A HISTORY
OF
ECLECTICISM
IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

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with the Author's sanction

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THIS is a translation of the second section of Dr. Zeller's 'Philosophie der Griechen, Dritter Theil, Erste Abtheilung.' The first section of the volume, concerning the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, has already been translated by Dr. Reichel. The present translation has been made from the third and latest edition of the German work.

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Errata.

Page 83, line 15 : *for* belonged *read* belongs
„ 95, „ 26 : *for* fundamental impulse *read* impulse
„ 116, „ 2 : *for* their *read* its
„ 162, „ 19 : *for* I *read* we
„ 205, „ 21 : *for* effects *read* affect
„ 206, „ 6 : *for* enquires *read* asks
„ 207, „ 2 : substitute a semicolon for a comma after 'doctrine.'
„ 210, „ 13 : substitute a note of interrogation for a comma after 'ourselves.'
„ 294, „ 3 : *for* under *read* in
„ 357, lines 1 and 2 : *for* that universal, which he claims for all men as their inborn conviction *read* that universal conviction which he claims for all men as innate

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ECLECTICISM.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF ECLECTICISM.

CHAP. I.

THAT form of philosophy which appeared about the beginning of the post-Aristotelian period had, in the course of the third and second centuries, perfected itself in its three principal branches. These three schools had hitherto existed side by side, each striving to maintain itself in its purity, and merely adopting towards the others, and towards the previous philosophy, an aggressive or defensive attitude. But it lies in the nature of things that mental tendencies, which have sprung from a kindred soil, cannot very long continue in this mutually exclusive position. The first founders of a school and their immediate successors, in the fervour of original enquiry, usually lay excessive weight upon that which is peculiar to their mode of thought; in their opponents they see only deviations from this their truth: later members, on the contrary, who have not sought this peculiar element with the same zeal, and therefore have not grasped it with

A. *Gradual blending of the three post-Aristotelian schools of philosophy.*

i. *Internal causes of this.*

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the same rigidity and one-sidedness, more easily perceive, even in adverse statements, that which is common and akin, and are more ready to sacrifice subordinate peculiarities of their own standpoint; the strife of schools will itself oblige them to repel exaggerated accusations and unqualified condemnations, by the stronger enforcement of that in which they coincide with others, to give up or put aside untenable assertions, to soften offensive propositions, and to break off from their systems the sharpest angles; many an objection of the adversary maintains its ground, and in seeking to elude it by another interpretation, it is found that the presuppositions of the objection have been partially conceded, together with the objection itself. It is, therefore, a natural and universal experience that in the conflict of parties and schools their oppositions gradually become blunted, that the common principle which underlies them all is in time more clearly recognised, and a mediation and fusion is attempted. Now, so long as philosophic productivity is still living and active in a people, the case will either never arise or arise only temporarily, that its whole science is infected by this eclecticism, because already in its youthful course, new directions are attempted before those immediately preceding them have decidedly begun to grow old. As soon, on the contrary, as the scientific spirit is exhausted, and a long space of time, devoid of new creations, is merely filled with discussions among the existing schools, the natural result of these

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discussions, the partial blending of the hostile parties, will appear to a greater extent, and the whole philosophy will assume that eclectic character which, in its universal diffusion, is always the premonitory sign either of a deeply seated revolution, or of scientific decay. This was precisely the position in which Greek philosophy found itself in the last centuries before Christ. All the causes which led, generally speaking, to the dissolution of classical culture, had also had a paralysing influence on the philosophic spirit; for centuries after the transformation of philosophy, which marks the end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century no new system arose; and if the post-Aristotelian systems in and for themselves had already lost the purely theoretic interest in the contemplation of things, and by their restriction to the life and aims of men, had announced the discontinuance of scientific endeavour, the long cessation of philosophic production could only serve to dull the scientific sense still more, and to call in question the possibility of scientific knowledge in general. This state of things found its proper expression in scepticism, which opposed the dogmatic systems with more and more signal success. The eclecticism which since the beginning of the first century before Christ had repressed scepticism and united together the previously separate tendencies of thought, was, however, merely the reverse side of scepticism itself. Scepticism had

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placed all dogmatic theories on an equality in such a manner as to deny scientific truth to all alike. This 'neither one nor another' (*Weder-noch*) became in eclecticism 'One as well as the other' (*Sowohl-als-auch*); but for that very transition scepticism had paved the way; for it had not been able to rest in pure negation, and had therefore, in its doctrine of probability, set up once more a positive conviction as a practical postulate. This conviction was not indeed to come forward with a claim to full certainty; but we cannot fail to perceive in the development of the sceptical theory, from Pyrrho to Arcesilaus, and from Arcesilaus to Carneades, a growing estimation of the value of the knowledge of probability: it was only necessary to advance one step further, to bring forward practical necessity more decidedly as against the sceptical theory, and the probable would receive the significance of the true —scepticism would be transformed into a dogmatic acceptance of truth (*Fürwahrhalten*). In this dogmatism, however, doubt would inevitably continue to exercise such an influence that no individual system as such would be recognised as true, but the true out of all systems would be separated according to the measure of subjective necessity and opinion. This had been exactly the procedure of the sceptics in the ascertainment of the probable; as they develop their doubt in the criticism of existing theories, so do they seek the probable primarily in the existing systems, among which they have reserved to themselves the right to

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decide. Carneades, as we know,[1] had so treated the ethical questions to which, we are told, abandoning his former predilection for combating hostile opinions, he more and more restricted himself with advancing years.[2] Similarly Clitomachus, while contending with the dogmatic schools, seems to have sought a positive relation to them;[3] and we learn that Æschines, another disciple of Carneades, adhered to that side only of his master's teaching.[4] Thus scepticism forms the bridge from the one-sided dogmatism of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophy to eclecticism; and in this respect we cannot regard it as a mere accident that from the followers of Carneades this mode of thought chiefly emanated, and that in them it was immediately connected with the point on which the Stoics and Epicureans had sustained their dogmatism, and even the Platonists, in the last resort, their doctrine of probability, viz. the necessity of definite theories for practical life. It was, however, generally speaking, the condition of philosophy at that time, and the strife of the philosophic schools, which first caused the rise and spread of scepticism, and in the sequel, the eclectic tendency in philosophy.

ii. *External causes.*

The most important external impulse to this

[1] Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, 3er Theil, 1e Abtheilung, p. 517 *sq.*

[2] Plut. *An seni s. ger. resp.* 13, 1. p. 791: ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς Αἰσχίνης, σοφιστῶν τινων λεγόντων, ὅτι προσποιεῖται γεγονέναι Καρνεάδου, μὴ γεγονὼς, μαθητής· ἀλλὰ τότε γε, εἶπεν, ἐγὼ Καρνεάδου διήκουον ὅτε τὴν βαχίαν καὶ τὸν ψόφον ἀφεικὼς ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ γῆρας εἰς τὸ χρήσιμον συνῆκτο καὶ κοινωνικόν.

[3] *Phil. der Griechen*, III. i. p. 524, note 2.

[4] *Vide* note 2.

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change was given by the relation in which Greek science and culture stood to the Roman world.[1] The first knowledge of Greek philosophy doubtless came to the Romans from Lower Italy: the founder of the Italian School (Pythagoras) is the first philosopher whose name is mentioned in Rome.[2] But the doctrines of the Greek philosophers can only have been heard of there in an entirely superficial and fragmentary manner before the beginning of the second century before Christ. This state of things must have changed, however, when, after the second Punic War, the Roman policy and Roman arms pressed forward farther and farther towards the east; when the wars with Macedonia and Syria brought distinguished Romans in great numbers to Greece, while, on the other hand, Greek ambassadors and state prisoners,[3] and soon also slaves, appeared more and more commonly in Rome; when men of the importance of the elder Scipio Africanus, T. Quinctius Flamininus, and Æmilius Paulus, applied themselves

Diffusion of Greek philosophy among the Romans.

[1] For what follows, cf. *Ritter*, iv. 79 *sq.*

[2] The arguments for this are given in *Phil. der Griech.* Part I. pp. 287, 3; 450, 1; cf. *ibid.* 313, 2; and Part III. ii. p. 77 *sq.* A still earlier date (if this statement is historical) must be fixed for the presence in Rome of Hermodorus the Ephesian, who assisted the decemviri in the drawing up of the twelve tables (Part I. 566, 2): but even if he were indeed the celebrated friend of Heraclitus, we have no ground for the supposition that he discoursed to the Romans on the physics of that philosopher.

[3] Such as the thousand Achæans who, 168 B.C., were carried away into Italy, and kept there for seventeen years, all of them men of repute and culture (among them we know was Polybius), whose long residence in the country could not have been without influence on Rome if even the least considerable of them had their actual abode in that city.

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with delight to Greek literature; when, from the beginning of the second century, Greek poetry was transplanted to Roman soil in the more or less free imitations of Ennius, Pacuvius, Statius, Plautus, and their successors; and Roman history was related in the Greek language by Fabius Pictor and other annalists. The philosophic literature of Greece stood in far too close a connection with the other branches—philosophy occupied far too important a place in the whole Hellenic sphere of culture, as a means of instruction and object of universal interest—to make it possible for such as had once found pleasure in Greek intellectual life to shut themselves up from it very long, however small the need for scientific enquiry might be in them. We find, then, even before the middle of the second century, many and various traces of the commencement of a knowledge of Greek philosophy among the Romans. Ennius shows that he was acquainted with it, and adopts from it isolated propositions. In the year 181 B.C. an attempt was made, in the so-called Books of Numa,[1] to introduce dogmas of Greek philosophy into the Roman religion.[2] Twenty-six years later (according to others only eight) the activity of the Epicurean philosophers in teaching caused their banishment from Rome.[3] In 161 B.C., by a decree of the senate, residence in Rome was forbidden to the philosophers and rhetoricians;[4] and this always

[1] Cf. *Phil. der. Griech.* III. ii. p. 83.

[2] Cf. *l. c.* III. ii. p. 85.

[3] Cf. *l. c.* III. i. p. 372, 1.

[4] This decree of the senate is to be found in Suetonius, *De Cl. Rhetor.* 1; Gell. *N.A.* xv. 11 (cf. also Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.*

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proves that there was reason for anxiety in regard to their influence upon the education of youth. Æmilius Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia, gave his sons Greek instructors, and for that purpose took with him on his expeditions the philosopher Metrodorus.[1] His companion in the Macedonian campaign, Sulpicius Gallus, besides the astronomical knowledge for which he was distinguished, may, perhaps, have also adopted certain philosophic theories of the Greeks.[2] But all these are merely isolated signs of the movement which from the middle of the second century manifested itself to a much greater extent. Hitherto comparatively few had occupied themselves with Greek philosophy; now the interest in that philosophy was more universally diffused. Greek philosophers come to Rome in order to try

161 B.C.). These authors tell us of another similar enactment: an edict of the censor Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus and L. Licinius Crassus, in which they express their serious displeasure with the teachers and frequenters of the newly-arisen Latin schools of rhetoricians on account of this departure from the *consuetudo majorum*. But, not to mention that the *rhetores Latini*, who were alone affected by this decree, according also to Cicero, *De Orat.* iii. 24, 93 *sq.*, were only indirectly connected with Greek philosophy, the decree was not promulgated until the year 95 B.C., as we see from a comparison of Cicero, *loc. cit.* with i. 7, 24. Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.*, dates it in 92 B.C.

[1] Plin. *Hist. Nat.* xxxv. 135; cf. Plut. *Æm. P.* 6. The latter mentions among the Greeks with whom Æmilius surrounded his sons, grammarians, sophists, and rhetoricians. Pliny gives the more definite information, that after the victory over Perseus (168 B.C.) he requested from the Athenians a good painter and an able philosopher. They sent him Metrodorus, who was both in one person. Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 525.

[2] Cicero praises his knowledge of astronomy, Cic. *Off.* i. 6, 19. According to Livy, xliv. 37; and Plin. *Hist. Nat.* ii. 12, 53, he foretold an eclipse of the sun before the battle of Pydna. A more detailed account of the authorities in regard to this event is given by Martin, *Revue Archéolog.* 1864, No. 3.

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their fortune, or are sent for thither by distinguished men. Young Romans, desirous of playing a part in the state, or of gaining distinction in cultivated society, think that they cannot do without the instruction of a philosopher, and it soon became usual to seek this not only in Rome, but in Athens itself, the chief school of Greek science. Already the famous deputation of philosophers in the year 156 B.C.[1] showed, by the extraordinary influence which Carneades especially obtained, how favourably Greek philosophy was regarded in Rome; and though we should not overrate the effect of this passing event, we may, nevertheless, suppose that it gave a considerable impetus to the previously awakened interest in philosophy, and spread it abroad in wider circles. More permanent, no doubt, was the influence of the Stoic Panætius during his residence, prolonged as it would seem to have been for many years, in the capital of the Roman empire, he being a man peculiarly fitted by the character of his philosophy to effect an entrance for Stoicism among his Roman auditors.[2] Soon after him Caius Blossius of Cumæ, a disciple of Antipater the Stoic, was in Rome, the friend and counsellor of Tiberius Gracchus,[3] who through him must likewise have

[1] The authorities for this are cited *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. p. 928, 1; cf. p. 498, 1; cf. Part III. i. p. 498, 1.

[2] Further details *infra*, chapter iii.

[3] Plut. *Tib. Graech.* 8, 17, 20; Val. Max. iv. 7, 1; Cicero, *Læl.* 11, 37. After the murder of Gracchus (133 B.C.) Blossius was also in danger. He left Rome, and went into Asia Minor to Andronicus, after whose fall (130 B.C.) he killed himself. A thorough examination of him is to be found in Ῥενιερῆ περὶ Βλοσσίου καὶ Διοφάνους (Leipzig, 1873). Mean-

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become acquainted with Stoicism.[1] And now that immigration of Greek learned men begins, which, in time, assumed greater and greater proportions.[2] Among the Romans themselves, men who by their intellect and position were so decidedly pre-eminent as the younger Scipio Africanus, his friend the wise Lælius, L. Furius Philus and Tiberius Gracchus, took philosophic studies under their protection.[3] With them are connected Scipio's nephew Tubero,[4] a disciple of Panætius, who,

while he himself calls his work ἔρευναι καὶ εἰκασίαι, and the latter so decidedly preponderate, that our historical knowledge of the man is scarcely extended by the treatise.

[1] That Gracchus, through the care of his mother, had distinguished Greeks for his instructors (Cic. *Brut.* 27, 104; cf. Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 20) is well known.

[2] Polybius (xxxii. 10), however, relates that much earlier, when Scipio was only eighteen (166 B.C.), he said to him and his brother: περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθήματα, περὶ ἃ νῦν ὁρῶ σπουδάζοντας ὑμᾶς καὶ φιλοτιμουμένους, οὐκ ἀπορήσετε τῶν συνεργησόντων ὑμῖν ἑτοίμως, καὶ σοὶ κἀκείνῳ· πολὺ γὰρ δή τι φῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπιρρέον ὁρῶ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων, which agrees with what is quoted *supra*, p. 7, note 4.

[3] Cicero, *De Orat.* ii. 37, 154: *Et certe non tulit ullos hæc civitas aut gloria clariores, aut auctoritate graviores, aut humanitate politiores P. Africano, C. Lælio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimos homines ex Græcia palam semper habuerunt. De Rep.* iii. 3, 5: *Quid P. Scipione, quid C. Lælio, quid L. Philo perfectius cogitari potest? qui . . . ad domesticum majorumque morem etiam hanc a Socrate adventiciam doctrinam adhibuerunt.* Cicero there puts the substance of Carneades' discourse against justice, which he himself had heard, into the mouth of Furius Philus, while he makes him at the same time follow the Academic philosopher in the *consuetudo contrarias in partes disserendi*; *loc. cit.* c. 5, 8 *sq.*; Lact. *Inst.* v. 14. Concerning the connection of Scipio and Lælius with Panætius we shall have to speak later on. Lælius, according to Cic. *Fin.* ii. 8, 24, had also attended the lectures of Diogenes, which we must, no doubt, connect with his presence in Rome in the year 156 B.C.

[4] Q. Ælius Tubero, through his mother a grandson of Æmilius Paulus, was a very zealous Stoic, who carried out

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with the sons-in-law of Lælius, Quintus Mucius Scævola,[1] and Caius Fannius,[2] P. Rutilius Rufus,[3] Lucius Ælius Stilo,[4] and others,[5] open the long

his principles in his life, not without exaggeration. Cf. concerning him Cic. *Brut.* 31, 117; *De Orat.* iii. 23, 87; *Pro Mur.* 36, 75 *sq.*; *Acad.* ii. 44, 135; *Tusc.* iv. 2, 4; Sen. *Ep.* 95, 72 *sq.*; 98, 13; 104, 21; 120, 19; Plut. *Lucull.* 39; Pompon. *De Orig. Juris*, i. 40; Gell. *N. A.* i. 22, 7; xiv. 2, 20; Val. Max. vii. 5, 1. Cic. *Off.* iii. 15, 63, mentions a treatise of Hecato addressed to him, and another of Panætius, ibid. *Acad.* ii. 44, 135; *Tusc.* iv. 2, 4; against which the pseudo-Plutarch, *De Nobilit.* 18, 3, is not any historical testimony; cf. Bernays, *Dial. d. Arist.* 140.

[1] One of the most celebrated of the ancient jurists and founders of scientific jurisprudence among the Romans (Bernhardy, *Grundr. d. Rom. Lit.* 676, &c.), son-in-law of Lælius (Cic. *De Orat.* i. 9, 35). According to Cicero, he had heard Panætius lecture, and (*l. c.* 10, 43) he calls the Stoics *Stoici nostri.*

[2] C. Fannius, son of Marcus, son-in-law of Lælius, was brought by Lælius to hear Panætius (Cic. *Brut.* 26, 101), and is designated by Cicero (*Brut.* 31, 18) as a Stoic. Cicero often mentions an historical work composed by him. Similarly Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 4. With regard to his consulate, cf. id. *C. Gracch.* 8, 11, 12.

[3] This is the Rutilius who was famous for his services in war (Val. Max. ii. 3, 2; Sallust, *Jug.* 54, 56 *sq.*), but principally for the purity of his character. On account of the impartiality with which, as proconsul, he defended the inhabitants of Asia Minor against the extortions of the Roman equites, one of the most shameless sentences of banishment was passed upon him, which he bore with the cheerfulness of a sage. He went to Smyrna, where he died, having refused to return, which was offered him by Sulla. Cf. on this subject Cic. *Brut.* 30, 115; *N. D.* iii. 32, 80; *in Pison.* 39, 95; *Rabir. Post.* 10, 27; *Pro Balbo*, 11, 28 (cf. Tacit. *Ann.* iv. 43); Sen. *Ep.* 24, 4; 79, 14; 82, 11; *Benef.* vi. 37, 2, &c.; Val. Max. ii. 10, 5, &c. Cicero (*Brut.* 30, 114) calls him *doctus vir et Græcis literis eruditus, Panætii auditor, prope perfectus in Stoicis.* Concerning his admiration of his teacher Panætius and his acquaintance with Posidonius, cf. Cic. *Off.* iii. 2, 10. He left behind him memorials and historical works: *vide* Bernhardy, *loc. cit.* 203, 506; also Cicero, *Fin.* i. 3, 7.

[4] *Vide* concerning this philosopher, the predecessor and teacher of Varro, Cic. *Brut.* 56, 205 *sq.*; also *Acad.* i. 2, 8; *Ad Herenn.* iv. 12; Bernhardy, *loc. cit.* 857.

[5] Such as Marcus Vigellius (Cic. *Orat.* iii. 21, 78) and Sp.

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series of Roman Stoics. Epicureanism, at the same time, obtained a still wider diffusion, having, through books written in Latin, gained entrance at an earlier period than the other systems, even among those who had not received a Greek education.[1] Somewhat later the Academic and Peripatetic schools, whose principles could not have remained unknown to the hearers of Panætius, were represented by celebrated teachers in Rome. Among the Platonists Philo is the first whose presence in Rome is known to us (irrespective of the deputation of philosophers); of the Peripatetics, Staseas.[2] But already, at a much earlier period, Clitomachus had dedicated works to two Romans;[3] and Carneades himself, we are told, was sought out in Athens by Roman travellers.[4] Soon after the beginning of the first century before Christ, Posidonius (*vide infra*) visited the metropolis of the world; before the middle of the same century we encounter there

Mummius, brother of the conqueror of Corinth, who, to judge by the date (Cic. *Brut.* 25, 94), must also have owed his Stoicism to Panætius.

[1] *Vide* Cic. *Tusc.* iv. 3, 6: *Itaque illius veræ elegantisque philosophiæ* (the Stoic, Peripatetic, and Academic) . . . *nulla fere sunt aut pauca admodum Latina monumenta . . . cum interim illis silentibus* C. Amafinius *extitit dicens*, &c.

[2] Further details, *infra*. Philo came to Rome in 88 B.C. Staseas, as we find from Cic. *De Orat.* i. 22, 104, appeared there in 92 B.C.

[3] To the poet Lucilius (148–102 B.C), and previously to L. Censorinus, who was consul in 149 B.C.; Cic. *Acad.* ii. 32, 102.

[4] So much truth may underlie the statement of Cicero (*De Orat.* iii. 18, 68) even supposing the statement itself to be untrue that Q. Metellus (Numidicus) as a young man listened to the aged Carneades for several days in Athens. Respecting Catulus' relation to Carneades, cf. the last pages of the chapter on Carneades, *Phil. d. Gr.* Part III. i.

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the Epicureans Philodemus and Syro.[1] Meanwhile, it was already at this time very common for Roman youths to seek Greek science at its fountain-head, and for the sake of their studies to betake themselves to the principal seats of that science, and especially to Athens.[2] At the commencement of the imperial era, at any rate, Rome swarmed with Greek savants of every kind,[3] and among these were many who were not merely turning to account a superficial knowledge in a mechanical manner;[4] while contemporaneously in various places of the west the philosophy of Greece became naturalised together with other sciences, and from these centres spread itself still further.[5] With the knowledge of Greek philosophy, that of Greek literature went naturally hand in hand, and from the time of Lucretius and Cicero a Roman literature sprang up at its side,[6]

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* Part III. i. 374.

[2] The best known examples are those of Cicero and Atticus, but we shall meet with many others later on. For the general practice, cf. Cic. *Fin.* v. 1, where Cicero describes his own life in Athens with companions in study (77 B.C.); and in regard to a somewhat later time, *Acad.* i. 2, 8, where he says to Varro: *Sed meos amicos, in quibus est studium, in Græciam mitto, ut ea a fontibus potius hauriant, quam rivulos consectentur.*

[3] The fact is notorious; for examples cf. Strabo, xiv. 5, 15, p. 675. Ταρσέων γὰρ καὶ Ἀλεξανδρέων μεστή ἐστι [ἡ Ῥώμη].

[4] Several Greek philosophers of the time of Augustus and Tiberius, residing in Rome, will come before us further on.

[5] The most important of these was the ancient Greek city Massilia, of which Strabo (iv. 1, 5, p. 181) says: πάντες γὰρ οἱ χαρίεντες πρὸς τὸ λέγειν τρέπονται καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. An early colony of Greek culture in Gaul, this city had now made such advances that noble Romans pursued their studies here instead of in Athens.

[6] That these two were the first noteworthy writers on philosophy in the Latin tongue is certain; the few earlier attempts (cf. III. i. 372, 2) seem to have been very unsatisfactory. Both, moreover, expressly

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which was scarcely inferior to the contemporary Greek, though not to be compared with the earlier, either in scientific acumen or creative individuality.

At the beginning of this movement, the Romans were related to the Greeks merely as disciples who adopted and imitated the science of their teachers; and, to a certain degree, this relation continued throughout its whole course; for in Rome the scientific genius and spirit never attained even to so much force and self-dependence as in Greece it had still preserved in the latter period. But in the end this influence of Greek philosophy could not remain without a reaction on itself. Though Romans by birth, like Cicero and Lucretius, might rehabilitate Greek science for their countrymen; and Greek philosophers, like Panætius and Antiochus, might lecture to the Romans, in both cases it was unavoidable that the character of their presentations should be more or less determined by regard to the spirit and requirements of their Roman hearers and readers. Even the purely Greek schools of philosophy in Athens, Rhodes, and other places, could not free themselves from this determining influence, on account of the great number of young Romans of position who visited them; for it was naturally from these

Inevitable reaction of that diffusion upon philosophy.

claim for themselves this honour, cf. Lucr. v. 336: *Hanc* (the Epicurean doctrine) *primus cum primis ipse repertus nunc ego sum in patrias qui possim vertere voces.* Cic. *Tusc.* i. 3, 5: *Philosophia jacuit usque ad hanc ætatem nec ullum habuit lumen literarum Latinarum . . . in quo eo magis nobis est elaborandum, quod multi jam esse libri Latini dicuntur scripti inconsiderate ab optimis illis quidem viris, sed non satis eruditis.*

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scholars that honour and profit mostly accrued to the teachers. Of still higher importance, however, than these considerations must be rated the unconscious influence of the Roman spirit; not merely upon the Romans who pursued philosophy, but also upon the Greek philosophers in the Roman empire; for, however great the superiority of Greek culture over Roman, however complete the literary dependence of the conquerors upon the conquered, it was inevitable that Greece, too, should receive spiritual influence from her proud scholars, and that the astuteness and force of will to which, in spite of science, she had succumbed, should necessarily acquire considerable value as compared with that science in the eyes of the subjugated nations. It was consistent with the Roman spirit, however, to estimate the worth of philosophy, as of all other things, primarily according to the standard of practical utility; and, on the contrary, to ascribe no importance to scientific opinions as such, when no great influence on human life was perceptible in them. From this source sprang those prejudices against philosophy, which at first led even to magisterial interposition.[1] The same point of view was

[1] Cf. on this subject what Plutarch (*Cato Maj.* 22) relates of Cato's behaviour to the embassy of philosophers as to whom he feared from the outset μὴ τὸ φιλότιμον ἐνταῦθα τρέψαντες οἱ νέοι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν δόξαν ἀγαπήσωσι μᾶλλον τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν στρατειῶν, and whom, after he had heard the contents of their lectures, he advised should be sent away as quickly as possible. Also id. ap. Gell. xviii. 7, 3; Nepos ap. Lactant. iii. 15, 10; and the edict of the censors quoted *supra*, p. 7, note 4, which censures the rhetorical schools: *ibi homines adolescentulos totos dies desidere.* To the Roman states-

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also, however, maintained even in the pursuit and study of philosophy. So far as philosophy was concerned merely with scientific questions, it could scarcely be regarded as anything more than a respectable recreation; it only attained to more serious value in the eyes of the Roman, inasmuch as it proved itself an instrument of practical education. The strengthening of moral principles and the training for the calling of orator and statesman, these are the aspects which primarily and principally recommended philosophic studies to his attention. But on this very account he was necessarily inclined to treat them with reference to these points of view. He cared little for the scientific establishment and logical development of a philosophic system; that which alone, or almost alone, concerned him was its practical utility; the strife of schools, he thought, turned mostly on non-essential things, and he himself could not therefore hesitate to select from the various systems, careless of the deeper interconnection of particular definitions, that which seemed to him serviceable. The proconsul Gellius, who made the well-meaning proposal to the philosophers in Athens that they should amicably settle their points of difference, and offered himself as mediator,[1] expressed the truly Roman conception of philosophy, though somewhat too candidly. Though the influence of this standpoint would doubtless have affected Greek

man and soldier philosophy must naturally have appeared even greater waste of time than rhetoric.

[1] Cic. *Legg.* i. 20, 53. Gellius was consul in 682 A.U.C. = 72 B.C. *Vide* Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* for that year.

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philosophy very little had it been exerted at an earlier period, it was quite otherwise when philosophy had itself taken the direction which especially corresponded with the Roman nature. When the internal condition of the philosophic schools, and especially the last important phenomenon in this sphere—the doctrine of Carneades—already led to eclecticism, it must necessarily have developed itself only the more speedily and successfully through the concurrence of internal motives with external influences.

B. *Principle and character of eclectic philosophy.*

But although this eclecticism primarily appears merely as the product of historical relations, which rather conduced to the external connection than to the internal harmonising of different standpoints, it is not wholly without a characteristic principle, which till then had not existed in this form. If we enquire according to what point of view the doctrines of the different systems were chosen, we find it was not sufficient to maintain those doctrines in which all were agreed; for the eclectics would then have been limited to a very few propositions of indefinite universality. But even the practical utility of theories could not be considered as the final mark of their truth; for the practical problem of mankind, and the way of its solution was itself a main object of the strife; the question was therefore, by what standard practical aims and relations should themselves be determined? This standard could only be ultimately sought in immediate consciousness. If it be required that the individual shall choose

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out of the various systems that which is true for his own use, this presupposes that each man carries in himself the standard for decision between true and false, and that truth is directly given to man in his self-consciousness; and it is precisely in this presupposition, that the individuality and importance of the eclectic philosophy seem chiefly to lie. Plato had indeed assumed that the soul brought with it from a previous life into its present existence the consciousness of ideas; and similarly the Stoics had spoken of conceptions which are implanted in man by nature; but neither Plato nor the Stoics had thereby intended to teach an immediate knowledge in the strict sense of the term; for the reminiscence of ideas coincides in Plato with the dialectic forming of conceptions, and arises, according to him, by means of the moral and scientific activities which he regards as preliminary stages of philosophy; and the natural conceptions of the Stoics are not, as has already been shown, innate ideas; but, like scientific thoughts, are derived merely in a natural manner from experience. Knowledge here also has to develop itself from experience, and is attained and conditioned by intercourse with things. This attainment of knowledge was first denied by scepticism, which declared the relation of our conceptions to the things conceived to be unknowable, and made all our convictions exclusively dependent upon subjective bases. But if in this way, not a knowledge of the truth, but only belief in probability can be established, this belief takes the place of knowledge

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in him who has despaired of knowledge: and so there results, as the natural product of scepticism, reliance on that which is given to man directly in his self-consciousness, and is certain before all scientific enquiry; and this, as we shall find in Cicero and others, is the last foot-hold in the eclectic fluctuation among the various theories.[1] Now, we can ascribe, it is true, to this principle of immediate knowledge only a very limited value. What it maintains is at bottom merely this: that the final decision concerning the questions of philosophy belongs to unphilosophic consciousness; and though the universal thought that every truth has to approve itself to human self-consciousness is entirely established, yet this thought is here introduced under a perverted and one-sided aspect, and the whole presupposition of an immediate knowledge is untrue; closer observation shows that these supposed immediate and innate ideas have likewise been formed by manifold intermediate processes, and that it is only a deficiency of clear scientific consciousness, which makes them appear as immediately given. This return to the directly certain is so far to be regarded primarily as a sign of scientific decay, an involuntary evidence of the exhaustion of thought. But at the same time it presents one aspect which is not with-

[1] The eclecticism of the last century B.C. stands in this respect to the preceding scepticism in a similar relation to that which in modern times the philosophy of the Scottish school bore to Hume; it cannot be regarded, any more than the Scottish philosophy, as a mere reaction of dogmatism against doubt, but it is, like the Scottish philosophy, itself a product of doubt.

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out importance for the further course of philosophic development. As the interior of man is regarded as the place where the knowledge of the most essential truth originally has its seat, it is herein maintained in opposition to the Stoic and Epicurean sensualism, that in self-consciousness a specific source of knowledge is given: and though this higher knowledge is something actual, a fact of inner experience—though this rationalism, so far, again resolves itself into the empiricism of direct consciousness, yet it is no longer the mere perception from which all truth is derived. This appeal to the immediately certain may, therefore, be regarded as a reaction against the sensualistic empiricism of the preceding systems. But because it does not go beyond the internally given, as such, and is nevertheless wanting in any deeper scientific establishment and development, philosophic convictions are not recognised actually in their origin from the human mind, but appear as something bestowed on man by a power standing above him; and thus innate knowledge forms the transition to that form of philosophy which only goes back to self-consciousness, in order to receive in it the revelation of God. How the belief in external revelations and the leaning of philosophy to positive religion are allied to this, will be shown later on; at present it is enough to remark that, as a matter of fact, in a Plutarch, an Apuleius, a Maximus, a Numenius, and generally among the Platonists of the first two centuries after Christ, eclecticism and the philosophy of revelation went hand in hand.

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1. *Eclecticism contained the germs of the later scepticism,*

But as eclecticism in this aspect bore within it the germ of the mode of thought which so powerfully developed itself subsequently in Neo-Platonism; from another point of view it also contained the scepticism, to which in great part it owed its own origin. For that dissatisfaction which will not allow thought to be at peace in any definite system, has its ultimate basis in this: that it has not fully overcome doubt in the truth of dogmatic systems, that it cannot refuse to recognise doubt as to certain particulars, even though it does not approve of it in principle. Scepticism is consequently not merely one of the causes which have conditioned the development of eclecticism; eclecticism has it continually within itself as a phase of its own existence; and its own behaviour tends to keep it awake; the eclectic vacillation between different systems is nothing else than the unrest of sceptical thought, a little moderated by belief in the original consciousness of truth, the utterances of which are to be brought together out of the many and various scientific theories. The more superficially, however, doubt was stilled by a mode of philosophising so devoid of principle, the less was it to be expected that it should be for ever silenced. If the truth which could be found in no individual system was to be gleaned out of all systems, it required only moderate attention to perceive that the fragments of various systems would not allow themselves to be so directly united—that each philosophical proposition has its definite meaning only in its interconnection with

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some definite system; while, on the other hand, propositions from different systems, like the systems themselves, mutually exclude one another: that the contradiction of opposite theories annuls their authority, and that the attempt to make a basis out of the harmonising propositions of the philosophers, as recognised truth, is wrecked on the fact of their disagreement. Therefore after the scepticism of the Academy had been extinguished in the eclecticism of the first century before Christ, doubt arose anew in the school of Ænesidemus to lose itself only in the third century, simultaneously with all other theories, in Neo-Platonism; and no argument has greater weight with these new sceptics than that which the precedent of eclecticism readily furnished to them: the impossibility of knowledge is shown by the contradiction of the systems of philosophy; the pretended harmony of these systems has resolved itself into the perception of their mutual incompatibility.

ii. *And of Neo-Platonism.*

Justifiable, however, as the renewal of scepticism appears in relation to the uncritical eclectic treatment of philosophy, it could no longer attain the importance which it had had in the school of the new academy. The exhaustion of thought which can be shown even in this later scepticism, made a positive conviction too necessary, to allow many to return to pure doubt. If, therefore, the belief in the truth of the systems hitherto in vogue was shaken, and if even their eclectic combination could not entirely satisfy, while strength was wanting for

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the independent production of a new system; the general result was only that thought began to long more and more for a source of knowledge lying outside itself and science as hitherto existing; which was sought partly in the inner revelation of the Deity and partly in religious tradition. Thus the way was entered upon, which Neo-Platonism in the next period more definitely pursued, and so opened the last epoch of Greek philosophy.

CHAPTER II.

ECLECTICISM IN THE SECOND AND FIRST CENTURIES BEFORE CHRIST. THE EPICUREANS. ASCLEPIADES.

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I. *Eclecticism in the two centuries* B.C.

A. *The Epicureans.*

Of the schools of philosophy which had still maintained themselves on the theatre of history up to the middle of the second century before Christ, that of the Epicureans was, to all appearance, least affected by the scientific movement of the time. Though its juxtaposition with other intellectual tendencies had left upon it some traces, it does not seem to have been influenced by any of these tendencies in a deeper and more permanent manner. We must, no doubt, suppose that even the refutation of the objections which encountered the Epicurean doctrine on all sides, gave occasion to some new phases in the conception and establishment of it; that the system perhaps was further developed or modified in certain subordinate points by one and another of its adherents, and that alien doctrines may have been more thoroughly investigated by them than by Epicurus himself. But when we have followed up all the traces which might seem to indicate that individual disciples of Epicurus had departed, either formally or materially, from their master,[1] the sum

Relation of the later Epicureans to Epicurus.

[1] A collection and examination of these—the value of which we cannot but acknowledge, though we may not agree with all the inferences and conjectures deduced from them—has been undertaken by Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Cic.* i. 165–190, in connection with Düning, *De Metrodori vita et scriptis*, p. 18 *sqq.*

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total of such departures which can be historically proved is so inconsiderable that the well-known judgments of Seneca and Numenius concerning the orthodoxy of the Epicureans[1] scarcely suffers any limitation from them. We learn from Cicero[2] that the theory of Epicurus was not seldom conceived by his Roman compatriots as if he had ascribed an independent value to intellectual culture and to virtue; but Cicero himself adds, that this opinion is to be found in no scientific representative of the Epicurean philosophy.[3] He tells us of some Epicureans of his time who separated themselves from Epicurus[4] by their theory of a disinterested love to friends. It is doubtful, however, whether this should be regarded as a radical deviation from the Eudæmonism of Epicurus; the statement in question only asserts that friends may be loved for their own sake, even when they bring us no advantage;[5] but this does not exclude the idea that love to them is based upon the pleasure secured by intercourse

[1] *Phil. der Gr.* III. i. p. 379, 4.

[2] *Fin.* i. 7, 25; 17, 55; cf. *Phil. der Gr.* III. i. 445, 2.

[3] *Quos quidem* (he makes Torquatus, i. 17, 55, observe respecting them) *video esse multos sed imperitos.*

[4] *Phil. der Gr.* III. i. 460, 2. Hirzel, *loc. cit.* 170 *sq.*, supposes these 'later philosophers' to be Siro and Philodemus; but though this idea is not improbable in itself, it cannot be ascertained whether it has any foundation.

[5] Cic. *Fin.* i. 20, 69, thus expresses it: *Primos congressus* (and so forth) *fieri propter voluptatem, cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiam si nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur.*

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with them.[1] Such a difference cannot be considered of much importance. Nor are we justified in ascribing an alteration of the Epicurean theology to Philodemus, though he may, perhaps, have carried it further in certain particulars than Epicurus himself:[2] and though many deviations from pure Epicureanism are perceptible[3] in Lucretius, on closer inspection they will be found to refer to traits which merely concern the form of the poetic presentation, but do not affect the scientific theories.[4]

[1] In the *amare propter se ipsum*, as opposed to the love because of utility, there lies nothing more than the conception of an affection based upon delight in the person of a friend, and not merely on a calculation of benefits. But such an affection can also be based on the motive of pleasure. To this only the further argument can be applied: *Etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos ludicra exercendi aut venandi consuetudine adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri potuerit et justius!*

[2] *Phil. der Gr.* III. i. 435, 1.

[3] Ritter, iv. 89–106.

[4] Ritter thinks (p. 94) that Nature and her component parts are described by Lucretius at times in a much more vivid, and at times in a much more detailed manner, than the lifeless and uniform physics of the Epicureans would seem to have permitted. Nature is conceived by Lucretius as a Unity, which rules absolutely over all. The sun is described as an essence which generates the births of the world; the earth, in animated language, as the mother of living creatures; even the conjecture that the stars are living beings he does not cast aside (v. 523 *sqq.*). This last, however, according to v. 122 *sqq.*, cannot be his own opinion. What he really says is only the same that Epicurus (ap. Diog. x. 112) also expresses in one of his hypothetical explanations of Nature with reference to earlier theories (*Phil. der Gr.* I. 245). Concerning the remaining points, Ritter himself remarks that the descriptions of the poet can only be intended figuratively; and this is the case with the passages which perhaps would be most surprising to an Epicurean (v. 534 *sqq.*), where Lucretius defends the Epicurean theory that the earth is borne up by the air (Diog. x. 74) with the observation that the air is not oppressed by the earth, because the earth was originally of one piece with it, just as the weight of our limbs is no burden to us. Though this strongly reminds us of the Stoic sympathy of the universe, Lucretius will have nothing to do with that theory, and consequently designates the parts of the world only as *quasi membra*. In any case this thought is without result for the rest of his doctrine of Nature. He rather maintains, as his own opinion, the unity of Nature in the same sense as Epicurus—*i.e.* in the sense of an interdependence brought about by the identity of physical and mechanical laws. Moreover, the doctrine of the spontaneous movement of the atoms (Lucr. ii. 133, 251 *sqq.*) is Epicurean; and if, on the other hand, Lucretius is distinguished from Epicurus by maintaining more firmly the conformity to law of natural phenomena (Ritter, 97), we have already heard (*Phil. der Gr.* III. i. 397, 1) the explanation of Epicurus, which is confirmed by his whole system, that unconditional necessity rules in universal causes, if even individual phenomena admit of various constructions. That Lucretius (ii. 333 *sqq.*), departing from Epicurus, assumes as many original figures of the atoms as there are atoms (Ritter, p. 101) is decidedly a misapprehension, expressly contradicted by the passage ii. 478 *sqq.* (which Ritter misunderstands). How little the ethics also of the Roman Epicurean differed from those of the ancient Epicurean it would be easy to show from the points adduced by Ritter, p. 104 *sq.* The agreement of Lucretius with Epicurus has now been expounded in the most thorough manner by Woltjer in the treatise quoted, *Phil. der Gr.* III. i. 363, 1.

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The same may be said of other philosophers among the later Epicureans concerning whom tradition has told us something. It may be that Zeno of Sidon appropriated to himself in the school of Carneades[1] a more dialectic method, a mode of argument going more acutely and thoroughly into details than we find in Epicurus;[2] or that Apollodorus[3] was superior to Epicurus in historical knowledge and interest;[4]

[1] Cf. *l. c.* III. i. 373, 2.

[2] As Hirzel conjectures, *loc. cit.* 176 *sqq.*, appealing to Cicero, *Fin.* i. 9, 31; *Tusc.* iii. 17, 38; *N.D.* i. 18, 46 *sq.*

[3] The *κηποτύραννος* discussed in *Phil. der Gr.* III. i. 373.

[4] Hirzel, 183 *sq.*, who asserts, in support of this, that Apollodorus (according to Diog. vii. 181; x. 13) had composed a *συναγωγὴ δογμάτων*, and perhaps had justified in it the judgment of Epicurus on Leucippus (*Phil. der Gr.* I. 842, 6).

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we also find Demetrius meeting an objection of Carneades with an answer which leads us to suppose that this Epicurean had gained in logical training through the dialectic of the Academy.[1] But that either of these philosophers in any definition of doctrine materially diverged from the doctrine of their master is not maintained in any quarter. When Diogenes in his catalogue mentions certain men who were called Sophists by the genuine Epicureans, we have no reason to consider these Sophists as more than isolated offshoots of the school, or to argue from their appearance any deeply seated disagreements within it, or any change in its general character.[2]

[1] In the exposition (mentioned in Part III. i. 371, 4) ap. Sext. *Math.* viii. 348, where he maintains, in opposition to the statement about argumentation discussed at p. 504, and in harmony with the distinction of *γενικὴ* and *εἰδικὴ ἀπόδειξις*, that whenever a valid separate proof is adduced, the admissibility of the argument is at once shown. To him also, perhaps, belongs what is quoted by Sextus, viii. 330; in any case it shows what influence the objections of Carneades had made even upon the Epicureans.

[2] The words in Diog. x. 25 proceed thus: (after the enumeration of several immediate disciples of Epicurus) *καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ἐλλόγιμοι, ὧν ἦν καὶ Πολύστρατος . . . ὃν διεδέξατο Διονύσιος, ὃν Βασιλείδης. καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' ὁ κηποτύραννος γέγονεν ἐλλόγιμος, ὃς ὑπὲρ τὰ τετρακόσια συνέγραψε βιβλία· δύο τε Πτολεμαῖοι Ἀλεξανδρεῖς, ὅ τε μέλας καὶ ὁ λευκός. Ζήνων θ' ὁ Σιδώνιος ἀκροατὴς Ἀπολλοδώρου, πολυγράφος ἀνήρ· καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Λάκων, Διογένης θ' ὁ Ταρσεὺς ὁ τὰς ἐπιλέκτους σχολὰς συγγράψας, καὶ Ὡρίων καὶ ἄλλοι οὓς οἱ γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν.* Hirzel (*loc. cit.* 180 *sqq.*) believes that those named Sophists by the true Epicureans must include all the men here mentioned, from Apollodorus onwards, and therefore Apollodorus himself, the two Ptolemæi, Zeno of Sidon, &c. But this is very improbable, even from the mode of expression. Had such been the meaning of the writer, he must at least have said: *πάντας δὲ τούτους οἱ γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν*; and if he wished to express himself clearly even this would have been insufficient. He must have written: *τὸν δὲ Ἀπολλόδωρον καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν οἱ γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν.* As it is, we can only refer the words *οὓς ἀποκαλοῦσιν* either to the *ἄλλοι* alone, or to the *ἄλλοι* and the names immediately preceding them, Orion and Diogenes. Diogenes may in this case be the same person mentioned by Strabo, xiv. 5, 15; but this is not necessarily the case, as Strabo does not describe Diogenes as an Epicurean, and in the enumeration of the philosophers of Tarsus, the Epicurean Diogenes may have been passed over, as well as the far more celebrated Stoic Zeno. But the positive arguments against the supposition of Hirzel are still more decisive. According to this, the Epicurean with whom the mention of Diogenes originates must have pointed out a whole series of Epicurean philosophers, whom he himself calls *ἐλλόγιμοι* as men who were named Sophists by the genuine Epicureans, and consequently members of the school who had become unfaithful to its true spirit. How is this conceivable? As *ἐλλόγιμοι*, he had previously mentioned Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Polyænus, &c.—in a word, the most loyal disciples of Epicurus; and is it likely that he would immediately after apply the same predicate to those who were not acknowledged by the genuine Epicureans as belonging to their number? This is in itself very improbable, but the improbability becomes greater still when we find that among these Sophists are two of the most distinguished leaders, Apollodorus and Zeno. Hirzel has just before (p. 170) shown that only Epicureans of the purest type were selected as overseers of the school; and we can all the less concede to him that an Apollodorus and a Zeno—the former, as his designation proves, a highly-esteemed head of the school; the latter regarded by Cicero and Philodemus as one of the first Epicurean authorities—could have been, in the judgment of the *γνήσιοι* only pseudo-Epicurean Sophists.

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Asclepiades the physician not an Epicurean, but shows affinities with the school.

The famous physician, Asclepiades of Bithynia,[1] stands in another relation to the Epicurean school. He is not expressly enumerated among its members by any of the authors who mention him, but his theories would certainly lead us to suppose that he had some connection with the school. He is at one

[1] This physician, whose theories are constantly mentioned in the *Placita* ascribed to Plutarch, and in the writings of Galen, is counted by the pseudo-Galen, *Isag.* c. 4, vol. xiv. 683 K, as one of the leaders of the logical school of physicians. According to Sext. *Math.* vii. 20 *sq.*, he was a contemporary of Antiochus of Ascalon. *Vide* p. 30, note 1.

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with the Epicurean sensualism[1] in his statement that the sensible perception gives a true image of the thing perceived, but that reason, on the contrary, is not an independent source of knowledge, borrows all its content from perception, and has to be verified by perception.[2] In connection with this he found reason superfluous,[3] as an integral part of the soul, herein going beyond Epicurus: the soul, he said, was only the whole compounded of all the senses collectively;[4] to which he gave as

[1] Sext. *Math.* vii. 201. That there were also some who declared sensations to be the criterion of truth, Antiochus shows in these words: ἄλλος δέ τις ἐν τῇ ἰατρικῇ μὲν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἁπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἐπείθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν. Here Asclepiades the contemporary of Antiochus can alone be referred to.

[2] This and nothing else can be the real opinion of Asclepiades, on which the statement, λόγῳ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν, is based, for he, like Epicurus, denominated his atoms νοητοί, λόγῳ θεωρητοί (*infra*, p. 31 n. 5), and also believed in an intellectual knowledge of the hidden by means of inferences from the perceived. *Vide infra*, note 4.

[3] Sext. *Math.* vii. 202: Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν ἰατρὸν . . . ἀναιροῦντα μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. *Ibid.* 380, he says: οὐδὲ ὅλως ὑπάρχειν τι ἡγεμονικόν. Tert. *De an.* 15: *Messenius aliquis Dicæarchus, ex medicis autem Andreas et Asclepiades ita abstulerunt principale, dum in animo ipso volunt esse sensus, quorum vindicatur principale,* in favour of which Asclepiades argues that many animals live for a time without head or heart (the two parts regarded as seats of the ἡγεμονικόν). See next note.

[4] This conception results from the passage in Tertullian, which therefore compares Asclepiades with Dicæarchus; and still more distinctly from Cæl. Aurel. *De Morb. acut.* i. 14 (quoted by Fabric. on Sext. *Math.* vii. 380): *Asclepiades regnum animæ aliqua parte constitutum* (a ἡγεμονικόν dwelling in a definite part of the body) *negat. Etenim nihil aliud esse dicit animam quam sensuum omnium cœtum: intellectum autem occultarum vel latentium rerum per solubilem fieri motum sensuum, qui ab accidentibus sensibilibus atque antecedenti perspectione perficitur memoriam vero alterno eorum exercitio dicit.* Plut. *Plac.* iv. 2, 8 (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 496) expresses the same in the following words: Ἀσκλ. ὁ ἰατρὸς [ἀπεφήνατο τὴν ψυχὴν] συγγυμνασίαν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, whether the συγγυμνασία may mean 'practice,' or 'common practice, work done together,' or whether in a sense otherwise not demonstrable, corresponding with *cœtus*, it may denote a society of συγγυμναζόμενοι.

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substratum the πνεῦμα consisting of light and round particles.[1] He also traced the activities of memory and intellect to movements in the organs of sense.[2] If lastly the atomistic theory of Asclepiades[3] is primarily allied to that of Heraclides of Pontus,[4] it is not to be supposed that he arrived at this theory without the tradition of the atomistic system which was still living in the Epicurean school. The primary constituents of all things he held to be small bodies which were distinguished from the atoms of Democritus and Epicurus in that they were divisible. From all eternity they strike together in constant motion and split up into numberless parts, of which sensibly perceptible things consist.[5] But even in compound bodies their cease-

[1] Chalcid. *in Tim.* 213: *Aut enim moles* (ὄγκοι, *vide infra*) *quædam sunt leves et globosæ eædemque admodum delicatæ ex quibus anima subsistit, quod totum spiritus est, ut Asclepiades putat,* &c. On the analogous, though somewhat different definitions of Epicurus and Democritus, cf. *Phil. der Gr.* III. i. 418; also I. 808.

[2] His exact conception of this is not clear from the passage of Cælius Aurelius quoted in note 4, p. 30. The *solubilis motus* points to the idea that from a complex of motions, certain motions detach themselves, and that through these arise abstract presentations.

[3] On this subject cf. Lasswitz, who discusses it in his treatise on Daniel Sennert, p. 425 *sq.* (*Vierteljahrschr. für wissensch. Philos.* iii. 408 *sqq.*), for this German restorer of the atomistic philosophy (he died in 1637) allied himself chiefly with Asclepiades.

[4] *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. i. 886 *sq.*

[5] The most complete account of this theory is given by Cæl. Aurel. *loc. cit.*: *Primordia corporis primo constituerat atomus* (this is inaccurate; he did not call them so for the reason that they are not indivisible) *corpuscula intellectu sensa, sine ulla qualitate solita* (without colour, and so forth) *atque ex*

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less motion continues, so that nothing in any section of time, even the smallest, remains unchanged.[1] If

initio comitata (?) *æternum se moventia quæ suo incursu offensa mutuis ictibus in infinita partium fragmenta solcantur magnitudine atque schemate differentia, quæ rursum eundo sibi adjecta vel conjuncta omnia faciant sensibilia, vim in semet mutationis habentia aut per magnitudinem sui aut per multitudinem aut per schema aut per ordinem. Nec, inquit, ratione carere videtur quod nullius faciant qualitatis corpora* (that being without quality, generate bodies of definite quality); silver is white, whereas that which is rubbed off from it is black; the goat's horn is black, the sawdust of it white. These primeval bodies Asclepiades, like Heracleitus, called ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι (cf. the passages quoted, *Phil. der Gr.* II. i. 886, 3; where, however, in Eus. *Par. ev.* xiv. 23, 3, instead of μὲν ὀνομάσαντες, μετονομάσαντες is to be read, according to Diels, *Doxogr.* 252, 2). I previously understood the expression as applying to bodies not joined together—*i.e.*, not divisible; but I must concede to Lasswitz that the primitive atoms of Asclepiades are not this. The interpretations *locker*, 'loose' (therefore capable of separation), and *ungeordnet*, 'unordered,' seem to me, however, in point of language, questionable. I should, therefore, prefer to give to ἄναρμος the signification, 'not combined *with one another*' (so that each ὄγκος is separated from the other and moves itself for itself). That these ὄγκοι (as Epicurus had said of the atoms) are λόγῳ θεωρητοὶ and δι' αἰῶνος ἀνηρέμητοι, we are told by Sext. *Math.* iii. 5. He also speaks (viii. 220) of νοητοὶ ὄγκοι and νοητὰ ἀραιώματα. What Cælius Aurel. says of the shattering of the atoms receives confirmation from the words quoted by Lasswitz (p. 426) from the pseudo-Galen, *Introd.* c. 9, vol. xiv. 698 *k*: κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου ὄγκοι θραυστοὶ καὶ πόροι; and from Stob. *Ecl.* i. 350, according to which the predecessor of Asclepiades (Heraclides) declared θραύσματα to be the smallest bodies (the theories also ascribed to Heracleitus in the foregoing, and in the *Placita*, i. 13, 2—cf. ψηγμάτιά τινα ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ—seem, however, originally to belong to Heraclides). This divisibility of the ὄγκοι is referred to when Sextus (*Math.* x. 318) observes that Democritus and Epicurus represent things as arising ἐξ ἀνομοίων (*i.e.* τοῖς γεννωμένοις) τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν. Heraclides and Asclepiades, on the contrary, ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν παθητῶν δὲ καθάπερ τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων. The πόροι, which are side by side with the ὄγκοι, and have the same significance as the void beside the atoms, are also mentioned by Galen, *Theriac. ad Pis.* c. 11, vol. xiv. 250 K.

[1] Sext. *Math.* viii. 7. Plato ascribes true Being to the not-sensible alone, because sensible things are always in a state of Becoming: ποταμοῦ δίκην ῥεούσης τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε ταὐτὸ μὴ δύο τοὺς ἐλαχίστους χρόνους ὑπομένειν μηδὲ ἐπιδέχεσθαι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης, δύο ἐπιδείξεις διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς ῥοῆς (on account of the swiftness of the flow nothing can show itself twice).

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these theories had been attributed to an acknowledged member of the Epicurean school, they would no doubt contain a noteworthy departure from the doctrine of the master, but as Asclepiades is not described as an Epicurean, they only show in one individual case what seems in itself natural and probable, viz., that the influence of Epicureanism, as of other systems, was not strictly confined within the limits of the school.

CHAPTER III.

THE STOICS: BOËTHUS, PANÆTIUS, POSIDONIUS.

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B. *The Stoics.*

AMONG the remaining schools of philosophy, that of the Stoics was the first which, in partial divergence from its older teachers, admitted foreign elements. This occurred, however, subsequently to a still more considerable extent in the Academy, which, from the first century before Christ, was the chief seat of eclecticism. The Peripatetics seem, on the whole, to have preserved the tradition of their school in greater purity; but we shall find that some, even among them, were inclined towards an eclectic combination of that school with other standpoints.

In the school of the Stoics, the rise of eclecticism is connected with the names of Boëthus, Panætius, and Posidonius.

Supposed vacillation of the successors of Chrysippus concerning the final conflagration of the world.

Already at the beginning of the second century the successor of Chrysippus, Zeno of Tarsus, is said to have been perplexed as to one of the distinctive doctrines of his school—the doctrine of the destruction of the world—so that he left the question of its truth undecided:[1] and similarly, after him,

[1] Numen. ap. Eus. *Pr. ev.* xv. 18, 2. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus taught the doctrine of the conflagration of the world: *τὸν μὲν γὰρ τούτου μαθητὴν καὶ διάδοχον τῆς σχολῆς ζήνωνά φασιν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων.*

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Diogenes of Seleucia in his later years became doubtful about this dogma, which he had previously defended.[1] Neither of these statements, however, is satisfactorily attested;[2] though the thing is possible in itself, and we can easily explain it, especially in the case of Diogenes, if the objections of his disciples against the conflagration of the world had embarrassed him and caused him to refrain from expressing any decided opinion on the subject. As to Boëthus,[3] we know that he not only openly renounced the Stoic tradition on this point, but on other and more important questions approximated to the Peripatetic doctrine, so as to imperil the purity of his Stoicism.

Boëthus.

His deviations from pure Stoicism.

An example of this has already come before us in his doctrines concerning the theory of knowledge: for if he described Reason (*νοῦς*) and Desire as criteria[4] side by side with Perception and Science, he not only set up the Aristotelian *ἐπιστήμη* in the place of the Stoic *πρόληψις*,[5] but added to it and to Perception two other independent sources of knowledge, the recognition of which was not consistent

[1] Ps.-Philo. *Ætern. m.* c. 15, p. 248 *Bern.*: *λέγεται δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἡνίκα νέος ἦν συνεπιγραψάμενος τῷ δόγματι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως ὀψὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐνδοιάσας ἐπισχεῖν.*

[2] Neither of the witnesses speaks from his own knowledge, as they themselves tell us. We know not, therefore, on what their assertions are based. In regard to Zeno of Tarsus, the otherwise well-instructed author of the Philonic treatise cannot have been acquainted with any divergence of his from the school, or he would not have omitted to appeal to him.

[3] Concerning whom cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 46, 1.

[4] *Ibid.* III. i. 71, 1; 84, 1.

[5] *Ibid.* III. i. 74; 84 *sq.*; and concerning *ἐπιστήμη*, *ibid.* II. ii. 650.

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with the Stoic empiricism, though it perfectly harmonised with the Peripatetic doctrine.[1]

But the attitude of Boëthus to the Stoic theology is still more antagonistic. For although he held, with others, that God was an ethereal substance,[2] he would not admit that He dwelt in the world as its soul; and he consequently refused to describe the world as a living being;[3] he rather assigned the abode of the Deity to the highest sphere, and represented Him as working from thence upon the universe.[4] As to the reasons which determined the

[1] In respect to *νοῦς* this is shown in *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 190 *sqq.* Aristotle nowhere, indeed, describes the *ὄρεξις* as a source of presentations or cognitions; but he traces practical ends and aims partly to natural desires, and partly to the constitution of the will, on which must depend what we consider to be good (*l.c.* 582, 3; 586, 2; 631, 2; 653; cf. *Eth. N.* i. 7; 1098, *b*, 3).

[2] Stob. *Ecl.* i. 60: *Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο.* In his opinion of the soul also he remained faithful to the Stoic materialism.

[3] Diog. vii. 143. The Stoics declare the world to be living and animate: *Βόηθος δέ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον.* Philo, *Ætern. m.* c. 16, p. 251, *Bern.*: *ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεός*—if these words belong to the excerpt from Boëthus, which now appears to me most probable, at least according to the sense.

[4] Diog. vii. 148: *Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν*, which is to be understood in the same way as the corresponding definitions of other Stoics (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 137, 1, 2), the *ἡγεμονικὸν* of the world is said to have its seat in the purest part of the ether. This would not necessarily exclude the ancient Stoic doctrine that it spreads itself from thence through all the parts of the world. But in that case the world would be a living creature and the Deity its soul, which Boëthus did not allow. But if this conception be rejected, there remains only a motion of the world from without, and so far the extract given by Philo (*l.c.*) corresponds with the view of our Stoic: *ἕκαστα ἐφορᾷ [ὁ θεὸς] καὶ πάντων οἷα γνήσιος πατὴρ ἐπιτροπεύει, καὶ, εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, ἡνιόχου καὶ κυβερνήτου τρόπον ἡνιοῦχεῖ καὶ πηδαλιοῦχεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα, ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ, &c. παριστάμενος καὶ συνδρῶν ὅσα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διαμονὴν καὶ τὴν κατ' ὀρθὸν λόγον ἀνυπαίτιον διοίκησιν.*

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philosopher to this rejection of Stoic pantheism, tradition tells us nothing: the decisive cause must no doubt have lain in the fear of imperilling the sublimity and unchangeableness of God, if He were, according to His substance, connected with the world. In these theories Boëthus, in opposition to his school, agreed with Aristotle, but he essentially differs from him both in his materialism, and in the opinion that God not only directs and guides the universe from the ruling point, but stands beside every part of it, ready to help; whereas Aristotle denies to the Deity every activity directed to the world.[1] Boëthus is therefore seeking a middle course between the pantheism of the Stoics and the theism of Aristotle; like that which was subsequently attempted from the Peripatetic side in the 'Book of the Universe.'[2]

With this is connected Boëthus' contradiction of the doctrine of the conflagration of the world. Of the four arguments by which he opposes this doctrine,[3] the first shows that the destruction of the world must result without a cause, for outside the world there is nothing but the void, and in the world there is nothing which could bring destruction to it. The second seeks to prove, not altogether conclusively, that of all the different kinds of destruction[4] none

[1] *ἡλίῳ τε καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πλάνησι καὶ ἀπλανέσιν, ἔτι δ' ἀέρι καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ κόσμου παριστάμενος καὶ συνδρῶν* (Philo, *loc. cit.*).

[2] *Vide infra*, chapter v.

[3] According to Ps.-Philo, *l.c.* c. 16 *sq.*, p. 249–253, *Bern.* (952, C. *sq.* H., 503 *sq.* M.).

[4] *κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος* (as in the destruction of a figure), *κατὰ σύγχυσιν* (chemical mixture, cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 127, 1).

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could be applicable to the world.[1] The third maintains that after the destruction of the world the Deity would have no object for his activity, and must consequently sink into inaction; nay, if the Deity be the world-soul, he must himself be destroyed. Lastly, the fourth contends that, after the complete annihilation of the world, this fire must itself be extinguished for want of nourishment;[2] and then the new formation of the world would be impossible. But Boëthus had doubtless concluded from this not only that the world was imperishable, but also that it had no beginning;[3] he exchanged the Stoic cosmology not for the Platonic but for the Aristotelian theory, the doctrine of the eternity of the world: his departure from the Stoic dogma is here also a transition to that of the Peripatetics.

That Boëthus likewise opposed the Stoic belief in prophecy is not asserted;[4] his own utterances on this subject are confined to an enquiry concerning the prognostics of weather and similar things, the

[1] For that only is capable of division which is ἐκ διεστώτων, or ἐκ συναπτομένων, or only weakly united—not that which is superior to all else in force. An entire annihilation of the quality of the world is not maintained by the other view, for this is still to subsist in the form of fire. If finally all elements were simultaneously abolished through σύγχυσις, there would be a transition of the ὄν into the μὴ ὄν.

[2] Because as pure fire it could be neither ἄνθραξ nor φλόξ, but only αὐγή (on which cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 153, 2), and this would presuppose a luminous body.

[3] This appears especially from the third argument; the pseudo-Philo also (p. 249, 4) represents him as attacking the presupposition εἰ γενητὸς καὶ φθαρτὸς ὁ κόσμος.

[4] The contrary would rather seem to result from Cic. *Divin.* ii. 42, 88, according to which Panætius *unus e Stoicis astrologorum prædicta rejecit*; but this only implies that Boëthus did not expressly oppose the belief, not that he himself shared it.

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connection of which with the phenomena portended he sought to discover.[1]

Panætius: born in Rhodes, 180 B.C.

With Boëthus is associated his celebrated co-disciple Panætius,[2] not only in his opposition to the doctrine of the destruction of the world, but also in the independent attitude he assumed to the tradition of his school, and in his readiness to allow entrance to other views. This distinguished and influential philosopher, the chief founder of Roman Stoicism, was born, it would seem, about 180 B.C., in Rhodes,[3] and was introduced to the Stoic philosophy by Diogenes and Antipater.[4] He afterwards went to

[1] Cic. *Divin.* i. 8, 13: *Quis igitur elicere causas præsensionum potest? Etsi video Boëthum Stoicum esse conatum, qui hactenus* (*only* so far) *aliquid egit, ut earum rationem rerum explicaret, quæ in mari cœlove fierent.* Ibid. ii. 21, 47: *Nam et prognosticorum causas persecuti sunt et Boëthus Stoicus . . . et . . . Posidonius.* In both passages the emphasis falls on the *causæ prognosticorum*, the natural connection between prognostic and result.

[2] Van Lynden, *De Panætio Rhodio*, Leiden, 1802.

[3] Concerning his native place there is no doubt (*vide* Strabo, xiv. 2, 13, p. 655). On the other hand, we are told nothing of the year either of his birth or death, and they can only be approximately determined from the facts that he attended the discourses of Diogenes of Seleucia; in 143 B.C. as an openly-recognised philosopher, accompanied Scipio to Alexandria, and was no longer living after 110 B.C. Van Lynden places his life between 185–112 B.C. The *Ind. Herc. Comp. Col.* 51 (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 33, 2) names Nicagoras as his father, and in *Col.* 55 mentions his two younger brothers. That he was of good family, we know from Strabo, *l.c.* When Suidas, *sub voce*, distinguishes from the celebrated Panætius a second and younger Panætius, the friend of Scipio, this is merely a proof of his ignorance, as is abundantly shown by Van Lynden, p. 5 *sqq.*

[4] Diogenes is mentioned as his teacher in the *Ind. Herc. Col.* 51, 2; and by Suidas, Παναίτ.; Antipater, by Cicero, *Divin.* i. 3, 6. His piety towards the latter is praised by the *Ind. Herc. Col.* 60. Besides these, according to his own statement (ap. Strab. xiv. 5, 16, p. 676), he heard Crates of Mallos in Pergamus. Polemo also, the Periegete, is, on chrono-

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His residence in Rome.

Rome,[1] where he long remained an inmate of the household of Scipio Africanus, the younger.[2] Scipio and Lælius were his friends[3] and hearers, and he won over many zealous youths to Stoicism.[4] Scipio also chose him for his companion when in 143 B.C. he was sent at the head of a deputation to the East, and particularly to Alexandria.[5] After the death of Antipater, Panætius undertook the leadership of the school in Athens,[6] of which apparently he was the

Appointed head of the Stoic school in Athens.

logical grounds, regarded as his teacher rather than his disciple. The text of Suidas which asserts the latter (Πολέμ. Εὐηγ.) seems corrupt. Cf. Bernhardy *in loc.*, Van Lynden, 36 *sq.*

[1] Whether this occurred after the Alexandrian journey, and whether Panætius visited Rome of his own accord, or was invited there by others, tradition does not inform us. Plutarch (*C. Princ. Philosoph.* i. 12, p. 777) presupposes that Panætius was not in Rome when Scipio invited him to accompany him. But Scipio must have been already well acquainted with him to have given such an invitation.

[2] *Vide* the following note, and Cic. *Pro Mur.* 31, 66; Vell. Paterc. i. 13, 3. How long Panætius was in Rome we do not know; but as he came thither at latest after the Alexandrian journey, therefore in 142 B.C., and probably before that journey, and as, on the other hand, Rutilius Rufus, who died after 81 B.C., seems to have heard him in Rome (*supra*, p. 11, 3), which can scarcely have happened before 135–130 B.C., we must suppose that he worked here for a considerable number of years. Vellejus says that Scipio had him with him *domi militiæque*, and the *Ind. Herc. Col.* 56, 2, seems to speak as if he accompanied Scipio to the army.

[3] Cic. *Fin.* iv. 9, 23; ii. 8, 24. *Off.* i. 26, 90; ii. 22, 76. Gell, *N. A.* xvii. 21, 1. Suidas Παναίτ. Πολύβιος.

[4] *Vide supra*, p. 10 *sq.*

[5] Cic. *Acad.* ii. 2, 5; *Posidon.* ap. Plut. *l. c.*, and *Apophthegm. reg. et imp. Scrip. Min.* 13 *sq.* p. 200; Athen. xii. 549, d. (where Ποσειδώνιος is in any case a slip of the memory for Παναίτιος, which, however, is repeated xiv. 657 *sq.*). Cf. Justin. *Hist.* xxxviii. 8.

[6] *Ind. Herc. Col.* 53: διάδοχος ἐγένετο τῆς Ἀντιπάτρου σχολῆς. Cf. these further statements; that he died in Athens (Suid.); that he did not again return to Rhodes (Cic. *Tusc.* v. 37, 107); that he was offered the right of citizenship in Athens, but did not accept it (Procl. in *Hesiod.* Ἔ. καὶ Ἡμ. 707, no doubt after Plutarch); that there was in Athens a

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His learning and reputation.

head until about 110 B.C.[1] That he had previously been active in a similar capacity in his native city is not likely.[2] As teacher and author,[3] scholar and

society for common meals called Panætiasts (Athen. v. 186, *a*). The attempt of Scheppig, *De Posidon. Apam.* (Sondersh. 1869), p. 3 *sq.* to make Panætius the head of the Rhodian, and not of the Athenian school is settled by the foregoing, and by the proofs given *infra*, p. 42, 1, and p. 52, 3 (Mnesarchus and Dardanus).

[1] We cannot place his death much earlier, as, according to Cic. *Off.* iii. 2, 8, he lived after the composition of his work on Duty (which he cannot have written when he was very young), for 30 years; but especially because Posidonius could otherwise scarcely have been his disciple; nor can it have occurred much later, for Crassus, who came as quæstor to Athens found Mnesarchus there, and not Panætius (Cic. *De Orat.* i. 11, 45); and Crassus, born, according to Cicero, *Brut.* 43, 161, under the Consuls Q. Cæpio and C. Lælius (140 B.C.) could not have become quæstor before 110 B.C., but also not very long after that date. *Vide* Zumpt, *Abh. d. Berl. Acad.* 1842; *Hist. Phil. Kl.* S. 104 (80).

[2] Suidas (Ποσειδών Ἀπαμ.) presupposes this when he says of Posidonius: σχολὴν δ' ἔσχεν ἐν Ῥόδῳ, διάδοχος γεγονὼς καὶ μαθητὴς Παναιτίου. But Cicero, *Tusc.* v. 37, 107, reckons him among those *qui semel egressi nunquam domum reverterunt*; and on the other hand Suidas manifestly presupposes that Posidonius had been the immediate successor of Panætius in Rhodes, which according to the dates would only be possible if Panætius had been at the head of the Rhodian, and not the Athenian school, and had filled this post towards the end of the second century.

[3] Concerning his writings *vide* Van Lynden, p. 78–117, 62 *sqq.* The best known of these are the books περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 273, 3, 276 *sq.*), acknowledged, according to Cicero, to be the most profound work on that subject, the model of Cicero's own. There are also quoted a work on the schools of philosophy (π. αἱρέσεων), π. εὐθυμίας, π. προνοίας, a political treatise (Cic. *Legg.* iii. 6, 14) and a letter to Tubero. From the treatise π. προνοίας Cicero seems to have taken his criticism of astrology, *De Divin.* ii. 42, 87—46, 97. (Cf. *l. c.* § 88, 97; Schiche, p. 37 *sqq*; Hartfelder, p. 20 *sqq.* of his treatise *Die Quellen von Cic.*; Büch, *De Divin.* Freiburg, 1878). Hirzel supposes that treatise to be also the source of Cicero's *De Nat. De.* ii. 30, 75–61, 154, and he is probably right, while Schwenke (*Jahrb. für Philol.* 1879, p. 135 *sq.*), derives this section, with the rest of the book, from Posidonius π. θεῶν. The letter to Tubero may have been used by Cicero for the second book of the *Tusculanæ Disputationes* (cf. Zietzschmann, *De Tusc. Dis-*

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philosopher, he enjoyed great reputation,[1] and it is probable that no one since Chrysippus had worked with greater success for the spread of Stoicism.

His character as a philosopher.

The Stoic system, however, had undergone considerable alteration in his hands. Though Panætius agreed with its principles and found no part of it superfluous,[2] yet his own interest, consistently with the spirit of the period, was chiefly directed to the practical side of philosophy;[3] and he therefore endeavoured (herein departing from the usage of his school) to bring that aspect nearer to the general comprehension by presenting it in a more intelligible and attractive form.[4] But this practical interest, when the scientific objects are subordinated to it, always involves an attempt to harmonise and com-

put. Font. Halle, 1868); on the other hand the chief source of the first book of the *Tusculan. Disp.* is not, as Heine thinks (*De Font. Tusc. Disp.* p. 8 *sq.*), to be sought in a treatise of Panætius, whose view is directly opposed to that of Cicero; but, as Corssen says (*De Posid. Rhod.* Bonn, 1878), in a treatise of Posidonius.

[1] This, after what has been said, scarcely requires a special proof. Cicero, *e.g.*, calls him (*Divin.* i. 3, 6) *vel princeps ejus* [sc. *Stoicæ*] *disciplinæ*; (*Legg. l. c.*) *magnus homo et imprimis eruditus*; (*Fin.* iv. 9, 23) *imprimis ingenuus et gravis*; (*Off.* ii. 14, 51) *gravissimus Stoicorum*; the *Ind. Herc. Comp. Col.* 66, praises his many-sided knowledge, and mentions (*Col.* 68) the esteem in which he was held in Athens; in *Col.* 71 we are told of his honourable burial; Seneca, *Ep.* 33, 4, compares him and Posidonius with Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus.

[2] Which is evident from his title of *princeps Stoicorum*, and is confirmed by the quotations in Part III. i. 61, 3.

[3] A few physical propositions of Panætius have been handed down to us; but the greater number and the most characteristic of the quotations from him that we possess relate to anthropology, theology, and morality. Such of his writings as we know are either historical, ethical, or theological in their contents; whereas not a single dialectic definition has ever been quoted from him.

[4] Cic. *Fin.* iv. 28, 79; *Off.* i. 2, 7; ii. 10, 35.

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bine differing points of view. Panætius, therefore, assumed a freer attitude towards the doctrine of his predecessors: he would not withhold from other philosophers the recognition due to them: he highly esteemed Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, and Dicæarchus; and his admiration of Plato was so great that it might seem he would have preferred to follow him, rather than Zeno.[1] It cannot be expected of one who appreciated the merits of the earlier philosophers so impartially that he should adhere very scrupulously to the traditional doctrines of a single school: and, in fact, the many deviations of Panætius from the Stoic dogmas show that he treated the authority of his school, in respect to philosophy, with the same independence of judgment that he displayed in regard to questions of literary and historical criticism.[2] He disputed,

Relation to the Stoic doctrines.

[1] Cic. *Fin.* iv. 28, 79: *semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicæarchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. Tusc.* i. 32, 79 (*vide* p. 44, 1,). *Ind. Herc. Col.* 61: ἦν γὰρ ἰσχυρῶς φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλοαριστοτέλης, ἀ[λλὰ] καὶ παρε[νέδ]ω[κ]ε τῶν Ζηνων[είω]ν [τι διὰ τὴ]ν Ἀκαδημίαν [καὶ τὸν Περί]πατον. Of Crantor's treatise on Affliction he said (Cic. *Acad.* ii. 44, 135) it should be learned by heart, word for word. According to Proclus in *Tim.* 50 B, he seems to have written a commentary on Plato's *Timæus*; the words of Proclus, however, Παναίτ. καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν, do not necessarily imply that Proclus reckoned himself among the Platonists; they may also be translated: 'Panætius and some others belonging to the Platonic school.' Whether he or Posidonius is meant by the philosopher from Rhodes, whose remarks on Parmenides are mentioned by Proclus in *Parm.* vi. T. vi. 25, cannot be ascertained.

[2] Panætius is in this respect a remarkable exception to the careless manner in which the majority of the ancients are accustomed to deal with learned tradition. His opinion concerning the genuineness of the dialogues passing under the name of Socrates, and his judgment concerning the writ-

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like Boëthus, the doctrine of the conflagration of the world;[1] and though he only said that the

ings of Ariston of Chios are discussed in *Phil. d. Gr.* II. 1, 206, 1, and III. i. 35, 1. We see from Plutarch, *Arist.* 27, and Athen. xiii 556, *b*, that he was the first, as it seems, to dispute the story of the bigamy of Socrates, and from Plut. *Arist.* 1, that he corrected a wrong statement of Demetrius Phalerius concerning a χορηγία of Aristides through closer investigation. It is possible that he went too far in the matter of Ariston's writings, and his conjecture respecting Archelaus (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* I. 869) may have been unfounded, as in his opinion (*Schol. in Aristoph. Ran.* 1493 *sqq.*; cf. Hirzel, *Unters. zu Cic.* i. 234) that Aristophanes, *l. c.*, is speaking of another Socrates; but the fact that Panætius felt the necessity of critical examination, rarely felt in his time, is not affected by this. On the other hand it is in the highest degree improbable that the assertion of his having denied Plato's authorship of the *Phædo* rests upon any other ground than a misunderstanding, as I have shown concisely in Part II. *a*, 384, 1, and more at length in the *Commentationes Mommsenianæ*, p. 407 *sq.*; cf. 405.

[1] *Diog.* vii. 142: Παναίτιος δ' ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον. Philo, *Ætern. m.* c. 15, p. 248, *Bern.* (947, *C. H.* 497 M.): Βοηθὸς γοῦν ὁ Σιδώνιος καὶ Παναίτιος . . . τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας καταλιπόντες πρὸς θειότερον δόγμα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς ηὐτομόλησαν. Epiph. *Hær.* iii. 2, 9, p. 1090, D: Παναίτ. . . . τὸν κόσμον ἔλεγεν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρω. With this agrees in substance Stob. *Ecl.* i. 414 (Παν. πιθανωτέραν εἶναι νομίζει καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκουσαν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἰς πῦρ μεταβολήν), though we learn from it that Panætius after his manner had expressed himself guardedly upon the point; and it is also quite consistent therewith that in a dissertation on the universe probably emanating from Panætius (ap. Cic. *N. D.* ii. 45, 115, 46, 119), it is emphatically asserted that the whole universe is framed with a view to the *incolumitas mundi*, and that there is nothing in it so admirable *quam quod ita stabilis est mundus atque ita cohæret ad permanendum, ut nihil ne excogitari quidem possit aptius*, for a philosopher who assumed the destruction of the world would have had no occasion to lay the chief stress on its durability. Nor does Cic. *N. D.* ii. 33, 85, offer any contradiction: if the Stoic does not here come to a decision whether the world will last for ever or only for an indefinitely long period, this does not prove that he had no opinion about it, but only that it is not necessary for his immediate purpose, the proof of a world-forming intelligence to bring this question into discussion. It is true that the burning of the world is mentioned, *l. c.* 46, 118, with the comment: *de*

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eternity of the world was, in his opinion, more probable, we can see that he decidedly preferred the Platonic or Aristotelian theory to that of the Stoics.[1] In connection with this, he not only limited the soul's existence after death to a certain space of time, but denied it entirely.[2] It is also stated that

quo Panætium addubitare dicebant, but this mode of expression can neither be taken from Panætius nor from Cicero's Greek original, the author of which cannot have learned merely by hearsay that Panætius was sceptical concerning the world's conflagration. The words are to be laid to Cicero's account; nor can we infer from them that even he was uncertain about Panætius's real meaning, for he may have employed this form of language to represent Balbus as speaking from his recollection of oral communications (cf. *Comment. Mommsen.* p. 403 *sq.* That Arnob. *Adv. Nat.* ii. 9, names Panætius among the defenders of the conflagration theory is only a proof of his superficiality (cf. Diels, *Doxogr.* 172 *sq.*).

[1] For which of these two theories he had decided—whether he repudiated a beginning of the world as well as an ending—we are not told. The words, ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρω in Epiphanius, if they really emanate from Panætius, remind us of Plato's ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον (*Tim.* 33, A); and even the further statements do not carry us with certainty beyond the question of the *end* of the world, since the notion of having no beginning is not so completely included in the word ἀϊδιότης (nor in ἀφθαρσία) as having no end. But as the former was as a rule admitted by the Platonic school (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 876 *sq.*), and as the chief opponents of the Stoic doctrine since Zeno were the Peripatetics (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 836, 929), it seems to me probable that Panætius, when he had once given up the Stoic dogma, did not remain half way, but went over to the Peripatetic, which at that period was generally the next alternative.

[2] This is clear from Cic. *Tusc.* i. 32, 78. After the Stoic doctrine of a limited duration of the soul has been repudiated, Cicero continued: *M. Numquid igitur est causæ, quin amicos nostros Stoicos dimittamus, eos dico, qui ajunt animos manere, e corpore cum excesserint, sed non semper? A. Istos vero*, &c. *M. Bene reprehendis . . . credamus igitur Panætio a Platone suo dissentienti? quem enim omnibus locis divinum, quem sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum philosophorum appellat, hujus hanc unam sententiam de immortalitate animorum non probat. Vult enim, quod nemo negat, quicquid natum sit interire: nasci autem animos . . . alteram autem adfert rationem: nihil esse, quod doleat, quin id ægrum*

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he reckoned only six divisions in the soul instead of the traditional eight; for he included speech under the voluntary motions, and ascribed sexual propagation, not to the soul, but to the vegetable nature.[1]

esse quoque possit: quod autem in morbum cadat, id etiam interiturum: dolere autem animos, ergo etiam interire. Now, as I must concede to Heine (*De Fontibus Tuscul. Disput.* Weimar, 1863, p. 8 *sq.*), even an orthodox Stoic would necessarily oppose the doctrine of immortality so far as this maintains not merely continuance after death, but an eternal continuance. But that the objections of Panætius had not this meaning merely, we can see from the manner in which Cicero introduces them. He distinguishes Panætius, indeed, quite clearly from those Stoics *qui ajunt animos manere.* These are previously disposed of, and there then remain only two possible views, that of Plato and that of Panætius—that which maintains an endless duration of life after death, and that which altogether denies it. The same is evident even from the objections which Cicero quotes from Panætius, especially the second: he who represents souls as lasting till the conflagration of the world, must not base his denial of their unlimited existence on the argument that they become diseased, and therefore may also die, but on the view that they are not able to withdraw themselves from the fate of the whole; for they would succumb, according to his theory, not to internal disease and dissolution but to external force. When, at last, Panætius abandoned the conflagration of the world, he had no motive for attributing to the soul a limited existence; he had only the choice between absolute denial and unlimited acceptance of its immortality. From *Tusc.* i. 18, 42, it would appear that Panætius believed in the dissolution of the soul immediately after death. *Is autem animus,* it is here said, *qui, si est horum quatuor generum, ex quibus omnia constare dicuntur, ex inflammata anima constat, ut potissimum videri video Panætio, superiora capessat necesse est. Nihil enim habent hæc duo genera proni, et supera semper petunt. Ita, sive dissipantur, procul a terris id evenit; sive permanent et conservant habitum suum, hoc etiam magis necesse est ferantur in cælum.* When Cicero here remarks that 'the view of Panætius concerning the nature of the soul being presupposed, we must admit that it is exalted to Heaven even in the event of its being annihilated after death,' the inference is that it was Panætius himself with whom he had found the doctrine of such a dissolution of the soul.

[1] Nemes. *De Nat. Hom.* c. 15, p. 96: Παναίτιος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος τὸ μὲν φωνητικὸν τῆς καθ' ὁρμὴν κινήσεως μέρος εἶναι βούλεται, λέγων ὀρθότατα, τὸ δὲ σπερματικὸν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως. Tertull. *De An.* 14: *Dividitur autem [anima] in partes nunc in duas . . . nunc in quinque* (to which Diels, *Doxogr.* 205, from the parallel passage in Theodoret, *Cur. Gr. Aff.* v. 20, adds: *ab Aristotele*) *et in sex a Panætio.* Through Diel's luminous restoration of the text, those conjectures are set at rest which Zietzschmann (*De Tusc. Disp. Font.* 20 *sqq.*) connects with the reading of the manuscripts: *Nunc in quinque et in sex a Pan.* When this author infers from Cic. *Tusc.* ii. 21, 47 (*est enim animus in partes tributus duas, quarum altera rationis est particeps, altera expers*) that Panætius in his ethics followed the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of a rational and irrational part of the soul, I cannot agree with him. Even if Cicero in this section holds to Panætius throughout, it is still questionable how far this dependence extends to details, and it is perfectly conceivable that here and in what follows he himself may first have given this un-Stoical meaning to the truly Stoic notion of the dominion of the λόγος (*ratio*) over the ὁρμὴ (*temeritas*).

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The first of these theories is not of much importance;[1] but the second, in the discrimination of ψυχὴ from φύσις, presupposes a psychological dualism, which is originally foreign to Stoicism.[2] Panætius here follows the Peripatetic doctrine, as in his theory of immortality. We are again reminded of it in his ethics, by the division of the virtues into theoretical and practical.[3] That he also departed from the severity of the Stoics and approximated to the view of the Academy and the Peripatetics, in his definition of the highest good, is not probable;[4]

His Ethics.

[1] Ritter (iii. 698) undoubtedly seeks too much in it.

[2] The old Stoic psychology derives all practical activities from the ἡγεμονικόν, and in its materialism has no occasion for the distinction of ψυχὴ and φύσις; the latter is rather supposed to be changed into the former after birth (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 197, 1).

[3] Diog. vii. 92.

[4] Diogenes indeed maintains (vii. 128): ὁ μέντοι Παναίτιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ χρείαν εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ χορηγίας. But as this statement in regard to Posidonius (*vide* proofs in *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 214, 2; 216, 1) is decidedly false, Tennemann (*Geschichte*

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though he perhaps emphasised more strongly the distinction between desirable things and things to be rejected; and similarly the statement that he denied the ἀπάθεια of the wise,[1] may be traceable to the fact that he brought out more clearly the difference between the Stoic superiority over pain and the Cynic insensibility to it. But we may, nevertheless, gather from these statements that he tried to soften the asperities of the Stoic ethics, and among the many possible views of their propositions, gave the preference to those which brought him least into collision with the ordinary theory.[2] The same endeavour is also evinced by the tendency of his celebrated work on Duty, the prototype of that of Cicero; for this is expressly designed, not for the perfected

d. Phil. iv. 382) is right in saying that we cannot trust to it in regard to Panætius. According to Plutarch (*Demosth.* 13), he tried to prove that Demosthenes held the καλὸν alone to be a δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν: all the less would he himself have doubted it; and Cicero says expressly (*infra*, p. 49, 2) that he did not. When Ritter (iii. 699) finds in the proposition (ap. Sext. *Math.* xi. 73) that 'there is not only a pleasure contrary to nature, but a pleasure according to nature,' a manifest deviation from the older Stoicism, this seems questionable, both from the passage itself and the quotation in *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 219 *sq.* The Stoic doctrine is only that pleasure is a thing indifferent (ἀδιάφορον), with which the theory of a pleasure according to nature is not inconsistent; but when we understand by pleasure in the narrower sense the emotion of ἡδονή, it is like every emotion contrary to nature. Cf. *ibid.* III. 218, 3.

[1] A. Gell. xii. 5, 10: ἀναλγησία *enim atque* ἀπάθεια *non meo tantum, inquit, sed quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu prudentiorum hominum sicuti judicio Panætii . . . improbata abjectaque est.*

[2] This is seen from the circumstance that, according to Cicero, *Fin.* iv. 9, 23, in the letter to Tubero *de dolore patiendo*, he did not expressly declare that pain is not an evil, but only enquired: *Quid esset et quale, quantumque in eo esset alieni, deinde quæ ratio esset perferendi.*

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wise man, but only for those who are making progress in wisdom; and for this reason it does not treat of the κατόρθωμα, but only of the καθῆκον.[1] Meanwhile, however, all this contains no real deviation from the Stoic ethics, and what we are otherwise told concerning the moral doctrines of Panætius is in harmony with them.[2] His divergences from the traditional theology of his school were more considerable. It can only be the doctrine of Panætius which his scholar, Mucius Scævola, puts forward (like Varro[3] at a later period), when he says[4] that there are three classes of gods, those spoken of by the poets, by the philosophers, and by the statesmen. The narratives of the poets concerning the gods are full of absurd and unworthy fables: they represent the gods as stealing, committing adultery, changing themselves into beasts, swallowing their own children, &c. On the other hand, philosophic theology is valueless to states (it does not adopt itself to a

His theology.

[1] This at least results from Cicero's exposition, *Off.* iii. 3, 13 *sq.*; also ap. Sen. *Ep.* 116, 5, Panætius would first of all give precepts for those who are not yet wise. In reply to the question of a youth as to whether the wise man will fall in love, he says that they will both do better to keep themselves from such an agitation of the mind, as they are not yet wise men. For further details concerning the treatise of Panætius see *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 273, 276 *sq.*

[2] Ap. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* ii. 416, B; Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 114, he sets forth the claim of life according to nature; ap. Cic. *Off.* iii. 3, 11 *sq.*; 7, 34, he declares *id solum bonum, quod esset honestum*; ap. Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 112, he compares particular duties with marksmen aiming from different standpoints at the same mark. What Cicero quotes (*Off.* ii. 14, 51) has also an analogy (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 263) with the ancient Stoics. The utterance in *Off.* ii. 17, 60, is truly Zenonian.

[3] Cf. *infra*, chapter vii. *Varro.*

[4] According to Augustine, *Civ. D.* iv. 27, whose authority was doubtless Varro.

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public religion), for it contains many things the knowledge of which is either superfluous or prejudicial to the people; under the latter category, Scævola places the two propositions that many of the personages honoured as gods—as Heracles, Æsculapius, the Dioscuri—were merely human beings, and the gods are not in appearance as they are represented, for the true God has no sex, no age, and no members.[1] From this it naturally resulted[2] that the existing religion could only be regarded as a convenient public institution in the service of order, and that the authors of it must regulate themselves in their doctrine of the gods according to the power of comprehension in the masses. Though we do not know whether Panætius was the first to bring forward this discrimination of a threefold doctrine of the gods,[3] we must at any rate assume that in his theology, as in that of the men who for the most part adopted it—Scævola, Varro, and Seneca—a thoroughly free attitude to the popular religion found expression and was justified: though it is not known that either of them, in the allegorical interpretation of myths, which was so much in favour with the Stoics and from which

[1] Among those portions of philosophical theology which are unnecessary for the people, concerning which Augustine is silent, we must reckon the purely philosophic doctrines, incomprehensible to him.

[2] Varro says this more definitely.

[3] In the *Placita* (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 317, 3) this is treated as belonging to the Stoics universally; but the Stoic from whom the author of the *Placita* here takes his excerpt can only have belonged to the later period, which is also indicated by the appeal to Plato, i. 6, 3.

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no Stoic could ever entirely escape,[1] went beyond the most general determinations. Panætius placed himself in open opposition to the Stoic tradition, on a point which the school was accustomed to consider of the highest importance—namely, in his disbelief of soothsaying, mentioned above:[2] herein, he seems to have accepted the criticism of Carneades.[3] We cannot, however, on this account convict him of desertion from the Stoic principles,[4] since the Stoa of that time acknowledged him as one of its members.[5] His relation to his school is, nevertheless, of quite another kind from that of Antiochus to the later Academy: he remained true in the main to its doctrine; yet in his theories, and his attitude towards the earlier philosophers he unmistakably tends to an understanding with points of view regarding which Stoicism had hitherto been accustomed to maintain a purely hostile position.[6]

[1] Vide *Phil. d. Gr.* III. p. 325, with which cf. the quotations from Varro, *infra* chap. vi. end.

[2] Even on this point the testimonies are not quite unanimous. Diogenes (vii. 149) says simply: ἀνυπόστατον αὐτήν [τὴν μαντικὴν] φησι. Epiphan. *c. Hær.* III. 2, 9: τῆς μαντείας κατ' οὐδὲν ἐπεστρέφετο. On the other hand, Cicero says, *Divin.* i. 3, 6: *Nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit.* Similarly *Acad.* ii. 33, 107. Meanwhile we see from *Divin.* i. 7, 12, that he propounded his doubts pretty decidedly, and from *Divin.* ii. 42, 88; 47, 97 (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 340, 1, and *supra*, p. 42, 1) that he alone among the Stoics positively discarded, at any rate, astrological soothsaying.

[3] Cf. Cic. *Divin.* i. 7, 12: *Quare omittat urgere Carneades, quod faciebat etiam Panætius requirens, Juppiterne cornicem a læva, corvum ab dextera canere jussisset.*

[4] Epiphanius is entirely in the wrong when he adds, after the words quoted in the previous note: καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν λεγόμενα ἀνῄρει. ἔλεγε γὰρ φλήναφον εἶναι τὸν περὶ θεοῦ λόγον.

[5] *Supra*, p. 42, 2.

[6] Some other opinions quoted from Panætius are unimportant

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Contemporaries and disciples of Panætius.

Heraclides.

Sosigenes.

That Panætius, in adopting this mode of thought, did not stand alone among the Stoics of that time, is proved, not only by what we have seen above of the deviations of Boëthus from the Stoic doctrine, but also by what we are told of his fellow disciples, Heraclides and Sosigenes. The former opposed the Stoic proposition concerning the equality of all faults;[1] the latter, like others, is said to have attempted, not without inconsistencies, to combine the Aristotelian theory of the mingling of substances with that of Chrysippus.[2] But we know nothing further of either of these contemporaries of Panætius. In his own school we may suppose that the conception and treatment of the Stoical doctrine, which he himself favoured, was predominant. But here, again, we have to regret the meagreness of the historical tradition. Though we are acquainted with the names of many of his numerous disciples,[3] Posidonius is the only one concerning

so far as his character as a philosopher is concerned. Van Lynden (72 *sq.*) mentions among these his opinion respecting comets (Sen. *Nat. Qu.* vii. 30, 2); his theory that Attica, on account of its healthy climate, produced gifted men (Procl. *in Tim.* 50 *c.*, following Plato, *Tim.* 24, *c.*); the statement that the torrid zone is inhabited (Ach. Tat. *Isag. in Petav. Doctr. Temp.* iii. 96).

