qualifications ? or is different with each qualification ? If it is common to all, then it does not differ from what we call 'Community' ; and the only slight difference that there is between you and ourselves is that you regard this 'Community' to belong to the cognition,

while we attribute it to the object, on account of its being cognised as something outside of ourselves. If then, this form be regarded as distinct from the 'qualification', and changing with each cognition,—or even if it were non-different from the cognition,—in either case, it would not be capable of any verbal relationship ; as like cognition it would never form the object of any verbal convention.

It might be urged that, "what the 'concrete qualification' does is to indirectly impose its own external form on the cognition, and thus make it also concrete ; as it is only thus that the cognition could come into existence, and this externality of form would form the basis of the verbal relationship."

But in that case, the form of the concrete qualification externally imposed, having its character dependent upon a single thing (viz the qualification itself), would be destroyed as soon as it would be produced on the production of the 'concrete qualification'; and thus being cognised as undergoing destruction, it would be different with each 'concrete qualification'; and we have already shown that there can be no verbal convention with regard to any such thing as would differ with each individual.

Objection : "The 'concrete qualification' of the cow "imposes its appearance externally ; and the appearance imposed "by another 'concrete qualification would be similar to that "imposed by the former. The concrete qualifications too are com- "prehensive of their own forms only ; and as such they could "never lead to the apprehension of the difference among the forms "imposed by themselves ; as the apprehension of difference "depends upon the apprehension of both the members (between "whom the difference exists). Hence as this difference is not "apprehended, we come to look upon the forms imposed by the "concrete qualifications to be all one only ; and thus speak of "there being a single objective for all these qualifications. It is "this objective that constitutes the 'Sāmānya' or 'community';

"and this community is negative in its character, being "devoid of any absolute difference from the externally imposed "forms of the 'concrete qualifications'; and combining with "the four other factors—of (1) the 'specific individuality'; (2) the "cognition, (3) the form of the cognition, and (4) the imposed "form,—comes to be spoken of as '*ardhapancamākāra* (with a "four-and-a half-fold form); and having *externality* imposed upon "it, it becomes expressible by words, and thereby comes to be the "objective of the verbal relation. And it is the cognition of this "that consititutes the cognition of the 'specific individuality'; "and the form in which the community is imposed is that "of that individuality. This 'community' again has the character "of the *preclusion of all other things*; it has both positive and "negative forms, as is proved by such assertions as 'the cow is', "'the cow is not', and so with all other things; if the communi- "ty expressed by the word 'cow' were only in the positive form, "then we could not have the assertion 'the cow is'; as such "an assertion would be tautological (the idea of 'is' being con- "tained in the word 'cow' itself); nor could we have the "assertion 'the cow is not'; as this would be a contradiction in "terms (no negation being compatible with positive charac- "ter); similarly, if it had a purely negative form, the asser- "tion 'the cow is not' would be tautological, and that 'the "cow is' would be a contradiction in terms; as has "been declared in the following words:—'We cannot say that "the *jar exists*, as the jar is a real entity; nor can we say *the "jar does not exist*, as there is contradiction between *existence* "and *non-exsistence*'. It is for this reason that even distinct "individuals appear as one.

"This 'community' is the objective of all 'concrete quali- "fications'; and the singleness of this leads to the singleness of "these qualifications; and the singleness of these latter leads "to the singleness also of their origin in the shape of the "abstract unqualified cognitions that we have with regard to "each individual object; and this leads to the singleness of the

"origin of these abstract notions,—namely, the objects them- "selves. This has been thus declared:—'The cognition being "the cause, a single idea cannot be diverse; and as the cause "of a single cognition the individualities must be one".

