# NOTES

ON

# THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

*J. A. STEWART*

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# NOTES

ON THE

# NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF

# ARISTOTLE

BY

J. A. STEWART, M.A.

STUDENT AND TUTOR OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD

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# BOOK VI.

## CHAPTER I.

### ARGUMENT.

*We have said that we must choose the mean, and that the mean is that which the 'right reason' points out. But how is the 'right reason' determined? What makes it 'the right reason'? What is it that 'the right reason' has in view in fixing on this point rather than on that as 'the mean'? The musician, for example, in tuning his instrument, must have some standard of tension before his mind. It is true that the strings must not be too tight or too loose, but just the right tightness. Again, it is true that the patient must get just what a skilful physician would prescribe—neither more nor less:—all this is true, but it is not definite enough. So in morals it is true that we must choose the mean as the right reason directs: but not definite enough. We must know definitely what the right reason is, that is, why, or in relation to what, it is 'right.'*

*We have distinguished the virtues of the soul as virtues of the moral character and virtues of the intellect. We have discussed the moral virtues: let us now discuss the intellectual—but first a few words about the soul generally. We have seen that there are two parts of the soul, the part which has reason, and the irrational part. Now let us divide the part which has reason into* (1) *that part by which we perceive necessary truth, and* (2) *that by which we perceive contingent truth: for, as the objects are generically distinct, there must be generically distinct faculties of the soul naturally corresponding to each class of objects, knowledge implying a certain similarity and kinship between faculty and object. Let us call* (1) *the Scientific Faculty, and* (2) *the Calculative Faculty, for to deliberate and to calculate is the same thing, and no one deliberates about necessary truths. The best state of each of these faculties will be the 'virtue' of each. We have to discover, then, what is the virtue of each, or the state which enables it to perform its proper function.*

**§§ 1–4.**] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 19, 20) points out that this book has two introductions, (1) ἐπεὶ . . . ὅρος, §§ 1, 2, 3, and (2) τὰς δὲ . . . οὕτως, § 4. The motives of these two introductions seem, on first inspection at least, to differ. In §§ 1–3 we are told that the ideal or law of the perfect exercise of reason must now be examined, 1138 b. 18.

1138 b. 18. because reason (as distinguished from feeling) is the faculty which perceives the exact point where, in a given case, the moral mean lies. The moral function of reason cannot, it would appear, be rightly understood apart from the ideal or law which regulates its speculative function. The completion of the doctrine of the moral mean thus seems to be presented by the writer of §§ 1–3 as the justification of a formal discussion of the *ἀρεταί* of the rational part of the soul, leading up to a definition of the ideal, or law, of the perfect exercise of reason. But in § 4 the discussion of the intellectual *ἀρεταί* is not introduced as for the sake of the right understanding of the moral *ἀρεταί*; the writer, having finished what he has to say about the moral *ἀρεταί*, simply passes on to the second coordinate part of his treatise—the discussion of the intellectual *ἀρεταί*. It is to be noted that the writer of the *M. M.* does not seem to have had § 4 before him. He follows the writer of §§ 1–3 in introducing the discussion of the intellectual *ἀρεταί* as necessary to complete the doctrine of moral virtue; see *M. M.* i. 34. 1196 b. 4 *ἐπειδὴ δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν καὶ ἐν τίσιν καὶ περὶ ποῖα, καὶ περὶ ἑκάστης αὐτῶν, ὅτι εἰ πράττοιμεν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τὸ βέλτιστον, τὸ μὲν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, ὁμοιόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ὑγίεια ἄριστ' ἂν γένοιτο, εἴ τις τὰ ὑγιεινὰ προσφέροιτο. τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἀσαφές· ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ μοι, τὰ ποῖα διασάφησόν ἐστιν ὑγιεινά. οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου, τί ἐστιν ὁ λόγος καὶ τίς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος; ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ἐστὶν πρῶτον μέν, ἐν ᾧ ὁ λόγος ἐγγίνεται, ὑπὲρ τούτου διελέσθαι. διωρίσθη μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς ὡς τύπῳ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς· ἔστιν δ' εἰς δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχον τὸ λόγον ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν ἐστι τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἐπιστημονικόν κ.τ.λ.* Further on, (*M. M.* i. 34. 1197 b. 28–35), we find him stating distinctly that his treatise is *ὑπὲρ ἠθῶν*, and defending, though not without some confusion of thought, or perhaps of language, the discussion of *σοφία* in such a treatise—*ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις καὶ θαυμάσειε, διὰ τί ὑπὲρ ἠθῶν λέγοντες καὶ πολιτικῆς τινὸς πραγματείας ὑπὲρ σοφίας λέγομεν. ὅτι ἴσως γε πρῶτον μὲν οὐδ' ἀλλοτρία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ἡ σκέψις ἡ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀρετή, ὡς φαμέν. ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν φιλοσόφου καὶ περὶ τούτων παρεπισκοπεῖν ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντα. καὶ ἀναγκαῖον δέ, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομεν, περὶ ἁπάντων λέγειν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν ψυχῇ· ὥστε οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὑπὲρ . . . ψυχῆς ποιούμεθα τοὺς λόγους.*

It is not a profitable line of enquiry to ask which 'introduction' is 'Aristotelian,' and which 'Eudemian.' Thus much may be said, however, by way of bringing out the implication of each:—§ 4



seems to assume that the Statesman's Manual ought to cover the 1138 b. 18. whole ground of human nature, the intellectual *ἀρεταί* being as indispensable as the moral *ἀρεταί* to the noble life. The unity of the *ἀρεταί* in the *σπουδαῖος* having been assumed once for all, no explanation is offered of the special connexion of one *ἀρετή* with another, or of one set of *ἀρεταί* with another set: it is thought to be enough to arrange them according to the popularly received psychological divisions, and to describe them in order as they occur on the list: §§ 1–3, on the other hand, instead of passing, like § 4, without comment from the description of the moral *ἀρεταί* to that of the intellectual *ἀρεταί*, come forward with a reason why the intellectual *ἀρεταί* should be discussed at all:—they are to be discussed because the discussion of them is necessary to complete the doctrine of the moral mean. Whereas § 4 seems to present the moral and intellectual *ἀρεταί* as holding coordinate places in the treatise, §§ 1–3 give us a logical bridge by which we seem to pass from the main subject of the treatise—the moral *ἀρεταί*—to a subordinate part—the discussion of the intellectual *ἀρεταί*—appended as necessary to the comprehension of the main subject. But if the true position of the writer of §§ 1–3 is to be estimated from *E. E.* Θ. 3. (H. 15) 1249 a. 21–b. 25 (and it is safe, I think, from the striking similarity of language, to suppose that it is), he misrepresents himself, when he thus—apparently from a desire for logical connexion between the parts of his treatise—*introduces reason as if it were merely ancillary to moral virtue.* It cannot be his real intention to put reason on any such footing. The *σκοπός* or *ὅρος* of the present passage, if identical with that of *E. E.* Θ. 3. (H. 15), will, after all, be the law of the moral mean, only because it is the law or ideal of man's life, not as human and moral, but as godlike. Reason does not exist (as becomes afterwards clear) to accommodate itself to the exigencies of the moral life, and to perform the function of blind-man's leader to passion; rather the moral life is for the sake of the life of divine speculation, as matter is for the sake of form. Reason must regulate passion, that man's life may become *δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἴδους* —receptive of its true form, capable of the contemplation and service of God. I transcribe the whole passage *E. E.* Θ. 3. (H. 15) 1249 a. 21–b. 25, as being essential to the right understanding of *E. N.* vi. 1. §§ 1–3—*ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστί τις ὅρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι πυσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον, οὐκέτι· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ*

1138 b. 18. τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ [περὶ] φυγῆς ⟨καὶ περὶ⟩ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν εἴπειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης. τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ. δεῖ δὴ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότου καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καὶ ἕκαστον ἂν δέοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττή· ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια· ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνη)· οὕτω δ' ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει (διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· διώρισται δ' ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ κεῖνός γε οὐθενὸς δεῖται. ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἡ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος· ἥτις δ' ἢ δι' ἔνδειαν ἢ δι' ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος ἄριστος, τὸ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ τοιοῦτον. τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον· . . . If I may venture to say so, Zeller hardly does justice to the place of the Sixth Book in the *Ethics*, from failing to connect the ὅρος or σκοπός of chap. i with that of *E. E.* Θ. 3. (H. 15). He regards the Sixth Book as written merely to complete the doctrine of moral virtue by an account of φρόνησις—the other intellectual ἀρεταί being discussed only with the view of defining more accurately the sphere of φρόνησις. His wôrds are (*Ph. der Gr.* ii. 2, p. 648 third Ed.) 'Alle ethische Massbestimmung, und mit ihr alle ethische Tugend, ist durch die Einsicht bedingt. Auch für das Verständniss der ethischen Tugend lässt sich daher die Frage nach dem Wesen der Einsicht nicht umgehen; und so beschäftigt sich denn Aristoteles im sechsten Buch seiner Ethik mit demselben, indem er es durch Vergleichung mit verwandten Eigenschaften erläutert und die praktische Bedeutung der Einsicht auseinandersetzt.'

§ 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες] *cf. E. E.* ii. 5. 1222 a. 6–10, *E. N.* ii. 2. 2. Grant translates ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος by 'the right law.' It is important to remember that λόγος is at once the objective order, and the faculty in man which perceives it. When a man's passions are regulated, his nature is a λόγος, or organism, of the balance of



which in all its parts he is delicately perceptive by means of his 1138 b. 18.
λόγος, or reason. Such a man will know at once where the mean point lies in a given case, because his 'moral consciousness'—his consciousness of the 'right law,' or 'just proportion,' of his nature will tell him, as healthy feeling tells a man when he has eaten enough. But what makes the λόγος, or proportion, itself ὀρθός, or right? It is safe to answer—its end. What then is its end, or, as the writer here expresses it, its σκοπός or ὅρος? For the sake of what does human nature exist as an organism? Till we know this we cannot attach definite meaning to the phrase ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

ἔστι τις σκοπός] Grant says—'Ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν is a metaphor b. 22.
from tuning the strings of a lyre. *Cf.* Plato, *Lysis*, p. 209 B καὶ ἐπειδάν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, τὴν λύραν λάβῃς, οὐ διακωλύουσί σε οὔθ' ὁ πατὴρ οὔθ' ἡ μήτηρ ἐπιτείναί τε καὶ ἀνεῖναι ἣν ἂν βούλῃ τῶν χορδῶν . . . This metaphor is not quite in accordance with the other metaphor of 'looking to the mark,' but in fact the term σκοπός seems to have become so regular a formula with Eudemus as to have lost its metaphorical association. By Aristotle, σκοπός was used as a pure metaphor . . . But in the writing of Eudemus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος: *cf. Eth. Eud.* ii. 10. 20 [i.e. ii. 10. 1227 a. 6] ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά τινος, καὶ ἐστὶ σκοπός τις ἀεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται . . . The similar use of ὅρος by Eudemus is not found in *Eth. Nic.*, but appears borrowed from the mode of writing in the *Politics* of Aristotle.' Grant's remark that 'by Aristotle σκοπός was used as a pure metaphor' is true, I think, only of two passages in the so-called Aristotelian books of the *E. N.*—viz. ii. 6. 14 ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, and i. 2. 2 καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες. In the one other place in which the word σκοπός occurs in these books—iii. 12. 9 διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, it seems to be used in much the same way as in *E. E.* ii. 10. 1227 a. 7 quoted by Grant. The same may be said of its use in *Rhet.* i. 6. 1362 a. 17 ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπὸς τὸ συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δὲ οὐ περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος κ.τ.λ., and of its use in *Pol.* Δ. (H.) 13. 1331 b. 26 ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο ἐστὶν ἐν οἷς γίνεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοιν δ' ἐστὶν ἓν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκοπὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἓν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὑρίσκειν. Here surely we may borrow Grant's words about the Eudemian σκοπός, and say that *by Aristotle* 'σκοπός is used as a scientific term equivalent to τέλος'—although, when two

1138 b. 22. lines below he uses it again, he seems to remember its metaphorical character—*ἐνίοτε γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυχεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν.* But in *E. E.* i. 2. 1214 b. 7 is it not also used metaphorically?—*ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἤτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις.* There seems therefore to be nothing in Grant's view that 'By Aristotle *σκοπός* was used as a pure metaphor . . . but in the writing of Eudemus it seems used as a scientific term equivalent to *τέλος*.' Both 'Aristotle' and 'Eudemus' use it as a metaphor, and both use it as a scientific term equivalent to *τέλος*. As for 'the similar use of *ὅρος* by Eudemus' it is true that it 'is not found in the *Eth. Nic.*' But Grant admits that it occurs in the *Politics*. The non-metaphorical use of *σκοπός* and *ὅρος* as 'scientific terms' in the Sixth Book of the *Ethics* seems to me to contribute nothing to the solution of the question of authorship.

b. 25. § 2. *ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές*] Fritzsche finds in these words a strong confirmation of his view that Eudemus is the author of this Book. He says—'eadem sunt verba de re eadem Eud. p. 1249 b. 6: nusquam in *E. N.* est haec formula. An Aristotelem se ipsum tam graviter reprehendisse veri simile est? Contra eum, qui reprehendendi et conformandi emendandique locum sibi reperisse videretur, in repetenda hac formula sibi placuisse et credibile est et similibus recentiorum philosophorum, qui, scholae philosophi certi addicti, quum quaedam principe scholae melius sibi intelligere videntur, haec ut nauseam paene moveant identidem repetunt, exemplis possit illustrari, nisi odiosa sint exempla.' Grant also sees in the words the protest of the disciple against his master. He says—'This same expression, with the same illustration of the medical art, is repeated *Eth. Eud.* viii. 3. 13 [Θ. 3 (H. 15). 1249 b. 6] *ἐν μὲν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν εἴπειεν ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης, τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ* . . . In the present place there is an apparent protest against the indefiniteness and relativity of Aristotle's moral theory of "the mean" and "the law." Eudemus does not seem (according to the statement here) content to give greater explicitness to the idea of the 'law' by the development of the idea of the wise man who is its impersonation. But he asks (separating *σκοπός* and *ὅρος* from the *λόγος*), "What is the



mark to which one possessing the law must look?" "What is the standard of the law?" In reality these questions get no answer. They only cloud the subject by introducing a confusion of formulae.' But are the words *ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές* too strong to be used by a writer speaking of himself? Surely not, if we may judge from *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 14 (quoted by Ramsauer) *ὃ δὲ ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν*, or from *E. N.* i. 7. 9 *ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογουμένου τι φαίνεται, σαφεστέρα δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι.* Indeed in *E. E.* Θ. 3 (H. 15) 1249 b. 3–6 (quoted by Fritzsche and Grant!) we find Eudemus correcting himself[1] in words identical with those in which Fritzsche and Grant here see the protest of the disciple against his master.

Again, is Grant right when he says that the questions—'What is the mark to which one possessing the law must look?'—'What is the standard of the law?' get no answer? Surely they do at the end of the *E. E.*, where the *ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας* is determined, and in the Tenth Book of the *E. N.* where the *βίος θεωρητικός* is discussed. It is true however that in the Sixth Book itself we get no answer to them. The Sixth Book merely prepares us for the answer by completing the detailed account of the *ἀρεταί* of the *σπουδαῖος*. When the *σπουδαῖος* has been once placed concretely before us in the fulness of his attributes, we shall then be in a position to appreciate the definition of his *ὅρος* or *σκοπός*—of the ideal for which he lives. It may be that in the undisputed Nicomachean Books more value is attached to the living example of the *σπουδαῖος* than to a formal definition of his *σκοπός*—as we have it at the end of the *E. E.* (see note on *E. N.* ii. 6. 15), but so far as a formal account of the ideal is given in the undisputed Nicomachean Books, it does not seem to differ from that given at the end of the *E. E.* In *E. N.* x the ideal is *ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ* (*E. N.* x. 7. 8), and the man who acts up to it is *θεοφιλέστατος* (x. 8. 13); in *E. E.* Θ. (H.) the ideal is *τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν.* This latter formula is quite 'Aristotelian' in substance; and it matters little whether it owes its phraseology to the master himself or to a disciple of the school.

b. 32. § 3. *διὸ δεῖ . . . τίς ὅρος.*] A moral rule—*e.g.* 'Be moderate in your pleasures'—cannot be interpreted aright apart from a correct

[1] If he wrote *E. N.* vi, as Fritzsche and Grant hold.

1138 b. 32. view of the ideal or chief end of life. As interpreted by an Epicurean this rule would mean—'Enjoy yourself as much as you can consistently with your own health and peace of mind.' But this would be excess from the Aristotelian point of view; such enjoyment would hinder *τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ*. What the writer of *E. N.* vii. 13. 4 says of *εὐτυχία* is here virtually said of *μεσότης*, viz. *πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς*—the mean point in every case is fixed, where it is fixed, because the Chief Good is what it is. What then is it? The answer finally given is—The exercise of the Speculative Reason. But before this answer can be given, the rational part of the soul, as a whole, must be examined, and especially the Practical Reason—*φρόνησις*—both because it is that manifestation of Reason which is *γνωριμώτερον ἡμῖν*, and because it must have performed its function of rationalising the feelings and desires, before the Speculative Reason can engage, without impediment, in that activity of *θεωρία* which is the highest expression of man's nature—*i.e.* the final cause of his being. We have seen that the object of this speculative activity is 'God,' and that the man who engages in it is *θεοφιλέστατος*. It may be said then that, in their answer to the question *τούτου τίς ὅρος*, the Aristotelians maintain that the ultimate moral standard is given by the religious consciousness. The *ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων* given by *φρόνησις*, or the Practical Reason (*cf.* *ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν E. N.* ii. 6. 15, and *ἕξις ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν* vi. 13. 4) is not the *ultimate* standard, because the position of *φρόνησις* in the hierarchy of faculties is that described in *E. N.* vi. 13. 8—*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ. ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει*: *cf.* x. 8. 1 *δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ.*

This note may be brought to a close with a reference to a note of Fritzsche on *E. E.* ii. 5. 1222 b. 7–8, in which he maintains the view against which I have been arguing—that the *ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειε* of the *E. N.* was put forward as an *ultimate* standard 'by Aristotle,' and that it was left to Eudemus 'to correct Aristotle,' by showing that it is not ultimate, but dependent on the *ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας*: my contention being that 'Aristotle' (as we must conclude from the subordinate place which he assigns to the *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ αἱ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν* in *E. N.* x. 8) does not regard the



*ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν* as an ultimate standard, but as dependent 1138 b. 32.
on a standard which is identical with the 'Eudemian' *ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας*—that, in short, there is no difference between the positions of 'Aristotle' and of 'Eudemus' with regard to the ultimate standard. Fritzsche's note, which thus raises a very important question respecting the difference between 'Aristotle' and 'Eudemus,' will be found on p. 40 of his edition of the *E. E.*

**ἀληθῶς**] $K^b$ Γ Ald. $B^a$. b. 33.

**§ 4. ἔφαμεν**] *E. E.* ii. 1. 1220 a. 5, *E. N.* i. 13. 19. 1139 a. 1.

**§ 5. πρότερον**] *E. E.* ii. 4. 1221 b. 27, *E. N.* i. 13. 9. a. 3.

**ἄλογον**] After this word Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 211) supposes a. 4.
that *ὧν ἤδη διώρισται τὸ ἄλογον*, or words to such effect have fallen out; but the supposition is unnecessary. *Τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον* relates to *δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς*, and the writer means that, as the *ψυχή* has two parts—*τὸ λόγον ἔχον* and *τὸ ἄλογον*, so *τὸ λόγον ἔχον* has also two parts.

**καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα**] This division is not to be a. 6.
confused with that indicated in *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 b. 28 *ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγου μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἐπιτάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι*, and in *E. N.* i. 13. 19 *διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι*. In these passages we have really the main division of the *ψυχή* into *ἄλογον* and *λόγον ἔχον*, and only apparently a subdivision of *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*. But in the passage before us (vi. 1. 5) the *λόγον ἔχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ* is itself subdivided into the faculty which apprehends things which are necessarily what they are—*τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, and that which apprehends things which are contingently what they are—*τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα*. For the distinction between *τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν* (=*τὰ ἀΐδια, τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς*) and *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν* (here =*τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*), see notes on iii. 3. §§ 3–5, and i. 3. 4. This distinction, regarded by Aristotle as in things, is really in our way of looking at things. There is no contingency in things, but there is often failure on the part of organic beings to cope with the complexity of the necessary laws which things obey. A 'necessary truth' so-called is one of which we become conscious by the way of intuition[1]. Thus, the truth that the three angles of a triangle

[1] Cf. Spinoza's theory of *Scientia intuitiva*, *Eth.* ii. 40; Schol. 2.

1139 a. 6. are equal to two right angles is apprehended by us as 'necessary,' because we see that, in the diagram before us (which represents all that is essential to a triangle), they are plainly equal to two right angles: we assist at the operation of superposing them upon two adjacent angles, and see that they cover them. Again, the truth that a thing cannot be at once this and not this is apprehended by us as 'necessary' as soon as we look at an object and see plainly that it has a definite attribute—that a rose, *e.g.* is red, and not also not-red. When, however, we pass from this region of direct intuition to that of forces so complicated in their interaction that it is impossible to calculate more than roughly what events will result, we are in the region of the so-called 'contingent.' The events which *do* result are indeed necessarily what they are—there is no 'contingency' in them, as we should see if we could comprehend *all* their causes; but this we either cannot do, or cannot wait to do; for in most cases we are called upon for present *action* in relation to these imperfectly understood future events, and are compelled to forecast them as we best can. Our attitude towards them is thus not 'speculative,' but essentially 'practical.' The apprehension of 'contingent truth' is, in short, 'correspondence with environment.' In apprehending this kind of truth, we prepare, as we best can, for a future condition of the environment, which must always be more or less difficult to forecast; in apprehending 'necessary truth' we see plainly something which is immediately present. 'Contingent truth' may then be described as that body of beliefs and expectations upon which a being, whose life is 'a correspondence extending in time[1]' acts on the whole successfully. The Aristotelian God, whose life is a timeless intuitive function, perceives all things as 'necessary.' In so far as man perceives 'necessary truth,' he too is a 'spectator' of the universe, and lives a divine life; but, as concrete human being, he, is no longer a 'spectator,' but an 'actor' engaged in a struggle—*ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον*—and in this struggle his human life is guided by his perception of 'contingent,' or, as it may be called, 'practical' truth.

In the foregoing remarks I have treated *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν* as being here equivalent to *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*. Technically *τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης*, as well as *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*, fall under the head of *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, but are obviously not to be thought of here in a passage

[1] See Spencer, *Psychol.*, vol. i. p. 320.



which distinguishes faculties of knowledge in relation to objects of 1139 a. 6. knowledge. *Τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης* are not objects of knowledge.

**πρὸς γὰρ . . . ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς**] The doctrine that to generically a. 8. distinct objects of knowledge must correspond generically distinct faculties is here based by the writer on the hypothesis that knowledge implies a 'similarity,' or 'kinship' between object and faculty. This hypothesis meets us in various forms in the history of Psychology. Sometimes it is the analogy of the reflection in a mirror (perhaps suggested by the fact that we see by images reflected in the eye), which seems to determine the form which the hypothesis takes. Knowledge in the mind is something in having which the mind becomes like the object which it knows, just as the mirror, in reflecting, becomes like the object which it reflects. Under this head may be brought those ancient theories identified with the names of Empedocles, Democritus, and Epicurus, according to which certain *εἴδωλα, ἀπόρροιαι, ῥεύματα*, images of themselves are thrown off by objects, and passing into the soul, become its knowledge of the objects: and also the various modern theories of Representative Perception, which explain knowledge by means of 'ideas.' To a closely related class belong the theories, both ancient and modern, of 'impressions,' 'traces,' and the like, in which the mirror analogy has been replaced by the allied wax and seal analogy. Sometimes again the hypothesis *γινώσκεσθαι τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον* appears in a form determined by a desire actually to *identify* the faculties of the knowing mind with the objects known. Under this head come those theories which assert that the mind is itself *made of* the elements (*στοιχεῖα*), material or formal, which it perceives in objects: see *de An.* i. 2. 404 b. 10

*λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες ταύτας, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως*

*γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ,*
*αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον,*
*στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.*

*τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν*

1139 a. 8. *μὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο· μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἕν· τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ.* All such attempts to explain how mind and external objects can be brought into the contact of knowledge are idle. The gulf, which they would bridge by 'images' and the like does not exist. Knowing faculty and object known are not two separate entities. Each exists only as the correlate of the other in the organic whole of knowledge. We cannot go behind knowledge to find there something *γνωριμώτερον* by means of which to explain it. What seems to be an explanation is invariably a metaphor, fitted only to conceal from us our true problem—the faithful description of the organic whole as it is actually given.

The view *καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις*, adopted here without demur, is submitted to lengthy criticism in the *de An.*, and finally accepted only in a modified form. In *de An.* i. 5 the point first insisted upon is that it is not enough to make the *ψυχή* contain merely the four material *στοιχεῖα* which it perceives in external objects; it must also, if the view is to be consistently held, contain the manifold *λόγοι*, or *συνθέσεις*, in which these *στοιχεῖα* are combined in the objects: and this is regarded as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view in the crude form in which it is held by Empedocles: see *de An.* i. 5. 410 a. 7 *οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος ἐνεῖναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ μὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἐνέσονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις· γνωριεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ δ' ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐνέσται. τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐθὲν δεῖ λέγειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσειεν εἰ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λίθος ἢ ἄνθρωπος; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.* The more refined form of the view, according to which the mind contains not the material, but the formal *στοιχεῖα*—*i.e.* the categories which it perceives in things, is next examined, and dismissed—for the mind cannot perceive these *στοιχεῖα* in things either in virtue of containing that which is common to them all (the categories having nothing in common, being ultimate *γένη*); nor yet in virtue of containing *οὐσία*, *ποιόν*, *ποσόν*, and the rest, separately, inasmuch as it is itself *οὐσία*, and *οὐσία* cannot be built up out of elements which are not substantial. If, *e.g.* the mind 'contains' *ποσόν*, or is composed of *ποσά*, it must be *ποσόν*. Again the view is inconsistent with the fundamental truth that 'like *cannot be affected* by like'—a truth which is referred to in *de An.* ii. 4. 10. 416 a. 29 in connexion with nutrition (the parallel between nutrition and knowing is an interesting point in



the Aristotelian psychology), and insisted on generally in *de Gen. et* 1139 a. 8. *Corr.* i. 7. 323 b. 29 *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ τυχὸν πέφυκε πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅσα ἡ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ἢ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον τῷ γένει μὲν ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ταὐτό, τῷ δ' εἴδει ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐναντίον.* κ.τ.λ. In *de An.* ii. 5 the view is subjected to a second criticism, through which Aristotle passes to the statement of his own position. If a sense (*τὸ αἰσθητικόν*) is *like* that which it perceives, why does it not then perceive *itself*? It does not, which shows that it is a *potentiality* of perceiving (which only becomes actual under the influence of the stimulus supplied by an external object), not, as the *ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ* theory makes it, the *thing perceived*—the actual 'earth,' the actual '*ποσόν*.' It may be compared to something combustible which does not actually burn till fire is applied to it. As the combustible is not fire, but becomes fiery, so the mind, unlike the object which affects or impresses it (for otherwise it could not be affected or impressed), when once affected or impressed, is like it: see *de An.* ii. 5. 417 a. 17 *πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος. διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν . . .* 418 a. 4 *πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ' ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.* This then is the modified form in which the *ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ* hypothesis is accepted in the *de An.*—a form in which the influence of metaphor is as plain as in the cruder forms of the hypothesis, upon the criticism of which it is built. The Aristotelian theory of sensation, in fact, starts from the wax and seal metaphor: see *de An.* ii. 12. 424 a. 18 *ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἐστὶ τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον.* As wax cannot be impressed by a soft substance like itself, but, being impressed by that which is unlike itself, takes on the likeness of that which impresses it; so the mind takes on the likeness of the objects which it knows. Yet the metaphor, assuming, as it does, the separate existence of two entities brought into mechanical relation to each other, does not bind Aristotle's speculation, as similar metaphors seem to have bound the psychologists whom he criticises. The powerful instrument of thought which he wields in his philosophical language, enables him to pass beyond his metaphor. The employment of the distinction between *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* enables him to see that, after all, the two entities of the metaphor are really two correlates—an aperçu which he formulates

1139 a. 8. in *de An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 26 ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς· κ.τ.λ. This is his *philosophical* position; but on the whole he is satisfied with his metaphor, which, it must be admitted, takes account of the duality in knowledge, which some of those who insist upon its unity, are inclined to make too little of.

Now to return to *E. N.* vi. 1. 5. In what sense is the faculty which apprehends 'ὄντα which are necessarily what they are' *like* these ὄντα, and the faculty which apprehends 'ὄντα which are contingently what they are' like these ὄντα? The answer is that, on Aristotelian principles, the faculties in exercise are not merely like, but identical with the objects as perceived. The ὄντα, their objects, are in both cases *relations, i.e.* πρός τι, whose 'entity consists in their intelligibility.' That θεωρία, or the scientific faculty in exercise, is identical with the θεώρημα is a doctrine of the widest reach in the Aristotelian philosophy, and is often insisted upon: *e.g. de An.* iii. 7. 431 a. 1 τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι: *cf. de An.* iii. 4. 430 a. 4, iii. 7. 431 b. 16. But what is thus said of the scientific faculty is true of all faculties. In active exercise they are all identical with their objects—for their true objects are εἴδη, constructions of their own activity, 'relations which the mind sets up[1],' whether it be in sensation, in practical deliberation, or in θεωρία: see *de An.* iii. 8. 431 b. 21 ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστιν· πάντα γὰρ ἢ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά· πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ ζητεῖν. τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς δυνάμεις, ἡ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς ἐντελεχείας· τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταὐτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ αἰσθητόν. ἀνάγκη δ' ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι. αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος· ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χεὶρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. With the οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος of this passage may be compared Green's remark (*Proleg.* pp. 36, 37) that 'as we pursue the analysis of the operations involved in the simplest perception of fact, we are unable to detect any residuary phenomenon amounting to a fact at all, that can be held to be given independently of a combining and relating activity, which if the antithesis between the work of the mind and the work of things be accepted must be ascribed to the former.' *Cf.* also Green's *Works*, vol. ii. p. 179, § 18.

[1] Green, *Prolegom.*, p. 36.



The forecasting or calculating faculty in exercise will then be identical with its object—the probability of the occurrence of the event about which the forecast is made. The probability is not a quality belonging to the event; it is a quality attaching to the thought of a mind ready to venture upon a certain line of action[1]. Just as the theorem is what the thinker plainly sees it to be, *i.e.* his thought, so the probability of the occurrence of a certain event is the readiness to act in view of it displayed by the man whose interest it is to make as correct a forecast as possible. 1139 a. 8.

We thus have two distinct faculties of the 'rational part'—that of plainly seeing the truth of the theorems (τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης vi. 3. 2), and that of wisely forecasting future occurrences (τὸ ἐσόμενον καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον vi. 2. 6), each naturally related to its object in the way described.

The writer of the *M. M.* gives a good commentary on the distinction between the two rational faculties. It will be observed that he does not trouble himself with the καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡ γνῶσις explanation of the distinction—*M. M.* i. 34, 1196 b. 15 ἔστιν δ' εἰς δύο τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχον τὸ λόγον ἔχον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν ἔστι τὸ μὲν βουλευτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἐπιστημονικόν. ὅτι δὲ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ δὴ ἕτερά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων χρῶμά τε καὶ χυμὸς καὶ ψόφος καὶ ὀσμή, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑτέρας αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἀπέδωκεν (ψόφον μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῇ, χυμὸν δὲ γεύσει γνωρίζομεν, χρῶμα δὲ ὄψει), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τἆλλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν. ἐπεὶ δὴ ἕτερα τὰ ὑποκείμενα ἐστίν, ἕτερα καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι μέρη οἷς ταῦτα γνωρίζομεν. ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῇ γνωρίζομεν· ἕτερον ἄρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ μόριον τὸ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ νοητά. τὸ δὲ βουλευτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐν κινήσει καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα ἐν γενέσει τε καὶ φθορᾷ ἐστίν. βουλευόμεθα γὰρ ὑπὲρ τούτων ἃ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν καὶ πρᾶξαι καὶ μὴ πρᾶξαι προελομένοις, περὶ ἃ ἐστιν [καὶ] βουλὴ καὶ προαίρεσις τοῦ πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν αἰσθητὰ καὶ ἐν κινήσει τοῦ μεταβάλλειν· ὥστε τὸ προαιρετικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστίν.

§ 6. τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν] the 'scientific' faculty and the 'calculative' faculty. I think that Grant is right when he says that the terms ἐπιστημονικόν and λογιστικόν as they occur in *de An.* iii. 11 are *not* opposed to each other, as they are here. In *de An.* iii. 11 Aristotle is discussing the psychology of animal motion, with a. 12.

[1] Cf. Lotze, *Logic*, p. 367 (English translation).

1139 a. 12. which the 'scientific' faculty has nothing to do, and he naturally confines himself to the 'calculative' faculty, which, like the writer of *E. N.* vi, he identifies with the faculty of practical deliberation. The operation of this faculty, in pursuance of his ball and socket explanation of action (see *de An.* iii. 10) he resolves into the perception of a fixed principle (described as *ἀκίνητον* 433 b. 16) and the perception of a particular fact as falling under the principle. The perception of the fixed principle, *ἡ καθόλου ὑπόληψις* (answering to the socket), is due to an element in the calculative or deliberative faculty which he calls *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν* (434 a. 16)[1]. But the *ἐπιστημονικόν* of *E. N.* vi is not a principle of action.

a. 13. **οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν**] We deliberate only where we have to do with things which we can modify by our action. Power of modifying the course of events by action may indeed be accepted as a definition of *προαίρεσις*, or **βουλευτικὴ** *ὄρεξις*. An irrational animal, being without *βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις*—being dominated by the impulse or fancy of the moment, and unable to weigh alternatives before acting, is not the real cause of those modifications in the course of events which it seems to bring about by what it does. It is merely a link in the chain of necessary consequence formed by act, impulse, and antecedents of impulse. This is what the writer means by denying *πρᾶξις* to the lower animals, as he does below in ch. 2, § 2. It is only a rational being that can *initiate* a modification in the course of events. For the irrational animal there exist no *ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, in the sense of *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*, any more than in the sense of *τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης*: see *Phys.* ii. 6. 197 b. 3 *ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην . . . ὥσθ' ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· οὐδ' εὐτυχία οὐδ' ἀτυχία ὑπάρχει τούτοις, εἰ μὴ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρώταρχος εὐτυχεῖς εἶναι τοὺς λίθους ἐξ ὧν οἱ βωμοί, ὅτι τιμῶνται, οἱ δὲ ὁμόζυγες αὐτῶν καταπατοῦνται.* This, I think, is a fair statement of what the distinction between man and the lower animals in respect of the 'contingent' meant for the Aristotelian School in its earlier period:—man, as deliberating and choosing, is an *ἀρχὴ πράξεων*: the lower animals are mere vehicles (*ἑκούσια*—pleased and consenting vehicles, it is true) of an

[1] The use of *ἐπιστημονικόν* and *ἐπιστήμη* in *E. N.* vii. 3. 13, 14 may be compared with the use of *ἐπιστημονικόν* in *de An.* iii. 11.



impelling force: 'man is not a necessary, because not a natural agent[1].' It is plain that we have here a germ capable of growing, in a suitable soil, into the 'Free Will Theory' as we find it in modern philosophy. It may therefore be worth while to call attention to the approach which later Aristotelianism made towards such a theory. In his treatise *περὶ ψυχῆς* B. 159 b. 160 a. we find Alexander Aphrod. denying that *φύσις* and *διδασκαλία* are in any real sense the causes of our *προαιρέσεις*. If they were, our actions would be *necessary*. Only *contingent actions* are in our power, and contingent actions imply *προαίρεσις ἀναίτιος*. His words are (*περὶ ψυχῆς* B. p. 160, ed. Ald.) *μόνον ψυχὴν λογικὴν ἔχει (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) καθ' ἣν βουλεύεσθαί τε καὶ ζητεῖν δύναται περὶ τῶν πρακτέων αὐτῷ· καὶ οὐ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, ἃ τῷ μὴ κοινωνεῖν τῆς τοιᾶσδε δυνάμεως ἄλογα καλοῦμεν, ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντασίαις ἑπόμενά τε καὶ συγκατατιθέμενα, καὶ ἀνεξετάστως ἕκαστον, ὧν πράττει, ποιοῦντα. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων μετὰ τὴν προσπεσοῦσαν αὐτῷ φαντασίαν περί τινος ὡς πρακτέου, οἷόν τε ζητεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ βουλεύεσθαι, εἴτε χρὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι τῷ φανέντι, εἴτε καὶ μή. βουλευσάμενος δὲ καὶ κρίνας, οὕτως ὁρμᾷ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν ὁπότερον· καὶ ὁπότερον προέκρινεν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, ἄρχεται. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μόνον τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων ἐφ' αὑτῷ τὸ πράττειν ἔχει, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχει . . . . . ἃ οὖν ἀναιτίως καὶ μὴ προϋπαρχούσης αἰτίας προαιρούμεθα, ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ὧν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι δυνατὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν μὴ προκαταβεβλῆσθαι· ἥτις προϋπάρχουσα, πάντως ἂν τοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦτο τὴν ἀνάγκην παρεῖχε. διὰ ταῦτα πολλάκις τινὲς καὶ πεφυκότες ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔθεσιν ἠγμένοι, διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων γίνονται παρὰ τὰς ἀναιτίους προαιρέσεις*[2].

In this theory of *προαίρεσις* **ἀναίτιος** we have perhaps the nearest approach in ancient philosophy to the modern doctrine of 'Free Will.' I will only add here that the germ of the opposite theory of 'Necessitarianism' is also contained in the Aristotelian view. The Aristotelian view, as presented in the *Ethics*, however, seems to combine the truth of the 'Free Will Theory,' with that of 'Necessitarianism,' without abstracting or exaggerating either. Man is 'a creature, yet a cause.' *Ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ πράξεων*, and *ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος* are both true.

§ 7.] *Cf. E. N.* ii. 6. 3 *ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς* a. 15.

[1] See Green's *Prolegg.*, pp. 112, 113.

[2] I have transposed these two passages to bring out the argument more clearly.

1139 a. 15. ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει, and *E. E.* ii. 1. 1218 b. 37 ταῦτα δὴ ὑποκείσθω καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ἢ ἕξις ἢ δύναμις ἑκάστων, ὅσων ἐστί τις χρῆσις ἢ ἔργον.

## CHAPTER II.

### ARGUMENT.

*There are three principles in the soul which go to determine moral action and truth—sense, reason, appetite.*

*Now sense, as such, cannot originate moral action: thus the brutes are incapable of moral action.*

*As for reason or understanding, and appetite—it is to be noted that pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of appetite answer to affirmation and negation in the sphere of the understanding. Accordingly, since moral virtue is a habit which involves choice, and since choice is deliberate appetite, the process of deliberation must be true, and the appetite must be right, if the choice is to be good,* i. e. *the understanding must affirm, and the appetite must pursue the same things. Here we have the practical understanding and practical truth. The function of the understanding in science (as distinguished from its function in conduct and its function in art) is well performed when truth is obtained, badly performed when falsity results. To attain truth is indeed the function of the understanding generally, but the special function of the understanding in relation to conduct—*i. e. *of the practical understanding, is to attain truth which is in harmony with appetite rightly directed.*

*Choice is the efficient, but not the final cause, of moral action; while the efficient cause of choice itself is appetite and reasoning directed to a certain end; thus choice involves reason and understanding, and a definite condition of the moral nature. Understanding by itself supplies no motive; it is only when understanding has a practical end before it that it moves to action, the end of the understanding as employed in art being included under the practical end. for when we produce, or make, anything, we do so, not for the mere sake of making the thing, but with a practical end in view. Wherefore choice is reason moved by appetite, or appetite directed by understanding, and such a principle is man.*

*The past i. not an object of choice; no man 'chooses' to have sacked Troy, for no man deliberates about the past, but only about the future and contingent.*

*Truth then is the object of both the intellectual parts. That condition which makes each best able to attain truth will be the virtue, or excellence, of each.*

a. 17. § 1. τρία δή ἐστιν . . . ὄρεξις] These words introduce a singularly confused passage, in which the Aristotelian doctrine of animal motion, as we find it in *de An.* iii. chapters 9, 10, 11, and *de Motu Anim.*, is applied to the explanation of πρᾶξις in particular. It will be well then to begin with a sketch of that doctrine.



The question asked in *de An.* iii. 9. 432 b. 13 is—What makes 1139 a. 17. an animal move its limbs?—τί τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ζῷον τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν; Ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις is always accompanied by the idea of an object (φαντασία), or by an appetite (ὄρεξις) urging the animal to seek or shun an object. Hence ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις cannot be the cause of this κίνησις, for plants have ἡ θρεπτ. δύν. but not φαντασία or ὄρεξις. Nor can τὸ αἰσθητικόν be the cause of it; for many sentient animals do not move κατὰ τόπον. As for νοῦς being the cause of it—the θεωρητικὸς νοῦς cannot be the cause of it, for this does not contemplate 'conduct'; it has nothing to say about 'things that are sought or things that are shunned—the objects which the man who moves κατὰ τόπον has before his mind: while the other kind of νοῦς, which does contemplate 'conduct,' and issues commands about shunning this or seeking that—the πρακτικὸς νοῦς cannot *insure* κινήσεις in accordance with its commands; ἐπιθυμία steps in, as in the case of the ἀκρατής, and produces a κίνησις contrary to that commanded by νοῦς. And yet, on the other hand, we cannot say that ὄρεξις or ἐπιθυμία is the sole determining cause (κυρία) of ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, for the ἐγκρατής, although his ὄρεξις is strong, follows the dictates of his νοῦς. Thus it would appear that *both* νοῦς (including φαντασία) and ὄρεξις are causes of ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις. But as νοῦς, in this connexion, is ὁ ἕνεκά τινος λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός, and as the ἀρχή of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, *i. e.* that which starts its deliberation, is τὸ ὀρεκτόν, we get ultimately one cause of ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, viz. τὸ ὀρεκτόν which is τὸ κινοῦν πρώτως, and uses νοῦς (*i. e.* προαίρεσις, or βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις) and ὄρεξις (*i. e.* ἐπιθυμία roused by αἴσθησις or φαντασία) as its *instruments*. That τὸ ὀρεκτόν is the prime movent is seen from the fact that νόησις (the mere contemplation of truth) without ὄρεξις does not produce κίνησις, whereas ὄρεξις (appetite) often produces κίνησις in spite of λογισμός. The ὀρεκτόν, as prime movent of ἡ κατὰ τόπ. κίν. is 'the good'—either that which is really good, or that which a man thinks good—the good, however, in the sphere of conduct (τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν), not the good in the sphere of speculation[1]—the good which is realised in the contingent sphere, not that which is realised in the necessary sphere: see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 27 ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ,

[1] It must not be forgotten, however, that it is as ὀρεκτόν that God, the object of man's speculative faculty, moves the universe (and with it man's speculative faculty): see *Met.* Λ. 7.

1139 a. 17. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν: and *de Motu Anim.* 6. 700 b. 15 πάντα τὰ ζῷα καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κινεῖται ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς πάσης τῆς κινήσεως πέρας, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα . . . βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὄρεξις, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις κοινὸν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως· ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν· οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος . . . τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον κινεῖ. The ὀρεκτόν, as κινοῦν πρώτως moves, but is not moved (κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον): the ὀρεκτικόν, or appetitive faculty, is moved, and moves (κινούμενον κινεῖ): the animal is moved (κινεῖται): or, to put it otherwise, the animal is moved by a movent which has two parts or elements —an unmoved part (ἀκίνητον *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 15) *viz.* τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, and a part which is moved, and moves (τὸ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον), *viz.* τὸ ὀρεκτικόν or appetitive faculty. Thus ἡ κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τόπον depends on a mechanism which may be compared to a ball and socket joint (*de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 21, *cf. de Motu Anim.* 1. 698 a. 14). Like the ball, ὄρεξις moves in the fixed socket of τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, as νοῦς (which is always ὀρθός, see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 26) presents the ἀγαθόν truly, or as φαντασία (which is καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή, see *de An. l. c.*) presents it truly or falsely. Or, we may compare the Practical Syllogism (see note on vii. 3. 9, a. 28) to the ball and socket joint: ἡ καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος is a fixed centre of control determining the sweep of the μερικὴ δόξα: the μερικὴ δόξα is the efficient, but not the final, cause of the πρᾶξις—the occasion, but not the principle, of the act: ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὔ *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 19. There can be no κίνησις without a fixed *point d' appui*—πρὸς τὸ ἠρεμοῦν δεῖ ἀπερείδεσθαι τὸ κινοῦν (*de Motu Anim.* 8. 702 a. 26); no πρᾶξις (ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις κίνησις) without a fixed principle of conduct—ἡ καθόλου δόξα ἡ ἠρεμοῦσα. In other words, animal motion (including moral action) implies a definitely constituted organism (or character) and a stimulus received by that organism (or character) from its environment.

To return now to *E. N.* vi. 2. 1.—The difficulty is in τρία. In the *de An.* and *de Motu Anim.* τὰ κινοῦντα are *two*—νοῦς or διάνοια (including αἴσθησις and φαντασία) and ὄρεξις. But even these two are κινοῦντα only in the sense of being *instruments* of motion. The



ultimate cause—τὸ κύριον—is τὸ ὀρεκτόν, *i.e.* τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. 1139 a. 17. According to the doctrine of *de An.* iii. 9, αἴσθησις, νοῦς and ὄρεξις are certainly not to be described as κύρια τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως—under which, of course, πρᾶξις is included, ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις κίνησις (*E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 29). But does the addition καὶ ἀληθείας in *E. N.* vi. 2. 1 make any difference? It indicates that the πρᾶξις which we have here to do with is *right*—that νοῦς, which is πᾶς ὀρθός (*de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 26) is operative, and has presented τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, instead of τὸ ἥδη ἡδύ (see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 7), to the agent as his end; and that the appetitive part of his nature has accepted this νοητόν as ὀρεκτόν; further that διάνοια, the discursive faculty (see Bonitz, *Met.* p. 214), which attains ἀλήθεια in joining and separating thoughts as the corresponding things are actually joined and separated (see *Met.* Θ. 10. 1051 b. 3 ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα: *Met.* E. 4. 1027 b. 20 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὴν κατάφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ συγκειμένῳ ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἀπόφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ διῃρημένῳ, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος τούτου τοῦ μερισμοῦ τὴν ἀντίφασιν . . . οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν . . . ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ . . . ἡ συμπλοκή ἐστι καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι), and in selecting the suitable means to an end, has performed its work well—*i.e.* ἀληθῶς, in exact correspondence with the conditions of the virtuous life, and that τὸ ὀρεκτικόν has consented to adopt the means suggested. Thus ὅ τε λόγος ἀληθής ἐστι καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ὀρθή (§ 2), and the result of this harmonious co-operation of reason and appetite is πρακτικὴ ἀλήθεια—right action. The addition καὶ ἀληθείας then indicates that we are concerned here with the *harmonious* action of νοῦς or διάνοια (including αἴσθησις) and ὄρεξις. Although each separately may be described as κινοῦν (just as engine-driver and steam may both be said to 'set the train in motion'), neither can be described as κύριον, for νοῦς needs ὄρεξις, and often thwarts it, and both are themselves moved by τὸ ὀρεκτόν. But acting harmoniously together, they constitute a single cause of πρᾶξις καὶ ἀλήθεια (= πρακτικὴ ἀλήθεια § 2), or right action; and may well be described as κύρια, being coextensive with the whole nature of the agent (καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος § 5). In their harmonious action, manifesting itself in προαίρεσις (defined in § 5 as νοῦς ὀρεκτικός or ὄρεξις διανοητική), they are a single principle of motion, like the ball and the socket in the organic unity of the joint.

But still the difficulty remains that a coordinate place is assigned

1139 a. 17. to αἴσθησις, as one of *three* elements jointly κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας. The position here assigned to αἴσθησις is certainly not that assigned to it in the *de An.* and *de Mot. An.*, where only two κινοῦντα are recognised—νοῦς and ὄρεξις—αἴσθησις being included in νοῦς; but it is not necessarily inconsistent with the doctrine of these treatises. It ought, I think, to be explained in connexion with the theory of the Practical Syllogism, the minor premiss of which is described in *E. N.* vii. 3 as δόξα αἰσθητοῦ, and as αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη. A right action is the conclusion of a syllogism in which the minor premiss—a simulus of sense—is followed by that action which the moral rule, defined by the major premiss, requires in the circumstances. Indeed all πρᾶξις, wrong as well as right, involves such a 'syllogism' with major and minor premisses. Αἴσθησις or αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία (for the latter see *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 5) alone, as the lower animals have it, cannot initiate πρᾶξις, right or wrong:—*E. N.* vi. 2. 2 τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν: *E. N.* vii. 3. 11 τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην: *cf. M. M.* i. 11. 1187 b. 7, and *E. E.* ii. 6. 1222 b. 15. The lower animals, in Aristotle's view, act on no definite plan, of which they are themselves conscious, but as αἴσθησις, αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, and ὄρεξις momentarily determine; whereas man's αἴσθησις, with the ἐπιθυμία attending it (see *de An.* ii. 2. 413 b. 23 ὅπου μὲν αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδυνή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία), moves, or ought to move, in a definite manner within the 'fixed socket' of rational principle.

I would therefore explain the words πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις in the present passage as the formula of the Practical Syllogism read upwards thus—πρᾶξις (conclusion), δόξα αἰσθητοῦ (minor premiss), ὑπόληψις τοῦ νοητοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ ὄντος (major premiss). Jointly the premisses determine the conclusion. The minor alone could not determine it, for the minor alone would have no *point d'appui*, nor could the major alone, ἠρεμεῖ γάρ.

a. 21. § 2. **ἔστι δ' ὅπερ . . . φυγή**] τὸ ὂν τὸ ὡς ἀληθές (and it is with ἀλήθεια the ἔργον διανοίας that we are here concerned), *i.e.* 'is = is *true*' (for the various senses of τὸ ὄν, see *Met.* Δ. 7, and Θ. 10) consists in affirmation (κατάφασις) and negation (ἀπόφασις) in correspondence with fact:—*Met.* Δ. 1017 a. 31 ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὅτι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ



καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, οἷον ὅτι ἔστι Σωκράτης μουσικός, ὅτι ἀληθὲς 1139 a. 21.
τοῦτο, ἢ ὅτι ἔστι Σωκράτης οὐ λευκός, ὅτι ἀληθές· τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ διάμετρος σύμμετρος, ὅτι ψεῦδος: Θ. 10. 1051 b. 1 ἐπεὶ . . . τὸ κυριώτατα ὂν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι, ὥστ' ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἐψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ' ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθὲς λεγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος; τοῦτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἶ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν: *De Interp.* 1. 16 a. 12 περὶ γὰρ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσίν ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀληθές: *Met.* Γ. 7. 1012 a. 2 πᾶν τὸ διανοητὸν καὶ νοητὸν ἡ διάνοια ἢ κατάφησιν ἢ ἀπόφησιν· τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον ὅταν ἀληθεύῃ ἢ ψεύδηται. ὅτον μὲν ὠδὶ συνθῇ φᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, ἀληθεύει, ὅταν δὲ ὡδί, ψεύδεται: *De An.* iii. 6. 430 a. 26 ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις, περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος· ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ ἓν ὄντων—*i.e.* united not as the successive ideas in a reverie, but because certain attributes really belong to certain things. Now, the faculty which thinks together those things which exist or occur together in the external world, and thinks apart those things which exist or occur apart—which, in other words, affirms and denies in accordance with objective conditions, and realises *truth* where it is possible to fall into *falsity* (*sc.* 'truth' as that is given in *propositions*) is διάνοια: see *Met.* Ε. 4. 1027 b. 25 οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδ' ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ. Διάνοια is the Understanding, or discursive intellect, as distinguished from νοῦς—Reason, or the intuitive intellect. The latter is concerned with εἴδη or notions *per se*, which are indivisible in the unity of their οὐσία—περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδ' ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ *sc.* ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος (see Alex. quoted at end of this note)—their ἀληθές consists simply in their 'clear intelligibility' (τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τὸ νοεῖν αὐτά *Met.* Θ. 10. 1052 a. 1), and has no ψεῦδος opposed to it: see *Met.* Θ. 10. 1051 b. 24 τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ κατάφασις καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν· ἀπαταθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστι . . . τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἀπάτη, ἀλλ' ἄγνοια (on which see Alexander, p. 571, ed. Bonitz—ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἁπλῶν ἢ θιγγάνει ὁ νοῦς αὐτῶν καὶ καθάπερ εἰσὶν ἅπτεται τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν καὶ ἁπλῇ ἐπιβολῇ ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ὄψις τῶν χρωμάτων . . . ἢ οὐ θιγγάνει, οὐδ' οἷον ὁρᾷ αὐτά): *cf.* also Themistius, περὶ ψυχῆς A. fol. 71 b τὸ νοεῖν μὲν ὅταν τοὺς ἁπλοῦς ὅρους καταλαμβάνῃ, τὸ διανοεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν τῷ συντιθέναι τούτους καὶ διαιρεῖν . . . τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τῷ

1139 a. 21. *συντιθέναι τούτους καὶ διαιρεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀληθές· καὶ νοεῖν μὲν οὐχ οἷόν τε ψευδῶς, διανοεῖσθαι δὲ οἷόν τε*: see also Alex. on *Met.* Γ. 7. 1012 a. 1 (Alex. ed. Bonitz, p. 289, line 15).[1] This is undoubtedly the distinction (recognised by Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iii. p. 183, Trendelenburg, *de An.* p. 272, Bonitz, *Met.* p. 214, Waitz, *Organon*, vol. ii. p. 298), which the Aristotelians make between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια*, when they do make any distinction; but they often use the terms interchangeably. Thus in the chapter before us (*E. N.* vi. 2), *διάνοια* in § 2 is obviously equivalent to *νοῦς* in § 1; and in § 5 *προαίρεσις* is defined as *ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική*. Again, in *de An.* iii. 4. 429 a. 23, we find *νοῦς* given as the faculty of *διανοεῖσθαι*, and in *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 b. 5 *διάνοια* given as the genus under which *νοῦς* falls as a species. Again, in *de An.* ii. 2. 413 b. 12, the parts of the *ψυχή* are distinguished as *θρεπτικόν*, *αἰσθητικόν* and *διανοητικόν*; in iii. 4. 429 a. 30 as *νοητικόν*, *αἰσθητικόν* and *θρεπτικόν*: in *de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 9 we read *φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς*, and a few lines below 433 a. 17 *δύο ταῦτα φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική*. Lastly, Alexander in his commentary on *Met.* E. 4, where the technical meaning of *διάνοια* as *discursus* seems clear, writes as if intellect in the general sense were intended (Alex. ed. Bonitz, p. 424. 4)—*οὐ μόνον δ' ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς τοῖς ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ*.

For *φυγή* and *δίωξις* as elements of *ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις ἡ τῶν ζῴων*, see *de An.* iii. 9. 432 b. 28 *ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἢ φεύγοντός τι ἢ διώκοντός τί ἐστι*.

a. 22. **ἕξις προαιρετική**] *E. E.* ii. 10. 1227 b. 8, *E. N.* ii. 6. 15.

a. 23. **ὄρεξις βουλευτική**] *E. E.* ii. 10. 1226 b. 17, *E. N.* iii. 3. 19.

a. 24. **τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν**] *ὄρεξις* is *ὀρθή* when it seeks (*δίωξις*) what *λόγος* or *διάνοια* affirms (*κατάφασις*) to be good, and shuns (*φυγή*) what it denies (*ἀπόφασις*) to be good:—when, to use the expression of *E. N.* i. 13. 17, it *ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ*: *cf. E. N.* i. 13. 18 *τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως* [*λόγου*] *ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν*. The motive power in man, *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*, left to itself, simply seeks present pleasure, and shuns present pain: but this is *wrong*. The motive power is used *rightly*, only when it is used to further that welfare of the whole life which reason comprehends: see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 5 *ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν* (*ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἥδη· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἥδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον*), *εἴδει μὲν ἓν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ᾗ ὀρεκτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν* (*τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι*), *ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα*. By *λόγος* in *E. N.* vi. 2. 2 we are to understand the *συλλογισμός* or chain of deliberative reasoning leading up to the act of *προαίρεσις*. This *λόγος* is *ἀληθής* when the thoughts of which it consists are connected as facts require—when the means which will actually ensure the end are duly thought of in the proper order.

[1] Cook Wilson (*Trans. Oxf. Philol. Soc.* 1887–88, p. 6) remarks that 'the doctrine that single or simple notions are neither true nor false is clearly stated in treatises whose genuineness is doubted, viz. *De Int.* c. 1, *Cat.* 4, and *Met.* E. 1027 b. 18.' I understand *Cat.* 4. 2 a. 8 to state that *τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα* are 'neither true nor false' in the sense in which 'true' and 'false' are applied to *propositions*; but I do not think that this statement is inconsistent with the doctrine that there is an *ἀληθές* = *τὸ νοεῖν*.



1139 a. 24.

§ 3. **θεωρητικῆς . . πρακτικῆς . . . ποιητικῆς**] See *Met.* E. 1. 1025 b. a. 27. 25 *πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητική*.

*Διάνοια* in the technical sense—the understanding, or faculty by which the steps to an end are reviewed in their *true* order, *i. e.* in correspondence with the actual conditions of the problem, operates in three fields, according as the end is the solution of a scientific problem, the attainment of a practical good, or the construction of a work of art. Take the last—the field of *τέχνη*. The architect apprehends by *νοῦς* the plan of his temple—an indivisible form (*ἀδιαίρετον, ἁπλοῦν*). This plan is with him in all the steps of his work. It is a fixed principle (*ἀκίνητον*) from which his *διάνοια* may be said to *deduce* these steps. The plan being assumed to be a realisable one, *διάνοια ποιητική* or 'the faculty of thinking of the means by which a thing may be made,' performs its function well when it devises a method of finding and employing materials which is *true*—*i. e.* one in which the steps really suitable are duly thought of. In Geometry again the thinker starts with a definite problem to be solved, and his *διάνοια θεωρητική* reviews the steps which lead to a solution in the order determined by the conditions of the problem: see *E. N.* iii. 3. 11 *ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα*. But in the field of *πρᾶξις* we cannot, as in the fields of *τέχνη* and *θεωρητικὴ ἐπιστήμη*, start with

1139 a. 27. a definite plan or problem. We have no clear-cut notion of Life (*τὸ εὖ ζῆν*) before we begin to deal dianoetically with the emergencies of life. It is only after we have spent much time in dealing with them, that we see *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* as *νοητόν* and *καλόν*. We do not know what the problem of Life is till we have in part solved it. This is perhaps a reason for not insisting much on the technical distinction between *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* in this field.

a. 29. **τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον**] See passages quoted above in note on *ἔστι δ' ὅπερ* κ.τ.λ., § 2, a. 21.

**τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ**] = *τῆς δὲ πρακτικῆς διανοίας*. Its function is the attainment of *ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ*. That *ὄρεξις* is *ὀρθή* which obeys the dictates of the *πρακτικὴ διάνοια*, and the dictates of the *πρακτικὴ διάνοια* are such as *ὄρεξις* can obey—*i. e.* they are concerning *τὸ φευκτὸν καὶ διωκτόν*.

a. 31. **§ 4.** This section, § 5, and § 6 down to *πεπραγμένα* Ramsauer marks as probably *aliunde huc translata*. At any rate, whether a digression due to the writer himself, or an interpolated fragment, the passage seems to him to be out of place here. I cannot share this view. The passage, culminating as it does in *διὸ ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική* (§ 5), seems to me to be fully justified by the contribution which it makes to the writer's object—the explanation of *διάνοια πρακτική* as *κυρία πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας*. Much less can I follow Susemihl who brackets § 4, § 5 from *διό*, and § 6 down to *πεπραγμένα*, and thus brings *διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ* at the beginning of § 5 into immediate connexion with the end of § 3. It seems to me that § 4, dealing as it does with *πρακτικὴ διάνοια* as a source of *κίνησις*, is naturally followed by *διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ*.

**πράξεως μὲν οὖν . . . ἕνεκά τινος**] *προαίρεσις* is the efficient cause (*ἀρχὴ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*), but not the final cause (*ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα*) of *πρᾶξις*: *cf. de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 13 *ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρεκτόν*. The final cause of *πρᾶξις* is *τὸ ὀρεκτόν* which is *τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν* (*de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 29) or *εὐπραξία* (*E. N.* vi. 2. 5). Its efficient cause is the 'last appetite' in the deliberation started by the final cause—*i. e.* its efficient cause is the *ὄρεξις* which translates



into act the idea of something now to be done to which *βούλευσις* 1139 a. 31.
has conducted the agent: see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 a. 16 *τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως*, and *E. N.* iii. 3. 12 *καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει* κ.τ.λ. The *προαίρεσις* or deliberate *ὄρεξις* of an act then is the efficient cause of the act; while the efficient cause of the deliberate *ὄρεξις* itself is the deliberation started by that final *ὀρεκτόν* for the sake of which the act is performed—*προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος*. Briefly, the good moves the *ὄρεξις διανοητική*, and the *ὄρεξις διανοητική* moves the agent: see *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 14 *τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ᾗ ἐνέργεια), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον*.

The *caveat* conveyed by the words *ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα* is not to be overlooked. *Προαίρεσις* is only the instrument, not the *raison d'être* of *πρᾶξις*. An act is good, not because it gives a certain faculty assumed to be 'authoritative,' or a certain motive classed as 'high,' an opportunity of manifesting itself, but because it contributes to the realisation of an objective good. Right and wrong do not depend on an 'arbitrary make of faculties,' but are qualities 'in things.' *Προαίρεσις* is distinguished from the *ἐπιθυμία* which is contrary to it, not by its 'good intentions' or any other such subjective quality, but by its rationality; and its rationality means its correspondence with objective law. But the acts of the *ἀκρατής* (who is *μὴ προαιρούμενος E. N.* vii. 4. 4) are produced by an *ἀρχή*—the *ἐπιθυμία* of the moment—which is at once their efficient and their final cause. They are done not for the sake of objective good, but for the sake of the gratification of the subjective feeling which immediately excites them. It is only in man, however, that such a violation of nature is possible. In the irrational animals (which are incapable of *ἀκρασία*, *E. N.* vii. 3. 11) *ὄρεξις* is always primarily for the sake of *objects* and only incidentally for the sake of its own gratification. When the irrational animals seem to follow present pleasure they are really striving after *τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον*. Thus *προαίρεσις* or *ὄρεξις διανοητική* only conforms to the law of all healthy *ὄρεξις* in producing acts which look beyond the gratification of subjective feeling to correspondence with environment. Butler's contention against Hobbes—that, as food, not self (*i. e.* pleasure), is the object of the appetite of hunger, so our neighbour, not self, is the object of benevolence, is based on the recognition of this law

1139 a. 31. of life often strangely ignored by moralists—antihedonistic as well as hedonistic, perhaps more often and more thoroughly by the former than by the latter.

In his note on προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος, Eustratius is puzzled by Aristotle's inconsistency in first making ὄρεξις the γένος of προαίρεσις, defined as βουλευτικὴ (*differentia*) ὄρεξις (*genus*)—*i.e.* its *material* cause, and then here its *efficient* cause.

a. 33. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις] Here νοῦ καὶ διανοίας take up λόγος in the immediately preceding clause, and ἠθικῆς ἕξεως takes up ὄρεξις. The ὄρεξις involved in προαίρεσις, as distinguished from that involved in mere ἐπιθυμία, is a steadily operating appetite, proceeding from and declaring the ἠθικὴ ἕξις or ἦθος of its subject:—see *E. N.* iii. 2. 1 οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ προαίρεσις τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. According as the ἠθικὴ ἕξις or ἦθος is good or bad, so is the end οὗ ἡ ὄρεξις—*E. N.* iii. 5. 20 τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα: vi. 12. 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν: *cf.* vi. 12. 10, vi. 13. 7.

It may be asked whether νοῦς and διάνοια are distinguished in *E. N.* vi. 2. 4. It is certainly plain that elsewhere in this chapter they are not distinguished; but here we are tempted to think that the two names would not have been brought so close together unless the writer had wished to distinguish two faculties. In *de An.* iii. 9. 433 a. 1, which resembles the present passage in bringing the two terms closely together, a distinction seems to be intended—ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής. In *de An.* iii. 9 Aristotle seems to distinguish νοῦς as authoritative principle or ἀρχή (ἐπιτάττοντος) from διάνοια as merely indicating (λεγούσης) what particular things are to be sought or shunned. If we are to distinguish between νοῦς and διάνοια in *E. N.* vi. 2. 4, we may say that νοῦς grasps the end immediately, and διάνοια reviews the means: ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ gives the moral interest in the end declared by νοῦς, and προαίρεσις is the rational choice of the means discovered by διάνοια. It may be mentioned that Eustratius, in his note here, treats νοῦς and διάνοια as distinct. He says—ὁ κυρίως νοῦς ἁπλαῖς ἐπιβολαῖς γινώσκειν πέφυκε, τούτῳ μέσῳ χρωμένη ἡ διάνοια οἰκείῳ τοῦ πράγματος ἀνειλιγμένως καταλαμβάνει.

a. 34. εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν] *i.e.* τὰ θηρία πράξεως οὐ κοινωνεῖ—τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ.



§ 5. διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ] αὐτή—by itself, without ὄρεξις τοῦ 1139 a. 35.
πρακτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—*i.e.* διάνοια θεωρητική. Eustratius has—ἡ διάνοια ἁπλῶς αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔχει τι τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας σκοπιμώτερον ἵνα τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κινῇ . . . ἡ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὴ διάνοια τέλος ἔχει τὸ εὑρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ περαιτέρω οὐδὲν προστίθησιν, ἡ δὲ πρακτικὴ εὑρίσκεται μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ τἀληθές, οὐ μέχρι δὲ τούτου ἵσταται, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ αὐτῇ καὶ πράξεως ἵν' ἐφίκηται τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ περὶ οὗ καὶ συνελογίσατο: *cf. de Motu Anim.* 6. 700 b. 24 οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ διανοητὸν προαιρετόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ κινοῦν· ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ καλὸν κ.τ.λ.—on which Mich. Eph. (*de Motu An.* fol. 152) has τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα διανοητὰ μέν, οὐ προαιρετὰ δὲ . . . ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ καλόν· ἡ γὰρ γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα καλὸν οὖσα ἠρεμίας μᾶλλον ἀλλ' οὐ κινήσεώς ἐστιν αἰτία.

Although it is convenient to distinguish διάνοια αὐτή from ἡ μετ' ὀρέξεως (*i.e.* ὀρέξεως τοῦ πρακτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ), it must be remembered that all διάνοια is μετ' ὀρέξεως. Pure speculation is sustained by the ardour of a mind striving to make itself more and more perfect—a truth recognised by Plato when he makes ἔρως the impulse to dialectic, and by Spinoza when he identifies *intellectus* and *voluntas*, and by Aristotle himself in the opening words of the *Metaphysics*—πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.

αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει] *I. e.* we have not *two* dianoetic b. 1.
ἀρχαὶ κινήσεως, *viz.* πρακτική and ποιητικὴ διάνοια, for πρακτικὴ διάνοια is the ἀρχή of ποιητικὴ διάνοια. A life of noble action (εὐπραξία) is the end for the sake of which all ποιηταί, from the cobbler to Phidias, work.

καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς (ἀλλὰ πρός τι καὶ τινός) τὸ ποιητόν] *Cf. E. N.* b. 2.
vi. 5. 4 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος.

ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν] *sc.* τέλος ἁπλῶς. The reading ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πρακτόν, b. 3.
given by Ald., Eustr., rc. $K^b$, rc. CCC, NC, Cambr., requires us to understand πρός τι καὶ τινός.

ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ κ.τ.λ.] τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, the object of διάνοια b. 4.
πρακτική (and ultimately of διάνοια ποιητική), is ὀρεκτόν: *therefore* man, as ἀρχὴ πράξεων, is ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική.

§ 6.] This section down to πεπραγμένα, might have been dispensed b. 5.
with: but this is no reason for bracketing it.

οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ b. 7.
ἐνδεχομένου] See the remarkable passage, *de Interp.* 9. 18 a. 28

1139 b. 7. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὄντων καὶ γενομένων ἀνάγκη τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ εἶναι . . . a. 33 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ μελλόντων οὐχ ὁμοίως· εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ἅπαν ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε εἰ ὁ μὲν φήσει ἔσεσθαί τι ὁ δὲ μὴ φήσει τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη ἀληθεύειν τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν, εἰ πᾶσα κατάφασις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής . . . b. 5 οὐδὲν ἄρα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε γίνεται οὔτε ἀπὸ τύχης οὔθ' ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν, οὐδὲ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἅπαντα καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν· ἢ γὰρ ὁ φὰς ἀληθεύει ἢ ὁ ἀποφάς . . . . εἰ ἔστι λευκὸν νῦν, ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν πρότερον ὅτι ἔσται λευκόν, ὥστε ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὁτιοῦν τῶν γενομένων ὅτι ἔσται· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται, οὐχ οἷόν τε τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲ μὴ ἔσεσθαι· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι· ὃ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι· ἅπαντα οὖν τὰ ἐσόμενα ἀναγκαῖον γενέσθαι· οὐδὲν ἄρα ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τύχης ἔσται· εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὡς οὐδέτερόν γε ἀληθὲς ἐνδέχεται λέγειν, οἷον ὅτι οὔτε ἔσται οὔτε οὐκ ἔσται . . . . b. 22 εἰ δὲ μήτε ἔσται μήτε μὴ ἔσται αὔριον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὁπότερ' ἔτυχεν, οἷον ναυμαχία· δέοι γὰρ ἂν μήτε γενέσθαι ναυμαχίαν μήτε μὴ γενέσθαι . . . . b. 31 ὥστε οὔτε βουλεύεσθαι δέοι ἂν οὔτε πραγματεύεσθαι, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν τοδὶ ποιήσωμεν, ἔσται τοδί, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ τοδί, οὐκ ἔσται τοδί. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει καὶ εἰς μυριοστὸν ἔτος τὸν μὲν φάναι τοῦτο ἔσεσθαι τὸν δὲ μὴ φάναι, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσεσθαι ὑποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν τότε . . . . 19 a. 1 ὥστε εἰ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τοῦτο γενέσθαι, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν γενομένων ἀεὶ οὕτως εἶχεν ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενέσθαι. ὅ τε γὰρ ἀληθῶς εἰπέ τις, ὅτι ἔσται, οὐχ οἷόν τε μὴ γενέσθαι· καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἀληθὲς ἦν εἰπεῖν ἀεὶ ὅτι ἔσται. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα—ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι, καὶ ὅτι ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως· ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι: *i.e.* future events *are not settled beforehand.* They have yet to be produced by φύσις or by human agency. If we maintain therefore that of two contradictory propositions about a future event, the one must be true, and the other false, in the sense that the one is *already* true, and the other *already* false, we make the occurrence of the 'contingent' *necessary*: we banish the 'contingent' from the world, and leave no place for deliberation. It is, of course, *logically* necessary that a battle should either take place to-morrow in a certain spot, or not take place: but if it takes place, it does not take place 'necessarily,' and if it does not take place, it does not not-take place 'necessarily.'—*de Int.* 9. 19 a. 28 εἶναι μὲν ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἔσεσθαί γε ἢ μή. οὐ μέντοι



διελόντα γε εἰπεῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἀνάγκη μὲν ἔσεσθαι 1139 b. 7.
ναυμαχίαν αὔριον ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἔσεσθαί γε αὔριον ναυμαχίαν ἀναγκαῖον οὐδὲ μὴ γενέσθαι· γενέσθαι μέντοι ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι ἀναγκαῖον.

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων] The ἐπιστημονικὸν μέρος and the b. 12.
λογιστικὸν μέρος of chap. 1. § 6.

## CHAPTER III.

### ARGUMENT.

*The modes in which the soul reaches truth in affirmation or negation are five—art, science, prudence, wisdom, reason.*

*The object of science strictly so called is necessary truth, or that which cannot be otherwise, and is therefore eternally true; for things that are necessary in the strict sense are all eternal, and things which are eternal are without generation and corruption. Moreover science can always be taught, and its object learnt. Now, all teaching starts from previous knowledge, as we say in Logic, and proceeds sometimes by induction, sometimes by syllogism. Induction is the source of the universal; syllogistic reasoning starts from universals. It is by induction therefore that syllogistic principles are obtained. The scientific faculty accordingly is the faculty of demonstrating conclusions from principles which are 'better known' than the conclusions derived from them. So much for science.*

§ 1. ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.] 'This chap- b. 14.
ter,' Grant says, 'proposes to consider the two parts of the reason (scientific and calculative) from a fresh point of view.' In chap. 1. § 5 Reason was divided into two parts, because its objects are of two kinds; here it is the consideration of διάνοια, the faculty of affirming and denying truly, which suggests a list of five rational states—ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν. In this list τέχνη answers to διάνοια ποιητική, ἐπιστήμη to διάνοια θεωρητική, and φρόνησις to διάνοια πρακτική, while νοῦς supplies τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, and φρόνησις with their respective ἀρχαί (see chap. 6), and σοφία is the possession of both νοῦς and διάνοια—especially θεωρητικὴ διάνοια (see chap. 7. § 3). If this is plainly the rationale of the present list, it is even more plainly that of the list in *Anal. Post.* i. 33. 89 b. 7, by which Grant thinks it highly probable that the present list was suggested. In *An. Post.* i. 33 we have the rational states given in the following order—διάνοια, νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, σοφία—*i.e.* first, the main division of the rational part into the discursive reason (διάνοια) and the reason which grasps principles immediately (νοῦς): then, the three kinds of discursive

1139 b. 14. reason: and lastly, the possession of discursive ability together with the power of grasping principles. The list as we find it in *E. N.* vi. 3. 1 bears its rationale less clearly on its face. Διάνοια is not mentioned, although we must assume from οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι that the writer has it in his mind: and the logical order is reversed when σοφία is placed before νοῦς, although it is to be noted that in the subsequent discussion of these two states σοφία is taken last. Grant thinks that 'Eudemus' does not distinguish διάνοια from νοῦς here. It is certainly in favour of this view that νοῦς appears in a list οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ **καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι**, for, as we have seen in *Met.* Θ. 10. 1051 b. 24, quoted in note on vi. 2. 2, a. 21, the ἀλήθεια which is perceived by νοῦς, as intuitive reason, is that of τὸ θιγγάνειν, or of φάσις, not that of κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις which is the ἔργον διανοίας. On the other hand the identification of νοῦς in the present list with διάνοια is inconsistent with the special function assigned to νοῦς as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη in chap. 6. The statement with which chap. 6 ends—λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν makes it, I think, impossible to regard the νοῦς of the list as anything but the intuitive reason. The words οἷς ἀληθεύει τῷ **καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι** must therefore be taken to apply directly to τέχνη ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις, and to be loosely extended to νοῦς on account of its position as κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐπιστήμης (chap. 7. § 3).

Prantl, in his work *über die dianoetischen Tugenden in der Nicomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles* 1852, maintains the thesis that to regard this as a list of *five intellectual* ἀρεταί is to involve oneself in a confusion of Logic and Ethics. There are only two intellectual ἀρεταί—σοφία and φρόνησις. Σοφία is the ἀρετή of the λόγον ἔχον μέρος, *quâ* concerned with τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, and φρόνησις (including εὐβουλία, σύνεσις, γνώμη and δεινότης) the ἀρετή of the λόγον ἔχον μέρος, *quâ* concerned with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. Νοῦς is not an ἀρετή, but *das Unmittelbare, i.e.* the mind itself. Ἐπιστήμη is not an ἀρετή, for there is an ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμης, *viz.* σοφία. Τέχνη is not an ἀρετή, for there is an ἀρετὴ τέχνης, which in its highest form is also called σοφία:—see p. 10 of Prantl's work for a summary statement of these results. On p. 14, he calls attention to *E. N.* vi. 11. 7. 1143 b. 15, as strongly supporting his view that σοφία and φρόνησις are the only intellectual ἀρεταί—τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκάτερα τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα εἴρηται. Zeller examines Prantl's view in his *Phil. d. Gr.* ii. 2, p. 649 note 2, and rejects it on two grounds—(1) because the subject



of Book vi, as stated in ch. 1. § 4, is the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί, and no 1139 b. 14. hint is thrown out that these are not the *five* states enumerated in ch. 3. § 1: (2) because the Aristotelian conception of ἀρετή as ἐπαινετὴ ἕξις (*E. N.* i. 13. 19) applies to all five. Ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη are certainly ἐπαινεταὶ ἕξεις (ἐπιστήμη is adduced as an example of a ἕξις in *Cat.* 8. 8 a. 29, 11 a. 24); and νοῦς (not as *part* of the soul, but as *state* of the soul) is expressly described as a ἕξις in *E. N.* vi. 11. 2. If it is a ἕξις, it is an ἐπαινετὴ ἕξις—*i.e.* an ἀρετή. I think that Zeller's general position is unassailable. Ἐνεργεῖ **κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν** could undoubtedly be said of the ἐπιστήμων, and also of the τεχνίτης, without violence to Aristotelian usage. But it must at the same time be conceded to Prantl that a certain difficulty is felt by the writer of the Sixth Book about the place of ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη—see vi. 5. 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν . . . δῆλον ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶν [ἡ φρόνησις] καὶ οὐ τέχνη—(this is perhaps why τέχνη is omitted from the list given in ch. 6. § 2): see also *M. M.* i. 34. 1197 a. 16 ἔστιν δ' ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετή, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη (ἐπιστήμη seems to do duty for both ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη here, as in the list 1196 b. 36), ἐπαινετοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ φρόνιμοι, ὁ δ' ἔπαινος ἀρετῆς· ἔτι δ' ἐπιστήμης μὲν πάσης ἀρετή ἐστιν, φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτό τι ἐστὶν ἀρετή. I ought to add that Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 124 note) gives his opinion very strongly in favour of Prantl's view that σοφία and φρόνησις are the only intellectual ἀρεταί, properly so called, recognised in the Sixth Book.

**ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι**] What is here b. 17. implied is expressed fully in ch. 6. § 2—εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν **καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα** περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. In what sense, then, are all these ἕξεις said to be *infallible*? Νοῦς is infallible as the immediate perception of ἀδιαίρετα or ἁπλᾶ: see *Met.* Θ. 10. 1051 b. 24, and other passages quoted in note on vi. 2. 2, a. 21. Ἐπιστήμη is infallible inasmuch as the truths which it apprehends, or of which it is the apprehension, are such as, if seen at all, are clearly seen for what they are, and leave no room for the supposition that they might be seen otherwise—see § 2 below, πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν. Σοφία is infallible, because it is νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη (ch. 7. § 3). But in what sense can the ἕξεις which have to do with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν be said to be infallible? We are saved the trouble of trying to answer

1139 b. 17. this question as regards *τέχνη*, for *τέχνη* does not appear in the corrected list of infallible *ἕξεις* given in ch. 6. § 2, and it is stated in ch. 5. § 7 that there are degrees of excellence in it—*τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή*, and implied that involuntary, as well as voluntary *ἁμαρτία* is possible in it—*ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος* (*sc. τοῦ ἀκουσίως ἁμαρτάνοντος*). We have therefore only to explain how *φρόνησις*, concerned as it is with *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν*, is infallible. The explanation seems to be that *φρόνησις* is correlated with the perfect organisation of the whole moral nature—*E. N.* vi. 12. 10 *ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν. Φρόνησις* is the consciousness of what goodness requires for its preservation. This consciousness is always present with the good man, and authoritative in him. An artist may forget his art, because it is only a part of himself—like a limb which may be cut off, leaving the body alive; but *φρόνησις* is the good man himself—a second nature, which, having once put on, he cannot put off—*E. N.* vi. 5. 8 *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.* It directs him unerringly in the interest of the noble life, as instinct directs an animal in the interest of the physical life. There is indeed nothing exceptional in 'the infallibility of the good man' (see *E. N.* iii. 4. 4, 5—*ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται . . . ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν*); every organism knows infallibly how to be itself.

**ὑπολήψει**] *ὑπόληψις* is a *view* or *assumption*, whether true or false: see Bonitz, *Met.* p. 41—'Significat *ὑπολαμβάνειν* sumere et statuere aliquid pro vero, sive illud est verum sive secus.' It is sometimes reached mediately as the conclusion of a syllogism—*ὅταν διὰ συλλογισμοῦ λάβῃ τὴν ὑπόληψιν*, sometimes is taken up immediately—*ὅταν ἁπλῶς ὑπολάβῃ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν* (see *An. Post.* i. 16. 79 b. 27): in the latter case it may amount either to *ἐπιστήμη ἀναπόδεικτος*—defined in *An. Post.* i. 33. 88 b. 7 as *ὑπόληψις τῆς ἀμέσου προτάσεως* (*sc. καὶ ἀναγκαίας*), or to *δόξα* as defined in the same passage (89 a. 2–4)—*λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν ἢ ψεῦδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις τῆς ἀμέσου προτάσεως καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαίας.* It would thus appear that *ὑπόληψις* is a term of very wide application: *cf. de An.* iii. 3. 427 b. 24 *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων*: and *E. N.* vi. 9. 7 *ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ*



*φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.* In the section before us (vi. 3. 1), 1139 b. 17. however, *ὑπόληψις* is evidently used in a specific sense as equivalent to *δόξα*, the standing opposite of *ἐπιστήμη*: see *An. Post.* i. 33. 89 a. 5 *ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα ἀβέβαιον καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τοιαύτη· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδεὶς οἴεται δοξάζειν ὅταν οἴηται ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐπίστασθαι· ἀλλ' ὅταν εἶναι μὲν οὕτως, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως οὐδὲν κωλύειν, τότε δοξάζειν, ὡς τοῦ μὲν τοιούτου δόξαν οὖσαν, τοῦ δ' ἀναγκαίου ἐπιστήμην.*

**§ 2. ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.**] See *An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 9 *ἐπίστασθαι* b. 18. *δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν. Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι τὸ ἐπίστασθαί ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι οἱ μὲν οἴονται αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἔχειν, οἱ δ' ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ ἔχουσιν, ὥστε οὗ ἁπλῶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν. Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τρόπος, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, φαμὲν δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. Ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν. Ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. Εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου. Συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ' οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην.*

**ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν**] 'the various analogical and inaccurate uses of b. 19. the word "knowledge"' (Grant). In the strict sense *ἐπιστήμη* is *ἀποδεικτική*, as described in *An. Post.* i. 2 quoted in last note: but *politics*, and many other *πραγματεῖαι* dealing with *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν* (where there can be no *ἀπόδειξις*—see *E. N.* vi. 5. 3), are called *ἐπιστῆμαι* in a loose sense. They are 'branches of knowledge.'

**ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται**] He means that a concrete thing is b. 21. known for certain to exist, or be of a certain kind, only when it is actually present to our observation; whereas a necessary truth is apprehended as being always what it is now apprehended to be: *cf. Top.* v. 3. 131 b. 21 *ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔξω γινόμενον τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἄδηλον γίνεται· ἀφανὲς γάρ ἐστιν εἰ ἔτι ὑπάρχει, διὰ τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνον γνωρίζεσθαι.*

**ἐξ ἀνάγκης**] In *Met.* Δ. 5, *τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης* as (1) *μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως* b. 22. *ἔχειν* is distinguished from (2) *τὸ ἄνευ οὗ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται*, (3) *τὸ βίαιον*, and (4) *ἡ ἀπόδειξις*, or syllogistic *consequentia*: *cf. Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b.

1139 b. 22. 11 (where no. 4 is omitted) τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον . . . τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ὅτι παρὰ τὴν ὁρμήν, τὸ δὲ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς :—*i.e.* τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν (*e.g.* a mathematical truth) is ἀναγκαῖον *in itself*: the other kinds distinguished are ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ὑποθέσεως—see *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34.

b. 23. ἀίδιον ἄρα] If ἐξ ἀνάγκης in the sense of μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, then ἀεί: see *Phys.* ii. 5. 196 b. 10 ἐπειδὴ ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἰτία ἡ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, οὔτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ οὔτε τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ πολύ: *cf. Met.* E. 2. 1026 b. 27 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης, ἀλλ' ἣν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως, κ.τ.λ. The Divine Power which moves the πρῶτος οὐρανός, and with it all things, is οὐσία ἀίδιος ἀκίνητος—see *Met.* Λ. 6. 1071 b. 5, and 7. 1072 a. 23. So also pure form, as it is studied in the mathematical sciences, is ἀίδιον: see *E. N.* iii. 3. 3 περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων, οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι: *Phys.* iv. 12. 222 a. 6 τὸ ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι τὴν διάμετρον ἀεί ἐστιν.

τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς] as distinguished from τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως: see *Phys.* ii. 9. 199 b. 34 τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ. *If* a saw is to cut, 'it is necessary that' it should be made of iron (*Phys.* ii. 9. 200 a. 12)—ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Here the 'necessity' is extrinsic—'*if* we are to have cutting, it is necessary to have iron.' But the truths of mathematics are ἀναγκαῖα ἁπλῶς—necessary without qualification, in themselves, *i.e.* their necessity is intrinsic: see *Met.* Δ. 5. 1015 b. 9 τῶν μὲν δὴ ἕτερον αἴτιον τοῦ ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα ἕτερά ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὥστε τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυρίως ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστίν.

b. 24. τὰ δ' ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα] See *Met.* N. 3. 1091 a. 12 ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ γένεσιν ποιεῖν ἀιδίων ὄντων: Z. 8. 1033 b. 17 τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται: Z. 10. 1035 a. 27 ὅσα δὲ μὴ συνείληπται τῇ ὕλῃ ἀλλ' ἄνευ ὕλης, ὧν οἱ λόγοι τοῦ εἴδους μόνον, ταῦτα δ' οὐ φθείρεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ οὕτοι οὕτω γε: Z. 15. 1039 b. 20 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οὐσία ἑτέρα τό τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος· λέγω δ' ὅτι μὲν οὕτως ἐστὶν οὐσία σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δὲ ὁ λόγος ὅλως. ὅσαι μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἔστι φθορά· καὶ γὰρ γένεσις. τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις (οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκίᾳ εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ), ἀλλ' ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσίν.



§ 3. ἔτι διδακτή . . . συλλογισμῷ] See *An. Post.* i. 1. 71 a. 1 Πᾶσα 1139 b. 25. διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. Φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν· αἵ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τεχνῶν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. Ὡσαύτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ὅ ἐστιν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός. Grant, after quoting the above passage, says—'what Aristotle had said of dialectical arguments (τοὺς λόγους) Eudemus applies to science, which he accordingly asserts to be sometimes inductive. His further assertion that the principles of deductive science are obtained by induction is inconsistent with the conclusion of chapter vi [*i.e.* λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν], though it agrees with Arist. *An. Post.* ii. 19 [100 b. 12 νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν].' Whether the two statements ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου and νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν are really 'inconsistent' will be examined under chap. 6. § 2.

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν] 'This is a general mode of ex- b. 27. pression, not a particular reference' (Grant). For the 'Analytics' of Eudemus see Fritzsche, *Eth. Eud.* Prolegom. p. xvi, and Grant's *Ethics*, vol. i. Essay i. p. 32 (4th edition).

δι' ἐπαγωγῆς] Aristotle's treatment of ἐπαγωγή may be brought under three distinct heads:—(1) In *An. Post.* ii. 19 he treats it psychologically, giving a sketch of the process by which general notions are gradually formed in the mind out of the data of sense: (2) in *An. Prior.* ii. 23 he treats it formally, supplying a syllogistic formula for the inductive process, to correspond with that already found for the deductive process: and (3) in *Top.* i. 12, 13, ii. 10, 11 certain ὄργανα δι' ὧν εὐπορήσομεν συλλογισμῶν, and certain τόποι, are explained which remind us of the *Inductive Methods* of Modern Logic. It is in these chapters of the *Topics* (in which the word ἐπαγωγή seldom occurs), and in the chapter on παράδειγμα, *An. Prior.* ii. 24, rather than in *An. Prior.* ii. 23 (on the inductive syllogism) that we must look for Aristotle's real contribution[1] to the 'Logic of Induction.' The so-called inductive syllogism of *An. Prior.* ii. 23, being ἐξ ἁπάντων, misrepresents a process which results,

[1] Bacon seems to take no account of this contribution.

1139 b. 27. not in demonstrated truth, as the deductive syllogism does, but in moral, or practical certainty.

b. 28. **συλλογισμῷ**] defined *An. Prior.* i. 1. 24 b. 18 as *λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.*

**ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου**] L.$^{b}$ and Ald. read *ἀρχῆς*, and Γ seems to omit *καί*. *Καί* may have been introduced, to make the clause coherent, by a scribe who read *ἀρχῆς*. If the genitive *τοῦ καθόλου* depends on *ἀρχή*, it is difficult to explain *καί*: if *καί* be retained, it seems necessary to render—'Induction is the beginning, and is concerned with the universal'—not a very satisfactory rendering, I think.

b. 29. **εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν . . . ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα**] See *An. Post.* i. 3. 72 b. 18 *Ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον. Καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἵσταταί δέ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ' ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. Ταῦτά τ' οὖν οὕτω λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τινά φαμεν, ᾗ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν.* The words *ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα* are regarded by Trendelenburg (*Histor. Beitr. zur Phil.* vol. ii. 367) as a gloss. In the parallel passage *M. M.* i. 34. 1197 a. 21 *ἐπαγωγή* is not mentioned—*ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεως ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι*: nor in the passage just quoted from *An. Post.* i. 3. 72 b. 18. But surely we must retain *ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα*, unless we are prepared to reject *ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου*. It seems to be impossible to distinguish between 'Eudemus' and 'Aristotle' here. Both ascribe the principles of syllogism, sometimes to *ἐπαγωγή*, sometimes to *νοῦς*. Aristotle, at any rate, saw so little inconsistency in this, that he even gives us the two explanations within the limits of the same immediate context—*An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 b. 3 *Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ' ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή.* No explanation of *νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν* can be



right which fails to take account of a passage like the following— 1139 b. 29.
*An. Post.* i. 18. 81 a. 38 *φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ γένει ἕνια, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ᾗ τοιονδὶ ἕκαστον. ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.* See below, note on ch. 6. § 2, a. 7.

**§ 4. ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς.**] See *An. Post.* i. 2. 71 b. 9—a passage quoted above, § 2 note ἐπιστήμη, b. 18. b. 31.

**ὅταν γάρ . . . ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην.**] Scientific knowledge is realising a truth as the necessary consequence of premisses which are clearly known, *i.e.* more clearly known than the conclusion established by means of them: for if they were not more clearly known, how could the conclusion be established by means of them? It would be independent of them. It would be knowledge without proof—'accidental knowledge.' The language here resembles closely that of *An. Post.* i. 2. 72 a. 25—*ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ πιστεύειν τε καὶ εἰδέναι τὸ πρᾶγμα τῷ τοιοῦτον ἔχειν συλλογισμὸν ὃν καλοῦμεν ἀπόδειξιν, ἔστι δ' οὗτος τῷ τάδ' εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον προγινώσκειν τὰ πρῶτα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· ἀεὶ γὰρ δι' ὃ ὑπάρχει ἕκαστον, ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, οἷον δι' ὃ φιλοῦμεν, ἐκεῖνο φίλον μᾶλλον. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἴσμεν διὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πιστεύομεν, κἀκεῖνα ἴσμεν τε καὶ πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον, ὅτι δι' ἐκεῖνα καὶ τὰ ὕστερον. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ πιστεύειν μᾶλλον ὧν οἶδεν, ἃ μὴ τυγχάνει μήτε εἰδὼς μήτε βέλτιον διακείμενος ἢ εἰ ἐτύγχανεν εἰδώς. συμβήσεται δὲ τοῦτο, εἰ μή τις προγνώσεται τῶν δι' ἀπόδειξιν πιστευόντων· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀνάγκη πιστεύειν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἢ πάσαις ἢ τισὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος. τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα ἕξειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν δι' ἀποδείξεως οὐ μόνον δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς μᾶλλον γνωρίζειν καὶ μᾶλλον αὐταῖς πιστεύειν ἢ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ, ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἄλλο αὐτῷ πιστότερον εἶναι μηδὲ γνωριμώτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἐξ ὧν ἔσται συλλογισμὸς ὁ τῆς ἐναντίας ἀπάτης, εἴπερ δεῖ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἁπλῶς ἀμετάπειστον εἶναι.* b. 33.

# CHAPTER IV.

## ARGUMENT.

*In the sphere of the contingent, or that which can be otherwise, making and doing are to be distinguished. The habit of reasoning truly, where the making of something is concerned, is Art. The artist sees how something, which may or may not be, shall be produced, the principle residing in himself, the maker, and not in the thing that is being made; for art is not concerned with things that exist or come into existence of necessity; nor is it concerned with the products of nature, for they have their principle in themselves. There is a sense in which chance and art are concerned with the same things. 'Art loves chance and chance loves art.' Art, then, is a habit of reasoning truly where something is being made (while the man who is without art reasons falsely), and operates in the sphere of the contingent.*

1140 a. 2. **§ 2. ἕτερον**] ποίησις is an ἐνέργεια ἀτελής—it has an ἔργον παρ' αὐτήν: πρᾶξις is an ἐνέργεια which is its own τέλος: see notes on i. 1. 1, 2: *cf. M. M.* i. 34. 1197 a. 3 οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐστί τι παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν ἄλλο τέλος, οἷον παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπειδὴ ἐστιν ποιητικὴ οἰκίας, οἰκία αὐτῆς τὸ τέλος παρὰ τὴν ποίησιν, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τεκτονικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐθὲν τέλος παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἷον παρὰ τὸ κιθαρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐθέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις.

a. 3. **ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις**] See note on i. 13. 9. Eustrat. has—ἐξωτερικοὺς δ' ὀνομάζει λόγους οὓς ἔξω τῆς λογικῆς παραδόσεως κοινῶς τὰ πλήθη φασί.

**ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις**] μετὰ λόγου is opposed to ἄλογος in *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 2, and is really = λογικός, as that adjective is used by the later Aristotelians in the sense of 'rational.'

a. 5. **διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων**] Ramsauer remarks that this is inconsistent with vi. 2. 5—αὕτη (ἡ πρακτική) γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει, and thinks that the writer of the present chapter cannot have had ch. 2. § 5 before him.

a. 7. **§ 3. ὅπερ**] 'A logical formula implying identity or convertibility of terms' (Grant). Eustrat. *ad loc.* has—τὸ δὲ ὅπερ δηλοῦν κεῖται τὸ οὐσιωδῶς κατηγορεῖσθαι τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς τὴν τέχνην, καὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν αὐτῆς· ὡς εἴ τις λέγει τὸν ἄνθρωπόν τι ζῷον εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ οὐσία τις ἔμψυχος



αἰσθητική· διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τοῦ ζῴου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὡς εἶδος εἰς γένος 1140 a. 7.
τὸ ζῷον ἀναφερόμενον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅπερ τί ἐστι τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ· τοῦ ὅπερ δηλοῦντος τὴν οὐσιώδη κατηγορίαν τοῦ γένους κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους· καὶ ὡς ταὐτόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅπερ τί ζῷον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὅπερ τινὰ οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικήν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν ταὐτὸν εἰπεῖν εἶναι τέχνην τινά, καὶ ὅπερ ἔξιν τινὰ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικήν, ὡς τοῦ ὅρου τούτου ἐξισάζοντος πρὸς τὴν τέχνην καὶ ἀντιστρέφοντος. See note on vii. 13. 1 ὅπερ, b. 6.

**μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς**] Where we have τέχνη, as distinguished from a. 10.
ἀτεχνία (see below, § 6), the calculation, or λόγος, which διάνοια ποιητική goes through, consists of ideas following one another in the *true* order—*i. e.* in the order of the steps which actually constitute 'the making' of the thing.

**§ 4. περὶ γένεσιν**] See *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 8 (τὸ καθόλου) τέχνης a. 11.
ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης. But φύσις is also περὶ γένεσιν: accordingly, to define the province of τέχνη, it is necessary to add—as the writer does here—ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ: *cf. Met.* Λ. 3. 1070 a. 7 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ: *Phys.* ii. 8. 199 b. 28 εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν φύσει ἐποίει. Eustratius has the following note here—ἔστι γὰρ ἰδεῖν καὶ τὴν φύσιν περὶ γένεσιν ἐνεργοῦσαν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν φύσις ἐντὸς οὖσα καὶ διὰ τῶν σωμάτων χωροῦσα οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεργεῖ, ἡ δὲ τέχνη οὐκ ἐντὸς οὖσα ἀλλ' ἐκτὸς τῶν σωμάτων περὶ ἃ καταγίνεται, οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοῖς τὰ τεχνητὰ εἴδη ἐντίθησιν· ἐκτὸς γὰρ ἡ ἀνδριαντοποιητικὴ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ ἡ τεκτονικὴ τοῦ ξύλου· ἐν τοῖς τεχνίταις δ' οὖσαι καὶ ἄμφω, οὕτω κινοῦσι τὰ ὑποκείμενα, διὸ καὶ ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τὰ εἴδη περιτιθέασιν.

**καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν**] Bek.², Fritzsche, Rams., and Susem., following Muretus, bracket the second *καί*. Muretus says: 'deleo *καί*, ubi enim docuit quid sit *τέχνη*, statim addit quid sit *τεχνάζειν*.'

**§ 5. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις . . . πράξεως εἶναι**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 43) a. 16.
brackets this sentence as an interpolation.

**καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη**] τύχη and a. 17.
πρᾶξις (ποίησις or τέχνη being included under πρᾶξις, see *E. N.* vi. 2. 5) operate in the same sphere, viz. in that of τὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν γιγνόμενα ἕνεκά του (see *Phys.* ii. 5. 196 b. 18). Where a man uses his intelligence to *do* or *make* something, he generally succeeds—*i. e.* the result which follows is caused by him. But sometimes a result (good or bad) which he did not contemplate makes its appearance.

1140 a. 17. Of this Chance is the cause. He ploughs in order to raise a crop, and he turns up a treasure—'by chance': see *Phys.* ii. 5. 197 a. 5 *δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του. διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἄνευ διανοίας*: ii. 6. 197 b. 1 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις. διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ εὐτυχία ἢ ἐγγύς, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ. ὥσθ' ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· οὐδ' εὐτυχία οὐδ' ἀτυχία ὑπάρχει τούτοις, εἰ μὴ καθ' ὁμοιότητα.* Τύχη and *πρᾶξις* (the latter including *ποίησις*) are thus *περὶ τὰ αὐτά*, *τύχη* operating irregularly to produce or frustrate results which *πρᾶξις* produces regularly. There is a special sense, however, in which *τύχη* and *τέχνη* (*τέχνη* being distinguished from *πρᾶξις*) may be said to be *περὶ τὰ αὐτά*. Τύχη seems to cooperate with and favour (*ἔστερξε*) *τέχνη*, as it does not favour *πρᾶξις*. This is because *πρᾶξις* is a more perfect expression of reason, or the organising principle, than *τέχνη*. Πρᾶξις is the realisation of the rational personality itself. But *τέχνη* realises its good in an external *ἔργον*, and the *εἶδος* which it imposes on *ὕλη* is only a surface form—very different from the forms, penetrating to the very heart of the *ὕλη*, which *φύσις* and *ἀρετή* produce (*cf. E. N.* ii. 6. 9 *ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις*: *Met.* Λ. 3. 1070 a. 7 *ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη ἀρχὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ*). Τέχνη is a weak principle which cannot succeed unless the underlying *ὕλη*—the element of irrationality and accident—be favourable. Thus its greatest triumphs are often unexpected. The exigency of a rhyme suggests a beautiful turn of thought; 'a mere accident' gives the world a great mechanical invention. But though, for this reason, *τέχνη* owes more to *τύχη* than *πρᾶξις* does, we must not forget that the highest *πρᾶξις*—*εὐδαιμονία*, needs *εὐτυχία*, and that the fundamental *πρᾶξις*—the physical life of plant and animal—is often most vigorous when some 'accidental' variation has given a new direction to inherited tendency.

a. 21. § 6. *ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις*] When the unskilful man tries to make something, he realises the steps of the operation 'falsely.' He goes to work 'in the wrong way.'



# CHAPTER V.

## Argument.

*Prudence comes next: in order to understand what it is, let us look at the characteristics of the people who are deemed prudent. It would appear to be characteristic of the prudent man to be able to deliberate well about the things that are good and expedient for himself, not in the narrow sense of good for health or strength, but in the general sense of good for the life of the noble citizen. Now no man deliberates about things which are necessarily what they are, nor about things which it is not in his own power to do. Accordingly prudence will not be science, or art—not science, because its object—that which is done—is contingent; not art, because making and doing are generically distinct. It remains, then, that prudence is the faculty of reasoning truly where something is being done, its sphere being that of man's good and evil. The end of doing is not something different from the doing; it is well-doing; whereas the end of making is something different from the process of making. Pericles may be taken as an example of the prudent man, as popularly understood—the man who has the faculty of seeing what is good for himself and for others in the State and the family. Hence too σωφροσύνη gets its name ἀπὸ τοῦ σῴζειν τὴν φρόνησιν, because it 'preserves' a man's conception of what is good—a conception, or principle, which differs from a scientific conception, or principle, in being distorted and vitiated by pleasure and pain—for in conduct the end aimed at is the principle, and the man who has been vitiated by pleasure or pain is, because so vitiated, blind to the good end. Prudence, then, is a rational habit, which forms true conceptions about what is good for man, and issues in moral action. It is a virtue or excellence, not an art; for we speak of excellence* in *art, but not of excellence* in *prudence; and in art voluntary error is better than involuntary, whereas in the sphere of prudence and of the moral virtues voluntary error is worse. It is the excellence of that division of the rational part of the soul, which forms opinions, or deals with probabilities. But it is not merely a rational habit: for a merely rational habit may be lost; but prudence is never lost.*

§ 1.] From hence onwards the Sixth Book may be thought to justify better its place in an Ethical Treatise. It will now be concerned mainly with Reason as 'the Moral Faculty': but see note on ch. 1. §§ 1–4. 1140 a. 24.

**περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως**] Grant has an important note here, in which he traces the history of the doctrine of *φρόνησις* down to the form which it takes in this Book:—'Plato (*Phaedo* 79 D) identified the

1140 a. 24. moral consciousness with philosophy'—*i. e.* he made *φρόνησις* identical with *σοφία*—'With Aristotle *φρόνησις* was gradually coming to assume its distinctive meaning, as practical wisdom,' being described in the *Politics* Γ. 2. 1277 b. 25 as 'the only virtue properly belonging to a ruler'—*i. e.* as 'practical wisdom, but in a broad general sense with reference to state affairs rather than to individual life': while 'in the present Book we have the Eudemian exposition and development of Aristotle's theory, which entirely contrasts *φρόνησις* with *σοφία*, and limits the former to the regulation of individual life.' See also Grant's *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. p. 194. I cannot agree with Grant that in this Book *φρόνησις* is limited to the regulation of individual life; nor do I think that in the *Politics* it is denied to the individual as managing for himself his own private affairs—(if this is the import of Grant's remark, quoted above, on its place in the *Politics*), but only to the individual, *quâ ἀρχόμενος*. We shall have opportunities, however, of returning to these points in subsequent notes.

**θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους**] For this method of enquiry Fritzsche compares *E. N.* iv. 3. 2 *διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν.*

a. 28. **πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως**] *Cf. E. N.* vi. 9. 7 *πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς.* Bekker omits *ὅλως* with $K^b$. All other MSS. read it (or *ὅλον*). As I have had occasion to remark before, the *omissions* of $K^b$ count for little; and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 62) is undoubtedly right when he says—'*ὅλως*, das kaum entbehrlich ist, hätte Bekker meiner Ansicht nach aufnehmen sollen. Vgl. p. 1141 a. 12 *εἶναι δέ τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς.*'

a. 30. **§ 2. ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη**], because *τέχνη* is concerned with *ποίησις*, not with *πρᾶξις*.

a. 31. **§ 3. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς κ.τ.λ.**] See *E. N.* iii. 3.

a. 33. **μετ' ἀποδείξεως**] See note on ch. 3. § 2 **ἐπιστήμη**, b. 18.

**ὧν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις**] See *An. Post.* i. 4. 73 a. 21 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν οὗ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῶς, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην. ἀποδεικτικὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἣν ἔχομεν τῷ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐξ ἀναγκαίων ἄρα συλλογισμός ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.*



**πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν**] *i. e.* all *conclusions from contingent premisses* are contingent; see Eustrat.—*πάντα τὰ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένων ἀρχῶν συναγόμενα συμπεράσματα ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις· τὰ γὰρ ἀποδεικτικῶς συμπεραινόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.* The parenthesis beginning with *πάντα*, which Fritzsche, Michelet, Susemihl, and Bywater close with *ἔχειν*, ought, as in Bekker's text, to include *καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων*, for, as Ramsauer points out, if these words belonged to the protasis, we should have *μή*, not *οὐ*. 1140 a. 35.

**§§ 4–8.**] In these §§ the order is very confused. The following rearrangement is offered, not as a reconstruction of the text as it may have originally stood, but as an attempt to make the meaning of the passage, as we now have it, clearer. It will be seen that I am indebted to Rassow (see *Forsch.* pp. 43–45, and 30–31), and to Susemihl (app. crit. *ad loc.*), although I have ventured to take a line of my own:—1140 b. 3... *ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τις ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ (ἀληθοῦς?) περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν· σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά. τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.* The points in the foregoing rearrangement which I would call attention to are—(1) one of the *two* clauses in which *φρόνησις* is defined is omitted—viz. that in § 4, which differs from that in § 6 in adding *καὶ κακά*, and in having *ἀληθῆ* in a position in which it would be difficult to read *ἀληθοῦς*: (2) *τέχνη* and *φρόνησις* b. 4.

1140 b. 4. are contrasted in a continuous passage; and (3) the statement *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον*, with the *σημεῖον—ὅτι λήθη φρονήσεως οὐκ ἔστι*, is brought into close connexion with the passage which explains the function of the *moral* *ἕξις*, *σωφροσύνη*, in 'preserving' the *ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις* of the *intellect* *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθά*. This rearrangement professes merely to make §§ 4–8 read more evenly. About the causes of their present unevenness—omissions, interpolations, transpositions, or double versions—I forbear to speculate.

b. 5. **§ 4. ἕξιν ἀληθῆ**] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 44, 45) calls attention to this strange conjunction. The definition of *τέχνη* at the end of ch. 4 is *ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική*: so we ought to have here *ἕξιν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς πρακτικήν*. In § 6, however, *ἀληθοῦς* is supported by good authority (Γ) and ought, I believe, to be read. The definition given here in § 4, with its *καὶ κακά* (an addition supported neither by § 1, nor by § 5[1]), and its *ἀληθῆ* placed where *ἀληθοῦς* would be unnatural, seems to be a late interpolation due to some one who thought proper to show that *φρόνησις* is a *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἧς οὐκ ἔστι λήθη*, by defining it as a *ἕξις ἀ—λήθης μετὰ λόγου*.

b. 6. **ἕτερον τὸ τέλος**] See *M. M.* i. 34. 1197 a. 4, quoted above in note on vi. 4. 2. 1140 a. 2.

b. 7. **οὐκ ἂν εἴη**] The corruption *οὐκ ἀεί* is given by $M^b$ and accepted by Eustratius and Michelet, who explain that there are some *πράξεις* or *πρακτικαὶ τέχναι* with ends which, though not *ἔργα* like the ends of the *ποιητικαὶ τέχναι*, are still subservient to higher ends—as, *e.g.* the immediate end of riding is subordinate to victory.

b. 8. **§ 5. Περικλέα**] Surely this is against Grant's view (note on vi. 5. 1 quoted above *ad loc.*) that the developed theory of the Sixth Book 'limits *φρόνησις* to the regulation of individual life.' Indeed, in his note on the present §, Grant refers us to his note on ch. 8. § 1, which treats of 'the connection established by Eudemus between thought (*i. e. φρόνησις*) for the individual, for the family, and for the state.'

b. 10. **οἰκονομικούς**] CCC has the strange blunder *οἰκουμενικούς*.

[1] In *Rhet.* i. 9. 1366 b. 20 however we have—*φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας, καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.*



**τὴν σωφροσύνην . . . ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν**] The editors quote 1140 b. 11.
Plato, *Cratylus* 411 E *σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὖ νῦν δὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως.*

**§ 6. τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν**] *τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καταγινο-* b. 12.
*μένην ἢ τὰ κακά* (Eustratius). Pleasure and pain are the influences which interfere with the maintenance of that moral balance of which *φρόνησις* is the consciousness. *Σωφροσύνη*, then, being the maintenance of the balance, *quâ* endangered by the most pressing pleasures and pains, will 'preserve' *φρόνησις* in a special manner. The wide Platonic conception of *σωφροσύνη*, however, as the *ὁμόνοια* of all the parts of the soul, seems also to be present to the writer's mind here, as well as the narrower Aristotelian conception of it as *μεσότης περὶ σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας*. *Cf.* with the doctrine of this passage that of *E. N.* i. 3—that the man whose *πάθη* are not under moral control does not 'know' what is right and what is wrong, and that therefore (since *πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως*) we must not begin to train him by the way of the intellect—*τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων . . . ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς . . . . τοῖς τοιούτοις (i. e. τοῖς κατὰ πάθος ζῶσιν) ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι—E. N.* i. 3. §§ 5–7. It is only the 'good man' who is *φρόνιμος*, because the 'knowledge' in virtue of which a man is called *φρόνιμος* is knowledge conducive to right action—knowledge *upon which a man is prepared to act.* The 'knowledge' with which the *ἀκρατής* is credited is only formally 'knowledge':—*οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός* (*E. N.* vii. 10. 2). But knowledge which does not call for action—*οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον κ.τ.λ.*—is accessible to good and bad men indifferently. In short, knowledge of an environment we ascribe only to the being which corresponds with that environment:—*ὁ σπουδαῖος ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται* (*E. N.* iii. 4. 4).

**δύο ὀρθάς**] *sc. γωνίας.* b. 15.

**αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαί κ.τ.λ.**] *cf. E. N.* vi. 12. 10 *οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν* b. 16.
*πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)· τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ*

1140 b. 16. φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν.

b. 22. § 7. τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν] The Paraph. Heliodorus has—τῆς μὲν τέχνης ἔστι καὶ κακία καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τεχνίτην καὶ πονηρόν· φρονήσεως δὲ οὔτε κακία ἔστιν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ φρόνιμόν τινα φαῦλον εἶναι) οὔτε ἀρετή. αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετή· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀρετῆς οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ γὰρ μεσότης μεσότητος: *cf. M. M.* i. 34. 1197 a. 16 ἔστιν δ' ἡ φρόνησις ἀρετή, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη (= τέχνη here). ἐπαινετοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ φρόνιμοι, ὁ δ' ἔπαινος ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δ' ἐπιστήμης μὲν πάσης ἀρετὴ ἔστιν, φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτό τί ἐστιν ἀρετή.

καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκών . . . περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς] The editors refer to *Met.* Δ. 29. 1025 a. 6, where the paradox τὸν ἑκόντα φαῦλον βελτίω, maintained in *Hipp. Min.* 373 C, is criticised. The Aristotelians seem to miss Plato's point when he says that it is better to do injustice voluntarily than to do it involuntarily. They tell him 'that the analogy of the arts does not apply to the virtues. The man who voluntarily spells incorrectly is indeed a better *speller* than the man who involuntarily spells incorrectly (see Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2. 20 πότερον δὲ γραμματικώτερον κρίνεις ὃς ἂν ἑκὼν μὴ ὀρθῶς γράφῃ καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκῃ, ἢ ὃς ἄκων; ὃς ἂν ἑκών); but voluntarily to keep back money one owes is worse than to do so unwittingly.' Surely Plato did not wish to dispute this truth. Voluntarily to keep back money, he would say, is worse, because it indicates 'ignorance in the soul' (*Rep.* 382 B) in the sense of a bad character, just as involuntarily to spell incorrectly is worse, because it indicates 'ignorance in the soul' in the sense of defective education or stupidity. But Plato put this paradoxically; he said that to do wrong voluntarily is better than to do so involuntarily. The Aristotelians, it would appear, either could not, or would not see that by 'involuntarily' he meant, not 'in consequence of an accidental oversight,' but 'in consequence of moral blindness, or ignorance in the soul.' His language is of course rather misleading; but he could not have really misled Aristotle. Aristotle must have seen that Plato was only making the distinction marked by the ἄγνοια ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα and the ἄγνοια ἡ καθόλου of *E. N.* iii. 1. 15.

b. 26. § 8. δοξαστικοῦ] = λογιστικοῦ of *E. N.* vi. 1. 6. Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 43, 44) finds the employment of δοξαστικόν for λογιστικόν incon-



sistent with the manner in which δόξα is conceived, not only in other parts of the *E. N.*, but in this Book. In this Book it is βουλεύεσθαι, and not δοξάζειν, which is characteristic of the φρόνιμος: and the wide difference between δόξα and βουλή is seen in the chapter on εὐβουλία (vi. 9), where—1142 b. 13. § 3—it is said καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάν τε εὖ ἐάν τε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. Further, to prove that φρόνησις is the ἀρετή of the δοξαστικὸν μέρος, the writer of vi. 5. 8 adds—ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις: but this is inconsistent (Rassow thinks) with *E. N.* iii. 2. 10. 1111 b. 31 ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀΐδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. The term δοξαστικόν for λογιστικόν occurs again in this Book 1144 b. 14. vi. 13. 2, in a context, however, which Rassow suspects to be of later origin. I cannot attach much weight to Rassow's difficulties. It is true that the *Index Arist.* gives the term δοξαστικόν = λογιστικόν as occurring only in these two places in the Aristotelian Corpus; but it must be remembered that in vi. 10. 3 we find σύνεσις defined as consisting ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, and that τὸ δοξαστόν —'the probable'—is the regular Aristotelian opposite of τὸ ἐπιστητόν: nor must we forget that the premisses of the Practical Syllogism are generally described as δόξαι (*e.g.* vii. 3. 9). All this makes me think that Rassow goes too far when he accepts the occurrence of δοξαστικόν = λογιστικόν here and in vi. 13. 2 as evidence for the interpolation of the respective contexts. It seems to me quite natural that the writer of vi. 1. 6 should happen to substitute δοξαστικόν here and in vi. 13. 2 for λογιστικόν. With regard to Rassow's difficulty about the consistency of δοξαστικόν = λογιστικόν with *E. N.* iii. 2. 10—surely that passage does not mean that τὸ δοξαστόν *as such* is ever τὸ ἀΐδιον: it surely means only that, although 'probable matter' is the proper object of δόξα as distinguished from ἐπιστήμη, yet people are ready enough to trespass into the region of 'necessary truth' with their 'unscientific opinions'—to offer 'opinions' about what ought not to be matter of opinion at all, but of 'scientific knowledge.' Lastly, as regards Rassow's difficulty in connexion with *E. N.* vi. 9. 3. 1142 b. 13—it is true that δόξα (*i. e.* an opinion) is φάσις τις, and βούλευσις is ζήτησις: but this does not imply that τὸ δοξαστικὸν μέρος *quâ* χρώμενον ταῖς δόξαις is not a faculty of ζήτησις.

1140 b. 26.

σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη κ.τ.λ.] See note on vi. 3. 1. 1139 b. 17. b. 28.

## CHAPTER VI.

### ARGUMENT.

*Since scientific knowledge is knowledge derived by a discursive process from necessary principles, the derivation of these principles themselves cannot be discursive: they cannot be scientifically demonstrated: nor can they be produced in the mind by the operation of the making faculty, nor yet by that of the faculty of prudence—for they are* necessary *principles, and art and prudence have to do with contingencies: nor again can we say that Wisdom or Philosophy gives us the principles of demonstrated or scientific knowledge: this would be too general a statement, for the philosopher does not merely apprehend principles, but draws conclusions from principles. Accordingly, in our list of the faculties by which, or ways in which, certain truth is always attained—Science, Prudence, Wisdom, and Reason—Reason only remains as the faculty by which we obtain first principles.*

The argument of this chapter, as the editors note, is borrowed from *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 b. 5, quoted in note on vi. 3. 3 b. 29.

1140 b. 31. **§ 1. περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις**] **ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη**, with which, as distinguished from *νοῦς*, the present argument has to do, is *ὑπόληψις περὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν καθόλου*—see *E. N.* vi. 3. 3 *ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου*. These demonstrated truths are of course themselves *καθόλου καὶ ἀναγκαῖα*, but it is awkward to begin a chapter, intended to present the distinction between *ἐπιστήμη* and *νοῦς*, with words ascribing to the former a characteristic (*τὸ περὶ τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν εἶναι*) which it shares with the latter. The *ὑπόληψις* of the present passage is *ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ* of *An. Post.* i. 16. 79 b. 29: see note on vi. 3. 1. 1139 b. 17 *ὑπολήψει*.

b. 33. **μετὰ λόγου**] *Cf. An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 10 *ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί*. *Λόγος* is here = *συλλογισμός*, as again in *E. N.* vi. 8. 9 *ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος*, and vi. 11. 4 *τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος*.

**τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη**] *i. e.* **ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη** (with which alone the present argument is concerned—*τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν*), for there is an *ἀναπόδεικτος ἐπιστήμη* which gives *ἀρχαί*: see *An. Post.* i. 3. 72 b. 18 *ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν οὔτ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον*.



**τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν**] *i.e.* the *σοφός* is the 1141 a. 2.
comprehensive genius who grasps scientific principles, and reasons from them, as explained in chapter 7. § 3. *Σοφία* is not *exclusively τῶν ἀρχῶν*. We have to find the faculty which has to do with them exclusively.

§ 2.] Why is *τέχνη* omitted from this list, after having been a. 3.
included in that given in chapter 3. § 1? Is it because *τέχνη* has been shown in chapter 5 to be a *ἕξις ἧς ἔστι λήθη*? Or does *ἐπιστήμη* here include *τέχνη*? Or have we the lists of two different writers?

**λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν**] Grant says—'In following im- a. 7.
plicitly the passage above cited (*An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 b. 5–15, which is to the effect that *νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν*), Eudemus has ignored for the time the earlier part of the same chapter, in which Aristotle attributes the origin of universals rather to induction (*Post. An.* ii. 19. 100 b. 3). Also he is at variance with his own statement above ch. 3. § 3.' I have pointed out in my note on ch. 3. § 3 1139 b. 29 that *ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου* and *λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν* can scarcely be inconsistent statements in the Sixth Book of the *Ethics*, when Aristotle himself in the *An. Post.* makes them both in the same context (*An. Post.* ii. 19 from 100 b. 3 to end of the chapter). There is no inconsistency in saying at once that *νοῦς* gives *ἀρχαί*, and that *ἐπαγωγή* gives *ἀρχαί*, because *νοῦς*, as distinguished from *αἴσθησις*, is the faculty which man, as rational being, possesses of taking notice of that which is common in a number of particulars presented; and *ἐπαγωγή* is the process in which the particulars are presented.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ARGUMENT.

*When we speak of the* Wisdom (*σοφία*) *of a great artist like Phidias, we mean by 'Wisdom' nothing but excellence in the particular art. * * * 'Wisdom' is, in short, the most perfect of the sciences or arts: accordingly, if a man is 'wise,' i.e. knows 'perfectly,' he will know not only scientific results but principles: 'Wisdom' is therefore Science crowned, as it were, with Reason—knowledge of results, and grasp of principles, in the highest sphere.*

*It would be absurd to make practical knowledge higher than speculative knowledge, unless* Man *were the highest object of knowledge in the universe.*

*The objects of practical knowledge or Prudence, like the conditions of health, vary: but the absolute truth, which 'Wisdom' or philosophy apprehends, may be compared to 'White' or 'Straight,' which is always the same. There are as many different kinds of Prudence, as there are classes of men (perhaps we ought to say, of animals) capable of seeing to their own different interests. It is plain, then, that we cannot identify Prudence and Wisdom without falling into the contradiction of 'many kinds of Wisdom—many kinds of Absolute Truth.' But perhaps it may be argued—Man is so far exalted above other creatures, that we may regard his peculiar human good as a thing* sui generis *and unique—as the best thing in the universe, an absolute to be apprehended by the highest faculty, the faculty of 'Wisdom.' To this it must be replied, that man is not highest in the universe: the nature of the Heavenly Spheres is more divine than human nature. If the knowledge of man's peculiar human good be 'Wisdom,' there will be 'another kind of Wisdom,' concerned with the good which is more divine than man's: but 'another kind of Wisdom—another kind of Absolute Truth' is a contradiction in terms. There is only one 'Wisdom'—the exercise of the understanding and the reason in relation to the ultimate Truth. Indeed, popular opinion recognises clearly enough the distinction between the spheres of 'Wisdom' and 'Prudence.' Anaxagoras and Thales are held to be 'wise men'—'philosophers' with the knowledge of things high and wonderful, but ignorant of the useful truths of daily life which Prudence perceives.*

*Prudence is concerned with man's peculiar human good in so far as that good can be made object of deliberation. Indeed, deliberating well is the distinguishing function of the prudent man. No man deliberates about things which are necessarily what they are, and cannot be changed, or about things which have no reference to a practical end. The man who 'deliberates well,' in the strict sense of the expression, is he whose calculation enables him to hit the highest and best mark which man can aim at—to realise as perfectly as may be the ideal of the life of noble action. But Prudence has to do, not merely with the ideal, or universal, but also with particulars. Prudence is a habit which results in action, and action is concerned with particular things to be done: these particular things to be done, therefore, the prudent man must know as well as the ideal. The analogy of an art like that of the physician shows us how important the knowledge of particulars is: an empiric knowledge is more useful than mere theory, without experience—it is better to know that 'chicken's flesh is digestible,' than to know generally that 'all light flesh is digestible,' and nothing more.*

*Since Prudence, then, is not mere theoretical knowledge, but knowledge for the sake of moral action, and since moral action involves an end or ideal for the sake of which particular things are done, to be prudent a man must know both the universal and the particulars: at any rate the particulars. But when we say—'at any rate the particulars,' let us remember that even in what seems to be knowledge of mere particulars there must always be present some consciousness of the 'plan' which the particulars subserve.*



With §§ 1–5 of this chapter *cf. Met.* A. 2. 982 a. 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι τις τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ' ἂν ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν γένοιτο μᾶλλον. ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν· εἶτα τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γνῶναι δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ ῥᾴδια ἀνθρώπῳ γιγνώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥᾴδιον καὶ οὐδὲν σοφόν)· ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν διδασκαλικώτερον [τῶν αἰτίων] σοφώτερον εἶναι περὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἱρετὴν οὖσαν μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἑτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἧττον ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἑτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἧττον σοφόν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μάλιστ' ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν· οὗτος γὰρ οἱδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου· πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν. ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λαμβανομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλική γ' ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον· οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν οἱ τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἑκάστου. τὸ δ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ μάλιστ' ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ὁ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἑαυτὸ αἱρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον αἱρήσεται, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ μάλιστ' ἐπιστητοῦ· μάλιστα δ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων τἆλλα γνωρίζεται, ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑκάστοις, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ. ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἓν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν. According to this account σοφία is the science of first causes. This is not inconsistent with the view of the writer of *E. N.* vi—δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν (vi. 7. 3).

§ 1. ἔν τε] $L^b$ $M^b$ have ἔν γε, and Cambr. and Ald. have ἐν 1141 a. 9. alone. Ramsauer, reading τε, and failing to find any conjunction answering to it (εἶναι δέ τινας in § 2, l. 12 he regards as answering

1141 a. 9. to ἐνταῦθα μέν in § 1, l. 11), conjectures that the quotation from the *Margites* was followed by a clause containing illustrations of the ascription of σοφία to οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι τὰς ἐπιστήμας, as distinguished from οἱ ἀκριβ. τὰς τέχνας. As the text now stands, the argument conducting to ὥστε δῆλον l. 16 is, he thinks, defective. It is possible that something has fallen out before ὥστε δῆλον, but the anacoluthia noted by Ramsauer need not be regarded as pointing to such a supposition: δέ often answers to τε in Aristotle and the best writers (see Eucken *de Arist. dicendi ratione*: pars prima, *de particularum usu*, pp. 16, 17, and Fritzsche on *E. N.* viii. 14. 1 and ix. 11. 1), and εἶναι δέ τινας, though answering, so far as regular form is concerned, to the nearer ἐνταῦθα μέν, may well answer also, per anacoluthiam, to ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας (to which indeed ἐνταῦθα μέν relates). The two facts—that σοφία is ascribed both (τε) to those who are perfect in some art, and (δέ) to those who are capable in the general sense (ὅλως), seem to me to be sufficient to warrant the conclusion ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία.

An examination of the articles σοφία and σοφός in *Liddell and Scott* shows (1) that any one who excelled his fellows as a carpenter, charioteer, pilot, soothsayer, sculptor, and especially as a poet or musician, was called σοφός: (2) that a man with natural abilities was distinguished as σοφός from ὁ μαθών who owes all to teaching: (3) that σοφός was applied like φρόνιμος to the man who was wise in matters of common life—*e. g.* the seven sages were called σοφοί: and (4) that the application of the term was restricted by the philosophers to those who were skilled in the sciences, learned, profound, wise.

ἀκριβεστάτοις] On ἀκρίβεια, see note on i. 7. 18; also Grant's note on that §.

a. 10. οἷον Φειδίαν] 'sc. λέγοντες: quod e verbo ἀποδίδομεν elici potest.' Rams.

a. 13. § 2. σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος] Of course, if these are (as is generally assumed) σοφοί *par excellence*—philosophers like Thales and Anaxagoras, and not merely men of brilliant general ability and culture, the conclusion ὥστε δῆλον κ.τ.λ. follows easily enough.

a. 14. ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν] The quotation merely gives illustrations of ἡ κατὰ μέρος σοφία, and throws no light on the conception of the 1141 a. 14. σοφὸς ὅλως.



ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ] In *Poet.* 4. 1448 b. 30 and 38 Aristotle ascribes the *Margites* to Homer, and says that it bears the same relation to comedy that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* do to tragedy.

οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν] The editors refer to Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. a. 16. 281 (221), who completes the line with πάσης δ' ἡμάρτανε τέχνης.

ὥστε δῆλον κ.τ.λ.] The argument is (1) that, because σοφία is ascribed τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις, it is itself ἀκριβεστάτη, and (2) that it is ἀκριβεστάτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν—because, as ἀκριβεστάτη, concerned, not only with τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν, but with ἀρχαί, and, in its highest form, with the ultimate ἀρχαί of all ἐπιστῆμαι, with τὰ τιμιώτατα τῇ φύσει: see *An. Post.* i. 27. 87 a. 31, where a science which has in itself both the ὅτι and the διότι is said to be ἀκριβεστέρα than one which has to borrow its διότι.

§ 3.] *Cf. M. M.* i. 34. 1197 a. 20 ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν a. 17. νοητῶν καὶ τῶν ὄντων· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεως ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς. ἡ δὲ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ συγκειμένη. ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ σοφία καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἤδη δεικνύμενα, περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη· ᾗ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτὴ μετέχει, ᾗ δὲ περὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς μετ' ἀποδείξεως ὄντα, τῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἔκ τε νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης συγκειμένη, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν περὶ ταὐτά, περὶ ἃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη.

ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων] The σοφία, a. 19. so called, of a creative artist like Phidias is ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη—technical skill guided by artistic ideals which the artist's own genius supplies—οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ: the σοφία of the metaphysician—and this is the σοφία strictly so called—is ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων, *i. e.* τῶν χωριστῶν καὶ ἀκινήτων, the explanation of the universe by reference to its ultimate principle, God, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν —, hence distinguished from μαθηματική and φυσική, the other θεωρητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, as θεολογική: see *Met.* K. 7. 1064 a. 28 ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καὶ χωριστόν, σκεπτέον πότερόν ποτε τῇ φυσικῇ τὴν αὐτὴν θετέον ταύτην εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἑτέραν. ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσικὴ περὶ τὰ κινήσεως ἔχοντ' ἀρχὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ μαθηματικὴ θεωρητικὴ μὲν καὶ περὶ μένοντά τις αὕτη, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστά. περὶ τὸ χωριστὸν ἄρα ὂν καὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον ἑτέρα τούτων ἀμφο-

1141 a. 19. *τέρων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι τις, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ πειρασόμεθα δεικνύναι. καὶ εἴπερ ἔστι τις τοιαύτη φύσις ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐνταῦθ' ἂν εἴη που καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἀρχή. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, φυσική, μαθηματική, θεολογική. βέλτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν γένος, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα· περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, βελτίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἑκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐπιστητόν. ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πότερόν ποτε τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν ἐπιστήμην καθόλου δεῖ θεῖναι ἢ οὔ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ μαθηματικῶν ἑκάστη περὶ ἓν τι γένος ἀφωρισμένον ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου κοινὴ περὶ πάντων. εἰ μὲν οὖν αἱ φυσικαὶ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, κἂν ἡ φυσικὴ πρώτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη· εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἑτέρα φύσις καὶ οὐσία χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἑτέραν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ προτέραν τῆς φυσικῆς καὶ καθόλου τῷ προτέραν.* For the technical meaning of *τίμιος* see notes on *E. N.* i. 12.

a. 20. *ἄτοπον γάρ*] Ramsauer and Susemihl suspect a lacuna between *τιμιωτάτων* and *ἄτοπον*—on insufficient grounds, I think: see their notes *ad loc.* The connexion seems to me very plain in the text as we have it—*Σοφία* is *ἀκριβεστάτη τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἤτοι σπουδαιοτάτη*, because concerned with *τὰ τιμιώτατα* (*cf. Met.* K. 7 quoted above); for ($M^b$ has *δέ*) it would be absurd to say that *φρόνησις* is *σπουδαιοτάτη*, inasmuch as its object is *χεῖρον*—*cf. M. M.* i. 34. 1197 b. 6 *ἔστιν δὲ χείρων ἡ φρόνησις τῆς σοφίας (περὶ χείρω γὰρ ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία περὶ τὸ ἀΐδιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἀνθρώπῳ.*

$L^b$, $O^b$, $B^1$, $B^2$, $B^s$, NC, CCC, Γ, and Ald. read *τὴν ἐπιστήμην πολιτικήν*, introducing confusion into the passage by making *ἐπιστήμη* the subject of a passage which is concerned with *σοφία*. Coraes, reading *ἐπιστήμην*, proposes to meet the difficulty by inserting *τήν* before *πολιτικήν*, while Cambr. does so by reading *τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐπιστήμην*.

a. 21. *εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον κ.τ.λ.*] *Cf.* below § 4. 1141 a. 34 *καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, κ.τ.λ.* *Cf.* an interesting passage in Grant's *Ethics*, Essay v. vol. i. pp. 286, 287, in which Aristotle's 'idea of the slightness of man and of his actions in comparison with nature, and what he would call the "diviner parts" of the universe,' is dwelt on: 'Aristotle might, indeed, seem to coincide with the utterance of the Psalmist, "What is man in comparison with the Heavens?" But with him the heavens were not a mere



physical creation; rather the eternal sphere of Reason, the abode of pure Intelligences, the source of all emanations of Reason and Intelligence throughout the world. Compared with this higher sphere individual man, with his practical and moral life, appeared insignificant.' On the *πρῶτος οὐρανός* and other *σφαῖραι*, see note on iii. 3. 3. 1141 a. 21.

§ 4. *εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν κ.τ.λ.*] I prefer *δ'* ($M^b$) to *δή* here: *another* a. 22. reason is being given for not identifying *φρόνησις* with *σοφία*. The argument of the § is—As 'healthy' or 'good' has a different meaning, according as it is applied to the condition of men, or of fishes, while 'white' or 'straight' has the same meaning in all connexions; so 'wise' has always the same meaning, whereas 'prudent' has not: 'prudence' in one case is not necessarily 'prudence' in another, any more than what is a 'healthy' condition in one case is necessarily a 'healthy' condition in another case—utilities, the objects of Prudence or Statesmanship, vary, and there are consequently many kinds of Prudence or Statesmanship; but philosophic truth, the object of Wisdom, is one, and there is only one kind of Wisdom: accordingly, if we identify Prudence or Statesmanship with Wisdom, by making Wisdom the knowledge of utilities, we shall land ourselves in the contradiction of 'many kinds of Wisdom'—'many kinds of philosophic truth.' But it may be asked—Is not man so highly exalted above the other animals, that we may place his utility in a category by itself, as *the* utility *par excellence*—one in contradistinction to the many varying utilities of the other animals? If so, may we not then identify Statesmanship, the science of man's utility, with Wisdom, without thus making 'many Wisdoms'? No, because there are existences higher than man. With these Wisdom must concern itself; and if it concerns itself also with man's utility, we shall still have 'many Wisdoms.' I follow Michelet in making the apodosis begin at *καὶ τὸ σοφόν* l. 24. Zell would make it begin at *φανερὸν δὲ καί* l. 28.

*Ὑγιεινὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν* are the objects of *φρόνησις*, in the wide sense of the term in which it includes the 'intelligence' of the lower animals; but *τὸ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθύ* are not the objects of *σοφία*; they merely *resemble* its objects in being always the same. So the Paraph.—*τὸ αὐτὸ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἐπιστητὸν (=σοφόν) εἶναι, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λευκὸν παρὰ πᾶσιν.* The Paraph., it will be

1141 a. 22. observed, takes τὸ σοφόν as the *object* of σοφία. It is better to take it as the *subject* of σοφία—the wise being or faculty. He or it is of only one type: whereas τὸ φρόνιμον, the prudent being or faculty, is of many types.

a. 25. **τὰ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν φησὶν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψει αὐτά**] This is Bywater's reading for Bekker's τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα εὖ θεωροῦν φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν αὐτά. For τά all MSS. read τό: τό before εὖ is omitted by Γ and $M^b$: φησίν is given by $K^b$ alone: and ἐπιτρέψει by $K^b$ alone. Susemihl, otherwise following Bekker, reads αὐτούς for αὐτά, after $M^b$. Rassow advocates αὐτούς, *Forsch.* p. 63. If $K^b$ is right with φησίν and ἐπιτρέψει, the change to the singular number, after the emphatic **πάντες** ἂν εἴποιεν, is so awkward, that one is tempted to suspect that something has dropped out; but see Byw. *Contrib.* p. 50. Αὐτά are the ἕκαστα, its own peculiar ὠφέλιμα. We trust a being which is φρόνιμον to see to its own interests.

a. 27. **τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμα**] See *Met.* Λ. 1. 980 b. 22 φρόνιμα . . . οἷον μέλιττα καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῴων ἐστίν.

a. 33. τῶν ὄντων] ἰατρική is περὶ ζῴων, animate beings, not περὶ ὄντων, existences as such. Hence the editors have suspected the genuineness of the words. Perhaps they have arisen out of a dittograph of πάντων: but *cf. E. E.* 1217 a. 26 quoted by Byw. *Cont.* 51.

a. 34. **οὐδὲν διαφέρει**] 'that makes no difference'—still there will be 'many wisdoms.' Eustr. has—οὐθὲν διαφέρει τοῦτο· τουτέστιν οὐκ οἰκεῖόν ἐστιν πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι μὴ ἑτέρας οὔσας πρὸς ἀλλήλας σοφίαν καὶ φρόνησιν.

b. 1. **οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν**] 'As— to take the most obvious instance—the heavenly bodies' (Peters). So the Schol. Paris. quoted by Zell—τὰ οὐράνια σώματα, ἵνα μὴ λέγωμεν ἥρωας καὶ δαίμονας. *Cf. Met.* Λ. 8. 1074 a. 30, quoted by the editors, τέλος ἔσται πάσης φορᾶς τῶν φερομένων τι θείων σωμάτων κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν: *Phys.* Β. 4. 196 a. 33 τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ θειότατα τῶν φανερῶν: *cf. Met.* Ε. 1. 1026 a. 18 τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων. These phrases—τὰ θειότατα τῶν φανερῶν—τὰ φανερὰ τῶν θείων—show that 'to take the most obvious instance' does not fully render the force of οἷον φανερώτατά γε. For some account of τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος see passages quoted in note on iii. 3. 3.



§ 5. **ἐκ δὴ . . . τῇ φύσει**] Ramsauer and Susemihl bracket these words. They are unnecessary, and interrupt the obviously close connexion between the closing lines of § 4 and **διὸ** Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὔ φασιν εἶναι. Ramsauer also notes the unusual nature of the construction νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων. 1141 b. 2.

**διὸ κ.τ.λ.**] Grant quotes Plato *Theaet.* 174 A—ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θρᾷττά τις ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δ' ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. Ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. b. 3.

§ 6. **ἡ δὲ φρόνησις . . .** b. 12 **πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 20) prints this sentence and the beginning of chapter 5 as duplicate passages. Grant notes that the remark βουλεύεται δ' οὐδεὶς κ.τ.λ. is here repeated for the third time: *cf.* ch. 1. § 6, and ch. 5. § 3. b. 8.

**οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν**] No man deliberates about what is invariable, nor, in the region of the variable, about things which have no practical bearing upon life—*i. e.* about things 'which involve no end realisable in action.' As Ramsauer remarks, οὐδ' ὅσων limits the sphere of φρόνησις to a certain class of ἐνδεχόμενα, whereas in ch. 1. §§ 5, 6 it is simply said that τὸ λογιστικόν is concerned with τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. b. 11.

**ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος**] *i. e.* εὔβουλος in the strict sense of the word: *cf.* ch. 9. § 7 ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος: *cf.* ch. 5. § 1. b. 12.

**τοῦ ἀρίστου**] τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. Eustr. has the following note here: ἄριστον δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ὥσπερ διαφορὰ κείμενον ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην ἀποτελουμένων διίστησι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἀγαθὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τεχνῶν ὑπάρχει ἀποτελέσματα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἐξ ἐκείνων ὑπάρχει ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἄριστον. οἰκεῖα γὰρ καὶ θρόνος καὶ τράπεζα, καὶ ἱμάτιον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡς χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα, οὐδὲν δὲ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἄριστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ὑποθέσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ τὰ πάθη, καὶ κύριον αὐτὸν καὶ δεσπότην τῆς ἀλόγου ποιήσασθαι. πρακτὰ δὲ λέγονται ἀγαθὰ τὰ διὰ πράξεως κατορθούμενα. οἷον τὸ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀνδρίσασθαι, τὸ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας πολεμούμενον ἐγκρατεύσασθαι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. b. 13.

1141 b. 13. ὧν πάντων ἄριστόν τε καὶ ἐξοχώτατον ἡ ἀπάθεια, καὶ τὸ ἔξω γενέσθαι τῆς σαρκός. κ.τ.λ.

b. 14. § 7. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον] This remark seems to suggest itself here as a qualification of what has just been said. The general conception of τὸ ἄριστον ἀνθρώπῳ is not enough: acquaintance with particulars is also necessary.

b. 16. πρακτικὴ γάρ] It is of the essence of the 'knowledge,' which the φρόνιμος as such possesses, to issue in action. In the sphere of conduct, 'knowledge' without works is dead.

b. 17. οὐκ εἰδότες] *sc.* τὰ καθόλου, Eustr.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις] in other matters as well as in those with which φρόνησις is concerned; *e.g.* in matters with which ἰατρική (εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα κ.τ.λ.) is concerned: so Eustrat. Zell and other editors quote here *Met.* A. 1. 981 a. 12 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθόλου γνωρίζῃ, τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσιν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν, οἱ δ' οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν. The writer of *E. N.* vi. 7. 7 may have had this passage in his mind. His introduction of the term ἀρχιτεκτονική 1141 b. 22 may have been suggested by διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας κ.τ.λ.

b. 18. τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά] κοῦφον is opposed to τῷ ποιοῦντι βάρος *de Part. Anim.* Γ. 11. 673 b. 7 quoted by Ramsauer. The argument is—'All light flesh is wholesome: the flesh of fowls is light: therefore it is wholesome.' The man who knows the conclusion, 'the flesh of fowls is wholesome,' is more likely to prescribe successfully than the man who knows the major 'all light flesh is wholesome,' without knowing the minor, 'the flesh of fowls is light.' Hence Trendelenburg (*Histor. Beiträge zur Ph.* vol. ii. p. 371) would seem to be right in bracketing κοῦφα καί l. 20. Whether Rassow is right (*Forsch.* pp. 96, 97) in substituting κρέα καί for the rejected words is more doubtful. But κρέα καί may have come in here (l. 20) as a dittograph of κρέα καί in the line above (19).



1141 b. 18.

b. 21. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 45) regards the whole passage beginning with these words and ending with σκεπτέον ch. 8. § 4, 1142 a. 11 as an interpolation. The σημεῖον in ch. 8. § 5 can be properly understood, he thinks, only in close connexion with the remarks in ch. 7. § 7 ending with ποιήσει μᾶλλον 1141 b. 21. I shall try to show that the σημεῖον follows naturally what has been said in the immediately preceding section—vi. 8. 4.

ἄμφω] καὶ τὴν καθόλου φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν καθ' ἕκαστα.

ταύτην μᾶλλον] τὴν καθ' ἕκαστα φρόνησιν. b. 22.

εἴη δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική] But even to the most intimate knowledge of τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα the direction of a master faculty is necessary. The man who knows details cannot deal with them without a plan of life. This plan he finds, for the most part, embodied in the institutions which have grown up under the νομοθεσία of his State. The master prudence, ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις, under which his prudence of detail works as a χειροτέχνης, is the direction afforded by πολιτικὴ *qua* νομοθετική—referred to a few lines below in ch. 8. § 2. It is only as conforming to general rules laid down for the common good that the individual finds his own private good. For ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις see *M. M.* i. 34. 1198 a. 32 πότερον δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ἢ οὔ, ἴδοι ἄν τις ἐντεῦθεν, ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐπιβλέψας, οἷον ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκοδομικήν. ἔστιν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ ὁ μὲν ἀρχιτέκτων τις καλούμενος, ὁ δὲ ὑπηρετῶν τούτῳ οἰκοδόμος· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ποιητικὸς οἰκίας. ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων, καθὸ οὗτος ἐποίει οἰκίαν, ποιητικὸς οἰκίας. ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ποιητικῶν ἔχει, ἐν αἷς ἔστιν ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὑπηρέτης τούτου. ποιητικὸς ἄρα τινὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων ἔσται, καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου ⟨οὗ⟩ ποιητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπηρετικός. εἰ τοίνυν ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει, ὅπερ εἰκὸς καὶ εὔλογον, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἂν εἴη πρακτική. αἱ γὰρ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι πρακτικαὶ εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἀρχιτέκτων τις αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅπως γὰρ αὕτη προστάξει, οὕτως αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ οἱ κατ' αὐτὰς πράττουσιν· ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ πρακτικαί, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ἂν εἴη. In this passage we must understand that it is

1141 b. 22. as realising ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα φρόνησις, or empirical knowledge of right and wrong, that αἱ ἀρεταί are contrasted with ἡ φρόνησις ἢ ἀρχιτεκτονική.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Statesmanship and Prudence are the same faculty regarded from different points of view.*

*Under Statesmanship, or Prudence as concerned with the welfare of the State, are included—(1) the faculty of legislating in accordance with a comprehensive plan of social life; (2) the faculty of dealing with the details of social life: this latter species (which has taken to itself the generic term, Statesmanship) is (a) deliberative and (b) judicial; and dealing, as it does in the assembly and law-courts, with particular cases—issuing in particular decrees and verdicts, is thought by many to be the only form of statesmanship; for it is that in the practice of which alone people are seen to be 'doing something,' like workmen.*

*Similarly, many think that Prudence as concerned with one's own private affairs is Prudence* par excellence. *It has, indeed, the generic name, Prudence; but knowing the good of others in the family and in the State is equally Prudence. Knowing what is good for oneself is only one species of knowing what is good for man; but it is a species distinguished from the other species—knowing what is good for other people—by a large* differentia: *it therefore seems to many to be* sui generis: *the man who can see well to his own interests is thought to be 'prudent,' and those who devote themselves to the interests of others are considered 'busybodies,' not 'prudent.' But surely a man's 'own' interest cannot thus be abstracted from the interests of 'other people.' A man cannot be prudent in 'his own' interest without considering the interests of other people in the family and the State.*

*If 'one's own' interest could be abstracted from the social tissue, and made the object by itself of 'Prudence,' then boys would be 'prudent': they deal successfully with the abstractions of mathematics; why not, then, also with the abstraction of 'their own' interests? But they are no more 'prudent' in 'their own' interests than they are well versed in philosophy and the natural sciences. This may be taken as a sign that 'one's own' interest cannot be abstracted; that Prudence, like proficiency in the concrete sciences, requires long and wide experience for its acquirement—experience of 'one's own' interest as that inheres in the tissue of the interests of the community.*

*Prudence, then, being the immediate knowledge of* particulars, *is not scientific knowledge, for scientific knowledge is mediate, or proved, knowledge; it is therefore the antithesis of Reason, for Reason apprehends* universals *immediately. Its particulars, then, being apprehended, not mediately as conclusions*



*are apprehended by science, but immediately, Prudence will be a sort of sense—not indeed like sight, which perceives colour immediately as its special object, or hearing, which perceives sound, but rather like the sense by which we perceive a geometrical figure—a triangle or a circle—immediately for what it is.*

§ 1. ἡ πολιτική] Grant has an important remark here—that, according to Aristotle, 'φρόνησις was a psychological term expressing a faculty of the mind, but πολιτική was merely one of the divisions of the sciences. In order to make them commensurate, Eudemus alters the signification of πολιτική. He treats it as a state of the mind (ἕξις), as a mode of φρόνησις, dealing with the State either universally or in details. From the same later point of view he adds also οἰκονομική.' 1141 b. 23.

ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς] See note on v. 1. 20. Πολιτική, the prudence of the citizen, and φρόνησις, the prudence of the man, are the same habit viewed from different points, as the citizen and the man are the same person viewed from different points. Take the case of one who 'gets on well in the world.' He may be looked at either as a man who conducts his own affairs prudently, or as a citizen who contributes by his position and influence to the welfare of the State of which he is the product. His career is a line in which the private can only logically be distinguished from the public side. Except as conforming to the conditions of the community to which he belongs, and as promoting its good, no man can be said to manage his own affairs prudently—οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας § 5. Even the narrowest φρόνησις περὶ αὑτόν is πολιτική—although the latter name is technically given only to the faculty of the 'public man'—the legislator, ecclesiast, dicast, or executive officer. We may say then that the ἕξις προνοητικὴ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ ἀγαθά is φρόνησις *quâ* περὶ αὑτόν, and πολιτική *quâ* περὶ ἕτερον. These are two aspects logically distinguishable: but there is no such thing as caring *only* for oneself, or caring *only* for others.

Fritzsche and Grant make much of this § and the three following §§ as fulfilling a promise 'made before in the *E. E.*'—viz. i. 8. 1218 b. 9 τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα ὡς τέλος ἄριστον καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὑφ' αὑτὸ καὶ πρῶτον πάντων. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κυρίαν πασῶν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ οἰκονομικὴ καὶ φρόνησις. διαφέρουσι γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τῷ τοιαῦται εἶναι· πρὸς δ' ἀλλήλας εἴ τι διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον λεκτέον.

1141 b. 24. § 2.] The divisions made in this § and in § 3 may be tabulated thus:—




Here φρόνησις is used in a generic sense (A), and a specific sense (a)—δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη (a) τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα (A), φρόνησις § 3. Πολιτική is also used in a generic (A), and a specific (a) sense.

b. 25. **νομοθετική**] The architectonic relation of νομοθετική to ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, as well as to οἰκονομική and ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν φρόνησις, is not exhibited to the eye in the above table, in which νομοθετική appears as coordinate with πολιτική (a), and as having no bearing at all upon οἰκονομική or φρόνησις (a). In the well-ordered State, however, it dominates all three—φρόνησις (a), οἰκονομική, and πολιτική (a)—ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἀγορεύει περὶ ἁπάντων. Its architectonic relation, to πολιτική (a) at least, is better brought out in *Pol.* Δ. 11. 1297 b. 37, where three μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν are distinguished —(1) τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν—the deliberative body: (2) τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς—the executive: and (3) τὸ δικάζον—the judicial body; and νομοθετική is said to be concerned 'theoretically,' *i. e.* architectonically, with all three: ἔστι δὴ τρία μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν περὶ ὧν δεῖ θεωρεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην ἑκάστῃ τὸ συμφέρον.

**ἡ δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα**] The Vet. tr. has—haec autem ut circa singularia commune habet nomen politica, as if he read ἡ δὲ ὡς περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Ramsauer conjectures ἡ δὲ ὡς χειροτεχνικὴ (or ὡς πράττουσα) περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Would it not be simpler to read ἡ δὲ ὡς καθ' ἕκαστα? *Cf.* iii. 1. 15 ἡ ἄγνοια . . . ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα.



1141 b. 27. **πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική**] This is not the formal division of πολιτική (a). That is given in the next section as βουλευτική and δικαστική. Here the writer wishes merely to characterise πολιτική (a) as πρακτική, *i. e.* as concerned with τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, in contradistinction to νομοθετική which involves ἡ τῶν καθόλου θεωρία. He adds καὶ βουλευτική in order to explain πρακτική—τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. He might have written—αὕτη δὲ πρακτική, ἤτοι βουλευτικὴ καὶ δικαστική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον (*sc.* ἐν τῇ βουλεύσει), καὶ ἡ κρίσις.

b. 28. **ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον**] Eustr. has—τὸ ψήφισμά ἐστιν ὃ τελευταῖον ὁ κρίνας ἢ βουλευσάμενος ἀπεφήνατο τί δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ προτεθέντι ζητήματι, οὐχ ὡς καθόλου φαινόμενον ἀλλ' ὡς ἔσχατον καὶ καθέκαστον· τὸ γὰρ καθόλου οὐ πράξει ὑποτίθεται. A ψήφισμα is the first step in the execution of a policy. It carries with it consequences which result in the realisation of a certain τέλος. Deliberation, starting from the conception of this τέλος, reviews the steps by which it may be realised till *at last* the first step actually to be taken is reached in thought. This is the ψήφισμα, which is thus τὸ ἔσχατον: *cf. E. N.* iii. 3, 11, 12 ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν . . . ὥσπερ διάγραμμα . . . καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. The term ἔσχατον often stands simply for the 'particular' as such—*e.g. E. N.* vi. 11. 3 ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά: *Met.* K. 1. 1059 b. 26 πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων: *cf. E. N.* vii. 3. 13 ἔσχατος ὅρος. Particulars as such are called ἔσχατα, doubtless because they are individuals, or ultimate units found by breaking up genus and species.

**διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι κ.τ.λ.**] πολιτική (a)—ἡ χειροτεχνική, has appropriated to itself the generic name which it ought to share with ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική. Only 'party men,' 'active politicians'—those who 'have a hand in carrying on the current business of the State,' are popularly regarded as 'our statesmen.' Political thinkers are not regarded as 'statesmen.'

b. 29. **§ 3. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ.**] Similarly, φρόνησις (a) has appropriated to itself the generic name which it ought to share with οἰκονομική and πολιτική. To be able to manage 'one's own' affairs well is Prudence—and the only real Prudence, it is thought (δοκεῖ); for to attend as a 'politician' to other people's affairs is the mark, not of a prudent man, but of a busybody. The truth, however,

1141 b. 29. is that, as the State which is ruled by *ψηφίσματα* instead of *νόμος* sinks into the social chaos of *ἡ ἐσχάτη δημοκρατία* (*Pol.* E. 8. 1312 b. 36), so the man who tries to manage 'his own affairs,' without regard for the common good, courts his own ruin. 'One's own good' cannot be abstracted from the common good, and treated as a thing by itself.

b. 33. § 4. **εἶδος . . . πολυπράγμονες**] 'Knowing one's own good (*φρόνησις α*)' and 'knowing what is good for other people (*πολιτική*[1])' are the two species (*εἴδη*) of 'knowing what is good (*φρόνησις* A).' But these two species are distinguished from each other by such a large 'difference' (*διαφορά*), that they often do not seem to be coordinate species at all under the same genus. 'My own good' is such a very different thing to me from 'my neighbour's good,' and seems so superior, that the tendency is to make the knowledge of the former coextensive with Prudence, and to cast the knowledge of the latter out of the genus altogether as *πολυπραγμοσύνη*. This interpretation assumes that *διαφορά* is here used in its logical sense as *διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός* or *differentia specifica*, and is suggested by the foregoing *εἶδος* = *species*: see (*e.g.*) *Met.* I. 7. 1057 b. 7 *ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ γένους καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν τὰ εἴδη*. It is the interpretation adopted by Eustratius, who writes:—*τὴν διαφορὰν διδάσκει διὰ τούτων τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν φρονίμου πρὸς οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν· καὶ φησὶν ὅτι ἑκάστῳ μὲν τούτων καὶ γνῶσις ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις, πλὴν ἔχουσι διαφορὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τῷ γένει μὲν ἴσως ὄντας τοὺς αὐτοὺς (ταύτας* Eustr.) *διαφέροντας δὲ πολὺ τούτων πρὸς τὰ λοιπά, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε καὶ δοκεῖν τὸν εἰδότα τὰ περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ διατρίβοντα, φρόνιμον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν οὐ φρόνιμον ἀλλὰ πολυπράγμονα ὡς τὰ ἔξω ἑαυτοῦ ζητοῦντα, καὶ ἐξετάζοντα.*

It is difficult to suppose that in a context in which the *species* of a *genus* are distinguished, *διαφορά* can be used in any but in this, its logical, sense. Zell, Coraes, Grant, and Ramsauer, however, follow Lambinus in understanding *ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν* to mean—'verum de hoc ipso magna est controversia.'

b. 34. **γνώσεως**] Eustr. had a *v. l.* *φρονήσεως* before him.

**τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι**] Eustr. says that the phrase is elliptical, and that we must understand *ὠφέλιμον, συμφέρον*, or *ἄριστον*. *Αὑτοῦ*, the

[1] *Οἰκονομική* is not mentioned, perhaps because, as Eustr. says, *ἡ γὰρ οἰκονομικὴ ἐγγίζει τῇ γνώσει τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου συμφέροντος ἑνός τινος.*



reading of $M^b$, is tempting, but is probably only one of the conjectures of which $M^b$ is full. 1141 b. 34.

**καὶ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.**] Eustr. brings out correctly the force of these words—*διαφέροντας* (*i. e.* *τὸν καθ' ἑαυτὸν φρόνιμον καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν*) *τοσοῦτον ὥστε καὶ δοκεῖν τὸν εἰδότα τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν φρόνιμον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν οὐ φρόνιμον ἀλλὰ πολυπράγμονα.* So much is made of the specific difference between *φρόνησις περὶ αὑτόν* and *πολιτική*, that the latter is cast out of the genus, which the former is allowed to monopolise.[1] But the truth is, as the writer is about to show, that *φρ. περὶ αὑτόν* and *πολιτική* are closely connected. A man cannot secure 'his own' interests *ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας* (§ 4). If (§ 5) 'one's own' interests could be abstracted from the concrete tissue of social well-being, and treated simply by themselves, boys, who can deal with simple abstractions, might be expected to be *φρόνιμοι*. As a matter of fact they are not *φρόνιμοι*, because the 'good' with which even the most self-regarding *φρόνησις* is concerned, is concretely implicated with the 'common good,' which only a man of ripe experience can estimate. 1142 a. 1.

**οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες**] Zell and Grant quote Plato *Rep.* 433 A *τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν*, and *Gorg.* 526 C *φιλοσόφου τὰ αὑτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος*: *cf.* Isoc. *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* 319 *τοὺς μὲν διὰ πολυπραγμοσύνην ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀγώνων γεγενημένους.* a. 2.

**Εὐριπίδης**] From the *Philoctetes* of Euripides: see Dindorf, *Poet. Scen.* p. 352. The third line of the present quotation seems to have been in full—

*ἴσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχης;*

After this line there seems to have followed a passage (paraphrased by Dio Chr. *Or.* 59. p. 575) which ended with the lines—

*οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω γαῦρον*[2] *ὡς ἀνὴρ ἔφυ·*
*τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον*
*τιμῶμεν ἄνδρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.*

After *πλέον* in our text 1142 a. 6 the Paraph. Heliodorus seems to have read *Ζεὺς μισεῖ*, and CCC adds *οὐκ ᾤετο φρονίμους.*

**ζητοῦσι**] *sc.* those *οἷς δοκεῖ ὁ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος εἶναι.* a. 7.

[1] For examples of the general tendency illustrated by the extrusion of *πολιτική* from its genus, see Mill's *Logic*, iv. 5, especially § 4.

[2] *γαῦρος* = *αὐθάδης, σεμνός, μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἢ μετέωρος*—Hesych.

1142 a. 9. καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ[1] ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας] It is impossible to secure one's own good, without taking account of the good of the household and even of the State. The Paraph. has a good note here in which he shows how the next sentence ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. and the σημεῖον § 5 are connected with this remark—καίτοι οὐ δυνατὸν ἴσως τὴν ἠθικὴν[2] εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς, οὐδὲ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν ἄνευ τῆς πολιτικῆς· οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ καθ' ἑαυτόν τινα διαθεῖναι, τῆς οἰκίας αὐτῷ, ἢ τῆς πόλεως οὐ καλῶς ἐχούσης. χαλεπὸν γὰρ μὴ διαφθαρῆναι τινὰ μετὰ πολλῶν φαύλων διατρίβοντα· εἰ δὲ μετὰ μηδενὸς διατρίβει, ἀλλὰ βίον ἔχει μονώτην, πῶς εἴσεται τὸ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθόν; ἄδηλον γάρ, καὶ χρεία διδασκαλίας πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ σκέψεως. ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἄνευ ἐμπειρίας γενέσθαι· ἡ δὲ ἐμπειρία τῶν ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, καὶ ἄνευ τούτων οὐκ ἔνι ἔμπειρον οὐδὲ φρόνιμον εἶναι. Similarly Eustrat., who formally distinguishes two reasons why οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας—(1) Man is a social being. Family and public life is part of the concrete life of the individual: (2) the deliberation necessary to secure τὸ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθόν cannot be carried on without κοινωνοί. This is how he explains 1142 a. 10 ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον. He says—τῇ δὲ σκέψει δεῖ κοινωνοῦ, ἡ δὲ κοινωνία ἡ οἰκονομικὴ ἢ πολιτική. This interpretation of σκεπτέον 1142 a. 10, by which it is made to refer to the σκέψις of the φρόνιμος, is, I daresay, possible; but it would be more in accordance with Aristotelian usage to make it refer to the σκέψις of the writer and his reader. The sentence ἔτι δὲ . . . σκεπτέον is one which it is indeed difficult to explain satisfactorily in its context. At any rate, however, we may suppose that the οὐκ ἄδηλον of § 6, 1142 a. 20 is intended to contrast with the ἄδηλον of § 4, 1142 a. 10.

a. 11. § 5. σημεῖον κ.τ.λ.] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 45), as was pointed out in note on ch. 7. § 7, b. 21, regards the passage beginning ch. 7. § 7. 1141 b. 21 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική, and ending here 1142 a. 11 with σκεπτέον, as an interpolation, and takes the σημεῖον closely with the remarks in ch. 7. § 7 which end with ποιήσει μᾶλλον 1141 b. 21. It is true that the σημεῖον would follow these remarks very appositely. But does it not follow καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας appositely enough? Τὸ εἰρημένον is οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας—φρόνησις περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα

[1] Cambr. seems to be the only MS. which agrees with $K^b$ in reading εὖ.
[2] Moral science conceived as the science of the individual's good.



requires that wide experience which can be obtained only in κοινωνία. The fact that boys are not φρόνιμοι, although μαθηματικοί, points to the truth of this statement; for if we enquire why they are not φρόνιμοι, we find that it is because φρόνησις needs long experience of life, and if we enquire why they are μαθηματικοί, we find that it is because the abstract truths of mathematics do not need 'long experience of life' for their apprehension, but are plain at first sight. If τὸ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθόν were something which could subsist by itself in abstraction from τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν (as the δόξα stated and examined in § 4 would have us believe), boys might be equal to its comprehension, as they are equal to the comprehension of the abstract truths of mathematics: but they are not equal to the comprehension of τὸ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθόν: so it would seem to follow that this ἀγαθόν does not subsist by itself in abstraction from τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν, but that to comprehend it one must be able (which boys are not) to take account of the good of the household and of the State. 1142 a. 11.

διότι]=ὅτι: see *Index Arist.* s. v. διότι: but perhaps we ought to read ὅτι here, treating δι- as a dittograph of the preceding αι: see *Index Arist.*—'interdum literas δι in v. διότι inde videri ortas esse, quod praecedit vocabulum terminans in αι, praecipue καί, Vahlen monet Rhet. p. 58—' then follow several references to places where διότι=ὅτι is preceded by καί. a. 12.

ἐξ ἐμπειρίας] See *Met.* A. 1. 981 a. 15 ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις: *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 3 ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν. a. 15.

§ 6. ἐπεί] In § 5 the question was—'Why is a boy μαθηματικός but not φρόνιμος?' and the answer was—'because φρόνησις needs experience, and he has no experience.' Section 6 proceeds—'and this is the true answer, because (ἐπεί) it assigns his lack of φρόνησις to a cause which accounts also for his not having a grasp of the principles of philosophy or of natural science.' Render—'For if we go on to ask why a boy may be a mathematician, but cannot understand philosophy or natural science, we find that it is because the truths of mathematics are abstract, whereas the principles of philosophy and natural science are reached through long experience. A boy does not realise the meaning of the principles of a. 16.

1142 a. 16. philosophy and natural science, but merely repeats by rote the formulae used to express them; the truths of mathematics, on the other hand, he comprehends fully, for they are plain at first sight.'

a. 17. **σοφός**] *i.e. σοφὸς ἁπλῶς* as distinguished from *σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα* above, line a. 13.

a. 18. **δι' ἀφαιρέσεως**] *τὰ δι'* or *ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως*, 'results or products of abstraction,' are regularly used as = 'the truths of mathematics': see notes on i. 3. 1 and i. 3. 5: *cf.* Trendelenburg's note on *de An.* iii. 4. 8 (*cf.* also his *Elem. Log.* § 36, note), where it is pointed out that the first meaning of *ἀφαίρεσις* is material—*e.g.* it is the process of chipping away the block of stone till the perfect form of the statue is reached in *Phys.* i. 7. 190 b. 7 *τὰ δ' ἀφαιρέσει οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὁ Ἑρμῆς*. It is then applied to the process of reaching *εἴδη* or concepts by leaving out of account the particularities of individuals, and fixing attention upon essential characteristics: and especially to the process of reaching those *εἴδη* with which mathematical science (see *An. Post.* i. 13. 79 a. 7) is concerned. Eustratius has the following note on *τὰ δι' ἀφαιρέσεως* here —*χωρὶς τῶν ὑποκειμένων κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑφίστασθαι μὴ δυνάμενα, ἀφαιροῦνται δὲ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἐν οἷς ὑφεστήκασι, καὶ ὡς ἐν φαντασίᾳ ὑφεστηκότα περὶ τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἐξέτασιν δέχονται περὶ τῶν ἑπομένων αὐτοῖς.*

Opposed to *ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως* 'abstract' is *ἐκ προσθέσεως* 'concrete': see *Met.* A. 2. 982 a. 27 and *An. Post.* i. 27. 87 a. 31, where geometry is said to be 'more concrete' than arithmetic, and therefore less exact—*καὶ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητική· λέγω δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος· στιγμὴ δὲ οὐσία θετός· ταύτην ἐκ προσθέσεως.* Geometry is *ἐκ προσθέσεως* as compared with arithmetic, because it adds *position*: it adds also the three dimensions as generated by the *motion* of the point, line, and plane respectively: see Trendelenburg, *Kategorienlehre*, pp. 83, 84.

It is not to be understood from the words *τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας* that *ἀφαίρεσις* and *ἐμπειρία* are mutually exclusive. The *ἀρχαί* of natural science are *ἐν ἀφαιρέσει*, inasmuch as they are general points of view, not particular observations; see *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 6 *ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ὃ ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτὸ τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης*: and it is by induction



that even *τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως par excellence*—the truths of mathematics, 1142 a. 18. are said to become known in *An. Post.* i. 18. 81 b. 2 *ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν*—on which see Waitz's note.

**καὶ τὰ μέν**] The *ἀρχαί* of philosophy or natural science, *τῶν δέ* a. 19. being *τὰ δι' ἀφαιρέσεως*.

**οὐ πιστεύουσιν**] 'do not realise': see *Index Arist.*—'*πιστεύειν* omnino firmitatem persuasionis significat, sive ea *δόξης* sive *ἐπιστήμης* vim ac naturam habet sive ad cognitionem principiorum pertinet'—see *de An.* iii. 3. 428 b. 4, 428 a. 21, *E. N.* vii. 3. 4, *An. Prior.* ii. 23. 68 b. 13 *ἅπαντα πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς*.

**ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν**] Grant compares *E. N.* vii. 3. 8 *οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες* a. 20. *συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴασι δ' οὔπω*.

**τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον**] *i.e.* the *definitions*, *ὁρισμοί* (*θέσεις* or *λόγοι τοῦ τί ἐστιν An. Post.* ii. 10. 94 a. 10), from which the mathematician starts, are plain and easily understood at first sight: as Eustratius says—*τί ἐστι στιγμή, τί ἐστι γραμμή, τί ἐστιν ἐπιφάνεια, τί σῶμα, τί κύκλος, τί τρίγωνον, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἕτερα ὁριστικῶς λαμβάνει ὁ γεωμέτρης . . . οἴδασι διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλοῦ δεῖσθαι χρόνου πρὸς τὸ καὶ τοὺς ὅρους αὐτῶν ἐπίστασθαι.* On *ὁρισμοί* and their relation to *ἀπόδειξις* see *e.g. An. Post.* ii. 3. 90 b. 30 *ὁρισμὸς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ οὐσίας· αἱ δ' ἀποδείξεις φαίνονται πᾶσαι ὑποτιθέμεναι καὶ λαμβάνουσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν· οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τί μονὰς καὶ τί τὸ περιττόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως*.

§ 7. **ἔτι κ.τ.λ.**] This seems to be another argument (after the digression in §§ 5, 6) to prove that *οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας*. So Eustr.—*τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ ἀνωτέρω ἐστὶν ὅτι δεῖ τῇ εἰδήσει τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γνώσεως . . . ὁ γὰρ βουλευσάμενος ἢ ἥμαρτε . . . ἢ ἠυστόχησε . . . ἔν τε τῷ καθόλου καὶ τῷ καθέκαστα. ὥστε ἄμφω δεῖ τὸν φρόνιμον ἔχειν . . . καθόλου δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγει καὶ καθέκαστον, τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἰδικόν· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἰδικὸν τοῦ ἰδίως φρονίμου, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ, ὥστε δεῖ τῷ ἰδίως φρονίμῳ τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ. Cf.* the Paraph.—*Ἔτι, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἡ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπὸ ἀγνοίας συμβαίνει, ἢ τῆς καθόλου, ἢ τῆς μερικῆς (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀγνοῶν καθόλου, ὅτι τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, καὶ ὁ τοῦτο μὲν εἰδώς, ἀγνοῶν δὲ μερικῶς, ὅτι τάδε τὰ ὕδατα βαρύσταθμα, ὁμοίως ἁμαρτήσεται· χρήσεται*

1142 a. 20. γὰρ ἑκάτερος τοῖς φαύλοις ὕδασι), φανερὸν ὅτι πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἁμαρτεῖν, ἀναγκαῖον μὴ μόνον εἰδέναι, ὅτι τάδε τὰ ὕδατα βαρύσταθμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι τὰ βαρύσταθμα φαῦλα· δεῖται ἄρα ἡ μερικὴ φρόνησις τῆς καθόλου φρονήσεως τῆς πολιτικῆς, καὶ ἀδύνατον τὴν ἠθικὴν ἄνευ τῆς πολιτικῆς συστῆναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν μερικὴν γνῶσιν ἄνευ τῆς καθόλου μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἀδύνατον. It would thus appear that in the present § we have a parallel adduced from medical science to illustrate the interdependence of a knowledge of what is good for others and a knowledge of what is good for oneself. The universal πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα is parallel to the knowledge of the social good; the particular, τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον, to the knowledge of one's own good. As the conclusions of ἰατρική demand the knowledge of both a major and a minor, so do those of φρόνησις—even when it seems to be concerned merely with 'one's own' good.

Zell refers to *Probl.* 933 b. 28, where it is stated that τὸ μὲν ἁλμυρὸν βαρύ, τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ κοῦφον. The adjective βαρύσταθμον appears to occur only here in the Aristotelian Corpus. Susemihl brackets this §.

a. 23. **§ 8. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται**] *Cf. Met.* K. 1. 1059 b. 26 πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων. For this sense of ἔσχατον (= ultimate individual) see above, note on vi. 8. 2 b. 28. The expression τοῦ ἐσχάτου ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις has not actually occurred before, but, as Ramsauer notes, the equivalence of τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον and τὸ ἔσχατον is assumed.

a. 25. **§ 9. νῷ**] *i.e.* τῷ θεωρητικῷ νῷ as distinguished below in vi. 11. 4 from the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, which is τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως.

a. 26. **λόγος**] = συλλογισμός.

a. 27. **ἐπιστήμη**] *i.e.* mediate, deductively derived knowledge.

**οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἔσχατον τρίγωνον**] We have here the Aristotelian distinction between the ἴδια αἰσθητά (*propria sensibilia* of the Schoolmen) and the κοινὰ αἰσθητά (*communia sensibilia*), as explained in *de An.* ii. 6. 418 a. 7 Δεκτέον δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρῶτον. λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς, ὧν δύο μὲν καθ' αὑτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἓν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν δὲ δύο τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἐστὶν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν. λέγω δ' ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται



ἀπατηθῆναι, οἷον ὄψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ. ἡ δ' ἁφὴ 1142 a. 27. πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφοράς· ἀλλ' ἑκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ' ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις· καὶ γὰρ ἁφῇ κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο οὗ αἰσθάνεται. διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ἢ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. τῶν δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητά, καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἡ οὐσία πέφυκεν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως. *Cf.* περὶ ἐνυπνίων 1. 458 b. 4 κοινὰ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οἷον σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κίνησις καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἴδια δ' οἷον χρῶμα ψόφος χυμός. We must note the admission, made at the end of the passage quoted from *de An.* ii. 6 that the κοινὰ αἰσθητά are after all not αἰσθητά in the strict sense (κυρίως). In *de An.* iii. 1. 425 b. 5 they are called the common concomitants (τὰ ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ κοινά) of the ἴδια αἰσθητά, and must be regarded as really *intelligibilia* formally present in the propria *sensibilia*. As such, they differ from the κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητά of *de An.* ii. 6. 418 a. 20, which are merely *empirically inferred* proper sensibles: *e.g.* when one infers the bitterness of the yellow bile which one sees, the bitterness is κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητόν (*de An.* iii. 1. 425 b. 1). The eye, as such, is not affected by it. The κοινὰ αἰσθητά are described by Hamilton (*Reid*, p. 830) as 'concomitant cognitions to which the impression on the organ of the proper sensible only affords the occasion';—and Grant says—'We see in the apprehension of number, figure, and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms and categories, *i.e.* itself, on the external object.' In *de An.* iii. 1. 425 a. 13 the five common sensibles enumerated in *de An.* ii. 6 are reduced to one—κίνησις:—ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ' εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὃν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα ⟨οὐ⟩ κατὰ συμβεβηκός[1], οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ ἑνός·[2] ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει· ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα· μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα· τὸ δ' ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κι-

[1] The οὐ is Torstrik's conjecture. The κοινὰ αἰσθητά are not to be confounded with τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητά of *de An.* ii. 6. 418 a. 20. The κοινὰ αἰσθητά are not *empirically inferred from* the ἴδια αἰσθητά, but are *formally present in* them: see *de An.* iii. 1. 424 a. 27 τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινὴν οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

[2] We have not really a sixth common sensible added here to the five given in ii. 6, for ἕν is included in ἀριθμός.

1142 a. 27. *νείσθαι· ὁ δ' ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀποφάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς, καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις· ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὁτουοῦν ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἶναι τούτων, οἷον κινήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται ὥσπερ νῦν τῇ ὄψει τὸ γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα. τοῦτο δ' ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, ᾗ καὶ ὅταν συμπέσωσιν ἅμα γνωρίζομεν.* On this reduction of the *κοινὰ αἰσθητά* to *κίνησις* Hamilton (*Reid*, p. 829 note *) has the following remarks—'Many modern philosophers when they attempted to explain the origin of our notion of extension from motion, and, in particular, the motion of the hand, were not aware that they had the Stagirite at their head. It is to be remembered, however, that Aristotle does not attempt, like them, to explain by motion our necessary concept[1] of space, but merely our contingent perception of the relative extension of this or that particular object. This, however, takes it for granted, that by motion (*κίνησις*) Aristotle intends *local motion*. But motion is with him a generic term, comprising under it four, or six, species; and in point of fact, by motion Aristotle may here (de An. iii. 1), as in many, if not most, other places of his psychological writings, mean a subjective mutation (*ἀλλοίωσις*) or modification of the percipient. This too is the interpretation given to the passage by the great majority, if not the whole, of the ancient expositors .... It is therefore remarkable that Dr. Trendelenburg, in his late valuable edition of the De Anima, should have apparently contemplated the interpretation by local motion, as the only one proposed, or possible.' See also Trendelenburg's *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. i. chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, in which the intuition of motion is described as fundamental in sensation and thought—'Die Bewegung ist die erste Thätigkeit des Denkens und des Seins: der Raum ist das äussere Erzeugniss der Bewegung: die Zeit ist die Vorstellung des innern Masses der Bewegung' (p. 168).

The *κοινὰ αἰσθητά*, as distinguished from the *ἴδια αἰσθητα*, are to be assigned directly to the so-called *κοινὸν* or *κύριον αἰσθητήριον* or *κοινὴ αἴσθησις*, as faculty: (see *de Mem.* 1. 450 a. 9). But ultimately the *ἴδια αἰσθητά* also are to be referred to it. 'Common sense—*κοινὴ αἴσθησις*,' says Hamilton (*Reid*, p. 756), 'was employed by Aristotle to denote the faculty in which the various reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common apperception': see *περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως* 2. 455 a. 12 *ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπάρχει καθ' ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν τὸ μέν τι ἴδιον τὸ δέ τι κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν οἷον τῇ ὄψει τὸ ὁρᾶν, τῇ δ' ἀκοῇ τὸ ἀκούειν, ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἔστι δέ τις καὶ*

[1] Kant would say—intuition, not concept.



*κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ᾗ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει καὶ αἰσθάνεται·* 1142 a. 27. *οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ. καὶ κρίνει δὴ καὶ δύναται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερα τὰ γλυκέα τῶν λευκῶν, οὔτε γεύσει οὔτε ὄψει οὔτ' ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά τινι κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἁπάντων. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ μία αἴσθησις, καὶ τὸ κύριον αἰσθητήριον ἕν· τὸ δ' εἶναι αἰσθήσει τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου ἕτερον, οἷον ψόφου καὶ χρώματος. τοῦτο δ' ἅμα τῷ ἁπτικῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ χωρίζεται τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτου ἀχώριστα.*

Κοινὴ αἴσθησις is thus the 'consciousness' of sensations—the reference of them to a self-conscious subject, this subject being embodied in a tactually sensitive organism governed, in the case of *τὰ ἔναιμα*, by a heart—*de Somno*, ch. 3. 456 a. 4 *πάντα τὰ ἔναιμα καρδίαν ἔχει, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κυρίας ἐντεῦθέν ἐστιν.* Κοινὴ αἴσθησις is the ultimate 'faculty' of *all* sensation—*i.e. τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητά* (magnitude, figure, &c.) are indeed to be referred to it, but so are ultimately the *ἴδια αἰσθητά* also. It is the living being, one and indivisible, conscious of the various *ἴδια αἰσθητά* in the forms or categories of *μέγεθος, σχῆμα, στάσις, ἀριθμός, κίνησις*. But the living being is essentially *ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ αἰσθήσεως* (*de Somno* 4. 456 a. 5), and the categories in which it is conscious of *αἰσθητά* may be reduced to one—viz. *κίνησις*. Since, however, *ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτή ἐστι καὶ μία* (*de An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 25)—since in actual experience subject and object are one, this ultimate category of the mind is also ultimate in things: 'die Bewegung ist die erste Thätigkeit des Denkens und des Seins.'

On the general subject of the *ἴδια* and *κοινὰ αἰσθητά*, see Hamilton's *Reid*, note D on Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body, especially pp. 828–830 (Hamilton regards the Aristotelian distinction as analogous to that between Primary and Secondary Qualities): see also Trendelenburg, *de Anima*, notes on passages quoted above, and Edwin Wallace, *Psychology of Aristotle*, Introduction § ix, and notes on passages quoted above: see also Grant's useful note *ad loc.*

*οἷᾳ*] 'like that by which we perceive.' The nature of the perception involved in *φρόνησις* is merely illustrated by means of the mathematician's perception of the common sensible *σχῆμα*. The *ἔσχατον*, or particular, which the mathematician, as such, perceives is the *particular shape* (triangular, quadrilateral, circular) of the figure before him; and shape is not the datum of a single sense a. 28.

1142 a. 28. as colour *e.g.* is, but is given in the perceptions of more than one sense. I thus take τρίγωνον to be merely an *example* of the common sensible σχῆμα (κύκλος would have done equally well), and dismiss as untenable the view of Michelet and other commentators, that what the mathematician is here said to perceive is that 'what is ultimate or simplest in geometry is the triangle'—*i.e.* that all figures may be broken up into triangles. But surely, if the writer had been thinking of 'that which is ultimate in geometry,' he would not have mentioned a *figure* at all, but στιγμή.

Φρόνησις then is concerned with ἔσχατα—particulars, which it perceives, as αἴσθησις perceives its ἔσχατα, *immediately*: but the ἔσχατα of φρόνησις are not like the ἴδια αἰσθητά perceived by the special senses,—'this is red, this is sweet,'—but rather, they are like the perceptions of the geometer—'this shape before me is triangular, or circular.' As a coloured object seen, or a resisting object touched, is the *occasion* for the geometer of the perception of σχῆμα by his κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον, so in the φρόνιμος the various feelings and circumstances which make up τὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι are responded to by an activity of the moral reason which imposes on the ὕλη presented to it its own form of Duty. As the geometer solves his problem by perceiving *shapes* in the data of eye (or touch), and recognising this construction, or manipulation of shapes, as better fitted for the solution of a given problem than that other construction, so the φρόνιμος solves the problem of τὸ εὖ ζῆν by apprehending τὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, not as things pleasant or painful to sense here and now, but as things which are *good* or *bad*—*i.e.* fitted, or not fitted, to have a permanent place in the general plan of life: ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἢ αἴσθησις, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οὐχ οἷα τε οὐδὲ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῦ τέρποντος ἢ ἀνιῶντος. τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ νοῦ μόνου κρίνειν ἐστί: Themistius, vol. ii. p. 211, ed. Spengel.

Although I believe that the *first* meaning of τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς][1] ἔσχατον in the writer's mind was the geometer's *particular—this particular shape, e.g.* triangle, he could not fail to be conscious of the other meaning of ἔσχατον, as the *last step* in ζήτησις: see *E. N.*

[1] ἐν τοῖς μαθ. bracketed by Bywater. The words may very well have been inserted by a scribe in the interest of the interpretation adopted by Michelet referred to above: in his *Contributions* (p. 51), however, Bywater remarks that 'it is quite possible that ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς is only out of place, and that it came in originally after αἰσθανόμεθα.'



iii. 3. 11, 12 ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν . . . ὥσπερ 1142 a. 28.
διάγραμμα . . . καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει.
Indeed the words with which vi. 9 begins—τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ. (I see no reason for assuming, with Rassow, *Forsch*, p. 46, and Susemihl, that there is a lacuna between ch. 8 and ch. 9) make it pretty certain that, as a matter of fact, the term ἔσχατον did suggest ζήτησις to his mind. We may then follow up this suggestion, and say that the φρόνιμος, like the γεωμέτρης, ζητεῖ—follows out a train of thought (φαντασία λογιστική in his case, φαντ. αἰσθητική in the case of the γεωμέτρης: see Trendelenburg, *Historische Beiträge zur Phil.* vol. ii. pp. 381, 382, *de An.* iii. 10. 433 b. 29) till he reaches an ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει—something which he finds will serve his purpose, and beyond which he does not care to go. This ἔσχατον is *a particular reached at last*, and recognised as *a means now to be taken* for the attainment of the end in view. Thus the γεωμέτρης reaches a point at which the further διαίρεσις of his διάγραμμα (see *Met.* Θ. 9. 1051 a. 21. sqq. and note on *E. N.* iii. 3. 11 b. 20 ἀναλύειν . . . διάγραμμα for the difference between ἀνάλυσις and διαίρεσις) may cease, when, as in Eucl. *El.* i. 47, he has got certain τρίγωνα, by means of which he can show that the square described upon the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares described upon the sides which contain the right angle. The φρόνιμος likewise reaches a point at which he must say—'Here at last I must stop thinking, and begin to act. This is the *right* thing to do: it is unpleasant, perhaps; but it is right. I must do it.'

κἀκεῖ] 'for on that side too we shall reach a point beyond which a. 29.
we cannot go.' We cannot go beyond the πρῶτοι ὅροι on the one side, or the καθ' ἕκαστα or ἔσχατα on the other side.

ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος] 'But this latter sense (*i.e.* the κοινὴ αἴσθησις operative in mathematics) is sense rather than prudence, though specifically different from the other sense (*i.e.* ἡ τῶν ἰδίων)': so Coraes—αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀντίληψις τῶν μερικῶν, οἵαν εἴρηκε συμβαίνειν ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, αἴσθησις ἂν μᾶλλον λέγοιτο ἢ φρόνησις. In other words, the sense operative in mathematical ζήτησις, though specifically distinct from the special senses, is not to be identified with prudence or the deliberating faculty. It is only analogous to prudence. For ἤ some MSS. and editors read ἡ—in which case the distinction is between ἡ φρόνησις ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα (which is then said to resemble the mathematician's

1142 a. 29. αἴσθησις) and ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις (which cannot be classed as a kind of αἴσθησις). I prefer the ἤ reading; but anyhow the clause is awkward and unnecessary.

## CHAPTER IX.

ARGUMENT.

*Deliberating, or taking counsel, is a species of seeking.*

*What is good counsel? Is it scientific knowledge, or opinion, or happy guessing?*[1]

*It cannot be scientific knowledge, for he who* knows *does not* seek, *and taking good counsel, or deliberating well, is a form of deliberation, i. e. of seeking.*

*It cannot be happy guessing, for one makes a happy guess all at once without thinking, whereas deliberation takes time. Nor is it sagacity, which is a kind of happy guessing.*

*Again, it cannot be opinion of any kind.*

*Since deliberating well is deliberating 'correctly,' it will be 'correctness' of some kind,—not correctness of scientific knowledge, however, for 'correct' is used only where 'incorrect' is possible, and scientific knowledge is never 'incorrect'; nor of opinion, for correctness of opinion is truth—something definite and settled (indeed, an opinion as such, whether true or false, is always something definite and settled), whereas the man who deliberates (whether correctly or incorrectly) has not yet reached anything definite and settled, but is still seeking and thinking. It remains, then, that deliberating well is a correct* process *of thinking conceived as still going on, not a correct* result *of thinking conceived as definitely affirmed.*

*But when we speak of deliberation as 'correct,' we must be careful to note that it is not enough that it should be 'correct' as regards any single one of the three elements—end, means, and length of time taken—which are distinguished in deliberation: it must be 'correct' as regards all three, e.g. he does not deliberate well, or 'correctly,' who attains to a good end by bad means; or who even attains to a good end by good means, but takes an unusually long time in his deliberation, and so runs the risk of missing the opportunity of action.*

*There are of course many ends in relation to which we say of a man, 'he deliberates well,' specifying in each case the end; but when a man 'deliberates well or correctly' in relation to* the *end* par excellence*—the chief end of man—we say without any qualification, 'he deliberates well or correctly,'—'he is a man of good counsel.' Good counsel then, in the strict sense, will be the characteristic quality of the prudent man—the man who has a true conception of the chief end and employs the means which subserve it.*

This chapter, as Grant explains, commences the examination of a set of faculties (εὐβουλία, εὐστοχία, ἀγχίνοια, σύνεσις, and γνώμη) cognate to φρόνησις, or forming part of it.

[1] I owe this rendering of εὐστοχία to Peters.



§ 1. περὶ εὐβουλίας.] 'It is an abrupt, awkward commencement of the chapter to say, "enquiring and deliberating are different, for deliberating is a species of enquiring." But what is meant apparently is, to bring "good counsel" under the head of enquiring, which separates it at once from both science and opinion.'—Grant. This seems to me to be the correct view of the place of the clause; and I cannot agree with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 46), who says—'das Capitel das über die εὐβουλία handelt, beginnt mit einem Satz der völlig zusammenhanglos dasteht: τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν.' The Paraphrast brings out the connexion, recognised by Grant, as follows—καὶ πρῶτον περὶ εὐβουλίας· οἰκείως γὰρ ἔχει μάλιστα τῇ φρονήσει, ἧς τὸν λόγον ἀρτίως ἀπηλλάξαμεν· ὥστε τὸν περὶ εὐβουλίας λόγον τῷ περὶ τῆς φρονήσεως συναπτέον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ζήτησις· ἐπὶ πλέον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ζήτησις τῆς εὐβουλίας· οὐ μόνον γὰρ ὁ εὖ βουλευόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κακῶς βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ζητοῦνται· περὶ ἃ ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη· οἷον, εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔχει δύο ὀρθάς, ζητεῖται πρὸς τῆς ἐπιστήμης, καὶ εἰ ἡ σελήνη σφαιροειδής ἐστι· διὰ τοῦτο ἡ εὐβουλία οὐκ ἔστιν ταὐτὸν τῇ ζητήσει· ἔτι δέ, οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ εὐβουλία· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμων οὐ ζητεῖ περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται, ὁ δὲ εὔβουλος ζητεῖ· ἡ γὰρ εὐβουλία βουλή τις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ ζήτησις ἐστιν τοῦ τί δεῖ πράττειν· καὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται περὶ τῶν πράξεων, ὅπως εὖ καὶ καλῶς γένωνται· ὥστε ἡ μὲν εὐβουλία ζήτησις, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη οὐ τοιαύτη· ἡ εὐβουλία ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη. The writer of the *M. M.* thus describes the relation of εὐβουλία to φρόνησις ii. 3. 1199 a. 4—ἡ δέ γε εὐβουλία ἐστὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ φρονήσει (περὶ γὰρ τὰ πρακτά ἐστι τὰ περὶ αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ὄντα), ἔστιν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ τούτων ἐστί, ἡ δὲ εὐβουλία ἕξις ἢ διάθεσις ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἡ ἐπιτευκτικὴ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς βελτίστων καὶ συμφορωτάτων. 1142 a. 33.

§ 2. ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου] does not involve a process of reasoning. b. 2.

§ 3. ἀγχίνοια] The editors refer to *An. Post.* i. 34. 89 b. 10 for the definition of ἀγχίνοια as εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου. It is the faculty of guessing at once the 'middle term,' or cause, which explains a phenomenon; and thus answers to Locke's *sagacity* (*Essay*, iv. 2. 3 'a quickness of the mind to find out these intermediate ideas that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other, and to apply them right'), or to what is now called the 'Scientific Imagination.' b. 5.

1142 b. 6. **οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία**] After this assertion we expect a clause giving the reason for it; but instead we have a clause which goes off with *ἀλλά*. It is not till we come to the words 1142 b. 13 *καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα . . . λογίζεται* that we get the reason for the assertion *οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα . . . οὐδεμία*. The run of the passage would be greatly improved if we could adopt Zwinger's rearrangement (for which see Zell's note and Susemihl's *Appar. Crit., ad loc.*) so far as to insert 1142 b. 13 *καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα . . . λογίζεται* after *οὐδεμία* 1142 b. 7. The sentence 1142 b. 7 *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς . . .* b. 12 *πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν* would then come in without awkwardness. As for the words 1142 b. 12 *ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . οὔπω φάσις*, they are rejected by several critics. Their inconsistency with 1142 b. 16 *ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς* is insisted on by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 46)—'Aeltere Erklärer, wie Giphanius und Zwinger, nehmen Anstoss an den von mir eingeklammerten Worten (*i.e.* 1142 b. 12 *ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . οὔπω φάσις*), die neueren halten es für hinreichend, zu *διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται* die Worte *ὀρθότητα αὐτὴν εἶναι* zu ergänzen. Allerdings handelt es sich um die Frage: *τίνος ὀρθότης ἡ εὐβουλία*; aber wenn auf diese bereits mit *λείπεται* κ.τ.λ. die letzte Antwort gegeben wird, wie passen dann die Worte *ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς*, in denen doch ersichtlich erst das Endresultat der Untersuchung angegeben werden soll? Durch Umstellung ist, wie ich glaube, hier nicht zu helfen.'

b. 8. **ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται**] *i.e. εὖ=ὀρθῶς*, therefore *εὐβουλία* is *ὀρθότης τις*.

b. 10. **ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδε γὰρ ἁμαρτία)**] as Eustrat. explains—*ἐπιστήμη* is itself *ὀρθότης*, and there is no *ὀρθότης ὀρθότητος*. The infallibility of *ἐπιστήμη*, as such, has already been asserted in ch. 3. § 1 and ch. 6. § 2.

b. 11. **δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια**] Of course *ἐπιστήμη*, although it has properly no *ὀρθότης*, has its *ἀλήθεια*. It is one of the faculties *οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα*, ch. 6. § 2.

**ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ δόξα ἐστίν**] 'the object of opinion is, as such, always something definite': *δόξα* has already adopted a definite view: *βουλή* is a process which has not yet led to the adoption of anything definite. As the Paraph. puts it—*ἡ μὲν εὐβουλία ζητεῖν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δόξα εὑρηκέναι.*

b. 12. **ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' . . . οὔπω φάσις**] If this sentence be retained (and



I think that Rassow and Susemihl go too far when they bracket it, 1142 b. 12. after Giphanius), we ought to take the first clause very closely with what immediately precedes—'The object of *δόξα* is always a definite result already reached; but *εὐβουλία* is only a process (*λόγος*) which has not yet reached a result.' Then follow the words *διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται*, to which we must supply *ὀρθότητα αὐτὴν εἶναι*. Since *εὐβουλία* cannot be the *ὀρθότης* of either *ἐπιστήμη* or *δόξα*, for the reasons given, it remains that it is the *ὀρθότης* of the discursive faculty—the faculty which carries on the process of reviewing *the steps which lead to results*, but is not itself the *ὑπόληψις* of these results—*αὕτη γὰρ* (*sc. διάνοια*) *οὔπω φάσις*.

§ 4. **ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς**] Rassow (*Forsch.* b. 16. p. 46), as we have seen, regards these words as inconsistent with *διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται*. I think that something might be said for bracketing them, and retaining the sentence *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις*, bracketed by Rassow. As for the words 1142 b. 16 *διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζητητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί*—they are bracketed by Rassow, because (*Forsch.* p. 46) 'das Wesen der *βουλή* ist ja schon viele Male erörtert und im Folgenden ist davon nicht die Rede, vielmehr wird der Begriff der *ὀρθότης*, auf den es hier ganz allein ankommt, näher bestimmt.'

**ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα**] *ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι* b. 17. is an expression which lends itself to several inaccurate senses. It is inaccurate to describe (1) the man who has taken *the right means* to the attainment of a *bad end* as *ὀρθῶς βεβουλευμένος*: or (2) the man who has reached a *good end* by *improper means:* or (3) the man who has reached a good end by right means, but only after spending an *unreasonably long time* in deliberation. Thus *πᾶσα* must be taken distributively: 'when we say *ὀρθῶς βεβουλευμένος*, we do not wish the expression to be understood in *any one* of its various senses, but only in the one strict sense in which it is applied to the man who reaches a good end, by right means discovered within a reasonable time.'

**ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς** κ.τ.λ.] The description of the *ἀκρατής* here, as b. 18. employing *λογισμός* for the attainment of a bad end, is not consistent with the account of him given in *E. N.* vii, and answers rather to the *ἀκόλαστος*. See Grant *ad loc.*

**ὃ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν**] *ἰδεῖν* is the reading of $K^b$, $L^b$, $M^b$, $O^b$, CCC,

1142 b. 18. Cambr., $B^3$. Instead of ἰδεῖν NC and Par. 1853 have καὶ σκέψασθαι δεῖν—σκέψασθαι being probably a gloss on ἰδεῖν: *cf.* Eustrat. ὁ γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ φαῦλος προτίθεται ὡς τέλος ἰδεῖν ἤτοι σκέψασθαι ὅπως αὐτοῦ ἐπιτεύξεται, καθὸ ἀκρατὴς καὶ φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔσται ὠφέλιμον. Madvig (*Adv. Crit.* 462) suggests δεῖν (so Γ), which is adopted by Grant (3rd ed.) and Jackson, who compare Plato, *Soph.* 221 A ὅπερ ἄρτι προὐθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 97) suggests οὗ προτίθεται τυχεῖν, which is adopted by Bek.², Susemihl, and Grant in his last edition. I would suggest λαβεῖν: *cf.* the following εἰληφώς.

b. 20. **δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.**] Fritzsche quotes, among other aphorisms, Soph. *Antig.* 1050 κράτιστον κτημάτων εὐβουλία.

b. 22. **§ 5. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ κ.τ.λ.**] Eustrat. has ὡς γὰρ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἐνδέχεται ἀληθὲς εἶναι συμπέρασμα, τοῦ μέσου λαμβανομένου ψευδοῦς . . . ., οὕτως ἐνδέχεται καὶ διὰ φαύλου τρόπου τέλος ἀποβῆναι χρηστόν, οἷον εἴ τις πένης μοιχεύσας ἐκ τούτου ηὐπόρηκεν. It is inaccurate, as Grant notes, to speak of 'a false middle term' (ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι), falsehood or truth belonging to propositions, not to terms. What the writer means is that either or both of the premisses containing the middle term may be false, and yet the conclusion be true: see *An. Prior.* ii. 2. 53 b. 4 ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥστ' ἀληθεῖς εἶναι τὰς προτάσεις, δι' ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός· ἔστι δ' ὥστε ψευδεῖς· ἔστι δ' ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ, τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα ἢ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἐξ ἀληθῶν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος συλλογίσασθαι, ἐκ ψευδῶν δ' ἔστιν ἀληθές, πλὴν οὐ διότι, ἀλλ' ὅτι· τοῦ γὰρ διότι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ ψευδῶν συλλογισμός.

b. 27. **§ 6. ἐκείνη**] *i. e.* the βουλή which, having a good end and employing good means, yet takes too long time. The man who comes to a 'right' decision only when the time for action is past, cannot be called εὔβουλος.

**ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε**] 'but rightness where the advantageous is concerned—end, means, and length of time, being all what they ought to be.' I scarcely think that Eustr. is right in making καὶ οὗ δεῖ epexegetical of τὸ ὠφέλιμον. He says—ἐκείνη ἡ ὀρθότης τῆς εὐβουλίας ἐστὶν εὐβουλία, ἣ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἔχει τοῦ τέλους, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου τὸ ἐπαινετόν, ὃ δηλοῖ τὸ ὡς, καὶ τοῦ χρόνου τὸ ἀρκοῦν, ὅπερ δηλοῖ τὸ ὅτε. τὸ δὲ ὠφέλιμον καὶ οὗ δεῖ ἐκ παραλλήλου ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτό.

b. 28. **§ 7.**] The Paraph. Heliodorus has the following note: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ τέλος ἡ καθόλου ἐστὶ καὶ ἔσχατον, ἡ μερικόν, ἔσχατον μέν, πρὸς ὃ πᾶσα πρᾶ-



ξις ἀνθρωπίνη φέρεται, μερικὸν δέ, πρὸς ὅ τινες πράξεις φέρουσιν, ἀκολούθως καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία ἔχει· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου ἐστίν, ἥτις ὀρθὴ καὶ ἀγαθὴ βουλή ἐστι περὶ τῶν φερόντων εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, τὴν κατ' ἀρετὴν ζωήν· ἡ δὲ μερική, ἥτις εἰς μερικόν τι τέλος φέρει, ὃ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἔσχατον, φέρει δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος. Thus τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς is the τέλος τέλειον—εὐδαιμονία: *cf. E. N.* vi. 5. 1 δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. 1142 b. 28.

**τὶς δέ**] so Sus. and Byw. after $K^b$, $M^b$, Γ. Bekker's ἡ δέ τις is given by $L^b$, NC, $O^b$, $B^{1,2,3}$: ἡ τὶς δέ by Cambr. b. 30.

**ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν**] Bywater has restored τό before τέλος from $K^b$ and Γ, instead of τι read by Bekker. It has been suggested that τὸ συμφέρον; not τέλος, is the antecedent to which οὗ relates—on the ground that φρόνησις is concerned with means to the end given by ἠθικὴ ἀρετή (see *E. N.* vi. ch. 12. § 8–ch. 13. § 2). But then, we should have had πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς, not πρὸς τὸ τέλος or πρός τι τέλος. The clause beginning οὗ is necessary to define the reference of τὸ (or τι) τέλος. Nor is there any difficulty in making φρόνησις the ὑπόληψις τοῦ τέλους. Φρόνησις is ἀρχιτεκτονική, as well as περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα (see *E. N.* vi. 7. 7). We may say that φρόνησις indeed apprehends the end, but could not do so in the way required by morality—*i. e.* with a 'single eye,' unless ἠθικὴ ἀρετή invested that end with a moral interest. The Paraph. is quite distinct in referring οὗ to τέλος. He says that the words πρός τι τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστι are put διὰ τὴν πονηρὰν βουλήν, ἥτις τὰ μὲν τέλει προσήκοντα καὶ ἀκόλουθα ζητεῖ, πρὸς τέλος δὲ φέρεται πονηρὸν οὗ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις.

## CHAPTER X.

### ARGUMENT.

*Intelligence is not the same as knowledge generally, or opinion (then all men would be 'intelligent'), nor is it a special branch of knowledge, like medical science or geometry; for it is not concerned with the 'eternal and immutable,' and among things 'that come into being' only with those which, being difficult to understand, are subjects of deliberation. Its field therefore is the same as that of Prudence; but it is not Prudence: for Prudence issues commands or recommendations, whereas Intelligence merely sits, as it were, and judges. The*

*intelligent man, using his experience, comes to a right decision about matters within the province of Prudence laid before him by another in a speech: as he listens he does not* add to *his experience, but* makes use of *his experience, just as a man who knows Greek does not* learn *Greek, when he listens to another speaking Greek, but uses the Greek which he has, in order to* understand *what is said. The intelligent man is he who* understands, *or appreciates correctly, the value of recommendations made to him within the province of Prudence.*

1142 b. 34. **§ 1. σύνεσις**] intelligence, is another element in *φρόνησις*, or a state cognate to it. It is the faculty of understanding and appreciating good advice laid before one by another person. The *συνετός, quâ συνετός*, does not initiate policies, or schemes of conduct, but has the intelligence to recognise good ones when they are presented to him. **Σύνεσις** is thus the excellence of the *κριτής* who listens to a speech (*ἄλλου λέγοντος* § 3), and judges rightly as to the merits of the plan of action which it recommends (*ἐπιτάττει* § 2). **Σύνεσις** may be regarded as a stage in the development of *φρόνησις*. A man must have listened intelligently to what his elders advise on practical matters, before he can take rank himself as an authoritative adviser. Of course the majority of men—so far as large political questions are concerned—never become *φρόνιμοι* and *ἐπιτακτικοί*, but are, at best, only intelligent followers or critics—*συνετοί*.

**εὐσυνεσία**] All MSS. seem to give *ἀσυνεσία*, and, in the next line, *ἀσυνέτους*. *Εὐσυνεσία* and *εὐσυνέτους* is the certain emendation of H. Stephanus—made, independently it would appear, by Spengel also (see *Arist. Studien* i. p. 212).

1143 a. 2. **πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί**] He seems to mean that *all men* would then be 'intelligent,' for all men have either *ἐπιστήμη* or *δόξα*: but the Paraph. understands the words rather differently: he says—*ἢ γὰρ ἂν πάντες οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ἢ οἱ δοξάζοντες συνετοὶ ἦσαν. ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσίν*: *i. e.* either *all* **ἐπιστήμονες** or *all* **δοξάζοντες** would be *συνετοί*.

a. 8. **§ 2. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν . . . ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον**] Grant points out that 'the opposition of these terms is taken from Plato, *Politicus* 259 E–260 C,' where it is said that 'all science may be divided under the two heads of critical and mandatory' —*ἆρ' οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείποιμεν, ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαῖμεν διῃρῆσθαι*;

a. 10. **ταὐτὸ γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι**] added to meet the possible objection that, although *σύνεσις* is *κριτικὴ μόνον*, 1143 a. 10. *εὐσυνεσία* may be something more.

**§ 3. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν κ.τ.λ.**] Grant quotes *Soph. El.* iv. 1. 2 a. 12. (*i. e. Top.* ix. 3. 165 b. 32) for the double meaning of *μανθάνειν*=(1) to learn, (2) to understand—*τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην.*

**Σύνεσις** is not the possession or acquisition of *φρόνησις*—the power of giving good advice—but the employment of one's intelligence in estimating advice given. *Συνιέναι* is thus like *μανθάνειν*, where *μανθάνειν* means, not 'learning something new,' but 'understanding' what is said to one in conversation, by means of knowledge (*e. g.* knowledge of the language in which the conversation is carried on) which one already possesses.

**οὕτως κ.τ.λ.**] As, in conversation, one 'understands' (*μανθάνει*) a. 13. what is said in a language, and on a subject, with which one is already familiar, so, in the *ἐκκλησία*, the ordinary citizen employs his general experience and intelligence (*δόξα—cf. τὸ δοξαστικόν=τὸ λογιστικόν E. N.* vi. 5. 8, vi. 13. 2) in apprehending (*συνιέναι*) the advice given in a statesman's speech.

**ἄλλου λέγοντος**] For *σύνεσις*, regarded specially as the excellence a. 15. of the listener in the assembly or court, *cf.* Philemon (Meineke, *Fragm. Comic.* vol. iv. 46)—

*χαλεπόν γ' ἀκροατὴς ἀσύνετος καθήμενος,*
*ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀνοίας οὐχ ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται.*

**καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς**] *sc. ἔστιν ἡ σύνεσις, καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία*: then follows *τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς τὸ αὐτό.*

**§ 4. ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν**] 'from the intelligence shown in a. 17. "understanding"'—*sc.* the meaning of a person with whom one is talking. Coraes has the following note here—'*χρώμεθα πολλάκις τῷ μανθάνειν ἐπὶ τοῦ συνιέναι· οἷον, ἡνίκα ὁ μὴ συνιεὶς τὰ λεγόμενα φησὶ πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα* ('Αριστοφ. Βάτρ. 1444)

*. . . πῶς; οὐ μανθάνω·*
*ἀμαθέστερόν πως εἶπὲ καὶ σαφέστερον.*

*ὅπερ ἂν Γάλλος ἀνὴρ ἑρμηνεύσειεν οὕτως*, comment? je ne te comprends point; parle-moi un peu moins savamment et plus intelligiblement.'

# CHAPTER XI.

## ARGUMENT.

*Judgment is the faculty of deciding correctly what is equitable: this definition is in accordance with the view commonly held about the equitable man—that his chief characteristic is to be ready to pass favourable judgment.*

*The faculties mentioned—judgment, intelligence, prudence, and reason—have all, it is easy to see, the same reference, and may be ascribed to the same character: they all have to do with ultimate particulars, intelligence and judgment being faculties which come to right decisions as regards matters within the province of prudence,* i.e. *as regards things which men do, which are always ultimate particulars, never universals. Reason, indeed, is concerned with 'ultimates' at both ends of the series; it is both beginning and end—as speculative, it is concerned with the ultimate universals which cannot be demonstrated by syllogistic reasoning, but are the immutable first principles of scientific demonstration—as practical, it is concerned with the ultimate particulars, which are contingent, and find their place in the minor premiss of the practical syllogism: these particulars the practical reason, as regulating conduct, must perceive immediately, for it is from often perceiving them thus that a man acquires the universal principle of conduct—the prevailing bent of character.*

*Since reason, and the cognate faculties, intelligence and judgment, are concerned with particulars, they will require time and experience for their development: and, as a matter of fact, we see these faculties (as distinguished from the speculative faculty) growing naturally up in men, as they become older: so much so that we feel that undemonstrated assertions and opinions, coming from men of years and experience, have all the weight of demonstrations. Such men have the eye of experience and see correctly.*

*So much for Prudence and Wisdom. Each has its own nature, and its own sphere, and is the excellence of its own separate part of the soul.*

1143 a. 19. § 1. **γνώμη**] rendered by Grant 'considerateness.' It is perhaps impossible to bring out in any single English word the whole meaning of this term. It may be sufficient to think of *ὁ γνώμην ἔχων* as 'the man of good sense and good feeling'—especially in so far as he exhibits these qualities in his judicial decisions (*ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή*). The dicasts swore *γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ* (or *δικαιοτάτῃ*) *κρίνειν*—'to decide according to the best of their judgment'—*cf. Pol.* iii. 16. 1287 a. 25 *ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας*: *Rhet.* i. 15. 1375 a. 27 *φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ᾖ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ νόμῳ χρηστέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὡς δικαιοτέροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ*



*ἀρίστῃ τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις.* The 1143 a. 19.
original meaning of *γνώμη* is 'knowledge' or 'understanding.' Thus in Democritus, quoted by Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* vii. 138, we have *γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη*—'genuine knowledge' and 'dark knowledge': and in Herodotus iii. 4, *γνώμην ἱκανός* means 'a man of good understanding.' Secondly, *γνώμη* came to stand for 'a thought'—especially for 'a thought' or 'opinion' relating to the conduct of life. And this is the sense in which we find *γνώμη* technically used by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*: see *Rhet.* ii. 21. 1394 a. 22 *ἔστι δ' ἡ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποιός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν.* A *γνώμη* is thus a generalisation relating to the conduct of life: and Aristotle takes special pains to make it clear that it is a generalisation which has merely an empirical basis—*i. e.* has not been verified by syllogistic derivation from higher principles; for he goes on to say 1394 a. 26 *ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὁ περὶ τοιούτων συλλογισμός ἐστιν, σχεδὸν τὰ συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαί εἰσιν, οἷον*

> *χρὴ δ' οὔ ποθ' ὅς τις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνήρ,*
> *παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.*

*τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί ἐνθύμημά ἐστιν τὸ ἅπαν, οἷον*

> *χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,*
> *φθόνον παρ' ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ.*

*καὶ τὸ*

> *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅς τις πάντ' ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ*

*καὶ τὸ*

> *οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅς τις ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος*

*γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα,*

> *ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης.*

A maxim which may be used, by way of *σημεῖον* or *εἰκός*, as the premiss of an *ἐνθύμημα* or 'rhetorical syllogism' (see *Rhet.* i. 2), or may, as conclusion of an *ἐνθύμημα*, be deduced from suitable premisses, is, if taken by itself (*ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ*), a *γνώμη*. A *γνώμη*, then, is a moral maxim, a piece of proverbial wisdom (*cf.* the expression *ποιηταὶ γνωμικοί*), advanced and accepted without

1143 a. 19. proof, but recommending itself by its obvious agreement with the sentiments and feelings of the society in which it appears.

Here, in the *Ethics*, the meaning of *γνώμη* seems to waver between 'the act of deciding sensibly and kindly,' and 'the disposition which results in sensible and kind decisions.'

**συγγνώμονας**] This is the reading of $K^b$ and $M^b$ restored by Bywater, instead of Bekker's *εὐγνώμονας* the reading of $L^b$, Γ, Cambr., NC, $B^{1, 2, 3}$, CCC, Eustr., Heliod. The *Index Arist.* does not give *εὐγνώμων* except in this chapter, and in *M. M.* ii. 2, where *συγγνώμων* does not occur, and *εὐγνωμοσύνη* is used instead of *γνώμη*. It is not unlikely therefore that *εὐγνώμων* got into the text of the *Ethics* at a date subsequent to the compilation of the *M. M.*[1] Apart, however, from this suspicion, there is nothing against the word in the context here. Indeed it may be thought that the words a. 21 *σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν* follow *εὐγνώμονας* more naturally than *συγγνώμονας*: that the connexion between *ἐπιείκεια* and *συγγνώμη* is assumed to be better known than that between *ἐπιείκεια* and *γνώμη, καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας καὶ ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην*, and is therefore adduced as a *σημεῖον*: *cf. Rhet.* i. 13. 1374 b. 4 *ἐφ' οἷς γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ταῦτα ἐπιεικῆ*, and b. 10 *τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές.*

**Συγγνώμη** means properly 'thinking and feeling with others,' and answers to the *sensus communis* of the Roman writers: *cf.* Quintil. *Inst.* i. 2—Sensum ipsum, qui communis dicitur, ubi discet, cum se a congressu, qui non hominibus solum, sed multis quoque animalibus naturalis est, segregârit?—Hor. *Sat.* i. 3. 66 Simplicior quis et est . . . ut forte legentem Aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus, Communi sensu plane caret, inquimus: —on which Orelli quotes Seneca, *de Benefic.* i. 12 Sit in beneficiis sensus communis: tempus locum personas observet, quia momentis quaedam grata et ingrata sunt. The *συγγνώμων* is the man of social sympathy, who enters into the thoughts and feelings of others, and especially is ready to make allowance for their difficulties in his formal or informal verdicts—who, in short, gives judgment (*γνώμη*) in their favour (*συν*) when a rigid interpretation of the law would warrant an unfavourable judgment.

a. 23. **ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ**

[1] I find, since writing the above, that this is Bywater's opinion; see *Contributions*, p. 52.



**τοῦ ἀληθοῦς**] Trendelenburg brackets *συγγνώμη*: the sentence is 1143 a. 23.
then a mere repetition of what has just been said three lines above—*ἡ γνώμη . . . ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ κρίσις ὀρθή*: on the other hand, with *συγγνώμη* retained, the definition of *συγγνώμη* is in the same terms as that of *γνώμη*. I think that the words *ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή* ought to be bracketed. The clause *ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς* follows the *ὀρθή* of line 20 very naturally, *σημεῖον δέ . . . συγγνώμην* being parenthetical. I agree with Rams. that *τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς* in line 20, as in line 23, is neuter—the genitive of the object. Grant makes it masc. in both places.

**ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς**] *sc. κριτική*, if line 23 be retained: if not, a. 24.
*κρίσις*—'that is a *right* decision which gives a *true* verdict.'

The whole § may be paraphrased thus—What is called 'good sense'—the quality of people whom we describe as 'fair and sensible,' and as 'taking a sensible and proper view,' may be defined as 'the habit of coming to right decisions in matters of equity.' That this is a correct definition of 'good sense' is seen, if we refer to the usage of the term 'common sense' as equivalent to 'fellow feeling' or 'tendency to give favourable judgment.' It is generally admitted that 'the equitable man' is distinguished for his 'common sense,' or 'fellow feeling,' and that to give effect to this sense or feeling in certain cases is 'equitable.' 'Common sense' is, in fact, 'good sense,' which enables a man to come to a right decision in a matter of equity: a 'right' decision being one which gives a *true* verdict.

Instead of *γνώμη*, the writer of *M. M.* uses *εὐγνωμοσύνη*, as we have seen—ii. 2. 1198 b. 34 *ἡ δὲ εὐγνωμοσύνη καὶ ὁ εὐγνώμων ἐστὶν περὶ ταὐτὰ περὶ ἃ καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια, περὶ τὰ δίκαια* [*καὶ*] *τὰ ἐλλελειμμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου τῷ μὴ ἀκριβῶς διωρίσθαι, κριτικὸς ὢν τῶν ἐλλελειμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ γιγνώσκων ὅτι ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐλλέλειπται, ἔστι μέντοι δίκαια, ὁ τοιοῦτος εὐγνώμων. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιεικείας ἡ εὐγνωμοσύνη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρῖναι τοῦ εὐγνώμονος, τὸ δὲ δὴ πράττειν* [*καὶ*] *κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς.* It ought to be remembered that the writer of the *M. M.* discusses *ἐπιείκεια* in a context parallel, not to *E. N.* v. 10, but to *E. N.* vi. 11.

I said that *σύνεσις* may be regarded as a stage in the development of *φρόνησις*. But the power of intelligently following a speech, and estimating its recommendations at what they are worth, presupposes something more than mere intellectual sharpness and nimbleness.

1143 a. 24. The successful critic of a policy must be in sympathy with the traditional thought and feeling of the community for which the policy is recommended. Γνώμη, or *communis sensus*, underlies σύνεσις. And, as there are many who are συνετοί but never (at least in great matters) become φρόνιμοι, so there are many who have γνώμη and συγγνώμη without rising to the clear intellectual consciousness of reasons possessed by the συνετοί. The συνετοί appreciate the force of the ἐνθυμήματα (ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοί) which the speaker employs: but γνῶμαι are points of view which recommend themselves without syllogistic proof (ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ)—are *felt* to be *true* by ὁ γνώμην ἔχων.

In the foregoing remarks I have purposely allowed the Aristotelian associations connected (*a*) with the term γνώμη, as (1) moral maxim, (2) judge's decision, (3) disposition which results in γνῶμαι (1) or (2), and (*b*) with the term συγγνώμη, as *communis sensus*, and especially the manifestation of *communis sensus* in equitable judgments, to have free play, and influence one another. I believe that the writer of this § could not use the term γνώμη without being affected by these various associations. At the same time, it is proper to say, in conclusion, that I think that the sense of γνώμη as judge's decision is most prominent in his mind. If σύνεσις is especially the κρίσις in the ἐκκλησία, γνώμη is especially that in the δικαστήριον.

a. 27. § 2. **γνώμην ἔχειν**] This infinitive is grammatically the object of ἐπιφέροντες, and we should have expected the article before it; but the writer omits the article, because he still has λέγομεν in his mind. That he has λέγομεν in his mind is shown clearly by the following accusatives καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. Michelet makes the construction—γνώμην γὰρ καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες, λέγομεν καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετοὺς γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη: but, if this is the construction, why have we not the article before φρονίμους and συνετούς?

**νοῦν ἤδη**] I think that Grant's suggestion is right—that this expression refers 'to what is said in § 6 ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει' and is 'nearly equivalent to our saying of a person that he had "attained to years of discretion."'

a. 31. **τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον**] 'for equity enters into all good relations between man and man'—



*i. e.* equity is coextensive with justice. This is given as a reason 1143 a. 31.
for the statement ἐν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ εὐγνώμων[1] ἢ συγγνώμων:—the φρόνιμος has to do with 'all good relations between man and man'; and the συγγνώμων is κριτικὸς τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, which is coextensive with these 'good relations.'

§ 3.] Having proved at the end of § 2 that σύνεσις and γνώμη a. 33.
have the same sphere as φρόνησις or νοῦς, because τὰ ἐπιεικῆ are coextensive with τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον, the writer now proves the same point again, by reference to the fact that τὰ πρακτά (which are ἔσχατα) are the objects of σύνεσις and γνώμη, as well as of φρόνησις or νοῦς. Ramsauer brackets τὰ πρακτά in line 33, and $K^b$ $M^b$ Γ, Cambr. pr., and NC read ἁπάντων for ἅπαντα.

§ 4. **καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα**] γνώμη, σύνεσις, φρόνησις a. 35.
and νοῦς have been exhibited as πᾶσαι εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι, because all concerned with moral ἔσχατα (ἐπιεικῆ, ἀγαθά, πρακτά). The writer now goes on to say that νοῦς is concerned, not only with moral ἔσχατα—the particulars of action— but, in science as distinguished from conduct, with another kind of ἔσχατα—*ultimate* principles—the highest *universals*: so that, if we use νοῦς in its generic sense, we can say that it is concerned with 'ultimates at both ends of the series' (Grant)—*i. e.* with universals at the top, and particulars at the bottom.

**νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος**] The highest universals and the ultimate b. 1.
particulars are apprehended intuitively, not reached by discursive reasoning.

**καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις**] *sc.* νοῦς. The construction is ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις νοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων. This is the νοῦς θεωρητικός, as distinguished from the νοῦς πρακτικός—ὁ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς (*sc.* δόξαις *cf. E. N.* vii. 3. 9, or προτάσεσι, or perhaps ἀποδείξεσι understood in a loose sense).

**τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων**] *sc.* ἐστί, 'is concerned with.' These b. 2.
are the First Principles of θεολογική and μαθηματική.

**ἐνδεχομένου**] The full expression requires the addition of καὶ b. 3.

[1] Εὐγνώμων ἢ fort. secludendum Byw.; see above § 1, note on συγγνώμονας 1143 a. 19.

1143 b. 3. ἄλλως ἔχειν, which Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 77) accordingly proposes to insert.

τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως] the minor premiss, called in *E. N.* vii. 3. 13 ἡ τελευταία πρότασις. The phrase ἑτέρα πρότασις does not appear from the *Index Arist.* to occur except here.

b. 4. ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται] αὗται (attracted to the gender of ἀρχαί) are the particulars (ἔσχατα) which constitute the 'minor premiss' apprehended by νοῦς πρακτικός. These particulars are said to be the ἀρχαὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα—to supply the materials out of which the moral end, or the character, is built up by ἐθισμός, as by a sort of induction—ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὰ καθόλου[1]. For a similar use of ἀρχή (as the material source) Grant compares *E. N.* vi. 3. 3 ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου.

b. 5. § 5. τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς] The πρακτικὸς νοῦς is here represented as a *sensibility* to certain particular impressions. The cumulative effect of such particular impressions is a certain *bent of character*, or settled way of looking at, and feeling with regard to, the objects from which the impressions are received. But when νοῦς πρακτικός is thus described as a sensibility to certain particular impressions, it is evident that, *from the very first*, it must find, in the things which impress it, the common attribute to which the character eventually formed is the adaptation. Νοῦς πρακτικός is indeed the sensibility to certain particular impressions, in so far as it is on the occasion of the presence of particular αἰσθητά (ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρά) that it receives its impressions; but these αἰσθητά impress it from the first *in a moral way*. It is therefore not merely passive in relation to them; it *perceives* this among them to be *good*, and that *bad*, irrespectively of the present pleasure or pain which attends either: *i. e.* it criticises them in view of the requirements of its own permanent nature. It is as true, in short, of the αἴσθησις with which the νοῦς πρακτικός is here identified, as of the αἴσθησις of the bodily senses, that it involves a perception of the καθόλον: see *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 16 καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν.

[1] If τὰ καθόλου (K$^b$ M$^b$ Bywater) is right (as against Bekker's τὸ καθόλου), Trendelenburg's, I think, mistaken view (*Hist. Beitr.* ii. 384) that τέλος is to be supplied after καθόλου is finally disposed of.



The sharp contrast drawn between the νοῦς θεωρητικός and the 1143 b. 5. νοῦς πρακτικός in *E. N.* vi. 11. §§ 4, 5 is indeed very misleading. A καθόλου is at first dimly seen *by each* in the material setting of the καθ' ἕκαστα belonging to its sphere; and *each*, using its own peculiar method—νοῦς θεωρητικός using ἐπαγωγή, and νοῦς πρακτικός, ἐθισμός—comes to apprehend its καθόλου more clearly. The only ground (apart, of course, from the difference of spheres, or object-matter) for contrasting the νοῦς θεωρητικός and the νοῦς πρακτικός is that of the clearness with which each ultimately apprehends its καθόλου. The generalisations of the νοῦς θεωρητικός, clear-cut forms embodied in ὁρισμοί, seem, at last, to stand out independent of the particulars; whereas the generalisations of the νοῦς πρακτικός are never clear-cut, but always inhere in particulars. They are the ways in which Kallias, and people who have received the same training as Kallias, generally act, in certain (approximately described) circumstances, when they act in the manner generally assumed to be right. But the generalisations of the νοῦς θεωρητικός are abstract formulae, which distinguish themselves by their necessity from the particulars (as such, contingent) falling under them. To arrive at such formulae being the goal of the νοῦς θεωρητικός, that faculty is represented as being 'concerned with' them; whereas the νοῦς πρακτικός is said to be 'concerned with particulars,' because it never can, with any appearance of perfection, detach its generalisations from them.

διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα] ταῦτα are νοῦς, φρόνησις, σύνεσις, b. 6. and γνώμη, as Eustratius notes. These habits are all concerned with τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, and therefore (διό) require time and experience for their formation. They *grow up in us naturally* (φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι), as we gain experience of life. But we do not naturally grow up to be philosophers (φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδείς): philosophy requires special teaching: see Eustrat. *ad loc.*—διότι φησὶν ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡμῖν παραγίνεται καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία τῶν καθόλου, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ φύσει ἡμῖν πρόσεστιν ἀλλ' ἐκ μαθήσεως περιγίνεται, ὡς εἶναι καὶ νέον δυνατὸν ὑπάρξαι σοφὸν ἐν γνώσει τῶν καθόλου γενόμενον καθὰ καὶ προλαβὼν ὁ φιλόσοφος εἴρηκεν. αἱ δὲ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις, ἐπεὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπειρίας συνάγονται τῶν καθέκαστα χρόνου δεῖ αὐτοῖς μακροῦ, καὶ ἡλικίας τελεωτέρας, δι' ἧς αὗται ἀνθρώποις προσγίνονται. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκ φύσεως ἡ ἡλικία, καὶ ὁ μακρὸς τῆς ζωῆς χρόνος δι' ὅσου ἡ κτῆσις τῶν ἕξεων

1143 b. 6. τούτων πορίζεται, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φυσικὰ δοκοῦσι καὶ ἐκ φύσεως ἔρχεσθαι. *Cf.* Philemon (Meineke, *Fragm. Comic.* vol. iv. p. 34)—

> ἥκουσα τούτων αὐτός, οὐδὲ φύεται
> αὐτόματον ἀνθρώποισιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, νοῦς
> ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγρῷ θύμος· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ
> ἑτέρων ἀκούειν καὶ θεωρῆσαι . . .
> κατὰ μικρὸν ἀεί, φασί, φύονται φρένες.

b. 9. § 6. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 31) places these words after αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς § 5, 1143 b. 5. A scribe, he suggests, transposed the two sentences both beginning with διό. This is very likely. Moreover, it is only after τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς that the grammatical reference of the words ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων is intelligible.

As for the meaning of the statement ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς—it is doubtless given correctly by the Paraph.—ἀρχὴ μέν, καθ' ὅσον τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν ἐστὶ γνῶσις, καὶ θεωρητικὸς λέγεται· ἀρχὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἀποδείξεως· τέλος δέ, καθ' ὅσον γνῶσίς ἐστι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ ἐν αἰσθήσει, καὶ πρακτικὸς λέγεται. For the expression ἐκ τούτων . . . καὶ περὶ τούτων, *cf.* i. 3. 4 ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας κ.τ.λ. He means that 'reasoning' in morals is ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, and περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα. The term ἀποδείξεις is, of course, used here in a loose sense, for 'morality is not capable of *demonstration*.'

b. 14. ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς] This is the reading of $L^b$ (and apparently $O^b$) only: ἀρχάς or τὰς ἀρχάς is given instead of ὀρθῶς by $K^b$, $M^b$, Γ, CCC, NC, Cambr., and $B^{1, 2, 3}$, Ald., Hel., Eustr.

b. 16. § 7. ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου] *i. e.* σοφία is the highest excellence of the ἐπιστημονικὸν μέρος, and φρόνησις of the λογιστικόν: see note on ch. 3. § 1. 1139 b. 14, for Prantl's view of the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί.



# CHAPTER XII.

## Argument.

*Let us now discuss the question—What is the practical use of Wisdom and Prudence?*

*Wisdom, it may be urged, is useless: it is concerned with that which* eternally is, *not with that which* comes to pass *or* is produced, *and consequently does not regard the means which produce Human Happiness.*

*Prudence indeed regards these means; but must we have Prudence in order to secure them practically? The good man* in virtue of his good habits *employs these means*, i. e. *performs good acts. Surely* knowing that these acts are good *does not help to make him perform them, any more than knowing that a regular pulse is a healthy symptom (as distinguished from knowing the proper treatment of an irregular pulse) makes a man's pulse regular. And if it be said that we must have Prudence, not indeed to tell us that such and such acts are good, but to tell us how to secure their performance, what, it may still be asked, is the practical use of Prudence? It is superfluous in the case of those who are already good, and perform the acts in question from habit; and why should those who are not already good, but wish to become good, trouble themselves to have Prudence of their own? Why should they not consult a professional expert in Prudence, as we do a doctor in the matter of health? Lastly, there is the awkward point—If Prudence is practically useful, if it really does something—especially 'something so great as the production of Human Happiness—it will take the lead over Wisdom, for the practical faculty which uses materials always directs as a mistress the scientific or artistic faculty which supplies the materials. But how can Wisdom be thus ancillary to Prudence? Prudence is surely inferior to Wisdom.*

*So much for the statement of the difficulties: now let us attempt to answer them.*

*Let us begin by saying that Wisdom and Prudence, even if they result in nothing 'practical,' must be choice-worthy in themselves, inasmuch as each of them is the excellence of its own part of the soul.*

*Secondly, they do produce results. Wisdom produces Happiness, not indeed as efficient cause of it, but as formal cause: it is one of the formal elements in that totality of the virtuous character, which realises itself in the function called Happiness. The other formal elements are Prudence and Moral Virtue, Virtue making the end aimed at good, and Prudence the means. Wisdom is the excellence of the scientific part, Prudence of the deliberative, Moral Virtue of the appetitive: the excellence of the fourth part of the soul, the nutritive, is not one of the formal elements in the totality of the virtuous character: for it does not rest with it to do, or not to do.*

*As regards the objection that Prudence does not help us to perform good acts, let us meet it by analysing 'a good act' a little deeper. What looks like 'a*

*good act' may be performed under external pressure, or from ignorance, or for some end which has nothing to do with goodness, by a man who is not good: but an act is really 'good' only when it is done by a good man, being deliberately chosen by him because it is a good act*—i.e. *contributes to the chief end. This chief end, for the sake of which acts are deliberately chosen as means, is set up by Virtue*—i.e. *it is the same thing to say 'This man is virtuous or good' and 'his end is good'—but the steps which must be taken in order to realise this end are discovered, not by virtue but by another faculty. Let us stop to explain this point. Cleverness is the power of hitting upon the means conducive to a given end. If, then, the end be good, we praise the faculty which discovers the means, and call it Prudence: but we call it Roguery if the end be bad. Cleverness is the* potentiality *of Prudence (as it is of Roguery); but Prudence, as confirmed* habit, *does not supervene without Virtue: for, without Virtue, the syllogisms in which Prudence reasons would have no major premiss: it is only the good man who sees the good end which constitutes the major premiss. Vice distorts and falsifies a man's view of the principles of conduct. It is plain, then, that a man cannot be Prudent without being good.*

1143 b. 19. **§ 1. θεωρήσει**] Byw. after $K^b$, $M^b$, Cambr. All other MSS., apparently, give *θεωρεῖ*, which I prefer.

b. 20. **οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως**] on the contrary, it is the contemplation of *being* (*τὸ ὄν*, as distinguished from *τὸ γιγνόμενον*).

b. 22. **ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια**] $L^b$ seems to be right in omitting *ἡ*: see Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 63).

b. 25. **ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά**] Ramsauer suggests the insertion of *τῷ* before *τὰ ὑγιεινά*. The construction is—*ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῷ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικὰ εἰδέναι πρακτικώτεροί ἐσμεν τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ εὐεκτικῶν*. This usage of *πρακτικώτεροι* is well illustrated by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 124) from *E. N.* v. 1. 4 *οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων.*

b. 26. **ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται**] 'I mean *ὑγιεινά* and *εὐεκτικά* in the sense, not of the efficient causes, but of the manifestations of *ὑγίεια* and *εὐεξία*.' *Cf. Met.* Γ. 2. 1003 a. 34 *τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας, τὸ δὲ ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς*: *cf. Top.* ii. 2. 110 a. 19, *Met.* K. 3. 1061 a. 6. He means that the mere knowledge of 'what concerns health' does not make a man perform healthy functions. 'Healthy functions' (*τὰ ὑγιεινὰ τὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λεγόμενα*) are not like 'the means to health' (*τὰ ὑγιεινὰ τὰ τῷ ποιεῖν τὴν ἕξιν λεγόμενα*) which are suggested by medical knowledge. Medical knowledge—knowledge of 'the means to health'— 1143 b. 26.
makes a man indeed *πρακτικώτερος τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τῶν τῷ ποιεῖν τὴν ὑγίειαν λεγομένων*—*i. e. πρακτικώτερος κατὰ τὸ ἰατρεύειν*, but not *κατὰ τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἐνεργεῖν*, or *τῶν ὑγιεινῶν τῶν τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λεγομένων*.

**οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι κ.τ.λ.**] After *πρακτικώτεροι* we may under- b. 27.
stand, then, *κατὰ τὸ ὑγιεινῶς καὶ εὐεκτικῶς ἐνεργεῖν*, or some such words. Knowledge of the means to health or good training, as they are set forth in the sciences of *ἰατρική* and *γυμναστική*, will not make a man who has not the **ἕξις** of *ὑγίεια* or *εὐεξία*, a healthy man or a powerful athlete. The Paraphrast Heliodorus has the following comment here—*οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια πρακτικοὶ αὐτῶν γίνονται· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὑγιεινοὶ ἢ εὐεκτικοὶ γινόμεθα ἀπὸ τοῦ καλῶς εἰδέναι τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἔχειν ἕξιν ὑγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας· οὐ γὰρ ὁ πύκτης πυκτικώτερος γίνεται διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς πυκτεύειν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἕξιν ἔχειν πυκτικῆς, πυκτεύει· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ παλαιστὴς καὶ ὁ δρομικός· καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ ὁ γυμνικὸς διὰ τὴν ἕξιν γυμνικός ἐστιν, οὐ διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ εὐεκτικὰ καὶ γυμνικά· λέγω δὲ εὐεκτικὰ καὶ γυμνικὰ ἢ ὑγιεινά, οὐ τὰ ποιητικὰ εὐεξίας ἢ ὑγιείας, ἀλλ' ἃ ποιεῖ ὁ ὑγιαίνων, ἢ ὁ εὐεκτῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕξιν ὑγιείας ἢ εὐεξίας ἔχειν.*

**§ 2. τούτων χάριν**] *τοῦ ταῦτα εἰδέναι χάριν.* b. 28.

**τοῦ γίνεσθαι**] *sc. σπουδαίους.* b. 29.

**τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν**] *sc. ἀρετήν*: *i.e.* 'those who have not the **ἕξις** b. 30.
(of *ἀρετή*)': *οὖσιν* has been unnecessarily suggested for *ἔχουσιν*.

**αὐτοὺς ἔχειν**] *sc. τὴν φρόνησιν*: the writing is very careless.

**§ 3. ποιοῦσα**] used here in the sense of *χρωμένη* (see *E. N.* i. b. 35.
2. 7): hence not to be compared with *ἡ ποιήσουσα*, but with *ἡ χρησομένη* of *Rep.* 601 D. The Paraphrast seems to suggest the line of thought which led the writer to describe *φρόνησις* as *ἡ ποιοῦσα*: he says—*δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ φρόνησις βελτίων τῆς σοφίας, καθόσον ἀρχή ἐστι πράξεως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κυριωτέρα τῆς σοφίας, ἥτις μόνον θεωρητική ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ πρακτικὴ ἕξις ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον*—*i. e. φρόνησις*, as *πρακτική* or *ἀρχὴ πράξεων*, is the efficient cause *τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον* (see *de Gen. et Corrup.* i. 7. 324 b. 13 *ἔστι δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὡς ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως*) of *εὐδαιμονία*, and (it may be maintained) *uses materials supplied by* **σοφία**, which it therefore directs, as the wearer directs the tailor.

**περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον**]

1143 b. 35. Zell compares *Pol.* Θ. 6. 1340 b. 20 *πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ᾄδοντας τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μή, καθάπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον.*

1144 a. 1. § 4.] Human nature, as a system of *ἀρεταί*, is an end in itself: see *Met.* A. 2. 982 b. 24 *δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν (sc. σοφίαν) ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη, μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν.*

a. 3. § 5.] After **ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια** understand *τὸ ὑγιαίνειν*. *Σοφία* 'produces' *εὐδαιμονία*—not, however, as the doctor (efficient cause), but as the principle of health (formal cause), produces a healthy state. Eustratius *reads τὰ εὐεκτικά* after *ὑγίεια*, but *explains* the sentence as if he read *εὐδαιμονίαν*: *σοφία* and *φρόνησις*, he explains, produce *εὐδαιμονία*, not as merely external causes, like *ἰατρική* when it produces health; but as constituent parts (*μέρη*) of *εὐδαιμονία*, like *ὑγίεια*, which is also a constituent part of *εὐδαιμονία*. *Ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* (the character of which *εὐδαιμονία* is the function) is made up of the *ἀρεταί* of the *mind* and of the *body*, aided by *external means*, such as wealth. *Σοφία* is the highest *ἀρετή* of the *mental*, as *ὑγίεια* is of the *bodily* part. *Εὐδαιμονία* is a *ὅλον* constituted by the union of these two *μόρια*. *Σοφία* accordingly *produces εὐδαιμονία*, just as *ὑγίεια* also produces it, in the sense of being *one of the factors which constitute it*. *Ἰατρική* is not one of the *factors* or *constituent elements* of that which it 'produces', but is external to the product. Such is the explanation offered by Eustratius. It is not inconsistent with the view of *εὐδαιμονία* presented in *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 18 *εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν, πολυφιλίαν, χρηστοφιλίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, πολυτεκνίαν, εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἷον ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχὺν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν, δόξαν, τιμήν, εὐτυχίαν, ἀρετήν.* But surely it is inconsistent with the words which follow in § 6, 1144 a. 9 *τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ.* These words make it impossible to regard *ὑγίεια*, the excellence of *τὸ θρεπτικόν*, as a *μέρος τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς*: see also *E. E.* ii. 1. 1219 b. 20 *διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μόριόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ μόριον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος.* We must therefore understand *τὸ ὑγιαίνειν*, not *εὐδαιμονίαν*, after *ὑγίεια* 1144 a. 4, and explain—*σοφία* (he has dropped *φρόνησις* for the moment) 'produces' *εὐδαιμονία*, as formal, not as efficient cause:—*i. e.* it is a



*μέρος*, or formal element, in the *ὅλον*, or *εἶδος*, of the virtuous character whose function is *εὐδαιμονία*. For the technical use of *μέρη*, as the *notae notionis*, see Bonitz on *Met.* Δ. 25. 1023 b. 19 *ἔτι εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖταί τι ἢ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται τὸ ὅλον, ἢ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος.* The phrase *ὅλη ἀρετή* does not occur in the 'Nicomachean' Books of the *E. N.*, but is well known to Eudemus. Grant remarks that Eudemus came to identify *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* with *καλοκαγαθία* —for which see *E. E.* H. 15. 1248 b. 8 sqq. The Paraphrast explains the present § correctly—*Ἔπειτα καὶ χρήσιμοί εἰσι πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἰατρικὴ πρὸς ὑγίειαν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ ὑγίεια πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἔχει, οὕτω σοφία καὶ φρόνησις πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν χρήσιμοί εἰσιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου εὐδαιμονία ἡ παντελής ἐστιν ἀρετή, σοφίαι δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μέρος εἰσὶ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς· ὥστε μέρος εἰσὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης εὐδαιμονίας σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, καὶ τὸ ταύτας ἔχειν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν ὅλην εὐδαιμονίαν.* 1144 a. 3.

**§ 6. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κ.τ.λ.**] 'Further, the function of the *εὐδαίμων* (*τὸ ἔργον* takes up *ἐνεργεῖν* (?) immediately preceding) requires for its complete fulfilment Prudence and Moral Virtue—Virtue making the end aimed at (*sc.* in the sphere of conduct) right, and Prudence making the means right.' Man's is a *σύνθετος φύσις*. *Ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* includes, as its *μέρη*, the *ἠθικαί*, as well as the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί*. The *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν*, or man's function, as man, is an *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, which involves not only *θεωρία*, but *πρᾶξις*. For the doctrine of this passage *cf. E. E.* ii. 11. 1227 b. 19 *ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι, εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἡ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. . . . τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν.* 1144 a. 6.

*Ἀρετή* is the moral structure or organisation, which, like all living

1144 a. 6. structures, strives to maintain itself: in suo esse perseverare conatur (Spinoza, *Eth.* iii. 6). Asked to define the 'rightness' of the virtuous end, we can only answer—that it is being the end which human nature, as a well-known type, is seen to propose to itself. It is the life which this particular organism, as a matter of fact, strives to lead. Our answer is thus given in the same way as it would have to be given, if the question were—How do you define the 'rightness' of (say) a sparrow's *σκοπός*?

*Φρόνησις ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα*, as here described in relation to *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, is the consciousness of the moral structure or organisation, in so far as this consciousness manifests itself in the delicate perception of the particular things which are advantageous or hurtful to the structure.

a. 9. **τετάρτου**] The four parts are (1) *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*, with its *ἀρετή*—*σοφία*, (2) *τὸ λογιστικόν*, with its *ἀρετή*—*φρόνησις*, (3) *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*, with its *ἀρετή*—*ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, and (4) *τὸ θρεπτικόν*, with its *ἀρετή*—*ὑγίεια*.

a. 10. **ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη**] is *ἀρετή* which can be regarded as a *μέρος* of *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή* (see note on § 5 above), and more especially (as is shown by the explanatory clause *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν*) *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*.

a. 12. **§ 7. ἄνωθεν**] Ramsauer compares *E. N.* viii. 1. 6 *καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσιν καὶ φυσικώτερον*—where see note.

a. 16. **ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά**] *ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι, ἢ χρήματα ἢ ἡδονήν, τὸ δίκαιον πυιοῦντες, καὶ μὴ δι' ἑαυτό* (Paraph.).

a. 19. **οἷον**] here = '*i. e.*'—see Waitz, *Organon* vol. i. p. 280—'Aristoteles saepe voce *οἷον* ita utitur, ut explicet (*scilicet, nempe*), non ut exempla afferat.'

For the doctrine of this §, see *E. N.* ii. 4.

a. 20. **§ 8. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως**] Grant says—'There is some confusion here in speaking of the means to a purpose, *προαίρεσις* itself being in the Aristotelian psychology a faculty of means; but *cf. Eth. Eud.* ii. 11. 5–6 [1227 b. 36], where *προαίρεσις* is said to imply both end and means, and whence the present passage is repeated almost *verbatim*, *ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινός. οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου,*



*ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα* 1144 a. 20.
*ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τελος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως* [*οὖ*] *ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία.*' I think that Grant is mistaken in supposing (as he seems to do) that there is any deviation marked here from Aristotle's doctrine of *προαίρεσις* as 'faculty of means.' The writer says distinctly *ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου* (*i. e.* of the *end*), *ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα* (the means); and if he gives us to understand that *προαίρεσις* 'implies both end and means,' he only expresses what is involved in Aristotle's and his own view of *προαίρεσις* as faculty of *means*—*sc.* of means *to a certain end*. There is no more awkwardness, I think, in saying *τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης* (*sc. τῆς προαιρέσεως*) *ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς*, than in saying, as both Aristotle (*E. N.* iii. 2. 1) and Eudemus (*E. E.* ii. 11. 1228 a. 2) say, that we judge of a man's character (*i. e.* his end) from his *προαίρεσις*—*i. e.* we think less of what his acts are in themselves, than of the end for which he chooses them as means. It must be remembered also that the popular meaning of *προαίρεσις* (to which 'Eudemus' may be allowed to revert here, without being thought guilty of much 'confusion') is that of 'general policy'—as in Demosth. 257. 7 *ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ πολιτεία*. By *ἑτέρας δυνάμεως* we are to understand *φρονήσεως*. It points out to the man whose interest is in the good end, the things naturally fitted to serve as means to this end. These things he accordingly chooses and does.

**ἐπιστήσασι**] *sc. τὴν διάνοιαν.* a. 22.

**§ 9. τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπόν**] 'a given end'—*i. e. δεινότης*, or a. 24. 'cleverness,' is the power of discovering and employing the means which lead to any end which happens to be in view—no account being taken, so far as the notion of *δεινότης* is concerned, of the *morality* of the end. *Δεινότης*, of course, operates largely in non-moral fields, where it undergoes no transformation: but in the moral field, when it is habitually enlisted in the cause of a good end, it becomes the *ἕξις* of *φρόνησις*; when habitually enlisted in the cause of a bad end, the *ἕξις* of *πανουργία*. In *E. E.* ii. 3. 1221 a. 12 (in the *ὑπογραφή* of doubtful authenticity), *φρόνησις* is given as the *μεσότης* between *πανουργία* and *εὐήθεια*.

**τυγχάνειν αὐτοῦ**] *αὐτοῦ* (*i. e. τοῦ σκοποῦ*) is Bywater's reading for a. 25. the *αὐτῶν* of the MSS. I think that *E. E.* ii. 11. 1227 b. 40 is

1144 a. 25. against Bywater's reading—**τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν.**

a. 27. **διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι**] These words are to be construed (as by Eustr. and the Paraph.) in the obvious way—*τοὺς φρονίμους* being the subject, and *δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους* the predicate. It is adduced as a proof of the close connexion which the writer wishes to establish, between *δεινότης* and *πανουργία* on the one hand, and *δεινότης* and *φρόνησις* on the other, that '*even* the *φρόνιμοι* are often popularly described as *δεινοί* and *πανοῦργοι*'—*i. e.* that the terms *φρόνιμος*, *δεινός*, and *πανοῦργος* are used (inaccurately, of course, but still used) interchangeably. Michelet construes—*διὸ καί φαμεν τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ πανούργους εἶναι δεινούς*, but does not satisfactorily explain the omission of the article before *πανούργους* in the existing text. Ramsauer (followed by Susemihl) inserts the article before *πανούργους*. It may perhaps be thought that *οὐ*, which CCC reads before *πανούργους*, is a fragment of an original *τούς*. Fritzsche quotes Plato, *Theaet.* 177 A *δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι*, and Demosth. *Olynth.* i. p. 9 *πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος πράγμασι χρήσασθαι.*

a. 28. **§ 10. οὐχ ἡ δύναμις**] Bekker's *οὐχ ἡ δεινότης* is the reading of $M^b$ alone. Not only do the great MSS.—$K^b$ and $L^b$—read *δύναμις*, but the inferior ones—Cambr., CCC, NC, $B^1$, $B^2$, and $B^3$—also. Accordingly Susemihl and Bywater revert to *δύναμις*. I agree with Ramsauer (against Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 63) when he says—'*οὐχ ἡ δύναμις* nullo modo ferri potest, nisi addatur (*ἡ δύναμις*) *αὕτη*. Optime, ut sexcenties, Bekkerus de Nic. meruit corrigens *δεινότης*.' It is to be noted that the Paraph. Heliodorus has—*ἔστι δὲ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ αὕτη ἡ δύναμις, ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ' κ.τ.λ.*

a. 29. **ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ κ.τ.λ.**] Eustratius (followed by Zell, Fritzsche, and Grant) is plainly wrong in regarding the *ὄμμα* here as *νοῦς πρακτικός*. The passages quoted by these editors (*e.g. E. N.* vi. 11. 6 *διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς*, i. 6. 12 *ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς*) certainly show that *νοῦς* is described as *ὄμμα* or *ὄψις*: but the question here is—What does *τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ* mean? and it surely can only mean the *δύναμις* of *δεινότης*, which becomes the *ἕξις* of *φρόνησις* (or *νοῦς πρακτικός*), when *ἀρετή* has taken it into its service. Grant compares Plato, *Rep.* 518. It will be seen that the *δύναμις* or *ὄμμα* of Plato answers to the *δεινότης* or innate capacity of *E. N.* vi. 12. 10, not to *φρόνησις*—518 B *Δεῖ δή,* 1144 a. 29.
*εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν, οὐχ οἵαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι, τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνοῦσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐνιθέντες. Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον, ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ ξὺν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη· τοῦτο δ' εἶναί φαμεν τἀγαθόν. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη, τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι. Ἔοικε γάρ, ἔφη. Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσί τε καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμον καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται. ἢ οὔπω ἐννενόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μέν, σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα, ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ' ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν, ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον;*

**ὡς εἴρηται**] Ramsauer makes a difficulty about the statement thus a. 30.
referred to, and comes to the conclusion that it is not to be found, and must have occurred in a lost passage—most likely in the present Book. But what is the statement? Virtually, that *ἀρετή* makes the *σκοπός* of the *ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς* good, and so makes the *ὄψις* of this *ὄμμα* an *ἐπαινετὴ ἕξις*. This has been said several times in §§ 6–9. I cannot understand why Ramsauer declines to recognise the remarks in these §§ as referred to by *ὡς εἴρηται*.

**οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδή κ.τ.λ.**] a. 31.
*ἔχοντές εἰσιν* (if the reading is sound) must be taken as equivalent to *ἔχουσιν*: so the Paraph.—*οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν, οὓς δηλονότι συλλογιζόμενοι πράττομεν, ἀρχὰς ἔχουσι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων.* For the Practical Syllogism, see notes on vii. 3. 9. Ramsauer suspects *τὸ τυχόν*, which he regards as inappropriate where *τὸ ἄριστον* is concerned. This objection seems a little hypercritical.

1144 a. 36. **ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν**] *φρόνησις* is the consciousness of what is required, in all circumstances, for the maintenance of the moral character. Similarly, every living creature is aware, in all that it does, of the requirements of its particular type.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*As Prudence is related to Cleverness, so is Virtue strictly so called related to natural virtue. That there is such a thing as natural virtue is plain: people are born with tendencies to acquire this or that virtuous disposition—temperance, or courage, or justice: such tendencies are constitutional or natural. Unless directed by reason they are obviously harmful; but under the direction of Reason,* i.e. *of Prudence, they settle down into habits and become virtues strictly so called. Thus, as we find Cleverness and Prudence under the opining part of the soul, so we find natural virtue and virtue strictly so called under the moral part: and virtue strictly so called does not come into existence without Prudence. Hence Socrates held that the virtues are so many forms of Prudence. He was wrong in simply identifying the virtues with Prudence, right in so far as he recognised that Prudence is necessary to them. And this is what all now recognise in their definition of Virtue as 'a habit in relation to certain objects —determined,' they add, 'as the right ratio requires,' meaning by 'right' that determined by Prudence. A slight alteration, however, is necessary in this definition. Virtue is not only 'a habit determined as the right ratio requires,' for thus the right ratio might be a law external to the 'virtuous disposition—rather, Virtue is 'a habit which has the right ratio in itself.'*

*It is plain then from what has been said that a man cannot be good in the strict sense without Prudence, or prudent without moral virtue: and it is by means of the distinction which we have drawn between Virtue strictly so called and natural virtue that we meet the dialectical argument which tries to show that the virtues may exist separately in a man—that he may have this virtue, and not yet have acquired that. The 'virtues' which this argument manipulates are only the 'natural virtues,' which indeed may exist separately; but as for the virtues which constitute the character of the good man strictly so called, they cannot exist separately. If a man have Prudence, he will at the same time have all the virtues. Even if Prudence did not help conduct, we should need it as being the excellence of a part of the soul; as it is, however, it does help conduct; without it and Virtue choice would not be right; for Virtue gives the good end and makes it attractive, Prudence discovers means such as virtuous choice can adopt.*

*As for the difficulty about Prudence being mistress of Wisdom—It is no more so than medical science is mistress of health. Prudence does not use Wisdom as a means, but provides that Wisdom shall abound. It is* for, *not* to *Wisdom that Prudence issues commands. Prudence stands to Wisdom, as the State stands to the gods whose worship it regulates.*



**§ 1. καὶ γὰρ . . . πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν**] The reading of $L^b$, $O^b$, NC is tempting—*παραπλησίως γὰρ ἔχει ὡς κ.τ.λ.* for the *καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς κ.τ.λ.* of the other MSS.: in any case, however, the *ἀναλογία* is given incorrectly: it ought to be—*ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα, οὕτω καὶ ἡ κυρία ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν φυσικήν*. One is also tempted to think that *οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν, ὅμοιον δέ* is an interpolation. If we retain it, we must understand *ἡ δεινότης τῇ φρονήσει*: and might then be ready to agree with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 126) that the terms of the other ratio are given in the correct order—*οὕτω ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν*. 1144 b. 1.

**πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.**] The doctrine of *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*, or a constitutional tendency to goodness, which lends itself kindly to moral training, is, Fritzsche (*E. E.*, note here pp. 146–7, and note on *E. E.* iii. 7. 1233 b. 16) takes pains to show, a Eudemian development of hints supplied by Aristotle—*e.g.* in *E. N.* ii. 1. 3, ii. 5. 5, x. 8. 2, x. 9. 8. It is true that the doctrine of *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* is very definitely presented in the *E. E.*, as will be seen from the passage quoted below; but I think that justice is scarcely done to Aristotle's statements on the subject, when they are summarily described as 'hints:'—'Confidentius ut de rebus exploratis loquitur Eudemus quam facit Aristoteles, ex cujus quasi adumbrationibus . . . haec doctrina petita est' (Fritzsche ad *E. E.* 1233 b. 16). The statement of Aristotle (referred to by Fritzsche) in *E. N.* ii. 1. 3 *οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους*, seems to go far beyond a hint. Nor must we forget, in estimating Aristotle's position in relation to this doctrine, to take into account the prominence which he gives to *εὐγένεια* (defined as *ἀρετὴ γένους*: see note on i. 8. 16 *εὐγενείας* 1099 b. 3), and to *national* character (see *Pol.* H. 6. 1327 b. 18 sqq.), and to the *continuity* of mental, as well as of corporeal forms, in the ascending scale of organic life generally: see *Hist. Anim.* Θ. 1. 588 a. 16 *Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ἄλλην φύσιν τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ οἱ βίοι κατὰ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς τροφὰς διαφέρουσιν. Ἔνεστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἴχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τρόπων, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει φανερωτέρας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ γὰρ ἡμερότης καὶ ἀγριότης, καὶ πραότης καὶ χαλεπότης, καὶ* b. 4.

1144 b. 4. ἀνδρία καὶ δειλία, καὶ φόβοι καὶ θάρρη, καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ πανουργίαι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συνέσεως ἔνεισιν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητες, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐλέγομεν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων (ἔνια γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἔνια δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις μᾶλλον), τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει· ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις, οὕτως ἐνίοις τῶν ζῴων ἐστί τις ἑτέρα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις. Φανερώτατον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἡλικίαν βλέψασιν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τῶν μὲν ὕστερον ἕξεων ἐσομένων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οἷον ἴχνη καὶ σπέρματα, διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἄλογον εἰ τὰ μὲν ταὐτὰ τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια τὰ δ' ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις. Οὕτω δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀψύχων εἰς τὰ ζῷα μεταβαίνει κατὰ μικρὸν ἡ φύσις, ὥστε τῇ συνεχείᾳ λανθάνειν τὸ μεθόριον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ μέσον ποτέρων ἐστίν.

The most definite statement of the doctrine of φυσικὴ ἀρετή in the *E. E.* is that in iii. 7. 1234 a. 24 sqq. The writer is speaking of the παθητικαὶ μεσότητες (αἰδώς, νέμεσις, φιλία, σεμνότης, εὐτραπελία) and their respective extremes, and he says—πᾶσαι δ' αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μέν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἀρεταί, οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τι ἐστίν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδὼς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην. Here an attempt is made to distinguish separate natural or constitutional bases in the πάθη, not only for separate virtues, but for separate vices: and it may be at once admitted that Aristotle supplies only *hints* for such detail, as when he says of the courage διὰ τὸν θυμόν *E. N.* iii. 8. 12—φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι, and when he recognises the value of αἰδώς as a quality in the young, *E. N.* iv. 9. 3. The passage in the *M. M.*, parallel to *E. N.* vi. 13. §§ 1–5 is as follows —i. 34. 1197 b. 36 ὥσπερ δ' ἔχει ἡ δεινότης πρὸς φρόνησιν, οὕτως δόξειεν ἂν ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἁπασῶν. λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ καὶ φύσει ἐν ἑκάστοις ἐγγινόμεναι, οἷον ὁρμαί τινες ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰσὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἔθει καὶ προαιρέσει. αἱ δὲ δὴ μετὰ λόγου οὖσαι τελέως ἀρεταί εἰσιν ἐπαινεταὶ ἐπιγινόμεναι. ἔστιν οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ αὕτη ἡ ἄνευ λόγου χωριζομένη μὲν τοῦ λόγου μικρὰ καὶ ἀπολειπομένη τοῦ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν



προαίρεσιν προστιθεμένη τελείαν ποιεῖ τὴν ἀρετήν. διὸ καὶ συνεργεῖ τῷ λόγῳ 1144 b. 4.
καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ λόγου ἡ φυσικὴ ὁρμὴ πρὸς ἀρετήν. οὐδ' αὖ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ πάνυ τελειοῦται τῷ εἶναι ἀρετὴ ἄνευ τῆς φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς. διὸ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, φάσκων εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν λόγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελος εἶναι πράττειν τὰ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, μὴ εἰδότα καὶ προαιρούμενον τῷ λόγῳ. διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔφη λόγον εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν τὰ καλά, τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ὀρθῶς μὲν οὐδ' οὗτοι. πράξαι μὲν γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ δίκαια προαιρέσει μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ, οὐδὲ γνώσει τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλ' ὁρμῇ τινὶ ἀλόγῳ, ὀρθῶς δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (λέγω δέ, ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς κελεύσειεν, οὕτως ἔπραξεν)· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ τοιαύτη πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἐπαινετόν. ἀλλὰ βέλτιον, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀφορίζομεν, τὸ μετὰ λόγου εἶναι τὴν ὁρμὴν πρὸς τὸ καλόν· τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐπαινετόν. Eustratius describes φυσικὴ ἀρετή as εὐφυΐα τις πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τῆς κυρίως ἀρετῆς, and φρόνησις as εἰδοποίησίς τις καὶ μόρφωσις τῆς δεινότητος.

**σωφρονικοί**] capable of becoming σώφρονες. b. 5.

**καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν**] *i. e.* are capable of acquiring the other ἕξεις, b. 6.
or have the other ἕξεις potentially.

**§ 2. ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει**] The highest b. 12.
moral life consists in the greatest possible αὐτάρκεια of the inner, or rational, as distinguished from the outer, or sensitive, man. But reason and sense are not to be regarded as two *entities* having no part in each other, the one being the principle of morality, and the other of immorality. If this were the distinction, it would be difficult to understand Aristotle's view of a voluntary act, as one springing from any ἀρχή within the man, whether it be ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, or λόγος (*E. N.* iii. 1. 20), and his definition of προαίρεσις as βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις (*E. N.* iii. 3. 19). The moral reason is no mere abstraction out of contact with the passions, but it is the Form (εἶδος) and they are the Matter (τὸ δεκτικόν)—not antagonistic, but really complementary forces which morality seeks to harmonise. Choice, or προαίρεσις, wherein man appears so clearly as an ἀρχή—without which there would be no such thing as morality, belongs as much to the sensitive and emotional, as to the rational side of human nature, and presupposes the power of performing voluntary (ἑκούσια) acts, which irrational beings have no less than man. As the objects of the scientific νοῦς are always presented in a particular ὕλη, so the ὀρθὸς λόγος, or moral organism, of which νοῦς

1144 b. 12. *πρακτικός* is the consciousness, is an *ἔνυλος λόγος*, an equilibrium of real passions. The inner, or rational, is the Form of the outer, or sensitive man. The moral reason is the *εἰδοποίησις καὶ μόρφωσις τῶν παθημάτων*. Aristotle thus avoids the extreme Socratic position—that virtue is knowledge, and vice consequently involuntary, without surrendering the truth that reason is essential to morality. Morality is the perfection of the form of a given matter. In *plants*, their manner of growth—*τὸ θρεπτικόν*—is the form. *Animals* are conscious of their organisms in the schemata of pleasure and pain; and mere *ὄρεξις* is the exponent of their form, so that whatever thwarts mere *ὄρεξις* is not themselves. Acts done from mere *ὄρεξις* by *man* are his own acts, and voluntary, because in him the sensible nature is the material vehicle of the rational moral nature, and if he is to have credit for achieving the perfect form, he must be responsible for acts which hinder its reception—if virtue is in his power, vice must also be in his power. This is the practical consideration which makes Aristotle, in treating of *τὸ ἑκούσιον*, represent man as coextensive with his *ὀρέξεις* of all kinds. There is therefore no contradiction between the statements that Reason is the Man (*e.g. E. N.* ix. 8. 6), and that acts done from *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός*, as well as those done from *λόγος*, are voluntary, *i.e.* the man's own acts (*E. N.* iii. 1. 21). Reason is the Form taken by the whole sensitive nature. The more clearly a man sees that Reason is himself, the more readily will he hold himself responsible for all acts of the sensibility which stand in the way of the final victory of Reason. A central government becomes strong and succeeds in crushing lawlessness in the provinces, only by holding *itself*—*its own* weakness—responsible for the lawlessness.

The education of the young citizen under *νόμος* consists in the process of centralising the *ἀρχή* of his nature. At first he acts *κατὰ λόγον*—in accordance with an external standard, supplied by the *νομοθέτης*, which he could not see unless it were pointed out to him, and would not conform to unless he were constrained. As time goes on, he begins to see for himself what is right, and to desire, independently of external constraint, to do it, till at last he acts *μετὰ λόγου*—in accordance with a standard which he has now appropriated to himself and assimilated: see *E. N.* vi. 13. 5 *ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν*. By habituation the natural tendencies to proper conduct (*αἱ φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί*) become fixed in relation to one another; and as



they become fixed, the consciousness of their relation to one another becomes clearer, and more capable of serving as a principle of guidance, when circumstances arise in which the due relation is likely to be disturbed. *Φυσικὴ ἀρετή* becomes *κυρία ἀρετή*, by habituation, under the eye of *φρόνησις*, which itself becomes clearer as the passions are reduced to order (*E. N.* vi. 13. 6). *Αἰδώς*, for example, is the natural basis of *σωφροσύνη* (*E. E.* iii. 7. 1234 a. 32). This natural tendency to refrain from acts of intemperance is strengthened by education till it begins to attract its possessor's attention, and he makes 'intemperance' and 'temperance' *objects of moral reflection* in relation to other objects of moral experience. This is the beginning of *φρόνησις*, which reacts upon the incipient habit of temperance—ensures its fixture by keeping it steadily in consciousness, and determines its place in relation to other habits similarly made objects of reflection: *cf.* Shaftesbury's *reflected sense*, by the operation of which a creature rises from 'mere goodness' to 'virtue[1].' 1144 b. 12.

**κυρίως ἀρετή**] It is not till a man becomes fully conscious for himself of the order of his moral nature, and delicately sensitive to all that makes for or against it—that he is virtuous *in the strict sense of the term*—*i.e.* virtuous *in his own right*, and a law to himself. b. 14.

**δοξαστικοῦ**] See note on vi. 5. 8.

**ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως**] He has told us in ch. 12. § 10 that *ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν*. Trendelenburg (*Hist. Beiträge zur Philos.* ii. 385–6) discusses this apparent circle, remarking that 'Dialectic can easily exhibit a relation of mutuality b. 16.

[1] Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, Book i. Pt. 2. § 2—'When in general, all the Affections or Passions are suited to the publick good, or good of the species . . . then is the *natural temper* entirely good . . . § 3 But to proceed from what is esteemed mere *Goodness*, and lies within the reach and capacity of all *sensible creatures*, to that which is called *Virtue* or *Merit*, and is allowed to *man* only—In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are objects of the affection, but the very *actions* themselves, and the *affections* of Pity, Kindness, Gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects; so that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.'

1144 b. 16. as a vicious circle.' We must look out of the dialectical circle, as it were, beyond the *relata* themselves, and enquire after the cause which has brought them into this relation of mutuality. We shall then see that *ἀρετή* and *φρόνησις* grow up *together* in the citizen, because the *νοῦς*, or *φρόνησις ἀρχιτεκτονική* of the *νομοθέτης*, which produces both, cannot, as a matter of fact, produce the one without producing the other. The fully formed *ἕξις* of *κυρία ἀρετή* is the assured order of the passions; and the order is not assured till the subject is clearly conscious for himself of its essential lines. This clear consciousness of the moral order is the fully formed *ἕξις* of *φρόνησις*: *cf.* also Zeller's *Ph. der Griechen*, ii. 2 (Aristoteles) p. 658 (3rd ed.), p. 508 (2nd ed.).

b. 17. § 3. **διόπερ**] The connexion here is well brought out by the writer of the *M. M.* in the passage i. 34. 1197 b. 36–1198 a. 21 quoted above in note on vi. 13. 1.

b. 18. **φρονήσεις**] *Cf. E. E.* i. 5. 1216 b. 2 *Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτει τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως. ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾤετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον.*

**Σωκράτης**] See Grant's note *ad loc.*, in which it is concluded from the absence of the article that 'the actual and historical Socrates is designated' here. It is scarcely necessary to say that the bald doctrine—*πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας εἶναι* attributed by Eudemus in i. 5. 1216 b. 2 sqq. to *Σωκράτης ὁ πρεσβύτης*, and by the writer of the *M. M.* in i. 1. 1182 a. 16 to *Σωκράτης*, and in 1183 b. 8 sq. to *ὁ Σωκράτης*, is *not* the doctrine either of the historical or of the Platonic Socrates. *Συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ* (*sc.* *Σωκράτει*) *ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ πάθος καὶ ἦθος* (*M. M.* i. 1. 1182 a. 20) is a captious inference from isolated statements of Socrates or Plato, not a fair account of the theory of either, which did not differ essentially from that of the Aristotelian school.

b. 19. **ἐζήτει**] Eustr. connects *ἐζήτει* with the circumstance that Socrates philosophised *διαλογικῶς καὶ ζητητικῶς*.

b. 21. § 4. **καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες**] Fritzsche has an important note here (*E. E.* p. 147)—'Ego interpretor *nunc, quum valeat doctrina Peripatetica, relicta jam Academia,* et comparo *M. M.* i. 35. 1198 a. 13 *διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔφη* (Socrates) *λόγον εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ἀλλ' οἱ νῦν βέλτιον*: atque existimo ita scribere potuisse Aristotelis aemulum Eudemum, non potuisse ita scribere Aristotelem. *Cf.* etiam infra v. 30 *ἡμεῖς*.'



1144 b. 21. **ὅταν ὁρίζωνται . . . . . τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον**] What *οἱ νῦν* add is *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*. They define *ἀρετή* as 'a *ἕξις* concerned with certain objects,' and add 'in accordance with the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*.' Eustr. explains that *πρὸς ἃ*=*πρὸς πράξεις καὶ πάθη*, and that the *ἴδιον* which is added is *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*. So the Paraphrast—*ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, εἰπόντες αὐτὴν καὶ περὶ τίνα καταγίνεται, προστιθέασι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.*

b. 22.

§ 5. **μικρὸν μεταβῆναι**] *μικρὸν παραλλάξαι τὴν λέξιν* (Eustr.).

b. 26.

**κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον—μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου**] Socrates made the *ἀρεταὶ λόγοι*, the writer says: they are not *λόγοι*, but *ἕξεις, περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, κατὰ λόγον*—or rather, *μετὰ λόγου*, for the *λόγος* which the *πάθη* of the *κυρίως ἀγαθός* obey is not an external one,—not that of law which a man conforms to, but of principle which he reveres. The *κυρίως ἀγαθός* performs his virtuous acts *proprio motu*, according to a standard which he has assimilated—with which he identifies himself: see Eustratius—*οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὡς μέτρον δεῖ τάξαι τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας ἢ πείσεως, ἵν' εἴη πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς κατ' αὐτόν· τὸ γὰρ μέτρον ἐνδέχεταί ποτε τοῦ μετρουμένου χωρίζεσθαι· οὐκ ἀεὶ δέ ποτε πράττειν ἢ πάσχειν κατ' ἀρετήν, χωριζομένης φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεῖ παρεῖναι καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ἀεί, καὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ τὰς πράξεις γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς πείσεις ἵνα κατ' ἀρετὴν γίνοιτο, καὶ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστι.* *Cf.* also the Paraphrast, who has *τὸ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον διαφέρει τοῦ μετὰ λόγου· κατὰ λόγον γάρ τις ποιεῖ τι, καὶ ἑτέρου κινοῦντος, καὶ τὸ τέλος σκοποῦντος, ὥσπερ ἡ φύσις κατὰ λόγον ποιεῖ· μετὰ λόγου δέ, ὅταν αὐτὸς εἰδὼς πράττῃ, καὶ τὸ τέλος σκοπῶν κατὰ λόγον ποιῇ.* The introduction of *consciousness* (*ὅταν αὐτὸς εἰδὼς πράττῃ*) by the Paraphrast, as discriminating *τὸ μετὰ λόγου* from *τὸ κατὰ λόγον*, is unfortunate. It is true that in man the rule of an internal principle is the rule of consciousness, or conscience; but surely plant life, from which consciousness is absent, is also ruled by an internal principle (*ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ*), and if the term *λόγος* is used to express the law of that life, it ought to be used in the formula *μετὰ λόγου*, not, as by the Paraphrast, in the formula *κατὰ λόγον*. We shall avoid confusion if we take *μετὰ λόγου* to mark *an inward principle* (whether its inwardness appear as self-con-

1144 b. 26. sciousness, or merely as the organic unity of the physical individual), and *κατὰ λόγον an external rule*. Thus, a temple is built *κατὰ λόγον*: a tree grows *μετὰ λόγου*.

b. 32. **§ 6. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος . . . . . πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν**] The writer of the *M. M.* helps us to understand the real nature and object of the dialectical argument (*ὁ λόγος . . ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἄν*) referred to here, which tries to prove that the *ἀρεταί* are independent of one another. Its real object is to make a casuistical interpretation of duty possible, by showing that there may be 'a conflict of duties' in any given case—that man is nothing but a bundle of separate virtuous tendencies, any one of which may be indulged at the expense of the others. His words are—*M. M.* ii. 3. 1199 b. 36 *ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀπορίαν, οἷον ἐπειδὰν μὴ ᾖ ἅμα πρᾶξαι ταὐδρεῖα καὶ τὰ δίκαια, πότερ' ἄν τις πράξειεν; ἐν μὲν δὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀρεταῖς ἔφαμεν τὴν ὁρμὴν μόνον [δεῖν] τὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ λόγου· ᾧ δ' ἐστὶν αἵρεσις, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι ἐστίν. ὥστε ἅμα τὸ ἑλέσθαι [καὶ] παρέσται καὶ ἡ τελεία ἀρετὴ ὑπάρξει, ἣν ἔφαμεν μετὰ φρονήσεως εἶναι, οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς φυσικῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ καλόν. οὐδ' ἐναντιώσεται ἀρετὴ ἀρετῇ. πέφυκεν γὰρ ὑπείκειν τῷ λόγῳ, [ἡ] ὡς οὗτος προστάττει, ὥστ' ἐφ' ὃ ἂν οὗτος ἄγῃ, ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἀποκλίνει. τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ αἱρούμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ τῆς φρονήσεως αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ γίνονται, οὔθ' ἡ φρόνησις τελεία ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ἀλλὰ συνεργοῦσί πως μετ' ἀλλήλων ἑπακολουθοῦσαι τῇ φρονήσει.*

b. 35. **τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ.**] The *λύσις* of the casuistical argument is that man is not a bundle of separate natural tendencies, but a moral organism: and that, as a matter of fact, the best men are conscious of this organism, and make the consciousness of it, and not feeling or natural inclination (however amiable), their guide in life.

1145 a. 1. **ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν**] *ὑπαρχούσῃ* (Byw.) is the reading of $K^b$, $M^b$, Cambr.: *οὔσῃ* is the reading of $L^b$, and other authorities, accepted by Bekker and Susemihl. I think that *ὑπαρχούσῃ* is better than *οὔσῃ*, if we read the future *ὑπάρξουσιν*—'if *φρόνησις* is present, all the virtues will be present': but $L^b$, which reads *οὔσῃ*, reads *ὑπάρχουσιν*. As for *μιᾷ*—it accords with *οὔσῃ*, but scarcely with *ὑπαρχούσῃ*. We seem to require—*ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει, μιᾷ οὔσῃ, ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν*. As regards the doctrine of the sentence—*ὅλη ἀρετή*, of which *φρόνησις* is the con-



sciousness, is the resultant of all the special *ἀρεταὶ ψυχῆς*, just as 1145 a. 1.
*εὐεξία* is of the normal condition of all the bodily organs:—see *E. E.* ii. 1. 1220 a. 2 *ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ ἧ τέλος*. Were it not for the resultant, the special *ἀρεταί* would be *ἀρεταί* only in an equivocal sense. If we can be sure that a man has really one virtue—*e.g. σωφροσύνη*, we may be sure that he has all the other virtues which make up the organism of *ἡ ὅλη ἀρετή*: but a man may have *αἰδώς*, and not *νέμεσις*, in his natural constitution. Grant remarks that the theory of this § approaches nearly to the Stoical idea of the wise man: *cf.* Diog. Laert. vii. § 125 (quoted by Michelet) *τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν* (*sc.* *οἱ Στωϊκοί*) *ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν*. On the general subject of the relation of *φρόνησις* to *ἀρετή* see note on ii. 6. 15.

§ 7.] This § recapitulates what has been said in ch. 12. § 4 and a. 2.
§§ 7, 8.

§ 8.] *Cf. M. M.* i. 34. 1198 b. 9 *πότερον δὲ αὕτη πάντων ἄρχει τῶν* a. 6.
*ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ ἀπορεῖται; ἢ οὔ; τῶν γὰρ βελτιόνων οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν, οἷον τῆς σοφίας οὐκ ἄρχει. ἀλλά, φησίν, αὕτη ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων, καὶ κυρία ἐστὶ προστάττουσα. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ ὁ ἐπίτροπος. οὗτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ· ἀλλ' οὔπω οὗτος ἄρχει πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζει τῷ δεσπότῃ σχολήν, ὅπως ἂν ἐκεῖνος μὴ κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκλείηται τοῦ τῶν καλῶν τι καὶ προσηκόντων πράττειν. οὕτω καὶ ὁμοίως τούτῳ ἡ φρόνησις ὥσπερ ἐπίτροπός τίς ἐστι τῆς σοφίας, καὶ παρασκευάζει ταύτῃ σχολὴν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον, κατέχουσα τὰ πάθη καὶ ταῦτα σωφρονίζουσα. Cf. Met.* A. 2. 982 a. 14 *καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἱρετὴν οὖσαν μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἑτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἧττον σοφόν.* As was pointed out in note on vi. 1. 1–4. 1138 b. 18, *φρόνησις* does not apprehend the *ultimate* standard. That is given by *σοφία*. The moral life is what it is in order to subserve the ideal of the speculative reason.

# BOOK VII.

*Introductory Note.*—'These chapters [vii. 1–10],' says Grant, 'form a necessary complement to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of view (*ἄλλην ἀρχήν*) than that which would divide mankind simply into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states; and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction between the "Intemperate" [*ἀκόλαστος*], and the "Incontinent" [*ἀκρατής*], as the use of the English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to give a certain special and technical meaning to the word "Intemperate," in order to make it stand as the representative of *ἀκόλαστος*[1].' *Cf.* the Aldine Scholiast on vii (not Aspasius, but 'Anonymus rec.'—see Rose: *Commentare zur Ethik des Arist.*, Hermes, vol. v) fol. 117ᵛ—*ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐκ ἔστι κυρίως ἀρετὴ ἀλλ' ἐγγίζει τῇ ἀρετῇ . . . ᾗ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἐκ προαιρέσεως γινομένη καὶ περὶ πρακτὰ καταγινομένη, ἔοικεν ἀρετή· ᾗ δὲ πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἰσονομία ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μάχη τις καὶ στασιασμός, ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς ἔχει μὲν τὸν λόγον προστάσσοντα δεῖν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχει μὴ ἀκολουθοῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἀντιτείνουσαν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἡδονῶν ἀντέχεσθαι σπεύδουσαν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἰσονομία τίς ἐστιν καὶ οὐ μάχη τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ ὁ σώφρων ἔχει μὲν τὸν λόγον προστάσσοντα δεῖν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ εὐθὺς ἔχει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπακολουθοῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ μὴ ἀντιτείνουσαν . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἡ ἀντικειμένη τῇ ἀρετῇ ἤτοι τῇ ἐγκρατείᾳ ἑτέρα τίς ἐστι κακία παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἀντικειμένας ταῖς ἠθικαῖς ἀρεταῖς ἥγουν τὴν ἀκολασίαν τὴν δειλίαν καὶ τὰς λοιπάς· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς ἔχει μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐρρωμένον ὅτι κακόν*

[1] 'Incorrigible' is perhaps the closest rendering of *ἀκόλαστος*. He is the man who has no principle, and is an 'incorrigible offender.' 'Intemperate,' however, is amply justified by the fact that *ἀκολασία* is the regular contrary of *σωφροσύνη*.



*ἐστι τὸ μοιχεύειν, ἡττᾶται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, καὶ γίγνεται κανταῦθα μάχη τις τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· τῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμίας σπευδούσης ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἡδονῶν, ὁ λόγος ἀντιτείνει καὶ ἡττᾶται· ὁ δὲ ἀκόλαστος ἔχων τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ῥέπουσαν πρὸς τὰς φαύλας ἡδονὰς εὐθὺς ἔχει καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐπακολουθοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀντιτείνοντα.* *Cf. M. M.* ii. 4. 1200 a. 35 *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ποιησαμένοις λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία αὗταί εἰσιν ἄτοποι, ὡσαύτως ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς περὶ τούτων λόγους λεχθησομένους ἀτόπους γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία ἡ ἀρετὴ αὕτη ἐστὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη ὁρμῶσι, καὶ οὐκ ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτης ἐναντιοῦνται ἀλλήλοις ὅ τε λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη.* The paradoxical character (*τὸ ἄτοπον*) of *ἀκρασία*, to which Socrates first called attention, made the state a favourite subject of discussion. Thus the chief difficulties in the notion of voluntary action present themselves to the writer of the *Eudemian Ethics* (*E. E.* ii. 7 and 8) in connexion with *ἐγκράτεια* and *ἀκρασία*: the writer of *E. N.* v discusses the puzzle of self-injury with immediate reference to the *ἀκρατής* (*E. N.* v. 9. 5); the interest of the writer of *E. N.* vii. chapters 1–10 in his subject is, to a considerable extent, a dialectical one; and the same remark applies to the writer of the *M. M.* ii. chapters 4, 5, and 6, who follows *E. N.* vii. 1–10 very closely, and probably (see Ramsauer *E. N.* p. 425) had no other treatment of the subject before him, when he wrote. It is the circumstance, as it seems to me, that *ἀκρασία* lends itself to dialectical discussion, rather than the intrinsic importance of the subject—great as that is[1]—which accounts for its remarkable prominence in the Aristotelian system, and more especially (as was to be expected) in the later versions of that system.

[1] The necessity of assuming the existence of intermediate states between the confirmed *ἕξεις*, *ἀρετή* and *κακία*, is set forth by Alexander Aphrod. in his **ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις**, iv. 3. p. xxx. Ald. '*ὅτι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, καὶ ὅλως ἀρετῆς τε καὶ κακίας, ἔστι τις ἕξις μεταξύ.*' If there were no intermediate states, how, he asks, would it be possible to *become* virtuous? Everything comes either *ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου* or *ἐκ τοῦ μεταξύ*. If *ἀρετή* came *ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου*, then *κακία* would be *φύσει*, and *ἀρετή* consequently *παρὰ φύσιν*. Therefore *ἀρετή* and *κακία* are differentiated *ἐκ τοῦ μεταξύ*.

# CHAPTER I.

## ARGUMENT.

*Let us now pass to another division of our subject.*

*Dispositions to be avoided are three,* (1) *Vice,* (2) *Incontinence,* (3) *Brutality. Virtue and Continence are plainly the contraries of Vice and Incontinence: the contrary of Brutality is not so plain; but may be taken to be superhuman virtue, such as we ascribe to heroes and to the gods. As this godlike virtue is rare among men, so is its opposite brutality—oftenest found among barbarians, and sometimes even caused by disease and mutilation. We shall return to it afterwards—at present we are concerned with those properly human dispositions which lie between the god and the brute. Of these dispositions, Vice and Virtue have been already discussed: there remain Incontinence and Softness, Continence and Endurance, the latter two belonging to the same genus as Virtue, but differing from it specifically; the former two belonging to the same genus as Vice, but differing from it specifically.*

*Let us conduct this enquiry in our usual way,—first stating the views held regarding these dispositions; then going through the difficulties in the views: then proceeding to establish, if possible, all the views backed by sufficient opinion, or, at least, the most of them, and the weightiest: for the purpose of this treatise will have been sufficiently served if, having removed certain confusions, we leave men's opinions to speak for themselves.*

*The following views, then, are held—*

(1) *Continence and endurance are good, incontinence and softness bad.*

(2) *The continent man is he who abides by the result of his reflection; the incontinent, he who falls away from it.*

(3) *The incontinent man acts under the influence of feeling, knowing that what he does is bad; the continent man, knowing that his desires are bad, obeys his reason and does not follow them.*

(4) *The temperate man is continent and enduring; while the converse of this statement some regard as universally true, and others do not.*

(5) *Some use the terms 'incorrigible' and 'incontinent' interchangeably; others distinguish between them.*

(6) *Some say that the prudent man cannot be incontinent; others say that prudent and clever people are sometimes incontinent.*

(7) *There is 'incontinence' in anger, and in the pursuit of honour and of material advantages.*

1145 a. 15. **§ 1.**] In this section we have six states—(1) θεία ἀρετή, ἡ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον, (2) ἀρετή, ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, (3) ἐγκράτεια, (4) ἀκρασία, (5) κακία, ἡ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, (6) θηριότης. Although the ἀρετή above ἐγκράτεια *in pari materia* is σωφροσύνη (*i. e.* περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς



ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας), and the κακία below ἀκρασία is ἀκολασία, I do not 1145 a. 15.
think that Grant is right in assuming, as he seems to do in his note on this section, that the terms ἀρετή and κακία, as here employed, are simply equivalent to σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία respectively. Ἀρετή here marks the character, as a whole, of the virtuous *man*, as distinguished from the *god*, whose attribute is τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, and κακία the character, as a whole, of the vicious *man*, as distinguished from the *beast*. This seems to be the view of the Ald. Schol. *ad loc.*—ἡ γὰρ κακία ἀντίκειται πάσαις ταῖς ἠθικαῖς ἀρεταῖς· ἡ γὰρ δειλία καὶ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ᾗ κακίαι ἀντίκεινται ταῖς ἠθικαῖς ἀρεταῖς. Similarly the Paraphrast Heliodorus describes the ἀρετή of this section as ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθική.

οὐδὲ ἐῴκει κ.τ.λ.] *Il.* xxiv. 258. a. 21.

§ 2. **οὐδὲ θηρίου . . . γένος κακίας**] *Cf. Pol.* i. 1. 1253 a. 27 ὁ δὲ a. 25.
μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως. ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. *Cf.* Plut. *de Vita et Poesi Homeri*, 133 μέσος θεοῦ καὶ θηρίου γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος . . . τὴν μὲν ἄκραν ἀρετὴν θείαν ἡγεῖται [Ὅμηρος], τὴν δὲ ἄκραν κακίαν θηριωδίαν, ὡς ὕστερον Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνόμισε. The brutes have neither ἀρετή nor κακία, because ἀρετή and κακία are states acquired by habituation (ἕξεις); whereas the dispositions of brutes are what they are φύσει. The Ald. Schol. and Heliod. explain this difference between man and the brutes by the presence of λόγος in man. The Ald. Schol. says—τοῖς μὲν θηρίοις ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι διότι ἡ ἀρετὴ προαιρετή ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν λογικῶν ἐστίν: and Heliod. has—οὐ γὰρ ἔστι θηρίου κακία ἡ ἀρετὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ μετὰ λόγου ποιεῖν ἢ παρὰ τὸν λόγον: *i. e.* man lives in, and is conscious of (λόγος), a moral environment (πόλις), with the conditions of which he either may (ἀρετή), or may not (κακία) correspond. But the brutes are born into a merely physical environment, with which they are, from the first, in perfect correspondence. God, on the other hand, has no ἀρετή, for ἀρετή is a ἕξις, or acquired capacity of correspondence with an environment, and represents the painful victory of organising form (λόγος) over matter (ὕλη): God's being is pure form—ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως—νόησις νοήσεως—the formative principle in him is not confronted by an alien matter, but regards itself alone. This conclusion, arrived at by an *à priori* method in *Met.* Λ. 7 and 9, is confirmed by considerations of a somewhat popular kind in *E. N.* x. 8. 7.

The expression τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς 1145 a. 26 indicates that the

1145 a. 25. divine good is not a ἕξις, which is merely ἐπαινετόν, but an ἐνέργεια, which is τίμιον: see *E. N.* i. 12.

a. 27. **ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας**] The genitive *κακίας* depends on *ἕτερον*: see Coraes *ad loc.*—διάφορόν τι γένος παρὰ τὴν κακίαν, ὡς ἐξηγεῖται ἡ Ἀργυροπούλου—diversum quid est a vitio genus.

a. 29. **§ 3. ⟨οἳ⟩ ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του, σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν**] Bywater adds *οἵ*. I like better Susemihl's way of meeting the difficulty, by making *σεῖος ἀνὴρ φασιν* parenthetical. Coraes (with the approval of Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 126, and Susemihl *ad loc.*) reads *οὗτος* between *φασιν* and *οὕτω*, on the strength of Plato, *Meno.* 99 D, which the writer of the present passage seems to have had in his mind—*καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δή που τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν,* **οὗτος**. Argyropulus, as Coraes notes, favours *οὗτος*: his version is—Dicunt enim vir divus *hic* est. The Ald. Schol. also may have read *οὗτος*: his version is—*οἱ Λάκωνες . . . ἔλεγον οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ θεός ἐστιν ἤτοι θεῖος.*

On the construction *ἐπεί . . . . οὕτω* see Eucken, *de Arist. dicendi ratione* p. 30, who compares *Pol.* 1253 b. 23–33, and *Pol.* 1258 a. 31.

a. 30. **μάλιστα δ' . . ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν**] '(1) Some men are born brutal; (2) others are made so; (3) others make themselves so'—Peters' note *ad loc.* *Τοὺς διὰ κακίαν ὑπερβάλλοντας*, introduced by *καὶ*—*δέ*, are distinguished as a third variety from (1) *οἱ φύσει, i. e. βάρβαροι*, and (2) *οἱ διὰ νόσους.*

a. 31. **πηρώσεις**] We are to think of bodily mutilations and defects, not, with the Ald. Schol., of a defective moral nature—*εἰσὶ γάρ τινες*, he says, *πεπηρωμένον ἤτοι βεβλαμμένον ἔχοντες τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ τῶν οἰκείων φρενῶν ἐκστάντες.* Coraes, noting that Argyropulus has *laesiones principii*, suggests the reading *πηρώσεις τῆς ἀρχῆς*, and compares the *πεπηρωμένος πρὸς ἀρετήν* of *E. N.* i. 9. 4: but the association of *πηρώσεις* with *νόσοι* (frequent, as Fritzsche *ad loc.* notes, in the *E. E.* and in *E. N.* vii) seems conclusive in favour of understanding the former term of bodily injuries or defects.

a. 34. **§ 4. ὕστερον**] vii. 5.

**περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον**] *E. E.* iii. 2 (*cf. E. N.* iii. 10), if *κακία* be taken here rather in its special sense, as *ἀκολασία*, than in the general sense of the contrary of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*. The Paraph. probably takes it in the general sense: he says *περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται* 1145 a. 34. *πρότερον, ὅτε περὶ ἀρετῶν ἐλέγομεν ἠθικῶν.*



**οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ** a. 36. **ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 126) remarks on the extraordinary carelessness of the writing here, and supposes that the author, when he wrote *περί*, intended to use *λεκτέον*, as in the previous clause, but wrote *ὑποληπτέον* instead. Coraes adopts the reading *ὡσπερεί* for *ὡς περί*. Ramsauer notes the carelessness with which *ἑκατέραν* is used in the singular number, although, on the one side, three dispositions (*ἀκρασία, μαλακία*, and *τρυφή*) are enumerated, and, on the other side, two (*ἐγκράτεια* and *καρτερία*). *ὥσπερ οὐσῶν*, for *ὡς περί*, might be suggested, if it were not easier to accept the careless writing of the text as it stands.