[1] Diog. vii. 121.

[2] Alex. Aphr. *π. μίξεως* 142, a. m.: Of the Stoics after Chrysippus, *οἱ μὲν Χρυσίππῳ συμφέρονται* (especially in regard to the mixture, for which cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. 126 *sqq.*) *οἱ δέ τινες αὐτῶν, τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους δόξης ὕστερον ἀκοῦσαι δυνηθέντες, πολλὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ὑπ' ἐκείνου περὶ κράσεως καὶ αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν. ὧν εἷς ἐστι καὶ Σωσιγένης, ἑταῖρος Ἀντιπάτρου* (cf. *ibid.* III. i. p. 48). Because they could not, on account of their other presuppositions follow Aristotle entirely (this seems the sense of the imperfect text), they fell into contradictions.

[3] Among these the following names should be mentioned: (1) Greeks: Mnesarchus, of Athens, who had also heard

whose opinions we possess any details. Of the successor of Panætius, Mnesarchus, we can only con-

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Diogenes and Antipater, the successor of Panætius (Cic. *De Orat.* i. 11, 45; cf. 18, 83; *Ind. Herc. Comp. Col.* 51, 4; 78, 5; *Epit. Diog.* cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 33, 2), who likewise heard Antiochus in Athens (Cic. *Acad.* i. 22, 69; Numen. ap. Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xiv. 9, 2; quoting from him Augustin. c. *Acad.* iii. 18, 40). Cicero (*l.c.* cf. *Fin.* i. 2, 6) calls him and Dardanus *tum principes Stoicorum*. From *Ind. Herc. Col.* 51, 53, 78, cf. *Epit. Diog.*, it follows that Dardanus was likewise an Athenian and a disciple of Diogenes, Antipater, and Panætius. As he was at the same time called the successor of Panætius, he would seem to have conducted the school in common with Mnesarchus. Their successor was probably (as Zumpt supposes, *Abh. d. Berl. Acad. Hist. Phil. Kl.* 1842, p. 105) Apollodorus of Athens, whom Cicero describes as a contemporary of Zeno the Epicurean (*N. D.* i. 34, 93) and the *Ind. Herc. Col.* 53, names among the disciples of Panætius, but who is to be distinguished from the Seleucian before mentioned, with whom Zumpt confuses him. His leadership of the school must have fallen in the beginning of the first century, and perhaps even began before the end of the second. Apollonius of Nysa, in Phrygia, *τῶν Παναιτίου γνωρίμων ἄριστος* (Strabo, xiv. 1, 48, p. 650), of whom nothing further is known. Asclepiodotus, of Nicæa (*Ind. Herc. Col.* 73). Damocles of Messene (*ibid.* 76, 4). Demetrius the Bithynian (*Diog.* v. 84; *Ind. Herc. Col.* 75), with whom his father Diphilus is also mentioned as a Stoic. To him belong, as it appears, the two epigrams in *Anthol. Gr.* ii. 64, *Jac.* Dionysius of Cyrene, a great geometrician (*Ind. Herc.* 52). Georgius of Lacedæmon (*Ind. Herc.* 76, 5). Hecato of Rhodes, whose treatise on Duties, dedicated to Tubero, is quoted by Cicero, *Off.* iii. 15, 63; 23, 89 *sqq.* From the same treatise, if not from a separate work of his own on Benevolence, Seneca seems t have taken the greater part o what he quotes from him (Sen. *Benef.* i. 3, 9; ii. 18, 2, 21, 4; iii. 18, 1; vi. 37, 1; *Ep.* 5, 7; 6, 7; 9, 6. Several other works, some of them comprehensive, are quoted by Diogenes (see his Index), who, according to the epitome (in which Rose rightly substitutes Ἑκατ. for Κάτων), had dedicated to him his own biography. The Bithynians Nicander and Lyco (*Ind. Herc.* 75, 5; 76, 1). Mnasagoras (*Epit.* D). Paramonus of Tarsus (*Ind. Herc.* 74, 77). Pausanias of Pontus (*ibid.* 76, 1). Plato of Rhodes (*Diog.* iii. 109). Posidonius (*vide infra*). Sosus of Ascalon (*Ind. Herc.* 75, 1; Steph. Byz. *De Urb.* Ἀσκ.), doubtless the same after whom Antiochus of Ascalon, the Academician, had named a treatise (*infra*, p. 86, 2). Perhaps after the death of Panætius he

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jecture that the Stoicism which his pupil Antiochus (*vide infra*) found it so easy to combine with the

had still belonged to the school of Mnesarchus and Dardanus, (which Antiochus also visited), as an older member. Sotas of Paphos (*Ind. Herc.* 75, 1). Stratocles of Rhodes, described by Strabo (xiv. 2, 13, p. 655) as a Stoic, and by the *Ind. Herc.* 17, 8, cf. 79, as a disciple of Panætius and author of a work on the Stoic school. Timocles of Knosos or Cnidus (*Ind. Herc.* 76, 2). Antidotus also appears to have belonged to the school of Panætius or Mnesarchus, as, according to *Ind. Herc. Col.* 79, Antipater of Tyre, seems at first to have been his disciple and afterwards the disciple of Stratocles. Also the poet Antipater of Sidon (*Diog.* iii. 39), of whom the *Anthology* contains many epigrams (*vide* Jacob. *Anthol. Gr.* xiii. 846), belongs to the generation after Panætius. According to Cicero (*De Orat.* iii. 50, 194) he was already known about 92 B.C., and still living; and the same author refers to an event in his life (*De Fato*, 3, 5), which Posidonius would seem to have quoted. Diotimus, or Theotimus, must have been a contemporary, or a little later; the same who, according to *Diog.* x. 3, forged immoral letters with the name of Epicurus (perhaps also the same person that is quoted by Sext. *Math.* vii. 140); for, according to Athen. xiii. 611, *b*, he was executed for this at the instance of Zeno the Epicurean (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 402). Concerning Scylax of Halicarnassus, celebrated as an astronomer and politician, we learn from Cic. *Divin.* ii. 42, 88, that he was a friend of Panætius, and, like him, an opponent of astrology. That he belonged to the school of the Stoics, is not, however, said. In regard to Nestor of Tarsus, it is not quite clear whether he was a fellow disciple or a disciple of Panætius, or lived at a later time. Strabo (xiv. 514, p. 674) mentions him after Antipater and Archedemus and before the two Athenodori (discussed *infra*, p. 71); the *Epitome* of Diogenes, side by side with Dardanus and other disciples of Diogenes of Seleucia, before Antipater. On the other hand, according to Lucian, *Macrob.* 21, the Stoic Nestor of Tarsus, had been the teacher of Tiberius, which, as a contemporary of Panætius, in spite of the ninety-two years life here attributed to him, he could not possibly have been. We might conjecture that the so-called Lucian had mistaken the Stoic Nestor for the philosopher of the Academy of the same name (mentioned *infra*, p. 102, 1), the teacher of Marcellus (who may also have instructed Tiberius), and that the Stoic was a contemporary of Panætius. Between Nestor and Dardanus the *Epitome* introduces a Basilides. This, however, was probably not the teacher of Marcus Aurelius (*infra*, ch. viii.) but an otherwise unknown

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doctrine of the Academy already approximated to that doctrine in his own exposition of it;[1] and that his views resembled those of his master on other points besides psychology, of which this is expressly stated.[2] Of Hecato, we know that he considerably departed from the strict ethical doctrine of the Stoics

member of the school of Diogenes; for the former could not have been placed here, and was no doubt earlier than the source of the Stoic biographies of the Laertian.—Besides the Greeks, there were the Romans whom Panætius had for disciples in Rome, and some of them also perhaps afterwards in Athens. The most important of these, Q. Ælius Tubero, Q. Mucius Scævola, C. Fannius, P. Rutilius Rufus, L. Ælius, M. Vigellius, Sp. Mummius, have been already named (*supra*, p. 10 *sq.*). Further we may mention: A certain Piso, of whom we know nothing more (*Ind. Herc. Col.* 74, 6), but according to the theory of Comparetti he was the L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, who was consul in 133 B.C.; Sextus Pompejus (Cic. *De Orat. l. c.* and i. 15, 67; *Brut.* 47, 175; *Off.* i. 6, 19; *Philipp.* 12, 11, 27), a distinguished authority on civil law, geometry, and the Stoic philosophy; and L. Lucilius Balbus (*De Orat.* iii. 21, 78: *Brut.* 42, 154); for that the two last owed their Stoicism to Panætius is most probable. On the other hand, Q. Lucilius Balbus (Cic. *N. D.* 6, 15) seems to be too young for this. When, therefore, we hear in *De Orat.* iii. 21, 78 (supposed date 91 B.C.), of two Balbi who were Stoics, one of these must be meant together with a third of the same name, Besides these the *Ind. Herc. Col.* 74 names the Samnites Marcius and Nysius; which latter introduced the σπουδαιότατοι (in distinction from the σπουδαῖοι) as a separate class.

[1] Nothing else has ever been quoted from him except an utterance against unphilosophical rhetoric (ap. Cic. *De Orat.* i. 18, 83), a logical observation (ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 436), and a definition of God (*ibid.* 60). These passages contain nothing divergent from the general Stoic doctrine.

[2] Galen, *H. Phil.* 20 (Diels, *Doxogr.* 615): Μνήσαρχος δὲ τὴν Στωικῶν ὑπόληψιν ἐπικρίνων τὸ φωνητικὸν (καὶ add. D.) τὸ σπερματικὸν περιείλεν οἰηθεὶς τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως ταῦτα (μὴ add. D. p. 206) μετέχειν (Panætius did not reckon it according to p. 46, 1, *supra*, as belonging to the ψυχή), μέρη δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς φήθη μόνον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, the latter being naturally again divided into the five senses, with which we come back to Panætius' six faculties of the soul.

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in its application to individual details;[1] in this respect he was certainly anticipated by Diogenes; but tradition tells us nothing further of these philosophers.

Posidonius.

Rather more has been communicated to us respecting Posidonius,[2] a Syrian of Apamea,[3] whose long activity seems to have extended over, or nearly over, the first half of the first century.[4] A disciple

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 263, 2.

[2] Bake, *Posidonii Rhodii Reliquiæ Doctrinæ*: Leiden, 1810; Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Græc.* iii. 245 *sqq.*; Scheppig, *De Posid. Apam. Rerum Gentium Terrarum Scriptore*: Sondersh. 1869.

[3] Strabo, xiv. 2, 13, p. 655; xvi. 2, 10, p. 753; *Athen.* vi. 252, *e.*; Lucian, *Macrob.* 20; Suidas, *sub voce.*

[4] More precise information we do not possess. Three data may be made the basis of an approximate calculation: (1) that Posidonius was the disciple of Panætius; (2) that he lived to be eighty-four years old (Lucian, *l. c.*); and (3) that, according to Suidas, he came to Rome under the consulate of M. Marcellus (51 B.C.). Accordingly Bake, and subsequently almost all the authorities, believe that he was born in 135 B.C. and died in 51 B.C. But the statement of Suidas (notwithstanding Scheppig, p. 10) seems to me suspicious; partly because it is not probable that Posidonius as an old man of more than eighty years journeyed a second time to Rome; partly because Suidas speaks as if this visit of Posidonius to Rome were the only one, or the most known (ἦλθε δὲ καὶ εἰς Ῥώμην, ἐπὶ Μάρκου Μαρκέλλου), and thus shows himself (as in the statement discussed *supra*, p. 41, 2) to be imperfectly informed as to Posidonius; and partly because we should necessarily expect to find some trace of his presence in Rome in Cicero, all of whose philosophical writings, and a great part of his letters, were written at a later time. Perhaps the circumstance that under M. Marcellus the league of the Rhodians with Rome was renewed (Lentulus, in *Cic. ad Famil.* xii. 15)—possibly, however, a merely clerical error—may have caused the journey which occurred in the last consulate of Marius (*infra*, p. 57, 2) to be placed under that of Marcellus. Müller (*l. c.* p. 245) believes Posidonius to have been ten years younger than he is represented according to the ordinary theory. He bases this partly on the assertion of Athen. xiv. 657, *f.*, that Strabo, B. vii., said that he had known Posidonius; partly on Strabo, xvi. 2, 10, p. 753 (Ποσειδ. τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσόφων πολυμαθέστατος); partly on Plut. *Brut.* i., where something is quoted from Posido[illegible] which seems to have [illegible] written after Cæsar's death. But the last is not correct; the quotation from Posidonius contains no allusion to Cæsar's murder. From the καθ' ἡμᾶς we can only infer at most that the lifetime of Posidonius had touched that of Strabo, which would also have been the case if Posidonius had died in 50 B.C. Meantime Wyttenbach in Bake, p. 263 *sq.*, shows that the expression is not seldom used, even by Strabo in a wider sense. The acquaintance of Strabo with Posidonius may still be held without placing the death of Posidonius much beyond 50 B.C. For as Strabo (*vide infra*, p. 73, *n.*) went to Rome as a boy before the year 44, perhaps (as Scheppig, p. 11 *sq*, thinks, agreeing with Hasen-Müller, *De Strab. Vita*, 18) in 46–7, or even in 48 B.C., he might possibly have seen the Rhodian philosopher in his later days. Scheppig therefore places his birth in 130 B.C. and his death in 46 B.C. Even on this assumption sufficient time would not be found for the instruction which Posidonius received from Panætius. It is therefore questionable whether we can depend upon the statement of Athenæus. This statement occurs at the same place where Athenæus also maintains that Posidonius had been with Scipio in Egypt (*supra*, p. 40, 5), and may be founded upon a mistake as well as the latter statement. It relates, perhaps, not to a passage in the last part of Strabo's seventh book, but to c. 3, 4, p. 297 (ἐκ τε ὧν εἶπε Ποσειδώνιος), or c. 5, 8, p. 316, where a report of Posidonius is quoted concerning an event that occurred in his period of office, which an inaccurate recollection might have represented to Athenæus as an oral communication. But if the two statements which occasioned the death of Posidonius to be placed in or before 51 B.C., concerning his visit to Rome under Marcellus and his meeting with Strabo, are both uncertain, the possibility is not excluded that he may have been born some years before 135 B.C. and may have died before 51 B.C.

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of Panætius,[1] he also visited the countries of the West, as far as Gades,[2] but not to seek a sphere for his

[1] Cic. *Off.* iii. 2, 8; *Divin.* i. 3, 6; Suid. *vide supra*, p. 41, 2.

[2] The traces of this journey are preserved in Strabo's quotations from Posidonius. We here see that Posidonius remained a long time in Spain, especially at Gades (iii. 1, 5, p. 138; c. 5, 7–9, p. 172, 174; xiii. 1, 66, p. 614); from thence he coasted along the African shores to Italy (iii. 2, 6; xvii. 3, 4, p. 144, 827); that he visited Gaul (iv. 4. 5, p. 198), Liguria (iii. 3, 18, p. 165), Sicily (vi. 2, 7, p. 273), the Lipari islands (vi. 2, 11, p. 277), the east coast of the Adriatic Sea (vii. 5, 9, p. 316). That he did not neglect this opportunity of visiting Rome may be taken

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teaching;[1] this he found in Rhodes,[2] where he was so completely naturalised that he is frequently called a Rhodian.[3] His name attracted numerous scholars, and especially Romans; therefore, although he never himself taught in Rome, he must certainly be reckoned among the men who did most for the spread of the Stoic philosophy among the Romans;[4]

for granted. He came a second time from Rhodes under the last consulate of Marius (86 B.C.) on business to Rome (Plut. *Mar.* 45), while, on the other hand, the supposed visit in the year 51 seems to me, as I have shown, improbable.

[1] At any rate, we have not the slightest intimation of such a design. The chief purpose of this journey rather consisted, as far as we can gather, in geographical and historical investigation. The date seems to be the beginning of the first century, soon after the war with the Cimbri; cf. Strabo, vii. 2, 2, 293. For further conjectures, *vide* Scheppig, p. 4 *sqq.*

[2] At what time he went to Rhodes and what induced him to settle there, we are not told; but as the journey in the west must have consumed several years, it is to be supposed that he only commenced his activity as a teacher subsequently.

[3] Athen. vi. 252, *e*; Luc. *Macrob.* 20; Suid. From Luc. *l. c.*; Strabo, xiv. 2, 13, p. 655; vii. 5, 8, p. 316; Plut. *Mar.* 45; we find that he received the Rhodian citizenship, and filled public offices—even that of a Prytanis.

[4] We can at once perceive this from the manner in which Cicero mentions him, treating him throughout as a man well known to his Roman readers; cf., for example, *N. D.* i. 44, 123: *Familiaris omnium nostrûm Posidonius.* He himself had heard him in Rhodes (Plut. *Cic.* 4; Cic. *N. D.* i. 3, 6; *Tusc.* ii. 25, 61; *De Fato*, 3, 5; *Brut.* 91, 316), and kept up a constant connection with him (*Fin.* i. 2, 6: *Legimus tamen Diogenem*, &c., *in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium*). In the year 59 B.C. he sent Posidonius the memorial of his consulate to revise, but Posidonius declined the proposition, as the memorial could gain nothing by it (*Ep. ad Att.* ii. 1). This is the last definite date in the life of Posidonius. Previously Pompey had made the acquaintance of the philosopher, and given him repeated proofs of his esteem (Strabo, xi. 1, 6, p. 492; Plut. *Pomp.* 42; Cic. *Tusc. l. c.*; Plin. *H. N.* vii. 112). The story of Pompey's visit to him, which Cicero (*Tusc. l. c.*) cites as a proof of Stoic fortitude under sufferings, is well known. He was also acquainted with the older disciple of Panætius, Rutilius Rufus (Cic. *Off.* iii. 2, 10).

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even at a later period he was regarded as one of the first Stoic authorities,[1] and his numerous writings were among the scientific works most read.[2]

His philosophic tendencies.

In his conception of Stoicism, Posidonius follows in the main the tendency of his teacher Panætius. In critical acuteness and freedom of spirit he stands indeed as far behind Panætius[3] as he excelled him in erudition;[4] and he consequently did not oppose

[1] Seneca repeatedly names him as such (*Ep.* 33, 4; 104, 21; 108, 38), together with Zeno, Chrysippus, and Panætius; and in *Ep.* 90, 20, he says of him: *Posidonius, ut mea fert opinio, ex his, qui plurimum philosophiæ contulerunt.*

[2] Concerning the writings known to us, cf. Bake, 235 *sqq.*; Müller, 248 *sq.*; on the geographical and historical writings, Scheppig, 15 *sqq.* There are more than fifty of them, some of them extensive works. What a mine of knowledge and learning the later authors possessed in them, we see from the numerous quotations in Cicero, Strabo, Seneca, Plutarch, Athenæus, Galen (*De Hippocratis et Platonis Placitis*), Diogenes, Stobæus, &c. But, no doubt, much besides has been transferred without acknowledgment to other expositions.

[3] Posidonius shows himself, as we shall find, very credulous, not merely in his defence of soothsaying, but in other cases where he accepts fabulous statements too easily, for which Strabo occasionally censures him (ii. 3, 5, p. 100, 102; iii. 2, 9, 147; iii. 5, 8, 173; cf. also xvi. 2, 17, p. 755). What Scheppig (p. 42 *sq.*) observes in his defence is not convincing to me, and when he says that the facility with which Posidonius appropriates the most fabulous narratives about fulfilled prophecies does not signify much, he forgets that a person who accepts the most improbable stories without competent authority cannot possibly be a critical investigator of history.

[4] There is but one voice among the ancient authorities concerning the comprehensive learning of Posidonius. Strabo (xvi. 2, 10, p. 753) calls him: ἀνὴρ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσόφων πολυμαθέστατος; and Galen says (*De Hippocr. et Plat.* viii. 1; vol. v. 652 *k*): Ποσειδώνιος ὁ ἐπιστημονικώτατος τῶν Στωϊκῶν διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι κατὰ γεωμετρίαν. His knowledge of geometry is also praised by Galen (iv. 4, p. 390). Stray portions of his geometrical works are to be found in Proclus (Bake, p. 178 *sqq.*; Friedlein's *Indeæ*). A proof of his astronomical knowledge is the globe of the heavens, which Cicero describes, *N. D.* ii. 34, 88. Of his geographical enquiries

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the tradition of his school with the same independence as his master did. In regard to several important points in which Panætius deserted the old Stoic doctrine, Posidonius returned to it. He held to the dogma of destruction of the world by fire;[1] and he added some further arguments and theories to the ingenious devices invented by his predecessors for the defence of soothsaying:[2] for he ascribed a

(Bake, 87 *sqq.*; Scheppig, 15 *sqq.*) we have evidence in Strabo's numerous quotations. Concerning the enquiries into natural history which he combined with his geographical descriptions, *vide infra*, p. 62, 3. A mass of historical knowledge must have lain in the great historical work, the 49th book of which is quoted by Athenæus, iv. 168 *d.* This work treated in fifty-two books of the period from the conclusion of Polybius's history (146 B.C.) to 88 B.C. For further details, *vide* Bake, p. 133 *sqq.*, 248 *sqq.*; Müller, 249 *sqq.*; Scheppig, 24 *sqq.*

[1] Diog. vii. 142: περὶ δὴ οὖν τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου φησὶ Ζήνων μὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ ὅλου, Χρύσιππος δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ κόσμου, &c. Παναίτιος δ' ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον. That in these words not merely the discussion, but the assertion of the beginning and destruction of the world is ascribed to Posidonius, is self-evident. In confirmation of this statement we have the remark (Plut. *Plac.* ii. 9, 3 *par.*) that Posidonius, deviating from his predecessors, would only allow so much space external to the world, as would be necessary for the world's ἐκπύρωσις. The contrary statement in Philo, *Ætern. Mundi*, where, in the passage quoted *supra*, p. 44, 1, was read (previously to Bernays' correction), instead of Βοηθὸς ὁ Σιδώνιος, Βοηθ. καὶ Ποσιδώνιος, is nullified by this restoration of the true text, which also does away with Hirzel's objections (*Unters. zu Cic.* i. 225 *sqq.*) to my exposition of the theory of Posidonius.

[2] Further details will be found in the passages quoted, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 337, 1. We there learn that Posidonius had treated of prophecy not only in the 2nd book of his φυσικὸς λόγος, but also in a separate and comprehensive book; that he sought to establish belief in it, and to explain its possibility more particularly by other arguments (*ibid.* III. i. 339, 1; 341, 3; 343, 5); that his acceptance of fulfilled prophecies and dreams was just as uncritical as his predecessors Antipater and Chrysippus (*ibid.* III. i. 339, 5). To him, indeed, is to be referred (cf. *ibid.* II. i. 337, 1) the entire representation of the Stoic doctrine of prophecy in the 1st book of Cicero's treatise *De Divinatione*.

[1] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. 319, 2; 320, 3; Cic. *Divin.* i. 30, 64: *Tribus modis censet* (*Posid.*) *Deorum adpulsu homines somniare: uno quod prouideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognatione teneatur, altero, quod plenus aër sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tamquam insignitæ notæ veritatis adpareant, tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus conloquantur.*

[2] Hirzel (*Unters. zu Cic.* i. 231 *sq.*) indeed thinks that as Posidonius like Panætius disbelieved in the conflagration of the world, so like him he must have entirely denied the doctrine of immortality. But even if this were not in itself unnecessary, the conjecture is wholly excluded when it has been shown that Posidonius entertained no doubt of the conflagration of the world. Posidonius' belief in demons would already predispose him to believe in a future life (until the end of the world); for he who allows the existence of immortal souls generally has no ground for denying human souls to be immortal. But we also learn from Cicero (*l. c.* c. 31, 63 *sq.*) that Posidonius maintained that dying persons had the gift of prophecy because (for there is no doubt that this argument also belongs to him) the soul which even in sleep detaches itself from the body, and thus is rendered capable of looking into futurity, *multo magis faciet post mortem, cum omnino corpore excesserit. Itaque adpropinquante morte multo est diuinior.* As, moreover, it has never been said in any quarter that Posidonius doubted the life of the soul after death, though Cicero especially had every opportunity of asserting it, we have not the slightest ground for the assumption. But whether we are justified in going still farther, and ascribing to him the Platonic doctrine of the eternity of the soul will be discussed *infra*, p. 67, 4.

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value to this belief that might incline us to consider him not merely a Stoic but a Syrian Hellenist. The belief in demons was also taken under his protection and utilised in support of a belief in prophecy;[1] likewise the immortality of the soul,[2] which Panætius had opposed. But on the whole he is, in his mode of thought, unmistakably the disciple of Panætius. The chief problem of philosophy for him also avowedly lies in ethics: it is the soul of the whole system;[3] a point of view which in and for

[3] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 62, 1.

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His love of rhetoric.

Erudition.

Natural science.

itself was already likely to cause a certain indifference to dogmatic controversies. The adornment of speech and the general intelligibility of discourse had also for Posidonius a value which they had not for the older Stoics; he is not merely a philosopher but a rhetorician, and even in his scientific exposition he does not belie this character.[1] If, lastly, he excelled most philosophers in learning, there lay therein an attempt to work, even in philosophy, rather on the surface than in the depths; and it cannot be gainsaid that he was inclined to ignore the difference between philosophic enquiry and erudite knowledge.[2] If the interest in natural science was stronger in him than was usual in the Stoic school, this circumstance might also contribute to tarnish the purity of his Stoicism, and to bring him nearer to the Peripatetics.[3] His admiration

[1] Cf. Strabo, iii. 2, 9, p. 147: Ποσειδώνιος δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν μετάλλων (in Spain) ἐπαινῶν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀπέχεται τῆς συνήθους ῥητορείας, ἀλλὰ συνενθουσιᾷ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς. Even the fragments we possess are sometimes ornate in style, but always well written, and show no trace of the tasteless mode of exposition delighting mostly in the form of scholastic inference employed by Zeno and Chrysippus.

[2] According to Seneca, *Ep.* 88, 21, 24, he reckoned mathematics and all liberal arts under philosophy. Seneca, *Ep.* 90, 7 *sqq.*, combats the statement which Posidonius had tried to establish—that even the mechanical arts were invented by the philosophers of the Golden age. Perhaps he is responsible also for what Strabo says, i. 1, that as philosophy is the knowledge of things human and divine (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 238, 3), so πολυμάθεια can belong to no one except to a philosopher; geography is consequently a part of philosophy.

[3] Strabo, ii. 3, 8, p. 104: πολὺ γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἰτιολογικὸν παρ' αὐτῷ (Strabo is speaking primarily of his geographical work) καὶ τὸ ἀριστοτελίζον, ὅπερ ἐκκλίνουσιν οἱ ἡμέτεροι (the Stoics) διὰ τὴν ἐπίκρυψιν τῶν αἰτίων. Some particulars borrowed by Posidonius from Aristotle are given by Simplicius

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for Plato[1] was just as great (after the example of Panætius); and in his commentary on the Timæus,[2] we may well suppose that he tried to combine the Stoic doctrine with the Platonic. Even his agreement with Pythagoras is of consequence in his eyes;[3] and Democritus himself is reckoned by him among the philosophers;[4] to which the earlier Stoics would have demurred on account of the relation of Democritus to Epicurus.[5] Hence it is mani-

Phys. 64, *b. m.* (from Geminius' abstract of his Meteorology.) *De cœlo*, 309, *b*, 2 K; *Schol. in Arist.* 517, *a*, 31; Alex. Aphr. Meteorol. 116, *a*, *o*.

[1] Galen, *Hipp. et Plat.* iv. 7, 421: καίτοι καὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνος θαυμαστῶς γράψαντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐπισημαίνεται θαυμάζων τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ θεῖον ἀποκαλεῖ, ὡς καὶ πρεσβεύων αὐτοῦ τά τε περὶ τῶν παθῶν δόγματα καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, &c. Posid. *ibid.* v. 6, p. 472: ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξε.

[2] Sext. *Math.* vii. 93; Plut. *Procr. An.* 22, p. 1023; Theo Smyrn. *De Mus.* c. 46, p. 162, Bull.; Hermias in *Phædr.* p. 114, Ast., if a commentary on the Phædrus of his own is not here referred to. That he perhaps wrote a commentary on the Parmenides has already been observed, *supra*, p. 43, 1.

[3] Galen, *l. c.* iv. 7, p. 425; v. 6, p. 478. What Plutarch, *l. c.*, quotes from Posidonius (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 659, 1) belongs to the exposition of the Timæus, not directly to his own theory; and the Pythagorean opinion ap. Sext. *l. c.*, as the comparison of the passage in *Math.* iv. 2 *sqq.* shows, does not belong to the citation from Posidonius. Also the remark in Theo Smyrn. *l. c.*, that day and night correspond with the even and uneven, manifestly taken from the commentary on the Timæus, can only serve to give a physical sense to the Platonic utterances, and therefore can prove nothing in regard to Posidonius' own adhesion to the Pythagorean number system. Ritter iii. 701.

[4] Sen. *Ep.* 90, 32.

[5] His eclecticism would have gone still further if Posidonius really, as Ritter, iii. 702, says, had derived Greek philosophy from Oriental tradition. This, however, is not correct in so universal a sense; he merely said of Democritus that his doctrine of atoms was taken from the supposed Phœnician philosopher Mochus (*Phil. d. Gr.* I. 765), but this tells nothing as to the philosophical tendency of Posidonius, but only as to his deficiency in historical criticism, which is abundantly attested by Cicero and Strabo.

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fest that he must necessarily have approximated the other systems to Stoicism, and Stoicism to the other systems. A special opportunity for this seems to have been afforded to him, as to his contemporary Antiochus (*vide infra*), by the polemic against scepticism. In order to repel the accusations which were derived from the conflict of the philosophic systems, it was asserted that in the main they were agreed.[1] It does not appear, however, that he allowed himself many departures in material respects from the ancient Stoicism: our sources, at any rate, only mention one important divergence, his Platonising anthropology.[2] Whereas the Stoic doctrine, in opposition to that of Plato and Aristotle, denied a plurality of faculties belonging to the soul, and reduced all the phenomena of life to the one intellectual fundamental faculty, Posidonius was of opinion that the facts of the soul's life are not to be explained in reference to one principle. He found it, like Plato, inconceivable that reason should be the cause of that which is contrary to reason and of the passions;[3] and he believed that the fact of our

His anthropology.

[1] To this the following passage refers (Diog. vii. 129): δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς . μήτε διὰ τὴν διαφωνίαν ἀφίστασθαι φιλοσοφίας, ἐπεὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ προλείψειν ὅλον τὸν βίον, ὡς καὶ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ἐν ταῖς προτρεπτικοῖς.

[2] The observation mentioned *supra*, p. 60, 1, concerning empty space outside the world is quite unimportant: and what we otherwise know of his physical, astronomical, and geographical definitions, though they doubtless contain many amplifications and rectifications of the earlier theories, tell us nothing of any departure from the Stoic doctrine in connection with his philosophical view of the universe. It will, therefore suffice to indicate the quotations, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i., given in the account of the Physics of the Stoics.

[3] Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat.* (where this subject is treated at length) iv. 3, p. 377 *sq.*; v. 5, 461.

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affections being frequently at strife with our will could only be explained by an original opposition of the faculties working in man;[1] he showed that passionate movements of the mind could not arise merely from our notions about good and evil things, for as soon as these notions are of a rational kind, they do not produce a passionate movement, nor have they this result with all persons in the same manner; and even an existing emotion does not exclude a simultaneous and opposite activity of reason.[2] Finally he remarked that the circumstance that fresh impressions affect the mind more strongly cannot be explained on the presuppositions of the Stoic theory—for our judgment concerning the worth of things is not changed by duration of time.[3] For all these reasons, Posidonius declared himself for the Platonic doctrine that the emotions arose not from the rational soul but from courage and desire, as from two particular faculties,[4] which,

[1] *Loc. cit.* iv. 7, 424 *sq.*

[2] *Loc. cit.* iv. 5, 397; c. 7, 416; v. 6, 473 *sq.*

[3] *L. c.* iv. 7, 416 *sq.* I pass over some further arguments. When, however, Ritter, iii. 703, represents Posidonius as saying: In order to understand the doctrine of the passive emotions there is no need of lengthy arguments and proofs, I cannot find this in the utterance in Galen, v. 178, ch. (502 *k*). Posidonius here blames Chrysippus for appealing to passages from the poets in regard to such questions as the seat of the soul, and not only in regard to points which may be decided simply from immediate perception or self-consciousness. As an instance of the latter he brings forward mental conditions, and says of them that they require οὐ μακρῶν λόγων οὐδ' ἀποδείξεων, μόνης δὲ ἀναμνήσεως ὧν ἑκάστοτε πάσχομεν. But this does not mean, In order to *understand* them there needs no proof; but, Their actual constitution is known to us immediately through self-consciousness.

[4] Galen, *l. c.* v. 1, 429: Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν . . . ἀποδεικνύναι

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being distinct from reason, are determined by the constitution of the body:[1] he would have these forces regarded, however, not as parts of the soul but only as separate faculties of one and the same essence, the seat of which, according to the prevailing opinion of his school, he placed in the heart.[2] Desire and courage must also, he thought, belong to the animals; the former to all; the latter only to those capable of changing their place:[3] an indica-

πειρᾶται κρίσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δ' οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ λύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη. ὁ Ποσειδώνιος δ' ἀμφοτέροις διενεχθεὶς ἐπαινεῖ τε ἅμα καὶ προσίεται τὸ Πλάτωνος δόγμα καὶ ἀντιλέγει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὔτε κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη δεικνύων οὔτε ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρίσεσι, ἀλλὰ κινήσεις τινὰς ἑτέρων δυνάμεων ἀλόγων ἃ ὁ Πλάτων ὠνόμασεν ἐπιθυμητικήν τε καὶ θυμοειδῆ. *Ibid.* iv. 3, 139, *et passim.*

[1] *Loc. cit.* v. 2, 464: ὡς τῶν παθητικῶν κινήσεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἑπομένων ἀεὶ τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος.

[2] *Loc. cit.* vi. 2, 515: ὁ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος εἴδη μὲν ἢ μέρη ψυχῆς οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν (which he has perhaps done in inaccurate language, *infra* p. 68, 5) δυνάμεις δ' εἶναί φασι μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης. When Tertull. (*De An.* 14), departing from the above exposition, says: *Dividitur autem* (sc. *anima*) *in partes . . . decem apud quosdam Stoicorum, et in duas amplius apud Posidonium, qui a duobus exorsus titulis, principali, quod ajunt ἡγεμονικόν, et a rationali, quod ajunt* λογικόν, *in duodecim exinde prosecuit*, this discrimination of the ἡγεμονικόν from the λογικόν shows that we have here to do with a misunderstanding of his own in regard to what he had found in his authority. For conjectures as to the origin of this misunderstanding, *vide* Diels, *Doxogr.* 206.

[3] Galen, *l. c.* v. 6, 476: ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν ζῴων δυσκίνητ' ἐστὶ καὶ προσπεφυκότα δίκην φυτῶν ταῖς πέτραις ἢ τισιν ἑτέροις τοιούτοις, ἐπιθυμίᾳ μόνῃ διοικεῖσθαι λέγει αὐτά, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ ἄλογα σύμπαντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμφοτέραις χρῆσθαι τῇ τ' ἐπιθυμητικῇ καὶ τῇ θυμοειδεῖ, τὸν ἄνθρωπον δὲ μόνον ταῖς τρισὶ, προσειληφέναι γὰρ καὶ τὴν λογιστικὴν ἀρχήν. The distinction between animals which are capable of motion from a place and those which are not, together with the observation that even the latter must have sensation and desire, is first met with in Aristotle (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. II. *b*, 498).

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tion that Posidonius, in agreement with Panætius[1] and Aristotle,[2] held that the faculties peculiar to the less perfect natures were retained in the higher, and were only completed by the addition of new faculties.[3] Whether Posidonius, like Plato, drew the further inference from the opposition of the rational and irrational soul, that the former, before its entrance into the body, existed without the latter, and will exist without it after death, is uncertain;[4] but if he held this, even with the modifications required by the doctrine of the world's destruction, his deviations from the Stoic anthropology would necessarily be multiplied thereby to a considerable extent.

His ethics.

These deviations from the Stoic tradition had not, indeed, the influence on the other doctrines of Posi-

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 47, 2.

[2] *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 499.

[3] Cf. Schwenke (*Jahrb. f. Class. Philol.* 1879, p. 136 *sq.*), who here appeals to the observation of Cicero, apparently derived from Posidonius, *N. D.* ii. 12, 33: Plants are endowed (φύσει συνέχεσθαι, cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 192, 3) with a *natura; bestiis autem sensum et motum dedit* (sc. *natura*) *. . . hoc homini amplius, quod addidit rationem.*

[4] Cicero remarks (*De Divin.* i. 51, 115) in order to establish foreknowledge in dreams: The spirit lives in sleep *liber ab sensibus. Qui quia vixit ab omni æternitate versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animus, omnia quæ in natura rerum sunt, videt,* &c.; and in c. 57, 131, he returns to the subject: *Cumque animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint,* [*quid est*] *cur ii quid ex quoque eveniat et quid quamque rem significet perspicere non possint?* If this agrees with the other contents of the first book of Posidonius, the pre-existence of the soul (Corssen, *De Posid.*, Bonn, 1878, p. 31) must have been found there. But the *semper* and *ab omni æternitate* must even then be laid to Cicero's account, for Posidonius could admit souls to exist neither before the beginning nor after the end of the world to which they belong. It is all the more questionable whether the exposition of this Stoic has not been here amplified by Cicero, or whether something which he hypothetically quoted from Plato may not have been taken in a more definite sense.

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donius which we might have expected from his own utterances; though he decidedly recognises the dependence of ethics upon the theory of the emotions,[1] there is nothing told us of his ethics which would clash with the Stoic moral doctrine: for the statement of Diogenes,[2] that he did not hold virtue to be the only good, and sufficient for happiness, we have already seen to be untrustworthy;[3] and if he was of opinion that many things, even for the preservation of one's country, ought not to be done,[4] this, though a deviation, was, in any case, only such a deviation from the cynicism of the oldest Stoics as may be considered an amendment in harmony with the spirit of the system.[5] Nevertheless, we cannot regard the Platonising anthropology of our philosopher as a merely isolated admission of alien elements into the Stoic system; for in this alliance with Plato and Aristotle there comes to light an internal, historical, and not unimportant transformation of Stoicism. This system had, in its theoretical part, abolished the Platonic and Aristotelian duality of form and substance, spirit and matter:

[1] *Loc. cit.* iv. 7, 421; v. 6, 469; 471 *sq.*

[2] vii. 103; 128.

[3] *Vide supra*, p. 47, 4.

[4] Cic. *Off.* i. 45, 159.

[5] Even the contradiction given by Posidonius to an inadequate explanation of the requirement of life according to nature (Galen, *l. c.* v. 6, p. 470) does not touch the nucleus of the Stoic theory, and his own definition of the highest good (ap. Clem. *Strom.* ii. 416, B): *τὸ ζῆν θεωροῦντα τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀλήθειαν καὶ τάξιν καὶ συγκατασκευάζειν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, κατὰ μηδὲν ἀγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς*, is only a formal extension of the older definitions. The difference between Posidonius and Chrysippus (mentioned *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 232, 2), in regard to diseases of the soul, is also unimportant.

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and in connection therewith had also denied the existence of a plurality of spiritual faculties in man. At the same time, however, in the practical sphere, it had demanded the withdrawal of self-consciousness from externality, and founded an ethical dualism such as neither Plato nor Aristotle had recognised. The contradiction of these two determinations now makes itself felt; the moral dualism, which marks the fundamental tendency of the Stoic philosophy, reacts on the theoretic view of the world, and obliges the Stoics in this also, at any rate in the sphere of anthropology, to introduce an opposition of principles; for we may easily see that it is not the Platonic triple division of reason, courage, and desire, but rather the twofold distinction of rational and irrational in the human soul, with which Posidonius is concerned.[1] Our philosopher himself clearly indicates this connection when, in his doctrine of the emotions and their connection with reason, he exalts as their principal use—that they teach us to recognise in ourselves the distinction of the divine and rational from the irrational and animal, and to follow the demon within us, and not the evil and un-divine.[2] Here not only is the psychologic dualism

[1] This dualism is expressed also in the notice in Plutarch, *Fr.* 1, *Utr. an. an corp. s. ægr.* c. 6, which says that Posidonius divided all human activities and conditions into *ψυχικὰ, σωματικὰ, σωματικὰ περὶ ψυχὴν* and *ψυχικὰ περὶ σῶμα*.

[2] Ap. Galen, v. 6, p. 469: *τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κάσμον διοικοῦντι, τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλίνοντας φέρεσθαι. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο παριδόντες οὔτε ἐν τούτοις βελτιοῦσι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν παθῶν, οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς*

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Psychologic dualism.

which constitutes with Posidonius the proper nucleus of the Platonising triple division clearly enunciated; but it is also said that this dualism chiefly appears necessary to the philosopher for the reason that it is the anthropological presupposition of the ethical opposition of sense and reason. The first symptom of this bias we have already noticed in Panætius—in the distinction of ψυχὴ and φύσις; in its further development in Epictetus and Antoninus we shall find, later on, one of the phenomena which prepared the transition from the Stoa to Neo-Platonism. The psychology of Posidonius therefore appears as a link in a great historical nexus; that it was not without importance for the later conception of the Stoic doctrine, we may see from the statement of Galen,[1] that he had met with none among the Stoics of his time who had known how to answer the objections of Posidonius against the old Stoic theory.[2]

A link between the Stoic doctrine and Neo-Platonism.

Stoics of the first century, B.C.

In the period immediately following Posidonius the spread of the Stoic school is indeed attested by the great numbers of its members with whom we are acquainted;[1] but only a portion of these seem to have occupied themselves independently with philosophy, and even of that portion there was certainly not one philosopher to compare with Panætius and Posidonius in scientific importance and influence. It is, therefore, all the

εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ὁμολογίας ὀρθοδοξοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ βλέπουσιν ὅτι πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κατὰ μηδὲν ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀλόγου τε καὶ κακοδαίμονος καὶ ἀθέου τῆς ψυχῆς. Cf. *ibid.* p. 470 *sq.*, and what is quoted *supra*, 68, 5, from Clemens. In opposition to the moral dignity of the spirit, Posidonius, ap. Sen. Ep. 92, 10, speaks of the body as *inutilis caro et fluida receptandis tantum cibis habilis.*

[1] *Loc. cit.* iv. 7, end; 402 *sq.*

[2] In the preceding pages it has been shown what is peculiar to Posidonius as compared with the older Stoic doctrines; the points on which he is evidence for them, and as such has repeatedly been quoted in earlier sections of this work, are enumerated by Bake. In his collection, completed by Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* iii. 252 *sqq.*, and Scheppig, *De Posid.* 45 *sqq.*, are to be found the historical and geographical fragments and theories of this philosopher.

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[1] Beside those already enumerated, p. 52 *sq.*, the following may here be mentioned:—(*a*) Greeks: Dionysius, who, according to Cicero (*Tusc.* ii. 11, 26), must still have been teaching in Athens in the year 50 B.C., as Cicero in this treatise represents him as heard by his young interlocutor in that city. In that case he must be distinguished from Dionysius of Cyrene, the disciple of Panætius (p. 53); but he is no doubt the same person spoken of by Diog. vi. 43, ix. 15, and opposed by Philodemus π. σημείων, col. 7 *sqq.* (as results from col. 19, 4 *sq.* after Zeno). If he was the head of the school, he can scarcely have followed immediately after Mnesarchus (*vide supra*, p. 53); perhaps, as has already been shown, *loc. cit.*, Apollodorus is to be placed between them. Further, we have the three disciples of Posidonius: Asclepiodotus (Sen. *Nat. Qu.* ii. 26, 6; vi. 17, 3, *et passim*); Phanias (Diog. vii. 41) and Jason, the son of his daughter, who succeeded him as head of the school in Rhodes (Suidas, *sub voce*; while on the other hand, as is shown, *Phil d. Gr.* III. i. 48, he cannot be, as Comparetti supposes, the anonymous disciple of Diogenes alluded to in the *Ind. Herc.* col. 52, 1); and Leonides, whom Strabo, xiv. 2, 13, p. 655, describes as a Stoic from Rhodes was probably a pupil of Posidonius. Also the two teachers of the younger Cato, Athenodorus with the surname Cordylio, from Tarsus, whom Cato took with him from Pergamum to Rome and kept with him till his death (Strabo, xiv. 5, 14, p. 674. Plut. *Cato Min.* 10, 16; *Epit. Diog.*), previously overseer of the library at Pergamum in which he capriciously corrected the writings of Zeno (Diog. vii. 34); and Antipater of Tyre (Plut. *Cato*, 4; Strabo, xvi. 2, 24, p. 757; *Epit. Diog.*), doubtless the same who, according to Cicero, *Off.* ii. 24, 86, died shortly before the composition of this treatise, in Athens, and had written, it would seem, upon Duties; a treatise of his περὶ κόσμου, is quoted in Diog. vii. 139 *et pass.*; and respecting two other treatises, it is uncertain to which Antipater they belong. According to *Ind. Herc.* col. 79 (*supra*, p. 54) he had one or perhaps two disciples of Panætius for his instructors. Apollonius of Tyre seems, according to Strabo, *l. c.*, to have been somewhat younger; treatises under his name are quoted by

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more probable that most of them followed the direction which these two men had given; that the school at that period held in the main to the doctrine of Zeno and Chrysippus, but repudiated alien elements less strictly than before; and partly

Strabo, and ap. Diog. vii. 1, 2, 6, 24, perhaps also ap. Phot. *Cod.* 161, p. 104, *b*, 15. Diodotus, who instructed Cicero, and who afterwards lived with him, finally having become blind, died at his house about 60 B.C. and made Cicero his heir (Cic. *Brut.* 90, 309; *Acad.* ii. 36, 115; *N. D.* i. 3, 6; *ad Div.* xiii. 16, ix. 4; *Tusc.* v. 39, 113; *ad Att.* ii. 20); a disciple of his, a freedman of the triumvir Crassus, Apollonius by name, is mentioned by Cicero, *ad Fam.* xiii. 16. From him must be distinguished the Apollonius of Ptolemais in the *Ind. Herc.* col. 78, whom the compiler of that catalogue calls φίλος ἡμῶν; for this man, as is there stated, had heard Dardanus and Mnesarchus who were both (cf. p. 53) disciples of Diogenes, and as such can hardly have lived to the year 90 B.C.; whereas the Apollonius of Cicero, as a boy in his house, long after this date, enjoyed the instruction of Diodotus and accompanied Cæsar (though not probably in extreme age) to the Alexandrian war. Comparetti (*l. c.* p. 470, 547) wrongly identifies them. Apollonides, the friend of Cato, who was about him in his last days (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 65 *sq.*; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 48). Athenodorus, the son of Sandon, from Tarsus or the neighbourhood, perhaps a disciple of Posidonius, the teacher of the Emperor Augustus, concerning whom cf. Strabo, xiv. 5, 14, p. 674; Lucian, *Macrob.* 21, 23; Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 33, p. 24 R; Ælian. *V. H.* xii. 25; Plut. *Poplic.* c. 17, and *Apophthegm. Reg. Cæs. Aug.* 7, p. 207; *Qu. Conv.* ii. 1, 13, 3, p. 634; Dio Cass. lii. 36; lvi. 43; Zosim. *Hist.* i. 6; Suid. Ἀθηνόδ.; Müller. *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* iii. 485 *sq.* Whether the writings and sayings quoted from Athenodorus belong to him or to another person of the same name, in most instances cannot be discovered with certainty, but it seems to me probable that by the Athenodorus mentioned in Sen. *Tranqu. An.* 3, 1–8, 7, 2; *Ep.* 10, 5, without further description, is to be understood our Athenodorus, since at that time he was certainly the best known man of the name in Rome; that he was likewise the same who wrote about, *i.e.* against, the Aristotelian categories, and who was opposed on particular points by Conutus, we find from Simpl. 5, *a*. 15, δ. 41, γ. (*Schol. in Arist.* 47, *b*, 20; 61, *a*, 25 *sq.*) 32, ε. 47, ζ.; Porph. ἐξήγ. 4, *b*, 21, *b* (*Schol. in Arist.* 48, *b*, 12); cf. Brandis, *Abhandl. d. Berl. Akad.* 1833;

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in its learned activity, partly in the practical application of its principles, came into amicable contact on many points with other schools. An example showing the extent to which this eclecticism attained in individuals will be presented to us in Arius

Phil.-Hist. Kl. 275; Prantl. *Gesch. d. Log.* i. 538, 19. Some fragments of an historical and geographical character have been collected by Müller, *i. c.* The ethics quoted in Diog. vii. 68, 121, may also belong to the son of Sandon; and he is no doubt the Athenodorus Calvus, who inspired Cicero's treatise on Duties (Cic. *ad Att.* xvi. 11, 14); while on the other hand the author of the περίπατοι, which Diogenes frequently cites, is more probably the Peripatetic of the same name spoken of *infra*, p. 124. To this same period belongs Theo of Alexandria, who according to Suidas, *sub voce*, lived under Augustus and was the author of a work on Rhetoric besides an epitome of Apollodorus' Physics. Perhaps he may be the person alluded to in the *Ind. Herc.* col. 79, in the words ὧν Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, thought by Comparetti to be Dio of the Academy (*vide infra*, p. 100). In that case he was a disciple of Stratocles (*vide supra*, p. 54) and only the latter part of his life can have fallen under Augustus. If he survived Arius (*vide infra*, 106, 1: Suidas says: γεγονὼς ἐπὶ Αὐγούστου μετὰ Ἄρειον) he must have lived to a great age like his master Stratocles. (Of two other Stoics of this name, one of them from Antioch, mentioned by Suidas, Θέων Σμυρν., the other from Tithora, mentioned by Diogenes, ix. 82, we do not know the dates, but the latter must be older than Ænesidemus.) Lastly, Strabo, the famous geographer, considered himself as belonging to the Stoic school. His birth must be placed, as Hasenmüller says, *De Strab. Vita Diss.*, Bonn, 1863, p. 13 *sq.* (who also discusses the various theories), in or before 58 B.C., as in 44 B.C. he saw P. Servilius Isauricus, who died in his ninetieth year (Strabo, xii. 6, 2, p. 568), and saw him in Rome, whither Strabo can scarcely have gone before his fourteenth year. His native city was Amasea in Pontus (Strabo, xii. 3, 15, 39, p. 547, 561); he lived, however, under Augustus and Tiberius at Rome. (At the end of his 6th book he names Tiberius as the present ruler and Germanicus as his son; this passage must accordingly have been written between 14 and 19 after Christ.) He betrays himself to be a Stoic not only by utterances such as i. 1, p. 2 (the Stoic definition of philosophy), i. 2, 2, p. 15, but he also calls Zeno ὁ ἡμέτερος i. 2, 34, p. 41, and xvi. 4, 27, p. 784; *vide supra*, p. 62, 3.

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Didymus, who indeed counted himself a member of the Stoic school, but who approximates so closely to Alexander the Academician, that it seems preferable to speak of him after that philosopher.

Perhaps Athenodorus, the son of Sandon, may have introduced him to Stoicism; whom he calls ἡμῖν ἑταῖρος (xvi. 4, 21, p. 779), and concerning whom he shows himself to be accurately informed (xiv. 5, 14, p. 674). Meanwhile he had also heard the Peripatetic Tyrannio (xii. 3, 16, p. 548) and Xenarchus (xiv. 4, 4, p. 670) and had had the still more famous Boethus either as a fellow disciple or more probably (for the word συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν in xvi. 2, 24, p. 757, permits also this interpretation) as a teacher. (Of a third instructor, Aristodemus, he does not say in xiv. 1, 48, p. 650, to what school he belonged, or in what he instructed him.) The date of Protagoras, a Stoic, mentioned by Diogenes, ix. 56, is unknown. (*b*) Among the Romans of this period, the following are known to us as adherents of the Stoic doctrine: Q. Lucilius Balbus, whom Cicero praises as a distinguished Stoic (*N. D.* i. 6, 15) and whom in the second book of this treatise he considers as the representative of the school. M. Porcius Cato Uticensis, already described by Cicero (*Parad. Proœm.* 2, as *perfectus Stoicus*; in *Brut.* 31, 118 as *perfectissimus Stoicus*; and in *Pro Mur.* 29, 61 attacked on account of Stoical asperities, called in *De Finibus* the leader of his school, the writings of which Cato (iii. 27) earnestly studied, and after his death one of the ideals of the Stoics (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 254, 3). His teachers, Antipater and Athenodorus and his friend Apollonides have already come before us. Concerning his Stoicism *vide* also Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* vii. 30, 113, xxxiv. 8, 92. M. Favonius, a passionate admirer of Cato's, respecting whom cf. Plut. *Brut.* 34; *Cato Min.* 32, 46; *Cæsar*, 21; *Pomp.* 73; Sueton. *Octav.* 13; Valer. Max. ii. 10, 8; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 7, xxxix. 14. Also Valerius Soranus, an older contemporary and acquaintance of Cicero's (Cic. *Brut.* 46, 169), seems from what is quoted by Augustine (*Civ. D.* vii. 11, 13), probably from his treatise on the Gods (Bernhardy, *Rom. Lit.* 229), to have belonged to the school of Panætius. Some others who are also occasionally reckoned among the Stoics, as Varro and Brutus, will be spoken of later on.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHERS IN THE FIRST CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST.

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C. *The Academics.*

This approximation and partial blending of the schools of philosophy, as has been already observed, was accomplished in a still more decisive manner in the Academy. We have seen how effectively the way was cleared for eclecticism, partly through the scepticism of the Academy, and partly through the theory of probability connected with that scepticism; and how in consequence certain traces of this mode of thought appear even among the first disciples of Carneades.[1] It was still more definitely developed after the commencement of the first century before Christ, by Philo and Antiochus.

Philo of Larissa.

Philo,[2] a native of Larissa, in Thessaly,[3] was the disciple and successor of Clitomachus in Athens.[4] In

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 526, 2; *supra*, p. 5, 2.

[2] C. F. Hermann, *De Philone Larissæo*: Gött. 1851; ibid. *De Philone Lariss. disputatio altera*, 1855; Krische on Cicero's *Academica*, *Göttinger Studien*, ii. 126–200, 1845.

[3] Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 38.

[4] Cic. *Acad.* ii. 6, 17: *Clitomacho Philo vester operam multos annos dedit*; Plut. *Cic.* 3; Stob. *l. c.* According to the *Ind. Herc. Academicorum* (ed. Bücheler Griefsw. 1869), col. 33, he came when he was about twenty-four to Athens, and here for fourteen years attended the school of Clitomachus, after he had previously been instructed in his native city (according to Bücheler's emendation, for eighteen years; therefore, from his sixth or seventh year; I should rather conjecture: περὶ ὀκ[τὼ σκεδὸν]ἔτη, or something similar) by Callicles, a disciple of Carneades. According to the

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the Mithridatic war he fled, with others on the Roman side, to Rome,[1] and here gained for himself great esteem,[2] both as a teacher and as a man. Through him Cicero was won over to the doctrine of the new Academy, as Philo had apprehended it.[3] Whether he ever returned to Athens we do not know; but in any case he does not seem to have long survived the Roman journey.[4] As a philosopher he at first, we

Ind. Herc. he had also enjoyed the instruction of Apollodorus the Stoic, at least the imperfect text seems to mean this; but whether Apollodorus is the Athenian mentioned (*supra*, p. 53) or the Seleucian mentioned (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 47) seems the more doubtful, as Philo's own leadership of the school (*supra*, p. 53) can scarcely have begun later than that of Apollodorus of Athens, and as the predecessor of the latter, Mnesarchus, was the teacher of Philo's pupil Antiochus (*vide infra* 86, 1). That he followed Clitomachus as head of the school, we find from the *Ind. Herc.* and Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xiv. 8, 9 (according to Numenius); and from Cic. *Brut.* 89, 306, that he was the most important philosopher of the Academy of his time (*princeps Academiæ*); *Acad.* ii. 6, 17 (*Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiæ non defuit*). In Athens Antiochus was his pupil (*vide infra* 86, 1). Besides philosophy he taught rhetoric very zealously (Cic. *De Orat.* iii. 28, 110).

[1] Cic. *Brut.* 89, 306. Concerning the instructions he gave there in philosophy and rhetoric, *vide Tusc.* ii. 3, 9; 11, 26.

[2] Plut. *Cic.* 3: Φίλωνος διήκουσε τοῦ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας, ὃν μάλιστα Ῥωμαῖοι τῶν Κλειτομάχου συνήθων καὶ διὰ τὸν λόγον ἐθαύμασαν καὶ διὰ τὸν τρόπον ἠγάπησαν. Cic. *Acad.* i. 4, 13: *Philo, magnus vir.* Cf. the following note, and also Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 40.

[3] Plut. *l. c.*; Cic. *Tusc. l. c.*; *N. D.* i. 7, 16; Brut. *l.c., totum ei me tradidi.*

[4] The Mithridatic war broke out in 88 B.C., and probably Philo came immediately after this to Rome. We hear of a treatise he had composed while Antiochus was with Lucullus in Alexandria (Cic. *Acad.* ii. 4, 11), which, according to Zumpt (*Abh. d. Berl. Acad.* 1842; *Hist. Phil. Kl.* p. 67), would fall in the year 84, according to Hermann *l. c.* I. 4, in 87. When Cicero came to Athens in 79 B.C. he cannot have been there, as he would otherwise have been mentioned in Plut. *Cic.* 4; Cic. *Brut.* 91, 315; *Fin.* v. 1, 1. Perhaps he remained in Rome, or, as seems to me more probable, was no longer living. How the statement as to the length of his life is to be completed cannot be ascertained. Bücheler prefers ἑξήκοντα τρία, for he says there is no room in the lacuna for ἑβδομήκοντα (*Ind. Herc. Acad.* 33, 18).

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are told, zealously defended the doctrine of Carneades in its whole content; in the sequel, however, he became unsettled in regard to this doctrine, and without expressly abandoning it, he sought greater fixity of conviction than the principles of his predecessors afforded.[1] Though it was not in itself contrary to the spirit of scepticism that he should regard philosophy from the practical point of view,[2] yet this mode of treating it received from him an application which went beyond scepticism: he was not satisfied, like Pyrrho, by the destruction of dogmatism to clear away hindrances, with the removal of which (according to that philosopher) happiness came of itself; but in order to attain this end he found complete directions for right conduct to be necessary. The philosopher, he says, may be compared with a physician; as health is for the latter, so is happiness for the former, the final end of his whole activity;[3] and from this definition of its aim,

His practical bias.

[1] Numen. *ap. Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 9, 1: At the beginning of his career as a teacher, Philo was full of zeal in defending the doctrine of the Academy: καὶ τὰ δεδογμένα τῷ Κλειτομάχῳ ηὔξε καὶ τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐκορύσσετο νώροπι χαλκῷ. Subsequently, however, οὐδὲν μὲν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ ἐνόει, ἡ δὲ τῶν παθημάτων αὐτὸν ἀνέστρεφεν ἐνάργειά τε καὶ ὁμολογία. πολλὴν δῆτ' ἔχων ἤδη τὴν διαίσθησιν ἐπεθύμει, εὖ οἶσθ' ὅτι, τῶν ἐλεγξόντων τυχεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐδόκει μετὰ νῶτα βαλλὰν αὐτὸς ἑκὼν φεύγειν. That Philo had at first professed the Academic scepticism more unconditionally than he afterwards did, follows from Cic. *Acad.* ii. 4, 11 *sq.*; *vide infra*, p. 80, 2.

[2] Pyrrho had already done this (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 484, 3).

[3] Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 40 *sq.*: ἐοικέναι δέ φησι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἰατρῷ . . . καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἰατρικῇ σπουδὴ πᾶσα περὶ τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ὑγίεια, καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

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he derives the six divisions of philosophy which he assumed,[1] and according to which he himself treated of ethics in its whole extent.[2] Where the interest for a systematic form of doctrine, though primarily only in the sphere of practical philosophy, was so strong, there also the belief in the probability of scientific knowledge must necessarily have been strength-

[1] According to Stobæus, *l. c.*, they are the following. The *first* thing that is necessary, he says, is that the sick man should be prevailed upon to submit himself to medical treatment, and that other counsels should be opposed—this is the λόγος προτρεπτικὸς (παρορμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν), which has partly to prove the worth of virtue (or, perhaps more accurately, of philosophy) and partly to confute the objections against philosophy. (The προτρεπτικὸς of Philo is thought by Krische, *l. c.* p. 191, and Hermann, i. 6, ii. 7, to be the prototype of Cicero's *Hortensius*; cf., however, *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 63). This being attained, there must, *secondly*, be a remedy applied—on the one hand, false and injurious opinions must be discarded, and, on the other, right opinions must be imparted—ὁ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τόπος. The *third* is the λόγος περὶ τελῶν. In this part of Philo's ethics Hermann conjectures (ii. 7) the source of the 4th book of Cicero's treatise *De Finibus*. This, however, not only cannot be proved, but it is also improbable, as Philo, and not Antiochus, was the first to maintain that the Stoic ethics agreed so entirely in all things essential with those of the Academy and Peripatetics, that Zeno had no occasion to separate himself from the Academy. The *fourth* part treats περὶ βίων, and fixes the θεωρήματα δι' ὧν ἡ φυλακὴ γενήσεται τοῦ τέλους, primarily for the conduct of individuals. The same problem is undertaken by the *fifth* part, the πολιτικὸς, in regard to the commonwealth. In order to provide not only for the wise, but also for the μέσως διακείμενοι ἄνθρωποι, who are unable to follow logical investigation, the *sixth* part is required, the ὑποθετικὸς λόγος, which coins the results of ethics into rules for individual cases.

[2] This is evident from the concluding words of Stobæus, p. 46 (in regard to Arius Didymus): οὕτως μὲν οὖν Φίλωνος ἔχει διαίρεσις. ἐγὼ δ' εἰ μὲν ἀργοτέρως διεκείμην, ἀρκεσθεὶς ἂν αὐτῇ συνεῖρον ἤδη τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων, τῇ τῆς ἐξαμερείας ἐπικουφιζόμενος περιγραφῇ, &c. Any one who agrees with Hermann's conjecture respecting *Fin.* iv. has the less right to dispute this, as Hermann does (ii. 5).

ened and the inclination to scepticism weakened;[1] and so we actually find that Philo withdrew from the standpoint which had simply disputed the possibility of knowledge. The Stoic theory of knowledge he could not, of course, adopt; against the doctrine of intellectual cognition, he argued with Carneades that there is no notion so constituted that a false notion may not co-exist with it:[2] and the truth of sensible perception from which the Stoics ultimately derived all notions he denied for all the reasons which his predecessors in the Academy had given;[3] and little as he could agree with the

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Modification of the scepticism of the Academy.

[1] This connection is, indeed, denied by Hermann, *l. c.*; but as we know (from Stob. *l.c.*) that Philo placed the ultimate end of philosophy in happiness, that he believed this to be conditioned by right moral views (ὑγιῶς ἔχουσαι δόξαι, θεωρήματα ἐπὶ βίου), and by a whole system of such views, and devoted one of the six sections of his ethics expressly to the removal of false and the imparting of true opinions, the inference is inevitable that he held true opinions to be necessary, and consequently did not maintain—at any rate, for the practical sphere—the standpoint of pure doubt, nor was satisfied with mere probability; and what we know of him shows that this was not the case.

[2] Cic. *Acad.* ii. 6, 18: *Cum enim ita negaret, quicquam esse quod comprehendi posset, . . . si illud esset sicut Zeno definiret tale visum . . . visum igitur impressum effictumque ex eo, unde esset, quale esse non posset ex eo, unde non esset . . . hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, judicium tollit incogniti et cogniti.* But this does not mean, as Hermann (ii. 11) asserts, that Philo maintained that if there were a *visum* like that required by Zeno, no *comprehensio* would be possible; but rather, if the comprehensible must be a *visum impressum*, and so forth, there would be nothing comprehensible; the same statement that is made by Sext. *Pyrrh.* i. 235 (*infra*, p. 81, 2). Cf. as to the corresponding propositions of Carneades, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 501 *sq.*

[3] If we have no direct information on this point, it follows with great probability from what we can gather of the contents of the lst book of Cicero's *Academica Priora* and the 2nd book of the *Academica Posteriora*; from *Acad.* ii. 25, 79, and from the

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adversaries of the Academic doctrine as hitherto understood, he as little desired to renounce the doctrine itself. When his disciple Antiochus advanced the proposition that the school of the Academy had been untrue to its original tendency since the time of Arcesilaus, and that there must therefore be a return from the new Academy to the old, Philo raised the liveliest opposition to this demand, and to the whole statement: the new Academy, he declared, was not distinct from the old, and there could, therefore, be no question of a return to the latter, but solely and entirely of maintaining the one genuine Academic doctrine.[1] But when we look more closely, this union of the new Academy with Plato, as that of Philo with the new Academy, is only to be attained by a subtlety which even his contemporaries did not fail to rebuke.[2] Scepticism,

fragments preserved by Nonius (cf. the arguments of Krische, *l. c.*, p. 154 *sq.*, 182 *sq.*; Hermann, ii. 10).

[1] Cic. *Acad.* i. 4, 13: *Antiochi magister Philo . . . negat in libris, quod coram etiam ex ipso audiebamus, duas Academias esse, erroremque eorum, qui ita putarunt* (as Antiochus, *vide infra*), *coarguit.* The same is maintained by Cicero as an adherent of Philo's doctrine (he has just before directly acknowledged himself a follower of the new Academy), c. 12, 46. In relation to this subject Cicero says (*Acad.* ii. 6, 17): *Philone autem vivo patrocinium Academiæ non defuit.* The Academy which he defends is the new Academy, that of Clitomachus and Carneades, which he undertakes to defend against Antiochus. Cf. Augustin, *c. Acad.* iii. 18, 41: *Huic* (Antiochus) *arreptis iterum illis armis et Philon restitit donec moreretur, et omnes ejus reliquias Tullius noster oppressit.* From Philo are probably derived the arguments of Cicero (ap. August. iii. 7, 15) on the superiority of the Academy to all other schools.

[2] When Philo's treatise came into the hands of Antiochus (as Cicero relates, *Acad.* ii. 4, 11) he was quite startled, and asked Heraclitus of Tyre, for many years the disciple of Philo and Clitomachus: *Viderenturne illa Philonis, aut ea num vel e Philone vel ex ullo Academico audivisset aliquando?* to which he replied in the negative. In the same work Philo's statement concerning the doctrine of the new Academy is described as an untruth, and this censure is repeated, 6, 18.

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His theory of knowledge.

Philo believed, was, as against the Stoic arguments, perfectly well established; for the rational conception, which they had made the criterion, was as such not available: but in themselves things are not unknowable;[1] and in connection with this, he maintained that the scepticism of the Academy was, from the beginning, only meant in this sense; it was not its design to deny all and every knowledge of things;[2] this was denied only in opposition to the Stoics, and with reference to the Stoic criterion,[3] while genuine Platonism was maintained as the esoteric doctrine of the school.[4] As the danger from the Stoics no longer appeared to be pressing, he considered it an opportune time to go back to the original doctrines professed by the

[1] Sext. *Pyrrh.* i. 235: οἱ δὲ περὶ Φίλωνά φασιν, ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωϊκῷ κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν καταληπτά. But the expression καταληπτὸς must here be taken in a somewhat wider sense; cf. *inf.* p. 82, 3.

[2] Cic. *Acad.* ii. 4, 12. The arguments of Antiochus against Philo he will pass over, *minus enim acer adversarius est is, qui ista, quæ sunt heri defensa* (the pure Carneadean scepticism, the representative of which in the first edition of the *Academica* was Catulus), *negat Academicos omnino dicere* (cf. *ibid.* 6, 18).

[3] Thus the rise and design of the scepticism of the Academy is represented by Augustine (*C. Acad.* ii. 6, 14), who no doubt derived this conception from Philo as explained by Cicero. Cf. *supra*, note 1.

[4] This statement meets us often (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 493, 4); that it is ultimately derived from Philo is probable, partly from its inter-connection with all other presuppositions of his, and partly because it is not only found in Augustine, *C. Acad.* iii. 17, 38; 18, 40; but in c. 20, 43, Augustine expressly appeals to Cicero for it.

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Platonic school;[1] but he could not see in this restoration of the old Academy any abandonment of the tendency of the new, since he held that the new Academy had not departed at all from the original Platonism.[2] But if we ask in what consisted this genuine Platonism, the answer is not very satisfactory. On the one hand, Philo, in agreement with his predecessors of the new Academy, denied the possibility of a complete knowledge, of comprehending; not merely in regard to the Stoic theory of knowledge, but quite universally; for like those predecessors, he lacked a sure criterion for the discrimination of true and false.[3] Notwithstanding,

[1] August. iii. 18, 41 (doubtless after Cicero): *Antiochus Philonis auditor, hominis quantum arbitror circumspectissimi, qui jam veluti aperire cedentibus hostibus portas cæperat et ad Platonis auctoritatem Academiam legesque revocare* (as he saw the enemy in retreat, he had begun to open the gates of the city they were besieging, and to re-establish the previous order which had been interrupted by the war).

[2] So far Plutarch (*Luc.* 42; *Brut.* 2) may call Philo the head of the new Academy, and Antiochus that of the old; and similarly Cicero (*Acad.* i. 4, 13; ii. 22, 70) may describe Antiochus as the man who through the renovation of the old Academy fell away from Philo while he himself conversely sees in his retrogression from Antiochus to Philo a *remigrare in novam domum e vetere.*

[3] This is evident from Cic. *Acad.* ii. 22, 69. After Cicero, as an adherent of Philo, has defended the proposition, *nihil esse quod percipi possit*, with the old sceptical argument, the impossibility of finding a criterion for the discrimination of true and false, he here continues: *Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui hæc ipsa, quæ a me defenduntur, et didicit apud Philonem tam diu, ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de his rebus acutissime; et idem hæc non acrius accusavit in senectute quam antea defensitaverat . . . quis enim iste dies inluxerit, quæro, qui illi ostenderit eam, quam multos annos esse negitavisset, veri et falsi notam? Vide* the following note.

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His doctrine of 'manifestness.'

however, he would not renounce all certainty of conviction, nor would he allow that with the comprehensibility of things, all knowledge must stand and fall. Between 'uncertain' and 'incomprehensible,' he thought, there is a great difference; he who holds things to be incomprehensible is far from necessarily asserting that no certainty is to be attained; there is a clear manifestness, which is yet something other than comprehension — a truth stamped upon the soul, to which we hold even if we are not in a position to understand it.[1] How we receive information of this truth, Philo does not seem to have shown more particularly, nor did he explain what share in the formation of manifest convictions belonged on the one hand to the senses, and, on the other, to the reason;[2] but when he speaks of a truth which is stamped upon the soul,[3] we can hardly think of anything else than that immediate knowledge, which, as we shall see, played so great a

[1] The representative of Antiochus in Cic. *Acad.* ii. 10, 32, seems to refer to Philo when he says, having previously spoken of the absolute scepticism of the new Academy: *Alii autem elegantius, qui etiam queruntur, quod eos insimulemus omnia incerta dicere, quantumque interesse inter incertum et id, quod percipi non possit, docere conantur atque distinguere.* But in any case what is added in c. 11, 34, must relate to him: *Simili in errore versantur, cum convitio veritatis coacti perspicua* (= ἐναργῆς, ἐνάργεια) *a perceptis volunt distinguere et conantur ostendere esse aliquid perspicui, verum illud quidem impressum in animo atque mente, neque tamen id percipi ac comprendi posse.* Carneades and Clitomachus, who allow only a high degree of probability to our knowledge at the best, cannot have expressed themselves in such a manner.

[2] We should have expected even in this case that his definitions of it would have been alluded to in the discourses directed against him by Cicero.

[3] A definition to which Hermann (ii. 13) rightly draws attention.

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part with his disciple Cicero. When, however, we find that he did not venture to ascribe to this knowledge the full certainty of intellectual cognition, and consequently assumed manifestness to be a kind of conviction, the certainty of which transcends mere probability, but does not reach the unconditional certainty of the conception—this is very characteristic of the middle position of our philosopher between Carneades and Antiochus,[1] and it was so far not without reason that Philo was distinguished from his predecessors, no less than from his successors,[2] as the founder of the fourth Academy; while, on the other hand, this appellation tells in favour of the opinion that between the doctrine of Philo and that of Carneades an important divergence had really taken place. That directly certain element, Philo, like Cicero after him, might seek before all things in the utterances of moral consciousness, and so his theory of knowledge might serve him as a foundation for practical philosophy, the necessity for which seems to have been his determining influence in originating the theory.[3]

[1] This opinion I believe to be justifiable, notwithstanding Hermann's contradiction (*l. c.* ii. 13), for I cannot admit that Philo's *perspicuitas* coincides with the unconditioned certainty, which, according to Plato, is present in the intuition of ideas, and excels in truth the intellectual knowledge of the Stoics. Had this been Philo's meaning he could not possibly have maintained universally as he does (*vide supra*, 79, 2; 82, 3) that there is no *nota veri et falsi, nihil esse quod percipi possit*. On the contrary, when he missed even in the Stoic *φαντασία καταληπτική* the sign of true knowledge, and consequently the *nota veri et falsi*, he must have discovered it all the more in that knowledge to which he ascribes such unconditional certainty.

[2] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 526, 2.

[3] *Supra*, p. 77 *sq.*

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But in itself Philo's scientific position could not long be maintained. He who assumes a certainty, as Philo did in his doctrine of the self-evident or manifest, could not, without inconsistency, deny that every sure token of distinction between the true and the false is wanting to us; he could no longer profess the principles of the new Academy; conversely, he who did profess them could not logically go beyond Carneades' doctrine of probability. If a man found it impossible to satisfy himself any longer with that doctrine, there remained nothing for him but to break with the whole standpoint of the scepticism of the new Academy, and to claim afresh for human thought the capability for the knowledge of truth. This further step was taken by the most important of Philo's disciples,[1] Antiochus[2] of Ascalon.[3]

Antiochus of Ascalon.

This philosopher had for a long time enjoyed Philo's instructions, and had himself embarked upon works advocating the scepticism of the Academy, when he began to grow uncertain about it.[4] This may have been in great measure the result of his having attended the lectures not only of Philo, but

[1] Of whom those known to us are mentioned *infra*, p. 99 *sq.*

[2] Concerning him, *vide* Krische, *Gött. Stud.* ii. 160–170; and C. Chappius, *De Antiochi Asc. vita et doctrina*, Paris, 1854; who, however, does not go beyond what is well known. A literal copy of this dissertation appeared in D'Allemand's *De Antiocho Asc.* Marb. and Par. 1856; but, as the treatise of Chappe was unknown in Germany, this flagrant plagiarism was only discovered after the death of its author.

[3] Strabo, xvi. 2, 29, p. 759; Plut. *Luc.* 42; *Cic.* 4; *Brut.* 2; Ælian, *V. H.* xii. 25. Ἀσκαλωνίτης is his most usual appellation.

[4] *Supra*, p. 80, 1; 82, 1, 3; Cic. *Acad.* ii. 2, 4; 19, 63.

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of the Stoic Mnesarchus,[1] who, as the disciple of Panætius, had indeed opposed the scepticism of the new Academy, but at the same time prepared the way for that blending of Stoicism with the Platonic doctrine which in the sequel was completed by Antiochus. During the first Mithridatic war, we find him with Lucullus in Alexandria;[2] and only then did things come to an open rupture between him and Philo.[3] He afterwards stood at the

[1] Numen. ap. Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xiv. 9, 2; Augustine, *C. Acad.* iii. 18, 41, doubtless taken from Cicero; cf. Cic. *Acad.* ii. 22, 69: *Quid? eum Mnesarchi pœnitebat? quid? Dardani? qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum.* He only separated himself from Philo at a later date. Concerning Mnesarchus and Dardanus, *vide supra*, p. 52, 3.

[2] Cic. *Acad.* ii. 4, 11 (cf. *supra*, 76, 4); *ibid.* 2, 4; 19, 61. Whether he went straight from Athens to Alexandria, however, or had accompanied Philo to Rome, and here allied himself with Lucullus, is not stated.

[3] According to Cicero, *l. c.*, it was in Alexandria that Antiochus first saw the work of Philo, which he was so unable to reconcile with those doctrines of Philo already known to him that he would scarcely believe the treatise to be genuine (*vide sup.* p. 80, 2); and this induced him t[illegible]rite a work against it, call[illegible] *Sosus* (*vide N. D.* i. 7, 16), [illegible] which Philo seems again t[illegible]ave responded (*vide sup.* p. [illegible]1, and concerning the Stoic whose name the treatise of Antiochus bore, p. 53, *n.*). Either in this work or in the Κανονικά, from the second book of which a passage is quoted in Sext. *Math.* vii. 201 (*vide sup.* p. 30, 1), but probably in the former, we have the source of the whole polemic against the scepticism of the Academy, which Cicero (*Acad.* ii. 5 *sqq.*) represents Lucullus as repeating from spoken discourses of Antiochus (*vide* 5, 12; 19, 61). Cf. Krische, *l. c.* 168 *sqq.* Of the second version of the *Academica* Cicero expressly says (*Ad Att.* xiii. 19), *quæ erant contra* ἀκαταληψίαν *præclare collecta ab Antiocho, Varroni dedi;* but Varro had now taken the place of Lucullus. Cicero also made use of Antiochus by name in the books *De Finibus*, the fifth of which is taken from him. Also, in regard to the *Topica*, Wallies (*De Font. Topic. Cic.*, Halle, 1878) shows it to be probable that Cicero follows Antiochus in chapters 2–20. But as in the rapid compilation of this short treatise he had no books at hand and consequently wrote from

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head of the Platonic school in Athens when Cicero, in 79–78 B.C., was his pupil[1] for half a year. About ten years later he died.[2]

His polemic against scepticism.

Through Antiochus the Academy was so decidedly diverted from the sceptical tendency to which it had abandoned itself since Arcesilaus, that it never, as a whole, returned to it; and Antiochus is, therefore, called the founder of the fifth Academy.[3] When he had once freed himself from the scepticism of Carneades, he made a polemic against it the special task of his own life.[4] The sceptic, as Antiochus believes, abolishes, with the certainty, even the probability which he himself maintained; for if

memory (*Top.* i. 5) we may also perhaps discover in it the substance of a lecture which he heard while with Antiochus, and with the help of written notes brought away; nothing is known besides this of any treatise of Antiochus on *Topica*.

[1] Plut. *Cic.* 4; Cic. *Fin.* v. 1, 1; *Brut.* 91, 315; cf. *Acad.* i. 4, 13; ii. 35, 113; *Legg.* i. 21, 54. Atticus also had made his acquaintance in Athens (*Legg. l. c.*). To this later time must be referred what is said in the *Ind. Acad. Herc.* 34, of missions (πρεσβεύων) to Rome and to the generals in the provinces.

[2] We see this from Cic. *Acad.* ii. 2, 4, and more distinctly from c. 19, 61: *Hæc Antiochus fere et Alexandreæ tum et multis annis post multo etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum, paulo ante quam est mortuus* (cf. Plut. *Luc.* 28, according to which Antiochus had mentioned the battle at Tigranocerta, perhaps as an eye-witness). Since this battle took place on October 6, 685 A.U.C. (69 B.C.) Antiochus must have lived at least till the following year. On the other hand, we see from the *Ind. Herc.* 34, 5, that he died in Mesopotamia in consequence of the hardships of the expedition. Brutus some years later heard no longer Antiochus but his brother Aristus in Athens (Cic. *Brut.* 97, 332, with which *Tusc.* v. 8, 21, does not disagree). More precise dates for the life of Antiochus it is not possible to fix.

[3] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 526, 2.

[4] Cf. Cic. *Acad.* ii. 6, 12; Augustine, *C. Acad.* 6, 15: *Nihil tamen magis defendebat, quam verum percipere posse sapientem.*

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the true does not allow itself to be known as such, it cannot be said that anything appears to be true;[1] consequently he not only contradicts the natural necessity for knowledge,[2] but also makes all action, impossible; for Antiochus, like Chrysippus, rejected the notion that we might follow probability in action, even without knowledge and assent; partly because, as we have seen, without truth there can be no probability, and partly because it is impossible to act without assent and conviction, or, on the other hand, to refuse assent to the self-evident, the possibility of which a portion of the adversaries conceded.[3] This practical interest is just what is, in his eyes, of the highest importance: the consideration of virtue is, as Cicero expresses it, the strongest proof of the possibility of knowledge, for how could the virtuous man make a sacrifice to his fulfilment of duty, if he had no fixed and unassailable conviction? how would practical wisdom be possible if the aim and problem of life were unknowable?[4] But he also believed he had the better of his adversaries even in the sphere of theory. The whole question here turns on the statement, against which Carneades had chiefly directed his attacks—that true conceptions have tokens in themselves, by which they may be distinguished with certainty from false.[5] Against this

[1] Cic. *Acad.* ii. 11, 33, 36; 17, 54; 18, 59; 34, 109.
[2] *Loc. cit.* 10, 30 *sq.*
[3] *Loc. cit.* 8, 24; 10, 32; 12, 37 *sqq.*
[4] *Loc cit.* 8, 23; cf. 9, 27.
[5] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 501 *sqq.* and Cic. *Acad.* ii. 6, 18; 13, 40. In the first of these passages Lucullus says, in reference to Philo's objections against rational conceptions (*supra*, 79, 2): *Omnis oratio contra Academiam suscipitur a nobis, ut retineamus eam definitionem, quam Philo voluit evertere.*

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the sceptics had chiefly urged the various cases of deceptions of the senses, and similar errors. The existence of these errors Antiochus does not deny, but he believed we ought not on that account to discard the dicta of the senses; it merely follows that the senses are to be kept healthy—that all hindrances to correct observation are to be banished, and all rules of foresight and prudence are to be observed, if the testimony of the senses is to be valid.[1] In themselves the senses are for us a source of true conceptions; for though sensation is primarily only a change taking place in ourselves, it also reveals to us that by means of which this change is effected.[2] We must likewise, as Antiochus readily admits, allow truth to general concepts, if we would not make all thought, and all crafts, and arts impossible.[3] But if, as against this, the imaginations of dreamers or lunatics are brought forward by his opponents, Antiochus replies that these are all wanting in that self-evidentness which is proper to true intentions and conceptions;[4] and if they seek to embarrass us with their sorites,[5] he answers that from the similarity of many things it does not follow that there is no distinction between them; and if in particular cases we are obliged to suspend our judgment,[6] we need not, therefore,

[1] *Loc. cit.* 7, 19 *sqq.*
[2] Sext. *Math.* vii. 162 *sq.*
[3] Cic. *l. c.* 7. 21 *sq.*
[4] *Loc. cit.* 15, 47 *sqq.*; 16, 51 *sq.* According to 16, 49, Antiochus must have discussed this objection at great length.
[5] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 503.
[6] That Antiochus after the precedent of Chrysippus (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 115, 2) adopted this expedient even in regard to purely dialectical objections, such as the so-called ψευδόμενος we see from Cic. *Acad.* ii. 29, 95 *sqq.*

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permanently renounce all claim to it.[1] The sceptics themselves, however, are so little able to carry out their principles that they involve themselves in the most striking contradictions. Is it not a contradiction to maintain that nothing can be maintained, and to be convinced of the impossibility of a firm conviction?[2] Can a person, who allows no distinction between truth and error, use definitions or classifications, or even a logical demonstration, of which he is absolutely ignorant whether truth belongs to it?[3] Lastly, how can it be simultaneously maintained that there are false notions, and that between true and false notions there is no difference, since the first of these propositions presupposes this very difference?[4] We must allow that some of these arguments, especially those last quoted, are not deficient in subtlety, but others must certainly be called very superficial, and rather postulates than proofs.

In any case, however, Antiochus believed himself justified by such reasoning in repudiating the demand that we should refrain from all acquiescence;[5] and in striving after a dogmatic knowledge

[1] *Loc. cit.* 16, 49 *sq.*; 17, 54 *sqq.*

[2] *Loc. cit.* 9, 29; 34, 109.

[3] *Loc. cit.* 14, 43.

[4] *Loc. cit.* 14, 44; 34, 111, where there is also the observation that this was the objection which caused Philo the most embarrassment.

[5] Cic. *l. c.* 21, 67 *sq.* He thus formulates the relation of Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Antiochus. Arcesilaus drew this inference: *Si ulli rei sapiens adsentietur unquam, aliquando etiam opinabitur; nunquam autem opinabitur; nulli igitur rei adsentietur.* Carneades admitted that the wise man sometimes agreed, and therefore had an opinion. The Stoics and Antiochus deny this latter; but they also deny that from agreement opinion necessarily follows; for a man can distinguish false and true, knowable and unknowable. The ultimate question, therefore, is always this: whether there is anything which lets itself be known with certainty, a φαντασία καταληπτική (cf. *sup.* 87, 4; 88, 5).

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instead of sceptical nescience. But he was not creative enough to produce an independent system; he therefore turned to the systems already existing, not to follow any one of them exclusively, but to adopt that which was true from all; and as it was the mutual contradiction of the philosophical theories which appeared to give to scepticism its greatest justification, Antiochus believed that he could not better establish his own conviction than by asserting that this contradiction in some cases did not exist, and in others concerned only unessential points; that all the most important schools of philosophy were in the main agreed, and only differed from each other in words. He counted himself, indeed, as belonging to the Academy; he desired to re-establish the Platonism which his predecessors since Arcesilaus had abandoned, and to return from the new Academy to the old.[1] But this, in his opinion, did not exclude a simultaneous alliance with Zeno and Aristotle. The Academic and Peripatetic doctrines are, he says, one and the same form of philosophy bearing different names; their diversity lies not in the fact but only in the expression.[2] The same is the case with the Stoics: they also adopted the Academic-Peripatetic philo-

Maintains the essential agreement of all the chief systems.

[1] *Sup.* 82, 2; Cic. *Acad.* i. 12, 43; *Fin.* v. 3, 7; *Brut.* 91, 315; Augustine, *C. Acad.* ii. 6, 15; iii. 18, 41.

[2] Cic. *Acad.* i. 4, 17; 6, 22; ii. 5, 15; 44, 136; *Fin.* v. 3, 7; 5, 14; 8, 21; cf. iv. 2, 5.

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sophy, and only changed the words:[1] or, if it be admitted that Zeno introduced much that was new in substance also,[2] this was of such a subordinate kind, that the Stoic philosophy may, nevertheless, be considered as an amended form of the philosophy of the Academy, and not as a new system.[3] Antiochus himself adopted so many Stoic doctrines that Cicero says concerning him: 'he desired, indeed, to be called a member of the Academy, but was, with the exception of a few points, a pure Stoic.'[4] Yet these points, as a review of his doctrine will show, are of such importance that we can in truth call him as little a Stoic as an Academician or Peripatetic; and in spite of the affinity of his mode of thought with Stoicism, he must be considered an eclectic.

His eclecticism.

Antiochus divided philosophy in the usual manner, into three parts;[5] that he did not ascribe the same value to each of these is clear from the posi-

[1] Cic. *Acad.* ii. 5, 15; 6, 16; *Fin.* v. 8, 22; 25, 74; 29, 88; *N. D.* i. 7, 16; *Legg.* i. 20, 54; Sext. *Pyrrh.* i. 235.

[2] *Acad.* i. 9, 35 *sq.*

[3] *Ibid.* 12, 43: *Verum esse autem arbitror, ut Antiocho nostro familiari placebat, correctionem veteris Academiæ potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam* [*Stoicorum philosophiam*].

[4] *Acad.* ii. 43, 132: *Antiochus, qui appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus;* or, as it is said in 45, 137, *Stoicus perpauca balbutiens.* Cf. Plut. *Cic.* 4. When Cicero heard Antiochus, he had already left the new Academy: τὸν Στωϊκὸν ἐκ μεταβολῆς θεραπεύων λόγον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις. Sext. *Pyrrh.* i. 235: ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν Στοὰν μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, ὡς καὶ εἰρῆσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ Στωϊκά. August. *C. Acad.* iii. 18, 41.

[5] Cic. *Acad.* i. 5, 19 (cf. ii. 36, 116). That these two representations reproduce the views of Antiochus, Cicero expressly states, *Acad.* i. 4, 14; *Fin.* v. 3, 8.

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tion he assigned to them; for he placed ethics, as the most important division, first, physics second, and logic third.[1] He paid most attention to the theory of knowledge and ethics.[2] Ethics, especially, is said by Cicero to have been in his opinion the most essential part of philosophy.[3] In his theory of knowledge the principal thing is that refutation of scepticism which we have already mentioned; for the rest he adhered, according to Cicero,[4] strictly to the principles of Chrysippus; and this is not contradicted by the fact that he also held the Platonic theory; for he seems to have regarded as the most essential element of the latter those universal determinations in which Platonism agreed not only with the Peripatetic doctrine, but also with that of the Stoics: that all knowledge proceeded, indeed, from sensible perception, but in itself was an affair of the understanding.[5] The

His theory of knowledge.

[1] So at least we find in *Acad.* i. 5 *sqq.*, not only in the enumeration, but also, and repeatedly, in the exposition of the three divisions.

[2] Antiochus, ap. Cic. *Acad.* ii. 9, 29, *etenim duo esse hæc maxima in philosophia, judicium veri et finem bonorum*, &c.

[3] *Acad.* i. 9, 34.

[4] *Acad.* ii. 46, 142: *Plato autem omne judicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam, abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus, cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit. Numquid horum probat noster Antiochus? ille vero ne majorum quidem suorum, ubi enim aut Xenocratem sequitur . . . aut ipsum Aristotelem . . . ? a Chrysippo pedem nusquam.* So, in c. 28–30, Antiochus is throughout opposed on the assumption that he recognises the dialectical rules of Chrysippus.

[5] *Acad.* i. 8, 30: *Tertia deinde philosophiæ pars . . . sic tractabatur ab utrisque* (Plato and Aristotle); *quanquam oriretur a sensibus tamen non esse judicium veritatis in sensibus. Mentem volebant rerum esse judicem*, &c. But the disciple of Antiochus speaks in a precisely similar manner of Zeno (11, 42).

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doctrine of ideas, on the other hand, he abandoned,[1] and thus, in his efforts for unity, it might well appear to him at last that the Stoic theory of knowledge was only an extension and closer definition of the theory of Plato and Aristotle.[2] To what an extent Aristotelian and Stoic definitions and expressions were mingled in his logic, we see in Cicero's *Topica*,[3] supposing this account really follows Antiochus.[4] In the same superficial manner, Antiochus combines the Platonic metaphysics not only with those of Aristotle, but also of the Stoics; for he, or Varro in his name,[5] represents the supposed identical doctrine of Plato and Aristotle as follows: there are two natures, the active and the passive, force and matter, but neither is ever without the other. That which is compounded of both is called a body or a quality.[6] Among these qualities the simple and the compound are to be distinguished; the former consisting of the four, or, according to Aristotle, five, primitive bodies; the latter, of all the rest; of the first category, fire and air are the active, earth and water the receptive and passive. Underlying them all, however, is the matter without quality, which is their substratum, the imperishable,

Metaphysics and physics.

[1] *Vide Acad.* i. 8, 30, compared with 9, 33 and *sup.* p. 93, 4.
[2] Cf. *Acad.* i. 11, 42 *sq.*
[3] *Vide sup.* p. 86, 3.
[4] As Wallies demonstrates thoroughly (*De Font. Top. Cic.* 22 *sqq.*).
[5] *Acad.* i. 6, 24 *sqq.*
[6] Cicero expressly says, *qualitas*; and as on this occasion, as he himself remarks, he introduces the word *qualitas* newly into the Latin language as a translation of the Greek ποιότης, he must have found ποιότης and not ποιόν, employed by his predecessor. Qualities were declared to be bodies by the Stoics (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 99, 111).

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but yet infinitely divisible elements, producing in the constant change of its forms definite bodies (*qualia*). All these together form the world; the eternal reason which animates and moves the world is called the Deity or Providence, also Necessity; and, because of the unsearchableness of its workings, sometimes even Chance. To the man who could so entirely mistake the fundamental doctrines of the older systems, and mingle together earlier and later elements in so arbitrary a manner, the opposition of the Stoic system to the system of Plato and Aristotle could no longer appear specially important; and so in the work we have so often mentioned,[1] it is only said that Zeno discarded the fifth element of Aristotle (æther), and was likewise distinguished from the earlier philosopher in that he held bodies alone to be real. How far even this one distinction extends, the eclectic does not seem to suspect. He expressly confounds mind with sense;[2] and says of Aristotle that he represents spirits as consisting of æther, for which Zeno substituted fire.[3] We may with certainty assume that he did not enter into special physics.

In regard to morals also, Antiochus remained true to his eclectic character. He starts, like the Stoics, from self-love, and the fundamental impulse of self-preservation as the fundamental impulse of human nature, and attains from this starting point

Ethics.

[1] *Loc. cit.* 11, 39.
[2] *Acad.* ii. 10, 30, Lucullus says: *Mens enim ipsa, quæ sensuum fons est, atque etiam ipsa sensus est*, &c.
[3] *Acad.* i. 7, 27; 11, 39.