To the above we make the following reply: The above reasoning is not sound; as it would seem that the Bauddhas give the name 'community' to the unity that is imposed by reason of the non-apprehension of the difference among the forms of the 'concrete qualifications,'—this non-apprehension being inferred from the fact of no other alternative being found to be possible. And on this point we have the following observations to make:—Does the 'imposition of non-difference' consist in the non-apprehension of difference among the forms? or does it consist in the apprehension of non-difference? The former could not be the case; as in that case the imposition of difference too would be as likely; that is to say, just as the differences among the forms of the concrete qualifications are not apprehended, so also is non-difference not apprehended; and hence just as nondifference is imposed by reason of the non-appehension of difference,—so in the same manner, would difference be imposed by the non-apprehension of non-difference; and thence there could be no usage based upon non-difference. Nor is the second alternative quite reasonable—viz: that the imposition of non-difference consists in the apprehension of non-difference. Because it is only when the *existence of the soul is admitted that a single perceiver can apprehend both difference and non-difference; when however, the existence of the soul is denied (as it is by the *Bauddha*), there can be no one observer of many things; speceally as the 'concrete qualifications' are each restricted to their own individual forms. Even though there be asingle observer of many things,—yet unless there be any ground for singleness, there can be no apprehension of non-difference among different things. In fact, even

*The reading '*abhāvādēkō*' does not afford any meaning, hence the translation adopts the reading '*ātmavādē*.'

if there were such an apprehension, it would be possible also in the case of such different forms as those of the cow, the horse and the buffalo; as there would be no difference in the character of the differences in the two cases.

Page 320.] *Objection*: "In the case of the forms of the cows, we have such a ground for singleness in the form of the *preclusion of non-cows.*"

Reply: What are the 'non-cows' the preclusion whereof imposes singleness on the form of cows? It might be urged that those animals that are not cows are the 'non-cows.' But then, the question would arise—what are the cows that are not 'non-cows'? And thus it would be necessary to determine the forms of the *cow*, the preclusion whereof would determine the form of the *non-cow*; and conversely it would be necessary to determine the form of the *non-cow*, the preclusion whereof would determine the form of the *cow*; and thus the ignorance of one would imply the ignorance of both. As has been thus declared by the great teacher (Kumārila): 'It would only be the well-known *cow* that could be precluded; and as this *preclusion* would be in the form of the negativing of the cow, it becomes necessary to say what this *cow* is that is negatived; until the cow is known, there can be no *non-cow*; and when there is no *non-cow*, whence could there be the *cow*? (*Çloka-vartika*—Chapter on '*Apoha*').

It might be urged that what constitutes the denotation of the word is the *Apoha* or *negation of the contrary*. To this we make the following reply: what is this '*apoha*'? Is the 'apoha,' 'the negation of the non-cow' a positive entity, or a negative one? If the former, then, is this positive entity of the same character as the individual cow,? or is it in the form of the individual non-cow? If the former, then it becomes something specific (as pertaining to a definite individual) and not generic (pertaining to all individuals; and we have already shown that no verbal process can apply to any such specific entity. If however, it be held to be of the nature of the individual non-cow, then too the same objections would apply; and over and above these there would be the further objection that the *cow* in that case would cease to form the denotation of the word 'cow'. If then the 'Apoha' be regarded as a positive entity apart from the particular individuals, and pertaintng to all of these,—then the difference in our views would be only verbal (as in this case what you call '*apoha*' we call '*Sāmānya*').

Further, if Apoha be regarded as a negative entity, consisting as it does, of negation or preclusion,—then (being a negative entity) it could never be apprehended by a direct positive sensuous cognition; as it is only that which produces a cognition that can have the apprehensible or coginsable character; and a negative entity is, by its very nature, wholly devoid of the productiveness of any effect. And when a thing is not cognised by Sense-perception, there can be no cognition of a verbal convention with regard to it; and thus no verbal process could apply to a negative entity. When a negative entity is cognised by means of a word, the person hearing the word could not, by its means, be moved to any activity towards a positive object; for the simple reason that the negative is wholly different from the positive entity, and the two are devoid of all reationship between themselves.

Objection: "The verbal process applying to the 'specific individuality' must be regarded as due to non-discrimination or ignorance; snice the individuality is cognised in the negative form; that is to say, the cognition of the cogniser is mistaken, being due to their unifying the perceptible and the imaginary, and then attributing a character to a thing to which it does not belong.*"

*This sentence is rather obscure; aud appears to be a quotation from an old Bauddha work.