Ἐγκράτεια and *ἀρετή* (here=*σωφροσύνη*, apparently) belong to the same *γένος*, inasmuch as both result in good acts, where certain bodily pleasures are concerned; but differ *κατ' εἶδος*, in that the good acts proceeding from *ἀρετή* are done without, and those proceeding from *ἐγκράτεια* with, a struggle. Similarly, *ἀκρασία* and *μοχθηρία* (=*ἀκολασία*) belong to the same *γένος*, inasmuch as both result in bad acts; but they differ *κατ' εἶδος*, in that the bad acts proceeding from *μοχθηρία* are done without, and those proceeding from *ἀκρασία* with, a struggle. So also *καρτερία* produces good acts, where certain bodily pains are concerned, but after a struggle; and thus belongs to the same *γένος* as *ἀρετή*, but differs from it *κατ' εἶδος*: and *μαλακία* produces bad acts, where certain bodily pains are concerned, but after a struggle, thus belonging to the same *γένος* as *μοχθηρία*, but differing from it *κατ' εἶδος*. For the difference between the *ἀκρατής* and *ἀκόλαστος* see *E. N.* vii. 3. 2 *ὁ μὲν γὰρ* (*sc. ἀκόλαστος*) *ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ'* (*sc. ἀκρατής*) *οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει δέ.* The Ald. Schol. marks the difference by saying that in the *ἐγκρατής* and *ἀκρατής* there is a *μάχη τις*, in the *σώφρων* and *ἀκόλαστος* an *ἰσονομία τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς*: *cf.* Plutarch, *de Virt. Morali* ch. 6 *νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνη μέν ἐστιν, οὗ τὸ παθητικὸν ὥσπερ εὐήνιον θρέμμα καὶ πρᾷον ὁ λογισμὸς ἡνιοχεῖ καὶ μεταχειρίζεται, περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας χρώμενος ὑπείκοντι καὶ δεχομένῳ τὸν χαλινὸν καὶ κρατοῦντι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν· ἐγκράτειαν δὲ οὐκ ἀλύπως ἄγει, οὐδὲ πειθομένην, ἀλλὰ πλαγίαν καὶ ἀντιτείνουσαν, οἷον ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινοῦ καταβιαζόμενος καὶ ἀνακρούων, ἄγωνος ὢν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ θορύβου μεστός· οἷον ὁ Πλάτων ἐξεικονίζει περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποζύγια, τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ζυγομαχοῦντος ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἡνίοχον διαταράττοντος, ἀντέχειν*

1145 a. 36. ὀπίσω, καὶ κατατείνειν ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀεί, μὴ βάλῃ φοίνικας ἐκ χειρῶν ἱμάντας κατὰ Σιμωνίδην. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀρετὴν αὐτοτελῆ ἀξιοῦσι τὴν ἐγκράτειαν, ἀλλ' ἔλαττον ἀρετῆς εἶναι· μεσότης γὰρ οὐ γέγονεν ἐκ συμφωνίας τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, οὐδ' ἀνῄρηται τοῦ πάθους τὸ ὑπερβάλλον, οὐδὲ πειθόμενον οὐδὲ ὁμολογοῦν τῷ φρονοῦντι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, ἀλλὰ λυποῦν καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ κατειργόμενον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, ὥσπερ ἐν στάσει δυσμενὲς καὶ πολέμιον συνοικεῖ·

πόλις δ' ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει,
ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων.

b. 2. § 5.] *On the method of the present enquiry.* First, we must state what men think on the subject (τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα): then, review the difficulties in the various opinions (διαπορήσαντας); but not in such a way as to overthrow any, or, at least, many of them (οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα); for men's opinions about matters of conduct, if certain confusions be cleared up (ἐὰν λύηται τὰ δυσχερῆ), will generally be found to be right. *Cf. E. E.* i. 6. 1216 b. 28 κράτιστον μὲν πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως. According to this view, the function of the moral philosopher is to introduce form into the matter already supplied by the common opinions of men. These opinions, often representing imperfect knowledge and states of feeling, and generally couched in misleading language, cannot, as they stand, combine to form a consistent theory of conduct. They necessarily conflict with one another at many points, if not in their substance, at least in their expression. The moralist has to note the points at which they conflict, and to present the exact nature of the conflict in every case as sharply as possible in a striking ἀπορία. When two conflicting opinions have been sharply defined side by side, the grounds on which each has been adopted will generally appear. Each is seen to embody part of the truth; each regards the same thing from a somewhat different point of view; or even perhaps it is not the same thing at all that is regarded, but two things which a word confounds. The detection of the equivocation, or other cause of misunderstanding, which has opposed two nearly correct



opinions as the ἐναντία of an ἀπορία, immediately removes the dead- 1145 b. 2.
lock, and enables the moralist to use the opinions as materials in the construction of his ethical system. Thus, ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν (*E. N.* vii. 2. 12), the λύσις being effected, not by the eristic method of championing the one ἐναντίον and discrediting the other, but by the method of examining the truth in each—by discovering 'the grounds on which each has naturally approved itself,' as Eudemus puts it in a passage (*E. E.* vii. 2. 1235 b. 13) which Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies* § 65) compares with the passage before us—λεκτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τά τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις. *Cf. E. N.* vii. 14. 3 ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. A good example of the method of dealing with ἀπορίαι recommended in *E. E.* vii. 2, is given in *E. N.* ix. 8. One λόγος, or view, condemns the φίλαυτος, another maintains that a man ought to love himself most. The ἐναντίωσις here is caused by the ambiguity of the term αὐτός. The former view regards the lower and merely sensitive self, the latter the higher and rational self. Instead of being contrary views about the same thing, they turn out to be views about entirely different things.

Moral science then being, as it were, the *formation* of common opinions into a system, the moralist must begin by stating these opinions. He must next arrange them so as to bring out clearly the inconsistencies which they involve in relation to one another. He is then in a position to see more or less easily why they present themselves as inconsistent, and it suggests itself to him to reconcile the inconsistencies by drawing needful distinctions—as when in *E. E.* vii. 2 the discussion of the ἀπορία whether τὸ φιλούμενον is τὸ ἡδύ or τὸ ἀγαθόν results in the establishment of three εἴδη of φιλία: or by applying an 'appropriate idea' instead of the inappropriate one which caused the ἀπορία—as in *E. N.* vii. 8. 1, where the appropriate idea of τὸ μεταμελητικὸν εἶναι is introduced, and enables us to see the ἀκόλαστος and ἀκρατής in their true relation to each other, which we could not do so long as the misleading idea of τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν (*E. N.* vii. 2. 10) was retained. Thus, by the method

1145 b. 2. of τὸ διαπορῆσαι (=διεξελθεῖν τὰς ἀπορίας, see Bonitz, *Met.* p. 137), the moralist hits upon the distinctions and ideas (together with the terminology to express them) which bring light and order into the rough material of popular opinion. These distinctions and ideas are not likely to be fanciful and arbitrary, for they have been forced upon the moralist by a careful study of the intricacies of his subject-matter. They will be οἰκεῖοι λόγοι τοῦ πράγματος (see *E. E.* i. 6. 1217 a. 9). In other words—ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν. As most ἀπορίαι are largely due to the ambiguities of common language, an important part of the method of τὸ διαπορῆσαι is to distinguish τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα. Thus, in *Top.* i. 13. 105 a. 21 this is given as the second of the four parts into which the method of dialectical enquiry is divided—*τὰ δὲ ὄργανα δι' ὧν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐστὶ τέτταρα· ἓν μὲν τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν· τρίτον δὲ τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν, τέταρτον δὲ ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις.* The method sketched in the above passage, and fully explained in *Top.* i. chapters 14–18, is indicated in the section before us (*E. N.* vii. 1. 5), and followed, though not very systematically, in the enquiry prosecuted in *E. N.* vii. chapters 1–10. In the section before us, *τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα* answers to τὸ προτάσεις λαβεῖν: and τὸ δεικνύναι τὰ ἔνδοξα (resulting from τὸ διαπορῆσαι) corresponds to the εὐπορία effected by the detection of ambiguities (τὸ ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται δύνασθαι διελεῖν), by the observation of distinctions which had been overlooked (τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν), and by the survey of the subject as a connected whole (ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου σκέψις), which the detection of ambiguities and the observation of distinctions render possible.

The value attached by Aristotle to τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς is well set forth in the following passage, *Met.* B. 1. 995 a. 24 sqq.—*Ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον, περὶ ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί τινες, κἂν εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνοι παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν. ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ἧ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ, ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς* **δυσχερείας** *τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γινώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ*



*δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ* 1145 b. 2. *κρῖναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκούτα πάντων.*

**δεικνύναι**] 'to establish.' b. 4.

**τὰ ἔνδοξα**] *Top.* i. 1. 100 a. 29 sqq.—*διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος . . . ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς· καὶ τούτοις ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις.*

The conditions of moral and political welfare (as distinguished from the recondite laws of the physical world) are represented with substantial accuracy in the common opinions of men; for if common opinions had misrepresented conditions so essential to its survival, the human race must have long ago perished. These common opinions, arbitrary and accidental though they may often seem, are really, like the colours of flowers and the markings of insects, *parts* of the rational or 'noumenal' world, not mere opaque 'phenomena' which hide it from our sight. Hence the moralist fulfils a function of the first *philosophical* importance, when he detects and removes certain obscurities and confusions which prevent a connected view of the whole body of experience represented by *ἔνδοξα*.

**ἐὰν γὰρ . . . ἱκανῶς**] The Ald. Schol. and the Par. take τὰ b. 6. δυσχερῆ to mean *false ideas*—*τοὺς λόγους τοὺς μὴ συμβαίνοντας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* (Par.)—*ὅσαι μὲν τῶν δοξῶν ἔχονται ἀληθείας ταύτας λαβεῖν, ὅσαι δὲ εἰσὶ πεπλανημέναι καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔξω ταύτας ἐᾶσαι* (Ald. Schol.); but **λύηται** τὰ δυσχερῆ cannot mean the rejection of false views, the reference plainly being to the **λύσις** τῆς ἀπορίας which is εὕρεσις, or εὐπορία. The δυσχερῆ here are evidently the δυσχέρειαι or δεσμός of the passage quoted above, *Met.* B. 1. 995 a. 24 sqq., *i.e.* the *causes* of the various ἀπορίαι, such *e.g.* as the reason why two ἔνδοξα, each of which is apparently well-founded in itself, seem to contradict and discredit each other. When this reason has been detected, then *καταλείπεται τὰ ἔνδοξα*—each of the two ἔνδοξα is seen to be true from its own somewhat different point of view, and the moralist fulfils his function sufficiently if he states in unambiguous terms the precise sense in which each is true. I therefore agree with Grant and Ramsauer, who explain *ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα* in connexion with

1145 b. 6. *E. N.* vii. 2. 12 *αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσι, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.* Here *τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν* and *ἡ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας* answer to *ἐὰν λύηται τὰ δυσχερῆ*, as these latter words have been explained above; and *τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν* answers to *καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα*. The words in *E. N.* vii. 2. 12 I understand to mean that these questions must be dealt with on the method of removing difficulties, *and so* leaving the truth (embodied in the *ἔνδοξα*) plain.

*δεικνύναι* and *δεδειγμένον* seem to be used here rather than the compound with *ἀπο-*, because the *διαλεκτικὸς συλλογισμός* is distinguished from the *ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμός* by being *ἐξ ἐνδόξων*, the *ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμός* being *ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων*. See *Top.* i. 1.

b. 8. **§§ 6, 7**] enumerate the *φαινόμενα*, *ἔνδοξα*, or *λεγόμενα* about *ἐγκράτεια*, *ἀκρασία*, &c. These *ἔνδοξα* are generally reduced to six (as by the Paraph.), though a more minute division is possible. The Paraph. has *Δοκεῖ δὴ πᾶσιν ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι· ἡ δὲ ἀκρασία τοὐναντίον. φασὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐγκρατείας καὶ ταῦτα πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῷ ἐμμενετικῷ ἔντινι λογισμῷ καὶ ἀκινήτῳ, καὶ ἐγκράτεια τὸ ἐμμένειν τῷ λογισμῷ, ἀκρασία δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς τοὐναντίον· δεύτερον, ὅτι εἰδὼς ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, ἀφίσταται τούτων καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής, εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει, διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐ πείθεται τῷ λόγῳ· τρίτον, ὅτι καὶ ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατής ἐστι καὶ καρτερικός, καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος τοὐναντίον· τέταρτον, ὅτι καὶ πᾶς ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων· ἔνιοι δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πάντα ἀκόλαστον, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ εἶναί φασιν· ἄλλοι δὲ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων· πέμπτον, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται φρόνιμον καὶ δεινὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· ἕκτον, ὅτι λέγονται ἀκρατεῖς οἱ πρὸς θυμὸν ἐπιρρεπεῖς, καὶ οἱ σφόδρα τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους ὀρεγόμενοι· ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας· ὧν περὶ ἑκάστου σκεψώμεθα· καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ πρώτου.*

For the various views see the passages quoted by Fritzsche and Grant from Xen. *Mem.* i. 5. §§ 4, 5, 6; iv. 5. §§ 3–7; ii. 1. § 1: Plato, *Gorg.* 491 D; *Rep.* iv. 430 E; *Legg.* ix. 869 A: and Isoc. *Demon.* p. 6 c *ὑφ' ὧν κρατεῖσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν αἰσχρόν, τούτων ἐγκράτειαν ἄσκει πάντων, κέρδους, ὀργῆς, ἡδονῆς, λύπης.*

b. 15. **§ 6. οἳ δ' οὔ**] *i.e.* they regard *ἐγκράτεια* as a term of wider extent than *σωφροσύνη*.

b. 18. **§ 7. φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινούς**] *τὸ καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἤτοι* (Ald. Schol.). It is because they confound *φρόνησις* and *δεινότης* (see *E. N.* 1145 b. 18. vi. 12. 9 for the difference), that they can, with any plausibility, speak of the *φρόνιμος* as sometimes *ἀκρατής*. In the words *καὶ δεινούς* we have thus a good example of the *λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας*.



## CHAPTER II.

### Argument.

*Having stated the views commonly held, let us next go through the difficulties in them.*

*The first difficulty is—How can a man have a 'right conception,' and yet act incontinently against it? His 'conception,' some maintain, cannot be 'true knowledge'; 'true knowledge' cannot be dragged about like a slave by passion: it was on this ground that Socrates absolutely denied the existence of 'incontinence' or 'acting against knowledge of right,' holding that ignorance is the cause of men's doing what is wrong. This view is plainly at variance with experience; the man who acts incontinently is certainly not 'ignorant' before he is overtaken by passion. Granted that he* becomes *ignorant; but* how *does he become ignorant? By whose fault?*

*Others, again, admitting that 'true knowledge' cannot be overcome by passion, tell us that 'opinion' may; and that accordingly 'opinion about what is right' is the 'conception' which opposes itself (unsuccessfully) to passion in the incontinent man. The objection to this view is that by substituting 'opinion' for 'knowledge' it sets up a weak principle against passion; and if the incontinent man have only a weak principle with which to combat strong desires, he ought to be excused if they prevail, whereas we do not excuse him.*

*Then, it may be replied, after the rejection of knowledge and opinion, prudence remains as the opposing 'conception'; it is surely a very strong principle. To this we have to say that 'prudence' and 'incontinence' are incompatible qualities in the same character. How absurd to make the 'prudent' man, who not only* has *all the virtues, but* exercises *them, voluntarily perform the worst actions!*

*Another point is—Continence necessarily implies the presence of strong and bad desires (hence 'temperate' and 'continent' are not convertible terms—the temperate man has not excessive or bad desires); for 'continence' opposing 'good desires' would not be good, and opposing weak desires, it would not be the great and noble quality that it is.*

*Again, if continence is abiding by any opinion—false as well as true—it will sometimes be a bad thing; and if incontinence is falling away from any opinion, there will be a good kind of incontinence, like that of Neoptolemus, when he did not abide by his intention of telling a lie, because it gave him pain to have to tell it.*

*Other difficulties—and hard ones to solve—are set forth in the following sophistical arguments—*

*(1) If a weak incontinent man is only stupid and ignorant enough, he is a virtuous character, for his opinions are wrong and he has not strength of will to act on them, but incontinently does what is right.*

*(2) The man who pursues pleasure deliberately, convinced that it is right to do so, is a better character than the man who does so from incontinence, and not because he is convinced that it is right. The former may change his erroneous conviction for a true one—come to believe that it is* wrong *to make pleasure his end—and then he will be a reformed character; whereas the latter—the incontinent man—cannot change his conviction for a better: he already believes that his actions are wrong, but he nevertheless goes on performing them; he is as full of sound knowledge as a drowning man is of water; and it does him no good. His case his hopeless.*

*Lastly, what is the strict sense of the term 'incontinent'?*

*These, then, are the difficulties; we must now try so to remove them as to leave the truth bare; for it is in the resolution of difficulties that discovery consists.*

**1145 b. 21.** § 1.] This § introduces the discussion of the *ἀπορίαι* involved in the view *ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος* κ.τ.λ. ch. 1. § 6. 1145 b. 12. Zell, Fritzsche, and Grant quote Plato, *Protag.* 352 B, a passage which the present writer evidently had in his mind—*δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι· οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ', ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων.*

**πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεταί τις**] 'how it is possible to have an *ὀρθὴ ὑπόληψις* and yet act incontinently,' or 'what is meant by the *ὀρθὴ ὑπόληψις* of the *ἀκρατής*.' Ὑπόληψις is the generic term, including both *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* (see note on vi. 3. 1 b. 17). Hence the writer goes on—**ἐπιστάμενον** *μὲν οὖν* κ.τ.λ. and (§ 4) *ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε* **δόξα** κ.τ.λ.

**b. 24.** **αὐτήν**] This is the reading of $K^b$ and NC accepted by Rassow, Susemihl, and Bywater, instead of *αὐτόν* given by Bekker and Ramsauer. Rassow advocates *αὐτήν* as follows (*Forsch.* p. 63)—'Für *αὐτόν* giebt K *αὐτήν*. Diese Lesart verdient den Vorzug, theils wegen der platonischen Stelle, die Aristoteles im Sinne hat, Protag. p. 352 B (*i. e.* *διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου,* **περιελκομένης**), theils weil es am Schluss des vierten Capitels (vii. 3. 14) heist: *οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς* **1145 b. 24.** *αἰσθητικῆς.*' Ramsauer, reading *αὐτόν*, explains—'quem scientia liberum et quasi dominum reddidit.' I think that this is a very strong defence of *αὐτόν*: *cf.* Xen. *Mem.* i. 5. § 3 *ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε μηδὲ* **δοῦλον** *ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον* **αὐτόν** *γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.*

**Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως . . . ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν**] 'Socrates indeed **b. 25.** was entirely opposed to the view (*sc.* that a man may know the right and do the wrong), maintaining that there is no such thing as incontinence (*sc.* defined as—knowing the right and doing the wrong).' See Xen. *Mem.* iii. 9. §§ 4 and 5 *Σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὰ μὲν καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνώσκοντα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸν τὰ αἰσχρὰ εἰδότα εὐλαβεῖσθαι, σοφόν τε καὶ σώφρονα ἔκρινε. Προσερωτώμενος δέ, εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μέν, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τἀναντία, σοφούς τε καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι; Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς. πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἃ ἂν οἴωνται συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας, οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι. Ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τά τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα, ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότας ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καί, ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καί, ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν, ἁμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τά τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καλά τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστί.* *Cf.* Plato, *Protag.* 352 C *ἆρ' οὖν καί σοι τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ οἷον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου; καὶ ἐάν περ γιγνώσκῃ τις τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἃ ἂν ἐπιστήμη κελεύοι, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἴπερ τῳ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων. Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλούς φασι γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλα πράττειν.* *Cf. M. M.* ii. 6. 1200 b. 25 *Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης*[1] *ἀνῄρει ὅλως καὶ οὐκ ἔφη ἀκρασίαν εἶναι,*

[1] *Cf. E. E.* i. 5. 1216 b. 2 and Fritzsche's note. *Πρεσβύτης* is a term of honour, and does not distinguish a senior from a junior Socrates.

1145 b. 25. λέγων ὅτι οὐθεὶς εἰδὼς τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακά εἰσιν ἕλοιτ' ἄν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς δοκεῖ, εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα εἰσίν, αἱρεῖσθαι ὅμως, ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. διὰ δὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ᾤετ' εἶναι ἀκρασίαν· οὐ δὴ ὀρθῶς. ἄτοπον γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πεισθέντας ἀναιρεῖν τὸ πιθανῶς γινόμενον· ἀκρατεῖς γὰρ εἰσὶν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰδότες ὅτι φαῦλα ὅμως ταῦτα πράττουσιν.

b. 26. **ὑπολαμβάνοντα**] Spengel (*Arist. Studien* p. 45) would insert ὀρθῶς before ὑπολαμβάνοντα. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 126) thinks that there is nothing to prevent ὑπολαμβάνων standing alone, as εἰδώς so often does. I agree with Rassow.

b. 27. **§ 2. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος κ.τ.λ.**] The view of Socrates (οὗτος ὁ λόγος) conflicts with τὰ ἔνδοξα, but, as Socrates is a great man, we must treat his θέσις, or παράδοξον, respectfully, and enquire how the ἄγνοια, by which he explains away ἀκρασία, 'comes on' (γίνεται b. 29—see Grant *ad loc.*). It is evidently not a chronic state of ignorance, but an ignorance which 'comes on' like sleep or drunkenness (see *E. N.* vii. 3. 7), for the ἀκρατής is not 'ignorant' before he is tempted.

b. 28. **καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας**] Bywater suggests in his note *ad loc.* (*cf. Contributions* p. 53) that perhaps γίνεται should be inserted after δέον, and omitted after τρόπος. There seems to be some doubt about the use of δέον (*i. e.* δέον ἐστί, as distinguished from δέον the acc. abs., which is common) = δεῖ: see *Index Arist.* s. v. δεῖν: in *E. N.* ii. 7. 1. 1107 a. 32—περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. λῃπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.—$K^b$ omits οὖν. If the doubt is sufficient to recommend a change of the text here (vii. 2. 2. 1145 b. 28), I think that it would be simpler to read δέοι ἄν for δέον, than to suppose that γίνεται has been displaced.

b. 30. **οὐκ οἴεταί γε**] After γε NC and Ald. insert δεῖν πράττειν ἃ πράττει. These words must, at any rate, be understood: *cf. E. N.* vii. 9. 6 ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὃ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος: *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 b. 8 τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὃ οἴεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαί ἐστιν: *E. N.* v. 9. 6 βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει.

b. 33. **§ 3. τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν**] Their argument falls back on the 'uncertainty of δόξα'—a commonplace of Greek philosophy. They argue that, because δόξα is not



so 'certain,' it is not so 'strong' as ἐπιστήμη—a piece of reasoning disposed of below *E. N.* vii. 3. 4 ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. 1145 b. 33.

Δόξα is not so 'certain' as ἐπιστήμη, because the ὑπολήψεις of the δοξάζων are not about things taken in connexion with their causes, as the ὑπολήψεις of the ἐπιστάμενος are. The truest ὑπολήψεις of the δοξάζων are apt to run away like slaves, and leave him, because they are not bound by chains of reasoning to their causes. Ὁ ὀρθῶς δοξάζων has, in short, 'empirical,' as distinguished from 'scientific' knowledge. This is how the 'uncertainty' of δόξα is represented in the *Meno* 97 D. Elsewhere Plato describes the 'empirical' character of the knowledge of the δοξάζων by making τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος the object of δόξα: see Bonitz, *Met.* p. 411—'opinationem, δόξαν, a scientia Plato, fortasse secutus Parmenidem, ita distinxit, ut quomodo generatio medium inter ens et non-ens locum habet, ita δόξα medium quidpiam sit inter scientiam rei et ignorantiam, *cf.* Conviv. 202 a ἔστι δὲ δήπου τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ ἀμαθίας καὶ φρονήσεως: de Rep. v. 477 a οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ ὄντι γνῶσις ἦν, ἀγνωσία δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ μὴ ὄντι, ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τούτων μεταξύ τι καὶ ζητητέον ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἴ τι τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἆρ' οὖν λέγομέν τι δόξαν εἶναι; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Theaet. 190 a, Soph. 263, Phileb. 37 a. Idem discrimen Ar. exponit An. post. i. 33 89 a. 2 λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν καὶ ψεῦδος, ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν—ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα ἀβέβαιον, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τοιαύτη—ὡς τοῦ μὲν τοιούτου δόξαν οὖσαν, τοῦ δ' ἀναγκαίου ἐπιστήμην': *cf.* also Bonitz, *Met.* p. 142 'vocabulo δόξα . . opinandi naturam incertam et inconstantem notat [Arist.], quae fere est vis hujus vocabuli ubi ἐπιστήμῃ opponitur.'

§ 4.] *Cf. M. M.* ii. 6. 1200 b. 38 ἀλλ' ἆρα γε ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὔ, δόξα δέ; ἀλλ' εἰ δόξαν ἔχει ὁ ἀκρατής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψεκτός. εἰ γὰρ φαῦλόν τι πράττει μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδὼς ἀλλὰ δοξάζων, συγγνώμην ἄν τις ἀποδοίη προσθέσθαι τῇ ἡδονῇ καὶ πρᾶξαι τὰ φαῦλα, μὴ ἀκριβῶς εἰδότα ὅτι [οὐ] φαῦλα εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντα· οἷς δέ γε συγγνώμην ἔχομεν, τούτους οὐ ψέγομεν· ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατής, εἴπερ δόξαν ἔχει, οὐκ ἔσται ψεκτός. ἀλλ' ἔστιν ψεκτός. b. 36.

§ 5. **φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον**] If an ἠρεμαία ὑπόληψις cannot, consistently with the circumstance that he is ψεκτός, be ascribed to the ἀκρατής, it follows then that an ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις must be ascribed to him. Such is φρόνησις—αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον: *cf. E. E.* H. 13. 1246 b. 34 τὰ Σωκρατικὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν 1146 a. 4.

1146 a. 4. *ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως.* It is to be remarked, however, that, for those who take their stand on the Socratic *οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως*, the position *φρονήσεως ἀντιτεινούσης* is really identical with the position *ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης* (§ 1). Those who take their stand on the Socratic *οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως* evidently do not distinguish between *ἐπιστήμη* and *φρόνησις*. Aristotle and his school, however, distinguish between them; and the reasoning by which the present writer refutes the position *φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης* involves the special connotation which he attaches to *φρόνησις* as something different from *ἐπιστήμη*. The words *αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυράτατον* (§ 5), therefore, representing as they do the *extreme Socratic* position, are somewhat startling, as put in the mouths of persons who depart from that position (*τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ' οὔ* § 3), and try to explain *ἀκρασία* by distinguishing *φρόνησις* from *ἐπιστήμη*, and that too in a list which corresponds exactly with the Aristotelian division of *τὸ νοεῖν*, or *ὑπόληψις*, into *ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, φρόνησις*, as given in *de An.* iii. 3. 427 b. 9 *τὸ νοεῖν ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τἀναντία τούτων*: and 427 b. 24 *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως* (*cf.* the *πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς* of *E. N.* vii. 2. 1) *διαφοραὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τὰ ἐναντία τούτων.* The Paraphrast sees that the writer is conducting his opponents through a formal list: he says *ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε δόξα ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς οὔτε ἐπιστήμη, δοκεῖ φρόνησις εἶναι· αὕτη γὰρ λείπεται, καὶ ἐστὶν ἰσχυρὰ γνῶσις.*

a. 5. **ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής**] After all, the position which the writer takes up here—that the *φρόνιμος* cannot be *ἀκρατής*—does not differ essentially from that of Socrates —*οὐθένα ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν*— for *φρόνησις* is an *ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις* (*E. N.* vi. 9. 7) involving the possession (and exercise) of all the virtues—*ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ ὑπαρχούσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί.* The *ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν* of the Socratic position means that the *ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις*, which Aristotle equally with Socrates regarded as incompatible with *ἀκρασία*, is absent.

a. 8. **πρότερον**] *i. e. E. N.* vi. 7. 7 (*πρακτικός*='one who tends to perform good actions')—vi. 8. 8 (*τῶν ἐσχάτων τις*='one concerned with particulars')—vi. 13. 6 (*τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς*='one who has all the virtues'). Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 127) points out that the words *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς* do not belong to the causal clause



*τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις*, which he accordingly (followed by Susemihl and Bywater) makes parenthetical. It is inserted to explain *πρακτικός*: *cf. E. N.* vi. 8. 8 *τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον.* 1146 a. 8.

Perhaps we ought to read *ἐστί* for *τις* 1146 a. 9.

**§ 6. οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων**] *Cf.* *E. N.* vii. 1. 6 *καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ' οὔ.* a. 10.

**τὸ ἄγαν**] The Ald. Schol. seems to have read *τὸ ἄγεσθαι.* His version is—*ὁ γὰρ σώφρων οὐδ' ὅλως ἔχει αἰσχρὰς ἡδονὰς ἐπηρεάζουσας αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου προστάσσοντος δεῖν ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἡδονῶν, εὐθὺς ἔχει τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπακολουθοῦσαν αὐτῷ, καὶ μένει ἠρεμῶν· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ σώφρονος ἐστὶ τὸ ἄγεσθαι, ἢ τὸ πολεμεῖσθαι ὑπὸ αἰσχρῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἰσχυρῶν.* The Paraphrast Heliodorus may also have read *ἄγεσθαι*: he says—*εἰ δὴ ὁ σώφρων ἔσται ἐγκρατὴς ἕξει φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἰσχυράς· ὅπερ ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς σωφροσύνης· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἕπεσθαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῷ λόγῳ ἡ σωφροσύνη οὐ συνίσταται.* *Cf. E. N.* vii. 9. 6 *ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.* The blunder of the Ald. Schol. may perhaps be due to a confused recollection of this use of *τὸ ἄγεσθαι.* Ἄγαν is certainly right here, although this is the only place in the Aristotelian corpus given by the *Index Arist.* for its use, with the article, as a substantive. a. 12.

**ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε**] *i. e.* the *ἐγκρατής* must have strong and evil desires: *cf. M. M.* ii. 6. 1201 a. 12 *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔσται ἐγκρατής, σφοδρὰς δεήσει ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμίας.* The *ἐγκρατής* differs from the *σώφρων* in having strong and evil desires—in being strongly tempted by *τὰ μὴ φύσει ἡδέα*: and that the desires of the *ἐγκρατής* must necessarily (*ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε*) be strong and evil is plain; for otherwise it would follow that *ἐγκράτεια* is not always the good and admirable quality which it is supposed to be.

§ 7.] This *ἀπορία* is solved at the beginning of chap. 9, where it is pointed out that it is not 'any opinion'—*πᾶσα δόξα*—which the *ἐγκρατής* sticks to and the *ἀκρατής* abandons, but 'the true opinion'—*ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα.* a. 16.

The Paraphrast Heliodorus, following the order in which the *λεγόμενα* are enumerated in *E. N.* vii. 1. §§ 6 and 7, gives his version

1148 a. 16. of vii. 2. §§ 7–10 ἄλλα πράττει 1146 b. 1 (answering to vii. 1. 6 καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς . . . ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ) first, then proceeds to give his version of vii. 2. §§ 1–6, and ends with vii. 2. 11 ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα . . . ἁπλῶς.

a. 19. **Νεοπτόλεμος**] See Soph. *Philoct.*, especially 54–122, where Odysseus persuades Neoptolemus to deceive Philoctetes, and 895–916, where Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes the truth. *Cf. E. N.* vii. 9. 4.

a. 21. § 8. **ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία**] *ψευδόμενος* has given much trouble to the commentators. I agree, however, with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 127) and others that it is merely a dittograph of *ψευδόμενος* in the line above, and ought to be expunged from the text. There are insuperable objections to supposing, with Fritzsche, a reference to the logical fallacy, *ὁ ψευδόμενος, mentiens*, associated with the name of Eubulides the Megarian, the formula of which is given by Aul. Gell. xviii. 2 Cum mentior et me mentiri dico, mentior an verum dico?[1] As Rassow remarks (p. 127), the article is indispensable before *ψευδόμενος* if the *mentiens* is to be understood; also, instead of *συμβαίνει ἔκ τινος λόγου* § 9. 1146 a. 27, we should require *ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου*: and lastly, the argument which proves that *ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἀρετή* is *not* the *mentiens*.

If retained, *ψευδόμενος* must be taken, as by Zell, to be a predicate qualifying *ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος*—'Again, there is the sophistical argument which causes difficulty by conducting people to a false conclusion'; and Grant's very ingenious comparison with *Soph. El.* 3. 165 b. 12 may be accepted—'Supposing,' says Grant, 'that *ψευδόμενος* be allowed to stand, we must interpret it in a logical sense, not as if it had anything to do with the fallacy of Eubulides. The explanation of it is to be found in the *Soph. Elench.* of Aristotle iii. 1–2, where it is said that the aims of the Sophists and Eristics are five in number, *ἔλεγχος καὶ ψεῦδος καὶ παράδοξον καὶ σολοικισμὸς* (making one talk bad grammar) *καὶ πέμπτον τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχῆσαι* (making one repeat the same thing over and over) . . . *μάλιστα γὰρ προαιροῦνται φαίνεσθαι ἐλέγχοντες, δεύτερον δὲ ψευδόμενόν τι δεικνύναι, τρίτον εἰς παράδοξον ἄγειν κ.τ.λ.* In the above passage we see that the writer has brought together two of these separate terms, speaking of *παράδοξα ἐλέγχειν*. It is possible that he may also have

[1] For this fallacy see also Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* § 233 Eubulides, and Ueberweg's *Logic*, Engl. Trans. pp. 244–247.



qualified the "sophistical reasoning" with another of these logical 1146 a. 21. formulae.'

**παράδοξ . . . ἀελέγχειν**] 'to refute by means of paradoxical con- a. 22. clusions.' 'The Elenchus,' says Grote (*Arist.* ii. 69), 'is a syllogism with a conclusion contradictory to, or refutative of, some enunciated thesis or proposition (*ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος Soph. El.* 1. 165 a. 2) . . . the Sophistical Elenchus or Refutation being a delusive semblance of refutation, which imposes on ordinary men, and induces them to accept it as real.'

**δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια**] The editors compare *Met.* B. 1. 995 a. 24. a. 24 sqq. quoted above in note on vii. 1. 5. 1145 b. 2.

§ 9. **ἔκ τινος λόγου**] *i. e. ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος* mentioned above a. 27. in § 8.

Sections 8 and 9, in their connexion, may be paraphrased thus—'Again, there is the sophistical argument which gets some people into a difficulty, by starting from **πάσης** *δόξης ἐκστατικὸν ἡ ἀκρασία* (§ 7), and conducting them to a false conclusion, which they see plainly to be false, and yet cannot refute—I mean the sophistical argument which proves that 'folly with incontinence is virtue.'

This paraphrase, it will be observed, retains *ψευδόμενος* a. 22 (='by conducting them to a false conclusion'); but the sense of the whole passage paraphrased would not be affected if the word were omitted (and I think it ought to be omitted, as a dittograph); for the words *διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα κ.τ.λ.* down to the end of § 8 explain the particular *ἀπορία* produced by the *σοφιστικὸς λόγος* in question, as that of one who has been entrapped into a conclusion which he sees to be false, but cannot refute.

§ 10.] This § contains another *σοφιστικὸς λόγος*, similar to that a. 31. given in § 9, and, like it, starting from the assumption **πάσης** *δόξης ἐκστατικὸν ἡ ἀκρασία. Ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων . . . καὶ προαιρούμενος* is the *ἀκόλαστος*, as distinguished from the *ἀκρατής*. The *ἀκρατής* is elsewhere in this Book carefully described as *οὐ προαιρούμενος, οὐκ οἰόμενος, οὐ πεπεισμένος*: see *E. N.* vii. 7. 3 *τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων κ.τ.λ.*: vii. 8. 4 *ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν . . . ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν κ.τ.λ.*: vii. 3. 2 *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει δέ*: vii. 9. 6 *ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες, ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ*

1146 a. 31. οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος. Hence Rassow, Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater, following $K^b$, $M^b$, r, omit μή (read by Bekker) before ἐπέπειστο 1146 b. 1, the meaning being—'if the ἀκρατής acted διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι or κατὰ προαίρεσιν, instead of acting, as he does, παρὰ προαίρεσιν or οὐκ οἰόμενος δεῖν, then τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι would be possible in his case.' The omission of μή before ἐπέπειστο, however, necessitates the insertion of οὐ (or ἄλλα Ramsauer and Bywater) before πεπεισμένος 1146 b. 2, against all MS. authority, except that followed by the Vet. Interp. (r), which gives *nunc autem non suasus*. See Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 64)—'Es scheint mir keinem Zweifel zu unterliegen, dass mit den besseren Handschriften dieses Buches (MK), die Negation μή vor ἐπέπειστο zu streichen ist. Freilich ist es dann nöthig, in den folgenden Worten mit Lambin. νῦν δ' οὐ πεπεισμένος zu schreiben. . . . Die alte Uebersetzung hat die Negation an erster Stelle nicht, wohl aber an zweiter: si quidem enim persuasus esset qui agit, dissuasus utique quiesceret; nunc autem non suasus nihil minus talia agit.' The difficulties which the omission of μή and the insertion of οὐ remove are (1) that of having to apply the term πεπεισμένος to the ἀκρατής, in opposition to the usage of vii attested by such passages as ch. 8. § 4 quoted above: and (2) that of having to understand ἐπέπειστο and πεπεισμένος to imply a right conviction, whereas πεπεῖσθαι at the beginning of the § must be understood to imply a wrong conviction. Ramsauer's conjecture (adopted by Bywater) νῦν δὲ ἄλλα πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄλλα πράττει (Byw. brackets ἄλλα before πράττει) seems to me to labour under the objection that it does not remove difficulty (1): it still applies to the ἀκρατής the epithet πεπεισμένος, which seems in this Book to be retained in a technical sense for the ἀκόλαστος alone. But the 'nunc autem non suasus nihil minus *talia* agit' of the Vet. Interp. suggests a reading which, I think, meets the requirements of the case. The Vet. Interp. had doubtless before him νῦν δὲ οὐ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἧττον τοιαῦτα πράττει. For τοιαῦτα read τὰ αὐτά, and retain οὐ before πεπεισμένος: the meaning being that the ἀκρατής, without τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, commits *the same acts* as the ἀκόλαστος does with τὸ πεπεῖσθαι: *cf. E. N.* vii. 8. 3 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ. It seems to be impossible to decide whether the writer of the *M. M.* had the text as given by Bekker (*i. e.* μή before ἐπέπειστο, and no negative before πεπεισμένος) or as rendered by the Vet. Interp.: see *M. M.* ii. 6. 1203 a. 6 πότερος δὲ εὐιατότερος, ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἢ ὁ ἀκρατής; οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἴσως οὐχ ὁ ἀκρατής· ὁ γὰρ



ἀκόλαστος εὐιατότερος· εἰ γὰρ αὐτῷ λόγος ἐγγένοιτο ὁ διδάξων ὅτι φαῦλα, οὐκέτι πράξει· τῷ δέ γε ἀκρατεῖ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὅμως πράττει, ὥστε ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἀνίατος εἶναι[1]. 1146 a. 31.

As regards the proverb—ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;—the ἀκόλαστος, it is argued, acts from a wrong conviction, which he may exchange for a right one, and so become a reformed character: but the ἀκρατής does not act from conviction, but from passion. It is true that he has a right opinion, but it is not capable of influencing his conduct: his case is therefore hopeless: the proverb applies to him—'when water sticks in a man's throat, what can he drink to wash it down?' The true opinion of the ἀκρατής is ineffectual; and no truer and more effectual one can be found. This represents the interpretation of the proverb given by the Ald. Schol., Stahr, Grant, Peters, and others. Rassow, however (*Forsch.* p. 65), interprets differently. 'Das tertium comparationis,' he says, 'ist die Fülle. An richtiger Erkenntniss (und diese ist es doch die mit dem Wasser verglichen wird) fehltes dem Zügellosen nicht, er hat davon die Hülle und Fülle, man braucht sie ihm nicht erst beizubringen.' If we accept this interpretation, we may perhaps render the proverb —'A drowning man doesn't need more water to drink.' The Paraphrast's explanation leaves the sense in which he understood the proverb doubtful—"Οτι δὲ ὁ δυνάμενος ἐκστῆναι τῆς δόξης βελτίων τοῦ μὴ δυναμένου, δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ τῷ ἡπατῆσθαι τὰ φαῦλα διώκων, ὅτι νομίζει ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, βελτίων ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰδότος ὅτι φαῦλα, καὶ διώκοντος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡπατημένος μεταπεισθεὶς δύναται ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι, ὁ δὲ δι' ἀκρασίαν διώκων, καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα, οὐ δύναται ἐκστῆναι τῶν κακῶν· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκσταίη, ἐπεὶ οὐ δύναται μεταπεισθῆναι; ὃ γὰρ ἔδει γινώσκειν, οἶδε, καὶ εἰδὼς ἀκρατεύεται, καὶ ἔνοχός ἐστι τῇ παροιμίᾳ,

"Οταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;

As regards the general significance of the §, and its connexion with what precedes—It is another σοφιστικὸς λόγος, starting, like that given in § 9, from the assumption—πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν. In § 9 it was proved paradoxically that, if the ἀκρατής be ἄφρων, and his δόξαι false, his actions will be good: in § 10 it is proved paradoxically that, if he have true δόξαι, he is in a hopeless state—he has the best possible δόξαι, but he is too weak to act up to them: whereas the ἀκόλαστος, who is not ἐκστατικὸς τῆς δόξης, may, if sup-

[1] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 54) thinks that the καὶ ὅμως πράττει of the above passage is an echo of οὐδὲν ἧττον πράττει, without the ἄλλα of our MSS.

1146 a. 31. plied with true δόξαι, act on them as steadfastly as he now acts on his false δόξαι. The paradox thus established by means of the inappropriate use of the idea μεταπεισθῆναι in the context is left here by the writer unrefuted, as an example of those difficulties by grappling with which ethical theory advances. His answer to it is deferred to *E. N.* vii. 8. 1: but it may be useful just now to point out the solution naturally suggested by the terms to which the difficulty has been reduced.

The point which decides us in favour of the ἀκρατής against the ἀκόλαστος is that the *end* which the former ignores in his acts is good, whereas that which the latter acts up to is bad. The argument insists on the point that the ἀκόλαστος follows the recommendations of his λόγος, while the ἀκρατής does not. But we ask, *Why* does the ἀκόλαστος follow the recommendations of his λόγος? and the answer is—*because it recommends that which is bad.* This the sophistical argument in *E. N.* vii. 2. 10 keeps in the background, proceeding to infer that, as the ἀκόλαστος follows reason when it recommends the bad, he would follow it with the same steadfastness if it could be made to recommend the good. But the truth is that we have not to do here with the reason or understanding, but with the moral character and habits. A false issue is raised by assuming that the ἀκόλαστος will yield to arguments addressed to his understanding; and when it is argued that it is useless to try to reform the ἀκρατής, because he already knows what is right, the possibility of strengthening his moral nature is ignored. But this is really the important point. What is represented as 'false opinion,' or 'wrong conviction,' in the ἀκόλαστος, is really an inveterate moral blindness and depravity brought on by the repeated neglect of that 'true opinion,' the possession of which is represented as putting the ἀκρατής in such a hopeless position. The ἀκόλαστος was once ἀκρατής. His so-called 'false opinion' or 'wrong conviction' is merely an intensified form of the weakness of the ἀκρατής. The fallacy of the argument lies in its transformation of moral depravity into intellectual error. The intellectual error so-called of the ἀκόλαστος is contrasted with the weakness of the ἀκρατής: intellectual error, it is argued, may be corrected, but weakness such as that of the ἀκρατής cannot be cured. The truth, however, is that the so-called intellectual error of the ἀκόλαστος, being really inveterate weakness or utter depravity, is incurable, whereas the not yet inveterate weakness of the ἀκρατής may be cured:



see *E. N.* vii. 8. 1, where ἀκολασία is compared to a chronic disease, 1146 a. 31. and ἀκρασία to a sudden passing seizure: see also *E. N.* vii. 8. 4 ὁ δὲ (*sc.* ἀκόλαστος) πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς—where the 'conviction' or 'opinion' of the ἀκόλαστος is said to be the *effect* of his depraved moral character. Thus the σοφιστικὸς λόγος of vii. 2. 10 is guilty of a ὕστερον πρότερον: it assumes that his 'conviction' or 'opinion' is the *cause* of his bad character—that if we could change his 'opinion' we should change his character. There is nothing more striking in the Aristotelian teaching than its opposition to this vulgar assumption. Opinion or Belief, according to Aristotle, follows conduct—as a man becomes better or worse his belief becomes better or worse. The 'true opinion' of the ἀκρατής is a favourable symptom so far as it goes, indicating that his character is not yet utterly ruined: the 'false opinion' of the ἀκόλαστος means that his character is utterly ruined; it is a 'false opinion' which he will always stick to.

§ 11. ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα . . . τινας ἁπλῶς] If ἀκρασία be mani- b. 2. fested in anything (περὶ πάντα), *i. e.* in θυμός, or in relation to κέρδος, or to τιμή, what do we mean when we use the term ἀκρατής simply (ἁπλῶς), without adding any such qualification as θυμοῦ or κέρδους? We must mean that there is a man who is ἀκρατής in some one special respect not explicitly stated, for we cannot mean that any one is ἀκρατής in all respects together: *cf.* the Ald. Schol.—εἰ περὶ πάντα, ἤτοι τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὸ κέρδος καὶ ἁπλῶς περὶ πάντα ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία καταγίνεται, ὁ ἁπλῶς ἤτοι ὁ κυρίως ἀκρατὴς τίς ἐστιν; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔχει πάσας τὰς ἀκρασίας, ἀλλ' ὁ μέν ἐστιν ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ, ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς τιμῆς, ὁ δὲ ἀκρατὴς φιλοχρηματείας. εἰ οὖν ὁ μὲν ἔχει τήνδε τὴν ἀκρασίαν ἤτοι τοῦ θυμοῦ, ὁ δὲ τήνδε, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔχει πάσας, λοιπὸν ὁ κυρίως ἀκρατὴς τίς ἐστιν· λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι εἰσί τινες ἁπλῶς ἤτοι κυρίως ἀκρατεῖς.

§ 12.] See note on vii. 1. 5. 1145 b. 6. Cook Wilson (*Arist.* b. 6. *Studies* I. pp. 60, 61) thinks that συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθὲς ᾖ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ *E. E.* vii. 2. 1. 1235 b. 17, 18, was almost certainly written (by another writer) as an elucidation of τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν of *E. N.* vii. 2. 12, 'which seems to have been understood by the author of *E. E.* vii. 2. 1 as meaning that some of the ἀπορίαι must be done away with, and some left. The latter expression (καταλιπεῖν) seemed paradoxical in connection with the sentence which follows—ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας

1146 b. 6. εὔρεσίς ἐστιν, because an aporia consists of opposing opinions whose opposition must be somehow overcome: the author of *E. E.* vii. 2. 1 accordingly wrote the passage συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. to explain it—"The opposition (ἐναντίωσις) must be allowed to stand (μένειν), if what is said is true in one sense and not in another."' I think that Cook Wilson's rendering—'the opposition *must be allowed* to stand'—of the words συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις places his view of their origin as an explanation of τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν in *E. N.* vii. 2. 12 in rather too favourable a light. I take the words συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, *E. E.* 1235 b. 17, to mean —'if the thing said be true in one sense, and not in another, *the result is* (συμβαίνει) that the opposition of opinion remains unresolved': *i. e.* one reason why the opinions opposed in an ἀπορία *remain* opposed—why, in short, an ἀπορία is not resolved—is that the subject about which the opposite opinions are held has really two sides (from one point of view it is true to say this about it, and from another point of view that, as *e. g.* about τὸ φιλούμενον), but we have not yet succeeded in *showing* that it has two sides—in showing that the two opposite views about it are both *reasonably* held (εἰλόγως δοκοῦντα *E. E.* 1235 b. 15)—that they do not really contradict each other: the whole passage (*E. E.* 1235 b. 13 sqq.) is—λεκτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τά τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθὲς ἡ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. It will be observed that I attach importance to the antithesis marked by φαίνηται—ἤ. It would be true to say—συμβαίνει δὲ λύεσθαι τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθὲς φαίνηται τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. The ἀπορία is resolved, when the reasonableness of a difference of opinion has been shown.

As I said in my note on vii. 1. 5. 1145 b. 6, I understand the words before us, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν, to mean that these questions must be dealt with on the method of removing difficulties, and *so* leaving the truth (embodied in the ἔνδοξα) plain. The words before us are, in fact, equivalent to the ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα of *E. N.* vii. 1. 5, and, thus understood, correspond exactly to the λεκτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τά τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει (= τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν) καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις (= τὰ δὲ ἀνελεῖν) of *E. E.* vii. 2. 1235 b. 13. It is perhaps worth adding that τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν 1146 b. 6. ἀνελεῖν τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν does not mean that '*some of the* ἀπορίαι must be done away with and some left,' but that '*some things in the* ἀπορίαι must be done away with and some left'—*i. e.* the confusions, causing ἐναντίωσις, must be done away with, or cleared up, in such a way that, as they are cleared up (ἅμα *E. E.* 1235 b. 13), views, hitherto merely ἐναντία, are left no longer as merely ἐναντία, but as εὐλόγως δοκοῦντα.



## CHAPTER III.

### Argument.

*We have to enquire—(1) Whether the incontinent man 'knows' or not, and if he 'knows,' in what sense it is that he 'knows.' (2) In relation to what things a man is to be described as 'continent' or 'incontinent'*—i. e. *whether in relation to any pleasure or pain, or only in relation to certain definite pleasures or pains. (3) Whether 'continence' is identical with 'endurance,' or is to be distinguished from it. These and cognate questions we have to answer.*

[*Our enquiry begins with the question (1) Whether it is a difference between their respective objects, or a difference between their attitudes to objects (with or without a difference in the objects) which distinguishes between the continent man and the incontinent man. Our next question (2) is whether continence and incontinence are concerned with any objects*—i. e. *with any pleasures or pains, or are limited (as they certainly are when strictly understood) to the pleasures and pains with which incorrigible profligacy, or intemperance, has to do—the difference between intemperance and incontinence strictly so called being in the attitude, not in the objects*—i. e. *intemperance pursuing the pleasure of the moment 'on principle,' incontinence pursuing it indeed, but not 'on principle.'*]

*To begin, then, with the question about the 'knowledge' involved in incontinence—The substitution of 'true opinion' for 'knowledge' does not make it easier to explain the prevalence of passion in incontinence, for 'opinion' is often as hard to move as 'knowledge.'*

*The distinction between 'merely having knowledge' and 'having it and realising it,' is more likely than that between 'opinion' and 'knowledge' to help us. It surely need cause no surprise if a man acts against knowledge, which he has, but does not realise. Of the two premisses of the Practical Syllogism, the major—excess is evil—may be fully realised,* quâ *universal proposition, in consciousness, and the man may yet act incontinently, because he does not realise the minor—'this is a case of excess.'*

*And not only have we the difference between the major and the minor—the former realised by the incontinent man, the latter not realised—but in the major*

*itself we have to distinguish two sides—one relating to the agent and the other to things. The form of the major is,* '*All agents who are such and such, ought to do such and such things.*' *To this two-sided major corresponds a two-sided minor—*'*I am such and such, and this thing is such and such.*' *The latter part of this minor a man is much more likely* '*not to know,*' *or* '*not to realise,*' *than the former part; but even this merely* half *ignorance of the minor is enough to account easily for incontinence, or acting against fully realised knowledge of the major* as universal proposition[1].

*So much for* '*having knowledge,*' *and* '*having it and realising it*'; *but there is a third kind of* '*having*'—'*having which does not amount to having,*' *which may be considered in connexion with incontinence. It is in this third sense that a mad or drunken man* '*has knowledge*'; *and the incontinent man, repeating moral phrases without* '*knowing*' *what they mean, may be compared to a madman, or to a man who is drunk, or to an actor playing the part assigned to him.*

*Hitherto our explanation of incontinence has consisted in a general reference to* '*non-realised knowledge.*' *Let us now try to find the* immediate cause *of incontinence—how it comes about that, in the peculiar condition of the incontinent man, knowledge is* '*not realised.*'

*It is in the way that the machinery of the Practical Syllogism is worked by Desire that we shall find the immediate cause of an incontinent act. The major premiss,* '*excess is evil,*' *which opposes itself to Desire is not allowed to reign without a rival. Desire sets up* another major,—'*sweet things are pleasant,*' *and is thus able to represent the incontinent act as a conclusion validly drawn from premisses. Desire marks its opposition to Moral Principle by putting forward a maxim—*'*sweet things are pleasant—which does not in itself (though it does in its consequences) conflict with* '*excess is evil,*' *the maxim of Moral Principle.*

*As for the question—How the incontinent man, when the fit is over, recovers his knowledge, the explanation of this recovery will be the same as that given by the physiologists for* '*recovery*' *from the unconsciousness of drunkenness or sleep.*

*We are now in a position to define our attitude to the view of Socrates. Socrates may be allowed to say—*'*knowledge cannot be overpowered by passion*' *—if by* '*knowledge*' *be understood* 'true *knowledge*'—'*knowledge of the universal.*' *This, because it is universal, is not touched by passion. It is only* '*the knowledge of the sense-particular*'—*and this after all is not* '*knowledge*'—*which enters into conflict with passion, and may be conquered by it.*

1146 b. 8. §§ 1, 2.] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 20, 21) points out that each of these sections contains a separate list of proposed enquiries. The list given in § 1 corresponds, in substance and in order, with the contents of the following chapters, whereas that given in § 2 mentions only one point actually discussed afterwards—viz. ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ; 1146 b. 18. The two passages therefore appear to Rassow and Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, Paragraphs 25, 28, 29, 61) to be independent duplicates not belonging to the same version. Cook Wilson seems inclined to regard that in § 2 as the earlier, and as having introduced a version now lost. This opinion must be taken in connexion with his whole theory of the structure and authorship of the present chapter. He regards it as made up of passages from two very similar versions, either of which § 1 fits equally, while § 2 fits neither: and with respect to the authorship of the chapter he is of opinion that 'whether the two versions [of which it is composed] are by the same hand or not, there is a strong probability that (α) neither is by Aristotle, that (β) neither is by the author of the Eudemian Ethics—or at least of the second book of that treatise, and that (γ) they are not by the same author as some of the most important parts of this book' (*Arist. Studies*, I. paragraph 60). He arranges the parallel versions thus— 1146 b. 8.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| $A^1$ § 2 | | A § 1 | |
| | $B_1$ § 3 | = | $B_2$ § 4 |
| | $C_1$ § 5 | = | $C_2$ §§ 7–8 |
| | $D_1$ § 6 | = | $D_2$ §§ 9–12 |
| | ? §§ 13, 14 | | |

See *Aristotelian Studies*, I, Table I, and paragraphs 25–32, and 59–61.

That there is considerable confusion and repetition in this chapter no one can deny; but whether so much as to justify all the details of Cook Wilson's theory may, I think, be doubted. Sections 1 and 2 seem to me to be clearly, and sections 3 and 4 probably, parallel versions: but §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8 strike me as consecutive; and §§ 9, 10, and 11 can only be described as parallel to § 6 in the sense that, like it, they treat of the Practical Syllogism; for that Syllogism is analysed, and applied to the explanation of ἀκρασία, in the two passages from two different, though not inconsistent, points of view, in such a way that the two analyses and applications, taken together, seem only to present the subject exhaustively. The relation of §§ 9, 10, and 11 to § 6 seems to me to differ in an important point from that of § 4 to § 3; for whereas § 4 merely repeats the substance of § 3, §§ 9, 10, and 11 say something not said in § 6, and something well worth saying.

[1] 'Knowledge of the major, as universal proposition' must not be confounded with 'the application of this knowledge to particular cases.'

1146 b. 8. The circumstance that the treatment of the Practical Syllogism is not continuous, but broken by §§ 7 and 8, is evidence of confusion in the structure of the chapter; but, as the considerations added in §§ 9, 10, and 11 are so well worth adding, we ought perhaps not to have much difficulty in supposing that the writer of §§ 5, 6, 7, and 8—doubtless with some sacrifice of symmetry—added them. On the other hand, it must be noted that the writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 6), in his version of this chapter, treats of the Practical Syllogism in one place, not in two places; but his treatment of it is so jejune and slight as to make it unlikely that, even if his authority had treated of it in two places, he would have followed his example.

Although I cannot accept, in anything like its fulness, Cook Wilson's theory of the structure of this chapter, I think that his view of its authorship (that it is probably not by Aristotle, not by Eudemus, not by the author of the principal parts of this Book) has much to say for itself; and the remarks which he makes in the course of paragraphs 59–61 in support of his view have also great value, independently of the immediate purpose to which he applies them, and I shall frequently have to refer to them in subsequent notes. According to Cook Wilson this chapter is probably not by Aristotle, not by Eudemus, not by the author of the principal parts of Book vii, because (1) these three writers describe the *ἀκρατής* as the subject of 'an active struggle between reason (*λόγος*, sometimes *προαίρεσις*="rational will") and appetite (*ἐπιθυμία*), between the desire to do what is wrong and the conviction that it is wrong' (*Arist. Stud.* paragraph 60, p. 49); whereas this chapter, by applying the distinction of actual and potential knowledge to explain *ἀκρασία*, makes a mental struggle impossible, there being no actual knowledge for appetite to struggle with: and because (2) 'chapter 3 is an obvious concession to the Socratic principle, as the writer of the last section of it felt' (p. 50), whereas Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the other parts of Book vii, are strongly opposed to that principle.

The following (among other) passages are quoted by Cook Wilson (paragraphs 59–61) to show that Aristotle, Eudemus, and the writer of the other parts of Book vii regard the struggle in the *ἀκρατής* as an active and conscious one—*E. N.* i. 13. 15, 16. 1102 b. 14–25; ix. 4. 8. 1166 b. 7–10; *de An.* iii. 9. 8. 433 a. 1–3; *de An.* iii. 10. 6. 433 b. 5–10; *E. E.* ii. 7 and 8. 1224 a. 30–36 and



1224 b. 19–23; *E. N.* vii. 2. 1–4. 1145 b. 21–1146 a. 4; *E. N.* vii. 1146 b. 8. 7. 8. 1150 b. 19–28.

§ 2.] Ramsauer, who thinks that this section is out of place here, b. 14. and may have been the opening of an Aristotelian discussion which has not come down to us, remarks that the words *οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ'* κ.τ.λ. b. 19 assume as settled what is elaborately established in subsequent chapters. Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, paragraph 61) remarks that 'according to § 1 the first subject for consideration is that which follows . . . *πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες*: § 2 not only puts a different subject first, but omits this, at least in any distinct shape, from the list. Perhaps therefore § 2 belongs to an earlier version which contained nothing about potential knowledge possessed by the *ἀκρατής*. The writer of § 2 may merely, as against Socrates, have maintained or presupposed what is implied in chapter 2, that in *ἀκρασία* there is a strong and active consciousness of wrong-doing (*ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις . . . ἀντιτείνουσα*), and have added that this conviction could be disobeyed, if not accompanied, as in *φρόνησις* (*cf.* ch. ii. § 5. 1146 a. 4 sqq.) by a strong desire to realise it, but opposed by *ἐπιθυμία*. He may have felt no more difficulty in this representation than the author of the passages quoted from the de An. and Nic. Ethics [see end of last note] seems to have done, and therefore not have dwelt on it further. . . . The above is somewhat countenanced by the conclusion of § 2. The first problem (*ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως*) being, whether the *ἀκρατής* and *ἐγκρατής* are differenced by their objects or by their relation to them; the fact that the *ἀκρατής* knows he should not adopt the pleasant motive (*ὃ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μὲν διώκει δέ*) is assumed as subsidiary to the solution of the problem, without any hint that the fact itself is a principal difficulty awaiting settlement.'

Peters expresses his view of this section in an interesting note (p. 215), which I quote to show how plausibly the obscure phenomena here presented to criticism may be accounted for on still another hypothesis.—'This section (§ 2) seems to me not an alternative to § 1, but a correction of it, or rather a remark to the effect that the whole passage (both § 1 and the discussion introduced by it) ought to be rewritten, and an indication of the way in which this should be done. Of considerable portions of the Nicomachean Ethics we may safely say that the author could not have regarded them as finished in the form in which we have them. I believe

1146 b. 14. that the author made a rough draft of the whole work, or of the several parts of it, which he kept by him and worked upon,—working some parts up to completion; sometimes rewriting a passage without striking out the original version, or even indicating which was to be retained (*e.g.* the theory of pleasure); more frequently adding an afterthought which required the rewriting of a whole passage, without rewriting it (*e.g.*, to take one instance out of many in Book v, *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* is an afterthought which strictly requires that the whole book should be rewritten); sometimes (as here) making a note of the way in which a passage should be rewritten. Suppose, if need be, that the work, left in this incomplete state, was edited and perhaps further worked upon by a later hand, and we have enough, I think, to account for the facts.'

b. 19. *ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής*] The man strictly so called, or without further qualification—*i. e.* the man who is incontinent about certain bodily pleasures (see ch. 4), as distinguished from the man so called with an added qualification (*μετὰ προσθέσεως*)—*ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ, κέρδους*, or *τιμῆς*. Viewed as *ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής*, a man is viewed as related to the same bodily pleasures as the *ἀκόλαστος*: but the relation is not the same in each case. The relation in which the *ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς* stands to these pleasures is not so *simple* as that in which the *ἀκόλαστος* stands to them: the *ἀκόλαστος* is conceived as 'simply related to them'—*πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχει*: but the *ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς* is conceived as 'related to them in a certain manner'—*ὡδὶ ἔχει*—in a certain manner which distinguishes him from the *ἀκόλαστος*: *i. e.* the *ἀκόλαστος* simply goes in for them: the *ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς* goes in for them *—after a struggle.*

b. 24. §§ 3, 4.] Imelmann (*Obs. Crit. in Arist. Eth. Nic.* p. 44), regarding §§ 3 and 4 as two independent versions, would strike out the words *ἐπιστήμη δόξης* in § 4, b. 29, on the ground that *οὐθὲν διοίσει* immediately preceding is equivalent to the *οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον* of § 3, b. 25. 'Quaestio est,' he says, 'utrum contra ipsam scientiam immodici peccent an contra opinionem: quam nihil facere ad rem Aristoteles indicat, quoniam opinionem interdum eadem pertinacia atque scientiam defendamus et obtineamus. Quem sententiarum nexum duo verba aperte perturbant. Etenim *οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης* prorsus sunt aliena ab hoc loco, cum, si quidem *οἱ δοξάζοντες* facilius mollitiae indulgent, differre *ἐπιστήμην δόξης*



dicendum erat . . . quam inepte autem illa illata sunt, manifesto, 1146 b. 24.
opinor, elucebit, si hic quoque duplicem exstare ejusdem sententiae conformationem ipsa verborum collocatione demonstraverimus—' he then prints §§ 3 and 4 in parallel columns, omitting the words *ἐπιστήμη δόξης*. But a comparison of the corresponding passage in the *M. M.* (ii. 6. 1201 b. 1 sqq.) shows that the whole clause, *οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης*, as it stands, is equivalent to *οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον*. The passage runs thus—*τὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν παρέχοντα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ λῦσαι τὰς ἀπορίας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἐδόκει εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα ταύτην ἀποβάλλειν ἢ μεταπίπτειν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δόξαν εἶναι ἢ ἐπιστήμην· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ δόξα σφοδρὰ τῷ βέβαιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμετάπειστον, οὐθὲν διοίσει τῆς ἐπιστήμης, κ.τ.λ.*: *cf.* the Paraphrast—*συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις τὴν δόξαν οὕτω βεβαίως ἐγκεῖσθαι ὥστε μὴ διαφέρειν ἐπιστήμης κατὰ τὸ ἀντιβαίνειν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.* In the light of these commentaries § 4 may be paraphrased thus—'If you argue that *δόξα* is weak, and therefore more likely than *ἐπιστήμη* to be overpowered, we shall reply that there is no difference between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη* in the matter of strength, for some people, like Heraclitus, are as firm in their *δόξα* as others are in their *ἐπιστήμη*.' *Οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης* is thus not to be understood, as it is apparently by Imelmann, as an *inference from εἰ οὖν . . . πράξουσιν*, but as an *answer to* it: 'If you argue *εἰ οὖν . . . πράξουσιν*, our answer will be *οὐθὲν διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη δόξης*.' Doubtless the expression *οὐθὲν διοίσει δόξα ἐπιστήμης* would have been more correct than the *οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης* of the text, *δόξα*, not *ἐπιστήμη*, being the proper subject of the argument; and it will be observed that the writer of the *M. M.* and the Paraphrast have adopted the more correct expression.

The exact scope of the argument *οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης* is well defined by Grant—'Of course neither Aristotle nor his school would wish to do away with the distinction which Plato had established between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*. It is only as connected with the will, and as forming a ground for action, that opinion can be considered as strong as science.'

§ 4. *δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος*] The Ald. Schol. (who also instances the b. 30.
dogmatism of Democritus about his atoms) says—*δηλοῖ δὲ Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι ἔστι βεβαία καὶ ἰσχυρὰ δόξα, καὶ οὐ πᾶσα δόξα ἐστὶν ἀσθενής, ἐκεῖνος γὰρ δοξάζων ὅτι κίνησις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀκριβῶς οἶδε, δείξας ὅτι κἂν δόξαν*

1146 b. 30. ἔχειν λέγωσι τὸν ἀκρατῆ κἂν ἐπιστήμην τῷ αὐτῷ ἀτοπήματι ἐμπίπτουσι. See Diog. Laert. ix. 1. 5 quoted by Fritzsche and Grant—ἤκουσέ τε οὐδενὸς ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἔφη διζήσασθαι καὶ μαθεῖν πάντα παρ' ἑαυτοῦ: and Did. ix. 1. 1, where he is described as μεγαλόφρων καὶ ὑπερόπτης: see also other passages collected by Bywater (*Heracl. Eph. Reliq.* p. 33) under fragm. LXXX. Peters (p. 216) supposes that the allusion in the words δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος is a general one, to 'the Heraclitean doctrine, which Aristotle rather unfairly interprets as a denial of the most fundamental of all first principles—the law of contradiction. *Cf. Met.* iii. 7. 1012 a. 24.'

b. 31. §§ 5–11.] Rassow's view (with which I agree) of the relation of these §§ to one another is as follows (*Forsch.* pp. 127–129). Against the Socratic doctrine that there is no such thing as ἀκρασία, because no one *knowingly* does wrong, four considerations, coupled together by ἔτι, are brought forward—(*a*) Knowledge is not always actual. A man may *have* knowledge, without *using* it: § 5. (*b*) The reflection which precedes action may be reduced to the form of a syllogism, in which the general rule is the major, the particular case the minor premiss. Now, the knowledge of the major premiss may be consciously present, while that of the minor may remain latent; and so a man may do wrong, notwithstanding the fact that his ἄγνοια is only partial: § 6. (*c*) His passions may take such hold of a man that he may be said to *have* in a sense, and yet *not have*, the knowledge of right and wrong, his condition being like that of a madman, or of a man asleep or drunk: §§ 7, 8. The προπετὴς ἀκρασία, or προπέτεια of *E. N.* vii. 7. 8, is the form of ἀκρασία which the writer has in view in §§ 7 and 8. (*d*) The fourth consideration (presented in §§ 9, 10, 11) takes up the other kind of ἀκρασία distinguished in *E. N.* vii. 7. 8, viz. ἀσθένεια. The passions occasion ignorance or moral blindness, not directly, but by means of sophistical representations; they place, by the side of the major premiss which contains the rule of conduct, another major premiss which is not in itself false, but in the circumstances is irrelevant. Hence, in acting from this true, but irrelevant, major premiss, the ἀκρατὴς acts ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης. These, according to Rassow, are the four separate considerations urged in this chapter against the view of Socrates.

§ 5.] 'The distinction between the possession and the application of knowledge' is made, as the editors note, by Plato, *Theaet.* 197, 198 οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστερῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐροῦμεν 1146 b. 31. ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα, ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἡ δὲ κεκτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο.

διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ b. 33. πράττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα]] So Bywater. Bekker and Susemihl read διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα, which expresses the sense intended more neatly. The words καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα are given by all authorities, apparently, except $M^b$ and Γ. On the other hand, all authorities seem to give the words bracketed by Bywater—τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. Of course we cannot retain both the words omitted by $M^b$ and Γ, and those bracketed by Bywater.

For the antithesis ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δέ see *de An.* ii. 1. 412 a. 22 αὕτη δὲ (*i. e.* σώματος ἐντελέχεια) λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν κ. τ. λ. *Cf. Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 a. 32 λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἐὰν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρῆσαι. *Cf. Phys.* viii. 4. 255 a. 33 ἔστι δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως ὁ μανθάνων ἐπιστήμων καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν . . . ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν. See Bonitz, *Met.* p. 394.

§ 6.] Section 5 called attention generally to the fact that know- b. 35. ledge may be possessed without being realised in consciousness, and argued that there is nothing paradoxical in supposing that the ἀκρατής acts 'against knowledge,' if his knowledge is merely possessed, but not realised in consciousness. Section 6 points out further that there is nothing to prevent the ἀκρατής acting 'against knowledge,' if, while his knowledge of the universal is realised in consciousness (χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου), his knowledge of the particular is not (ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος). There is nothing inconsistent in this supposition, for, although knowledge of the universal includes knowledge of the contained particular, it does not necessarily entail the *consciously realised* knowledge of the particular; see Ald. Schol. *ad loc.* εἴ τις μὲν οὖν γινώσκει τὴν καθόλου πρότασιν, καὶ τὴν μερικὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης γινώσκει δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἡ γὰρ μερικὴ πρότασις ὑπὸ τῆς καθόλου προτάσεως περιέχεται. Nor is there any difficulty in supposing that the ἀκρατής, in acting against his non-realised, or latent, know-

1146 b. 35. ledge of the particular, acts also against his consciously realised knowledge of the including universal: for action does not lie in the sphere of the universal, but in that of the particular—*πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*, it is 'particular things,' not 'things in general,' that are done—see the Paraph. *ad loc.* *ἀμφοτέρων οὐσῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν προτάσεων, ἐπειδὰν ἐπιθυμία τις ἐπί τι κινῇ πονηρόν, συνβαίνει τῇ μὲν καθόλου χρῆσθαι, ὅτι τὸ κακὸν οὐ δεῖ πράττειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν κατ' αὐτὴν τηνικαῦτα, τὴν δὲ μερικήν, ὅτι τόδε κακόν, ἔχειν μέν, οὐ χρῆσθαι δέ, οὐδὲ συνορᾶν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν μοχθηρίαν χωρεῖν, ὥσπερ ἀποτυφλωθέντα, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ χρῆται τῇ καθόλου προτάσει, ἀλλὰ πράττειν οὐ δύναται κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην μὴ χρώμενος καὶ τῇ μερικῇ· αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κυρία τῶν πράξεων.* Here the last sentence explains very clearly the words of the text *οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην . . . πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.* A man may consciously realise a general rule of conduct without realising that this is a case in which it is applicable, and it is only by what he realises in particular cases that his actions, being particulars, can be influenced. The knowledge of the general rule is not an efficient cause. It 'rests' as a final cause. Where it does not inspire efficient causes to act in its interest, actions (produced by efficient causes hostile to its interest) may take place: see *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 16 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε), ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου· ἢ ἅμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὔ.* In short, 'universal knowledge,' being 'at rest'—not entering into the arena of particular conflicts—is no more affected by the passions which affect 'particular knowledge,' and make it 'latent,' than the Race is affected by the particular incidents of disease and decay which affect Individuals.

The section then proceeds (from *διαφέρει* 1147 a. 4 onwards) to call attention to the circumstances in which consciously realised knowledge of the universal most frequently coexists with that merely latent knowledge of the particular, which makes the prevalence of *ἐπιθυμία* intelligible. I agree with Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, paragraph 31) in regarding as mistaken the view (maintained by Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 128) that §§ 5 and 6 'do not refer to *ἀκρασία*, and that the words *δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις* § 7 show that the state of the *ἀκρατής* is first discussed in §§ 7, 8.' 'This would be strange in itself,' continues Cook Wilson, 'and seems to be disproved by the sentence in § 5 *διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ*



*θεωροῦντα· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν*, and the infer- 1146 b. 35.
ence in § 6 *κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηθὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν*: for these mean that the distinctions made remove the apparent paradox (compare *δεινόν, ἄτοπον, θαυμαστόν*) that the **ἀκρατής** acts against his knowledge: for this is *the* paradox which is before the writer, as is evident both from § 1 and § 3.' It may be added that the writer of *M. M.* ii. 6. 1201 b. 11 sqq. applies remarks parallel to those in §§ 5 and 6 explicitly to the *ἀκρατής*. With Cook Wilson's opinion, however, that it is wrong to argue (as Rassow does) on the supposition that 'the chapter is a whole,' I cannot agree.

**διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου κ.τ.λ.**] 'Aber auch bei dem Allge- 1147 a. 4.
meinen macht es einen Unterschied, ob dasselbe etwas von ihm (dem Menschen) selbst oder von einer Sache aussagt.'—Stahr. Not only is there the important difference, just noticed, between the universal and the particular, but also in the universal itself (*καὶ τὸ καθόλου*) there is a difference, according as the reference is to 'oneself' or to 'things.' This difference is mentioned, because it has a bearing on the 'latency of the particular,' by which the phenomenon of *ἀκρασία* is being accounted for. See the Paraphrast's note—*"Οταν γὰρ τὸ καθόλου οὕτως ἔχῃ, ὥστε περιέχειν αὐτὸν τὸν συλλογιζόμενον, ἢ τὸν ὁμοειδῆ, τῇ καθόλου συγγινώσκεται καὶ ἡ μερική· οἷον, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις βλαβερὸν ὁ ἑλλέβορος, αὐτὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος, αὐτῷ ἄρα βλαβερὸν ὁ ἑλλέβορος· ἐνταῦθα τῇ καθόλου καὶ ἡ μερικὴ συγγινώσκεται· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν δύναται ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος· ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν τοὺς ὁμοειδεῖς περιέχῃ, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ αὐτοὺς ἀγνοεῖν δυνατόν. ὅταν δὲ ἡ καθόλου πρᾶγμά τι περιέχῃ, τότε οὐκ ἀνάγκη, τῆς καθόλου γινωσκομένης, καὶ τὴν μερικὴν γινώσκεσθαι· οἷον, πᾶς ἑλλέβορος βλαβερόν, τόδε ἑλλέβορος, τόδε ἄρα βλαβερόν· ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀνάγκη γινώσκεσθαι τὴν μερικήν, τῆς καθόλου γινωσκομένης.*

In so far as the universal 'relates to oneself,' the included knowledge of the particular is not likely to remain latent; but in so far as the universal relates to 'things,' the knowledge of the particular is often latent, and *τὸ ἀκρατεύεσθαι* easily explained. As 'the difference in the universal' thus owes its importance to the difference which it involves between particulars, the Paraph. actually begins his note (part of which has been quoted above) on *διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου*, with the words— *αἱ μερικαὶ δὲ διαφέρουσι· τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶσα εἰδέναι, τῶν καθόλου γινωσκομένων· τὰς δὲ οὔ—*

1147 a. 4. (then follows the passage quoted above). The Paraphrast's *αἱ μερικαὶ δὲ διαφέρουσι* is quite in place in a *commentary;* but Ramsauer's conjecture *διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος* for the *διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου* of the *text* is unworthy of the scholastic subtlety of the present passage.

The best explanation of the words *διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου* seems to be given by the passage *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 16, lately quoted—*ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε), ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου· ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὔ.* The formula of the universal proposition is 'all men in such and such circumstances ought to do acts of such and such a kind.' To apply correctly a general rule drawn according to this formula, the agent must (1) recognise his own circumstances in the general description given—the general description of circumstances being the *τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ* of the present §: it is assumed that he will not find much difficulty in doing so, and in supplying the *αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος* or *κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε* part of the minor. (2) He must recognise in the particular thing now before him the marks which the general rule gives as characteristic of the things which men in his circumstances ought to do. These characteristic marks given by the general rule are the *τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος* of the present §, where it is assumed that the agent may easily fail to notice in a particular thing the marks which characterise the things which men in his circumstances ought to do.

It will be observed that the one universal proposition of the *de An.*, with its double reference—to persons and to things (*δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον—τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν*), is resolved, in *E. N.* vii. 3. 6, into two universal propositions—(1) *παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά*, 'all *men* are benefited by dry nourishment' (with its minor *αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος*—'I am a man'), and (2) *ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε*, 'all things with such and such qualities are *dry*' (with its minor *τόδε τοιόνδε*, 'this thing now before me possesses these qualities'). The resolution, however, is more apparent than real, for the first universal proposition has already a reference to both persons and things, and the second universal proposition merely describes more fully the things referred to in the first proposition. *Παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὸ ξηρόν* is really equivalent to *τῷ τοιούτῳ συμφέρει τὸ τοιόνδε*—a general rule, expressing the relation of a class of persons to a class of things, which finds its application in the minor *τόδε τοιόνδε κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε*—



a proposition which has likewise a double reference—to a person 1147 a. 4.
and to a thing. It is in the application, then, of the thing-side of the universal proposition that, according to the present §, the agent's chief difficulty lies (*ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ* 1147 a. 7). A man may know generally that acids are bad for bilious people: and he may know that he is bilious: but he may continue to drink sherry, not knowing that it contains a great deal of acid. His conduct might be described as *μηδὲν ἄτοπον*. It would have to be described as *θαυμαστόν*, if he continued to drink sherry, after his doctor had told him its real nature. The distinction, then, drawn in this § seems to resolve itself into that between knowing and not knowing the particular—a distinction which has much more significance in the case of the *ἀκρατής* than in that of the 'bilious patient' of our example, for there is that in the condition of the *ἀκρατής* which makes it peculiarly difficult for him to interpret and apply the universal—that is, 'to know the particular.' The *ἀκρατής* is likely to find as much difficulty with the *κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε*, as with the *τόδε τοιόνδε*.

**αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος**] *αὐτός* is Rassow's reading (see *Forsch.* pp. 65, a. 6.
66) for Bekker's *οὗτος*. $K^b$ pr. and $M^b$ have *ὁ αὐτός*, and Cambr. has *ὁ οὗτος*. The Paraph. seems to have had *αὐτός*, and the reading is supported by the *αὐτὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος* of the Practical Syllogism in *de Motu Anim.* 7. 701 a. 13.

**κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους**] Ramsauer notes that a. 8.
this *τε* answers to *ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων* § 7. 1147 a. 10, where another *τρόπος* is mentioned.

**οὕτω μέν . . . ἄλλως δέ**] Coraes has—*οὕτω μέν· ὁ νοῦς δ' οὖν,* a. 9.
*ὥστε δοκεῖν μηδὲν ἄτοπον τὸ οὕτως εἰδέναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὥστε τὴν μείζω πρότασιν ἐπίστασθαι μόνην καὶ τὴν καθόλου, τὴν δ' ἐλάττω καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἁμαρτάνειν· ἄλλως δέ· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ θαυμαστὸν τὸ εἰδότα ἀμφότερα, τό τ' ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ καθόλου, ἁμαρτάνειν.*

**§ 7. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων** a. 10.
**ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις**] The connexion between this § and §§ 5 and 6 seems to me to be the following—§ 5 explained the phenomenon of Incontinence by a general reference to the distinction between potential and actual knowledge: § 6, going into detail, showed that knowledge of the particular is often potential, even when knowledge of the including universal is actual: § 7

1147 a. 10. proceeds to point out that incontinence may be explained, not only by reference to the distinction, just considered, between potential and actual knowledge, but also by reference to a distinction which must be drawn within the limits of potential knowledge itself—for knowledge may be 'potential' in the proper and positive sense of 'likely to be actualised,' and 'potential' in the merely negative sense of 'not only not actualised, but unlikely, in the circumstances, to be actualised.' There are cases in which the natural tendency of potential knowledge to rise into actuality (*cf. E. N.* ix. 9. 7 *ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται*) is impeded to such a degree that, while the impeding influences continue to operate, the knowledge can scarcely be called even potential—*i. e.* it is potential in a merely negative sense. The Paraphrast expresses this view of the meaning and connexion of § 7 very well—"Ἔτι, *οὐ τούτῳ μόνῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι, τῷ τοὺς μὲν ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἔχειν μέν, οὐ χρῆσθαι δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔχειν διαφέρουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὰς ἐπιστήμας οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι· ἔστι γὰρ ἔχοντά τινα ἐπιστήμην, μὴ ἔχειν· οἷον, τὸν καθεύδοντα, καὶ μαινόμενον, καὶ οἰνωμένον· κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· μεθύουσι γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ μαίνονται ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ.* Similarly Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 128)—'Dort (*i. e.* in the cases contemplated in §§ 5 and 6) war das Wissen dem Menschen zwar nicht gegenwärtig, aber es konnte durch Erinnerung und Zureden in ihm erweckt werden; in diesem Falle (*i. e.* the *ἄλλος τρόπος* of § 7) hat die Leidenschaft dem Menschen mit der Besinnung die Fähigkeit geraubt, sich zu sammeln und zum Wissen zurückzukehren. So lange daher die Raserei der Leidenschaft vorhält, ist er gegen alle Mahnung taub und vollkommen ausser sich.' Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, paragraphs 26, 27, 30), holding §§ 7 and 8 to be another version *parallel to* § 5, and placing them immediately after § 4, makes the words *ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων* and *διαφέρουσαν* in § 7 refer to what has preceded in § 4. 'There (*i. e.* in § 4) the only kinds of "having" belief are having it doubtfully or having it certainly, in each of these the "having" being actual, §§ 7 and 8 add the case where the "having" is potential.' He thus regards §§ 7 and 8 as explaining, *for the first time* in the version to which they belong (see above note on vii. 3. 1–2. 1146 b. 8 for Cook Wilson's resolution of this chapter), the difference of explicit or actual, and implicit or potential knowledge. 'According to what seems the necessary meaning of the



words, §§ 7 and 8 explain the difference of explicit (or actual) and 1147 a. 10. implicit (or potential) knowledge, premising that it has *not been mentioned hitherto*—*ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων κ.τ.λ.*' (paragr. 26 *β*). Now, as the difference has been mentioned in § 5, Cook Wilson argues that § 5 and § 7 cannot belong to the same version. Then, referring to the interpretation commonly given (as by the Paraphrast, quoted above, and by Rassow), he says (paragr. 26 *β*), 'some have thought . . . that the intention of § 7 is to describe, not the difference of implicit from explicit knowledge in general, but a new species of implicit knowledge, distinct from what has been given (*ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων*), and defined by the examples *καθεύδων, μαινόμενος, οἰνωμένος.* It may be doubted whether this explanation would ever have been thought of, had it not been for the supposed necessity of reconciling § 5 and § 7, for it does not seem to suit either passage'—for, he argues, 'if *ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων* referred to § 5, that § must also be the description of a particular kind of implicit knowledge; but it is a description of implicit knowledge in general, not of a particular species.' Nor, again, can 'the reference be to § 6, as that only uses the general notion of potentiality (*οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ*) given in § 5' (paragr. 26)—*i. e.* 'applies the distinction [of potential and actual knowledge expounded in § 5] to the action of the *ἀκρατής* through the Practical Syllogism' (paragr. 27 end).

Cook Wilson's statements—that § 5 is 'a description of implicit knowledge in general, not of a particular species,' and that § 6 'only uses the general notion of potentiality given in § 5,' do not seem to me to put the matter correctly. I take it that §§ 5 and 6 are concerned, not with 'implicit knowledge in general,' but with two particular species of '*having* knowledge'—*τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην*. The notion of 'having knowledge'—*ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην*—is not convertible with the notion of 'implicit knowledge': 'the implicit *having* of knowledge' is one species of '*having* knowledge' and the other species is 'the explicit *having* of knowledge.'

The *ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων* of § 7, then, naturally refers to §§ 5 and 6, because in § 5 two species of 'having knowledge'—*τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην*—have been distinguished, viz. *τὸ ἔχειν καὶ θεωρεῖν* (where the 'having' is actual) and *τὸ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ θεωρεῖν δέ* (where the 'having' is potential); and in § 6 these two species of 'having knowledge' have been considered in connexion with the two *προτάσεις* of the Practical

1147 a. 10. Syllogism, and the ἀκρατής has been distinctly said to 'have' *both* προτάσεις, the 'having' of the major being actual, and that of the minor potential.—**ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας . . . χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος**[1].

To these two species of ἔχειν distinguished in §§ 5 and 6 (the ἔχειν of the οὐ χρώμενος and the ἔχειν of the χρώμενος), § 7 adds yet another species (*cf.* Ramsauer's note—'κατά τε δὴ τούτους τοὺς τρόπους 1147 a. 8 : τε istud ad τὸ ἔτι 1147 a. 10. § 7 spectat, quo ἄλλος τρόπος additur'), viz. τὸ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, which differs from the normal ἔχειν μὲν μὴ θεωρεῖν δέ in the manner explained at the beginning of the present note. If we keep it steadily in view that the object of § 7 is not 'to explain the difference of explicit and implicit knowledge,' but merely to call attention to another kind τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, the fact that this third kind τοῦ ἔχειν resembles one of the two kinds distinguished in §§ 5 and 6 in being implicit need not trouble us. Indeed, without compromising the position taken up against Cook Wilson's view, one might admit (though I do not think that it is necessary to do so) that this third kind of ἔχειν, being a variety of implicit ἔχειν, was perhaps not in the author's mind when he wrote § 5, but that he there thought merely of the broad specific difference between implicit ἔχειν and explicit ἔχειν : *cf.* the opinion stated by Peters at the end of the following note, p. 217—'Action in spite of knowledge presents no difficulty (1) if that knowledge be not present at the time of action § 5, or (2) if, though the major (or majors) be known and present, the minor (or one of the minors) be unknown or absent § 6. But (3) other cases remain which can only be explained by a further distinction introduced in § 7 ; *i. e.* a man who has knowledge may at times be in a state in which his knowledge, though present, has lost its reality—in which, though he may repeat the old maxims, they mean no more to him than to one who talks in his sleep. Section 7, I venture to think, is (like § 2) not a repetition or an alternative version, but an afterthought, which requires the rewriting of the whole passage.'

In referring the words ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων to § 4, Cook Wilson says (paragraph 30) 'There (*i. e.* in § 4) the only kinds of "having" belief are having it doubtfully or having it

[1] The words **ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας** κ.τ.λ. in § 6 are sufficient to show that not only the ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δέ, but also the χρώμενος is thought of as ἔχων—a point which Bywater's reading and bracket in § 5. 1146 b. 34 conceal.



certainly, in each of these the "having" being actual, §§ 7 and 8 1147 a. 10.
add the case where the "having" is potential.' Surely this view requires § 4 to say 'there are two kinds of "having *knowledge*"—τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην—having it doubtfully and having it certainly, in each of these the "having" being actual': but § 4 compares ἐπιστήμη and δόξα—does not mention two kinds τοῦ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην, indeed says nothing about 'having'—ἔχειν—either δόξα or ἐπιστήμη : whereas the words with which § 7 begins—ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις—seem to imply that the technical expression ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην does not occur here for the first time in the context, and that other modes τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην have been mentioned before.

The ἔχειν καὶ θεωρεῖν—ἔχειν μὲν μὴ θεωρεῖν δέ—and ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν of these §§ recall τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι ἤδη ἔστι κατὰ ἐνέργειαν—τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι ἐνεργήσειεν ἄν—and τὸ οὐδέποτε ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ δύναμις μόνον of *de Interp.* 13. 23 a. 8–25, on which see Grote's *Arist.* vol. i. pp. 184, 185.

Before leaving the subject of the τρόποι τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, I would call attention to the expressions **οὐ θεωρῶν** and **οὐ χρώμενος**, used in §§ 5 and 6 to describe the state of the man whose 'having' is implicit. Θεωρεῖν and χρῆσθαι are terms applicable only to the man whose faculties are in normal working order, and the expressions οὐ θεωρῶν, οὐ χρώμενος are intended to show that one who easily could 'think' or 'use' simply does not happen to do so—as when an Englishman who 'has' a knowledge of German does not happen to be reading a German book; but the ἔχειν of § 7, which is practically equivalent to μὴ ἔχειν, and is defined, not by οὐ θεωρῶν, but by μαινόμενος, is knowledge which cannot, in the circumstances, be produced at will—it is tied up, as it were, like money in some bad unrealisable security.

**§ 8. τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης**] *Cf. Met.* K. 3. 1061 a. 3 ἰατρικὸς γὰρ a. 18.
λόγος καὶ μαχαίριον λέγεται τῷ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ταύτῃ χρήσιμον.

**ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους**] Besides the poem περὶ φύσεως, a. 20.
Empedocles wrote a poem called καθαρμοί, in which the Agrigentines were exhorted to live piously and virtuously. See Mullach, *Fr. Phil.* vol. i. pp. 12 sqq., and Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Ph.* §§ 167 and 179.

1147 a. 22. **συμφυῆναι**] Ald. Sch. *οἱονεὶ φύσιν γενέσθαι τὴν ἕξιν ἐν αὐτοῖς.* The reading of $K^b$ *συμφυῆναι*, which Sus. and Bywater adopt in place of Bekker's *συμφῦναι*, is supported by Ald., CCC, and $B^s$, which have *συμφυῆ εἶναι.*

a. 24. **§ 9. φυσικῶς**] 'Again, we may look at the more immediate causes of incontinence'—*i. e.* we may examine the precise mechanism by which an incontinent act is produced. Hitherto the enquiry has been conducted *λογικῶς* rather than *φυσικῶς*—the remote and abstract explanation afforded by the great Aristotelian distinction of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* has been adduced rather than the proximate cause or *οἰκεῖος λόγος*, which an examination of the concrete nature (*φύσις*) of the phenomenon will make known. (For the distinction *λογικῶς—φυσικῶς* see note on i. 3. 4 *πεπαιδευμένου* 1094 b. 23, and on viii. 1. 6. 1155 b. 2.) The proximate cause (*οἰκεῖος λόγος*) of an incontinent act, or the precise mechanism by which it is produced, is not, however, given in the premisses of the Practical Syllogism, as such. The premisses of the Practical Syllogism, as such, explain all acts generally (*λογικῶς*), not incontinent acts specially (*φυσικῶς*). The proximate cause of an incontinent act is to be sought in the special manner in which *ἐπιθυμία* uses the mechanism of the Practical Syllogism to attain its own object; and §§ 9, 10 and 11, in explaining the sophistical use which *ἐπιθυμία* makes of the Practical Syllogism, give the *οἰκεῖος λόγος* of one form, at least, of incontinence (*ἀσθένεια*: see vii. 7. 8, and note on vii. 3. 5–11. 1146 b. 31), thus differing from § 6 [1], which merely mentions the premisses of the Practical Syllogism in connexion with the remark that the knowledge of the universal may be consciously realised, while that of the included particular may, on account of causes not specially stated, be latent. Section 7, with its *οἰνωμένος, μαινόμενος, καθεύδων*, prepares us for the *οἰκεῖος λόγος* stated in §§ 9–11.

a. 26. **ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν**] *i. e.* when the conclusion results from the premisses: *ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς καθόλου καὶ τῆς μερικῆς δόξης ἄλλην τινὰ συναγάγωμεν δόξαν* (Paraph.).

a. 27. **ἔνθα μέν**] *εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἡ δόξα θεωρητική* (Paraph.).

a. 28. **ποιητικαῖς**] =*πρακτικαῖς*: *cf. de Motu Anim.* 7. 701 a. 23 *αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαί.* The Ald. Schol. has—*ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς, ἤτοι ἂν δὲ ὦσιν αἱ δόξαι ποιητικαὶ ἤτοι πρακτικαί, οὐ δεῖ τὸ συμπέρασμα φάναι, ἀλλὰ πρᾶξαι.*

[1] According to Cook Wilson §§ 9–12 are *parallel* to § 6; see *Arist. Studies*, Table I.



For the Practical Syllogism, see note on vi. 2. 1. 1139 a. 17, and Grant's excellent section on 'the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism,' *Ethics*, Essay iv. pp. 263–270.

The *de Motu Animalium*, in the 7th chapter of which (701 a. 7 sqq.) we find a detailed account of the Practical Syllogism, is a late Peripatetic work (see Val. Rose, *de Arist. Lib. Ord. et Auct.* pp. 162–174); but the account does not seem to be in any way inconsistent with what we find in *E. N.* vii, or in *de Anima* iii, or elsewhere, in works presumably earlier than the *de Motu Anim.* It is just what we might expect, however, that the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism, originating doubtless in Aristotle's own wish to find a neat logical formula for action corresponding to that found for ratiocination, would, because giving a neat logical formula, be put prominently forward by his followers. Accordingly it is to a late treatise like the *de Motu Anim.* that we have to go for a detailed account of the Practical Syllogism. In reading this account, it is important that we should look behind its scholastic phraseology, and remember that the 'major premiss' stands for the permanent organism of the animal (or the moral character of the man): the 'minor premiss' for a stimulus coming from the environment, and calling forth a movement (or action)—'the conclusion'—in accordance with the nature of the permanent organism of the animal (or moral character of the man). Thus the major premiss, compared to the fixed socket of the joint, is said *ἠρεμεῖν* (*de Anima* iii. 10. 433 b. 21 sqq.), while the minor premiss is said *κινεῖν*—to produce motions (or actions) with a sweep, as it were, controlled by the fixed socket of organic structure (or moral principle). Without the *point d'appui* of permanent organic structure (or fixed moral principle), and the particular stimuli of sense, animal motion (or moral action) is impossible. In short, the movements of an animal take place, in accordance with the structure of the animal, on the occasion of sense-stimuli. In the doctrine of the Practical Syllogism this physiological truth is put into scholastic form, and the formula applied more especially to the explanation of moral action.