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the ground principle of the Stoics and Academics, that of life according to nature.[1] It is as much a doctrine of the Stoics, however, as of the Academy that that which is according to nature is determined for each creature according to its own particular nature, and that therefore the highest good for man is found in a life according to human nature, perfected on all sides.[2] But herein the point is already indicated at which our philosopher diverges from Stoicism. Whereas the Stoics had recognised only the rational element in man as his true essence, Antiochus says that sensuousness also belongs to perfected human nature, that man consists of soul and body, and though the goods of the noblest part have the highest worth, those of the body are not on that account worthless; they are not merely to be desired for the sake of another, but in and for themselves.[3] The highest good, therefore, according to him, consists in the perfection of human nature in regard to soul and body, in the attainment of the highest mental and bodily completeness;[4] or, according to another representation,[5] in the possession of all mental, bodily, and external goods. These constituents of the highest good are doubtless of unequal worth: mental endowments have the highest value, and among these, moral endowments (*voluntariæ*) have a higher place than merely natural gifts;[1] but although corporeal goods and evils have only a slight influence on our well-being, it would be wrong to deny all importance to them;[2] and if it be conceded to the Stoics that virtue for itself alone suffices for happiness, yet for the highest stage of happiness other things are likewise necessary.[3] Through these determinations, in which he agrees with the old Academy,[4] our philosopher hopes to strike the true mean between the Peripatetic school which, in his opinion, ascribed too much value to the external,[5] and the Stoic school which ascribed too little;[6] but it is undeniable that his whole exposition fails in exactness and consistency.

[1] Cic. *Fin.* v. 9, 11.

[2] *Vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil requirente* (Cic. *l. c.* 9, 26).

[3] *Acad.* i. 5, 19; *Fin.* v. 12, 34; 13, 38; 16, 44; 17, 47. Beauty, health, strength, are desired for themselves: *Quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit qui est maxime e natura.* So also Varro, as will be shown later on.

[4] *Fin.* v. 13, 37; 16, 44; 17, 47.

[5] *Acad.* i. 5, 19, 21 *sq.*, in the description of the Academic-Peripatetic philosophy

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The same observation applies to other particulars. If Aristotle had given precedence to knowledge, and Zeno to action, Antiochus placed the two ends side by side, since both depend upon original impulses of nature.[7] If the Stoics had maintained the unity,

[1] *Fin.* v. 13, 38; 21, 58, 60.

[2] *Fin.* v. 24, 72.

[3] *Acad.* i. 6, 22: *In una virtute esse positam beatam vitam, nec tamen beatissimam, nisi adjungerentur et corporis et cetera quæ supra dicta sunt ad virtutis usum idonea* (ii. 43, 134; *Fin.* v. 27, 81; 24, 71).

[4] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 881, 5.

[5] *Fin.* v. 5, 12; 25, 75. Aristotle himself is thus separated from his school, and beside him Theophrastus only (though with a certain limitation) is recognised as an authentic source of the Peripatetic doctrine; so that even here in respect to the Academic school, Antiochus wishes his innovations to be regarded merely as a resuscitation of the original doctrine of the Academy.

[6] *Fin.* v. 24, 72.

[7] *Fin.* v. 21, 58: *Actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam minora majoribus. Maximæ autem sunt . . . primum consideratio cognitioque*

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and the Peripatetics the plurality of virtue, Antiochus declares that all virtues are inseparably connected with one other, but that each of them presents itself in an individual activity;[1] he does not, however, attempt, as Plato did, to give any deeper account of their difference. If the Stoic schools were not quite agreed whether or not community with other men were a good in the strict sense—something to be desired in and for itself—Antiochus here again seeks to mediate; for while he most fully acknowledges the value and necessity of this relation,[2] he makes a double distinction among things of value in and for themselves: viz., those which are directly a constituent of the highest good (the endowments of the soul and the body), and those which are to be

rerum cœlestium, &c. *Deinde rerum publicarum administratio . . . reliquæque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes.* Cf. 18, 48; 20, 55; 23, 66.

[1] *Fin.* v. 23, 66 *sq.*

[2] *Fin.* v. 23, 65 *sqq.*; *Acad.* i. 5, 21. In both passages the community of men with one another is treated as something inherent in human nature; and in the former it is shown how the feeling for this, from its first appearance in family love, spreads itself in an ever widening circle and finally becomes universal love of mankind (*caritas generis humani*). This is essentially Stoic, and more particularly in the spirit of the later Stoicism; but the thought of a universal love of mankind, based upon the natural interdependence of men, was not alien to the Peripatetic school. Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II., ii. 693; 851, 1; 865, and Arist. *Eth. N.* viii. 1, 1155, *a*, 16 *sqq.*, where it is shown in the same way as by Antiochus that nature has implanted the love of parents to children (φιλία) and of members of the same race to each other, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν, and it is added: ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. The same is developed (by Arius Didymus) in the account of the Peripatetic ethics, ap. Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 250 *sq.*, in a discussion which so distinctly recalls the manner of Theophrastus that we may doubtless derive it from this Peripatetic, of whom something similar is observed, *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 851.

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desired as an object of moral activity: only in the latter class does he place friends, relations, and fatherland.[1] Like the Stoics, Antiochus would only allow the wise to be regarded as rulers, as free, rich, and noble; like them he declares all the unwise to be slaves, and mad; and demands from the wise man a complete apathy;[2] notwithstanding that he thereby contradicted the doctrine of the older Academy, and had himself no right to such unqualified statements, considering his own opinions respecting the highest good. But when we find him violently opposing the closely connected proposition of the equality of all faults,[3] this trait may likewise show us that he was not very scrupulous about scientific consistency.

School of Antiochus.

Consistency, however, was not the quality on which the success of a philosopher at that time chiefly depended. Among the contemporaries of Antiochus in the Academy, who are mentioned to us, only the elder seem to have held to the doctrine of Carneades;[4] among the younger generation, on

[1] *Fin.* v. 23, 68: *Ita fit ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum, quod est in iis, in quibus completur illud extremum, quæ sunt aut animi aut corporis: hæc autem, quæ sunt extrinsecus . . . ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere, quo illa, non sunt*, &c.

[2] *Acad.* ii. 44, 135 *sq.*

[3] *Ibid.* 43, 135 *sq.*

[4] This is true of Heracleitus of Tyre, who is known to us through Cicero (*Acad.* ii. 4, 11 *sq.*) as a disciple of long standing of Clitomachus and Philo, and a distinguished representative of the new Academy; for the Academy is certainly meant by the *philosophia, quæ nunc prope dimissa revocatur*, as will be immediately shown. Through a misunderstanding of the expression, Zumpt (*Ueber den Bestand der Phil. Schul. in Athen.*) *Abh. d Berl. Akad.* 1842; *Hist. Philol.*

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the contrary,[1] Antiochus was so successful, that, according to the testimony of Cicero, the doctrine of the new Academy was in his time almost entirely abandoned.[1] Ænesidemus says the same thing; and

Kl. 67 *sq.*) has been misled into considering the disciple of Clitomachus and Philo as a Peripatetic. He is perhaps the same person of whom it is said in the *Ind. Herc. Acad.* 33, 4, that he was seventy years old. Among the Romans who occupied themselves with Greek philosophy, C. Cotta is mentioned (who was consul in 76 B.C.) by Cicero (*N. D.* i. 7, 16 *sq.*) as an acquaintance of Antiochus, but a disciple and adherent of Philo. He criticises the Epicurean (*l. c.* i. 21 *sqq.*) and (iii. 1 *sqq.*) the Stoic theology from the standpoint of the new Academy. As hearers of Philo, Cicero also (*Acad.* ii. 4, 11) mentions Publius, Caius Selius, and Tetrilius Rogus. Diodorus, a partisan of Mithridates, is also mentioned in this period, who held to the Academic school (Strabo, xiii. 1, 66, p. 614); but he can scarcely be counted among the philosophers.

[1] Pre-eminent among their number is Aristus, the brother of Antiochus, who succeeded him in his position of instructor at Athens (Cic. *Brut.* 97, 332; *Acad.* ii. 4, 12; i. 3, 12; *Tusc.* v. 8, 21; Plut. *Brut.* 2; *Ind. Herc.* 34, 2 *sq.* In 51 B.C. Cicero (*ad Att.* v. 10; *Tusc.* v. 8,22) met him there, and describes him as the only man who formed an exception to the generally unsatisfactory state of philosophy in Athens. According to the *Ind. Herc.*, he had heard many other philosophers besides his brother. Plutarch (*Brut.* 2) places his moral character higher than his ἕξις ἐν λόγοις. Also Dio, doubtless the same who (according to Strabo, xvii. 1, 11, p. 796; Cic. *Pro Cœl.* 10, 23; 21, 51) perished as a member of an Alexandrian embassy to Rome in 56 B.C., and is the person mentioned by Plutarch as the author of table conversations (Plut. *Qu. Conv. Pro.* 3). Also, according to the *Ind. Herc.* 34, 6 *sqq.* (where by αὐτοῦ any other philosopher than Antiochus can scarcely be intended), Apollas, of Sardis; Menecrates, of Methyma; and Mnaseas, of Tyre. Concerning Aristo and Cratippus, who went over to the Peripatetic school, *vide infra*, p. 121, 2. Aristus seems to have been followed by Theopompus, whom Brutus heard in Athens (Plut. *Brut.* 24) in 44 B.C., and who is mentioned by Philostratus (*v. Soph.* i. 6). At the same date there lived in Alexandria at the court of Ptolemy XII. (Dionysus) Demetrius (Lucian, *De Calumn.* 16), of whom we know, however, nothing further; but, at any rate, he was a worthier member of the school than the Philostratus mentioned by Plutarch (*Anton.* 80). Among the Romans, besides Cicero, Varro, of whom we shall have to speak more particularly later on, was also a disciple of Antiochus. M. Brutus had been instructed by Aristus (Cic. *Brut.* 97, 332;

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Acad. i. 3, 12; *Fin.* v. 3, 8; *Tusc.* v. 8, 21), whom he resembled both personally and in his opinions. Cicero (*Acad. l. c.; ad Att.* xiii. 25) classes him as a follower of Antiochus with Varro, and in *Parad.* Pro. 2, with himself. In *Brut.* 31, 120; 40, 149, he enumerates him with the followers of the old Academy, and (*Tusc. l. c.*) puts a proposition of Antiochus into his mouth. Plutarch also (*l. c.*, cf. *Dio*, 1) says that he was indeed well acquainted with all the Greek philosophers, but was himself an admirer of Antiochus and an adherent of the old Academy, as opposed to the later and new Academy. His talent and knowledge are praised by Cicero (*ad Att.* xiv. 20; *ad Div.* ix. 14; *Brut.* 6, 22; *Fin.* iii. 2, 6; his writings in *Acad.* i. 3, 12; *Tusc.* v. 1, 1; *Fin.* i. 3, 8; *vide* also, in regard to his writings, Sen. *Consol. ad Helv.* 9, 4; *Ep.* 95, 45; Quintil. x. 1, 123; Charisius, p. 83; Priscian, vi. p. 679; Diomed. p. 378. On the preceding, *vide* Krische, *Gött. Stud.* ii. 163 *sqq.*) M. Piso also heard Antiochus with Cicero (according to Cic. *Fin.* v. 1 *sqq.*), acknowledged himself his disciple (*l. c.* 3, 7 *sq.*), and expounded his ethical principles (c. 4–25), but in such a manner that he still wished to retain his loyalty to the Peripatetic school into which his housemate Staseas, of Naples, had introduced him (*l. c.* 3, 8; 25, 75; *De Orat.* i. 22, 104). Cf. *ad Att.* xiii. 19 (according to which he was not living when Cicero wrote *De Finibus*).

[1] In *Acad.* ii. 4, 11, Cicero mentions, as we have observed, Heracleitus the Tyrian: *Homo sane in ista philosophia, quæ nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis.* That this philosophy can only mean the new Academy, is clear from the context. For when a disciple of Clitomachus and Philo is mentioned, we can but conclude that the philosophy in which he distinguished himself was the philosophy of these men; and Cicero says expressly that Heracleitus opposed Antiochus, the rival of the Academy (of Carneades, &c.), dispassionately indeed, but zealously. The new Academy, therefore, which in Cicero's time had been almost universally abandoned, was by him revived. Cicero says the same thing most distinctly, *N. D.* i. 5, 11: *Nec vero desertarum relictarumque rerum patrocinium suscepimus* (through the defence of the doctrine of the new Academy); *non enim hominum interitu sententiæ quoque occidunt, sed lucem auctoris fortasse desiderant, ut hæc in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte judicandi profecta a Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit ætatem; quam nunc prope orbam esse in ipsa Græcia intelligo.* If these evidences are considered to be disproved by the saying of Augustine, *C. Acad.* iii. 18, 41 *vide*

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with these testimonies everything that we know regarding the tendency of the Academic school [1] until nearly the end of the first century coincides. Our knowledge of this school at that time is certainly very incomplete,[2] but that the eclecticism of Antiochus still maintained itself there, is plain from the

supra, p. 79, 2), according to which Cicero would only have had to finish suppressing the *reliquiæ* of the false doctrines of Antiochus opposed by Philo. This is to ascribe an importance to the Augustinian phrase which clearly does not belong to it, since it is plain that the notion of Cicero's refuting the eclecticism of Antiochus is false.

[1] Ap. Phot. *Cod.* 212, p. 170, 14: οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, φησὶ, μάλιστα τῆς νῦν, καὶ Στωϊκαῖς συμφέρονται ἐνίοτε δόξαις, καὶ εἰ χρὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, Στωϊκοὶ φαίνονται μαχόμενοι Στωϊκοῖς. Cicero and others judged in a similar manner of Antiochus; *vide supra*, p. 92, 4.

[2] Of the heads of the Athenian school we know none between Theomnestus (*vide supra*) and Ammonius, the teacher of Plutarch; of other members of the Academy, besides Eudorus, Nestor of Tarsus (Strabo, xiv. 5, 14, p. 675, expressly distinguishes this Nestor from the previously-mentioned Stoic of the same name—*vide supra*, p. 54: the former, according to him, was the teacher of Marcellus, son of Octavia) and the Tubero spoken of in *Phil. d. Gr.* III., ii. 7, 5, only Dercyllides and Thrasyllus. Even of these we are told very little. Of Dercyllides, whose date cannot be definitely fixed, but who seems to have lived earlier than Thrasyllus, we find from Albinus, *Introd. in Plat.* 4; Procl. *in Tim.* 7, B.; Porph. ap. Simpl. *Phys.* 54, *b*,; 56, *b*, that he had composed a great work on the Platonic philosophy, from which perhaps the extensive astronomical fragment in Theo Smyrn. *Astron.* c. 40 *sq.*, and the smaller excerpt in Proclus *in Plat. Remp.* (quoted from A. Mai, *Class. Auct.* i. 362, by Martin on Theo, p. 74) are taken. Thrasyllus became acquainted in Rhodes, perhaps his native city, with Tiberius, to whom he succeeded in making himself indispensable as an astrologer (what is related, however, as to the proofs of his art in Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 20; Sueton, *Tiber.* 14; and, still more, in Dio Cass. lv. 11; lviii. 27, is embellished with fables). He then lived, from the last years of Augustus (Sueton. *Aug.* 98; Dio Cass. lvii. 15), in Rome, and died a year before Tiberius, 36 A.D. (Dio, lviii. 27). He is chiefly known to us through his division of the Platonic dialogues into tetralogies (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 428). He is mentioned as a Platonist with Pythagorean tendencies by Porphyry, *Plot.* 20. But as both Thrasyllus and Dercyllides seem to have been grammarians rather than philosophers, it may here suffice to refer, in regard to Thrasyllus, to K. F. Hermann, *De Thrasyllo* (Ind. Schol. Götting. 1852); Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* iii. 501; Martin on *Theo. Astron.* p. 69 *sq.*; and in regard to Dercyllides to the work last mentioned, p. 72 *sqq*,

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example of Eudorus,[1] a philosopher of Alexandria,[2] and a contemporary of the Emperor Augustus.[3]

i. *Eudorus of Alexandria.*

This philosopher is denominated a member of the Academy,[4] but he had expounded the works of Aristotle,[5] as well as those of Plato,[6] and had discoursed at length on the Pythagorean doctrine, which he apprehended in the sense of the later Platonising Pythagorism.[7] This many-sided occupation with

[1] Concerning Eudorus, *vide* Röper, *Philologus*, vii. 534 *sq.*; Diels, *Doxogr.* 22, 81 *sq. et passim*.

[2] Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 46. *Vide infra*, p. 104, 1.

[3] The date of his life cannot be determined with accuracy. Strabo (xvii. i. 5, p. 790) describes him as his contemporary. Brandis (*Ueber die Griech. Ausleger des Aristot. Organons, Abh. der Berl. Acad.* 1833; *Hist. Phil. Kl.* p. 275) infers that he was earlier than the Rhodian Andronicus, from the manner in which Simplicius (*Schol. in Arist.* 61, *a*, 26; 73, *b*, 18) compares him with Andronicus, and the latter passage, at any rate, seems to me conclusive. If, on the other hand, Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 46 *sqq.* is taken from Arius Didymus (on this subject, *vide infra*), he must have written before him.

[4] (Ar. Did. ap.) Stob. *l. c.*: Εὐδώρου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως, ἀκαδημικοῦ φιλοσόφου. Simp. *Schol. in Arist.* 63, *a*, 43; Achil. Tat. *Isag.* ii. 6 (in *Petav. Doctr. Temp.* iii. 96; Eudorus is also quoted in *Isag.* i. 2, 13, p. 74, 79).

[5] His commentary on the Categories is often quoted in that of Simplicius (cf. *Schol. in Arist.* 61, *a*, 25 *sqq.*; 63, *a*, 43; 66, *b*, 18; 70, *b*, 26; 71, *b*, 22; 73, *b*, 18; 74, *b*, 2, and *Cat. ed. Basil.* 44, ε. 65, ε). That he also expounded the Metaphysics does not certainly follow from Alex. *Metaph.* 44, 23; *Bon. Schol.* 552, *b*, 29.

[6] Plut. *De An. Procr.* 3, 2; 16, 1, p. 1013, 1019 *sq.*, seems also to refer to a commentary on the *Timæus*.

[7] In the fragment quoted in *Phil. d. Gr.* I. 331, 4, from Simpl. *Phys.* 39, *a*, not only are the two Platonic principles, the One and Matter, attributed to the Pythagoreans, but these principles are themselves referred (in agreement with the Neo-Pythagoreans, cf. *ibid.* III. ii. 113 *sq.*) to the One or the Deity as their uniform basis. The same theory, however, is ascribed by Eudorus even to

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the older philosophers, and especially his digest of the Aristotelian categories, would at once lead us to suppose that the Platonism of Eudorus was not entirely pure; and this is confirmed by the statements of Stobæus concerning an encyclopædic work of his, in which we are told he treated the whole of science problematically: *i.e.* he gave a summary of the questions with which the different parts of philosophy are concerned, and compared the answers given to them by the most important philosophers.[1] In the epitome of ethics, which has been preserved to us from this work, the classification and terminology is rather Stoic than Platonic;[2] and no doubt

Plato, when, according to Alex. (in *Metaph.* i. 6, 988, *a*, 10), after the words τὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ τί ἐστιν αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν, he added καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ. On this theory, in agreement with the Stoic monism (on which cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 131, 138, 145 *sq.*) though without its materialistic interpretation, even the ὕλη must have sprung from the Deity or the primal One.

[1] *Ecl.* ii. 46: ἔστιν οὖν Εὐδώρου τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως ἀκαδημικοῦ φιλοσόφου διαίρεσις τοῦ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγου, βιβλίον ἀξιόκτητον, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσαν ἐπεξελήλυθε προβληματικῶς τὴν ἐπιστήμην. The above explanation of this expression results from p. 54 *sqq.*, where the author, after he has given Eudorus' division of ethics, continues, ἀρκτέον δὲ τῶν προβλημάτων, and then gives the views of the various philosophers—first concerning the τέλος, then concerning goods and evils, lastly concerning the question εἰ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετόν. These extracts also, as far as p. 88, are no doubt borrowed from Eudorus by Arius Didymus whom Stobæus is here transcribing.

[2] Having divided the whole of philosophy into ethics, physics, and logic, Eudorus distinguishes three parts in ethics: περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀξίας, π. τὴν ὁρμήν, π. τὴν πρᾶξιν (θεωρητικόν, ὁρμητικόν, πρακτικόν). The first of these parts then falls into two sections: (1) the ends of life, and (2) the means for their attainment, and each of these into a number of subdivisions among which we find the truly Stoical titles περὶ τῶν προηγουμένων, περὶ ἔρωτος, περὶ συμποσίων (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 260 *sq.*; 241, 1; 273, 7; 283, 2). Even the doctrine of virtue, one of the sections of the second division (for this must be

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it was the same with the details of his ethics,[1] so that Eudorus in this respect entirely followed the precedent of Antiochus. That he did not confine himself to ethics appears from what has been already quoted, and from certain other indications.[2]

How widely spread, in the second half of the last

divided by the words, p. 50, τὸ μέν ἐστι περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, &c., before which οὗ or τούτου δὲ may probably have been lost) primarily indicates the Stoic view, though among the four cardinal virtues, φρόνησις takes the place of the Platonic σοφία. The second main division of ethics treats partly of the ὁρμὴ generally and partly of the πάθη, which are defined quite in the Stoic manner, into ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα and ἀρρώστημα. The third main division is separated by means of subordinate classes into eight τόποι: παραμυθητικὸς, παθολογικὸς, περὶ ἀσκήσεως, περὶ καθηκόντων, περὶ κατορθωμάτων, περὶ χαρίτων, περὶ βίων, περὶ γάμου. How closely this whole classification resembles that of the Stoics will be seen from *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 206 *sq.* Eudorus is so completely in agreement with what is there quoted from Sen. *Ep.* 84, 14, and the commencement especially of his classification quoted by Stobæus bears such striking resemblance to the passage of Seneca, that either Seneca must have followed Eudorus, or both must have followed some common, and in that case Stoic, source.

[1] This is clear from the next section of Stobæus, which, as before observed, seems also to be taken from Eudorus, especially from p. 60: ὑποτελὶς δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ' οὗ κατήρξατο συναισθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον τῆς συστάσεως αὐτοῦ, οὕπω λογικὸν ὂν ἀλλ' ἄλογον, κατὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ σπερματικοὺς λόγους . . . γενόμενον γὰρ τὸ ζῷον φκειώθη τινὶ πάντως εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 208 *sq.*). How Eudorus was allied with Antiochus in this is shown by a comparison of the words immediately following ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὑποτελὶς, κεῖται δ' ἐν τινι τῶν τριῶν· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἡδονῇ ἢ ἐν ἀοχλησίᾳ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις κατὰ φύσιν) with what Cicero, *Fin.* v. 6, 16 (*vide ibid.* III. i. 518, 1), quotes from Antiochus.

[2] According to Strabo, xvii. 1, 5, 790, Eudorus and Aristo the Peripatetic mutually accused each other of plagiarism in regard to a treatise on the Nile (Strabo will not decide who is in the right, but he says that the language of the treatise is more like Aristo's). Achil. Tat. *Isag.* 96 (169), mentions that Eudorus, agreeing with Panætius, believed the torrid zone to be inhabited, and the same writer (as Diels shows, *Doxogr.* 22) quotes something further, taken by Eudorus from Diodorus the mathematician, and from Diodorus by Posidonius.

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ii. *Arius Didymus.*

century before Christ, was this eclecticism of which, as we have seen, Antiochus was the foremost representative, is also clear from the example of Arius Didymus.[1] For though this philosopher is reckoned with the Stoic school,[2] his views approximate so

[1] He is no doubt the same Ἀρείος of Alexandria who is known to us (from Plut. *Anton.* 80 *sq.*; *Reg. Apophth. Aug.* 3, 5, p. 207; *Præc. Ger. Reip.* 18, 3, p. 814; Sen. *Consol. ad Marc.* 4 *sq.*; Sueton. *Octav.* 89; Dio Cass. li. 16. lii. 36; Ælian. *V. H.* xii. 25; M. Aurel. viii. 31; Themist. *Or.* x. 130, *b*, Pet.; Julian. *Ep.* 51, p. 96, Heyl.; cf. *Or.* viii. 265, C; Strabo, xiv. 5, 4, p. 670) as a teacher of philosophy, a confidant of Augustus and friend of Mæcenas. He was so highly esteemed by Augustus that, as we read in Plutarch, Dio, and Julian, he declared to the people of Alexandria, after the capture of that place, that he pardoned them for the sake of their founder Alexander, their beautiful city, and their fellow citizen Arius. From a consolatory epistle of Arius to Livia, after the death of Drusus (9 B.C.), whom Arius must have survived, Seneca, *l. c.*, quotes a considerable fragment. It is true that in none of these passages is Arius called Didymus, while on the other hand none of the authors who have transmitted to us fragments from Δίδυμος or Ἄρειος Δίδυμος, describe him as an Alexandrian or a friend of Augustus. But as none of these authors had any occasion to enter into the personal circumstances of Arius Didymus this does not justify us in distinguishing with Heine (*Jahrb. f. Class. Phil.* 1869, 613) the friend of Augustus from Arius Didymus the Stoic. It is rather an instance of that which Diels, *Doxogr.* 86, asserts, and of which he adduces many examples in this period, that the same man is designated sometimes by his own name, sometimes by the addition of his father's, to distinguish him from others bearing the same name, and sometimes by both names together: *e.g.* the well-known Rhodian rhetorician Apollonius is sometimes called Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Μόλωνος, sometimes Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Μόλων; and even by his disciple Cicero, Apollonius (Cic. *ad Att.* ii. 1; *Brut.* 89, 307; 91, 316); Molo (*De Orat.* i. 17, 75; 28, 126; *De Invent.* i. 56); and the Stoic Musonius Rufus is called by Epictetus, Rufus only, and by others, as a rule, Musonius only (*vide infra*, ch. vi.). As in the case of Arius sometimes the name and sometimes the surname stands first, we cannot be certain whether Ἄρειος or Δίδυμος was the original name of this philosopher; but Diels, *l. c.*, seems to show that the latter is the more probable.

[2] The *Epit. Diog.* (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 33, 2) mentions Arius between Antipater (the Tyrian, concerning whom *vide supra*, p. 71, *n.*) and Cornutus, the contemporary of Nero.

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closely to those of Antiochus that we should be tempted to consider him his disciple,[1] if there were not express testimony as to his Stoicism. We are only acquainted, indeed, with historical expositions of his, of the older doctrines, probably taken from one and the same work;[2] but among these there is

[1] I myself shared this opinion (supported by the *Epit. Diog.*) in the second edition of the present volume; and in connection with it the supposition that in the notice of Suidas, Δίδυμος Ἀτήϊος (ἢ Ἄττιος) χρηματίσας φιλόσοφος Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς, the word Ἀτήϊος had been substituted for Ἄρειος. I must now abandon that theory. The Atejus Didymus who wrote two books πιθανῶν καὶ σοφισμάτων λύσεις καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ might more probably be the double of the Alexandrine grammarian Δίδυμος νέος, afterwards quoted, to whom also πιθανὰ are ascribed; but this too is quite uncertain.

[2] A number of fragments from this work are quoted under its name and that of its author. Such are the following:—(1) An exposition of the Stoic theories of God and the world, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιτομῆς Ἀρείου Διδύμου (ap Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xv. 15). (2) The Stoic psychology, from the ἐπιτομὴ Ἀρείου Διδύμου, *ibid.* c. 20, chap. xviii. *sq.*, concerning the conflagration and renewal of the world, seems to be taken from the same source. (3) To the same treatise no doubt belongs the account of the Platonic doctrine of ideas which is quoted anonymously (ἐκ τῶν Διδύμῳ περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων Πλάτωνι συντεταγμένων) by Eusebius, *l. c.* xi. 23, 2 *sq.*; and by Stobæus, *Ecl.* i. 330. Likewise (4) the remarks on two maxims of the seven sages quoted by Clemens, *Strom.* i. 300, B, from Didymus; and (5) a statement respecting Theano, *l. c.* 309, C, from Δίδυμος ἐν τῷ περὶ Πυθαγορικῆς φιλοσοφίας. Lastly (6) a passage is quoted in Stob. *Floril.* 103, 28 (ἐκ τῆς Διδύμου ἐπιτομῆς), concerning the Peripatetic doctrine of εὐδαιμονία; this passage, however, is found, as Meineke discovered (Mützell's *Zeitschr. für d. Gymnasialw.* 1859, p. 563 *sqq.*) in the exposition of the Peripatetic ethics, ap Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 274 *sq.*; and thus it is shown that not only this whole section (from p. 242–334), but also the corresponding section on the Stoic doctrine, p. 90–242, is borrowed from the epitome of Arius. From the same source Stobæus has probably taken also the four preceding sections of the same (sixth) chapter, beginning at p. 32. We therefore possess very considerable fragments from the work of our philosopher, which show that it contained a comprehensive survey of the doctrines of all the earlier philosophers. The proved or supposed frag-

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a review of the Peripatetic ethics, which approaches so nearly to the ethics of the Stoics, and so entirely agrees with the opinions of Antiochus as represented by Cicero, that it is scarcely possible to mistake its ultimate source;[1] and though the work is ostensibly

ments of this treatise relating to physics have been collected by Diels, *Doxogr.* 445–472, with some limitations of Meineke's conjectures. The same writer treats of Arius and his works, *l. c.* p. 69–88.

[1] As Antiochus, in his account of the Peripatetic ethics (which for him coincided with those of the Academy), pursued the double end of defending the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine against the attacks of the Stoics, and of combining it with the Stoic doctrine (*vide supra*, p. 95 *sqq.*), so do we find with Arius. Like Antiochus, he takes as his basis the commonly recognised demand of life according to nature, and this in its Stoic acceptation. The φυσικὴ οἰκείωσις is the point of view according to which it is decided what is a good, a δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν (of the αἱρετὸν itself a definition is given, p. 272, corresponding with the Stoic definition quoted *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 223, 4). The instinct of self-preservation is acknowledged as the fundamental impulse: φύσει γὰρ ᾠκειῶσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (Stob. 246 *sq.*; 252, 258; cf. what is quoted, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 209, 1, about the Stoics, and, *supra*, p. 95 *sqq.*, about Antiochus); the καθήκοντα (this conception also is Stoic) are reduced to the ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν and the ἀπεκλογὴ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν (p. 250; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 258, 3). Like Antiochus, he then seeks to show that from this point of view belongings, friends, countrymen, human society generally, are to be desired for themselves; also praise and glory, health, strength, beauty, corporeal advantages of all kinds: only the goods of the soul are incomparably more valuable than all others (p. 246–264). His discussion of the natural love of all men for each other (already mentioned) especially reminds us of his predecessors in the Academy. Like Antiochus (*vide supra*, p. 97, 1), he classes the πολιτικαὶ καὶ κοινωνικαὶ and the θεωρητικαὶ πράξεις together as equally original problems (p. 264 *sq.*); like him, he distinguishes two kinds of goods—those which are to be considered as constituents (συμπληρωτικὰ) of happiness, and such as only contribute something to happiness (συμβάλλεσθαι); corporeal goods he will not, like Cicero's Antiochæan, reckon under the first, but the second class: ὅτι ἡ μὲν εὐδαιμονία βίος ἐστὶν ὁ δὲ βίος ἐκ πράξεως συμπεπλήρωται (p. 266 *sq.*; cf. p. 274 for the distinction between καλὰ and ἀναγκαῖα, the μέρη εὐδαιμονίας and ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ); he opposes, like Aristotle, the theory that the virtuous man is happy even in the extremity of suffering; also the Stoic proposition concerning the αὐτάρκεια of virtue, and the impossibility of losing it; and the statement that there is nothing intermediate between happiness and unhappiness (p. 282; cf. p. 314); thus showing himself in these particulars less strict than Antiochus (*sup.* p. 97, 3). On the other hand (p. 266), the Stoic doctrine of the εὔλογος ἐξαγωγὴ (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 305 *sq.*) is also forced upon the Peripatetics[1] For the doctrine of virtue, Arius makes use especially of Theophrastus (*vide ibid.* II. ii. 860, 1) as well as Aristotle; and the disciple of Antiochus (Cic. *Fin.* v. 5) quotes only from these two philosophers (*supra*, 97, 5); but in expounding the doctrine (p. 314) he uses the Stoic distinction of the καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα (III. i. 264 *sq.*), and imports into it (p. 280) the Stoic προκοπή. In his Œconomics and Politics he keeps entirely to Aristotle, only that he calls the third of the right constitutions not Polity, but Democracy, and its defective counterpart Ochlocracy, and introduces, beside the right and wrong forms of government (p. 330), the mixed forms compounded from the three first (those of Dicæarchus, discussed in *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 892).

[1] Their common use of this philosopher may perhaps explain why Cicero and Arius Didymus, in expounding the ethics of the Stoics, use the very same words (cf. *ibid.* III. i. 226, 6; 227, 4; 232, 2).

[2] He seems at times entirely to forget that he is merely giving an account of the doctrines of others, for he passes from indirect to direct narration (cf. *ib.* III. i. pp. 256, 270, 276, 322).

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and chiefly a mere reproduction of the Peripatetic doctrine, still it is clear that Arius could not have brought that doctrine so near to that of the Stoics, or adopted an older exposition which did so (that of Antiochus),[1] if the distinctive doctrines of the different schools had had the same importance for him as for the ancient Stoic authorities, if he had not shared the mode of thought which inspired the exposition of Antiochus, and had not been disposed, like Antiochus, to disregard the opposition of Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics, as compared with their common conviction.[2]

iii. *Potamo.*

With Arius and Antiochus we must connect Potamo of Alexandria, who, according to Suidas, was

a contemporary of Arius,[1] while Diogenes Laertius speaks as though he had lived not long before his own time, therefore towards the end of the second Christian century;[2] perhaps, however, he may be here merely transcribing the statement of an older writer.[3] That which his predecessors had actually attempted, the setting up of a system which should combine in itself the true out of all the philosophical schools of the time, Potamo also avowed as his express design; for he designated his school as eclectic;[4] and the little we know of his doctrine certainly shows that he had not chosen this name without cause; for it apparently combines, regardless of

[1] Suid. *sub. voce*: Ποτάμων Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, φιλόσοφος, γεγονὼς πρὸ Αὐγούστου καὶ μετ' αὐτόν (probably κατ' αὐτὸν is here to be read).

[2] *Procem.* 21: ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐκλεκτική τις αἵρεσις εἰσήχθη ὑπὸ Ποτάμωνος τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέως ἐκλεξαμένου τὰ ἀρέσκοντα ἐξ ἑκάστης τῶν αἱρέσεων. (The same, but with the omission of the expression still more unsuitable to him, πρὸ ὀλίγου, is found in Suidas, αἵρεσις, S. II. 48 B.).

[3] This theory, advanced by Nietzsche (*Rhein. Mus.* xxiv. 205 *sq.*; *Beitr. z. Quellenk. d. Diogenes Laertius*, 9), and advocated among others by Diels (*Doxogr.* 81, 4), ascribes to Diogenes great want of thought, but not, on the whole, more than might be expected in him. Concerning the different attempts to decide between the accounts of Diogenes and Suidas, or to reconcile them, and to discover something more about the life and circumstances of Potamo, cf. Fabric. *Bibl. Gr.* iii. 184 *sq.* Harl.; Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Phil.* ii. 193 *sqq.*; J. Simon, *Histoire de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie*, i. 199 *sqq.* In these there is also a review of the other men of this name known to us — the rhetorician Potamo, of Mytilene, who, according to Suidas, *sub. voce* (cf. Θεόδ. Γαδ. and Λεσβώναξ, where the rhetorician is called φιλόσοφος), taught under Tiberius in Rome; and Potamo, the ward of Plotinus (Porph. *v. Plot.* 9), whom, however, the new editions call Polemo. There is also the Potamo from whom some mathematical observations are quoted, according to Alexander, in Simpl. *De Cœlo*, 270, *a*, 42; 289, *a*, 23 K; *Schol. in Ar.* 513, *b*, 8; 515, *a*, 42.

[4] *Vide* preceding note.

logical consistency, Platonic[1] and Peripatetic elements with an essentially Stoic foundation. In the question of the criterion, he allied himself with the Stoics, only that, instead of the 'intellectual notion,' he substituted a vaguer form of expression, the 'most accurate notion.' In his metaphysics he added quality and space to substance and efficient force as the highest principles; that he reduced, like the Stoics, efficient force itself to substance is not stated. The highest good, he thought, consisted in the perfection of the life, the most essential condition of which lay in virtue, for which, however, in agreement with Aristotle and the older Academy, corporeal and external goods were found indispensable.[2] Scarcely any original thoughts are to be found in this superficial combination and modification of older doctrines; and so the 'Eclectic school,' except for the one mention of it by Diogenes and his Byzantine followers, has left no further trace in history.

[1] According to Suidas, he wrote a treatise on the Platonic Republic.

[2] Ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτῷ (continues Diog. *l. c.*), καθά φησιν ἐν στοιχειώσει, κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑφ' οὗ γίνεται ἡ κρίσις, τουτέστι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, τὸ δὲ ὡς δι' οὗ, οἷον τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην φαντασίαν. ἀρχάς τε τῶν ὅλων τήν τε ὕλην καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, ποιότητά τε καὶ τόπον· ἐξ οὗ γὰρ καὶ ὑφ' οὗ καὶ ποίῳ καὶ ἐν ᾧ. τέλος δὲ εἶναι ἐφ' ὃ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, ζωὴν κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν τελείαν οὐκ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐκτός.

CHAPTER V.

THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL IN THE FIRST CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST.

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D. *The Peripatetic School. Its later direction.*

SIMULTANEOUSLY with the tendency which was introduced into the Academy by Antiochus, the school of the Peripatetics also received a new impulse and pursued a partially altered course. As Antiochus wished to bring back the Academy to the doctrine of their founder, so the Peripatetics turned anew to the works of Aristotle: it is to the expounding of these works to which for whole centuries, down to the times of Neo-Platonism, their entire strength is directed, and in which their principal task consists. Here also there is displayed the phenomenon so characteristic of this whole period: the more unmistakable and pressing is the feeling of mental lassitude, and the stronger the mistrust of its own scientific power, of which scepticism has been the formal expression, the more obvious becomes the necessity to return to the old masters and to lean upon them. No other school, however, has so zealously and carefully carried on the work of exposition, and none has produced such a long and connected line of commentators as that of the Peripatetics.[1]

[1] Concerning these, *vide* Zumpt (*Ueber d. Bestand der Philosoph. Schul. in Athen.*) *Abhandl. der Berl. Akademie*, 1842; *Hist. Phil. Kl.* 93 *sq.*; Brandis, *Ueber die Griech. Ausleger des Arist. Organons*, ibid. 1833, 273 *sq.*

[1] *Top.* i. 3. A distinguished rhetorician had declared that the *Topica* of Aristotle was unknown to him: *Quod quidem minime sum admiratus, eum philosophum rhetori non esse cognitum, qui ab ipsis philosophis præter admodum paucos ignoraretur.* Though the Peripatetics are not here mentioned, it cannot be supposed that the great mass of the philosophers of the time were unacquainted with Aristotle's writings, if they were not neglected in the Peripatetic school itself.

[2] In the passage quoted, *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 139, 2.

[3] Cf. *ibid.* II. ii. 934.

[4] Andronicus was, according to Plut. *Sulla*. 25, a contemporary of Tyrannio (*vide infra*, p. 115, 1); and as Tyrannio appears to have only come to Rome in 66

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The Commentators.

The scientific activity of this school, since the middle of the third century, had already, so far as we can judge from the accounts we have received, confined itself to the propagation, exposition, defence, and popularising of the doctrines of Aristotle and Theophrastus; and even Critolaus, its most important representative in the second century, did not go beyond this. After Critolaus the school itself seems to have lost more and more the precise knowledge of the Aristotelian doctrines and writings. Cicero[1] and Strabo[2] expressly tell us so, and the assertion is confirmed by the circumstance that, excepting the approximation of Diodorus to the Epicurean ethics,[3] not a single scientific proposition has been handed down to us from any of the successors of Critolaus, during a period of nearly a century. Andronicus of Rhodes first gave a new impulse to the scientific life of his school. This distinguished man was, in the second third of the first century before Christ, head of the school in Athens.[4] His edition of Aristotle's

Andronicus of Rhodes.

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works,[1] for which Tyrannio the grammarian furnished

B.C., and Andronicus used his transcripts of Aristotle's writings for his own edition of them, this must certainly be placed after 60 B.C. His invariable surname ὁ Ῥόδιος designates his birthplace; Strabo mentions him among the celebrated philosophers of Rhodes (xiv. 2, 13, p. 655). That he was head of the Peripatetic school (in Athens) is asserted by David, *Schol. in Arist.* 24, *a*, 20; 25, *b*, 42; Ammon. *De Interpret. l. c.* 94, *a*, 21; 97, *a*, 19. He is here called the ἐνδέκατος ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους; following the Scholium in Waitz, however, (*Aristot. Org.* i. 45), which is also ascribed to Ammonius, his disciple Boëthus was this eleventh philosopher. According as we give the preference to the one or the other statement, and reckon Aristotle himself, or omit him, there will be wanting to the number of the known heads of the school (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Strato, Lyco, Aristo, Critolaus, Diodorus, Erymneus, Andronicus) one, two, or three names. If three are found deficient, I should be inclined to insert them, not with Zumpt (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 927, 1) between Aristo and Critolaus, but in the evident gap between Erymneus and Andronicus. It seems to me most probable, however, that only two are wanting, and that, according as we reckon, Andronicus or Boethus might thus be called the eleventh (counted not *after*, but *from* Aristotle—ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους).

himself arranged the writings of Plotinus: μιμησάμενος . . Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν περιπατητικὸν, who τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε, τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών. This statement, as well as that of Plutarch (*Sulla*, 26): παρ' αὐτοῦ [Τυραννίωνος] τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὑπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων (supplied with transcripts by Tyrannio) εἰς μέσον θεῖναι, can only be understood of an actual edition of Aristotle's works, especially if we remember that, according to Plutarch, the Peripatetics before Andronicus had wandered from the doctrine of their founder on account of their scanty acquaintance with his works. When the same writer adds to the words already quoted, καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας, we must understand by these lists of writings a supplement to the edition which probably did not confine itself to a mere enumeration of the works, but embraced also enquiries as to their genuineness, contents, and arrangement. In any case, Andronicus had instituted such enquiries, as is shown by his condemnation of the so-called *Post-prædicamenta* and the book περὶ ἑρμηνείας (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 67, 1; 69, 1), and the reasons he gives for it. The proposition (cf. David, *Schol. in Arist.* 25, *b*, 41) that the study of philosophy should begin with logic may also have been brought forward in this connection. On the other hand, what David says (*l. c.* 24, *a*, 19)

[1] Porphyry (*Plot.* 24) says he

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him with the means,[1] did them inestimable service by promoting their universal diffusion and more systematic study.[2] At the same time by his enquiries into their authenticity and arrangement,[3] and by his commentaries[4] on several of them, he showed the

on the division of the Aristotelian writings cannot be taken from Andronicus because of the quotation from the treatise περὶ κόσμου; and the treatise of Andronicus *De Divisione* (Boët. *De Divis.* p. 638) cannot have dealt with the division of the books of Aristotle.

[1] This great scholar was born in Amisus in Pontus. When the place was conquered by Lucullus, he became the slave of Murena, was then set at liberty, and taught in Rome (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 139, 1). Here he gained considerable property, collected a famous library, and died at a great age (Suidas, *sub voce*; Plut. *Lucull.* 19). Strabo (xii. 3, 16, p. 548) says that he had heard him lecture. That he belonged to the Peripatetic school is nowhere asserted, but his study of Aristotle's writings shows that he, like so many other grammarians, was connected with it. He is to be distinguished from his namesake and disciple, the freedman of Terentia. Cf. Suid. Τυραν. νεώτ.

Tyrannio had found opportunity of making use of Apellico's library, which Sulla had brought to Rome; and many besides himself made copies of the Aristotelian works therein (Strabo, xiii. 2, 54, p. 609). Through him Andronicus received his copies (cf. preceding note, and *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 139). Whether Andronicus had also come to Rome, or had merely received copies of Tyrannio's recension, is not stated.

[2] This, at any rate, may be conceded, if even the further statement that the principal works of Aristotle were absolutely wanting in the Peripatetic school before the time of Andronicus cannot be maintained (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 139 *sq.*).

[3] *Vide supra*, 114, 1.

[4] Of these his exposition of the categories is most frequently quoted. It is mentioned by Dexipp. *in Cat.* p. 25, 25 Speng. (*Schol. in Arist.* 42, *a*, 30); Simpl. in *Cat. Schol.* 40, *b*, 23; 61, *a*, 25 *sqq.*; and in about thirty other passages. At p. 6 ε. 7, δ. (*Schol.* 41, *b*, 25; 42, *a*, 10), Simplicius seems to describe the work of Andronicus as a mere paraphrase (Ἀνδρ. παραφράζων τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν βιβλίον). Meantime we see from other statements, as those which are quoted below, that the paraphrase was only a part of the task which Andronicus had set himself, and that he afterwards entered into the explanation of words, criticism of texts, and questions as to the genuineness of particular sections (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 67, 1; 69, 1) and philosophic investiga-

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Peripatetic school the way in which from henceforth their criticism and exegesis was to proceed. He did not confine himself to mere explanation, but sought to maintain as a philosopher the same independence with which as a critic he departed from tradition in the treatment of weighty questions. This we see from various and not altogether unimportant determinations by which in the doctrine of categories he diverged from Aristotle,[1] and still more clearly,

tion of the contents.[1] Cf. Brandis, *l.c.* 273 *sq.* That Andronicus had also commented on the Physics does not certainly follow from Simpl. *Phys.* 101, *a*; 103, *b*; 216, *a*; although it is probable from the first of these passages. Simplicius, however, does not seem to have had this commentary in his own hands, or he would have quoted from it more frequently. The observations on Arist. *De An.* i. 4, 408, *b*, 32 *sqq.*, and the Xenocratic definition of the soul there discussed, which is quoted from Andronicus by Themist. *De An.* ii. 56, 11; 59, 6 Speng., point to an exposition of the treatise on the soul (*vide infra*, p. 117, 2). The definition of *πάθος*, ap. Aspas. in *Eth. N.* (*infra*, p 118, 3) is taken, perhaps, from a commentary on the Ethics. Of the two treatises still in existence, bearing the name of Andronicus, one, the treatise *De Animi Affectionibus*, is the work of Andronicus Callistus in the fifteenth century, the other, the commentary on the Nicomachæan Ethics, is written by Heliodorus, of Prusa (1367); cf. Rose, *Hermes*, ii. 212. Andronicus cannot possibly have been concerned with either of them.

[1] According to Simpl. *Cat.* 15, *ε*. (*Schol.* 47, *b*, 25), he regarded with Xenocrates (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 865, 4)—this division, however, is in the main Platonic (cf. *l. c.* 556, 4)—as the fundamental categories, the *καθ' αὑτὸ* and the *πρός τι* (the Aristotelian definition of which he expounds, ap. Simpl. *Cat.* 51, *β. γ. Schol.* 66, *a*, 39; Porph. Ἐξήγ. *ἐ. τ. κατηγ.* 43, *a*). The *καθ' αὑτὸ* he must then have divided still further, for (according to Simpl. p. 67, *γ*. 69, *a*; *Schol.* 73, *b*, 10; 74, *b*, 29) he added to the four Aristotelian kinds of quality (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 269, 2) a fifth kind under which thickness, heaviness, &c., must fall, but which, as he observed, may itself be reckoned under the *παθητικαὶ ποιότητες*; and it is only with reference to the categories arising from further division that he can have asserted (Simpl. 40 *ζ*.; *Schol.* 59, *b*, 41; cf. 60, *a*, 38) Relation to be the ultimate category of all. Observations of his are also mentioned concerning the

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from his view of the soul, which in the spirit of Aristoxenus and Dicæarchus,[1] and consequently in approximation to the Stoic materialism, he held to be a product of the bodily organism.[2] His whole standpoint, however, we must assume to have been that of the Peripatetics, though he strove to improve the doctrine of his school in regard to particular points.

Boëthus of Sidon.

The work of Andronicus was continued by his disciple Boëthus of Sidon,[3] who is often mentioned

ἕξις (Simpl. 55, *ε*.; *Schol.* 65, *a*, 7), *ποιεῖν*, and *πάσχειν* (Simpl. 84, *β*.), and those conceptions which he called indefinite magnitudes, and desired, therefore, to reckon not only under Relation, but also under Quantity (*l. c.* 36 *δ*.; *Schol.* 58, *a*, 37). Lastly, he wished to substitute Time and Space for the *ποῦ* and *ποτὲ*, and to reckon under these categories not only *ποῦ* and *ποτὲ*, but all other determinations of Place and Time. Simpl. 34, *β*. 36, *β*. 87, *α*. 88, *α. β*. 91, *β*.; *Schol.* 57, *a*, 24; 58, *a*, 16; 79, *b*, 1; 30, 37; 80, *b*, 3; cf. also Brandis, *l.c.* p. 273 *sq.*; Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.* i. 537 *sq.*

[1] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 888, 890.

[2] This is maintained by Galen, *Qu. Animi Mor.* c. 4, vol. iv. 782 *sq.* K. As Andronicus, he says, was wont to speak freely and without obscure circumlocutions, he plainly declares the soul to be the *κρᾶσις* (sc. *τοῦ σώματος*) or the *δύναμις ἐπομένη τῇ κράσει*. In the same sense he explains (according to Themistius, *De An.* ii. 56, 11; 59, 6 *sqq.* Sp.) the well-known definition of Xenocrates (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 871). While censuring Aristotle because in his objections to that definition he kept exclusively to the expression *τοὔνομα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ*, he himself perceived in it the thought that all living natures consist of a mixture of the elements formed *κατά τινας λόγους καὶ ἀριθμούς*; so that it coincides in the main with the reduction of the soul to the harmony of the body. But when he adds that this number is called a self-moving number (*αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς κράσεως ταύτης αἰτία καὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς μίξεως τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων*), this does not agree with Galen's statement, according to which it was in the first place a product of the *κρᾶσις*; and it is questionable whether Galen has not missed the meaning of Andronicus.

[3] Strabo mentions that he was a native of Sidon, xvi. 2, 24, p. 757; Andronicus names as his teacher Ammon. in *Categ.* 5 (ap. Zumpt *l. c.* 94); that he was also a follower of his seems

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with him. He, too, acquired considerable fame[1] as an expounder of the Aristotelian writings: the best known of his works is a commentary on the categories:[2] but some traces are found of commentaries on the Physics and the Prior Analytics—perhaps also on the treatise 'De Animâ' and the Ethics.[3] In his

to result from the *Scholion*, quoted *supra*, p. 113, 4. But, in opposition to this theory, we find that in the years 45 and 44 B.C. Cicero himself (*Off.* i. 1, 1) and Trebonius (in Cicero's *Ep. ad Fam.* xii. 16) mention only Cratippus as teacher of the Peripatetic philosophy in Athens. Boëthus is not mentioned, whereas this philosopher, whom Strabo, *l. c.*, designates (ᾧ συνεφιλοσόφησαμεν ἡμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια) as his own teacher, survived this date by at least one decade, perhaps several. Strabo also would, no doubt, have said if he had heard him lecture in Athens. Boëthus, therefore, must have been a teacher of philosophy elsewhere. Perhaps Strabo may have availed himself of his instructions in Rome.

[1] Simplicius (*Cat.* 1, *a*. 41 *β.*; *Schol.* 40, *a*, 21; 61, *a*, 14) calls him θαυμάσιος and ἐλλόγιμος; and on page 209 *β.*; *Schol.* 92, *a*, 42, he praises his acuteness. Cf. p. 3, *γ.*; *Schol.* 29, *a*, 47; τὰ τοῦ Βοηθοῦ πολῆς ἀγχινοίας γέμοντα.

[2] According to Simplicius (i. *a*) one of those which βαθυτέραις περὶ αὐτὸ (the Aristotelian book) ἐννοίαις ἐχρήσαντο, but at the same time (*l. c.* 7, *γ.*; *Schol.* 42, *a*, 8) a continuous exposition καθ' ἑκάστην λέξιν. This commentary is frequently quoted in that of Simplicius and also that of Dexippus. In it, perhaps, was the statement which Syrian, in *Metaph. Schol.* 893, *a*, 7, contests, that the Platonic ideas are the same as class-conceptions. A separate treatise of his on the πρός τι is mentioned by Simplicius, 42, *a*, *Schol.* 61, *b*, 9.

[3] That there was a commentary on the Physics is shown by the quotations in Themistius, *Phys.* 145, 14; 337, 23; 341, 9 Sp.; which Simplicius, no doubt, has borrowed from him (*Phys.* 46, *a*; 180, *a*; 181, *b*), as in the last of these three passages he expressly quotes the words of Themistius, and only in them those of Boëthus; and nowhere adduces anything from Boëthus' Physics except what he finds in his predecessor. An exposition of the First Analytics may be conjectured from the quotations of the pseudo-Galen Εἰσαγ. διαλ. p. 19, and of Ammon. in *Arist. Org.* ed. Waitz, i. 45, from the doctrine of the syllogism; an exposition of the books on the soul (though less certainly) from what Simplicius (*De An.* 69, *b*) tells us concerning his objections against immortality; an exposition of the Nicomachæan Ethics from what Alexander (*De An.* 154, *a*) says of his observations on self-love and the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον; and what Aspas. (*Schol. in Eth.* Classical Journal, xxix. 106) and Rose (*Aristot. Pseudo-Epigr.* 109) says of his and Andronicus' definition of the πάθος.

[1] David, *Schol. in Ar.* 25 *b*, 41. For what follows, Prantl's *Gesch. der Logik*, i. 540 *sqq.* has been gratefully made use of.

[2] Dexipp. in *Categ.* 54; Speng. *Schol. in Arist.* 50, *b*, 15 *sqq.*

[3] Simpl. *Categ.* 20 *β sq.*; *Schol.* 50, *a*, 2. At the beginning of this passage, Boëthus entirely waives the enquiry concerning νοητὴ and σωματικὴ οὐσία, but only because it does not belong to the same connection. He desired (*vide* Themist. *Phys.* 145, 14 Sp.; Simpl. *Phys.* 46, *a*) that matter should be called ὕλη only in relation to the form which it has not yet assumed, and ὑποκείμενον in relation to the form imparted to it, but this is merely a matter of verbal expression. What Simplicius quotes from Boëthus (24 ζ *sq. Schol.* 53, *a*, 38–45) seems to me of small importance.

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apprehension of the Peripatetic doctrine he likewise, so far as we can judge, shows much independence, and an inclination to that naturalism which in the immediate followers of Aristotle had already overpowered the Platonic and idealistic element, and which was especially prominent in Alexander of Aphrodisias. This also appears in the fact that he wished the study of philosophy to be commenced not with logic but with physics.[1] When, moreover, he denied that the universal of nature was prior to the particular,[2] and would not allow form to be regarded as a substance in the strict sense (πρώτη οὐσία), but only matter, and in one aspect, that which is compounded of matter[3] and form—this presupposes a theory of the value and priority of matter in things, which diverges from Aristotle, and rather approaches to the materialism of the Stoics. The same mode of thought is apparent in his utterances concerning immortality, which place him on the side of those who understood the Aristotelian doctrine

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as a simple denial of it;[1] and in further agreement with these tendencies we learn that in the sphere of Ethics he maintained that the primary object of desire for everyone (the *πρῶτον οἰκεῖον*) was naturally his own self, and everything else must be desired only because of its relation to one's self.[2] In other instances, Boëthus now and then sought to justify the Aristotelian determinations,[3] and sometimes defended them, especially against the Stoics;[4] but

[1] Simpl. *De An.* 69, *b*: *ἵνα μὴ ὡς ὁ Βοηθὸς οἰηθῶμεν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμψυχίαν, ἀθάνατον μὲν εἶναι ὡς αὐτὴν μὴ ὑπομένουσαν τὸν θάνατον ἐπιόντα, ἐξισταμένην δὲ ἐπιόντος ἐκείνου τῷ ζῶντι ἀπόλλυσθαι.* This refers to Plato's ontological proof of immortality. Boëthus concedes to him that, strictly speaking, the soul does not die, but only the man (because death, according to the *Phædo*, 64 C, consists in the separation of soul from body, and therefore denotes the dissolution of man into his constituent parts, and not the destruction of those parts as such); but he thinks the continuance of the soul does not follow from this. Eusebius (*Pr. Ev.* xi. 28, 4; xiv. 10, 3) gives extracts from a treatise of Porphyry, *περὶ ψυχῆς*, in which he defended immortality against Boëthus. From the former of these passages it is clear that Boëthus had also attacked the proof derived from the kinship of the human spirit with God (*Phædo*, 78, B *sqq.*).

[2] This view is ascribed by Alex. *De An.* 154, *a*, to Xenarchus and Boëthus, who appeal in support of it to Arist. *Eth. N.* viii. 1, 1155, *b*, 16 *sqq.*; ix. 8, 1168, *a*, 35 *sqq.* Our text names the 9th and 10th books, evidently by a confusion of the alphabetical designations of the books (Θ I) with the corresponding numerical signs.

[3] To these attempts belong (1) a remark, ap. Simpl. *Cat.* 109, *β*; *Schol.* 92, *a*, 33; *Categories*, 14, 15, *b*, 1 *sqq.*) on the applicability of the opposition of *ἠρεμία* and *κίνησις* to qualitative change; (2) the demonstration in which Theophrastus had already anticipated him, that the syllogisms of the first and second figure are perfect (Ammon. in *Analyt. Pr.* i. 1, 24, *b*, 18; ap Waitz, *Arist. Org.* i, 45); (3) the doctrine evolved from the hypothetical syllogisms as the *ἀναπόδεικτοι* and *πρῶτοι ἀναπόδεικτοι* (Pseudo-Galen. *Εἰσαγ. διαλ.* p. 19; *Min.* ap. Prantl, p. 554); (4) the remarks on the question whether time is a number or a measure, and whether it even existed without the soul that reckons it, ap. Themist. *Phys.* 337, 23; 341, 9 Sp.; Simpl. *Phys.* 180, *a*, 181, *b*; Simpl. *Categ*, 88, *β*; *Schol.* 79, *b*, 40.

[4] Thus he defends (ap. Simpl. 43, *a*, *β*; *Schol.* 62, *a*, 18, 27) the Peripatetic doctrine of the *πρός τι* against the Stoic doctrine of the *πρός τι πως ἔχον*, while at the same time he tried to apprehend Aristotle's definition more exactly, in the way pointed out by Andronicus (Simpl. 51, *β*; *Schol.* 66, *a*, 34; cf. Simpl. 41, *β sq.*; 42, *a*; *Schol.* 61 *a*, 9, 25 *sqq. b*, 9). He considered the division of *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν* as two distinct categories (Simpl. 77 *β*; *Schol.* 77, *b*, 18 *sqq.*), and also the category of Having, which he examined particularly (Simpl. 94 *ε*; *Schol.* 81, *a*, 4) as well founded.

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what has come down to us in this connection is of little importance as affecting the special character of his philosophy.

A third interpreter of Aristotle's writings, belonging to the same period, is Aristo,[1] a disciple of Antiochus, who afterwards went over from the Academy to the Peripatetics.[2] But we know

Aristo. (3)

[1] He is mentioned by Simpl. 41, *γ.*; *Schol.* 61, *a*, 25, together with Boëthus, Eudorus, Andronicus, and Athenodorus among the *παλαιοὶ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγηταί*, and, consequently, no doubt the author of a commentary on this book, and not of a mere treatise on the *πρός τι*, which Simplicius in his mention of him in this place as well as at p. 48, *a*; 51, *β*; *Schol.* 63, *b*, 10; 66, *a*, 37 *sqq.* alone allows. In the latter passage the definition given also by Andronicus and Boëthus of the *πρός τί πως ἔχον* is quoted primarily from him, with the remark that Andronicus has the same. He is no doubt that Aristo of Alexandria, who, according to Apul. *Dogm. Plat.* iii. p. 277 Hild. (where he is rightly censured for this) added to the Aristotelian syllogistic forms (perhaps in a commentary on the Prior Analytics) three *modi* of the first and two of the second figures, and to whom, in the following passages (where Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, i. 590, 23, restores the *Aristo* of the MSS. instead of *Aristotle*), an account of the syllogistic figures is ascribed. He is likewise the Alexandrian Peripatetic Aristo whom Diogenes mentions (vii. 164; also *vide supra*, p. 105, 2).

[2] *Ind. Acad. Hercul.* col. 35: [Antiochus had for disciples] *Ἀρίστωνά τε καὶ Δίωνα Ἀλεξανδρεῖς καὶ Κράτιππον Περγαμηνὸν, ὧν Ἀρίστων [μὲν] καὶ Κράτιππος . . . ἐγένοντο Περιπατητικοὶ ἀποστατήσαντες τῆς Ἀκαδημείας.* Cic. (*Acad.* ii. 4, 12) shows him and Dio to us at Alexandria in the company of Antiochus, with the observation *quibus ille* (Antiochus) *secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat.* If Seneca (*Ep.* 29, 6) resorted to him, he must have taught in Rome in the latter part of his life; meanwhile, the *lepidus philosophus Aristo*, of whom Seneca here relates certain anecdotes, must mean another person of the same name; not only because Seneca

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Staseas. Cratippus.

little about him, and that little does not lead us to suppose him a great philosopher. Concerning the philosophy of the other Peripatetics of the first century before Christ—Staseas,[1] Cratippus,[2]

reckons this man among the *circulatores qui philosophiam honestius neglexissent quam vendunt*, but also because the Julius Græcinus, from whom a remark on him is quoted, only died under Caligula; whereas the disciple of Antiochus, who was with him about 84 B.C. (*vide sup.* 76, 4), scarcely survived the beginning of the reign of Augustus, or at any rate cannot long have survived it. The Aristo of Cos mentioned by Strabo, xiv. 2, 19, p. 658, must not be taken for our Aristo (as Zumpt supposes, *Abh. d. Berl. Akad.* 1842; *Hist. Phil. Kl.* 68), for the former is described as the disciple and heir of the well-known Peripatetic, Aristo of Julis (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 925).

[1] Staseas of Naples, the instructor of Piso, who resided with him (Cic. *De Orat.* i. 22, 104; *Fin.* v. 3, 8, 25, 75; *vide sup.* p. 100, 1, end) is also called by Cicero, *nobilis Peripateticus*; but is censured by him for ascribing too much importance to external fortunes and corporeal conditions (*Fin.* v. 25, 75). An unimportant theory of his is quoted in Censorinus, *Di. Nat.* 14, 5, 10. As Piso heard him lecture about 92 B.C. (*l. c. De Orat.*) he must have been at least as old as Andronicus.

[2] This philosopher, born in Pergamus, was likewise originally a disciple of Antiochus. In the years 50–46 B.C. we meet with him in Mytilene (Cic. *De Univ.* 1; *Brut.* 71. 250; Plut. *Pomp.* 75). Soon after this he must have settled in Athens, where Cicero got for him the Roman citizenship from Cæsar, but at the same time induced the Areopagus to request him to remain in Athens (Plut. *Cic.* 24). Here about this time Cicero's son heard him (Cic. *Off.* i. 1, 1; iii. 2, 5; *ad Fam.* xii. 16; xvi. 21) and Brutus visited him (Plut. *Brut.* 24). That he was the head of the school is not expressly stated, but is very probable. Cicero, who was a great friend of his, speaks with the highest appreciation of his scientific importance (*Brut.* 71, 250; *Off.* i. 1, 1; iii. 2, 5; *Divin.* i. 3, 5; *De Univ.* 1), but this praise is scarcely altogether impartial. As to his views, nothing has been transmitted to us except what we are told by Cicero, *Divin.* i. 3, 5; 32, 70 *sq.* (cf. Tertullian, *De An.* 46): that he admitted prophecy in dreams, and ecstasy (*furor*), and that he based this theory upon the Peripatetic doctrine of the divine origin of spirit, and upon the numerous cases of fulfilled prophecies. The anthropology presupposed by him in this is the Aristotelian: *animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus* (= θύραθεν, from the divine spirit) *esse tractos et haustos*

Nicolaus of Damascus,[1] and others, our information is too scanty, and too unimportant to detain us with

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Nicolaus of Damascus.

. . . *eam partem, quæ sensum, quæ motum, quæ adpetitum habeat, non esse ab actione corporis sejugatam*; the sequel, however, sounds rather more Platonic: *quæ autem pars animi rationis atque intelligentiæ sit particeps, eam tum maxime vigere, cum plurimum absit a corpore.*

[1] Nicolaus (concerning whom *vide* Müller, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 343 *sqq.*), born in Damascus about 64 B.C. (therefore called ὁ Δαμασκηνὸς, Athen. iv. 153 f. *et pass.*; Strabo, xv. 1, 72, p. 719), and carefully brought up by his father Antipater, a prosperous and respectable man, lived many years at the court of the Jewish King Herod, was one of his confidants and came in his company and, some years later, (8 B.C.) for the second time, on his affairs, to Rome, where he gained the favour of Augustus. After the death of Herod the Great he accompanied his son Archelaus thither, and from this journey he never seems to have returned, but to have passed the latter part of his life in Rome (*vide* the references in Suidas, Ἀντίπατρος and Νικόλ.; Nicol. *Fragm.* 3–6, taken from the *Excerpta de Virtutibus*; Joseph. *Antiquit.* xii. 3, 2; xvi. 2, 3; 9, 4; 10, 8; xvii. 5, 4; 9, 6; 11, 3, who also, like Suidas, follows Nicolaus' own statements in Müller). The theory that he was a Jew, shared also by Renan, *Vie de Jésus*, p. 33, is at once refuted by what we read (ap Suid. Ἀντίπ.) respecting an offering to Zeus, and concerning the gods. He is called in Athen. vi. 252 *f.*; 266, *e*; x. 415, *e*; xii. 543, *a*; iv. 153 f., an adherent of the Peripatetic doctrine (Περιπατητικὸς) to which he had early allied himself (Suid. Νικόλ.) and to which he devoted a portion of his writings. Simpl. (*De Cœlo, Schol. in Ar.* 493, *a*, 23) mentions his treatise περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίας (out of which may perhaps be taken the quotation from his θεωρία τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ in the inscription to Theophrastus' metaphysical fragment, p. 323, Brand.). A second work, περὶ τοῦ Παντὸς, which treated περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ κατ' (not καὶ) εἴδη; Id. *l. c.* 469, *a*, 6; a third, περὶ θεῶν, from which statements concerning Xenophanes and Diogenes of Apollonia are reported, is mentioned by Simpl. (*Phys.* 6, *a*, *b*; 32, *a*, *b*; an ethical work περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς καλῶν (= περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων), a πολύστιχος πραγματεία, as mentioned by Simpl. *in Epict. Enchir.* 194, *c.*; here he may perhaps have said of Epicurus, what Diogenes asserts (Diog. x. 4). In none of these passages, however, is any philosophical proposition quoted from him; and Nicolaus was doubtless far more of a scholar than a philosopher. Suidas calls him Περιπατητικὸν ἢ Πλατωνικὸν, which might point to his combination of the views of Plato and Aristotle, if any dependence could be placed upon

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them.[1] But Xenarchus[2] and his treatise against the Aristotelian theories respecting the æther may here be

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the passage. As an historian he is censured by Josephus (*Antiquit.* xvi. 7, 1) on account of his partiality for Herod; and his life of Augustus was no doubt only a panegyric. For the rest *vide*, concerning his historical works, Müller; cf. Dindorf. *Jahrbücher für Class. Philol.* vol. xcix. H, 2, 107 *sqq.* Meyer's supposition that he wrote the treatise περὶ φυτῶν, is discussed *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 98, note.

[1] Among them the owner of Theophrastus' library, Apellico, of Teos (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 139); but though this man occasionally occupied himself with the Peripatetic philosophy (*Athen.* v. 214, *d*), and composed a treatise on Hermias and Aristotle (Aristocl. ap. Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xv. 2, 9), Strabo (p. 609), no doubt rightly, calls him φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος. As little does Athenio or Aristio (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. ii. 934, 3) deserve a place among the philosphers, even supposing he really taught the Peripatetic philosophy. Somewhat later we have Alexander, the teacher and friend of M. Crassus, the Triumvir (Plut. *Crass.* 3); Athenæus, of Seleucia in Cilicia, in the time of Cæsar (Strabo, xiv. 5, 4, p. 670); Demetrius, the friend of Cato, who was with him in his last days (Plut. *Cato Min.* 65, 67 *sq.*); Diodotus, the brother of Boëthus of Sidon (Strabo, xvi. 2, 24, p. 757). To the Peripatetic school belong also, no doubt, Athenodorus, the Rhodian, named by Quintillian, *Inst.* ii. 17, 15, with Critolaus as the enemy of rhetoric (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 930, 2); and perhaps the author of the Περίπατοι quoted in Diog. iii. 3; v. 36; vi. 81; ix. 42. When he lived we do not know, but he seems to be later than Critolaus, whom Quintillian places before him. In Rome, according to Cicero, there must already have been, about the beginning of the first century, persons acquainted with the Aristotelian philosophy and writings, if M. Antonius and Q. Lutatius Catulus really spoke as he (*Orat.* ii. 36, 152 *sqq.*) represents. We have no warrant, however, for supposing that this representation is historically true; indeed, Cicero himself implies clearly enough both here and in c. 14, 59, that Antonius was not acquainted, so far as he knew, with Greek literature; and though it may certainly have been otherwise with Catulus, we are hardly justified in ascribing to him an accurate knowledge of that literature, and particularly of the Peripatetic philosophy. The only Roman adherent of this philosophy of whom we hear in the first century B.C. is that Piso of whom we have spoken, *supra*, p. 100, 1, end; but, as is there shown, he also attended the instruction of Antiochus, whose eclectic principles Cicero puts into his mouth.

[2] Xenarchus, of Seleucia, in Cilicia, passed the greater part of his life as a teacher in Alexandria, Athens, and Rome. It was in the first of these cities that Strabo probably heard him. Befriended by Arius, and patronised by Augustus, he died in Rome at a great age (cf. Strabo, xiv. 5, 4, p. 670).

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mentioned;[1] for this polemic against so integral a portion of the Aristotelian physics affords a further proof that the Peripatetic school was not so absolutely united by the doctrine of its founder as to preclude many departures from that doctrine among its members.

The treatise περὶ Κόσμου.

But there is still stronger evidence of this fact in a treatise which perhaps dates from the first century before Christ, and has been transmitted to us as the work of Aristotle—the book of the Cosmos.[2]

Various theories as to its origin.

The authenticity of this work was already questioned in antiquity,[3] and denied by Melanchthon;[4] in

[1] *Vide* concerning this treatise and the objections developed in it against the Aristotelian doctrine: Damasc. *De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist.* 456, *a*, 6; 460, *b*, 15; Simpl. *De Cœlo, Schol.* 470, *b*, 20; 472, *a*, 22; 472, *b*, 38 *sqq.*; 473, *a*, 9; 43, *b*, 24; (9, *a*, 11; 11, *b*, 41; 13, *b*, 6; 36; 14, *a*, 19; 21, *b*, 32 *sqq.*; 25, *b*, 4; 27, *b*, 20–34, *a*, 18 K): Julian. *Orat.* v. 162, A, *sq.* Simplicius calls it: αἱ πρὸς τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν ἀπορίαι, τὰ πρὸς τὴν π. οὐσ. ἠπορημένα or γεγραμμένα. In the same treatise were perhaps to be found the observations against Chrysippus' doctrine of empty space, ap. Simpl. *l. c.* 129, *a*, 18 K. His opinion concerning the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον (*supra*, 120, 2), and his (Aristotelian) definition of the soul (Stob. *Ecl.* i. 798) are also quoted elsewhere.

[2] Weisse, *Aristoteles von der Seele und von der Welt*, 1829, p. 373 *sqq.*; Stahr, *Aristoteles bei den Römern*, 1834, p. 163 *sqq.*; Osann, *Beiträge zu Griech. und Röm. Literaturgesch.* i. 143 *sqq.*; Petersen in the review of this treatise, *Jahrb. f. wissensch. Krit.* 1836, 1, 550, *sqq.*; Ideler, *Aristot. Meteorol.* ii. 286 *sq.*; F. Gieseler, *üb. d. Verf. d. Buchs v. d. W. Ztschr. f. Alterthumsw.* 1838, Nr. 146 *sq.*; Spengel, *De Arist. Libro X. Hist. Anim.* Heidelb. 1842, p. 9 *sqq.*; Hildebrand, *Apulej. Opera*, i. 44 *sqq.*; Rose, *De Arist. Libr. Ordine et Auct.* p. 36, 90 *sqq.*; Adam, *De Auctore Libri Pseudo-Aristotelici π. Κ.* Berl. 1861; Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, *Météorologie d'Aristote*, Par. 1863. p. 88 *sqq.*; Goldbacher, *Ztschr. f. Oesterreich. Gymn.* xxiv. (1873), 670 *sq.*; *Z. Kritik von Apulejus De Mundo*, &c.

[3] Procl. in *Tim.* 322, E: Ἀριστοτέλης, εἴπερ ἐκείνου τὸ περὶ κόσμου βιβλίον.

[4] Physica, *Opp.* ed. Bretschn. xiii. 213 *sq.*

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modern times it has found some advocates,[1] but is nevertheless quite untenable. As little, however, can the treatise be ascribed to any other school than the Peripatetic, or regarded, not as a writing foisted upon Aristotle, but as the work of a younger philosopher, which did not itself claim to be Aristotelian —or even the elaboration of such a work. In modern times its authorship has been assigned sometimes to Chrysippus,[2] sometimes to Posidonius,[3] sometimes to Apuleius,[4] but against each of these conjectures there are most important objections. In regard to Chrysippus it is highly improbable that he should have sent forth a work under a borrowed name, and quite inconceivable that he should have adopted for the purpose that of Aristotle; but that the work claims Aristotle's name for itself is incontestable,[5]

[1] Its authenticity has been finally maintained most confidently by Weisse. I am the more willing to spare myself a detailed exposure of the weaknesses of this attempt, as that has already been fully accomplished by Osann, Stahr, and Adam (p. 14 *sqq.* &c.), and as the decisive points in the matter will be brought forward in the following pages.

[2] Osann, *l. c.*, seeks to establish this theory at length.

[3] Ideler, *l. c.*, following Aldobrandinus, Huetius, and Heinsius.

[4] Stahr, *l. c.*, and, in another way, Adam. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire follows the former, without naming him.

[5] Osann, indeed, declares himself, p. 191, very decidedly against the supposition that the work was designedly foisted upon Aristotle. Both in manner of exposition, he says, and in substance, its unlikeness to Aristotle is so unmistakably evident, that only a person entirely unacquainted with Aristotle, or a fool, could have indulged the fancy that it could possibly be regarded as the work of that philosopher. But this, the only argument that he adduces, tries to prove too much. How many are the forged writings in which *we*, at the first glance, can detect the forgery? From this it does not follow that they are not forgeries, but that they are not clumsy forgeries. In the present case, however, the forgery was not clumsy enough to prevent numerous persons and even philosophers and critics of our own time—Weisse, for example—from being deceived. And would a work that was evidently not written by Aristotle pass more easily for his if it were anonymous than if it went forth under his name?

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and when Osann would separate its dedication to Alexander[1] from the rest of the work, this is an arbitrary proceeding which is wholly unjustifiable.[2] Moreover, the exposition of Chrysippus, according to the unanimous testimony of antiquity and the specimens in our possession, is distinguished as much by its learned prolixity, as by its dialectic pedantry and contempt of all rhetorical adornment;[3] whereas the treatise περὶ Κόσμου exhibits throughout the most opposite qualities, so that even on this ground it is quite impossible to attribute it to Chrysippus. No less, however, is such a theory excluded by its contents. That it has adopted many Stoic doctrines and definitions, and expresses some of these in the formulæ which, after Chrysippus, had been transplanted into the Stoic school, is indeed undeniable; nevertheless, as will immediately be shown, this work so entirely contradicts the most important distinctive doctrines of the Stoic school

[1] Naturally Alexander the Great; for that this Alexander was another man of the name of whom nothing further is known, no reader of Osann's book (p. 246) will easily believe.

[2] Osann (p. 246 *sq.*) has no further proof to give than that the dedication is incompatible with his theory of the author of the book. Apart from this there is no trace either in external evidence or the internal character of the passage that it was originally absent. Even in C. 6, 398, *b*, 10, the language is such that the Persian empire must be supposed to be still existing, and if the writer, in his necessarily numerous references to older philosophers, has carefully avoided every definite allusion to what is post-Aristotelian, we see from this that he wishes his work to pass as Aristotelian.

[3] Cf. p. 42.

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as compared with the Peripatetic, that it might be ascribed to any author rather than to Chrysippus. Lastly, though we will not here anticipate the more particular demonstration of the date of this book, it is sufficient for the refutation of Osann's hypothesis, to observe that Chrysippus's work on the Cosmos consisted of at least two books, and that quotations are made from it which are nowhere to be found in the writing we are considering.[1] The same arguments hold good in great measure against those who conjecture Posidonius to have been the author of the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise. Its ornate language, however, can with far more probability be attributed to him than to Chrysippus; and there are many particular details which approximate much more to the time of Posidonius than to that of Chrysippus: indeed, we shall find that the author probably in a considerable part of his work made direct use of this philosopher. But that Posidonius should have forged a work of Aristotle is as wholly unlikely as that Chrysippus should have done so; and though we can certainly remark in him concerning special points, a leaning to the Academic and Peripatetic philosophy, this never makes him untrue (like the author of περὶ Κόσμου) to the fundamental doctrines of his school—so as to deny the substantial presence of God in the world, the destruction and conflagration of the world, or to distinguish æther

[1] Stob. *Ecl.* i. 180; Alex. *Aphr. Anal. Pr.* 58, *b* (*supra*, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 158, 1). Against Osann, cf. Petersen, p. 554 *sqq.*; Gieseler, Spengel, Adam, *l. c.*

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and all elementary bodies whatever.[1] As to Apuleius this objection, it is true, would not hold good: in his treatise on the Cosmos he has entirely appropriated the contents of the so-called Aristotelian treatise. But how are we justified in regarding him not merely as the translator or reviser, but also as the author of the latter? If the work is not mentioned before Apuleius,[2] in the remains of ancient literature which we possess, it does not follow from this that it did not exist: and though Apuleius, in the introduction to his Latin recension, speaks as if it were not a mere translation, but an independent work on the foundations of Aristotle and Theophrastus,[3] there is no proof whatever that he was sufficiently scrupulous about literary right of property, and sufficiently free from boastfulness, not to found a claim of original authorship on the minor alterations and additions by which his work is distinguished[4] from Aristotle's.[5]

[1] For these reasons the hypothesis of Posidonius is opposed by Bake, *Posidon. Rel.* 237 *sq.*; Spengel, p. 17; Adam, p. 32.

[2] The quotation in Justin, *Cohort. ad Gr.* c. 5, cannot be placed earlier than Apuleius, since the authenticity of this treatise, as has lately been shown by Adam (p. 3 *sqq.*) in opposition to Semisch, has decisive reasons against it.

[3] At the end of the dedication to Faustinus, which is distinguished from that of the pseudo-Aristotle to Alexander only by unimportant alterations and omissions: *Quare* [*nos Aristotelem prudentissimum et doctissimum philosophorum*] *et Theophrastum auctorem secuti, quantum possumus cogitatione contingere, dicemus de omni hac cœlesti ratione*, &c. The words in parenthesis are wanting in the best MSS.; but are nevertheless to be considered genuine. Cf. Goldbacher, *l. c.* p. 690.

[4] Concerning these, *vide* Hildebrand, *Apul. Opp.* I. xlviii. *sq.*

[5] The ancients, as is well known, had much less strict ideas than we have on this subject; and many others besides Apuleius behave in such matters with a surprising laxity. Eudemus, *e.g.*, seems nowhere to have said that his work on 'Physics' was only a new edition of Aristotle's nor does

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Closer investigation leaves no doubt that his Latin work on the Cosmos is not (as Stahr and Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire assert) the model, but only a revision of the Greek work which is to be found in our collection of Aristotelian writings; for the latter has throughout the conciser, sharper, more original form of expression, while the former has the character of a paraphrased translation: the flowery language of the one too often in the other becomes bombast, which is sometimes hardly comprehensible without a comparison with the Greek text; and while there is nothing in the Latin which cannot be regarded as a paraphrase or translation of the Greek, the Greek, on the contrary, has passages which could not possibly have arisen from the Latin, but must evidently have been before the eyes of the Latin writer.[1] But to admit this, and to make Apuleius the author of the Greek book which he then himself translated into Latin,[2] is equally impossible. For in the first place we thus abandon the only ground on which the hypothesis of his authorship could even plausibly be maintained—viz., the credibility of his own

he say so of his Ethics. He speaks, even where he adheres quite closely to Aristotle, as an independent author in his own name; and so does the writer of the *Magna Moralia*. Cicero, too, notoriously translated, or, at any rate, transcribed extensive portions in his writings from the Greeks, without mentioning the sources from which they came. And would Apuleius, in his *Aristoteles et Theophrastus auctor*, have really named the sources of a treatise which has taken so much from Stoic authors and Stoic doctrine?

[1] Some of the most striking are these: περὶ Κόσμου 392, *a*, 5; 325, *a*, 7; 398, *b*, 23; 400, *a*, 6; *b*, 23; compared with the corresponding Apul. *De Mundo*, c. 1, 12, 27, 33, 35, p. 291, 317, 362, 368 Oud. For the rest I must refer to Adam, p. 38 *sqq.*; Goldbacher, 671 *sq.*

[2] Adam, *l. c.*, 41 *sqq.*

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assertions; we regard it as impossible that he should have represented his writing as an independent work if it were merely the revision of the work of another, but we unhesitatingly charge him with having foisted his own work in its Greek original upon Aristotle.[1] In order to clear him from the imputation of boasting we attribute to him a forgery.[2] But in the second place this theory would lead us to the improbable conclusion that Apuleius, the Latin rhetorician, had expressed himself far better, more simply and to the point, in the Greek language than in his own; and that, in spite of his being himself the author, he had not unfrequently in the Latin version confused and obscured, nay, completely misunderstood that which in the Greek is perfectly clear.[3] Finally, passing over other difficulties, from the evidence furnished by his other writings of his philosophical capacity, we can scarcely ascribe to Apuleius so important a

[1] That the author of the Greek treatise asserts it to be Aristotelian has been already shown, p. 127, 2. Apuleius also designates it as such in the passage quoted *supra*, p. 129, 3, from the Procemium, and c. 6, p. 300 Oud., where he says, in reference to περὶ Κόσμου, 3, 393, *a*, 27: [*Marc*] *Africum, quod quidem Aristoteles Sardiniense maluit dicere.*

[2] Nor would his forgery have answered his purpose; for if he declared the Greek version of his book to be the work of Aristotle, and the Latin to be his own, these statements would be nullified by each other.

[3] A number of the most striking proofs, not only of the dependence of Apuleius on one Greek text, but also of the misunderstandings which beset him in the reproduction of it, some of which arise from false readings, are given by Goldbacher, p. 679 *sqq.* The same writer shows, p. 674 *sq.*, how untrue is the statement of Adam, that Apuleius, according to his own assertion, was in the habit of composing the same treatise in Latin and Greek.

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work as the treatise on the Cosmos undoubtedly is; and we must necessarily have expected to find in this writing, if it had emanated from him, much more distinct traces of those Platonising metaphysics and theology, and especially of that demonology, which we shall presently discover in Apuleius. This third attempt, therefore, to find a definite author for the book must also be considered unsuccessful, and the question for us can only be, not by whom it was composed, but to what period and school its author belonged.

Its standpoint and character.

That this author reckoned himself among the Peripatetics seems probable from the name of Aristotle, which the work bears; for by that name it claims to be considered one of the genuine records of the doctrines of the school. The same is confirmed, however, by its contents. Though the conception of the world which it advances is far enough from the truly Aristotelian conception, and though it is full of foreign constituents, yet its fundamental features are taken from the Aristotelian doctrine, and it approximates at least as closely to it as the philosophy of Antiochus, for example, approximates to the Platonic philosophy. The metaphysical foundations of the Aristotelian system, the author leaves, indeed, in the spirit of his time, unnoticed, but in his presentation of the universe and its relation to God, he chiefly allies himself with Aristotle. He does so when he asserts the distance of our world from the higher world, its changefulness and imperfection in contrast with

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the purity and invariability of the heavenly spheres,[1] and when he makes the perfection of Being gradually diminish with the distance from the supreme heaven;[2] and when he expressly maintains the distinction between the æther, of which the heavenly bodies consist, and the four elements, in unmistakable contradiction to the Stoic doctrines.[3] Further, while the divine essence, according to the Stoic doctrine, permeates the whole world even to the smallest and ugliest things, our author finds this presentation of the Divine Majesty altogether unworthy; he declares himself, on the contrary, most decidedly for the Aristotelian theory that God, removed from all contact with the earthly, has His abode at the extreme limits of the universe, and from hence, without moving Himself, and simply through His influence, effects the movement of the whole,

[1] C. 6, 397, *b*, 30 *sq.*; 400, *a*, 5, *sq.* 21 *sqq.*

[2] C. 6, 397, *b*, 27 *sqq.*

[3] C. 2, 392, *a*, 5, 29 *sq.*; c. 3, 392, *b*, 35; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 434, *sq.* How closely this work adheres to Aristotle's expositions has been already observed, *l. c.* p. 437, 6. That it should speak (392, *b*, 35 *a*, 8) of five στοιχεῖα, æther, fire, &c., is unimportant. Aristotle himself had called the æther πρῶτον στοιχεῖον (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 437, 7), and if he described it as ἕτερον σῶμα καὶ θειότερον τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων (*Gen. An.* ii. 3, 736, *b*, 29) the treatise means the same in 392, *a*, 8, as στοιχεῖον ἕτερον τῶν τεττάρων, ἀκήρατόν τε καὶ θεῖον. Osann, p. 168, 203 *sq.*, moreover allows that the theory of the treatise περὶ Κόσμου concerning the æther is Aristotelian; it is, therefore, all the more astonishing that he can believe Chrysippus to have also advanced the same theory; for our treatise declares itself expressly against the Stoic identification of æther with fire (*l. c.* III. i. 185, 2, 3); and, as we see from Cic. (*Acad.* i. 11, 39), this was one of the most notorious points of contest between Stoics and Peripatetics. The question is not unimportant for on the discrimination of the æther from the four elements Aristotle bases the antithesis of the world below and the world above.

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however manifold the forms it may assume in the world.[1] Still less, of course, can he admit the identification of God and the world: a Stoic definition which expresses this he only adopts after having altered its pantheistic language.[2] Finally, the author shows himself to be a Peripatetic by expressly defending[3] the eternity and unchangeableness of the world (also a distinctive doctrine of this school) against Stoicism. Though it is clear from all this that the work cannot have been written by a Stoic or by any leader of the Stoic school, such as Posidonius or Chrysippus, yet in it the endeavour is very perceptible to unite the

[1] This occupies the whole of the sixth chapter. Here again the polemic against Stoicism is unmistakable (cf. p. 397 *b*, 16 *sqq.*; 398, *a*, 1 *sq. b*, 4–22; 400, *b*, 6 *sq.*) and the theory (Osann, 207) that the divergence from it is only a concession to the popular religion is quite inadmissible; the popular religion is not at all in question here, but the Aristotelian theology; if Chrysippus, however, wished to support the popular religion, he was quite able to do this, as we have seen, without contradicting the fundamental principles of his system. We may quote as a special indication of the Peripatetic origin of our treatise that the passage 398, *b*, 16 *sqq.* seems to have reference to *De Motu Anim.* 7, 701, *b*, 1 *sqq.*

[2] The treatise περὶ Κόσμου, begins, after the introduction, c. 1, with definitions of the κόσμος, in which it shows resemblance not only to the Stoics in general, but more particularly to that exposition of their doctrines from which Stob. *Ecl.* i. 444 (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 147, 1) has given us extracts. The alterations which are found necessary in the treatise are all the more worthy of note: Κόσμον δ', we read in Stob., εἶναί φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων, ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. λέγεται δ' ἑτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεὸς, καθ' ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. Our treatise takes the first of these definitions literally, and passes over the second; for the third it substitutes these words: λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως κόσμος ἡ τῶν ὅλων τάξις τε καὶ διακόσμησις, ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ διὰ θεῶν φυλαττομένη.

[3] C. 4, end; c. 5, beginning; *l. c.* 397, *a*, 14 *sq. b*, 5.

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Stoic doctrine with the Aristotelian, and partially to admit even those determinations to which an unqualified recognition is denied. With the Stoic writings which the author has employed, and even transcribed,[1] he has also appropriated Stoic doctrines to a considerable extent; and this may be said not merely of the cosmological, astronomical, and meteorological details which Osann brings forward,[2] but also of definitions deeply affecting the whole system. Quite at the beginning of the cosmological exposition,[3] we encounter a Chrysippean definition of the Κόσμος. Further on it is demonstrated, in the spirit and after the precedent of the Stoic system, that it is precisely the contrast between the elements and parts of the world, on which depends the unity and subsistence of the whole:[4] this unity itself is called, in Stoic language, sympathy:[5] and that his harmony with the Stoics shall not escape us, the author does not hesitate to quote, expressly as a witness in his own behalf,[6] the great authority of this school, Heracleitus. In his theory of the elements, he allies himself with the Stoics, though he diverges from Aristotle in making cold the fundamental quality of air.[7] He adopts the Stoic doctrine of the πνεῦμα, with which

[1] This will be proved later on.

[2] Page 208 *sqq.*

[3] C. 2, beginning; *vide sup.* p. 134, 2.

[4] C. 5.

[5] C. 4, end, αἱ τῶν παθῶν ὁμοιότητες.

[6] C. 5, 396, *b*, 13; cf. c. 6, end.

[7] C. 2, 392, *b*, 5: ὁ ἀὴρ . . . ζοφώδης ὢν καὶ παγετώδης τὴν φύσιν. Likewise, as is shown p. 183, 2, the Stoics, against whom Aristotle (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 444) maintains cold to be the fundamental determination of water, and moisture that of air.

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there are points of contact even in the Peripatetic doctrine.[1] But his approach to Stoicism is most striking in regard to theology. While repudiating the Stoic Pantheism as such, the diffusion of the divine substance through the world, the author quite approves of its propositions as soon as they are applied, not to the divine essence, but the divine force;[2] and he accordingly teaches that the active influence emanating from the Deity only extends, indeed, primarily to the outermost sphere of the universe, but spreads from this to the inner spheres, and so is transmitted through the whole.[3] God is, therefore, the law of the whole;[4] from Him proceeds the order of the world by means of which it is classified into the various species of existences, through their individual seminification;[5] and because of this, his all-governing influence, God bears the manifold names, the enumeration and explanation of which in the treatise *περὶ Κόσμου* are stamped with the most genuine Stoicism. The name, the predicates, and the origin of Zeus are here explained quite in the Stoic sense; *ἀνάγκη*,

[1] C. 4, 394, *b*, 9: *λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως πνεῦμα ἥ τε ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἔμψυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία.* Cf. the quotations, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 138, 1; 191, 1; 331, 3.

[2] C. 6, 397, *b*, 16: *διὸ καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰπεῖν τινὲς προήχθησαν ὅτι πάντα ταῦτά ἐστι θεῶν πλέα τὰ καὶ δι' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐνδαλλόμενα ἡμῖν καὶ δι' ἀκοῆς καὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως, τῇ μὲν θείᾳ δυνάμει πρέποντα καταβαλλόμενοι λόγον οὐ μὴν τῇ γε οὐσίᾳ.*

[3] C. 6, 398, *b*, 6 *sqq.* 20 *sq.*; cf. 396, *b*, 24 *sq.*

[4] C. 6, 400, *b*, 8: *νόμος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἰσοκλινὴς ὁ θεός.* The conception of *νόμος* for the order of the universe is, as is well known, pre-eminently Stoic. Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 140, 222 *sq.* 303 *sq.*

[5] C. 6, 400, *b*, 31 *sq.* This exposition likewise reminds us of the Stoics, in the doctrine of the *λόγοι σπερματικοί*.

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εἱμαρμένη, *πεπρωμένη*, Nemesis, Adrasteia, the Moiræ, are referred to him by means of Stoic etymologies; and for the confirmation of philosophic doctrines, the sayings of the poets are interspersed, after the manner of Chrysippus.[1] It is clear that the author wishes indeed to maintain the Peripatetic doctrine, but also to combine with it as much Stoicism as was possible without absolute inconsistency.[2] That Plato likewise agrees with his proposition is indicated at the close of the work, by the approving citation of a passage from the 'Laws' (IV., 715, E.), and we are again reminded of Plato, when God is extolled not merely as the Almighty and Eternal, but also as the prototype of beauty.[3] But this, like all eclecticism, was naturally only possible by the relaxation of the strictly philosophic interest and philosophic definiteness; and thus we see in the writing *περὶ Κόσμου*, side by side with the cheap erudition displayed especially in Chapters II. to IV., the popular theological element decidedly preponderating over the purely philosophical element. In the discussions on the transcendental character of the divine essence this religiosity even assumes a mystic tinge when the dignity of God and His exalta-

[1] C. 7; cf. Osann. p. 219 *sqq.*

[2] That he, therefore, ceased to be a Peripatetic and consequently "*Zellerus ipse suam sententiam egregie refellere videtur*" (Adam. p. 34) is a singular assertion. As if no philosopher had ever mingled foreign elements with the doctrines of the school to which he belonged and desired to belong.

[3] C. 6, 399, *b*, 19: *ταῦτα χρὴ καὶ περὶ θεοῦ διανοεῖσθαι δυνάμει μὲν ὄντος ἰσχυροτάτου, κάλλει δὲ εὐπρεπεστάτου, ζωῇ δὲ ἀθανάτου, ἀρετῇ δὲ κρατίστου,* &c.