Reply: This is not right; that which is not cognised cannot have imposed on it any thing as identical with itself, in the form of a negative entity. As a matter of fact, the person hearing the word uttered has at that time no cognition of the object signified; as the word (according to you) pertains to something wholly different; and there is no other means available for cognising it; and yet we find the word giving rise to an activity on the part of the hearer, towards a positive object. And hence we cannot regard a negation to be the denotation of a word.

Nor have we any other ground for singleness (of the forms of individual cows). If all positive entities were to be mere negations of one another, and appearing as a new object at every moment, then no such entity could be cognised by means of any word; and that which is not directly cognised cannot form the object of avoidance or acceptance, as its capablities would be absolutely unknown. And yet as a matter of fact, we do find usage based upon words; and so have we also the activity of all living beings in the world tending towards the obtaining of the desirable and the avoiding of the undesirable, and proceding from direct sensuous perception. And it is this usage that establishes the existence of a community common among many individuals; and it is to these communities that we find the denotations of words to pertain; and when a man knows of the capabilities of a certain class, and he comes to know that such and such a thing belongs to that class, he acts towards the obtaining of that object, even though he may never have perceived the particular object before.

Thus then the comprehensive cognition pertaining to distinct individuals serves as the basis for Community; and if this were a mere negation, then the whole activity of the world would be impossible.

CHAPTER VIII.

On Viçesha.

Text (156): *Individualities are the ultimate (i. e., final) specificatives or differentiatives of their substrates. They reside in such beginningless and indestructible eternal substances, as the Atoms, Ākāça, Time, Space, Soul and Mind,—inhering in their entirety in each of these, and serving as the basis of absolute differentiation or specification. Just as we have with regard to the Bull as distinguished from the Horse, certain distinct cognitions—such f. i. as, (1) that it is a 'bull,' which is a cognition based upon its having the shape of other bulls, (2) that it is 'white,' which is based upon a quality, (3) that it is 'runing swiftly', which is based upon action (4) that it has a 'fat hump,' which is based upon 'constituent parts,' and (5) that it carries a 'large bell', which is based upon conjunction; so have the Yogis, who are possessed of powers that we do not possess, distinct cognitions based upon similar shapes, similar qualities and similar actions—with regard to the eternal atoms, the liberated souls and minds; and as in this case no other cause is possible, those causes by reason whereof they have such distinct cognitions,—as that 'this is a peculiar substance,' 'that a peculiar soul,' and so forth,—and which also lead to the recognition of one atom as being the same that was perceived at a different time and place,—are what we call the 'ultimate Individualities.'*

Page 322] Objection: *"What would be the harm if even in the absence of such 'Individualities,' Yogis could have, by the help of merits born of*

Yogic practices, the said distinct cognitions and recognitions?"

Reply: *This could never be; just as the merits born of Yoga could never bring about the cognition of whiteness where there is no whiteness, or the recognition of that which has never been perceived; in fact if there were any such, they could only be false; exactly in the same manner, without the 'ultimate individualities' in question, the Yogis could not, by the helps of the merits of Yoga alone, have the distinct cognitions or recognitions referred to above.*

Objection: *"Why cannot you assume a self-differentiation in the atoms themselves, as you do in the 'Individualities'?"*

Reply: *The atoms themselves could not be the cause of these distinct cognitions; because of all atoms having the same nature; that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the cognitions that a certain thing brings about are with regard to things other than itself; e. g., the lamp brings about the cognition of the jar; and certainly one lamp is never rendered cognisable by another lamp. And just as the flesh of the cow and the horse are unclean by themselves, and other things become unclean by coming in contact with them,—so in the case in question, the 'ultimate Individualities,' though of the same nature, are differentiated by themselves, and the atom &c., become differentiated by reason of their contact with these 'individualities'* (I-ii-6).

Commentary.

Reverence to the Wearer of Five Faces who is free from

five-foldness, and who is the ordainer of the four cycles of time, the four sciences and the four castes!