The latter part of *de Motu An.* ch. 7 (from 701 a. 36) and ch. 8 may be read for the 'physiology' of the Practical Syllogism. As a small movement of the rudder produces a great movement at the

1147 a. 28. prow, so a slight physical change or movement in an internal part, caused by the heat or cold induced by a *πάθος*, is communicated through nerves and muscles, and results in the manifest movement of a limb: 701 b. 13 sqq. *ἐν δὲ τῷ ζῴῳ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ σχήματα μεταβάλλειν, αὐξωμένων τῶν μορίων διὰ θερμότητα καὶ πάλιν συστελλομένων διὰ ψύξιν καὶ ἀλλοιουμένων. ἀλλοιοῦσι δ' αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ ἔννοιαι· αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλοιώσεις τινὲς οὖσαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόησις τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσι δύναμιν· τρόπον γάρ τινα τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ ἡδέος ἢ φοβεροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὂν οἷόν περ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα πάθη καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν. ἀλλοιουμένων δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι τὰ μὲν μείζω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω γίνεται. ὅτι δὲ μικρὰ μεταβολὴ γινομένη ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφορὰς ἄποθεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οἷον τοῦ οἴακος ἀκαριαίόν τι μεθισταμένου πολλὴ ἡ τῆς πρώρας γίνεται μετάστασις. . . . ἔστι δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα πάντα σχεδὸν μετὰ ψύξεώς τινος καὶ θερμότητος· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν παθημάτων· θάρρη γὰρ καὶ φόβοι καὶ ἀφροδισιασμοὶ καὶ τἆλλα τὰ σωματικὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα τὰ μὲν κατὰ μόριον μετὰ θερμότητος ἢ ψύξεώς ἐστι, τὰ δὲ καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα· μνῆμαι δὲ καὶ ἐλπίδες, οἷον εἰδώλοις χρώμεναι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅτε μὲν ἧττον ὅτε δὲ μᾶλλον αἰτίαι τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ὥστ' εὐλόγως ἤδη δημιουργεῖται τὰ ἐντὸς καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὀργανικῶν μορίων μεταβάλλοντα ἐκ πεπηγότων ὑγρὰ καὶ ἐξ ὑγρῶν πεπηγότα καὶ μαλακὰ καὶ σκληρὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων· τούτων δὲ συμβαινόντων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, καὶ ἔτι τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ποιητικοῦ τοιαύτην ἐχόντων φύσιν οἵαν πολλαχοῦ εἰρήκαμεν . . . ὁπόταν μηδὲν ἀπολίπῃ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, εὐθὺς τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει. διὰ τοῦτο δ' ἅμα ὡς εἰπεῖν νοεῖ ὅτι πορευτέον καὶ πορεύεται, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ ἕτερον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία· αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως.*

a. 33. **§ 10. αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ**] *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μερικὴ δόξα ὅτι τόδε γλυκύ· αὕτη δὲ ἡ μερικὴ δόξα ἐνεργεῖ* (Ald. Schol.). So also Peters—'Now when you have on the one side the universal judgment forbidding you to taste, and on the other side the universal "all sweet things are pleasant" (*ἡδύ* here corresponds to *γεύεσθαι δεῖ* above: *note*), and the particular judgment, "this thing before me is sweet," and this latter judgment is effectively present, or, in other words, appetite for the sweet is there....' Grant's rendering, however, is grammatically preferable, as referring *αὕτη* to the second universal proposition (*ἡ δέ*), not to the *μερικὴ δόξα* under it—'When therefore there is in the mind one



universal which forbids tasting, but another which says "all that is 1147 a. 33.
sweet is pleasant" (having a minor) "this thing is sweet," and thus the second universal is realised'—*i. e.* the second universal is applied in its minor.

**κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων**] Some (*e. g.* Ramsauer) a. 35.
have taken this to mean—'for each of the "Parts of the Soul"—*i. e.* *λόγος* and *ἐπιθυμία*—can move the man'; but I have no doubt that *τῶν μορίων* are the *ὀργανικὰ μέρη*—'bodily parts,' of the passage quoted above from the *de Motu Anim.* *τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δὲ ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη*, and that the Paraph. is right with—*ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία μετὰ τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ γευστὸν ἄγει· δύναται γὰρ κινεῖν ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, λέγω δὲ τὰς οἰκείας αἰσθήσεις τῷ ἐπιθυμητῷ, ὅρασιν εἰ ὁρατόν ἐστι τὸ ἡδὺ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκει καὶ γεῦσιν τὸ γευστόν.*

Section 10, as I said, gives the proximate cause of an incontinent act, by exposing the sophistical use which *ἐπιθυμία* makes of the Practical Syllogism.

On the one side, we have the maxim of Reason—*ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἡ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι*, and on the other side, the desire of sweet things. But the *ἀκρατής*, unwilling to apply the maxim of Reason, and yet anxious not to seem to act without Reason, presents his irrational desire in the disguise of a rational, or true, proposition, which he makes the major premiss of a new Practical Syllogism, and his incontinent act, though really proceeding from irrational desire, seems to be the conclusion of this syllogism, and to be performed 'under the influence of Reason'—*ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι*. He incontinently tastes something sweet, and then pleads in justification of his act the authority of a principle which he can represent as a rational one; for it is certainly *true* that 'all sweet things are pleasant.' It is not *quâ true* that this principle is contrary to the other principle—that of Right Reason or Temperance—*ἡ καθόλου ἡ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι*, but *quâ* implying the *desire to disobey* that principle. The two general propositions 'Immoderate indulgence in sweet things is evil,' and 'Sweet things are pleasant,' are both true, and, so far, there is no contrariety between them; but when the latter is put thus in its true colour, 'I must have sweet things!' then its contrariety to the former becomes evident. 'Η *μερικὴ δόξα*—'this thing is sweet,' and the corresponding *καθόλου*—'all sweet things are pleasant,' *are placed in* an attitude of opposition to the principle of Temperance by their

1147 a. 35. association with desire, although *in themselves* they are not opposed to that principle—*ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ.* The *λόγος*, under the influence of which the *ἀκρατής* is said to act incontinently, is simply his principle of uncontrolled *ἐπιθυμία* transmuted into the true proposition—'all sweet things are pleasant.' But it is not the truth of this proposition that is in dispute, but its value as a principle of conduct. It is no justification of an incontinent act to say 'all sweet things are pleasant,' when this only means—'I am passionately fond of sweet things,' and the point at issue is—'*Ought* I to yield to my passion?' The Ald. Schol. has a good note—*οὐκ ἐναντία δέ ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ ἡ δόξα ἡ μερικὴ ἡ λέγουσα ὅτι τόδε γλυκύ ἐστι τῷ λόγῳ τῷ καθόλου τῷ λέγοντι οὐδενὸς γλυκέος ἀπογεύεσθαι δεῖ· ποίαν γὰρ ἐναντιότητα ἔχουσι; γίνονται δὲ ἐναντία κατὰ συμβεβηκός, διότι γὰρ συμβέβηκε τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ συνελθεῖν τῇ μερικῇ δόξᾳ καὶ καταναγκάσαι τὴν γεῦσιν γεύσασθαι τοῦδε τοῦ γλυκέος:—i. e. ἡ μερικὴ δόξα,* 'this is sweet,' is the *occasion* of contrariety to the moral law, by arousing desire, which is directly contrary to it. Then men attempt to excuse themselves by pleading the 'rationality of their desire'—by transmuting *ἐπιθυμία* into *πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ.* 'Die Sophistik der Begierde, von der unter §§ 10, 11 die Rede ist (says Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 129, note), macht sich natürlich noch auf anderen Gebieten geltend, als dem der *ἀκρασία*, und sie ist um so gefährlicher, je mehr sie das *ἡδύ* in eine sittliche Form zu kleiden weiss. Der Feige, der sein Leben nicht preis giebt, weil er sich für seine Kinder erhalten will, der Hungernde, der stiehlt, indem er dem siebenten Gebote das Gebot der Selbsterhaltung gegenüberstellt, sind derartige Sophisten.' *Cf.* Plut. *de Virt. Mor.* 6 *σοφιστικῆς οὖν ψυχῆς ἡ ἀκρασία.*

b. 4. **§ 11. τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ**] because *ἀκρασία* implies a struggle between *ἐπιθυμία* and *λόγος*, and the brutes have not *λόγος*. They have no principle 'forbidding them to taste'; they cannot even construct a spurious *λόγος* by transmuting *τουτὶ γλυκύ* into *πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ.* They have nothing but the impression or idea of the particular—*οἷον ὁ ὄνος ἐνέπεσε τῷδε τῷ βόθρῳ, διὰ καὶ ἔκτοτε ἰδὼν τὸν βόθρον φαντάζεται ὅτι ἐκεῖ ἔπεσε καὶ ἀποφεύγει αὐτόν* (Ald. Sch.). *Cf. E. E.* ii. 8. 1224 a. 26 *οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα λόγον καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ζῇ· ἐν δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω.*

b. 8. **§ 12. φυσιολόγων**] See Grant's note *ad loc.* He quotes Sext. Empir. *Adv. Math.* vii. 129, on the theory of Heraclitus, that in sleep the *αἰσθητικοὶ πόροι* are closed, and the *νοῦς* is cut off from its connexion with *τὸ περιέχον.* The treatise *de Somno* also gives a physiological account of sleep and waking, in which *ἀναθυμιάσεις*, produced by *τὸ θερμόν*, and rising to the sleeper's brain, play an important part. The Ald. Schol., probably with a recollection of this account, speaks of the *ἀναθυμιάσεις* of drunkenness in his note on the present passage.



1147 b. 8. **§§ 13, 14.**] If Ramsauer's very plausible conjecture—*δέ* after *ταύτην* b. 10—be accepted (it is accepted by Susemihl), the words *ἐπεὶ* b. 9 . . . *ὅρον* b. 14 make the protasis, the apodosis beginning with *καὶ ἔοικεν* b. 14: if Ramsauer's conjecture be not accepted, *ἐπεὶ* b. 9 . . . *πράξεων* b. 10 is the protasis, and *ταύτην* b. 10 . . . *Ἐμπεδοκλέους* b. 12 the apodosis of one sentence; while *καὶ διά* b. 13 . . . *ὅρον* b. 14 is the protasis, and *καὶ ἔοικεν* b. 14 . . . *συμβαίνειν* b. 15 the apodosis of another sentence. This is the alternative accepted by Bywater. Bekker's punctuation—a comma after *Ἐμπεδοκλέους*, and a full stop after *ὅρον*—must, one would think, be due to the printer. It gives no construction.

I understand §§ 13, 14, in their connexion with the whole chapter, as follows—*Τὸ ἀκρατεύεσθαι* has been accounted for by the latency of the knowledge of the particular, and it has been carefully pointed out that, although the knowledge of the particular is latent, that of the universal is actively present in consciousness—*ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος* § 6—if a man's knowledge of the particular—viz. that 'this particular act is wrong'—be rendered latent by passion (see §§ 7 and 8), there will be nothing to prevent him performing the wrong act, for it is one's view of a particular act, not one's general maxim of conduct, which is the immediate antecedent or efficient cause of the performance of the particular act: without the *δόξα αἰσθητοῦ*, the act could never take place—see *de Anima* iii. 11. 434 a. 19 *ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα* (*i. e. ἡ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα*), *οὐχ ἡ καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον* (*i. e.* as a regulative principle, and *point d'appui*), *ἡ δ' οὔ.* Now, *ἡ δόξα αἰσθητοῦ ἡ κυρία τῶν πράξεων* (*i. e.* their efficient cause or *κινητικὴ αἰτία*), which is rendered latent by passion, is a 'minor premiss'; and, since the knowledge involved in the minor premiss is not really *ἐπιστήμη*, as is that involved in the major premiss, we can see that

1147 b. 9. the Socratic position is not without foundation: the passion which prevails in incontinence is not matched directly against real knowledge (*οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος* § 14)—real knowledge, though consciously present in the mind of the *ἀκρατής*, is not *near enough* (*οὐ παρούσης*) to this passion to be buffeted about and suppressed by it (*οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος*): it is only the knowledge of the particular (*ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη=δόξα αἰσθητοῦ*) which stands near enough to the passion to be affected by it, or, indeed, is of a nature to be affected by it—*i. e.* suppressed and rendered latent by it. But this knowledge of the particular (that 'this particular thing is wrong'), as we said, is not really knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*): so, we have explained *ἀκρασία* (knowing the right and doing the wrong) without entirely discrediting the Socratic position. This is a result in perfect keeping with the principle of procedure laid down in vii. 1. 5 *δεῖ δὲ . . . δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα.* I am accordingly unable to agree with Cook Wilson that an 'obvious concession of the Socratic principle' (*Arist. Stud.* paragr. 60) is contained in ch. 3 generally, and in §§ 13 and 14 in particular, which contributes to make it probable that the chapter is not by the same author as some of the most important parts of *E. N.* vii. I would put the case, as between Socrates and the writer of this chapter, thus—Socrates denied the existence of *ἀκρασία*, because *ἐπιστήμη* cannot be conquered by *πάθος*. The writer of this chapter opposes the view that *ἀκρασία* does not exist; but 'concedes' the point that true *ἐπιστήμη* cannot be conquered by *πάθος*. He is enabled to make this 'concession' by drawing a distinction—the *ἀκρατής* has actively present in his mind the true *ἐπιστήμη*, the general proposition that 'it is wrong to yield to *πάθος*,' but this *ἐπιστήμη*, to quote the expression used in *de An.* iii. 11. 434 a. 20, *ἠρεμεῖ μᾶλλον*, and can touch action only through the intermediation of the *δόξα αἰσθητοῦ*—'to do this particular act would be to yield to *πάθος*.' This *δόξα αἰσθητοῦ*, however, is not true *ἐπιστήμη*, and its latency, caused by *πάθος*, sufficiently accounts for the occurrence of an act of *ἀκρασία*, without obliging us to say, against Socrates, that true *ἐπιστήμη* is affected by *πάθος*. The clause *οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται τὸ πάθος* I understand to mean that 'the affection (*τὸ ἀκρατεύεσθαι*) does not occur in the immediate presence of real knowledge'—'real knowledge,' though actively present in the consciousness



of the *ἀκρατής*, does not operate as an *efficient cause* (*οὐ κινεῖ de An.* 1147 b. 9. iii. 11. 434 a. 20) of action, and so does not come into conflict with *ἐπιθυμία*. Only particulars can come to close quarters with particulars. Only *μερικαὶ δόξαι* are *κύριαι τῶν πράξεων*, and the *μερικὴ δόξα*, 'this is wrong,' is defeated by another *μερικὴ δόξα*—that of *ἐπιθυμία*—'it is pleasant.' While I am at one with Cook Wilson (paragr. 66) in thinking that the context does not allow us to understand *τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης* to mean the presence of both minor and major premisses[1], I cannot accept his view that *οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης κ.τ.λ.* means that 'the Socratic opinion about *ἀκρασία* agrees with the theory just given, inasmuch as knowledge proper *has not been allowed* to the *ἀκρατής*': and consequently I cannot follow him in a difficulty which he expresses a few lines below—'The reason (which the present passage) assigns for the absence of knowledge proper is "that the minor premiss is not so much of the nature of true knowledge as the major." This must mean that the *ἀκρατής* has not true *ἐπιστήμη*, because he has only the minor and not the major, which of course is in direct contradiction to the beginning of § 13 and to the rest of the chapter.'

According to the view which I have attempted to state above, it is not argued in § 14 'that the *ἀκρατής has not* true *ἐπιστήμη*,' but 'that the true *ἐπιστήμη*, which he has—and has consciously—is not in a position to be affected by *πάθος*, because it is universal, and so does not enter the arena of particular action.'

While the word *παρούσης* may be thus, I think, satisfactorily explained, I have considerable doubt as to its genuineness. The homoeoteleuton *δοκούσης παρούσης*[2] is suspicious, and the awkwardness of having to take *τὸ πάθος* in a different sense after *γίνεται* and *διά* respectively—as 'the affection, viz. *ἀκρασία*' in the first case, and as 'passion' in the second case[3]—seems to suggest that there is something wrong in the text as it stands. I offer the conjecture, I confess with hesitation—for what it is worth—that *παρούσης* represents *περι* and a dittograph of the termination of *δοκούσης*, the

[1] Ramsauer understands the words to mean this.

[2] CCC and NC, however, have *τῆς κυρίως εἶναι δοκούσης ἐπιστήμης παρούσης.*

[3] Ramsauer says '*τὸ πάθος* vs. 16 intelligas *τὸ τῆς ἀκρασίας* quod fit *διὰ τὸ πάθος* vs. 17 affectum qui facit quasi impetum.' Similarly, Stahr translates the first *πάθος* by Unenthaltsamkeit, the second by Leidenschaft. Both Grant and Peters manage ingeniously to render *πάθος* in each place by phrases containing 'condition,' or 'passion.'

1147 b. 9. dittograph ουσης having (by a blunder which sometimes appears in MSS.) inserted itself between the περι and the γίνεται of an original περιγίνεται. The deliberate alteration of the resulting περιούσης into παρούσης would then be natural, even if παραγίνεται had not, before the insertion of the dittograph ουσης, taken the place of περιγίνεται, by a blunder which often[1] occurs in MSS. The sentence then would originally stand—οὐ γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δυκούσης **περιγίνεται** τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. Here τὸ πάθος means 'passion' in both places, and τῆς αἰσθητικῆς is governed, as is τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης, by περιγίνεται='gets the better of.'

The following is the Paraphrast's explanation of §§ 13 and 14. It seems to me to be a very satisfactory explanation of the text as it stands: Ὅταν δὲ ἐν τῷ πάθει γένηται ὁ ἀκρατής, τὴν ἐλάττω πρότασιν, τὴν κυρίαν τῶν πράξεων, τὴν ὅτι τόδε κακόν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲ ἐπίσταται, ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ οἱ μεθύοντες καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι ἔπη τινὰ καὶ ἀποδείξεις λέγουσιν· ἄλλως τε, ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ ἐλάττων πρότασις αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐπιστημονική ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἡ καθόλου καὶ μείζων. ὥστε ἔοικεν, ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ γὰρ παρούσης τῆς κυρίως εἶναι δυκούσης ἐπιστήμης, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ καθόλου, γίνεται τὸ πάθος· οὐ γὰρ ταύτης κρατεῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· ἀλλὰ τῆς κυρίας τῶν πράξεων, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ ἐλάττων καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ καθέκαστα· ταύτην γὰρ διαφθείρει ὁ πράττων, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις· καὶ αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου.

b. 14. § 13. ἐζήτει] 'sought to establish' (Peters).

b. 17. § 14. τῆς αἰσθητικῆς] See Grant's note: he quotes Sext. Empir. *Adv. Math.* vii. 145 on the ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις of Speusippus, which is described as ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον (*i.e.* τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον) ἀληθείας.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ARGUMENT.

*Let us now determine the sphere of incontinence,* strictly so called.

*It is plain that continence and endurance, incontinence and softness, are relative to pleasures and pains.*

*Now the things which cause pleasure are either* necessary, *such as food,*

[1] I have counted in *E. N.* v eight cases in which παρά and περί are confused by NC; and in two out of the four places in which παραγίνεται occurs (according to Grant's index) in the *E. N.*, περιγίνεται is the reading of a MS. or MSS.



*or not necessary, but* desirable in themselves, *such as honour, or wealth. Those then who, against their own sound judgment, exceed in relation to these latter sources of pleasure, are not described as 'incontinent' simply: the term is indeed applied to them, but not in its strict sense, only with a qualifying addition—'incontinent* about honour *or* about wealth.' *That 'incontinence' has different meanings as ascribed on the one hand to the man who yields against his judgment to the pleasure of getting honour or wealth, or of giving vent to his anger, and on the other hand to the man who yields against his judgment to the pleasures of touch and taste, is shown by the circumstance that we blame it in the latter case as a form of vice, but not in the former case; and also by the circumstance that we call people 'soft' in relation to the sensations of touch and taste, but not in relation to honour or wealth. Our conclusion, then, is that the term 'incontinent' is applied* strictly, *and without qualifying addition, to the man who errs, against his judgment and resolve, in relation to those pleasures (and pains) of touch and taste, in relation to which the incorrigible or intemperate man errs deliberately, and the temperate man observes moderation. Non-deliberate excess in the pursuit of such objects as honour and wealth (good and desirable in themselves) is 'incontinence'* with a qualification: *similarly, we have to add a qualification, if we apply the term 'incontinent' to one who yields to the unnatural pleasures which may be derived from the* contraries *of things good and desirable in themselves. 'Incontinence' is ascribed with a qualification also to the man who cannot restrain his anger; without qualification only to the man who exceeds, against his judgment and resolve, in relation to the* normal *pleasures of touch and taste.*

§ 1. ἐφεξῆς] See ch. 3. § 1. 1146 b. 9 εἶτα κ.τ.λ. 1147 b. 21.

§ 2. ἐπεί] here='whereas': see Cook Wilson, *Arist Stud.* parag. 39. The apodosis begins with τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα b. 31. *Cf.* Simplicius (fol. 56 b) quoted by Trend. on *de An.* iii. 3. 1—ἐν δὲ τῇ λέξει (*i.e. de An.* iii. 3. 1) πρὸς τὸν ἐπεὶ σύνδεσμον διὰ μακροῦ ἀποδέδωκεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ. . . . . διὰ τὴν διὰ μακροῦ ἀπόδοσιν τὸν οὖν προσθεὶς σύνδεσμον. b. 23.

ἀναγκαῖα] See *Rep.* 558 βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα, πρῶτον ὁρισώμεθα τάς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς μή; . . . οὐκοῦν ἅς τε οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη. . . . . ἅς γέ τις ἀπαλλάξαιεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῴη ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρώσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τουναντίον, πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν εἶναι, ἆρ' οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; . . . προελώμεθα δή τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων, αἵ εἰσιν, ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς . . . ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ὑγιείας τε καὶ εὐεξίας καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη; . . . ἡ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἡ τοιούτων ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν b. 24.

1147 b. 24. *ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρός τε φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἆρά γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαία ἂν καλοῖτο;*

For the Aristotelian use of *ἀναγκαῖος*, Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 22, note 1) compares *E. N.* i. 9. 7. 1099 b. 27, x. 6. 2. 1176 b. 2; *Pol.* 1333 a. 32, 1338 a. 13 and 32.

b. 28. **ἔθεμεν**] *E. E.* iii. 2, or *E. N.* iii. 10. When we use the term *ἀκρατής* simply by itself (*ἁπλῶς*) without qualifying addition, we signify the man who yields, after a struggle, to those bodily pleasures (of touch and taste), the deliberate pursuit of which constitutes *ἀκολασία*: but the man who pursues gain incontinently can be called *ἀκρατής* only with a qualifying *πρόσθεσις—ἀκρατὴς κέρδους*: also the man who does not succeed in controlling his anger is *ἀκρατής* with a *πρόσθεσις—θυμοῦ*.

Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 21, 22) has called attention to the circumstance that § 5 goes over the same ground as § 2; and Cook Wilson (*Arist. Stud.* parags. 6–9 and 37–42) resolves the whole chapter into duplicate passages forming different versions. His resolution (Table II) is as follows:—

A § 1 (Introduction common to both versions).

$B_1$ § 2 *ἐπεὶ . . . . ἡδέων* = $B_2$ § 5 *ἐπεὶ . . . . ὑπερβάλλειν.*

$C_1$ *τοὺς μὲν οὖν—οὐθείς* = $C_2$ § 5 *Διό . . . § 6 κακόν.*

$D_1$ § 3 *τῶν δέ—§ 4 λύπας εἶναι* = $D_2$ § 6 *ὥσπερ—φαμέν.*

'Both columns,' says Cook Wilson p. 8, 'begin with *ἐπεὶ δέ*, and it will be seen that either may be read after the first section of the chapter, A, with equal coherence both in syntax and subject-matter. Thus each of the two orders A $B_1$ $C_1$ $D_1$, A $B_2$ $C_2$ $D_2$ yields a chapter on the same subject as the other, and very like it.' I entirely agree with this statement of the case; I also agree with Cook Wilson's conclusion (parag. 42) that there are differences in style and subject-matter between the two columns which 'point in the direction of diversity rather than of unity in the authorship.' The discrepancy also between *E. E.* iii and *E. N.* iii on the one side, and this ch. on the other, with respect to the object of *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*, is a point of great interest noticed by Cook Wilson (parag. 39), and I am inclined to think with him that it proves that this chapter is not by the writer either of *E. E.* iii or of *E. N.* iii.

b. 34. **καὶ θυμοῦ**] 'The position of *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* in ch. 4,' says Cook Wilson (parag. 70), 'is not without obscurity, for *θυμός* cannot be called *φύσει αἱρετόν, φύσει τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, αἱρετὸν καθ' αὑτό*, in the same sense as the examples *κέρδος, τιμή, νίκη*: it is not classed with these higher *ἡδέα*, and *ἀκρασία* in respect of it is associated with *ἀκρασία* in respect of them without explanation. Perhaps the oversight occasioned later the introduction of a separate proof in ch. vi that *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* is not so blameworthy as *ἀκρασία* of bodily pleasures: and it is worth notice that § 3 (ch. 6. 1149 b. 19) adds, as corollary, the assertion that it is not properly (*ἁπλῶς*) *ἀκρασία*, without reference to the result of ch. iv, which may well have been thought insufficient.' The suggestion here made by Cook Wilson seems to be supported by a passage in *M. M.* ii. 6. 1202 b. 3—referred to by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 47) in his discussion of the place of ch. 6 in *E. N.* vii (see below, note on vii. 6. 1, a. 24): *ἔστιν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικὰς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής.—δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι περὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἀκρασία· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ψεκτὸς ὁ ἀκρατής, ψεκτὰ εἶναι δεῖ τὰ ὑποκείμενα· τιμὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ δόξα καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ χρήματα καὶ περὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, οὐκ εἰσὶν ψεκτά, αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ ψεκταί· διὸ εἰκότως ὁ περὶ ταύτας ἂν μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος, οὗτος ἀκρατὴς τελέως λέγεται. ἐπειδὴ δέ ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀκρασιῶν λεγομένων ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν οὖσα ἀκρασία ψεκτοτάτη, πότερον ψεκτοτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς;*—then follows a passage founded on *E. N.* vii. 6.

**ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ 'Ολύμπια νικῶν· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ . . . ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν**] b. 35. Bywater restores *νικῶν* from $K^b$, in place of Bekker's *νενικηκώς*. Cambr. is, so far as I know, the only MS. which agrees with $K^b$ in giving *νικῶν*. I explain the passage as follows, making *ἄνθρωπος* a predicate—'"The Olympionices" in the school-example—"The Olympionices is a man," will illustrate the distinction between the *ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς* and the *ἀκρατὴς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*. "The Olympionices," though described generally as "a man," has also, *quâ* "Olympionices," a notion of his own, which differs, slightly indeed, but yet differs, from the notion "man."' *Cf. Pol.* iii. 2. 1276 b. 21 (quoted by Zell) *τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ πρῳρεύς, ὁ δ' ἄλλην τινὰ ἔχων τοιαύτην ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἑκάστου λόγος ἴδιος ἔσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμόσει πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν πάντων· τούτου γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων.* The writer means that the man who is incontinent in relation to certain bodily pleasures is *ἀκρατὴς* without qualification, and the man who is incontinent in relation to money is *ἀκρατὴς* with that qualification, just as *ἄνθρωπος*, when unqualified, stands for *ζῷον λογικὸν*

1147 b. 35. *θνητόν*, but when qualified as *ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν*, stands for *ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν ἀθλοφόρον*. So the Paraph.—*Ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ὑπερβάλλων τὰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα οὐ λέγεται ἁπλῶς χωρὶς προσθήκης ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ ἀκρατὴς δόξης, ἢ ἀκρατὴς πλούτου, ὡς ἕτερος ὢν ἐκείνου τοῦ κυρίως καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατοῦς, ὀνομαζόμενος δὲ ἀκρατὴς διά τινα πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὁμοιότητα· καθάπερ διαφέρει ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκὼς τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀνθρώπου· καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ μικρόν ἐστι τὸ διάφορον αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως διαφέρει, καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι διὰ τὴν προσθήκην.* Clearly the parallel here is not an exact one: the Olympionices is called a *man*, because he has *ὁλοκλήρως* the nature of *man*, and is included within the class *man*: whereas the *ἀκρατὴς κέρδους* is not included within the class of the *ἀκρατεῖς ἁπλῶς*, but belongs to a class which is coordinate with it. Under the general notion of *ἀκρατής* fall (1) *ὁ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἀκρατής=ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής*, and (2) *ὁ κέρδους* (or *τιμῆς*) *ἀκρατής*: *ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής* does not include *ὁ κέρδους ἀκρατής*, as *ὁ ἁπλῶς ἄνθρωπος* includes *ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν*. Rather, in the expression *ἀκρατὴς κέρδους*, the proper meaning of the term *ἀκρατής* is metaphorically extended, as the proper meaning of *man* (=human being) is extended in the expression 'wild *man* of the woods' (=ape). Nor do I think that the parallel between the *ἀκρατὴς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν* and the Olympionices would be made more strict if we accepted the incredible and plainly 'aetiological' story about the Olympian victor whose proper name was *Ἄνθρωπος*—see Alex. *Soph. Elench.* 316 a. 34 *ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ὀλυμπιονίκης ὠνομάζετο αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ἄνθρωπος.* Alex. *Top.* 262 b. 14 *ἄνθρωπος ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἴδιον ὄνομα τοῦτο τοῦ Ὀλυμπιονίκου πύκτου οὗ ἐν Ἠθικοῖς ἐμνημόνευσεν.* Suidas s. v. *ἄνθρωπος.*—*ἄνθρωπος τὸ προσηγορικόν· καὶ Ἄνθρωπος ἴδιον ὄνομα οὗ ἐν ἠθικοῖς Ἀριστοτέλης μνημονεύει.* Eustath. *Il.* A. p. 847 *καὶ Ὀλυμπιονίκης τις κατὰ κυριωνυμίαν ἐκλήθη Ἄνθρωπος.* Mich. Eph. on *Eth. Nic.* v. init. fol. 56 b *ἡ δὲ προκειμένη ἀρετή* (*i. e. ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη*) *δικαιοσύνη μὲν λέγεται καὶ ὀνομάζεται τῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὀνόματι· ὄνομα δ' ἴδιον οὐκ ἐκληρώσατο, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ὁ Ὀλυμπιονίκης οὐ Σωκράτης οὐ Πλάτων οὐκ Ἀριστείδης, ἀλλὰ τῷ κοινῷ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ὀνόματι ἄνθρωπος ὀνομάζεται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ παροῦσα ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη καλεῖται τῷ κοινῷ τῆς ὅλης δικαιοσύνης ὀνόματι.* Ald. Schol. on the present passage—*ὥσπερ καὶ ἦν τις νικήσας εἰς τὰ Ὀλύμπια καὶ ἤκουεν Ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ ὁ δεῖνα ἀκούει Σωκράτης ἢ Πλάτων, ἐκείνου γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος ἤτοι ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος ἤτοι τὸ ζῷον λογικὸν θνητὸν μικρὸν διέφερε τοῦ ἰδίου ὀνόματος· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἤκουε· μικρὰ γάρ τις προσθήκη ποιεῖ τὴν διαφοράν· οἱ μέλλοντες γὰρ δηλῶσαι αὐτὸν καὶ διαχωρίσαι αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ καθόλου, προσετίθουν ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς.*



This story is accepted by Michelet, Williams, and Stahr. Stahr indeed adds a finishing touch to the myth which is worth recording (p. 240, note 2)—'Anthrōpos mit langem ō heisst auf griechisch Mensch. Der Sieger in den olympischen Spielen hiess nun ebenfalls Anthropos (vgl. Suidas s. v. *Ἄνθρωπος*), aber wahrscheinlich wurde sein Name mit kurzem ŏ gesprochen und geschrieben.' Grant's suggestion that the historical tenses *διέφερεν* and *ἦν* gave rise to the fiction about a person called *Ἄνθρωπος* is probably correct; and his further remark that the past tenses 'must be understood to mean a reference to some previous logical discourse with which the school was familiar' I accept, substituting '*grammatical example*' for '*logical discourse*': see the grammarian Apollonius, *περὶ συντάξεως*, Book i. *§ λά—πηλίκος ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησε τὰ Ὀλύμπια. λ. ὡς ἐπιδείκνυμεν ἐν τῷ περὶ ῥημάτων, αἱ προκείμεναι οὖν συντάξεις, ὑποστελλομένων τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων ἀδιαφόρους ἔχουσι τὰς ἀναστροφὰς χωρὶς ἄρθρου λεγομένας· ἄνθρωπος δραμὼν ἐνίκησε.* The circumstance, vouched for by these passages, that *ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησε τὰ Ὀλύμπια* was a *grammatical* example in use, seems to me entirely to dispose of the *Ἄνθρωπος* myth as accepted by Michelet and Stahr, and to make it unnecessary to have recourse to Peters' conjecture (p. 221, note)—'As we do not know the facts to which Aristotle alludes, we can only conjecture his meaning. It may be that the man in question had certain physical peculiarities, so that though he "passed for a man" he was not a man quite in the common meaning of the name. So Locke asks (*Essay* iv. 10. 13), "Is a changeling a man or a beast?"' 1147 b. 35.

*σημεῖον δέ*] *sc. τοῦ διαφέρειν τὴν ἁπλῶς ἀκρασίαν τῆς μετὰ προσθέσεως ἀκρασίας* (Coraes). 1148 a. 2.

*ἢ ἁπλῶς οὖσα ἢ κατά τι μέρος*] *περὶ πάσας τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἢ κατὰ τήνδε ἢ τήνδε τὴν σωματικὴν ἀπόλαυσιν μερικῶς* (Coraes); *i. e. ἀκρασία*, whether in relation to *all* bodily indulgences, or to *one* of them, is blamed not merely as a fault, but as a form of vice. The Ald. Schol. and the Paraph. are wrong in taking *οὖσα* with *κακία*, instead of with *ἀκρασία* as above, and in thus making the words before us mean that '*ἀκρασία* is blamed . . . either as *τελεία κακία* (*i. e. κακία ἁπλῶς οὖσα*) or as *ἐγγίζουσα τῇ κακίᾳ* (*i. e. κακία κατά τι μέρος οὖσα*).' a. 4.

§ 3. *περὶ ἃς λέγομεν*] Those mentioned in *E. N.* iii. 10 and 11. a. 5.

1148 a. 7. καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων] *sc.* τὰς ὑπερβολάς. Instead of understanding τὰς ὑπερβολάς, Ramsauer suggests the insertion of ὁτιοῦν after τῶν λυπηρῶν: 'ideo sunt ἀκόλαστοι et ἀκρατεῖς quod ipsam voluptatis absentiam tanquam miseriam ferre nequeunt' is the reason which he gives for his suggestion; and he refers to *E. N.* iii. 11. 5, and to § 4 of the present chapter (διὸ μᾶλλον . . . σφόδρα), and to vii. 14. 2 ἐναντίως δ' . . . τὴν ὑπερβολήν. Similarly, Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 78) suggests the insertion of τὰ μέτρια before τῶν λυπηρῶν, comparing the καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας of § 4 below. His words are—'Sehr auffällig ist τῶν λυπηρῶν. Der, welcher das Uebermass des Schmerzes flieht, wäre ein ἀκρατής? Unmöglich kann dies die Ansicht des Aristoteles sein. Jeder vernünftige Mensch flieht das Uebermass des Schmerzes, und nur der, welcher auch vor mässiger Unlust zurückschrickt, kann ἀκρατής genannt werden.' Rassow seems to find support for his suggestion in the fact that Bekker's τε before ἡδέων a. 7 (if genuine: Bywater omits it: it is not given by $L^b$, $M^b$, r, CCC, or Ald.) is wrongly placed, as the sentence stands: τῶν ἡδέων and τῶν λυπηρῶν, on account of the different verbs φεύγων and διώκων in the two clauses, cannot, he thinks, be connected by τε—καί: but τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολάς, καὶ τὰ μέτρια τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων would be grammatically correct.

Ramsauer's ὁτιοῦν and Rassow's τὰ μέτρια seem to me to originate in a misunderstanding. The passage which Ramsauer quotes from iii. 11. 5 describes the **ἀκόλαστος**, not the **ἀκρατής**: and the passage which they both quote from vii. 4. 4 describes the **ἀκόλαστος** as avoiding μετρίας λύπας. But the character described here (§ 3) is not the ἀκόλαστος, but the ἀκρατής—ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι διώκων . . . καὶ φεύγων—the man who struggles with strong desires (pleasures and pains), and who succumbs διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα—because he has been overtaken by a νεανικὴ ἐπιθυμία καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας **λύπη ἰσχυρά** (§ 4 below). It is not **ὁτιοῦν τῶν λυπηρῶν**, or **τὰς μετρίας λύπας**, that such a person yields to, but **τῶν λυπηρῶν τὰς ὑπερβολάς**. The passage, again, which they both (and Bywater, *Contrib.* p. 55) quote from vii. 14. 2 is not, as I understand it, intended to describe the ἀκρατής, but the φαῦλος (of 1154 a. 16), *i. e.* the ἀκόλαστος, who is the subject of φεύγει—ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν—'the ἀκόλαστος pursues excessive pleasure, and avoids, not only



excessive pain (as the ἀκρατής does), but any pain, even the absurd 1148 a. 7.
pain of absent pleasure (see *E. N.* iii. 11. 5)—a pain which only an habitual follower of excessive pleasure, like himself, feels at all.' See note on vii. 14. 2. With regard to Rassow's remark—that every rational man avoids excessive pain, I would say—surely the ἐγκρατής and καρτερικός deliberately endure it, and the ἀκρατής and μαλακός try to endure it, but fail.

**ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους**] Cook Wilson (paragraph 39) remarks that a. 8.
the doctrine of the present passage, according to which the ἀκόλαστος has to do with the pains of heat and cold, 'disagrees as much with the Eudemian as the Nic. Ethics. According to Nic. Eth. iii. 10 and 11, the σώφρων and ἀκόλαστος have to do with pleasures and pains, but the pains are only those of unsatisfied desire for pleasure. Compare Nic. Eth. iii. 11. 5, 6. 1118 b. 28–1119 a. 5.

'But this chapter (4 of Book vii) gives as examples of pains within the sphere of σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία, . . . πεῖνα, δίψα, ἀλέα, and ψῦχος. The last two of these are obviously excluded by the definition of Book iii: they are not pains caused merely by the desire for pleasure; it cannot be said of them τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

'Two other passages in *Nic. Eth.* iii show how much stress the author laid on the exclusion of all pains originating independently of imagined pleasure—ch. 10. § 1. 1117 b. 24–27, *i. e.* it is primarily of pleasure and only secondarily of pain, so far as pain may be "caused by pleasure"; ch. 12. §§ 1, 2. 1119 a. 21–25. If the account of σωφροσύνη in the Eudemian Ethics (iii. 2), which answers to the above part of Nic. Eth. iii, showed the same deviation from the Nicomachean version as Book vii. ch. 4, there would be some ground perhaps for referring the last to the author of Eud. Eth. ii. But on the contrary, the Eudemian account (ii. 2) follows the Nicomachean (iii. 10 and 11) in mentioning no other pain as object of σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία save that of unsatisfied desire for pleasure: compare Eud. Eth. 1231 a. 30–32 καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι· οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες. The pains of ἀλέαι and ψύχη are referred to (Eud. Eth. 1229 b. 5) in the chapter on ἀνδρεία, and not in any connection with σωφροσύνη and ἀκολασία, but associated with the objects of ἀνδρεία and δειλία.' To the passages quoted above by Cook Wilson from the *Nic. Eth.* may be added *E. N.* iii. 10. 11 οὐ

1148 a. 8. *περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἁφή, ἀλλὰ περί τινα μέρη*: by this limitation the pains of *ἀλέαι* and *ψύχη* are excluded.

a. 12. § 4. **μαλακοί**] *ἀκόλαστοι*, the reading of CCC, Ald. Sch., Heliod., Ald., is accepted by Coraes and Michelet: but *μαλακοί* is obviously right. The fact that people are popularly called (*λέγονται*) *μαλακοί* in relation to *σωματικά*, and not in relation to *κέρδος* &c. (*περὶ ἐκείνων οὐδεμίαν*), is a *σημεῖον* in favour of the correctness of our view that in the *σωματικά* we have a very definitely marked off and important class of objects or motives, which warrants us in distinguishing people who are *ἀκρατεῖς* in relation to them as *ἀκρατεῖς ἁπλῶς*, from people who are *ἀκρατεῖς* in relation to other objects or motives. Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, p. 47) remarks that these words *καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται* ignore the doctrine of ch. 7, in which *μαλακία* is technically distinguished from *ἀκρασία*, as the yielding (after a struggle) to pain, from the yielding (after a struggle) to pleasure. And on p. 73 he writes—'The way in which *μαλακοί* occurs 1148 a. 12 (vii. 4. 4) is remarkable: it is said that the pains with which the *ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς* has to do are bodily, and a sign of this is that people are called *μαλακοί* for yielding to them: whereas according to ch. 7 . . . *μαλακοί* is *the proper name* for such characters. This difficulty admits of explanation. . . . It has been pointed out (parag. 39 *β*) that the third book of the Nic. Ethics and the Eudemian book corresponding associate *μαλακία* with cowardice, and not with *ἀκολασία*, and that there is no trace of the definite coordination (see ch. 7) of *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* with *σωφροσύνη*, *ἀκρασία* &c. The author of vii. 4. 4, though deviating in one respect from Eud. Eth. ii and Nic. Eth. iii (*i. e.* as to the painful motives which concern *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*), has not advanced to the development of the theory of *μαλακία* found in ch. 7:[1] he merely calls attention to the fact that the ignominious term *μαλακός* is applied where men yield to bodily pains, to show that such conduct is held specially bad, and belongs therefore to *ἀκρασία* proper, and not to *ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*.' I am not sure that it is safe to say, with Cook Wilson, that 'the author of vii. 4. 4 . . . has not advanced to the development of the theory of

[1] 'In Nic. Eth. iii. 10 and 11 there is no thought of separating the desire for pleasure and the pain of such desire as different motives, and constitutive of different characters, but they are clearly aspects of one and the same thing.' Cook Wilson, *Arist. Stud.* p. 47.



*μαλακία* found in ch. 7.' We must remember that in vii. 4. 4 1148 a. 12. it is only *the popular denotation* of the term *μαλακός* that the writer appeals to, in order to show, by a *σημεῖον*, that the sphere to which he has assigned the *ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς* is very definitely marked off from other spheres of so-called *ἀκρασία*. His immediate object does not require him to give *his own theory* (stated in ch. 7) *of the connotation* of *μαλακία*.

**οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται**] The *προαίρεσις* of the a. 17. *ἀκόλαστος* sides with his *ἐπιθυμία*, and he is said to act *προαιρούμενος* rather than *ἐπιθυμῶν*: whereas the *ἀκρατής* acts *ἐπιθυμῶν* but not *προαιρούμενος*—from mere desire, and not from deliberate choice—*ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὔ* (*E. N.* iii. 2. 4). We can understand what is meant by the *προαίρεσις* of the *ἐγκρατής* which *opposes* *ἐπιθυμία*, and prevails over it—*ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δέ . . . . προαιρούμενος μὲν πράττει, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ· καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, κ.τ.λ.* (*E. N.* iii. 2. §§ 4 and 5); but what is this *προαίρεσις* of the *ἀκόλαστος* which *sides with* *ἐπιθυμία*? The object of *ἐπιθυμία* is present pleasure *as such*: surely it is the function of *προαίρεσις*, as *βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος*, to look at present pleasure, not as such, but in relation to a system of life? Is not the very notion of *προαίρεσις*, then, travestied in a definition like this—vii. 7. 2 *ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων † ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς † ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος*? If it is true that *ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος* (iii. 2. 5), how can it be *προαίρεσις*, as distinguished from *ἐπιθυμία*, in the *ἀκόλαστος*, which makes present pleasure, as such, its object? Indeed, except in a somewhat recondite sense (to be noticed afterwards), the ordinary *ἀκόλαστος* cannot be said to act *προαιρούμενος*, any more than the *ἀκρατής*. The ordinary *ἀκόλαστος* was once *ἀκρατής*. Strong *ἐπιθυμίαι*, after a struggle, have their own way in the *ἀκρατής*. As time goes on the same man yields to feeble *ἐπιθυμίαι* without a struggle, and is called *ἀκόλαστος*. This he does habitually—*i. e.* he always, with perfect consistency, yields to feeble *ἐπιθυμίαι* without struggling, or thinking it wrong to yield. The consistency of his conduct, as compared with the inconsistency which exists between the theory and practice of the *ἀκρατής*, seems something rational and deliberate; he may even get credit for strength of character, and hopes may be entertained of his reformation, if he would only listen to good advice. But this 'consistency' of the *ἀκόλαστος* is only the weakness

1148 a. 17. of the ἀκρατής in an intensified form, and become chronic. Such a man is after all more correctly conceived as acting ἐπιθυμῶν, than as acting προαιρούμενος: unless it be said that, since action breeds *belief*, he eventually acquires a false λόγος, or theory of life, in virtue of possessing which he may be conceived as acting προαίρουμενος—as deliberately choosing means to the end which that false theory of life holds up before him. This is the recondite sense, just now referred to, in which he may be said to act προαιρούμενος—ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκόλαστος ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν (this is his theory of life) τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν vii. 3. 2. But after all it is his long-indulged craving for pleasure, rather than his false theory, which makes him act as he does. And in the sentence just quoted note the contradiction in the terms—ἄγεται—προαιρούμενος. Man is an ἀρχή in his προαίρεσις: it is by his ἐπιθυμίαι that he is *led*—ἄγεται.

So much for the ordinary ἀκόλαστος—the ἀκόλαστος who once was ἀκρατής. But it perhaps ought to be admitted that there are also born ἀκόλαστοι—men in whom λόγος, or *conscientia*, was never effectively present to mar the pleasures of indulgence by its shadow; who never viewed these pleasures askance, as forbidden fruit, but always calmly, as pleasures; and so have been able early to make them objects of the nice comparisons and deliberate preferences and rejections of the connoisseur. Such men may be described as προαιρούμενοι with more correctness than the ordinary ἀκόλαστοι, or chronic weaklings, with whom the Seventh Book is, I believe, chiefly, if not exclusively, concerned.

διό] 'The conjunction διό,' says Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, p. 73), 'may of course be taken in its non-illative use, but even thus it must at least be equivalent to "and so," and implies that the subject which it introduces has been in some way prepared for: but it is by no means prepared for, and succeeds most abruptly. The subject of the whole chapter is the distinction of the ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς from the ἀκρατὴς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, which is wound up in § 4 by the statement that the ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς has to do with the same pleasures and pains as the ἀκόλαστος, ἐγκρατής, and σώφρων, and that the characters so associated differ as regards προαίρεσις: it is clear that the special depravity of that ἀκόλαστος who has little or no ἐπιθυμία is put in no sort of connection with this.' I confess I cannot see any difficulty in taking διό closely with the words οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται, οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται, immediately preceding:—



the ἀκόλαστος is προαιρούμενος: and this is why (διό) we ascribe 1148 a. 17.
ἀκολασία rather to the man whose acts of indulgence are not attended at all, or not to any considerable extent, by ἐπιθυμία, than to the man whose acts are consequent upon strong ἐπιθυμία: the acts of the former, not being explicable by ἐπιθυμία, must be due to προαίρεσις. Σημεῖον δέ· μᾶλλον γάρ might have taken the place of διὸ μᾶλλον without changing the sense of the passage.

It is to be observed that Cook Wilson, as quoted above, takes μᾶλλον with ἀκόλαστον=ἀκολαστότερον—he speaks of 'the special depravity of that ἀκόλαστος who has little or no ἐπιθυμία.' Similarly Ramsauer speaks 'de diversis quasi gradibus τῆς ἀκολασίας': Grant says 'it is more intemperate to pursue luxury, &c., in cold blood than to do so under the influence of passion.' Coraes has καὶ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀκολαστότερον, and Peters translates—'And so a man who without desire or with only a moderate desire pursues excess of pleasure, and avoids even slight pains, should be called more profligate than one who, &c.' This, I think, is wrong: the clause, as I understand it, means—'And this is why ἀκολασία is ascribed to the man who, without desire, pursues excessive pleasures, *rather than* to the man who, &c.' Degrees of ἀκολασία are not distinguished, but ἀκολασία is distinguished from ἀκρασία. The τοῦτον ὅστις a. 19 is the ἀκρατής. That this is the meaning of the passage is clearly shown by a comparison of it with what is probably its 'duplicate'—vii. 7. 3 παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἥρεμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. On the 'duplicate' character of vii. 4. 4 διὸ . . . ἰσχυρά and vii. 7. 3 παντί . . . ἀκρατοῦς, see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 23 and Cook Wilson, *Arist. Stud.* p. 71.

§ 5.] ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.] A 'duplicate' of vii. 4. 2: see note on vii. 4. a. 22.
2. 1147 b. 28.

Bekker and Bywater make τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά a. 23, 24 parenthetical. I prefer to make τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων a. 23 . . . πρότερον a. 25 parenthetical, thus referring the examples χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή to τῶν τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων a. 23 (=τῶν φύσει αἱρετῶν). The τὰ τῷ γένει καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα or τὰ φύσει αἱρετά of this section correspond to the αἱρετὰ καθ' αὑτά of § 2: the ἐναντία τούτων were not mentioned in § 2: they are the φευκτά of chapter 5: while τὰ μεταξύ—so called, I think, simply

1148 a. 22. because the present list is a threefold one, whereas that in § 2 was only twofold—answer to the *ἀναγκαῖα* or *σωματικά* of § 2. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 79), followed by Bywater, inserts *τῶν* before *τῷ* a. 23, rightly, I think.

a. 26. **πρὸς ἅπαντα δέ**] Zell, Bekker and Ramsauer (Ramsauer reading *δή*) begin the apodosis here. Bywater (making *διὸ ὅσοι* a. 28 . . . *μωραίνειν* b. 2 parenthetical—and apparently following the Ald. Sch. in understanding the construction to be *διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον κρατοῦνται . . . ψέγονται*) seems to make the apodosis begin with *μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν* b. 2. That this is really the apodosis is clear, I think, from the 'duplicate' passage vii. 4. 2, in which the apodosis begins b. 31 with *τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα* (*i. e. τὰ αἱρετὰ καθ' αὑτά*).

a. 28. **τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν**] Bekker omits *καί* with $K^b$ $M^b$; but *καί* (approved by Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 66) is necessary. The meaning is *ψέγονται τῷ πῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ἤτοι τῷ ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐπιθυμεῖν*. $L^b$, $O^b$, NC, CCC, Cambr., $B^{1.\ 2.\ 3}$ give *καί*.

On the relation between § 2 and § 5 of this chapter Cook Wilson (*Arist. Stud.* p. 6) has the following remarks—'§ 2 divides objects causing pleasure into two classes . . . § 5 gives the same under different phraseology. . . . The examples too of the first class in § 2 are repeated in § 5. . . . But § 5 adds a third class not found in § 2. . . . This amounts to a correction of § 2. In § 2 it is said of the *αἱρετὰ καθ' αὑτά* that they admit of excess, implying that they are wrong in excess. . . . In § 5 the same thing is put in a clearer and better way: "it is not susceptibility to these, nor desire and liking for them which are bad, but a certain excess in them." . . . The badness of *ἀναγκαῖα* or *σωματικά* when indulged in to excess is not stated in § 2; though half implied by the term *ἀναγκαῖα*, and asserted lower down in the same column (§ 3). In § 5 the fact is expressly mentioned. From these considerations it is evident that § 5 is not a mere recapitulation of § 2, for it contains more; that it is not a mere addition to § 2, for it contains the same matter as § 2: it is rather an entire reconstruction which makes § 2 quite unnecessary.' Then on pp. 33, 34 he says—'In subject-matter the second version, as already seen, expands the main statements of the first. The additions (in the second version) seem a true advance. . . . Of two versions of the same subject, the more advanced may be by the same author as the other, and written when his mind has developed further: but among other alternatives it is possible also that the advance may be the work of another and even inferior writer, representing merely the general progress of philosophy since the first author, or the advantage which the second author had in having the works of the first before him. The latter hypothesis will be the more probable, if, while the advance is such as might be made by an inferior thinker under the conditions aforesaid, there are found real traces of inferior philosophic ability in the second version. And the inference will be much strengthened if there is a considerable falling off in style. . . . In the case of the second of the two versions now under discussion, though the improvement is such as would in all probability not be retraced by the same author if once made, it is not too great to be due to the less able philosopher reflecting on the work of the abler. And on the other hand there do seem to be marks of less ability'—*e.g.* the writer of § 2, wishing to classify *ἡδοναί* and *ἐπιθυμίαι*, begins with a division of objects causing pleasure (*ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν*) and gives *νίκη, τιμή* &c. as examples of these objects; the writer of § 5 begins with *ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* and 'involves himself in the inaccuracy . . . of giving *ἡδέα* and *ἐπιθυμητά*, *νίκη, τιμή* &c., as instances of *ἡδοναί* and *ἐπιθυμίαι*, which of course is avoided in § 2.' Here I think Cook Wilson is a little hard on the writer of § 5. Although the writer of § 5 leads off with *ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν*, he goes on—*εἰσὶ τῶν τῷ γένει καλῶν κ.τ.λ.*, which really means 'since the *objects* of some pleasures and desires are to be classed as noble and good. . . .' This writer, equally with the writer of § 2, seems to me to have a classification of *τὰ ποιοῦντα ἡδονήν* primarily in view. Although, however, I differ from Cook Wilson on this small point, I agree with him in thinking that § 2 and § 5 are probably by different authors, of whom the author of § 5 is probably the later.



1148 a. 28.

**διὸ ὅσοι . . . μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ.**] I have said that I think that the apodosis of the sentence *ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.* a. 22 is *μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί*: but the passage *διὸ ὅσοι* a. 28 . . . b. 2 *μωραίνειν*, made parenthetical by Bywater, is not ignored by the writer when he comes to this apodosis: for *ταῦτ'* b. 2 is not the *ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξύ* of a. 26, but only *τὰ τοιαῦτα* (*χρήματα, κέρδος, νίκη, τιμή*) to which the words *διὸ . . . μωραίνειν* confine themselves.

1148 a. 28. The meaning is—'Those who pursue *τὰ φύσει αἱρετά* to excess are not *μοχθηροί, i. e. ἀκόλαστοι*—because their objects are not *ἀναγκαῖα*, or *σωματικά*, but *φύσει αἱρετά*: and for the same reason (*ὁμοίως* § 6) they are not *ἀκρατεῖς ἁπλῶς*—their objects are *φύσει αἱρετά*, the excessive pursuit of which is *φευκτόν* but not strictly *ψεκτόν*, as in the excessive pursuit of *τὰ σωματικά*. They are, however, called *ἀκρατεῖς καθ' ὁμοιότητα*.' Ramsauer is of opinion that the reason stated—*ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὑτό*—is not sufficient to prove *μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστί*: it seems to me to be sufficient, if understood as above—'their objects are *φύσει αἱρετά*, as recently distinguished from *σωματικά*—the objects of *μοχθηρία* or *ἀκολασία*.' On the words with which § 6 opens, Cook Wilson (p. 35) says—'In § 2 the fact of the greater guilt in true *ἀκρασία* is clearly expressed in the sentence *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται αὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις*: the corresponding phrase in § 6 *ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν* is much weaker and gets the author into a confusion, for here he makes *ψέγεσθαι* the differentia of the *ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς* from the *ἀκρατὴς κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*, whereas above (*πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ . . . ψέγονται*) the term *ψέγεσθαι* is used of the error of both.' I am inclined to think that, whereas the verb *ψέγονται* may be used popularly and vaguely, *τῶν ψεκτῶν*—'the class of *τὰ ψεκτά*'—is a technical expression, and marks that severe censure which we pass on *ὑπερβολαί* in *σωματικά*.

a. 34. **Σάτυρος**] The stories given by the Ald. Sch. and the Paraph. (different stories) are not worth transcription. There were kings of Bosporus of this name. Isoc. *τραπεζιτικός* 370 b. mentions Satyrus I. (B.C. 407–393) as continuing his father's policy of favouring Athenian grain-shippers. See note on v. 5. 13, b. 8.

b. 7. **§ 6. περὶ ἕκαστον**] Restored by Ramsauer, Susemihl and Bywater for Bekker's *περὶ ἑκάστου*. 'We use the term *ἀκρασία* by analogy, adding in each case what the *ἀκρασία* is in'—*λέγουσι τὴν ἀκρασίαν προσεπιτιθέντες τὸ ὅτι περὶ ἕκαστον*.



# CHAPTER V.

## ARGUMENT.

*There are things which are* (1) *naturally pleasant, either* (a) *generally, or* (b) *for certain kinds of animals and human beings; and* (2) *things which are not naturally pleasant, but* (a) *become pleasant for constitutions depraved by mutilation or habit, or* (b) *are pleasant for constitutions originally bad.*

*To the different sorts of 'pleasant things' enumerated under* (2) *will correspond different dispositions, which may be distinguished as brutish* (e.g. *cannibalism*), *as caused by definite diseases* (*thus it was mental disease which made the man eat his fellow-servant's liver*), *and as generally 'morbid' or due to perverted habit* (e. g. *eating earth, unnatural lust*). *In so far as he has, and gives himself up to, one of these dispositions, a man is outside the boundaries of what we call* vice; *for* vice *is relative to normal human desires; and in so far as he has one of these dispositions and keeps it under control, or is mastered by it, he is not 'continent' or 'incontinent' in the strict sense of the term, but in a qualified sense, just as we have seen that the man who controls his anger is 'continent' in a qualified sense. We must qualify the terms* vice *and* incontinence *when we use them in relation to the 'pleasant things' enumerated under* (2), *and speak of* brutish *or* morbid *vice*, brutish *or* morbid *incontinence.*

*Introductory Note.*] This chapter goes on still further to limit the sphere of *ἡ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία*. If a man have unnatural desires (whether (1) connate, or (2) induced by (*a*) disease, or (*b*) habit), and keeps them in check, or yields to them, he is not *ἐγκρατὴς* or *ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς*, but so *κατὰ πρόσθεσιν—i. e.* the unnatural desire which he checks or yields to must be specified (just as *κέρδους* &c. must be specified in the cases mentioned in ch. 4), for the terms *ἐγκρατὴς* and *ἀκρατής*, even in relation to *σωματικά*, are applied strictly (*ἁπλῶς*) only to the man whose desires are natural. As Grant says—'In states that are entirely morbid, whether originally so, or from the effects of an ill-regulated life, the distinctions of right and wrong are no longer applicable.'

§§ 1–8.] The writing of this chapter is very careless, and has given much trouble to the critics (see Rassow, *Forsch.* pp. 79, 80, and Imelmann, *Obs. Crit.* p. 22 note); but the general meaning is plain:—Unnatural propensities are (1) *θηριώδεις*—bestial (*e.g.* cannibalism), exhibited, for the most part, by savages. These *θηριώδεις ἕξεις* are *connate*, belonging to the *μοχθηρὰ φύσις* of the 1148 b. 15.

1148 b. 15. race, or of the individual: (2) *νοσηματώδεις*—morbid propensities. These *νοσηματώδεις ἕξεις* are either (*a*) due to *supervening* disease, bodily or mental—*αἱ δὲ διὰ* (omit *τε* after *διά* with $K^b$ $L^b$: see Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 67) *νόσους γίνονται καὶ διὰ* (insert *διά* with $K^b$: see Rassow, *l. c.*) *μανίαν ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ.*[1] § 3, b. 25—*cf.* below § 6, a. 11 *οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις*: or (*b*) *νοσηματώδεις*, in a specific sense, as being morbid *constitutional* states —*ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία* § 4, b. 31. From the *νοσηματώδεις ἕξεις* in this specific sense must be distinguished (*c*) or (3) *αἱ ἐξ ἔθους*—how closely, however, the two kinds are connected is shown, not only by the expression *αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους* § 3, b. 27, but by the difficulty of determining how far the *ἕξεις* adduced as examples (*οἷον τριχῶν . . . . ἄρρεσιν* § 3, b. 27–29) are due to constitutionally morbid conditions, and how far they are habits the formation of which could have been avoided. The expression § 4, b. 33 *καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος* seems to show that the distinction most prominent in the writer's mind was that between constitutionally morbid states, and *morbid* states produced by bad habits. The question—how far bad habits can result in *morbid* states, where there is no constitutional bias—he does not go into. He merely says, with special reference to the last instance in his list b. 27–29, that these unnatural propensities are due sometimes to *φύσις*, sometimes to *ἔθος*—*τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν* § 3, b. 29.

The foregoing explanation of the distinctions intended in *αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις* b. 24—*αἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται* b. 25—*αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις —ἢ ἐξ ἔθους* b. 27 renders unnecessary, I think, while it practically gives the same sense as, Rassow's conjecture (adopted by Susemihl) *αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ⟨φύσει ἢ⟩ ἔξ ἔθους* (*Forsch.* p. 80), and also shows that the omission of *ἤ* before *ἔξ ἔθους* ($K^b$), approved by Imelmann (*Obs. Crit.* p. 22 note), is a blunder.

b. 33. § 4. *ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος*] *ὅσοι* is Bywater's correction for the *τοῖς* of the MSS. Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 80) says—'Gedanke und Sprache fordern gleicherweise den Accusativ: *ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοὺς νοσηματωδῶς ἔχοντας δι' ἔθος sc. οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς*. Die äussere Unwahrscheinlichkeit dieser Aenderung leuchtet mir ein, aber ich habe mich vergeblich

[1] It may be noted that cannibalism, which seems to be the typical *θηριώδης ἕξις*, is instanced here as due to supervening disease or madness.



bemüht einen anderen Ausweg zu entdecken.' The meaning is undoubtedly that expressed by Rassow's conjectural reading. 1148 b. 33.

I had made up my mind, however, to acquiesce in *τοῖς*, supposing that the writer intended to convey this meaning, but, instead of correctly employing the accusative, blunderingly wrote *ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς* to correspond with *ὅσοις μὲν οὖν* above. But now Bywater's convincing *ὅσοι* removes all difficulty.

§ 5. *τὸν δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν*] Bywater reads *τόν* with $K^b$ instead of *τό*. I prefer *τό*, notwithstanding the *τόν* in a. 3. 1149 a. 1.

*κρατεῖν*] We ought to have *οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἐγκράτεια* answering to this, as *οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία* answers to *κρατεῖσθαι*. a. 2.

*καθάπερ . . . λεκτέον*] 'just as we call one who stands to his angry feelings in this relation (*i. e.* in a relation of inferiority to them—*κρατεῖσθαι*) incontinent in respect of those feelings (*τοῦ πάθους i. e. τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς*), but not incontinent without qualification.' I thus read *τοῦ πάθους ἀκρατῆ, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον* with Lamb., Coraes, Susemihl. Coraes writes *καθάπερ . . . τοῦ πάθους ἀκρατῆ, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον· προσέθηκα τὸ πρῶτον ἀκρατῆ προσθετέον εἶναι καὶ ἑτέρων κρινάντων. ὁ γὰρ νοῦς καὶ ἡ συνάρτησις, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ θυμοῦ (μετὰ προσθήκης δηλονότι) καὶ οὐκ ἀκρατῆ (ἁπλῶς καὶ δίχα προσθήκης) λεκτέον.* a. 3.

§ 6.] In this section *ἐκ φύσεως* is opposed, as the characteristic of a *θηριώδης ἕξις*, to *διὰ νόσον*, which is made the characteristic of a *νοσηματώδης ἕξις*. There is some confusion in the opposition. A *θηριώδης ἕξις* is *φύσει* as belonging to the *μοχθηρὰ φύσις* of a race or individual; but, as we have seen, a *νοσηματώδης ἕξις* may also be *φύσει*. Only those *νοσηματώδεις ἕξεις* can be fairly said not to be *φύσει*, which have been contracted solely by *ἔθος* (if that is possible), or are due to *νόσοι ἐπιληπτικαί* or *μανίαι*—*supervening* disease, as distinguished from a morbid *constitutional* state. a. 7.

*τὴν γαλῆν*] *Cf.* Plut. (?) *Fragm.* (ed. Tauchnitz vi. 341) *εἰ ἔνιοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες ὁμως φοβοῦνται φαῦλα ἄττα, οἷον γαλῆν ἢ ἀλεκτρυόνα ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς φανερᾶς αἰτίας.* The *γαλέη* or *γαλῆ* seems to have been the polecat, and only in later writers the domestic cat. See *Liddell and Scott.* a. 8.

*νοσηματώδεις*] The construction of course is—*οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας ἀλόγιστοι ὄντες εἰσὶ νοσηματώδεις.* a. 12.

1149 a. 13. **§ 7. ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον**] Bywater adds *μέν* with $K^b$ and $M^b$. Although *ἐνίοτε μόνον* stands in Cambr., there are signs of correction.

a. 23. **§ 9. ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας**] *i. e.* answering to other objects (the *φύσει αἱρετά* of chapter 4 and the *φευκτά* of chapter 5, as distinguished from the *ἀναγκαῖα*) there are states 'specifically distinct from *ἀκρασία*,' to which the term *ἀκρασία* is applied in an extended, not in its proper, sense.

## CHAPTER VI.

### Argument.

*Incontinence in anger is not so disgraceful as incontinence in desires, for anger indeed lends an ear to reason, but misapprehends its instructions. Like a hasty servant who runs away to execute his master's orders without waiting to hear them out, anger rushes off to take reprisals, if reason or imagination only suggest that insult or slight has been offered—the mere suggestion is enough to make anger rush off with the inference that the insult must be forthwith avenged. Desire, on the other hand, rushes off to enjoy itself, if only reason or sense have said that something is pleasant. Thus anger serves reason in a manner, while desire does not. Again, anger is more constitutional, and even hereditary, than bad desires are, and therefore the man who yields to it is more excusable; also, anger is open—not, like desire, an insidious principle plotting against the just rule of reason. Moreover, it is pain which makes a man vent his anger; but pleasure which actuates the wantonness of desire; and wantonness rouses our just indignation rather than excesses of anger. Since, as we have seen, bodily pleasures are either normally human, or brutish, or morbid, it is with the first class only that temperance and intemperance are concerned; and the brutes are not to be described as either temperate or intemperate—except perhaps by a metaphorical transfer of the term.*

*Brutality is not such an evil as vice—for in brutality principle simply does not exist, has not been destroyed—but it is more formidable.*

a. 24. **§ 1. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν**] Apparently *ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρασία*, as occupying a peculiar position among the other kinds *κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμεναι* (see note on vii. 4. 2. 1147 b. 34), is selected here for comparison, 'from a moral point of view' (Grant *ad loc.*), with *ἀκρασία* proper: *cf.* especially *M. M.* ii. 6. 1202 b. 3 (quoted in note on vii. 4. 2. 1147 b. 34), a passage which Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 47) accounts for



by the desire of the writer to give some reason for discussing the special question of the superiority of *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* to *ἀκρασία ἁπλῶς —ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*, when already it had been established that the forms of *ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσθεσιν* generally (*ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* being one of them) are better than *ἀκρασία ἁπλῶς*. I gather that Rassow regards vii. 6 as interpolated. Susemihl brackets it. 1149 a. 24.

**ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ**] *Cf.* a. 25. *Probl.* KH. 3. 949 b. 13 *διὰ τί ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μόνον, οὖσης τῆς ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργήν; ἢ ὅτι ἀκρατὴς μέν ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τι πράττων, καὶ ἀκρασία ἡ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἀγωγή, εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπιθυμίαι ὡς ἐπίπαν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὸν λόγον, αἱ δ' ὀργαὶ μετὰ λόγου, οὐχ ὡς κελεύσαντος τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὡς δηλώσαντος τὸν προπηλακισμὸν ἢ τὴν αἰτίαν.* In *E. N.* vii. 3. 10 the *ἀκρατής* proper is said to act *ὑπὸ λόγου* in a sense, just as here the *ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ* is said *ἀκούειν τι τοῦ λόγου*. Moreover even within the limits of the present passage *λόγος* is represented as influencing *ἐπιθυμία* no less than *θυμός*—*ὁ μὲν γὰρ* **λόγος** *ἢ ἡ φαντασία* 1149 a. 32 . . . *ἀπόλαυσιν* 1149 b. 1—although the writer proceeds immediately to contradict himself by adding 1149 b. 1 *ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ*. The writing is thus very careless and confused, but the sense intended is true. The *λόγος* upon which *ἐπιθυμία* acts is the sophistry of the selfish passions in the *ἀκρατής*, or the hedonistic theory of the *ἀκόλαστος*, whereas that which prompts *θυμός* is 'an idea of justice, however wild that idea may be'—Grant *ad loc.* Anger and Desire, in themselves, are equally irrational; but Anger coexists with a certain consciousness of what is due between man and man, whereas Desire thinks only of its own gratification. 'Anger is a less immediately selfish passion than Desire. It is less debasing in the long run to the character.'—Grant *ad loc.* *Cf.* Plato, *Rep.* 440, where *θυμός* is said to aid *λόγος* against *ἐπιθυμία*. Resentment is roused by the thought of base and selfish acts: see note on iii. 8. 10, b. 23. *Cf.* also Butler, *Sermon* 8 *Upon Resentment*: 'The only way in which our Reason and Understanding can raise anger is by representing to our mind injustice or injury of some kind or other. . . . Since . . . it is necessary for the very subsistence of the world that injury and injustice and cruelty should be punished, and since compassion, which is so natural to mankind, would render that execution of justice exceedingly difficult and uneasy; indignation against vice and wickedness is . . . a balance

1149 a. 25. to that weakness of pity, and also to any thing else which would prevent the necessary methods of severity. Those who have never thought upon these subjects may perhaps not see the weight of this: but let us suppose a person guilty of murder or any other action of cruelty, and that mankind had naturally no indignation against such wickedness and the authors of it; but that every body was affected towards such a criminal in the same way as towards an innocent man: compassion amongst other things would render the execution of justice exceedingly painful and difficult and would often quite prevent it. And notwithstanding that the principle of Benevolence is denied by some and is really in a very low degree, that men are in great measure insensible to the happiness of their fellow creatures; yet they are not insensible to their misery, but are very strongly moved with it: insomuch that there plainly is occasion for that feeling which is raised by guilt and demerit, as a balance to that of compassion. Thus much may, I think, justly be allowed to resentment in the strictest way of moral consideration.'

b. 4. § 2.] **φυσικαῖς**] It is more excusable to follow those *ὀρέξεις* (*ὄρεξις* is the generic term covering *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*) which are *φυσικαί*, *i. e. κοιναί*, not *ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι* (see *E. N.* iii. 11. 1). And *θυμός*, that is (*καί*) *ἡ χαλεπότης* (= *ὁ θυμὸς ὁ καθ' ὑπερβολήν*), is *φυσικώτερον* than *αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς*. *Θυμός* is, as Grant puts it, 'more constitutional,' and is even hereditary: as the Ald. Schol. says—*ὅτι δὲ φυσικὸς ὁ θυμὸς δῆλον· διότι κατὰ γενεὰς ἐπακολουθεῖ*. Of course the writer's elsewhere-expressed view—that *ἡ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία*, though concerned with *αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς*, is nevertheless confined within the limits of man's normal *φύσις*, must not be regarded as in any way modified by the present passage.

b. 8. **ὁ ἀπολογούμενος**] *Cf. M. M.* ii. 6. 1202 a. 25—he was acquitted!

b. 16. § 3. **δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς**] a lyric fragment of unknown authorship. The editors compare Sappho—

*ποικιλόθρον' ἀθάνατ' Ἀφροδίτα*
*παῖ Διὸς δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε.*

**κεστὸν ἱμάντα**] 'the embroidered (*κεντεῖν* to stitch) girdle.'

b. 17. **Ὅμηρος**] *Il.* xiv. 214–217

*ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν ἱμάντα,*
*ποικίλον· ἔνθα δέ οἱ θελκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτο·*



*ἔνθ' ἔνι μὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ' ἵμερος, ἐν δ' ἀπάριστύς* 1149 b. 17.
*πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων.*

§ 4. **ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς**] b. 20. Grant observes that 'this argument is similar to that used Eth. iii. 12. 2 to prove that intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice.' In *Rhet.* ii. 2. 1378 a. 31 *ὀργή* is defined—**ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν.**

**εἰ οὖν οἷς . . . ὕβρις**] The reasoning here is—(1) that the b. 21. indulgence of an *ὄρεξις* which involves pain is less voluntary than that of one which involves pleasure, and consequently, if wrong, less unjust: therefore *θυμός* is less unjust than *ὕβρις*—(2) since the object of anger is supposed injustice (see *E. N.* v. 8. 10 *ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστι*), that which raises anger with greater justice is more unjust than that which raises it with less: we are more justly angry at *ὕβρις*, than at excesses of *θυμός* which do not involve *ὕβρις*: therefore acts of *ὕβρις* are more unjust than excesses of *θυμός*.

In short, *ὕβρις* is worse than *χαλεπότης*, because (1) *χαλεπότης* is painful, and *ὕβρις* pleasant: (2) we do not feel so indignantly angry at acts due to *χαλεπότης*, as at acts due to *ὕβρις*.

It may perhaps be thought that the question is begged in the words **οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα.** The truth however remains that, roughly, things are wrong or unjust in proportion to the indignation they rouse. This is all that the writer means by the unfortunately worded statement that 'they are unjust in proportion to *the justice of* the indignation.'

§ 6. **εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς**] The distinction is made in chapter 5: b. 27. but if we suppose that the expression *κατ' ἀρχάς* must refer to the beginning of the present treatise on *ἀκρασία*, we may adopt the view of Cook Wilson (*Arist. Stud.* p. 15) and others, that the reference is to ch. 1. § 3: see Cook Wilson (*A. S.* p. 14)—'The phrase *ὥσπερ κατ' ἀρχάς* does not seem to be used when the "beginning" referred to is at such a short distance (the preceding chapter) as ch. 5 would be in the present case: but only when it is so far off that it is better for the sake of clearness to take this rather than a more general form like *ὥσπερ εἴρηται*. This is borne out by all the passages collected in Bonitz's Index'—where, according to Cook Wilson, the intervals are of 83, 22, at least 15, 12, $9\frac{1}{2}$, and $4\frac{1}{2}$ pages (Bekker) respectively, 'the smallest interval being about 350 lines.' Grant, however,

1149 b. 27. holds that the reference in the passage before us (vii. 6. 6) 'goes back to ch. 5. § 1, and gives colour to a suspicion that the book may have been put together out of separate pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of which may have commenced with the fifth chapter.' So Stahr (*Eth. Uebers.* p. 248, note)—'Der Ausdruck "zu Anfang" geht auf den Anfang der "heutigen" Vorlesung. Denn die Aristotelischen Schriften tragen durchaus den Character mündlicher Vorlesungen und Vorträge.' Without expressing any opinion on the point of 'the oral character' of the *Ethics*, I would say that I have little hesitation in referring the present *εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς* to vii. 1.

b. 31. **διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία κ.τ.λ.**] The connexion seems to be this:—'*ἄνθρωποι* are called *σώφρονες* or *ἀκόλαστοι* in respect of a relation subsisting between *προαίρεσις* and *ἀνθρώπιναι καὶ φυσικαί*, not *νοσηματώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις, ἐπιθυμίαι*: hence *τὰ θηρία* are not described as *σώφρονα* or *ἀκόλαστα* (except sometimes metaphorically—*e.g.* when the members of a race distinguished by extraordinary voracity or lasciviousness are described as *ἀκόλαστα*): for (1) their *ἐπιθυμίαι* are *θηριώδεις*, and (2) they have no *προαίρεσις*.' In short, *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* are ascribed to man with his normal human desires and rational principle, not to the irrational brutes with their brutish desires.

b. 32. **τινι**] If we read *τινι* it must go with *ὕβρει*—'remarkable for wantonness, it may be, or lechery' (Grant): but Bywater's suggestion *τι* is preferable.

b. 35. **ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων**] Ramsauer is wrong, I think, when he makes *τοιαῦτα γένη τῶν ζῴων* the subject of *ἐξέστηκε*, and adds—'Cogitatur igitur generalis quaedam omnium animalium sana natura, a qua nonnulla genera (*παρὰ φύσιν*) degeneraverint.' The subject of *ἐξέστηκε* is the same as that of *ἔχει* in the line above—viz. *τὰ θηρία—all* brutes generally, and the meaning is that the normal condition of brutes resembles that of madmen in being without the consciousness of those limits which define the 'nature' of rational beings. The term *φύσεως* must be regarded as coloured by its proximity to *προαίρεσιν* and *λογισμόν*, just as *φυσικαί* above is coloured by its proximity to *ἀνθρώπιναι*. The Paraph. brings this out in his version—*οὐδαμῶς ἔχουσι* (*τὰ θηρία*) *λόγον ἀλλὰ πάντη τῆς φύσεως ταύτης ἀφέστηκεν ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.*



Similarly the Ald. Schol.—*οὐ τοῦτο φησὶν ὅτι ἔξω τῆς φύσεως τοῦ* 1149 b. 35. *ἀλόγου ἐγένοντο, καὶ λογικὴν φύσιν ἔλαβον, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰ θηρία ἐοίκασι τοῖς ἐξεστηκόσι τῆς φύσεως ἤτοι τοῖς μαινομένοις.*

§ 7. **ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 81) reads 1150 a. 1. *ἔλαττον δὲ* **κακὸν** *θηριότης κακίας*, quoting the Paraphrast in support of the insertion—*διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔλαττον κακὸν ἡ θηριότης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κακίας, εἰ καὶ φοβερώτερον.*

**ὅμοιον . . . θηρίου**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 23) regards *ὅμοιον* a. 3. a. 3 . . . *ἀρχή* a. 5 and *παραπλήσιον* a. 6 . . . *θηρίου* a. 8 as duplicates. 'The last passage,' says Cook Wilson (*Arist. Stud.* p. 16), 'is evidently a bungler's work, for the comparison *συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον* is an unfortunate substitute for *ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον*, and can hardly be by the same author.' It is to be observed that the Paraphrast does not notice the clause *παραπλήσιον* a. 6 . . . *κάκιον* a. 7: his commentary is good—*Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἔλαττον κακὸν ἡ θηριότης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κακίας, εἰ καὶ φοβερώτερον. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνη κακία τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ διαφθείρει, δηλονότι τὸν λόγον, ἡ δὲ θηριότης οὐδαμῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον κακὸν ἔλαττον τοῦ ἐμψύχου κακοῦ· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχήν, ἥτις αὐτὸ κινεῖ, βλαβερώτερον τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος· τὸ γὰρ ἀκίνητον κακὸν ἀνεκτότερον τοῦ κινουμένου κακοῦ, καθόσον ἔλαττον δύναται δρᾶν. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ ἔμψυχον κακὸν χεῖρον τοῦ ἀψύχου, ὅτι ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχήν, ἥτις αὐτὸ κινεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ λογικόν, ὅτι τοῦ ἀλόγου μᾶλλον ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βλαβερώτερον καὶ χεῖρον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.* The Ald. Schol., however, comments on *παραπλήσιον . . . κάκιον* in a manner which amply bears out the truth of Cook Wilson's remark that 'the comparison *συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον* is an unfortunate substitute for *ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον*. The Scholiast's comment is to the following effect—'That the unjust man is hurtful in proportion to the degree in which he participates in Injustice: therefore Injustice, as the source, is worse than the unjust man (*εἰ γὰρ τὸ προσεγγίζον τῷ πυρὶ θερμαίνεται, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ πῦρ θερμότερον*). On the other hand, Injustice is a lifeless thing in itself, unable to hurt unless realised in the unjust man; and in this sense is not so bad as the unjust man.'

# CHAPTER VII.

## ARGUMENT.

*The man who struggles against those pleasures and pains of touch and taste to which* ἀκολασία *and* σωφροσύνη *are related, may exhibit either more or less than the average power of coping with them. If he exhibit more than the average power of coping with the pleasures, we call him* ἐγκρατής, *more than the average power of coping with the pains,* καρτερικός: *if he exhibit less than the average power of coping with the pleasures,* ἀκρατής, *with the pains,* μαλακός.

*On the other hand, the man who does not struggle against the 'necessary' pleasures of touch and taste, but pursues them excessively, of deliberate choice, is* ἀκόλαστος—*that is 'incorrigible,' for he is not the man to feel regret for what he does, and so is incurable: opposed to him is the man who deliberately indulges too little in these pleasures, while the* σώφρων *occupies the mean. There is also the man who shuns bodily pains, not because he is conquered in a struggle with them, but deliberately. He is not exactly* μαλακός—*for* μαλακία *is the non-deliberate avoidance of pains—but it is a sort of* μαλακία (§ 3 μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον) *which he exhibits. Those who do not act from deliberate choice are to be distinguished as the man who is led on by pleasure, and the man who shuns the pain of unsatisfied desire for pleasure. The man who does something wrong without the spur of any, or a strong, desire is plainly worse than the man who does it under the influence of a strong desire. So the* ἀκόλαστος *is worse than the* ἀκρατής.

*The real opposite of the* ἀκρατής *is the* ἐγκρατής, *and of the* μαλακός *the* καρτερικός. Ἐγκράτεια *is a higher quality than* καρτερία, *for to overcome* (κρατεῖν) *is better than merely to hold one's ground* (ἀντέχειν). *Under the head of* μαλακία *may be brought luxurious effeminacy, with its indolent valetudinarian ways. A man may be pardoned who after a struggle is overcome by powerful pleasures or pains—like Philoctetes or Cercyon in the play, or like Xenophantus, who could not restrain his laughter: but there is no excuse for one who, without constitutional or morbid weakness, yields to what most people can resist.*

*The man who is very fond of amusement is sometimes thought of as* ἀκόλαστος, *but he is really* μαλακός, *for amusement is relaxation from the pain of work, and it is this pain which the man who is very fond of amusement shirks.*

*There are two species of* ἀκρασία—*that of the impetuous 'melancholic' temperament, and that of the weak character. The weak man deliberates and then falls away from his resolve under the influence of passion, whereas the impetuous man does not deliberate and is therefore carried away by passion.*

1150 a. 11. **§ 1. διωρίσθη**] *sc.* εἶναι or γίνεσθαι (Zell).

**ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν . . . a. 16 χείρους**] Grant has a good note.



Here the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent' are fixed 'relatively 1150 a. 11.
to what *is*, as implying more or less continence than people in general have. And yet there is evidently some reference beside to the standard of what ought to be, else it could not be said that people in general verge rather to the worse side. To represent the majority of mankind as possessing a mediocre moral character, neither eminently good nor bad, but inclining to weakness, was in accordance with the Greek point of view. Widely different from this was what may be called the Semitic point of view, which, regarding man with greater religious earnestness, attributed to him "desperate wickedness." The latter feeling was not confined to the Jews and to the pages of the Bible, but in some degree made itself known to the world in the Stoical philosophy.'

**ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερικός**] Cook Wilson (*Arist.* a. 14.
*Studies* pp. 33 and 73) points out that *E. N.* iii, and the corresponding *E. E.* ii, associate μαλακία with δειλία, and καρτερία with ἀνδρεία, and that there is no trace of the definite co-ordination found in vii. 7, with σωφροσύνη, &c.

**§§ 2, 3.**] According to Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 23) these §§ contain a. 16.
an unnecessary discussion of the difference between ἀκολασία and ἀκρασία, which repeats what has already been said in ch. 4. §§ 1–4. The conclusion of the passage ch. 4. §§ 1–4 διὸ μᾶλλον 1148 a. 17 . . . ἰσχυρά a. 22 presents a striking resemblance to that of the passage ch. 7. §§ 2, 3, παντὶ δ' ἂν 1150 a. 27 . . . ἐν πάθει ὤν a. 30, and nothing would be lost by the omission of the whole passage ch. 7. §§ 2, 3, the words ἀντίκειται κ.τ.λ. § 4, a. 32, following naturally after πρὸς τὰς χείρους § 1, a. 16.

**§ 2. ἐπεὶ δ' . . . ἐλλείψεις**] 'Since some pleasures are necessary (while others are not), and the necessary pleasures are so only within certain limits, their excess and defect not being "necessary" (*i. e.* being wrong)': see Stahr—'wir haben ferner gesehen, dass einige Genüsse nothwendig sind, andere dagegen es nicht sind, dass ferner *jene ersteren* es nur bis zu einem gewissen Grade sind.' Grant is wrong in referring καὶ μέχρι τινός to αἱ δ' οὔ, translating—'Now, as some pleasures are necessary, but others are not to be called so, as being (καί) only necessary in certain degrees.' The words αἱ δ' οὔ are really parenthetical.

**λύπας**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 132) conjectures φυγάς, referring to a. 18.

1150 a. 18. § 1, where we have *ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς*, and to the verbs *διώκειν* and *φεύγειν* which follow in the present §.

a. 19. **ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων † ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς † ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν**] See Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 132): 'Sicher verderbt sind die Worte: *καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν*. Nicht bloss *ἤ*, das man in *ᾗ* oder *εἰ* hat ändern wollen, sondern auch *καθ' ὑπερβολάς* ist anstössig. Was man erwartet, findet sich in der Handschrift M: *καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν*. Sollte diese Lesart eine Correctur sein, so ist sie wenigstens wahrscheinlicher als die neueren Aenderungsvorschläge.' I think that Bywater's suggestion—*ᾗ ὑπερβολαί* for *ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολάς*—is good; the meaning, I take it, being that 'he pursues excessive pleasures, because they are excessive, that is (*ᾗ*) deliberately'; but nothing would be lost to this meaning, it seems to me, by the simple omission of the words *ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς ἤ*.

The Paraphrast's explanation of the text *as it stands* (the second *ἤ* apparently omitted) is satisfactory enough—*ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδονῶν, καὶ ἢ τὰς φύσει μεγάλας ἀεὶ ζητῶν ἡδονάς, ἢ τὰς φύσει μετρίας ὑπερβαλλόντως ζητῶν, οὐχ ἑλκόμενος βιαίως πως ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ μετὰ προαιρέσεως ἐπ' αὐτὰς τρέχων, οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι δόξαν, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἢ κέρδος, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς δι' ἑαυτάς, ἀκόλαστος.*

a. 21. **ἀνάγκη γὰρ . . . ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος**] These words seem out of place here, unless the suggestion thrown out by Grant be accepted, that they 'lay some stress on the etymology of the word *ἀκόλαστος*.' Ramsauer places them after *ἀκρατοῦς* § 3, a. 31.

a. 31. **§ 3. τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος**] These words refer to the distinction drawn in § 2 between *ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων . . . διὰ προαίρεσιν* and *ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν*—*i. e.* the deliberate pursuit of bodily pleasure and the deliberate avoidance of bodily pain are distinguished, just as the non-deliberate yielding to pleasure is distinguished from the non-deliberate shrinking from pain. For non-deliberate action, according as it refers to pleasure, or to pain, there are appropriate technical terms—*ἀκρασία* and *μαλακία*: but there are no appropriate technical terms to mark the similar distinction which obtains in deliberate action, and the writer is obliged to retain the term *ἀκολασία* for the deliberate pursuit of pleasure, and to describe the deliberate avoidance of pain as 'rather a kind of *μαλακία*'—



*μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον*,—not as *μαλακία* simply, for that term is technically retained for the *non-deliberate* avoidance of pain: see Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 132, 133), who explains as above, and Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, paragr. 77, p. 69). 1150 a. 31.

The intervention, however, of the passage *τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων* a. 25 . . . *ἀκρατοῦς* a. 31, which relates to non-deliberate action, has induced many critics to suppose that *τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων* must be the *ἀκρατής* and *μαλακός*, and hence that *ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος* a. 32, the reading of all MSS., should be *ὁ δ' ἀκρατής*: see Michelet *ad loc.*, who reads and defends *ἀκρατής*, and Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* p. 213), who proposes *τὸ δ' ἀκρασίας*. The intervention of *τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων* a. 25 . . . *ἀκρατοῦς* a. 31 is certainly awkward, but I do not think that there can be any serious objection to treating the passage as a parenthesis, so far as its length is concerned. Of course, if the passage is an interpolation, as Cook Wilson argues (*Arist. Studies*, paragr. 78, p. 70), all difficulty disappears, *τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων* following immediately after *προαίρεσιν* § 2, a. 25. 'In the first place,' says Cook Wilson, 'the sentence *παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε κ.τ.λ.* (a. 27) interrupts in the most irrelevant manner a context which has for its object to explain the characters of *καρτερία* and *μαλακία*, and in the second place it is equally difficult to keep the first part of § 3 in the text, because it makes the pain to which the *μαλακός* yields that of unsatisfied desire, which by no means suits the description of the *μαλακός* in §§ 5, 6, where the examples are certainly not of such pains.' Holding the distinction drawn in § 3, *ὁ μέν* a. 25—*ὁ δέ* a. 26 . . . *ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων*, to be between two sorts of *ἀκρασία* proper (see paragr. 83)—that in which the motive is pleasure and that in which it is pain caused by the absence of pleasure—not between *ἀκρασία* and the *μαλακία* of which instances are given below in § 5, Cook Wilson supposes the original locus of vii. 7. 3 *τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων* a. 25 . . . *ἀκρατοῦς* a. 31 to have been somewhere after the passage *ὥσπερ* 1148 b. 9 . . . *φαμέν* b. 14, vii. 4. 6, which and vii. 7. 3 *τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων* a. 25 . . . *ἀκρατοῦς* a. 31 he presents (Tab. IX) as fragments of a duplicate of vii. 4. §§ 3, 4 *τῶν δὲ περί* 1148 a. 4 . . . *ἰσχυρά* a. 22, a passage—also presented by him as somewhat fragmentary—in which the **ἀκρατής** is said to yield to bodily pleasures *and to avoid bodily pains*. The bodily pains enumerated in vii. 4. 3 are, it is true, those of *πεῖνα, δίψα, ἀλέα, ψῦχος*, whereas those mentioned in vii. 7. 3 are only those of unsatisfied desire: Cook Wilson notices this discrepancy between

1150 a. 31. vii. 7. 3 and vii. 4. 3, but does not find it serious as between *duplicate versions* (see *Arist. Studies*, paragr. 83); while between vii. 4. 6 and vii. 7. 3 τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων . . . ἀκρατοῦς, which he presents as parts of the *same version*, there is no such discrepancy, vii. 4. 6 merely describing generally the objects of ἀκρασία as the same as those of ἀκολασία.

I offer no opinion as to the correctness of Cook Wilson's view that the original locus of vii. 7. 3 τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρομένων . . . ἀκρατοῦς is after vii. 4. 6. I limit myself to saying that, with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 23), I think that the whole passage ἐπεί 1150 a. 16 . . . ἀκόλαστος a. 32, vii. 7. §§ 2, 3 interrupts the sense, being a repetition (especially in the latter part of § 3) of what has been said before in vii. 4. §§ 1–4.

a. 32. § 4.] ἐγκρατής is the proper opposite of ἀκρατής, because ἐγκρατής involves τὸ κρατεῖν (and ἀκρατής, τὸ κρατεῖσθαι); and καρτερικός is the proper opposite of μαλακός, because τὸ καρτερεῖν involves τὸ ἀντέχειν —'bearing up' against the pressure to which the μαλακός, or 'soft' man, yields. There is no value in the distinction drawn here between the ἐγκρατής and the καρτερικός, on the ground of the difference between 'victory' and 'bearing up.' It may surely be said that the ἐγκρατής 'bears up' against pleasure, and that the καρτερικός is 'victorious over' pain; at any rate, both succeed in *acting well*, one in spite of pleasure, the other in spite of pain: the καρτερικός is not fairly distinguished from the ἐγκρατής merely by the possession of the negative virtue of 'bearing up.' If he 'bears up,' it is in order to act well.

Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies* pp. 17, &c., and pp. 45, &c.) regards § 4 as part of a version parallel to § 1 (see Table IV)—'In § 1 the relation to one another of the ἀκρατής, μαλακός, ἐγκρατής, and καρτερικός is determined. The first two of these yield (ἡττᾶσθαι) to the bad impulse, but for the ἀκρατής, this is given by pleasure, for the μαλακός by pain. The last two agree so far as both overcome (κρατεῖν) the bad impulse, and differ, like the first two, in its nature. Κρατεῖν then is common to the ἐγκρατής and καρτερικός, ἡττᾶσθαι to the μαλακός and ἀκρατής. This is contradicted by § 4, according to which κρατεῖν belongs to the ἐγκρατής alone, and not to the καρτερικός, whose action is mere ἀντέχειν: and this difference is made a reason for preferring the former to the latter, because κρατεῖν is better than μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. Two such opposite views cannot have been intended



for the same context' (p. 17). The version to which § 4 belongs 1150 a. 32. Cook Wilson regards as composed of §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, and holds it to be 'the work of an inferior thinker who, in attempting to make advance on the other [*i.e.* the parallel version § 1] only adds subtleties, partly confused, partly fallacious' (p. 45)—*i.e.* he adds a character standing to ἀκολασία in the relation in which μαλακία stands to ἀκρασία, calling this new character somewhat confusedly εἶδος μαλακίας μᾶλλον, and yet is silent as to his reason for not completing the symmetry by adding another character differing from καρτερία as σωφροσύνη from ἐγκράτεια. 'Another unsuccessful attempt to refine is the substitution by the second version of ἀντέχειν for κρατεῖν as characteristic of καρτερία: for this so far from being an improvement is a fallacy . . . ἀντέχειν could only mean a balance of motives, when the agent is quite undecided and no action results. But this is not the meaning of καρτερία, nor is there any ground in the context for believing such a meaning here intended. And if it were, the division ought to have been carried further, and a corresponding character put on the side of pleasure, differing as only withstanding pleasure, from the ἐγκρατής who overcomes it. The author probably thinks of the καρτερικός as "enduring" (καρτερῶν), or "holding out (ἀντέχων) against" pain which cannot be annihilated . . . and in that sense cannot be overcome (κρατεῖν). But since this "holding out" means that the man does not allow the pain to determine his will, it is κρατεῖν in the fullest sense; the other kind of κρατεῖν which he has not, is of no importance morally, because it is not in the sphere of his will at all. It is quite mistaken therefore to rank ἐγκρατής higher than καρτερικός, on the ground that the latter does not "overcome" in the sense described' (*Arist. Studies*, p. 45).

I entirely agree with Cook Wilson in the criticism which he passes in the last sentence; but I cannot see why the writer of § 4 should not still be the writer of § 1. Having said μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, the writer of § 1 would very naturally go on to explain, as is done in § 4, which of the four—ἀκρασία, ἐγκράτεια, μαλακία, καρτερία, are really ἀντικείμεναι, or *vis à vis* to which. Appealing to etymology, and the usage of language (καρτερεῖν means ἀντέχειν—'to resist pressure,' 'to be hard': ἐγκρατής and ἀκρατής are both compounds derived from κρατεῖν), he shows that it is the ἐγκρατής, not the καρτερικός, who is the *vis à vis* (ἀντίκειται) of the ἀκρατής, and the καρτερικός, not the ἐγκρατής, of the μαλακός. It so happens that his appeal to etymology and popular usage betrays him into the error

1150 a. 32. of representing the *καρτερικός* as inferior to the *ἐγκρατής* in not achieving 'victory'; but I do not see why the writer of § 1 should be deemed incapable of falling into this error, which, after all, does not come into conflict with anything stated in § 1. As I read it, § 1 only says that the *ἐγκρατής* and *καρτερικός* are stronger (*κρείττους*) and the *ἀκρατής* and *μαλακός* weaker (*ἥττους*) than the average man, where pleasures and pains are concerned.