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tion above all contact with the world is made the chief argument against the immanence of the divine essence in the universe. We see here how eclecticism accomplished the transition from pure philosophy to the religious speculation of the neo-Platonists and their predecessors. The road of strict enquiry being abandoned, and those results of speculation alone maintained which commended themselves to the universal consciousness as true and expedient, metaphysics must necessarily be replaced by theology, in which the majority of mankind satisfy their theoretical wants; and if, at the same time this theology were based on the Aristotelian doctrine of the transcendency of God, and the Stoic idea of his omnipresent influence on the world, there resulted at once a theory of the universe in which the Peripatetic dualism and the substantial Pantheism of the Stoic school were reconciled in a system of dynamic Pantheism.[1]

Probable date of composition.

To what period the attempt at such a reconciliation contained in the book we have been considering, may be assigned, is not certain, but it may be approximately determined. The revision of the treatise by Apuleius shows that it was in circulation as an Aristotelian work about the middle of the second century after Christ. The only question is,

[1] The view above developed, of the character of the treatise περὶ Κόσμου, has also in the main been advanced by Petersen (*l. c.* p. 557 *sqq.*). As it had already been the result of my own investigation, in the first preparation of this work, independently of Petersen, to whose book my attention was first drawn by Adam, this will be in favour of its correctness.

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therefore, how long before this date it was composed? That we cannot place it earlier than the first century before Christ, is probable from the evidence of external testimony. If the first trace of its existence is met with in Apuleius; if a Cicero and an Antiochus—to whom, by its intermediate position between the Peripatetic and Stoic doctrine, its distinct arrangement, general comprehensibility, and rhetorical language, it would so greatly have commended itself—never betray by any indication that it was known to them, we can scarcely suppose that it was written earlier than the beginning of the first century before Christ. But its whole character would lead us still more definitely to assign it to this century or the century immediately following. For before the attempt could have been made to put into the mouth of the founder of the Peripatetic school, such important concessions to the Stoics, the individuality of both schools must already, in great measure, have disappeared, and the knowledge of them become obscured; in a word, philosophic eclecticism must have attained a development, which, according to all other traces, it did not attain before the time of Antiochus, the Academician. When, therefore, Rose[1] would place the date of this work before the middle of the third century before Christ, the proof for this assertion must be very strong to counterbalance the opposite probability. But this is so little the case[2] that we are

[1] *De Arist. libr. Ord. et Auct.* 36, 97 *sqq.*

[2] Rose's arguments are the following: (1) The passage

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rather constrained by decisive facts to suppose that the work περὶ Κόσμου must be later than Posidonius, one or more of whose writings the author employs,

περὶ Κόσμου c. 6, 399, *b*, 33 to 400, *a*, 3, was already transcribed in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων (c. 155, p. 846), which cannot be more recent than Antigonus of Carystus, who died about 220 B.C. But which of the two works has borrowed from the other cannot be discovered from a comparison of the passages; moreover the passage in the treatise περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων, which Rose believes to be copied in περὶ Κόσμου, belongs to a section which he himself considers to be a later addition (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 109, 1). On this argument, therefore, nothing can be based. (2) Rose observes that in περὶ Κόσμου (c. 3, 393, *b*, 18) the breadth of the habitable plain of the earth, ὃς φασιν οἱ εὖ γεωγραφήσαντες, is given as nearly 40,000 stadia, and its length about 70,000 stadia; and this proves that the work was written not only before Hipparchus, but also before Eratosthenes; for Eratosthenes reckoned its length at 77,800, and its breadth at 38,000 stadia; and Hipparchus, whom the later writers mostly followed, counted 70,000 for its length and 30,000 for its breadth (Strabo, i, 4, 2, p. 62 *sqq.*; ii. 5, 7, p. 113 *sqq.*). But how do we know that our author must have kept precisely to these predecessors if he were later than they? Rose himself says that others even after Hipparchus set up other computations: Artemidorus, for example, in agreement with the περὶ Κόσμου, gives the length of the terrestrial plain as more than 68,000 stadia, and its breadth more than 39,000 (Plin. *Hist. Nat.* ii. 108, 242 *sq.* Of Posidonius we know only that he reckoned the length at 70,000 (Strabo, ii. 3, 6, p. 102); what he said of the breadth tradition does not inform us. How anything concerning the date of the treatise, therefore, is to be deduced from its divergence from Eratosthenes and Hipparchus, it is hard to see. (3) According to c. 3, 393 *b*, 23, as Rose asserts, between the Caspian and Black Seas there is στενώτατος ἰσθμός; and this could not be maintained after Eratosthenes had placed the breadth of this isthmus at 1,000 (?) stadia, and Posidonius at 1,500 (Strabo xi. 1, 5, p. 491). Our author, however, does not maintain this; he says, the boundaries of Europe are μυχοὶ Πόντου θάλαττά τε Ὑρκανία, καθ' ἣν στενώτατος ἰσθμὸς εἰς τὸν Πόντον διήκει, *i.e.* the Caspian Sea at the place where the isthmus between it and the Pontus (which was also designated as the boundary between Europe and Asia, according to Dionys. Perieg. *Orb. Descr.* v. 20) is narrowest. The further observations of Rose I venture to

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and from whom he has, perhaps, borrowed the greater part of the natural science he imparts to us.[1] The

pass over, as, even supposing they are correct, they would only prove the possibility and not the probability or truth of his theory.

[1] It has already struck other writers how many points of contact are presented by our treatise with the fragments of Posidonius; and the phenomenon deserves all consideration. Thus we find in π. Κ. c. 4, 395, *a*, 32, the definition: Ἶρις μέν οὖν ἐστὶν ἔμφασις ἡλίου τμήματος ἢ σελήνης, ἐν νέφει νοτερῷ καὶ κοίλῳ καὶ συνεχεῖ πρὸς φαντασίαν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ θεωρουμένη κατὰ κύκλου περιφέρειαν. This singular definition is quoted by Diogenes, vii. 152, with the same words and with only slight and unimportant differences from Posidonius, Μετεωρολογική. In c. 4, 394, *b*, 21 *sqq.* our treatise maintains that, of the east winds, καικίας is the wind that blows from the place of the sun's rising in summer, ἀπηλιώτης that which comes from the ἰσημεριναί, εὖρος from the χειμεριναὶ ἀνατολαί; of the west winds, ἀργέστης blows from the θερινὴ δύσις, ζέφυρος from the ἰσημερινὴ, λίψ from the χειμερινὴ δύσις. These very definitions are quoted by Strabo, i. 2, 21, p. 29, from Posidonius. In c. 4, 395, *b*, 33, we read: Earthquakes are occasioned by winds being pent up in the cavities of the earth and seeking to escape: τῶν δὲ σεισμῶν οἱ μὲν εἰς πλάγια σείοντες κατ' ὀξείας γωνίας ἐπικλίνται καλοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ἄνω ῥιπτοῦντες καὶ κάτω κατ' ὀρθὰς γωνίας βράσται, οἱ δὲ συνιζήσεις ποιοῦντες εἰς τὰ κοῖλα χασματίαι· οἱ δὲ χάσματα ἀνοίγοντες καὶ γῆν ἀναρρηγνύντες βῆκται καλοῦνται. Cf. Diog. vii. 154: τοὺς σεισμοὺς δὲ γίνεσθαι πνεύματος εἰς τὰ κοιλώματα τῆς γῆς ἐνδύοντος ἢ [καὶ] καθειρχθέντος, καθά φησι Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ· εἶναι δ' αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν σεισματίας, τοὺς δὲ χασματίας, τοὺς δὲ κλιματίας, τοὺς δὲ βρασματίας, also Sen. *Nat. Qu.* vi. 21, 2. In c. 4 we read that there are two kinds of vapours, dry and moist; from the latter arise fog, dew, hoar-frost, clouds, rain, &c.; from the former, winds, thunder, lightning, &c. Compare with this, Seneca, *Nat. Qu.* ii. 54: *Nunc ad opinionem Posidonii revertor: e terra terrenisque omnibus pars humida efflatur, pars sicca et fumida: hæc fulminibus alimentum est, illa imbribus* (which Posidonius himself must naturally have given much more at length). If dry vapours are shut up in the clouds, they break through them, and this causes thunder. With this explanation of thunder our treatise also agrees (c. 4, 395, *a*, 11): εἰληθὲν δὲ πνεῦμα ἐν νέφει παχεῖ τε καὶ νοτερῷ καὶ ἔξωθεν δι' αὐτοῦ βιαίως ῥηγνύον τὰ συνεχῆ πιλήματα τοῦ νέφους, βρόμον καὶ πάταγον μέγαν ἀπεργάσατο, βροντὴν λεγόμενον. With the explanation of snow quoted by Diogenes (vii. 153), and no doubt abbreviated from Posidonius, the somewhat more detailed account in περὶ Κόσμου

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work cannot, according to this, have been written before the middle of the first century before Christ; probably it is rather later; but we cannot assign it to a later date than the first century after the com-

harmonises (c. 4, 394, *a*, 32). The definition of the *σέλας* (ap. Diog. *l. c.*), which is most probably taken, like most of the meteorological portions of his expositions of Stoicism, from Posidonius, we again find in *περὶ Κόσμου* (4, 395, *b*, 2). Also what is there said (c. 2, 391, *b*, 16; 392, *a*, 5) on the stars and the ether, reminds us of the description of the *ἄστρον*, which Stobæus quotes (*Ecl.* i. 518) from Posidonius. That the agreement of our treatise with Posidonius in these cases is not merely accidental is manifest. As little can we suppose that their harmony is the result of their common dependence on a third exposition, which in that case could have been nothing less than a complete meteorology; for in the first place Posidonius in these matters enjoys great reputation, and we cannot ascribe such dependence to him; and in the second, it would be inexplicable that he and not his predecessor should always be named as the authority, whom he must have followed very closely if he copied him word for word. Still more untenable is Rose's theory (*l. c.* p. 96) that Posidonius borrowed from the treatise the passages in which he resembles it. We know that Posidonius wrote comprehensive works on meteorology, geography, and astronomy, the result of his own investigations, the contents of which went far beyond those of the treatise *περὶ Κόσμου*; whereas the latter book in all that it says concerning those subjects bears the character of a summary, not pursuing enquiries, but only comparing results; how can we then think it more credible that Posidonius should have taken his opinions from this compendium than that the author of the compendium should have borrowed his from the work of Posidonius? And if this had ever occurred, how is it explicable that later writers should have referred them all to Posidonius, without a syllable of allusion to their ancient and well-known source, attested by the name of Aristotle? But even if we disregard all this, the theory will not suffice to save the originality and higher authority of our treatise unless, with Rose, we assume that the exposition of the Stoic cosmology (ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 444) was likewise taken from it. That this exposition, however, altogether contradicts such a theory will be shown immediately. Who can believe that instead of the Stoic doctrines being foisted upon Aristotle out of Stoical writings by the Peripatetic, the Stoic doctrines have been taken out of Aristotle himself? I have, however, dwelt too long upon this hypothesis, which is manifestly only a device to escape from a difficulty. The passages quoted above place it beyond

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a doubt that the author of the treatise has made abundant use of Posidonius, and even copied from him. If this is certain, we may with great probability derive all his geographical and meteorological dissertations (c. 3, 4) from the Stoic philosopher whose achievements in these departments are celebrated. To him the detailed discussion on the sea especially points; Posidonius had written a separate work on the sea, and therein had asserted, what our treatise (c. 3, 392, *b*, 20) also strongly enforces, that the whole of the inhabited earth is surrounded by the sea (Strabo, ii. 2, 1, 5, p. 94, 100; i. 1, 9, 3, 12, p. 6, 55). There is another portion of the treatise which I should suppose, from its contents, to be borrowed from Posidonius. Osann (p. 211 *sqq.*) has already shown that the section from the beginning of c. 2 to c. 3, 392, *b*, 34, is almost point for point the same as the exposition quoted ap. Stob. i. 144 *sq.* (which Stobæus no doubt borrowed from Arius Didymus) even though there may be slight differences in the arrangement and the conceptions; and that our treatise here also must be a copy and not an original is evident from what is quoted p. 134, 2. For as the excerpt in Stobæus names Chrysippus as the source for the two first of its three definitions of the *κόσμος*, this quotation cannot have been taken from our treatise: in it there is also wanting the second of these definitions, and the third (as is shown *l. c.*) is conceived in a manner which can only be explained by the design of the Peripatetic to bring the definitions ready to hand in the Stoic authority into harmony with his own standpoint. Now the passage of Stobæus only claims to be an account of the Stoic doctrine, and we clearly see that it is not taken literally from a Stoic work. But it is equally clear (and its agreement with our treatise places it beyond a doubt) that it is abstracted from such a work. That this was Chrysippus's *περὶ Κόσμου*, as Osann supposes, seems to me more than doubtful. Stobæus himself ascribes the two first definitions of the *Κόσμος* to Chrysippus. But this statement he may also owe to a third writer, and that it is so, and that this third writer was no other than Posidonius, is probable for three reasons: first, the same definitions which Chrysippus, according to Stobæus, set up, are quoted in Diog. vii. 138, from the *μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις* of Posidonius; Posidonius must, therefore, have repeated them here; he would no doubt have mentioned Chrysippus as their author. Thus the section of our treatise which coincides with the passage of Stobæus is so closely connected with the following, in which the employment of

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mencement of our era: since it had already been handed down to Apuleius as a work of Aristotle, and Apuleius in his copy must have found some false readings[1] which still exist, the probability is that it was composed a longer or shorter time before the end of the first century, B.C.[2] However this may be, it is, at any rate, a remarkable memorial of the eclecticism which, about this time, had found entrance even into the Peripatetic school.

Posidonius can be proved, that no break is perceptible between what is borrowed from Posidonius and that which comes from another source. Lastly, the dissertation on the islands, and the assertion that the supposed mainland is also an island (Stob. 446; περὶ Κόσμου, c. 3, 392, *b*, 20 *sqq.*) seems to suit Posidonius (as we have already observed) exactly. It seems, therefore, probable that it is the same work of Posidonius, his μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις, from the first section of which Stobæus (*i.e.* Arius Didymus) gives an excerpt, and which the author of the περὶ Κόσμου has used in its whole extent, in which case not much of the knowledge which he parades (c. 2–4) can be placed to his own account.

[1] As Goldbacher shows (p. 681 *sq.*) from *Apul. Proœm.* p. 288, c. 7, p. 302 Oud.). In the first of these passages Apuleius' unnatural translation is explained by the supposition that in π. K. 1, 391, *a*, 22 he may have read with some of our MSS. *uérous obs oiktíseier*; in the second, the otherwise incomprehensible transformation of the predicate λοξὴ into the name of an island, Oxe or Loxe, is accounted for by the still existing variant, λοξὴ καλουμένη, instead of λοξὴ πρὸς τὴν οἰκουμένην (π. K. 3, 393, *b*, 15).

[2] To fix the date of its composition more exactly would hardly be possible. That the author wrote before Strabo would seem probable, because his description of the sea (c. 3, 393, *a*, 26) is less precise than Strabo's (ii. 5, 19 *sq.* p. 122 *sq.*). Meantime this inference is the more unsafe if the author in the geographical part of his work has simply followed Posidonius. The φρόνησις is apportioned to the λογιστικὸν; to the θυμοειδὲς the πραότης and ἀνδρεία, to the ἐπιθυμητικὸν the σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια, to the whole soul the δικαιοσύνη, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία and likewise the opposite failings. Of these duties and faults somewhat superficial definitions are given; lastly, it is shown by what conduct they are manifested; and many other sub-kinds of virtues and faults are brought forward.

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Treatise on virtues and vices.

Another remnant of that eclecticism we probably possess in the short treatise on virtues and vices, also to be found in our Aristotelian collection. The doctrine of virtue is here based on the Platonic discrimination of the three faculties of the soul, and the four chief virtues; to these the author tries to reduce the virtues treated of by Aristotle; and the corresponding vices to the evil nature of the parts of the soul relating to them; while at the same time he passes in review the tokens and manifestation of the different virtues and vices in the descriptive manner of the later ethics, as seems to have been especially customary in the Peripatetic school after Theophrastus. With Stoicism there are scarcely even external points of harmony.[1] But this short treatise is not of sufficient importance to detain us longer.[2]

[1] For instance, perhaps, the remark that the whole treatise from beginning to end is devoted to the opposition of the ἐπαινετὰ and ψεκτά.

[2] Even its origin is not quite certain; but, from its admission into the Aristotelian collection, and its whole treatment of the subject, it is probable that it emanated from the Peripatetic school, and not from the Academy; and if its date cannot be precisely fixed, we may assign it, generally speaking, to the period of Eclecticism. An earlier Peripatetic would hardly have allied himself to Plato so unhesitatingly, as if it were a matter of course, in the way that the writer does in c. 1, 1249, *a*, 30: τριμεροῦς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβανομένης κατὰ Πλάτωνα, &c. There is also an indication of a later period in the mention of dæmons between the gods and parents in c. 4, 1250, *b*, 20; c. 7, 1251, *a*, 31, under the head of piety and godlessness; perhaps after the precedent of the Pythagorean Golden Poem (v. 3).

CHAPTER VI.

CICERO. VARRO.

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E. Eclecticism of the first century B.C.

Its practical character, exemplified in Cicero.

FROM the preceding chapters it will be seen how, in the first century before Christ, the three scientifically most important schools of philosophy had coincided in a more or less strongly developed eclecticism. This mode of thought must have commended itself the more readily to those who, from the outset, had concerned themselves rather with the practically applicable fruits of philosophic studies than with strict science. Such was the case with Cicero.[1]

Cicero's youth falls in a period in which not only the influence of Greek philosophy on Roman culture, but also the approximation and partial blending of the philosophic schools had already begun to develop themselves strongly.[2] He himself had become acquainted with the most various systems, partly from the writings of their founders and representatives and

[1] Concerning Cicero as a philosopher, cf., besides Ritter (iv. 106–176), Herbart, *Werke*, xii. 167 *sqq.*; Kühner, *M. T. Ciceronis in Philosophiam Merita*, Hamb. 1825 (this is only to be regarded as a laborious collection of materials); concerning his philosophical works, cf. Hand in *Ersch. und Gruber's Allg. Encycl.* sect. i. 17, 226 *sqq.*; Bernhardy, *Röm. Litt.* 769 *sqq.*; and the treatises named in the passages quoted *infra*, pp. 148, 5; 149, 1.

[2] Cicero, as is well known, was born on the 3rd January, 648 A.U.C. (*i.e.* 106 B.C.), and therefore some years after the death of Panætius.

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partly from his teachers. In his earliest youth, the Epicurean doctrine had commended itself to him through the teaching of Phædrus;[1] after this Philo of Larissa introduced him to the new Academy,[2] among whose adherents he persistently reckoned himself; at the same time he enjoyed the instruction of the Stoic Diodotus who also remained at a later period in close proximity to him;[3] before the commencement of his public career[4] he visited Greece, attended the instructions of his old teacher Phædrus and those of Zeno, the Epicurean,[5] but with special eagerness those of Antiochus,[6] the chief founder of Academic eclecticism, and he entered into a connection with Posidonius, which continued till the death of that philosopher.[7] Also in philosophical literature he had taken such a wide survey that we cannot withhold from him the praise of wide reading, though at the same time his knowledge of that literature is neither independent nor thorough enough to warrant his being called a man of great erudition.[8] He himself based his fame not so much on his own enquiries

[1] *Ep. ad Fam.* xiii. 1: *A Phædro, qui nobis, cum pueri essemus, antequam Philonem cognovimus, valde ut philosophus . . . probabatur.*

[2] *Vide supra*, p. 76, 2, 3.

[3] *Vide supra*, p. 70, 3.

[4] In 78 and 77 B.C.; therefore in his 29th and 30th year; Plut. *Cic.* 3 *sq.*

[5] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 373, 2; 374, 1.

[6] *Supra*, p. 87, 1.

[7] *Supra*, p. 58, 4.

[8] The writers on philosophy to whom he most commonly refers and most frequently quotes are Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle (of whom, however, he seems only to have known some popular and rhetorical works), then Theophrastus and Dicæarchus, with their political writings, Crantor, Panætius, Hecato, Posidonius, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Philodemus (or Zeno).

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into philosophy as on the art with which he had clothed Greek philosophy in a Roman dress, and made it accessible to his countrymen.[1] He only arrived, however, at this literary activity in his more advanced age, when he had been compelled to renounce public service,[2] and thus his manifold and tolerably extensive philosophical works are compressed into the space of a few years.[3] But our astonishment at the rapidity of his work will be considerably lessened when we look more closely at his mode of procedure in the compilation of his philosophical works. In one portion of these he does not directly express his own views, but allows each of the most important philosophic schools to explain theirs through one of their adherents,[4] and for this purpose he seems almost throughout to have made free use of the several expositions which lay ready to hand, and to have confined himself mainly to the comparison, representation, and elucidation of their contents.[5] And even

[1] Of the merit which he claims for himself in this respect Cicero often speaks while defending his philosophical works against censure, *e.g. Fin.* i. 2, 4 *sqq.*; *Acad.* i. 3, 10; *Tusc.* i. 1 *sqq.*; *N. D.* i. 4; *Off.* i. 1, 1 *sq.*

[2] *Acad. l. c.*; *Tusc.* i. 1, 1; 4, 7; *N. D. l. c.*

[3] The earliest of these (irrespective of his two political works), the *Consolatio*, the *Hortensius*, and the first version of the *Academica*, fall in the year 709 A.U.C., *i.e.* 45 B.C. As Cicero was murdered on December 3rd, 43 B.C., his activity as a philosophical writer occupies only about three years.

[4] As in the *Academica*, *De Finibus*, *De Natura Deorum*, *De Divinatione*.

[5] Ἀπόγραφα *sunt*, confesses Cicero himself in a much-quoted passage (*ad Att.* xii. 52), *minore labore fiunt: verba tantum affero, quibus abundo*; and that this, in spite of *Fin.* i. 2, 4 (*Non interpretum fungimur munere*, &c.), is no exaggerated modesty, is sufficiently proved by the recent investigations into the sources of his expositions. In the *Academica* he had borrowed from Antiochus that which, in the first version, he placed in the mouth of Lucullus, and afterwards in the mouth of Varro (*vide supra*, p. 86, 3); the sceptical dissertations he had probably taken from Philo as well as from Clitomachus (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 501, 3). The source of the fifth book in *De Finibus* is to be found in Antiochus (*vide supra*, p. 86, 3), and that the rest originated in the same way, admits of no doubt. For the first book on the gods two Epicurean treatises (concerning which cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 373, 2; 374, 1) are employed; for the second, probably one of Posidonius and one of Panætius (cf. *supra*, p. 41, 3); for the third, and for the second half of the first, Clitomachus (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 505, 3). *De Divinatione* is worked out from Posidonius, Panætius, and Clitomachus (*vide ibid.* III. i. p. 337, 1; and *supra*, 41, 3).

[1] For his *Hortensius*, Aristotle's Προτρεπτικὸς probably served him as a model (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 63); for the *Consolatio*, Crantor's περὶ πένθους (*ibid.* II. i. 899, 3). The principal source of the first book of the *Tusculanæ* seems to have been the writings of Posidonius and Crantor; of the second, Panætius (*vide supra*, p. 41, 3; Heine, *Font. Tusc. Disput.* 11 *sq.*); of the fourth, Posidonius (as Heine, *l. c.* p. 13 *sq.*, supposes), or Antiochus (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 517, 1). In the treatise *De Fato* he appears to repeat the inferences of Clitomachus. The books *De Officiis* keep in substance to Panætius' work of the same name (*vide supra*, p. 41, 3); the substance of the *Topica* has probably been furnished by Antiochus (*vide supra*, p. 86, 3). It may reasonably be supposed that it was the same with the other works whose Greek prototypes have not hitherto been ascertained, though Cicero may not in all of them have been dependent on his predecessors to the same extent.

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where he speaks in his own name, he frequently allies himself so closely to older writings that his own works are scarcely more than reproductions of these.[1] Yet this is no great disadvantage in regard to our knowledge of his standpoint, since he can only bring forward the views of others as his own when he agrees with them; and even in his expository dialogues he, as a rule, sufficiently indicates which of the theories under discussion he approves.

His scepticism.

His standpoint may be generally described as an

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eclecticism founded upon scepticism. The very habit we have already mentioned, of stating arguments for and against, without drawing any conclusion, indicates a tendency to scepticism, for this procedure cannot be compared with the indirect development of thought in the Platonic dialogues, or with the Socratic conversations, from which Cicero himself derives it;[1] its true analogy is with the colloquies of Carneades;[2] and it can only originate in the fact that the philosopher is not satisfied with any theory, but objects to something in every given system. Cicero, however, expressly avows himself as belonging to the new Academy,[3] and brings forward in his own name the arguments with which it had denied the possibility of knowledge.[4] For himself, one of the great reasons, if not the greatest, for his doubt, seems to lie in the disagreement of the philosophers concerning the most important questions; at any rate, he not only pursues this subject with predilection,[5] but expressly remarks that he attaches much greater value to it than to all that has been said by the Academy on the deception of the senses and the impossibility of any fixed definition of ideas.[6]

[1] *Tusc.* i. 4, 8; v. 4, 11; *N. D.* i. 5, 11.

[2] Cf. *Tusc.* v. 4, 11: *Quem morem cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias sæpe et nuper in Tusculano, ut ad eam consuetudinem disputaremus.*

[3] *Acad.* ii. 20; 22, 69; i. 4, 13; 12, 43, 46; *N. D.* i. 5, 12; *Offic.* iii. 4, 20.

[4] *Acad.* ii. 20 *sqq.* I think it unnecessary to specify these arguments further in this place, as they are not to be considered original, and have been quoted, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 500 *sqq.*

[5] *Loc. cit.* 33, 107; c. 36 *sq.*; *N. D.* i. 1, 1; 6, 13; iii. 15, 39.

[6] *Acad.* ii. 48, 147: *Posthac tamen, cum hæc quæremus, potius de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturæ deque errore tot philosophorum, qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tantopere discrepant, ut cum plus uno verum esse non possit, jacere necesse sit tot tam nobiles disciplinas, quam de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici texuerunt.*

[1] *Acad.* ii. 31; c. 33, 105, 108; *N. D.* i. 5, 12.

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Scepticism with him, therefore, is not so much the fruit of an independent enquiry as the consequence of the uncertainty in which the strife of philosophic theories has placed him; it is only the reverse side of his eclecticism, only a sign of the same independence of his Greek predecessors which that eclecticism expresses: so far as the philosophers are to be reconciled, the common elements from their systems are co-ordinated; so far as they are at strife, knowledge respecting the debated points is despaired of, because the authorities neutralise one another.

Its limits and significance.

Thus it is that doubt in Cicero cannot have by any means the importance or significance that it had had in the new Academy; and we therefore see him, in fact, limiting his scepticism in two respects: for he attributes greater worth to the knowledge derived from probability than the Academy, and he makes hardly any use of certain parts of the philosophy derived from his sceptical principle. If he is within the principles of the Academy in replying, like Carneades, to the objection that scepticism makes all action impossible —that for action full certainty is not necessary, but only greater probability;[1] we cannot consider him so in the explanation he gives concerning

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the aim of his method of disputation. This method was to enable him, by testing the various theories, to find out the theory which had the most in its favour.[1] Doubt is, therefore, only the preparation for a positive conviction; and even if this conviction does not reach the full certainty of knowledge but only an approximate certainty, it suffices, as we already know, for practical life, the end and aim of the Ciceronian philosophy. There is no mistaking the fact: the two elements of the Academic philosophy, the denial of knowledge, and the assertion of a knowledge of probability, stand here in a different relation from that which they occupy with Carneades; for him, doubt itself, the suspension of judgment, had been the proper aim of philosophic enquiry; the theory of probability was only in the second rank, and resulted from the consideration of that which remained over from doubt; but to Cicero the discovery of the probable appears as the original problem of philosophy, and doubt has value only as a means and a condition of the solution of this problem. Cicero himself therefore plainly declares that his scepticism was properly only in regard to the Stoic demand for an absolute knowledge; with the Peripatetics, on the other hand, who do not claim so much in respect to knowledge, he is funda-

[1] *Tusc.* 1, 4, 7: *Ponere jubebam de quo quis audire vellet: ad id aut sedens aut ambulans disputabam . . . fiebat autem ita, ut cum is qui audire vellet dixisset quid sibi videretur, tum ego contra dicerem. Hæc est enim, ut scis, vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. Nam ita facillime quid veri simillimum esset inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur.* Similarly (v. 4, 11) this procedure claims the advantage, *ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus, errore alios levaremus, et in omni disputatione quid esset simillimum veri quæreremus.*

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mentally agreed.[1] But even this modified scepticism receives still further limitations. Though our philosopher expresses himself hesitatingly on the subject, yet, all things considered, it is only as to purely theoretical enquiries that he is in harmony with the new Academy: practical principles on the contrary and the philosophic and religious convictions directly connected with them, he does not wish to question in the same way. He objects to dialectic that it guarantees not real knowledge but only formal rules on the construction of propositions and inferences;[2] his judgment on physics, exclusive of theology, is that it is far easier for physics to say what things are not, than what they are;[3] it would be presumptuous to arrogate to itself a knowledge, even of its most universal principles;[4] no human eye is keen enough to penetrate the darkness with which the nature of things is concealed;[5] and even if we have to limit these expressions to the case of theology, we find no opposite declarations counterbalancing them in regard to natural enquiries proper. In ethics, on the contrary, though he finds considerable discord among the philosophers on the most important questions;[6] and he himself,

[1] *Fin.* v. 26, 76.

[2] *Acad.* ii. 28, 91; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 503, 5.

[3] *N. D.* i. 21, 60: *Omnibus fere in rebus et maxime in physicis, quid non sit citius, quam quid sit dixerim.*

[4] *Acad.* ii. 36, 116: *Estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore, ut sibi se illa scire persuaserit?*

[5] *Acad.* ii. 39, 122: *Latent ista omnia, Luculle, crassis occultata et circumfusa tenebris, ut nulla acies humani ingenii tanta sit, quæ penetrare in cælum, terram intrare possit. Corpora nostra non novimus,* &c. § 124: *Satisne tandem ea nota sunt nobis, quæ nervorum natura sit, quæ venarum? Tenemusne quid animus sit?* &c.

[6] *Acad.* ii. 42; c. 48, 147.

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as we shall presently discover, cannot avoid fluctuation in replying to them; yet we soon perceive that here he is far from admitting the same justification to doubt as in the purely theoretical sphere. What he occasionally says in his discussions concerning the *Laws*, that he does not intend to examine further the doubt of the new Academy,[1] he seems to have made a general rule in his moral philosophy; for in none of his writings on this subject does he pay any regard to the considerations which he himself had previously raised; but as soon as the doubt in the enquiries of the Academy has had space to express itself, the highest good and duties[2] are treated of in the moral discussions in a wholly dogmatic tone, though at the same time without any fixed plan. In connection therewith we also find our philosopher bringing forward opinions about God and the human soul, which are manifestly for him something more than uncertain conjectures, though even here he despairs of absolute certainty of knowledge. He constantly says that he is merely following probability—and expressing his own personal opinion.[3] But that he was really a consistent

[1] *Legg.* i. 13, 39: *Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum Academiam hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem exoremus ut sileat. Nam si invaserit in hæc . . . nimias edet ruinas. Quam quidem ego placare cupio, submovere non audeo.*

[2] Proof of this will presently be given.

[3] So *N. D.* i. 1, 2: *Quod maxime veri simile est et quo omnes duce natura venimus, Deos esse;* and at the conclusion of the treatise, iii. 40, 95: *Ita discessimus, ut Velleja Cottæ disputatio verior, mihi Balbi ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior.* *Tusc.* iv. 4, 7: *Sed defendat quod quisque sentit; sunt enim judicia libera: nos . . . quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile semper requiremus.* V. 29, 82 *sq.*; *Acad.* ii. 20, 66: *Ego vero ipse et magnus quidem sum opinator, non enim sum sapiens,* &c. *Vide infra,* p. 157, 1.

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adherent of Carneades[1] could only be inferred from such utterances if his whole procedure corresponded with them. This, however, is not the case. His convictions are not so fixed and decided that he trusts unconditionally to them, and he is never so sure of them that he does not keep before him the probability of having, at another time, another opinion about the same subjects; indeed, he is superficial enough to pride himself on his fickleness.[2] But even his doubt is too shallow to deter him from statements which a member of the new Academy would not have ventured to advance so explicitly. Though he calls the existence of the gods merely probable, he immediately adds that were the belief in providence abolished, all piety, and fear of God, all human community and justice, would be destroyed;[3] which he could not possibly have said if that belief had had for him merely the value of even a probable conjecture. Moreover, when he founds an argument for the truth of a belief in gods on its universality, he does so without any limitation, in his own name.[4] This is also the case, as we shall find, with his development of the teleological argument, his utterances concerning the unity of God and the divine government of the universe, on the dignity of man, and the immortality of the soul. A logical scepticism is here not in question:

[1] Burmeister, *Cic. als Neuakademiker.* Oldenb. 1860 (*Gymn. progr.*).

[2] *Tusc.* v. 11, 33; *vide infra,* p. 157, 1.

[3] *N. D.* i. 2, 3 *sq.*

[4] *Vide infra,* p. 161, 1, 167.

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the philosopher, no doubt, mistrusts human knowledge, and holds greater or less probability to be the highest thing attainable; but he reserves to himself the power of making an exception to this rule in all cases where a pressing moral or mental necessity demands a more fixed conviction.

Practical end of philosophy.

This more confident treatment of practical questions has, however, with Cicero so much the more significance, because, according to his view, the whole problem of philosophy is exclusively contained in them. Though he admits that knowledge is a good in and for itself, and further, that it secures the purest and highest enjoyment;[1] and though he expressly includes physics in this admission,[2] yet not knowledge itself, but its effects on life appear to him the ultimate aim of philosophic enquiry. Knowledge completes itself only in action; action has, therefore, a higher value than knowledge;[3] the enquiry concerning the highest good is the most important of all enquiries, and determines the whole of philosophy:[4] the best philosophy is that of Socrates, which does not trouble itself with things which lie beyond our sphere of vision, and, being convinced of the uncertainty of human knowledge, applies itself entirely to moral problems.[5] The proper aim

[1] *Fin.* i. 7, 25; *Tusc.* v. 24 *sq.*; *N. D.* ii. 1, 3; cf. the following note.

[2] *Acad.* ii. 41, 127; *Tusc.* v. 3, 9; 24, 69; *Fin.* iv. 5, 12; *Fragm.* from Hortensius, ap. Augustin. *De Trin.* xiv. 9.

[3] *Off.* i. 43, 153; cf. c. 9, 28; c. 21, 71.

[4] *Fin.* v. 6, 15: *Hoc (summo bono) enim constituto in philosophia constituta sunt omnia*, &c.

[5] *Acad.* i. 4, 15; cf. *Fin.* ii. 1, 1; *Tusc.* v. 4, 10.

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of philosophy, therefore, may be attained in spite of the restriction of our knowledge: we know nothing with absolute certainty; but we know that which is most important with as much certainty as we require to know it; scepticism is here merely the underlying base of a mode of thought, which is founded upon the practically useful; and because this tendency towards the practical best harmonised with the disposition of the Roman and the statesman, Cicero was more susceptible to the doctrine of Carneades than he would otherwise have been; because purely theoretical enquiries already appeared to him worthless and transcendental, he abandons also the scientific proof of their impossibility; but as soon as his practical interests come in contact with doubt he makes a retreat, and would rather content himself with a bad expedient, than admit the inevitable consequences of his own sceptical statements.

His eclecticism.

If we ask, then, from whence we are to derive our positive convictions, we have already been told that the probable is best discovered by the comparison and testing of different views: the positive element in Cicero's scepticism is that eclecticism, which we shall presently have an opportunity of examining further.[1] But in order to decide be-

[1] It will here suffice to recall the characteristic observations in *Off.* iii. 4, 20: *Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut quodcunque maxime probabile occurrat id nostro jure liceat defendere.* *Tusc.* v. 11, 33: *Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum et testificaris quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant; nos in diem vivimus; quodcunque nostros animos probabilitate*

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tween opposite opinions, we must have the standard of decision in our hands, and as philosophic enquiry consists in this very proving of different views, such a standard must be already given before every scientific investigation. Two things seem then to be directly present: the evidence of the senses and the evidence of consciousness. Even the first, in spite of his many complaints of the deception of the senses, is not despised by Cicero; he says that it would be contrary to nature, and must make all life and action impossible, if we admitted no conviction (*probare*, not *assentiri*) and that among those convictions which force themselves upon us with the greatest probability, the assurance of the senses occupies one of the foremost places;[1] for this reason he employs sensible evidence as an example of the highest certainty;[2] and he himself in all his writings appeals generally to experience and historical matters of fact. In accordance with his whole tendency, however, he is forced to lay the chief stress on the other side, on the witness internal to us; for his interest belongs not to the external but to the moral world, and even in his ethical doctrine

percussit, id dicimus; itaque soli sumus liberi.

[1] *Acad.* ii. 31, 99: *Tale visum nullum esse, ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio, multa. Etenim contra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vitæ . . . eversio. Itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt,* &c. *Quæcunque res eum [sapientem] sic attinget, ut sit visum illud probabile neque ulla re impeditum* (ἀπερίσπαστον, cf. Part III. i. 515 *sq.*) *movebitur. Non enim est e saxo sculptus aut e robore dolatus. Habet corpus, habet animum: movetur mente, movetur sensibus: ut ei multa vera videantur,* &c. *Neque nos contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici,* &c.

[2] *Loc. cit.* c. 37, 119.

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he throughout allies himself with those philosophers who have made independence of the external and dominion over sensuality their watchword. All our conviction, therefore, according to Cicero, depends in the last resort upon direct internal certainty, upon the natural feeling for truth, or innate knowledge; and this theory which gained so important an influence in the later, especially the Christian philosophy, he was the first to enunciate definitely;[1] for though Plato and Aristotle, Zeno and Epicurus had preceded him with similar doctrines, yet our previous enquiries have shown that none of these taught innate knowledge in the strict sense: the reminiscence of ideas, according to Plato, must be awakened by methodical study, and their content fixed; we attain to the principles that are beyond proof, according to Aristotle, by the scientific road of induction; the πρόληψις of Epicurus and the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι of the Stoics are only abstracted from experience. Here on the contrary there is an assertion of a knowledge antecedent to all experience and science, and concerning the most important truths. The germs of morality are inborn in us, if they could develop themselves undisturbed, science would be unnecessary; only through the perversion of our natural disposition arises the need of a technical training to virtue.[2] The conscious-

Doctrine of innate knowledge.

[1] It is possible, indeed, that he may herein have followed Antiochus; but how far this is the case cannot now be ascertained.

[2] *Tusc.* iii. 1, 2: *Sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutum; quæ si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vitam natura perduceret;* only the obscuring of natural consciousness through evil habits and

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ness of right is implanted in man by nature; subsequently a tendency to evil is formed which obscures it.[1] Nature has endowed our spirit not only with a moral disposition, but also with the fundamental notions of morality preceding any instruction, as an original dowry; it is only the development of these innate notions which is incumbent on us:[2] with reason, those impulses are directly given which prompt men to moral community with others and the investigation of truth.[3] The essence of moral activity may, therefore, be deduced not merely from the intuition of distinguished men, but also from the universal consciousness, with greater certainty than from any definition of ideas; the nearer the individual still stands to nature, the more keenly will this be reflected in him: we learn from children what is according to nature.[4] Belief in the Deity rests upon the same

false opinions makes a doctrine and science necessary.

[1] *Legg.* i. 13, 33: *Atque hoc in omni hac disputatione sic intelligi volo, jus quod dicam naturam esse, tantam autem esse corruptelam malæ consuetudinis, ut ab ea tanquam igniculi extinguantur a natura dati exorianturque et confirmentur vitia contraria.*

[2] *Fin.* v. 21, 59: (*Natura homini*) *dedit talem mentem, quæ omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere et induxit in ea quæ inerant tanquam elementa virtutis. Sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit, nihil amplius. Itaque nostrum est (quod nostrum dico, artis est), ad ea principia quæ accepimus consequentia exquirere, quod sit id quoad volumus effectum.*

[3] *Fin.* ii. 14, 46: *Eademque ratio fecit hominem hominum appetentem, &c. . . . eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi, &c.* Further evidence for these propositions is easily to be found.

[4] *Loc. cit.* 14, 45: [*Honestum*] *quale sit non tam definitione qua sum usus intelligi potest . . . quam communi omnium judicio atque optimi cujusque studiis atque factis.* On the same subject, *vide* v. 22, 61:

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basis: by virtue of the human spirit's affinity with God, the consciousness of God is immediately given with self-consciousness: man has only to remember his own origin in order to be led to his Creator.[1] Nature, therefore, herself instructs us concerning the existence of God,[2] and the strongest argument for this truth is its universal recognition; for that in which all agree without previous persuasion, must always be regarded as an utterance of nature.[3] The immortality of the soul must likewise belong to these innate truths, of which we are convinced through universal consent;[4] and in the same way Cicero seems to presuppose the freedom of the will

Indicant pueri in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur.

[1] *Legg.* i. 8, 24: *Animum . . . esse ingeneratum a Deo: ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum cœlestibus vel genus vel stirps appellari potest. Itaque ex tot generibus nullum est animal præter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei. Ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immansueta neque tam fera, quæ non, etiamsi ignoret qualem habere Deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. Ex quo efficitur illud, ut is agnoscat Deum, qui unde ortus sit quasi recordetur ac noscat.*

[2] *Tusc.* i. 16, 36: *Deos esse natura opinamur.* Cf. *N. D.* i. 1, 2.

[3] *Tusc.* i. 13, 30: *Firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt; id enim vitioso more fieri solet* (observe here the distinction between *mos* and *natura*): *omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus effecit: non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. Omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est* (cf. § 35; *omnium consensus naturæ vox est*). *Vide* also *sup.* note 1. If Cicero elsewhere makes his Academic philosopher claim this proof (*N. D.* i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11) from the *consensus gentium* which is put in the mouth of the Epicurean as well as the Stoic (*N. D.* i. 16, 43 *sq.*; ii. 2, 5) he implies here (i. 23, 62; iii. 40, 95) what is placed beyond a doubt by passages from his other works, that Cotta did not express his opinion on the subject.

[4] *Tusc.* i. 12 *sq.*; 15, 35 *sq.*

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simply as an internal matter of fact.[1] In a word, philosophy, as well as morality, is here founded on direct consciousness: this is the fixed point from which the testing of philosophic opinions sets out, and to which it returns.

The material results of Cicero's philosophy have nothing distinctive, and can therefore be only shortly discussed in this place. As to the chief philosophic sciences, dialectic is regarded merely in the sceptical manner already mentioned. In the domain of physics, theological and psychological enquiries alone have any value for Cicero; questions of other kinds—for instance, concerning the number of the elements, whether there are four or five; concerning the material and efficient principle and the like—are only touched upon in cursory historical notices, or in a sceptical comparison of different doctrines. In the estimation of this philosopher, the chief thing is ethics. With ethics, therefore, I commence.

Prominence of ethics in his philosophy.

Cicero develops his ethical principles, as, indeed, his whole philosophic doctrine, in the criticism of the four contemporary theories, the Epicurean, Stoic, Academic, and Peripatetic. Of these four systems, he opposes himself definitely to the first alone. The Epicurean doctrine of pleasure appears to him so strikingly to contradict the natural destiny and natural necessities of man,[2] the facts of moral consciousness and of moral experience, that we have no need to enter more particularly into the remarks with which he opposes it in the second book of *De*

[1] *De Fato*, c. 14.

[2] *Fin.* i. 7, 23, *sq.*; ii. 14, &c.

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Finibus, and elsewhere—generally speaking, rather in the tone of a rhetorician than in the severer strain of a philosopher. On the other hand, his judgments on the three remaining systems are far from being consistent. Even as to the reciprocal relation of these systems, he is never quite clear. For though he remains true to the assertion of his master Antiochus in regard to the Academy and the Peripatetics—viz. that these two schools, as they agree generally, especially coincide in their ethics, and that the feebler morality of Theophrastus and of later Peripatetics is not further removed from the moral doctrine of the Academy than from the original doctrines of Aristotle[1]—yet he is uncertain whether he shall explain the difference between the Stoics and these two schools as essential, or unessential, as a divergence in fact or in words. While, on the one hand, he repeatedly maintains distinctly and in his own name, that Zeno is really at one with his predecessors, and only changes their expressions;[2] on the other, he gives a tolerably long list of the points in which the Stoic morality differs from that of the Academy and Peripatetics,[3] and he speaks of the opposition, as we shall presently find, with a full acknowledgment of its importance. Cicero certainly makes use of a very poor expedient to justify this contradiction, when he says that, as a member of the Academy, he has a right to follow the pro-

[1] *Acad.* i. 6, 22; *Fin.* v. 3, 7 *sq.*; 5, 12; cf. 25, 75; *Tusc.* iv. 3, 6; v. 30, 85; *Off.* iii. 4, 20.

[2] *Fin.* iii. 3, 10 *sq.*; iv. 20–26; v. 8, 22; 25, 74; 29, 88

[3] *Acad.* i. 10. *Off.* i. 2, 6; *Tusc.* v. 11, 34.

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bability of that time without regard to consequences.[1] But even for himself he seems unable in this discussion to find any fixed standpoint. So far, indeed, as the statements of both sides agree—in the universal principles of life according to nature, and in the unconditional appreciation of virtue, he is quite sure of himself;[2] but as soon as the roads diverge he knows no longer which he shall follow. The grandeur, consistency, and severity of the Stoic ethics excite his admiration; it appears to him nobler to regard virtue as sufficient for happiness and not to distinguish between the good and the useful, than to assent to the opposite view of the Peripatetics;[3] he finds the Stoics' admission of the affections weak, and their moral principles hazardous, since that which is faulty in its nature, like the affections, should not merely be restricted, or, still less, regarded as a help to virtue, but wholly eradicated.[4] He reproaches them with the inconsistency of assuming goods with which the happy man may dispense, and evils which he may endure; and thus distinguishing from the happiness of the virtuous as such, a supreme happiness, and from the perfect and complete life, a life that is more than complete.[5] He prefers, therefore, to follow the nobler mode of thought, to call the wise man happy under all circumstances, even in the bull of

[1] *Tusc.* v. 11, 33; *supra*, p. 157, 1.
[2] *Acad.* i. 6, 22; *Fin.* iv. 10, &c.
[3] *Tusc.* v. 1, 1; 25, 71; *Off.* iii. 4, 20; cf. with the following, Ritter, iv. 134 *sqq.*, 157 *sqq.*
[4] *Tusc.* iv. 18 *sqq.*; *Off.* i. 25, 88; cf. *Acad.* i. 10, 35, 38.
[5] *Fin.* v. 27 *sq.*; *Tusc.* v. 8–12, 15 *sq.*

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Phalaris;[1] he desires to adopt, at any rate tentatively, the famous Stoic Paradoxes.[2] If, however, we enquire more closely into this Stoicism, it is clear that our philosopher is not so certain about it as we might have supposed from these utterances. A man of the world, like Cicero, cannot conceal from himself that the Stoic demands are much too exalted for men as they are, that the Stoic wise man is not found in reality,[3] that the Stoic morality does not admit of being transferred to daily life;[4] he cannot possibly allow that all the wise are alike happy, and all the unwise absolutely wretched, and that there is no difference in value between the most hardened wickedness and the most trivial offence.[5] But he believes he can show that the severity of the Stoics is not scientifically justifiable, and, moreover, that it contradicted their own presuppositions; for if the first principle is life according to nature, among the things according to human nature are also to be counted sensible well-being, health, freedom from pain, and an untroubled mind—even pleasure is not to be wholly despised. "To live according to nature is not to separate oneself from nature, but rather to encourage and sustain it.[6] These arguments draw our eclectic philosopher so strongly to the side of the Peripatetics, that he declares himself to be of their number.[7] The truth,

[1] *Tusc.* v. 26.
[2] *Paradoxa.*
[3] *Lael.* 5, 18; cf. *Off.* iii. 4, 16.
[4] *Fin.* iv. 9, 21.
[5] *Fin.* iv. 9, 21; 19, 55; 28, 77 *sq.* Cf. *Off.* i. 8. 27.
[6] *Fin.* iv. 11–15; *Cato*, 14, 46; *Tusc.* ii. 13, 30.
[7] In the fourth book of *De Finibus*, it is Cicero himself who brings forward the Peripatetic view.

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however, is only finally expressed in his confession that sometimes the consideration of his own weaknesses, and of human weaknesses generally, inclines him to the laxer doctrine, and, at other times, the thought of the majesty of virtue inclines him to the stricter;[1] he comforts himself therefore for his vacillation, by the conviction that it can exercise no essential influence on practical conduct, since even on the Peripatetic theory, a far higher value must be assigned to virtue than to all else.[2]

It would be difficult to discover in these propositions any new principle, and in the Ciceronian ethics generally any other characteristic than that of an eclectic and popular philosopher; for even the trait on which Ritter lays stress,[3] viz. that with Cicero, the honourable (*honestum*) takes the place of the beautiful (*καλὸν*) and that in connection therewith he ascribes greater value to glory than the Greeks did, even this is partly a mere difference of language, having no influence on the content of the moral principle; and partly it is a concession to the Roman spirit, which, being devoid of any scientific foundation, can only be regarded as a further proof of the uncertainty of Cicero's manner of philosophising. All the less reason is there to enter further into the details of Cicero's ethical and political principles than has already been done.[4] Striking as many of his remarks on these subjects may be, they show too little connection with definite philosophic

[1] *Tusc.* v. 1, 3.
[2] *Off.* iii. 3, 11.
[3] IV. 162 *sqq.*
[4] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 276 *sq.*

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principles to allow us to attribute to them any importance in the history of philosophy. His theories concerning the Deity and the essential nature of the soul must, however, be shortly mentioned.

His theology.

The belief in a Deity, as already observed, appears to our philosopher to be required, not merely by immediate consciousness, but also by moral and political interest. Without religion, he thinks, truth and justice, and all human social life would be at an end.[1] But the other arguments for the existence of God are not entirely repudiated by him, and he brings forward the teleological argument especially, in spite of the criticism of the Academy which meets it, in its Stoic form,[2] with full conviction.[3] In regard to the nature of God, Cicero is, no doubt, in earnest in the remark which he places in the mouth of his Academic philosopher, viz. that nothing can be asserted with perfect certainty, about it;[4] but, so far as the probable may be determined, he thinks he may venture to presuppose not only the unity of God[5] but also His spirituality;[6] this, how-

[1] *N. D.* i. 2, 4; cf. ii. 61, 153. Hence (*N. D.* iii. 2, 5; *Legg.* ii. 7, 15) the observations on the political necessity of religion.
[2] *N. D.* iii. 10, 24; 11, 37.
[3] *Divin.* ii. 72, 148; *Tusc.* i. 28 *sq.*
[4] *N. D.* i. 21, 60 *sq.*; cf. iii. 40, 95.
[5] *Tusc.* i. 23; 27; *Legg.* i. 7, 22; *Somn. Scip.* (*Rep.* vi. 17) 3, 8 *et pass.*
[6] *Tusc.* i. 27, 66: *Nec vero Deus ipse qui intelligitur a nobis alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens ipsaque prædita motu sempiterno.* *Rep.* vi. 17, 8; *Legg.* ii. 4, 10, &c.

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ever, he does not apprehend in a very strict sense, for he admits the possibility[1] that the Divine Spirit may be conceived, according to the Stoic view, as air or fire; or with Aristotle, so far as Cicero understood him,[2] as æthereal essence: in the dream of Scipio, the supreme heaven, in agreement with this misconception of Aristotle is declared to be itself the highest god.[3] But this closer definition of the conception of Deity had scarcely much value for Cicero himself. For him the belief in Providence is of far greater importance, though he allows even this to be doubted by his Academic philosopher.[4] Since he chiefly regards religion from the practical point of view, the whole significance of it is in his opinion comprehended in a belief in a divine government of the world:[5] the law of justice and morals is for him the type of the divine world-ruling wisdom.[6] From this standpoint only a negative or external relation was possible to the popular religion, unless, indeed, the violent methods of the Stoic orthodoxy were to be followed; when, therefore, Cicero desires that the existing religion and even the existing

[1] *Tusc.* i. 26, 65; cf. c. 29.
[2] *Tusc.* i. 10, 22; *N. D.* i. 13, 33; *Acad.* i. 7, 22.
[3] *Rep.* vi. 17, 4.
[4] *N. D.* iii. 10; 25–39. Ritter (iv. 147, 150) deduces from these passages that Cicero disbelieved in Providence, and opposed the Natural to the Divine, setting on the one side God without Nature, and, on the other, Nature without God; but I cannot agree with this, for we are not justified, in the face of so many contradictory explanations (*vide N. D.* iii. 40), in identifying Cicero's own opinion with that here brought forward.
[5] Many passages in which Cicero treats of Providence are quoted by Kühner, *l. c.* p. 199. I merely refer in this place to *Tusc.* i. 49, 118; *N. D.* i. 2, 3; *Legg.* i. 7: iii. 1, 3.
[6] *Legg.* ii. 4, 8.

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superstitions shall be maintained in the State, he is speaking entirely from political considerations;[1] personally, he not only makes no attempt to justify polytheism and its myths after the manner of the Stoics, but he shows by many utterances, and, above all, by the sharp criticism to which he subjects the popular belief in gods in his third book *De Natura Deorum*; and soothsaying in his second book *De Divinatione*, how far he himself stands from the national religion. Reverence for the Deity, which is consistent with a true view of nature, and coincides with true morality, is to be required; the existing religion is to be maintained for the good of the commonwealth; superstition, on the other hand, is to be torn up by the roots[2]—such, in a word, is Cicero's theological confession of faith.

Anthropology.

With the belief in God, according to Cicero's view, as we have already seen, the conviction of the dignity of human nature is intimately connected. This conviction also depends far more with him upon inner experience and moral self-consciousness than on any philosophic theory concerning the essential nature of the soul. If we consider the number of our endowments, the loftiness of our vocation, the high prerogative which reason confers upon us, we shall become conscious of our higher nature and descent.[3] Accordingly

[1] *N. D.* iii. 2, 5; *Legg.* ii. 7 *sq.*; ii. 28, 71 (*Fragm. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 13, 32; *Divin.* ii. 12, 28; 33, 70; 311, 1).
72, 148.
[2] *Divin.* ii. 72, 148 *sq.*; *N. D.* vi. 17, 8.
[3] *Legg.* i. 7 *sq.*, 22 *sq.*; *Rep.*

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Cicero, in agreement with the Stoic and Platonic doctrine, regards the soul as an emanation of the Deity, an essence of supernatural origin;[1] without troubling himself to develop this notion more particularly, or to define the relation between this supernatural origin of the soul, and the material origin of the body. But, as he is uncertain about the nature of God, so he expresses himself hesitatingly about that of the soul, and though his inclination unmistakably tends to explain it as an immaterial substance, or, at any rate, as a substance differing from terrestrial matter,[2] he will not altogether exclude the possibility that it consists of air or fire; it is only the coarser materiality of the body that he unconditionally denies in respect to the soul.[3] The immortality of the soul he defends at length, partly on the ground of direct consciousness and universal agreement,[4] and partly by the Platonic arguments;[5] if he also tries to silence the fear of death, even supposing that souls perish in death,[6] this is merely the prudence of the Academician and of the practical man who would

[1] *Tusc.* i. 27: *Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest*, &c. *Loc. cit.* 25, 60; *Legg.* i. 8, 24: *Exstitisse quandam maturitatem serendi generis humani, quod sparsum in terras atque satum divino auctum sit animorum munere. Cumque alia quibus cohærent homines e mortali genere sumpserint, quæ fragilia essent et caduca, animum tamen esse ingeneratum a Deo.* Cf. *Cato*, 21, 77.

[2] *Tusc.* i. 27; 29, 70.

[3] *Tusc.* i. 25, 60: *Non est certe nec cordis nec sanguinis nec cerebri nec atomorum. Anima sit animus ignisve nescio; nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri me nescire quod nesciam; l. c.* 26, 65; 29, 70.

[4] *Tusc.* i. 12 *sqq.*; *Læl.* c. 4; *Cato*, c. 21 *sqq.*

[5] *Tusc.* i. 22 *sqq.*; *Rep.* vi. 17, 8; *Cato*, 21, 78.

[6] *Tusc.* i. 34 *sqq.*; *Ep. ad Famil.* v. 16.

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make the moral effect of his discourses as far as possible independent of all theoretic presuppositions. He tries to prove free will as generally understood in the same manner as immortality, but the treatise which he devoted to the subject,[1] and which has been transmitted to us full of lacunæ, contains no independent psychological enquiry.

These traits will suffice to justify the position which we have assigned to Cicero, and to prove him, together with his teacher Antiochus, the truest representative of philosophic eclecticism in the last century before our era. But that he was far from standing alone in respect to this kind of philosophy among his countrymen and contemporaries will be clear from our previous examination of the school of Antiochus.[2] Among the Roman adherents of this mode of thought, M. Terentius Varro,[3] the learned friend of Cicero was, after Cicero himself, the most important. His principal achievements lie indeed in another sphere;[4] as a philosopher he did not exercise anything like the widespread influence of Cicero, though his historical knowledge of Greek philosophy was perhaps more thorough and complete.

Varro, also a Roman eclectic and a friend of Cicero.

[1] *De Fato.* The principal propositions of this treatise (c. 11) are taken from Carneades.

[2] *Supra*, p. 99.

[3] The life of Varro falls between 116 and 27 B.C. For the rest, *vide* concerning him the histories of Roman literature—Bähr, in Pauly's *Real-encyc. d. Klass. Alterth.* vi. 1688 *sqq.*, and the authorities there quoted, Kritsche, *Gött. Stud.* 1845, ii. 172 *sq.*; Ritschl, '*Die Schriftstellerei des M. Ter. Varro*,' *Rhein. Mus. N. F.* vi. 481-560; Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.* iii. 602 *sqq.*, 624 *sq.*

[4] As Cicero (*Acad.* i. 2, 4 *sqq.*) represents him as saying of himself, though he has previously praised his knowledge of philosophy.

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Yet the philosophical direction taken by so famous a scholar[1] and so well known an author must necessarily have been influential. This direction was, Cicero assures us,[2] that of Antiochus, whose lectures Varro had attended in Athens;[3] and Varro in his treatise on philosophy, so far as we can gather from Augustine,[4] expressed himself quite in the sense of Antiochus.[5] The sole aim of philosophy, he here tells us, is the happiness of man; consequently those distinctions of doctrine among the schools of philosophy are alone to be considered important which relate to the definition of the highest good.[6] Great, therefore, as is the

His view of philosophy and the various sects.

[1] *Doctissimus Romanorum* he is called in Sen. *Ad Helv.* 8, 1; and again very justly, *vir Romanorum eruditissimus* (Quintil. x. 1, 95. Cicero (*Acad.* Fr. 36). says of him (ap. Augustine, *Civ. D.* vi. 2), *Homine omnium facile acutissimo et sine ulla dubitatione doctissimo*; and Augustine (*l. c.*) says he is *doctrina atque sententiis ita refertus* that in respect to matters of fact he has achieved as much as Cicero did as a stylist.

[2] *Ad Att.* xiii. 12: *Ergo illam* ἀκαδημικὴν . . . *ad Varronem transferamus. Etenim sunt* Ἀντιόχεια, *quæ iste valde probat; l. c.* 19; *l. c.* 25. In Varro's mouth is placed, as we know, the doctrine of Antiochus, in the second edition of the Academica (*Acad.* i. 4 *sqq.*). *Vide* what is quoted from Antiochus, *sup.* p. 94, with which *Acad.* i. 2, 6, agrees: *Nostra tu physica nosti: quæ cum contineantur ex effectione et ex materia ea, quam fingit et format effectio*, &c.

[3] Cic. *Acad.* i. 3, 12; 1, 1, 3; *Ad Famil.* ix. 8; August. *Civ. D.* xix. 3, 2: *Varro asserit, auctore Antiocho, magistro Ciceronis et suo.*

[4] *Civ. D.* xix. 1–3.

[5] Cf. with what follows, the account of Antiochus *supra*, p. 94. In regard to this it is to be observed that Varro's book, according to Cic. *Acad.* i. 2, 4 *sqq.*, is later than the expositions of Cicero there made use of, only one of which is put into the mouth of Varro.

[6] *Loc cit.* 1, 3: *Neque enim existimat ullam philosophiæ sectam esse dicendam, quæ non eo distet a ceteris, quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et malorum. Quandoquidem nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi vt beatus sit: quod autem beatum facit, ipse est finis boni: nulla est igitur causa philosophandi, nisi finis boni: quamobrem quæ nullum boni finem sectatur, nulla philosophiæ secta dicenda est.*

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number of possible sects—Varro, sometimes indeed adopting very superficial grounds of distinction, enumerates no fewer than 288[1]—they may all be reduced to a few chief classes, if putting aside all that does not relate to the conception of the highest good we confine ourselves to the main question.[2] But this concerns the relation of virtue to the first thing according to nature,[3] on which again depends its relation to all included herein, and therefore especially to pleasure and freedom from pain. Is the first thing according to nature to be desired for the sake of virtue, or virtue for the sake of the thing according to nature, or both for their own sakes? This, according to Varro, is the funda-

His ethics.

[1] In their derivation, Varro (*l. c.* 1, 2) proceeds thus: There are, he says, four natural objects of desire: sensual pleasure, absence of pain, the combination of these two, and, as a fourth, the *prima naturæ*, which beside these include all other natural advantages of soul and body. Each of the four can be desired for the sake of virtue (the excellence superadded to nature by the instrumentality of teaching) or virtue may be desired for its own sake, or both may be desired independently. Thus we obtain four possible divisions. These become twenty-four, so far as a man desires each of them merely for his own welfare or for that of others. The twenty-four are again divided into forty-eight, of which the one half pursue their end as true, like all other dogmatic philosophers; the other as merely probable, like the new Academy. Since, moreover, each of them can adopt the ordinary, or the Cynic, manner of life (*habitus et consuetudo*) there result ninety-six divisions instead of forty-eight. Lastly, because in each of these sections, regard may be had to the theoretical (*otiosus*), the practical (*negotiosus*), or to a life compounded of both, we must treble this number, and thus we arrive at 288.)

[2] That this is the case with the majority of the divisions named by him, Varro himself shows, *l. c.* i. 3, c. 2, beginning.

[3] The *prima naturæ*, *primigenia naturæ* = τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 309, 1; 257, 2; 258, 1).

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mental question of all philosophy.[1] For a reply to it, he goes back to the conception of man, as it is only on this basis we can decide what is the highest good for man. But man is neither body nor soul exclusively, but consists of both together. His highest good must, therefore, consist of goods of the body as well as goods of the soul; and he consequently must desire for himself the first things according to nature and virtue.[2] But the highest of these goods is virtue, the art of life acquired by instruction.[3] As it includes in itself that which is according to nature, which also was present before the existence of virtue—virtue now desires all for its own sake, and in considering itself as the principal good, it enjoys also all other goods, and ascribes to each the value belonging to it according to its relation to the others; but equally does not hesitate, on this account, to sacrifice the lesser, if so it must be, to the greater. When virtue is wanting, no matter how many other kinds of goods there may be, they do not profit their possessor, they are not his goods, because he makes a bad use of them. In the possession of virtue and of the bodily and mental advantages conditioning it, lies happiness; this increases when other goods with which virtue in itself could dispense, are added; it is perfected

[1] *Loc. cit.* c. 2.

[2] C. 3, 1. That the *prima naturæ* in which Varro has previously included natural advantages and dispositions of mind, is here identified with the totality of corporeal goods, is an inaccuracy which we must ascribe to Varro himself, and not merely to Augustine.

[3] *Virtutem, quam doctrina inserit velut artem vivendi—virtus, i. e. ars agendæ vitæ, l. c.*

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when all goods of soul and body are found together and complete.[1] But to this happiness also belongs sociability, and to virtue the disposition which wishes for others for their sakes the same goods as itself; and this disposition must extend not only to the family and state to which each man belongs, but also to mankind and to the whole world, heaven and earth, gods and men.[2] Its external realisation is to be sought neither in the theoretical nor in the practical life as such, but in the combination of the two. But it must be absolutely sure of its principle: the principles concerning goods and evils must not be considered merely probable by us as by the philosophers of the Academy, they must be unquestionable. This is the doctrine of the old Academy which Varro, like his master Antiochus, professes.[3] In this discussion we find no remarkable philosophic peculiarity: it contains no new thoughts, and what belongs to Varro himself in the views of Antiochus transmitted by him is characterised neither by acuteness of judgment nor by vivacity of style. But we can at least see that Varro had arrived at these views by his own reflection, and that the

[1] *Hæc ergo vita hominis, quæ virtute et aliis animi et corporis bonis, sine quibus virtus esse non potest* (to these belong, as is afterwards explained, life, reason, memory), *fruitur, beata esse dicitur: si vero et aliis, sine quibus esse virtus potest, vel ullis vel pluribus, beatior: si autem prorsus omnibus, ut nullum omnino bonum desit vel animi vel corporis, beatissima* (c. 3, 1, *l. c.* further on).

[2] Varro is therefore quite at one with the Stoic cosmopolitanism; but he deduces from it the proposition that man can feel himself at home everywhere: exile, he says, (ap. Sen. *Ad Helv.* 8, 1) is not in itself an evil, *quod quocumque venimus eadem rerum natura utendum est.*

[3] Aug. *l. c.* 3 2.

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whole tendency of Antiochus corresponded to his way of thinking: that which must have recommended it to him and to his countrymen, was chiefly no doubt the practical aim of this philosophy, and that regard to the necessities of life which is prominent in its theories concerning the various constituents of the highest good, and the relative value of them.

Anthropology and theology.

But the greater the influence allowed by Antiochus to the Stoic doctrine,[1] the less can we wonder if Varro approached it in regard to some other question still more closely than in his ethics.[2] If he explained the soul to be air which is breathed in through the mouth and warmed in the breast, in order to spread itself thence through the body,[3] by reducing it to the Pneuma he allied himself with the Stoic materialism, to which Antiochus also is no stranger.[4] He further discriminated with the Stoics the well-known three gradations and forms of soul-life.[5] But his connection with the Stoic theology is of especial importance. In agreement with it, he explained the universe or, more precisely, the soul of the universe as the Deity: only the parts of this world-soul, the souls ruling in the

[1] Cf. *sup.* p. 92.

[2] He himself, according to Cicero (*Brut.* 56, 205; *Acad.* i. 2, 8) had the disciple of Panætius, L. Ælius Stilo (*sup.* p. 11, 4), for his instructor.

[3] Lactant. *Opif. D.* 17: *Varro ita definit: anima est aër conceptus ore, defervefactus in pulmone, temperatus in corde, diffusus in corpus.* Cf. Varro, *L. Lat.* v. 59: *sive, ut Zeno Citius, animalium semen ignis is qui anima ac mens.*

[4] Vide *sup.* p. 95 *sqq.*

[5] Augustine, *Civ. D.* vii. 2, see following note.

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different parts of the world, are they who are worshipped in the gods of polytheism, down to the genii and heroes.[1] But, like Panætius and Scævola, he drew a marked distinction between natural and philosophical, mythical and civil theology,[2] and if

[1] Augustin. *Civ. D.* iv. 31: Varro says: *Quod hi soli ei videantur animadvertisse quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem. Loc. cit.* vii. 6 (c. 9 repeatedly): *Dicit ergo idem Varro . . . Deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi . . . et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum: sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem; ita mundum Deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et corpore. Loc. cit.* vii. 23: (Varro in the book concerning the *Dii selecti*) *tres esse affirmat animæ gradus in omni universaque natura*, those discussed in *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 192: Nature, the irrational soul, and reason. *Hanc partem animæ mundi* (their rational part, their ἡγεμονικόν) *dicit Deum, in nobis autem genium vocari. Esse autem in mundo lapides ac terram . . . ut ossa, ut ungues Dei. Solem vero, lunam, stellas, quæ sentimus quibusque ipse sentit, sensus esse ejus. Æthera porro animum esse ejus: ex cujus vi quæ pervenit in astra ipsam quoque facere Deos* (it makes into Gods); *et per ea quod in terram permeat, Deam Tellurem, quod autem inde permeat in mare atque oceanum, Deum esse Neptunum.* Similarly in c. 6, the world is divided into heaven and earth, the heavens into æther and air, the earth into water and earth: *quam [quas] omnes quatuor partes animarum esse plenas, in æthere et aëre immortalium, in aqua et terra mortalium*; from the outermost circle of heaven, as far as to the sphere of the moon, extend the heavenly gods; between this and the region of clouds *aëreas esse animas . . . et vocari heroas et lares et genios.* Also in *l. c.* c. 9, he (for only Varro can be intended) calls Jupiter, *Deus habens potestatem causarum, quibus aliquid fit in mundo*; in c. 11, and c. 13, he appropriates to himself (for Augustine must have taken this from him) the verses of Soranus (*sup.* p. 74, n. end), in which Jupiter is called *progenitor genitrixque Deûm*; and in c. 28 he derives the male divinities from heaven or Jupiter as the active principle, and the female divinities from the earth or Juno as the passive principle, while Minerva denotes the ideas as prototypes. That all these propositions are either directly Stoic, or allied with Stoicism, is evident from the proofs adduced in *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 138 *sqq.*; 146, 6; 315 *sqq.* 325.

[2] Aug. *l. c.* vi. 5: *Tria genera dicit esse* (in the last books of the Antiquities, cf. c. 3) . . .

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he censured the mythology of the poets for relating the most absurd and unworthy things about the gods,[1] he did not conceal that he had also much to blame in the public religion: for example, he declared that the worship of images was a defilement of the true worship of God;[2] that, for his part, the philosophic doctrine of the Deity would suffice,[3] and that he regarded the religion of the State merely as a civil institution, which, in the interest of the commonwealth, must make the most important concessions to the weakness of the masses.[4] In all this there is nothing which goes beyond the Stoic doctrine as taught by Panætius, but nothing on the

eorumque unum mythicon appellari, alterum physicon, tertium civile. The first includes the poets, the second the philosophers, the third states (*populi*). In the first there is much that is opposed (*vide* following note) to the nature and dignity of the Deity; to the second belong—*Dii qui sint, ubi, quod genus, quale, a quonam tempore an a sempiterno fuerint; an ex igne sint ut credit Heraclitus, an ex numeris ut Pythagoras, an ex atomis ut ait Epicurus. Sic alias, quæ facilius intra parietes in schola, quam extra in foro ferre possunt aures.*

[1] *Loc. cit.* (*vide* the previous note) with the addition: *In hoc enim est, ut Deus alius ex capite alius ex femore sit alius ex guttis sanguinis natus; in hoc, ut Dii furati sint, ut adulteraverint, ut servierint homini: denique in hoc omnia Diis attribuuntur, quæ non modo in hominem sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem cadere possunt.*

[2] *Loc. cit.* iv. 31. 'The ancient Romans,' says Varro, worshipped the gods for 170 years, without images: *Quod, si adhuc inquit, mansisset, castius Dii observarentur* (vi. 7). *Fatetur sicut forma humana Deos fecerunt, ita eos delectari humanis voluptatibus credidisse.*

[3] *Loc. cit.* iv. 31. Varro himself confesses that if he had to found a State anew, *ex naturæ potius formula Deos nominaque eorum se fuisse dedicaturum.*

[4] That he regarded the religion of the State as a political institution, is evident from *l. c.* vi. 4, where Varro says, if he had to treat *de omni natura Deorum*, he would first have to speak of the gods, and then of men; but as he has only to do with the gods of the State he

other hand that is incompatible with the Stoicising eclecticism of an Antiochus.[1]

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follows the contrary order. For *sicut prior est, inquit, pictor quam tabula picta, prior faber quam ædificium, ita priores sunt civitates quam ea quæ a civitatibus sunt instituta.* How little the real philosophical doctrine of the gods was worth as a public religion, we have already seen (*sup.* p. 177, 2). A public religion must include in it much that is mythological. *Ait enim, ea quæ scribunt poëtæ minus esse quam ut populi sequi debeant; quæ autem philosophi plus quam ut ea vulgus scrutari expediat. Quæ sic abhorrent, inquit, ut tamen ex utroque genere ad civiles rationes assumpta sint non pauca.* The philosophers, indeed, desire to teach by their enquiries, and so far (*l. c.*) it may be said, *physicos utilitatis causa scripsisse, poëtas delectationis.* But this teaching is only for those who understand it, not for the masses.

[1] As Krische (*l. c.* 172 *sq.*) rightly maintains, against O. Müller's assertion (Varro, *L. Lat.* s. v.) that Cicero incorrectly makes Varro a follower of Antiochus, whereas he went over to the Stoics.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SCHOOL OF THE SEXTII.

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F. *School of the Sextii.*

History of the school.

THE school of the Sextii occupies a peculiar position among the Roman philosophers. But even this school was not so independent of the contemporary Greek philosophy, nor were its achievements so important, as to obtain for it any extensive influence or long duration. Its founder, Quintus Sextius, was a Roman, of good family, a somewhat later contemporary of Augustus,[1] who had rejected a political career in order to devote himself wholly to philosophy.[2] After

[1] Sen. *Ep.* 98, 13: *Honores reppulit pater Sextius, qui ita natus, ut rempublicam deberet capessere, latum clavum divo Julio dante non recepit.* As this must have occurred at latest in 43 B.C., and Sextius must have been at least 25–27 years old (cf. Ott, *Charakter und Urspr. der Sprüche des Sextius*, p. 1), his birth must be placed in 70 B.C. or even somewhat earlier. When Eusebius, Chron. zu Ol. 195, 1 (1 A.D.), dates the prime 'of Sextus the Pythagorean philosopher' at that period, he is too late if our Sextius be meant. That Seneca was personally acquainted with the older Sextius is not probable; the passages quoted by Ott, p. 2, 10, rather indicate the contrary. *Ep.* 59, 7; 64, 2 *sqq.*; *De Ira*, ii. 36, 1, refer only to his treatise. *De Ira*, iii. 36, 1, may either have been taken from a written work or from oral tradition. *Ep.* 73, 12, may have been taken from such a tradition. In *Ep.* 108, 17, Seneca gives an account of the doctrines of Sextius, after Sotion, as he himself says.

[2] *Vide* the preceding note, and Plut. *Prof. in Virt.* 5, p. 77: καθάπερ φασὶ Σέξτιον τὸν Ῥωμαῖον ἀφεικότα τὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς διὰ φιλοσοφίαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν αὖ πάλιν δυσπαθοῦντα καὶ χρώμενον τῷ λόγῳ χαλεπῷ τὸ πρῶτον, ὀλίγου δεῆσαι καταβαλεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἔκ τινος δήρους. This transition from practical activity to philosophy seems to be referred to in Plin. *Hist. Nat.* xviii. 28, 274. Pliny here relates how Democritus had enriched himself with his traffic (this is also related of Thales) in oil (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* I. 766) but had returned his gains to those who had shared in it; and he adds: *Hoc postea Sextius e Romanis sapientiæ adsectatoribus Athenis fecit eadem ratione:* which does not mean that he carried on the same traffic, but merely that he silenced those who blamed him for devoting himself to philosophy, in a similar manner, and for his part renounced all profits.

[1] There is no express tradition of this; but as the school is universally described as the school of the Sextii (see the following note), and the elder Sextius as a philosopher is distinguished from his son by the addition of *Pater* (Sen. *Ep.* 98, 13; 64, 2), it is extremely probable.

[2] Sen. *Ep.* 108, 17 *sqq.*; 49, 2. The age at which he heard Sotion, Seneca designated by the word *juvenis*, in *Ep.* 108; in *Ep.* 49, by *puer*. It may, therefore, have occurred in 18–20 A.D. This date is also indicated by *Ep.* 108, 22; cf. Tac. *Ann.* ii. 85. For the distinction between this Sotion and the Peripatetic of the same name, *vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 3, and *infra* ch. xi. note 2. In support of the theory that the teacher of Seneca, and not the Peripatetic, was the author of the treatise περὶ ὀργῆς, Diels, *Doxogr.* 255 *sq.*, rightly appeals to the similarity between a fragment from Sotion's περὶ ὀργῆς (ap. Stob. *Floril.* 20, 53) and Seneca, *De Ira*, ii. 10, 5. Also the repeated quotation of utterances of Sextius, *De Ira*, ii. 36, 1, points to this source.

[3] Quintil. x. 1, 124: *Scripsit non parum multa Cornelius Celsus, Sextios secutus, non sine cultu ac nitore.* For further details concerning this physician and polyhistor, *vide* Bernhardy, *Röm. Litt.* 848.

[4] A grammarian, who had already won for himself considerable fame as a teacher, especially in Smyrna, when he *dimissa repente schola transiit ad Quinti Septimii* [l. *Sextii*] *philosophi sectam.* Sueton. *De Illustr. Gramm.* 18.

[5] This philosopher (of whom Seneca, *Brevit. Vit.* 10, 1; *Ep.* 11, 4; 40, 12; 100, 12, speaks as of a deceased contemporary whom he had himself known and heard) was, according to these passages, a man of excel-

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his death his son appears to have undertaken the guidance of the school.[1] Among its adherents we find mention of Sotion of Alexandria, whose enthusiastic disciple Seneca had been in his early youth;[2] Cornelius Celsus, a prolific writer;[3] Lucius Crassitius of Tarentum,[4] and Fabianus Papirius.[5] It became,

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however, extinct with these men: lively as was the applause which at first greeted it, in Seneca's later years it had already long since died out.[1] The writings of this school, too, have all been lost, with the exception of some scattered utterances of the elder Sextius, of Sotion, and Fabianus.[2]

lent character, *non ex his cathedrariis philosophis, sed ex veris et antiquis* (*Brevit. Vit.* 10). His lectures and expositions are also greatly praised by Seneca (*Ep.* 40, 12; 58, 6; 100); and in *Ep.* 100, 9, he is described as an author to whom, in regard to style, only Cicero, Pollio, and Livius are to be preferred, though certain deficiencies in him are admitted. Seneca also says in the same place that he wrote nearly as much on philosophy as Cicero; and he mentions besides (*l. c.* 1) his *Libri Artium Civilium*. The ectures to the people which are alluded to in *Ep.* 52, 11, seem to have been of a philosophical character. The older Seneca, *Controvers.* ii. *Præf.*, says that he was a disciple of Sextius (the elder) by whom he was persuaded to devote himself to philosophy instead of rhetoric. To his manner of writing, Seneca is less partial. Some utterances of his are to be found ap. Sen. *Cons. ad Marc.* 23, 5; *Brevit. Vit.* 10, 1; 13, 9; *Nat. Qu.* iii. 27, 3.

[1] Sen. *Nat. Qu.* vii. 32, 2: *Sextiorum nova et Romani roboris secta inter initia sua, cum magno impetu cœpisset, exstincta est.*

[2] Of these three philosophers something has been preserved by Seneca, and of Sotion also, by Stobæus in the *Florilegium*. Moreover, a collection of maxims exists in the Latin translation of Rufinus, which was first quoted by Orig. *c. Cels.* xiii. 30, with the designation Σέξτου γνῶμαι, is often used by Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam*, without mention of the writer, and of which there is a Syrian edition, ap. Lagarde, *Analecta Syr.* Lpz. 1858. (On the two Latin recensions of this and the later editions, cf. Gildemeister in the preface to his edition from which I now cite; *Sexti Sententiarum recensiones Latinam Græcam Syriacas conjunctim exh.* Bonn. 1873). This collection, sometimes called γνῶμαι or *sententiæ*, sometimes *enchiridion*, and, since the time of Rufinus, also *annulus*, was much in use among the Christians. Its author is sometimes named Sextus, sometimes Sixtus, or Xystus; and while most writers describe him as a Pythagorean philosopher, others see in him the Roman bishop Sixtus (or Xystus, about 120 A.D). Of more recent writers, many (*e.g.* Lasteyrie, *Sentences de Sextius*, Par. 1842; and Mullach, *Fragm. Philos.* ii. 31 *sq.*) regarded the maxims as the work of a heathen philosopher, and more especially of one of the two

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Its character and

Whatever can be deduced from these utterances respecting the doctrine of the school, serves

Sextii. (How Ott, *l. c.* i. 10, discovers this opinion in my first edition, I do not understand.) On the other hand, Ritter (iv. 178) believes them to be the Christian rehabilitation of a work belonging to a Sextus, and possibly to our Sextius, but in which so much that is Christian is interwoven that it has become entirely useless as an historical authority. Ewald (*Gött. Aug.* 1859, 1, 261 *sqq.*; *Gesch. d. V. Isr.* vii. 321 *sqq.*) on his side declares the Syrian recension of the collection of sayings to be the true translation of a Christian original, the value of which he cannot sufficiently exalt, and the authorship of which he ascribes to the Roman Sixtus. Meinrad Ott, lastly, in three discourses (*Charakter und Ursprung der Sprüche des Philosophen Sextius*, Rottweil, 1861; *Die Syrische 'Auserlesenen Sprüche,'* &c., ibid. 1862; *Die Syrische 'Auserlesenen Sprüche,'* ibid. 1863), maintains that the sentences were composed by the younger Sextius, in whom the original tendency of the Sextian school is said to have been essentially modified—partly by Pythagorean, partly and especially by Jewish influences—and placed on a purely monotheistic basis. But completely as he has proved against Ewald that the Syrian recension is a later *réchauffé*, in which the original, translated by Rufinus, is watered down, and its original character obliterated, his own hypothesis is nevertheless untenable. In the first place the presupposition that one of the two Sextii was the author of the collected sentences, would be most uncertain if this work itself claimed such authorship, for it only made its appearance in the third century. But we have no reason to think that the writer of the sentences wished to appear as one of the two Sextii. The most ancient authorities always call him Sextus; later writers, subsequent to Rufinus, as we have seen, also Sixtus, or Xystus, but never Sextius (cf. Gildemeister, *l. c.* lii. *sqq.*); so likewise Latin MSS. (*l. c.* xiv. *sqq.*) and the Syrian revisers (*l. c.* xxx. *sq.*), who both say Xystus. We can, therefore, only suppose that the author called himself Sextus, and not Sextius. Ott's theory would oblige us to suppose a radical difference to have existed between the doctrine of the elder Sextius (who, to quote only this one passage, was so opposed to the strict monotheism of the sentences, *infra*, p. 186, 4, that he calls the highest god Jupiter) and that of his son, whereas all the ancient authorities, without exception, speak only of one school of the Sextii; and equal violence must be done to the sense and the expression of the passage in Seneca, *Nat. Qu.* vii. 32 (*vide* preceding note) in order to find in the *Nova Sextiorum Schola* the school of the younger Sextius as distinct

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to confirm the judgment of Seneca that it possessed indeed great ethical importance and the vigour

philosophic standpoint.

from that of his father, especially as the predicate *Romani roboris* entirely harmonises with what Seneca elsewhere says of the elder Sextius (*Ep.* 59, 7): *Sextium . . . virum acrem, Græcis verbis, Romanis moribus philosophantem*), and would, on the contrary, be little applicable to a mixture of Stoic-Pythagorean philosophy with Jewish dogmas. Lastly, and this makes further argument unnecessary, the references to Christian conceptions and to New Testament passages are so unmistakable in the sentences, that we cannot suppose their origin to have been either purely Roman, or Judaic and Roman. For though many echoes of Christian expression and modes of thought (as Gildemeister shows, p. xlii.) are merely apparent, or introduced by Christian translators and revisers, yet in the case of others, as the same writer admits, the reference to definite expressions in the New Testament is undoubted. At p. 39 the prospect is held out to those who live wickedly that they shall be plagued after their death by the evil spirit, *usque quo exigat ab eis etiam novissimum quadrantem.* This can only be explained as a reminiscence of *Matt.* v. 26; p. 20 refers to *Matt.* xxii. 21; p. 110 to *Matt.* xv. 11; 16 *sqq.*; p. 193 to *Matt.* xix. 23; p. 242 to *Matt.* x. 8; p. 336 to *Matt.* xx. 28, where the διακονηθῆναι corresponds to the *ministrari ab aliis*; p. 60 (cf. p. 58) to *John*, i. 12. Less certain, but nevertheless probable, is the connection between pp. 233 and *Matt.* v. 28; pp. 13, 273, and *Matt.* v. 29 *sq.*; xviii. 8 *sq.*; p. 30 and 1 *John*, i. 5. Also the *homo Dei*, p. 2, 133 (Rufinus' translation first introduces him at p. 3) belongs to the Christian nomenclature (*vide* 1 *Tim.* vi. 11; 2 *Tim.* iii. 17); likewise *filius Dei* (pp. 58, 60, 135, 221, 439); *verbum Dei* (pp. 264, 277, 396, 413); *judicium* (pp. 14, 347); *sæculum* (pp. 15, 19, 20); *electi* (p. 1); *salvandi* (p. 143). Note further, the angels (p. 32); the prophet of truth (p. 441); the strong emphasising of faith (p. 196 *et pass.*). In many passages (cf. Gildemeister, *l. c.*) the Christian revisers have substituted *fides* and *fidelis* for other expressions. At pages 200, 349 *sq.*, 387, the persecutions of Christians, and at p. 331 the falling away from Christianity seems to be alluded to. The book of sentences, as it stands, therefore, can only have been composed by a Christian; and as it refers to some of the latest writings of our New Testament canon, and there is no proof of its own existence until about the middle of the third century, it cannot in any case have been written long before the end of the second century, and possibly not until the third. If the doctrines peculiar to Christianity are thoroughly absent from it, and the name of Christ is not once mentioned, this only proves that the author

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of ancient Rome, but that it contained nothing different from the doctrines of Stoicism.[1] The only thing that distinguishes the Sextians from the Stoics is the exclusiveness with which they confined themselves to ethics; but even in this they agree with the later Stoicism and with the Cynics of Imperial times. Though they do not seem to have absolutely condemned physical enquiry,[2] they sought and found their strength elsewhere. A Sextius, a Sotion, a Fabianus, were men who exercised a wide moral influence by their personality;[3] and to their per-

did not intend his work only for Christians, but for non-Christians as well, and wishes by means of it chiefly to recommend the universal principles of monotheism and of Christian morality. Whether he himself was called Sextus, or whether he falsely prefixed the name of an imaginary philosopher Sextus (who in that case no doubt was already described by himself as a Pythagorean), cannot be ascertained. As before observed, the work does not seem to announce itself as the composition of one of the Sextii. Still, it is certainly probable that the author borrowed the greater part of his sentences from philosophers; but as he never tells us whence he derived any of them, his collection, as Ritter rightly decides, is wholly useless as an authority for the history of philosophy. The attempt to separate from it a genuine substratum, to be regarded as the work of the two Sextii, would be purposeless, even if it were undertaken with more ingenuity than is the case with the attempt of J. R. Tobler (*Annulus Rufini*, i.; *Sent. Sext.* Tüb. 1878).

[1] *Nat. Qu.* vii. 32; *Ep.* 59, 7 (*vide* p. 677, 4; 679); *Ep.* 64, 2: *Liber Qu. Sextii patris, magni, si quid mihi credis, viri, et, licet neget, Stoici.*

[2] In regard to Fabianus at any rate, we see from Sen. *Nat. Qu.* iii. 27, 3, that his opinion about the *diluvium* (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. ii. 156 *sq.*) was somewhat different from that of Seneca. He must, therefore, have held the general Stoic theory on the subject.

[3] Cf. concerning Sextius, besides the quotation *supra*, p. 182, 1 (Sen. *Ep.* 64, 3): *Quantus in illo, Di boni, vigor est, quantum animi!* Other philosophers *instituunt, disputant, cavillantur, non faciunt animum, quia non habent: cum legeris Sextium, dices: vivit, viget, liber est, supra hominem est, dimittit me plenum ingentis fiduciæ;* [illegible]oncerning Fabianus *sup.* 181, 5; [illegible]oncerning Sotion, Sen. *Ep.* [illegible] 17.

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sonal influence they attached much greater value than to scientific enquiry: we must fight against the emotions, says Fabianus, not with subtleties but with enthusiasm;[1] and concerning learned labours which have no moral purpose in view, his judgment is that it would perhaps be better to pursue no science, than sciences of such a kind.[2] The life of man, is, as Sextius argues,[3] a constant battle with folly; only he who perpetually stands in readiness to strike can successfully encounter the enemies who press round him on all sides. If this reminds us of Stoicism and especially of the Stoicism of the Roman period, the resemblance is still more striking in the proposition of Sextius that Jupiter could achieve nothing more than a virtuous man.[4] With this Stoical character, two other traits, which Sextius seems to have borrowed from the Pythagorean school, are quite in harmony: viz., the principle of rendering account to oneself at the end of every day of the moral profit[5] and results of it; and the renunciation of animal food. Sotion, however, was the first who based the latter precept upon the transmigration of souls: Sextius inculcated it only on the ground that by the

[1] Sen. *Brevit. Vit.* 10, 1: *Solebat dicere Fabianus . . . contra adfectus impetu non subtilitate pugnandum, nec minutis volneribus, sed incursu avertendam aciem non probam: cavillationes enim contundi debere, non vellicari.*

[2] *Ibid.* 13, 9.

[3] Ap. Sen. *Ep.* 59, 7.

[4] Sen. *Ep.* 73, 12: *Solebat Sextius dicere, Jovem plus non posse, quam bonum virum,* which Seneca carries further in the sense discussed, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 252, 1, 2.

[5] *Vide* Sen. *De Ira,* iii. 36, 1, with which cf. the Pythagorean Golden Poem, v. 40 *sqq.*

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slaughter of animals we accustom ourselves to cruelty, and by devouring their flesh to enjoyments that are superfluous and incompatible with health.[1] Nothing else that has been handed down respecting the ethics of Sextius displays any important individuality.[2] It was a more remarkable deviation from Stoicism if the Sextii, as has been stated,[3] maintained the incorporeality of the soul; but this, after all, would only show that, while following the eclectic tendency of their time, they were able to combine, with the ethics of the Stoics,

[1] Sen. *Ep.* 108, 17 *sqq.* The discussions of Sotion, by which Seneca for a time was persuaded to abstain from eating meat, are here expounded more at length. Of Sextius it is said: *Hic homini satis alimentorum citra sanguinem esse [illegible] et crudelitatis consuet[illegible]ieri, ubi in voluptatem esse[illegible]cta laceratio. Adiciebat, contrahendam materiam esse luxuriæ. Colligebat, bonæ valitudini contraria esse alimenta varia et nostris aliena corporibus.* With this the passage in the sayings of Sextus, p. 109, agrees (ap. Orig. *c. Cels.* viii. 30): ἐμψύχων χρῆσις μὲν ἀδιάφορον, ἀποχὴ δὲ λογικώτερον.

[2] *Vide* the utterances of Sotion in the *Florilegium* of Stobæus, which no doubt belong to our Sotion; the recommendation of brotherly love (84, 6–8; 17, 18); the sayings against flattery (14, 10), anger (20, 53 *sq.*), about grief (108, 59), and on consolatory exhortations (113, 15). None of these contain anything by which we can recognise the school to which their author belonged. Our collection of sentences, however, it may be incidentally remarked, brings forward nothing which is not equally to be found in many other writers.

[3] Claudian. Mamert. *De Statu Animæ,* ii. 8: *Incorporalis, inquiunt* (the two Sextii), *omnis est anima et illocalis atque indeprehensa vis quædam; quæ sine spatio capax corpus haurit et continet.* The last clause reminds us of the Stoic doctrine, that the soul holds the body together. Mamertus is not, indeed, an altogether trustworthy witness; he also tries to prove (*l. c.*) that Chrysippus regarded the soul as immortal, because he required the conquest of sensuality by reason. But his utterances about the Sextii are so definite that we must necessarily refer them to tradition rather than to any inference of this kind.

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definitions from the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine. We therefore find nothing in their school that is new and scientifically noticeable; it is a branch of Stoicism, which doubtless is indebted merely to the personality of its founder that it had an independent existence for a time; but we can see in its points of contact with Pythagoreanism and Platonism how easily in that period systems which started from entirely different speculative presuppositions, could coalesce on the basis of morality, when once men had begun to consider distinctive theoretical doctrines of less consequence than similar practical aims; and that there was inherent in the ethical dualism of the Stoa a natural tendency to the views which were most strongly opposed to the materialistic monism of their metaphysics, and to their anthropology.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST CENTURIES AFTER CHRIST. THE SCHOOL OF THE STOICS. SENECA.

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Section II. *Eclecticism in the first centuries after Christ.*

A. *The Stoics.*

General character of philosophy in the Imperial times.

THE mode of thought which had become predominant during the first century before Christ in the Greco-Roman philosophy, maintained itself likewise in the succeeding centuries. By far the greater part of its representatives, indeed, were adherents of one or other of the four great schools into which the domain of Greek science was divided after the third century. The separation of these schools had, indeed, been confirmed afresh by two circumstances: on the one hand by the learned study of the writings of their founders, to which the Peripatetics especially had devoted themselves with such zeal since the time of Andronicus; on the other, by the institution of public chairs for the four chief sects which took place in the second century after the beginning of our era.[1] This learned activity must have tended to make the special characteristics of the different systems more distinctly

Zeal for the study of the ancient philosophers.

[1] Cf. O. Müller, *Quam curam resp. ap. Græc. et Rom. literis . . . impenderit* (*Gött. Einladungsschrift*, 1837), p. 14 *sqq.*; Zumpt, *Ueb. d. Bestand d. philos. Schulen in Athen. Abh. d. Berl. Akad.* 1842; *Hist.-Phil. Kl. Schr.* 44 *sqq.*; Weber, *De Academia Literaria Atheniensium seculo secundo p. Chr. constituta* (Marb. 1858), and the quotations at p. 1.