Page 323.] The eternal substances are called 'anta' 'end' or 'ultimate,' because they continue to exist at the end of (after) all productions and destructions; and the 'specific individualities' inhere in these eternal substances and they are called '*viçesha*' or 'specific,' because they serve to specify or differentiate their substrates from all other things. This the author proceeds to explain—*They reside in such beginningless and indestructible &c., &c.* This expression, serves to explain what is meant by the word '*antya*,' 'ultimate' The expression, '*serving as the bases &c,*' explains what is meant by the individualities being differentiatives of their substrates.' *Inhering in their entirety &c.*—that is, in each substance there is only one distinct 'Individuality; in as much as the differentiation of one substance is accomplished by a single 'individuality,' there would be no need for assuming any more of such 'Individualities.' How this is the distinguishing feature of 'Individualities' we have explained before.

As the putting forward of the definition of these individualties would be right only after their existence has been proved, the author proceeds to prove their existence.....

.....Just as we have distinct cognitions with regard to individual cows &c., so would those people who are capable of perceiving the atom &c., be sure to have distinct cognitions with regard to these; as only thus could the existence ef individual atoms be possible. The mere difference among the individuals could not be the cause of these distinct cognitions; as though we may see an individual object, we may not have a definite cognition with regard to it; as we find in the case of the post which, when seen, is not definitely recognised as a post. The distuict cognitions in question could not be possible without some cause, and we find no other ground

or cause available, in as much as the shapes, qualities and action are the same in all; hence that which serves as the cause or ground of the distinct cognitions of the atom &c., is what we call 'specific individuality.' Then again, atoms are often recognised to be the same even though seen at different times and places;—and that they are thus recognised is proved by the fact of their belonging to certain communities, and possessing certain 'individualities',—just like such ordinary objects as the jar and the like. No recognition of a previously perceived substance would be possible unless it possessed some 'specific individuality'; hence we conclude that the cause or ground for the distinct cognitions in question, lies in the form of the 'specific individuality'.

An objection is raised: "The Yogis have the perception of super-sensuous things, by reason of certain merits acquired by yoga; and by the same powers they could have the distinct cognitions and recognitions of atoms &c., even without the 'individualities'."

Reply:—This cannot be;.....
.....The perception of supersensuous things also by force of yogic powers is not without some cause.

Page 324.] *Objection:* "*Why cannot you assume &c., &c.* The Individualities could not be possessed of further individualities; as that would land us in a *regressus ad infinitum*; and hence, just as distinct cognitions, by Yogis, of the individualities are possible even without their possessing other individualities,—so could the Yogis have in the case of atoms also by themselves; what then is the use of assuming any individualities at all?"

Reply: Not so;.....because one thing tends to bring about the cognition of something different from itself; *e. g.* the jar, &c., which are not of the nature of Light, are illumined and rendered perceptible by the lamp, which is of the nature of Light; and one lamp is not illumined by another; every lamp being self-luminous. *Just as the flesh of the cow &c., &c., &c.* The touch of these unclean things brings impurity to the man touching them. The distinct cognitions of the atoms, which are distinct and possessed of certain common properties, are possible only by reason of certain 'individualities', and not by themselves.

In each of the eternal substances, possessing certain properties in common, there inhere certain individualities which serve to differentiate them.

CHAPTER IX.

On *Samavāya*—Inherence.

Text (157): *Inherence is the relationship between things that are inseparably connected, and which stand to each other in the relation of the container and the contained,—the relationship, namely, that serves as the ground of the notion that 'such and such a thing subsists in this.' That is to say, the relationship named 'Samavāya' or 'inherence' is that from which proceeds the notion that 'this subsists in this,'—with regard to substances, qualities, actions, communities and individualities, that appear in the form of causes and effects, as well as those that do not appear as causes and effects, which are inseparably connected; and also that relationship from which proceeds the inter-dependence of things of limited extension upon something else, from which they are known to be different. As for instance, the notion that 'there is curd in this pit' is found to be present only when there is a distinct relationship between the two things; so also the notions—'the cloth is in these threads' 'the mat is in these reeds,' 'this, quality and that action are in this substance' 'Being is in these substances, qualities and*

actions', 'there is the general character of substance in this substance', 'the general character of quality in this quality', 'the general character of action in this action', 'the ultimate individualities in this eternal substance'; and from all such notions we infer the existence of the relationship in question. (VII-ii-29, 27, 28, ; V-ii-23)

Commentary.