If I have explained correctly the nature of the appeal to etymology made in § 4, Cook Wilson's conjecture (*Arist. Studies*, p. 70) *ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ μαλακός, τῷ δὲ ἐγκρατεῖ ὁ καρτερικός* cannot be accepted.

b. 5. **§ 6. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν**] *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* are relative to *ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις*: so also are *ἐγκράτεια* and *ἀκρασία*: then follow explanatory remarks—*οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις κ.τ.λ.*, which concern both *ἀκρασία* and *μαλακία*, as is plain from the words *ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν* b. 7.

b. 9 **Θεοδέκτου**] Theodectes was a rhetorician and tragic poet, often mentioned and quoted by Aristotle—*e.g. Rhet.* ii. 23. 1400 a. 27 as the author of a piece called the *Ajax*: *Rhet.* ii. 23. 1397 b. 3 of an *Alcmaeon*: *Rhet.* ii. 24. 1401 a. 35 of an *Orestes*: *Rhet.* ii. 23. 1399 a. 8 of a *Socrates*: *Pol.* i. 2. 1255 a. 36 of a *Helené*. The *Rhetoric* of Theodectes (probably founded on Aristotle's lectures) is alluded to in *Rhet.* iii. 9. 1410 b. 2 *αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται*. He was a native of Phaselis in Pamphylia, but spent most of his life at Athens, where he was the pupil of Isocrates and Aristotle (see Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden*, pp. 260 and 266: he deserted Isocrates for Aristotle: and, in fact, seems to have put Aristotle in possession of some of the secrets of Isocrates' rhetorical teaching). Aristotle evidently thought very highly of him. The writer of the *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1421 b. 2 alludes to an Aristotelian rhetorical treatise with which the name of Theodectes was associated—*ἐν ταῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τέχναις Θεοδέκτῃ γραφείσαις*. He seems to have died at Athens: see Plut. (?) *Oratorum vitae, Isocrates*, *ἐμαθήτευε δ' αὐτῷ . . . καὶ Θεοδέκτης ὁ Φασηλίτης ὁ τὰς τραγῳδίας ὕστερον γράψας, οὗ ἐστὶ τὸ μνῆμα ἐπὶ τὴν Κναμῖτιν πορευομένοις, κατὰ τὴν ἱερὰν ὁδὸν τὴν ἐπ' Ἐλευσῖνα, τανῦν κατερηρειμμένον*. With regard to the *Philoctetes* mentioned here the Ald. Schol. has the following:—*ὁ Θεοδέκτης τραγικὸς ἦν καὶ παράγει τὴν χεῖρα δεδηγμένον τὸν Φιλοκτήτην ὑπὸ ὄφεως καὶ μέχρι μὲν πολλοῦ καὶ ἀντέτεινε*



*πρὸς τὰς λύπας καὶ τοὺς πόνους, ὕστερον δὲ ἡττήθη καὶ ἐβόᾳ· κόψατε τὴν* 1150 b. 9. *ἐμὴν χεῖρα*. Aspasius (p. 133. 6. Heylbut) has:—*οἷον εἴ τις ὥσπερ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Θεοδέκτῃ Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τῆς ἕλκους πεπαρμένος κρύπτειν βουλόμενος, τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νεοπτόλεμον μέχρι μέν τινος ἀνέχει, ὕστερον δ' οὐχ ὑπομένων τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἀλγηδόνων φανερὸς γίνεται*.

**ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων**] There were two tragic poets called Carcinus, one an Athenian, the other an Agrigentine. In *Rhet.* iii. 16. 1417 b. 18 'the *Oedipus* of Carcinus' is mentioned: in *Rhet.* ii. 23. 1400 b. 9, the *Medea*: *Poet.* 16. 1454 b. 23, the *Thyestes*: and in *Poet.* 17. 1455 a. 26, the *Amphiaraos* (?). In this last passage Aristotle refers to a blunder in the acting of the piece, which displeased the spectators very much—*σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὃ ἐπετιμᾶτο Καρκίνῳ· ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἱεροῦ ἀνήει, ὃ μὴ ὁρῶντα τὸν θεατὴν ἐλάνθανεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσε, δυσχερανάντων τοῦτο τῶν θεατῶν*. From this passage we may infer that the play mentioned was acted at Athens, and that its author was the Athenian Carcinus. We may assume that in the other places where Carcinus is mentioned by Aristotle the Athenian dramatist[1] is intended. With regard to the *Alopê*, the Ald. Schol. has the following:—*ὁ Κάρκινος τραγικὸς ἦν· ὁ δὲ Κερκύων εἶχε θυγατέρα τὴν Ἀλόπην, μαθὼν δὲ ὅτι ἐμοιχεύθη ἡ αὐτοῦ θυγάτηρ Ἀλόπη, ἠρώτησεν αὐτὴν τίς ἦν ὁ μοιχεύσας, λέγων· εἰ μοι τοῦτο ἂν εἶποις, οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν λυπηθῶ. εἶτα εἰπούσης τῆς Ἀλόπης τὸν αὐτὴν μοιχεύσαντα, οὐκ ἔτι ὁ Κερκύων ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης ἔφερε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀπελέγετο*. *Cf.* Nauck, *Fragm. Trag.* p. 619: and for a discussion of the myth of Kercyon and Alopê, as represented in art, see Miss J. E. Harrison's Introductory Essay to *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, pp. cv–cix.

**Ξενοφάντῳ**] Alexander is said to have had a musician of this name, b. 12. who may have been known to Aristotle: see Seneca, *de Ira* ii. 2, quoted by Zell—'Alexandrum aiunt Xenophanto canente manum ad arma misisse.'

**ἀλλ' εἴ τις**] *i.e. οὐ θαυμαστὸν εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ λυπῶν ἥττᾶται* (b. 7), *ἀλλὰ θαυμαστὸν εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἥττᾶται*.

**ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν**] It is not necessary to suppose with b. 14. many commentators that the reference here is to the infirmity

[1] There was a comic Carcinus too: he is mentioned by Aristophanes, *Nub.* 1261, *Pax* 781.

1150 b. 14. mentioned in Herod. i. 105. Nor do I find, in the detailed account given by Hippocrates (*περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων* 21, 22, ed. Littré, vol. ii. pp. 74 sqq.) of the physique of the Scythians, anything answering to the *μαλακία* of the present chapter, which is *περὶ λύπας*. The *θεία νοῦσος* is indeed said by Hippocrates to attack the richer classes especially, but it has nothing in common with the *μαλακία* here mentioned.

b. 15. **καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν**] The point is the natural inferiority of women in the power of bearing up under pain.

b. 17. **§ 7. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ κ.τ.λ.**] The *παιδιώδης*—the man given up to amusement—is thought to be *ἀκόλαστος*, but is really *μαλακός*, for *παιδιά* is an *ἄνεσις πόνων*. This relaxation from *πόνος* the *παιδιώδης* pursues excessively. He is therefore *μαλακός*, or too fond of avoiding *πόνος*, not *ἀκόλαστος*, given up to *ἡδονή*. The true use of *παιδιά* is given in *E. N.* x. 6. 6 *παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ.*

b. 19. **§ 8. οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δέ**] *οἱ μέν* refers to *ἀσθένεια*, and *οἱ δέ* to *προπέτεια*. *Cf. M. M.* ii. 6. 1203 a. 30 *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀκρασίας δύο εἴδη, ἡ μὲν προπετικὴ τις καὶ ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἐξαίφνης γινομένη (οἷον ὅταν ἴδωμεν καλὴν γυναῖκα, εὐθέως τι ἐπάθομεν, καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους ὁρμὴ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξαί τι ὧν ἴσως οὐ δεῖ), ἡ δ' ἑτέρα οἷον ἀσθενική τις, ἡ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου οὖσα τοῦ ἀποτρέποντος. ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν οὐδ' ἂν λίαν δόξειεν εἶναι ψεκτή· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐγγίνεται, ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς καὶ εὐφυέσιν· ἡ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦτοι ψεκτοί.*

b. 22. **ἔνιοι γάρ κ.τ.λ.**] This clause is added to show the value of *τὸ βουλεύσασθαι*, which is absent in *προπέτεια*. The implication is that the *προπετεῖς*, as distinguished from the *ἀσθενεῖς*, are strong enough to abide by the results of deliberation, if they deliberated at all, which they do not.

**προγαργαλίσαντες**] It seems to me that we must supply *ἄλλους*, not (as Zell does) *ἑαυτούς*, with *προγαργαλίσαντες*: and understand the reference to be to a 'tickling match,' in which the aggressor has the advantage. The reading of $L^b$, $M^b$, CCC, $B^1$, NC, Asp., Hel., is *προγαργαλισθέντες*: *cf. Probl.* ΛΕ. 6. 965 a. 11 (quoted by the editors) *διὰ τί αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ῥᾳθεῖς γαργαλίζει; ἢ ὅτι καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἧττον, ἐὰν προαίσθηται, μᾶλλον δ', ἂν μὴ ὁρᾷ; ὥσθ' ἥκιστα γαργαλισθήσεται, ὅταν μὴ λανθάνῃ τοῦτο πάσχων· ἔστι δὲ ὁ γέλως παρακοπή τις καὶ ἀπάτη.*



**μελαγχολικοί**] See Grant's excellent note *ad loc.* in which he refers to 'the curious disquisition on *μελαγχολικοί* and the *μέλαινα χολή* in Ar. *Probl.* xxx. 1,' to show that 'both passionate impetuosity and cold sluggishness were considered by the ancient physiologist to be different manifestations of the same strange temperament.' '. . . With the moderns,' he adds, 'the term "melancholy" is restricted to the cold and dejected mood; while the ancients much more commonly applied the term *μελαγχολικός* to denote warmth, passion, and eccentricity of genius.' The opening sentence of *Probl.* Λ. 953 a. 10 presents the *μελαγχολικὴ κρᾶσις* as associated with genius—*διὰ τί πάντες ὅσοι περιττοὶ γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν ἢ ποίησιν ἢ τέχνας φαίνονται μελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες;* In these cases the *μέλαινα χολή* (which may be either cold or hot) is moderately hot. Where it is too hot, men are given up to their passions, and tend to madness; where it is too cold, it anticipates and aggravates the chilling effect of the thought of danger and trouble, and makes men dejected and timid, and drives them to suicide. In *de Memor.* 2. 453 a. 19 the *μελαγχολικοί* are said to be easily affected by ideas, and images of the mind—*τούτους γὰρ φαντάσματα κινεῖ μάλιστα*: and in the treatise *περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς* 2. 463 b. 16 they are said to be great dreamers—*ὅσων ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ λάλος ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ καὶ μελαγχολική, παντοδαπὰς ὄψεις ὁρῶσι*—, and to be distinct dreamers—*εὐθυόνειροι*, and capable of divining the future in their dreams—2. 464 a. 32 *οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ διὰ τὸ σφόδρα, ὥσπερ βάλλοντες πόρρωθεν εὔστοχοί εἰσι· καὶ διὰ τὸ μεταβλητικόν, ταχὺ τὸ ἐχόμενον φαντάζονται αὐτοί· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ Φιλαιγίδου ποιήματα καὶ οἱ ἐμμανεῖς ἐχόμενα τοῦ ὁμοίου λέγουσι καὶ διανοοῦνται, οἷον Ἀφροδίτην· καὶ οὕτω συνείρουσιν εἰς τὸ πρόσω. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἐκκρούεται αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις ὑφ' ἑτέρας κινήσεως*:—on this passage see Themistius fol. 105 b. (vol. ii. p. 296, ed. Spengel) *ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ Φιλαιγίδου ποιήματα μὴ ἔχοντα μεταβολὰς προσώπων καὶ διηγημάτων μεταπτώσεις ἀεὶ ἐχόμενα τοῦ ὁμοίου διανοοῦνται καὶ συνείρουσιν, οἷον εἴ τις Ἀφροδίτην ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶπε καὶ μέχρι τέλους ταύτης ἔχεται, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἐμμανεῖς ἐχόμενα τοῦ ὁμοίου διανοοῦνται καὶ βλέπουσι.* In short, the *μελαγχολικοί* are persons of strong passions and vivid imagination, who allow themselves to drift down the torrent of their fancies and feelings:—*cf. E. N.* vii. 14. 6 *οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται ἀεὶ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν.* 1150 b. 25.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*The ἀκόλαστος, as we said, is not the man to repent of what he has done; but the ἀκρατής is always ready to repent. Hence it is not the ἀκρατής, as was suggested in 2. §§ 10, 11, but the ἀκόλαστος who is incurable. Ἀκολασία is like a chronic disease, such as dropsy or consumption; ἀκρασία like a temporary seizure. In short they differ generically—ἀκολασία is present in its subject without his knowledge, but the ἀκρατής knows that he is ἀκρατής.*

*Of the two species of ἀκρασία, that of the impetuous character is the better.*

*The ἀκόλαστος and the ἀκρατής are then distinct characters, the former acting as he does from deliberate choice, the latter acting as he does against deliberate choice. What they do, however, is much the same: as 'the Milesians are not unintelligent, but do the things that unintelligent people do,' so the ἀκρατής is not ἀκόλαστος, but does the things that the ἀκόλαστος does. But since the character of the ἀκρατής is such that he follows bodily pleasures immoderately without thinking it proper to do so, whereas the ἀκόλαστος thinks that it is proper to follow them because it is his character to follow them, our conclusion must be that it is the ἀκρατής, and not the ἀκόλαστος, who can be easily induced to 'think differently'—the ἀκρατής may still be reformed, because he still has the Principle of good conduct within him—that Principle which virtue (as in the σώφρων) preserves intact, and vice (as in the ἀκόλαστος) destroys—the good end which in conduct is the principle, as the assumptions are the principles in mathematics: in mathematics it is not a process of reasoning which leads to principles; so, in conduct it is not reasoning of any kind, but virtue, natural or acquired by habit, which gives a right view of the Principle. The σώφρων, then, has the right view, as the ἀκόλαστος has a false view; while the ἀκρατής, though constrained by passion to follow bodily pleasures immoderately, is not constrained by it to believe that it is proper to do so. He is not wholly bad; for that which is best—Principle—is alive in him. Opposed to the ἀκρατής is the ἐγκρατής, in whom reason prevails against passion.*

1150 b. 29. § 1.] The writer now passes naturally from οἱ μὴ ἐμμένοντες (ch. 7. § 8) to the ἀκόλαστος—ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει.

ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη] A reference (bracketed by Susemihl) to ch. 7. § 2. 1150 a. 21 ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος—a clause which (as noted *ad loc.*) comes in awkwardly in its context.

b. 31. ἠπορήσαμεν] Ch. 2. §§ 10, 11. The appropriate conception μεταμελητικὸν εἶναι solves the ἀπορία which was caused by the inappropriate conception μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν ch. 2. §§ 10, 11. The



ἀκρατής, after he has gratified the desire of the moment, ceases to 1150 b. 31.
look back upon the gratification with the same satisfaction with which he regarded it before he effected it; the idea of the desire is now weak, and the sense of the harm done by its gratification proportionally strong. This means that he now 'regrets' that he has gratified the desire. But the ἀκόλαστος acts under the habitual influence of desires so comparatively feeble, that if the ideas of them occur to his mind at all after gratification, they must occur with a vividness little inferior to that which they possessed before gratification. If it seemed good to gratify them then, it now seems good to have gratified them. This means that the ἀκόλαστος does not feel 'regret.' Indulgence has become so habitual to him, that it is no longer, in each case, accompanied and followed by the consciousness of a system of life which is being sacrificed. Acts of indulgence are no longer regarded as involving the agent in a serious responsibility, but are performed as it were mechanically, and in unconsciousness of all but their momentary pleasure. Thus ἡ μὲν κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει 1150 b. 36—explained by the Ald. Schol. ἡ μὲν κακία ἤτοι ἡ ἀκολασία λανθάνει ἑαυτήν· οὐ γινώσκει γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μοιχεύειν κακόν ἐστι, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ οἴεται· ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει, ἤτοι οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὅτι τὸ μοιχεύειν κακόν ἐστι.

§ 2.] Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, pp. 25 and 66) regards this § 1151 a. 1.
as interrupting the line of thought begun in § 1, and pursued in § 3. Grant, on the other hand, says—'the thread of reasoning goes on continuously from the end of the preceding chapter, and so there is nothing remarkable in the writer's now reverting to the two kinds of incontinence, as if he had never digressed from discussing them.' I am inclined to endorse Grant's view, which seems to agree practically with that of Ramsauer—'Adjunguntur haec (a. 1–5) haud alieno quidem loco, sed tamen ita ut unâ istâ sententiâ ab eâ disputatione quae per reliquum caput obtinetur devertatur. Ita vero jam agitur, ut nisi et praecesserit 1150 b. 19–28 et eodem respiciatur verba vix intellegi possint.' Although § 2 opens rather awkwardly with αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, which are not the ἀκόλαστος and ἀκρατής as might perhaps be supposed, but the ἀκρατεῖς themselves (οἱ ἐκστατικοί being the προπετεῖς, and οἱ μὴ ἐμμένοντες the ἀσθενεῖς of ch. 7. § 8), I cannot think that its subject is out of place. Section 1 has solved the old ἀπορία of ch. 2. §§ 10, 11 by pointing out that the ἀκόλαστος sticks to his bad principle

1151 a. 1. throughout—*i. e.* never repents of having, on any occasion, stuck to it, whereas the *ἀκρατής* always repents of not having stuck to his good principle. It is with the *ἀκρατής* as *μὴ ἐμμένων*, then, that the *ἀκόλαστος* as *ἐμμένων* is contrasted in § 1. But ch. 7. § 8 (with which ch. 8. § 1 is thus obviously connected) has just mentioned *two* varieties of the *ἀκρατής*—not only the *μὴ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ*, but the *μὴ ἀναμένων τὸν λόγον*. What, then, more natural than that § 2 should supplement § 1 by showing that if *οἱ μὴ ἐμμένοντες τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ* are thus better than *οἱ ἐμμένοντες τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ*, still better are *οἱ μὴ ἀναμένοντες τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*?

Ramsauer notes that *οἱ ἐκστατικοί* in ch. 8. § 2 are the *προπετεῖς*, as distinguished from the *ἀσθενεῖς*, whereas below in § 5 *διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικός* a. 20 describes the *ἀκρατής* generally, whether *προπετής* or *ἀσθενής*. This is one of the reasons why Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, p. 26) thinks that ch. 8. § 2 and ch. 8. § 5 were not intended for the same context: but see note on § 5.

Grant observes that the terms *ἔκστασις*, *ἐκστῆναι*, and *ἐκστατικός* are frequently used in *Probl.* A, in connexion with the *μελαγχολικοί*. The analogy between the *μελαγχολικὴ κρᾶσις* and drunkenness is also insisted on in *Probl.* A.

a. 3. **ἥττῶνται**] *sc.* *οἱ μὴ ἐμμένοντες.*

**ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατὴς κ.τ.λ.**] The Paraph. Heliod. understands this of *ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀσθενῆ ἀκρασίαν ἀκρατής*, and the Ald. Schol. has *ὁ γὰρ ἀσθενὴς ἀκρατὴς κ.τ.λ.* This must be the writer's meaning, but it is very careless to use the generic term thus.

a. 6. **§ 3. ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως**] Ramsauer brackets these words, which certainly interrupt the run of the sentence. If we retain them (Bywater makes them parenthetical), the sentence will mean—'it is plain, then, that *ἀκρασία* is not *κακία* (= *ἀκολασία*), if each be regarded *per se*, or as what it is in itself: yet perhaps we may say that they are the same *secundum quid*; for, although *ἀκρασία*, viewed as what it is in itself, is *παρὰ προαίρεσιν*, and *ἀκολασία* is *κατὰ προαίρεσιν*, nevertheless they are much the same in respect of their *πράξεις*.'

a. 8. **Δημοδόκου**] A native of the island of Leros near Miletus. Bergk (*Poet. Lyr.* p. 356) writes the lines thus—

*καὶ τόδε Δημοδόκου· Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μέν*
*οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷά περ ἀξύνετοι.*



**καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικήσουσι δέ**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 133) shows that *καί* stands for *οὕτω καί*, and that Bekker's full stop after *ἀξύνετοι* a. 10 should be replaced by a comma. Susemihl and Bywater follow him in this punctuation. Bywater introduces *ἀδικήσουσι*, the reading of $K^b$, CCC, and Cambr. I prefer the *ἀδικοῦσι* of other authorities, so far as the sense is concerned; and suspect that the preceding *εἰσίν* may have given rise to the form *ἀδικήσουσι*. 1151 a. 10.

§ 4. **μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι**] See note on vii. 2. 10. 1146 a. 31. a. 11.

**ὃ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς**] The 'conviction' or 'theory' of the *ἀκόλαστος* is plainly said here to be the *result* of moral depravity: see note on vii. 4. 4. 1148 a. 17. To be 'convinced' as the *ἀκόλαστος* is convinced, implies the loss of moral character, which is irreparable: moral character is not produced, like the conclusion of a syllogism, by a process of reasoning (*ὁ λόγος* a. 17), nor can it be reinstated by such a process; it is rather a Life (analogous to the life or nature of a plant or animal), inherited in germ by the individual (*φυσικὴ ἀρετή* a. 18), and largely developed by him (*ἐθιστή* a. 19) in correspondence with the conditions of his special environment. If this life be once lost by the individual, it is lost irreparably. But the *ἀκρατής* has not yet suffered this irreparable loss: he still thinks that his acts (which, as acts, are much the same as those of the *ἀκόλαστος*) are wrong: he still has the principle of moral life in him (*ἀρχή, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα* a. 16)—the conception of conduct, and is *εὐμετάπειστος* (a. 14), *i. e.* amenable to moral influences—can still be touched by reproof and example, and still has some regard for other people, and for his own better self. It is true that he has no need to 'change his conviction,' for it is already correct: he must change his *acts*; and it is the possibility of his doing this which is conveyed by the term *εὐμετάπειστος*—used here, I think, not because it is the most appropriate term, from the writer's own point of view, to express the conversion, or reformation, of the *ἀκρατής*, but because *μεταπεισθῆναι* occurs in the puzzle, left unsolved in chapter 2. §§ 10, 11, and disposed of here by means of considerations which make it possible for the writer now to *quote* the term, without being misunderstood:—'if,' he in effect says, 'we may use the misleading term *εὐμετάπειστος*, it is the *ἀκρατής*, not, as our opponents argue, the *ἀκόλαστος*, who is *εὐμετάπειστος*.' a. 13.

1151 a. 16. **ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις**] *ὑποθέσεις* in the sense of the *θέσεις*, or peculiar *ἀρχαί*, of mathematics which are *ὁρισμοί*, is not in accordance with strict Aristotelian usage. According to the doctrine of the *An. Post.* the *θέσεις*, or immediate principles, of a particular science (as distinguished from the *ἀξιώματα* or immediate principles necessary to all sciences) are either *ὑποθέσεις* or *ὁρισμοί*. Ὑποθέσεις are *θέσεις* which assert existence or non-existence, while *ὁρισμοί* are *θέσεις* which state formal essence. Mathematical science has, as its peculiar *ἀρχαί*, *θέσεις* of the latter kind, *i. e. θέσεις* which are *not ὑποθέσεις*, but *ὁρισμοί*. See *An. Post.* i. 2. 72 a. 14 *Ἀμέσου δ' ἀρχῆς συλλογιστικῆς θέσιν μὲν λέγω ἣν μὴ ἔστι δεῖξαι, μηδ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενόν τι· ἣν δ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον, ἀξίωμα· ἔστι γὰρ ἔνια τοιαῦτα· τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστ' ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις εἰώθαμεν ὄνομα λέγειν. Θέσεως δ' ἡ μὲν ὁποτερονοῦν τῶν μορίων τῆς ἀποφάνσεως λαμβάνουσα, οἷον λέγω τὸ εἶναί τι ἢ τὸ μὴ εἶναί τι, ὑπόθεσις, ἡ δ' ἄνευ τούτου ὁρισμός. Ὁ γὰρ ὁρισμὸς θέσις μέν ἐστι· τίθεται γὰρ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς μονάδα τὸ ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ποσόν·* **ὑπόθεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστι·** *τὸ γὰρ τί ἐστι μονὰς καὶ τὸ εἶναι μονάδα οὐ ταὐτόν.* See also *An. Post.* ii. 7. 92 b. 15 *τί μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τρίγωνον ἔλαβεν ὁ γεωμέτρης· ὅτι δ' ἔστι δείκνυσι*—on which Themistius has (fol. 10 a. vol. i. p. 77, ed. Spengel) *λαμβάνοντες τί σημαίνει τὸ τρίγωνον ὅτι περιέχεσθαι ὑπὸ τριῶν εὐθειῶν, οὕτω δεικνύουσιν ὅτι ἔστι, συνιστάντες αὐτὸ ἐκ τριῶν εὐθειῶν*: see also *An. Post.* i. 10. 76 b. 35 **οἱ μὲν οὖν ὅροι οὐκ εἰσὶν ὑποθέσεις·** *οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι λέγονται . . . τοὺς δ' ὅρους μόνον ξυνίεσθαι δεῖ. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ὑπόθεσίν τις φήσειεν εἶναι.* Accordingly, in the passage before us (*E. N.* vii. 8. 4), if the *ὁρισμοί* of mathematics are meant, the employment of the term *ὑποθέσεις* to convey the meaning is against strict Aristotelian usage.

Grant observes that the term *ὑπόθεσις* is used in precisely the same way in the *E. E.* as here—viz. *E. E.* ii. 10. 1227 a. 8 *περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκριβείας)*, and *E. E.* ii. 11. 1227 b. 28 *ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.* Now, these passages both agree with that before us (*E. N.* vii. 8. 4) in adducing the *ὑποθέσεις* of mathematics to illustrate the *τέλος*, or *οὗ ἕνεκα*, of *πρᾶξις*, for which *βούλευσις* finds means. Remembering that it is with mathematical *analysis* that *βούλευσις* is compared in *E. N.* iii. 3. 11, 12 (where see notes), we may ask the question—Is it probable that 1151 a. 16. the writer employs *ὑποθέσεις* here (*E. N.* vii. 8. 4) for *ὁρισμοί*, or the *ἀρχαί* of the *synthetic* process in mathematics, and consequently violates strict Aristotelian usage? May he not be employing the term quite accurately, to denote the assumption of the thing to be proved, from which an analytical proof in mathematics starts? I am inclined to think that he probably employs the term *ὑποθέσεις* in this sense. Of course the general statement which immediately follows—*οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν*—may be thought to point the other way.



**τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν**] governed by *διδασκαλική* understood. A man's a. 19. 'end' is given by his character; his 'end' is the assertion throughout life of a character, just as the 'end' of an animal or plant is the assertion and maintenance of its particular organism. *Cf. E. N.* iii. 5. 17 *ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ*: or as the same truth is stated, more generally, by Spinoza (*Eth.* iii. 6 and 7), 'Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. . . . Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.' It goes without saying, in short, that the good man's 'end' or 'principle' is good, and the bad man's bad. *Cf. E. N.* vi. 12. 10 *οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)· τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς*: and *E. N.* vi. 5. 6 *αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.* On *φυσική* and *ἐθιστὴ* (or *κυρία*) *ἀρετή*, see *E. N.* vi. 13. 2. 6.

Plutarch (*de Virt. Mor.* ch. 6) illustrates the difference between the *ἀκόλαστος* and the *ἀκρατής* from the poets—

Ἀκολάστων μὲν αἵδε φωναί·

> *τίς δὲ χάρις, τί δὲ τερπνὸν ἄνευ χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης;*
> *τεθναίην ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλει.*

καὶ ἕτερος·

> *τὸ φαγεῖν, τὸ πιεῖν, τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τυγχάνειν,*
> *τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκας ἅπαντ' ἐγὼ καλῶ . . .*

1151 a. 19. φησίν· αἱ δὲ τῆς ἀκρασίας ἕτεραι καὶ διαφέρουσαι·
γνώμην ἔχοντά μ' ἡ φύσις βιάζεται,
καὶ
αἴ αἴ, τὸ δὴ θεῖον ἀνθρώποις κακόν,
ὅταν τις εἰδῇ τἀγαθόν, χρῆται δὲ μή.
καὶ
ἕλκει με γὰρ ἥδη θυμός, οὐδ' ἔτ' ἀντέχει,
θινῶδες ὡς ἄγκιστρον ἀγκύρας σάλῳ·

θινῶδες ἄγκιστρον οὐ φαύλως λέγων τὸ μὴ κάτοχον τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδὲ ἀραρός, ἀλλὰ μανότητι τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ μαλακίᾳ προϊέμενον τὴν κρίσιν. οὐ πόρρω δὲ τῆς εἰκόνος ταύτης κἀκεῖνα εἴρηται·

ναῦς ὥς τις ἐκ μὲν γῆς ἀνήρτηται βρόχοις,
πνεῖ δ' οὖρος, ἡμῖν δ' οὐ κρατεῖ τὰ πείσματα.

πείσματα γὰρ λέγει τὰς ἀντεχούσας κρίσεις πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν . . . τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πλησίστιος μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. Σωφροσύνη he illustrates thus (*de Virt. Mor.* ch. 7)—

δή τοτ' ἔπειτ' ἄνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο, ἡ δὲ γαλήνη
ἔπλετο νηνεμίη, κοίμισσε δὲ κύματα δαίμων.

. . . πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν εὐάγωγον οὖσαν,

ἆθλον ἵππῳ πῶλον ὡς ἅμα τρέχειν.

a. 20. § 5. ἐκστατικός] Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, p. 26) thinks that § 5 and § 2 'were not intended for the same context.' In § 2 'the terms ἐκστατικοί and μὴ ἐμμένοντες κ.τ.λ. are opposed, as denoting different species of the same genus'—*i. e.* προπέτεια and ἀσθένεια, the two species of ἀκρασία: but in § 5 'the passages 1151 a. 26 ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος of the ἐγκρατής, and 1151 a. 20 ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον shew . . . that the terms ἐκστατικοί and μὴ ἐμμενετικοί [=οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ] are identical, and not opposed to one another.' In § 5 each term 'is used to characterise all ἀκρασία, and not a species of it.'

The circumstance that § 2 and § 5 differ in their use of the term ἐκστατικός (μὴ ἐμμενετικός does not occur in § 2) is noticed by Ramsauer also (see above note on § 2. 1151 a. 1), but he does not draw Cook Wilson's inference from the circumstance. I think that the significance of the circumstance may be easily exaggerated. The use of ἐκστατικός in the generic sense, as in § 5, is of course the regular use of the term in this book: but I confess that I do not find much



difficulty in allowing the writer of § 5 to use οἱ ἐκστατικοί in § 2 for 1151 a. 20. οἱ μὴ ἀναμένοντες τὸν λόγον, as opposed to **οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν**, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ. Associations derived from ἔκστασις and ἐκστῆναι naturally place the ἐκστατικός, as ἀλόγιστος, in opposition to ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων: and I do not see why even the writer of § 5 should not be allowed to yield to these associations for a moment in § 2.

Cook Wilson is of opinion that § 4 ἐπεὶ a. 11 . . . τὴν ἀρχήν a. 19 and § 5 σώφρων a. 19 . . . φαύλη a. 28 are parallel versions (*Arist. Studies*, pp. 35 sqq., Table vi), § 4 being the later, and by an inferior thinker:—'at least there are confusions in it from which § 5 is free' (p. 36), viz. in § 4 'the sentence ἐκεῖνος . . . σώζει implies that the ἀκρατής has ἀρετή': the attribution of **ὀρθοδοξεῖν** περὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν to φυσικὴ ἀρετή 'is quite against the tenor of the doctrine about φυσικὴ ἀρετή which is given in *Eth.* vi. 13. There it is distinctly said that φυσικὴ ἀρετή does not belong to the **δοξαστικόν** but to the ἠθικόν in the soul' (vi. 13. 2): lastly 'the substitution of the more determinate εὐμετάπειστος (§ 4) for βελτίων (§ 5) disturbs the text awkwardly.' I cannot see that it is implied in § 4 that 'the ἀκρατής has ἀρετή.' What the writer says is that ἀρετή (*sc.* in the σώφρων, mentioned at the end of the §—in a sentence with which Cook Wilson begins the parallel version contained in § 5) σῴζει τὴν ἀρχήν, and what he implies is that the ἀκρατής has not yet lost the ἀρχή which ἀρετή (in the σώφρων) keeps permanently safe. As for the attribution of τὸ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν to φυσικὴ ἀρετή being against the tenor of vi. 13, because **φυσικὴ** ἀρετή is said (vi. 13. 2) to belong to the ἠθικόν and not to the δοξαστικόν—is not vi. 12. 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ **ἀρετὴ** (*sc.* ἡ ἐθιστὴ) **τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν** equally against the tenor of vi. 13. 2? Both kinds of ἀρετή belong to the ἠθικόν. An intellectual function is ascribed in vi. 12. 6 to ἡ ἐθιστὴ ἀρετή—inaccurately, no doubt, if we insist on the point that it belongs to the ἠθικὸν μέρος: what, then, is there to prevent the writer of vii. 8. 4—inaccurately, but not against the lead given in vi—ascribing an intellectual function to φυσικὴ ἀρετή—especially, I would add, in a clause in which the two kinds of ἀρετή are mentioned so closely together, in one breath, as it were—ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή?

With regard to the use of the term εὐμετάπειστος in § 4 see note on that §, a. 13.

# CHAPTER IX.

## ARGUMENT.

*To revert to a former difficulty—Is it* any *view and choice, or the* right *view and choice, that the* ἐγκρατής *abides by?*

*Is it* any *view and choice, or the* false *view, and* wrong *choice, that the* ἀκρατής *fails to abide by?*

*Our answer must surely be, that* per accidens *it may be any view or choice, but* essentially *it is the* true *view and the* right *choice that the one abides by, and the other fails to abide by.*

*There are certain people—described generally as 'people with strong views'—who hold very firmly to their own opinions, and are very hard to convince of error. Their quality resembles* ἐγκράτεια, *but is spurious; for the* ἐγκρατής, *while maintaining an unchanging attitude towards passion, is ready to yield, if need be, to the persuasion of reason; whereas these 'people with strong views' are not actuated by reason but by desire—they are ignorant clownish people 'with views of their own,' who are actuated by the pleasure of not being beaten by those who try to persuade them—they are unhappy if they have not their own way, like a democratic assembly. They thus resemble the* ἀκρατής *rather than the* ἐγκρατής.

*There are others, again, who do not abide by their resolves and yet are not* ἀκρατεῖς: e. g. *the Neoptolemus of Sophocles did not abide by his resolve to tell a lie: it was pleasure which made him abandon his resolve—but* noble *pleasure—the pleasure of telling the truth. It is only where the pleasure which determines action is* bad *that we speak of* ἀκολασία *and* ἀκρασία.

*Just as* σωφροσύνη *seems to have only one contrary—*ἀκολασία, *because the man who avoids pleasure from deliberate resolve is seldom met with; so* ἐγκράτεια *seems to have only one contrary—*ἀκρασία, *because we seldom see a man whose resolve to seek the due amount of pleasure is overpowered by a disinclination towards pleasure. Such a man, however, when he occurs, is to be accounted bad.*

*We speak, in a loose way, of 'the Continence* (ἐγκράτεια) *of the temperate man* (τοῦ σώφρονος)*'; but we must always remember that, although both* ἐγκρατής *and* σώφρων *are men who do not transgress the law of reason under the influence of bodily pleasures, yet they differ in this most important respect, that the* ἐγκρατής *has bad desires, and the* σώφρων *has not: the* σώφρων *does not feel those things to be pleasant which transgress the law of reason; the* ἐγκρατής *feels pleasure in them, but does not let them lead him away.*

*So also the* ἀκρατής *and the* ἀκόλαστος *resemble, and differ from, each other. They both follow bodily pleasures, but the* ἀκόλαστος *thinks, while the* ἀκρατής *does not think, that it is proper to do so.*

1151 a. 29. **§ 1.**] **ὁποιῳοῦν**, *i. e.* good or bad, as the Ald. Schol. explains. Fritzsche and Michelet (but *not* 'Aspasius,' *i. e.* the Ald. Schol., as



Grant erroneously states) carry on *ἐμμένων* from *μὴ ἐμμένων* to govern *τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ κ.τ.λ.* But, as Grant remarks, 'this will not do. The *ἀκρατής* cannot be said "to abide by a false opinion."' Hence the reading *τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ* (*μὴ ἐμμένων* being understood) adopted by Bywater and some other editors (Susemihl reads *ἀψευδεῖ* instead of *μὴ ψευδεῖ*). I prefer to leave the text as Bekker gives it—*τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ*—following all the MSS. (except $L^b$, which has *τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ*) and Asp., and to suppose that the writer, wishing to make a symmetrical schema, added *ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ* on the *μὴ ἐμμένων* side, as the diametrical opposite of *ὁ ἐμμένων τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει*, or *τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ*, on the other side, thus— 1151 a. 29.

*ὁ ἐμμένων*
*ὁποιῳοῦν* ——— *τῷ ἀληθεῖ*
*ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων*
*τῷ ψευδεῖ* ——— *ὁποιῳοῦν.*

Does sticking to one's opinion or purpose, right or wrong (*ὁποιῳοῦν*), characterise continence, or does the continent man stick only to a right opinion, or purpose? And does not sticking to one's opinion, or purpose, right or wrong, characterise incontinence, or must we say that the incontinent man does not stick to a false opinion and wrong purpose? Here, I think, the desire for symmetry has led the writer to mention a case so inconsistent with the notion of *ἀκρασία* (although, it is to be noted, vii. 2. 7 shews that it was regarded by some as possibly a case of *ἀκρασία*) that critics, among them Rassow[1], have thought it necessary to rescue him from inconsistency by changing the text which rests on the authority of all MSS. save $L^b$.

**ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον**] vii. 2. 7. a. 32.

**ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκός κ.τ.λ.**] *moral strength* (*τὸ ἐμμένειν*) is the general characteristic of the continent man, *moral weakness* (*τὸ μὴ ἐμμένειν*) of the incontinent man. It may sometimes happen that moral strength is the cause of a man's sticking to a mistaken purpose or opinion (*κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιῳοῦν*), but, as a rule, it a. 33.

[1] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 100) approves the emendation of Muretus—*ὁ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ*, believing that the passage has been corrupted in deference to the view that the opposition between *ἐγκράτεια* and *ἀκρασία* makes it necessary to give *λόγος* opposite predicates.

1151 a. 33. is a good purpose, or right opinion, that moral strength enables a man to stick to, and we apply the term continent strictly (*καθ' αὑτό* or *ἁπλῶς*) to the man who sticks to a good purpose, or right opinion; for the man who sticks to a *bad* purpose, or *wrong* opinion is *ἀκόλαστος* (see vii. 8. 1). Again, it may sometimes happen that moral weakness is the cause of a man's departing from a bad purpose or wrong opinion; but such an exceptional case is not contemplated in the term 'incontinent,' which is strictly applied only to those who do not stick to a good purpose, or right opinion (*δόξα ἀληθής*, or *λόγος ἀληθής*). We must remember that it is the *ἀκόλαστος* and the *ἀκρατής* who are distinguished in respect of *δόξα*, or *λόγος*, that of the *ἀκόλαστος* being *ψευδής*, and that of the *ἀκρατής* being *ἀληθής*; but it is not in respect of *λόγος* that the *ἀκρατής* is distinguished from the *ἐγκρατής*, but in respect of strength of character (*ἐμμένειν* and *μὴ ἐμμένειν*):—as Zeller puts it (*Phil. d. Griech.* vol. ii. 2. *Arist.* p. 659, third ed.) 'Aristoteles . . . unterscheidet beide (*i.e.* *ἐγκράτεια* and *ἀκρασία*) von den sittlichen Eigenschaften der Selbstbeherrschung (*σωφροσύνη*) und Zügellosigkeit (*ἀκολασία*) durch das Merkmal, dass die Beherrschung oder Herrschaft der Begierden bei diesen auf einer grundsätzlichen Willensrichtung, bei jenen nur auf der Stärke oder Schwäche des Willens beruht.'

The sentence *εἰ γάρ τις* a. 35 . . . *καθ' αὑτό* b. 3 seems to be merely a logical note introduced to explain the difference between *καθ' αὑτό* and *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*—which hardly needs explanation—and to enable the writer to wind up with the satisfactory formula *ἔστι μὲν ὡς . . . ἁπλῶς*. The article before *τῇ ἀληθεῖ* b. 4 should be omitted: see Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 100) and Ramsauer *ad loc.* It is bracketed by Bywater.

b. 4. **§ 2. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν κ.τ.λ.**] The *ἐγκρατής* 'sticks to' his true opinion; but there are people who resemble him in 'sticking to' their opinions, but differ from him in that their opinions are often wrong. The obstinate man or *ἰσχυρογνώμων* is related to the *ἐγκρατής* as the *ἄσωτος* is to the *ἐλευθέριος*. Both *ἄσωτος* and *ἐλευθέριος* 'spend,' but the *ἄσωτος* spends foolishly, the *ἐλευθέριος* wisely. So both *ἰσχυρογνώμων* and *ἐγκρατής* 'stick to' an opinion, but the opinion of the *ἰσχυρογνώμων* is often foolish, while that of the *ἐγκρατής* is necessarily true.

b. 9. **ὁ ἐγκρατής**] In both places where *ὁ ἐγκρατής* occurs, here and in b. 10, it seems to be interpolated. Susemihl brackets it in both places: Bywater in b. 9.



1151 b. 9.

**οἳ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου**] *sc.* *μεταβάλλουσιν.* b. 10.

**ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν**] 'For they (*i.e.* the obstinate) often enough conceive desires, and are led away by their pleasures.' The expression *ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι* occurs in *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 a. 28 *πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι.* b. 11.

**§ 3.**] **ἰδιογνώμονες**] *'εἶεν ἂν οἱ Γαλλιστὶ καλούμενοι opiniâtres'* (Coraes). b. 12.

**οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες**] The *μέν* contrasts the *ἰδιογνώμονες* with the *ἀμαθεῖς* and the *ἄγροικοι*, who, however, are not characterised. b. 13.

**ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ**] because they are too much influenced by pleasure (*χαίρουσι*) and pain (*λυποῦνται*). They are *ἀκρατεῖς περὶ νίκην*, however, not *ἀκρατεῖς ἁπλῶς.* b. 16.

**§ 4.**] To abandon a bad resolution, so far from being an indication of weakness (*ἀκρασία*), may often be an indication of moral strength and the power of principle, as in the case of Neoptolemus: see vii. 2. 7. Zell refers the point raised in this § to the question mooted in § 1 of the present chapter—'an etiam is impotens sive incontinens dici possit, qui falsam et perversam sententiam susceptam non tueatur?' This he does believing that in § 1 the question conveyed by the words *ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ κ.τ.λ.*, as they stand, is inadmissible, and that what the writer really means to ask is 'whether *even* he who, like Neoptolemus, departs from a wrong purpose, is *nevertheless* to be called incontinent'—as if the text stood *ἢ καὶ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ κ.τ.λ.* Ramsauer, in his note on § 1, after giving his approval to the emendation *ἢ ὁ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ*, adds—'ne enim leviore correcturâ eadem quaestio quae prior erat aliis verbis iterum efficiatur *ἢ καὶ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ*, dissuadet, si non ipsa sententia, at lex concinnitatis.' b. 17.

**καλόν**] 'imo *αὐτῷ ἡδὺ ἦν ὃν καλόν*' (Ramsauer). b. 20.

**οὐ γὰρ πᾶς κ.τ.λ.**] The best *ἐνέργειαι* have their own *καλαὶ ἡδοναί*, which sustain and perfect them: thus *ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν E. N.* vii. 14. 8. The *καλὴ ἡδονή* which attends the function b. 21.

1151 b. 21. of εὐδαιμονία can never lend itself to intemperate uses; nor can the pleasures of sight and hearing, although perhaps they may sometimes be pursued to a somewhat reprehensible extent: see *E. N.* iii. 10. §§ 2–6: with which compare Plutarch, *Sympos.* vii. 5 *ἀκρασίας μὲν ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπολύω τὸ φιλήκοον καὶ φιλοθεάμον· οὐ μὴν Ἀριστοξένῳ γε συμφέρομαι παντάπασι, ταύταις μόναις φάσκοντι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τὸ καλῶς ἐπιλέγεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὄψα καλὰ καὶ μύρα καλοῦσι, καὶ καλῶς γεγονέναι λέγουσι, δειπνήσαντες ἡδέως καὶ πολυτελῶς· δοκεῖ δέ μοι μηδ' Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίᾳ δικαίᾳ τὰς περὶ θέαν καὶ ἀκρόασιν εὐπαθείας ἀπολύειν ἀκρασίας, ὡς μόνας ἀνθρωπικὰς οὔσας· ταῖς δ' ἄλλαις καὶ τὰ θηρία φύσιν ἔχοντα χρῆσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι καὶ μουσικῇ πολλὰ κηλεῖται τῶν ἀλόγων.*

b. 23. § 5. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι . . . μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής] In b. 24 Bekker, following all the MSS., reads *χαίρων*. Muretus, objecting to the participles after *τοιοῦτος οἷος*, wishes to read *χαίρειν* and *οὐκ ἐμμένειν*, forgetting, as Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 134) points out, that *ἐμμένειν* would require *μή*. Susemihl and Bywater adopt *χαίρειν* (which Asp. seems to have read), retaining *ἐμμένων*. Zell and Coraes, on the ground that the Ald. Schol. speaks of the *ἐλλείπων* as *ἀνώνυμος*, and the Paraph. of the *ἐλλείπουσα ἕξις* as *ἀνώνυμος*, think that words to that effect have dropped out of the text, and Zell suggests that these words may have justified the participles *χαίρων* and *ἐμμένων*. Rassow, however (p. 134), quotes *M. M.* ii 9. 1208 a. 1 for the participle after *τοιοῦτος οἷος—ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷος ὑποστελλόμενός τι τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δόξειε καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι.* I do not think that the Ald. Scholiast's remark that the *ἐλλείπων* is *ἀνώνυμος*, or the Paraphrast's that the *ἐλλείπουσα ἕξις* is *ἀνώνυμος*, by any means makes it even probable that either commentator had words to that effect in his text. Each makes the remark, indeed, at the place near the beginning of § 5 where Zell suspects that the words have dropped out of the text; but repeats it later on in connexion with the statement *ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τήν* b. 30 . . . *τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ* b. 32. The Paraphrast's words, in this connexion (he has already said at the beginning of his remarks on § 5 *ἡ δὲ ἐλλείπουσα ἕξις ἀνώνυμος*) are—*ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ ἐλλείπουσα ἕξις ἀνώνυμος καὶ ἐλάχιστα συμβαίνει (σπάνιοι γὰρ οἱ ἧττον τοῦ δέοντος χαίροντες ταῖς σωματικαῖς ἡδοναῖς) διὰ τοῦτο μόνη ἡ ἀκρασία δοκεῖ ἐναντία εἶναι, ὅτι ἡ ἠλιθιότης ὀλιγάκις εὑρίσκεται.* Here the use of the word *ἀνώνυμος* is naturally suggested to the Par. and Ald. Schol. by the words *ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις*, and goes no way, in the circumstances, towards proving that it stood in their text. It would be very rash indeed to found any inference here on the words of commentators who are so careless as to say, as they virtually do, that 'the *ἕξις* is *ἀνώνυμος* and it is called *ἠλιθιότης*.' I see no reason for supposing that *ἀνώνυμος*, any more than *ἠλιθιότης*, stood in their text.



1151 b. 23. All MSS., except $M^b$, read *ὁ* instead of Bekker's *ᾗ* ($M^b$ has *ᾗ*) before *τοιοῦτος* b. 24. The reading *ᾗ τοιοῦτος* seems to me to give exactly the sense required—viz. that there is a character *defined as* departing from consciously realised dictates of reason in the direction of the avoidance of bodily pleasures, which stands to the transitional states *ἐγκράτεια* and *ἀκρασία* in the same relation that *ἀναισθησία* stands to the fixed states *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*: see *E. N.* iii. 11. 7. Of course $M^b$ is generally an unsafe authority, but I think that here it has made a safe emendation. All MSS. seem to give *τοιοῦτος* b. 24, which Bywater (reading *ὁ*) brackets: *cf.* his *Contributions*, p. 57.

b. 25. μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής] 'It is plain,' Grant says, 'that *ἐγκράτεια* is not a mean in the sense of being a balance or harmony of the mind. It is only imperfect temperance, it is temperance in the act of forming.' The writer simply means, I take it, that the *ἐγκρατής* 'stands between' the *ἀκρατής* and the *ἧττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρων*.

b. 27. οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον] '*τὸ λεγόμενον οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον συντέτακται κατὰ τμῆσιν συνήθη τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ* δι' οὐδέτερον, *καθὰ καὶ ἡρμήνευται καὶ ἐν τῇ* APΓ, *ob neutrum*' (Coraes).

b. 33. § 6. καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια . . . ἠκολούθηκεν] 'We come to speak metaphorically of the continence of the temperate man' (Peters). The writer probably uses *ἠκολούθηκεν* here with some consciousness of the technical meaning of the term, for which see Bonitz, *Met.* p. 42 'verbo *ἀκολουθεῖν* pariter ac verbo *ἕπεσθαι* Aristoteles denotat praedicari aliquam notionem de altera, ita ut hac posita illa etiam ponenda sit, *cf.* Γ. 2. 1003 b. 23 et de interpr. 13 passim.'

# CHAPTER X.

## Argument.

*The next point to notice is that the same man cannot be both φρόνιμος and ἀκρατής, for φρόνησις, as we have seen, implies goodness, and is not simply knowledge, but knowledge which issues in good actions, whereas the ἀκρατής is not one who performs good actions. Cleverness—*δεινότης, *is indeed compatible with incontinence; hence, because* δεινότης *and* φρόνησις *are nearly related (see* vi. 12. §§ 9, 10*—as intellectual faculties they are nearly related, but from the moral point of view they differ), some have taken up the notion that* φρόνησις *and* ἀκρασία *are compatible. But so far is* ἀκρασία *from being compatible with the active knowledge of the* φρόνιμος*, that we ought rather to compare the* ἀκρατής *with one who is asleep or drunk. Of course he acts voluntarily (for he knows after a fashion what he does and why he does it); but his* character *is not bad, for his deliberate choice is good—his badness is thus only partial; and he is not unjust, for he does not do evil deliberately—being either a weak irresolute man who fails to abide by the result of deliberation, or an impetuous man who does not deliberate at all.*

*The incontinence of the impetuous man is more easily cured than that of the irresolute man: and incontinence, due to habit, is more easily cured than natural incontinence; although habit may become a second nature.*

*So much for continence and incontinence, endurance and softness.*

1152 a. 6. § 1] takes up vii. 1. 7.

a. 7. **ἅμα γὰρ . . . δέδεικται ὤν**] See *E. N.* vi. 13. *Φρόνησις* is the clear consciousness of one's moral nature, as an organic whole: it insures the maintenance and proper function of the moral organism.

a. 9. **§ 2. τῷ πρακτικός**] *sc. εἶναι.* The *φρόνιμος* not only knows what is right, but applies his knowledge, or acts upon it. He is *σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος—i. e.* his feelings and desires have been so accustomed to move in harmony with his knowledge, that what is technically called *πρᾶξις* may be always looked for from him. *Πρᾶξις* is 'moral action,' or 'conduct.' It is deliberate, being the outcome and expression of definite organisation or *λόγος.* Isolated *πάθη* do not produce *πράξεις*: hence *E. N.* vi. 2. 2 *αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν.* The *ἀκρατής*, although he possesses the general knowledge of right and



wrong (*τὸ εἰδέναι*), lets his *πάθη* prevent the application of it. His 1152 a. 9.
acts are mere responses to isolated *πάθη*, not *πράξεις κατ' ἀρετήν—ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός* a. 9.

**τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι**] See *E. N.* vi. 12. 9, 10. a. 10.
*Δεινότης* is the cleverness with which the means to an end are discovered and employed. It does not give the end, or make it good or bad (being a purely intellectual faculty), but merely pursues it cleverly when given. If the end be morally good, cleverness in the pursuit of it, having become habitual, is called *φρόνησις*: and *πανουργία*, if the end be bad. It is only when the end is not one which can be viewed morally—as morally good or bad—that the neutral term *δεινότης* can be properly used. How then is the *ἀκρατής* here said to be sometimes *δεινός*? His end is good, and he is blind to the means thereto. This difficulty admits of the following answer, I think. It is the steady influence of a morally good end which converts the *δύναμις* of *δεινότης* into the *ἕξις* of *φρόνησις*, the steady influence of a bad end which converts it into *πανουργία*: *i. e.* the *δεινός*, as such, is clever and ingenious, and doubtless shows his cleverness in many ways in non-moral matters; but it requires 'a good or bad end'—a steady inducement appealing strongly to his will and emotions—to make him show and use his cleverness habitually in the moral sphere. Hitherto, we suppose, his cleverness, so far as the moral sphere is concerned, has not been habitually shown—*i. e.* it has existed merely as the *δύναμις* of either *φρόνησις* or *πανουργία*. Now, the *ἀκρατής* has 'a good end'; but it is inoperative in him—in his ill-regulated nature it does not appeal strongly enough to his will and emotions to make him show, in the moral sphere, as *φρόνησις* the *δεινότης* which he probably shows in non-moral matters, where the ends are sufficiently interesting to him to make him exert his natural ability for the discovery and employment of the suitable means. The end of the *ἀκρατής* is good, but not good with the constraining power over conduct which, in the *σπουδαῖος* (the man who is 'in earnest' about good conduct), presses the morally neutral *δεινότης* into the service of morality. Thus the *ἀκρατής*, in spite of his so-called 'good end,' remains merely *δεινός*, his *δεινότης* being inferred from his non-moral activity, and doubtless, as time goes on (for the *ἀκρατής* is on the downward path), from indications suggestive of incipient *πανουργία*. The Paraph. has a good note—*Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον*

1152 a. 10. *καί τινας ἀκρατεῖς φρονίμους ὀνομάζουσι καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν· τινὲς γὰρ τῶν ἀκρατῶν δεινοί εἰσιν· ἡ δὲ δεινότης ἔοικε τῇ φρονήσει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ δεινοὶ κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ δέοντος εὐίκασι τοῖς φρονίμοις· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν γινώσκουσι μόνον τὸ δέον, οὐ προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν, οὐδὲ πράττουσιν· οἱ δὲ φρόνιμοι γινώσκοντες τὸ δέον καὶ πράττουσι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ μὲν φρόνιμος σπουδαῖός ἐστιν· ἀκρατὴς δὲ κἂν δεινὸς ᾖ, φαῦλός ἐστι καὶ ψέγεται.*

a. 13. **κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν**] 'as far as reason goes they are closely allied, though they differ in purpose' (Peters). This translation might be understood to imply that *δεινότης* involves purpose (*προαίρεσις*), though a different sort of purpose from that involved in *φρόνησις*: but *δεινότης* (so far as morality is concerned) is merely a *δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων*, not a *προαιρετικὴ ἕξις*. The meaning is—'*δεινότης* resembles *φρόνησις* in being an intellectual faculty, but differs from it in not involving moral choice.' The Ald. Schol. is wrong in two points in his comment here—*κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἤτοι τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἐγγύς ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ δεινότης . . . καὶ γὰρ ἡ δεινότης ἕξις ἦν ἐφευρετικὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ φρονίμου ἡ προαίρεσις ἀγαθή . . . τοῦ δὲ δεινοῦ ἡ προαίρεσις φαύλη.*

a. 14. **§ 3. οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς . . . οἰνωμένος**] *sc.* *ἀκρατεύεται* Asp., *ἡττᾶται ὁ ἀκρατής* Ald. Schol. Notwithstanding his formal possession of a 'good end,' the *ἀκρατής* keeps his intellectual endowment at the level of *δύναμις*, so far as moral matters are concerned: *i. e.* he is *δεινός*, not *φρόνιμος*, because his good end is otiose, and does not interest him sufficiently to call forth his *δεινότης* into its service, and transform it into *φρόνησις*: *cf.* the Paraphrast's note—*καὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ γινώσκει τὸ δέον (ὁ ἀκρατής) ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἐνεργείᾳ θεωρῶν καὶ χρώμενος τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἴρηται, ὡς ὁ καθεύδων καὶ οἰνωμένος· διὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ὁ δεινὸς ἀκρατὴς φρόνιμος ὀνομάζεται, καὶ ἔοικε φρονίμῳ.* See Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, p. 27) on the difficulty of connecting the words *οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν* with what goes before. He thinks it 'probable that the end of the book (*i. e.* ch. 10) is made of pieces not belonging to each other.' Bywater connects *οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ.* closely with *ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός* § 2, a. 9, making the intervening words *τὸν δὲ δεινόν* a. 10 . . . *προαίρεσιν* a. 14 parenthetical.

a. 15. **καὶ ἑκὼν μὲν . . . ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής**] The *ἀκρατής* acts



voluntarily, because *ἐπιθυμία* is the cause of voluntary actions: see 1152 a. 15. *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 a. 37 *ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν οἷος πράττειν . . . ἑκὼν ἄρα πράξει· καὶ ἑκούσιον τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.* There is some confusion of language in the statement *ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής* (as also in the statement *τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν* vii. 8. 3), because *προαίρεσις* is the *act* of choice, and the *ἀκρατής* of course does not 'deliberately choose' (*προαιρεῖται*) what he does, but acts from *πάθος*. He is, in fact, distinguished as *μὴ προαιρούμενος* from the *ἀκόλαστος*, who acts *προαιρούμενος*. We must suppose that *προαίρεσις* is used loosely here for 'the good intentions' which are overcome by *πάθος* in the *ἀκρατής*. *Βούλησις* would have been more correct than *προαίρεσις*: see *E. N.* v. 9. 6 *παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει (ὁ ἀκρατής)· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει.* Aspasius sees the awkwardness of *ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐκεικής*: he says (141. 6 Heylbut)—*προαίρεσιν δὲ πάλιν ἢ τὸν λόγον εἴρηκεν ἢ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν βούλευσιν.*

**καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος**] *Cf. E. N.* v. 8. 8 *ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς* a. 17. *μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός.* Again, below (v. 8. 10), the *ἄδικος* is described as *ἐπιβουλεύσας.*

On *οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος* here in vii. 10. 3 Grant remarks that 'though lust, as compared with anger, is called *ἐπίβουλος* (*cf.* ch. 6. § 3), yet it is true on the other hand that the incontinent man is not a designing character.'

**Ἀναξανδρίδης**] a comic poet, a native of Camirus in Rhodes: a. 22. mentioned by Aristotle three times in *Rhet.* iii, viz. 1411 a. 18, 1412 b. 16, 1413 b. 25. Athenaeus preserves (p. 374) the following passage relating to Anaxandrides from the *περὶ κωμῳδίας* of Chamaeleon of Heraclea—*Ἀναξανδρίδης διδάσκων ποτὲ διθύραμβον Ἀθήνησιν, εἰσῆλθεν ἐφ' ἵππου, καὶ ἀπήγγειλέ τι τῶν ἐκ τοῦ ᾄσματος. ἦν δὲ τὴν ὄψιν καλὸς καὶ μέγας, καὶ κόμην ἔτρεφε, καὶ ἐφόρει ἰλουργίδα καὶ κράσπεδα χρυσᾶ. πικρὸς δ' ὢν τὸ ἦθος, ἐποίει τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰς κωμῳδίας. ὅτε γὰρ μὴ νικῴη, λαμβάνων ἔδωκεν εἰς τὸν λιβανωτὸν κατατεμεῖν, καὶ οὐ μετεσκεύαζεν ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί. καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντα κομψῶς τῶν δραμάτων ἠφάνιζε, δυσκολαίνων τοῖς θεαταῖς διὰ τὸ γῆρας. λέγεται δ' εἶναι τὸ γένος Ῥόδιος ἐκ Καμείρου. θαυμάζω οὖν πῶς ὁ Τηρεὺς περιεσώθη, μὴ τυχὼν νίκης, καὶ ἄλλα δράματα των*

1152 a. 22. ὁμοίων τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Chamaeleon, the writer of this passage, was a Peripatetic philosopher, one of the immediate disciples of Aristotle. Coraes thinks that the line before us is from the πόλεις of Anaxandrides. Athenaeus (p. 299) preserves fourteen lines of this play. The present line is quoted also by Cyril, *de Trin.* ii. p. 96 (see Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* vol. iii. p. 200). Anaxandrides seems to have imitated Euripides (apud Aelian, H. A. iv. 54)—Ὅμηρος μὲν οὖν ἔδωκεν ἵππῳ φωνήν, ἀσπίδι δὲ ἡ φύσις ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει, φησὶν Εὐριπίδης.

a. 27. § 4. εὐιατοτέρα . . . τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι] This passage Cook Wilson (*Arist. Studies*, Table V) places after vii. 7. 8, and regards as a duplicate of vii. 8. 2.

a. 29. φυσικῶν] Ramsauer suggests φύσει.

a. 31. τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν] Zell and Fritzsche quote *de Mem.* 2. 452 a. 27 ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος. διὸ ἃ πολλάκις ἐννοούμεθα ταχὺ ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα· ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ.

Εὔηνος] There seem to have been two elegiac or gnomic poets of this name, natives of Paros. One of them (whether the elder or younger is uncertain) is said to have instructed Socrates in poetry. Plato refers several times to Euenus as a teacher of rhetoric, in somewhat satirical terms—*Apol.* 20 A, *Phaedr.* 267 A, and *Phaedo* 60 D–61 A. In *Met.* Δ. 5. 1015 a. 25 and *E. E.* ii. 7. 1223 a. 31 he is named as the author of the line πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ, which is also quoted in *Rhet.* i. 11. 1370 a. 10 without his name. See Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iii. p. 203. For the verses of Euenus see *Poet. Gnom.* (ed. Tauchn. p. 109).

## CHAPTER XI.

### ARGUMENT.

*The subject of* Pleasure and Pain *is one which the Political Philosopher must consider; for he is the Architect of Life—he gives us the End to which we refer when we call this good and that bad.*

*Moreover, it is necessary to consider this subject, because we assigned moral virtue and vice to the field of 'pains and pleasures,' and because most people affirm a close connexion between Happiness and Pleasure.*

*There are three opinions which (following our ordinary method of stating the opinions held on the subject under discussion) we begin by noticing—*

(1) *That no pleasure is good, either* per se *or* per accidens.

(2) *That some pleasures are good, but most of them bad.*

(3) *That, even if all are good, yet the chief good cannot be pleasure.*

*The first opinion is supported by the following reasons:—(a) all pleasure is a process in consciousness towards natural perfection, and accordingly is itself imperfect; (b) the temperate man avoids pleasures; (c) the prudent man seeks absence of pain, not pleasure; (d) pleasures hinder thinking; (e) there is no art of pleasure: if pleasure were a good thing there would be an art of it; (f) children and brutes follow pleasures.*

*The second opinion is supported by reference to the bad, disreputable, and hurtful pleasures which admittedly exist.*

*The third opinion is held on the ground that pleasure is not Perfection or End, but Process.*

*So much for the 'sayings' on this subject.*



§ 1. περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης] The discussion of ἡδονή contained in the last four chapters of vii, and that contained in the first five chapters of x, follow the same general lines, but arrive at different results in some points. The mere circumstance by itself that two treatises on ἡδονή exist side by side in the *E. N.* raises a strong presumption in favour of the view that the corpus of the *E. N.*, as we have it, is the result of editing: for either the two treatises on ἡδονή were composed by the same author writing at different times, from somewhat different points of view—in which case it seems highly improbable that he would publish them both together in one work, though a later editor might do so; or they were composed by different authors—in which case the hypothesis of an editor is of course necessary. So much for the antecedent presumption in favour of the hypothesis of an editor raised by the mere circumstance of two treatises on ἡδονή coexisting in the Nicomachean Corpus. But we can go further than this, and say that an editor is certainly accountable for the Nicomachean Corpus, as we now have it. There can be no doubt that *E. E.* iv, v, vi (=*E. N.* v, vi, vii) belong, in thought and style, rather to the *E. E.* than to the *E. N.*[1] It is impossible to account for the fact that these three books are common to the *E. N.* and *E. E.*, by supposing 1152 b. 1.

[1] It may be sufficient to refer the student to Grant's *Ethics*, Essay i. pp. 50–71, and Jackson's *Book V*, Introduction, pp. xxii–xxxii.

1152 b. 1. that their original locus was in the *E. N.*, and that they were transferred thence *en bloc* into the *E. E.* We must rather believe that they were compiled, subsequently to the composition of the *E. N.*, from materials already to hand, and were transferred *en bloc* from the *E. E.* into the *E. N.* by an editor of the *E. N.* who wished to supply an original deficiency in that corpus, or, more probably, to repair a loss which it had suffered. But it may be asked—Why did the editor of the *E. N.* admit the superfluous account of ἡδονή? This difficulty suggests the supposition that, when he inserted v, vi, vii, he did not find x attached to the Nicomachean Corpus. It may have attached itself at a later time. That this supposition is not gratuitous seems to be shown by the fact that the writer of the *E. E.* (or perhaps I ought to put myself in order by saying—the writer mainly responsible for the composition of the *E. E.*)—who apparently had Nicomachean materials before him in the following order—

(*a*) *E. N.* i–iv.

(*b*) Books on the subjects of *E. E.* iv, v, vi. 1–10 = *E. N.* v, vi, vii. 1–10.

(*c*) A treatise on ἡδονή perhaps identical with that in *E. N.* x.

(*d*) *E. N.* viii, ix περὶ φιλίας—

ends his work with two chapters (appended to his lengthy discussion of φιλία)—one on εὐτυχία, and the other on καλοκαγαθία—written without reference to the contents of *E. N.* x. 6–9. It is difficult to suppose that the Nicomachean work, which he follows very carefully up to the close of its discussion of φιλία, can have ended with our *E. N.* x. Even if the Eudemian writer differs from the Nicomachean, as Schleiermacher and Fritzsche suppose (see Fritzsche, *Eth. Eud.* pp. 262, 263), in treating Ethics as a subject distinct from Politics, this does not appear to me to account for the Eudemian writer omitting to reproduce *more suo* much of the latter part of *E. N.* x, had that book been actually before him.

The suggestion, then, which I venture to make is this—When the Eudemian compilation was made, the Nicomachean Corpus ended with part (*d*); and when, parts (*b*) and (*c*) of that corpus having been afterwards lost, an editor supplied the gap by inserting *E. E.* iv, v, vi, the treatise on ἡδονή, contained in the last-named book, was inserted with the rest, because the Nicomachean Corpus still ended with (*d*). Afterwards, however, the missing Nicomachean



treatise on ἡδονή, or one very like it, was recovered, and, its original 1152 b. 1.
locus immediately after the discussion of ἀκρασία being now occupied by its Eudemian equivalent, it was placed, together with x. 6–9, at the end of the composite edition, thus completing the *Nic. Eth.*, as we now have the work.

I offer this suggestion for what it is worth. Much uncertainty, I take it, will always remain as to the exact circumstances in which the two treatises on ἡδονή found their way into the Nic. Ethics.

To pass then from speculation to facts—it may be useful here, at the outset, to state, without detail, the chief points in which the two treatises on ἡδονή differ and agree.

In the first place, it may be noticed that the present treatise gives somewhat more prominence to *bodily* pleasures than that in x. This I do not attribute, as some do (*e.g.* Bendixen, *Bemerkungen zum Siebenten Buch der Nik. Eth.* Philologus, vol. x. pp. 270–92), to the difference between the positions of the two treatises—that which has more to say about the σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί following immediately after the discussion of ἀκρασία, and that which has less to say about them leading up to the discussion of εὐδαιμονία: for I think it probable that the original position of the treatise in x (or of its archetype) was that now occupied by the treatise in vii—viz. immediately after the discussion of ἀκρασία. It seems better to explain the greater prominence of the σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί in the last-mentioned treatise simply by the preference of the writer. The subject of ἀκρασία, involving as it does that of the σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί, had a greater interest for the writer (or writers) of the Eudemian Corpus, than it had for the writer of the *E. N.* This is very evident, for instance, if we compare the Eudemian treatment of τὸ ἑκούσιον with the Nicomachean[1]. It is not necessary, then, to go to the position which the Eudemian treatise on ἡδονή occupies after the detailed discussion of ἀκρασία to account for the greater prominence given in it to the σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί. That the subject of ἡδονή is closely connected with that of ἀκρασία in the mind of the Eudemian writer, and that his special interest is in the σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί, is shown by a passage, *E. E.* iii. 2. 1231 b. 2 (referred to by Fritzsche, *E.E.* Prolegom. p. xlv, and Spengel, *Arist. Stud.* p. 197), which promises a more accurate account of the ἡδοναί when ἐγκράτεια and ἀκρασία come up for special

[1] See introductory note to vii.

1152 b. 1. discussion—*ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας*[1].

It would be a mistake, however, to think that, because the present treatise has more to say about the *σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί* than that in x has, its connexion with the subject of *εὐδαιμονία* is less vital. The words with which the present treatise opens (vii. 11. §§ 1, 2) are as explicit as those with which the treatise in x opens, in declaring the intimate connexion of the two subjects of *ἡδονή* and *εὐδαιμονία*. Moreover, there is a highly interesting passage in an earlier part of the *E. E.* (quoted by Fritzsche, *E. E.* p. 179, and by Grant on vii. 11. 1), in which the writer promises to discuss the relation of *ἡδονή* to *εὐδαιμονία*, with special reference to the *σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί*. It is *E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 30–36 *τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς*[2] *ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον, ὥστ' οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι, καὶ πότερον εἰ δεῖ προσάπτειν τῷ ζῆν καλῶς ἡδονάς τινας, ταύτας δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν, ἕτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἴονται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως.* It is worth noticing, too, that the writer of the *M. M.* introduces his account of *ἡδονή* in the following terms—*M. M.* ii. 7. 1204 a. 19 *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ ἡδονῆς ἐπειδήπερ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος κ.τ.λ.* I accordingly disagree entirely with the view that the two treatises on *ἡδονή* in vii and x respectively were written with different objects—that in vii *ἡδονή* is considered merely as the material of continence and incontinence, in x as sweetening *εὐδαιμονία*: see Coraes *ἄλλοι δέ φασιν ἐκ προνοίας δὶς τὸν φιλόσοφον περὶ αὐτῆς γράψαι, ἐνθάδε μὲν οἷον ὕλην περὶ ἣν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία τὴν ἡδονὴν ὑποτιθέμενον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἑξῆς* (*i. e.* x) *ὡς ᾠκειωμένην ὅλως τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ θεωροῦντα.* The object of both treatises is one—to show how *ἡδονή* is related to *εὐδαιμονία* or the *ἀγαθόν*—how it hinders, *and how it furthers*, the performance of duty. Thus, after a few introductory remarks, the treatise in x opens its subject with the words *οἱ μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσι*, and that in vii with *τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν.* 'Is Pleasure good?' then, is the chief question for both treatises. The answers, however, seem, at

[1] Perhaps, however, we ought to read, for *τοῦ γένους, τούτου τοῦ γένους*, referring to *τὰ ἡδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν* 1231 a. 38. If so, the passage would not promise a treatment of *ἡδονή* generally.

[2] For **τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις** ought we not to read **τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις**?



first sight, to differ *toto coelo*. According to the writer of vii a 1152 b. 1. pleasure may be found which is identical with the *summum bonum* (vii. 13. 2); according to the writer of x (3. 13) pleasure is not the *summum bonum*. No two positions surely could differ more widely. The writer of vii must be a 'Hedonist.' But he is no more a hedonist than the writer of x is. The difference between the two positions, in fact, reduces itself to very moderate limits, when we examine the scholastic ground on which it rests—viz. on the fact that according to the writer of vii *ἡδονή* is *ἐνέργεια*, whereas according to the writer of x it is not *ἐνέργεια*, but attends and 'perfects' it—the formula of vii being *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος ἡ ἡδονή* (vii. 12. 3), and that of x *τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή* (x. 4. 8). If—the writer of vii infers—*ἐνέργεια* and *ἡδονή* are convertible terms (where vital functions are concerned), then the *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν*, or *εὐδαιμονία*, will be a *ἡδονή*. Plainly, this position (identical, it may be noted, with that of the writer of *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 16) differs only verbally from that of Aristotle in *E. N.* i. 8. 12 *οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν* (*i. e.* *τῶν εὐδαιμόνων*) *ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.* Both master and disciple are fundamentally at one: both connect the most desirable pleasure inseparably with the life of virtuous activity—against the hedonists who connect it with the passive life of personal enjoyment. Perhaps I may venture to formulate the difference between the writer of vii and the hedonists in this way.—The writer of vii says—'the Good (meaning the strenuous performance of the highest duty) is Pleasure': the hedonists say—'Pleasure (meaning the pleasure of sense) is the Good.' The writer of vii comes to the subject of pleasure with a firm grasp of the Aristotelian definition of the Good: his identification of *ἡδονή* and *ἐνέργεια* is a piece of scholasticism which does not affect his position as a moralist[1]. It is because he does not see

[1] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 48, 49) believes that the treatise in vii, as distinguished from that in x, has a 'hedonistic character': he says—'Beide Abhandlungen differiren in den wesentlichsten Puncten. Im zehnten Buche wird die Lust von der Thätigkeit gesondert (1175 b. 32), so dass sie nichts als eine blosse Qualität derselben erscheint, im siebenten wird sie als *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος* definirt; das zehnte Buch bekämpft die Ansicht, dass die Lust das höchste Gut sei, das siebente sucht, wie sich bei seiner Grundanschauung erwarten lässt, wahrscheinlich zu machen, dass mindestens eine Art der Lust das *ἄριστον* sei. Schon diese Ansicht genügt, um die Abhandlung des siebenten Buches als unecht zu kennzeichnen; denn sie würde der Aristotelischen Ethik einen hedonistischen Charakter aufdrücken, der mit ihren sonstigen Anschauungen unvereinbar ist.' I differ from this view in (1) at-

1152 b. 1. this that Aspasius (151 Heylbut)—who turns out to be the writer of the 'notable scholium' discovered by Brandis in the Vatican (quoted by Fritzsche, *E. E.* p. 189, and by Grant on vii. 13. 2)—thinks of 'Eudemus' (to whom he conjecturally attributes the treatise περὶ ἡδονῆς in vii) as merely airing 'a probable opinion' (ἐπιχειρεῖ ἐνδόξως ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτὴν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν), and not giving his own real view, in the statement (vii. 13. 2) ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον.

Ἡδονή, then, is discussed here in the seventh, as it is in the tenth book, *in relation to the good—i. e.* not theoretically, as interesting from a physiological or psychological point of view, but with a practical reference. In other words, the object of the enquiry is not to tell us what pleasure *is*, but to tell us what it *does*—how it hinders, and how it helps virtuous action—in short, to place its relation to the practical end in a true light, as against the erroneous views of others—extreme Platonists, on the one side, who held that pleasure can only hinder morality, and hedonists of the Cyrenaic stamp, on the other side, who held that passive enjoyment is the chief good. It is true that the following chapters abound with extremely abstract considerations, which might easily be mistaken for what a barren scholasticism has to offer as physiology and psychology; but we must remember that an abstract scholastic treatment of the subject is, in part, forced upon the writer by the nature of the arguments which he has to meet—and the same remark applies to the writer of the treatise in x. If, however, we turn to the doctrine concerning ἡδονή which may be extracted from the *E. N.* and *E. E.* elsewhere than from the treatises in vii and x, we find that, not being advanced in a polemical form, it is free from the subtleties which mark (and, it may be thought, mar) the discussions in vii, and also, though perhaps in a less degree, those in x. We must be careful, then, not to pronounce the doctrine of vii and x worthless, because verbal criticism of it lands us in the difficulties so cleverly exposed by J. S. Mill in the 25th chapter

taching great importance to the fact that both writers connect the notions of ἐνέργεια and ἡδονή closely together, as against those, whether hedonists or Platonists, who connect the notions of ἀναπλήρωσις, or πάθος, and ἡδονή—nedonists, because it suits their manner and theory of life to do so, ascetic Platonists, because it suits their argument against the hedonists to do so—and (2) in regarding the difference between τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή, and ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια ἡ ἡδονή, as of trifling, and merely scholastic significance.



of his *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*. Mill's 1152 b. 1.
criticism is relevant only against writers who profess to give an answer to the purely scientific question—'What *is* Pleasure, as a physiological or psychological phenomenon?' Mill has little difficulty in showing that the formula ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος, as reduced to 'Pleasure is the result of a pleasurable state of the sense and a pleasure-giving quality in the object presented to it,' is scientifically worthless. But he fails to see that the real object of the writers is, as has been said, to explain what pleasure *does*—how it helps or hinders the attainment of the ethical end—ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια. It is inseparable from ἐνέργεια, enhances ἐνέργεια, is ἐνέργεια, was the formula in which Aristotle and his school summed up the results of their practical enquiry. This formula cannot be taken out of its setting in the practical enquiry, as it is by Mill, without being entirely misrepresented. Its true significance, missed by Mill, is that it asserts the opposite of 'Pleasure is γένεσις or ἀναπλήρωσις'—that it maintains the paramount importance, in human life, of the pleasures of active function, against those who ignored them—the hedonists, because they wished to recognise only the pleasures of ἀναπλήρωσις, or passive reception, as worth anything—the ascetic Platonists because they wished, in their argument against the hedonists, to dwell on pleasures which could easily be shown to be unsatisfactory.

ἁπλῶς] Things are called *good* or *bad* in the strict sense, when b. 3.
regarded as means, or hindrances, respectively, to the attainment of εὐδαιμονία. When they are called good or bad in relation to minor ends, the ends have to be specified; the terms good and bad cannot, in that case, be used by themselves—ἁπλῶς or *simpliciter*—without further specification.

§ 2. ἔθεμεν] *E. E.* ii. 4. 1221 b. 38. b. 6.

ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν] Muretus conjectured ἀπὸ τοῦ μάλα χαίρειν, and b. 7.
M$^{b}$ has ἀπὸ τοῦ μάλιστα χαίρειν. The Ald. Schol. has ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ βίῳ, as if μακάριος were μακροχάριος. Asp. has τὸν εὐδαίμονα μακάριον ὠνομάσθαι, οἷον ὡς ἂν εἴποις μάλα χαίροντα.

§ 3. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.] *No pleasure is good.* This was the view b. 8.
of Antisthenes the Cynic (as Asp. notes): see Aul. Gell. ix. 5 (quoted by Fritzsche) Antisthenes summum malum dicit esse voluptatem: ejus namque hoc verbum est μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην. *Cf.*

1152 b. 8. Euseb. *Praep. Evang.* xv. 13 (quoted by Mullach *Frag. Phil.* vol. ii. p. 286) Ἀντισθένης Ἡρακλείτειός τις ἀνὴρ τὸ φρόνημα, ὃς ἔφη τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τὸ μαίνεσθαι κρεῖττον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ παρήνει τοῖς γνωρίμοις, μηδέποτε χάριν ἡδονῆς δάκτυλον ἐκτεῖναι. Speusippus (nephew and successor of Plato) also held that no pleasure is good. See vii. 13. 1 for the argument with which he maintained this position: *cf.* Aul. Gell. ix. 5 (quoted by Fritzsche) 'Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese.'

b. 10. **τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι κ.τ.λ.**] This, as Fritzsche observes, is the view of Plato (*Phileb.* 48 A, sqq., where *ἀληθεῖς, καθαραί, ἄμικτοι* are distinguished from *μικταί* and *ἀκάθαρτοι ἡδοναί*).

b. 11. **ἔτι κ.τ.λ.**] Plato's view, expressed in the *Philebus*, and referred to in *E. N.* x. 2. 3 *τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναίρει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν.* The view of *E. N.* x is also *μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.*

For Bekker's *ἀγαθόν* in b. 9, Bywater reads *τὸ ἀγαθόν* with $K^b$. This is not to be understood as the *summum bonum*, but simply as 'that which is good.' 'They think that no pleasure is good, either in itself (as the *ἀρεταί* are good in themselves), or relatively (as *ἰατρεῖαι* are relatively good); for "good" and "pleasant" are not the same.'

b. 12. **§ 4.**] The Paraph. explains the connexion between this § and § 3—*τὰ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦντα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ταῦτά ἐστι· ῥητέον δὲ δι' ἃ ἐδόκει.*

**ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν**] *i. e. οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν* b. 8.

b. 13. **ὅτι . . . οἰκίᾳ**] The reference here cannot (or, in justice, ought not to) be to Plato himself, for he did not regard *all* pleasures as *γενέσεις*: see below note on vii. 12. 3, a. 8. The phrase *γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή* does not occur *verbatim* in Plato's writings (although *ἀναπλήρωσις αἰσθητή* does in *Phileb.* 51 B: see Fritzsche, *E. E.* p. 181); it was probably used in the Platonic school, however; perhaps, Fritzsche thinks, by Speusippus. It may have been borrowed from Aristippus (who is probably referred to in *Phileb.* 53 C *ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς*): an expression of his preserved by Diog. Laer. ii. 8. 6. 85 (quoted by Fritzsche, *E. E.* p. 181) resembles it—'Ἀρίστιππος τέλος ἀπέφαινε τὴν λείαν κίνησιν εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένην.



The Paraph. gives the following version of the words before us (ὅλως . . . οἰκίᾳ)—*οἱ μὲν οὖν λέγοντες μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἐπεχείρουν· πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή. ἡ γὰρ εἰς τὴν φύσιν γένεσις τῶν φυτῶν οὐκ οὖσα αἰσθητή, ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἡδονὴ γένεσις, ἡ δὲ γένεσις ἀτελές, τὸ δὲ ἀτελὲς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, ἡ ἡδονὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τὸ ἤδη γεγονός, οὐ τὸ γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ γένεσις ὁμογενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, εἰς ἃ τελευτᾷ· οὐ γὰρ ἡ οἰκοδομία ὁμογενὴς τῷ οἴκῳ.* b. 13.

**ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς**] This argument must not be ascribed to Plato himself. He recognised the value of the pleasures which attend the virtuous life: see *Phileb.* 63 E *ἄλλας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἃς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθ' ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ξυνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ· τὰς δ' ἀεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἑπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μιγνύναι.* Those ascetics who argue that 'pleasure is bad because the *σώφρων* avoids pleasure' fall into the error noticed in *E. N.* ii. 3. 5 *διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.* b. 15.

**ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ**] See ch. 12. § 7. The Paraph. has—*ὁ φρόνιμος τὸ ἀγαθὸν διώκει, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οὐ διώκει.* But the good which the *φρόνιμος* seeks is not an abstraction; it is always given concretely in the *ὕλη* of the human affections and passions: it is therefore incorrect to say that the *φρόνιμος* shuns pleasure for the absence of pain. Pleasure for pleasure's sake he shuns; but not pleasure as the vehicle of duty. The dictum of Antisthenes expresses pretty exactly the Aristotelian (and Eudemian) doctrine of the relation of *φρόνησις* to *ἡδονή*—Ἀντισθένης δὲ *τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον*: Athenaeus 513 (see Mullach, *Fragm. Phil.* ii. 286).

**ἔτι ἐμπόδιον κ.τ.λ.**] But the pleasures of thought stimulate, do not hinder, thought, as will be shown later on. b. 16.

**τῇ τῶν ἀφροδισίων**] Susemihl and Bywater read *τῇ* with $K^b$, $M^b$, Cambr., for Bekker's *τήν*. b. 17.

**ἔτι τέχνη κ.τ.λ.**] No argument of this kind in Plato, according to Spengel, p. 525, quoted by Fritzsche. b. 18.

1152 b. 19. ἔτι παιδία κ.τ.λ.] Children and brutes seek pleasure by an *irrational* impulse (ἀλόγως φερόμενα Paraph.), and that which is thus sought cannot be *good*. From this very fact, that children and brutes seek pleasure, the Cyrenaics, Fritzsche observes, drew the opposite conclusion—that it is good.

b. 20. § 5. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας] *sc.* αἴτιον εἶναί τινες ἐδόξαζον (Ald. Schol.).

b. 22. νοσώδη] 'unhealthy.'

## CHAPTER XII.

### ARGUMENT.

*The arguments mentioned in chapter* 11. §§ 4, 5 *do not prove that pleasure is not good, or even that it is not the Chief Good: for* (1) *they ignore the fact that a thing may be 'good' in either of two senses—either 'good absolutely,' or 'good relatively.' There are doubtless many pleasures which are good relatively to bad or impaired states and natures, and which are consequently bad; but there are also pleasures which are good absolutely.*

(2) *They ignore the fact that the term 'good' may be applied to an actual function, as well as to a state or condition. It is argued that pleasure is 'not good' because it is only a 'process towards' goodness—*i. e. *towards the perfect restoration of an impaired state: but the pleasures of thinking are forgotten, which are not 'processes towards the restoration of impaired states,' but functions put forth by a perfect state. Even the pleasure attending the satisfaction of a bodily want is really a 'function put forth' by an unimpaired nucleus in the state requiring restoration.*

*The 'goodness' of a state, then, is not the only or the highest 'goodness': there is also the 'goodness' of function proceeding from state, and this is the higher kind of 'goodness.'*

*Thus it is not necessary to suppose that there is something better than pleasure, as the end is 'better than' the process towards the end; for pleasure is not a 'process towards' (nor are all pleasures even associated with 'process'): it is rather a 'function proceeding from'; it is an end realised by the subject* quâ *doing something, not* quâ *undergoing a process; and is to be defined, not as a 'process of which one is conscious,' but as 'unimpeded function.'*

*There are some again, who, giving another meaning to 'process,' identify pleasure and 'process,' because, they argue, pleasure is absolutely good. They confound 'process' and 'function.'*

*To argue that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are bad for health, is absurd—for even thinking is sometimes bad for health. Neither thought nor any faculty is hindered by* its own *pleasure, only by* alien *pleasures;*



*nay, the pleasure of thinking and learning makes us think and learn all the better.*

*As for there being 'no art of pleasure'—that is just what one might expect: art deals with the conditions of the performance of a function, not with the actual function itself, as such.*

*As for the argument that the temperate man shuns pleasure, and the prudent man seeks the life devoid of pain rather than the life of pleasure—we answer it, as above, by distinguishing pleasures: the pleasures which are associated with painful craving—the excessive bodily pleasures—the temperate or prudent man indeed shuns; but he has* his own *pleasures—those of the good life.*

§ 1. μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον] As Michelet notes, the present chapter deals with μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, and ch. 13 with μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον. 1152 b. 25.

πρῶτον μὲν . . . καμνόντων] The apodosis begins b. 27 with καὶ αἱ φύσεις. The term ἀκολουθήσουσιν must be understood to mean, not only that the general distinction, formulated in the protasis, between τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν and τὸ τινί *will be found applicable to* ἀγαθαὶ φύσεις καὶ ἕξεις, with their κινήσεις and γενέσεις, but also that a *corresponding* general distinction between τὸ ἁπλῶς φαῦλον and τὸ τινί may be inferred (on the principle laid down in *E. N.* v. 1. 6 ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ θάτερον πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι), and that it will be found applicable to φαῦλαι φύσεις καὶ ἕξεις, with their κινήσεις and γενέσεις. The Paraphrast sees this—Ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη διὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν, μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς λέγεται, τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ κυρίως, ὡς ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθόν, τινὶ δὲ ἀγαθόν, ὡς τὸ λωποδυτεῖν τῷ λωποδύτῃ ἀγαθόν, ἀκόλουθόν ἐστιν ὅτι καὶ φύσις πᾶσα, καὶ ἕξις, καὶ πᾶσα κίνησις, καὶ γένεσις, ἡ μὲν ἔσται ἁπλῶς ἀγαθή, ἡ δέ τινι. ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. κινήσεις γάρ, καὶ γενέσεις, καὶ ἕξεις, αἱ μὲν φαῦλαι ἁπλῶς, αἱ δέ τινι, καὶ τῶν φαύλων τινί· καὶ αἱ μὲν καὶ ἀεὶ φαῦλαί τινι, αἱ δὲ κατά τινα τρόπον, καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον.

The argument in this §, directed against οἱ λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, may be explained as follows—When we say that a thing is 'good,' we mean, either that it is good without qualification—good in itself: thus Wisdom is good in itself, without qualification—or that it is good in a qualified sense—not in itself, but in relation to something else: thus the venom of a snake is good in relation to the welfare of the snake, the amputation of a limb is good in relation to the survival of the patient, but they are 'bad' in themselves—*cf. M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 a. 29 ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαύλη, οἷον ἡ τῶν

1152 b. 26. σκωλήκων καὶ ἡ τῶν κανθάρων καὶ ὅλως ἡ τῶν ἀτίμων ζῴων . . . καὶ σπουδαία, οἷον ἡ ἀνθρώπου.

Now, those who say roundly that 'no pleasures are good' regard exclusively motions and processes (*κινήσεις καὶ γενέσεις*), which are 'good' only in a relative sense, and 'bad' in themselves—viz. the motions and processes which belong to bad or impaired natures (*φύσεις*) and states (*ἕξεις*). The motions and processes (equivalent, in the view of the philosophers here criticised, to the pleasures) of bad natures are good for the possessors of the bad natures (being *their own* pleasures, see *E. N.* i. 8. 10), but are in themselves bad—*i. e.* unworthy of human nature: the motions and processes of a remedial kind, which restore impaired natures and states to their normal condition, are good for the possessors of the impaired natures or states, but bad in themselves—*i. e.* not characteristic of healthy human nature: indeed they are often not even felt as pleasures by the patients, but are only thought to be pleasures because they remove pain. It is from looking exclusively, then, at these 'pleasures'—the 'relatively good' but 'intrinsically bad' motions and processes of (1) bad, and (2) impaired natures and states, that they draw the sweeping conclusion—'no pleasures are good.' They ignore the existence of pleasures (indicated in the next §) belonging to the free activities of the rational nature of man, which, as rational, is good in itself, and suffers no losses needing painful repair. The argument of this §, as given above, is summed up later on by the writer himself—vii. 14. 4 *καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις . . . αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς.*

On the ground that the *φαῦλαι κινήσεις* ought to be subdivided in the same manner as the *σπουδαῖαι*, Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 81, 82) conjectures that after *αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι* b. 29 the words *αἱ δὲ τινὶ μὲν φαῦλαι* have fallen out; and instead of understanding *ἁπλῶς* with *αἱρεταὶ δ' οὔ* b. 31 (as Bekker's *χρόνον, αἱρεταὶ δ' οὔ* requires—*cf.* Ald. Schol. *αὐταὶ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρεταὶ οὐκ εἰσίν*), he conjectures *χρόνον αἱρεταί, ἀεὶ δ' οὔ*. This last conjecture (accepted by Sus.) gives, I think, a good meaning, and is palaeographically probable. Bywater's *αἱρεταί, ⟨ἁπλῶς⟩ δ' οὔ* b. 31 does not seem to me to bring out so well the contrast intended, which is between the *ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε ὀλίγον χρόνον*, and the *ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε πάντα τὸν βίον*. So far as the authority of Asp. goes, I think that it is quite as much in favour of supplying *ἀεί* as *ἁπλῶς*—*αἱ δὲ οὐδὲ αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ*



*οἷον τῷ νοσοῦντι τομαὶ καὶ ἰατρεῖαι τότε ὅτε νοσεῖ. ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱρεταί· αἱ δὲ ἀεί, αἱ δὲ οὔ.* I cannot, however, accept Rassow's other proposal —the insertion of *αἱ δὲ τινὶ μὲν φαῦλαι* in b. 29 (accepted by Sus.). This would favour Rassow's, I think mistaken, view that *ἁπλῶς* is used in two senses in this §—in the clause *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί* in its ordinary sense, as defined in *Top.* ii. 11. 115 b. 29 *τὸ δ' ἁπλῶς ἐστὶν ὃ μηδενὸς προστεθέντος ἐρεῖς ὅτι καλόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον*—*i. e.*= *per se*, 'in itself,' 'without qualification,' 'in the abstract,' 'ohne Einschränkung, schlechthin'; but in the clause *αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ.* b. 29 in another sense, meaning 'generally,' 'in the majority of cases,' as opposed to *τινί*, 'in an exceptional case.' For this second meaning of *ἁπλῶς* Rassow quotes *E. N.* v. 1. 9. 1129 b. 2 *περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἔσται* (*sc.* *ὁ ἄδικος*), *οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί.* But if *ἁπλῶς* in v. 1. 9 means 'generally,' 'in the majority of cases,' as distinguished from 'in itself'—why is *ἀεί* added? The writer of v. 1. 9 means, I take it, that 'money' (*e.g.*) in itself, or in the abstract, is always regarded as something good; though when we view it in the concrete—qualified as 'the profligate's money'—we may think of it as a bad thing. So in the present § (vii. 12. 1) *ἁπλῶς* may, I submit, be translated '*per se*' in both places where it occurs.

**αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί**] 'nedum *αἱρεταί*' (Ramsauer). The motions b. 31.
which proceed from a bad nature, though good and pleasant to that nature, as being its own motions, are in themselves bad: the motions which are called forth to allay pain and want are not good in themselves, or even pleasant, but are chosen merely as less evils than the pain and want which they allay. No wonder that those who confine their attention to motions of these two kinds arrive at the conclusion that 'pleasure is not good.'

**§ 2. ἔτι . . . τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης**] In § 1 the writer has b. 33.
referred to the formal distinction between *τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ τινὶ ἀγαθόν*, in order to suggest to his opponents—*οἱ λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν*—the one-sidedness of assuming, as they do, that only 'relatively good' pleasures exist—only those which are 'good' as *κινήσεις καὶ γενέσεις* whereby the cravings of some inferior or defective *φύσις* are satisfied: similarly, in § 2, he now refers to another formal distinction—that between *τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ καθ' ἕξιν ἀγαθόν*, in order to intimate to his opponents that they err in assuming that the only

1152 b. 33. 'good' they have to consider in this connexion is that of the ἕξις. They argue—the ἕξις, as end, is 'good' and 'real': therefore pleasure, which is ἡ γένεσις ἡ καθιστᾶσα εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν, is not 'good' or 'real' in its own right. This is the argument for which Socrates gives thanks in *Phileb.* 54 C, D οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν . . . οὐκοῦν τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ' ἠντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ. But the 'good' of the ἕξις is not the only 'good' to be considered in this connexion. The ἕξις is for the sake of the ἐνέργεια which proceeds from it, and the ἐνέργεια is 'good' in a more eminent sense than the ἕξις. What if pleasure be, not a 'motion' which generates (κίνησις=γένεσις) the ἕξις, but a function which proceeds from it—ἡ τῆς φυσικῆς ἕξεως ἐνέργεια, and so the true οὐσία of the ἕξις? This, it is suggested, is a point which is overlooked by οἱ λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν.

It is thus in the form of criticism that the writer introduces his own theory of pleasure as ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως. And it is to be noted how completely he makes his own theory occupy the ground from the very first. Not only are the ἡδοναί of thought, which involve no pain or craving, ἐνέργειαι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, but even αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν—the generative motions which restore a ἕξις—depend on the unimpaired part of the ἕξις—or the ἕξις *quâ* unimpaired (ἡ ὑπόλοιπος ἕξις)—performing an ἐνέργεια: and it is this ἐνέργεια of the unimpaired part of the ἕξις, or of the ἕξις *quâ* unimpaired, which is the pleasure—therefore no merely secondary and apparent pleasure—experienced in connexion with the γένεσις, ἀναπλήρωσις, or ἰατρεία, by which a want is satisfied. If the ἕξις were entirely destroyed—had no remnant of vitality left in it, it could not be restored. Ἰατρεία implies the *vis medicatrix naturae*. The pleasure experienced in restoration is thus the *reaction* of the organism, *quâ* unimpaired, against the pain and want of its partially impaired condition. There are, however, other pleasures which are the spontaneous *actions* of their ἕξεις.

The passage (ἔτι b. 33 . . . οὔσης a. 2) may be paraphrased as follows—'Again, the term "good" is applicable to a function and to a state:—the natural state being "good," the motions which restore a man to it are, of course, "good," and "pleasant" derivatively. If these "motions" are what we are to understand by "pleasures," then our opponents have made out their case—no



pleasures are "good." But we must not allow them to stop short 1152 b. 33.
at the "goodness" *of the mere state*. The "goodness" of *its function* is higher; and when desire for restoration is being satisfied, the state, in so far as it remains partly unimpaired, performs a function: it is this function which is the pleasure experienced in the restorative process—not but that there are pleasures without accompanying pain and desire—for instance the functions of thought, proceeding from a state, or faculty, which lacks nothing to the fulness of its nature.' Aspasius has a good commentary (145. 1 Heylbut)—ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δὲ ἕξις, ὡς ἕξις μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀρετή, ὡς ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, καὶ αἴσθησις μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἕξις (λέγω δὲ αἴσθησιν τὴν δύναμιν, ἡ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐνέργεια), ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν οὐχ ὡς ἕξις ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνέργεια τῆς φύσεως. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ αἱ ἀναπληρώσεις καὶ ἀποκαταστάσεις, αἳ εἰσιν εἰς τὴν φύσιν, ἡδεῖαι. προηγουμένως μὲν γὰρ ἡδόμεθα διὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν φύσιν τρεφομένων ἡμῶν· λέγω δὲ φύσιν τὴν ψυχήν. ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ τότε ἡ θρεπτική, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡδόμεθα. συμβαίνει δὲ τὸ τηνικαῦτα καὶ ἀναπλήρωσιν γενέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἐνέργεια τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἐν ἡμῖν φύσεως καὶ ἕξεως. κἂν γὰρ ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τήν γε φύσιν ὑπολελειμμένην καὶ δυναμένην ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνεργεῖν ἔχομεν ⟨ὥστε Diels⟩ αὐτὴν συμπαρόντων αὐτῇ τῶν σιτίων καὶ τῶν ποτῶν ἐνεργεῖν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἡδονὴ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, ὥς φησιν, ἀναπλήρωσις γίνεται τοῦ ἐνδέοντος ἐν τῷ σώματι.