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Endowment of public chairs of philosophy.

perceived, and to refute the idea upon which the eclecticism of an Antiochus and Cicero had fallen back, viz: that the divergences between them were founded rather upon differences of words, than matters of fact; and it might form a counterpoise to the eclectic tendencies of the time the more easily, since it was directed as much to the defence, as to the explanation, of the heads of the ancient schools and of their doctrines. In Rome, where in the first century not only Stoicism, but philosophy in general, was regarded in many quarters with political mistrust, and had had to suffer repeated persecution,[1] public teachers of philosophy were first established

[1] The banishment of Attalus the Stoic from Rome under Tiberius (Sen. *Suasor.* 2), and that of Seneca under Claudius, were not the result of a dislike upon principle to philosophy. On the other hand, under Nero, laws were multiplied against men who had acquired or strengthened their independence of mind in the school of Stoics. Thrasea Pætus, Seneca, Lucanus, and Rubellius Plautus were put to death; Musonius, Cornutus, Helvidius Priscus were banished (further details later on); and though these persecutions may have had in the first instance political or personal reasons, a general distrust had already manifested itself against the Stoic philosophy especially, which *Stoicorum adrogantia sectaque quæ turbidos et negotiorum adpetentes faciat* (as Tigellinus, ap. Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 57, whispers to *Nero*); and Seneca (*Ep.* 5, 1 *sqq.*; 14, 15; 103, 5) finds it necessary to warn the disciple of philosophy against coming forward in any manner at all conspicuous or calculated to cause offence; and so much the more as this had been prejudicial to many, and philosophy was regarded with mistrust. The political dissatisfaction displayed by the Stoic and Cynic philosophers after the execution of Helvidius Priscus occasioned Vespasian to banish from Rome all teachers of philosophy, with the exception of Musonius; two of them he even caused to be transported (Dio Cass. lxiv. 13); and this precedent was afterwards followed by Domitian. Being irritated by the panegyrics of Junius Rusticus on Thrasea and Helvidius, he not only caused Rusticus and the son of Helvidius to be executed, but ordered all philosophers out of Rome (Gell. *N.A.* xv. 11, 3; Sueton. *Domit.* 10; Plin. *Ep.* iii. 11; Dio Cass. lxvii. 13). But these isolated and temporary measures do not seem to have done any lasting injury to philosophic studies.

as it seems by Hadrian;[1] and in the provinces, by Antoninus Pius:[2] rhetoric had already been similarly provided for by some of their predecessors,[3] and the ancient institution of the Alexandrian Museum, and its maintenances designed for the support of learned men of the most various sorts, had also continued to exist in the Roman period.[4] Public

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[1] Cf. Spartian. *Hadr.* 16: *Doctores, qui professioni suæ inhabiles videbantur, ditatos honoratosque a professione dimisit,* which would only have been possible if they had before possessed them. Still less is proved by the previous context: *Omnes professores et honoravit et divites fecit.* That these statements relate not merely to grammarians, rhetoricians, &c., but also to philosophers, is shown by the connection.

[2] Capitolin. *Ant. P.* 11: *Rhetoribus et philosophis per omnes provincias et honores et salaria detulit.* Moreover, teachers of sciences and physicians were exempted from taxation. This favour, however, in a rescript of Antoninus to the *Commune Asiæ* (quoted from Modestin. *Excus.* ii.; *Digest.* xxvii. 1, 6, 2) was restricted in regard to the physicians to a certain number according to the size of the city; but in regard to the philosophers it was to hold good absolutely διὰ τὸ πανίους εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας.

[3] Thus we hear of Vespasian especially (Sueton. *Vesp.* 18) that he *primus e fisco latinis græcisque rhetoribus* (perhaps in the first place only to one rhetorician for each speech) *annua centena* (100,000 sestert.) *constituit.* The first Latin rhetorician so endowed, in the year 69, was, according to Hieron. *Eus. Chron.* 89 A.D., Quintilian; a second under Hadrian, Castricius (Gell. *N.A.* xiii. 22).

[4] Cf. Zumpt, *l. c.*; Parthey, *Das Alexandrin. Museum* (Berl. 1838), p. 91 *sqq.*; O. Müller, *l. c.* p. 29 *sq.* From the statement (Dio Cass. lxxvii. 7) that Caracalla took from the Peripatetics of Alexandria (out of hatred to Aristotle, on account of the supposed poisoning of Alexander) their Syssitia and other privileges, Parthey (p. 52) infers with probability that there also (though perhaps only in the time of Hadrian or one of his successors) the philosophers belonging to the museum had been divided into schools. A similar institution to the museum, the Athenæum, was founded in Rome by Hadrian (Aurel. Victor. *Cæs.* 14; cf. Dio

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teachers from the four most important Schools of philosophy[1] were settled by Marcus Aurelius in

Cass. lxxiii. 17; Capitolin. *Pertin.* 11; *Gord.* 3; Lamprid. *Sever.* 35), That maintenance for the learned man admitted was also attached to it, is not expressly stated; whether the words of Tertullian (*Apologet.* 46), *statuis et salaribus remunerantur* (the philosophers), relate to Rome or to the provinces, we do not know, but they probably refer to the western countries.

[1] That Marcus Aurelius appointed alike for the four schools—the Stoic, Platonic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean—teachers with a salary of 10,000 drachmas each, is plain from Philostr. *v. Soph.* ii. 2; Lucian, *Eunuch.* 3: according to Dio Cass. lxxi. 3, it was while he was in Athens, after the suppression of the insurrection of Avidius Cassius (176 A.D.) that Marcus 'gave all mankind in Athens instructors, whom he endowed with a yearly stipend.' At this time, or soon after, Tatian may have written the λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας in which (p. 19) he mentions philosophers who receive from the Emperor an annual salary of 600 χρυσοῖ. According to Lucian, *l. c.*, each of the schools mentioned seems to have had two public instructors, for we are there told how, after the death of 'one of the Peripatetics,' two candidates disputed before the electing assembly for the vacant place with its 10,000 drachmas. Zumpt (*l. c.* p. 50) offers the suggestion that only four imperial salaries had been given; but that if the existing scholarch of a school was not in need of such assistance, a second teacher was named side by side with him, so that a school may have had two simultaneously—one chosen by the school, and one nominated by the Emperor. The passage in Lucian, however, is not favourable to this view. As the philosophers whom the Emperor endowed with the salary of 10,000 drachmas are first spoken of, and we are then told καὶ τινά φασιν αὐτῶν ἔναγχος ἀποθανεῖν, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν οἶμαι τὸν ἕτερον, this manifestly presupposes that among those who were paid by the Emperor there were two Peripatetics, in which case the other schools must each have had two representatives in this reign. The choice of these salaried philosophers, Marcus Aurelius, according to Philostr., *l.c.*, gave over to Herodes Atticus; according to Lucian, *Eun.* c. 2 *sq.*, the candidates brought forward their claims before the ἄριστοι καὶ πρεσβύτατοι καὶ σοφώτατοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει (by which we may understand either the Areopagus, the βουλή, or a separate elective council, perhaps with the participation of the schools concerned, and under the presidency of an imperial official); but if an agreement could not be arrived at, the affair was sent to Rome to be decided. The imperial ratification was, doubtless, necessary in all cases; and in particular instances the teacher was probably directly named by the Emperor; the words of Alexander of Aphrodisias may be taken in either sense, when, in the dedication of his treatise περὶ εἱμαρμένης, he thanks Septimius Severus and his son, Caracalla, ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας μαρτυρίας διδάσκαλος αὐτῆς (the Aristotelian philosophy) κεκηρυγμένος.

[1] On the repute and popularity of Athens in the middle of the second century, cf. also Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 1, 6, who in the time of Herodes Atticus speaks of the Θράκια καὶ Ποντικὰ μειράκια κἀξ ἄλλων ἐθνῶν βαρβάρων ξυνερρυηκότα, whom the Athenians received for money.

[2] Cf. Lucian, *l. c.* 4: τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν λόγων προηγώνιστο αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἑκάτερος τῶν δογμάτων ἐπεδέδεικτο καὶ ὅτι τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τῶν ἐκείνῳ δοκούντων εἴχετο.

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Athens,[1] which was thus declared anew the chief seat of philosophic studies; and thus the division of these schools was not merely acknowledged as an existing fact, but a support was given to it for the future which in the then condition of things was no slight advantage. In the appointment of the office of teacher, the express avowal of the system for which he desired to be employed was required from the candidate.[2] Externally, therefore, the schools remained sharply separated in this period as heretofore.

Continued Eclecticism.

As this separation, however, had previously done little to hinder the rise of eclectic tendencies, so was it little in the way of their continuance. The different schools, in spite of all divisions and feuds, approximated internally to each other. They did not actually abandon their distinctive doctrines, but they propagated many of them, and these the most striking, merely historically as a learned tradition, without concerning themselves more deeply with them; or they postponed them to the essentially

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practical aims and principles, in which the different schools approached more nearly to each other; or they readily admitted many changes and modifications, and without renouncing on the whole their distinctive character, they yet allowed entrance to definitions, which, having originally grown up on another soil, were, strictly speaking, not altogether compatible with that character. The Epicurean School alone persistently held aloof from this movement; but it also refrained from all scientific activity worthy of mention.[1] Among the three remaining schools, on the contrary, there is none in which this tendency of the time did not manifest itself in some form or other. With the Peripatetics it is their restriction to criticism and explanation of the Aristotelian writings, in which the want of independent scientific creative activity is chiefly shown; with the Stoics, it is the restriction to a morality in which the asperities of the original system are for the most part set aside and the former severity gradually gives place to a gentler and milder spirit: in the Academy, it is the adoption of Stoic and Peripatetic elements, with which is combined an increasing inclination towards that belief in revelation which in the third century through Plotinus became wholly predominant. That none of these traits exclusively belong to either of these schools will appear on a more thorough investigation of them.

School of the Stoics from the beginning of the first, till towards the middle of the

[1] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 378, and *sup.* p. 24 *sqq.*

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first to the third century A.D.

third century, we are acquainted with a considerable number of men belonging to this school.[1] The

[1] Of the Stoics that are known to us, Heracleitus must first be mentioned in connection with those named *supra*, p. 71. This learned man (concerning whose Homeric allegories cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 322 *sqq.*) seems to have lived at the time of Augustus, as the latest of the many authors whom he mentions is Alexander of Ephesus (*Alleg. Hom.* c. 12, p. 26) who is reckoned by Strabo (xiv. 1, 25, p. 642) among the νεώτεροι, is apparently alluded to by Cicero, *Ad Att.* ii. 22, and quoted by Aurel. Victor, *De Orig. Gent. Rom.* 9, 1, as author of a history of the Marsian War (91 *sqq.* B.C.) and must have flourished in the first half or about the middle of the first century before Christ. Under Tiberius, Attalus taught in Rome; he is mentioned by Seneca (*Ep.* 108, 3, 13 *sq.*, 23) as his Stoic teacher whom he zealously employed and admired, and from whom he quotes in this and other places (*vide* Index) sayings which especially insist, in the spirit of the Stoic ethics, on simplicity of life and independence of character. With this moral doctrine we shall also find his declamations as to the faults and follies of men and the ills of life (*l. c.* 108, 13) reproduced in his disciple Seneca; what Seneca, however (*Nat. Qu.* ii. 48; 2, 50, 1) imports to us from his enquiries concerning the portents of lightning, shows that he plunged much more deeply than Seneca into the superstition and soothsaying of the school. On the instigation of Sejanus, he was forced to leave Rome (Sen. *Rhet. Suasor.* 2). Somewhat later is Chæremon, the teacher of Nero (Suid. Ἀλέξ. Αἰγ.), subsequently (as we must suppose) head of a school in Alexandria (*ibid.* Διονύσ. Ἀλέξ.) and an Egyptian priest of the order of the ἱερογραμματεῖς. That he was so, and that the Stoic Chæremon, mentioned by Suidas, Origen (*c. Cels.* i. 51), Porphyry (*De Abstinen.* iv. 6, 8) and Apollonius in Bekker's *Anecdota*, is not distinct from the ἱερογραμματεὺς mentioned by Porphyry, ap. Eus. *Pr. Ev.* v. 10; iii. 4; and Tzetz. *Hist.* v. 403; *in Iliad.* p. 123, *Herm.*, as Müller maintains (*Hist. Gr.* iii. 495), but that they are one and the same person as Bernays considers (*Theophr. von der Frömmigkeit*, 21, 150), I have explained in the *Hermes*, xi. 403 *sq.* In his Egyptian history (fragments of which are given by Müller, *l. c.*) he explains, according to *Fr.* 2 (ap. Eus. *Pr. Ev.* iii. 4), the Egyptian gods and their mythical histories in a Stoic manner with reference to the sun, moon, and stars, the sky, and the Nile, καὶ ὅλως πάντα εἰς φυσικά; and in his διδάγματα τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων (ap. Suid. Χαιρ. Ἱερογλυφικά) he declares, in agreement with this, that the hieroglyphics were symbols in which the ancients laid down the φυσικὸς

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most important of them, and those who represent to us most clearly the character of this later Stoicism

λόγος περὶ θεῶν (Tzetz. *in Il.* p. 123; cf. *l. c.* 146; *Hist.* v. 403). He is also in harmony with the Stoic theology when in a treatise on comets (according to Origen, *l. c.*) he explained how it came about that these phenomena sometimes foretell happy events. Porphyry, in *De Abst.* iv. 8, end, calls him ἐν τοῖς στωικοῖς πραγματικώτατα φιλοσοφήσας. He was succeeded in Alexandria by his disciple Dionysius, who is called by Suidas Διονύσ. Ἀλ. γραμματικὸς, and was probably, therefore, more of a learned man than a philosopher. Seneca will be fully treated of later on. Other members of the Stoic school were the following:—Claranus (Sen. *Ep.* 66, 1, 5; he has been conjectured, though probably erroneously, to be identical with the Greek philosopher Cœranus, Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 59; the latter was also a Stoic), most likely Seneca's relative Annæus Serenus (Sen. *Ep.* 63, 14; *De Const.* i. 1; *De Tranqu. An.* 1; *De Otio*), his friend Crispus Passienus (*Nat. Qu.* iv.; *Præf.* 6; *Benef.* i. 15, 5; cf. *Epigr. Sup. Exil.* 6), and his adherent Metronax in Naples (*Ep.* 76, 1–4). He tries to include Lucilius also among the Stoics, in the letters dedicated to him. Contemporary with him is Serapio, from the Syrian Hierapolis (Sen. *Ep.* 40, 2; Steph. Byz. *De Urb.* Ἱεράπ.); and Lucius Annæus Cornutus of Leptis (Suid. Κορν.) or the neighbouring Thestis (Steph. Byz. Θέστις) in Africa, who was banished (according to the incorrect statement of Suidas, put to death) by Nero, on account of an objection he made to the poetical projects of the Emperor, in 68 A.D., according to Hieron. in *Chron.* (Cf., however, Reimarus on the passage in Dio; he conjectures 66 A.D.) In the epitome of Diogenes (Part III. i. 33, 2) Cornutus closes the series of the Stoics mentioned by this writer. Of the theoretical and philosophical works attributed to him by Suidas, one on the gods has been preserved (*sup.* Part III. i. 301 *sqq.*); this is doubtless his own treatise and not a mere abstract of it. He is described in the *Vita Persii Sueton.* as *tragicus*, to which Osann (on *Corn. De Nat. Deor.* xxv.) rightly objects. Further details concerning him and his works will be found in Martini (*De L. Ann. Cornuto*, Lugd. Bat. 1825, a work with which I am only acquainted at third hand), Villoison, and Osann, *l. c.*; *Præf.* xvii. *sqq.*; O. Jahn on Persius, *Prolegg.* viii. *sqq.* Among the disciples of Cornutus were (vide *Vita Persii*) Claudius Agathinus of Sparta (Osann, *l. c.* xviii., differing from Jahn, p. xxvii., writes the name thus, following Galen, *Definit.* 14, vol. xix. 353 K), a celebrated physician, and Petronius Aristocrates of Magnesia, '*duo doctissimi et sanctissimi viri*,' and the two Roman poets

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are Seneca, Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Heracleitus, on the other hand, is rather a

A. Persius Flaccus (born in 34, died in 62 A.D., vide *Vita Persii*, and Jahn, *l. c.* iii. *sqq.*) and Marcus Annæus Lucanus the nephew of Seneca, born 39 A.D., died 65 A.D., both put to death for having joined in Piso's conspiracy (*vide* concerning Lucanus the two lives which Weber has edited, Marb. 1856 *sq.*; the *Vita Persii*, Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 49, 56 *sq.* 70, and other statements compared by Weber), of whom Flaccus especially, as he says himself in *Sat.* v., regarded his master with the highest veneration. To the Stoic school belonged further, besides the contemptible P. Egnatius Celer (Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 32; *Hist.* iv. 10, 40; Dio Cass. lxii. 26; Juvenal, iii. 114 *sq.*), the two magnanimous Republicans Thrasea Pætus (Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 21 *sqq.*; cf. xiii. 49; xiv. 48 *sq.*; xv. 23; Dio Cass. lxi. 15, 20; lxii. 26; lxvi. 12; Sueton. *Nero*, 37; *Domit.* 10; Plin. *Ep.* viii. 22, 3; vi. 29, 1; vii. 19, 3; Plut. *Præc. Ger. Reip.* 14, 10, p. 810; *Cato Min.* 25, 37; Juvenal, v. 36; Epict. *Diss.* i. 1, 26 *et pass.*; Jahn, *l. c.* xxxviii. *sq.*), and his son-in-law Helvidius Priscus (Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 28–25; *Hist.* iv. 5 *sq.* 9, 53; *Dial. de Orat.* 5; Sueton. *Vesp.* 15; Dio Cass. lxvi. 12; lxv. 7), of whom the first was executed by Nero's order, and the second who had been already banished by Nero, was put to death, not without some reason, by order of Vespasian. Rubellius Plautus also (Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 22, 57–59) who was also put to death by Nero, is described as a Stoic. Lastly, under Nero and his successors, there lived Musonius Rufus and his disciple Epictetus, who, together with Musonius' disciples, Pollio and Artemidorus, and Arrianus, the pupil of Epictetus, will come before us later on. Euphrates, the teacher of the younger Pliny, who equally admired him on account of his discourses and his character, was a contemporary of Epictetus and lived first in Syria and afterwards in Rome (Plin. *Ep.* i. 10; Euseb. *c. Hierocl.* c. 33). He is the same person whom Philostratus, in the life of Apollonius of Tyana, and the author of the letters of Apollonius, represents as the chief opponent of this miracle-worker. Epictetus quotes an expression of his (*Diss.* iv. 8, 17 *sqq.*) and praises his discourses (*l. c.* iii. 15, 8; *Enchir.* 29, 4). Marcus Aurelius (x. 31) also mentions him. His passionate hostility to Apollonius is alluded to by Philostr. *V. Soph.* i. 7, 2. The same writer calls him here and *l. c.* i. 25, 5, a Tyrian, whereas, according to Steph. Byz. *De Urb.* Ἐπιφάν., he was a Syrian of Epiphania, and according to Eunap. *V. Philos.* p. 6, an Egyptian. Having fallen sick in his old age, he took poison 118 A.D. (Dio Cass. lxix. 8).

collector and arranger of traditional material, and the same holds good of Cleomedes. Concerning

One of his pupils was Timocrates of Heraclea in Pontus (Philostr. *V. Soph.* i. 25, 5) according to Lucian (*Demon.* 3, *Alex.* 57, *De Saltat.* 69), who speaks with great respect of him; and was himself a teacher of Demonax the cynic, and an opponent of the famous conjuror, Alexander of Abonuteichos. A disciple of Demonax, Lesbonax, is mentioned by him (*De Salt.* 69). Under Domitian and Trajan we find the following names given by Plutarch (*Qu. Conv.* i. 9, 1; vii. 7, 1): Themistocles, Philippus, and Diogenianus, to whom we may add the two philosophers called Crinis (Epict. *Diss.* iii. 2, 15; Diog. L. vii. 62, 68, 76). Also Junius Rusticus, executed by Domitian (Tacit. *Agric.* 2; Sueton. *Domit.* 10; Dio Cass. lxvii. 13; Plin. *l. c.*; Plut. *Curiosit.* 15, p. 522), whose trial gave occasion to the persecution of the philosophers, was doubtless a Stoic. The two Plinys, on the other hand, cannot be reckoned under this school, though they have points of resemblance with the Stoics, and the younger had Euphrates for his teacher. Under Hadrian Philopator probably lived (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 166, 1), whose disciple was Galen's teacher (Galen, *Cogn. an Morb.* 8, vol. v. 41 K); in the same reign, or that of Antoninus Pius, Hierocles may have taught in Athens (Gell. *N. A.* ix. 5, 8), and Cleomedes may have written his Κυκλικὴ θεωρία μετεώρων; for in this treatise he mentions several earlier astronomers, but not Ptolemy; he follows in it chiefly, as he says at the conclusion, Posidonius. Within the same period fall the Stoic instructors of Marcus Aurelius: Apollonius (M. Aurel. i. 8, 17; Dio Cass. lxxi. 35; Capitolin. *Ant. Philos.* 2, 3; *Ant. Pi.* 10; Eutrop. viii. 12; Lucian. *Demon.* 31; Hieron. *Chron. zu Ol.* 232; Syncell. p. 351. Whether he came from Chalcis or Chalcedon or Nicomedia we need not here enquire). Junius Rusticus, to whom his imperial pupil always gave his confidence (M. Aur. i. 7. 17; Dio, *l. c*; Capitol. *Ant. Phil.* 3); Claudius Maximus (M. Aur. i. 15, 17; viii. 25; Capitol. *l. c.*); Cinna Catulus (M. Aur. i. 13; Capitol. *l. c.*); among them was probably also Diognetus (according to Capitol, c. 4, where the same man is most likely meant, his teacher in painting; but according to M. Aur. i. 6, the first who gave him an inclination to philosophy); Basilides of Scythopolis (described by Hieron. *Chron. on Ol.* 232, and Sync. p. 351, as a teacher of Marcus Aurelius and probably the same who is quoted by Sext. *Math.* viii. 258, *vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 87, 1; but not the person mentioned *sup.* p. 54), and some others (Bacchius, Tandasis, Marcianus; M. Aurelius heard them, as he says, i. 6, at the instance of Diognetus) must be added. To these Marcus Aurelius Antoninus subsequently allied himself (*vide infra*). Under his reign Lucius, the disciple of Musonius the Tyrian, is said to have lived, whom Philostratus, *V. Soph.* ii. 1, 8 *sq.*, describes as the friend of Herodes Atticus, and represents as meeting with Marcus Aurelius in Rome when the latter was already emperor; he was the same person, doubtless, from whom Stobæus (*Floril. Jo. Damasc.* 7, 46, vol. iv. 162, Mein.) quotes an account of a conversation with Musonius (his conversations with Musonius are also mentioned by Philostratus); for though he is called Λύκιος in our text of Stobæus, that is of little consequence. Here, as well as in Philostratus, he appears as a Stoic or Cynic, and he was no doubt the same Lucius who is mentioned *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 48, note, with Nicostratus. Brandis (*Ueber d. Ausleger d. Arist. Org., Abh. d. Berl. Akad.* 1833; *Hist. Phil. Kl.* p. 279) and Prantl (*Gesch. d. Log.* i. 618) consider both to have belonged to the Academy, from the way in which they are named by Simplicius (*Categ.* 7, δ, 1, α) together with Atticus and Plotinus; but it seems to me that this cannot be proved on that evidence; there is more foundation for the statement, in their objections quoted by Prantl, *l. c.*, from Simplicius, against the Aristotelian categories of the Stoic type, namely in the assertions of Nicostratus that no σπουδαῖος is a φαῦλος (Simpl. 102, α), and that (*l. c.* 104, α) an ἀδιάφορον ἀδιαφόρῳ ἀντίκειται, and similarly an ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῷ, *e.g.* the φρονίμη περιπάτησις is opposed to the φρονίμη στάσις (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 213, note); as also in the terms belonging to the Stoic nomenclature, λόγοι ὁμοτικοί, ἀπομοτικοί, θαυμαστικοί, ψεκτικοί (*l. c.* 103 α) *vide ibid.* III. i. 103, 4. But the Musonius who is called Lucius' teacher must be either distinct from Musonius Rufus, or we must suppose, even irrespectively of the Τύριος of Philostratus, his narrative to be inexact; for as Musonius scarcely survived the first century, it is not conceivable that his disciple should have come to Rome after 161 A.D. It seems to me most probable that the teacher of Lucius is no other than Musonius Rufus, and that the anecdote, ap. Gell. *N. A.* ix. 2, 8, refers to him; while the predicate Τύριος arose through a mistake from Τυρρηνὸς (supposing even that Philostratus himself made the mistake); and that the meeting of Lucius with Marcus Aurelius either did not take place at all, or occurred before he became emperor; partly because when we hear of Musonius we naturally think of the most celebrated man of the name, and the only Musonius known to us in that period; partly and especially because that which Lucius puts into the mouth of his Musonius entirely agrees with the quota-

Cornutus also, we know that his activity was chiefly devoted to grammatical and historical

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works, and he therefore seems to have occupied himself with philosophy more as a scholar than an independent thinker.[1] His work on the gods contents itself with reproducing the doctrine of his school; and if, in a treatise on the categories, he has contradicted [2] not only Aristotle, but also his Stoic rival

tion from Musonius Rufus (ap. Stob. *Floril.* 29, 78). In the first half of the third century we hear, through Longinus (ap. Porph. *V. Plot.* 20, of a number of philosophers, contemporary with this writer, and somewhat earlier, and among them are a good many Stoics. He mentions as Stoics who were also known for their literary activity Themistocles (according to Syncell. *Chronogr.* p. 361 B, about 228 A.D.), Phœbion, and two who had not long died (*μέχρι πρώην ἀκμάσαντες*), Annius and Medius (Porphyry, according to Proclus *In Plat. Remp.* p. 415, note, in his *Σύμμικτα Προβλήματα*, mentions a conversation with Longinus, in which he defended against Longinus the Stoic doctrine of the eight parts of the soul). Among those who confined themselves to giving instruction are Herminus, Lysimachus, (according to Porphyry, *l. c.* 3, probably in Rome), Athenæus, and Musonius. At the same period as Plotinus, Trypho (described by Porphyry, v. *Plat.* 17, as *Στωικός τε καὶ Πλατωνικὸς*) was residing in Rome. The Athenian Stoic, Callietes, mentioned by Porph. ap Euseb. *Pr. Ev.* x. 3, 1, came somewhat earlier, about 260 A.D. We know nothing as to the dates of the following men: Aristocles of Lampsacus (Suidas, *sub voce*, mentions an exposition of his, of a logical treatise of Chrysippus), the two namesakes Theodorus (Diog. ii. 104), of whom one probably composed the abstract of the writings of Teles, from which Stob. *Floril. Jo. Dam.* i. 7, 47, T. iv. 164 Mein. gives a fragment; Protagoras (Diog. ix. 56); Antibius and Eubius, of Ascalon; Publius of Hierapolis (*Πόπλιος*) ap. Steph. Byz. *De Urb.* *Ἀσκαλ.* *Ἱεράπ*; the two namesakes, Proclus of Mallos in Cilicia (ap. Suid. *Πρόκλ.*—one of these latter is mentioned by Proclus *In Tim.* 166 B, with Philonides among the *ἀρχαῖοι*: if the pupil of Zeno is here intended (Part III. i. 39, 3), Proclus himself may be placed further back; but he cannot in any case be older than Panætius, as Suidas mentions an *ὑπόμνημα τῶν Διογένους σοφισμάτων*, no doubt written by him.

[1] Cf. the references to his rhetorical writings, his exposition of the Virgilian poems, and a grammatical work in Jahn's *Prolegg. in Persium*, xiii. *sqq.*; Osann. *l. c.* xxiii. *sqq.*

[2] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 520, note.

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Athenodorus,[1] we can see from the fragments preserved, that this treatise regarded its object principally from the standpoint of the grammarian.[2] It is an important divergence from the Stoic tradition, if he really taught that the soul dies simultaneously with the body;[3] this, however, is not certain,[4] though it is possible that in his views of the subject he allied himself with Panætius. If, lastly, his ethical discourses are praised by Persius [5] on account of their good influence on those who heard them, we can hardly venture to ascribe to him in this sphere any important individuality, or striking effect on

[1] Simpl. *Categ.* 5, *α*; 15, *δ*; 47 *ζ*; 91, *α* (*Schol. in Arist.* 30, *b*, note; 47, *b*, 22; 57, *a*, 16; 80, *a*, 22); Porph. *in Categ.* 4, *b* (*Schol. in Arist.* 48, *b*, 12); *l. c.* 21; cf. Brandis, *Ueber die Griech. Ausl. d. Arist. Org. Abh. d. Berl. Akad.* 1883, *Hist. Phil. Kl.* p. 275. In this treatise was probably to be found the statement quoted by Syrian in *Metaph. Schol. in Ar.* 893, *a*, 9, from Cornutus, that he, like Boëthus the Peripatetic, reduced the ideas to general conceptions.

[2] Porph. 4, *b*, says of him and Athenodorus: *τὰ ζητούμενα περὶ τῶν λέξεων καθὸ λέξεις, οἷα τὰ κύρια καὶ τὰ τροπικὰ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα . . . τὰ τοιαῦτα οὖν προφέροντες καὶ ποίας ἐστὶ κατηγορίας ἀποροῦντες καὶ μὴ εὑρίσκοντες ἐλλιπῆ φασιν εἶναι τὴν διαίρεσιν.* Similarly Simpl. 5, *α*, cf. 91, *α*, where Cornutus would separate the place from *ποῦ*, and the time from *ποτὲ*, because the form of expression is different in the one case from the other.

[3] Iambl. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 922. Does the cause of death lie in the withholding of the animating air, the extinction of the vital power (*τόνος*), or the cessation of vital warmth? *ἀλλ' εἰ οὕτως γίγνεται ὁ θάνατος, προαναιρεῖται ἢ συναναιρεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ Κουρνοῦτος οἴεται.*

[4] For though it is probably this Cornutus to whom the statement of Iamblichus refers, it is nevertheless possible that what he said may relate to the animal soul and not to the rational and human soul. The theories from which Iamblichus derives his assertion agree with the doctrine of the Stoic school, according to which death ensues *ὅταν παντελῶς γένηται ἡ ἄνεσις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος* (Plut. *Plac.* i. 23, 4).

[5] *Sat.* v. 34 *sqq.*, 62 *sqq.*

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Seneca.

philosophy: had this been the case, he would have left stronger traces of it behind him.

The case is different with Seneca.[1] This philosopher not only enjoys a high reputation[1] with his contemporaries, and with posterity, and possesses for us, considering that most of the Stoical writings have been destroyed, an especial importance, but he is in himself a really great representative of his school, and one of the most influential leaders of the tendency which this school took in the Roman world, and especially in the times of the Emperors. He is not, indeed, to be regarded as its first founder: imperfectly as the history of Roman Stoicism is known to us, we can clearly perceive that from the time of Panætius, with the growing restriction to ethics, the tendency also to the softening of the Stoic severity and the approximation to other systems is on the increase; and if the moral doctrine of Stoicism on the other hand was again rendered more stringent in the code of the Sextians, and of the revived Cynicism (*vide infra*), the neglect of school theories and the emphasising of all

[1] The extensive literature concerning Seneca is to be found in Bähr, *sub voce*, in Pauly's *Realencykl. d. Klass. Alterth.* vi. *a*, 1037 *sqq.* Cf. likewise, respecting Seneca's philosophy, Ritter, iv. 189 *sqq.*; Baur, *Seneca und Paulus* (1858, now in *Drei Abhandl.* &c., p. 377 *sqq.*); Dörgens, *Senecæ Disciplinæ Moralis cum Antoniniana Contentio et Comparatio*: Leipzig, 1857; Holzherr, *Der Philosoph. L. A. Seneca*: Rast und Tüb. 1858, 1859 (*Gymn. progr.*). Concerning Seneca's life and writings, besides the many older works, Bähr, *l. c.*; Bernhardy, *Grundriss der Röm. Liter.* 4, *a*, p. 811 *sqq.*; Teuffel, *Gesch. der Röm. Liter.* 2, *a*, p. 616 *sqq.* Born at Corduba, of the equestrian order, the second son of the famous rhetorician, M. Annæus Seneca (Sen. *Epigr. S. Exil.* 8, 9; *Fr.* 88; *ad Helv.* 18, 1 *sqq.*; Tacit. *Ann.* xiv. 53 *et pass.*), Lucius Annæus Seneca came as a child with his parents to Rome (*ad Helv.* 19, 2). His birth must have occurred, according to the statements in *Nat. Qu.* i. 1, 3; *Ep.* 108, 22, in the first years of the Christian era. In his early years and even afterwards he constantly suffered from ill health (*ad Helv.* 19, 2; *Ep.* 54, 1; 65, 1; 78, 1 *sqq.*; 104, 1), and he devoted himself with great ardour to the sciences (*Ep.* 78, 3; cf. 58, 5), and especially to philosophy (*Ep.* 108, 7), to which Sotion, the disciple of Sextius (*vide supra*, 181, 2), and the Stoic Attalus (*vide supra*, 195, 1) introduced him. He finally embraced the calling of an advocate (*Ep.* 49, 2), attained to the office of quæstor (*ad Helv.* 19, 2), married (cf. *De Ira*, iii. 36, 3; *Ep.* 50, 2; and concerning a child, Marcus, *Epigr.* 3; *ad Helv.* 18, 4 *sqq.*; and another who had died shortly before, *l. c.* 2, 5; 18, 6), and was happy in his external circumstances (*l. c.* 5, 4; 14, 3). Threatened by Caligula (Dio, lix. 19), and banished to Corsica under Claudius in 41 A.D. in consequence of the affair of Messalina (Dio, lx. 8; lxi. 10; Sen. *Epigr. S. Exilio ad Polyb.* 13, 2; 18, 9; *ad Helv.* 15, 2 *sq.*), he was only recalled after her fall by Agrippina in 50 A.D. He was immediately made prætor, and the education of Nero was confided to him (Tac. *Ann.* xii. 8). After Nero's accession to the throne, he, together with Burrhus, was for a long time the guide of the Roman empire and of the young sovereign (Tac. xiii. 2). Further details as to Seneca's public life and character will be found *infra*, p. 232, 3). With the death of Burrhus, however, his influence came to an end; Nero discarded the counsellor who had long become burdensome to him (Tac. xiv. 52 *sqq.*), and seized the first opportunity of ridding himself of the man whom he hated (cf. xv. 45, 46) and, perhaps, also feared. The conspiracy of Piso in the year 65 A.D. furnished a pretext for the bloody mandate, to which the philosopher submitted with manly fortitude. His second wife Paulina (*Ep.* 104, 1 *sqq.*), who wished to die with him, was hindered in her purpose after she had already opened her arteries (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 56–64).

[1] Concerning the favourable verdicts of antiquity—of Quintilian (who, indeed, censures Seneca, *Inst.* x. 1, 125 *sqq.*, for many things as an author and philosopher, but at the same time testifies to his great merits—*ingenium facile et copiosum, plurimum studii, multa rerum cognitio*—and the extraordinary reputation he enjoyed); Plinius (*H. Nat.* xiv. 5, 51); Tacitus (*Ann.* xiii. 3); Columella (R. R. iii. 3); Dio Cass. (lix. 19); and the Christian writers (cf. Holzherr, i. 1 *sq.*). Others, indeed, as Gell. *N.A.* xii. 2, and Fronto, *ad Anton.* 4, 1 *sq.*, 123 *sqq.*, speak of him with very little appreciation.

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His reputation and influence.

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that is universally human, based upon immediate consciousness and important for moral life—the universalistic development of ethics—the endeavour after a system more generally comprehensible and more practicably efficient was demanded from this side also. These traits, however, are still more thoroughly developed in Seneca and his followers, and little as they wished to give up the doctrines of their school, boldly as they sometimes express the Stoical doctrines, on the whole, Stoicism with them takes the form more and more of universal moral and religious conviction; and in the matter of their doctrines, side by side with the inner freedom of the individual, the principles of universal love of mankind, forbearance towards human weakness, submission to the Divine appointments have a prominent place.

In Seneca, the freer position in regard to the doctrine of his school which he claimed[1] for himself,

[1] That Seneca is and professes to be a Stoic requires no proof. Cf. the use of *nos* and *nostri*, *Ep.* 113, 1; 117, 6 *et pass.*; and the panegyrics he bestows on Stoicism, *De Const.* 1; *Cons. ad Helv.* 12, 14; *Clement*, ii. 5, 3; *Ep.* 83, 9. He expresses himself, however, very decidedly on the right of independent judgment, and on the task of augmenting by our own enquiries the inheritance we have derived from our predecessors (*V. B.* 3, 2; *De Otio*, 3, 1; *Ep.* 33, 11; 45, 4; 80, 1; 64, 7 *sqq.*). He does not hesitate, as we shall find, to oppose tenets and customs of his school, and unreservedly to appropriate anything that he finds serviceable, even beyond its limits (*Ep.* 16, 7; *De Ira*, i. 6, 5). He very frequently applies in this manner sayings of Epicurus, whom he judges in regard to his personal merits with a fairness that is most surprising from a Stoic (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 446, 5); and if in this he may, perhaps, be influenced, by the predilection of his friend Lucilius for Epicurus, it is, nevertheless, unmistakable that he wishes to show his own impartiality by this appreciative treatment of a much-abused opponent.

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His doctrines concerning the problem of philosophy.

is shown in his views concerning the end and problem of philosophy. If in the original tendencies of Stoicism there already lay a preponderance of the practical interest over the theoretical, with Seneca this was so greatly increased that he regarded many things considered by the older teachers of the school to be essential constituents of philosophy, as unnecessary and superfluous. Though he repeats in a general manner the Stoic determinations respecting the conception and parts of philosophy,[1] he lays even greater stress than his predecessors on its moral end and aim; the philosopher is a pedagogue of humanity,[2] philosophy is the art of life, the doctrine of morals, the endeavour after virtue:[3] in philosophy we are concerned not with a game of quick-wittedness and skill, but with the cure of grave evils;[4] it teaches us not to talk, but to act,[5] and all that a man learns is only useful when he applies it to his moral condition.[6] According to its relation to this ultimate end the value of every scientific activity is to be judged: that which does not effect our moral

[1] Cf. in regard to the latter *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 51, 2, and to the former, *l. c.* 61, 1; 64, 1; 67, 2; 207; and *Ep.* 94; 47 *sq.*; 95, 10.

[2] *Ep.* 89, 13. Aristo maintained that the parænetic part of Ethics is the affair of the pedagogue, and not of the philosopher: *Tamquam quicquam aliud sit sapiens quam generis humani pædagogus.*

[3] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. 1, pp. 51, 2; 54, 1; *Ep.* 117, 12; 94, 39.

[4] *Ep.* 117, 33: *Adice nunc, quod adsuescit animus delectare se potius quam sanare et philosophiam oblectamentum facere, cum remedium sit.*

[5] *Ep.* 20, 2: *Facere docet philosophia, non dicere*, &c., 24, 15.

[6] *Ep.* 89, 18: *Quicquid legeris ad mores statim referas. Loc. cit.* 23: *Hæc aliis dic . . . omnia ad mores et ad sedandam rabiem adfectuum referens.* Similarly 117, 33.

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condition is useless, and the philosopher cannot find adequate words to express his sense of the folly of those who meddle with such things; though even in the warmth of his zeal he cannot help showing how conversant he himself is with them. What are we profited, he asks, by all the enquiries with which the antiquarians occupy themselves? Who has ever become the better and the juster for them?[1] How small appears the value of the so-called liberal arts, when we remember that it is virtue alone that is important, that it claims our whole soul, and that philosophy only leads to virtue![2] But how much that is superfluous has even philosophy admitted into itself, how much trifling word-catching and unprofitable subtlety! Even in the Stoic School,[3] how many things of this kind have found entrance! Seneca for his part will have nothing to do with them, even in cases where the subtleties of which he complains

Uselessness of merely theoretic enquiries.

[1] *Brevit. Vit.* 13, where after the citation of numerous examples of antiquarian and historical enquiries he concludes thus: *Cujus ista errores minuent, cujus cupiditates prement? Quem fortiorem, quem justiorem, quem liberaliorem facient?*

[2] This is discussed at length in *Ep.* 88. Seneca here shows that grammar, music, geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy are at most a preparation for the higher instruction, but in themselves are of subordinate value (p. 20): *Scis quæ recta sit linea: quid tibi prodest, si quid in vita rectum sit, ignoras?* &c. (p. 13). *Una re consummatur animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum immutabili, quæ soli philosophiæ competit: nihil autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis quærit* (p. 28). *Magna et spatiosa res est sapientia. Vacuo illi loco opus est: de divinis humanisque discendum est, de præteritis, de futuris, de caducis, de æternis,* &c. *Hæc tam multa, tam magna ut habere possint liberum hospitium, supervacua ex animo tollenda sunt. Non dabit se in has angustias virtus: laxum spatium res magna desiderat. Expellantur omnia. Totum pectus illi vacet* (p. 33–35).

[3] Cf. *Ep.* 88, 42.

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are evidently connected with the presuppositions of the Stoic doctrine,[1] and in the same way he easily disposes of the dialectical objections of their opponents: he considers as trifling juggleries not worth the trouble of investigating, not only the fallacies which so readily occupy the ingenuity of a Chrysippus and his followers,[2] but also those comprehensive discussions of the sceptics, which gave the ancient Stoa so much employment; and the eclectic arguments against the sensible phenomenon are simply reckoned by him among the superfluous and trifling enquiries which merely serve to divert us from the things that are necessary for us to know.[3]

Superfluousness of dialectic.

[1] *Ep.* 117, 13; *Ep.* 113, 1 *sqq.* In both cases he embarks on the exposition and refutation of the Stoic definitions of the long and the broad in order to accuse their authors and himself of having wasted their time with such useless questions instead of employing themselves in something necessary and profitable. Similarly in *Ep.* 106 *et passim*; *vide infra*, p. 208, 1.

[2] *Ep.* 45, 4 His predecessors, the great men, have left many problems: *Et invenissent forsitan necessaria, nisi et supervacua quæsissent. Multum illis temporis verborum cavillatio eripuit et captiosæ disputationes, quæ acumen inritum . . . exercent.* We should search out not the meaning of words, but things—the good and the evil; and not fence with sophisms the *acetabula præstigiatorum* (cf. the ψηφοπαίκται of Arcesilaus, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 495, 4) ignorance of which does not harm, nor knowledge of them profit us: *Quid me detines in eo, quem tu ipse ψευδόμενον adpellas . . .? Ecce tota mihi vita mentitur,* &c. Similarly *Ep.* 48; 49 5, *sqq.*

[3] *Ep.* 88, 43: *Audi, quantum mali faciat nimia subtilitas et quam infesta veritati sit.* Protagoras says we can dispute for and against everything; Nausiphanes, that everything is not, just as much as it is; Parmenides, that nothing is except the universe; Zeno, of Elea, *nihil esse. Circa eadem fere Pyrrhonei versantur et Megarici et Eretrici et Academici, qui novam induxerunt scientiam, nihil scire hæc omnia in illum super vacuum studiorum liberalium gregem comice,* &c. *Non facile dixerim, utris magis irascar, illis qui non nihil scire voluerunt, an illis, qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire.*

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Wisdom, he says, is a simple thing and requires no great learning: it is only our want of moderation which so extends the sphere of philosophy; for life, the School questions are for the most part worthless;[1] they injure, indeed, rather than benefit, for they render the mind small and weakly, instead of elevating it.[2] We certainly cannot, as we have already seen and shall see later on, take Seneca exactly at his word in regard to such declarations; but it is undeniable that he wishes to limit philosophy in principle to moral problems, and only admits other things so far as they stand in manifest connection with those problems.

This principle must inevitably separate our philosopher from that portion of philosophy to which the older Stoics had originally paid great attention, but which they had ultimately regarded as a mere outwork of their system—viz., Logic. If, therefore, Seneca includes it under the three chief divisions of philosophy,[3] the subject is only cursorily and occa-

[1] *Ep.* 106, 11. After a thorough discussion of the proposition that the good is a body (Part III. i. 120, 1, 3; 119, 1): *Latrunculis ludimus, in supervacaneis subtilitas teritur: non faciunt bonos ista, sed doctos, apertior res est sapere, immo simplicior. Paucis est ad mentem bonam uti literis: sed nos ut cetera in supervacaneum diffundimus, ita philosophiam ipsam. Quemadmodum omnium rerum, sic literarum quoque intemperantia laboramus: non vitæ sed scholæ discimus.* Cf. *Ep.* 47, 4 *sq.*; 87, 38 *sq.*; 88, 36: *Plus scire velle quam sit satis, intemperantiæ genus est.*

[2] In *Ep.* 117, 18, after discussing the statement that *sapientia*, and not *sapere*, is a good: *Omnia ista circa sapientiam, non in ipsa sunt: at nobis in ipsa commorandum est . . . hæc vero, de quibus paulo ante dicebam, minuunt et deprimunt, nec, ut putatis, exacuunt, sed extenuant.* Similarly, *Ep.* 82, 22.

[3] *Vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 61, 1; 64, 1; 67, 2. Elsewhere, however (*Ep.* 95, 10), philosophy is divided, as with the Peripatetics, into theoretical and practical philosophy; and in *Ep.* 94, 45, virtue is similarly divided (as with Panætius, *vide supra*, p. 48). This division was all the more obvious to a philosopher who ascribed no independent value to logic.

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sionally touched upon in his writings. He expresses himself at times in agreement with his school respecting the origin of conceptions, and the demonstrative force of general opinion;[1] he speaks of the highest conception and of the most universal conceptions subordinated to it;[2] he shows generally that he is well acquainted with the logical definitions of his school;[3] but he himself has no inclination to enter into them more deeply, because in his opinion this whole region lies too far from that which alone occupied him in the last resort—the moral problem of man.

Far greater is the value which he ascribes to Physics, as in his writings also he has devoted to it greater space. He praises Physics for imparting to the mind the elevation of the subjects with which it occupies itself;[4] in the preface, indeed, to his writings on Natural History,[5] he goes so far as to

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 74, 3; 75, 2.

[2] *Ep.* 58, 8 *sqq.*; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 92. The highest conception is that of Being; this is partly corporeal, partly incorporeal; the corporeal is partly living, and partly lifeless; the living is partly animated with a soul and partly inanimate (ψυχή and φύσις, *vide ibid.* III. i. 192, 3); the animate is partly mortal and partly immortal (cf. *Ep.* 124, 14).

[3] Besides the quotations *supra*, pp. 207, 1; 208, 1, 2, cf. in regard to this, *Ep.* 113, 4 *sq.*, and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 97, 2; *Ep.* 102, 6 *sq.*; *Nat. Qu.* II. 2, 2, and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 96, 2; 118, 4.

[4] *Ep.* 117, 19: *De Deorum natura quæramus, de siderum alimento, de his tam variis stellarum discursibus, &c. Ista jam a formatione morum recesserunt: sed levant animum et ad ipsarum quas tractant rerum magnitudinem adtollunt.*

[5] *Nat. Qu.* i. *Prol.* Cf. vi. 4, 2: '*Quod*,' *inquis*, '*erit pre-*

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His high estimation of Physics.

maintain that Physics are higher than Ethics, in proportion as the Divine with which they are concerned is higher than the Human; they alone lead us from earthly darkness into the light of heaven, show us the internal part of things, the Author and arrangement of the world; it would not be worth while to live, if physical investigations were forbidden us. Where would be the greatness of combating our passions, of freeing ourselves from evils, if the spirit were not prepared by Physics for the knowledge of the heavenly, and brought into communication with God—if we were only raised above the external, and not also above ourselves, &c. Meanwhile, we soon perceive that these declamations express rather a passing mood than the personal opinion of the philosopher. Seneca elsewhere reckons physical enquiries, to which we have just heard him assign so high a position, among the things which go beyond the essential and necessary, and are rather an affair of recreation than of philosophical work proper; though he does not overlook their morally elevating effect on the mind;[1] he declares

tium operæ?' Quo nullum magis est, nosse naturam. The greatest gain of this enquiry is, *quod hominem magnificentia sui detinet, nec mercede, sed miraculo colitur* (*Ep.* 95, 10, &c.).

[1] *Ep.* 117, 19 (cf. *sup.* p. 209, 4): Dialectic is only concerned with the outworks of wisdom. *Etiam si quid evagari libet, amplos habet illa [sapientia] spatiososque secessus: de Deorum natura quæramus, de siderum alimento,* &c. Similarly in *Ep.* 65, 15, a discussion on ultimate causes is defended as follows: *Ego quidem priora illa ago et tracto, quibus pacatur animus, et me prius scrutor, deinde hunc mundum. Ne nunc quidem tempus, ut existimas, perdo. Ista enim omnia, si non concidantur nec in hanc subtilitatem inutilem distrahantur, adtollunt et levant animum.* In the contemplation of the world and its author, man raises himself above the burden of the flesh, learns to know his high origin and destiny, to despise the body and the corporeal, and to free himself from it. Lofty as is the position here assigned to speculative enquiries, Seneca in the last resort can only justify them by their moral effect on men.

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the essential problem of man to be the moral problem, and only admits natural enquiries as a means and help to this;[1] and he considers it a duty to interrupt from time to time his expositions of natural history by moral reflections and practical applications, because all things must have reference to our welfare.[2] The interconnection between the theoretical and practical doctrines of the Stoic system is not abandoned by him, but it seems to be laxer than with Chrysippus and his followers.

In those of his writings that have come down to us, Seneca has treated in detail only that part of Physics which the ancients were accustomed to call Meteorology. To this in the last years of his life[3] he devoted seven books of enquiries into natural

[1] *Nat. Qu.* iii. *Præf.* 10, 18: *Quid præcipuum in rebus humanis est? . . . Vitia domuisse . . . erigere animum supra minas et promissa fortunæ,* &c. *Hoc nobis proderit inspicere rerum naturam,* because we thereby loose the spirit from the body and from all that is base and low, and because the habit of thought thus engendered is favourable to moral convictions.

[2] Cf. *Nat. Qu.* iii. 18; iv. 13; v. 15, 18; vi. 2, 32; but especially ii. 59. After he has treated of lightning at length, he remarks that it is much more necessary to remove the fear of it, and proceeds to do so in these words: *Sequar quo vocas: omnibus enim rebus omnibusque sermonibus aliquid salutare miscendum est. Cum imus per occulta naturæ, cum divina tractamus, vindicandus est a malis suis animus ac subinde firmandus,* &c.

[3] This appears from iii. *Præf.*, and from the description of the earthquake which in the year 63 A.D. destroyed Pompeii and Herculaneum, vi. i. 26, 5. Seneca had already composed a treatise on earthquakes in his earlier years (*Nat. Qu.* vi. 4, 2).

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history. Meanwhile the contents of the work answer very imperfectly[1] to the lofty promises with which it opens; it contains discussions concerning a number of isolated natural phenomena, conducted rather in the manner of learned pastime than of independent and thorough physical investigation. Seneca's philosophical standpoint is little affected by them, and would suffer no material alteration if even the greater part of their results were totally different from what they are. For us they are of the less importance, since their subject-matter seems mostly to have been taken from Posidonius and other predecessors.[2] It is the same with other writings on natural history which are attributed to Seneca.[3] The metaphysical and theological opinions which he occasionally enunciates, are of more value in regard to philosophy. But even here, no important deviations from the Stoic traditions are to be found. Like the Stoics, Seneca presupposes the corporeality of all the Real;[4]

His metaphysical and theological doctrines.

[1] In proof of this let anyone read the beginning of the treatise, and he will scarcely be able to resist the feeling of an almost comic disappointment, when the author, after the above-mentioned declamations on the dignity of natural enquiry, after the concluding sentence: *Si nihil aliud, hoc certe sciam, omnia angusta esse, mensus Deum*, continues: *Nunc ad propositum veniam opus. Audi quid de ignibus sentiam, quos aër transversos . . .*

[2] Cf. on this subject, and the content of *Nat. Qu.*, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 191, 2, 3.

[3] According to Plin. *H. N.* i. 9, 36; ix. 53, 167, he consulted Seneca about his statements on water - animals and stones. Pliny, vi. 17, 60, and Servius on *Æn.* ix. 31, mention a treatise, *De situ Indiæ*; Serv. *Æn.* vi. 154, *De situ et sacris Ægyptorum*. Cassiodorus, *De Art. Lib.* c. 7, speaks of another treatise, *De forma mundi*.

[4] Cf. *Ep.* 117, 2; 106, 4; 106, 5; 113, 1 *sqq.*; where Seneca, indeed, opposes some conclusions of Stoic materialism, but expressly teaches it himself.

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like them he discriminates matter from the force working in it, and the Deity from matter;[1] and he does this in exactly the same sense as they do: the active force is the *spiritus*, the breath, which forms and holds together material substances.[2] Even the Deity is the Spirit, not as an incorporeal essence, but as the πνεῦμα permeating the whole universe,[3] corporeally and in an extended manner. So also he follows the Stoic doctrine of the relation between God and the world: God is not merely the reason of the world, but the world itself, the whole of the visible, as of the invisible things.[4] Seneca, however, brings forward much more emphatically the moral and spiritual side of the Stoic idea of God; and in accordance with this he prefers to place the efficient

[1] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 131, 4; 134, 1; also 177, 1. Proofs of the existence of God, 134, 3; 161, 2; 135, 5.

[2] *Ibid.* III. i. 118, 4. Seneca's conception of *spiritus* will be discussed *infra*, p. 219, in connection with his psychology.

[3] Seneca is not very explicit here, but, from the fact that everything efficient must be a body (*Ep.* 117, 2), it follows that what he says (*Ep.* 102, 7) must hold good even of the world—viz., that the unity of everything depends upon the *spiritus* which holds it together; that the soul which he represents to be of the same substance with Deity—in fact, as a part of Deity—is, as we shall presently find, conceived by Seneca, in agreement with the whole Stoic school, materialistically; that even visible things are described as parts of the Deity (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 146, 6); that only a corporeal god can take back into himself the corporeal world by means of the world's conflagration (*l. c.* 144, 1). If, therefore, Seneca (*ad Helv.* 8, 3) places the Platonic conception of Deity as incorporeal reason, and the Stoic conception, according to which the Deity is the universally diffused *spiritus*, side by side without discriminating them, the second only corresponds with his own opinion.

[4] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 146, 6; 148, 1; also *Fr.* 16 (ap. Lact. *Inst.* i. 5, 27): *quamvis ipse per totum se corpus* (sc. *mundi*) *intenderat*; and also the Stoic doctrine of Pneuma and τόνος.

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activity of God in the world under the idea of Providence, and the order and arrangement of the world under the teleological aspect. God is the highest reason, the perfect Spirit, whose wisdom, omniscience, holiness, and, above all, His beneficent goodness, are continually extolled.[1] He loves us as a father, and desires to be loved by us, and not feared;[2] and therefore the world, whose Creator and ruler[3] He is, is so perfect and beautiful, and the course of the world so blameless; which Seneca proves in many ways.[4] Since his general theory of the universe has its centre in the moral life of man, so in his conception of God the physical element is less prominent than the ethical: it is the care of the Deity for men, His goodness and wisdom, in which His perfection is principally revealed to Seneca; and therefore it is inevitable that the personal aspect of the Deity, in which, as reason forming and governing the world and working according to moral ends, He is distinguished from the world itself, should preponderate, as compared with the Pantheistic aspect, in which the Deity is not only the soul, but the substance of the world. It is going too far, however, to say[5] that Seneca abandoned the Stoic idea, and thus gave to ethics a new direction; that whereas in true Stoicism God and matter are in

[1] Authorities are given in *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 139, 1; 148, 1. Others may easily be found. Cf. Holzherr, i. 99 *sq.*

[2] *De Prov.* 15 *sq.*; 2, 6; *Benef.* ii. 29, 4–6; iv. 19, 1; *De Ira*, ii. 27, 1; cf. p. 313, 1.

[3] *Fr.* 26; b. Lact. *Inst.* i. 5, 26; *V. Be.* 8, 4.

[4] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 171, 3; 178, 2; 135, 5.

[5] Holzherr, i. 33; 36; 91 *sqq.*; ii. 5 *sqq.*

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their essential nature one, in Seneca they appear as essentially different; that God is to him the incorporeal nature, who has formed the world by His free-will, and that his god is no longer the god of the Stoics, but of the Platonists. Our previous arguments will rather have shown that the conception of God, which according to this exposition is peculiar to Seneca, is in no way foreign to the elder Stoics; that they, too, laid great stress on the goodness and wisdom of God, and on His benevolence to man; they, too, regarded Him as the Spirit that guides all things, the reason that has ordered and adapted all things for the wisest ends; by them also the belief in Providence is regarded as of the highest value, and is most vigorously defended; and the law of the universe and of morality coincides with the will of God.[1] They will also have shown that Seneca, on the other hand, is far from abandoning those definitions of his school according to which the distinction between efficient force and matter is only a derived distinction, and consequently is often annulled in the course of the world's development;[2] that he, too, seeks God in the πνεῦμα conceived as

[1] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 139, 1; 159, 1; 161; 163, 1; 171 *sq.*; 505 *sq.*

[2] *Ep.* 6, 16, where Seneca says exactly the same as is quoted from Chrysippus, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 143, 2. Similarly Holzherr's chief proof for the essential difference between God and matter (*Ep.* 65), as will be seen from *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 131, 4 *sqq.*, entirely corresponds with the doctrine of the Stoic school, to which Seneca, indeed, expressly appeals; and when in *De Prov.* 5, 9 (the mere questions in *Nat. Qu.* i. *Præf.* 16, can prove nothing) he brings forward for the Theodicee the proposition that the Divine artist is dependent on his material, he follows herein not only Plato, but also Chrysippus, as is shown *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 177, 1.

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corporeal, and not in the incorporeal Spirit;[1] declares the parts of the world to be parts of the Deity, and God and the world to be the same;[2] identifies nature, fate, and God,[3] and reduces the will of God to the law of the universe, and Providence to the unalterable concatenation of natural causes.[4] If, therefore, a certain difference exists between his theology and that of the elder Stoics, this does not consist in his giving up any essential definition of theirs, or introducing any new definition; it is merely that among the constituents of the Stoic conception of God he lays greater emphasis on the ethical aspects, and therefore brings that conception nearer, sometimes to the ordinary presentation, sometimes to the Socratic-Platonic doctrine. This is primarily a consequence of the relation in which the moral and speculative elements stand with him: as the latter is subordinate to the former, so the metaphysical and physical determinations of the Stoic theology are in his exposition less prominent than the ethical. But it was all the easier on this account for the dualism of the Stoic ethics to react upon his theology, and it is undeniable that the

[1] *Vide supra*, 213, 3.

[2] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 146, 6; 148, 1; 140 *m*; *Ep.* 92, 30: *Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et Deus: et socii sumus ejus et membra.*

[3] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 140 *m.*; 143, 1; *Benef.* iv. 8, 2: *Nec natura sine Deo est nec Deus sine natura, sed idem est utrumque, distat officio . . . naturam voca, fatum, fortunam, omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.*

[4] *Loc. cit.* and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. 157, 2; 163, 2; cf. 168, 1, 2. The same results from *Benef.* vi. 23, though Seneca at first expresses himself as if the will of the gods were the author of the laws of the universe.

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opposition of God and matter, in direct connection with the ethical opposition of sense and reason, is more strongly asserted by him than their original unity.[1] If, however, on this side he has reached the limits of the Stoic doctrine, he did not really overstep them.

Theories of the world and nature.

Nor do we find in Seneca's theory of the world and of nature anything that contradicts the principles of the Stoics. His utterances concerning the origin, the end, and the new formation of the world;[2] its form;[3] its unity establishing itself out of contradictions,[4] and maintaining itself in the ceaseless change of things; its beauty[5] asserting itself in the multiplicity of its productions; the perfect adaptation of means to ends in its arrangement,[6] as to which even the evil in it should not cause us any doubt;[7]—all these serve to complete and verify the accounts we have from other sources respecting the doctrines of his school. To the littleness and super-

[1] *Vide Ep.* 65, especially 2 and 23.

[2] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 149, 3; 144, 1; 152, 2; 154, 1; 155; 156, 3. In Seneca these doctrines are connected with the theory that mankind and the world in general had been uncorrupted in proportion as they were nearer their first beginnings. He opposes, however, the exaggerated notions of Posidonius on this subject. Cf. *Ep.* 90, especially from s. 36, and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 269, 6.

[3] *Fr.* 13, and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 146, 6, end.

[4] *N. Qu.* iii. 10, 1, 3; vii. 27, 3 *sq.*; *V. Be.* 8, 4 *sq.*; *Ep.* 107, 8; and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 179, 3; 183, 1.

[5] *Loc. cit.* 171, 3; *Benef.* iv. 23.

[6] *Ep.* 113, 16; *De Provid.* i. 1, 2–4; *Nat. Qu.* i. *Prœm.* 14 *sq.* Cf. with these passages Sen. *Benef.* iv. 5; *ad Marc.* 18. The conception of the world as an *urbs Dîs hominibusque communis*, in the latter passage is eminently Stoic. *Vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 285, 1; 286, 2; 361 *sq.*

[7] Concerning the Stoic Theodicee, and Seneca's participation in it (about which much might be quoted) *vide ibid.* III. i. 173 *sqq.*

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ficiality into which the Stoic teleology had already fallen at an early period, he opposes the propositions that the world was not created merely for men: it rather carries its purpose in itself and follows its own laws;[1] it is an undue limitation when we place it under the aspect of the useful, instead of admiring its glory as such.[2] He does not, however, deny that in the arrangement of the world regard was paid to the welfare of man, and that the gods unceasingly show the greatest benevolence to men.[3] What he says likewise concerning the system of the universe and its parts—the elements, their qualities and their transition into each other;[4] on the heavenly bodies, their revolution, their divine nature,[5] their influence on earthly things;[6] the earth, and the spirit that animates it;[7] on the regular interconnection of the universe,[8] interrupted by no empty spaces,—all this only deviates from the Stoic tradition in regard to certain details which do not affect his theory of the universe as a whole.[9]

[1] *De Ira*, 27, 2; *Nat. Qu.* vii. 30, 3; *Benef.* vi. 20.

[2] *Benef.* iv. 23 *sq.*

[3] *Benef. l. c.*; vi. 23, 3 *sq.*; i. 1, 9; ii. 29, 4 *sq.*; iv. 5; *Nat. Qu.* v. 18 *et pass.*

[4] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 179, 3 (*Nat. Qu.* iii. 10, 1; 3); *ibid.* III. i. 183, 2; 184, 1 (*Nat. Qu.* ii. 10); and *ibid.* 185, 3 (*Nat. Qu.* vi. 16); *Nat. Qu.* ii. 6; *Ep.* 31, 5.

[5] *Nat. Qu.* vi. 16, 2; vii. 1, 6; 21, 4; *Benef.* iv. 23, 4; vi. 21–23.

[6] In regard to this influence Seneca alludes first to the natural influence of the stars (*e.g. Benef. l. c.*; *Nat. Qu.* ii. 11; iii. 29, 2), but he couples with it in the manner of his school the theory of a natural prognostication through the stars, which, as he believes, is as little confined to the five planets as the influence above mentioned (*Nat. Qu.* ii. 32, 6 *sq.*; *ad Marc.* 18, 3).

[7] *Nat. Qu.* vi. 16; ii. 5. On the repose of the earth, *vide De Provid.* i. 1, 2; *Ep.* 93, 9; *Nat. Qu.* i. 4; cf. vii. 2, 3.

[8] *Nat. Qu.* ii. 2–7 (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 187, 4).

[9] So in regard to the comets,

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He also adheres to that tradition in the few passages to be found in his works mentioning terrestrial natures exclusive of man.[1]

Anthropology.

In his views of human nature he is farther removed from the doctrine of the elder Stoics. The groundwork of these views is formed by the Stoic psychology with its materialism; but the dualism of the Stoic ethics, the reaction of which on his theoretical view of the world had already made itself felt in his theology, acquires a stronger and more direct influence on his anthropology, in which consequently two tendencies cross one another. On the one hand, he wishes to derive, with his school, the whole life of the soul from a simple principle conceived materially; on the other, the ethical opposition of the inner and the outer, which even in the Stoic doctrine is so sharply accented, is transferred by him to the essential nature of man, and based upon it; and thus over against the ancient Stoic monism a dualism is introduced, which approximates to the Platonic anthropology, and depends upon it. The soul, says Seneca (in general agreement with the Stoics), is a body, for otherwise it could not possibly have any effect upon the body.[2] It must,

which he considers to be wandering stars with very distant orbits (*Nat. Qu.* vii. 22 *sqq.*).

[1] Seneca agrees with the discrimination of ἕξις and φύσις, &c. (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 192, 3) by virtue of his classification of essential natures mentioned *supra*, p. 209, 2; like Chrysippus (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 193, 1) he, indeed, ascribes to the animals a *principale*, but denies them not only reason, but affections (*De Ira*, i. 3). With this coincides what is remarked concerning the soul life of animals (*Ep.* 121, 5 *sqq.*; 124, 16 *sqq.*).

[2] He expresses himself quite unequivocally on this point in *Ep.* 106, 4, and it is not true

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however, certainly be the finest of all substances, finer even than fire and air.[1] It consists, in a word, of warm breath, or πνεῦμα.[2] This theory had not prevented the elder Stoics from recognising the divine nature and dignity of the human spirit to the fullest extent, and Seneca is so completely possessed by it that there is no other theorem which he reiterates more frequently and more emphatically. Human reason is to him an effluence of Deity, a part of the Divine Spirit implanted in a human body, a god who has taken up his abode there; and on this our relationship to God he bases, on the one hand, his

(Holzherr, ii. 47) to say that he is arguing from a Stoic premiss which he did not himself share. On the contrary, he is speaking in his own name; and if he ultimately declares the investigation of the question whether the good is a body to be worthless (*supra*, p. 207, 1), it does not follow that he himself does not regard the good as such, still less that he was not in earnest as to the proposition which is brought forward to assist this enquiry, but is quite independent of it—viz., that the soul is a body. The same holds good of the further proposition (*l. c.*) that the affections and the diseases of the soul are bodies, and of the reason given for it—that they cause the changes of expression, blushing and turning pale, &c., and that they cannot be accounted for: *Tam manifestas notas corpori imprimi nisi a corpore.* This also Seneca declares to be his own opinion. If, however, the affections are something corporeal, so is the soul; for an affection is only the *animus quodam modo se habens* (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 120, 3); and if the corporeal alone can work upon the body, the soul must be something corporeal, as Cleanthes had already shown (*ibid.* III. i. 194, 1).

[1] *Ep.* 57, 8. As the flame or the air cannot be subjected to pressure or a blow, *sic animus, qui ex tenuissimo constat, deprehendi non potest . . . animo, qui adhuc tenuior est igne, per omne corpus fuga est.*

[2] *Ep.* 50, 6. If a man can bend crooked wood, and make it straight, *quanto facilius animus accipit formam, flexibilis et omni humore obsequentior! Quid enim est aliud animus quam quodam modo se habens spiritus? Vides autem tanto spiritum esse faciliorem omni alia materia, quanto tenuior est.* Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 195, 2, and 142, 2, where definitions entirely similar are proved to be universal among the Stoics.

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demand for the elevation of the soul above the earthly, and for the recognition of the dignity of mankind in every man; and, on the other, the internal freedom of the man who is conscious of his high origin and essential nature.[1] This thought, however, takes a direction with Seneca which makes him deviate from the ancient Stoic doctrine on the side of Platonism. The Divine in man is his reason, and that alone; but in opposition to reason stand the irrational impulses, the affections; and in combating the affections Seneca, as we shall find, in accordance with the whole Stoic school, finds the weightiest moral problem. The elder Stoics had not allowed this to confuse them in their belief as to the oneness of man's essential nature. But already Posidonius had discovered that the affections could not be explained, unless, with Plato, irrational powers of the soul were admitted as well as the reason.[2] Similar reflections must have had the more influence on Seneca's view of human nature. With all the greater force, the more vividly he felt its moral weakness and imperfection, the more absolutely he was convinced that no human being was without fault; that all vices were implanted in all men; that the superior power of evil in human society as a whole would never be broken, nor the complaints of the corruption of manners cease;[3] and that even after the renovation

[1] Some of his utterances on this subject are quoted, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 200, 2; 201, 1; and *supra*, 216, 2; *vide* also *ad Helv.* 6, 7; 11, 6 *sq.*; *Nat. Qu.* i. *Præf.* 12; *Ep.* 41, 5; 44, 1; 65, 20 *sq.*; 120, 14, &c.

[2] Cf. *supra*, p. 64.

[3] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 253 *sq.*; *Benef.* vii. 27; *Ep.* 94, 54;

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of the world the ensuing time of innocence would be only of short duration.[1] Such a universal phenomenon cannot possibly be regarded as accidental: if a few only sustain the conflict with sin, none or next to none are free from it; and therefore in man, side by side with the Divine, there must also be an element not Divine; and side by side with reason, from which error and sin cannot be derived, an element which is irrational and strives against reason.[2] This irrational element of human nature Seneca finds primarily in the body, the opposition of which to the Spirit he emphasises much more strongly than the ancient Stoics appear to have done. The body, or, as he also contemptuously calls it, the flesh, is something so worthless that we cannot think meanly enough of it:[3] it is a mere husk of the soul: a tenement into which it has entered for a short time, and can never feel itself at home: a burden by which it is oppressed: a fetter, a prison, for the loosing and opening of which it must neces-

and elsewhere. Expressions like those in *Ep.* 11, 1–7; 57, 4, are of less importance.

[1] *Nat. Qu.* iii. 30, 8; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 156, 3.

[2] Seneca himself seems freely to admit this. *'Erras,'* he says, in *Ep.* 94, 55, *si existimas nobiscum vitia nasci: supervenerunt, ingesta sunt . . . nulli nos vitio natura conciliat: illa integros ac liberos genuit.* But this utterance must be judged according to the standard of the Stoic fatalism. Vices stand, indeed, in opposition to our natural destiny and vocation, and are not inherent in us; they develop themselves gradually. But that does not exclude the theory that they develop themselves from natural causes.

[3] *Ep.* 65, 22: *Numquam me caro ista compellet ad metum . . . numquam in honorem hujus corpusculi mentiar. Cum visum erit, distraham cum illo societatem . . . contemptus corporis sui certa libertas est.* Concerning the expression cf. *ad Marc.* 24, 5; *Ep.* 74, 16; 92, 10; and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 443, 3.

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sarily long;[1] with its flesh it must do battle, through its body it is exposed to attacks and sufferings, but in itself it is pure and invulnerable,[2] exalted above the body, even as God is exalted above matter.[3] The true life of the soul begins, therefore, with the departure from the body, and though Seneca is averse to exchanging the Platonic belief in immortality[4] for the Stoic theory of a limited continuance of existence after death, he closely approximates to the latter[5] (as has already been shown) in his idea of the close relationship existing between the present and future life, and also in respect to the duration of future existence expressions involuntarily escape him which a Stoic in the strictest sense of the term would not have ventured to employ;[6] even the pre-existence of the soul, which as personal existence certainly had no place in his system, finds countenance in passages

[1] *Ep.* 92, 13, 33: The body is a garment, a *velamentum* of the soul, an *onus necessarium.* 102, 26: The day of death is *æterni natalis. Depone onus: quid cunctaris?* 120, 14: *Nec domum esse hoc corpus, sed hospitium et quidem breve hospitium.* 65, 16: *Corpus hoc animi pondus ac pœna est: premente illo urgetur, in vinculis est, nisi accessit philosophia,* &c. *Loc. cit.* 21: I will not be a slave to my body, *quod equidem non aliter adspicio quam vinculum aliquod libertati meæ circumdatum . . . in hoc obnoxio domicilio animus liber habitat. Ep.* 102, 22; *ad Marc.* 24, 5; *ad Polyb.* 9, 3; Part III. i. 203, 3.

[2] *Ad Marc.* 24, 5: *Omne illi cum hac carne grave certamen est, ne abstrahatur et sidat. Ad Helv.* 11, 7: *Corpusculum hoc, custodia et vinculum animi, huc atque illuc jactatur . . . animus quidem ipse sacer et æternus est et cui non possit inici manus.*

[3] *Ep.* 65, 24: *Quem in hoc mundo locum Deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus. Nat. Qu. Præf.* 14.

[4] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 154, 1; 202, 1.

[5] *Ibid.* 203 *sq.*

[6] *Immortalis, æternus* (*Ep.* 57, 9; and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 154, 1; 203, 3).

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where the recollection of its high descent is enjoined upon the soul, and its elevation to heaven is represented as a return to its original home, when it leaves the body behind, where the soul found it.[1] But as with Plato the psychologically different parts of the soul had been combined with the anthropological opposition of soul and body, so Seneca cannot entirely escape this inference. With Posidonius[2] he follows the Platonic discrimination of a rational and irrational element in the soul, the irrational element being again divided into courage and desire;[3] and though he expressly includes them all under the ἡγεμονικόν, and so far adheres to the doctrine of his school against Plato and Aristotle, there still remains between his theory and that of Chrysippus the important difference that Seneca assumes in the very centre of personality a plurality of original faculties, while Chrysippus makes one and the same fundamental faculty, reason, generate affections and desires through the changes that take place in it.[4]

Though we cannot help recognising the period of

[1] *Ad Marc.* 24, 5; *Ep.* 79, 12; 102, 22; 120, 14; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 203, 2; 3; *Ep.* 65, 16: The soul will *reverti ad illa quorum fuit* (92, 30 *sq.*).

[2] *Supra*, p. 64 *sqq.*

[3] *Ep.* 94, 1: *Puto inter me teque conveniet, externa corpori adquiri, corpus in honorem animi coli, in animo esse partes ministras, per quas moventur alimurque, propter ipsum principale nobis datas* (the seven derived powers of the soul [*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 198, 1] or analogous to them) *in hoc principali est aliquid irrationale, est et rationale: illud huic servit. Loc. cit.* 8: *Irrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam, ambitiosam, impotentem, positam in adfectionibus, alteram humilem, languidam voluptatibus deditam* (*Ep.* 71, 27).

[4] *Vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 199, 3.

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eclecticism in these deviations from the older Stoic doctrine, yet the sceptical side of this eclecticism is also exhibited by Seneca in the occasional uncertainty of his language respecting the same subjects of which he elsewhere speaks in the tone of full dogmatic conviction. We cannot perhaps, argue from the fact that in his epistle to his mother concerning the comfort afforded by the dependence of all things on God, he secures himself against every attack by not deciding what God is.[1] But it has an undeniably sceptical sound when he elsewhere, in discussing the question of the highest causes, declares that a man must be content among conflicting views to choose the most probable: to determine the truest, exceeds our powers.[2] In the same way he says of the soul: 'What and where it is, no one can fathom. One sets up this definition and another that; but how can the soul, which is not clear about itself, attain to certainty about other things?'[3] We should not be justified in calling

Assertion of the uncertainty of all speculation.

[1] Cf. *l. c.* 145, 1.

[2] *Ep.* 65, 10 (cf. 65, 2, and 65, 23): *Fer ergo judex sententiam et pronuntia, quis tibi videatur verisimillimum dicere, non quis verissimum dicat. Id enim tam supra nos est quam ipsa veritas*; and after he has set forth the objections of the Stoics against the Platonic theories he proceeds thus: *Aut fer sententiam aut, quod facilius in ejusmodi rebus est, nega tibi liquere et nos reverti jube.* In estimating this passage we must remember that it clearly echoes the passage from Plato, *Tim.* 29, *c*, which Seneca has quoted in the preceding context.

[3] *Nat. Qu.* vii. 25, 1: *Multa sunt, quæ esse concedimus, qualia sunt, ignoramus. Habere nos animum . . . omnes fatebuntur: quid tamen sit animus ille rector dominusque nostri, non magis tibi quisquam expediet, quam ubi sit: alius illum dicet spiritum esse, alius concentum quendam, alius vim divinam et Dei partem, alius tenuissimum aërem, alius incorporalem potentiam.*

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Seneca a sceptic because of such isolated utterances, to which the dogmatism of his whole method is otherwise opposed, but they, at any rate, prove that he is not free from severe attacks of scepticism, and that, as with Cicero and other eclectics, it is, above all things, the strife of philosophic theories which causes the dogmatism of the Stoic to waver.

Ethics.

The Stoicism of Seneca is purer in the sphere to which he himself attaches the greatest importance—namely, ethics. The idealism of the Stoic moral doctrine in its grandeur, and also in its asperities, finds in him a zealous and eloquent representative. He declares with the Stoics that there is no good but virtue, because virtue alone is, for man, according to nature: he can paint the satisfaction which it secures, the independence of all external fortune, the invulnerability of the wise man, with glowing and even glaring colours; he is convinced that the virtuous man is in no way inferior to the Deity,—in a certain respect, indeed, is even superior; he requires from us not merely moderation in our emotions,[1] but their unconditional eradication; he reiterates the well-known remarkable statements about the unity and equality of all virtues, the perfect completeness of the wise man; the

Essential agreement with the principles of the Stoics,

Non deerit, qui sanguinem dicat, qui calorem: adeo animo non potest liquere de ceteris rebus, ut adhuc ipse se quærat. De Clement. i. 3, 5, would prove little, taken alone, and *Ep.* 121, 12, still less. In *Ep.* 102 (beginning) a belief in immortality, which is based rather upon wishes and authority than on proofs is named a *bellum somnium*; but this is unimportant.

[1] *Vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 252, 1 *sq.*, and *Ep.* 53. 11: *Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedat Deum: ille beneficio naturæ non timet suo sapiens.*

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misery, defectiveness, and madness of the unwise; in fact, all the principles on which the peculiar character of the Stoics had been most clearly stamped—with the full decision of personal conviction, and all the pathos of the orator.[1] But even here we can perceive that the reasons which must have recommended the Stoic doctrine to him are opposed by reflections and inclinations of another kind. The Stoic morality is intended for natures capable of a pure and perfect virtue; how can it be applied unaltered to us men, who one and all are so

which he nevertheless softens and qualifies.

[1] The most definite utterances of Seneca on all these questions have been already quoted. I content myself, therefore, with referring to these quotations and completing them with a few others, though many might be added, since Seneca declares in innumerable places the leading thoughts of his ethical doctrine. On the principle of life according to nature, and its derivation from the impulse of self-preservation, cf. Sen. *Ep.* 121, 5 *sqq.*; 10, 11; *Vita Beat.* 3, 3; *Ep.* 118 *sqq.*; *Ep.* 121, 14; 92, 1; 76, 8; 89, 15; *Vita Beat.* 8, 6; *Ep.* 120, 22; *Benef.* iv. 25, 1; *Ep.* 122, 5 *sq.* Concerning the Good and goods, *Benef.* vii. 2, 1; *Ep.* 66, 5; 71, 4; 74, 1; 76, 7, 11; 85, 17; 120, 3; 118, 10. Concerning the autarchy of virtue and against the admission of external and corporeal things, pleasure and pain, among goods and evils, *vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 215–221; *Benef.* vii. 8 *sqq.*; *Ep.* 74, 76, 20 *sqq.*; 71, 17 *sqq.* On peace of mind as the chief constituent of happiness, *De Constant.* 13, 5; 75, 18; *Ep.* 29, 12. On the nature and reprehensibility of the emotions, *De Ira*, ii. 2, 1; *Ep.* 75, 11; 85, 5; 116, 1 *sqq.* On the nature and origin of virtue, *Ep.* 113, 2; 117, 2; *De Otio*, 1, 4; *Ep.* 65, 6; *Ep.* 108, 8; *Ep.* 94, 29. On wisdom and the principal virtues, *Ep.* 89, 5; 95, 55; 120, 11; 115, 3 (the division of the virtues, *Vita Beat.* 25, 6 *sq.* is of less importance) 67, 6; 10; 88, 29; *Benef.* ii. 34, 3. On the disposition and will as the seat of all virtue; on the equality of all virtues and vices and of all goods and evils, *Benef.* vi. 11, 3; i. 5, 2; ii. 31, 1; *Ep.* 71, 18; 66, 5 *sqq.*; 66, 32. On wise men and fools, *Benef.* iv. 26, 27, 2; v. 12, 3; 15, 1; vii. 3, 2 *sq.*; 6, 3; 8, 1; *Ep.* 81, 11 *sq.*; 73, 11, 13; *Prov.* i. 5; 6, 4 *sqq.*; *De Const.* 8, 2; *De Ira*, ii. 8–10; *De Const.* 2, 1; 7, 1; *Ep.* 9, 14 *et passim.*

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wicked and weak as Seneca maintains, and have these evils, as he also says, so deeply rooted in our nature?[1] The happiness of the wise man is conditioned by his wisdom, the autarchy of the virtuous by a virtue which corresponds to the Stoic demands. What does it profit us if this virtue and wisdom are never, or hardly ever, to be found in the actual world?[2] By these arguments the older teachers of the school had already, as we have seen, been induced to modify their original demands by important concessions, and Seneca was still more likely to adopt the same procedure. Thus we see him not only approving the concessions which his predecessors had made to human weakness, but in many of his utterances deviating still further from the original severity of the system. Like the older Stoics, he attributes a certain value to other things besides virtue;[3] and reckons these things among goods in the wider sense.[4] This is unimportant.[5] On the other hand, he is no longer

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 252 *sqq.*, and *supra*, p. 221. The utterances of Seneca there quoted often coincide almost word for word with those of the Apostle Paul on the universal sinfulness of man, and this is one of the most striking of the points of contact between them which have given rise to the legend of their personal intercourse and written correspondence; concerning which cf. Baur, *Drei Abhandl.* p. 377 *sqq.*, and A. Fleury, Sénèque et St. Paul, Paris, 1853; i. 269 *sqq.* Historically regarded, this coincidence only shows that two kinds of exposition were produced from similar circumstances, experiences, and temperaments, and that two writers need not stand in any immediate connection in order to agree, even as to their words, in many propositions.

[2] As Seneca admits, *Tranqu. An.* 7, 4; *Ep.* 4, 2; 90, 44.

[3] *E.g.*, *producta* (προηγμένα, concerning which cf. *Ep.* 74, 17; 87, 29; *Vita Beat.* 22, 4). Seneca calls them also *potiora* and *commoda*.

[4] In *Benef.* v. 13, 1, he agrees with the Academy and the Peripatetics in distinguishing *bona animi, corporis, fortunæ*. Elsewhere, however (*Ep.* 74, 17; 76, 8; 124, 13) he expressly says that everything except virtue is improperly (*precario*) named a good. The former view is to be found in Chrysippus and others, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 262, 3,

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quite consistent when he sometimes extravagantly praises the Cynic contempt for the necessaries of life and at other times counsels compliance with existing customs, and careful avoidance of all that can attract notice.[1] But we hear more of the Peripatetic language than the Stoic when Seneca, in spite of all his declamation about the self-satisfying nature of virtue, and indifference to things external,[2] is once more of opinion that Fortune can find no better steward for her gifts than the wise man; since riches alone can give opportunity for the unfolding of a number of virtues, and external goods may add something to the cheerfulness which springs from virtue.[3] It is the same thing with what he says of external evil. It sounds magnanimous enough when the philosopher challenges Fortune to an encounter, when he extols the sublimity of the spectacle which the wise man grappling with misfortune affords to the gods;[4] but this lofty tone changes only too completely into a feeble and querulous sound, when Seneca (to pass

[1] *Tranqu. An.* 8, 4 *sqq.*; *Benef.* v. 4, 3; 6, 1; *Ep.* 29, 1; 90, 14; *Benef.* vii. 8 *sq.*; *Ep.* 20, 9; 62, 3. And, on the other hand, Cic. *Fin.* iii. 20, 68; *Ep.* 14, 14.

[2] *E.g.*, *Ep.* 92, 5; *De Vit. Beat.* 22, 5; *Ep.* 62, 2. *Brevissima ad divitias* (to the true riches) *per contemptum divitiarum via est.* Further proofs *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 215, and *supra*, p. 227, 1.

[3] *Vit. Beat.* 21 *sq.*; *Ep.* 5.

[4] *Provid.* 2, 6 *sqq.*; *Ep.* 64, 4; 85, 39; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 178, 2; 215, 2.

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over other unimportant examples),[1] though elsewhere constantly assuring us that banishment is no evil, and that every land is a home for the wise man,[2] breaks forth into unmanly lamentations over his own exile,[3] or when he enforces the courtly principle that we must put a good face upon the wrong doings which those in high places permit themselves;[4] when he argues with much earnestness that there are no more peaceable citizens or more obedient subjects than the philosophers;[5] and when even Cato, who is elsewhere so idolised, is blamed for sacrificing himself uselessly in the political struggles of his time.[6] Though we must allow that his observations on this subject are partially true, yet it is another question whether they harmonise with his general utterances and with the principles of the Stoics. He excuses himself in such cases, it is true, by avowing that he is not a wise man, nor ever will be; he only regards himself as on the road to wisdom, and is

[1] As in *Ep.* 53, where the incredible troubles (*incredibilia sunt, quæ tulerim*) of a short sea voyage are described.

[2] Not only in his later writings, as in *Benef.* vi. 27, 2; *Ep.* 24, 3; 85, 4; but also and especially during his own exile in his consolatory letter to his mother, cf. 4, 2; 5, 4; 6, 1; 8, 3 *sqq.*; 10, 2; 12, 5 *sqq.*

[3] *Ad Polyb.* 2, 1; 13, 3; 18, 9; and in the Epigrams from exile. The dedication to Polybius Seneca is said to have subsequently tried to suppress on account of the flatteries it contained of this freedman and his master (*Dio*, lxi. 10).

[4] *De Ira*, ii. 33; *Ep.* 14, 7; cf. also the admonitions to prudence. *Ep.* 103, 5; 14, 14. Elsewhere, indeed (as in *De Ira*, iii. 14, 4), Seneca's judgment was quite different.

[5] *Ep.* 73, where among other things he assures us that the rulers (the then ruler was Nero) are honoured as fathers by the philosophers who are indebted to them for their leisure.

[6] *Ep.* 14, 12 *sqq.*; cf. for the sake of the contrast, *Ep.* 95, 69 *sqq.*; *De Const.* 2, 2; *De Provid.* 2, 9 *sqq.*

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content if things with him are going somewhat better;[1] but his concessions to human weakness expressly relate to the wise, and his avowal leads us back to the question as to the real existence of the Stoic wise man, which Seneca, as before remarked, has scarcely the courage to answer in the affirmative. But if he thus substitutes the man who is progressing for the wise man,[2] the requirements of the system on man as he is in reality are thereby necessarily lowered; and whereas it at first seemed as if through perfect wisdom and virtue he would and could be like God, it ultimately appears that we must be satisfied to imitate the gods, so far as human weakness allows of it.[3] In other places, again, Seneca speaks as though nothing were easier than to lead a life according to nature and reason, and as if such a life were solely and entirely a matter of will and not of power;[4] but this homage which the philosopher pays to his school and to himself cannot conceal from us his deviation from the spirit of the earlier Stoicism. The proud reliance on the power of moral will and intelligence, from which the Stoics' ethics started, is with Seneca deeply shaken. Were it otherwise he could not express himself so strongly respecting the weakness and wickedness of men, and the unavoidableness of these defects. We

[1] *Vit. Beat.* 16 *sq.*; cf. *Ep.* 57, 3; 89, 2: *ad Helv.* 5, 2.

[2] Cf. *Ep.* 72, 6 *sqq.*; 75, 8 *sqq.*; 42, 1, and p. 268–271.

[3] *Benef.* i. 1, 9: *Hos sequamur duces, quantum humana imbecillitas patitur. Vit. Beat.* 18, 1: *Cum potuero, vivam quomodo oportet.*

[4] *Ep.* 41, 9; 116, 8; *De Ira*, ii. 13, 1 *sqq.*

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perceive a similar deviation when Seneca, in spite of his sublime utterances about the blessedness of the wise man and Divine Providence, is forced by the consideration of human sufferings to complain[1] that all life is a torment, and that amidst its storms death is the only place of refuge. It would assuredly be wrong to conclude from this that he is not in earnest with the principles which he so frequently and so emphatically expresses; but as in his life he did not keep sufficiently free from the influence of his position and from the faults of a period (to the best men of which he nevertheless belongs) to preserve his character from vacillations and contradictions[2]—

[1] *Ad Polyb.* 9, 6 *sq.*: *Omnis vita supplicium est . . . in hoc tam procelloso . . . mari navigantibus nullus portus nisi mortis est. Loc. cit.* 4, 2 *sq.* The rhetorical nature of this consolatory treatise makes this testimony the less valuable. But we find the same elsewhere. Thus in the epistle *ad Marc.* 11, 1: *Tota flebilis vita est*, &c. *Ep.* 108, 37; 102, 22: *Gravi terrenoque detineor carcere.*

[2] Seneca's character, as is well known, has been frequently defamed in the strongest manner, both in ancient and modern times; and, on the other hand, it has been often extravagantly glorified. This is not the place for a complete examination of this vexed question, or for the enumeration of its literature; but I will shortly mention the most decisive points. It would certainly be a mistake to regard Seneca's life as altogether blameless. He himself made no such claim; he speaks of the *anni inter vana studia consumpti* (*Nat. Qu.* iii. *Præf.* 1); he acknowledges plainly that he was still far from the perfection of the wise man, and was clogged with many faults; that his words were stricter than his life; that his possessions were greater, and his household and manner of life much more luxurious than were properly compatible with his principles (*Vit. Beat.* 17; *Ep.* 6, 1 *et pass.*; *vide* p. 231, 2), and though much may be invented or exaggerated in that which his deadly enemy Suilius, ap. Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 42, and Dio Cass. (if he is speaking in his own name) lxi. 10, following the same or an equally hostile authority, says of his colossal income (supposed to be 300 millions of sesterces), his avarice, and his luxury, we must, nevertheless, suppose that

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so, as a philosopher, he was not so alive to the tendencies of his people and of his age, that we can

the 'over-rich and over-powerful' minister of Nero, ascribed to external possessions a far greater value, and perhaps beyond what was unavoidable in his position made a more luxurious use of it, than might have been expected from a Stoic. Concerning his riches and the splendour of his country houses and gardens, cf. *Nat. Qu.* iii. *Præf.* 2; *Ep.* 77, 3; but especially Tacit. xiv. 52 *sqq.* According to Dio, lxii. 2, the severity with which he demanded repayment of a loan of ten millions of sesterces was one of the causes of the insurrection under Nero in favour of Britannicus. Similarly, it may be that he, as a courtier and official of the empire, may have been silent, or lent his aid in regard to many a wrong. When he had once committed himself to this position it was hardly possible to avoid it; to abandon his post, even if Seneca had had the moral strength for such a course, might have seemed like a failure of duty towards the commonwealth. Meanwhile it is difficult to form a judgment. If, for instance, Seneca and Burrhus favoured Nero's inclination for acting (Tac. xiii. 12 *sq.*; cf. c. 2; xiv. 2), Tacitus avers that this was the best thing they could do according to the position of things. When they acquiesced in Nero's admission into the circus, Tacitus (xiv. 14) tells us that they had not the power to hinder it. (An unworthier part is ascribed to them by Dio, lxi. 2. Meanwhile Seneca is censured by Tacitus, xiv. 52, for precisely the opposite conduct.) Whether they were accessory to the plan for Agrippina's murder (as Dio maintains, lxi. 12) Tacitus cannot say. When their counsel was asked, little seems to have been left to them except silent acquiescence; for the saving of Agrippina, even if it had been effected, would seem to have been synonymous with their own certain destruction. Before his death Seneca speaks (Tac. xv. 62) as if he had had no complicity with the crime wherewith to reproach himself; but that he did not mean expressly to oppose it, and even defended it (Tac. xiv. 11) remains a dark spot on his life. So also his unworthy flattery of Claudius and his freedman Polybius (in the *Consolatio ad Polybium*) by which he sought to effect his return from banishment, and the despondency he displays under this misfortune, are justly considered blameable, especially when they are contrasted with his equally unworthy mockery of the deceased despot (in the *ludus de morte Claudii*) and his valiant protestations to Helvia (4 *sqq. et pass.*; *sup.* 230, 2). On the other hand, the reproach of immoral conduct cast upon him by Suilius and Dio (*l. c.*) are not only without proof, but to all appearance gratuitous inventions. Tacitus describes the

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expect from him perfect logical consistency in his views. If in addition to this we consider how easily the endeavour after rhetorical effect led him into exaggerations on the one side or the other, we may well understand that even in questions as to which he had a clear opinion he is not always consistent in his utterances.