Reverence to Çiva, accompained by Umā, the destroyer of internal darkness, the cause of the destruction and origination of the universe,—He who has pure Consciousness for his body!

The author proceeds to describe 'Samavāya' or 'inherence'. *Inherence is the relationship &c., &c.* This we have already explained when mentioning the categories by name. The author proceeds to show what the 'inseparable substances' are, the relationship whereof is called 'inherence':—*With regard to substances &c., &c. 'That appear in the form of causes and effects and those that do not appear in these forms'*—this is added with a view to restrict the scope of the relationship; that is to say, the relation between the whole and its parts, between transient substances and their qualities, between eternal substances and the transient qualities belonging to them, between actions and the substances to which they belong—all these appearing in the form of causes and effects,—is '*samavāya* or 'inherence'; and it is also that relationship which subsists between eternal substances and their qualities, between communities and the individuals included therein, between ultimate individualities and the substances in which they reside, —all these not appearing in the form of causes and effects, but being inseparably connected.

Similarly the expression—'*in the relationship of the container and the contained*'—is added by way of a restriction. Inherence is that which gives rise to the notion that 'this subsists in that'.

Inherence also consists in the interdependence, or non-separateness of such things of limited extension as are distinctly known to be different from each other. This we infer from the fact of mutual intermixture of two distinct things being due to a certain definite relationship (and this relationship can be none other than that of inherence).

This same fact the author proceeds to explain further:—*As for instance &c., &c.* All the notions cited point to some sort of a distinct relationship between the two objects in each case. The argument is put forward in the following form:—'All these notions are based upon a particular kind of relationship,—because they are definitely ascertained notions,—like the notion 'there is curd in this pit.'

Page 326]. Text (158): *Inherence is not mere conjunction; (1) because the members of this relationship are inseparably connected; (2) because this relationship is not caused by the action of any of the members related; (3) because it is not found to end with the disjunction of the members; and (4) because it is found subsisting only between the container and the contained.*

Commentary.

The author proceeds to show that Inherence is not the same as Conjunction. The relationship between the yarns and the cloth is not one of Conjunction. In proof of this, the following four reasons are given:—

(1) Conjunction occurs between objects that, prior to the conjunction, have a separate existence; whereas Inherence subsists between objects that have no separate existence. (2) Conjunction is brought about by the action of one or both of the members related, whereas in the case of Inherence we do not find any such cause; and the only cause for this relationship lies in the productive potency of the cause bringing the

substances into existence. (3) Conjunction ceases as soon as there is a disjunction of the members related ; whereas Inherence is indestructible. (4) Conjunction occurs between two substances that have independent existence ; for instance, the various fingers of the hand come into mutual contact when the hand is held up ; whereas Inherence subsists only in such substances as stand to each other in the relation of the container and the contained.

For these reasons, Inherence cannot be regarded as the same as Conjunction ; it is a distinct relationship.

Text (159): *Inherence is a category distinct from Substance and the rest ; as like 'being', it has a character different from these. That is to say, as in the case of 'being' we find that bringing about notions of itself in regard to the substrates of the classes of 'substance' and the rest, it differs from its substrates, as also from other classes,—so also Inherence, being the cause of the notion that 'this subsists in that,' with regard to the other five categories, must be regarded as something different from these. Nor is there a multiplicity of Inherences, as there is of Conjunctions ; because like 'being', Inherence has the same distinguishing feature, and also because there are no reasons for making distinctions in regard to it ; for these reasons Inherence, like 'being', must be regarded as one only.*

Commentary.