αἱ καθιστᾶσαι] *sc.* αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις—(a sort of hendiadys) b. 34.
='the κινήσεις which *produce* and restore ἕξεις' to be carefully distinguished, as ἀτελεῖς (see vii. 11. 4 οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν), from the ἐνέργειαι, or functions, which *proceed from* the ἕξεις. The writer's point is that his opponents, not looking beyond 'the good of the ἕξις,' forget that there are ἐνέργειαι proceeding from the ἕξις (which are 'better than' the ἕξις), as well as κινήσεις (=γενέσεις) leading up to it. The tendency to acquiesce in 'the good of the mere ἕξις' is one to which the Aristotelian school offers opposition all along the line—*cf. E. N.* i. 8. 9 τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν κ.τ.λ. For the phrase αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν Fritzsche quotes *Phileb.* 42 D εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ b. 35.
φύσεως] 'but what performs the function (*i. e. actually experiences*

1152 b. 35. *pleasure*), when the desires are being satisfied, is that which is left of the natural state.' Ἐνέργεια is used here in a way which seems to anticipate the identification made in § 3.

Ὑπολοίπου ($K^b$, NC, Asp.) means 'remaining,' 'left untouched' by the decay which has destroyed the rest of the state: *cf.* vii. 14. 7, which is a complete commentary on the present passage—λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. The reading of $M^b$, CCC, and Cambr.—ὑπολύπου (adopted by Zell, Coraes, and Michelet), is plausible on account of λύπης in the line below, but must be dismissed, as inconsistent with the τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς of vii. 14. 7. Nor can the meaning given by the Ald. Schol. and others to ὑπολοίπου, viz. 'defective' (ἤτοι τῆς λοιπαζομένης φύσεως καὶ ἐν ἐνδείᾳ οὔσης βρωμάτων Ald. Sch.)—suggested apparently by οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης 1153 a. 1—be defended: ὑπόλοιπος can mean only 'left behind,' 'left untouched,' 'remaining.' $L^b$ and $O^b$ have ἐπιλοίπου, and Γ apparently ἐπιλιποῦς (*indigentis et imperfecti*).

Grant gives the gist of § 2 excellently when he says—'The argument is that it is only life, and the vital action (φυσικὴ ἕξις καὶ ταύτης ἐνέργεια) which is good and pleasant: the restorative processes are only secondarily, non-essentially, and by a sort of inference pleasant. . . . The argument goes on to add that, even in these restorative processes, there is vital action (ἐνέργεια), namely of those organs that remain unimpaired.'

b. 36. ἐπεί] The transition marked by ἐπεί here may be brought out thus—'In restorative processes the pleasure is the *reaction* of the vitality left in the ἕξις: but it must not be supposed that all pleasure is reaction, for there are pleasures which are spontaneous *actions*.' For this use of ἐπεί (='although,' 'not but that') *cf.* vii. 12. 7 ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος.

1153 a. 2. σημεῖον δ'] *sc.* τοῦ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι ἡδονάς (Fritzsche). *Cf. M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 b. 20 ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ καθισταμένης τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, οἷον καθισταμένης μὲν αἱ ἐξ ἐνδείας ἀναπληρώσεις, καθεστηκυίας δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων οὖσαι, βελτίους ἂν εἶησαν αἱ καθεστηκυίας τῆς φύσεως ἐνέργειαι· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρους λεγόμεναι τοὺς τρόπους ἐνέργειαι εἰσίν· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδοναὶ καὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς καὶ τοῦ διανοεῖσθαι βέλτισται ἂν εἶησαν, ἐπεὶ αἵ γε σωματικαὶ ἐξ ἀναπληρώσεως.



Both pleasures—that of ἀναπλήρωσις and that of διανοεῖσθαι—are 1153 a. 2. ἐνέργειαι—vital functions proceeding from their respective states; but the former is apt to be confused with the accompanying ἀναπλήρωσις, while the latter is ignored by those who, on the strength of the confusion, conclude that 'pleasure is not good.' The circumstance, however, that there are plainly two classes of things called 'pleasant' (ἡδέα)—the one indefinite, the other perfectly definite—indicates that there are two kinds of pleasure. The first kind of pleasure is related to *anything which, however temporarily and superficially, relieves the pressing want* (*e. g.* τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν), the second to *things really pleasant* (τὸ φύσει or ἁπλῶς ἡδύ)—*i. e.* to a *definite* class of healthy functions, and the special circumstances in which—and in which alone—these functions are manifested in their full perfection.

The following passage in *M. M.* ii. 7. 1204 b. 6–36 renders the doctrine of vii. 12. 2 excellently, showing (1) that there are some pleasures, viz. those ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, and those of seeing, smelling, and hearing, which are obviously not γενέσεις; and (2) that, after all, no pleasure is a γένεσις—even the pleasure experienced in eating or drinking is the ἐνέργεια of a part of the ψυχή, and accompanies, but is not to be confounded with, the process by which hunger or thirst is relieved—ἔστι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις. ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴ γινομένη οὐκ ἔστιν γένεσις, οὐδ' ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ⟨ἰδεῖν καὶ⟩ ὀσφρανθῆναι. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας γινομένη, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν. αὗται μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς γίνονται, τῷ ἢ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἀναπληροῦσθαι ἢ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· διὸ γένεσις δοκεῖ εἶναι. ἡ δ' ἔνδεια καὶ ὑπερβολὴ λύπη. λύπη οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἔνθα ἡδονῆς γένεσις. ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἰδεῖν καὶ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ὀσφρανθῆναι οὐκ ἔστιν προλυπηθῆναι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡδόμενος τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ τῷ ὀσφραίνεσθαι προελυπήθη. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοίας ἔστι θεωροῦντά τι ἥδεσθαι ἄνευ τοῦ προλυπηθῆναι. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ ἣ οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις. εἰ οὖν ἡ μὲν ἡδονή, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν ἔφη, διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι γένεσις, ἔστι δέ τις ἡδονή, ἣ οὐκ ἔστιν γένεσις, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν. τὸ δ' ὅλον οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὗται αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ φαγεῖν καὶ πιεῖν ἡδοναὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ γενέσεις, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ταύτας φάσκοντες εἶναι τὰς ἡδονὰς γενέσεις. οἴονται γάρ, ἐπειδὴ τῆς προσφορᾶς γινομένης γίνεται ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτο γένεσιν εἶναι· ἔστι δ' οὔ. ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς τι μέρος ᾧ ἡδόμεθα ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ὧν ἐσμὲν ἐνδεεῖς, τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖ καὶ κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ κίνησις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἡδονή· διὰ δὴ τὸ ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἐκεῖνο τὸ μόριον τὸ τῆς

1153 a. 2. *ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν, οἴονται γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τῷ τὴν προσφορὰν δῆλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μόριον ἄδηλον. ὅμοιον οὖν εἴ τις τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἴεται εἶναι σῶμα, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὔ· ἔστι δέ γε καὶ [ἡ] ψυχή. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτου· ἔστιν γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ ἡδόμεθα, ὃ ἅμα τῇ προσφορᾷ ἐνεργεῖ. διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ γένεσις.*

a. 7. **διέστηκεν**] The MSS. have *συνέστηκεν*, but a correction in CCC anticipates the conjecture of Bonitz—*διέστηκεν*, adopted by Bywater.

**§ 3. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς**] The Paraph. is wrong in thinking that the writer passes on here to discuss the second of the two points indicated at the beginning of this chapter—*ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον*. He is still concerned with the first point, and does not deal with the second till vii. 13. 2.

a. 8. **ὥσπερ τινές φασι κ.τ.λ.**] The argument 'that there is something "better than" pleasure, *i. e.* something for the sake of which pleasure is chosen, because pleasure is only a *γένεσις*,' falls to the ground, for pleasure is not a *γένεσις*. For the distinction between the *τέλος* (or *οὐσία*) and the *γένεσις*, on which this argument relies, see *Phileb.* 54 C (quoted by Zell and Fritzsche) *φημὶ ἑκάστην γένεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἑκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμπασαν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης. οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκα τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν. τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην μοῖραν θετέον. ἆρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστι, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν; ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν. οὐκοῦν τῷ μηνύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μέν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ' ἠντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελᾷ.* Here Plato thanks others for the formula *γένεσίς ἐστιν ἡ ἡδονή*. See also *Phileb.* 53 C *ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γέσεσίς ἐστιν οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες* [generally thought to be the Cyrenaics: see Grant, *Ethics* vol. i. p. 176, Essay ii] *αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μηνύειν ἡμῖν οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.* The formula then was not invented by Plato, and he did not apply it to the pleasures of thought and of the higher senses, except in a way which deprives it of the significance which it has as applied to those of eating and



drinking: for, although he thinks of the former pleasures as 1153 a. 8.
*ἀναπληρώσεις*, he distinguishes them, as *καθαραὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης*, from the latter, which are *ἀπαλλαγαὶ λύπης*: see *Rep.* 584, and *Phileb.* 51, 52.

Grant may be right when he says, speaking of the argument *βέλτιον τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως* criticised in the present section—'In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speusippus are here alluded to.'

**οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι**] *πᾶσαι*, of course, a. 9.
refers to *οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως* only. No pleasures are *γενέσεις*, although some are *μετὰ γενέσεως*. The words *οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσι*, equivalent to *οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσίν*, must be translated so as not to contradict the truth—*μετὰ γενέσεως τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι. Συμβαίνειν*, as in the formula of the syllogism *Top.* i. 1, and as one sense of the term is defined in *Met.* Δ. 30. 1025 a. 30 (*λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβεβηκός· οἷον ὅσα ὑπάρχει καθ' αὑτὸ ἑκάστῳ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα· οἷον τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν*), marks *necessary consequence*, as of the effect from its cause, the property from the essence. It is in this sense, and not in that of accidental concomitance, that it must be understood here. Grant's 'result from' brings this out well—'they do not result from our coming to our powers (*γινομένων*), but from our using those powers (*χρωμένων*).' The subject of *γινομένων* and *χρωμένων* is *ἡμῶν*. *Γένεσις* is sometimes materially necessary to the *χρῆσις* (*e. g.* the *ὑπόλοιπος ἕξις* of the hungry man feels pleasure, on the occasion of eating), but is not to be identified with it.

**ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως**] = *τῶν καθιστασῶν* a. 12.
*εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν*, according to Ramsauer: *i. e.* *ἀγομένων* is middle, and its subject is *κινήσεων* understood. This is the view of the Paraph. also, who has—*Καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ὅσαι μὲν εἰς τελείωσιν ἄγουσι φύσεως, οὐκ αὐταί εἰσι τέλος, ὥσπερ ἡ καθ' ἕξιν ἰατρικὴν ἐνέργεια τέλος ἔχει τὴν ὑγίειαν· ὅσαι δὲ οὐκ ἄγουσιν εἰς φυσικὴν τελείωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐταί εἰσιν ἡ φυσικὴ τελείωσις, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἄλλο τέλος, ἀλλὰ ἄλλων αὐταί εἰσι τέλη· ὥσπερ εἴ τις κατὰ τὴν τελείαν ἕξιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνεργεῖ.*

I am inclined to think that the writing is very careless, and that *ἀγομένων* is passive, its subject being the persons whose nature (*τῆς φύσεως*) is in question. I think that it is easier to suppose carelessness of this kind, than to take *ἀγομένων* = *ἀγουσῶν*.

1153 a. 12. **διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς κ.τ.λ.**] The definition rejected on philosophical grounds here (and, so far as *γένεσις* is involved, also in x. 3. 5) is not very different from that accepted by Aristotle as adequate for the more popular purpose of the student of rhetoric—*Rhet.* i. 11. 1369 b. 33 *ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον.* Ramsauer (p. 487) quotes two other passages in which Aristotle describes pleasure in terms which recall those of the definition here condemned, viz. *Probl.* 878 b. 11 *ἡ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδύ, ἐὰν ᾖ αἰσθητή*, and *E. N.* ix. 9. 9 *τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτὸ (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ).*

a. 14. **ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν κ.τ.λ.**] 'Aristotle,' says Grant, 'when writing accurately distinguishes pleasure from the moments of life and consciousness (*ἐνέργειαι*) from which it is inseparable. *Cf.* x. 5. 6. He, however, does not more specifically define it than as *ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος (τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ) Eth.* x. 4. 8. Eudemus does not preserve the distinction, but simply says that pleasure should be defined as "the unimpeded play of life." Aristotle himself occasionally writes in this way: *cf. Met.* xi. 7. 7 (Λ. 7. 1072 b. 16) *ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου.*'[1]

a. 15. **ἀνεμπόδιστον**] *ἀνεμπόδιστος* occurs nowhere in the *E. N.*, and only here and in ch. 13. § 2 in the *E. E.*; but in *Pol.* Δ. 9. 1295 a. 35 the following words occur—*εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον κ.τ.λ.* Hence Bendixen (*Bemerkungen zum siebenten Buch der Nicomachischen Ethik*: Philolog. x. 199–210, 263–292) maintains that Aristotle must refer to *E. N.* vii, because it is only in *E. N.* vii that the term *ἀνεμπόδιστος* occurs: consequently, that *E. N.* vii is by Aristotle. Against this view Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* pp. 189 sqq.) has little difficulty in showing that the reference in the *Politics* is not to the definition of *ἡδονή* given in vii, but to the doctrine of *E. N.* i and x, according to which *εὐδαιμονία* is *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένῳ*, the term *ἀνεμπόδιστος* being employed to sum up what is there expressed by *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ* and *τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένῳ—cf. E. N.* i. 10. 12 *τὰ δὲ μεγάλα (τῶν ἀτυχημάτων) . . . ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις.* See also Grant, *Ethics*, Essay i. vol. i. pp. 55, 56.

[1] *Met.* Λ is post-Aristotelian: see Rose, *de Arist. libr. ord. et auctor.* p. 242.



The **ἀνεμπόδιστος** *ἐνέργεια* of vii is, after all, not very different 1153 a. 15.
from the **τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή** of *E. N.* x (4. 5). According to *E. N.* x pleasure perfects, or is the perfection of, an *ἐνέργεια*—supervenes upon it, or crowns it, as beauty crowns youth (x. 4. 8)—without pleasure an *ἐνέργεια* is, in fact, *ἀτελής*—falls short of the full vitality which it is its *raison d'être* to realise. In the phraseology of *E. N.* vii, such an *ἐνέργεια* is 'impeded,' 'has not free play.' Pleasure is 'the free play of a function' in *E. N.* vii; in *E. N.* x it is 'the perfection of a function.' As in *Pol.* Δ. 9 *ἀνεμπόδιστος* takes the place of the *τέλειος* of *E. N.* i in the statement of the doctrine of *εὐδαιμονία*, so in *E. N.* vii it takes the place of the *τελειοῖ* of *E. N.* x. 4. 6 in the statement of the doctrine of *ἡδονή*. Undue importance has been attached to the difference between the *ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια ἡ ἡδονή* of vii and the *τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή* of x, because the doctrine *εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον* (vii. 13. 2), logically necessitated by the former formula, has been thought to mark the writer of vii as a 'hedonist.' I have tried to show (note on vii. 11. 1. 1152 b. 1) that his ethical position is substantially the same as that of the writer of *E. N.* x. He differs merely in attempting to do more with the term *ἐνέργεια*, as a symbol of thought, than the writer of *E. N.* x attempts; and he perhaps strains its use. He is, in short, somewhat scholastic, but in no sense a 'hedonist.' And, as has been noticed above, he does not stand alone in identifying *ἡδονή* and *ἐνέργεια*. The writer of *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 16 describes God's life as *ἐνέργεια, ζωὴ ἀρίστη*, and *ἡδονή*, using these expressions as interchangeable. It may perhaps be said that it is natural to fall into a more scholastic use of terms in describing the life of God than in describing the life of man, and that while *Met.* Λ. 7 is not inconsistent with Aristotelian principles, the present treatise is, being 'hedonistic.' To this we may answer—that it is not 'hedonism' to identify the highest pleasure with the highest function. 'Hedonism' takes no account of the pleasure of action; its highest good is passive enjoyment. Aristotelianism—represented by the writer of vii as well as by the writer of x—places pleasure in a position of philosophical dignity which it does not occupy in any other Greek school. As *εὐδαιμονία* is Life—what a man *does*, not what he *receives*—so Pleasure is not mere *relief*, or even *passive enjoyment*, but *that which sustains function*—or, as the writer of vii says more simply, *it is function*. So intimately is it bound up with Life, that it is difficult to say which is chosen for the sake of which

1153 a. 15. (*E. N.* x. 4. 11). All living beings striving after fulness of life according to their kinds, it is in the consciousness of successful life—*i. e.* in pleasure—that, for man and the other animals, the fulness of life is actually given. Life and Pleasure therefore cannot be separated as outer and inner—

Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale:
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.

The high position thus assigned to Pleasure by the side of, or rather in implication with, Life, or the Chief Good, marks the theory contained in vii and x as one to be viewed in a practical, or moral, rather than in a scientific light. The question, as I have said, which the theory sets itself to answer is (in spite of superficial appearances to the contrary) not 'What is pleasure as a physiological or psychological phenomenon?' but 'Is it good? And if so, how?'—*i. e.* 'What are the relations of the various pleasures to the good life?' Some of them doubtless hinder it; but others again sustain and heighten it. The hedonists placed the wrong pleasures—those of passive enjoyment—highest; the Platonists unduly depreciated pleasure. To show, as against both schools, that the pleasures of virtuous function, or Duty, crown life with perfection, seems to me to be the object of the Aristotelian theory—a practical, or moral, object, which is misrepresented by Mill when he points out (truly enough) that the object of a scientific psychology has not been attained—that no answer, or worse than no answer, has been given to its question, '*What is* pleasure?' See Mill, *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*, ch. 25. p. 486: 'Aristotle's theory, which, as understood by our author, differs little from his own, is presented by Sir W. Hamilton in the following words (*Lectures on Met.* ii. 452): "When a sense, for example, is in perfect health, and it is presented with a suitable object of the most perfect kind, there is elicited the most perfect energy, which at every instant of its continuance is accompanied with pleasure[1]. The same holds good with the function of Imagination, Thought, &c. Pleasure is the concomitant in every case where powers and objects are in themselves perfect, and between which there subsists a suitable relation." The conditions whereon upon this showing pleasure depends are the healthiness of the sense, and the perfection of the object presented to it. This is simply making the fact its

[1] This is the theory of *E. N.* x rather than of vii.



own theory. When is a sense in perfect health, and its object 1153 a. 15.
perfect? The function of a sense is twofold—as a source of cognition and of feeling. If the perfection meant be in the function of cognition, the doctrine that pleasure depends on this is manifestly erroneous: according to Sir W. Hamilton it is even the reverse of the truth, for he holds that the knowledge given by an act of sense and the feeling accompanying it are in an inverse proportion to one another. Remains the supposition that the perfection of which Aristotle spoke was perfection not in respect of cognition but of feeling. It cannot, however, consist in acuteness of feeling, for our acutest feelings are pains. What, then, constitutes it? Pleasurableness of feeling: and the theory only tells us that pleasure is the result of a pleasurable state of the sense and a pleasure-giving quality in the object presented to it. Aristotle and Sir W. Hamilton did not certainly state the doctrine to themselves in this manner; but they reduced it to this by affirming pleasure or pain to depend on the perfect or imperfect action of the sense, when there was no criterion of imperfect or perfect action except that it produced pain or pleasure.' Mill is perhaps right in his contention that our scientific knowledge of the nature of pleasure is not enriched by the statement that 'it is the concomitant of perfect action.' But as a protest against those who said 'all pleasure is evil,' and those who made passive enjoyment the end, the statement is of great ethical importance. An interesting account of the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of pleasure, and notices of later theories, notably of Kant's, will be found in Hamilton's *Lectures on Met.* Lect. 43. Kant's theory of pleasure and pain is thus stated in his *Anthropologie* § 60, as rendered by Hamilton, *Met.* ii. 472—'Pleasure is the feeling of the furtherance (Beförderung), pain of the hindrance of life. Under pleasure is not to be understood the feeling of life; for in pain we feel life no less than in pleasure, nay perhaps even more strongly. In a state of pain life appears long, in a state of pleasure it seems brief; it is only, therefore, the feeling of promotion—the furtherance of life which constitutes pleasure. On the other hand, it is not the mere hindrance of life which constitutes pain; the hindrance must not only exist, it must be felt to exist.' 'These definitions of pleasure and pain,' Hamilton observes, 'are virtually identical with those of Aristotle, only far less clear and explicit.' But Kant's theory soon parts company from Aristotle's, as may be seen from another passage

1153 a. 15. in the *Anthropologie*, which, however, I quote to show that Kant, though differing from Aristotle in important respects, is at one with him in having a practical purpose to serve with his theory of pleasure; and I would suggest that the Kantian theory of pleasure is as likely to be misrepresented as the Aristotelian, if treated as a contribution to 'scientific psychology.' The passage is given by Hamilton (*Met.* ii. 472) as follows—'If pleasure be a feeling of the promotion of life, this presupposes a hindrance of life; for there can be no promotion if there be no foregoing hindrance to overcome. Since, therefore, the hindrance of life is pain, pleasure must presuppose pain. . . . When we cast our eyes on the progress of things, we discover in ourselves a ceaseless tendency to escape from our present state. To this we are compelled by a physical stimulus. . . . But in the intellectual nature of man there is also a stimulus which operates to the same end. In thought man is always dissatisfied with the actual; he is ever looking forward from the present to the future. . . . Man is urged on by a necessity of his nature to go out of the present as a state of pain, in order to find in the future one less irksome. Man thus finds himself in a never-ceasing pain; and this is the spur for the activity of human nature. Our lot is so cast that there is nothing enduring for us but pain. . . . Pleasure is nothing positive; it is only a liberation of pain, and therefore only something negative. . . . It is certainly the intention of Providence that by the alternation of pain we should be urged on to activity. [Here Kant applies his theory; and its significance lies in the practical application he makes of it, not in the scientific meaning which may be extracted from the terms in which it is couched.] No one can find pleasure in the continual enjoyment of delights; these soon pall upon us. . . . There is no permanent pleasure to be reaped except in labour alone. . . . Labour is irksome, labour has its annoyances, but these are fewer than those we should experience were we without labour. As man, therefore, must seek even his recreation in toil itself, his life is at best one of vexation and sorrow. . . . Men think that it is ungrateful to the Creator to say that it is the design of Providence to keep us in a state of constant pain; but this is a wise provision in order to urge human nature on to exertion. Were our joys permanent, we should never undertake aught new. That life we may call happy which is furnished with all the means by which pain can be overcome; we have, in fact, no other conception of human happiness.'



A very different conception this of life and happiness, and of the 1153 a. 15.
relation of pleasure to life and happiness, from Aristotle's: my object, however, is not to contrast the theories, as such, of Aristotle and Kant, but to illustrate by another example the danger of taking a theory of pleasure (and the remark applies to any particular theory advanced by a great moralist in the construction of his ethical system—*e. g.* to a theory of Conscience such as Cardinal Newman's, or of Will such as Kant's) out of the context of the ethical system in which it is embedded, and of treating it as a contribution—valuable or worthless—to 'psychology.' Thus Kant's 'theory' that 'pleasure is nothing positive' may be accepted as a valuable psychological truth (as by Schopenhauer), and a whole system of 'psychological truths' may be deduced (to the psychologist's satisfaction) from it; or it may be rejected as 'psychologically untenable.' But plainly our view of its significance as that which helps Kant to express, in yet another figure, his deepest thought in presence of the problem of life, is not affected in the least by the favourable or unfavourable verdict of 'scientific psychology.' Indeed, 'untenable psychology' matters as little in Kant as untenable Ptolemaic cosmology in Milton. So with Aristotle's theory of pleasure. Mill's criticism may effectually dispose of it, as abstracted by Hamilton from its ethical context, and presented as a contribution to psychology: but it is not a contribution to psychology. It is an integral part of Aristotle's theory of duty—'The performance of duty,' Aristotle tells us, 'has its own pleasure, which ensures and perfects the performance. All other pleasures are inferior to this pleasure. The ascetics who say that pleasure is not good, and that we can do our duty without aid from pleasure, and the hedonists who say that the pleasures of passive enjoyment are the only pleasures worth seeking, are wrong.' Mill's criticism misses all this.

ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον] *i. e.* it is important to substitute the term ἀνεμπόδιστον for the term αἰσθητήν. It goes without saying that, being an ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, it is αἰσθητή or realised in consciousness; but unless it be ἀνεμπόδιστος, it is not realised as *pleasant*. The term αἰσθάνεσθαι is wide enough, according to Aristotelian usage, to cover the consciousness of thought, as well as that of sensation. I therefore think that the Paraphrast goes off on a wrong line here, when he says—ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰσθητή.

1153 a. 15. **δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τισιν εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν**] This refers not to the Platonists hitherto criticised, but probably to the Cyrenaics; and *γένεσις* must be here understood to mean the *outcome* or *operation of* a *ἕξις*, not the *process by which* a *ἕξις* is formed or restored, as the term was understood by the Platonists. The hedonists here referred to maintain that Pleasure is *really* or *perfectly* good (*κυρίως ἀγαθόν*); hence that it cannot be a *ἕξις*, which is only *potentially* or *imperfectly* good, but must be a *γένεσις*—the realisation or operation of a *ἕξις*: *cf. E. N.* i. 7. 13 (quoted here by Ramsauer) *τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.* Instead of the term *γένεσις*, the writer suggests the term *ἐνέργεια* as better fitted to signify 'the operation of a *ἕξις*.' Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 100) reads *τισιν* for the *τις* of the MSS. after *γένεσις*, on the ground that the clause mentions a view which has not hitherto been alluded to. His words are 'Diese Worte sind völlig unverständlich, wenn man sie auf die in dem vorhergehenden Satze bestrittene Platonische Lehre bezieht. Man hat daher wohl mit Grant an die Cyrenaiker zu denken. Damit es aber erkennbar wird, dass man es mit einer neuen und noch nicht besprochenen Ansicht zu thun hat, ist wie ich glaube, das ohne dies auffällige *τίς* nach *γένεσις* in *τισίν* zu ändern. Diese von mir schon, Observ. Crit. p. 28, vorgeschlagene Aenderung ist von Bekker in der kleineren Ausgabe von 1861 [and by Susemihl and Bywater] aufgenommen worden. Der Paraphrast, der die Stelle richtig erklärt, hat vielleicht *τισίν* gelesen: *γένεσις δὲ ἔδοξέ τισιν εἶναι ἡδονὴ ὅτι ᾠοντο τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον· τὸ δὲ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι· ἐνέργειαν δὲ καὶ γένεσιν μηδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν· τὸ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει.*'

a. 18. **§ 4. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν**] elliptical:=*τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἶναι φαῦλα, ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν.*—'To say that pleasures are bad, because some pleasant things are unhealthy, is like saying that healthy things are bad, because some of them are bad, for money-making': *cf.* the Paraph. *εἰ φαύλη λέγεται ἡ ἡδονὴ ὅτι ἔνια ἡδέα νοσώδη, ἔσονται καὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ φαῦλα, ὅτι τινὰ ὑγιεινὰ ἐμποδὼν ἵσταται τῷ πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πολλῶν χρημάτων ἐστὶν ἀναλωτικά.* Peters, I think, is wrong with '. . . is like arguing that some things that are healthy are bad for money-making.' I take *ὅτι* in a. 18, as in a. 17, to mean, not *that*, but *because*.

a. 19. **ταύτῃ**] *πρὸς χρηματισμόν.* He means that both *ἡδέα* and *ὑγιεινά* may be bad *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*—in some particular relation; but they



are not, on this account (*κατά γε τοῦτο*) bad in themselves—*φαῦλα* 1153 a. 19. *ἁπλῶς.*

§ 5] answers vii. 11. 4 *ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί*, on the a. 20. lines of *E. N.* x. 5. §§ 1–7, where it is laid down that every function has its own (*οἰκεία*) pleasure, which stimulates and perfects it, and that if a function is good (as judged, we must assume, not by the subjective standard of pleasurable feeling, but by the objective standard of correspondence with environment) its pleasure is good. It is by thus connecting pleasure with function, or correspondence with environment, that Aristotelianism meets hedonism and asceticism. It is to be observed that the writer here speaks of the *ἕξις* being impeded or stimulated by *ἡδονή*: whereas the writer of *E. N.* x. 5 speaks consistently of the *ἐνέργεια* (distinguished by him from the *ἡδονή*) being impeded or stimulated.

*Φρονήσει*, as Grant remarks, is used here generically for 'thought,' and not in the restricted sense given to it in Book vi.

§ 6] refers to vii. 11. 4 *ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν* a. 23. *τέχνης ἔργον.*

**εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν**] 'is but natural' (Peters): 'is just what one a. 24. might expect to find.' *Τέχνη* is concerned with the ordering of the conditions (*τῆς δυνάμεως ἐστί*) of a performance (*ἐνέργεια*), but not with the performance itself. See the Paraph. *οὐδεμία ἐνέργεια τέχνης ἐστὶν ἀποτέλεσμα· ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἡ τέχνη, ἡ δὲ δύναμις προάγει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τέχνη αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ δύνασθαι κυβερνᾶν· τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι κυβερνᾶν αἴτιόν ἐστι τῆς κατὰ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν ἐνεργείας.* So close is the connexion between *τέχνη* and *δύναμις*, that such *τέχναι* as *ῥητορική*, *ἰατρική* and *διαλεκτική* are often simply called *δυνάμεις*. They are the *δυνάμεις αἱ μετὰ λόγου* of *Met.* Θ. 2. 1046 b. 1, which are said to be concerned with contraries—*καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί.* So long as alternatives are open—so long as this possible arrangement, or that, may be preferred—so long as preparations have to be made, *τέχνη* rules; but the result of these preparations,—that for the sake of which they have been made, when once it is realised, is something definite, which *τέχνη* cannot modify. Art may instruct a man how to hold his bow and point his arrow straight for the mark; but the *ἐνέργεια* of all this instruction—the flying arrow—has already escaped beyond the reach of art. *Cf. M. M.* ii. 10. 1208 b. 1 *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τὴν χρῆσιν παραδίδωσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἕξιν.*

1153 a. 26. **καίτοι καί κ.τ.λ.**] We have here what the Ald. Schol. describes as an *ἔνστασις* brought against the *πρότασις*—*ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη* advanced by the opponent. It is submitted that arts of pleasure *are* popularly recognised. This *ἔνστασις* however is obviously not so seriously meant as the *ἀντιπαράστασις* (Ald. Sc.), or rejoinder, contained in the first part of the §. The writer of *M. M.* ii. 7. 1206 a. 26 oddly omits entirely the weighty rejoinder *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως*, and confines himself to the captious *ἔνστασις*. His words are *ἄλλος ἦν λόγος ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἡδονήν. ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές· οἱ γὰρ δειπνοποιοὶ καὶ στεφανοποιοὶ καὶ οἱ μυρεψοὶ ἡδονῆς εἰσὶ ποιητικοί. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ ὡς τέλος ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς τε καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν οὖν ἐπιστήμη ποιητικὴ ἡδονῆς.* This is all that the writer has to say in answer to the thesis *οὐδεμία ἐπιστήμη ποιεῖ ἡδονήν.*

a. 27. § 7.] 'Most of the arguments,' says Grant *ad loc.*, 'against pleasure ignore the distinction between different kinds of pleasures, the one kind being of the nature of life, and the end, and therefore good in themselves (§ 3); the other kind being connected with inferior conditions of our nature, with pain, want, etc., and being therefore only secondarily and accidentally good (§ 2). This latter kind of pleasures, and excess in them, are made the ground of reproaches against pleasure in general.'

**τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν**] *sc. τὰς ἡδονάς.*

a. 28. **τὰ θηρία διώκειν**] *sc. τὰς ἡδονάς.*

a. 30. **ἁπλῶς**] Fritzsche believes that this word has crept into the text from a scholium; thus the Ald. Schol. has *πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἤτοι ἁπλῶς καὶ κυρίως.*

**τὰς τοιαύτας**] *τὰς μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθάς* Par.

a. 31. **καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος**] *sc. διώκει.* These words seem to form a parenthesis. The *φρόνιμος* tries not to be pained by the absence of these bodily pleasures. *ὁ γὰρ φρόνιμος τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν βούλεται μὴ λυπεῖσθαι* (Ald. Schol.).

a. 35. **ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος**] *τῷ γὰρ δικαίῳ ἡδονὴ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν τὰ σώφρονα ἡδονὴ γίνεται* (Ald. Schol.). *Cf. E. N.* ii. 3. 1 *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων.*



# CHAPTER XIII.

## ARGUMENT.

*That pain is evil and avoided (evil in itself, and as impeding function) is admitted. Now, that which is contrary to what is avoided (quâ avoided and evil) is good. Pleasure therefore, as the contrary of pain (quâ avoided and evil), is good—for there is nothing in the argument of Speusippus, that, as greater, though contrary to less which is unequal, is not therefore equal, so pleasure, though contrary to pain which is evil, is not therefore good.*

*As for the view that pleasure is the chief good—there is nothing in the circumstance that some pleasures are bad to prevent us holding it: nay, we must hold it, if we define pleasure as 'unimpeded function'; for Happiness or the chief good is 'highest and best function,' and it would not be 'highest and best' if it were 'impeded': thus there will be a pleasure, viz. 'the highest and best (sc. unimpeded) function,' (other pleasures being bad, if you like, in themselves) which is identical with the chief good. This is why all men bind up the idea of pleasure with that of Happiness: the notion of 'perfect function' they naturally cannot separate from that of 'unimpeded function': hence the importance attached to external prosperity—and to the absence of all that 'impedes' (for those who maintain that Happiness is possible in the midst of tortures and great adversities, if only a man is virtuous, either intentionally or unintentionally say what is untrue); hence the identification which is made of prosperity and Happiness by those who forget that even prosperity, when too great, 'impedes' as well as adversity.*

*The fact that all creatures—beasts and men—follow pleasure, points to its being the chief good. If all do not follow the same pleasure, yet it is pleasur that they all follow—nay, perhaps at bottom the same pleasure, for they are all members of the one divine system.*

*The bodily 'pleasures' have appropriated the name, because all men experience them, and many men know no others.*

*Further, unless pleasure, or function, be good, the 'Happy Life' need not be 'pleasant'—for pleasure is superfluous, if not good—nay, the 'Happy Life' might even be 'painful'—for if pleasure is not positively good, then pain is not positively bad, but neutral, and there is no reason for avoiding it. Thus the good man's life need not be more 'pleasant' than the bad man's.*

§ 1. **Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν . . . ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι**] This is the second part of the argument of Eudoxus given in *E. N.* x. 2. 2. 1153 b. 1.

**ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική**] The words as they stand cannot, I think, be translated otherwise than as they are translated by Peters —'partly bad as in some sort an impediment to activity,' or by 1153 b. 2.

1153 b. 2. Stahr—'theils ist er (der Schmerz) es (ein Uebel), insofern er uns irgendwie behindert':—*τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική* (*sc.* *εἶναι*) forming a single expression in which *πῇ* qualifies *ἐμποδιστική*='as hindering in some way or other.' But the balance of the clause requires *ἢ δὲ πῇ, τῷ ἐμποδιστική* (*εἶναι*)—'Pain is partly bad in itself (*ἁπλῶς*), partly bad in relation to something else (*πῇ*=*κατά τι*) *i.e.* inasmuch as it hinders good activities'—*τῷ ἐμποδιστική* (*εἶναι*) being epexegetical of *πῇ*. Πῇ is frequently opposed to *ἁπλῶς* by Aristotle, but the *Index* gives no instance of *τῷ πῇ* where *πῇ* alone would be sufficient. Of course *πῇ*, like *ἁπλῶς*, or any such term, can be converted into a substantive by means of the article; but this use of the article would plainly be out of place here, where the meaning of *the formula* *πῇ* is not explained, but the formula is used. The Paraphrast seems to have read *πῇ τῷ*. His version is—*ἡ μὲν καθ' αὑτό ἐστι φευκτή, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ ἀρετῇ λύπη, ἡ δὲ πῇ, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ ζημίᾳ τινὶ λύπη, ἥτις φευκτή ἐστι κατά τι, ὅτι ἐμποδίζει τῇ θεωρίᾳ.* Similarly the Ald. Schol. *ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἀλλὰ πῇ κακὸν καὶ φευκτὸν ἤτοι καθὸ ἐμποδιστική.*

b. 4. **ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος κ.τ.λ.**] The best commentary on this obscurely brief reference is *E. N.* x. 2. 5, where the argument is given more fully but without the name of Speusippus.

The Paraph. explains the present reference thus—*οὐ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ Σπευσίππου λύσις καθ' ἣν ἐνιστάμενος λύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ τόνδε τὸν λόγον συμβαίνει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι καθάπερ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐναντία ἐστὶ τῷ ἴσῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν τὰ παρ' ἑκάτερα ἐναντία, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, ἡ μὲν ὡς μεῖζον ἡ δὲ λύπη ὡς ἔλαττον· καὶ ἔστι ἡ μὲν ἀλυπία ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ λόγος παντελῶς ἄδοξός ἐστιν· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἡ ἡδονὴ κακὸν δοκεῖ.* Similarly the Ald. Schol. *ἔλεγεν ὁ Σπεύσιππος ὅτι ὡς τὸ μεῖζον ἀντίκειται τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκρα ἤτοι τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἦ κακά, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἤτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀγαθὸν ἦ, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀντίκειται τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ τῇ λύπῃ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄκρα ἤτοι ἡ λύπη καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ εἰσὶ κακά, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἤτοι ἡ ἀλυπία ἀγαθὸν ἦ*:—*i.e.* Speusippus argued that, 'as greater and less are both contrary to equal, and therefore both unequal, so pleasure and pain are both contrary to the neutral state which is good, and therefore are both evil.' To this the writer of x, and the present writer, reply—'Pleasure is *not* in itself (*ὅπερ*) evil. We appeal to universal experience against you. You make a wrong application of a useful formula (*ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον*



*τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον*) to Pleasure: *cf.* *E. N.* x. 2. 5 1153 b. 4. *λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες.*

The formula thus misapplied by Speusippus is given in *Cat.* 11. 13 b. 36, with the *caveat* that it is applicable only within narrow limits, **ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθῷ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακόν· τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ· οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἀδικία, καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν.** *τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ οὖσα, ἀγαθόν ἐστιν·* **ἐπ' ὀλίγων δ' ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις·** *ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν.* Speusippus neglected the caution conveyed in these words. On Speusippus see Grant, *Ethics*, Essay iii. vol. i. pp. 217, 218, and Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* §§ 289–294. His theory of Pleasure is thus stated by Aul. Gell. ix. 5—Speusippus, vetusque omnis Academia, *voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse* dicunt opposita inter se: bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret.

**οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν**] Grant says— b. 6. 'We are probably to understand *τις*, with the Par. and Schol. Speusippus would have said that pleasure *is* an evil: *cf.* *Eth.* x. 2. 5.' I am not sure that Grant is right here. Speusippus would certainly have said that pleasure is an evil accidentally—probably he would have said that being evil is an 'inseparable accident' of pleasure; but would he have said that it is *essentially* evil? It seems to me that the word *ὅπερ* (see next note) makes it possible to understand Speusippus as the subject of *φαίη*—which is, of course, what the run of the sentence naturally suggests.

**ὅπερ**] 'For no one would say (or, Speusippus would not say) that pleasure is *in itself and essentially* an evil.' Eustratius in his note on *E. N.* vi. 4. 3 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι, καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική* explains correctly the technical meaning of *ὅπερ*—*τὸ δὲ ὅπερ δηλοῦν κεῖται τὸ οὐσιωδῶς κατηγορεῖσθαι τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς τὴν τέχνην.* See Alex. ad *Top.* iii. 1. 273 a. 14 (quoted by Bonitz, *Met.* p. 176. q. v. on the use of *ὅπερ*) *τὸ ὅπερ αὐτῷ τοῦ κυρίως ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν, καὶ ᾧ ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ὅπερ τὸ κυρίως ἐκεῖνο εἶναι σημαίνει, οἷον ὅπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ κυρίως ἄνθρωπος.* On which Bonitz remarks—'excludit igitur pronomen *ὅπερ* quaecunque rei accidunt, includit unice ea quae in substantia, *ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν* ejus, insunt . . . omnino eo (*i.e.* by *ὅπερ*) denotatur id ipsum quod res est, *τὸ τί ἐστι*, vel *ἡ*

1153 b. 6. *οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος.*' Κυρίως, or 'essentially,' being the fundamental meaning of *ὅπερ*, the term is often used as synonymous with *γένος*, as in *Top.* iv. 1. 120 b. 23 *οὔτε γὰρ ἡ χιὼν ὅπερ λευκόν, διόπερ οὐ γένος τὸ λευκὸν τῆς χιόνος, οὔθ' ἡ ψυχὴ ὅπερ κινούμενον· συμβέβηκε δ' αὐτῇ κινεῖσθαι*: but this only, as Bonitz points out, and as is plain from the terms of the passage just quoted *Top.* 120 b. 23, because *τὸ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν καὶ πρῶτον ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων Top.* iv. 5. 142 b. 27. Accordingly, with Waitz (*Organon*, vol. i. p. 467) simply to say that *ὅπερ* and *γένος* are synonymous is unduly to narrow the use of the former term. It may be noted that the Ald. Schol. on the present passage narrows the sense of *ὅπερ* in the way deprecated by Bonitz: his words are—*οὐδεὶς ἂν φαίη τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι ὅπερ κακόν, ἤτοι ὡς ἐν γένει ἀνάγεσθαι τῷ κακῷ καὶ εἶδος τοῦ κακοῦ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι.* The Paraphrast brings out the fundamental sense of the term better—*οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ὅπερ ἐστὶ κακὸν εἶναι.*

b. 7. **§ 2. τἄριστόν τ'**] The MSS. have *ἄριστόν τ'*, or *ἄριστόν δ'*. The conclusion *εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον* formulated in this § is logically necessitated (*ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ.*) by the identification of *ἡδονή* with *ἐνέργεια*: but, as I have tried to show, it does not involve any departure from Aristotelian principles, in the direction of 'hedonism.'

b. 8. **ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν**] *Cf. M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 a. 31 *ὁμοίως δ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι φαῦλαι, οἷον αἱ βάναυσοι· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐ διὰ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ἀγαθὸν τῷ γένει.* But the parallel drawn in the passage before us requires us to think of a certain *ἐπιστήμη* (*φιλοσοφία* Ald. Schol.) not as merely *good*, but as possibly the *summum bonum*. This is seen by the Paraph., who says—*καὶ γὰρ πολλῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ ἄριστον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην.* If, then, a certain *ἐπιστήμη* is the *ἄριστον*, how, it may be asked, can a certain *ἡδονή* also be the *ἄριστον*? Grant is probably right in thinking that we need not take the parallel very strictly: but the writer, if asked to defend the apparent inconsistency, would not have much difficulty in doing so, for *θεωρία is ἡδονή* on his principles.

b. 9. **ἴσως δὲ . . . τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή**] It is only if unimpeded (*ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος*) that the *ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, which we call *εὐδαιμονία*, can be described as *αἱρετωτάτη*: for, as he says below, *οὐδεμία ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη* b. 16. If then *εὐδαιμονία*, as *τέλειος* and *αἱρετωτάτη*, is *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*, it is *ἡδονή*, for *ἡδονή* has been defined as *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*. 1153 b. 9.

**εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν**] *ἡ τινὸς* b. 10. *αὐτῶν* is rightly explained by the Ald. Schol. as *θεωρία*, for which he refers to x (see *E. N.* x. 8. 8).

The Aristotelian doctrine of *εὐδαιμονία* does not, however, amount to the exclusive acceptance of either of the alternatives here presented *εἴθ' . . . εἴτε . . .* These alternatives mark rather two points of view from which *εὐδαιμονία* may be regarded. If it be regarded as an *ἔνυλον εἶδος*—as a life concretely realised, it presents itself as the harmonious play of all human functions, intellectual, moral and bodily—as the expression, in many ways, of the concrete unity —*mens sana in corpore sano*. But since such a concrete result cannot be produced or maintained without *θεωρία*, or the organising and regulative agency of Reason—is in fact nothing but the material manifestation of *θεωρία* which is its Form, Law, *οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης*, or *τί ἦν εἶναι*: and since the Form or Law *is* the thing, philosophically considered (see *Met.* Z. 6. 1031 a. 17 *ἕκαστόν τε οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας· καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία*), it follows that *εὐδαιμονία*, considered formally or philosophically, is identified with *θεωρία* its Form or Law. It is especially in *E. N.* x that *εὐδαιμονία* is so identified. But we must be careful not to fall into a somewhat natural misunderstanding of the language employed in such passages as *E. N.* x. ch. 7 and ch. 8. §§ 1–8. When the writer says (*E. N.* x. 8. § 8) *ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις*, he means that *εὐδαιμονία formally considered* is *θεωρία*. He does not mean that if we look at the *εὐδαίμων* in the concrete, we shall find that he is essentially a philosopher or man of science, spending his whole life in the exercise of his intellectual faculties, as such, in some department of knowledge: on the contrary, so to cultivate the intellect, as such, that the other powers of the human *ensemble* are allowed to lie fallow, would imply, in the writer's opinion, a narrow and partial conception of life—would, in fact, indicate the absence of the 'comprehensive view,' 'the survey,' 'the regulative agency of reason,' or *θεωρία* in which *εὐδαιμονία* essentially consists.

We may say, then, that in the passage before us the clause *εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία* indicates the more concrete way of

1153 b. 10. looking at the Happy Life, and the clause εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν the more formal philosophical way which sees it in its true nature: see *Met.* Z. 6 quoted above, and *cf. E. N.* ix. 8. 6 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος. It is *quâ rational* that man so organises the exercise of all his powers, intellectual, moral and bodily, as to be Happy: we may therefore say that Happiness *is* an employment of Reason—θεωρία τις.

b. 13. **φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς**] 'Even if most pleasures are bad, and, if you like, bad in themselves.'

b. 17. **διὸ προσδεῖται κ.τ.λ.**] *Cf. E. N.* i. 8. 16, x. 8. 9. Fritzsche quotes Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 6. 19 Aristoteles virtutis usum cum vitae perfectae prosperitate coniunxit: and Alex. περὶ ψυχῆς (β) p. 157 Ald. describes εὐδαιμονία as συμπλήρωσις τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

b. 18. **ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα**] The Ald. Schol. makes ταῦτα the subject—ὅπως καὶ ταῦτα ἤτοι τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά, ἀπόντα μὴ παρεμποδίζωσι τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος: but it is better to take ὁ εὐδαίμων as the subject, and make ταῦτα = κατὰ ταῦτα, 'in respect of body, or estate, or fortune.'

b. 19. **§ 3. τροχιζόμενον**] Zell quotes Cic. *Tusc.* v. 9 In eo libro quem scripsit (Theophrastus) de vita beata in quo multa disputat quamobrem is qui torqueatur qui crucietur beatus esse non possit. In eo etiam putatur dicere in rotam beatam vitam non escendere: non usquam id quidem dicit omnino; sed quae dicit idem valent. The τροχός is described by the Schol. ap. Suidas as ξύλινόν τι ἐν ᾧ δεσμούμενοι οἱ οἰκέται ἐκολάζοντο.

b. 20. **φάσκοντες**] The Cynics. Thus Antisthenes *Fr.* 58 apud Mullach, ii. p. 284 αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος (Diog. L. vii. 11–12).

b. 24. **§ 4. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς**] 'For good fortune can only be defined by its relation to happiness' (Peters). τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τῆς εὐτυχίας ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν (Paraph.).

b. 25. **§ 5. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα κ.τ.λ.**] The argument of Eudoxus quoted in x. 2. 1.

b. 27. **φήμη κ.τ.λ.**] Hesiod, ἔργ. καὶ ἡμ. 763. The second line continues —φημίζουσι· θεός νυ τις ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτή. Here, as Stahr remarks, we have the origin of *vox populi vox Dei.*



**§ 6. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ**] 'since however there is no one nature or state which is, or is thought to be, the best for all, so neither do they all pursue the same pleasure . . .' (Grant): πᾶσιν, necessary in the protasis, is carelessly omitted, perhaps because the writer looked forward to πάντες in the apodosis. 1153 b. 29.

**ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον**] If all pursue 'the same pleasure,' it must be because they have 'the same nature' fundamentally. In man this is νοῦς, resulting in the function of νόησις or θεωρία, often characterised as 'divine.' But the same organising principle, which appears in man as νοῦς, appears in the irrational animals (and in plants) as a nisus impelling them to purify the specific form, or εἶδος, from the incidents of individual decay and death, and make it eternal in the race (see *de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 29). While individual animals seem to live κατὰ πάθος, for themselves, and to satisfy merely their own immediate wants, there is all the while at work within them 'an eternal principle not themselves' (θεῖόν τι), by which their behaviour is regulated in conformity with a plan which includes all Nature: ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 13). The Aristotelian God is the abstract of all the various modes of the organising nisus in Nature. He is described as ἐνέργεια ἀΐδιος—eternal function; and this eternal function is also said to be ἡδονή (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 16). Inasmuch, then, as the lives, or ἐνέργειαι, of all creatures are particular cases of this one ἐνέργεια ἀΐδιος, which is ἡδονή, all creatures may be said τὴν αὐτὴν διώκειν ἡδονήν. b. 32.

**θεῖον**] *Cf. de An.* ii. 4. 415 a. 29, where it is said that living creatures propagate their kinds ἵνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ᾗ δύνανται.

**παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτάς**] *sc.* ἑαυτούς according to Michelet: but the *Index* takes it intransitively = 'to pass over to' 'to incline to': so the Ald. Schol. οἱ πλείονες πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς μᾶλλον ῥέπουσι. b. 34.

**διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους κ.τ.λ.**] *Cf.* the simile *M. M.* ii. 7. 1205 b. 35. b. 13 ἀλλ' οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐ σπουδαίαν, πεπόνθασιν οἷον οἱ μὴ εἰδότες τὸ νέκταρ οἴονται τοὺς θεοὺς οἶνον πίνειν, καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τούτου ἥδιον οὐθέν· τοῦτο πάσχουσιν διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν· οἷς ὅμοιον πεπόνθασιν οἱ πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς γενέσεις φάσκοντες εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ

1153 b. 35. εἰδέναι ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς σωματικὰς ταύτας τε ὁρᾶν γενέσεις τε οὔσας καὶ μὴ σπουδαίας ὅλως οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν.

1154 a. 1. **§ 7. εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια**] The subject is ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, and the predicate is ἀγαθόν: so the Paraph. and Ald. Schol. Susemihl and Ramsauer, on what appears to be weak MS. authority, read εἰ μὴ ἡ ($M^b$ $O^b$ Asp.) ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐνέργεια ($M^b$ seems to be the only authority for the omission of ἡ before ἐνέργεια), making ἀγαθόν and ἐνέργεια both predicates.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### ARGUMENT.

*Those who so discriminate between 'noble pleasures' and 'bodily pleasures,' as to maintain that, while the former are good, the latter—for they are the intemperate man's pleasures—are not, must be asked to explain why the pains contrary to these bodily pleasures are bad. 'Bad' implies 'good' as its contrary. The truth is that the bodily pleasures partake of the nature of the bodily states and motions with which they are associated—states and motions which are good up to a certain point, but bad beyond that point; for where a state or motion cannot pass beyond the point of absolute perfection, the corresponding pleasure does not admit of excess. Bodily pleasures are good, and necessary up to a certain point; bad as pursued to excess by the intemperate man, who, it may be further observed, avoids, not excessive pain, but pain simply—notably the pain which is opposed to excessive pleasure* (i. e. *the pain caused by the absence of excessive pleasure*)*—a pain which only intemperate people feel.*

*Let us now try to make the truth about the bodily pleasures more convincing by showing how an erroneous view about them has naturally recommended itself. The erroneous view is that the bodily pleasures are more desirable than other pleasures. Why does this view recommend itself as true? Because* (1) *the excessive bodily pleasures banish pain: they are eagerly sought after as anodynes and restoratives;* (2) *because they are the only pleasures known to inferior natures—and here we are reminded of what was mentioned above in ch.* 12*—that these are the two points—*(1) *certain pleasures belong to bad natures, and* (2) *certain other pleasures are restorative of impaired natures—which are brought forward by some to support the equally erroneous view that pleasure is* not *good. Both views—that which makes the bodily pleasures the most desirable, and that which maintains that pleasure is not good—ignore the existence of pleasures which do not admit of excess and are associated with no pains. These pleasures are related, not to things 'pleasant* per accidens*'—restoratives which set up recuperative activity in the sound part of an impaired organ or state—but to things 'really, or naturally, pleasant'—things which call forth the function of an unimpaired organ or nature.*

*It is because man is a composite and corruptible being that the 'accidental pleasures'—the 'pleasures of change'—play such a large part in his life; the pure nature of God, in the performance of its one unchanging function, enjoys eternally one pure pleasure.*



§ 1.] Fritzsche and Grant point out that 'Eudemus' here dis- 1154 a. 8.
cusses a subject ('untouched by Aristotle'—Grant) which he had proposed to himself in his first book—viz. *E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 30 τούτων δ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἡδονή, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία τις γίνεται, καὶ διὰ τίνων, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ὥστ' οὐ τίνες εἰσὶ δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτάς, ἀλλ' εἰ συντείνουσί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μὴ καὶ πῶς συντείνουσι· καὶ πότερον εἰ δεῖ προσάγειν τῷ ζῆν καλὰς ἡδονάς, ταύτας (*i. e.* τὰς σωματικάς) δεῖ προσάπτειν, ἢ τούτων μὲν ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν· ἕτεραι δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ δι' ἃς εὐλόγως οἴονται τὸν εὐδαίμονα ζῆν ἡδέως καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀλύπως· ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

§ 2. **διὰ τί οὖν κ.τ.λ.**] Aspasius, the Paraph., and the Ald. Schol. a. 10.
seem to connect this question more closely with ἐπισκεπτέον a. 8 than Bekker, Sus. and Byw., with their full stop after ἀκόλαστος a. 10, do. 'Those who say that bodily pleasures are not good, must be prepared to meet the question—why then are the contrary pains bad? Surely *bad* involves *good* as its contrary.' Aspasius has—τοῖς δὴ ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἐπισκεπτέον, διὰ τί αἱ ἐναντίαι λύπαι μοχθηραί; the Paraph. has—ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ τινὲς ἡδοναὶ ἀγαθαί εἰσι καὶ αἱρεταί, τινὲς δὲ φαῦλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ σωματικαὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος, διὰ τί πᾶσα λύπη μοχθηρά ἐστι καὶ φευκτή· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐναντίαν ταῖς ἀγαθαῖς ἡδοναῖς λύπην πονηρὰν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ταῖς φαύλαις ἐναντίαν ἀγαθήν· κακῷ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἡ λύπη πονηρά, δόξειεν ἂν τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Similarly the Ald. Schol.—πάλιν ἐπαπορεῖ τις . . . ἐὰν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ ὦσι κακαί, λείπεται ἄρα τὸ ἐναντίον ἤτοι τὰς λύπας ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· λύσις ὅτι αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ οὐκ εἰσὶ κακαί, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κυρίως ἀγαθαί, ἀλλ' οὕτως εἰσὶν ἀγαθαὶ ὡς μὴ κακαὶ καὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐν χρείᾳ τούτων ἐσμέν . . . ἑτέρα λύσις ἤτις καὶ κρείττων· ἢ εἰσὶν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ ἀγαθαὶ μέχρι τινός. Grant understands τοῖς λέγουσι a. 9 to be 'that section of the Platonists referred to above ch. 11. § 3 τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι.' Ramsauer follows Grant: I agree with Grant and Ramsauer against Zell and (apparently) Fritzsche, who understand ἡμῖν with τοῖς λέγουσιν. The writer having discussed the καλαὶ ἡδοναί of the εὐδαίμων goes on as he (?)

1154 a. 10. promised (*E. E.* i. 5. 1216 a. 30) to examine the σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί: and he recommends those who say roundly that they are bad to consider their nature a little more carefully. If they are bad, as they say, then how are the contrary pains also bad? The truth is that it is only in excess that the bodily pleasures are bad.

a. 12. **αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι**] *i. e.* αἱ σωματικαί: *cf.* vii. 4. 2. The Ald. Schol. has ἀναγκαῖαι δέ εἰσι τὰ σύμμετρα ποτὰ καὶ σιτία.

Of the two suggestions introduced by ἤ (a. 11 and a. 13), the latter gives the writer's opinion. The bodily pleasures are not merely negatively good—'good in the sense in which the absence of evil is good'; but positively good *up to a certain point*, beyond which, however, they become bad.

a. 13. **τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων**] οἷον τῆς ἕξεως τῆς θεωρητικῆς ὑπερβολὴ οὐκ ἔστιν (Ald. Schol.); and the same may be said of any ἀρετή, *as such*: its notion involves definite form, and excludes excess or the negation of form. *Cf. E. N.* ii. 6. 20 σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον . . . ὅλως γὰρ οὔθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

a. 18. **ἐναντίως δ' . . . διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν**] 'But with pain the case is reversed: not merely the excess of pain, but pain generally is to be avoided; for the opposite of excessive pleasure is not painful except to the man who pursues the excess' (Peters). Similarly Stahr—'Entgegengesetzt ist es mit dem Schmerz, denn hier flieht der Mensch nicht das Uebermass, sondern den Schmerz überhaupt; der Schmerz ist nämlich nicht das dem Uebermasse Entgegengesetzte, ausser für den, der dem Uebermasse nachtrachtet.'

Grant, after translating to the same effect, adds—'This argument goes to prove that bodily pleasure is, in itself, good; only when in excess is it evil. On the other hand, all pain is evil. Pleasure and pain, then, are opposite terms, the one being good, and the other evil. To make the doctrine of Speusippus (ch. 13. § 1) hold good, it would be necessary to make pain and the excess of pleasure opposite terms. But they are not so, except perhaps in the mind of the intemperate man, who thinks that the only alternative is between excessive pleasure and a painful sensation.' Fritzsche has—'Contra se res habet in dolore: nam hujus non fugimus quod nimium est: sed hunc fugimus in universum.



Itaque contraria sunt dolor, qua dolor est, et voluptas, qua voluptas 1154 a. 18.
est, non qua nimia est.'

According to these interpretations (which agree substantially with those of the Ald. Schol., Zell, and Michelet), τις understood is the subject of φεύγει a. 19. I think that ὁ φαῦλος a. 16 (=ὁ ἀκόλαστος) is the subject: see note on vii. 4. 3. 1148 a. 7. This is the view of the Paraphrast, whose comment seems to me very good—Ὅσαι τοίνυν ὑπερβάλλουσι τὸ δέον φαῦλαί εἰσι, καὶ κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἀκόλαστός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής· κατὰ τὰς δὲ ἐναντίας λύπας ἀκόλαστος οὐ περὶ τὰς ὑπερβολικάς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν ὑπερβαλλούσας ἡδονὰς διώκει, τὰς δὲ μικρὰς λύπας φεύγει· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῖς ὑπερβαλλούσαις ἡδοναῖς αἱ ἐν τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἀντικείμεναι λῦπαι οὐχ ὑπερβολικαί εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ μέτριαι, καὶ ἃς οὐδεὶς ἂν φύγοι τῶν σπουδαίων, ὅτι οὐδὲ λῦπαι εἰσίν· ἀλλὰ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλγεινὸν δοκεῖ τὸ μετρίως καὶ κατὰ λόγον αὐταῖς χρήσασθαι. The φαῦλος is assumed to err both in his pursuit of pleasure and in his avoidance of pain. The unnatural contrary which he sets up to excessive pleasure—the pain which those who pursue moderate pleasures do not feel at all—helps us to appreciate the moral difference—ignored by οἱ λέγοντες μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὰς τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονάς—between the excessive and the moderate pursuit of bodily pleasures.

§ 3. **Ἐπεὶ . . . αἱρετώτεραι**] The apodosis of this sentence begins a. 22.
with ὥστε a. 25.

**τοῦ ψεύδους**] The view that the bodily pleasures are better than a. 23.
those of the ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετήν. That the latter are better than the bodily pleasures is ταληθές which the writer seeks to corroborate by pointing out how τὸ ψεῦδος came to be believed—διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. 'This section,' as Grant says, 'no longer deals with the opinion of the Platonists [Ramsauer erroneously supposes that it does] that bodily pleasure is an evil, but takes up another question already partly anticipated ch. 13. § 6: namely, How is the vulgar error to be accounted for, which gives so much prominence to physical pleasure in the scale of pleasures?'—*i.e.* this § returns to the εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναί κ.τ.λ. of 13. § 6.

§ 4. **διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι**] *sc.* αἱρετάς, suggested by a. 30.
διώκονται. 'They seem good by contrast.'

**καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον . . . οὖν σπουδαῖαι**] These words, suspected by a. 31.

1154 a. 31. Zell, are bracketed by Ramsauer, as interrupting the flow of the argument; Ramsauer says—'et quae ante ista praecedunt, et quae insequuntur, eo spectant ut intellegatur *διὰ τί* **διώκονται** *αἱ σωματικαί*: haec vero ipsa fere in contrariam sententiam disputata sunt *ὅτι τῶν σωματικῶν ἕνεκα ἡ ἡδονὴ ὅλως* **φαύλη** *εἶναι δοκεῖ*. Nec dubito equidem quin e medio tollenda sint.' Grant observes—'This paragraph reverts parenthetically to the opinion of the Platonists.' I am inclined to take the paragraph as the writer's parenthesis suggested by the mention of *ἰατρεῖαι* immediately preceding. *ὥσπερ εἴρηται* a. 32 refers to ch. 12. § 1, and the *δύο ταῦτα* a. 31 are (1) *ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης κ.τ.λ.* a. 32, and (2) *αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς* a. 34. Ramsauer, I think, does injustice to the writer of the paragraph, when he accuses him of saying, first, that there are *two* reasons, and then enumerating *three*, viz. (3) *αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευμένων* b. 1. The words *αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευμένων* merely expand what is said of the *ἰατρεῖαι* in the sentence immediately preceding, and do not introduce a third class of pleasures: see Coraes *ad loc.* *αἱ δὲ ἰατρείαις ὅμοιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδ' αὗται σπουδαῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διότι τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς εἰσὶν ἀναπληρώσεις . . . αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται πληρώσεις συμβαίνουσι τοῖς τελειουμένοις, τουτέστι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδείας εἰς τὴν πλήρωσιν προϊοῦσι καὶ οὐ τοῖς τετελειωμένοις*[1].

Admitting, then, that the paragraph is parenthetical and very loosely attached to the context, I think the connexion of the writer's thought may be satisfactorily traced as follows—'Bodily pleasures, though inferior, are sought after more than other pleasures. Why? Because they are good remedies of pain by reason of their excessive character. And, in passing, it is interesting to observe, that the very qualities which recommend them to the vulgar—their excessive character (in the *φαύλη φύσις*), and their suitableness as remedies, are seized upon by certain theorists, mentioned before, to establish the sweeping generalisation that Pleasure is not good.'

a. 34. **αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι** [**ὅτι**] **ἐνδεοῦς**] Bywater's omission of *ὅτι* removes a great difficulty: but how *ὅτι* got into the MSS. (and I do not think that we can be sure that it was not in the MS. used by Aspasius) still remains a difficulty.

**ἔχειν**] to be in a natural state (*ἕξις*).

[1] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 58), taking this view of the position of *αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι*, suggests *δή* for *δέ*.



**τελευμένων**] *Cf.* vii. 12. 3 *καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς* 1154 b. 1. *τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως.*

**§ 5. ἔτι**] The argument, broken by the parenthesis *καὶ οὐ σπου-* b. 2. *δαῖον* a. 31 . . . b. 2 *σπουδαῖαι*, is now resumed.

**δίψας**] Zell, Coraes, Michelet, and Grant take this meta- b. 3. phorically, of artificially produced desires generally, *ἐπισκευασταὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* as they are called by the Paraph. Fritzsche follows the Ald. Schol. in taking the word literally—*βουλόμενοι πίνειν δι' ὅλης τῆς ἡμέρας ἐσθίουσιν ἁλμυρά τινα ἵνα διψιώτεροι οὕτω γίνωνται.* So also Aspasius. I am inclined to think that it ought to be taken literally, as a special example (introduced by *γοῦν*) of the length *οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι ἄλλαις χαίρειν* will go in the pursuit of excessive pleasures. Perhaps, however, *τινάς* is against the literal interpretation.

**ἀβλαβεῖς**] Not *δίψας παρασκευάζωσι*, but *ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζωσι.* b. 4.

**οὔτε γάρ κ.τ.λ.**] This clause explains *φαῦλον*: so, Aspasius. b. 5.

**τό τε μηδέτερον . . . φασίν**] The mere absence of pleasure is b. 6. painful to many men by reason of their temperament (*διὰ τὴν φύσιν*: the reference is chiefly to the *μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν* about to be mentioned): for 'physiology' teaches us that Life is a continual struggle, to the pain of which we become accustomed: some of us, however, so imperfectly that when the pleasure, which generally aids 'custom' in deadening pain, is absent, we feel this absence of pleasure (which to perfectly regulated or 'accustomed' minds ought to be a neutral state) positively painful, *i. e.* we become aware again of the fundamental pain of Life, which has been kept beneath the level of consciousness by the aid which pleasure gives to imperfect 'custom.' Aspasius ascribes the aphorism *ἀεὶ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον* to Anaxagoras.

**§ 6. ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι . . . ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται**] Grant b. 9. appositely quotes Goethe's

> Trunken müssen wir alle sein;
> Jugend ist Trunkenheit ohne Wein.

He refers to *Probl.* xxx. ch. 1 (A. 953) as the best commentary on the present passage. There 'a frequent comparison is made between the effects of wine, youth, and the melancholy (or bilious) temperament, in producing desire. . . . The principle of *αὔξησις* in

youth is represented as producing the same results as the humours (*χυμὸς ὁ μελαγχολικός—ἡ τῆς μελαίνης χολῆς κρᾶσις*) in the bilious temperament.'

The account which the Ald. Schol. gives of the operation of the *μέλαινα χολή* in arousing desire is as follows: *οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν . . . ἔχουσι τὴν χολὴν θερμοτάτην οὖσαν, συντόμως καταναλίσκουσαν τὰ ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ βρώματα, καὶ ἵνα μὴ τῆς γαστρὸς κενωθείσης διακαύσῃ πάντα ἐντόσθια ἡ χολὴ ἡ μέλαινα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ἕτερόν τι καταναλίσκειν, διὰ τοῦτο δεῖται ἀεὶ ὁ μελαγχολικὸς ἰατρεύειν ἤτοι ἀναπληροῦν βρωμάτων τὴν γαστέρα αὐτοῦ.* On the *μελαγχολικοί* see note on vii. 7. 8, b. 25.

b. 14. **ἥ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα**] Aspasius (156. 16 Heylbut) has the following comment—*καὶ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν αἰτιᾶται Θεόφραστος ἐν Ἠθικοῖς λέγων ὅτι ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ γε ἐναντία, οἷον ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ διψῆν, καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τουτέστιν ἥτις οὖν ἂν εἴη ἰσχυρά, ὥστε ἐνίοτε πεῖναν ἐξελαύνει καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅταν ᾄσμασιν ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀκούσμασι διαφερόντως χαίρωμεν.*

b. 15. **ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται**] It is natural to suppose that *οἱ μελαγχολικοί* are specially intended: but it is possible, with Aspasius (*καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι*), to understand the remark generally.

b. 16. **§ 7. τῶν φύσει ἡδέων**] See note on i. 8. 11.

b. 19. **ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι**] *sc. τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι*: 'the restoration itself seems pleasant' (Peters).

b. 20. **φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως**] Those things which effect *ἀναπλήρωσις*, or *τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι*, are pleasant indirectly—*i.e.* relatively to the nature which is being restored: this nature must have a sound part left in it (*τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς*: *cf.* *ὑπολοίπου* vii. 12. 2), otherwise it could not be restored at all. But those things which stimulate the functions of a completely sound nature (*τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως*) are in themselves pleasant—as the Paraph. puts it *φύσει δὲ ἡδέα οὐ τὰ ἀναπληροῦντα τὴν ἔνδειαν τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ τὰ ποιοῦντα πρᾶξιν αὐτῆς· οἷά ἐστι τὰ θεωρητά· τελειοῦσι γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν.* Ramsauer gives the correct meaning of *τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως*—'quae talis est qualis est, nec corrupta nec egens.' Peters has an instructive note here, which I take the liberty of quoting—'I am sick and take medicine, hungry and take food (which seems



to be here included under medicine); but neither the drug nor the food can of themselves cure me and restore the balance of my system—they must be assimilated (for the body is not like a jar that can be filled merely by pouring water from another jar), *i.e.* part of my system must remain in its normal state and operate in its normal manner. But this operation, this *ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως*, is pleasure (by the definition given above 12. 3), and in ignorance of the process we transfer the pleasure to the medicine and call it pleasant. The weakness of this account is that it overlooks the fact that, though the medicine cannot itself cure without the operation of *τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως*, yet on the other hand this *ἕξις*, this faculty, cannot operate in this manner without this stimulus; so that there seems to be no reason why the medicine, as setting up an *ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως*, should not itself be called *φύσει ἡδύ*. But the whole passage rests on the assumption that there can be activity without stimulus, *i.e.* without want—an assumption which has become inconceivable to us.' 1154 b. 20.

It is perhaps true that, on the whole, Aristotelianism takes too little account of stimulus, where the higher functions are concerned: but I think that the present passage, with its *φύσει ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως*, cannot be said to ignore it. *Τὰ φύσει ἡδέα* constitute the environment with which the healthy organism corresponds; *τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα*, or *τὰ ἰατρεύοντα*, are the circumstances in which an impaired, but not ruined organism, recovers its health.

**§ 8. μὴ ἁπλῆν**] *τὸ σύνθετον* of *E. N.* x. 7. 8. In man's composite nature the principle of Form asserts itself with difficulty against Matter. *Νόησις*, the purest expression of this principle, cannot be long kept up, for it is soon checked, and the pleasure attending it destroyed, by the resistance of the material part of his nature. Before *νόησις* can be resumed, and its attendant pleasure experienced again, the material resistance must have had time to subside—matter must have its own way, for a while, and be allowed its own pleasure. Thus the life of the individual man is broken up into short periods of *νόησις*, properly so called, alternating with times during which the material vehicle asserts itself on its own account: and this experience of the individual is paralleled, on a great scale, in the life of the race, the specific form of which is not realised in one immortal individual, but asserts itself, more or b. 21.

1154 b. 21. less perfectly, for a short time in the adults of one generation, is eclipsed by their decay and death, regains force in their young descendants, and again asserts itself, more or less perfectly, in these when they reach adult age. But God is not thus discrete, like the higher moments of man, or the individuals of a species. He is continuous—*ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ* (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 29). His nature is *ἁπλῆ*: it is *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*—Form not confronted by Matter—Form *in itself*, always actually achieved, not again and again to be imposed, by fatiguing efforts, upon *τὸ δεκτικόν*. His *ἡδονή* therefore is *ἁπλῆ*. Thus, the contrast between the immutability of God, as pure Form, and the mutability of the individual man, as compounded of Form and Matter, is the burden of the closing sentences of this treatise on Pleasure. But we must remember that Aristotelianism does not really acquiesce in this contrast. Man has—if I may venture to use the expression—his eternal and immutable moments—the moments of *νόησις* which he enjoys, when his Form—God's Form—asserts itself victoriously in his Matter. These moments have immeasurable worth and dignity—*διαγωγὴ δέ ἐστιν οἵα τε ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν* (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 14): or, as Alexander (*Met.* p. 671 ed. Bonitz) says (in a passage which shows how easily Aristotle's theology lends itself to neo-Platonic doctrine)—*ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς δυνάμει ὢν τὰ νοητά, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς ἄγαν εὐζωΐας ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται τὰ νοητά, τότε ζῶμεν τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ μακαριωτάτην καὶ πάσης ἡδονῆς ἐπέκεινα ζωήν, ἥτις λόγῳ μέν ἐστιν ἀνερμήνευτος, γινώσκεται δὲ τοῖς τὸ μακάριον τουτὶ παθοῦσι πάθος.*

b. 23. *ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ . . . τὸ πραττόμενον*] *ἰσάζῃ* intransitive—'And when the two elements are balanced, the result appears neither painful nor pleasant' (Grant). The Paraph. (followed by Coraes, Michelet, and Fritzsche) is wrong in thinking that the 'balance' mentioned, is the *ὁμόνοια* of the virtuous character, in which reason rules, and sense cheerfully obeys. The actions of the virtuous character are pleasant, not neutral. The writer is thinking rather of the effect which custom has in dulling the pleasure and pain of acts: see above § 5, b. 6.

b. 27. *ἀκινησίας*] God, or *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*, is described as *ἀκίνητον* in *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 a. 25 *ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα . . . ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὂν ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν.* The First Cause of the motion of material things in space is not itself



motion, and is not itself a material thing in space: *Met.* Λ. 7. 1154 b. 27. 1073 a. 3 *ἔστιν οὐσία ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν . . . μέγεθος οὐθὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλ' ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν. Cf. Met.* Γ. 8. 1012 b. 28 *ἀνάγκη τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλειν (i. e. ἀνάγκη ὄν τι εἶναι εἴ τι μεταβάλλει* Bonitz, p. 217)· *ἔκ τινος γὰρ εἴς τι ἡ μεταβολή. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντα ἠρεμεῖ ἢ κινεῖταί ποτε, ἀεὶ δ' οὐδέν· ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτό.*

When we are told that the eternal energy of this immaterial Principle is Pleasure—*ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου* (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 16)—we must ask no questions. The language is not that of science, but of poetry. As poetry we must accept also the words before us here (vii. 14. 8), notwithstanding that they begin with a 'wherefore'—*διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν* b. 26.

*καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει*] because the purest *ἡδονή* is that of *θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια*, or *νόησις*, and the *νοητόν* (with which *νοήσις* is identical) is a fixed intelligible system, as distinguished from the fluctuating crowd of sensible particulars. Thus in *An. Post.* ii. 19. 100 a. 6 *τὸ καθόλου* (the object of *νόησις*) is said *ἠρεμῆσαι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*: and in *de An.* i. 3. 407 a. 32 we read—*ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ καὶ ἑπιστάσει μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει*: *cf.* also *E. N.* x. 4. §§ 1–4, where it is shown that *ἡδονή* is *ὅλον τι*, and therefore not a *κίνησις*. Equally irreconcilable with its being a *κίνησις*, or being *ἐν κινήσει*, is the doctrine of this Book that it is *ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια*, or perfect function; for *κίνησις* is always in itself imperfect: *cf. Phys.* iii. 2. 201 b. 31 *ἥ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μέν τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἀτελὴς δέ.*

*μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ*] Eur. *Orest.* 234, who has *μεταβολὴ* b. 28. *πάντων γλυκύ*. Bywater restores *γλυκύ* to the text here. The MSS. have *γλυκύτατον*.

*ἡ δεομένη*] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 101) argues that *ἡ* must be b. 30. either expunged or changed into *ἡμῶν*: *δεομένη* is the predicate—'As the bad man is changeable, so our nature, being neither simple nor good, needs change.' If we retain *ἡ*, then *πονηρά* must be understood as predicate to the subject *ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς*, and the clause *οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής* (= *διὰ πονηρίαν τινά*) is superfluous.

§ 9.] Probably the work of an editor. b. 32.

# BOOK VIII.

*Introductory Note.*] The space given to φιλία in the *Ethics* is very large, and doubtless indicates by its extent the importance of the subject to Aristotle's moral system[1]. It must be remembered, however, that Aristotle's φιλία is a wider term than *Friendship*, and that, although the latter is discussed at considerable length, these two Books treat also of other subjects under the general head of φιλία.

The width of the field covered by the treatise may be estimated from the range of the two questions propounded respecting φιλία. These are (1) What is its Natural History? and (2) What may be done with it in the interests of the Higher Life? As discussing the first of these questions the treatise amounts to 'an enquiry concerning the Principles of Sociology'; as discussing the second question it is 'an Essay in the Metaphysic of Ethics.'

Examining the Natural History of φιλία, Aristotle finds that there are various forms of it, all more or less obvious phases of that gregarious instinct, to which, rather than to a perception of the advantages of co-operation and division of labour, society owes its origin and its maintenance—see *Pol.* iii. 4. 1278 b. 20 *φύσει μέν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν. διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαττον ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς.*

The earliest form of the gregarious instinct in man, as in the lower animals, is that natural affection, or στοργή, which unites parents and offspring, and generally those closely related by blood.

[1] I do not wish to commit myself to Grant's view (*Ethics*, vol. ii. p. 249) that 'nothing is more clear than that [the present treatise on Friendship] was written to form a part of Aristotle's work on Ethics'; but I readily admit that it might have been, so far as subject and treatment are concerned. At any rate, if originally an independent treatise among Aristotle's *moralia*, it soon had a definite position assigned to it immediately after the Books on the *ἀρεταί*, *ἀκρασία*, and *ἡδονή*. It must be assumed, I take it, that the writer of the *E. E.* found it in this position.



Ἡ συγγενικὴ φιλία (viii. 12. 2) is the primitive φιλία. As the Family grows into the Village, and Villages are organised into the City, persons more and more distantly akin are thrown together, and find pleasure and advantage in association. The aggregates so produced not only crystallise, as wholes, into political forms (*βασιλεία, ἀριστοκρατία, τιμοκρατική*) which retain traces of the original family relationships, but the individuals composing the aggregates contract, as individuals, mutual relations in which either social pleasure or private advantage is the more prominent feature. Where social pleasure is the more prominent feature the mutual relation is called ἑταιρικὴ φιλία (viii. 5. 3); where private advantage, ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. Aristotle's method is thus to generalise the notion of φιλία. Not only is there ἑταιρικὴ φιλία, but there are also συγγενικὴ φιλία, πολιτικὴ φιλία (ix. 6. 2), and ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον (viii. 3. 1–4). Two men become friends, or enter into a business contract, not only or principally because they now agree, as individuals, to be friends, or to make this particular bargain, but essentially because they are members of a social order or community which was constituted and is held together by fellow-feeling—by ὁμόνοια or πολιτικὴ φιλία. Πολιτικὴ φιλία in its turn may be traced back to συγγενικὴ φιλία—the natural affection binding together parents and offspring, and kinsmen generally; while συγγενικὴ φιλία itself touches the First Principle of Nature, being the consciousness of that endeavour after τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον, which Aristotle recognises as φυσικώτατον in all creatures. Contract and the division of labour, effecting public and private advantage (τὸ χρήσιμον, τὸ συμφέρον), can operate only among persons who already occupy the status of members of an established community, and feel confidence in one another. The expression ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον marks Aristotle's recognition of the truth that the individual cannot secure his own private advantage except in so far as he is the φίλος of those with whom he deals. He cannot secure his own advantage in a state of 'war of every man against every other.' Men are naturally 'friendly' to one another, and therefore secure advantages to themselves by fair dealing, not by plunder and murder. The thought of the private advantage which he buys reacts upon a man's 'friendly' feelings, and gives these the colour described by Aristotle in his account of ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον: yet, save in a society ultimately held together by 'friendly' feelings, private advantage could not be bought at all.

The rules of Justice express the various ways in which my advantage may be reconciled with yours in such a society. Justice, as a habit of the mind, is a preparedness to act according to rules which are established to secure the good of the community, and, through it, the good of its individual members. But the existence of such rules, and of the preparedness to observe them, imply that, on the whole, the good of the community is desired, although individual members may be often tempted to disregard it. In other words, there would be no δικαιοσύνη without φιλία. Φιλία, which is ἡ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις (*Pol.* iii. 5. 1280 b. 39), is the individual's *interest* in τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, and τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον is the standard of Justice—see *Pol.* iii. 4. 1279 a. 17 ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον.

From one point of view, then, Aristotle's treatise περὶ φιλίας is 'an Enquiry concerning the Principles of Sociology,' containing, as it does, his whole theory of the natural evolution of the State with its political forms and institutions, its rules of universal and particular justice, its economic laws, and its various associations for pleasure, business, and culture.

From another point of view, however, this treatise is 'an Essay in the Metaphysic of Ethics.' The end or final cause of the social evolution which has been traced is the friendship between *good* men. This beautiful relationship is the highest product of social life. In it the chief end of man—*θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια*—is most fully realised. Each friend sees in the other a 'second self,' in whom he can 'contemplate' the law of excellence more clearly and continuously than he can do if he regards it only in himself.

One recognises in this view of friendship the influence of Plato's doctrine of διαλεκτική. In the conversation (διαλέγεσθαι) of sympathetic friends, Plato held, the truth is touched, as it can be in no other way. Νόησις is called forth, and the Idea of the Good is seen. Similarly, Aristotle's Perfect Friendship is a Dialectic (like Plato's Dialectic, the last product of culture) by which a few virtuous and fortunate men in each generation are enabled to see the Chief End (what Eudemus calls ὁ σκοπὸς ὁ τῆς καλοκαγαθίας) more clearly, and keep it in view more continuously than their contemporaries. It is for the sake of these 'dialecticians' that the City exists.



# CHAPTER I.

## ARGUMENT.

*We must next discuss Friendship, for it is a virtue, or involves virtue: moreover, it is necessary as a means to social life: without it the rich could not preserve and use their wealth, or the powerful their influence: it is the refuge of poverty and misfortune; it guides the inexperience of youth, and succours the weakness of old age; 'Two together' are better than one in thought and action. But when we say that 'it is necessary as a means' to social life, we do not imply that it is a means arbitrarily or artificially selected:—it is natural to man: it appears in the natural affection which exists between parent and offspring (the lower animals also exhibit this kind of 'friendship'); men of the same race are naturally friendly—nay, men as men are naturally friendly to one another, as we see when strangers meet on a journey. Friendship, in short, is the bond of society. The lawgiver thinks it more important than Justice. If the citizens be merely just that is not enough; they must be well-disposed to one another, and of one mind. If they are this, they will be just to one another in the highest sense.*

*So much for the 'necessity' of Friendship. But it is not only necessary as a means to social life. It is also an end beautiful in itself.*

*Many views have been put forth about it. Some people say that it is 'similarity,' and quote 'Birds of a feather.' But others oppose this view with 'Rival Potters.' Then, there are those who go deeper, explaining Friendship in connexion with some theory of 'the nature of things.' Thus Euripides speaks of 'Parched earth in love with rainy sky,' and Heraclitus tells us that 'Strife is parent of all': others again, as Empedocles, maintain that 'Like seeks like.' We shall not follow those who thus carry the enquiry back to the ultimate 'nature of things.' It is the 'nature of man' that we are concerned with—man's feelings and dispositions: and the questions which we shall ask are these—'Can all men be friends, or can bad men not be friends?' and 'Is there only one species of Friendship, or are there several species?' Those who maintain that there is only one species, because there are degrees of friendship, are mistaken in their inference: in passing along a series of qualitative distinctions, i. e. of species, we may at the same time be aware of parallel quantitative differences.*

§§ 1–5.] These sections suggest the chief points in Aristotle's account of φιλία. Friendship is necessary to rich and poor, young and old. Without it life would be impossible; and, even if possible, not worth living (§§ 1, 2). It subsists naturally between parents and children, among the lower animals, as among men (§ 3). It is the bond which holds society together, and, as such, is the basis of 1155 a. 3.

1155 a. 3. Justice (§ 4). But not only is it thus necessary to the existence of human society (representing, as it does, the force which, originating in the family, caused the evolution of society), but it is also καλόν (§ 5). The higher life requires what may be called the Dialectic of Friendship.

**§ 1. ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς**] φιλία in the wide acceptation of the term is not itself an ἀρετή: it is that sense of being a member of the body politic without which the individual could not have the various ἀρεταί included under the general designation of ἡ ὅλη δικαιοσύνη. But ἡ τελεία φιλία (viii. 3. 6), in which the *communis sensus* is displayed in the most eminent way, may be described as ἀρετή τις—and also as μετ' ἀρετῆς, because it manifests itself in association with τελεία ἀρετή. Of course the disposition described in iv. 6 is not alluded to here.

a. 14. **§ 2. βοηθείας**] So Sus. and Byw. instead of βοηθεῖ preferred by Bekker. The weight of MS. authority is in favour of βοηθείας, which is given by $K^b$, $L^b$, $O^b$, Cambr., NC, CCC, $B^1$, $B^3$; but the construction suffers. Perhaps we ought to read βοηθεῖν and make it depend on οἴονται, the subject of βοηθεῖν being τοὺς φίλους.

a. 15. **σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω**] *Il.* x. 224.

a. 17. **§ 3. πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καί**] om. $K^b$, which, however, reads πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι. Ald. and CCC margin (hand, I think, which wrote the text) agree with $K^b$ in giving τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι (they omit πρός before τὸ γεννῆσαν), but read the words omitted by $K^b$—(CCC omits the first πρός in line 17). All other authorities, it would seem, omit the words ⟨καὶ⟩ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι. Susemihl brackets them.

a. 26. **§ 4. καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὰ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ**] When men are friends, no pressure is required to make them act justly towards each other; they rather vie with each other in beneficence. Indeed, mere pressure could never succeed, in the long run, in making men act justly. Friendly feeling made men invent the rules of justice at first, and must always be present if they are to be applied rightly; for to be applied rightly, just rules must be *equitably* applied, and equity, which is the perfection of justice (τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα), involves friendship (φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ) and fellow-feeling (*cf.* vi. 11. 1 ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην).



It is better, with Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche, Grant, and Peters, thus 1155 a. 26. to understand τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα of τὸ ἐπιεικές (*cf. E. N.* v. 10. 2 ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές, and vi. 11. 2, quoted by Peters, τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον), than, with Aspasius, Lambinus, and Gifanius, of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. Aspasius writes—πολλὰ γὰρ εἴδη τοῦ δικαίου, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, οἷον τὸ πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸ πατρικόν, καὶ τὸ δεσποτικόν· τούτων δὲ τὸ μάλιστα δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸ πολιτικόν, ὅπερ ὅμοιόν τί ἐστι τῷ φιλικῷ· κατ' ἰσότητα γάρ ἐστι τῶν κοινωνῶν. Aristotle has, indeed, just used the words ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, but we are not therefore obliged to identify τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα with τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. Indeed, to do so would be to make Aristotle merely repeat himself; whereas, if we understand him to refer to τὸ ἐπιεικές, something is added to what has been said. He begins § 4 by pointing out generally that Justice in the State—that system of νόμοι which we call τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον—was produced and is upheld by φιλία or ὁμόνοια: he ends it by intimating that the highest manifestation of this justice—the application of the general rule in its spirit and not in its letter to the particular case—τὸ ἐπιεικές, involves a special degree of φιλία, or fellow-feeling, elsewhere called συγγνώμη—*E. N.* vi. 11. 1 τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην. It is only the continued working in us of the constitutive principle of fellow-feeling which can preserve the habit of justice against our inclination to take too formal a view of the rights of others, and to make too much of our own rights; and he realises best the spirit of justice (τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα) who, from regard for others (φιλία or συγγνώμη), often declines to press his own strict rights—*E. N.* v. 10. 8 ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι.

**§ 5. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν**] 'This is repeat- a. 28. ing in other words that friendship is ἀρετή τις' (Grant). Fritzsche *ad loc.* quotes *E. N.* iii. 7. 2 τὸ καλὸν τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. The clause τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους (Γ, $L^b$, Ald., and CCC read φιλοφίλους, other authorities φίλους) ἐπαινοῦμεν adds a reason for regarding φιλία as an ἀρετή: *cf. E. N.* i. 13. 19 τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν. On the opposition between ἀναγκαῖον (that which is materially necessary) and καλόν (the beautiful result) see notes on viii. 12. 7 and ix. 11. 1.

1155 a. 31. **καὶ ἔτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους**] Bekker reads *καὶ ἔνιοι* for *καὶ ἔτι* with $M^b$, Γ, Cambr., and NC. Peters *ad loc.* compares *Rep.* 334 *φίλος μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ἐχθρὸς δὲ ὁ πονηρός; ναί.*

a. 32. **§ 6. διαμφισβητεῖται κ.τ.λ.**] Taken from Plato, *Lysis* 214 sqq.: see the notes of Zell and Grant. Both quotations—*ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον* (*Odys.* xvii. 218), and *καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ | καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ* (Hes. *ἔργ. καὶ ἡμ.* 25), occur in the passage in the *Lysis*. In *M. M.* ii. 11. 1208 b. 9 the proverb *κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιὸν ἱζάνει* is given. Ramsauer is of opinion that Aristotle, who uses *ποτί* not *παρά*, has in view another and an older proverb than that given by the writer of the *M. M.* It is to be noted, however, that $L^b$ reads *παρ*, and $O^b$ *παρά*. In *E. E.* vii. 1. 1235 a. 8 (the parallel passage) *παρά* is the reading.

b. 2. **ἀνώτερον καὶ φυσικώτερον**] '*φυσικῶς ζητεῖν* etiam per se utrumque valet: tum ita disputare ut ad rei veritatem penetretur opp. imprim. *λογικῶς*, tum ita ut naturalia in quaestionem vocentur opp. e. g. *ἠθικῶς*' (Ramsauer *ad loc.*). 'Others go deeper into these questions and into the causes of the phenomena' (Peters).

*Φυσικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν*, as opposed to *λογικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν*, is to investigate a subject in a concrete way with special reference to proximate causes; while *λογικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν* is to investigate it in the light of general formal principles: see *de Gen. et Corrupt.* ii. 9. 335 b. 25 sqq., where *φυσικώτερον λέγειν* means to state the efficient cause—*εἰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην τις φήσειε γεννᾶν διὰ τὴν κίνησιν φυσικώτερον μὲν ἂν λέγοι τῶν οὕτω λεγόντων* (*i.e.* than those who make the *εἴδη* causes of *γένεσις* and *φθορά*)· *τὸ γὰρ ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ τὸ μετασχηματίζον αἰτιώτερόν τε τοῦ γεννᾶν, καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν εἰώθαμεν τοῦτο λέγειν τὸ ποιοῦν, ὁμοίως ἔν τε τοῖς φύσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, ὃ ἂν ᾖ κινητικόν.* *Cf. de Coelo* 283 b. 17 *φυσικῶς δὲ καὶ μὴ καθόλου σκοποῦσι* (see also note on *E. N.* i. 3. 4, b. 23). But in the passage before us the special opposition is rather that between *τὸ φυσικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν* and *τὸ ἠθικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν*, as may be seen from the words with which § 7 opens. The result is that here *τὸ φυσικῶς ἐπιζητεῖν*, 'bringing in,' as Grant says, 'the analogies of the whole of nature,' is, as contrasted with the narrower ethical enquiry, indistinguishable from *τὸ λογικῶς καὶ καθόλου ἐπισκοπεῖν*. Hence the Paraphrast *ad loc.*—*τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀνάγειν τὸν λόγον εἰς καθολικούς τινας καὶ φυσικοὺς λόγους, καὶ ζητεῖν ἁπλῶς πῶς τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἐφίεται, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια τῶν ὁμοίων, οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖον τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως· ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὲ ὅσα μόνης ἔχεται τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως.*



1155 b. 2. The special meaning which *φυσικώτερον* has in the present passage is illustrated by the neighbouring *ἀνώτερον*: see *Ind. Arist.* s.v. *ἄνω*—'in serie notionum *ἄνω* dicuntur quae magis sunt universales.'

There is no reference by name to Heraclitus or Empedocles in the passage *Lys.* 214, 215. But *cf. Sympos.* 187 A *τὸ ἓν γάρ φησι* [*Ἡράκλειτος*] *διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ξυμφέρεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἁρμονίαν τόξου τε καὶ λύρας.* See Bywater, *Heracliti Eph. Reliq.* Fr. 45 and 46. Perhaps the idea in *τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον* is that of things rubbed against each other till they become smooth and fit well together, as, for example, the structures of organic beings modified in relation to one another in the course of the struggle for existence—*ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν* (juncturam) *καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι*—see *Origin of Species*, ch. 3 'The structure of every organic being is related in the most essential, yet often hidden manner to that of all the other organic beings with which it comes into competition for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys. This is obvious in the structure of the teeth and talons of the tiger, and in that of the legs and claws of the parasite which clings to the hair of the tiger's body.' Herodotus, however, uses *τὸ ἀντίξουν*, without any suggestion of its derivation from *ξέω*, to mean simply 'opposition.' Heraclitus probably uses it in the same way.