In the further development of his ethics, as we

influence of Seneca and Burrhus on Nero (Tac. xiii. 2) as very salutary. Seneca himself appeals (*l. c.* xv. 61) to his independent bearing towards Nero, of which Tacitus gives an example (Tac. xv. 23), and likewise Plutarch, *Coh. Ira*, 13, p. 461. Dio, lxi. 18, also relates an instance in which he restrained Nero's cruelty by a bold word. The same author says of him (notwithstanding all his hatred elsewhere), lix. 19: *πάντας μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὸν Ῥωμαίους πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ἄλλους σοφία ὑπεράρας*; and the judgment of Tacitus far outweighs even this. Tacitus (xv. 23) calls him a *vir egregius*; in xiii. 2, praises his *comitas honesta*; in xv. 62, he says he bequeathed to his friends before his death *quod unum jam et pulcherrimum habebat, imaginem vitæ suæ*; and in c. 65 he relates that many in the conspiracy of Piso had destined him for the throne, *quasi in sontibus claritudine virtutum ad summum fastigium delecto*. Seneca himself, in his writings, despite much that is declamatory, not only gives us the impression of a man to whom his moral principles and endeavours are matters of earnest conviction, but likewise displays particular traits which throw a favourable light on his character. We know that in the school of Sextius he adopted the habit of daily minute self-examination (*De Ira*, iii. 36 *sq.*); that in his youth, from enthusiasm for philosophy, he abstained from meat during many years, according to Sotion's precept; and in many respects carried out the simple mode of life enjoined on him by the Stoic Attalus, even at a ripe age (*Ep.* 108, 13–23). Tacitus (xv. 63) bears witness to his moderation (*corpus senile et parvo victu tentatum*); the passage *l. c.* xv. 45, where he follows prudential considerations, as in the contemplated transfer of his property to Nero (xiv. 53 *sq.*; Sueton. *Nero*, 35) cannot be adduced as contradictory evidence. One of the most pleasing features of his life is finally his beautiful relation with his admirable wife Paulina, cf. *Ep.* 104, 2, 4 *sq.*; Tac. xv. 63 *sq.*

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Spirit and application of his moral doctrines.

should expect, the same principles are prominent which characterise Stoicism as a whole. It has, however, been already pointed out that Seneca and the younger Stoics generally, differ somewhat from the older in their closer acceptation of these principles. Without abandoning or altering the ethics of their school in any important point, they yet lay greater stress on such determinations as chiefly correspond with the conditions and necessities of their times. The most important of these determinations are three. In a period of such terrible moral corruption and despotic tyranny, it must have been of the first consequence for the earnest thinker to gain a fixed basis in himself, and to found for himself in his own mind an impregnable refuge against the corruption of his surroundings and the power of Fate. If he turned his attention to others, all external distinctions among men must have lost their significance, when each day beheld the most abrupt vicissitudes of fortune,[1] when all national and historical oppositions disappeared in the general degradation, when the most abject were often endowed with the highest favours of fortune, and the best succumbed to wrong; and thus far the principle that all men as such are to be held equal, and worth is only to be attached to their moral inequality, must have gained fresh support. But on the other hand the moral as well as the

[1] Seneca from this experience (*Tranqu. An.* 11, 8 *sqq.*; 16, 1; *Ep.* 74, 4, *et passim*) deduces the moral application, especially in regard to each man's own conduct, that he dares not attach any value to things external.

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social conditions of the time must have evoked a lively feeling of human weakness and need of help; Stoic severity must have given place in some degree to sympathy with the failures of humanity, and Stoic self-sufficiency to the claims of philanthropic sympathy and assistance; the cosmopolitanism of the school must chiefly have been developed on the side of feeling, in the form of universal love of mankind. Finally, the less that circumstances afforded opportunity to individuals in the way of effectual interference with the course of the world, the more heavily the common fate pressed upon all, and the more relentlessly it fulfilled itself—the more must the inclination for public life have been lost, and the predilection for the repose of private life have gained ground, but the more strongly also must the necessity for submission to fate, and for the interdependence of moral conduct with religious conviction, which the Stoics had never denied, have made itself felt.

Independence of things external.

All this may be perceived in Seneca's moral writings. The independence of external things, which is assured to us by wisdom and virtue, is by no one more energetically commended than by him. No one requires us more pressingly to seek our happiness purely and entirely in ourselves,[1] and to

[1] Numerous authorities for this will be found in *Ep.* 82, 2; 30, 4 *sqq.*; 77, 11 *sq.*; 8 *sqq.*; *Cons. ad Marc.* 19, 3 *sqq.*; *Vita Beat.* 4, 3; *Ep.* 66, 14; 71, 18, 21; 85, 18; 39; 87; 11 *sq.*; 44; 120, 3; 92, 14 *sqq.*; 72, 7; *Benef.* iv. 2, 2, 4; *Vita Beat.* 11, 2; 13, 5; 14, 1; *De Ira*, 1, 9, 2 *sq.*; cf. *Ep.* 85, 10; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 234, 252, *supra* 226, 1. To the more decided declarations on this subject belong: *De Provid.* 2, 9 *sqq.*; *De Const.* 3, 5; 4, 2; 5, 4; 8, 2 *sq.*; 19, 4; *Vita Beat.* 4, 2 *sq.*; *Brevit.* v. 2; *ad Helv.* 5; *Benef.* iii. 20, 1; *Ep.* 53, 11; 59, 8; 64, 4; 74, 19; 75, 18; 85, 39.

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encounter bravely what fate may send us. But since it is his moral constitution alone which gives to man this freedom, he insists most emphatically on the conscientious fulfilment of the conditions to which it is attached, and he becomes the more earnest on the subject the more he is convinced that the victory is only to be won over man's inclination to evil by the most severe conflict.[1] All are, as he believes, sick and in need of healing; the combating of our faults is the chief problem of philosophy; the recognition of this, the first condition of improvement;[2] and even in his old age he says of himself that he is visibly another man, as he now sees what his defects are.[3] He, therefore, cannot

Strictness of Seneca's moral demands.

[1] Cf. Baur, *Drei Abhandl.* p. 40 *sqq.*

[2] Besides the quotations in *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 253 *sq.*, and *supra*, cf. *Ep.* 50, 4: *Quid nos decipimus? Non est extrinsecus malum nostrum: intra nos est, in visceribus ipis sedet, et ideo difficulter ad sanitatem pervenimus, quia nos ægrotare nescimus. Ep.* 28, 9: *Initium est salutis notitia peccati* (according to Epicurus) . . . *ideo quantum potes te ipse coargue, inquire in te*, &c. *Vita Beat.* 1, 4: One infects another: *Sanabimur, si modo separemur a cætu.* Similarly, *Ep.* 49, 9; 7, 1; 94, 52 *sqq.*; 95, 29 *sq.*

[3] In the remarkable passage which is so strikingly suggestive of Christian conceptions, *Ep.* 6, 1: *Intellego, Lucili, non emendari me tantum, sed transfigurari.* Much, indeed, is always in need of improvement: *Et hoc ipsum argumentum est in melius translati animi, quod vitia sua, quæ adhuc ignorabat, videt. Quibusdam ægris gratulatio fit, cum ipsi ægros se esse senserunt.* Concerning the expression *transfigurari* (μεταμορφοῦσθαι) cf. *Ep.* 94, 48, where these words are quoted from Aristo: *Qui didicit et facienda ac vitanda percepit, nondum sapiens est, nisi in ea quæ didicit animus ejus transfiguratus est.* The expression therefore signifies the inner transformation of the whole will and disposition, as distinguished from the merely theoretical conviction on the one hand, and merely temporary and occasional improvement on the other.

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too strongly impress upon us the necessity of a severe self-examination and a ceaseless labour within ourselves;[1] he recommends to us what he himself made a duty, to take precise account every evening of the day past;[2] he refers us to our conscience, from which nothing that we do can remain hidden;[3] he reminds us of the gods, the ever present witnesses of our words and deeds,[4] of the day of death, that great judgment day when it will be shown how much in man is genuine or false;[5] in a word, he desires that we should regard the happiness of the wise as the reward of the most unceasing moral activity, and he consequently finds necessary,[6] side by side with the universal principles of virtue, all those enquiries into individual circumstances of life, and those counsels designed for special cases, to which he himself has devoted so great a part of his writings.[7]

But the more completely the individual corresponds to his moral destination, the more closely will he find himself connected with others, the more purely will he apprehend this relationship, and the more entirely will he extend it to all men. The Stoic principles respecting the natural kinship of mankind, and the disinterested help which we owe to all without exception, have found in Seneca one of their most eloquent assertors;[1] in his conception of this relation, however, the political element throughout recedes before the universally human element, and the severity of the moral judge before a loving gentleness which bears witness not only to the benevolent disposition of the philosopher but also to his accurate knowledge and impartial judgment of human nature. In political life Seneca can feel no confidence, which is not surprising considering the age in which he lived, and his personal experiences: he finds the mass of mankind so evil that we cannot without moral injury make ourselves dependent on their favours, and the condition of the Commonwealth too hopeless for us to waste our strength upon it; the individual state seems to him too small beside the great polity of mankind and of the world, and the activity of the statesman beside that of a teacher of the human race to allow of his confining himself to them. Those connections have for him a far greater charm[2] which are based upon free

Universal love of mankind.

[1] Cf. also *Ep.* 50, 5 *sqq.*, 51, 6, 13 (*nobis quoque militandum est . . . proice quæcunque cor tuum laniant*).

[2] *De Ira*, iii. 36; cf. p. 186, 5.

[3] *Ep.* 28, 9; 41, 2; *sup.* p. 237, 2; *Ep.* 43, 4: Men live in such a manner that scarcely anyone could bear his whole conduct to be made public. *Quid autem prodest recondere se et oculos hominum auresque vitare? Bona conscientia turbam advocat, mala etiam in solitudine anxia atque sollicita est . . . o te miserum, si contemnis hunc testem!*

[4] *Vita Beat.* 20, 5; *Ep.* 83, 1.

[5] *Ep.* 26, 4 *sqq.*; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 204, 3.

[6] He goes very minutely into this in his 94th and 95th letters, in the former proving the indispensability of special precepts for practical life, and in the latter that of universal ethical principles (*decreta*). In both he maintains that, considering the greatness of human corruption, and the overwhelming influence of society, no counteracting means should be left unemployed; 94, 52 *sq.*; 68 *sqq.*; 95, 14 *sqq.*; 29 *sqq.*

[7] Especially in the treatise *De Beneficiis* and in the letters.

[1] As is shown in *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 286, 1; 287, 2; 299, 3.

[2] Cf. *ibid.* III. i. 295 *sqq.*; *Ep.* 14, 4 *sqq.* (cf. *supra*, 230, 7), and, concerning politics also, *De Clement.* i. 3, 4 *sqq.*, where we cannot suppose that what Seneca says of the importance of the ruler of the commonwealth, apart from some ex-

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choice and are regulated according to the needs and peculiar character of the individual. To marriage he has devoted an entire treatise,[1] and we have every reason to suppose, from what we are told on the subject that Seneca held married life, of which he himself had full experience, in the highest estimation. A taste for friendship also appears in him in a very marked degree, and we have already seen that he has difficulty in reconciling his need of friendship and his noble conception of this relation with the wise man's sufficiency for himself.[2] But the real crown of his moral doctrine lies in the universal love of man, the purely human interest which bestows itself on all without distinction, even the meanest and most despised, which even in the slave does not forget the man;[3] in that gentleness of disposition which is so especially antagonistic to anger and hatred, tyranny and cruelty,[4] and which

travagances of expression, is merely the language of a courtier; it was not only quite true according to the existing state of things, but doubtless his own personal conviction that in the Roman empire as it was then constituted, the emperor (as he says in c. 4) was the uniting bond of the state; and that the *pax Romana*, the *dominatio urbis*, was linked with his preservation: *Olim enim ita se induit reipublicæ Cæsar, ut seduci alterum non possit, sine utriusque pernicie; nam ut illi viribus opus est, ita et huic capite.* But if the republic was abandoned, public service must have lost its charm for the best of them.

[1] For the fragments of this treatise which, however, consist for the most part of quotations from other authors and examples of good and wicked women, cf. Haase, iii. 428 *sqq.* On the view of marriage there enunciated, cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 293, 4; concerning Seneca's second wife (of the first we do not know even her name) *vide sup.* p. 234, *n.*

[2] *Vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 289 *sqq.*

[3] Ample authority for this is quoted, *Ibid.* III. i. 299 *sq.* 286, 1.

[4] A mode of thought which

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considers nothing worthier of man and more according to nature, than forgiving mercy, and benevolence that is unselfish and disseminates happiness in secret, imitating the divine goodness towards the evil and the good; which, mindful of human weakness, would rather spare than punish, does not exclude even enemies from its goodwill, and will not return even injury with injury.[1] Seneca's dissertations on these subjects are among the most beautiful testimonies to the purity of moral conceptions arrived at by classical antiquity. In their content, as has already been shown, they entirely harmonise with the Stoic principles; but they have manifestly arisen from a somewhat different idea of life and a milder temper

also expresses itself in the decided repudiation of the inhuman gladiatorial shows and in censure of the Roman lust for war. For the same reason, and also on account of his passionate disposition and want of self-control, those severe sentences were passed upon Alexander the Great which furnished such welcome material for Seneca's rhetoric, *Benef.* i. 13, 3; *Clement.* i. 25; *De Ira*, iii. 17, 1, 23, 1; *Nat. Qu.* vi. 23, 2, *et passim.*

[1] Cf. *Ep.* 95, 52; *Vit. Beat.* 24, 3; *De Clem.* i. 1, 3; *De Ira*, i. 5; *De Otio*, i. 4; *De Ira*, ii. 32, 1; *Benef.* iii. 18–28; *De Clem.* i. 18, 2; ii. 4; *Ep.* 31, 11; *Vit. Beat.* 24, 3. In *De Clem.* ii. 4, he speaks of the possibility of uniting mildness with justice and the distinction between this and culpable neglect; the one does not punish where it ought, the other in punishing has regard to all really available grounds of extenuation; it desires only to carry out complete justice, *De Clem.* i. 6; *De Ira*, ii. 9, 4; 10, 1 *sq.* 28; iii. 27, 3 (on the weakness of man—we should not be angry with error, but pardon it); *Benef.* iv. 25 *sqq.* (how far, according to the example of the Gods, should favours be bestowed on the ungrateful?); vii. 31 *sq.* (*vincit malos pertinax bonitas*). As the gods, in spite of all unthankfulness, continue unweariedly to send rain upon the worthy and the unworthy, and patiently bear with the error of those who misconceive them, so also should we act, and conquer ingratitude by benefits, as the husbandman conquers unfruitful ground by tillage; *l. c.* ii. 9 *sq.* (hidden benefits).

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than were found among the elder Stoics. The need of community is stronger with Seneca than with them, and though the social nature and vocation of man is in both cases recognised with equal decision, in the older Stoics it appears more as the fulfilment of a duty, in Seneca more as an affair of inclination, of human affection, and of benevolence; and hence he lays the chief stress on the virtues of the philanthropic disposition. How closely this softening of the Stoic severity is connected with Seneca's deeper sense of human imperfection has already been indicated.

His religious temperament.

From the same source we must also derive the religious cast of his ethics. Here, too, he follows throughout the common tendency of his school.[1] The will of God is to him the highest law; to obey and to imitate that will, is the most universal command,[2] synonymous[3] with the claim of life according to nature; he perceives in reason and conscience the divine spirit dwelling in us;[4] he bases the equality of all men on the proposition that God can take up his abode as well in the soul of a slave as in that of a nobleman; and the union of the individual with humanity on the thought of the gods who, with us, belong to the universe and govern it;[5]

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 130.

[2] The Deity here coincides with Nature, and, therefore, also the will of God with the laws of nature.

[3] *Benef.* iv. 25, 1: *Propositum est nobis secundum rerum naturam vivere et Deorum exemplum sequi. L. c.* vii. 31, 2; *V. Be.* 15, 4–7; *Ep.* 16, 5; cf. *Benef.* vi. 23, 1; *Provid.* 5, 8.

[4] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 319, 2; 320, 1.

[5] *Ep.* 31, 11; *V. Be.* 20, 5; *De Otio*, 4, 1; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 302, 2; 296, 3.

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he pressingly insists on a willing and joyful acquiescence in the decrees of Providence, and sees in this disposition the most secure foundation for the freedom and peace of mind of the wise man;[1] but, at the same time, he would leave open to us as a last refuge the voluntary departure from life,[2] and would have us accustom ourselves above all to a contempt for death, without which, he says, no happiness is possible.[3] In all these utterances there is nothing which does not flow from the true spirit of the Stoic doctrine. Even the proposition that no one can be good without the assistance of the deity is to be understood with Seneca wholly in the sense of that system; the divine assistance which he claims is no supernatural aid, but coincides with the use of our reason and its natural powers.[4] If,

[1] Cf. *ibid.* III. i. p. 304, 1; 305, 1.

[2] *Ibid.* III. i. p. 306, 1.

[3] *Nat. Qu.* vi. 32, 5: *Si volumus esse felices, si nec hominum nec Deorum nec rerum timore vexari, si despicere fortunam supervacua promittentem, levia minitantem, si volumus tranquille degere et ipsis Dîs de felicitate controversiam agere, anima in expedito est habenda*, &c.

[4] This plainly results from a comparison of the passages in which this proposition is advanced. In *Ep.* 41, 2, after he has said that there dwells in us a divine spirit (by which nothing else is meant but reason and man's conscience), he thus proceeds: *Bonus vero vir sine Deo nemo est: an potest aliquis supra fortunam nisi ab illo adjutus exsurgere? Ille dat consilia magnifica et erecta. In unoquoque virorum bonorum (quis Deus incertum est) habitat Deus.* Similarly, *Ep.* 73, 15: *Non sunt Dî fastidiosi non invidi: admittunt et adscendentibus manum porrigunt. Miraris hominem ad Deos ire* (through the elevation of the mind and will)? *Deus ad homines venit, immo, quod est propius, in homines venit: nulla sine Deo mens bona est. Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt, quæ si bonus cultor excipit, similia origini prodeunt et paria his, ex quibus orta sunt, surgunt*, &c. The help of God must, therefore, consist in this: that an effluence of the Deity as λόγος σπερματικὸς is combined

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therefore, Seneca's doctrine is distinguished from the elder Stoicism by its religious character, this must on no account be understood to mean that he was thereby carried into radical deviations from the Stoic system, but only that the importance assumed by the religious element in relation to the philosophical is peculiarly characteristic of him; his distinction from the earlier Stoics is merely quantitative. That the religious point of view, however, acquired with him such great preponderance, we must attribute partly to the practical and popular cast of his philosophy and partly to his lively sense of human weakness and imperfection, which must naturally have disposed him to point more frequently and more emphatically to the support which the moral life of man finds in the belief in God and his guiding power in the world, and in the human spirit. How pure, moreover, is Seneca's conception of religion; how he keeps clear, not only of the belief of the people, but of the fallacies of Stoic orthodoxy; how the plurality of gods is cancelled in the unity of the divine nature, and external worship in the spiritual cultus of the knowledge of God, and the imitation of his moral perfection, have already been shown.[1] Here also Seneca appears as a worthy representative of Roman Stoicism, in which a purer

with a human body in the spiritual nature of man.

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 312 *sqq.*; 315, 5; 324, 1; 326, 1; 337, 3; 340 2. Even in the passages last quoted, soothsaying and the power of atonements are only defended very conditionally; and Seneca elsewhere treats such things simply as absurdities (*Nat. Qu.* iv. 4, 6).

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and freer view of religion had been implanted by Panætius in its very commencement, and which it had constantly maintained, as is seen by the example of a Scævola, a Varro, and a Cicero.[1] To Panætius, Seneca bears great resemblance in his whole mode of thought. Both postpone the theoretical doctrines of their school to the practical, and seek to make the latter as fruitful as possible by a treatment generally comprehensible and an application to individual details: and in this endeavour they have no scruple about recurring to other than Stoic predecessors, or departing from the Stoic tradition on certain points. But these departures are far more considerable with Panætius than with Seneca; and on the other hand, with Seneca the ethical base of the earlier Stoicism, confidence in the moral power of man, is much more deeply shaken, and the feeling of human weakness and defectiveness more vivid than seems to have been the case with Panætius; and while the healing of the morally diseased human race is regarded as the chief task of philosophy, there arises the fusion of philosophy with religion and the reaction of ethical dualism on metaphysics, by which the later Stoicism approximated more and more to Platonism.

[1] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 340, 1, and *sup.* p. 49, 2; 170 *sq.*; 176 *sqq.* If in the above sentences I name Cicero beside Scævola and Varro, this is justified partly by his particular connection with the Stoic school, and partly by his exposition of the Stoic theology in the second book of the treatise *De Natura Deorum*, from which some striking passages are quoted, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 311, 1; 314, 2.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STOICS CONTINUED: MUSONIUS, EPICTETUS, MARCUS AURELIUS.

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The Stoic school continued.

STOICISM maintained on the whole the same character during the entire course of its further history, except that the traits by which Seneca had already diverged from the original direction of his school, ultimately asserted themselves more strongly. The rest of the Stoic philosophy known to us may therefore, be discussed more concisely.

Musonius.

A younger contemporary of Seneca's, Musonius Rufus,[1] who resided in Rome in the reigns of Nero and Vespasian,[2] was a distinguished teacher of philosophy,[3] and was held in the highest estimation on

[1] *C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiæ et Apophthegmata c. Annot.* Edid. J. Venhuizen Peerlkamp (Harlem, 1822); the first 137 pages are taken from Petri Nieuwlandii *Dissertatio de Musonio Rufo* (which appeared in 1783); also, Moser, in *Studien von Daub und Creuzer*, vi. 74 *sqq.*

[2] Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 59; xv. 71, and elsewhere. *Vide* the following note.

[3] Musonius Rufus, son of Capito (Suidas), is apparently identical with the Cajus Musonius of whom Pliny (*Ep.* iii. 11, 5, 7) makes honourable mention. He was of good family, originally from Etruria (Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 59; *Hist.* iii. 81; Philostr. *Apollon.* vii. 16), and more especially Volsinii (Suid. cf. the epigram *Anthol. Lat.* i. 79; vol i. 57, Burm). The year of his birth is unknown, but as he had already in 65 A.D. aroused the jealousy of Nero by his fame as a teacher of philosophy (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 71) and according to Julian, ap. Suid. then filled a public office, it can hardly be supposed later than 20–30 A.D. An adherent of the Stoic school, the friend of Rubellius Plautus, with whom we find him in Asia Minor in the year 53 A.D. Thrasea Pætus and Soranus, whose death he afterwards revenged by the judicial prosecution of his accuser, the miserable Egnatius Celer (Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 59; *Hist.* iii. 81; iv. 10, 40; Epict. *Diss.* i. 1, 26) was banished by Nero, 65 (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 71; Dio Cass. lxii. 27; *Muson.* ap Stob. *Floril.* 40, 9, p. 75; Themist. *Or.* vi. 72, *d.*; vii. 94, *a*; Suid., Μουσών and Κορνοῦτος, instead of this, represents him as put to death, but this is a palpable error, arising perhaps from Justin. (*Apol.* ii. 8); according to Philostratus, *l. c.*, his place of banishment was Gyara, which was visited from all sides on his account. The same author (*Apol.* v. 19) and the pseudo-Lucian in his *Nero*, mention that one Musonius was employed in penal labour in the proposed cutting of the isthmus. Philostratus also (*l. c.* iv. 35, 46) mentions a Babylonian Musonius, a wonderful philosopher, whom Nero threw into prison. But whether our Musonius is here meant, and the Βαβυλώνιος of Philostratus should be altered to Βουλσίνιος, or discarded (*vide* Nieuwland, p. 30 *sqq.*) seems the more immaterial since these statements are as valueless as the absurd letters which Musonius is said to have exchanged with Apollonius. How the 'Tyrian' Musonius is related to our philosopher cannot be clearly ascertained, as we have seen (*sup.* p. 199); but they seem to be identical. He was probably recalled from exile by Galba (cf. Epict. *Diss.* iii. 15, 14; Tac. *Hist.* iii. 81); and when the philosophers were ordered to leave Rome by Vespasian he alone was excepted (Dio Cass. lxvi. 16); according to Themist. (*Or.* xiii. 173 *c.*) he had personal relations with Titus. How long he lived we do not know; but if he is really the person mentioned by Pliny he must have survived the reign of Trajan. Nothing is related as to any writings by him; that which Stobæus communicates from him seems like an account given of his lectures by a disciple, and indicates the existence of Memorabilia, such as those of Xenophon, or Arrian concerning Epictetus. Suidas (Πωλίων) ascribes such ἀπομνημονεύματα Μουσωνίου to Asinius Pollio, a contemporary of Pompey. Ridiculous as this is, it is probable that one Pollio had composed them; but he is not to be identified (as has been done by ancient and modern writers) with Claudius Pollio, who according to Pliny (*Ep.* vii. 31, 5) had written a *Liber de Vita Anni* (older reading *Musonii*) *Bassi*, but rather with the grammarian Valerius Pollio, who (Suid. *l. c.*) lived

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account of his personal character. This philosopher confined himself even more decidedly than Seneca

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Practical standpoint of his philosophy.

to moral problems. He too starts from the general bases of the Stoic system, and even its theoretic portions were not neglected by him. Epictetus relates that he practised his scholars in the use of logical forms, and demanded scrupulous accuracy with regard to them;[1] a remark as to the origin of moral conceptions points to the Stoic theory of knowledge and its empiricism.[2] He mentions in a similar manner certain physical doctrines; speaks of the unchangeable necessity of the universe, of the ceaseless change of all things to which everything, both in heaven and earth, is subject; of the regular transition of the four elements one into another,[3] fulfilling itself through the same stages upward and downward; of the divine nature of the heavenly

under Hadrian, and was called a philosopher. According to the description of the younger Pliny (*Ep.* iii. 11) his son-in-law, the Artemidorus whom Pliny so enthusiastically praises, is to be considered his disciple.

[1] *Diss.* i. 7, 32. When Rufus blamed him for not knowing how to find what was wanting in a syllogism, he excused himself thus: μὴ γὰρ τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἐνέπρησα, to which the other replied, ἀνδράποδον, ἐνθάδε τὸ παραλειπόμενον Καπιτωλίου ἐστιν ('here is what you have overlooked, the chief thing').

[2] Ap. Stob. *Floril.* 117, 8, 89 (Mein.): Man can attain to virtue: οὐ γὰρ ἑτέρωθέν ποθεν ταύτας ἐπινοῆσαι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχομεν (εἴχ.), ἢ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως, ἐντυχόντες ἀνθρώποις τοιοῖσδέ τισιν, οἵους ὄντας αὐτοὺς θείους καὶ θεοειδεῖς ὠνόμαζον. There is a similar declaration of Seneca, *Ep.* 120, 4; cf. *Ep.* 120, 11.

[3] Stob. *Floril.* 108, 60. This fragment bears with some others (*Floril.* 19, 13; 20, 60, 61; *Ecl.* ii. 356) the inscription: Ῥούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου περὶ φιλίας. That nothing more, however, is meant by this than an account taken from Epictetus (*i. e.* from a lost portion of Arrian's dissertations) concerning an utterance of Musonius (cf. Schweighäuser on Epictet. iii. 195) is the less open to doubt, since Musonius is always Rufus in Epictetus; and a comparison of *Diss.* iii. 23, 29, with Gell. *N. A.* v. 1, shows that he is the person intended.

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bodies;[1] and as these are nourished by vapours, so (in agreement with the Stoics and Heracleitus) the soul, he says, is nourished by the evaporation of the blood; the lighter and purer, therefore, our food is, the drier and purer will be the soul.[2] Some other definitions, standing in close connection with ethics —such as those respecting the goodness and moral perfection of God, the natural kinship of man with God,[3] the divine omniscience,[4] the divine law, the effluence of which is moral duty,[5] or virtue as an imitation of God[6]—we should necessarily have presupposed to belong to him, even had no decided utterances on these subjects been handed down to us. To the popular religion he also accorded the recognition allowed by the Stoic principles,

[1] These are the gods for whose nourishment the evaporation from the earth and from the waters is sufficient.

[2] Stob. *l. c.* Concerning the corresponding Stoic doctrines *vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 189. 4 and 196, 2. The observation (*Floril.* 79, 51, p. 94) that God has assigned the faculty of thought to the best protected place in the body, is of little importance; this may mean either the head or the breast (cf. *ibid.* III. i. p. 197, 2).

[3] *Floril.* 117, 8, p. 88. Man alone is a μίμημα θεοῦ upon the earth (similarly 17, 43, p. 286); as there is nothing higher in God than virtue (Musonius expressly enumerates the four fundamental virtues) as virtue alone makes him the perfect being, beneficent, friendly to man, and exalted above all weaknesses, such as we conceive Him (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 140), so also for man, virtuous conduct alone is according to nature.

[4] Stob. *Floril. Exc. Jo. Dam.* ii. 13, 125; *Bd.* iv. 218 (Mein). Musonius here infers from the omniscience of the gods that they require no demonstrative proof; and he applies this in the manner discussed *infra*, p. 252; but the thought of the omniscience of God admits of very forcible application in the way of ethical admonition.

[5] *Loc. cit.* 79, 51, p. 94.

[6] Cf. note 1 and Plut. *De Aere Alieno*, 7, 1, p. 830, where a capitalist says to Musonius, who wishes to borrow money: ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ σωτὴρ, ὃν σὺ μιμῇ καὶ ζηλοῖς, οὐ δανείζεται, and the other laughingly replied, οὐδὲ δανείζει.

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without apparently troubling himself with any speculative justification or interpretation of it.[1] But with scientific enquiry as such, with a knowledge that carries its end and purpose in itself, Musonius has no concern. We see this already from the fact that among the many sayings and discussions of his that have been preserved to us,[2] the theoretical doctrines of his school are only mentioned in a casual and superficial manner. But he has himself spoken most definitely on this subject. Men are to be regarded as sick, from a moral point of view; in order to be cured they require continual medical treatment.[3] Philosophy must supply this need.

[1] In this respect, however, there is little to be quoted from these fragments. The deity is called Zeus, and the divine law the law of Zeus (*Floril.* 79, 51, p. 94); the stars are treated as gods (*sup.* p. 249, 1); and as Chrysippus had blamed the unmarried state as an offence against Zeus Gamelios (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 293, 2) so Musonius urges, among other things, against the exposure of children, that it is a crime against the παρῴδοι θεοί and Ζεὺς ὁμόγνιος (*Floril.* 75, 15); and in favour of marriage he says that Hera, Eros, and Aphrodite have it under their protection; while the observation: θεοὶ γὰρ ἐπιτροπεύουσιν αὐτὸν, καθὸ νομίζονται παρ' ἀνθρώποις, μεγάλοι, even if we substitute νομίζεται and thus render the assertion less startling, still points the distinction between the popular and the philosophical notion of the gods. In the same way Musonius (*Floril.* 85, 20, end) argues against luxury that it hinders the fulfilment of our duties; among others, the duties connected with service to the gods.

[2] There are in all, more than fifty of them and among these many of considerable length; in Venhuizen Peerlkamp's work they occupy 135 pages.

[3] Plut. *Coh. Ira*, 2, p. 453: καὶ μὴν ὧν γε μεμνήμεθα Μουσωνίου καλῶν ἔν ἐστιν, ὦ Σύλλα, τὸ δεῖν ἀεὶ θεραπευομένους βιοῦν τοὺς σώζεσθαι μέλλοντας. Gell. *N. A.* v. 1, 2, and *infra* p. 252, 3. This point of view, under which the Cynics first represented philosophy (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 285, 3) becomes strikingly prominent everywhere after the beginning of the first century A.D.; examples have already come before us (*sup.* p. 77, 3; 237, 2) and we shall meet with others among Stoics, Platonists, and Neo-Pythagoreans.

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Philosophy is the only way to virtue,[1] and therefore occupation with it is necessary for every one, even for women;[2] but conversely virtue is the only end and content of philosophy; to philosophise means to learn and to practise the principles of conduct according to duty.[3] A philosopher and a righteous man are therefore synonymous;[4] virtue and philosophy are only different designations for the same thing. But whereas Socrates and Plato understood this proposition in the sense that virtue is merely the fruit of a real and fundamental knowledge, Musonius, on the contrary, agrees with the Cynics that true wisdom can be attained without much knowledge by means of moral endeavour. Philosophy requires few doctrines, and may dispense with theorems in which the Sophists take such delight; what is necessary may well be learned even in the occupations of the spade and the plough.[5] Virtue is far more a thing of custom than of instruction, for the vicious habits of men are only to be overcome by

[1] Stob. *Floril.* 48, 67, where we read: δίκαιος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις μὴ ἐπιστάμενος δικαιοσύνην ὁποῖόν τί ἐστι; but this is impossible without philosophy. Likewise in regard to σωφροσύνη and the other virtues. Therefore: πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον δύναιτο ἄν τις βασιλεῦσαι ἢ βιῶναι καλῶς, εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφήσειεν.

[2] *Floril. Jo. Damasc.* ii. 13, 123, 126 (iv. 212 *sqq.* 220 *sqq.* Mein).

[3] *Loc. cit.* ii. 13, 123, end, p. 216: φιλοσοφία καλοκἀγαθίας ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον (thus *Floril.* 48, 67); *l. c.* ii. 13, 126, p. 221: ζητεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως βιώσονται καλῶς, ὅπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι; *Floril.* 67, 20, end: οὐ γὰρ δὴ φιλοσοφεῖν ἕτερον τι φαίνεται ὂν ἢ τὸ ἃ πρέπει καὶ ἃ προσήκει λόγῳ μὲν ἀναζητεῖν ἔργῳ δὲ πράττειν.

[4] *Floril.* 79, 51: τὸ δέ γε εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τῷ φιλόσοφον εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι. Similarly 48, 67: the good prince is necessarily a philosopher, and the philosopher is necessarily fit to be a prince (?), (cf. *sup.* note 1).

[5] *Loc. cit.* 56, 18, p. 338 *sq.* Musonius here shows that the calling of a husbandman is best fitted for a philosopher.

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opposite habits.[1] The disposition to virtue, the germ of virtue, is implanted in all men by nature;[2] if we have before us an unspoiled pupil of a good disposition, it needs no lengthy argument to convey to him right moral principles and the right estimation of goods and evils; a few convincing proofs, indeed, are better than many; the main point is that the conduct of the teacher should correspond with his principles, and that similarly the disciple should live according to his conviction.[3] To this practical end, then, according to Musonius, all instruction should work. The teacher of philosophy should not produce applause but improvement; he should administer to his hearers the moral medicine that they require; if he does this in the right way, they will not have time to admire his discourse, they will be completely occupied with themselves and their conscience, with feelings of shame, repentance, and exaltation.[4] In this manner Musonius himself tried to work upon his disciples; he spoke so forcibly to their hearts that each individual felt as if personally struck;[5] he made the entrance to his school

[1] *Loc. cit.* 29, 78, with which the statement of Lucius (*sup.* p. 199) in the *Exc. e. Jo. Dam.* i. 7, 46 (vol. iv. 169 *sq.* Mein.) entirely agrees.

[2] Πάντες φύσει πεφύκαμεν οὕτως ὥστε ζῆν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ καλῶς . . . φυσικὴν εἶναι ὑποβολὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ πρὸς καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐνεῖναι, where this is proved (ap. Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 426 *sq.*) by the argument that the laws demand moral conduct from all, and all lay claim to the honour of it (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 224, 2).

[3] Stob. *Floril. Exc. e Jo. Dam.* ii. 13, 125 (iv. 217 *sqq.* M.)

[4] Gell. *N. A.* v. 1; Epict. *Diss.* iii. 23, 29.

[5] Epict. *l. c.*: τοιγαροῦν οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἴεσθαι ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν· οὕτως ἥπτετο τῶν γινομένων, οὕτω πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἑκάστου κακά.

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more difficult, in order to separate the stronger natures from the weaker and more effeminate;[1] he sought to brace their force of will by the thought of the difficulties life would bring to them;[2] and we may well believe that the influence of such instruction must have been very important and lasting on the character of those who enjoyed it. But we cannot expect that a philosopher who so decidedly subordinated scientific problems to practical influence, should distinguish himself by originating new thoughts or even by the firmer establishment and logical development of a doctrine already existing. If, therefore, in most of the fragments of Musonius we must acknowledge the purity of mind and correctness of moral judgment which they exhibit, we cannot estimate their scientific value very highly. What we mostly find in them is merely an application of the recognised Stoical principles which sometimes becomes so minute that the philosopher, after the example of Chrysippus, does not even disdain to give precepts on the growth of the hair and beard.[3] On certain points the Stoic principles are exaggerated; Musonius exceeds the bounds of Stoicism and approximates partly to the simplicity of the Cynics and partly to the asceticism of the Neo-Pythagoreans; at other times he deduces, even from thence, such pure

[1] *Loc. cit.* iii. 6, 10.

[2] *Loc. cit.* i. 9, 29: οὕτω καὶ Ῥοῦφος πειράζων με εἰώθει λέγειν· συμβήσεταί σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου. κἀμοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένου, ὅτι ἀνθρώπινα· τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον παρακαλῶ (to treat this better) παρὰ σοῦ αὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος.

[3] *Floril.* 6, 62, where Musonius, like Chrysippus before him (Athen. xiii. 565, *a*), expresses himself strongly against the cutting of the hair and beard.

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and yet humane precepts as were not universal in the Stoic school itself. His leading thought is the inner freedom of man. But this is linked to two conditions, (1) the right treatment of that which is in our power, and (2) submission to that which is not in our power. In our power is the use we make of our ideas, and on this depends all virtue and happiness. All the rest is out of our power; that we must, therefore, leave to the course of the universe, and must be satisfied and happy with whatever it brings us.[1] From this standpoint Musonius judges the value of things; in harmony with his school he declares virtue to be the only good, and wickedness the only evil; everything else, riches and poverty, pleasure and pain, life and death, are indifferent;[2] he requires that we should defend ourselves against the troubles of life, not by external means but by elevation above the external, and indifference towards it;[3] that, for example, we should regard exile as no evil, but should feel ourselves at home in the whole

[1] Stob. *Ecl.* ii. 356: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔθετο ὁ θεὸς τὰ δ' οὔ. ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ σπουδαιότατον, ᾧ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων ἐστί, τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν. τοῦτο γὰρ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον ἐλευθερία ἐστὶν εὔροια εὐθυμία εὐστάθεια, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ δίκη ἐστὶ καὶ νόμος καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ξύμπασα ἀρετή. τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποιήσατο. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς συμψήφους χρὴ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι καὶ ταύτῃ διελόντας τὰ πράγματα τῶν μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πάντα τρόπον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψαι τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ εἴτε τῶν παίδων δέοιτο εἴτε τῆς πατρίδος εἴτε τοῦ σώματος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν, ἀσμένους παραχωρεῖν. Cf. *Floril.* 7, 23 (μὴ δυσχέραινε ταῖς περιστάσεσιν); *l. c.* 108, 60, where from the thought of the necessity of the course of the world and of the change of all things, is deduced the moral application that the condition of a harmonious life is the ἑκόντα δέχεσθαι τἀναγκαῖα.

[2] *Floril.* 29, 78, p. 15; cf. Gell. *N. A.* xvi. 1.

[3] *Sup.* p. 253, 2.

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His ethics.

world,[1] that we should neither seek death nor shun it.[2] In order to attain this strength of mind, however, man needs not only the most continual moral practice and the most unremitting attention to himself,[3] but also bodily hardening.[4] Musonius, therefore, admonishes us to learn to endure bodily exertions, deprivations, and hardships;[5] he desires to lead us back as much as possible, in regard to food, clothing, and domestic arrangements, to a state of nature;[6] he goes further, and with Sextius and the Neo-Pythagoreans, counsels us to avoid the eating of flesh, because this is not according to nature for man, and because, as he thinks, it engenders thick and cloudy evaporations which darken the soul and weaken the power of thought.[7] On the other hand he cannot agree with many of the

[1] Cf. the lengthy discussion ap. Stob. *Floril.* 40, 9, which finally comes to the conclusion that as banishment robs a man of neither of the four principal virtues, it robs him of no real good; it cannot injure the good man, and the bad man is injured by his wickedness and not by banishment.

[2] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 306, 4, 5. It is in entire agreement with this that Musonius (ap. Epict. *Diss.* i. 26 *sq.*) blames Thrasea because he desired death rather than exile; for we should neither, he says, choose the harder instead of the easier, nor the easier instead of the harder, but regard it as a duty ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷ δεδομένῳ. The story which Tacitus (*Ann.* xiv. 59) relates with a qualifying 'ferunt' is also quite in accordance with his spirit—that he prevented Rubellius Plautus from escaping, by means of an insurrection, the death with which Nero threatened him.

[3] Cf. Stob. *Floril.* 29, 78, and the expression (ap. Gell. *N. A.* xviii. 2, 1), *remittere animum quasi amittere est.*

[4] For the body, he says (ap. Stob. *l. c.*), must be made the serviceable tool of the mind, and with it the soul also will be strengthened.

[5] Stob. *l. c.*; Pliny, *Ep.* iii. 11, 6, praises in Artemidorus (*sup.* p. 246, 3, end), besides other excellences, his hardiness, moderation, and abstemiousness.

[6] Stob. *Floril.* 1, 84; 18, 38; 8, 20; 94, 23.

[7] *Loc. cit.* 17, 43, *sup.* 249, 2.

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Stoics who carry the self-dependence of the wise man to the point of dissuading even from marriage; he is himself a warm advocate of a connection so natural, and, in a moral point of view, so beneficial; and gives very good and wholesome precepts on the subject.[1] He sets himself still more decidedly against the immoral courses which the elder Stoics had not unconditionally excluded, for he condemned all unchastity in or out of marriage,[2] as also the custom of the repudiation and exposure of children,[3] so common in antiquity, and justified even by Plato and Aristotle. The gentle disposition which guides him in all this is also shown in the proposition that it is unworthy of man to revenge injuries, partly because such faults as a rule arise from ignorance, partly because the wise man cannot really be injured, and not the suffering but the doing of wrong is to be regarded as an evil and a disgrace.[4] When, however, he condemns on this principle the judicial indictment of offences, we recognise the onesidedness of a standpoint where elevation above external things has become indifference to them, and has degenerated into a denial of their interconnection with things within.

Epictetus.

With Musonius is connected his famous disciple

[1] *Loc. cit.* 67, 20; 69, 23; 70, 14; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 293, 2, and *sup.* p. 246, 3. He himself was married, for Artemidorus was his son-in-law (*sup.* p. 246, 3, end), and in the *Program. Anthol. Lat.* i. 79 (vol. i. 57, Burm.) Testus Avienus calls himself *Musonî soboles, lare cretus Volsiniensi.*

[2] *Loc. cit.* 6, 61.

[3] *Loc. cit.* 75, 15; 84, 21; cf. *sup.* p. 250, 1.

[4] *Loc. cit.* 19, 16; 40, 9; *Schl.* 20, 61.

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Epictetus, a Phrygian who lived in Rome under Nero and his successors, went in the reign of Domitian to Nicopolis, and seems to have died in that of Trajan.[1] In the discourses[2] of this philo-

[1] Epictetus' native city was Hierapolis in Phrygia (Suid. Ἐπίκτ.). He himself was a slave of Epaphroditus, the freedman of Nero (Suid., Epict. *Diss.* i. 19, 19; cf. i. 1, 20; i. 26, 11; Gellius, *N. A.* ii. 18, 10; Macrob. *Sat.* i. 11, 45; Simpl. in *Epict. Enchirid.* c. 9, p. 102, Heins.), weak in body and lame (Simpl. *l. c.*; cf. Epict. *Enchir.* 9; Celsus, ap. Orig. *c. Cels.* vii. 7; Suid. and others: according to Simplicius he was lame from his youth; according to Suidas he became so through sickness; according to Celsus, through the ill-treatment of his master, who may indeed have used him harshly, judging from the quotation *sup.* p. 253, 2), and lived in great poverty (Simpl. *l. c.* and on c. 33, 7, p. 272; Macrob. *l. c.*). While he was yet a slave he heard Musonius (Epict. *Diss.* i. 7, 32; 9, 29; iii. 6, 10; 23, 29). In the sequel he must have become free. Under Domitian he must have left Rome (*sup.* p. 190, 1, end) with the other philosophers (Gell. *N. A.* xv. 11, 5; Lucian, *Peregr.* 18); he betook himself to Nicopolis in Epirus (Gell. *l. c.* Suidas), where Arrian heard him (Epict. *Diss.* ii. 6, 20; 1, *Præf.*; cf. iii. 22, 52). According to Suidas and Themistocles (*Or.* v. 63, he lived until the reign of Marcus Aurelius: this, however, is chronologically impossible. Even Spartian's statement (*Hadr.* 16), that Hadrian associated with him *in summa familiaritate* is somewhat suspicious, as Hadrian's accession to the throne (117 A.D.) is more than 50 years removed from the time when Epictetus seems to have heard Musonius in Rome; but the last years of his life may nevertheless have extended to the reign of Hadrian, or this emperor may have become acquainted with him before he came to the throne. He himself makes mention of Trajan (*Diss.* iv. 5, 17; cf. iii. 13, 9). The consideration in which Epictetus was held by his contemporaries and later authorities is attested, among others, by Gellius, who calls him (ii. 18, 10) *philosophus nobilis*, and (in xviii. 194) *maximus philosophorum*; also by Marcus Aurelius (*πρ. ἑαυτ.* i. 7), who thanks his teacher, Rusticus, even in mature age, for having made him acquainted with the *Memorabilia* of Epictetus; cf. likewise Lucian, *Adv. Ind.* 13 (who relates that an admirer of Epictetus bought his earthenware candlestick for 3,000 drachmas); Simpl. in *Enchir. Præf.* p. 6 *sq.* and many others.

[2] These are the Διατριβαί and the Ἐγχειρίδιον. Arrian wrote down the former, as he says in the preface, after Epictetus as faithfully as possible, in the

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His discourses reported by Arrian.

Moral practice the end

sopher, recorded by his admirer Arrian,[1] the problem of philosophy is likewise restricted to its moral operation. According to Epictetus, to philosophise is to learn what to desire and what to avoid.[2] The beginning of philosophy is the consciousness of a man's own weakness and need of help: he who is to become good must first be convinced that he is evil.[3]

first instance for his own use, and only published them when copies of them had begun to be taken without his co-operation. The 'Handbook' he compiled later, partly from the Dissertations (Simpl. in *Epict. Man. Præf.*, according to a letter of Arrian to Massalenus). He also wrote about the life and end of Epictetus (Simpl. *l. c.*). The latter work is probably identical with the twelve books Ὁμιλίαι Ἐπικτήτου mentioned by Photius (*Cod.* 58); of the eight books of Διατριβαί, to which the same writer alludes, we have still four, and of the other numerous fragments most are in Stobæus. I quote Arrian's writings on Epictetus simply under Epictetus' name. That Epictetus himself wrote much (Suid.) is manifestly false.

[1] Flavius Arrianus (Dio Cass. lxix. 15, attests the name Flavius) was born and grew up in the Bithynian town of Nicomedia, where he was also priest of Demeter and Kore (Arrian. ap. Phot. *Cod.* 93). Under Trajan we find him with Epictetus at Nicopolis (see the two last notes and Lucian, *Alex.* 2, and elsewhere); under Hadrian, in 133 A.D., as prefect of Cappadocia, he held the hostile Albanians in check (Dio Cass. *l. c.*). He afterwards rose to the consulate (Phot. *Cod.* 58, Suid.; ἀνὴρ Ῥωμαίων ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις, he is called by Lucian, *Alex.* 2). From this we see that, though belonging to a Nicomedian family (Phot. *Cod.* 58), he possessed the right of Roman citizenship, whether he himself had received it or one of his ancestors (probably from one of the Flavian emperors). He was also an Athenian citizen, and was named after the man whom he imitated as author and general, Ξενοφῶν or νέος Ξενοφῶν (Arrian. *De Venat.* 1, 4, 5, 6; Phot. *l. c.*, Suid.). According to Phot. *l. c.* and Suid. he lived till the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Concerning his writings, cf. Fabric. *Biblioth.* v. 91 *sqq.* Harl.; Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* iii. 586. The Arrian whose meteorology is often quoted is not the Stoic; cf. Ideler, *Arist. Meteor.* i. 138.

[2] *Diss.* iii. 14, 10: καὶ σχεδὸν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστι, ζητεῖν πῶς ἐνδέχεται ἀπαραποδίστως ὀρέξει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίσει.

[3] *Diss.* ii. 11, 1: ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας παρὰ τὴν θύραν (not θήραν)

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and problem of philosophy.

The philosopher is a physician to whom the sick come, and not the healthy;[1] he must not only instruct his scholars, but help and cure them; of what use is it to display his learning before them, to develop dogmas, however true they may be, or to provoke their applause by proofs of his cleverness? The most necessary and important thing is rather that he should speak to their consciences, that he should bring them to the feeling of their wretchedness and ignorance; that he should call forth in them the first resolve of amendment; that he should make them philosophers, not in their opinions, but in their behaviour;[2] in a word, that he should produce

ἁπτομένοις αὐτῆς συναίσθησις τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀδυναμίας περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. *Fr.* 3 (Stob. *Floril.* 1, 48): εἰ βούλει ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, πίστευσον ὅτι κακὸς εἶ. Cf. Seneca, *sup.* p. 273, 2.

[1] *Diss.* iii. 23, 30: ἰατρεῖόν ἐστιν, ἄνδρες, τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον· οὐ δεῖ ἡσθέντας ἐξελθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀλγήσαντας. ἔρχεσθε γὰρ οὐχ ὑγιεῖς, &c. Cf. *Fr.* 17 (Stob. *Flor.* iv. 94), and *Musonius*, *sup.* p. 733, 2; 734, 5 *sq.*

[2] *Diss.* iii. 23, 31, Epictetus continues: You come, not as healthy people, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὦμον ἐκβεβληκὼς, ὁ δ' ἀπόστημα ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σύριγγα ἔχων, ὁ δὲ κεφαλαλγῶν. εἶτ' ἐγὼ καθίσας ὑμῖν λέγω νοημάτια καὶ ἐπιφωνημάτια, ἵν' ὑμεῖς ἐπαινέσαντές με ἐξέλθητε, ὁ μὲν τὸν ὦμον ἐκφέρων οἷον εἰσήνεγκεν, ὁ δὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, &c. And shall the young men make long journeys, leave their parents and belongings, and spend their property, only in order to applaud thy fine oratory? (Similarly iii. 21, 8.) τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἐποίει; τοῦτο Ζήνων; τοῦτο Κλεάνθης. And also (passing over other utterances), ii. 19. Epictetus is here asked what he thinks of the κυριεύων (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 230, 4), and he replies that he has as yet come to no opinion thereupon; but he knows that very much has been written about it. Has he read the treatise of Antipater on the subject? No; and he does not wish to do so: what does the reader gain from it? φλυαρότερος ἔσται καὶ ἀκαιρότερος, ἢ νῦν ἐστι. Such things are worth just as much as the learning of the grammarians about Helen and the island of Calypso. But even with ethical doctrines it is generally the same thing. Men relate to one another the principles of a Chrysippus and a Cleanthes, as they relate a history from Hel-

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on them the deep moral impression which Epictetus himself had received from Musonius, and his scholars in like manner received from Epictetus.[1]

Inferior value of theoretical knowledge.

From this point of view Epictetus could of course ascribe to theoretical knowledge, as such, only a very subordinate value; and this must especially hold good of that part of philosophy which manifestly stood in the most distant connection with ethics, namely logic. The chief thing in philosophy is the application of its doctrines; next to this stands the proof of them; only in the third rank comes

lanicus; but if somebody were to remind one of these disciples of the philosophers during a shipwreck or a trial before the emperor, that death and banishment are not evils, he would regard it as an outrageous mockery. Of what use, then, is such a philosophy? Deeds must show to what school a man belongs. But most of those who call themselves Stoics prove themselves to be rather Epicureans, or, at the most, Peripatetics of the laxest sort. Στωϊκὸν δὲ δείξατέ μοι, εἴ τινα ἔχετε . . . δείξατέ μοι τινὰ νοσοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, κινδυνεύοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, &c. ψυχὴν δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν ἀνθρώπου θέλοντος ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ . . . μὴ ὀργισθῆναι, μὴ φθονῆσαι . . . θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιθυμοῦντα γενέσθαι . . . δείξατε. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχετε. τί οὖν αὐτοῖς ἐμπαίζετε; &c. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν παιδευτής εἰμι ὑμέτερος· ὑμεῖς δὲ παρ' ἐμοὶ παιδεύεσθε. My purpose is, ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκωλύτους, ἀναναγκάστους, ἀπαραποδίστους, ἐλευθέρους, εὐροοῦντας, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ. Your purpose is to learn this. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύεται; εἴπατέ μοι τὴν αἰτίαν. It can only lie in you, or in me, or in both. τί οὖν; θέλετε ἀρξώμεθά ποτε τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν κομίζειν ἐνταῦθα· τὰ μέχρι νῦν ἀφῶμεν· ἀρξώμεθα μόνον, πιστεύσατέ μοι καὶ ὄψεσθε. A further example of the manner in which Epictetus admonished his pupils is given in *Diss.* i. 9, 10–21.

[1] Concerning Musonius, *vide sup.* p. 252; concerning Epictetus, Arrian, *Diss. Præf.* 8 *sq.*: ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγων αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δῆλος ἦν ἐφιέμενος, ὅτι μὴ κινῆσαι τὰς γνώμας τῶν ἀκουόντων πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα. If his discourses, as reported by Arrian, did not accomplish this, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴστωσαν οἱ ἐντυγχάνοντες, ὅτι, αὐτὸς ὅπότε ἔλεγεν αὐτοὺς, ἀνάγκη ἦν τοῦτο πάσχειν τὸν ἀκροώμενον αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸν παθεῖν ἠβούλετο.

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the doctrine of proof, the scientific method, for that is only necessary on account of the proof, and proofs are only necessary on account of their application.[1] However useful and indispensable, therefore, logic may be in order to protect us from fallacies, and though accuracy and thoroughness are undoubtedly necessary in its pursuit,[2] yet logic cannot be an end in itself; the question is not that we should be able to explain Chrysippus and solve dialectic difficulties, but that we should know and follow the will of nature, that we should attain the right in what we do and avoid;[3] the only unconditioned end is virtue; dialectic is a tool in its service,[4] the art of speech is merely a subordinate help, which has nothing to do with philosophy as such.[5] In accordance with these principles, Epictetus seems to have occupied himself very little with dialectic questions; at any rate the written records of his doctrine contain not a single logical or dialectical discussion. Even the refutation of scepticism gives him little concern; he declares it to be the greatest stubbornness to deny self-evident things; he says he has not

[1] *Man.* c. 52. Epictetus elsewhere (*Diss.* iii. 2; ii. 17; 15 *sq.* 29 *sq.*) distinguishes three problems of philosophy: the first and most necessary is that it should set us free from our passions; the second, that it should make us acquainted with our duties; the third that it should strengthen our convictions with irrefragable proofs; and he insists that we should not trouble ourselves about this last point unless we are clear about the two first.

[2] *Diss.* i. 7; c. 17; ii. 25; *vide sup.* p. 248, 1.

[3] *Diss.* i. 4, 5 *sqq.*; ii. 17, 27 *sqq.*; iii. 2; c. 21, 1 *sqq.*; ii. 19 *sqq.* (*vide* previous note); c. 18, 17 *sq.*; *Man.* 46.

[4] *Diss.* i. 7, 1; *Man.* 52.

[5] *Diss.* i. 8, 4 *sqq.*; ii. 23.

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time to contend with such objections; for his part he has never taken hold of a broom when he wished to take up a loaf of bread; he finds that the sceptics themselves act in the same way, and put food into the mouth and not into the eye;[1] finally he encounters them with the old reproach that they cannot deny the possibility of knowledge without maintaining its impossibility.[2] Of the proper signification of scepticism and of the necessity of its scientific refutation he has no idea. He is just as little concerned about the investigations of natural philosophy; indeed, he expressly agrees with the saying of Socrates, that enquiry into the ultimate constituents and causes of things passes our understanding, and could have no value in any case.[3] If, therefore, he generally presupposes the Stoic theory of the universe, he not only institutes no independent inquiries in that sphere, but even in the doctrines of his school there are very few points—only the universal bases of the Stoic conception of the world, and especially the theological definitions—which attract his attention. He is full of the thought of God, who knows our

[1] *Diss.* i. 5; 27, 15 *sqq.*; ii. 20, 28.

[2] *Diss.* ii. 20, 1 *sqq.*

[3] *Fr.* 75 (Stob. *Flor.* 80, 14): *τί μοι μέλει, φησί, πότερον ἐξ ἀτόμων, ἢ ἐξ ὁμοιομερῶν, ἢ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς συνέστηκε τὰ ὄντα; οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ*, &c. *τὰ δ' ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς χαίρειν ἐᾶν; ἄτινα τυχὸν μὲν ἀκατάληπτά ἐστιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ γνώμῃ· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα θείη τις εἶναι καταληπτά, ἀλλ' οὖν τί ὄφελος καταληφθέντων*, &c. This discussion professes to be a commentary on the Socratic theory, as we see by the word *φησί*, which is afterwards repeated; but it is nevertheless unmistakable that Epictetus adopts the same standpoint himself.

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Religious view of the world.

words and intentions, from whom comes all good, in whose service the philosopher stands, without whose commission he may not go to his work, whom he should have always before his eyes.[1] He proves the guidance of Providence by the unity, order, and interconnection of the universe;[2] he praises the paternal care of God for men, the moral perfection which makes Him a pattern for us.[3] He recognises in the world the work of God, who has ordered all for the best: has made the whole perfect and faultless and formed all its parts to correspond with the necessity of the whole, has destined all men to happiness and furnished them with the conditions of it;[4] he extols, in the spirit of his school, the adaptation of means to ends in the universe, which he says meets us so clearly at every step that our whole life should be an unceasing song of praise to the Deity;[5] and, like his school, he condescends to point out this adaptation even in the smallest and most external things;[6] he does not allow himself to be disturbed in his faith even by the apparent evils and injustices in the world, having learned from the Stoa to reconcile these also with the perfection of God and his works.[7] This belief in Providence, however, Epictetus, in the true fashion of the Stoics, always refers primarily to the universe,

[1] I shall recur to this later on. Meanwhile, cf. *Diss.* 22, 2; 23, 53; 21, 18; ii. 14, 11, 18, 19; 19, 29; i. 16.

[2] *Diss.* i. 14, 16; *Man.* 31, 1.

[3] *Diss.* i. 6, 40; 9, 7; ii. 14, 11 *sqq.*

[4] *Diss.* iv. 7, 6; iii. 24, 2 *sq.*

[5] *Diss.* i. 16.

[6] Cf. *Diss.* i. 16, 9 *sqq.* and *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 172, end.

[7] *Ibid.* III. i. 175, 4; 178, 2; and *infra*, p. 271, 1.

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and to the individual only so far as is determined by the interdependence of the whole; when he counsels submission to the will of God, this coincides, in his sense with the demand that man should conform to the order of nature.[1] Things, he says, with Musonius, cannot happen otherwise than as they do happen; we cannot withdraw ourselves from under the law of change to which the heavenly bodies and the elements are subject;[2] against the universal order which all things serve and obey we ought not to rebel.[3] So also he expressly mentions the doctrine which most strongly asserts that nothing individual is more than a transient moment in the flux of the whole—the doctrine of the conflagration of the world.[4] And as the religious conviction of Epictetus allies itself on this side to physics, so on the other side it allies itself, like Stoicism, to the popular religion. Stoic pantheism with him also includes polytheism; the derived divine natures are to be distinguished from the primal divine nature;[5] and if all things

[1] *Diss.* i. 12, 15 *sq.* 28 *sq.*; ii. 5, 24 *sqq.*; 6, 9 *sqq.*

[2] In the fragment mentioned *sup.* p. 248, 3, which begins thus: ὅτι τοιαύτη ἡ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται· καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως γίγνεσθαι τὰ γιγνόμενα, ἢ ὡς νῦν ἔχει.

[3] *Fr.* 136 (Stob. *Floril.* 108, 66: πάντα ὑπακούει τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ ὑπηρετεῖ—earth, sea, stars, plants, animals, our own bodies. Our judgment alone cannot be set up in opposition to it. καὶ γὰρ ἰσχυρός ἐστι καὶ κρείσσων, καὶ ἄμεινον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν βεβούλευται, μετὰ τῶν ὅλων καὶ ἡμᾶς συνδιοικῶν. With Epictetus also, as with his whole school, God coincides with the universe.

[4] *Diss.* iii. 13, 4 *sqq.*, where, as in Sen. *Ep.* 9, 16, the condition of Zeus after the universal conflagration is described.

[5] Hence he says in *Diss.* iv. 12, 11: ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω τίνι με δεῖ ἀρέσκειν, τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι· τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκεῖνον (ii. 17, 25): τῷ Διΐ . . .

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are full of divine powers, so are they full of gods and dæmons.[1] The beneficence of these gods we continually enjoy in all that we receive from nature and from other men; to deny them is the more unjustifiable, the greater is the injury that we thereby cause to so many.[2] Yet the relation of Epictetus to the popular religion is, on the whole, very independent; accordingly he seldom mentions the popular gods, and then only casually, without further committing himself to the allegorical interpretations of his school, but prefers to speak in a general manner of the gods or the deity, or even of Zeus; he retains indeed, with Socrates, the principle of honouring the gods according to our power, after the manner of antiquity,[3] but he also knows very well that the true service of God consists in knowledge and virtue;[4] the fables about the underworld, the worship of hostile beings he blames;[5] and if he does not attack the belief in soothsaying, he demands that men should be able to dispense with prophecy, that they should make use of it without fear and desire, being previously in harmony with the result, and should not first enquire of the

τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, and iii. 13, 4 *sq.*), besides Zeus, Here, Athene, Apollo, and, generally speaking, the gods, who do not survive the conflagration of the world.

[1] *Diss.* iii. 13, 15: πάντα θεῶν μεστὰ καὶ δαιμόνων.

[2] *Loc. cit.* ii. 20, 32 *sqq.*, where, as examples of gods the denial of whom is censured by Euripides, Demeter, Kore, and Pluto are named; but the Stoic unmistakably reserves to himself the traditional interpretation of these gods in the φυσικὸς λόγος.

[3] *Man.* 31, 5.

[4] *Man.* 31, 1; cf. *Diss.* ii. 18, 19; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 311, 1.

[5] *Diss.* iii. 13, 15; i. 19, 6; 22, 16.

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soothsayer, where the fulfilment of a duty is in question.[1]

Man an emanation from God.

To Epictetus the belief in the kinship of the human spirit to God is of the highest value; man should be aware of his higher nature; he should regard himself as a son of God, as a part and emanation of the deity, in order to gain from this thought the feeling of his dignity, of his moral responsibility, his independence of all things external, brotherly love to his fellow men, and the consciousness of his citizenship in the universe;[2] and in the same sense Epictetus, after the manner of his school, also employs the conception of dæmons, understanding by them merely the divine in man.[3] On the other hand we vainly seek in him for more minute anthropological enquiries; even the question of immortality is only mentioned casually, and if from his utterances on the subject we gather that (departing from the Stoic dogma) he disbelieved in a personal existence after death, utterances of his are also to be found which logically lead to the opposite theory.[4] Nor is the question of the

[1] *Diss.* ii. 7; *Man.* 32.

[2] *Diss.* i. 3; c. 9; c. 12, 26 *sqq.*; c. 13, 3; c. 14, 5 *sqq.*; ii. 8, 11 *sqq.*; iv. 7, 7 *sq.*; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 200, 2.

[3] *Diss.* i. 14, 12 *sqq.*; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 319, 2.

[4] Epictetus' view of the destiny of the soul after death is not easy to state. On the one hand he treats the soul (this aspect will be spoken of again later on) as an essence which is, from the commencement, alien to the body, longs to leave it and to return to its original state. Thus in *Fr.* 176 (ap M. Aurel. iv. 41): ψυχάριον εἶ, βαστάζον νεκρόν; cf. *Diss.* ii. 19, 27: ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ νεκρῷ, *l. c.* i. 19, 9; but especially *Diss.* i. 9, 10 *sqq.* He thought that they (he here says to his disciples) ἐπιγνόντες τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συγγένειαν, καὶ ὅτι δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ . . . would wish to shake off this burden, καὶ ἀπελθεῖν πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς, that they would say to him, οὐκέτι ἀνεχόμεθα μετὰ τοῦ σωματίου τούτου δεδεμένοι . . . οὐκ . . . συγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ θεοῦ ἐσμεν κακεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν, ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ὅθεν ἐληλύσαμεν· ἄφες λυθῆναί ποτε τῶν δεσμῶν τούτων, that he, for his part, would have to remind them that they must await the call of God, and when that came to them, he should have to say, τότ' ἀπολύεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν. According to these utterances we should have supposed that Epictetus believed with Plato and the majority of the Stoics, that the soul after death was transferred to a better life with God. Other passages, however, render it doubtful whether he meant by this a personal existence. He says (*Diss.* iii. 13, 14), when God no longer grants to a man his subsistence in life, we should regard this as if He opened the door and called to him to come; and to the question 'whither?' this is the answer: εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν. ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἐγένου, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ πυρός, εἰς πῦρ ἄπεισιν· ὅσον ἦν γηδίου, εἰς γήδιον· ὅσον πνευματίου, εἰς πνευμάτιον· ὅσον ὑδατίου, εἰς ὑδάτιον. What becomes of the soul we do not learn; but as, on the supposition of its personal continuance, this was to be said before all things, we can only conclude that Epictetus made the soul also pass into the elements, fire and air; among the Stoics the soul was universally described as Pneuma or as fire, and Epictetus would not herein have diverged from his school; the faculty of sight, according to the Stoic doctrine an emanation of the ἡγεμονικόν, is expressly described in *Diss.* ii. 23, 3, as a Pneuma inherent in the eye. The same theory results from *Diss.* iii. 24, 93: τοῦτο θάνατος, μεταβολὴ μείζων, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ νῦν μὴ ὄν. οὐκέτι οὖν ἔσομαι; οὐκ ἔσῃ, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, οὗ νῦν ὁ κόσμος χρείαν ἔχει. Here the continued existence of man is certainly asserted, but it is not a personal existence; it is merely a continuance of his substance; he becomes ἄλλο τι, another individual.

[1] It is also plain from this that Epictetus places the superiority of man over the animals not in free will but in consciousness (the δύναμις παρακολουθητική); *Diss.* i. 6, 12 *sqq.*; ii. 8, 4 *sqq.*

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freedom of the will discussed with any exactitude; it seems, however, probable that Epictetus did not depart from the fatalism of his school[1] since he constantly insists that all faults are involuntary and merely a consequence of incorrect notions, for it is impossible not to desire what a man holds

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to be a good.[1] How this fatalism is to be combined with moral precepts and exigencies is nowhere indicated by our philosopher.

Ethics based on immediate consciousness.

But even in ethics we must not expect from Epictetus any more searching investigation. He who confines himself in philosophy to the practically useful, and carries on theoretic enquiry only as an accessory and means to this, is necessarily, even in his moral doctrine, devoid of any proper scientific foundation and mode of treatment; it only remains for him, therefore, to found that doctrine, in the last resort, upon immediate consciousness. Thus Epictetus, like his teacher Musonius, assures us that the universal moral conceptions and principles are innate in all men, and that all are agreed about them; the strife relates merely to their application in given cases. Philosophy has only to develop these natural conceptions and teach us to include the individual rightly under them: for instance, under the idea of good we are not to place pleasure or riches, and so forth. Here it is indeed acknowledged that the innate ideas do not suffice for themselves alone; and that in their application deceptive opinion is intermingled;[2] but since, as Epictetus believes, there is no strife concerning the universal conceptions, he hopes to put an end

[1] *Diss.* i. 18, 1–7; 28, 1–10; ii. 26; iii. 3, 2; iii. 7, 15. It forms no contradiction to the above when Epictetus says again (*Fr.* 180; ap. Gell. xix. 1) that acquiescence is an affair of our free will; for the Stoics, notwithstanding their fatalism, maintained the same.

[2] *Diss.* i. 22, 1 *sq.* 9; ii. 11; c. 17, 1–13.

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to the discord of moral presentations in the simple Socratic manner, starting from that which is universally acknowledged, by means of short dialectic discussions;[1] the scholastic argumentations, the systematic treatment of ethics, seem to him, not, indeed, worthless, so far as they serve to confirm our conviction, but at the same time not indispensable.

Independence of things external.

If we would enter somewhat more closely into the content of Epictetus' ethical doctrine, we may point out, as its fundamental feature, the endeavour to make man free and happy by restriction to his moral nature; from which proceeds the double demand to bear all external events with unconditional submission, and to renounce all appetites and wishes directed towards the external. This, according to Epictetus, is the commencement and sum of all wisdom—that we should know how to discriminate what is in our power and what is not in our power;[2] he is a born philosopher who desires absolutely nothing but to live free and not to be afraid of any event that may happen.[3] Only one thing is in our power—namely, our will, or what is the same, the employment of our notions and ideas; everything else, whatever it may be called, is for us an external, a thing that is not in our power.[4] Only this should have, therefore, any

[1] *Loc. cit.* especially ii. 11, and ii. 12, 5 *sq.*

[2] Cf. *sup.* p. 261, 1.

[3] *Man.* i. 1; 48, 1; *Diss.* i. 1; 21, 22, 9 *sq.*; cf. what is quoted by Musonius from the mouth of Epictetus, *sup.* p. 254, 1.

[4] *Diss.* ii. 17, 29; cf. 1, 4, 18. Cf. *sup.* note 3, and *Man.*

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value for us, only in it should we seek goods and evils, happiness and unhappiness;[1] and this we can do, for things external do not concern ourselves;[2] our will, our proper essential nature, nothing in the world, not even the deity, can coerce;[3] only on the will depends our happiness; it is not external things as such that make us happy, but only our conceptions of things; and the question is not how our external circumstances are shaped, but whether we know how to govern and employ our notions.[4] So long as we desire or avoid anything external to ourselves we depend upon fortune; if we have perceived what is ours and what is not, we restrict ourselves with our wishes to our own rational nature, we direct our efforts and counter efforts,[5] to nothing which does not depend on ourselves: then we are free and happy, and no fate can have any hold upon us; happen what will, it can never affect us and that on which our well-being depends.[6] And the more completely we have made ourselves thus independent in our minds of the external, the

6; *Diss.* i. 25, 1; 12, 34; ii. 5, *sq.*; iii. 3, 1; 14 *sqq.*; iv. 1, 100, &c.

[1] *Vide* preceding note and *Man.* 19; *Diss.* iii. 22, 38 *sqq.*; ii. 1, 4; i. 20, 7 &c.

[2] *Diss.* i. 1, 21 *sqq.*; c. 18, 17; 29, 24; ii. 5, 4; *Man.* c. 9, and elsewhere.

[3] *Diss.* i. 1, 23; 17, 27; ii. 23, 19; iii. 3, 10.

[4] *Man.* 5, 16, 20; *Diss.* i. 1, 7 *sqq.*; ii. 1, 4; c. 16, 24: iii. 3, 18; 26, 34 *sq.* and elsewhere. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 224, 1.

[6] *Man.* 1, 2, 19; *Diss.* i. 1, 7 *sqq.*; 21 *sqq.*; c. 18, 17; 19, 7; 22, 10 *sqq.*; 25, 1 *sqq.*; ii. 1, 4; 5, 4; 23, 16 *sqq.*; iii. 22, 38; iv. 4, 23 *et pass.*; Gell. *N. A.* xvii. 19, 5, where there is a quotation from Epictetus to the effect that the worst vices are impatience towards the faults of others, and intemperance in enjoyments and in all things; the art of living happily and without faults is contained in two words, *ἀνέχου* and *ἀπέχου*.

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clearer it will become that all that happens is necessary in the interdependence of things, and so far according to nature we shall acknowledge that to each event a moral activity may be linked, and that even misfortune may be used as a means of training; we shall for this reason submit unconditionally to our destiny and hold what God wills to be better than what we will, and feel ourselves free precisely herein, that we are satisfied with all as it is and happens; the course of the universe will correspond with our wishes, because we have received it unaltered into our wills.[1] Even the hardest experiences will not disturb the wise man in this temper; not only his property, his person, his health, and life, but even his friends, his belongings, his fatherland, he will consider as something that is merely lent, and not given, to him, and the loss of which does not affect his inner nature;[2] and as little will he permit himself to be troubled by the faults of others in his peace of mind; he will not expect that those belonging to him should be free from faults;[3] he will not require

[1] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 303, 1; 304, 1; *Man.* 8, 10, 53; *Diss.* i. 6, 37 *sqq.*; 12, 4 *sqq.*; 24, 1; ii. 5, 24 *sqq.*; 6, 10; 10, 4 *sq.*; 16, 42 *sqq.*; iii. 20; IV. i. 99, 131; 7, 20, and elsewhere. It is consistent with this principle that Epictetus, who with his school regarded suicide as the refuge kept open in the last resort, only allows it when circumstances unequivocally demand it (*vide Diss.* i. 24, 20; 9, 16; ii. 15, 4 *sqq.*; 6, 22; iii. 24, 95 *sqq.*

[2] *Man.* i. 1; c. 3; c. 11; c. 14; *Diss.* i. 15; 22, 10; iii. 3, 5, and elsewhere.

[3] *Man.* 12; 1, 14. Still less can natural compassion as to the external misfortunes of other men be permitted, though Epictetus is human and inconsistent enough to allow the *expression* of sympathy (*Man.* 16).

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that no wrong should be committed against himself: he holds the greatest criminal to be merely an unhappy and deluded man with whom he dares not be angry,[1] for he finds that all about which most men excite themselves, is grounded in the nature of things. Thus does man win freedom here by withdrawing with his will and endeavour absolutely into himself, while he accepts on the contrary all external events with perfect resignation as an unavoidable destiny.

Inclination of Epictetus to Cynicism.

We cannot deny that these principles on the whole are Stoic, but at the same time we cannot help feeling that the spirit which pervades the morality of Epictetus is not quite the same as that of the earlier Stoicism. On the one hand our philosopher inclines to Cynicism, when, as we have seen, he speaks disparagingly of theoretic science; when he carries his indifference to the external and submission to the course of the world so far that the distinction of that which is according to nature and contrary to it, that which is desirable and objectionable—which was the doctrine chiefly distinguishing the Stoic morality from the Cynic—for him almost entirely loses its meaning;[2] when he

[1] *Diss.* i. 18; c. 28.

[2] That distinction, he says in *Diss.* ii. 5, 24 *sq.*, only holds good so far as man is regarded for himself irrespective of his place in the interconnection of nature; τί εἰ; ἄνθρωπος. εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀπόλυτον σκοπεῖς, κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ζῆσαι μέχρι γήρως, πλουτεῖν, ὑγιαίνειν· εἰ δ' ὡς ἄνθρωπον σκοπεῖς καὶ μέρος ὅλου τινός, δι' ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον νῦν μέν σοι νοσῆσαι καθήκει, νῦν δὲ πλεῦσαι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, νῦν δ' ἀπορηθῆναι, πρὸ ὥρας δ' ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποθανεῖν. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς; . . . ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ σώματι, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ περιέχοντι, τούτοις τοῖς συζῶσι, μὴ συμπίπτειν ἄλλοις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. σὺν οὖν ἔργον, ἐλέόντα εἰπεῖν ἃ δεῖ, διαθέσθαι ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιβάλλει. What falls to a

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finds it dignified to disdain even those external goods which fate offers us without our co-operation;[1] when in his exaltation above mental emotions he advances to insensibility;[2] when he forbids us to feel compassion and sympathy for our fellow-creatures, at any rate in regard to their outward condition;[3] when he believes that the perfected wise man will keep himself from marriage and the begetting of children in the ordinary condition of human society, because they withdraw him from his higher vocation, make him dependent on other men and their necessities, and have no value for a teacher of humanity, as compared with his

man as his lot (as was said in c. 3; cf. c. 6, 1) is immaterial: τῷ πεσόντι δ' ἐπιμελῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο ἤδη ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστίν. In such observations Epictetus to a certain extent is anticipated by Chrysippus, from whom he quotes these words (*Diss.* ii. 6, 9): μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ᾖ τὰ ἐξῆς, ἀεὶ τῶν εὐφυεστέρων ἔχομαι πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· αὐτὸς γάρ μ' ὁ θεὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐκλεκτικὸν ἐποίησεν. εἰ δέ γε ἤδειν ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρμων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηλοῦσθαι. In a system so strictly fatalistic as that of the Stoics, only a relative value could be allowed to the opposition of 'contrary to nature' and 'according to nature'; from the standpoint of the whole, all that happens appears according to nature, because necessary. But as the ancient Stoics were not deterred from action by their fatalism, neither did they allow it to interfere with their conviction of the different relative values of things; without which no choice among them, and consequently no action, would be possible (Cic. *Fin.* iii. 15, 50). If that conclusion is more prominent in Epictetus, so that he approximates to the complete indifference of Aristo and the Cynics, this only shows the whole character of his ethical theory of life, in which the Stoic withdrawal from the external world becomes total indifference to that world, and submission to destiny becomes inactive sufferance, or tends to it.

[1] *Man.* 15.

[2] *Diss.* iii. 12, 10. Accustom thyself to bear injuries: εἶθ' οὕτω προβήσῃ, ἵνα κἂν πλήξῃ σέ τις εἴπῃς αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτόν ὅτι· δόξον ἀνδριάντας περιειληφέναι.

[3] *Vide sup.* p. 271, 3.

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His gentle disposition.

spiritual posterity;[1] when he dissuades us from taking part in political life, because for him every human community in comparison with the great state of the universe is too small;[2] when, finally, he develops his philosophic ideal under the name and in the form of Cynicism.[3] But, on the other hand, there unquestionably reigns in Epictetus a milder and gentler temper than in the older Stoa: the philosopher does not oppose himself to the unphilosophical world with that haughty self-confidence which challenges it to battle; resignation to the unavoidable is his first principle. He comes forward not as the angry preacher of morals who reproves the perversity of men in the bitter tone of the well-known Stoic propositions about fools, but as the loving physician who desires indeed to heal their diseases, but rather sympathises with than

[1] *Diss.* iii. 22, 67 *sqq.*; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 296. Epictetus himself was unmarried (Lucian, *Demon.* 55; cf. Simpl. in *Epict. Enchir.* c. 33, 7, p. 272). In iii. 7, 19; i. 23, 4 *sq.* he reproaches the Epicureans that their repudiation of marriage and of political life undermines human society, and in Lucian (*l. c.*) he admonishes Demonax the Cynic to found a family, *πρέπειν γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο φιλοσόφῳ ἀνδρὶ ἕτερον ἀνθ' αὑτοῦ καταλιπεῖν τῇ φύσει* (to which Demonax replied: 'Very good! Give me then one of your daughters!'). But this is only the same contradiction which we might everywhere find in the Stoic treatment of these questions. The principle of life according to nature and the necessity of human society demand family life; the independence and self-sufficingness of the wise man forbid it. With Epictetus, however, the latter point of view manifestly predominates, and thus there results a doctrine similar to that which prevailed at this time, and subsquently in the Catholic Church: marriage is recommended, but celibacy is considered better and higher, and is advised for all those who profess to be teachers in the service of God.

[2] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 296, 3.

[3] *Vide Diss.* iii. 22; iv. 8, 30; i. 24, 6.

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Universal love of mankind.

accuses them, who is not irritated even by the greatest wrong, but prefers to excuse it as an involuntary error.[1] When our connection with other men and the duties arising from it is in question, Epictetus represents these relations chiefly from the emotional side, as an affair of the affectionate temperament: we should fulfil our duties to the gods, to those belonging to us, and to our fellow-citizens, for we ought not to be without feeling, as if we were made of stone;[2] we should treat all men, even if they are our slaves, as brothers, for they all descend equally from God;[3] even to those who ill-treat us we ought not to refuse the love of

[1] *Vide*, besides the passages quoted *sup.* p. 259, 1, the quotations p. 268, 1; for example (i. 18, 3): *τί ἔτι πολλοῖς χαλεπαίνομεν; κλέπται, φησίν, εἰσὶ καὶ λωποδύται. τί ἔστι τὸ κλέπται καὶ λοποδύται; πεπλάνηνται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. χαλεπαίνειν οὖν δεῖ αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐλεεῖν αὐτούς;* There is no greater unhappiness than to be in error concerning the most important questions, and not to have a rightly constituted will; why be angry with those who have this unhappiness? We should rather compassionate them. And finally, we are only angry with them because we cannot free ourselves from dependence on the things of which they deprive us: *μὴ θαύμαζε σου τὰ ἱμάτια καὶ τῷ κλέπτῃ οὐ χαλεπανεῖς· μὴ θαύμαζε τὸ κάλλος τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τῷ μοιχῷ οὐ χαλεπανεῖς . . . μέχρι δ' ἂν ταῦτα θαυμάζῃς, σεαυτῷ χαλέπαινε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνοις.*

[2] *Diss.* iii. 2, 4. The first is being without passions or affections; the second is the fulfilment of duty: *οὐ δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ ὡς ἀνδριάντα*, &c.

[3] *Diss.* i. 13, where Epictetus exclaims to the master who is violent towards his slaves: *ἀνδράποδον, οὐκ ἀνέξῃ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ σαυτοῦ ὃς ἔχει τὸν Δία πρόγονον, ὥσπερ υἱὸς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σπερμάτων γέγονε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄνωθεν καταβολῆς; . . . οὐ μεμνήσῃ τίς εἶ καὶ τίνων ἄρχεις; ὅτι συγγενῶν, ὅτι ἀδελφῶν φύσει, ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς ἀπογόνων; . . . ὁρᾷς ποῦ βλέπεις; ὅτι εἰς τοὺς ταλαιπώρους τούτους νόμους τοὺς τῶν νεκρῶν; εἰς δὲ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν οὐ βλέπεις;* cf. Sen. *Benef.* iii. 18–28; *De Clement.* i. 18, 2; *Ep.* 31, 11; *Vit. Beat.* 24, 3; Musonius ap. Stob. *Floril.* 40, 9; *Ep.* 44; *Diss.* iii. 22, 83; i. 9.

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a father or a brother.[1] How this disposition is connected with the religious temperament of Epictetus and how from this starting-point a divergence from the older Stoicism is inevitable, even in the theoretical part of philosophy, will be discussed further on.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus

The greatest admirer of Epictetus was Marcus Aurelius Antoninus,[2] and in his apprehension of

[1] *Diss.* iii. 22, 54: δαίρεσθαι δεῖ αὐτὸν (the Cynic, the truly wise man) ὡς ὄνον καὶ δαιρόμενον φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς τοὺς δαίροντας, ὡς πατέρα πάντων, ὡς ἀδελφόν; cf. *Fr.* 70; ap. Stob. *Floril.* 20, 61; and concerning other Cynics who express themselves in the same manner, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 299, 4.

[2] M. Annius Verus (for so he was originally called) was born on the 25th of April, 121 A.D., in Rome (Capitolin. *Ant. Philos.* 1), where his family, which had emigrated with his great grandfather out of Spain, had attained a high rank (*l. c.*). His careful education was forwarded by his own anxiety to learn; philosophy very early attracted him, and already in his twelth year he assumed the garb of a philosopher and prescribed to himself abstinences which he only curtailed at the entreaties of his mother (*l. c.* c. 2). His teachers he loaded with proofs of his gratitude and respect, even when he became Emperor (*l. c.* c. 3; cf. *Ant. Pi.* 10; Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 9; and Dio Cass. lxxi. 1, who relate the same of Sextus as Capitolinus relates of Apollonius; cf. *sup.* p. 197, note). The philosophers whose instructions he attended were, besides the above mentioned, Stoics (*l. c.*); Sextus, the Platonist, of Chaeronea, nephew of Plutarch (M. Aurel. i. 9; Capitol. 3; Dio and Philostr. *l. c.*; Eutrop. viii. 12; Suid. Μάρκ.); Alexander (M. Aurel. i. 12; Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 5, 2 *sq.*), but this last only at a later period; and Claudius Severus, the Peripatetic (Capitol. 3). Among the earlier philosophers none made a deeper impression upon him than Epictetus, as we have already seen (*sup.* p. 738, 1; according to M. Aur. i. 7. Adopted by order of Hadrian (concerning his predilection for him, *vide* Capitol. i. 4; Dio Cass. lxix. 15) by Antoninus Pius, he took the name of Marcus Aurelius after he had borne that of his maternal grandfather Catilius for a while. On his accession to the throne the surname of Antoninus was also added (Capitol. i. 5, 7; Dio Cass. *l. c.*). His later life belongs to Roman imperial history, which exhibits to us on the throne of the Cæsars many more powerful princes, but none of nobler and purer character, no man of gentler disposition, stricter conscientiousness, and faithfulness to duty. I refer, therefore, to Dio Cassius (B. lxxi.), Capitolinus (*Ant. Philos.*; *Ant. Pius. Ver. Imp.*), Vulcatius (Avid. Cass.), and the well-known authorities for that part of Roman history; and in this place will only shortly mention the rare and peculiar relation in which Marcus Aurelius as Cæsar and actual coregent stood to his equally excellent father-in law and adopted father (136–161), to whom he himself (i. 16; vi. 30) in his meditations has raised so beautiful a monument. His own reign was disturbed by great public misfortunes (famine and plague in Rome, 165, 6 A.D.), difficult wars (with the Parthians in 162 A.D., the Marcomanni, 166 *sqq.* and 178 *sqq.*), dangerous insurrections (the Bucoli in Egypt in 170; Avidius Cassius in Syria, 175); and embittered by the indolence of his colleague Verus (died 172 A.D.), the immorality of his wife Faustina, and the wickedness and excesses of his son Commodus. On the 17th of March 180 A.D. Marcus Aurelius died at Vienna during the expedition against the Marcomanni; according to Dio Cass. c. 33, of poison, which his son had caused to be administered to him. A monument of his character and his philosophy remains in the aphoristic memoranda, chiefly written in his later years, which in the MSS. bear the title εἰς ἑαυτὸν or καθ' ἑαυτὸν, but are also quoted under other designations (Bach, p. 6). More recent monographs concerning him are the following: N. Bach, *De Marc. Aur. Anton.* Leipzig, 1826; Dörgens, *vide sup.* p. 202, 1; Zeller, *Vortr. und Abhandl.* i. 89 *sqq.*; Cless *M. Aurelius Selbstgespräche übers. und erläut.* Stuttgard, 1866. And others in Ueberweg, *Grundr.* i. 223.

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resembles Epictetus in his practical view of philosophy.

Stoicism, as well as in his whole mode of thought, he approximates very closely to him. Like Epictetus he generally presupposes the Stoic doctrine, but only those determinations of it which stand in close relation to the moral and religious life possess any interest for him. He does not feel called upon to be a dialectician or a physicist;[1] and though he admits the value of these sciences in general,[2] he is

[1] vii. 67: καὶ μὴ, ὅτι ἀπήλπικας διαλεκτικὸς καὶ φυσικὸς ἔσεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπογνῷς, καὶ ἐλεύθερος καὶ αἰδήμων καὶ κοινωνικὸς καὶ εὐπειθὴς θεῷ.

[2] So he says in viii. 13, in agreement with the Stoic triple division of philosophy: διηνεκῶς καὶ ἐπὶ πάσης, εἰ οἷόν τε, φαντασίας φυσιολογεῖν, παθολογεῖν, διαλεκτικεύεσθαι.

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nevertheless of opinion that a man may attain his proper destination without much knowledge.[1] The important thing is not that he should search out all things above and beneath the earth, but that he should commune with the dæmon within him and serve him in sincerity;[2] the greater are the difficulties which oppose themselves to the investigation of the Real, the more should a man hold to that which in the changefulness of things and of opinions can alone give us calm—to the conviction that nothing can happen to us which is not according to the nature of the universe, and that none can oblige us to act against our conscience.[3] It is only with these practical convictions, therefore, that he is concerned in his study of philosophy. Philosophy must give us a fixed support in the flux of phenomena, and supply a defence against the vanity of all finite things. 'What is human life?' he asks. A dream and an exhalation, a strife and a wandering in a strange land. Only one thing can guide us through it—namely, philosophy. This consists in our keeping the dæmon within us pure and clear, exalted above pleasure and pain, independent of the conduct of others; in our receiving all that happens to us as sent by God, and awaiting the natural end of our existence with cheerfulness and courage.[1] The problem of philosophy lies, therefore, in the forming of a man's character and the calming of his mind; only according to their relation to this problem is the value of scientific enquiries and dogmas to be estimated.

[1] *Vide* 277, 1; cf. i. 17, where he reckons among the benefits of the gods that he did not make greater progress in oratory and poetry and such studies which otherwise might have exclusively occupied him, and that when he applied himself to philosophy he refrained from ἀποκαθίσαι ἐπὶ τοὺς συγγραφεῖς, ἢ συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν, ἢ περὶ τὰ μετεωρολογικὰ καταγίνεσθαι.

[2] ii. 13; cf. ii. 2, 3: ἄφες τὰ βιβλία . . . τὴν δὲ τῶν βιβλίων δόξαν βίψον.

[3] v. 10: τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐν τοιαύτῃ τρόπον τινὰ ἐγκαλύψει ἐστὶν, ὥστε φιλοσόφοις οὐκ ὀλίγοις, οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν, ἔδοξε παντάπασιν ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι. πλὴν αὐτοῖς γε τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δυσκατάληπτα δοκεῖ· καὶ πᾶσα ἡ ἡμετέρα συγκατάθεσις μεταπτωτή· ποῦ γὰρ ὁ ἀμετάπτωτος; If we go further with external things, they are all transitory and worthless; if we consider men, even the best are scarcely endurable: ἐν τοιούτῳ οὖν ζόφῳ καὶ ῥύπῳ καὶ τοσαύτῃ ῥύσει . . . τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκτιμηθῆναι, ἢ τὸ ὅλως σπουδασθῆναι δυνάμενον ἐπινοῶ. It only remains to await in peace his natural dissolution, but until then τούτοις μόνοις προσαναπαύεσθαι· ἑνὶ μὲν τῷ, ὅτι οὐδὲν συμβήσεταί μοι, ὃ οὐχὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν ἐστίν· ἑτέρῳ δὲ, ὅτι ἔξεστί μοι μηδὲν πράσσειν παρὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θεὸν καὶ δαίμονα. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁ ἀναγκάσων τοῦτον παραβῆναι.

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For this purpose there are three points in the theoretical portion of the Stoic system which are chiefly important in the eyes of our philosopher. First, the doctrine of the flux of all things, of the decay of all existence, of the rotation of becoming and passing away, in which nothing individual has

His theoretic convictions.

Flux of all things.

[1] ii. 17: τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου βίου ὁ μὲν χρόνος στιγμή· ἡ δὲ οὐσία ῥέουσα, &c. συνελόντι δὲ εἰπεῖν, πάντα, τὰ μὲν τοῦ σώματος ποταμὸς, τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄνειρος καὶ τῦφος. ὁ δὲ βίος πόλεμος καὶ ξένου ἐπιδημία· ἡ ὑστεροφημία δὲ λήθη. τί οὖν τὸ παραπέμψαι δυνάμενον; ἓν καὶ μόνον, φιλοσοφία. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον καὶ ἀσινῆ, &c. ἔτι δὲ τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἀπονεμόμενα δεχόμενον, ὡς ἐκεῖθέν ποθεν ἐρχόμενα, ὅθεν αὐτὸς ἦλθεν· ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἴλεῳ τῇ γνώμῃ περιμένοντα, ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ λύσιν τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον ζῷον συγκρίνεται. Similar utterances concerning the vanity and transitoriness of life and the worthlessness of everything external are to found in ii. 12, 15; iv. 3 (ὁ κόσμος ἀλλοίωσις· ὁ βίος ὑπόληψις); iv. 48; v. 33; vi. 36 *et pass.*

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permanence,[1] but all returns in course of time;[2] of the ceaseless transmutation to which even the elements are subject;[3] of the change which conducts even the universe to its future dissolution.[4] With these doctrines he couples these reflections: what an unimportant part of the whole, what a transitory phenomenon in the stream of universal life, is each individual;[5] how wrong it is to set our hearts upon the perishable, to desire it as a good, or to fear it as an evil;[6] how little we ought to disturb ourselves if we form no exception to the law which holds good, and must hold good, for all parts of the world, if we too are hastening to our dissolution.[7] But the more lively is his consciousness of the changeableness of all the finite, the greater is the importance he attaches to the conviction that this change is governed by a higher law and subserves the end of the highest reason; and this is the conclusion of those propositions on the deity and providence, and on the unity and perfection of the world, to which Marcus Aurelius so often recurs. The belief in the gods is so indispensable to man that it would not be worth while to live in a world without gods;[8] and just as little can we doubt that

[1] iv. 36, 43; v. 13, 23; viii. 6; ix. 19, 28 *et pass.*

[2] ii. 14; viii. 6.

[3] ii. 17, end; iv. 46.

[4] v. 13, 32.

[5] v. 23; ix. 32.

[6] iv. 42; v. 23; vi. 15; ix. 28.

[7] ii. 17, end; viii. 18; x. 7, 31; xii. 21.

[8] ii. 11. If we ask how we know of the existence of the gods whom we do not see, Marcus Aurelius answers (xii. 28): We believe in them because we experience the effects of their power; but that we do not see them is not quite true, for they (*i.e.* a portion of them, the stars) are visible; and we believe in our souls without seeing them (cf. Xenoph. *Mem.* 3, 14).

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Belief in God.

Divine order of the universe.

the Divine Providence embraces all things and has ordered all things in the most perfect and beneficent manner;[1] whether this care extends to the individual immediately as such, or is related to him by means of the general interdependence of nature.[2] The same divine spirit permeates all things; as the substance of the world is one, so is its soul;[3] it is one rational and efficient force which goes through all things, bears in itself the germs of all things, and brings forth all things in fixed and regular succession.[4] The world, therefore, forms a well-ordered living whole, the parts of which are maintained in harmony and interconnection by an internal bond,[5] and all in it is regulated for the best, the fairest and the most appropriate ends; the worse is made for the sake of the better, and the irrational for the

[1] ii. 3: τὰ τῶν θεῶν προνοίας μεστά (xii. 5); πάντα καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως διατάξαντες οἱ θεοί (ii. 4,11; vi. 44, &c.).