Having thus proved the existence of Inherence, the author proceeds to show that it is distinct from the other categories :—By '*bhāva*' the community of 'Being' is meant ; the mention of 'substance &c.' includes the classes of 'Quality' &c. In the case of 'Being' we find that it brings about

notions akin to itself,—such for instance as 'this *is*'—with regard to its substrates, in the shape of substances, qualities and actions ; similarly the class of 'substance,' brings about the idea of *substance* with regard to its substrates, Substances ; the class of 'Quality' gives rise to notions of *quality* in regard to its substrates, Qualities ; similarly the class of Action brings about notions of itself with reference to its substrates, Actions. And just as bringing about these notions, the classes of 'Being,' 'substance' &c, are regarded as different from one another, and also from their respective substrates,—in the same manner, in the case of Inherence also, we find that it gives rise to the idea that 'this subsists in that,' in regard to all the other five categories ; and as such it cannot but be regarded as something different from these latter.

As regards the question as to whether Inherence is one or many, the author says—*It has no multiplicity, as Conjunction has* ; just as in the case of 'Being' we find that there is no difference in the various notions of 'being,' so, in the same manner, we do not find any difference in the various notions of Inherence that we have ; nor have we any proof for regarding Inherence as many ; and for these reasons we conclude that Inherence is one only.

Text (160) :—Objection : "*If Inherence is one only, then, in as much as there would be one and the same relationship between substances and the class 'substance,' between qualities and the class 'Quality,' and between actions and the class 'Action,'—we would have an intermixture of Categories.*"

Reply : *Not so ; because of the differences in the container and the contained in each case. That is to say, though Inherence is one only everywhere and self-sufficient, yet there is a restriction due to the differences of the container and the contained. For instance, the community of 'substance' resides in substances*

only; the community of 'quality' in qualities only; and that of 'Action' in actions only.

Question: *"How do you know that this is so?"*

Answer: *We learn this from the perception of their concomitances and non-concomitances; that is to say, from the invariable concomitance of the notion of 'this subsists in that', which is based upon Inherence, we infer that Inherence is one only everywhere; and from the non concomitance of the notion of 'substance' &c., in all cases we infer that there is a restriction or limitation in regard to them. For instance, as in the case of the curd and the pit, though the conjunction is one only, yet there is a restriction (as to which is the container and which the contained),—so, in the same manner, in the case of the communities (of 'substance' &c)., even though the Inherence is one only, there is restriction as to the container and the contained, based upon the differences in the potencies of being the 'manifester' and the 'manifested.'*

Commentary.

The sense of the objection may be thus explained:—"If Inherence were one only, then the relationship that the community of 'substance' would bear to the Earth and other substances would be the same as that subsisting between the community of 'Quality' and the particular qualities, and also that subsisting between the community of 'Action' and the particular actions; and thus in as much as the connection of the community of 'substance' which makes the Earth a *substance*, is the same the presence whereof we would find in qualities and actions also,—these latter also would be *substances*; and in the same manner, the connection of the community of 'Qnality' making colour, &c., qualities would be the same as that present

in substances and actions; and these latter would be *qualities* and so also as regards the connection of the community of 'Action.' Thus there would be an intermixture or overlapping of the categories."

[Page 328] *Reply*: There can be no overlapping among the categories; as the mere presence of Inherence does not make a *substance*; it is the inherence *of the community of 'substance'*, and that too *in a substance* only; and not in qualities or actions; hence these latter could not be substances. So also with the inherence of qualities and actions.

The author proceeds to explain this statement:—Though Inherence is self-sufficient and does not, like Conjunction, subsist through any other relationship &c., &c., &c.

Another objection is raised: "How do you know that the community of 'substance' resides in substances only, that of 'quality' in qualities only and that of 'Action' in actions only?"

The answer to this is that, as a matter of fact we feel that the idea of the community of 'substance' is concomitant with, or present in, substances only, and is non-concomitant with, or absent from, qualities and actions; similarly the idea of the community of 'quality' is present in qualities, and absent from substances and actions; and so also the idea of the community of 'action' is present in actions, and absent from substances and qualities; and from all these concomitances and non-concomitances we infer that there is a restriction as to the communities of 'substance' &c.