[2] Marcus Aurelius allows us to choose between these two theories, whereas he repudiates the third—that the gods do not trouble themselves about anything—as wicked and subversive of all religion; though even were it the case he holds that man could still take care of himself and his true welfare (vi. 44; *vide Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 163, 3. Similarly ix. 28: ἤτοι ἐφ' ἕκαστον ὁρμᾷ ἡ τοῦ ὅλου διάνοια, then be satisfied with it: ἢ ἅπαξ ὥρμησε, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν . . . τὸ δὲ ὅλον, εἴτε θεὸς, εὖ ἔχει πάντα εἴτε τὸ εἰκῇ, μὴ καὶ σὺ εἰκῇ. Therefore, iii. 11, διὰ δεῖ ἐφ' ἑκάστου λέγειν τοῦτο μὲν παρὰ θεοῦ ἥκει. τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὴν σύλληξιν καὶ τὴν συμμηρυομένην σύγκλωσιν, &c. The same distinction between indirect and direct divine causation, between God and destiny, we find *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 143, 2; 339, 1.

[3] xii. 30; ix. 8; iv. 40; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 200, 2; 140.

[4] *Ibid.* III. i. 159, 2, 3; v. 32: τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομοῦντα τὸ πᾶν.

[5] iv. 40; *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 140; 169, 1, 2.

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sake of the rational.[1] Even that which seems to us burdensome and purposeless has its good end for the economy of the whole; even the evils which seem to conflict with the divine goodness and wisdom are in part merely the inevitable reverse side of the good, and in part things by which the inner nature and true happiness of man are untouched.[2] And not content with recognising in the usual course of things the traces of Divine Providence, Antoninus, in the spirit of his school, does not deny even the extraordinary revelations of God in dreams and auguries,[3] of which he believes himself to have had experience;[4] on the relation of these revelations to the course and connection of nature[5] he says, however, little as concerning the relation of his gods to the popular deities;[6] and in other pas-

[1] *Loc. cit.* 170, 1; v. 16, 30 and elsewhere.

[2] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 174, 2; 175, 2; 176, 3; 177, 1; 178, 1, 2; ii. 11: *τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν εἴ τι κακὸν ἦν καὶ τοῦτο ἂν προίδοντο, ἵνα ἐπῇ πάντη τὸ μὴ περιπίπτειν αὐτῷ· ὃ δὲ χείρω μὴ ποιεῖ ἄνθρωπον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο βίον ἀνθρώπου χείρω ποιήσειεν*; xii. 5, and elsewhere.

[3] ix. 27. Even to the wicked we must be friendly: *καὶ οἱ θεοὶ δὲ παντοίως αὐτοῖς βοηθοῦσι, δι' ὀνείρων, διὰ μαντειῶν.*

[4] i. 17, where the *βοηθήματα δι' ὀνείρων* are mentioned which were imparted to himself, among other things, against blood-spitting and giddiness.

[5] Which had occupied the old Stoics so greatly (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 339 *sq.*).

[6] Marcus Aurelius always speaks in a general manner of the *θεοί* or the *θεός*, for whom he often substitutes 'Zeus'; in regard to the popular deities he doubtless followed, as Epictetus did, the universal theories of his school, but held to the existing public worship the more steadily, since for him as head of the Roman state it was a political necessity; and thus we can understand how Christianity appeared to him as rebellion against the laws of the State, and the constancy of the Christian martyrs as a wanton defiance (*φιλὴ παράταξις*, xi. 3), which must be crushed by severity. Under his reign, as is well known, great persecutions of the Christians took place (Zeller, *Vortr. und Abhandl.* i. 106 *sqq.*)

[1] In i. 6, he says in praise of Diognetus that he owes to him *τὸ ἀπιστητικὸν τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν τερατευομένων καὶ γοήτων περὶ ἐπῳδῶν καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων ἀποπομπῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λεγομένοις.*

[2] Cf. on this subject, to which he often recurs, the quotations, *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 200, 2; 319, 2.

[3] Marc. Aur. ii. 17; iii. 3; iv. 14, 21; v. 4, 13; vii. 32; viii. 25, 58. The most striking of these passages is iv. 21. As bodies which are buried last for a time, but then decay, *οὕτως αἱ εἰς τὸν αἰθέρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαί, ἐπὶ ποσὸν συμμείνασαι, μεταβάλλουσι καὶ χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται, εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβανόμεναι, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον χώραν ταῖς προσσυνοικιζομέναις παρέχουσι.* The same is referred to in iv. 14: *ἐνυπέστης* (= *ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπέστης*) *ὡς μέρος. ἐναφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν*; v. 13: *ἐξ αἰτιώδους καὶ ὑλικοῦ συνέστηκα· οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθαρήσεται ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὑπέστη*, &c. Cf. further xii. 5; how is it consistent with the divine justice that even the most pious persons die, in order not to return (*ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ ἀποθάνωσι μηκέτι αὖθις γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀπεσβηκέναι*)? to which the answer is not that the presupposition is false, but rather *τοῦτο δὲ εἴπερ καὶ οὕτως ἔχει, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι, εἰ ὡς* (this is to be omitted, or else to be replaced by *πως*) *ἑτέρως ἔχειν ἔδει, ἐποίησαν ἄν.* Also ii. 17, end; v. 33; viii. 18; ix. 32; x. 7, 31; xi. 3; xii. 1, 21, 31.

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sages he altogether repudiates the superstition of his age.[1] The primal revelation of God he considers to be the human spirit itself, as a part and emanation of the Deity,—the dæmon within us, on which alone our happiness and unhappiness depends; and this doctrine of the kinship of man to God is the third of the points which determine his view of the universe.[2] He diverges, however, from the Stoic doctrine of man's existence after death by the theory that the souls, some time after the separation from the body, return into the world soul or the Deity, as the body returns into the elements.[3]

Kinship of man to God.

The central point, however, of the philosophy of

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Ethics.

Antoninus lies, as has been said, in the moral life of man, and here his likeness to Epictetus comes out most strongly; but the difference of their nationality and social position made it inevitable that the Roman emperor should display in his theory of the world a stronger character and maintain the duties of the individual towards society more emphatically than the Phrygian freedman. For the rest, we find with him also that the fundamental determinations of his ethics are the dependence of man upon himself, resignation to the will of God, and the warmest and most boundless love of man.[1] 'Why dost thou disturb thyself about others?' he says to man; retire into thyself; only within dost thou find rest and wellbeing; reflect upon thyself; be careful of the dæmon within thee; loose thy true self from all that clings to it in a merely external fashion; consider that nothing external can affect thy soul, that it is merely thy presentations which trouble thee, that nothing can injure thee if thou dost not think it injures thee; consider that all is changeable and futile, that only within thee streams

Man's withdrawal into himself.

[1] Marcus Aurelius himself often brings forward these virtues, sometimes all three, sometimes only two of them, as the chief point. So in the passage quoted *sup.* p. 278, 3; 279, 1, he mentions purity and freedom of the inner life, and submission to the course of the universe, iii. 4; and together with these a recollection of the kinship of all men and the duty of caring for all. The same is in effect asserted in v. 33; the essential thing is *θεοὺς μὲν σέβειν καὶ εὐφημεῖν, ἀνθρώπους δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι* (cf. p. 270, 6). *ὅσα δὲ ἐκτὸς ὅρων τοῦ κρεαδίου καὶ τοῦ πνευματίου, ταῦτα μεμνῆσθαι μήτε σὰ ὄντα, μήτε ἐπὶ σοί.* But as he does not attempt any systematic enumeration, we cannot expect any consistency from him in this respect.

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an inexhaustible fountain of happiness, that the passionless reason is the only citadel in which man must take refuge if he would be invincible.[1] His rational activity is the only thing in which a being endowed with reason has to seek his happiness and his goods;[2] everything else, all that does not stand in connection with the moral constitution of man, is neither a good nor an evil.[3] He who confines himself to his internal nature, and has freed himself from all things external, in him every wish and every appetite is extinguished, he is every moment satisfied with the present, he accommodates himself with unconditional submission to the course of the universe; he believes that nothing happens except the will of God; that that which advantages the whole and lies in its nature must be the best for him also; that nothing can happen to a man which he cannot make into material for a rational activity.[4] For himself he knows no higher task than to follow the law of the whole, to honour the god in his bosom by strict morality, to fill his place[5] at every moment as a man (and as a Roman, adds the imperial philosopher), and to look forward to the end of his life, be it sooner or later, with the serene

Resignation to the will of God.

[1] ii. 13; iii. 4, 12; iv. 3, 7, 8, 18; v. 19, 34; vii. 28, 59; viii. 48; xii. 3 *et passim.*

[2] *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 210, 2, 3; 212, 4.

[3] *Ib.* III. i. 216, 1; 218, 1; viii. 10; iv. 39.

[4] x. 1; iii. 12; ii. 3, 16; iv. 23, 49; vi. 45; x. 6; viii. 7, 35 *et passim.* Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 177, 2; 178, 1. Hence the principle (x. 40; cf. v. 7) that men should not ask external prosperity from God, but only the disposition which neither desires nor fears what is external.

[5] ii. 5, 6, 13, 16, 17; iii. 5, 16, &c.

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cheerfulness which is simply content with the thought of that which is according to nature.[1] But how can man feel himself part of the world, and subordinate himself to the law of the universe without at the same time regarding himself as a member of humanity and finding in work for humanity his worthiest task?[2] and how can he do this if he does not bestow upon his more immediate fatherland all the attention which his position demands of him?[3] Not even the unworthy members of human society are excluded by Antoninus from his love. He reminds us that it befits man to love even the weak and erring, to take interest even in the ungrateful and hostile; he bids us consider that all men are our kindred, that in all the same divine spirit dwells; that we cannot expect to find no wickedness in the world, but that even the sinning sin only involuntarily and because they do not perceive what is really best for them; that he who does wrong harms only himself; our own essential nature can be harmed by no action of another's wrongdoing; he requires, therefore, that we should be hindered by nothing in doing good, that we should either teach men or bear with them, and instead of being angry or surprised at their faults, should only compassionate and forgive them.[4] We know how consistently Antoninus himself acted

Love to all men.

[1] For further details cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 286, p. 301 *sq.*

[2] *Ib.* p. 297, 2, 3.

[3] *Ib.* III. i. 297, 2, 3.

[4] vii. 22: ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τοὺς πταίοντας, &c.; *l. c.* c. 26; ii. 1, 16; iii. 11, &c.; iv. 3; v. 25; viii. 8, 14, 59; ix. 4, 42; xi. 18; xii. 12, *et passim.*

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up to these precepts.[1] From his life, as from his words, there comes to us a nobility of soul, a purity of mind, a conscientiousness, a loyalty to duty,[2] a mildness, a piety, and love of man which in that century, and on the Roman imperial throne, we must doubly admire. That the Stoic philosophy in times of the deepest degradation of morals could form a Musonius, an Epictetus, a Marcus Aurelius, will always redound to its imperishable glory. But it made no scientific progress through these men; and though the severity of the Stoic moral doctrine was modified by them, though the feelings of benevolence and self-sacrificing love to man attained with them a strength and reality which we do not find in the ancient Stoicism, yet this gain, great as it is in itself, cannot compensate for the want of a more methodical and exhaustive philosophic enquiry.[3]

[1] Zeller, *Vortr. und Abhandl.* i. 96 *sq.*; 98 *sq.*; 101 *sq.*

[2] As is seen, for example, in his repeated expressions of dissatisfaction with himself (iv. 37; v. 5; x. 8) and in his demand for strict self-examination.

[3] In regard to the anthropology and theology of Marcus Aurelius, something further will be said later on.

CHAPTER X.

THE CYNICS OF THE IMPERIAL ERA.

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B. *The Cynics.*

FROM this later Stoicism the contemporary Cynicism is only distinguished by the onesidedness and thoroughness with which it followed the same direction. Stoicism had originally formed itself out of Cynicism, for the Cynic doctrine of the independence of the virtuous will had furnished the basis of a more comprehensive and scientific view of the world, and in consequence of this was itself placed in a truer relation with the claims of nature and of human life. If this theoretic basis of morality were neglected, Stoicism reverted to the standpoint of Cynicism, the individual was restricted for his moral activity to himself and his personal endeavour after virtue: instead of creating the rules of his conduct from his knowledge of the nature of things and of men, he was obliged to resort to his immediate consciousness, his personal tact and moral impulse; philosophy, instead of a science, and a rule of life founded upon science, became a mere determination of character, if not an entirely external form, and it was inevitable that in this onesided subjective acceptation it should not seldom be

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at strife with general custom and even with legitimate moral claims. We may observe this tendency of Stoicism towards Cynicism in the later Stoics, especially in Musonius and Epictetus; indeed, the latter expressly designates and describes the true philosopher as a Cynic. On the same road we also encounter the school of the Sextii, though these, so far as we know, did not call themselves Cynics; and it is undeniable that the conditions which distinguish the last century of the Roman Republic and the first of the Imperial Government—the universal immorality and luxury, and the pressure weighing upon all—gave a sufficient opening for meeting the distress and corruption of the time in the same way as had been done under analogous but much more mitigated circumstances by Diogenes and Crates.[1] Soon after the beginning of the Christian era we again hear of the Cynics, and under that name is united a numerous host, partly of genuine, partly of merely nominal philosophers, who, with open contempt for all purely scientific activity, set before them as their only task the liberation of man from unnecessary wants, idle endeavours, and disturbing mental emotions; who herein far more than the Stoics set themselves definitely in opposition, even by their dress and mode of life, to the mass of men and their customs, and came forward as professed preachers of morals and moral overseers over the rest. That under this mask a number of impure elements were hidden,

Revival of Cynicism soon after the beginning of the Christian era.

[1] Cf. Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker*, 27 *sq.*

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that a great part, perhaps the greater part, of these ancient mendicant monks, through their obtrusiveness, shamelessness, and charlatanism, through their coarse and rude behaviour, through their extortions and impositions, and, despite their beggarly life, even through their covetousness, brought the name of philosophy into contempt, is undeniable, and may be proved from Lucian alone;[1] but we shall find that the new Cynical school, like its predecessor, had nevertheless a nucleus worthy of esteem. But even the better Cynics are of little importance in a scientific point of view.

Its adherents.

[1] E.g. *De morte Peregrini*; *Piscat.* 44 *sq.* 48; *Symp.* 11 *sq.*; *Fugit.* 16; also *Nigr.* 24. Similar complaints had been raised by others. Seneca warns his Lucilius (*Ep.* 5, 1) against the strange manner of life of those *qui non proficere sed conspici cupiunt*, against the *cultus asper*, the *intonsum caput*, the *negligentior barba*, the *indictum argento odium*, the *cubile humi positum, et quicquid aliud ambitio perversa via sequitur*, all traits of the new Cynicism; and there is also reference to it, no doubt, in *Ep.* 14, 14 (cf. 103, 5): *non conturbabit sapiens publicos mores nec populum in se vitæ novitate convertet.* Epictetus also (iii. 22, 50) sharply discriminates between the inner freedom and the outer moral qualities of the true Cynic; and that which many substitute for these: πηρίδιον καὶ ξύλον καὶ γνάθοι μεγάλαι καταφαγεῖν πᾶν ὃ ἐὰν δῷς, ἢ ἀποθησαυρίσαι, ἢ τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι λοιδορεῖν ἀκαίρως, ἢ καλὸν τὸν ὦμον δεικνύειν, &c.; and about the same period Dio Chrysost. (*Or.* 34, p. 33 R.) says, with reference to the philosophic dress, he knows well that those who are seen in it call themselves Cynics and regard themselves as μαινομένους τινὰς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ταλαιπώρους. The complaints of Lucian are echoed by his contemporary Aristides, the rhetorician (*De Quatuorv.* p. 397 *sqq.*; Dind. cf. Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyn.* p. 38, 100 *sqq.*). From these passages, to which may be added Lucian, *Dial. Mort.* 1, 1, 2; Galen, *Dign. An. Pecc.* 3, vol. v. 71, we see also wherein the external tokens of the Cynic life consisted: in the mantle, often very ragged, worn by these philosophers, the uncut beard and hair, the staff and wallet, and the whole rough mendicant life, the ideals of which were a Crates and a Diogenes.

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Demetrius.

The first philosophers who assumed the Cynics' name and mode of life are to be met with about the middle, and before the middle, of the first Christian century,[1] and the most prominent man of the school at this date appears to have been Demetrius, the friend of Seneca and of Thrasea Pætus.[2] Greatly, how-

[1] Cicero always treats Cynicism as a phenomenon belonging to the past; yet the passage in *Off.* i. 41, 148 (*Cynicorum vero ratio tota est ejicienda; est enim inimica verecundiæ*) seems to be aimed against panegyrists of the Cynic life. Somewhat later Brutus (Plut. *Brut.* 34) names M. Favonius (who is mentioned, *sup.* p. 74, foot, among the Stoics) with expressions descriptive of the Cynics (ἁπλοκύων and ψευδοκύων), but we cannot certainly infer from this that there was a Cynic school. Under Augustus is said to have lived that Menippus who plays so great a part in Lucian (*Schol. in Luc. Piscat.* 26; iv. 97 Jac.), and he is also said to have been identical with Menippus the Lycian, whose adventures with a Lamia are related by Philostratus (*Apoll.* iv. 25), while at the same time he calls him a disciple of Demetrius the Cynic (*Ibid.* iv. 39; v. 43). Of these statements not only is the second manifestly false (irrespective of the Lamia); for Demetrius did not live in the reign of Augustus, even supposing that he had a disciple called Demetrius; but the first is also untrue, though it was formerly universally accepted. The Menippus to whom Lucian in the *Icaromenippus* and a great portion of the Dialogues of the Dead has given the chief rôles, is unmistakably the Cynic of the third century B.C., famous for his Satires, who had already written a Νέκυια (Diog. vi. 101); Lucian (*Accus.* 33) also calls him Μενίππός τις τῶν παλαιῶν κυνῶν μάλα δλακτικὸς; treats him as a contemporary of the events of the third century (*Icaromen.* 15), and mentions his having killed himself (*Dial. Mort.* 10, 11), cf. Part II. *a*; 246, 3. The supposed contemporary of Augustus seems to have arisen out of an arbitrary combination of this Menippus with the Menippus of Philostratus, who was, moreover, assigned much too early a date. The first Cynics capable of historical proof will be named in the following note.

[2] This contemporary of Seneca, who often mentions him, was, according to *Benef.* vii. 11, already in Rome under Caligula, and was offered by the Emperor a gift of 200,000 sesterces, which, however, he declined. We find him in Rome under Nero (Sen. *Benef.* vii. 1, 3; 8, 2; *Ep.* 67, 14; 91, 19). The utterances of Seneca on

ever, as this philosopher is admired by Seneca,[1] and advantageously as his freedom from wants contrasts with the luxury of the Roman world, his philosophic value cannot be estimated very highly. At any rate, there have come down to us no remarkable thoughts of his, and the meagreness of the tradition renders it probable that none of any importance were known. He recommends his scholars not to trouble themselves with much knowledge, but to exercise themselves in a few rules of life for practical use;[1] he appeals with impressive eloquence to their moral consciousness;[2] he expresses with cynical rudeness his contemptuous opinion of others;[3] he opposes himself with bitter scorn to the threats of the despot;[4] he welcomes outward misfortunes as a means of moral training, and resigns himself willingly and joyfully to the will of God.[5] In all this there is nothing that a Stoic might not also have said; and even his light estimation of learning and knowledge Demetrius shares, at any rate, with the Stoicism of his time. The peculiarity of his Cynicism therefore lies only in the severity with which he stamps his principles on his life.

his poverty and his manner of life (*Vit. Beat.* 183) date from this time (*hoc pauperiorem quam ceteros Cynicos, quod, cum sibi interdixerit habere, interdixit et poscere*), *Ep.* 20, 9 (*ego certe aliter audio, quæ dicit Demetrius noster, cum illum vidi nudum, quanto minus, quam in stramentis, incubantem*), *Ep.* 62, 3 (he lives, *non tamquam contempserit omnia, sed tamquam aliis habenda permiserit*), also the word of Epictetus (*Diss.* i. 25, 22), and the anecdote in Lucian, *Saltator*, 63. When Thrasea Pætus was put to death (67 A.D.), whose intimate friend he was, he raised his voice in opposition (Tac. *Ann.* xvi. 34 *sq.*), and still more to his own disadvantage, after the accession of Vespasian undertook the defence of Egnatius Celer (Tac. *Hist.* iv. 40; cf. *Ann.* xvi. 32). On account of his injurious expressions concerning Vespasian he was banished (71 A.D.) to an island, but his continued insults were not further punished (Dio Cass. lxvi. 13; Sueton. *Vesp.* 13). In Lucian, *Adv. Ind.* 19, he appears in Corinth; in Philostratus, *Apoll.* iv. 25; v. 19, we meet with him in the reign of Nero at Athens and Corinth; subsequently he was recommended by Apollonius of Tyana to Titus (vi. 31), and in the reign of Domitian was still in the company of that necromancer (vii. 42; viii. 10 *sqq.*); but these statements are untrustworthy. He is described by most of those who mention him, as a Cynic. Nothing is known as to any writings left by him. According to Eunap. *V. Soph. Proœm.* p. 6, Musonius and Carneades were, as well as Menippus, contemporary with Demetrius. Two of these names, however (Menippus and Musonius), he doubtless merely takes from Philostratus (*vide sup.* pp. 291, 1; 246, 3), and we know not how much of what Philostratus says has any historical foundation; as to Carneades we can form no judgment, as he is mentioned nowhere else. But that there were other Cynics in Rome at the time of Demetrius is plain from the foregoing statements, and the quotations (p. 290, 1) from Seneca. One of these Cynics, by name Isodorus, who on account of his biting words had been exiled by Nero from Italy, is mentioned by Sueton. (*Nero*, 39).

[1] *Benef.* vii. 1, 3, he calls him: *Vir meo judicio magnus etiamsi maximis comparetur;* and in *l. c.* 8, 2, he says of him: *Quem mihi videtur rerum natura nostris tulisse temporibus, ut ostenderet, nec illum a nobis corrumpi nec nos ab illo corrigi posse, virum exactæ, licet neget ipse, sapientiæ*, &c. Cf. *Ep.* 62. According to Philostr. *Apoll.* iv. 25, Favorinus had also greatly praised him. He appears in a less brilliant light in what has just been quoted from Tacitus, Dio Cassius, and Suetonius.

[1] Sen. *Benef.* vii. 1, 3 *sq.* What follows, however, from § 5 onwards, is, as well as c. 9, 10, Seneca's own dissertation.

[2] In *l. c.* 8, 2: He was *eloquentiæ ejus, quæ res fortissimas deceat, non concinnatæ nec in verba sollicitæ, sed ingenti animo, prout impetus tulit, res suas prosequentis.*

[3] Cf. Lucian, *Adv. Indoct.* 19, where he takes the book out of the hand of a bad reader, and tears it in pieces. Further, his previously mentioned utterances concerning Vespasian, and Sen. *Ep.* 91, 9, who quotes from him: *Eodem loco sibi esse voces imperitorum, quo ventre redditos crepitus.* '*Quid enim, inquit, mea refert, sursum isti an deorsum sonent?*' If Seneca applies the word *eleganter* to these words, this is a matter of taste.

[4] In Epikt. *Diss.* i. 25, 22, he says to Nero: ἀπειλεῖς μοι θάνατον, σοὶ δ' ἡ φύσις.

[5] Sen. *Provid.* 3, 3; 5; 5; *Ep.* 67, 14.

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Œnomaus of Gadara.

Of the Cynics of the period immediately following,[1] some details have come down to us respecting Œnomaus of Gadara, who is said to have lived under

[1] Besides the Cynics mentioned *supra*, p. 291, 2, the following names are connected with this school, of which, however, our knowledge is very imperfect. Under Vespasian lived Diogenes and Heras, of whom, on account of their abuse of the imperial family, the former was scourged and the latter beheaded (Dio Cass. lxvi. 15); and probably also Hostilius (*l. c.* 13), who was banished with Demetrius. Under Domitian or Trajan we must place Didymus with the surname of Planetiades (if he was an historical person), in whose mouth Plutarch, *De Def. Orac.* c. 7, 413, puts a sarcasm against the oracle; under Hadrian, besides Œnomaus (*vide infra*), perhaps that Demetrius of whom it is related (Lucian, *Tox.* 27 *sqq.*) that he came to Alexandria to devote himself under the guidance of a certain Rhodius (or of a Rhodian?) to the Cynic philosophy, that he tended his unjustly-accused friend Antiphilus with the greatest self-denial in prison, and finally accused himself in order to share his fate. When their innocence was brought to light he gave over to his friend the considerable compensation which he received, and himself went to India to the Brahmans. The historical truth of this occurrence, however, is as little certain as the authenticity of the treatise which affirms it; and even were it otherwise, the time when Demetrius lived can only be approximately concluded from c. 34. Agathobulus in Egypt (Lucian, *Demon.* 3; *Peregrin.* 17) must also be counted among the Cynics of this period. Under Antoninus Pius and his successor lived Demonax, Peregrinus, and his pupil Theagenes, of whom we shall speak later on; also Honoratus (Luc. *Demon.* 19, where it is related of him that he was clothed in a bearskin, and that Demonax, therefore, called him Ἀρκεσίλαος) and Herophilus (*Icaromen.* 16) seem to be historical persons, Crato, on the contrary (Luc. *De Saltat.* i. *sqq.*) imaginary. To the period of Antoninus likewise belongs Pancratius, who lived in Athens and in Corinth (Philostr. *V. Soph.* i. 23, 1), and Crescens, the accuser of Justin the Martyr (Justin. *Apol.* ii. 3; Tatian, *Adv. Gent.* 19; Eus. *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 16, &c.); to the period of Severus, Antiochus, the Cilician, whom that emperor esteemed because he set his soldiers an example of endurance (Dio Cass. lxxvii. 19; cf. Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyn.* 30). After this time there is a gap in our knowledge of the Cynic philosophers extending over a hundred and fifty years, but the continuance of the school is beyond question. When Asclepiades lived, who, according to Tertullian, *Ad Nat.* ii. 14, travelled through distant lands with a cow; or Sphodrias, who is quoted by Athen. iv. 162 *b*, with a τέχνη ἐρωτικήν; or the Cynics named ap. Phot. *Cod.* 167, p. 114, *b* 23, among the authorities of Stobæus—viz., Hegesianax, Polyzelus, Xanthippus, Theomnestus—we do not know.

[1] He is placed in that period by Syncellus, p. 349 B. The statement of Suidas, Οἰνόμ. that he was a little older than Porphyry, is perhaps inferred from the circumstance that Eusebius (with whose more definite account, however, Syncellus was acquainted) *Præp. Ev.* v. 19 *sqq.*, discusses him immediately before Porphyry, and calls him (c. 18, 3) τὶς τῶν νέων.

[2] *Orat.* vii. p. 209 B. Spanh. cf. vi. 199 A.

[3] *Loc. cit.* p. 210 D. When Suidas, Διογένης ὁ Οἰνόμ. calls Œnomaus a writer of tragedies, whose name was also Diogenes, and who lived in Athens after the fall of the Thirty Tyrants, this statement seems to be founded on a confused recollection of this passage, where tragedies are mentioned, dedicated to Diogenes or to his disciple Philistus (Philiscus, cf. vol. ii. *a*, 244, 2), and then tragedies of Œnomaus are spoken of.

[4] The title of this book runs thus, according to Eus. *Præp. Ev.* v. 18, 3; 21, 4; vi. 6, 52; Theod. *Cur. Græc. Affect.* (par. 1642) vi. p. 561: γοήτων φωρὰ, named less accurately by Julian vii. 209, B: τὸ κατὰ χρηστηρίων.

[5] *Præp. Evang.* v. c. 19–36, vi. 6.

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the reign of Hadrian.[1] Julian reproaches him for destroying in his writings the fear of the gods, for despising human reason, and trampling under foot[2] all laws, human and divine; his tragedies, he says, are beyond all description shameful and preposterous;[3] and if in this verdict the horror of the pious emperor for the despiser of the popular religion has perhaps no small share, we must still suppose that Œnomaus must have departed in a striking manner from the prevailing customs and mode of thought. In the lengthy fragments from his treatise against the 'Jugglers,'[4] which Eusebius has preserved for us,[5] we find a polemic as violent as it is outspoken against the heathen oracles, in the

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spirit of cynical freethinking;[1] but it is based on no properly philosophic arguments; and in connection with it Œnomaus likewise turns against the fatalism of the Stoics, and exalts in its stead free-will as the rudder and foundation of human life, declaring it to be as much an incontrovertible fact of consciousness as our existence itself, and expounding the irreconcilability of foreknowledge with freedom, and of fatality with moral responsibility.[2] In these utterances we recognise the self-dependence of the man who, in spite of his Cynicism, would be a follower neither of Antisthenes nor of Diogenes;[3] but he was doubtless neither inclined nor adapted for any deeper study of philosophic questions.

Demonax.

The famous Demonax[4] also, who was highly esteemed in Athens, and extolled in a treatise

[1] Expressions entirely similar are put into the mouth of the representative of Cynicism by Plutarch, *Def. Orac.* 7, p. 413. Moreover, cf. *infra*, p. 298, 3, and *Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 280 *sqq.*; Bernays, *l. c.* 30 *sqq.*

[2] *Loc. cit.* vi. 7, 11 *sq.* (Theodoret, *l. c.*) with the proposition: *ἰδοὺ γὰρ, ᾧ τρόπῳ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀντειλήμμεθα, τούτῳ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐθαιρέτων καὶ βιαίων.* But of self-consciousness it was previously said: *οὐκ ἄλλο ἱκανὸν οὕτως ὡς ἡ συναίσθησίς τε καὶ ἀντίληψις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.*

[3] Julian, *Orat.* vi. p. 187 C: *ὁ κυνισμὸς οὔτε Ἀντισθενισμός ἐστιν οὔτε Διογενισμός.*

[4] Born in Cyprus of a good family, Demonax (according to c. 3) had enjoyed the instructions of the Cynics Agathobulus and Demetrius (*supra*, p. 291; 294, 1) and of the Stoics Epictetus and Timocrates (*supra*, pp. 197, 256); he afterwards lived in Athens, and died there when almost a century old, having starved himself to death on account of the advancing weakness of old age (*l. c.* c. 63 *sqq.*), but as he still had intercourse with Herodes Atticus (c. 24, 33) in this latter period, he may, perhaps, have lived till 160 A.D., or even longer. The treatise said to be by Lucian shows (as Bernays, *l. c.*, remarks), by the way in which Herodes is alluded to, that it was not written till after his death 176 A.D.

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bearing Lucian's name,[1] is much more distinguished by his character than by his science.[2] From Œnomaus he differs chiefly in that he tried to mitigate the severities of the Cynic mode of thought, and to reconcile it with life and its necessities; in other respects he is considerably in harmony with it. As Œnomaus had neither held strictly to a definite system nor troubled himself at all about any scientific knowledge, so Demonax, according to the assurance of his biographer,[3] carried his eclecticism to such an extent that it is difficult to say which of his philosophical predecessors he preferred. He himself, to all outward appearance, proclaimed himself a Cynic, without, however, approving of the exaggerations of the party; but in his own character he chose for a model the mild, benevolent, and moderate temper of Socrates,[4] and was large-hearted enough to esteem Aristippus side by side with Socrates and Diogenes.[5] His principal efforts were directed to the liberation of mankind from all things external: for the man who is free, said he, alone is happy; and he only is free who hopes

[1] Bekker has denied that it is Lucian's, and Bernays (*Lucian und die Kyn.* 104 *sq.*) has defended this opinion with very important arguments. But that its author, who nowhere gives himself out to be Lucian, was really a contemporary of his hero, and had intercourse with him for many years (*ἐπὶ μήκιστον συνεγενόμην*, c. 1), we have no reason to doubt, nor is there any internal reason in his work for suspicion as to its credibility.

[2] Concerning his gentle, humane, and amiable character, his imperturbable cheerfulness, his efforts for the moral welfare of those around him, and the extraordinary veneration he thereby acquired, cf. Lucian, *l. c.* c. 5–11; 57; 63; 67.

[3] *Demon.* 5.

[4] *Loc. cit.* 5–9; cf. 19; 21; 48; 52.

[5] *Loc. cit.* 62.

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nothing and fears nothing, being convinced of the transitoriness and paltriness of all men.[1] In order to resign nothing of this independence he abstained from marriage;[2] but he seems to have specially included in it, in the true spirit of Cynicism, freedom from the prejudices of the popular religion; he himself was indicted because he never offered sacrifices, and despised the Eleusinian mysteries, and he conceals neither in his defence nor elsewhere his low opinion of the existing worship.[3] In his suicide and his indifference to burial,[4] we recognise the disciple of Antisthenes and Zeno; and though the departure from this life, according to the Stoic doctrine, must open an entrance to a higher life, Demonax, like Panætius and Epictetus, disclaimed this view.[5] As to any scientific enquiry, however, we hear as little on this point as on any other. The philosopher considers his task to be solely the exercise of

[1] Lucian, *Demon.* 20; cf. c. 4: τὸ ὅλον ἐμεμελήκει αὐτῷ μηδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεᾶ εἶναι.

[2] Cf. the anecdote quoted *supra*, p. 274, 1.

[3] *Loc. cit.* 11. To the complaint that he did not sacrifice to Athena he replied he had hitherto refrained, οὐδὲ γὰρ δεῖσθαι αὐτὴν τῶν παρ' ἐμοῦ θυσιῶν ὑπελάμβανον; and when censured in respect to the mysteries, he said that he did not get himself initiated, because it would be impossible for him not to speak to the uninitiated about them; in order, if the mysteries were bad, to warn them against them, and if they were good, to make them acquainted with them. In c. 27 he refused to enter a temple to pray; for God, he said, could hear him just as well in any other place; and in c. 37 he confounded a soothsayer with the dilemma: either he must believe himself to have the power of altering the decrees of fate, or his art was worthless.

[4] *Loc. cit.* 65 *sq.*

[5] *Loc. cit.* c. 32: ἄλλου δέ ποτε ἐρομένου, εἰ ἀθάνατος αὐτῷ ἡ ψυχὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι; ἀθάνατος, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ὡς πάντα. Cf. c. 8, where he says that in a word, λήθη τις ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἐλευθερία μακρὰ πάντας ἐν ὀλίγῳ καταλήψεται.

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practical influence on those around him, and the means to this end is with him, as with Diogenes, not so much instruction as counsel, and before all things, ready and trenchant wit, the old weapon of the Cynics, which he in most cases employed very skilfully. Cynicism appears, indeed, in his person in its most interesting and attractive shape, but still with essentially the same features which have already been long familiar to us.

Peregrinus.

In contradistinction to this ideal picture we find a caricature in Lucian's description of Peregrinus,[1] who bears the cognomen of Proteus.[2] According to him, this Cynic escaped from a reckless and profligate youth first to Christianity and then to Cynicism, the most absurd and disgusting excesses of which he adopted, until at last the wish of making himself talked about induced him, half against his will and in constant struggle with the fear of death, to throw himself into the flames of a funeral pyre[3]

[1] Π. τῆς Περεγρίνου τελευτῆς. Of modern writers concerning Peregrinus and the literature relating to him, cf. Eckstein, *Encyklop. v. Ersch. u. Gruber*, sect. iii. vol. xvi. *sub voce*; Zeller, *Vortr. u. Abhandl.* ii. 173 *sq.*; Bernays, *Luc. u. d. Kyniker*, 21, and *l. c.*, p. 65, the translation and commentary of the treatise bearing the name of Lucian.

[2] He first received this name, according to Gellius, *N. A.* xii. 11, 1, after the time when that author made his acquaintance; what it means we are not told.

[3] Further details will be found in the treatise of Zelle already quoted. In that of Lucian, *vide*, concerning the excesses imputed to him, c. 9; the murder of his father, of which he is accused, c. 10, 14 *sq.*; his relation to the Christians, and the imprisonment which he suffered in consequence, c. 11–14; his introduction through Agathobulus to the Cynic philosophy (*supra*, p. 294, 1); his arrival in Italy, c. 18; his burning himself to death (which is also mentioned in Athenag. *Suppl.* 23; Tert. *Ad Mart.* 4; Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 1, 33), c. 20 *sqq.* Some few

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at the Olympic games in the year 165 A.D. But the most serious of these charges are too insufficiently attested[1] by Lucian's testimony, the uncertainty of which he himself cannot entirely conceal, to allow of our unconditionally endorsing his judgment of Peregrinus. If we separate from his account all that is internally improbable, this Cynic appears as a man who was sincere in his endeavours after virtue and austerity, but was, at the same time, always exaggerating and pushing forward his principles to an absurd extreme,[2] finally investing even suicide—in regard to which he has so many allies in the Stoic and Cynic school—with theatrical pomp, in order to produce the most striking effect possible.[3] There is other evidence to show that he asserted the claims of his school with some exaggeration;[4] but Gellius praises the earnestness and steadiness of his character,[5] and the value and usefulness of his

years after his death, previous to the year 180 B.C., Athenagoras (*l. c.*), in agreement with Luc. c. 27 *sqq.* 41, speaks of an oracular statue of Peregrinus which stood in the market-place of his native city.

[1] Cf. Zeller, *Vortr.* ii. 175 *sq.*; Bernays, 52 *sqq.*

[2] If he was thrown as a Christian into prison while his fellow-Christians remained unmolested, he must have given occasion to this by his behaviour; he was banished from Italy on account of his abuse of the Emperor; in Greece, besides his quarrels with the Eleans and his attacks (also mentioned by Philostratus, *V. Soph.* ii. 1, 33) on Herodes Atticus, he is said to have tried to raise an insurrection against the Romans (Luc. 18 *sq.*).

[3] The fact of this suicide (which has been disputed by A. Planck, *Theol. Stud. in Krit.* 1811, 834 *sq.*, 843; and Baur, *Kirchengesch.* ii. 412), according to all the above quotations, is beyond a doubt.

[4] Luc. *Demon.* When Peregrinus said to Demonax, on account of his cheerfulness: *οὐ κυνᾷς*, the latter replied, *Περεγρῖνε, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίζεις.*

[5] He calls him (*l. c.*) *vir gravis et constans*, whom he often visited in his hut before the city, and whose lectures he attended.

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doctrines,[1] and quotes a discourse of his, in which he says that a man should not avoid wickedness through fear of punishment, but from love to the good; and the wise man would do this even though his action remained hidden from gods and men; but he who has not made so much progress in morals may still be restrained from wickedness by the thought that all wrong-doing comes to light in the end. We are acquainted, however, with no scientific achievement either of Peregrinus or his scholar Theagenes,[2] or, indeed, of any of these later Cynics.

Theagenes.

The later Cynics.

But for the very reason that this Cynicism was far more a mode of life than a scientific conviction, it was able to outlast the vicissitudes of the philosophic systems, and to maintain itself down to the latest periods of Greek philosophy. Even in the second half of the fourth century the Emperor Julian found occasion for those two discourses against the Cynics, which give us a picture so unfavourable, but at the same time probably not essentially untrue, of this school at that time.[3]

[1] *Loc. cit.*: *Multa hercle dicere eum utiliter et honeste audivimus.* Cf. the same authority for what follows.

[2] This Cynic, whom Lucian (c. 3 *sqq.*; 7; 24; 30 *sq.*; 36) treats with the greatest malignity, is described by Galen, *Meth. Med.* xiii. 15, vol. x. 909 K. (as Bernays, p. 14 *sqq.*, has shown) as a philosopher of repute (*διὰ τὴν δόξαν τἀνθρώπου*) who gave lectures daily in Rome in the Gymnasium of Trajan.

[3] *Or.* vi.: *εἰς τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους κύνας. Or.* vii.: *πρὸς Ἡράκλειον Κυνικὸν, πῶς κυνιστέον.* For example, cf. *Or.* vii. 204, C. *sq.*, 223 B *sqq.* Julian (p. 224 C.) mentions, besides Heraclius, as Cynics of his time, Asclepiades, Serenianus; and Chytron. In *Or.* vii. 198 *a*, he mentions Iphicles of Epirus, whose free-spoken notions expressed before the Emperor Valentinian in the year 375 are related by Ammian. Marc. xxx. 5, 8. A Cynic named Demetrius Chytras, who, in extreme old age, was tor-

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Further traces of the recognition which Cynicism still found in this period are to be met with both in heathen and Christian authors.[1] About the beginning of the fifth century, Augustine tells us that all the schools of philosophy, except the Cynic, Peripatetic, and Platonic, had died out;[2] and even in the first decade of the sixth century we find in Athens a Cynic ascetic, Sallustius.[3] With the overthrow of heathenism this school, as such, naturally came to

tured under Constantius on a political and religious charge, but was finally set free, is mentioned by Ammian. xix. 12, 12; another in Julian's time is spoken of anonymously by David, *Schol. in Ar.* 14 *a*, 18.

[1] Bernays, *l. c.* p. 37, 99 *sq.*, alludes in this connection to the panegyric which Themistius pronounced on Cynicism and its founders in his discourse on Virtue, especially pp. 444, 417 (preserved in the Syrian language, and translated into German by Gildemeister and Bücheler in the *Rhein. Mus.* vol. xxvii.); also the violent attack of Chrysostom (*Homil.* 17, c. 2; Chrys. *Opp.* ed. Migne, ii. 173) upon the philosophers (clearly described as Cynics) who left Antioch on the approach of danger, but who enjoyed, it would appear, a certain degree of reputation among the inhabitants of that city.

[2] Cicero, *Acad.* iii. 19, 42: *Itaque nunc philosophos non fere videmus, nisi aut Cynicos aut Peripateticos aut Platonicos. Et Cynicos quidem, quia eos vitæ quædam delectat libertas atque licentia.* Later on, *Civ. D.* xix. 19, he remarks that if a philosopher goes over to Christianity it is not required that he should change his dress; the Church does not trouble itself about the Cynic garb. An example of an Egyptian Cynic, Maximus by name, who became a Christian in 370 A.D., and retained his dress a long time, is quoted by Bernays, *l. c.*, from Tillemont, *Mémoires*, ix. 2, 796 *sqq.*

[3] Damasc. *V. Isidori*, 89–92, 250; and at greater length Suidas (*sub voce*), who has taken the first of his articles, and probably also the second, from Damascius. That Sallustius, as is here observed, exaggerated the Cynic severity as well as the παίζειν ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιότερον, is confirmed by Simplicius, in *Epict. Man.* p. 90 H; according to whom he laid burning coals upon his leg to see how long he could endure it.

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an end; the only element which was peculiar to it, the Cynic mode of life, the Christian Church had long since appropriated in Monachism.[1]

[1] Julian, *l. c.* 224 A, already compares the Cynics with the ἀποστακτισταὶ (= *qui sæculo renunciaverunt*) of the Christians.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PERIPATETICS OF THE FIRST CENTURIES AFTER CHRIST.

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C. *The Peripatetics of the first centuries* B.C.

THE direction taken by the Peripatetic school in the first century before Christ was maintained by it during the whole of its further existence.[1] Those members of it with whom we are acquainted,[2] so far as we have any details concerning their writings, are mostly mentioned in connection with

[1] In regard to what follows, cf. Fabric. *Bibl. Gr.* iii. 458 *sqq.*; Harl.; Brandis and Zumpt in the treatises mentioned *supra*, p. 112, 1; Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, 545 *sqq.*

[2] Our knowledge of the Peripatetic school in this period is very imperfect. According to the writers named *supra*, pp. 113 *sqq.*, we find, about the middle of the first Christian century, Alexander of Ægæ, the instructor of Nero (Suid. Ἀλεξ. Αἰγ.), from whom Simplicius, *Categ.* 3, *a* (*Schol. in Arist.* 29, *a*, 40) quotes observations out of a commentary on the Categories, and Alex. Aphr. ap. Simpl. *De Cœlo*, *Schol.* 494, *b*, 28, from a commentary on the Books of the Heavens. (Karsten, 194, *a*, 6, here substitutes Aspasius for Alexander, whether by his own conjecture, or according to manuscripts, does not appear.) Ideler, *Arist. Meteorol.* i. xvi. *sqq.*, believes we should perhaps attribute to Alexander the commentary on the *Meteorology*, which has been handed down under the name of Alexander of Aphrodisias; and he seems to suppose that the Sosigenes whom Alexander mentions as his teacher is the famous astronomer of the time of Cæsar. We shall, however, find that Alexander the Aphrodisian had a Sosigenes for his teacher. Towards the end of the same century we encounter (ap. Plut. *Qu. Conviv.* ix. 6; 14, 5) a Peripatetic named Menephylus, perhaps the head of the school in Athens, and ibid. *Frat. Am.* 16, p. 487, Apollonius the Peripatetic, one of the 'later philosophers,' who was praised for having assisted his brother Sotion to attain greater honour than himself. This may, perhaps, be Apollonius the Alexandrian, from whom Simplicius, *in Categ. Schol. in Arist.* 63, *b*, 3, quotes a treatise on the Categories. Sotion, another Peripatetic, has already come before us in *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 931, 3 (*vide sup.* 181, 2), as author of the Κέρας Ἀμαλθείας. This man I have there conjectured to be the same from whom Alex. Aphr. *Top.* 213, apparently out of a commentary on the *Topica*, and Simpl. *Categ.* 41, *γ*, *Schol. in Ar.* 61, *a*, 22, from a commentary on the *Categories*, quotes one or two unimportant and erroneous observations. His compilation seems to be referred to by Pliny, *Hist. Nat. Præf.* 24. In this case Sotion must probably have lived in the middle of the first century, which would harmonise well with the theory that he was the author of the Διόκλειοι ἔλεγχοι, and the brother of Apollonius mentioned by Plutarch. His own brother Lamprias is also described by Plutarch, *Qu. Conv.* ii. 2, 2; cf. i. 8, 3, as a Peripatetic; he likewise describes his friend the grammarian from Egypt (*Qu. Conv.* i. 9, 1, 1; viii. 8, 2, 1), Theo (*vide*, concerning him, *De Fac. Lunæ*, 25, 13 *sq.*) *De Ei.* 6; *Pyth. Orac.* 3 *sq.*, as a man of Peripatetic tendencies. On the other hand, Favonius, who is spoken of *l. c.* viii. 10, 2, 1, as δαιμονιώτατος Ἀριστοτέλους ἐραστής is probably only the well-known Platonist, whom we shall discuss later on. In the second half of the second century Aspasius must have taught, as Galen (*De Cogn. an. Morb.* 8, vol. v. 42), in his fourteenth or fifteenth year, therefore in 145–6, B.C. had for his teacher a pupil of this philosopher, who apparently was still alive; and Herminus (ap. Simpl. *De Cœlo*, *Schol.* 494, *b*, 31 *sqq.*) quotes from him. Adrastus of Aphrodisias (David, *Schol. in Ar.* 30, *a*, 9; *Anon. l. c.* 32, *b*, 36; Simpl. *Categ.* 4, *γ*, *l. c.* 45; Ach. Tat. *Isag.* c. 16, 19, p. 136, 139), who is named together with him (Galen, *De Libr. Propr.* c. 11; vol. xix. 42 *sq.*; Porph. *V. Plot.* 14) was probably not far removed in point of time; this appears partly from the above juxtaposition, but more especially from the use made of him by Theo Smyrnæus (*infra*, p. 309, 4); for Theo was a contemporary of Hadrian (*infra*, p. 335). If, however, he is the author of a commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle and Theophrastus (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 855) mentioned ap. Athen. xv. 673, *e* (where our text has Ἄδραστον) he may have been still alive in the time of Antoninus Pius. Aristocles, the rhetorician of Pergamus, is placed by Suidas (*sub voce*) under Trajan and Hadrian; according to Philostratus, *V. Soph.* ii. 3, he was a contemporary of Herodes Atticus, therefore somewhat earlier, but had only occupied himself with the Peripatetic philosophy in his youth. What Synes. *Dio*, p. 12 R, says of Aristocles' desertion of philosophy for Rhetoric must

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commentaries on Aristotle's works, and among these his logical books seem chiefly to have occupied

Commentators of Aristotle's works.

apply to him and not to the Messenian. About 140–150 A.D. lived Claudius Severus, the teacher of Marcus Aurelius (Capitol. *Ant. Philos.* 3; cf. Galen, *De Præsagit.* c. 2, vol. xiv. 613), and Agathocles and Rufinus, mentioned by Lucian, *Demon.* 29, 54; at the same time and later Herminus, according to Alexander, Aphr. ap. Simpl. *De Cœlo. Schol.* 494, *b*, 31 *sqq.*, the teacher of this Peripatetic, and, as it would seem, the disciple of Aspasius, apparently the same that Lucian, *Demon.* 56, calls a man of bad character (concerning the *Categories*, which, according to this passage, Herminus constantly had in his mouth, Alexander the teacher had written a commentary much in use). Contemporary with him is Eudemus, an acquaintance of Galen's, who was treated in an illness by that physician in 165 B.C. at Rome in his 63rd year (Galen, *De Præsagit.* c. 2 *sq.* vol. xiv. 605–619; *et pass.* *Vide* the Index). Likewise the Cleodemus of Lucian (*Philops.* 6 *sqq.*; *Symp.* 6, 15) must have lived at this date But he is evidently an imaginary person. A contemporary of Marcus Aurelius (161–180) is Alexander of Damascus, whom Galen describes (*De Præsagit.* c. 5; *De Anatom. Administr.* i. 1, vol. xiv. 627 *sq.*; ii. 218) as the teacher of the Consul Flavius Boëthus (who is also named in vol. xiv. 612, and *De Libr. Propr.* 1, vol. xix. 15 *sq.*), and as public teacher of the Peripatetic philosophy in Athens; besides Paulus the Prefect (*l. c.* xiv. 612) and Premigenes of Mytilene (Galen, *Sanit. tu.* v. 11; vol. vi. 365, 367). Under the same emperor and his successor Commodus must be placed the teachers of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristocles of Messene (*vide infra*) and Sosigenes. That Alexander was instructed by the latter, we learn not only from himself (*Meteorol.* 116, *l. c.*, and from Philop. *Anal. Pr.* xxxiii. *b*, *Schol. in Ar.* 158, *b*, 28), but also from the editor of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, p. 432, 12; Bon. 741, *b*, 48 Bk.; and from Themist. *De An.* p. 112 Sp., who quotes his third book, περὶ ὄψεως. The statement (Ps. Alex. *Metaph.* 636, 21 (797, *b*, 6 Bekk.): ὕστερος γὰρ Σωσιγένης Ἀλεξάνδρου τῷ χρόνῳ, is either a mistake of the epitomist or a clerical error. Under Septimus Severus, and (as Zumpt shows, *l. c.* p. 98) between 198 and 211, Alexander of Aphrodisias was made the head of the Peripatetic school in Athens (*supra*, p. 192, 1). He, and not some otherwise unknown Peripatetic called Aristotle, is meant in the words νεώτερος Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ ἐξηγητὴς τοῦ φιλοσόφου Ἀριστοτέλους, Syrian *in Metaph.* xiii. 3 (*Schol. in Ar.* 889, *b*, 11), as is proved not only by the passage itself, but by a comparison of it with Alex. *Metaph.* 715, 18 *sqq.* Likewise, as David remarks in

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the attention of these commentators. But what we are told in this respect about the Peripatetics of the

Cat. Schol. 28, *a*, 21, Alexander was named Aristotle, οἷον δεύτερον ὄντα Ἀριστοτέλην. Besides these Peripatetics, whose dates may be at least approximately fixed, a good many others are named, of whom we can scarcely say more than that they must belong to the first two centuries after Christ. Among these is Archaicus (erroneously regarded by Fabric. *Biblioth. Gr.* iii. 536, Harl. as a Stoic), from whom Stobæus (*Cat. Schol.* 61, *a*, 22; 66, *a*, 42; *b*, 35; 73, *b*, 20; 74, *b*, 31) quotes observations on the *Categories*, doubtless from a commentary on that work; in the first of these passages he distinguishes Archaicus and Sotion as disciples of the ancient commentators—Andronicus, Boëthus, &c. Perhaps Archaicus is the same person mentioned as the author of a work on ethics in Diog. vi. 99. Also the following: Demetrius of Byzantium (Diog. v. 83), if he is not the other Demetrius named *supra*, p. 124, 1; Diogenianus, from whom Eusebius (*Pr. Ev.* iv. 3; vi. 8) quotes long fragments directed against Chrysippus' doctrines of Prophecy and Destiny, perhaps from a treatise περὶ εἱμαρμένης; he may be the same person as Diogenianus of Pergamos, who appears as one of the speakers in Plutarch, *De Pyth. Oraculis. Qu. Conv.* vii. 7, 8; viii. 1, 2; at any rate, what is put into his mouth has nothing to contradict this theory, and *Pyth. Or.* 5, 17, would indeed agree with his sceptical bearing toward soothsaying. More definite signs are wanting, however, that Diogenianus was described by Plutarch as a Peripatetic. Enarmostus, whom Aspasius blames (ap. Alex. in *Metaph.* 44, 23; Bon. 552, *b*, 29, Bekk.) because Eudorus and he had altered a reading in the *Metaphysics*, was also probably living in the first century. The philosophers quoted by Alex. Aphr. *De An.* 154, *b*, *o*; Socrates (probably the Bithynian Peripatetic named in Diog. ii. 47); Virginius Rufus, and perhaps also Polyzelus (*l. c.* 162, *b*, note); Ptolemy, concerning whom cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 54; Artemon, the collector of Aristotelian Letters (*Ibid.* II. ii. 562), who is probably older than Andronicus; Nicander, who, according to Suidas (Αἰσχρίων), wrote about the disciples of Aristotle: Strato, the Alexandrian Peripatetic (Diog. v. 61; in Tertullian, *De An.* 15, it is not this Strato, but the pupil of Erasistratus, also named by Diogenes, who is intended). Concerning the two last-named philosophers, it is not certain whether they lived before or after the Christian era; Julianus, of Tralles, whose theory of the movement of the heavens by the Platonic world-soul is discussed by Alex. Aphr. ap. Simpl. *De Cœlo*, 169, *b*, 42; *Schol.* 491, *b*, 43. Whether he was a Peripatetic or a Pla

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first century[1] is very unimportant. In the second century we hear of several works of Aspasius: 'Commentaries on the Categories,[2] on the treatise περὶ ἑρμηνείας,[3] on the 'Physics,'[4] the Books about the Heavens,[5] and the 'Metaphysics;'[6] but though he seems[7] to have carefully expounded the writings of Aristotle, and especially to have paid attention to the various readings, nothing has been handed down of his that indicates any independent investigation of philosophic questions. We have more precise information concerning Adrastus.[8] From his treatise on the arrangement of the Aristotelian works,[9] there are quoted observations on their order, titles, and genuineness.[10] A commentary on the Categories

Aspasius.

Adrastus.

tonist, and whether this quotation refers to a commentary on the *Books on the Heavens*, or to a commentary on the *Timæus*, cannot be discovered from the passage.

[1] Alexander of Ægae and Sotion, *vide supra*, p. 304, 2.

[2] Galen, *De Libr. Propr.* c. 11; vol. xix, 42 *sq.*

[3] Boët. *De Interpret.* cf. *Index* to the edition of Meister. Boëthus repeatedly expresses much dissatisfaction (ii p. 41, 14; 87, 17 Meis.) with his interpretations.

[4] Simpl. *Phys.* 28, *b*; 96, *a*, *b*; 99, *b*; 127, *a*, *b*; 130, *a*; 132, *b*; 133, *a*; 135, *a*; 138, *b*; 151, *a*; 168, *b*; 172, *a*; 178, *a*; 192, *b*; 199, *a*; 214, *a*; 219, *a*; 222, *a*; 223, *b*; 239, *a*, *b*.

[5] Simpl. *De Cœlo*, 194, *a*, 6; 23; 240, *a*, 44; Karst. *Schol. in Arist.* 494, *b*, 31; 513, *b*, 10.

[6] Alex. *Metaph.* 31, 23; 44, 23; 340, 10; Bon. 543, *a*, 31; 552, *b*, 29; 704, *b*, 11 Bekk.

[7] The Scholia on the four first books and parts of the seventh and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which Hase has published in the German *Classical Journal*, vols. xxviii. and xxix., claim to be extracted from a commentary of Aspasius; but they are otherwise of no great value.

[8] Concerning him *vide* Martin on Theo. Smyrn. *Astronomia*, p. 74 *sq.*

[9] Περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους συγγραμμάτων (Simpl. *Phys.* 1, *b*; *Categ.* 4, ζ. The designation is less specific of *Categ.* 4, γ: π. τάξ. τῆς Ἀριστ. φιλοσοφίας).

[10] According to Simpl. *Categ.* 4, γ, he wished to place the *Categories* (of which *l. c.* 4, ζ, cf. *Schol. in Arist.* 33, *b*, 30; 39, *a*, 19; 142, *b*, 38, he mentions a second recension) before all

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is also mentioned,[1] and from a commentary on the Physics, Simplicius[2] gives us a detailed statement concerning the conceptions of substance and of essential and accidental quality, which well explains the Aristotelian definitions and expressions. He also perhaps wrote on the ethics of Aristotle and Theophrastus.[3] If we add to this all that we are told concerning his mathematical knowledge, his writings on harmony and astronomy, and his Commentary on the Timæus, and what has been preserved of these writings,[4] we must allow that

the other writings of Aristotle, and next to them the *Topica*; and he, therefore, like some others, entitled the *Categories*: περὶ τῶν τόπων (*Anon. Schol.* 32, *b*, 36, whose account is to be preferred to that of David, *l. c.* 30, *a*, 8, as David, or perhaps his transcriber, evidently confuses the statements of Adrastus and the pseudo-Archytus). In the same treatise he had mentioned forty books of the *Analytics*, of which only four are genuine (*Phil d. Gr.* II. ii. 70, 1), and expressed his opinion on the title of the *Physics* and its principal divisions (Simpl. *Phys.* 1, *b*; 2, *a*; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 86).

[1] Galen, *Libr. Propr.* 11; xix. 42 *sq.*

[2] *Phys.* 26, *b*. That this discussion is taken from a commentary on the *Physics* is clear from the words with which Simplicius introduces it: ὁ δὲ Ἄδραστος βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι τὸ 'ὅπερ ὄν' (ap. *Arist. Phys.* i. 3; 186, *a*, 33) παρεξῆλθεν μὲν ὀλίγον τῶν προκειμένων, &c. Simplicius, however, does not seem to have had the commentary itself, which he never quotes, in his possession, but to have borrowed the passage from Porphyry, who, as he observes, had mentioned it. The extract from Adrastus probably refers to the words: οὐδὲ λέγεται ὅπερ τὸ συμβεβηκός.

[3] Cf. *supra*, p. 306 *sq.* and *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 855.

[4] He is described as a mathematician by Claudian Mamert. *De Statu An.* i. 25, if the Adrastus he mentions is the same person. From his commentary on the *Timæus*, Porphyry (in Ptol. *Harm.*; Wallis, *Opp.* iii. 270) quotes a definition on Consonance. His *Harmony*, in three books, still exists in MS. (Fabr. *Bibl. Gr.* iii. 459, 653). From the first of these books, the quotation ap. Procl. *in Tim.* 192, C; 127, C; 198, E; and probably also ap. Ach. Tat. c. 19, p. 136 (80), are doubtless taken; a treatise on the Sun is mentioned by Ach. Tat. c. 19, p. 139 (82). Lastly,

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the praise accorded by Simplicius to this Peripatetic[1] is entirely justified. But he nevertheless seems to have deserved it rather for his faithful transmission and intelligent elucidation of Aristotle's doctrines than for any new and original enquiries. As in the isolated definitions which have been handed down as his he almost entirely follows Aristotle, so in his general view of the universe and of God, he is allied with him. The universe, the construction of which he describes according to the pattern of Aristotle,[2] is formed by the highest essential nature for the best, and is moved thereby in the manner belonging to it, namely, in a circle. A consequence of the contrast between the terrestrial elements and the various influences which the planetary spheres in the multiplicity of their movements exercise upon them, is the change in our world;[3] but in saying this, Adrastus expressly guards himself against the opinion that the heavenly bodies are created for the sake of that which is meaner and perishable; they have, on the contrary, their end in themselves, and their influence on the earth is only an effect of natural necessity.[4] All

Martin has shown (*l. c.*) that the greatest part of Theo's astronomy is borrowed from a treatise of Adrastus; and that this is the commentary on the *Timæus* is proved by Hiller, *Rhein. Mus. N. F.* xxvi. 582 *sqq.* The same writer shows that Chalcidius has adopted a great deal from this commentary into his own.

[1] *Cat.* 4, γ: Ἀδρ. ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς, ἀνὴρ τῶν γνησίων Περιπατητικῶν γεγονώς.

[2] *Vide* the dissertations on the spherical form of the universe and of the earth, the place of the earth in the centre of the whole, the smallness of the earth in comparison with the whole, in Theo Smyrn. *Astron.* c. 1–4.

[3] *L. c.* c. 22.

[4] *L. c.* Beneath the moon

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this is Aristotelian. Adrastus sought likewise to maintain in principle the Aristotelian theory of the spheres, which he connected by means of ingenious modifications with the theories of later astronomers.[1] He therefore seems, irrespective of his mathematical and other learning, to have been merely a skilful expounder and defender of the Aristotelian theories. Not even as much as this can be said of Herminus.

reigns change, generation, and destruction: τούτων δὲ, φησὶν (Adrastus), αἴτια τὰ πλανώμενα τῶν ἄστρων. ταῦτα δὲ λέγοι τις ἄν, οὐχ ὡς τῶν τιμιωτέρων καὶ θείων καὶ ἀϊδίων ἀγεννήτων τε καὶ ἀφθάρτων ἕνεκα τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ θνητῶν καὶ ἐπικήρων πεφυκότων, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν διὰ τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον καὶ μακαριώτατον ἀεὶ οὕτως ἐχόντων, τῶν δὲ ἐνταῦθα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνοις ἑπομένων. The circular movement of the universe presupposed a central point at rest, and therefore an element the natural motion of which was towards the centre; but then there must also be one the motion of which was towards the circumference, and also elements lying between the two. These elements are in their nature changeable; their variation is really occasioned by that of the seasons, which is, on the other hand, conditioned by the changing position of the planets, especially of the sun and moon (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 440, 468 *sq.*

[1] In Theo, c. 32, with which cf. c. 18, and Martin, p. 117 *sq.* Adrastus here assumes that each planet is fastened to the surface of a globe, which extends from the upper to the lower limit of a hollow sphere, concentric with that of the fixed stars. This sphere turns from east to west in the direction of the ecliptic, but more slowly than the sphere of the fixed stars (or perhaps also, says Adrastus, it is drawn round in this direction by the sphere of fixed stars, while its own motion is from west to east); at the same time the sphere which holds the planet, corresponding with the Epicycles of Hipparchus, moves itself within the hollow sphere, so that the planet describes a circle the diameter of which extends from a point on the outer boundary of the hollow planetary sphere to the opposite point on its inner boundary, the centre of which, therefore, is distant from that of the concentric spheres as far as the radius of the sphere bearing the planet. Adrastus had, therefore, in his theory taken account of the hypothesis of eccentrics. The theory, apart from its other deficiencies, would only explain the apparent revolution of the sun and moon, as Martin observes, p. 119.

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Herminus.

What we are told of his commentaries on the logical writings of Aristotle[1] is sometimes unimportant, and sometimes displays an external and formalistic treatment of logical questions, with much misunderstanding of the Aristotelian propositions.[2] He derives the infinity of the motion of the heavens

[1] Among these the commentary on the *Categories* is most commonly quoted; *vide* the following note and Simpl. in *Categ. Schol. in Arist.* 40, *a*, 17; 42, *a*, 13; 46, *a*, 30; *b*, 15 (14, δ Basil.) 47, *b*, 1; 56, *b*, 39, and p. 3, ε Bas.; Porph. ἐξήγ. 33, *a*, *Schol.* 58, *b*, 16. Also the commentary on the treatise π. Ἑρμηνείας; Boët. *De Interpret.* (cf. the Index of the edition of Meiser); Ammon. *De Interpret.* 43, *a*, *Schol.* 106, *b*, 5. Also the following note, *l. c.* and ap. Alex. *Anal. Pri.* 28, *b*, concerning his commentary on the *Analytics*; and Alex. *Top.* 271, 274, *m*, in the *Topica*.

[2] Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.* i. 545 *sqq.* ‖The substance of the quotations from Herminus's *Logic* is as follows. The treatise on the *Categories*, which he considered as the foundation of Dialectic, and, therefore, with Adrastus entitled περὶ τῶν τόπων (David, *Schol. in Arist.* 81, *b*, 25, according to whom he thus explained the precedence of the doctrine of opposites, *Categ.* c 10), treats neither in an ontological manner of the highest kinds of the Real, nor merely of the parts of discourse, but of the designations proper for each class of the Real (Porph. ἐξήγ. 4, *b*; *Schol.* 31, *b*; cf. *l. c.* Z. 22; David, *Schol.* 28, *b*, 14). He leaves it undecided whether there are only so many highest kinds as Aristotelian Categories (Simpl. *Schol.* 47, *b*, 11 *sqq.*). It is observed *De Interpret.* 1 that the psychic processes designated by words are the same in all; but Herminus would not admit this, because in that case it would not be possible to take the same expression in different senses. He, therefore, *l. c.* 16, *a*, 6, instead of ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα, ψυχῆς, reads 'ταῦτα' (Boët. *De Interpret.* ii. p. 39, 25 *sqq.*; Meis. *Schol.* 101, *b*; Ammon. *De Interpret.* 21, *a*; *Schol.* 101, *b*, 6). In regard to the so-called infinite propositions, he distinguished three cases: the predicate or the subject, or both, might be infinite notions (negatively expressed); but he erroneously compared not merely the first class, but also the second and third, with the corresponding negative judgments (Boët. p. 275 M). He instituted a fruitless enquiry concerning *Anal. Pri.* 26, *b*, 37, as to which conception in syllogisms of the second figure was the primary and which the subordinate conception (Alex. *Anal. Pri.* 23, *b*, *m*; *Schol.* 153, *b*, 27; Prantl, 555 *sq.*).

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not from the operation of the first moving principle but from the soul inherent in them;[1] a deviation from Aristotle and an approximation to the Platonic doctrine which Alexander had already contradicted.[2] From the commentary of Achaicus on the Categories very little has been handed down to us, and that little is unimportant.[3] Nor has much been preserved of Sosigenes' logical writings;[4] but we get a very favourable idea[5] of his mathematical knowledge and the care with which he applied it to the elucidation of Aristotle, from his commentary and criticism of the Aristotelian theory of the spheres.[6] In regard to philosophy, however, the most considerable of these

Achaicus.

Sosigenes.

[1] Simpl. *De Cœlo, Schol.* 491, *b*, 45 (169, *b*, 45 K.), according to a statement of Alexander, which, however, seems to have referred not to a commentary, but to the discourses of Herminus; as in *l. c.* p. 494, *b*, 31 *sqq.*, an utterance of Herminus concerning a reading of Aspasius is also quoted from his discourses.

[2] We shall find, however, that this opposition did not extend to the theory of a particular soul in the heaven of fixed stars.

[3] The passages relating to this are given *infra*, p. 327.

[4] From a commentary on the *Categories*, Porphyry, ἐξήγ. 2, *b* (*Schol.* 31, *b*), and after him Dexipp. in *Categ.* p. 7, 20 *sqq.* Speng. gives his reflections on the question whether the λεγόμενον is a φωνὴ or a πρᾶγμα or a νόημα, on which, however, he could not decide. An observation on *Analyt. Pr.* i. 9 is given by Philop. *Anal. Pr.* xxxii. *b*, *Schol.* 158, *b* 28, after Alexander.

[5] Ap. Simpl. *De Cœlo, Schol.* 498, *a*, 45; 500, *a*, 40; 504, *b*, 41 (219, *a*, 39; 223, *a*, 29; 228, *b*, 15 K.), where Simplicius seems to follow Sosigenes, not merely in that wherein he expressly appeals to him, but throughout. Cf. ps.-Alex. *Metaph.* 677, 25 *sqq.*; Bon. (807, *a*, 29 Br.), who also names Sosigenes at the conclusion of his discussion.

[6] Such enquiries concerning mathematics and natural science were contained in the treatise of Sosigenes, περὶ ὄψεως, from the third book of which Themistius (*Phys.* 79, *a*) takes something concerning the shining of many bodies in the dark; and Alexander (*Meteorol.* 116, *a*) quotes some observations

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younger Peripatetics are Aristocles and Alexander of Aphrodisias; for they alone have left us discussions which, starting from the details of logic and physics, proceed to enquiries affecting the whole theory of the universe.

Aristocles of Messene.

Aristocles of Messene, in Sicily,[1] the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias,[2] is chiefly known to us from the fragments of an historical work of his

from the eighth book concerning the halo round the sun and moon.

[1] Suid. Ἀριστοκλ.

[2] That he was so, is asserted in the older texts of Simplicius (that retranslated from the Latin), *De Cœlo*, p. 34, *b*; and Karsten, p. 69, *b*, 25, has followed it. But in the collection of Academic *Scholia*, 477, *a*, 30, we read, on the contrary: ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς φησί, κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ διδάσκαλον Ἀριστοτέλην, also ap. Cyrill. *c. Julian.* ii. 61, D: γράφει τοίνυν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους μαθητής, and similarly in Alex. *De An.* 144, *a*, *sq.* (*vide infra*, p. 315, 4), according to the printed text Aristotle is named as the teacher of Alexander. Nevertheless, there is every reason to suppose that the older text of Simplicius is right, and not that of the Academy; and that even in the two other passages Ἀριστοκλέους is to be read, and not Ἀριστοτέλους. For (1) there is no trace of any Peripatetic called Aristotle, who, according to the dates, could have been the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias; that the supposed mention of him in Syrian comes to nothing, has been observed *supra*, p. 307; and (2) it is highly improbable that a transcriber should have changed the universally known name of Aristotle for the unknown name of Aristocles, whereas the converse might very easily happen, and has often happened. For example, Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* ii. 179; iv. 330, shows that, ap. ps.-Plut. *Parallel*, 29, p. 312; and *Apostol.* xiv. 70, we find Ἀριστοτέλης; whereas Stobæus, *Floril.* 64, 37, and Arsen. p. 385, give correctly Ἀριστοκλῆς (the historian of Rhodes). Similarly, the Scholiasts on Pindar, *Olymp.* vii. 66, fluctuate between the two names, of which that of Aristocles only is correct. According to Hoche, *Præf.* ii. two manuscripts have Ἀριστοτέλης instead of Ἀριστοκλῆς, and in Boët. *De Interpr.* ii. Meiser (p. 56, 2) was the first to correct the statement of the Basel edition (p. 309, *m*) that Plato was at first called Aristotle. On the other hand, in the various cases where Rose, *Arist. Pseudepigr.* 615 *sq.*, assumes the same mistake, the matter is very questionable, as Heitz shows (*Verlor. Schr. d. Arist.* 295).

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preserved by Eusebius;[1] and these contain, as might be expected in a work of the kind, no original enquiries into philosophy. Aristocles criticises and combats the doctrines of other schools—the Eleatics and the Sceptics, the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans, and even the materialism of the Stoics; while, on the other hand, he defends Aristotle against many charges;[2] the whole work must have contained a complete critical review of the systems of the Greek philosophers. The language of this Peripatetic concerning Plato is nevertheless remarkable. He calls him a genuine and perfect philosopher, and, as well as we can judge from the scanty excerpts in our possession, in expounding his doctrine, himself agrees with it.[3] He seems to assume that the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy in the main coincide, a statement at that period more frequently to be met with in the Platonic school. But Aristocles also combines the Peripatetic doctrine with the Stoic, in a manner which shows that the author of the treatise on the universe was not alone in this tendency. In a remarkable passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias,[4] we are told

[1] *Præp. Ev.* xi. 3; xiv. 17–21; xv. 2, 14. The title of this work is, according to Eus. xi. 2, 5: περὶ φυσιολογίας, according to *Id.* xiv. 17, 1; xv. 2; 14; Suid. Ἀριστοκλ.: περὶ φιλοσοφίας. In Eusebius (*l. c.*) there are quotations from the seventh and eighth books of this work; in Suid. Σωτάδας from the sixth book. The δέκα βιβλία π. φιλοσοφίας are mentioned by Philop. *l. c.*, and *Schol.* 15. Suidas further names a work on Ethics by him in nine books. What he elsewhere ascribes to him seems to belong partly to Aristocles of Pergamos and partly to the Rhodian.

[2] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II, ii. 8; 37, 2; 43, 3.

[3] Eus. xi. 3, 1: on the other hand, § 2 relates to Socrates.

[4] This passage is found in the

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that in order to escape from the difficulties of the Aristotelian doctrine respecting the reason which comes to man from without, Aristotle set up the following theory. The divine reason, he says, is in all things, even in terrestrial bodies, and is constantly working in the manner proper to it. From its operation in things arises not only the rational capacity in man, but also all union and division of substances, and therefore the whole conformation of the universe whether it affects this immediately, for itself alone, or in combination with the influences of the heavenly bodies, or whether nature originates primarily from those influences, and determines all things in combination with *νοῦς*. If, then, this activity of *νοῦς*, in itself universal, finds in any particular body an organ adapted to it, *νοῦς* works in this body as its inherent intelligence, and

second book *περὶ ψυχῆς*, p. 144, *a*; 145, *a*, and, in my opinion, must have been derived from Alexander even if Torstrik (Arist. *De Ann.* p. 186) is right in asserting that the second book, *περὶ ψυχῆς*, was not written by him; for even in that case it could only be the *réchauffée* of the second half of Alexander's work. Torstrik, however, has given no reasons for his judgment, and it does not seem to me justified. After Alexander has here treated of the passive and active intelligence in the sense of Aristotle, he thus continues, according to our printed text: *ἤκουσα δὲ περὶ νοῦ θύραθεν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλους ἃ διεσωσάμην.* If these words seem strange in themselves, our doubts are increased by what follows, and especially by p. 145 *a*, whether the exposition which they introduce should be ascribed to Aristotle and not to a teacher of Alexander, who took them from his mouth, though not himself agreeing with them. That this teacher can be no other than Aristocles, and that consequently *Ἀριστοκλέους* should be substituted for *Ἀριστοτέλους* has already been shown (p. 314, 2). Brandis (*Gesch. der Entwickelung der Griechischen Philos.* ii. 268) declares himself in agreement with the observations on this subject in my first edition.

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there arises an individual intellectual activity. This capability for the reception of *νοῦς* is, as Aristotle believes, conditioned by the material constitution of bodies, and depends especially on the question whether they have in them more or less fire. The corporeal mixture which affords an organ for active intelligence is named potential intelligence, and the operation of the active divine intelligence upon the potential human intelligence, whereby the latter is raised to actuality, and individual thought is realised, consists only in this: that the all-pervading activity of the divine *νοῦς* manifests itself in a special manner in particular bodies.[1] Alexander himself observes respecting these theories of his master, which he seeks to reconcile with the Aristotelian text,[2] that they have considerable affinity with the Stoic doctrine;[3] nor can we conceal from ourselves that *νοῦς* working in the whole corporeal world, and especially in the fiery element, closely approximates to the Stoic reason of the world, which is at the same time the primeval fire and, as such, the artistic and shaping force of nature. As the Heraclitean hylozoism was rendered more fruitful at the appearance of the Stoic system by the doctrine of Aristotle concerning *νοῦς*, so now we see that doctrine in the Peripatetic school itself, even in so distinguished a representative as Aristocles, entering

[1] *Loc. cit.* 144, *b*, *Med.*

[2] *Loc. cit.*: *καὶ τὴν λέξιν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ περὶ ψυχῆς τούτοις προσοικοῦν (-εἰοῦν) ἔλεγε δεῖν.*

[3] *Loc. cit.* 145, *a*: *ἀντιπίπτειν ἐδόκει μοι τότε τούτοις, τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι θεῖον ὄντα, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν*, &c.

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into a combination with the Stoic theory of the universe, which prepares the way for the later union of these systems in Neo-Platonism.[1]

Alexander of Aphrodisias, called the Commentator and

The Aristotelian doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias is purer and stricter.[2] This vigorous Peripatetic, celebrated by posterity under the distinguished names of the Commentator and the Second Aristotle,[3]

[1] Cf. *sup.* p. 137 *sq.* How far Aristocles was from being the only philosopher of that period who intermingled Aristotelian with Stoic theology is also shown by an utterance of his contemporary Athenagoras. This apologist, who was so well acquainted with Greek philosophy, says (*Supplic.* c. 5, p. 22 P.) of Aristotle and the Peripatetics: ἕνα ἄγοντες οἱονεὶ ζῷον σύνθετον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότα λέγουσι τὸν θεόν, σῶμα μὲν αὐτοῦ τὸ αἰθέριον νομίζοντες, τούς τε πλανωμένους ἀστέρας καὶ τὴν σφαῖραν τῶν ἀπλανῶν κινούμενα κυκλοφορητικῶς, ψυχὴν δὲ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει τοῦ σώματος λόγον, αὐτὸν μὲν οὐ κινούμενον αἴτιον δὲ τῆς τούτου κινήσεως γινόμενον. If this does not precisely correspond with the conception of Aristocles, the Deity is here treated in a Stoic manner, as the world-soul; only that the body of the world-soul is formed not by all parts of the world, but merely by the heavenly spheres. But Alexander himself did not (with Aristotle) place the seat of Deity outside the furthest sphere, but in it (*vide infra*, p. 329, 1).

[2] Concerning Alexander's personal history nothing has come down to us. His date can be fixed by the statement in *De Fato*, mentioned *sup.* p. 304, 2. From his native city, Aphrodisias (not Aphrodisium, cf. Ammon. *De Interpret.* 12, *b*; 81, *a*; 161, *b*; Simpl. *De Cœlo.* 168, *b*; 28 K), his invariable surname is Ἀφροδισιεὺς (he describes himself in *Metaph.* 501, 8; Bon. 768, *a*; 20, Br. 132, by the predicates ἰσχνὸς φιλόσοφος λευκὸς Ἀφροδισιεύς); but which Aphrodisias is thereby meant does not appear. Concerning his writings, *vide* Fabric. *Bibl. Gr.* v. 650 *sqq.* and the passages there quoted.

[3] Cf. Syrian and David in the passages quoted p. 307, *n.*; Simpl. *De An.* 13, *b*: ὁ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐξηγητὴς Ἀλεξ.; Themist. *De An.* 94, *a*: ὁ ἐξηγητὴς Ἀλεξ.; Philop. *Gen. et Corr.* 15, *a*; 48, *a*; 50, *b*; Ammon. *De Interpr.* 32, *b*: ὁ Ἀφροδισιεὺς ἐξηγητής. He is also called ὁ ἐξηγητὴς simply; *e.g.*, as Olympiodor. *Meteorol.* 59, *a*; ii. 157, Id. On the other hand, by the ἐξηγητὴς spoken of (*ibid.* 12, *a*; i. 185 Id.), who makes some remark on Alexander's commentary, a far earlier man is meant, a teacher of the author, as we see from the mode of quotation, ἔφη (not φησίν). We

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has unquestionably won for himself great merit by his commentary on the Aristotelian works, a great portion of which he has furnished with detailed explanations,[1] carefully entering into the words as

the Second Aristotle.

cannot, therefore, infer from this passage that the commentator on the *Meteorology* is distinct from the philosopher of Aphrodisias. Alexander's commentaries were read by Plotinus together with those of Aspasius, Adrastus, &c., to his pupils (Porph. *V. Plot.* 14).

[1] The still existing commentaries of Alexander, which are now collected in the Academy edition of the commentaries on Aristotle, and have appeared in a new and improved form of text, embrace the following works: (1) Book I. of the *First Analytics*; (2) on the *Topica* (partly revised, *vide* Brandis, p. 297, of the treatise alluded to *sup.* p. 112, 1); (3) on the *Meteorology*. That this commentary was not written by another Alexander has been already stated (*sup.* p. 304, 2, and 318, 3). Also the citations of Olympiodorus from the Aphrodisian harmonise almost exactly with our Alexandrian commentary; cf. Olymp. i. 133, Id.; Alex. 126, *a*; Ol. i. 202, where Ideler finds a difference that is quite groundless, between the citation of Olympiodorus and our commentator (Alex. 82 *a*; Ol. i. 293 *sq.*; Alex. 100, *b*; Ol. ii. 157; Alex. 124, *b*; Ol. ii. 200; Alex. 132, *a*). If, therefore, something is here and there attributed to the latter which is not to be found in our commentary (Ideler, *l. c.* I. xvii.), this would rather point to a later revision or to gaps in our text. Meantime it is a question whether by the ἐξηγητὴς in Ol. i. 187 Alexander is meant, and whether the passage which Olympiodorus quotes from him (evidently at third hand) really stood in his *Meteorology*; at any rate Simpl. (*De Cœlo*, 95, *a*; *Schol.* 492, *b*, 1), on which Ideler also depends, certainly refers to the commentary on the books of the heavens; (4) περὶ αἰσθήσεως, quoted by Alexander himself (*De An.* 133, *a*; *Qu. Nat.* i. 2, end, p. 19, edition of Thurot, 1875). On the *Metaphysics*, the commentary on Books i.–v. has been preserved entire; the rest in a shortened form; the first part, and extracts from the second, are printed in the *Scholia* of Brandis, and both at length in the separate edition of Bonitz. An explanation of the σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι, which likewise bears the name of Alexander, is certainly spurious (cf. Brandis, *l.c.* p. 298). Lost commentaries on the following works are quoted: (1) The *Categories*, by Simpl. (*Categ.* 1, *a*; 3, *a.* ε.; 23, γ, and often; *De Cœlo*, 76, *b*, 26 K; Dexipp. *Categ.* 6, 15; 40, 23; 55, 13 Speng.; David, *Schol.* 51, *b*, 8; 54, *b*, 15, 26; 65, *b*; 47, 81, *b*, 33. (2) Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (Ammon. *De Interpret.* 12, *b*; 14, *a*; 23, *b*; 32, *b*; 46,

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well as the thoughts of the author.[1] His own writings,[2] however, are no more than explanations

b; 54, *b*; 81, *a*; 161, *b*; 194. *b*; Boët. *De Interpret.* [very frequently]; cf. the Meiser Index. Mich. Ephes. *Schol. in Arist.* 100, *a*). (3) The second book of the *First Analytics* (Philop. *Schol. in Ar.* 188, *b*, 3; 191, *a*, 47; *Anon. Paris* [a commentary under Alexander's name, but much later, concerning which cf. Brandis, *l. c.* p. 290]; *Schol.* 188, *a*, 19; 191, *a*, 10, *b*, 28 *et passim*. (4) The *Second Analytics* (Ps.-Alex. in *Metaph.* 442, 9 Bon. 745, *b*, 7 Br.; Philop. in *Post Analyt. Schol.* 196, *a*, 33; 200, *b*, 30; 203, *b*, 18; 211, *b*, 34 *et passim*; Eustrat. in *Libr.* ii.; *Anal. Post.* 1, *a*; 5. *a*, *o*; 11, *a*, *o*; cf. Fabric. *l. c.* 666; Prantl *Gesch. d. Log.* i. 621, 18). (5) On the *Physics* (Simpl. *Phys.* 3, *b*; 4, *a*; 5, *b*; 6, *a*, and many other passages, especially the three first books; Philop. *Phys.* B, 16; M, 28; N, 13; T, 1; 4; 9. This commentary seems to have been the principal source from which that of Simplicius is taken; and the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosophy, especially, which give such great value to the work of Simplicius, would appear to have been altogether, or chiefly, borrowed from it). (6) The treatise on the heavens (Alex. *Meteorol.* 76. *a*; Ps.-Alex. *Metaph.* 677, 27; 678, 7 Bon. [807, *a*; 36, *b*, 11 Fr.]; Simpl. *De Cœlo. Schol.* 468, *a*; 11 *sqq.* [Damasc. *l. c.* 454, *b*, 11]; 470, *b*, 15–473, *a*; 485, *a*; 28 *sqq. et passim*. (7) *De Generatione et Corruptione* (Ps.-Alex. *l. c.* 645, 12 Bon. 789, *b*: 1 Fr.; title to Alex. *Qu. Nat.* ii. 22; Philop. *Genu. et Corr.* 14, *a*; 15, *a*; 18, *b*, *et passim*). (8) *De Anima* (Simpl. *De An.* 13, *a*, *b*; 25, *b*; 27, *b*, *et passim*; Themist. *De An.* 94, *a*; Philop. *De An.* A 10; 16, B, I.; Ps.-Alex. *Metaph.* 473, 6; 405, 28; 410, 20: 560, 25 Bon. [734, *a*, 28; 755, *a*, 32; 783, *b*, 23 Fr.; the first passage is wanting with him]; cf. Bonitz, *Alex. Comm. in Metaph.* xxii. Commentaries on the smaller anthropological writings are not mentioned with the exception of the still existing commentary *De Sensu*. Concerning some supposed commentaries on the Rhetoric and Poetics, *vide* Fabric. 665, 667. That Alexander expounded other writings besides those of Aristotle we cannot infer from the absurd statement of David (*Schol. in Ar.* 28, *a*, 24), that he commented, not only the works of Aristotle the Stagirite, but those of the other men of that name; also the discussion concerning the harmonic numbers of the *Timæus* mentioned by Philop. (*De An.* D 6) must have been found in the commentary on the *Treatise of the Soul*.

[1] Cf. on this point and against Ritter's (iv. 264) depreciatory judgment of Alexander, Brandis, *l. c.* p. 278; Schwegler, *Metaphysik des Arist.* i.; *Vorr.* s. viii.; Bonitz, *Alex. Comm. in Metaph. Præf.* i.; Prantl, *Gesch. der Log.* i. 621.

[2] We possess four of these

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and apologies for Aristotle's doctrines. In this manner, in his still existing commentaries, he has treated of logic,[1] meteorology, and metaphysics; in

Writings

besides the commentaries περὶ ψυχῆς, 2, B. (ap. Themist. *Opp.* Venet. 1534, p. 123 *sqq.*); π. εἱμαρμένης (*ibid.* 163 *sqq. et pass.*; latest ed. Orelli, Zur. 1824); φυσικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν ἀπορίων καὶ λύσεων, 4, B. (*quæstiones naturales*, &c., edition of Spengel, Munich, 1842, who in the preface, together with Fabricius, *l. c.* 661 *sq.*, gives all information respecting the title and earlier editions); περὶ μίξεως (attached to the Aldine edition of the *Meteorology*, and imperfect in the commencement). On the other hand the *Problems*, ἰατρικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν προβλημάτων, 2 B (cf. also Fabric. 662 *sqq.* and, in respect to Busemaker's edition in the fourth volume of Didot's Aristotle, Prantl, *Münch. Gel. Anz.* 1858, No. 25) and a treatise on Fevers (Fabric. 664), certainly do not belong to Alexander. Among lost writings are mentioned: A treatise on the difference between Aristotle and his disciples in regard to syllogisms with premisses of unequal modality (Alex. *Anal. Pr.* 40, *b*, 83, *a*; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 224); this is no doubt the work referred to by Philop. *Anal. Pr.* xxxii. *b*; *Schol.* 158, *b*, 28 (ἐν τινι μονοβίβλῳ), on the other hand the σχόλια λογικὰ (Alex. *Anal. Pr.* 83, *a*; *Schol.* 169, *a*, 14) must be something distinct from it; the words ἐπὶ πλέον εἴρηταί μοι ἐν τοῖς σχολίοις τοῖς λογικοῖς seem to me to be a gloss. Also a treatise περὶ δαιμόνων (Michaël or whoever may be the author of this commentary, printed with Simpl. *De Anima*, on the treatise περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς, p. 148, *b*): another treatise against Zenobius the Epicurean (*Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 377) in which, according to Simpl. *Phy.* 113, *b*, he had sought to prove the distinction of the Above, Below, &c., to be a natural distinction. The treatise, however, on the seat of the ἡγεμονικόν, alluded to in the commentary on the work περὶ ζώων κινήσεως, 154, *b*, 155, *a*, is doubtless not distinct from Alexander's dissertation, *De An.* i. p. 140 *sqq.*; and the μονοβιβλίον, quoted by Eustrat. in *Eth. N.* 179, *a*, in which it is proved as against the Stoics that virtue does not suffice for happiness, is the same as the portion of the work bearing the same independent title, p. 156 *sqq.* Concerning an essay on the virtues, which still exists in MS., a very doubtful treatise on the powers of stones quoted by Psellus; the allegorical interpretations of myths (Ps. Alex. *Probl.* i. 87) which are certainly spurious, and some Arabic treatises mentioned by Casiri, all, erroneously no doubt, attributed to Alexander (*vide* Fabric. v. 667 *sq.* 658).

[1] Concerning his logic, *vide* Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, i. 622 *sqq.* But, except his definitions on the relation of the individual

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consist wholly of apologies for Aristotle's and commentaries on them.

two books concerning the soul, and in many passages of enquiries into natural science, he has developed the anthropology and psychology of his master; in the first three books of the last mentioned work he has discussed many physical questions, and in the fourth many definitions of the Peripatetic ethics, in opposition to the cavils of the Stoics; in Book i. 18, he defends the necessity and eternity of the world against the Platonists; in the treatise περὶ μίξεως he combats the Stoic doctrine of the mutual interpenetration of bodies; in the treatise on destiny,[1] he defends the freedom of the will against the Stoic fatalism. The weaknesses of his adversaries are pointed out in this treatise with acuteness and skill, but we cannot expect to find in it a thorough and searching enquiry into the human will. Alexander lays chief stress on the practical results of fatalism,[2] among which he does not forget the theological arguments which for himself are not exactly fitting, namely, that fatalism does away with Providence and the hearing of prayer;[3] he also repeatedly and

and the universal, to be spoken of, *infra*; there is not much of importance to be derived from it. The most noteworthy portion (though in fact this is to be found already in Aristotle) is the distinction of the analytic and synthetic methods (*Anal. Pr.* 3, *b*; cf. *Nat. Qu.* i. 4; p. 13 *sq.* Speng.); the discussion on the subcontrary opposition (Boet. *De Interpr.* ii. p. 158 *sq.* Meis.); and the assertion that only the categorical syllogisms are pure and legitimate (*Top.* 6).

[1] περὶ εἱμαρμένης, cf. *De An.* ii. p. 159 *sq.*; *Qu. Nat.* i. 4; ii. 4 *sqq.*; iii. 13. Tennemann (v. 186 *sqq.*) and, more concisely, Ritter (iv. 265 *sq.*), give extracts from the former treatise. It is unnecessary to enlarge further upon it in this place, as the treatise contains no thoughts essentially new; and moreover has been made generally accessible through the edition of Orelli.

[2] *De Fato*, c. 16 *sqq.*

[3] *De Fato*, 17; *De An.* 162, *a*.

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emphatically insists on the principle that the universal opinion of mankind, and the innate ideas which express themselves especially in language, are a sufficient and irresistible proof of truth.[1] The Peripatetic here falls back upon immediate consciousness in the same way that we have so often noticed in the popular philosophy since the time of Cicero. More original theories are brought forward by Alexander in the discussions of some other metaphysical, psychological, and theological questions. The doctrine of Aristotle, of mind, divine and human, as we have seen, has much obscurity, and his sayings about the relation of the deity to the world, as well as those on the relation of human reason to the divine reason, and to the inferior parts of the soul, labour under a mystic vagueness. But this itself is connected with the fundamental determinations of the system concerning form and matter, and can hardly be removed without a recasting of these. Therefore, while Alexander is intent upon a conception of the Peripatetic doctrine, which shall set aside the mystic element as much as possible and establish an altogether natural interconnection of phenomena, he cannot avoid considerable deviations from the doctrine of his master, however little he may confess it to himself. Aristotle had indeed declared individual essences to be the truly Sub-

[1] *De Fato*, c. 2; c. 7; c. 8; cf. c. 5, 12, end; 14, beginning; *De An.* 161, *a*. Speech, however, is not itself inborn; only the faculty of speech is so (*Qu. Nat.* iii. 11; Boët. *De Interpr.* 32, p. 35 *sqq.*; 93, M). The contradictory statement of Ammonius (*De Interpr.* 32, *b*; *Schol. in Ar.* 103, *b*, 28) is rightly rejected by Prantl (*l. c.* 624, 27).

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Aristotle's doctrine of the particular and universal; form, and matter.

How treated by Alexander.

stantial, but at the same time he had declared the Universal to be the proper object of knowledge; he had conceded that forms, with the exception of pure reason and the deity, are not separated from matter, but he had nevertheless sought the proper essence of things in them alone. Alexander goes a step further. Of the two conflicting definitions that the higher reality belongs to the individual and the higher truth to the universal, he gives up the second to save the first. The individual, he maintains (herein departing from Aristotle[1]), is not only for us but in itself, prior to the universal, for if the individual were not, the universal could not be;[2] and consequently he not only includes incorporeal natures, such as the Deity, under the conception of individual substance,[3] but also holds the individual to be the proper object of universal conceptions; yet in these universal conceptions, only those determinations of the individual are brought under consideration which are equally present in several individuals or may be present.[1] The universal conceptions are therefore, as he observes, universal only in the intelligence which abstracts them from individuals; as soon as this ceases to think them, they cease to exist: it is only our thought which releases the forms bound up with matter from matter, and gives to them reality in their absolute existence (*fürsichsein*).[2] This indivisibility of form from matter

[1] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 197, 2.