Question: "But whence could you have such a restriction when Inherence is one and the same in the case of all? That is to say, the inherence of the community of 'substance' in Earth and other substances is the same as that of the community of 'quality' in colour and other qualities, and that of the community of 'Action' in 'Throwing upward' and other actions."

Answer : In the case of Conjunction we find that though it is one only, yet we have a restriction; as in the case of the *pit* and the *curd*, we find that it is the *pit* that is the container and the *curd* the contained, this restriction being due to the peculiarity of the capabilities of the objects concerned; and in the same manner, though Inherence is one only, yet there is a restriction as to which among substances, qualities and actions are the container and which the contained,—a distinction that is based upon their manifestiveness and manifestibility. That is to say, the community of 'substance' is manifestible by substances only; and hence it is in substances alone that that community inheres. Similarly with qualities and actions.

Text (161):—*Even though the members related are transient, the Inherence is not transient, like Conjunction; because like Being, it is not brought about by any cause. That is to say, in the case of Being we have found that it is eternal, because we cannot cognise any cause for it, by any of the valid means of knowledge; and the same may be said to be the case with Inherence also; as by none of the valid means of knowledge can we find any cause for it.*

Objection:—"*By what relation does Inherence subsist in substance &c? This relation can not be that of conjunction; as conjunction being a quality can reside in substances only (and Inherence is not a substance); nor can the relation be that of inherence; as the latter is one only; and there is no third relation by which it can subsist.*"

Reply:—*Not so; as it is itself of the nature of relation or subsistence. In the case of 'Being' with regard to substances, qualities and actions,*

we have seen that it has no connection with any other 'being'; and in the same manner, Inherence, being inseparable (from its substrate) and of the very nature of a subsisting relation, could have no other relation; and hence it is regarded as self-sufficient. For this reason it has been regarded as imperceptible by the sense-organs; specially as it is not found to have an existence in the perceptible substances in the same manner that 'being' &c., have; and as it is not perceptible by itself, we conclude that it is only inferable from the notion that 'this is in that.'

All reverence to that Kaṇâda who, having pleased Maheçvara by the superb character of his meditation and austerities, propounded the philosophy of the Vaiçēshika system!

Thus ends the Padartha-dharmasangraha of Praçastapâda.

Commentary

A question having been raised as to whether Inherence is eternal or transient, the author says—*Even though the members &c., &c* In the case of conjunction we find that the members in contact being transient, the conjunction also is transient; but not so in the case of Inherence; as in the case of conjunction it is only natural that the destruction of the members should bring about the destruction of the conjunction as the members form the material cause of the conjunction; the case of Inherence however is different; the members are mere related members, and not its cause; as we have shown above; hence Inherence is not destroyed on the destruction

of the members; as we recognise it as present in other substances; just as is the case with 'being' (which also is eternal).

Objection:—"Does Inherence correlate the members through some relation, or without any relation? Nothing could correlate things without being related itself; if it were not so, then we would have most absurd relationships. Then, as for being related, it could not bear the relation of conjunction &c.....and as we cannot find any relation by which Inherence can subsist in substances, we conclude that it does not subsist in them at all."

Reply: It cannot be rightly held that because it has no relationship, therefore it does not exist. Because it is itself of the nature of relation or subsistence. As for conjunction, it is caused; and hence though a relation, it subsits by another relation; the very presence of a cause constituting the nature of an effect; and as for Inherence, it does not stand in need of any other relation; it subsists by itself.

Page 330.—*For this same reason it is imperceptible by the sense-organs etc., etc.* 'Being' etc., are found to subsist in perceptible things; and hence they are regarded as perceptible by the sense, by reason of the organs coming in contact with the things in which 'Being' etc., inhere. Inherence however cannot subsit in the same manner, and hence it is regarded as imperceptible; as the organs of sense are found to have the power of perceiving only such things as are in direct contact with them, or those that inhere in such things.

Objection: "If there is a sensuous cognition of Inherence, then it is a mere absurdity to declare that it has no relation; and if there is no such cognition, then that must be stated clearly".

In view of this objection, the author adds—*It is not perceptible by itself*. That is to say, we have not the same cognition of Inherence that we have of conjunction; as the members related by inherence are found to constitute a single mass.

Thus then, Inherence should be regarded as that whereby is brought about the coherence of distinct substances, and which serves to set aside independence.

This commentary, the *Nyâyakandalí*, consisting of a combination of excellent letters and surpassing all others, is like the range of the peaks of the mount Meru (which is composed of a mass of gold, and which lies to the north of all things).

This *Nyâyakandalí*, while putting forward the good points of its own unmolested system, refutes the view of the opponents.

Located in the southern part of the *Rāḍhā* (a district in Bengal-Bēhar) is the village of *Bhūriśṛshti* belonging to the Brāhmanas that performed many sacrifices, and inhabitted by many wealthy men.

From out of this village was born, like the moon from the Ocean, the Brahmana who was a moon on the earth, by reason of his being a source of happiness to the people,—he who was respected of all people, like Bṛhaspati himself.

From him was born Baladêva, the great ocean of the gems of good qualities, the sustaining tree of the creepers of learning, of purest intentions, the great propeller of the river of manifold celebrity.

Abhokâ, born of a pure family, having many good qualities, was the wife of him, who was famous and possessed of excellent qualities.

From her was born Çrídhara, the fulfiller of the wish of all needy men—affording excellent protection (good shade), making excellent presents (producing good fruits), having many children (brancnes), the refuge of Brahmanas (birds).

This person gave birth to the beautiful Nyâyakandalī, which is fit to be listened to by the most clever among the learned, and serves to explain the six categories.

The Nyâyakandalī was composed in the year 913 of the Çāka era.

Thus ends the Nyâyakandalī, treating of the categories, composed by Bhatta Çrīdhara, at the request of Çri Pandūdâsa.

ERRATA.

Page	Line.	For	Read.
1	23	metempychosis	metempsychosis
37	35	so	to
43	1	to	of
52	17	suc	such
58	4	wehave	we have
66	2	enteral	eternal
74	19	differentation	differentiation
,,	20	,,	,,
81	11	minerials	minerals.
82	3	*quatities*	*qualities*
86	6	much	such
87	14	effeciency	efficiency
105	10	belong	belong to
,,	13	an is	is an
108	31	*aud*	*and*
121	33	thesmoke	the smoke
127	3	bot bayu	about by
129	14	*I*	*It*
132	12	buality of one thng	quality of one thing
133	18	couch	conch
138	32	*af*	*of*
,,	33	,,	,,
140	17	inact	intact
148	25	simle	simple
153	1	*existenc*	*existence*
161	33	of	or
205	8	symultaneity	simultaneity
207	29	poseriority	Posteriority
212	13	*posterority*	*posteriority*
213	17	Allo bjects	All objects
214	23	Infuence	Inference
215	4	knowledgc	knowledge
262	30	auther	author
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277	1	pape	paper
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361	32	noiion	notion
393	12	*pleasant*)	(*pleasant*)
409	13	bought	brought
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445	12	another	author
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513	27	belongs	belongs to
517	26	dalu	dual
525	19	*ro*	*or*
539	25	explicity	explicitly
,,	33	a such	such a
552	28	Soon	So on
556	13	*of*	*or*
562	10	affort	effort
563	11	undesirabl	undesirable
,,	14	sou	soul
565	20	composit	composite
568	11	Intrinsice	Intrinsic
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570	11	wheredy	whereby
572	19	*serics*	*series*
573	19	our	of our
580	14	ise	rise
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599	15	vituous.	virtuous
604	11	committee	committing
605	2 foot note	necessar	necessary
606	19	revoling	revolving
,,	25	regard	argued
608	9	poseibility	possibility
613	7	*form*	*form of*
616	11	Chapter XI	Chapter VI Section (11)
622	7	*eatering*	*entering*
,,	15	*form*	*from*
626	33	*final*	*find*
630	34	*and other*	*an other*
631	28	regious	regions
636	9	*for*	*far*
643	23	partieles	particles
645	7	restructed	restricted
648	29	extenal	external
649	19	ing	ring

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