[2] Simp. *Cat.* 21, β: ὁ μέντοι Ἀλέξανδρος ἐνταῦθα καὶ τῇ φύσει ὕστερα τὰ καθόλου τῶν καθέκαστα εἶναι φιλονεικεῖ, ἀπόδειξιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν κομίζων σχεδὸν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνων, ὅταν λέγῃ, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ κοινὰ παρὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λαμβάνειν . . . κοινοῦ γὰρ ὄντος, φησὶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἄτομον εἶναι, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς κοινοῖς τὰ ἄτομα περιέχεται· ἀτόμου δὲ ὄντος, οὐ πάντως τὸ κοινὸν, εἴγε τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς. *Loc. cit.* ζ: (Ἀλέξ.) καὶ τῇ φύσει προτέρας βουλόμενος εἶναι τὰς ἀτόμους οὐσίας τῶν κοινῶν. μὴ οὐσῶν γὰρ τῶν ἀτόμων, οὐδὲν εἶναι δύναται, φησὶ, τῶν ἄλλων. In agreement with this, cf. Dexipp. *Cat.* c. 12; 54, 22 *sqq.* Sp. (*Schol. in Ar.* 50, *b*, 15 *sqq.*) who compares Alexander in this respect with Boëthus (*sup.* 119, 2); and David. in *Cat. Schol.* 51, *b*. 10. We have no right to refuse credit to these utterances (as Prantl does i. 623) because Alexander also maintains the incorporeality of the concept (cf. Boët. in *Porph. a se Transl.* p. 55, m): for the ἄτομον is not necessarily something corporeal (*vide* next note), and as Boëthus (*l. c.*) says, quoting from Alexander, even from the corporeal the conception of incorporeal form can be abstracted.

[3] Simpl. *Cat.* 21, β: ὁ μέντοι Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ χωριστὸν εἶδος ἄτομον οὐσίαν λέγεσθαί φησι. *Ebd.* 23, γ: ὡς δὲ Ἀλέξ. ἐξηγεῖται τὴν ἄτομον οὐσίαν, φιλοτιμούμενος τὸ πρώτως κινοῦν ἐν αὐτῇ τιθέναι, χαλεπώτεραι αἱ ἀπορίαι.

[1] Alexander shows this, *Qu. Nat.* i. 3. The generic conceptions, he here says, relate neither to individuals, nor to an absolute self-subsistent universal, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ ὁρισμοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστα κοινῶν, ἢ τῶν καθέκαστα κατὰ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς κοινά . . . λέγονται δὲ τῶν νοημάτων καὶ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ ὁρισμοὶ, ὅτι νοῦ τὸ χωρίσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον (the essential nature of man) ἀπὸ τῶν σὺν οἷς ὑφέστηκεν ἄλλων καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν λαβεῖν· ὁ δὲ τοῦ ὑφεστῶτος μὲν μετ' ἄλλων, νοουμένου δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνων [καὶ ἄλλων, no doubt, should be omitted], καὶ οὐχ ὡς ὑφέστηκεν, ὁρισμὸς νοήματος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ κοινοῦ. Cf. Simp. *Phys.* 16, *b*.

[2] *De An.* 139, *b*: τῶν γὰρ ἐνύλων εἰδῶν οὐδὲν χωριστὸν ἢ λόγῳ μόνον, τῷ φθαρὰν αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης χωρισμόν . . . ὅταν μὴ νοῇται τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴδη οὐδὲ ἔστιν αὐτῶν τι νοῦς, εἴγε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ νοητοῖς εἶναι ὑπόστασις. τὰ γὰρ καθόλου καὶ κοινὰ τὴν μὲν ὕπαρξιν ἐν τοῖς καθέκαστά τε καὶ ἐνύλοις ἔχει, νοούμενα δὲ χωρὶς ὕλης κοινά τε καὶ καθόλου γίνεται, καὶ τότε ἔστι νοῦς ὅταν νοῇται, εἰ δὲ μὴ νοοῖτο οὐδὲ ἔστιν ἔτι. ὥστε χωρισθέντα τοῦ νοοῦντος αὐτὰ νοῦ φθείρεται, εἴγε ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς. ὅμοια δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁποῖά ἐστι τὰ μαθηματικά. *Loc. cit.* 143, *b*: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔνυλα εἴδη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ νοητὰ γίνεται ὄντα δυνάμει νοητά. χωρίζων γὰρ αὐτὰ τῆς ὕλης ὁ νοῦς, μεθ' ἧς ἐστιν αὐτῆς (1. αὐτοῖς) τὸ εἶναι, ἐνεργείᾳ νοητὰ αὐτὸς αὐτὰ ποιεῖ, &c. Cf. also *Metaph.* 763, *b*, 37; Br. 493, 30 Bon. The discussions in *Nat. Qu.* i. 17, 26, refer to this relation of the εἴδη ἔνυλα to their substance. Alexander here shows that Form is in substance, not ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ—*i.e.* not as if in something which existed without it, and to which it is superadded, therefore not κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς (cf.

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must hold good also of the soul, the more decidedly Alexander maintains the Aristotelian definition that the soul is nothing else than the form of the organic body.[1] As the form of the body, it is so closely bound up with it that it cannot exist without it, its origin and constitution is conditioned by the body, and no activity of the soul is possible without a corporeal motion.[2] Even the highest activities of

as to the meaning of this expression, *Phil. d. Gr.* II ii. 308, 1) for matter became this definite substance first through the instrumentality of Form; and Form, on the other hand, is only that which it is, as the form of this body. Similarly Alexander explained Time, in partial agreement with Aristotle (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 401) as something existing only in our idea, and he called man ποιητὴς τοῦ χρόνου (Themist. *De An.* 220, 26 Sp.)

[1] *De An.* 123, *a*; 124, *b*, *et pass*; cf. *Qu. Nat.* i. 17, p. 61; i. 26, p. 83.

[2] *De An.* 126, *a*. The continuation of the proposition ὅτι ἀχώριστος ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώματος, οὗ ἐστι ψυχή. *Ibid.* 125, *a*: that the soul is not a self-subsistent substance, but the form of the body, is plain from its activity; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἐνέργειάν τινα ψυχικὴν γενέσθαι χωρὶς σωματικῆς κινήσεως. This is then proved in detail, and the inference drawn ὡς τοῦ σώματος ἐστι τὶ (namely its form) καὶ ἀχώριστος αὐτοῦ. μάτην γὰρ εἴη χωριστὴ μηδεμίαν τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργειῶν καθ' αὑτὴν ἐνεργῆσαι δυναμένη. *Loc. cit.* 143, *a*: The soul is δύναμίς τις καὶ οὐσία ἐπὶ τούτοις (the parts of the body) γινομένη. καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἡ τούτου κρᾶσις αἰτία τῇ ψυχῇ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενέσεως, as we can see from the fact that the constitution of our souls corresponds to that of our bodies: ὃς δέ φαμεν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείας εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ τῆς φυχῆς αὐτῆς καθ' αὑτὴν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔχοντος αὐτήν . . . πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις τοῦ συναμφοτέρου τοῦ ζῶντος εἰσίν. Cf. *Qu. Nat.* ii. 2; Simpl. *Phys.* 225, *a*; and concerning the Aristotelian doctrine which Alexander here follows, cf. vol. ii. *b*, 597, 6. On account of this indivisibility of soul and body Alexander will not allow their relation to be apprehended according to the analogy of that between the artist and his tool (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 487), for the artist is separate from his tool; but the soul is in the body, and especially in the central organ, as its form and the force inherent in it; the other parts of the body can only be regarded as organs: *De An.* 127, *a*, *b*; cf. Simpl. *De An.* 13, *b*; Alex. ἀξιοῖ μὴ ὡς ὀργάνῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ· μὴ γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἓν τι ἐκ τοῦ χρωμένου καὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου.

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the soul form no exception to this. The Aristotelian doctrine of the parts of the soul is also defended by Alexander;[1] but he insists the more strongly that the higher faculties of the soul cannot exist without the lower, and that the unity of the soul depends upon this;[2] and whereas Aristotle had distinguished *νοῦς* as to its origin and its essence very decidedly from all other faculties, Alexander co-ordinates it in one series with the rest. Intellect in man exists primarily only as a disposition—*νοῦς ὑλικὸς καὶ φυσικὸς*—merely potential thought.[3] Through the development of this disposition, there arises the real activity of thought—intelligence as an operative quality, as an active power, the *νοῦς ἐπίκτητος* or *νοῦς καθ' ἕξιν*.[4] But that which effects the development of potential intelligence and brings it to actuality as the light brings colours, the *νοῦς ποιητικὸς*, is, according to Alexander, not a part of our souls, but only the divine reason operating upon it, and in consequence of this operation conceived[5] by it. Thus the mystic unity of human

The soul and νοῦς.

[1] *De An.* 128 *sqq.*; 146, *a*.

[2] *Loc. cit.* 128, *a*, *b*; 141, *a*.

[3] Perhaps it may be in connection with this, that Alexander, according to Simpl. *De An.* 64, *b*, would admit no pure self-consciousness, related to *νοῦς* as such; for he taught that *νοῦς* conceived directly the *εἶδη* alone; and itself only κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, so far as it is one with the *εἶδη*.

[4] *Loc. cit.* 138, *a*, *sq.*; 143, *b*. In these definitions of Alexander lie the source from which the Arabian and Scholastic philosophers derived their well-known doctrine of the *intellectus acquisitus*.

[5] *Loc. cit.* 139, *b*; 143, *b*, *sq.*; 139, *b*: ἀπαθὴς δὲ ὢν (ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς) καὶ μὴ μεμιγμένος ὕλῃ τινὶ καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν, ἐνέργεια ὢν καὶ εἶδος χωρὶς δυνάμεώς τε καὶ ὕλης. τοιοῦτον δὲ ὂν δέδεικται ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ὃ καὶ κυρίως ἐστὶ νοῦς, &c., p. 114, *a*: τοῦτο δὴ τὸ νοητόν τε τῇ αἰτοῦ φύσει καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν νοῦς, αἴτιον γινόμενον τῷ

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reason with the divine is here broken; on the one side is man, and on the other the deity operating upon him. The human soul is therefore an absolutely finite essence; the souls of the gods (*i.e.* no doubt the heavenly bodies) could only be called[1] souls in an improper sense (*ὁμωνύμως*). In accordance with this our philosopher places the seat of reason, to which Aristotle had denied any corporeal organ,[2] in the heart,[3] like the Stoics, and says, universally and unconditionally of the human soul, what Aristotle had said only of one part of it, that it passes away with the body.[4] The attempt which

ὑλικῷ νῷ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἀναφορὰν χωρίζειν τε καὶ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ νοεῖν καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν νοητὸν αὐτὸ, θύραθέν ἐστι λεγόμενος νοῦς ὁ ποιητικὸς, οὐκ ὢν μόριον καὶ δύναμίς τις τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν γινόμενος ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅταν αὐτὸ νοῶμεν . . . χωριστὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡμῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν εἰκότως. On account of this assertion, Alexander was frequently attacked by later commentators, cf. Themist. *De An.* 89, *b* (where, though not named, he is evidently alluded to); Simpl. *Phys.* 1, *a*; 59, *a*; Philop. *De An.* F, 11; G, 7; H, 8; Q, 2 3 (quotation from Ammonius); 10, *sq.* Alexander's general view of *νοῦς* is thus summed up by Philop. *l. c.*, O, Q, 2: *πρῶτον σημαινόμενον λέγει τοῦ νοῦ τὸν δυνάμει νοῦν, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν παίδων . . . δεύτερον σημαινόμενον τοῦ δυνάμει [leg. τοῦ νοῦ] ὁ καθ' ἕξιν νοῦς, ὅσπερ ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν τελείων ἀνθρώπων . . . τρίτον σημαινόμενόν ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ ὁ ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦς, ὃ ἐστιν ὁ θύραθεν, ὁ παντέλειος . . . ὁ κυβερνῶν τὰ πάν.* Concerning his explanation of the particular in the Aristotelian passages concerned, cf. *ibid.* Q. 4, 5, 8; also Simpl. *De An.* 64, *b.*

[1] *De An.* 128, *a.*

[2] Cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 568, 3.

[3] *De An.* 141, *a.* Observe here also the Stoic *ἡγεμονικὸν* and the Platonic *λογιστικὸν* instead of the Aristotelian *νοῦς.*

[4] *Loc. cit.* 127, *a*, *o*: *οὐσα δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ εἶδος τοῦ σώματος . . . τῷ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος καὶ συμφθείροιτο ἂν τῷ σώματι, ὅση γε αὐτῆς φθαρτοῦ σώματος εἶδός ἐστιν. Qu. Nat.* ii. 10: *ἡ ψυχὴ οὖν ἔννλον εἶδος ὂν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι. ὃ γὰρ ὕλης δεῖται πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, ταύτης τί ὂν* (namely its form) *ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι.* Alexander here infers that the soul cannot move itself, in and for itself; but it also follows that it cannot exist without the body. This denial of immortality, which Alexander in his commentary on *De An.* also tried to prove in Aristotle, is often mentioned by later writers, cf. David, *Schol. in Arist.* 24, *b*, 41; 26, *b*, 13; Philop. *De An.* A, 5, *o*; E, 8, Q, 4.

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is seen in these definitions to refer phenomena to natural causes by rejecting everything supernatural may be also perceived in the doctrine of the Aphrodisian on the relation of God and the world. All that happens in the world he derives, like Aristotle, from the influence which diffuses itself from the Deity first into the heavens, and from thence into the elementary bodies;[1] but this whole process is conceived entirely as a process of nature; in each of the elements there is more or less animate force, according as its higher or lower position in the universe, and its coarser or finer nature, places it nearer or further to the first bearer

Relation of God and the world.

[1] The motion of the heavens itself, Alexander explained, like Aristotle, by supposing that the *σῶμα κυκλοφορητικὸν* had a longing to become as like as possible to the highest, eternal, and unmoved substance (which, however, according to Simpl. *Phys.* 319, *b*, he did not, like Aristotle, conceive as outside the heavens, but as inherent in the outermost sphere as a whole); and since a longing presupposes a soul, he says that the *θεῖον σῶμα ἔμψυχον καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν κινούμενον.* Similarly each of the seven planetary spheres (to which accordingly Alexander again refers the 55 Aristotelian) *ἐφέσει καὶ ὀρέξει τινὸς οὐσίας* (the spirit of their sphere) must be moved in a direction contrary to that of the fixed star heaven, but, at the same time, must be carried round by it—a double motion which was necessary, because otherwise there could not be in the world beneath the moon a regular alternation of generation and passing away (*Qu. Nat.* i. 25). Alexander also (herein differing from Aristotle) attributes a soul to the *πρῶτος οὐρανὸς*, in which the longing, which Aristotle had ascribed to matter itself (*Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 373 *sq.*) must have its seat; his contradiction to Herminus (*vide supra*, p. 313, 1) consists only in this that Herminus derives from the soul what according to Alexander, is the effect of the first moving principle.

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of this force—the sky; and it is likewise divided among the bodies compounded of these elements in greater or lesser measure; they have a more or less perfect soul, according as they consist of purer or impurer substances and, particularly, according as more or less of the noblest element, fire, is mixed up in them.[1] In this divine power the essence of nature consists;[2] but Providence or destiny coincides with nature.[3] Therefore, though Alexander does not admit destiny in the Stoical sense, he is as little inclined to favour the ordinary belief in Providence. This belief seems to him not only irreconcileable with the freedom of the human will—for free actions, as he points out, the Deity Himself cannot foreknow, since His power does not extend to the impossible[4]—but is also opposed to right conceptions of God and the world. For it cannot possibly be supposed that the mortal and meaner is the end, and the activity of the higher—of God—is merely a means existing for the sake of the former;[5] nor can we say of the world that it

[1] *Qu. Nat.* ii. 3.

[2] *Qu. Nat. l. c.* p. 90; *De An.* 159, *b*: τῆς θείας δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῷ γεννητῷ σώματι ἐγγινομένης ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον [sc. σῶμα] γειτνιάσεως, ἣν καὶ φύσιν καλοῦμεν. According to Simpl. *De Cœlo*, 54, *a*, 23, Karsten, Alexander even identified the Deity with the æther, for it is here said (ap. Arist. *De Cœlo*, i. 3; 270*b*, 8) he referred the ἀθάνατον to the θεῖον σῶμα, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ. But only the reading of Brandis is compatible with the context, and with Alexander's theory (*vide supra*, p. 327, 5; 329, 1). Brandis, *Schol.* 475, *a*, 45: ὡς ἐπὶ τούτου ὅ. τ. θ.: 'so far as the deity is combined with the æther.'

[3] *De Fato*, c. 6: λείπεται δὴ λοιπὸν τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς εἶναι ταὐτὸν εἱμαρμένην τε καὶ φύσιν, which is then further discussed. *De An.* 162, *a*: λείπεται ἄρα τὴν εἱμαρμένην μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, &c.

[4] *De Fato*, c. 30.

[5] *Qu. Nat.* ii. 21, p. 128 *sqq.*

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requires a providence for its constitution and maintenance; on the contrary, its existence and condition is a consequence of its nature.[1] If, therefore, Alexander does not wholly deny Providence, he confines it to the world beneath the moon, because for this world alone care is taken by something outside itself which is destined to maintain it in its existence and order, through the world of planets;[2] and if he also opposes the notion that Providence is only an accidental operation of the Deity, he considers it just as little an activity working with design, but only as a consequence of Nature, foreknown and fore-ordained by it.[3] We cannot call these opinions on Providence entirely un-Aristotelian; but as they follow the Aristotelian doctrine only on the physical side, they give proof of the naturalism of the philosopher, whose explanation of the life of the soul approximates to the Stoic Materialism, and his whole theory of the universe to the standpoint of Strabo the physicist.

Alexander the last important Peripatetic.

Alexander of Aphrodisias is the last important teacher of the Peripatetic school with whom we are

Cf. the quotations from Adrastus, *supra*, p. 310, with whom, however, Alexander does not wholly agree; for he supposes the planets to have their double motion for the sake of the earthly sphere, *vide supra*, p. 329, 1.

[1] *Loc. cit.* ii. 19.

[2] *Loc. cit.* and i. 25, p. 79 *sq.* According to the second passage the conception of Providence can only have been applied in a more remote sense to the whole material world.

[3] *Qu. Nat.* ii. 21, p. 124 *sq.*, 131 *sq.* Alexander here observes that the question whether Providence proceeds καθ' αὑτὸ or κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς has never been more closely investigated by any of his predecessors; he himself gives the above decision only hypothetically, but it manifestly expresses his own opinion.

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From the second half of the third century the Peripatetic School is gradually merged in that of the Neo-Platonists.

acquainted. Of the few who are mentioned after him in the first half of the third century,[1] all without exception were insignificant.[2] From the second half of the third century the Peripatetic school seems gradually to have lost itself in the school of the Neo-Platonists, in which the knowledge of Aristotle's writings was also zealously maintained; we still hear of Peripatetics;[3] and there were not wanting men who commented on the Aristotelian writings and followed their doctrines in particular branches, such as logic, physics, and psychology;[4]

[1] Longinus ap. Porph. *V. Plot.* 20, among the philosophers of his time whom he there enumerates, mentions three Peripatetics: Heliodorus of Alexandria, Ammonius (according to Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 27, 6, he was probably in Athens), and Ptolemæus. Of these only the first left philosophical writings; of the other two, Longinus remarks that they were indeed full of knowledge, especially Ammonius (of whom Philostr. *l. c.* confirms this testimony), but only wrote poems and declamatory orations, to which they themselves would hardly have attributed so much value as to wish to be known to posterity by these productions. Porphyry, ap. Eus. *Pr. Ev.* x. 3, 1, also mentions as his contemporary in Athens, Prosenes the Peripatetic, perhaps head of the school there.

[2] Even Anatolius of Alexandria, who became bishop of Laodicea about 270 A.D., and, according to Eus. *Hist. Eccl.* vii. 32, 6, so distinguished himself in the Peripatetic philosophy that his native city wished to make him head of the school in that place, seems to have displayed his chief strength in mathematics. A fragment from his κακόνες περὶ τοῦ πάσχα is quoted by Eusebius, *l. c.*, 14 *sqq.*; a fragment likewise, ap. Fabric. *Bibl. Gr.* iii. 462 *sq.*, may, perhaps, belong to him; but the fragments ap. Iambl. *Theol. Arithmet.* (*vide* index) are from an earlier Anatolius, the teacher of Iamblichus.

[3] *Vide supra*, p. 302, 2.

[4] Thus, following Plotinus, came Porphyry, Iamblichus, Themistius, Dexippus, Syrianus, Ammonius, Simplicius, the two named Olympiodorus, and other Neo-Platonists, to whom we must add Philoponus; in the East, Boëthus, and the philosophers quoted by him, Victorinus and Vegetius Prætextatus. Of these men, so far as they come within the scope of the present exposition, we shall have to speak later on.

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but with regard to any philosophers who adopted the Peripatetic doctrine in their whole theory of the world, there are only incidental allusions.[1]

[1] We meet with such a Peripatetic even at the end of the fifth century in Dorus the Arabian, who, according to Damasc. ap. Suid. *sub voce*, cf. *Vers. Isid.* 131, was converted by Isidorus from the Aristotelian to the Platonic—*i.e.* the Neo-Platonic—system.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PLATONIC SCHOOL IN THE FIRST CENTURIES AFTER THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

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D. Platonists of the first centuries A.D.

OUR knowledge of the Academic school[1] at the point where we last left it becomes so fragmentary, that for half a century not even the name of any of its teachers is known to us.[2] Only in the last decades of the first century does some light break in upon this darkness, and from that time onward we can follow the school through a continuous series of Platonic philosophers to the times of Neo-Platonism.[3]

[1] Cf. Fabric. *Bibl.* iii. 159 *sqq.*; Zumpt, p. 59 *sqq.*, in the treatise quoted *supra*, p. 112, 1.

[2] Seneca, whose testimony must be valid at any rate for Rome, goes so far as to say: *Nat. Qu.* vii. 32, 2: *Academici et veteres et minores nullum antistitem reliquerunt.*

[3] After the Platonists, mentioned p. 100 *sqq.*, the next that we know of is Ammonius of Egypt, the teacher of Plutarch, who taught in Athens, probably as head of the Platonic school, and died there, after having repeatedly filled the office of Strategus (Plut. *Qu. Symp.* iii. 1; viii. 3; ix. 1, 2, 5, 1, 5; *De Ei.* c. 1 *sq.* p. 385, where a supposed conversation with him during Nero's visit to Greece 63 A.D. is narrated, *Def. Orac.* c. 4; 9; 20; 33; 38; 46; *De Adulat.* 31, p. 70; *Themistokl.* c. 32, end; Eunap. *V. Soph. Proœm.* 5; 8). With him Plutarch is connected, of whom we shall speak more at length later on. Aristodemus, of Ægium, was a friend and co-disciple of Plutarch, whom Plutarch calls, *Adv. Col.* 2, ἄνδρα τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας οὐ ναρθηκοφόρον, ἀλλ' ἐμμανέστατον ὀργιαστὴν Πλάτωνος, and to whom in this place, and in the treatise against Epicurus (*N. P. Suav.* v.) he has given a part in the conversation. Under Hadrian seem to have lived the Syrian Apollonius, mentioned as a Platonist by Spartian. *Hadr.* 2, and Gaius, whose pupil Galen heard in Pergamum about 145 B.C. (Galen. *Cogn. An. Morb.* 8, vol. 5, 41; *vide infra*, p. 337, 3). In the eighth year of Antoninus Pius (145 A.D.) Jerome (*Chron. Eus.*) places Calvisius Taurus, of Berytus (Eus. *l. c.*; Suid. Ταῦρ.). or Tyrus (Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii, 1, 34); but as, according to Gellius, *N. A.* i. 26, 4, he had Plutarch for his teacher, and, according to Philostr. *l. c.*, Herodes Atticus, who was consul in 143 A.D., he must have come forward some time previously (Zumpt, p. 70). Gellius, also his pupil, often mentions him. We see from *N. A.* 26; ii. 2, 1; vii. 10, 1; 13, 1 *sq.*; xvii. 8, 1, that he was at the head of the school. Concerning his writings *vide infra*. To the same period belong Nigrinus, who is known to us through Lucian (*Nigrin.*) as a Platonist residing in Rome (as such he describes himself in c. 18). Sextus, of Chæronea, a nephew of Plutarch's, teacher of Marcus Aurelius and Verus (Capitol. *Antonin.*; Philos. 3; *Verus.* 3; Suid. Μάρκ. and Σέξτ.; by whom, however, through his own mistake or his transcriber's, Sextus of Chæronea and Sextus Empiricus are confused; M. Aurel. i. 9; Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 9; Dio Cass. lxxi. 1; Eutrop. viii. 12; Porph. *Qu. Homer*, 26, cf. p. 276, 2); Alexander of Seleucia, in Cicilia, who was called Peloplaton, and who taught in Antioch, Rome, Tarsus, and other places, and also stood in favour with Marcus Aurelius (Philostr. *V. Soph.* ii. 5; M. Aurel. i. 12); Albinus, the pupil of Gaius (the title of a treatise spoken of *inf.* p. 337, 3, describes him as such) whose instructions Galen attended in Smyrna 151, 2 A.D. (Gal. *De Libr. Propr.* 2 vol. xix. 16; for further details concerning Albinus, *vide inf.* p. 338 *sq.*); Demetrius (M. Aurel. viii. 25); Apuleius of Madaura, and Maximus of Tyre. Under Hadrian lived Theo of Smyrna (cf. Martin, *Theon. Astron.* 5 *sqq.*), as we know from the fact that astronomical observations of the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 16th years of Hadrian are quoted from him (cf. Rossbach and Westphal, *Metrik. der Gr.* 2nd ed. 1, 76). He is described as a Platonist by Procl. *in Tim.* 26, A, and in the title borne by his principal work in several manuscripts, τὰ κατὰ τὸ μαθηματικὸν χρήσιμα εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀνάγνωσιν the first book of this work is the 'Arithmetic,' which Bullialdus first edited; the second, the 'Astronomy,' edited by Martin; the three remaining books are lost. Procl. (*l. c.*) seems to refer to a commentary on a Platonic work, perhaps the Republic (cf. Theo, *Astron.* c. 16, p. 203, and Martin, p. 22 *sq.* 79). Under the reign of Marcus Aurelius, besides Atticus (Jerome, *Chron Eus.* of the 16th year of Marcus; 176, A.D.

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General character of the school at this period.

In its mode of thought it remained true, on the whole, to the eclectic tendency which it had struck out since

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Philo and Antiochus. But, in the first place, this did not prevent individuals from protesting against such overclouding of pure Platonism; and, in the second place, after the commencement of the first century, there was united with this medley of philosophic doctrines in increasing measure that religious mysticism, through the stronger growth of which the eclectic Platonism of an Antiochus and

Porph. *V. Plot.* 14; further details *infra*), must be placed Daphnus (a physician of Ephesus, Athen. i. 1, *c*); Harpocration of Argos, a scholar of Atticus (Procl. *in Tim.* 93, B *sq.* Suid. *sub voce*), according to Suidas, *συμβιωτὴς Καίσαρος*, perhaps the grammarian, namesake and teacher of Verus, so described by Capitol. *Ver.* 2. Suidas mentions as written by him a *ὑπόμνημα εἰς Πλάτωνα* in twenty-four books, and *λέξεις Πλάτωνος* in two books. In the first was contained no doubt, what Olympiodorus *in Phädon.* p. 159, *Schol.* 38; F. *in Alcib.* p. 48 Cr. quotes from him. In the time of Marcus Aurelius, also seem to have lived Numenius, Cronius, and Celsus, to be spoken of later on; at the end of the second century Censorinus, attacked by his contemporary Alex. (*Aphr. Qu. Nat.* i. 13) for a statement concerning Epicurus' theory of colour; perhaps also Apollophanes, mentioned by Porphyry (ap. Eus. *Hist. Eccl.* vi. 19, 8) as a philosophical writer, with the Platonists Numenius, Cronius, and Longinus. In the first half and middle of the third century there lived in Athens, Theodotus and Eubulus, two *διάδοχοι* of the Platonic school, of whom the latter was still alive after 263 A.D. (Longinus ap. Porph. *V. Plot.* 20; Porph. himself, *l. c.* 15, where the few and unimportant writings of Eubulus are also mentioned). To them Longinus adds as Platonists (*l. c.*) who had written much, Euclides (cf. *inf.* 337, 3), Democritus, and Proclinus, in Troas: of Democritus, also mentioned by Syrian in *Metaph. Schol. in Ar.* 892, *b*, 31, we hear that he wrote commentaries on the *Alcibiades* (Olympiodorus *in Alcib.* p. 105, Cr.) and the *Phædo* (*Ibid. in Phæd.* p. 159, end, 38, F). Of Ammonius, Sakkas, Origen, and Longinus we shall have to speak further on. When *Ἀκύλλας* lived (quoted by Procl. *in Tim.* 319, F. in connection with a theory on *Tim.* 41, D), and whether he was earlier or later than Plotinus, cannot be ascertained; nor are the dates of Maximus of Nicæa (*vide inf.* p. 337, 3) and of Severus (*inf.* p. 339 *sq.*) exactly known.

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his successors was developed into Neo-Platonism. The opposition to the intermingling of other points of view with the Platonic doctrine, was chiefly called forth and nourished by the more accurate knowledge of its most ancient records. As the Peripatetics of this period turned their attention more and more to the Aristotelian writings, so do we see the Academics now applying themselves to the writings of Plato; and if the scientific activity of the school did not throw itself with the same zeal and exclusiveness into the works of its founder as the Peripatetics did, the study of those works nevertheless prevailed to an important and considerable extent. Among later writers Plutarch stands in the closest connection with the earlier expositors of Platonic writings;[1] inasmuch as he not merely in numerous passages refers to sayings of Plato in a general manner, but has also thoroughly discussed certain points of his doctrine and certain sections of his works.[2] As commentators of Plato, Gaius, Albinus, Taurus, and Maximus are likewise mentioned[3] among

Commentaries on the writings of Plato and study of them.

[1] *Dercyllides, Thrasyllus, Eudorus* (*vide sup.* p. 610 *sq.*).

[2] Especially in the *Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα* and the treatise *περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας*.

[3] In the fragment of the commentary on the Republic ap. A. Mai, *Class. Ant.* I. xiv. Proclus names as expounders of the mythus in *Rep.* x. 614 *sq.* *τῶν Πλατωνικῶν οἱ κορυφαῖοι, Νουμήνιος, Ἀλβῖνος* (as, according to Freudenthal, *Hellenist. Stud.* 3 H. p. 300, the MSS. give; Mai substitutes *Ἀλκῖνος*), *Γάϊος, Μάξιμος ὁ Νικαεὺς, Ἀρποκρατίων, Εὐκλείδης, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Πορφύριος.* A Scholium, ap. Fabric. iii. 158, says: *τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα ὑπομνηματίζουσι πλεῖστοι. Χρησιμώτεροι δὲ Γάϊος, Ἀλβῖνος, Πρισκιανὸς* (contemporaries of Simplicius), *Ταῦρος, Πρόκλος*, &c. Gaius also names Porphyry *V. Plot.* 14 among those whose commentaries Plotinus had read; an exposition of the Timæus is no doubt referred to in Procl. *in Tim.* 104. A; from Taurus, Gellius (*N. A.* vii. 14, 5) quotes the first book of a commentary on the Gorgias and also (xvii.

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others. Of Albinus we possess, in a later revision, an introduction to the Platonic dialogues,[1] and an epitome of the Platonic doctrines[2] hitherto falsely

20) his oral exposition of the Symposium; and from the first book of an exposition of the Timæus, extracts are given in the *Bekker Scholia* on Plato, p. 436 *sq.* and by Philop. *De Ætern. Mundi*, vi. 21. From the same source comes, no doubt what is quoted by Iambl. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* 1, 906.

[1] This treatise, included by Hermann in the sixth, and by Dübner in the third volume of his edition of Plato, has now been subjected to a thorough investigation, and newly edited on the basis of more perfect manuscripts by Freudenthal (the Platonic Albinus and the false Alcinous, *Hellen. Stud.* 3 H. pp. 241–327). Its title runs thus in the best MSS.: εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος βίβλον Ἀλβίνου πρόλογος. Its text, however, in its present form, as Freudenthal has shown, p. 247 *sqq.* is only a badly executed and mutilated extract. The same writer proves, p. 257 *sq.*, that c. 1–4 of the prologue, and Diog. Laert. iii. 48–62 have emanated from one source, which was earlier than Thrasyllus (concerning whom *vide sup.* p. 102, 2). As to its contents *vide* Alberti, *Rhein. Mus. N. F.* xiii. 76 *sqq.* Some further details will be found *Phil. d Gr.* II. i. 427, 3.

[2] This work is called in the MSS., almost without exception, Ἀλκινόου διδασκαλικὸς (or λόγος διδασκ.) τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων, in the transcripts of some of them also εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν Πλ., or ἐπιτομὴ τῶν Πλάτ. δογμάτων (by the moderns for the most part) εἰσαγωγή. It has now been placed beyond question by Freudenthal's thorough examination (*l. c.* 275 *sqq.*) that its author is no other than Albinus, with whose 'introduction' it entirely corresponds both in form and content, and to whom many of the doctrines brought forward by the supposed Alcinous, and among them some that are very remarkable, are expressly attributed. The alteration of Albinus into Alcinous was (as Fr. p. 300, 320 shows) so much the more possible as all our manuscripts are derived from the same ancient copy; and in this an Ἀλκίνου may have been found, or an Ἀλβίνου read Ἀλκίνου, and may have been changed, when the book was transcribed, into Ἀλκίνοου. But even this treatise of Albinus we possess according to all the evidence only in a later revision, which considerably shortened the original work and reproduced it not without some corrections; a Paris Codex (*l. c.* p. 244, now imperfect), names in its index Albinus' third book περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνι ἀρεσκόντων. But that Albinus in his treatise made plentiful use of more ancient works we see from the agreement—for the most part word for word—of his twelfth chapter with the passage from Arius Didymus (ap. Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xi. 23; Stob. *Ecl.* i. 330), which Diels has now proved more minutely (*Doxogr.* 76, 447).

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put forth under the name of Alcinous. He also composed commentaries, but we know nothing of them.[1] The commentary of Severus on the *Timæus* we know through Proclus.[2] The writings of Theo and Harpocration in explanation of Plato have been already mentioned;[3] commentaries on the *Timæus* and *Phædrus* are also quoted from Atticus;[4] from

[1] Among the more celebrated commentators of the Platonic writings, Albinus is reckoned in the passages quoted *sup.* p. 337, 3. What writings he expounded, and how his commentaries were made, tradition does not tell us; perhaps he merely explained a number of Platonic passages in one dogmatic work, probably that mentioned in the index of the Paris Codex named in the previous note (Freudenthal, p. 244), nine or ten books of a summary of the Platonic doctrines according to the discourses of Gaius (Ἀλβίνου [add. ἐκ] τῶν Γαΐου σχολῶν ὑποτυπώσεων πλατωνικῶν δογμάτων—this same work is alluded to by Priscian, *Solut.* p. 553, *b*, 32, as *Lavini ex Gaii scholis exemplaribus Platonicorum dogmatum*, for the translator read instead of AABINOY, 'AAB.' Freud. 246. According to its contents, that which Procl. *in Tim.* 104, A; 67, C; 311 A, quotes may have been part of a commentary on the Timæus; the passage we find ap. Tertull. *De An.* 28 *sq.* may have been taken from an exposition on the *Phædo*; and that in Iambl. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 896, may have come from an exposition of the Republic. Meantime most of these citations have amply sufficient parallels in the supposed Alcinous, and less exact parallels in Procl. *in Tim.* 104 A and Tertull. *De An.* 28 (cf. Freudenthal, 299 *sq.*), and though it does not follow unconditionally from this that they refer to that particular treatise, it is not unlikely that Albinus may have repeated and copied what he wrote there, as other writers in those later centuries are accustomed to do, and as he himself transcribes from his predecessors. Moreover, though the circumstance that three of the utterances of Albinus relate to passages of the *Timæus* and are quoted in a commentary on that dialogue, might serve to corroborate the theory that they originally stood in a similar commentary, yet I must concede to Freudenthal (p. 243 *sq.*) that this is not thereby rendered more probable.

[2] In *Tim.* 63, A; 70, A: 78, B; 88, D: 168, D: 186, E: 187, B; 192, B D; 198, B E *sq*; 304, B. I shall recur to this philosopher later on.

[3] *Vide supra*, pp. 337, 3; 335, 336.

[4] Concerning the first, cf. the Index to Procl. *in Tim.*; the other is mentioned *l. c.* 15, A.

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Numenius and Longinus, besides other treatises devoted to the Platonic writings, commentaries on the *Timæus*;[1] and from Longinus' contemporaries, Democritus and Eubulus, explanations and discussions of several dialogues.[2] The oral instruction also in the Platonic school consisted, doubtless, to a considerable extent, in the reading and interpretation of the Platonic works.[3] Through this thorough examination of the sources of the Academic doctrine the conviction must certainly have arisen that much which had in later times claimed to be Platonic was far removed from the real opinions of Plato, and thus we hear of several individuals who protested against the prevailing confusion of the various systems. Taurus wrote upon the difference of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, and against the Stoics;[4] but as to his own conception of the Platonic system, little has been handed down to us, and no noticeable peculiarities or characteristics[5] are

Opposition to the introduction of alien doctrines in the writ-

Syrian (*Schol. in Ar.* 892, *b*, 31) seems to refer to the commentary on the *Timæus*, and indeed to the passage discussed by Procl. *in Tim.* 87 B.

[1] *Vide* the Index to Procl. *in Tim.* He seems to have taken his quotations from Numenius, out of a commentary, and not from the other writings of this Platonist. Whether Cronius had written commentaries cannot be decided from Porph. *V. Plot.* 14.

[2] Concerning Democritus, *vide sup.* p. 336, *n.*; concerning Eubulus, *vide* Longinus, ap. Porph. *V. Plot.* 20.

[3] This we infer from the multitude of commentaries and expository writings, and also from statements like those quoted *supra*, p. 337, 3; 339, 1, on the lectures of Taurus and Gaius, and Porph. *V. Plot.* 14. Taurus also read Aristotelian writings with his scholars (ap. Gell. xix. 6, 2; xx. 4, the Problems).

[4] The former, according to Suid. *ταῦρ*, the latter according to Gellius, *N. A.* xii. 5, 5. He also, according to Suidas, composed a treatise *περὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων* and many other works.

[5] We learn from his disciple, Gellius, who frequently mentions him, that he required a thorough training for philosophy, and could not endure a merely rhetorical treatment of it (*N. A.* i. 9, 8; x. 19: xvii. 20, 4 *sq.*); that he did not despise subtle dialectic discussions, and special physical investigations (vii. 13; xvii. 8; xix. 6); that he did not wish to eradicate the emotions, but to moderate them, and therefore condemned passionate disturbances of the feelings, such as anger (i. 26, 10); that he abhorred Epicurus' doctrine of pleasure and denial of Providence (ix. 5, 8), to pass over points of less importance (ii. 2; vii. 10, 14, 5; viii. 6; xii. 5; xviii. 10; xx. 4). It further appears from the fragment ap. Philop. *De Ætern. M.* vi. 21 that he, with the majority of contemporary Platonists, denied a beginning of the world in time; and from the fragments in Bekker's *Scholia ad Plat.* p. 436 *sq.* and ap. Philop. *l. c.* xiii. 15, that he apportioned the five senses to the four elements, putting that of smell midway between water and air; and that in opposition to Aristotle's æther, he made the heavens to consist of earth and fire. From Iambl. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 906, we learn that his scholars were not agreed as to whether souls were sent upon the earth for the completion of the universe or for the manifestation of the divine life.

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exhibited in it. Atticus also, like Taurus, set himself against the tendency to amalgamate the Platonic and Peripatetic theories. In the fragments of a treatise which he devoted to this purpose[1] he appears as an enthusiastic admirer of Plato, who is anxious about the purity of the Academic doctrines; attacks the Peripatetic system with passionate prejudice, and especially reproaches it with the lowness of its moral standpoint, and its denial of Providence and immortality.[2] Of the remaining doctrines of Aristotle, it is the theory of a fifth element and the eternity of the world which particularly move him to opposition, the latter so much the more, as

ings of Taurus. and Atticus.

[1] Eus. *Pr. Ev.* xi. 1, 2; xv. 4–9, c. 13, and probably also in c. 12. In the first of these passages the subject of the treatise is indicated in the words: *πρὸς τοὺς διὰ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑπισχνουμένους*. What we find in the superscription of many chapters and in xv. 5, 1; 6, 1, as to Plato and Moses belongs, of course to Eusebius and his transcribers.

[2] xv. 4, 5, 9.

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he has here to contend with a portion of his own school.[1] Together with the Aristotelian doctrines on immortality he also contests the statement that the soul as such is unmoved, in order to uphold in its stead the Platonic conception of the Self-moving;[2] but he herein limits existence after death to the rational part of the soul, and represents this as uniting itself at each entrance into earthly life with the irrational soul dwelling in the body, which is now first brought into order,[3] so that he conceived the origin of the individual in a similar manner to that of the universe. He, no doubt, also opposed the Aristotelian conception of God, but of this tradition tells us nothing; as to his own theory, we are told that he made the Creator of the world identical with the Good, but discriminated the other ideas as creators of particular things from Him.[4] Some other quotations from his commentary on the *Timæus*[5] are of no importance; from his objections to the Aristotelian definitions concerning

[1] Against the æther of Aristotle and the views connected therewith concerning the stars, he appeals to Eus. xv. 7, 8; against the eternity of the world, to *l. c.* c. 6. But he nevertheless would not admit any end to the world, as we shall presently find. He had brought forward the same views in his commentary on the *Timæus*. The unordered matter (he here says, following Plutarch) and the imperfect soul that moves it are certainly indeed uncreated, but the world as an ordered whole, and its soul, were formed at a definite epoch (Procl. *in Tim.* 84 F; 87, A; 116, B F; 119, B; cf. 99, C; 170, A; 250, B; Iambl. ap Stob. *Ecl.* i. 894); but they may nevertheless be imperishable (cf. *Tim.* 41, A) through the will of the Creator (Procl. *l. c.* 304, B).

[2] Eus. xv. 9, 4 *sqq.*

[3] Procl. 311, A; Iambl. *l. c.* 910.

[4] Procl. *l. c.* 93, C; 111, C; 119 B; cf. 131, C.

[5] Ap. Procl. 87, B; 315, A; 7, C; 30, D; 83, C, D; 129, D; 187, B; 234, D; Syrian *Schol. in Ar.* 892, *b*, 31.

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Homonyms[1] we see that he extended his polemic to logic also. But no important results are to be expected from this, because he himself stood nearer to the eclecticism which he combated than he was aware. He is angry at the admixture of the Platonic doctrines with the Peripatetic, but he himself intermingles them with those of the Stoics when he opposes to the Aristotelian doctrine of goods an *αὐτάρκεια* of virtue, which only differs in words from that of the Stoics.[2] Still more clearly, however, does he betray the standpoint of the later popular philosophy in the proposition that the happiness of man is unanimously recognised by the philosophers as the ultimate end of philosophy.[3] It was precisely this onesided practical standpoint which, together with the indifference to a stricter scientific method, had called forth the eclectic amalgamation of contradictory doctrines. Atticus, however, does not seem to have proceeded very scientifically. His objections to Aristotle chiefly consist, as we have seen, in complaints about the moral and religious corruption of his doctrines; to Aristotle's deepest and most thoughtful discussions he opposes arguments like that by which he tries to reconcile the temporal origin of the world with its eternal existence; namely, that God by reason of his Omnipotence could preserve even what has come into existence from destruction.[4]

[1] Simpl. *Categ.* 7, 8, 8, *a*, and Porph. *ἐξήγ.* 9, *a*, *Schol.* 42, *b*, 9 (Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.* i. 618, 2 *sq.* These seem to have been taken from a separate treatise on the Categories.

[2] Eus. xv. 4, 1; 7 *sqq.*

[3] *Loc. cit.* xv. 4, 1; cf. 5, 1.

[4] *Loc. cit.* 6, 5 *sqq.*; cf. Procl. *in Tim.* 304 B.

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The philosopher who treated argument so lightly and derived his ultimate decision so recklessly from practical necessity, had indeed no right to raise objections to the fusion of the several systems, of which that very necessity had been the determining cause.

Eclecticism exemplified in

This eclecticism, then, constantly maintained its ascendency with the majority of the Academics. Men like Plutarch, Maximus, Apuleius, Numenius, are, indeed, Platonists, but their Platonism has absorbed so many foreign elements that they appear merely as the promoters of the tendency introduced by Antiochus. As these philosophers, however, will again engage our attention among the forerunners of Neo-Platonism, other details respecting them may be omitted for the present. In respect to Theo of Smyrna also it will suffice to remember that, as we

Theo,

have already noticed,[1] he found the free use of a Peripatetic treatise not incompatible with his Platonism, while, at the same time, in the first book of his work, he prefers to follow the tradition of the old and new Pythagoreans.[2] Concerning Nigrinus, there is, in spite of the Nigrinus of Lucian, little to say; the description of him shows us a man of excellent disposition, who took refuge in philosophy from the luxury

[1] *Sup.* p. 309, 4. Adrastus is also made use of in *De Mus.* c. 6; c. 13, p. 94, 97; c. 19, c. 22, p. 117; c. 40, p. 169.

[2] What Theo says in his first book, on numbers and the relations of tones, generally quoted under the two titles, περὶ ἀριθμητικῆς and περὶ μουσικῆς is no doubt chiefly Pythagorean, as he indicates in *De Mus.* c. 1, c. 12, *et passim*. In regard to his philosophy, the Neo-Pythagorean element is especially prominent in *De Arith.* c. 4; *De Mus.* c. 38 *sqq.*

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Nigrinus, Severus,

and immorality of his time, and found in it inner satisfaction and freedom; but the discourses which Lucian assigns to him might just as well have been put into the mouths of Musonius or Epictetus. We have still to speak of Severus and Albinus. Severus, whom, indeed, we can only place conjecturally in the second half of the second century,[1] is described as having explained Plato in the sense of the Aristotelian doctrines.[2] From a treatise of his on the soul Eusebius[3] has preserved a fragment in which the Platonic doctrine that the human soul is compounded of two substances, one capable of suffering, and the other incapable,[4] is attacked with the observation that this theory would annul the imperishableness of the soul, because two such different constituents must necessarily again dissolve their unnatural combination. According to this, he does not seem to have recognised this doctrine as Plato's real opinion. Severus himself described the soul,

[1] The first to mention him are Iamblichus and Eusebius. But there are as yet no traces of the Neo-Platonic period in the quotations from him. Proclus, *Tim.* 304 B., observes in respect to the opinion quoted *inf.* p 346, 3, of Severus, Atticus, and Plutarch, that many objections to it were raised by the Peripatetics; which also points to the fact that Severus was older than Alexander of Aphrodisias, the last author known to us of the Peripatetic school.

[2] Syrian (*Schol. in Ar.* 880, *b*, 38; Aristotle, *Metaph.* xiii. 2) opposes the doctrine that the mathematical element according to Plato, was in material bodies; but this is irrelevant, since such was not Plato's opinion: εἰ δὲ Σεβῆρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὕστερον ἐξηγησαμένων τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐκ τῆς παρ' αὐτῷ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηχήσεως τοῖς μαθήμασι καταχρῶνται πρὸς τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν φυσικῶν αἰτίων, οὐδὲν τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους.

[3] *Præp. Ev.* xiii. 17.

[4] *Tim.* 41 *sqq.*; 69, C *sq.*; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 690 *sq.*

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and primarily the world-soul, as an incorporeal mathematical figure, the constituents of which he represented to be the point and the line, while of the two elements from which Plato compounds the world-soul,[1] he connected the indivisible with the point, and the divisible with the line.[2] A beginning of the world in its proper sense he did not admit, even if the present world had been begun; he thought with the Stoics that the world, eternal in itself, changed its condition in certain periods, and he appeals for this doctrine to the mythus in the Platonic dialogue of the *Statesman*.[3] There is a reminiscence of the Stoics also in this, that he declared the Something (*τι*) to be the highest generic-conception, below which stand Being and Becoming.[4] However isolated these statements may be, they nevertheless prove that Severus departed in many respects from strict Platonism. But we have much more numerous and striking proofs, especially in his abstract of the Platonic doctrines,[5] of the eclecticism of Albinus. Quite at the beginning of this treatise we find the Stoic definition of wisdom as the science of things human and divine (c. 1), and the Peripatetic division of philosophy into the theoretical and the practical (c. 2), preceded by Dialectic as a third division

[1] *Tim.* 35, A; *vide* Part ii. *a*, 646, 3.

[2] Iambl. ap. Stob. *Ecl.* i. 862; Procl. *in Tim.* 186, E; 187, A *sq.*

[3] Procl. *l. c.* 88, D *sq.*; 168, D. That the world notwithstanding might be imperishable through the will of God (*l. c.* 304 B) was doubtless only a concession to the expressions of Plato.

[4] Procl. 70, A; cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. p. 92, 2.

[5] *Vide sup.* p. 338, 2.

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(c. 3). Albinus then, like Aristotle, divides theoretic philosophy into Theology, Physics, and Mathematics, without, however, himself keeping to this arrangement (c. 3, 7);[1] and practical philosophy also, like the Peripatetics, into Ethics, Œconomics, and Politics (c. 3).[2] Under Dialectic he first gives a theory of knowledge which combines Stoic and Aristotelian definitions with Platonic, and unites the *φυσικὴ ἔννοια* of the Stoics with the reminiscence of ideas. In regard to the faculty of knowledge, he distinguishes in man (corresponding with the Aristotelian doctrine of the active and the passive *νοῦς*) a double reason, that which is directed to the sensible, and that which is directed to the super-sensible.[3] Subsequently the whole Aristotelian logic with the syllogisms and the ten categories with various later additions of the Peripatetics and Stoics, is foisted upon Plato;[4] and the Aristotelian and Stoic terminology is unscrupulously employed.[5] In the section on theoretical philosophy three primary causes are enumerated: Matter, the primary forms, and the

[1] Instead of an exposition of the mathematics we find at c. 7 only an extract from the utterances of Plato's *Republic* on mathematics and their division of mathematics.

[2] Similarly the 'Introduction,' c. 6, spoken of *sup.* p. 338, 1; concerning the Peripatetic classification *vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 176 *sqq.* Albinus makes use of no Platonic divisions.

[3] C. 4. I pass over some further observations which are not very clear, concerning *νόησις* and *αἴσθησις*, *λόγος ἐπιστημονικὸς*, and *δοξαστικὸς*.

[4] C. 5 *sq.*; *vide* Prantl, *Gesch. d. Log.* i. 610 *sq.*; Freudenthal, 280 *sq.*

[5] Cf. Freudenthal, *l. c.* 279, 281. So also in c. 25; cf. Tertull. *De An.* 29; a Platonic argument for immortality (*Phædo*, 71, C *sqq.*) is defended with an Aristotelian definition concerning the *ἐναντία* (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 215, note).

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creative principle, or the Deity; the Deity is described in the manner of Aristotle as active Reason (c. 10), which, unmoved, thinks only itself. A threefold way is assumed to the knowledge of God: the way of emancipation, analogy, and elevation;[1] ideas are explained as eternal thoughts of God, but, at the same time, as substances; their sphere, with the exception of artificial things, or things contrary to nature, is restricted to natural classes, and side by side with the ideas, as their copies, the Aristotelian forms inherent in matter find a place.[2] In regard to matter, Albinus says, making use of an Aristotelian definition familiar to him, it is that which is neither corporeal, nor incorporeal, but is in the body potentially (c. 8, end). The eternity of the world, he also thinks, he can maintain as a Platonic doctrine, since, like some other philosophers, he describes the world as having had a beginning only because it is involved in constant Becoming, and thereby proves itself the work of a higher cause;[3] and he rightly concludes from this that the world-soul also has not been created by God, but is similarly eternal. It does not, however, agree very well with this, that the world-soul should be adorned by God and awakened as it were from a deep sleep, in

[1] In the second the author has in view the passage from Plato's *Republic*, vi. 508 B; in the third, another from the *Symposium*, 208, 3 *sqq*.

[2] C. 9, c. 10, Albinus, like some others (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 552, 2), calls the ideas ἰδέαι; the forms imitated from them εἴδη.

[3] To this passage or a similar one, of a commentary on the *Timæus* or the *Hypotyposeis* Proclus refers *in Tim.* 67 C. Precursors of Albinus in the theory mentioned above are named in *Phil d. Gr.* II. i. 666, *a*.

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order by turning to God, to receive the ideal forms from him;[1] and that Albinus cannot altogether free himself from the notion of a Divine *formation* of the universe having once taken place.[2] That he assumes the existence of inferior gods or demons, to whom the guidance of the world beneath the moon is confided, and that he regards these beings in the Stoic manner, as elementary spirits, cannot surprise us in a Platonist of that period (c. 15). It is also in accordance with the eclecticism of his age that he should introduce into the Platonic ethics the Aristotelian definition of virtue as μεσότης (c. 30); that he should place among the four fundamental virtues the Stoic-Peripatetic prudence in place of the Platonic wisdom,[3] and appropriate the Stoic doctrine that virtue is capable of no increase or diminution,[4] and with certain modifications also the Stoic theory of the passions.[5] Some other instances might be

[1] C. 14, Albinus here follows Plutarch, who, however, was more logical in disputing the eternity of the world (cf. *Phil. d. Gr.* III. i. 168 *sq*.); for before the world-soul had awaked out of sleep, the world as such could not possibly have existed.

[2] Besides what has already been stated, we find these words in *l. c.* p. 170, 3, Herm.: τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ταθείσης ἐκ τοῦ μέσου αὐτὴν τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κόσμου . . . περικαλύψαι and: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἄσχιστος ἔμεινεν, ἡ δὲ ἐντὸς εἰς ἑπτὰ κύκλους ἐτμήθη.

[3] In c. 29 the φρόνησις is called the τελειότης τοῦ λογιστικοῦ (for which subsequently the Stoic ἡγεμονικὸν is substituted) and defined quite in the Stoic manner as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων; in c. 30 the relation of φρόνησις to the virtues of the lower parts of the soul is spoken of in a way that reminds us altogether of Aristotle's *Eth. N.* vi. (*vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii. 502 *sqq*.).

[4] Cf. c. 30, and concerning the corresponding Stoic doctrine, *Ibid.* III. i. 246, 2.

[5] C. 32, where Albinus repeats Zeno's definition of πάθος (*Ibid.* III. i. 225, 2), while he opposes the reduction of the emotions to κρίσεις (*vide l. c.* 226 *sq*.) but enumerates the same four chief emotions as the Stoics held (*l. c.* 230).

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adduced,[1] but the previous quotations will suffice to show how inclined Albinus was to combine alien elements with the old Academic doctrine, which, however, he followed in the main, and how deficient he was in a clear consciousness of the peculiar character of the Platonic system. We are told that Albinus was one of the most important representatives of his school,[2] and if we may infer anything in respect to him from what we know of his master Gaius, with whom he agrees[3] in one of his expositions of the Platonic philosophy, it becomes the more evident that the mode of thought he exhibits was still very prevalent in the Platonic school about the middle of the second century of our era.

[1] Cf. Freudenthal, 278 *sqq.*
[2] Cf. *sup.* p. 337, 3; and Freudenthal, p. 243.
[3] *Sup.* p. 339, 1.

CHAPTER XIII.

ECLECTICS WHO BELONG TO NO DEFINITE SCHOOL—DIO, LUCIAN, GALEN.

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F. Eclectics of no particular school.

ALL the philosophers we have hitherto discussed reckoned themselves under one of the existing schools, though they allowed themselves many departures from their original doctrines. The number is much smaller of those who belong to no particular school, but, assuming a more independent attitude, borrowed from each and all that which seemed to them true. For though the internal unity of the schools and the logical consistency of the systems were greatly relaxed, yet the necessity for some standard of authority was much too strong in that period of scientific exhaustion to allow many to venture on freeing themselves from the custom which required every teacher of philosophy to be connected with some one of the ancient schools and its tradition. The philosophers even sought to shield themselves with the authority of antiquity, where they were conscious of divergence from all contemporary schools, as we see in the case of the Neo-Pythagoreans, when they claimed to be a continuation of the ancient Pythagoreans, and in that of the Sceptics when they professed to continue the

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school of Pyrrho. There are, therefore, but few among the philosophers of that time who stand outside the traditional pale of the schools, and these are invariably men who had not made philosophy the sole task of their life, but had occupied themselves with it merely in connection with some other art or science.

An opportunity for such incidental occupation with philosophy was afforded at that period partly by the natural sciences, partly and especially by rhetoric[1] which was constantly and zealously cultivated, and was included in the public education. When a man had learned from the rhetoricians the ornate form of exposition and discourse, he could only find an adequate content for it, as the different branches of instruction were then divided, with the philosophers. It was, therefore, hardly possible to advance beyond the merest outworks of rhetoric without in some way taking a glance at philosophy, and though this, no doubt, was done in most cases hastily and superficially enough,[2] yet it could not but happen that some individuals should occupy themselves more seriously and permanently with

[1] How numerous the schools of rhetoric and teachers of rhetoric were in the times of the Emperors; how lively the interest in the achievements and rivalry of celebrated rhetoricians (now called σοφισταί) and how pupils streamed to them from all sides, we see from Philostratus' *Vitæ Sophistarum*. The appointment of public teachers of rhetoric has been already noticed (*sup.* p. 190, *sqq*). Further details are to be found in the writings quoted *sup.* p. 189, 1.

[2] To students of rhetoric who only studied something of philosophy by the way, the censures of Calvisius Taurus, for example, refer (ap. Gell. *N. A.* i. 9, 10; xvii. 20, 4; x. 19, 1; the last passage, compared with i. 9, 8, proves how common this was.

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the claims of philosophy. In this way, towards the end of the first century, Dio, and, about the middle of the second, Lucian, went over from rhetoric to philosophy. But neither of these men is important enough as a philosopher to detain very long. Dio, surnamed Chrysostom,[1] after his banishment, desired indeed to be no longer merely a rhetorician, but before all things a philosopher;[2] he also assumed the Cynic garb;[3] but his philosophy is very simple, and confines itself exclusively to such moral considerations as were at that time not only to be

Dio Chrysostom.

[1] The sources for our knowledge of Dio's life are, besides his own writings, Philostr. *V. Soph.* i. 7 (the statements are quite untrustworthy in his *V. Apol.* v. 27 *sq.*; *V. Soph.* i. 7, 4, also seems not to be historical); Synes. *Dio*; Phot. *Cod.* 209; Suid. *sub voce*; Plin. *Ep.* x. 81 *sq.* (85 *sq.*); Lucian. *Peregr.* 18; *Paras.* 2; *Schol. in Luc.* p. 117; 248 Jac.; Eunap. *V. Soph. Procem.* p. 2, and some later biographical notices in Kayser's *Philostr. V. Soph.* p. 168 *sqq.* and in Dindorf's edition of *Dio*, ii. 361 *sqq.* The results have been summed up after Fabric. *Bibl. V.* 122 *sqq.* by Kayser (*l. c.*). In this place it will suffice to say that he was born at Prusa in Bithynia, and under Domitian (according to Emper. *De Exil. Dion.* Braunschw. 1840, p. 5 *sqq.*—in Dindorf's edition, *Dio*, I. xxxviii. *sqq.*—the date is 82 A.D.) was banished or escaped from Rome where he had taught rhetoric, wandered for many years through distant countries, as far as the Getæ, returned after the murder of Domitian to Rome and (according to Themist. *Or.* v. 63) stood high in the favour of Trajan.

[2] Dio often repeats that his hearers are not to seek rhetorical graces from him; like every true philosopher he desires to aim at their moral improvement—to be a physician of souls (*Or.* 33; *Or.* 34, p. 34, R.; *Or.* 35): he comes forward, generally speaking, as a man to whom God has given the vocation of declaring to all, the doctrines of philosophy (*Or.* 13, p. 431; *Or.* 32, 657 *sqq. et passim*). He himself dates this vocation from his exile (*Or.* 13, 422 *sq.*); likewise Synesius (*Dio*, 13 *sqq.*) shows how his destiny led him from Sophisticism (*i.e.* Rhetoric) to philosophy, which he had previously attacked in a vigorous manner in some of his discourses (κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων and πρὸς Μουσώνιον).

[3] *Or.* 72; *Or.* 34, p. 33; cf. *Or.* 1, p. 60.

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found alike in all the philosophical schools, but even outside them. With theoretical enquiries he did not concern himself; his whole endeavour is rather to impress upon the hearts of his hearers and readers the principles long acknowledged by the best, and to apply them to given cases.[1] Philosophy has, he says,[2] the task of curing men of their moral infirmities; it consists in the endeavour to be a righteous man. His philosophic ideal is Socrates, as conceived by the later popular philosophy—namely, as an excellent teacher of morals, but with whom specifically scientific thoughts and purposes are not in question;[3] after him Diogenes, whose emancipation from needs he admires so unconditionally that he pays no attention to what was unsound and distorted in his character, and finds even the most revolting things that are told of him praiseworthy.[4] He demonstrates that with virtue and wisdom happiness is also given;[5] he describes the virtuous man in his

His notion of philosophy, the endeavour to be a righteous man.

[1] Synes., p. 14 *sq.*, says very truly: ὁ δ' οὖν Δίων ἔοικε θεωρήμασι μὲν τεχνικοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ μὴ προσταλαιπωρῆσαι μηδὲ προσανασχεῖν φυσικοῖς δόγμασιν, ἅτε οὐδὲ τοῦ καιροῦ μετατεθειμένος (sc. ἀπὸ σοφιστικῆς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν)· ὄνασθαι δὲ τῆς στοᾶς ὅσα εἰς ἦθος τείνει καὶ ἠρρενῶσθαι παρ' ὀντινοῦν τῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἐπιθέσθαι δὲ τῷ νουθετεῖν ἀνθρώπους . . . εἰς ὃ χρήσασθαι προαποκειμένῃ παρασκευῇ τῆς γλώττης.

[2] *Or.* 13, p. 431; cf. *Or.* 70, 71, and *sup.* 353, 2. The same definition of the problem of philosophy has already come under our notice in connection with the Cynics, *Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 285, 3; Philo, *sup.* p. 77 *sqq.*; Musonius and Epictetus, *sup.* p. 250–272.

[3] Cf. *Or.* 13, 423 *sqq.*; *Or.* 12 374 *sqq.*: *Or.* 54, 55, 60, p. 312 and elsewhere.

[4] Cf. *Or.* 6, 8, 9, 10, and the coarse description of his supposed conversation with Alexander, *Or.* 4. In *Or.* 6, p. 203, Diogenes is admired even for the excesses mentioned in *Phil. d. Gr.* II. i. 274, 3.

[5] *Or.* 23, especially p. 515 *sq.*; *Or.* 69, 368 *sq.* where the φρόνιμοι and the ἄφρονες are discussed in the Stoical sense.

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moral greatness and his working for others;[1] he points out, with the Stoics, that true freedom coincides with reasonableness, and slavery with unreason;[2] in regard to the appetites, passions, and vices of men, luxury, avarice, love of glory, and of pleasure, anxiety, faithlessness, &c., he makes reflections such as were usual in the schools;[3] he recalls his readers from the mode of life prevailing in society, with its follies, its moral corruption, its artificial wants, to the simplicity of the state of nature;[4] he discourses in earnest and rational words against the immorality of his time,[5] occasionally also, with the punctilious zeal of the Stoics, against things so indifferent as the cutting of the beard;[6] he exalts the advantages[8] of civil institutions,[7] gives useful advice to states,[8] discusses in the Aristotelian manner the distinctions and relative forms of government;[9] in short, he expatiates on all possible questions of morality and practical life. But in these well-intentioned, verbose, and for the most part very sensible discussions, there is little real and indepen-

[1] *Or.* 78, 428 *sq.*

[2] *Or.* 14, 15, 80.

[3] E.g. *Or.* 5, 192; *Or.* 16, 17, 32, 66–68, 74, 79.

[4] Cf. on this point, besides the passages already quoted concerning Socrates and Diogenes, the happy description of an innocent natural life in the Εὐβοϊκὸς (*Or.* 7) that 'Greek village history,' as Jahn calls it; the purpose of which Synes. correctly estimates (*Dio*, p. 15 *sq.*). In the same respect Dio had commended the Jewish Essenes (Synes. p. 16).

[5] So in *Or.* 7, 268 *sqq.*, where the degradation and danger of the public immorality so universally tolerated, is very well exposed.

[6] *Or.* 36, 81 *sq.* 33.

[7] *Or.* 36, 83 *sq.*

[8] *Or.* 33 *sq.* 38, 40, *et passim.*

[9] *Or.* 3, 115 *sq.* On the monarchy as distinguished from the tyranny (cf. *Or.* 1–4, 62).

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dent philosophy to be found; as soon as Dio goes beyond actual and particular cases he falls into commonplaces which are treated in the spirit of a modified Stoicism or of the ethics of Xenophon.[1] Plato was indeed, next to Demosthenes, his pattern of style;[2] and in Dio's moral disquisitions the influence of his philosophy and writings are unmistakable; but of the speculative determinations of Plato's system we find only a few scattered echoes,[3] and in regard to the Platonic Republic, Dio is of opinion that it contains too much that is irrelevant to its proper theme—the question of justice.[4] We more commonly meet with Stoic doctrines in his writings: what he says about the kinship of God to the human spirit, on the knowledge of God that is innate in us, on the natural interdependence of all men,[5] next to the Socrates of Xenophon reminds us most of the Stoics; this is still more definitely the case with the proposition that the world is a common house for gods and men, a divine state, a nature governed by one soul,[6] and with the tracing of the dæmon to man's own internal nature.[7] Even the Stoic doctrine of the conflagration and formation of the world is at least tentatively brought forward.[8] But for Dio it is manifest that nothing is of real

[1] He expresses his admiration for Xenophon in *Or.* 18, 481.

[2] Cf. Philostr. *Vitæ Soph.* i. 7, 3.

[3] Such as *Or.* 30, 550; cf. *Phædo*, 62 B, and elsewhere.

[4] *Or.* 7, 267.

[5] *Or.* 12; cf. especially p. 384 *sq.*; 391 *sq.*; 397; *Or.* 7, 270.

[6] *Or.* 30, 557; *Or.* 36, p. 83, 88; cf. *Or.* 74, p. 405; 12, 390, &c.

[7] *Or.* 4, 165: cf. *Or.* 23, 25.

[8] *Or.* 36, 97 *sq.*

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value except that Universal, which he claims for all men as their inborn conviction, and with the denial of which he so severely reproaches the Epicureans[1]—the belief in the gods and their care for mankind. His standpoint is throughout that of the popular philosopher, which turns to account in a practical manner scientific results which have become common property, without enriching them by new and original enquiries.

Lucian.

A similar attitude to philosophy is assumed by Lucian,[2] though for the rest his literary character is widely different from that of Dio, and in mind and taste he is far above him. Moreover, it was only

[1] *Or.* 12, 390 *sq.*

[2] All that we know of Lucian's life and personality we owe almost entirely to his own writings. From them (confining myself here to what is of most importance) we find that he was born in Samosata (*Hist. Scrib.* 24; *Piscat.* 19), and was first destined for a sculptor, but subsequently devoted himself to learned studies (*Somn.* 1 *sqq.* 14) and had traversed part of the Roman dominions with glory and profit as a rhetorician, when at about forty years of age, and by his own account, through Nigrinus (*sup.* p. 334, 3), was won over to philosophy, and began to write philosophic dialogues (*Bis Accus.* 27 *sq.* 30 *sqq.*; *Apol.* 15; *Nigrin.* 4 *sq.* 35 *sqq.*; *Hermot.* 13). The time of his birth cannot be correctly stated, nor that of his death. From *Alex.* 48, we see that he composed this work after Marcus Aurelius' death. As an older man he filled the important and lucrative office of secretary at the court of the deputy (*Apol.* 12.; cf. c. 1, 15). We afterwards find him resuming his long interrupted discourses (*Here.* 7). Nothing further is known concerning his life. Suidas' story that he, in well merited punishment for his abuse of Christianity, was torn to pieces by mad dogs, is doubtless no more trustworthy than most of the similar accounts of the *mortes persecutorum*. It is possible that this story (as Bernays conjectures, *Lucian und die Kyniker*, p. 52) may have directly arisen from his conflict with the philosophic Κύνες, of whom he says himself (*Peregr.* 2): ὀλίγου δεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν Κυνικῶν ἐγώ σοι διεσπάσθην ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀκταίων ὑπὸ τῶν κυνῶν. Among Lucian's writings there are several which are spurious, or at any rate doubtful.

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in his more mature years that he went over from rhetoric to philosophy, and he appropriated from philosophy only so much as might prove advantageous to him either for his personal conduct or for the new form of his writings which chiefly harmonised with his individual character. True philosophy consists, according to his theory, in practical wisdom, in a temper of mind and bent of will which is attached to no philosophical system; on the other hand, the distinctive doctrines and other peculiarities of the schools appeared to him unimportant, and, so far as men pride themselves upon them and quarrel about them, ridiculous. Thus he assures us that it is philosophy that has made him disloyal to rhetoric, that he has always admired and praised philosophy and nourished himself upon the writings of its teachers, that he has fled from the noise of the courts of justice to the Academy and the Lyceum;[1] yet he has exempted no school and no philosopher from his mockery,[2] and chooses especially for the target of his wit those that through their remarkable customs and obtrusive character excite the most attention and offer the most tempting material for satire.[3] But as he confines himself almost entirely to the satirical exposition of the errors of others and very seldom brings forward his own views, his standpoint may indeed be generally

Philosophy in his opinion consists of practical wisdom, and is tied to no system.

[1] *Piscat.* 5 *sq.* 29; *Bis Accus.* 32, and elsewhere; cf. the previous note.

[2] References are superfluous. Among his chief writings of this kind are the *βίων πρᾶσις*, the *δραπέται*, the *συμπόσιον*, the *Ἑρμότιμος*, *Ἱκαρομένιππος*, *Εὐνοῦχος*, *Ἀλιεύς*, and several funeral orations.

[3] Above all the Cynics, *sup.* p. 290, 1; 344.

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determined, but cannot be explained by any more precise account of his convictions. If the treatise on Nigrinus be authentic,[1] he was at first much impressed with the independence of the external, and insight into the hollowness of the ordinary life of the world, which characterised the discourses of this Stoicising Platonist, but we cannot suppose the impression to have been very lasting, since in his description the rhetorical phraseology is patent enough. Even the Cynics, whom in the sequel he opposed with such passionate bitterness, he treats for a time not without kindliness, and puts his satires and especially his attacks upon the gods of the popular belief into their mouths.[2] In his later years he bestows high praise upon Epicurus for his freedom from religious prejudice and his relentless war against superstition.[3] But he gives utterance to his own opinion doubtless only where he maintains that he honours philosophy indeed as the true art of life, but that among the multitude of philosophical schools philosophy itself cannot possibly be found, since there is no token of it which does not require to be proved by a further

[1] I see no sufficient reason in its contents for denying this: even such a superficial man as Lucian may have had transient fits of disgust with the world.

[2] So in many of the funeral discourses (No. 1–3, 10, 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 24–28), in the *Menippus*, *Ζεὺς ἐλεγχόμ.*; *Catapl.* c. 7; cf. Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker*. 46 *sq.* On the other hand, the discourse on Demonax is not to be considered genuine, as has been already mentioned *sup.* p. 297, 1.

[3] *Alex.* c. 17, c. 25: *Ἐπικούρῳ, ἀνδρὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων καθεωρακότι καὶ μόνῳ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλήθειαν εἰδότι.* C. 61; *Ἐπικούρῳ ἀνδρὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἱερῷ καὶ θεσπεσίῳ τὴν φύσιν καὶ μόνῳ μετ' ἀληθείας τὰ καλὰ ἐγνωκότι καὶ παραδεδωκότι καὶ ἐλευθερωτῇ τῶν ὁμιλησάντων αὐτῷ γενομένῳ.*

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token; that they all strive for visionary treasures, and waste their time with useless things; the best philosopher is he who, conscious of his ignorance, abandons any claim to a specific wisdom, and, instead of speculative cogitations, keeps to the moral advantages of philosophy.[1]

The limitation of philosophy to a system of ethics, in which there is no question of any deeper scientific foundation, is here based upon a sceptical view of the human faculty of knowledge. We shall find this sceptical element still more strongly developed in Favorinus, who must, therefore, be discussed among the adherents of the sceptic school. The semi-philosophers from the rhetorical schools were none of them distinguished by any independent investigations, but the tendencies of the period are nevertheless shown in them—namely, the reduction of philosophy to the useful and generally comprehensible, and the connection of this popular philosophy with the mistrust of all philosophic systems which was spread abroad by scepticism.

Galen.

Far greater is the scientific importance of Claudius Galenus,[2] and though it is primarily the art of

[1] *Piscat.* 11, 29, and the whole of the *Hermotimus*; especially c. 15, 25 *sqq.* 52 *sq.* 70 *sqq.* 84; cf. *Bis Accus.* 24. Cf. also the characteristics of Lucian as given by Bernays, *l. c.* 42 *sqq.*

[2] All the information that can be gathered concerning Galen's life, almost entirely from his own writings, is to be found in Ackermann's *Hist. Literaria Galeni*, which first appeared in Fabric. *Bibl. Gr.* v. 377 *sqq.* Harl., revised in the first volume of Kühn's edition of Galen, s. xvii–cclxv. To this history I will also refer, even in respect of Galen's writings, passing over the rest of the voluminous literature concerning him. Born at Pergamum in the year 131 A.D., Galen, whose father was himself a great architect and mathematician, had received a careful education, and had already been introduced to philosophy; when in his seventeenth year he began the study of medicine. After his father's death, he pursued both studies in Smyrna, and medicine in several other places, especially in Alexandria (151 *sqq.*) and returned from thence in the year 158 to practise his art in his native city. In the year 164 he betook himself to Rome, where he won great fame by his success as a physician, and in 168 again returned to Pergamum, but was soon after recalled afresh to Italy by Marcus Aurelius and Verus. When he left Italy for the second time is not known; and from this point there is no connected record of his life whatever. A discourse delivered in the reign of Pertinax is mentioned by him (*De Libr. Propr.* c. 13; vol. xix. 46 K); he wrote *De Antidotis* (i. 13; vol. xiv. 16) in the reign of Severus (*Theriac. ad Pis.* c. 2, vol. xiv. 217, proves nothing against the genuineness of this treatise). According to one account (that of the anonymous person mentioned by Ackermann, *l. c.* xl. *sq.*) he lived to the age of 87; Suidas, however, says 70 years; so that he probably died in 200 or 201 A.D.

[1] In *Protrept.* I. vol. i. 3, he calls philosophy τὸ μέγιστον τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν, and in another treatise (vol. i. 53 *sq.*) he desires his fellow physicians to remember ὅτι ἄριστος ἰατρὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος.

[2] Galen had learned in his home, while still very young, the chief forms of philosophy as it then existed; from pupils of Philopator the Stoic, of Gaius the Platonist, and of Aspasius the Peripatetic, and from an Epicurean philosopher (*Cogn. an. Morb.* vol. v. 41 *sq.*), At a later period he heard Albinus in Smyrna (*vide supra*, 337); of Eudemus the Peripatetic, who perhaps was also his teacher (διδάσκαλε, however, may be a mere title of respect, *De Præcnot. ad Epig.* c. 4, vol. xiv. 624), he says that he had gained more from him in regard to philosophy than to medicine (*l. c.* c. 2, p. 608). Galen's philosophical writings were very numerous; but the greater part of them is lost.

[3] Concerning Galen's philosophic opinions cf. K. Sprengel, *Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Medicin*, i. 117–195.

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His fame as a physician.

healing to which he owes his extraordinary fame and influence, yet he also knows how to acknowledge to the full the worth of philosophy,[1] and occupied himself with it deeply enough,[2] to take his place among the philosophers of his century.[3] He himself indeed stands nearest to the Peripatetic

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Character of his philosophy. Eclecticism on a Peripatetic basis.

school, but he has also taken so much from others that we can only designate his standpoint on the whole as that of eclecticism on a Peripatetic foundation. Galen is at once placed among the eclectics by the fact that he compiled an entire series of continuous expositions and excerpts from Platonic and Aristotelian writings,[1] and also from those of Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Chrysippus, while at the same time he declares that none of all these schools satisfy him.[2] To Epicurus alone he is thoroughly antipathetic (as were the eclectics of that time almost without exception), and expressly opposes him.[3] The scepticism also of the New Academy appears to him an error, which he combats with great decision.[4] He for his part finds man, in spite of the limitation of his knowledge, sufficiently endowed with means for the attainment of truth; sensible phenomena we discern through the senses,

His theory of knowledge.

[1] Galen, *De Libr. Propr.* c. 11; 14-16; vol. xix. 41 *sq.* 46 *sq.*, where a great number of such works are named.

[2] *Loc. cit.* c. 11, p. 39 *sq.*, with immediate reference to the doctrine of proof. He sought counsel on the subject from the philosophers, but found here as in other divisions of logic so much strife among them and even within the several schools, that he would have fallen back upon Pyrrhonism if the certainty of the mathematical sciences had not kept him from it.

[3] Galen, in those of his writings which have been preserved, mentions Epicurus but seldom, and almost always in connection with subordinate points; on the other hand, he names (*De Libr. Propr.* c. 17, vol. xix. 48) no fewer than six works against Epicurus and his doctrine of pleasure.

[4] In the treatise περὶ ἀρίστης διδασκαλίας (vol. i. 40 *sqq.*) against Favorinus, *Cogn. an. Pecc.* c. 6, vol. v. 93 *sqq.* He also wrote upon Clitomachus, *De Libr. Propr.* c. 12, p. 44. His chief complaint against the sceptics is that they could not establish their standpoint without appealing to the judgment of others, and presupposing in them the capability of deciding between true and false.

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the deceptions of which may well be avoided with the necessary circumspection; the super-sensible is discerned by the understanding; and as the sensible perception carries with it an immediate power of conviction (ἐνάργεια), so also the understanding is in possession of certain truths which are established immediately and prior to all proof; of certain natural principles which verify themselves by universal agreement; through all this, which is self-evident, the hidden is known by logical inference. The criterion of truth, therefore, for all that is clear through itself, is the immediate certainty, partly that of the senses, partly that of the understanding; and the criterion of truth for what is hidden, is agreement with the immediate certainty, which is clear.[1] This appeal to the directly certain, to the senses and the unanimous opinion of men, this empiricism of the inner and outer sense, corresponds entirely with the standpoint of Cicero and of the later eclectic popular philosophy.

High opinion of logic.

Among the three principal divisions of philosophy, Galen ascribes a high value to logic,[2] as the indispensable instrument[3] of all philosophical

[1] *De Opt. Disc.* c. 4, vol. i. 48 *sq.*; *De Opt. Secta*, 2; i. 108 *sq.*; *Cogn. an. Pecc. l. c.*; *De Hippocr. et Plat.* ix. 7; vol. v. 777 *sq.* As principles that are immediately certain, Galen (*Therap. Meth.* i. 4; vol. x. 36) names the ἀρχαὶ λογικαί, that magnitudes equal to a third magnitude are equal to one another, that nothing happens without a cause, that we must either assent to, or deny everything, &c.

[2] Concerning Galen's logic *vide* Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik.* i. 559 *sqq.*

[3] *De Elem.* ex *Hippocr.* i. 6, vol. i. 460, *Quod Opt. Med. Sit Qu. Philos.* i. 59 *sq.*; *Constit. Art. Med.* c. 8; end, i. 253 *sq.*; *Hippocr. et Plat.* ix. 7; end, 1; vol. v. 782.

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enquiry. He himself has composed a great number of logical treatises,[1] but what remains of them[2] does not cause us to deplore very deeply the loss of the remainder. In the doctrine of the categories, which he with others declares to be the beginning and foundation of all logic,[3] he appears to have attempted a reconciliation between Aristotle and the Stoics;[4] otherwise the categories have for him only a logical and not a real importance.[5] In the syllogistic and apodeictic part of logic, which are to him of most importance, he tries to attain the certainty of the geometric method;[6] in regard to matter, he places

[1] For the catalogue of these cf. Gal. *De Libr. Propr.* c. 11 *sq.*; 15 *sq.*; xix. 41 *sq.*; 47 *sq.*; cf. Prantl, p. 559 *sq.*

[2] The short treatise π. τῶν κατὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων (vol. xiv. 582 *sqq.*), which is quoted by Alex. *Sophist. El.* 8, *b*, 45, *a* (*Schol.* 298, *b*, 14; 312, *b*, 29). But nowhere else are Galen's logical writings and commentaries mentioned by the Greek commentators (with the exception of the passage quoted *infra*, 365, 1).

[3] *Therap. Meth.* ii. 7; x. 145; 148; *Puls. Diff.* ii. 9; viii. 622, 624. Whether Galen had himself written on the *Categories* is not quite clear from his own expressions (*Libr. Propr.* 11, p. 42). The meaning seems to me to be that he did not actually write commentaries on them, but only some observations on the difficult questions they contained. This would explain the ὑπομνήματα on the *Categories* mentioned c. 15. Prantl (560, 79) is of a different opinion.

[4] David (*Schol. in Ar.* 49, *a*, 29) ascribes to him five *Categories*: οὐσία, ποσὸν, ποιὸν, πρός τι, πρός τί πως ἔχον, which does not indeed altogether agree with the division mentioned elsewhere (*Therap. Meth.* ii. 7; 129 *sq.*; 146; 156) of the οὐσίαι and the συμβεβηκότα; and of the latter division into ἐνέργειαι, πάθη, and διαθέσεις; but it can hardly be a mere invention; cf. *Puls. Diff.* ii. 10; viii. 632.

[5] He discriminates very decidedly between the γένος and the category; that which falls under the same category may belong to separate genera (*Puls. Diff.* ii. 9 *sq.*; 622 *sq.*; 632. What Prantl, p. 565 *e*, quotes concerning the differentiating of genera into species belongs to the older Peripatetics.

[6] *Libr. Propr.* 11, p. 39 *sq.*; cf. *Fat. Form.* c. 6; iv. 695; 702.

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himself on the side of Aristotle and Theophrastus[1] and against Chrysippus; but that he himself out of the five syllogistic forms which Theophrastus had added to the Aristotelian first figure,[2] formed a fourth figure of his own,[3] is very doubtful. What has otherwise been imparted to us from the logic of Galen, or is to be found in his writings, is in part so unimportant, and in part so fragmentary, that it may suffice to refer the reader for further details to Prantl's careful digest.

His physics and metaphysics based on those of Aristotle, but not entirely similar,

Also in his physics and metaphysics Galen even as a physician and naturalist chiefly follows Aristotle without however being entirely fettered by him. He repeats the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes, but increases their number to five by the addition of the middle cause (the δι' οὗ).[4] Like Plato and Aristotle, he regards the final cause as the most important:[5] the knowledge of them forms, he says, the groundwork of true theology, that science which far surpasses the art of healing.[6] In following the traces of the creative wisdom, which has formed all things, he prefers to dwell on the consideration of living creatures;[7] but he is at the same time convinced that if here in the meanest

[1] *Hippocr. et. Plat.* ii. 2; B. v. 213.

[2] *Vide Phil. d. Gr.* II. ii.

[3] Concerning this fourth figure of Galen's, which was formerly only known on the authority of Averroës, but is now confirmed and explained by a Greek fragment of Minas in his edition of the Εἰσαγωγὴ διαλεκτικὴ p. νέ *sq.*, *vide* the exhaustive investigation of Prantl, p. 570 *sqq.*

[4] *De usu Part. Corp. Hum.* vi. 13; vol. iii. 465.

[5] *Loc. cit.*

[6] *Loc. cit.* xvii. 1; vol. iv. 360.

[7] *Loc. cit.* p. 358 *sqq. et passim.*

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portion of the universe, and in these base and unclean substances, so wonderful a reason is at work, this must also be in overflowing measure in the heaven and its stars, which are so much more glorious and admirable.[1] In what manner it is inherent in the world he does not enquire more closely; but his expressions indicate a tendency to the Stoic conception, according to which the substance of the world is permeated by the divine mind.[2] He is opposed, however, to the Stoic materialism; for he shows that the qualities of things are not bodies;[3] he likewise contradicts the Stoic views on the original constitution of matter when he defends the doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, of the four elements, against the Atomists and the ancient physiologists, and among these, especially, against the Stoic-Heracleitean theory of one primitive matter.[4] What we are told of his objections against the Aristotelian discussions concerning space, time, and motion, is unimportant.[5] Galen's deviation from Aristotle in respect to the soul and its activity seems of more consequence, but even here his utterances sound so hesitating that we clearly see how completely he has failed to attain a fixed standpoint in the strife of opinions. As to what the soul is in its essence, whether corporeal or incorporeal, transitory or imperishable, he not only ventures to propound no definite statement, but not even a conjecture which lays claim to probability; and he omits every sound argument on the subject.[1] The theory of Plato, that the soul is an immaterial essence, and can live without the body, seems to him questionable; 'for how,' he asks, 'could incorporeal substances be distinguished from each other? how can an incorporeal nature be spread over the body? how can such a nature be affected by the body, as is the case with the soul in madness, drunkenness, and similar circumstances.'[2] So far

[1] *Loc. cit.*

[2] P. 358: τίς δ' οὐκ ἂν εὐθὺς ἐνεθυμήθη νοῦν τινα δύναμιν ἔχοντα θαυμαστὴν ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς ἐκτετάσθαι κατὰ πάντα τὰ μόρια; this νοῦς comes to the earth from the heavenly bodies: ἐν οἷς εἰκὸς, ὅσῳ πέρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ τοῦ σώματος οὐσία καθαρωτέρα, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἐνοικεῖν πολὺ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ γήϊνα σώματα βελτίω τε καὶ ἀκριβέστερον. And even here, before all things, in the human body, ἐν βορβόρῳ τοσούτῳ, there is a νοῦς περιττός; how much more, then, in the stars! through the air οὐκ ὀλίγος τις ἐκτετάσθαι δοκεῖ νοῦς, for how could it otherwise be heated and illuminated by the sun?

[3] *Quod Qualitates Sint Incorporeæ.* B. xix. 463 *sqq.*

[4] *De Constit. Artis Med.* c. 7 *sq.*; B. i. 245 *sqq.*; *De Elementis, l. c.* 413 *sqq.* Though the views of the Stoics are not named among those combated here, the Heracleitean doctrine of primitive matter which Galen opposes is also theirs (*De El.* i. 4, p. 444); cf. also *Hippocr. et Plat.* viii. 2 *sq.* v. 655 *sqq.*

[5] In respect to space, he defends (ap. Simpl. *Phys.* 133, *b*; Themist. *Phys.* 38, *b*) the definition controverted by Aristotle that it is the interval between the limits of bodies; a misconception of Aristotle's observation that time is not without motion; and the objection that Aristotle's definition of time contains a circle, are mentioned by Simplicius, *Phys.* 167 *a*; 169 *b*; Themist. *Phys.* 45, *a*; 46, *a* (*Schol.* 388, *b*, 20; 26); and an objection against Arist. *Phys.* vii. 1; 242, *a*, 5; in Simpl. *Phys.* 242, *b*. Simplicius here (p. 167, *a*) refers to the eighth book of Galen's *Apodeictic*, and it is probable, therefore, that all these remarks were to be found in this work.

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[1] *De Fœt. Form.* c. 6; iv. 701 *sq.*; *De Hipp. et Plat.* vii. 7; v. 653: the soul, according to its οὐσία, is either τὸ οἷον αὐγοειδές τε καὶ αἰθερῶδες σῶμα or, αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημα τε [δὲ] τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τουτί τὸ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τἄλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει. On the other hand, the Pneuma is neither its substance nor its seat, but only its πρῶτον ὄργανον (*l. c.* c. 3; p. 606 *sq.*).

[2] *Quod Animi Mores Corp. Temp. Seq.* c. 3; 5; iv. 775 *sq.*; 785 *sq.*; *De Loc. Aff.* ii. 5; viii. 127 *sq.*

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we might be inclined to endorse the Peripatetic doctrine, according to which the soul is the form of the body; but this would certainly lead to the view maintained by the Stoics and shared by many of the Peripatetics, that the soul is nothing else than the mixture of corporeal substances, and as to its immortality there could then be no question.[1] Galen does not venture to decide on this point, and as little does he purpose to affirm or to deny immortality.[2] It is the same with the question as to the origin of living creatures. He candidly acknowledges that he has not made up his mind upon this subject. On the one hand he finds in the formation of the human body a wisdom and a power which he cannot attribute to the irrational vegetable soul of the embryo; on the other hand the likeness of children to their parents obliges him to derive the children from that soul; if we further assume that the rational soul builds up its own body, we are confronted with the fact that we are most imperfectly acquainted with its natural constitution; the only remaining alternative, to assume with many Platonists, that the world-soul forms the bodies of living creatures, seems to him almost impious, since we ought not to involve that divine soul in such base occupations.[3] Galen declares himself more decidedly for the Platonic doctrine of

[1] *Qu. An. Mores.* &c. c. 3; 4; p. 773 *sq.*; 780.

[2] *Vide supra* and *l. c.* c. 3: ἐγὼ δὲ οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν [ἀθάνατον τὸ λογιστικὸν] οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔχω διατείνασθαι.

[3] *De Fœt. Form.* c. 6, iv. 683 *sqq.*

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the parts of the soul and their abodes,[1] which he also no doubt combines with the corresponding doctrine of Aristotle;[2] his uncertainty in regard to the nature of the soul necessarily, however, casts doubt also upon this theory. Nor will our philosopher decide, he says, whether plants have souls,[3] but in other places he declares himself decidedly for the Stoic distinction between the ψυχή and the φύσις.[4]

His contempt for merely theoretical enquiries as useless and out of our sphere.

We shall be all the less surprised at the vacillation and fragmentariness of these definitions when we hear what value Galen attributes to theoretical enquiries in general. The question concerning the unity of the world, whether or not it had a beginning, and the like, he thinks are worthless for the practical philosophers; of the existence of the Gods and the guidance of a Providence we must indeed try to convince ourselves, but the nature of the Gods we do not require to know: whether they have a body or not can have no influence on our conduct; in a moral and political point of view it is also indifferent whether the world was formed by a deity or by a blindly working cause, if only it be acknowledged that it is disposed according to purpose and

[1] Cf. besides the treatise *De Hippocratis et Platonis Placitis*, which discusses this subject in no fewer than nine books with wearisome diffusiveness, *Qu. Animi Mores*, &c., c. 3. That the three divisions of the soul are not merely three faculties of one substance, but three distinct substances, is asserted by Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat.* vi. 2, and *l. c.*

[2] *In Hippocr. de Alim.* iii. 10; xv. 293; *In Hippocr. de Humor.* i. 9; xvi. 93.

[3] *De Substant. Facult. Nat.* c. 1; B. iv. 757 *sq.*; cf. *in Hippocratis de Epidem. Libr.* vi.; *Sect.* v. 5; xviii. *b*, 250.

[4] *De Natur. Facult.* i. 1; ii. 1.

design. Even the question which he has so fully discussed, concerning the seat of the soul, is only of interest to the physician, and not to the philosopher;[1] while conversely a definite opinion regarding the nature of the soul is only necessary to theoretic philosophy, and neither to medicine nor ethics.[2] We certainly require no further evidence that a philosopher who measures the value of scientific enquiries so entirely according to their direct and demonstrated utility, could not advance beyond an uncertain eclecticism. But we shall greatly deceive ourselves if we therefore expect from him independent ethical enquiries. Galen's numerous writings on this subject[3] are all lost, with the exception of two;[4] but what we learn from occasional utterances in one place or another, concerning his ethical opinions, contains merely echoes of older doctrines. Thus we sometimes find the Peripatetic division of goods into spiritual, bodily, and external;[5] and in another connection the Platonic doctrine of the four fundamental virtues,[6] and again the Aristotelian proposition that all virtue consists in the mean.[7] The question whether virtue is a science or some-

His ethical writings are all lost but two which are not very important, but prove him to have been an eclectic also in this sphere.

[1] *De Hippocr. et Plat.* ix. 6; B. v. 779 *sq.*

[2] *De Subst. Facult. Nat.* B. iv. 764.

[3] *De Propr. Libr.* 13; 17.

[4] *De cognoscendis curandisque animi morbis. De animi peccatorum dignatione atque medela.*

[5] *Protrept.* 11; i. 26 *sq.*

[6] *De Hippocr. et Plat.* vii. 1 *sq.*; v. 594.

[7] In *Hippocr. de Humor.* i. 11, end; xvi. 104: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μέσον ἐστὶν αἱρετὸν ἐν πᾶσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἢ ἐλλεῖπες φευκτόν. ἀρεταὶ δὲ πᾶσαι ἐν μέσῳ συνίστανται αἱ δὲ κακίαι ἔξω τοῦ μέσου. These words refer indeed directly to corporeal conditions, but they have a universal application.

thing else, Galen decides thus: in the rational parts of the soul it is a science, in the irrational merely a faculty and a quality or disposition.[1] The eclectic tendency of the man thus shows itself in this portion also of his doctrine.

[1] *De Hippocr. et Plat.* v. 5; vii. 1; v. 468; 595.

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