According to Empedocles *φιλότης* is the principle of unification and order, *νεῖκος* of disintegration (see Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* § 170)—

> *καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,*
> *ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,*
> *ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.*

His 'like loves like' principle is illustrated by an anecdote in *E. E.* vii. 1. 1235 a. 11, repeated as follows in *M. M.* ii. 11. 1208 b. 11 *φασὶν δὲ καὶ κυνός ποτε ἀεὶ καθευδούσης ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμίδος, ἐρωτηθέντα τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, διά τί ποτε ἡ κύων ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς κεραμίδος καθεύδει, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔχει τι τῇ κεραμίδι ὅμοιον ἡ κύων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ὅμοιον τὴν κύνα φοιτῶσαν.*

The words quoted from Euripides belong to a fragment preserved by Athenaeus (xiii. 599), and Stobaeus (*Ecl.* i. 9. 1. 208). It appears in Dindorf's *Poetae Scenici* as Fr. 890—*ἀδήλου δράματος.*

1155 b. 11. **§ 7. πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι**] This question, as Grant points out, is started in the *Lysis* 214 D *τοῦτο τοίνυν αἰνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτ' ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται.* Aristotle's answer is conveyed in viii. 4. 2 *δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους ἀλλήλοις εἶναι καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιωοῦν, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοῖ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μή τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο.*

b. 13. **οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν οἰόμενοι . . . σημείῳ**] Michelet says—'contendunt unam tantum speciem amicitiae esse, quia quae quantitate tantum differunt (*ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον*), qualitate vel genere diversa esse non possint; quantitate autem diversas esse amicitias, quia, ut dicit Aspasius, *μᾶλλον μέν ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἡ τῶν πονηρῶν.* Hoc argumentum refutat Aristoteles optimo jure, dicens hanc quantitatis differentiam aliam etiam qualitatem et speciem efficere, cum nihil impediat quominus diversae species ita inter se distinguantur ut altera sit amplificatio, altera deminutio (*δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει*).' Michelet's 'hanc quantitatis differentiam aliam etiam qualitatem et speciem efficere' is hardly to the point here. It cannot be said that the three species of Friendship distinguished by Aristotle (viii. 3. 1) are constituted by mere differences of degree. There are profound qualitative differences between the *ἀγαθόν*, the *ἡδύ*, and the *χρήσιμον* (viii. 2. 1). But these are all *φιλητά*, and this general attribute may enter in various degrees into the specific forms, although the degree in which it enters into a given form has nothing to do with the specific differentiation of that form from another form. The friendship for pleasure differs qualitatively from the friendship for the good, because the good differs qualitatively from pleasure; but nevertheless we can say that the friendship for pleasure is *less* friendship than that for the good. The specific characteristics make it an *inferior* form, just as those of the ape place him beneath man. Οἱ *ἓν οἰόμενοι* forget that it is possible *both* to distinguish species, *and* to arrange those species so as to exhibit the quantitative variation of a given quality throughout the series of species taken as a whole. That however *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* is not itself *εἰδοποιόν* is shown by *Pol.* i. 5. 1259 b. 32 *καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον*



*ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας,* 1155 b. 13. *διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδέν.* The species of Friendship are like the various *ἀρεταί*, which are specifically distinct, and yet may be compared with one another in respect of the degree in which they conduce to the Noble Life: thus *ἀνδρεία* is *more* of a virtue than *εὐτραπελία*, but it is not this *more* which differentiates them specifically: or, to take the Paraphrast's example—*ἡ γὰρ οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἕτερα ὄντα τῷ εἴδει, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχονται· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως εἰσὶν ὄντα.*

**εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν**] The commentators refer us b. 15. to *E. N.* ii. 8, where the *ὑπερβολή* and *ἔλλειψις* opposed to a virtue are presented as specifically distinct from it, although they are only the amplification or diminution of the *πάθος* which is held in moderation by the virtue: see Michelet *ad loc.* Aspasius, not finding any passage in the *E. N.* exactly answering to the present reference, suggests—*ἔοικε δὲ εἰρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς ἐκπεπτωκόσι τῶν Νικομαχείων.* But the view of Grant and Ramsauer (supported apparently by Sus.) that the words *εἴρηται . . . ἔμπροσθεν* are spurious seems to be correct; for *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν* must be equivalent to *περὶ τοῦ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει*, while *περὶ αὐτῶν* in the next line (b. 17) refers to *τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη*: and further, as Ramsauer points out, *ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν = περὶ αὐτῶν* is unusual in the *Ethics*: see Eucken *über den Sprachgebrauch des Arist.—die Praepositionen*, p. 47—'Im allgemeinen nun ist dies (*ὑπέρ = περί* with gen.) bei Aristoteles nicht häufig, in einigen Schriften und zwar in der Ethik[1], Rhetorik und Topik findet es sich öfter als in den andern.' It is to be noted that in the *M. M.* and *Rhet. ad Alex.* *ὑπέρ = περί* with gen. is almost universal: see *Ind. Arist.* and Eucken, o. c. p. 47.

[1] The six passages in which it does occur in the *E. N.* (see note on iii. 3. 2 and add iv. 2. 4 to the passages there quoted) are, with the exception of the second, short connecting clauses which might have been inserted by an editor.

## CHAPTER II.

### Argument.

*But this question as to whether there are several species of Friendship may be settled by reference to the objects of Friendship*—i.e. *the things which occasion it. Now these are three—the good, the pleasant, and the useful—the first two being ends for the sake of which the third is chosen as means. The good or pleasant thus loved as an end by a particular individual is what that particular individual thinks good or pleasant for himself. What he thinks good or pleasant for himself may or may not be really good or pleasant—that is another question which does not here concern us.*

*The term 'Friendship' is not applied to the affection which we may have for a lifeless object: for a lifeless object cannot return affection, and we do not wish its good for its own sake, as we wish the good of our friend for his own sake. Where, however, the person whose good we thus wish does not reciprocate, our feeling towards him is well-wishing rather than Friendship: for Friendship is reciprocal well-wishing—or, more accurately, reciprocal well-wishing of which the parties are aware: for A might wish well to B whom he had never seen, and B might wish well to A, and yet each be ignorant of how he is regarded by the other. In that case A and B would not be friends, but merely well-wishers.*

1155 b. 17. § 1. **περὶ αὐτῶν**] *περὶ τῶν τῆς φιλίας εἰδῶν.*

b. 18. **φιλητόν**] The author of *M. M.* (ii. 11. 1208 b. 37) distinguishes between *τὸ φιλητόν* which is *τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ φιλητέον* which is *τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν*. Similarly *τὸ βουλητόν* is *τὸ ἁπλῶς*, and *τὸ βουλητέον τὸ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν*. *Cf. E. N.* iii. 4: as there the *σπουδαῖος* wishes *τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν*, so in the treatise on *φιλία*, he loves that which is *ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν*—human nature as a rational system.

The *ἀγαθόν* and the *ἡδύ* are loved as ends while the *χρήσιμον* is only a means—as the Paraphrast says *χρήσιμα φιλητά ἐστι ἃ πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ φέρει.*

b. 21. § 2.] Three objects of love are distinguished in this section: (1) *τἀγαθόν*, (2) *τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν*, (3) *τὸ φαινόμενον αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν*. See the Paraph. *ad loc.* *ὥστε ἁπλῶς μὲν φιλητὸν τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι· τισὶ δὲ φιλητὸν τό τισιν ἀγαθόν· φαινόμενον δὲ φιλητὸν τὸ δοκοῦν τισὶν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι.* The words *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ* imply that a similar threefold division obtains also where *τὸ φιλητόν* is *τὸ ἡδύ*. Ramsauer compares vii. 12. 1 *αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε . . . αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται.*



The *φιλητόν* is always something that is good or pleasant for 1155 b. 21.
a man, or which he thinks good or pleasant. For the good man that is good and pleasant which is really so, being absolutely suitable to human nature as a rational system. Such a man comprehends life as a system, and calls things good and pleasant only in virtue of their occupying their fit places in the great whole; the inferior man follows his *φαντασία*, which gives him partial and abstracted views. Things are good and pleasant for him because they satisfy a self which is isolated in its own sense and imagination. In the good man the matter of sense and imagination has received that form which is Reason, and there is no longer any discrepancy between *τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν*, as *φαντασία* presents the latter. *Φαντασία* has become the vehicle of Reason, and no longer abstracts *τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν*, but presents it concretely as an aspect of *τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν*—*sub specie aeternitatis*. The good man sees clearly that *οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας* (*E. N.* vi. 8. 4), and that the *πρακτικὸς βίος* itself is for the sake of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*.

**ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ**] *i. e. ἑκάστῳ φιλητὸν τὸ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθόν.* b. 24.

**διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον**] This will make b. 26.
no difference to our position—it is not altered by the substitution of *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσι* for *τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσι*: indeed *τὸ ἀγαθόν* is always given as *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*.

**§ 3. τριῶν δ' ὄντων**] I think that Spengel (*Arist. Stud. E. N.* b. 27.
p. 215), followed by Susemihl, is right in reading *δή* here.

**δι' ἃ**] $K^b$ omits *δι'*, which is accordingly bracketed by Ramsauer. But the omission seems to be a mere blunder: *cf.* *δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων* at the end of § 4. The *δι' ἃ* are the *ἀγαθόν*, *ἡδύ*, and *χρήσιμον*.

**ἐκείνῳ**] Byw., *ἐκείνων* codd.: *ἐκείνῳ* is 'the particular *ἄψυχον* that b. 29.
happens to interest the man'—Byw. (*Contributions*, p. 59), who refers to *Ind. Arist.* 166[a] 61 for the construction—'dat. after, verbal substantive *βούλησις*.'

**οἴνῳ**] Fritzsche and Grant compare *Lysis* 212 D—*οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποί εἰσιν, οὓς ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ' αὖ φιλόκυνές γε καὶ φίλοινοι, κ.τ.λ.* The writer of the *M. M.* (ii. 11. 1208 b. 27) denies the possibility of friendship between men and

1155 b. 29. gods—ἔστι γάρ, ὡς οἴονται, φιλία καὶ πρὸς θεὸν καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ἐνταῦθά φαμεν εἶναι οὗ ἐστι τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ πρὸς θεὸν φιλία οὔτε ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δέχεται, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ φιλεῖν. ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἴ τις φαίη φιλεῖν τὸν Δία.

b. 32. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους . . . λανθάνουσαν ;] If A wishes good to B for B's sake, but B does not reciprocate, A is said to be 'well-disposed' to B—not to be B's 'friend'; for the notion of 'friends' is that of two persons reciprocally well-disposed towards each other. This definition, however, is not complete—they must *both know* that they are reciprocally well-disposed towards each other.

According to §§ 3 and 4 φιλία requires (1) τὸ τὸν φιλοῦντα τῷ φιλουμένῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα—*i. e.* ἥ ἐστιν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος (ch. 3. § 2): (2) τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι: (3) τὸ μὴ λανθάνειν.

1156 a. 5. § 4. δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων] *i. e.* διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον. This is added somewhat irrelevantly, for it is obvious that in the friendships διὰ τὸ ἡδύ and διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον the first requirement of friendship, viz. τὸ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, is not strictly satisfied: as he says in ch. 3. § 2 οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν. These friendships for profit and pleasure, however, satisfy the first requirement after a certain fashion. A person who is merely a means to profit or pleasure may, like money, come to be regarded after a certain fashion as an end. This seems to be what is meant by the statement made below in viii. 3. 1 οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. We may perhaps suppose that the 'friendship' of the dog for his master satisfies the first requirement of friendship in this way.

## CHAPTER III.

### ARGUMENT.

*There being three objects of friendship, there will be three species of friendship, each involving reciprocal liking known to both parties.*

*Friends wish good to each other in respect of that which is the ground of their friendship—virtue, pleasure, or utility:* i. e. *they wish each other to be as virtuous, as pleasant, or as useful as possible. In the first case only do we love our friend for what he is in himself; but where utility is the ground of friendship, we love our friend not as an end in himself, but as a means to our own advantage; similarly, where pleasure is the ground of friendship—we do not love an amusing companion for himself,* i. e. *for what he is, but because he gives us pleasure. The friendships then which are based on pleasure and utility are friendships* per accidens: *men are loved, not for being themselves what they are, but for happening to be pleasant or useful to other people. Such friendships are easily dissolved, depending as they do on accidental relations—the friendship of utility, which exists chiefly between elderly people, who do not care to see much of each other or take much pleasure in the society of each other, except in so far as some advantage is hoped for—the friendship for pleasure, which is chiefly between young people who live as feeling rather than as interest dictates, and get the immediate pleasure, which they want, by close companionship, or, it may be, by falling in love; therefore cannot see too much of each other, so long as close companionship is pleasant, but when it ceases to be pleasant, cease to be friends—sometimes as suddenly as they became friends, sometimes by 'growing out of' their friendship.*

*Perfect Friendship is that between men who, being good, are of like character. In such friendship A wishes the same good for B as B wishes for A,* i. e. *each wishes for the other that he may remain what he is—a good man. Such friendship is lasting, for goodness is a lasting quality. Moreover, each of the friends is good in himself, and good in relation to the other,* i. e. *useful. He is also pleasant in himself, and to the other: for one's own actions and those like one's own always give one pleasure; and the actions of good men are the same or like. Thus in the similar goodness of the friends, upon which this friendship is based, are involved their similar pleasantness and their similar utility—for each friend, being really good (not good in some temporary relation), is also really pleasant and really useful—which means that he is pleasant and useful in the same way that the other is. Friendship like this then is naturally lasting; but it is rare, for good men are rare; it takes them a long time to test each other and gain each other's confidence and fit their characters together. People may all at once wish to be friends; but they do not become friends all at once. They must have time to know each other's characters.*



§ 1. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.] *i. e.* ἀγαθόν, ἡδύ, χρήσιμον. 1156 a. 6.

ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν] 'in relation to that which is the ground of their friendship'—*e. g.* those whose friendship is for profit do not love each other for 'what they are' (Peters), but for what they hope to get out of each other. As Ramsauer notes, ἀγαθόν a. 12 = ὠφέλιμόν τι (χρήσιμον). a. 10.

οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν] Grant has a good note—'"Do not love each other for their very selves." This phrase καθ' αὑτούς is rather a logical formula than an ordinary grammatical combination. It seems to have arisen from καθ' αὑτό, "the absolute."' Καθ' αὑτούς is opposed to κατὰ συμβεβηκός § 2. a. 11.

1156 a. 12. **τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι**] 'for their quality simply.' An *ἀρετή* (*e.g.* *εὐτραπελία*) is a *ποιότης*: see note on ii. 5. 1, b. 20. Having all the *ἀρεταί*—*being good*—is *the ποιότης par excellence*; see *E. N.* i. 9. 8 (referred to by Fritzsche) *ἡ πολιτικὴ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.*

a. 16. **§ 2. οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν**] = *ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστίν*, two lines below. Fritzsche, omitting *ὁ* with $K^b$, makes *φιλούμενος* a predicate like *χρήσιμος* and *ἡδύς*[1]: but the omission in $K^b$ is probably a mere blunder. Susemihl, following Bonitz, inserts *ὅσπερ ἐστίν* after *φιλούμενός ἐστιν*, line 16. I think that it is unnecessary to do so.

**κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δή κ.τ.λ.**] Fritzsche (*E. N.* viii, ix) has an important note here—'consociatae particulae *τε δή* ad concludendam rationem ita faciunt, ut cum barbara dictione *und also* comparari possint . . . Nam utitur auctor particula *δή* ad rem antea exploratam aut necessario ex superioribus consequentem indicandam . . . Jam vero ante hanc particulam quum insuper ponatur *τέ*, causa haec videtur esse, quod, pronunciata voce *τέ*, sententiam novam, subjecta voce *δή*, conclusionem aliquam se additurum superioribus declarat auctor.' Zell says to the same effect—'Particula *τε* pleonastice superaddita est, vel potius particula mere copulativa conclusivae conjuncta, quo arctius orationis membra cohaereant.' Eucken (*de Aristotelis dicendi ratione: pars prima: de particularum usu*, pp. 21, 22) opposes this view on the grounds that the meaning *und also* is expressed by *καὶ δή*, and that in almost all places in which *τὲ δή* occurs the *τέ* is followed by another copulative particle. In the present passage, Eucken reads *δέ* with $M^b$ instead of *δή* after *εὐδιάλυτοι* a. 19, and makes this *δέ* answer per anacoluthiam to *τε* a. 17. He thinks that two conclusions are thus drawn from the fact that *οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς*—viz. (1) *κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ φιλίαι αὗται εἰσιν*, and (2) *εὐδιάλυτοι αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσιν*—these two conclusions being coupled, per anacoluthiam, by *τε—δέ*. In the parallel passages adduced by Fritzsche, viz. *Phys.* 186 a. 4, *de Animal. gen.* 729 b. 8, and *Pol.* 1263 b. 7, the *τε* before *δή* is, Eucken points out, taken up

[1] So apparently Bywater, *Contributions*, p. 59.



by *καί* in the next clause. Cases of *τε* followed, per anacoluthiam, by *δέ* are not rare in the best writers (see Eucken, o. c. p. 17), and Eucken's suggestion that we should read *δέ* instead of *δή* after *εὐδιάλυτοι* a. 19 is strictly legitimate. But is it necessary? We have the authority of Eucken himself for the remarkable fact that while *τε*, not followed by another copulative particle, is very rarely used in Books i–vii of the *E. N.*, it occurs in Books viii, ix, and x much more frequently than in any other work of Aristotle. In *E. N.* i it does not occur; nor in ii; it occurs once in iii[1]; twice in iv; not at all in v; once in vi; and once in vii. On the other hand, in viii it occurs eight times; in ix twelve times; and in x sixteen times. In these three Books Eucken finds that the style approaches that of poetry, the subject not being evolved by means of intricate ratiocinations, but graphically presented to the mind's eye. Hence the particles by which clauses are subordinated to one another are of rare occurrence, while those which simply coordinate clauses are numerous. Thus *ἐπεί*, which is so common in the writings of Aristotle and in the seven earlier Books of the *E. N.*, is very rare in these three Books: see Eucken, *de Arist. dic. rat.* p. 14, and pp. 75, 76. Eucken's inference from this and from other peculiarities is (p. 77)—'cum libri ita inter se discrepent, hoc videtur elucere, non omnes eodem tempore ab Aristotele scriptos, sed postea demum alios cum aliis conjunctos esse.'

May we not then regard the *τε* of 1156 a. 17, notwithstanding the immediately following *δή*, as an instance of the *τε* not followed by another copulative particle (*τέ* adjunctivum: see *Ind. Arist.*) which Eucken finds characteristic of viii, ix, and x? I prefer so to regard it—to suppose that *τε* here merely facilitates the transition to a clause which may be viewed either as a conclusion from what has gone before (hence *δή*), or as merely adding (hence *τε*) an alternative phrase—*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*—to express the notion already expressed by the clause *οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς.*

1156 a. 16.

**§ 3. πρὸς ἐκεῖνα**] *πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδύ.* a. 24.

**§ 4. πρεσβύταις**] *Cf. Rhet.* ii. 13. 1389 b. 37 *καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς.*

[1] Here, 1112 a. 9, Bywater restores *δέ* from $K^b$.

1156 a. 29. **τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας**] the constant and pleasant intercourse *τοῦ συζῆν*.

a. 30. **εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν.**] *ξενικὴ φιλία* subsisting *e.g.* between an Athenian and a Spartan, does not imply *τὸ συζῆν*, and rests merely on mutual convenience. Ramsauer, admitting the correctness of classing *ξενικὴ φιλία* under *ἡ φιλία ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον*, thinks these words out of place here, and brackets them. The pronoun *ταύτας*, he urges, has nothing to which it can be grammatically referred, and the clause is almost a transcript of viii. 12. 1. 1161 b. 15 *εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν*. I think that *ταύτας* (viii. 3. 4) may easily be taken to relate to the various utilitarian *φιλίαι* mentioned above—those of *πρεσβῦται, οἱ ἐν ἀκμῇ*, and *νέοι*. The writer of the *M. M.* ii. 11. 1211 a. 12 looks at *ξενικὴ φιλία* from a different point of view—*βεβαιοτάτη δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι τῶν φιλιῶν ἡ ξενική· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς τέλος κοινὸν ὑπὲρ οὗ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς πολίταις· διαμφισβητοῦντες γὰρ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ μένουσιν φίλοι ὄντες.*

a. 31. **§ 5.**] Zell, Coraes, and Fritzsche quote *Rhet.* ii. 12. 1389 a. 3 *οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι. . . . καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλοίκειοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους.*

b. 3. **διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται**] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 33, 34) suggests *διόπερ ταχέως φιλοῦσι καὶ παύονται*, comparing *διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται* above 1156 a. 34. But there is a difference between *φιλοῦσι* and *γίνονται φίλοι* which perhaps sufficiently accounts for the different position of *ταχέως*. Bywater's note on *καὶ ταχέως* b. 3 is 'fort. *ταχέως καί*.'

b. 5. **τὴν φιλίαν**] 'their friendship'—is the reading of $K^b$, $O^b$, Cambr., CCC, $B^1$, $B^2$, and seems preferable to Bekker's *φιλίαν*, the reading of $L^b$, $M^b$, NC, Ald.

b. 7. **§ 6. τελεία . . . b. 11 συμβεβηκός**] 'The friendship between those who are good and alike in excellence is perfect; for in it each friend, being good in himself [*i.e.* not merely good for another, or useful], wishes alike the good of the other *quâ* good in himself:



and those who thus wish each the good of the other for the other's 1156 b. 7.
sake are friends in the truest sense, each being the friend of the other for what he is essentially, not for what he is accidentally.' This friendship between those who are both good *in themselves* (*καθ' αὑτούς*) is here shown to be *τελεία*, because in it *each* friend loves the other *for what that other is himself* (*δι' αὑτούς*)—*i.e.* loves him as *ἕτερος αὐτός* (ix. 9. 10)—'treats Humanity in him as an end, not as a means.' In line b. 10 *δι' αὑτοὺς οὕτως ἔχουσι* means *ἑκάτερος φιλικῶς ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον δι' ἐκεῖνον*—*i.e.* the expression *δι' αὑτούς* marks the two friends regarded as each the *final object* (hence *διά*) of the other's love, not regarded as *subjects* each of whom has the feeling of love for the other—in that case we should have had *καθ' αὑτούς*. It is to be observed that the Paraphrast reads *δι' αὐτούς*, not *δι' αὑτούς*: his comment is—*οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις, οὐχ ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τῶν φίλων, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὐτοὺς γὰρ τοὺς φίλους φιλοῦσι, καὶ βούλονται αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ οὐ δι' ἄλλο καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.*

**ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον**] *Cf. E. N.* i. 10. 10. b. 12.

**οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι**] Here b. 13.
*ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι* explains *τῷ φίλῳ ἀγαθός* of the preceding clause. These words are quoted by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 83) in support of his remark—'die Erklärer des achten Buches sind oft zu Irrthümern verleitet durch das Wort *ἀγαθός*, das bald im Sinne von *καλός* bald im Sinne von *χρήσιμος* gebraucht wird.' *Cf.* the use of *ἀγαθόν τι* in viii. 3. 1, 2 = *χρήσιμον* or *ὠφέλιμον*.

**καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις**] *οἱ ἁπλῶς ἡδεῖς* are b. 15.
those who, living the rational life, therefore give pleasure by their society to others who live the same life. It is the fact that the rational life is one for all men who live it that makes *οἱ ἁπλῶς ἡδεῖς* also *ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις*. In the life of reason man derives from man true pleasure and true profit—pleasure which can never bring pain afterwards—profit which never results in loss to oneself or to others. The common consciousness of a noble life lived together is pure pleasure; and to live this life together is the highest good. Accordingly in the life of Reason there is no conflict of pleasures or utilities, but all men necessarily agree. As Spinoza says (*Eth.* iv. 35) 'quia unus quisque ex suae naturae legibus id appetit quod bonum et id amovere conatur quod malum esse judicat; et quum praeterea id quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse

1156 b. 15. judicamus necessario bonum aut malum sit, ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt quae humanae naturae et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est quae cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt. Atque adeo homines etiam inter se, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt. Nihil singulare in rerum natura datur quod homini sit utilius quam homo qui ex ductu rationis vivit. Nam id homini utilissimum est quod cum sua natura maxime convenit, hoc est homo. At homo ex legibus suae naturae absolute agit quando ex ductu rationis vivit, et eatenus tantum cum natura alterius hominis necessario semper convenit. Ergo homini nihil inter res singulares utilius datur quam homo.'

b. 16. **αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται**] 'his own actions and those that resemble them.'

b. 17. **αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι**] This is the reading of $L^b$ $M^b$ ($K^b$ has *αὗται ὅμοιαι*) and seems preferable to *τοιαῦται ἢ ὅμοιαι*, the reading of Γ, $O^b$, CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald. Thus *αἱ αὐταί* corresponds to *οἰκεῖαι* (line b. 16), and *ὅμοιαι* to *αἱ τοιαῦται*.

**§ 7. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία κ.τ.λ.**] Stahr (*E. N.*, p. 280, note 10) and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 24) regard this section as merely a repetition of § 6, b. 11 *διαμένει οὖν* . . . b. 17 *ἢ ὅμοιαι*. Stahr accordingly brackets the whole section; and Ramsauer brackets down to b. 23 *ἁπλῶς ἐστίν*.

b. 18. **συνάπτει**] intransitive—'meet together.' The editors refer to viii. 4. 5 *οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται συνάπτουσιν*. *Cf.* also *Cat.* 6. 4 b. 36.

b. 20. **καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα**] This is generally taken (*e.g.* by the Paraph., Zell, Fritzsche, Williams, Peters) to mean that all friendship 'implies some similarity between the friends.' But Grant would omit the comma after *φιλοῦντι* and take the phrase to mean that a friendship which is for the sake of a relative good or pleasure, *i. e.* relative *τῷ φιλοῦντι*, is a friendship only *καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῆς τελείας φιλίας*—so called because it resembles the perfect friendship. In support of this rendering of *καθ' ὁμοιότητα* he refers to viii. 4. 4 *εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ᾗ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα*. He also refers to viii. 6. 7 *δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταὐτοῦ εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ'*



*ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι κ.τ.λ.*, and to viii. 4. 1 1156 b. 20. *ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει*. Grant's interpretation is supported by Aspasius (167. 25 Heylbut); but I have no doubt that the ordinary interpretation is correct. In the 'duplicate' passage (§ 6) the *ὁμοιότης* is the similarity of the friends.

**ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὑτούς**] 'but this (*sc.* b. 21. perfect friendship) has all the specified characteristics (*sc.* goodness, pleasantness, usefulness) as essential attributes of the parties.'

**ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά**] The difficulties which this clause b. 22. has raised for the commentators are well set forth by Coraes. In transcribing his note, I insert explanations and the views of later editors within square brackets. *οἱ μὲν ἐξηγήσαντο* [Aspasius, Michelet, Grant, Williams] *ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τῶν σπουδαίων ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ εἴδη τῶν φιλιῶν, ἥ τε διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οἱ δὲ μεταποιοῦντες τὴν γραφὴν εἰς τὸ ὅμοιοι* [the reading of $K^b$, Γ, Cambr., known to Aspasius, accepted by Fritzsche, Rassow *Forsch.* p. 24, and Susemihl], *ταύτῃ, κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι δηλαδή, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι ὅμοιοί εἰσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς, τουτέστι καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις καὶ χρήσιμοι* [Aspasius rendering the alternative reading *ὅμοιοι*, Lambinus, and Fritzsche]. *ἡ* ΑΡΓ [*i. e.* the paraphrase of Argyropylus], *λέγουσα huic enim similes sunt et ceterae, τοιαύτην τινὰ γραφὴν ἐμφαίνει,* **ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοιαι καὶ αἱ λοιπαί**, *τουτέστι, ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ ὁμοιαί εἰσι καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ φιλίαι· ὅπερ δηλοῖ καὶ ἡ* ΠΑΡ [the Paraphrast Heliodorus] *'καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα ταύτης αἱ ἄλλαι φιλίαι ὀνομάζονται.' εἰσὶ δ' οἱ* [Muretus] *καὶ (πιθανώτερον ἴσως) περιαιρεῖν ὅλως τοῦ κειμένου ὡς οὐ γνησίας τὰς ἐξ λέγεις* [the clause *ταύτῃ* . . . *λοιπά* b. 22] *παρήνεσαν*.

Here then we have two alternative interpretations, according as we read *ὅμοια* or *ὅμοιοι*: (1) reading *ὅμοια*—'for the other kinds of friendship resemble this, the perfect kind'; (2) reading *ὅμοιοι*—'for being similar in respect of virtue, they are similar also in the other respects.' As for the first interpretation—I think that it introduces an entirely irrelevant remark, obviously suggested by a misunderstanding of the preceding *καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα*, and must be rejected. The rejection of this interpretation of *ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά* may seem to raise a presumption in favour of *ὅμοιοι*, for which the MS. authority is certainly strong; although, on the other hand, there is a certain awkwardness in having to take *ταύτῃ* as=*κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι*, whereas in the line above (b. 21) it is the

1156 b. 22. pronoun for τῇ τελείᾳ φιλίᾳ. But can ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά not be interpreted otherwise than as above? Zell suggests the following interpretation—'Potest autem lectio vulgata alio modo sic quoque explicari: Huic bonorum virorum amicitiae sive in hac bonorum amicitia similia sunt, id est morum similitudo et reliqua, id est, reliqua quae ad firmam et veram amicitiam requiruntur, id est, absolute bonum et absolute jucundum[1].' Peters, apparently following Zell, translates—'for here there is similarity and the rest, viz. what is good simply and pleasant simply.' Surely ὅμοια cannot mean 'similarity,' as distinguished from τὰ λοιπά, 'the rest': and is it not better to regard ἡδύ without the article as the predicate of a clause introduced by the 'τέ adjunctivum' so common in Books viii, ix, x?—see note on viii. 3. 2, and Eucken, *de Arist. dic. rat.* p. 14, where this case is quoted.

Reading ὅμοια I venture to offer the following rendering—'every friendship is for good or pleasure (the good or pleasure being such either in itself or in relation to the person who has the friendly feeling), and implies some similarity between the parties; but true friendship possesses all the aforesaid characteristics in virtue of the essential nature of the friends—I say *all*, for in this friendship the other characteristics also (καὶ τὰ λοιπά, *i.e.* the pleasantness and usefulness of the friends to each other, as distinguished from their goodness) are similar (ὅμοια), the truly good being also truly pleasant.' True friends have a similar, or indeed identical, pleasantness and usefulness, as well as goodness—*cf.* below ch. 4. § 1, b. 34 κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἑκατέρῳ παρ' ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν—the qualities which the one friend really has the other truly loves, because they are similar to, or identical with, his own real qualities reciprocally loved by his friend. This means that these qualities exist ἁπλῶς, or that friends between whom this perfect ὁμοιότης subsists are ἡδεῖς καθ' αὑτούς, &c. Where all qualities are *not* ὅμοια, the one is not the other's *alter ego*, and, if called his 'friend,' must be so called because loved for some quality not inherent essentially in his character, but attaching to the special relation in which the two happen to be placed. The leading idea of my rendering is that where κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἑκατέρῳ παρ' ἑκατέρου, there the good pleasant and useful qualities of each friend must be absolute—ἁπλῶς, καθ' αὑτούς, not relative; for

[1] I have not altered the punctuation of the above quotation, but what I take to be Zell's meaning would be made clearer by a comma after *similitudo*.



if they were relative, then a dissimilarity between the friends would 1156 b. 22.
be implied, whereas good men cannot be dissimilar: *cf. M. M.* ii. 11. 1210 a. 8 ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἡ τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἡ τελεία φιλία· ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀνομοιότητα ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον.

μάλιστα δέ] The weight of MS. authority is in favour of δή here, b. 23.
and all MSS. seem to have δέ in b. 24: but I think that Bywater's δέ in b. 23 and δή in b. 24 make the passage run better.

§ 8. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας] οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀρετῆς b. 25.
δεῖται ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία καὶ τρόπων ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας (Paraph.).

τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας] *Cf. E. E.* H. 2. 1238 a. 2 διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν b. 27.
ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἁλῶν.

οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους] 'nor can they b. 28.
accept one another as friends, or be friends' (Peters). *Cf.* viii. 5. 3 οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους: *cf.* also *E. N.* ix. 8. 7 τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν.

For δή $L^b$, $M^b$, Γ, Cambr. read δεῖ.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ARGUMENT.

*This Friendship, then—that between good men—is perfect in duration and in all other respects, the friends always returning each other's offices in the same kind.*

*The friendship which is for the sake of pleasure, and that which is based on utility, are like this Friendship between good men; for good men, as friends, are pleasant and useful to each other. These imperfect friendships are most durable when, as in the Perfect Friendship, the return which each friend makes to each is in the same kind—such as pleasure, and that derived from the same thing—e. g. the pleasure derived from witty conversation which is the same for both talkers if both be witty, as distinguished from the pleasure of lover and beloved. Lover and beloved do not derive their pleasure from the same thing: the lover's pleasure is derived from seeing the beauty of the beloved; the beloved's pleasure from being courted by the lover; but when the beauty fades, the friendship too sometimes ceases, unless the two, from long familiarity, have come to love each other's dispositions. Where mere utility, however, is the ground of association*

*on one side, lover and beloved can scarcely be called friends, and the friendship between them cannot last long. Where utility, as distinguished from pleasure, is the ground of association on both sides, the so-called friendship ceases as soon as the parties cease to be useful to each other.*

*It will be seen then that for the sake of pleasure and utility bad men may be friends of bad men, good men of bad men, and men neither good nor bad of others neither good nor bad: but for the sake of each other, as such, only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other as such, but only in so far as some advantage is desired.*

*The friendship between good men is the only friendship which is proof against slander: such friends have known each other too long and too well to believe evil of each other.*

*It must be understood that we make a concession to popular usage when we call those who associate for utility* friends—*(in the same way we speak of allied states as friendly states—utility is the bond of alliance between states): we also make a concession to popular usage when we call those who associate for pleasure* friends *(as we speak of childish playmates as friends): it is only good men who love each other for their goodness who are friends in the primary and strict sense of the word. The other friendships are only metaphorically so called, because, while they are based on that which is good, it is not on that which is absolutely good, but on that which is only relatively good that they are based; for pleasant things are good in relation to the man who takes pleasure in them.*

*The two metaphorically called Friendships, or Friendships* per accidens, *seldom subsist together: there is no law by which accidents are conjoined—the parties to a 'friendship' for utility seldom happen to be the same as the parties to a 'friendship' for pleasure.*

1156 b. 34. **§ 1. ταὐτά**] This is Bekker's reading (after Muretus) for the ταὐτα of most MSS.

1157 a. 10. **πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν**] Zell very appositely compares *Sympos.* 183 E πονηρὸς δ' ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν ἅτε οὐδὲ μονίμου ἐρῶν πράγματος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι οὗπερ ἤρα, οἴχεται ἀποπτάμενος, πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις καταισχύνας. ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἤθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου μένει ἅτε μονίμῳ συντακείς.

a. 13. **§ 2. καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν**] supply ἧττον with διαμένουσιν.

a. 18. **μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν**] *i. e.* one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to a man of any sort, good, bad, or indifferent.

**δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς**] Only good men can each love the other for the other's sake, because only good men



are so alike that each finds his ἕτερος αὐτός in the other. But bad men differ indefinitely. A bad man has no ἕτερος αὐτός. He cannot identify himself with another man; he can only use him as a means to his own pleasure or profit— 1157 a. 18.

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

**οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς**] = ἀλλήλοις (Coraes). a. 19.

**§ 3. ἀδιάβλητος**] 'can defy calumny' (Peters). a. 21.

**ἐν τούτοις**] *i. e.* between the good men who are friends. a. 23.

**§ 4. ἐπεὶ γάρ**] For γάρ, the reading of all other MSS. apparently, Susemihl reads δέ with $M^b$. But the scribe of $M^b$ (or the scribe or corrector of the MS. from which he copied), as I have had occasion to point out before, and as Susemihl himself is aware (see *Eth. Nic. Praefat.* p. viii), is very fond of removing difficulties by conjectural emendations; and I have little doubt that he has tried to do so here by substituting δέ for γάρ. Retaining γάρ, we may explain the connexion thus—'suspicions and recriminations arise in the other (ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις) *friendships*; for we too must call the persons standing in these relationships *friends*, since they are commonly so called.' See the notes of Zell, Fritzsche, and Ramsauer. a. 25.

**ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω**] We must so far conform to popular usage as to call such persons φίλοι, but we must make it clear that their friendships are specifically distinct from friendship proper. a. 29.

**καθ' ὁμοιότητα**] 'in a secondary sense,' *i. e.* on account of their resemblance to the real friendship—the friendship strictly so called: *cf. E. N.* vi. 3. 2, where ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι is opposed to ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. a. 31.

**ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι**] 'in so far as there is involved in their relationship something good and resembling the good' or, if we treat ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι as a hendiadys, 'in so far as there is involved in their relationship something good in a secondary sense,' *e. g.* pleasure—καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. So the Paraph. καὶ ἔστι φιλία πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ᾗ ἀγαθοί· καθ' ὁμοιότητα δὲ αἱ λοιπαί· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, καθὸ ἀγαθόν τί ἐστιν, ὡς ἡδὺ συνάπτει τοὺς φιληδόνους· ἀγαθὸν γάρ τί ἐστι τοῖς φιληδέσι τὸ ἡδύ· καὶ a. 32.

1157 a. 32. *ἀγαθῷ ἔοικεν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ· καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ τῷ χρωμένῳ· διὰ τοῦτο καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῆς ἀληθοῦς φιλίας αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι λέγονται.* So also Michelet, with *ὁμοιόν τι sc. ἀγαθῷ*, and Grant. The emendation *ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ὅμοιον* suggested by Coraes, although, I think, inadmissible as an emendation, gives the sense correctly. His note is—*ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι κ.τ.λ.*] *γραφὴ ὕποπτος, ὡς δηλοῦσι καὶ αἱ μεταφράσεις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ* ΑΡΓ [Argyropylus] *παρέλιπε τὸ τελευταῖον ἐγκλινόμενον, τι* [*i. e.* after *ὅμοιον*: so Bek. and Sus.]: *ἡ δὲ* ΑΡ (Aretinus) *τοῦτο παραλείψασα καὶ τὸν συμπλεκτικὸν εἰς τὸν διαζευκτικὸν ἔτρεψεν, ἢ ὅμοιον, aut simile. ἴσ. γρ. ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ὅμοιον, ἵν' ᾖ ὁ νοῦς, καθ' ὃ γὰρ τὸ συνδέον αὐτοὺς εἰς φιλίαν (ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον) ὡμοίωταί πως τῷ ἀγαθῷ, κατὰ τοῦτό εἰσι φίλοι.*

a. 33. **§ 5. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται συνάπτουσιν**] 'But these two latter kinds are not apt to coincide' (Peters). *μικτὴ δὲ φιλία ἀπὸ χρησίμου καὶ ἡδέος οὐ πάνυ γίνεται, ὥστε τῶν φίλων τὸν μὲν διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ φιλεῖν τὸν δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον* (Paraph.). The Paraph. is hardly right here. Mixed friendships in which one party supplies pleasure and the other recompenses him by profit are not very rare. The kind of mixed friendship here alluded to by Aristotle is that in which both friends are mutually pleasant and useful. This seems to be sufficiently recognised by the editors—Fritzsche, Stahr, Ramsauer, Williams. Ramsauer's note is good—'Quantum differat *ἡ πρώτως καὶ κυρίως λεγομένη* a reliquis, exponitur ut non possit melius. Quod enim per illius naturam ultro efficitur ut boni et utiles inter se iidemque suaves sint, id in his vel casu vix semel contingit: alii utiles, alii suaves.'

a. 35. **τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός**] The sense of *τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός* here is clearly given in a passage (*Met.* Δ. 30. 1025 a. 14) quoted by Fritzsche and Grant—*συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται ὃ ὑπάρχει μέν τινι, καὶ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οἷον εἴ τις ὀρύττων φυτῷ βόθρον εὗρε θησαυρόν. τοῦτο τοίνυν συμβεβηκὸς τῷ ὀρύττοντι τὸν βόθρον τὸ εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ἐκ τούτου ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο· οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄν τις φυτεύῃ θησαυρὸν εὑρίσκει. καὶ μουσικός γ' ἂν τις εἴη λευκός· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο γίνεται, συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ λέγομεν.*

b. 2. **§ 6. ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες**] Here Grant seems to fall into error from a desire to be perfectly consistent in his rendering of *ὅμοιον* as it occurs in this and the previous chapter. His rendering is 1157 b. 2. 'In this respect (*i. e.* as affording and seeking pleasure or utility) being like (the good).' Peters adopts Grant's view, translating—'resembling true friends in this respect.' Aspasius gives the correct interpretation when he says *ταύτῃ φησὶν ὁμοίους ὄντας τουτέστι κατὰ τοῦτο, ὁμοίους ὄντας καθὸ ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ᾗ παρέχουσιν ἀλλήλοις ἡδονὴν καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν φίλοι εἰσίν. ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὅμοιοι.* This interpretation is followed by Michelet, Fritzsche, Stahr, Williams, and Ramsauer. The reference is to viii. 4. 2, where the difference between true friendship and the other kinds turns on the essential similarity of good men, as distinguished from the merely superficial similarity of bad men; but it must be admitted that the words *καὶ τῷ ὁμοιῶσθαι τούτοις* following immediately (b. 5) are awkward, and might be thought to favour Grant's rendering of *ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες.*



## CHAPTER V.

### ARGUMENT.

*Just as we may look at the virtuous man either as 'having a virtuous disposition' or as 'acting virtuously,' so we may look at Friends either as having the disposition of friendship, or as actively manifesting it. A and B may have constant opportunities of enjoying each other's society: C and D may live at a distance from each other and merely be so mutually disposed as to meet as friends when they do meet: for separation—unless it be very long—does not destroy the disposition of friendship, only prevents the active manifestation of the disposition.*

*Seeing much of each other and taking pleasure in each other's society is the great mark of friends. Hence old and morose people do not make friendships easily, because little pleasure is to be had from such people, and nobody cares to spend his days with people who are unpleasant.*

*Those who are on good terms, but do not see much of each other, are well-wishers rather than friends. Seeing much of each other, as we said, is the great mark of friends—whether they be those who depend on each other for assistance, or fortunate persons who love each other's society for its own sake. But people cannot see much of each other whose companionship is not mutually pleasant.*

*The friendship between good men is the truest friendship. Each is loved by each both for what he is in himself and for what he is to the other, what each is to the other being, in fact, what each is in himself. The nature of each is the same: accordingly each finds and loves his own good in the goodness of the*

*other: each gives to each and derives from each the same advantage and pleasure. The proverbial 'equality of friends' is thus realised most truly in the friendship of good men.*

1157 b. 9. **§ 1. ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν**] Ramsauer and Susemihl read *ὥστ' ἂν ἐνεργεῖν*, which the sense seems to require—'they do not perform friendly acts, but their state is such that they *would* perform them,' if circumstances permitted. $L^b$ reads *ὥστε καὶ ἐνεργεῖν*, which perhaps points to *κἂν*, as Ramsauer suggests.

b. 10. **οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν**] not the friendship regarded as such, *i. e.* as *ἕξις*, but its manifestation or *ἐνέργεια*: *cf. E. N.* v. 1. 20 *ἡ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς.*

b. 13. **πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν**] *Cf.* Athenaeus v. p. 187, where *τηλοῦ φίλοι ναίοντες οὐκ εἰσὶν φίλοι* is characterised as *μισανθρωποτάτη τῶν παροιμιῶν—πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄλογον τόπῳ τὴν φιλίαν καὶ οὐ τρόπῳ κρίνεσθαι;*

§§ 2, 3.] The passage *οὐ φαίνονται* b. 13 . . . b. 24 *ἔχειν* is regarded by Fritzsche and Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 24, 25) as the first of *gemini loci*, the other passage being ch. 6. § 1 *ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς* 1158 a. 1 . . . . *φιλικαί* a. 10. See note on ch. 6. § 1.

b. 18. **§ 3. ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους**] 'are on good terms'—or 'know each other': see note on viii. 3. 8, b. 28.

b. 19. **οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν**] Peters has a useful note here—'To a Greek of course this does not necessarily imply living under the same roof, as it does to us with our very different conditions of life.'

b. 21. **καὶ οἱ μακάριοι**] 'even the happy.' It seems better to take *μακάριοι* here, with the Paraph. and Asp., as equivalent to *εὐδαίμονες* and *ἀγαθοί* than, with Zell and Coraes, as meaning 'rich' like the Latin *beati*. Coraes' note is—*μακάριοι*] *ἐπὶ τοῦ πλούσιοι ἐνθάδε· ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὀρέγονται δὲ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι συνημερεύειν τοῖς φίλοις, καίπερ οὐ χρῄζοντες τῆς παρ' αὐτῶν ὠφελείας, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς.* This is plausible; but rendered improbable by the words immediately following *μονώτατα μὲν γάρ κ. τ. λ.* which suggest ix. 9. 3 *ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον*, where the *μακάριος* is the *εὐδαίμων = ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργῶν.*

b. 23. **ἡ ἑταιρικὴ (φιλία)**] 'comradeship' (Peters). The friendship of



those who have been inseparable since boyhood = the Latin *sodalitas*: see Fritzsche and Michelet. Ramsauer thinks that the clause *ὅπερ . . . ἔχειν* is an interpolation like *εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν* viii. 3. 4. 1157 b. 23.

**§ 4. πολλάκις**] five times according to Ramsauer. b. 26.

**ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ' ἀγαθός**] These words are omitted b. 27. by $K^b$, which reads . . . *ἡδύ, τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ ἄμφω ταῦτα.* Fritzsche adopts the text of $K^b$, interpreting thus—'That which is good and pleasant in itself is the object of love and choice; and the good man possesses both these qualities (*i. e.* the good in itself and the pleasant in itself).'

Retaining the text of all other MSS. and authorities (for very little weight ought to be attached to the mere *omissions* of $K^b$), we have to decide between two alternative interpretations of *ἄμφω ταῦτα*—that of the Paraphrast, and that of Aspasius. The Paraphrast says—*δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ. ἑκάστῳ δὲ φιλητὸν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν· ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τὸν ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἁπλῶς καὶ κυρίως ἀγαθόν ἐστι, καὶ τῷ φίλῳ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· ὥστε ὁ ἀγαθὸς φιλητός ἐστι, καὶ κατ' ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς τρόπους.* This view is adopted by Victorius, Zell, Coraes (*δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα· τὸ γὰρ συνάπτον αὐτοὺς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν γίγνεται*) and Michelet. On the other hand Aspasius says—*φιλητὸν μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδὺ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστου, τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ὁ ἀγαθός.* Grant adopts this view. I am in favour of the Paraphrast's interpretation. That of Aspasius seems to make the words *ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον* useless. I understand Aristotle to argue that a friendship which rests on the single ground of the subjective *τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ* must be surpassed by one which rests on the double ground of *τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ* in perfect harmony with the objective *ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ.*

§ 5.] In this § Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 32) would transpose the b. 28. sentences *ἔοικε δ' . . . ἀφ' ἕξεως* and *καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται . . . καθ' ἕξιν*, on the ground that the sentence *ἔοικε δ' . . . ἀφ' ἕξεως* contains an explanation of the words *οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕξιν* b. 32.

**φίλησις**] *amor* or *amatio* (Victorius), as distinguished from *φιλία*

1157 b. 28. *amicitia.* In *E. N.* ii. 5. 2 *φιλία* is enumerated among the *πάθη*. But too much must not be made of a merely popular enumeration. Aristotle's fully considered theory of *φιλία* makes it a *ἕξις*, *i. e.* the result of the rational formation, or *εἰδοποίησις*, of certain natural affections, many of which may be conveniently brought under the general designation of *φίλησις*. See the notes of Zell, Fritzsche, Michelet, and Grant.

b. 30. **ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως**] This is not a very true or relevant remark if intended merely to bring out the difference between *φιλία* and *φίλησις*: *ἄψυχα* indeed cannot love in return, but there are many other objects of mere *φίλησις* which render *φίλησις* in return, *ἄνευ προαιρέσεως*, and even in many *φιλίαι* so called, viz. in many of those *δι' ἡδονήν* (*cf.* especially viii. 3. 5), love is mutually given *ἄνευ προαιρέσεως*. The words *ἀντιφιλοῦσι μετὰ προαιρέσεως* serve to distinguish not so much between *φιλία* and *φίλησις*, as between *ἡ τελεία φιλία* and the inferior kinds; and may well be intended as another argument in support of *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν* § 4. The latter half of § 5 is also in favour of making the subject of *ἀντιφιλοῦσι* especially *οἱ ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι*. Friends of the inferior kinds never indeed properly acquire a *ἕξις* of friendship at all. This is shown by the fact that their friendships come to an end as circumstances alter. A good *ἕξις* is that by which a man corresponds with his permanent environment—the world as reason apprehends it, which is the same for all men, and has a place for every man. The friendship of the good, as based on the recognition of an orderly system of life, is the only friendship which can be properly described as a *ἕξις*. The friendships for pleasure and profit, based as they are on the feelings of the isolated individual irrationally seeking his own gratification without regard for others who are as truly persons in a kingdom of ends as himself, may be characterised as friendships *κατὰ πάθος*.

b. 31. **καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕξιν**] *Βούλησις* is of the *τέλος* (iii. 2. 9), as distinguished from *τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*. But such a *τέλος*, being *good*, can be apprehended only by reason, not by sense or feeling. See Themistius, vol. ii. 208 (ed. Spengel) *ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ αἴσθησις ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι οὐχ οἵα τε οὐδὲ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνου τοῦ τέρποντος ἢ ἀνιῶντος, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦ νοῦ μόνου κρίνειν ἐστί.* The *apprehension* of a good end requiring reason, the *wish* to realise it, or the moral *interest* in it, requires a *ἕξις* or rational disposition of the desires. In the life of mere desire there is no such thing as an *end* in the true sense of the term.



1157 b. 31.

**τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ**] Williams brings out the meaning of this passage in its context correctly, I think, as follows—'And hence each friend not only loves that which is his own good, but also makes a perfectly equivalent return in the good which he wishes his friend, and in the pleasure which he yields him.' Here *βουλήσει* = 'the wish for the *good*' (*cf.* *καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται* above) naturally suggests *ἡδεῖ*, *i. e.* *τῷ ἁπλῶς ἡδεῖ*, which is always associated with *τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν*. *Cf.* viii. 3. 7 *τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστί.* b. 36.

The *Vet. Tr.* and pr. $L^b$ read *εἴδει*, which Zell, Fritzsche, Stahr, and Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 32) adopt. Zell writes—'Non enim solum amicus amico par omnino pari refert, ut uterque eandem alterum demerendi voluntatem habeat, sed genere et specie quoque paria refert, id est, bona pro bonis, suavia pro suavibus, pro utilibus utilia': and Stahr has—'Mithin liebt auf beiden Seiten jeder das für ihn selbst Gute und gewährt seinerseits durch seine Willensbestrebung das Gleiche auch in derselben Gattung.' Susemihl now reads *ἤθει* after Zeller (see Susemihl, *Eth. Eud.* append. p. 173). The MSS. perhaps do not help us to come to a decision in the case of two forms so similar in sound and appearance as *ἡδεῖ* and *εἴδει*: but apart from MSS., the weight of probability seems to me to be greatly in favour of *ἡδεῖ*, which would naturally occur to the writer as the constant concomitant of *ἀγαθόν*, the object of *βούλησις*. Grant's point too that *ἴσον εἴδει* would not be a natural expression, as confounding degree with kind, is worth noticing.

The Paraph. has *ἑκάτερος οὖν φιλεῖ ἑκάτερον, ὡς ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον, καὶ βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ ἡδύς ἐστιν ὁμοίως*: and Aspasius has words to the same effect.

**φιλότης ἰσότης**] This is the reading of $K^b$ adopted by Bywater. All other MSS. apparently read *ἡ* before *ἰσότης*. In *E. N.* ix. 8. 2 the proverb is given as *ἰσότης φιλότης*, and in *E. E.* H. 6. 1240 b. 2. In *E. N.* viii. 8. 5, however, we have *ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης.*

1157 b. 36. As Ramsauer remarks, the old proverb was doubtless ἰσότης φιλότης or φιλότης ἰσότης without the article: but Aristotle allowed himself to alter a proverb to suit his purpose; and it would be a mistake to suppose that here the sense makes it impossible to take ἰσότης as the subject. It is the predicate however, I take it, in the passage quoted by Fritzsche from Diog. L. viii. 1. 8 πρῶτος εἶπε Πυθαγόρας κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ φιλίαν ἰσότητα.

## CHAPTER VI.

### ARGUMENT.

*As for stiff-tempered and elderly people—the more difficult they are to get on with, and the less pleasure they take in one another's society, the less likely is friendship to spring up between them: for nothing is so characteristic of friendship and so productive of it, as taking pleasure in one another's society: this is what young people do: and therefore they become friends quickly: but not so old people—nor stiff-tempered people: nevertheless such people may be well disposed to one another (wishing one another good and helping one another in need); but they cannot properly be called friends, since they do not spend their time together or take pleasure in one another—thus failing to realise the two most characteristic traits of friendship.*

*To be a friend to many in the way of Perfect Friendship is impossible, just as it is impossible to be in love with many at the same time: for Perfect Friendship is an exalted state of feeling, and, as such, has naturally one person as its object; also it is not easy for many to afford the highest satisfaction to the same person: not to mention the difficulty of finding many who are good: moreover, there cannot be perfect friendship unless the friends know each other well, and have come to enter familiarly into each other's dispositions—a hard thing to do where only two persons are concerned, and much harder where many are concerned.*

*Where, however, the object of friendship is utility or pleasure, it is possible to have many friends; for useful and pleasant people are numerous, and the services rendered are quickly rendered.*

*Of the two inferior friendships that for pleasure resembles Perfect Friendship most when the same services are rendered by both parties, and they take pleasure in each other or in the same things—as young people do in their friendships: there is something liberal in these friendships, which distinguishes them from the friendship for utility—the friendship of business. Further, the Happy need, not useful friends (since their material wants are already otherwise provided for), but pleasant friends—*i. e. *they wish for persons with whom to associate intimately: pain and ennui they can bear for a little while; but no one would go on always enduring that which gave him pain—no, not even if it were the* summum bonum *itself. This is why the Happy seek to have their friends pleasant: they ought of course to seek to have them good as well as pleasant—good both absolutely and relatively; thus their friendship will have all that perfect friendship requires—the good, the pleasant, and the useful or relatively good.*

*Men of wealth and station have their friends in distinct sets: they have useful friends and pleasant friends, and it seldom happens that the same friends are both useful and pleasant—able subordinates, and amusing companions: the good man is indeed, as we have said, both pleasant and useful; but the good man does not allow himself to become the friend of one who is his superior, unless the superiority be in goodness as well as in wealth and station; for if the superiority were in wealth and station only, the good man could not compensate for his inferiority by any proportionate return. High station and goodness, however, seldom go together.*

*The imperfect friendships mentioned are 'friendships between equals': equals render to each other the same things, or exchange one thing for another,* e. g. *pleasure for profit. They are thought to be or not to be 'friendships' according as they are viewed as resembling or as differing from the standard friendship. They are thought to be friendships, because they are for pleasure or profit, since the standard friendship—that based on virtue—has its elements of pleasure and profit; but in so far as the friendship based on virtue is proof against slander, and lasting, while the friendships for pleasure and profit quickly pass away and differ from the friendship based on virtue in many other respects, they are not thought to be 'friendships.'*



§ 1.] Fritzsche brackets this § as being merely a repetition of viii. 5. 1158 a. 1. 2, 3. Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 24, 25), after printing the *gemini loci* in parallel columns, leaves it undecided whether the first or the second ought to be bracketed. Against the claim of the first passage to stand he notes the point, overlooked by Fritzsche, that just that part of it which is *not* repeated here occurs again in another passage—ch. 6. § 4 καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ· συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐθεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη. On the other hand he thinks it undeniable that the second passage connects itself less naturally with what precedes it than the first passage does. Susemihl agrees with Rassow in leaving it undecided which of the *gemini loci* ought to be bracketed.

πρεσβυτικοῖς] Spengel (*Aristotelische Studien* i. p. 215) asks a. 2. why πρεσβύταις should not be read as below in this §, and in ch. 5. § 2. Victorius contends that πρεσβυτικοῖς is intentionally employed,

1158 a. 2. as Aristotle in this passage (as distinguished from 5. § 2) regards the disposition rather than the years of the old men in question—'neque enim cuncti hujus aetatis sunt difficiles.'

a. 3. **ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας**] Ramsauer regards these words as spurious, finding nothing to which *ταῦτα* can be satisfactorily referred. Fritzsche refers *ταῦτα* to *ὁμιλίαις* by a loose construction not uncommon in Aristotle's writings. Ramsauer notices the circumstance that the words *ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά* at the end of this § say the same thing as the words which he brackets as spurious. I would call attention to the circumstance (whatever it may indicate) that *three* passages end with similar expressions—viz. ch. 5. § 3 *μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ* **δοκεῖ** *ἔχειν*, ch. 6. § 1. 1158 a. 3 *ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις* **χαίρουσιν**· *ταῦτα γὰρ* **δοκεῖ** *μάλιστ' εἶναι* **φιλικὰ** *καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας*, and ch. 6. § 1. 1158 a. 9 *μηδὲ* **χαίρειν** *ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι* **δοκεῖ φιλικά**.

a. 8. **φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσί**] 'They cannot properly be called *friends*.'

a. 12. **§ 2. ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ**] Fritzsche is wrong, I think, in making *τὸ ἐρᾶν* the subject of *ἔοικε*. The Paraph. gives the sense of the passage rightly—*πολλοῖς δὲ φίλον εἶναι τὸν σπουδαῖον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα δυνατόν. ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τίς ἐστι φιλίας ἡ τελεία φιλία. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι.* In keeping with this interpretation Aspasius says *λεκτέον δ' ὑπερβολὴν τὴν κατὰ τὸ εὖ*. *Cf. E. N.* ii. 6. 17, where *ἀρετή* is said to be *κατὰ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης*. As Coraes says, *ἡ γὰρ τελεία φιλία . . . φιλιῶν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκροτάτη, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῆς ὑπερτέρα ἄλλη φιλία.* Perfect friendship is 'an exalted state.' In ix. 10. 5, however, which resembles this passage closely, *τὸ ἐρᾶν* is *ὑπερβολή τις φιλίας*.

a. 14. **ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι**] *sc. πολλοὺς ῥᾴδιον*.

a. 16. **§ 3. πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν**] Ramsauer conjectures *πολλούς*: unnecessarily, for *πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν* means simply, as Aspasius says, *πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλους*. His commentary is—*διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐνδέχεται πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλους· καὶ γὰρ πολὺ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων γένος, ἔτι οὐδὲ πολλοῦ χρόνου δεῖ οὐδ' ἐξετάσεως· ἐν ὀλίγῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ εὐθέως φανεραὶ γίνονται αἱ περὶ τῶν χρησίμων καὶ τῶν ἡδέων ὑπηρεσίαι, καὶ καταμάθοι ἄν τις ταχέως τὸν αὐτῷ ἡδὺν ἢ χρήσιμον. ὅταν δὲ μηκέτι γένηται τούτων ὁποτεροῦν, λύεται ἡ φιλία· ἐν ὀλίγῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ συστᾶσα, καὶ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει ὀλιγοχρόνιον.*



**§ 4. ἔοικε φιλίᾳ**] The MSS. read *φιλία*, but Asp. and the Paraph. *φιλίᾳ*, which is adopted by Victorius, Ramsauer, and Bywater. 1158 a. 18.

**τὸ ἐλευθέριον**] 'a generous spirit' (Peters). a. 21.

**καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δέ**] On *καὶ—δέ* see Eucken, *de Arist. dic. rat.* p. 32—'adjungit autem *καὶ—δέ* rem novam, saepe tam leni modo ut idem fere valeat atque *τε*.' It is most frequent in *E. N.* iv, viii, ix, x. a. 22.

**οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν**] 'If Aristotle had been capable of a joke, we must have considered this to be meant as such' (Grant). a. 24.

**δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς**] 'The *μακάριοι* require their friends to be *pleasant*: but they ought to require them to be *good* too, as well as pleasant (*τοιούτους ὄντας* = *ἡδεῖς ὄντας*), and also *useful* (lit. good for themselves); for thus they will have *all* that belongs to true friendship.' This rendering represents Rassow's (*Forsch.* p. 83) view of the interpretation of these words. With *ἔτι καὶ αὐτοῖς* he supplies *ἀγαθούς*, regarding the phrase as equivalent to *χρησίμους*. Thus to supply *ἀγαθούς* after *ἔτι καὶ αὐτοῖς* (*cf.* the Paraph. *τοὺς φίλους οἱ σπουδαῖοι ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀγαθοὺς ὄντας, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθούς*, with whom Ramsauer, Williams and Peters agree) is obviously correct, although I think it would not be right to press (if indeed Rassow does so) the identity of *αὐτοῖς ἀγαθούς* with *χρησίμους* in the more material sense of the latter term. It has just been stated that the material wants of the *μακάριοι* are fully supplied—that they do not need merely useful friends, *χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται*. Stahr seems to give the true sense of the passage when he writes—'Freilich sollten sie wohl auch dazu Menschen nehmen, die nicht nur an sich gute, sondern auch für sie selbst sittlich fördernd sind.' To supply *ἡδεῖς* after *ἔτι αὐτοῖς* with Fritzsche and Grant is, I think, quite inadmissible; *ἀγαθούς* evidently being the dominating thought of the clause beginning *δεῖ δ' ἴσως*, as *ἡδεῖς* was of the clause beginning *διό* a. 25. After *ἀγαθούς* a. 26 Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 84) supplies *καθ' ἑαυτούς*, which he considers necessary to bring out the opposition to *αὐτοῖς* (*ἀγαθούς*), and Susemihl introduces *καθ' ἑαυτούς* into his text. a. 26.

**§ 5. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις**] *λέγει δ' ἐν ἐξουσίαις τοὺς τυράννους* (Asp.). a. 27.

**χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά**] *οἱ ἐνάρετοι* (Asp.). a. 30.

1158 a. 32. **δεινούς**] After *δεινούς* Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 84) conjectures that *εἰς τό* has fallen out. Bywater's suggestion however (*Contrib.* p. 60)—to 'take *τοὺς δέ* to mean "others," and understand *δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν* to be a kind of predicate after *ζητοῦσι*'—seems to meet the difficulty.

a. 34. **§ 6. ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι κ.τ.λ.**] Aspasius gives the more generally accepted interpretation of this passage—*ὑπερέχοντος οὐ γίνεται φίλος ὁ σπουδαῖος ἂν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται ὁ ὑπερέχων κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. δεῖ δὲ οὕτως ἀκούειν τοῦ ὑπερέχεσθαι τὸν δυνάστην, ὥστε καὶ εἰδέναι, καὶ ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν σπουδαῖον ὡς πρὸς κρείττονα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται ἡ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ἰσότης, ἂν οἴηται μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχειν, θαυμάζοι δὲ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ὡς κατ' ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ διαφέροντα.* This view, according to which the subject of *ὑπερέχηται* is *ὁ ὑπερέχων* (*κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν*), is accepted by the Paraphrast, Victorius, Lambinus, Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche, Michelet, Stahr, Williams, and Peters.

As for *ὑπερεχόμενος* a. 36—some of these commentators make it the great man or prince, and others the good man: the Paraph. *e. g.* makes it the good man—*οὕτω γὰρ ἐξισάζει ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ κατ' ἐξουσίαν ὑπερέχοντι, ἀνάλογον ὑπερέχων καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος.*[1] Coraes on the other hand makes *ὑπερεχόμενος* the great man or prince—*εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπερέχοιτο ὁ ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ σπουδαίου, οὐκ ἰσάζει τῷ σπουδαίῳ* (*οὐ γίγνεται φίλος δηλαδή, εἴ γε ἐν ἰσότητι ἡ φιλία*) *ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος, τουτέστι τοσοῦτον ἀρετῇ ὑπερεχόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ σπουδαίου, ὅσον ἐκείνου ὑπερέχει κατ' ἐξουσίαν.*

According, then, to the view of Aspasius and most other commentators, Aristotle means to tell us here that the good man will not become the friend of a superior in rank and power unless that superior is his inferior in goodness—or, to use Grant's words, 'a good man would not be a friend to a potentate, if that potentate had superior moral qualities.' This cannot be Aristotle's meaning. Grant, Ramsauer, and Jackson (*Arist. Nic. Eth. Book* v, p. 91) are undoubtedly right in making *ὁ σπουδαῖος*, not *ὁ ὑπερέχων*, the subject of *ὑπερέχηται*, and rendering—'the good man does not become the friend of a superior in rank and power unless he is surpassed in goodness, as well as in rank and power, by that superior.' The awkwardness of making the subject of *ὑπερέχηται* different from that of *γίνεται* is thus avoided, and account is taken of the force of *καί* before *τῇ ἀρετῇ*, ignored by the other rendering.

[1] So also Fritzsche, reading *ὁ ὑπερεχόμενος* without MS. authority.



As for *εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος*—Grant, Ramsauer, 1158 a. 34.
and Jackson agree that *ὁ σπουδαῖος* is still the subject; but Jackson alone seems to me to have got the meaning of the clause clearly:—'because otherwise the inferior will not feel for the superior that love and regard by which alone he can requite superior services.' *Cf. E. N.* viii. 7. 2 *ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεταί πως ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ. Cf.* also viii. 8. 1. The equality found in *αἱ φιλίαι αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν* could not be realised in such a case of inferiority as that of a poor good man to a bad (or not good) rich man, for the poor good man would not be warranted in repaying the great material benefits, which he might receive from the rich man, with an amount of love and esteem equal to them. Between a poor good man and a very good rich man equal reciprocation, and therefore a friendly relation, is indeed possible; but—rich men are seldom very good—*οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι* (*sc. οἱ ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις*, Asp.)

The clause *εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος* may be rendered—'for if this be not so, he (the poor good man) cannot put himself on an equal footing by compensating for his inferiority'—*i. e.* by making a proportionate return for the benefits which he, in his inferior position, receives. I take *ἀνάλογον* with *ὑπερεχόμενος*: see the Paraph. (*ἀνάλογον ὑπερέχων καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος*) and Coraes quoted above, and *cf.* viii. 13. 1 *τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους* (*sc. δεῖ*) *τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι.*

Peters' contention that *ὁ σπουδαῖος* cannot be the subject of *ὑπερέχηται*, because '*the* ideally good man cannot be surpassed in virtue,' would have force if it were necessary to assume that Aristotle has here in view '*the* ideally good man.'

**§ 7. εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι**] *i. e.* these *φιλίαι*, b. 1.
as they have been hitherto described, are *ἐν ἰσότητι*: but all three may be also *καθ' ὑπεροχήν*—see viii. 13. 1 *τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν* (*καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες*), *τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι.*

1158 b. 10. **ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς**] *e. g.* they may subsist between bad men, they may include many persons.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Another class of friendships is that of the friendships between unequals—between father and son—and generally between elder and younger; between husband and wife—and generally between ruler and ruled. These friendships differ from each other—that of parents for children is not the same as that of rulers for ruled; and, further, the friendship of father for son is not the same as that of son for father, or of husband for wife the same as that of wife for husband; for the goodness and the function of the husband or father are not the same as the goodness and the function of the wife or son, and the reasons for which each feels friendship to each are different. The services rendered by each differing, there will be a fair and lasting friendship when children render to parents, and parents to children, those things which are due to parents and children respectively. The affection also in all these friendships between unequals ought to be 'in proportion' on each side—*i. e. *the better or the more useful ought to be loved more than he loves: for when there is affection in proportion to desert then, in a way, equality is produced—equality the great mark of friendship.*

*Equality is not the same in Justice and in Friendship. In justice proportionate equality is of primary, and absolute equality of secondary importance; in friendship absolute equality comes first, and proportionate equality takes the second place. This is shown by the fact that if the distance,* c. g. *in goodness or wealth, between the parties becomes great, they cease to be friends, or even to think of each other as friends. The clearest case is the relation between the gods and men; other cases are the relation between kings and their subjects, and that between men who are very good and very wise and those who are good for nothing. It is impossible to define exactly the distance at which people may still be friends: they may still be friends though the distance is considerable; but not if it be that at which the gods stand from men. Hence the question—Whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest good? Surely they do not wish them to become gods, and to cease to be their friends,* i. e. *their good. If we were right in saying that a friend wishes good things for his friend for his friend's sake, then his friend must remain what he is: a friend will wish the greatest of good things for his friend* as a man; *but perhaps not all these good things; the very greatest of them he will wish for himself.*

b. 12. **§ 1. τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν**] 'another kind of friendship in which the persons are unequal'—Peters.



**διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων**] *i. e.* as well as generally from **ἐν ἰσότητι.** 1158 b. 14.

**§ 2. καὶ τὴν φίλησιν**] Aspasius notices the *καί* before *φίλησιν*, but scarcely helps us to understand its force—*ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν φιλίαις οὐ μόνον τὴν φιλίαν δεῖ εἶναι ἀνάλογον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φίλησιν· καὶ σχεδὸν διὰ τὴν φίλησιν καὶ ἡ φιλία ἕξει ἀνάλογον.* I would explain as follows — The *ἰσότης* realised in these *φιλίαι καθ' ὑπεροχήν* is not merely that of a fair commercial *συνάλλαγμα*, in which equivalent amounts of different wares are exchanged; it is the *ἰσότης* of **φιλία**—the superior does not give merely assistance in return for the equivalent amount of respect which he receives from the inferior; he gives *φίλησις* as well—since he is the other's *φίλος*—and expects a proper return of *φίλησις*. The mutual exchange of *φίλησις* between the superior and inferior is indeed more characteristic of their friendship than the exchange of assistance and respect—materially necessary though the latter exchange may be to their 'friendship.' But in this mutual exchange of *φίλησις* the difference between superior and inferior must not be lost sight of—*οἷον* (here = *i. e.* not *e. g.*) *τὸν ἀμείνω* (*sc.* *δεῖ*) *μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν.* b. 29.

**§ 3.**] The essential thing in Justice is that every man shall get his due whatever that happens to be; the essential thing in Friendship is equality. Justice does not care how unequal the persons are, but gives them their due shares; whereas strict equality between the persons is required by the highest kind of Friendship, and although there are Friendships so-called in a secondary sense (*δευτέρως* b. 33), viz. *αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν* in which the absence of strict equality is compensated for by 'proportionate equality,' yet this compensation is possible only within certain limits. If the real inequality becomes very great *φιλία* also becomes impossible. See the Par. *ad loc.* *ἐὰν κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ἀνάλογον γίνηται ἡ διανομὴ δικαία ἐστί, κἂν σφόδρα τῷ ποσῷ διαφέρει οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸν τοῦ δικαίου σώζεσθαι λόγον, εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἴση εἴη καὶ μὴ ἀνάλογον οὐ δύναται εἶναι δικαία· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς φιλίας ἀνάπαλιν* κ.τ.λ. *Cf.* Grant's good note *ad loc.* b. 29.

**§ 4. διάστημα**] *τὸ κατὰ ποσὸν ἴσον* is primary in Friendship, otherwise Friendship would not be destroyed by **διάστημα.** b. 33.

1158 b. 35. **ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν**] Fritzsche compares *M. M.* ii. 11. 1208 b. 30 *ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη, εἴ τις φαίη φιλεῖν τὸν Δία.*

1159 a. 4. **§ 5. οἱ φίλοι**] Ramsauer and Susemihl bracket *οἱ*. The former however suspects the words *ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι*. Byw. suggests *ἡ φιλία* for *οἱ φίλοι*, thus getting a subject for *μένει*; see *Contrib.* p. 60.

a. 8. **§ 6. οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά**] *sc. εἰσι*, not as Zell and Fritzsche suggest, *βούλονται*. See Rassow, *Forsch.* p. 67. Rassow (followed by Sus. and Byw.) reads *οὐ* (with $K^b$, $M^b$, Γ) for *οὐδέ* before *γὰρ ἔτι* a. 7.

a. 12. **αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' κ.τ.λ.**] Asp. says *ἃ δ' ἑξῆς λέγει φάσκων τὸν φίλον αὑτῷ μάλιστα βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, οὐ περὶ τῶν τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν ἐχόντων εἴρηται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ὁμωνύμως λεγομένων φίλων· λέγει δ' ἑξῆς τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν κ.τ.λ.* Fritzsche also thinks that the inferior friendships are here referred to. But see *E. N.* ix. 8, where the conclusion is reached—*τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι.*

## CHAPTER VIII.

### Argument.

*Most men are ambitious of the honour of being loved more than they love (this is why the majority of men love flatterers); being loved is very nearly the same thing, in their view, as being honoured; and to be honoured is what the majority of men strive after. But honour is not sought for itself. The majority of men take pleasure in receiving it from persons who have much in their power, because they recognise it as the sign of the advantages which they hope for; while others seek to be honoured by good men who are connoisseurs of goodness, in order that they may have confirmation of their own good opinion about themselves. To be loved, on the other hand, gives men pleasure in itself. Accordingly to be loved is a better thing, it would seem, than to be honoured, and friendship is something in itself choiceworthy. But by 'friendship' we mean 'loving' rather than 'being loved.' The love of mothers for their young children by whom they cannot be loved in return may help us to see that friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved: this being so, and those who 'love their friends' being praised, it follows that 'loving one another' is the virtue of friends; and those who do this in proportion to desert are lasting friends. It is by this loving in proportion to desert that those who are not*



*equals may be made equals and so friends. Equality and similarity is Friendship—especially similarity in Virtue. Virtuous men are stable in themselves, and remain stable friends to one another, neither seeking for themselves, nor helping one another to, anything that is evil—nay, trying to keep one another out of evil. But wicked men have no stability. They do not remain long the same; they become friends to one another for a short time, pleased with one another's wickedness. Those whose friendship is for utility or pleasure remain friends longer—that is, as long as advantage or pleasure is forthcoming.*

*The friendship of utility seems especially to arise out of contraries*—e. g. *it arises between rich men and poor men, between the man who knows and the man who is ignorant. Under this head too may be brought that between lover and beloved, between one who is beautiful and one who is plain. Hence lovers sometimes make themselves ridiculous by expecting to be loved as much as they love, although they are not equally loveable. But perhaps the one contrary does not seek the other as such, but only* per accidens*—the mean being the real object of desire: for the mean is good; thus the good for the 'dry' is not to become 'wet,' but to reach the mean.*

1159 a. 14. **§ 1. ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ**] We see from this that the *ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος* of viii. 6. 6 effects the equality required in friendship by rendering more love than he receives.

a. 15. **προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος**] Bekker's *εἶναι* after *τοιοῦτος*, omitted by Byw., seems to have no MS. authority. NC reads *προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτο.*

a. 17. **§ 2.**] Grant compares *E. N.* i. 5. 5.

a. 25. **§§ 2–3. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν κ.τ.λ.**] See the Par. *ad loc. ἔστι δὴ οὐ μόνον τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δι' ἑαυτὸ αἱρετόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν, καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ βέλτιον.* To be loved is better than to be honoured. Thus *φιλία*, looked at even on its passive side, stands very high in the scale of human good things. But active love is its true mark—*δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι* (§ 3). The *ἐνέργεια* of *τὸ φιλεῖν*, proceeding from the virtuous *ἕξις* of *φιλία*, brings the good man, *quâ φίλος*, into 'the intelligible world' of active reason, as distinguished from the region of passive feeling. If we consider in this connexion the doctrine which Aristotle shares with Plato, that reason in all its flights is moved and sustained by love, we can see what a high place in the Aristotelian Metaphysic of Ethics *φιλία* occupies. Here, however, its place is merely indicated; in Book ix it is more accurately determined. *Cf. M. M.* ii. 11. 1210 b. 6 *ἔστι δὲ βέλτιον τὸ φιλεῖν ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν ἐνέργειά τις ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι οὐδεμία τῷ*

1159 a. 25. φιλουμένῳ ἐνέργεια γίγνεται· ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον τὸ γνωρίζειν ἢ γνωρίζεσθαι . . . ἔτι τὸ εὐποιητικὸν εἶναι βέλτιων ἢ μή· ὁ μὲν οὖν φιλῶν εὐποιητικὸς ἢ φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλούμενος ᾧ φιλεῖται οὔ. *Cf.* Aspasius on viii. 8. 3 ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλία ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖσθαι· μᾶλλον δὲ δοκεῖ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια ἑκατέρων τῶν φίλων ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργεια· ἕκαστος δὲ περὶ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι περὶ ὃ ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

a. 33. § 4.] Those who actively love their friends are *praised*; so, loving is the true *virtue* of friends. See *E. N.* i. 13. 19 τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

b. 1. § 5. οὕτω δ' ἄν κ.τ.λ.] ἄνισοι are equalised τῷ φιλεῖν ἀνάλογον—thus

ὑπερέχων : ὑπερεχόμενος :: ἡ τοῦ ὑπερεχομένου φίλησις : ἡ τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος φίλησις.

b. 3. τῶν κατ' ἀρετήν] '*sc.* φίλων' (Ramsauer): but it seems better to understand ὁμοίων.

b. 6. ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καί] 'nay rather, I ought to say . . .'

b. 20. § 7. ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός] οὐ γάρ, καθὸ φιλοῦσιν ἄλληλα, ἐναντία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίοις εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πένης ἐρᾷ τοῦ πλουσίου ὅτι ὠφέλιμός ἐστιν αὐτῷ καὶ χρήσιμος (Paraph.).

ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν] *Cf. E. N.* ii. 6. 9 ἡ ἀρετή . . . . ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. 'Correspondence with environment' is the law of life.

## CHAPTER IX.

### ARGUMENT.

*The sphere of justice and of friendship is the same. Every association or common undertaking has its kind of justice, and consequently its kind of friendship. Thus men speak of their fellow-soldiers as their 'friends.' As far as their common undertaking extends, so far does their friendship extend. Thus the proverb 'Friends have things in common' is true.*

*Brothers and comrades have all things in common: other friends have more or less in common, for some friendships are greater than others; and as the friendships vary, so does the justice in each case. The justice which a parent owes to his child differs from that which brothers owe one another—or, again, comrades—or fellow-citizens: injustice is aggravated in proportion as it is done to a nearer friend. This shows that justice and friendship have the same sphere.*

*All associations or common undertakings are parts of the great association of the Commonwealth. As the association of the Commonwealth sprang up and is maintained in order to secure the common good of its members, so each of these particular associations exists in order to secure some particular good. It is the common good (identical with that which is just) which legislators aim at; the minor associations aim at some particular good—*e. g. *business associations at wealth, military associations at victory. There are other associations again which are for pleasure—clubs, and guilds, and festivals in which the worship of the gods is combined with relaxation: it is to be noted that the ancient religious assemblies were harvest festivals, for the time immediately after harvest was the time at which people had most leisure. These associations then for worship and relaxation are parts of the great association of the Commonwealth which looks not to the advantage of the day but to that of the whole of life. Each of these associations has its own kind of friendship.*



§ 1. ἐν ἀρχῇ] viii. 1. 4, according to Asp. 1159 b. 25.

ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς] 'between the same persons': see Asp.—ἐν τοῖς b. 26.
αὐτοῖς· οἷον φιλία ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ⟨συσ⟩στρατιώταις . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ⟨τὰ⟩ αὐτά· περὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ γάρ κ.τ.λ.

καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον] *sc.* ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι καθ' ὅσον κοινωνοῦσι b. 30.
(Fritzsche).

§ 3. τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι] πρωθυστέρως ἀντὶ τοῦ τῷ πρὸς 1160 a. 4.
φίλους μᾶλλον εἶναι (Coraes).

αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον] διαφέρει τὸ ἐν a. 7.
τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς, αὔξησιν δὲ λαμβάνει τὸ δίκαιον τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους γίνεσθαι· βουλόμενος δὲ τοῦτο δεῖξαι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐπιχειρεῖ· εἰ γὰρ δεινότερον τὸ χρημάτων ἀποστερῆσαι ἑταῖρον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ τὸ πρὸς φίλους γινόμενον δίκαιον καὶ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν, εἰ δ' αὔξεται ἡ φιλία, αὔξεται καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα (Asp.).

§§ 4, 5, 6.] Since, ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἡ φιλία (§ 1), the various associations a. 8.
(κοινωνίαι) included in the commonwealth (πολιτικὴ κοινωνία), all of them subserving its end—the public good, by means of their own special ends (whether these special ends be described as useful or pleasant), involve their corresponding friendships.

§ 4. καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ a. 11.
ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν] Zell and Fritzsche remind us that this

1160 a. 11. is not a complete statement of Aristotle's theory of the origin and maintenance of society, and refer to *Pol.* iii. 4. 1278 b. 20 *φύσει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν· διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἔλαττον ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς.* Ramsauer refers to *Pol.* i. 1. 1252 b. 29 *γινομένη τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.* *Cf.* also *Pol.* iii. 5. 1280 a. 25 *εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι τῆς πόλεως ὅσονπερ τὸ τῆς κτήσεως· ὥσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν . . . εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἕνεκεν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὖ ζῆν . . . μήτε συμμαχίας ἕνεκεν, ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους . . . περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν, ὅτι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας κ.τ.λ.* Comparing the passage before us (*E. N.* viii. 9. 4) with the passages quoted from the *Politics* we observe (1) that according to Aristotle's complete theory other and more powerful causes than the perception of material advantage brought men into social union, and keep them in it; and (2) that *τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον* is a wide expression including *τὸ καλόν*, and not to be identified with the 'useful' as distinguished from the 'noble and good.'

a. 13. **οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται**] *Cf. E. N.* v. 1. 13.

**φασιν**] so Aristotle himself—*Pol.* iii. 4. 1279 a. 17 *φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθαὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον.*

a. 17. **§ 5. πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι**] as colonists or as exiles—Ramsauer.

a. 19. **ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι**] The Par. takes pains to show that even those associations which seem to have pleasure as their end, ultimately subserve *τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*, because *ἀναπαύσεις μεθ' ἡδονῆς* are necessary to the proper performance of earnest work. *τινὲς δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφίενται . . . ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν θιασωτῶν κοινωνία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐρανιστῶν . . . καὶ αὗται δὲ μέρη εἰσὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς· τάττονται γὰρ καὶ αὗται πρὸς τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον ὑπὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὃ νῦν ἐστὶ συμφέρον ζητεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὃ νῦν μὲν οὐ συμφέρει, συνοίσει δέ, καὶ τοῦτο διώκει . . . διὰ τοῦτο θυσίας τε εἰσήγαγε καὶ συνόδους καὶ συνουσίας μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ πόνων ἀναπαύσεις· μετὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς αἵ τε σύνοδοι ἐγίνοντο καὶ αἱ θυσίαι, ἀπαρχαί τινες οὖσαι· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς· διὰ δὴ τούτων τῶν κοινωνιῶν τό τε θεῖον ἴλεων αὐτοῖς ἐγίνετο, ὃ συνοίσειν ἐδόκει, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναπαυόμενοι, νεαροὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ συμφέροντος πόνων ἥπτοντο. Διὰ τοῦτο*



*φαίνεται ὅτι πᾶσα κοινωνία, καὶ ἡ ἡδέος ἕνεκα γινομένη, καὶ ἡ τοῦ συμ-* 1160 a. 19. *φέροντος, τὸ συμφέρον ἔσχατον ἔχει τέλος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶσαι μέρη εἰσὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς.*

**θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν**] 'The members of religious guilds and social clubs.' The *θίασος* was a guild of persons who danced along the streets in procession, and joined in sacrificial feasts in honour of a god—especially Bacchus. An *ἔρανος* was a social club in which each member made his contribution (*συμβολή*) to the common fund.

**θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες κ.τ.λ.**] Fritzsche (followed by Grant) omits a. 23. Bekker's full stop after *συνουσίας*, makes the words *οὐ γάρ* a. 21–a. 23 *τὸν βίον* parenthetical, and refers the participles *ποιοῦντες* &c. to *κοινωνοί* implied in *κοινωνιῶν* above.

Michelet refers them to *φυλέται καὶ δημόται*, regarding *ἔνιαι* a. 19–a. 23 *τὸν βίον* as parenthetical. I am more inclined to adopt Susemihl's suggestion that something has dropped out between *τὸν βίον* and *θυσίας τε* a. 23; perhaps, as Bywater suggests (see *Journ. of Philol.* vol. xvii. p. 69), *ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, ⟨αἱ⟩ θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· οὗτοι γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας* a. 19, 20. The point of the passage is excellently brought out by Peters—'But all these associations seem to be subordinate to the association of citizens; for the association of citizens seems to have for its aim, not the interests of the moment, but the interests of our whole life, even when its members celebrate festivals and hold gatherings on such occasions, and render honour to the gods, and provide recreation and amusement for themselves.' And in a note he adds—'It is the institution of the State which gives a permanent significance to these amusements of a day.'

## CHAPTER X.

### ARGUMENT.

*Constitutions are of three species—kingly rule, aristocracy, and timocracy. In each of these the end of government is the common good. But there is, corresponding to each of these three, a degraded form in which the good of the governing power is made the end of government. Thus tyranny is the degradation of kingly rule—the tyrant is the bad king who rules for his own*

*advantage; oligarchy, of aristocracy—the few, who are rich, rule in the interest of their own class; and democracy, of timocracy—the moderate property qualification recognised in timocracy is abolished. Of these degraded forms tyranny is the worst, because it is the contrary of the best—kingly rule; and democracy is the least bad, for it does not involve a very great declension from timocracy, since timocracy itself is the rule of the many*—i. e. *of those who are equals in virtue of coming up to a moderate property qualification.*

*Of all these constitutional forms we have analogues in the Family. The relation of the father to his children corresponds to kingly rule—thus, Homer calls Zeus, Father: and where, as in Persia, a father treats his children as slaves we have a relation which corresponds to tyranny. The relation between husband and wife corresponds to aristocracy, for the husband rules the wife in those things in which his superiority entitles him to rule her; where he takes all power into his own hands his rule becomes like oligarchy: sometimes again the domestic oligarchy is that of the wife, if she be an heiress. The relation between brothers corresponds to timocracy: brothers are equals except in so far as age makes a difference. The analogue of democracy is, for the most part, found in households which are without a head or where the ruler is weak and the members are allowed to do as they please.*

1160 a. 31. **§ 1. πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις**] See *Pol.* iii. 5. 1279 a. 22 sqq. and *Pol.* iv. 2. 1289 a. 26. Grant and Ramsauer think that this chapter can hardly have been written after the *Politics*: see their notes *ad loc.*

a. 34. **πολιτείαν δ' αὐτήν κ.τ.λ.**] 'constitutional government' (Peters). Ἡ ἐκ τιμημάτων is called πλουτοκρατία in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6. 12.

b. 6. **§ 2. μὴ τοιοῦτος**] μὴ αὐτάρκης.

**κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἴη βασιλεύς**] Fritzsche supposes the reference to be to the αἰσυμνήτης mentioned in *Pol.* iii. 9. 1285 a. 31, or αἱρετὸς τύραννος. But Coraes is more probably right with **κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἴη βασιλεύς**, *καθάπερ ὁ πρῶτος τῶν ἐννέα κληρωτῶν ἀρχόντων Ἀθήνησιν ἐπωνυμάζετο βασιλεύς*. Peters and Ramsauer adopt this interpretation, the latter quoting Plato, *Polit.* 291 A *τούτους τε τοίνυν τοὺς κληρωτοὺς βασιλέας ἅμα καὶ ἱερέας*, and 290 E *καὶ δὴ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν . . . τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεῖ φασὶ τῇδε τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιῶν ἀποδεδόσθαι*.

All recorded sources except $O^b$ and NC read ἤ after εἴη: this reading requires μᾶλλον to be supplied: see the Paraph. *ὁ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἔχων κληρωτὸς μᾶλλον ἄν τις εἴη ἢ βασιλεύς*.

b. 8. **καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη**] According to Ramsauer and Peters this means that it is more evident from an inspection of



τυραννὶς that it is the worst, than it is evident from an inspection of 1160 b. 8.
βασιλεία that it is the best form of government. Surely this is not the meaning. Nothing can be more evident, on Aristotle's principles, than that βασιλεία is the best form of government. The comparison in φανερώτερον is between the worst of the ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι, viz. τιμοκρατία (see above, 1160 a. 36 χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία), and the worst of the παρεκβάσεις, viz. τυραννίς. The latter is quite plainly the worst on its side because it is ἐναντίον to βασιλεία which is the best of all forms; whereas it is not so plain that τιμοκρατία is the worst on its side, because the difference between it and βασιλεία does not amount to ἐναντιότης.

**§ 3. μεταβαίνει**] impersonal = ἡ μεταβολὴ γίνεται, according to b. 10.
Ramsauer; but the Paraph. makes ἡ πολιτεία the subject—a construction supported by ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν at the end of the present section.

**καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία**] *i.e.* timocracy, as well as democracy, is a b. 18.
government of the many: see *Pol.* iii. 5. 1279 a. 37 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία.

**παρεκβαίνει**] taken transitively in the *Ind. Arist.*, and by the b. 20.
Paraph., Ramsauer, and Fritzsche. The term παρέκβασις seems to have been derived from the terminology of music: see *E. E.* H. 9. 1241 b. 28 πολιτεῖαι . . . καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις: and *Pol.* Θ. 7. 1342 a. 22 εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσί, καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα: on which see Susemihl's *Arist. Politik*, note 1098.

Democracy is the least evil of the debased forms (ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστι ἡ δημοκρατία), because it arises out of a form in which the governing body is large. In timocracy the governing body, being the majority of the people, governs for the good not of itself—the majority—but for the good of the whole State, the minority included. In democracy the majority governs for its own good, and neglects the rights of the minority. But still in democracy the rights and interests of the *majority*, at least, are attended to; whereas in tyranny and oligarchy, where the governing body is very small, the majority is oppressed. On the principle there-

1160 b. 20. fore of 'the greatest good of the greatest number,' the deflection implied in tyranny or oligarchy is a much more serious evil than that implied in democracy. But extremes meet. There is a form of Democracy in which everything is determined by *ψηφίσματα*, and not by *νόμος*. This form of Democracy, which Aristotle (*Pol.* Δ. 4. 1292 a. 4 sqq.) compares to tyranny, must be excepted from the application of the judgment *ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστι ἡ δημοκρατία*, and may have been present to the mind of Aspasius when he wrote—*εἰ καθ' αὑτὸ σκοπήσεις, χείρω ἂν εὑρήσεις τὴν δημοκρατίαν τῶν ἑτέρων· εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντες ἄρχουσιν, ἐν τῇ τυραννίδι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ὀλίγοι, τῇ δὲ εἷς· χεῖρον δέ ἐστι τὸ πολλοὺς φαύλους ἄρχειν ἢ καὶ ὀλίγους ἢ καὶ ἕνα.*

b. 21. **μάλισθ' οὕτως**] 'These then are the ways in which the several constitutions are most apt to change' (Peters); 'most apt,' for, there are other ways, as Aristotle himself points out in *Pol.* Θ, *e.g.* tyrannies sometimes arise directly out of oligarchies or democracies: democracies directly out of tyrannies. See Ramsauer *ad loc.*

b. 22. **§ 4. ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα**] 'analogues and, as it were, patterns.'

The parallels drawn in §§ 4, 5 and 6 differ in value and suggestiveness. Those drawn between the normal conjugal relation and aristocracy, and the abnormal conjugal relation and oligarchy are perhaps more ingenious than useful; but on the other hand, those drawn between the father and the king, between the master and the tyrant, between brothers and the members of a timocracy or democracy, rest upon a true view of the natural history of society.

The clan or village-community with its Chief (*βασιλεύς*) is the expansion of the house with its Father: see *Pol.* i. 1. 1252 b. 17 *ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας . . . οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ὁμογάλακτας παῖδάς τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον· πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου· ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.* *Cf. Pol.* i. 5. 1259 b. 10 *ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν, εἰπών*

*πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*



*τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἁπάντων· φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ,* 1160 b. 22.
*τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.* It is only, however, while a community remains small that the patriarchal kingship is possible; and in the Hellenic world, when Aristotle wrote, it had long become a thing of the past. Monarchy now existed chiefly in the form of tyranny, where the monarch was able to coerce a mixed and divided mass of subjects, as a master coerces his slaves. Greek communities, when they became too large to submit to the rule of the patriarchal chief, naturally became aristocracies and timocracies; that is—the customs (*νόμος*) which had grown up under the rule of the patriarchal chief, continued to govern the community after the disappearance of that rule. These customs expressed originally what kinsmen deemed due to one another in their various relations. It is true that on the disappearance, in a large community, of the lively sense of kinship which produced them, the customs underwent many transformations in correspondence with a changing environment: but in all their transformations they continued to give merely new expression to that social sense—that *communis sensus*, which, wide as its scope may become, can always be traced back to the feelings of near kinsmen—members of the same village, descended from brothers, members of the same family—*παῖδες καὶ παίδων παῖδες.*

Aristocracy and timocracy represent different stages in the evolution of the primitive association of brothers. First we have the preponderating influence of the 'elder branches'; then power becomes more equally distributed among all the 'kinsmen,' as population increases, and wealth becomes diffused. In other words — the aristocratic families whose local power made the central rule of the patriarchal chief impossible, continued to exercise that power till new families became influential and competed with them. In this evolution however from aristocracy to timocracy there is no break in continuity. The old customs inherited from the patriarchal period are slowly changed. But either in aristocracy or in timocracy force may break with old customs and introduce disorder. Hence oligarchy or democracy. If aristocracy does not, with increasing population and wealth, pass naturally into timocracy, it is because circumstances have aggrandised certain aristocratic families, and made them too powerful in a large community the customs of which have ceased

1160 b. 22. to be those of the patriarchal or the early aristocratic period. Timocracy becomes democracy chiefly under stress of population and poverty, when the old customs fail to meet the new circumstances, and the many poor take it into their own hands to alter the old customs more or less rudely. But a democracy which springs from timocracy, the development of aristocracy, is obviously much better than one which springs from oligarchy, the παρέκβασις of aristocracy. The former democracy is after all of the nature of an inevitable development; the latter implies a break in continuity and a revolution, followed soon by a 'Saviour of Society' in the shape of a tyrant.

b. 31. διαφερόντων] The slave is φύσει a slave: he differs from the free man as the body differs from the soul; see *Pol.* i. 2. 1254 b. 16 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου, διάκεινται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον, οὗτοι μὲν εἰσὶ φύσει δοῦλοι· οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστί (*i. e.* he is not a Person)· καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ' ἀμφοῖν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῴων. βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον . . . συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοὐναντίον κ.τ.λ.

b. 32. § 5. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικός] *sc.* κοινωνία.

b. 36. μεθίστησιν] *sc.* τὴν κοινωνίαν.

1161 a. 1. ἐπίκληροι] Zell, Fritzsche, and Grant quote Menander in illustration of the Greek feeling about heiresses—

> ὅστις γυναῖκ' ἐπίκληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν
> πλουτοῦσαν, ἤτοι μῆνιν ἐκτίνει θεῶν,
> ἢ βούλετ' ἀτυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

In *Pol.* ii. 6. 1270 a. 23 the evil consequences arising to the Spartan state from the heiresses are noticed—ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων κ.τ.λ.: see Newman's note on 1270 a. 21.



§ 6. οἰκήσεων] 'Dicuntur autem haud male *οἰκήσεις* quae non sunt *οἰκίαι* nedum *οἶκοι*' (Ramsauer). The habitations of wild animals are *οἰκήσεις*: see *Ind. Arist.* s. v. 1161 a. 7.

## CHAPTER XI.

### ARGUMENT.

*In each of the constitutional forms we find a friendship coextensive with the justice involved in the particular form. The friendship of a king for his subjects is that of one who confers the greater benefits. The king tends his people. Thus Homer calls Agamemnon 'The shepherd of the people.' The friendship of a father is of this kind—only, a father confers greater benefits than a king: he confers existence—thought to be the greatest of all—nurture and education: forefathers too are thought of as conferring these benefits. The father has a natural right to rule over his children. The king also has a natural right to rule over his people, because he represents the forefather.*

*These friendships, being between unequals, involve, like the kinds of justice corresponding to them, 'return in proportion to desert': this is why parents receive honour—the only thing which children can return in an amount proportionate to the benefits which they receive.*

*The friendship of husband and wife is the same as that between rulers and ruled in an aristocracy. The friendship between brothers resembles that between comrades—for they are equals and belong to the same generation; and those who are such generally feel and are disposed alike. Now the friendship found in a timocracy is of this kind—its members stand on an equal footing, and take turns in holding office. But in the degraded forms, as justice exists to a small extent, so does friendship. When ruler and ruled have nothing in common there is no friendship between them, for there is no justice: the relation between them is like that between workman and tool, soul and body, master and slave: the slave is a living tool: one cannot make a slave,* quâ *slave, a 'friend,' any more than one can be 'just' to him: although* quâ man *he may be the object of friendship and justice.*

*In tyrannies there is very little friendship and very little justice: in democracies more than in the other degraded forms: for in democracies men are equal, and so have much in common.*

§ 1. φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον] *i. e.* φιλία subsists between those only whose relations to one another are regulated by νόμος: *cf. E. N.* v. 6. 4 τοῦτο δ' (*i. e.* τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον) ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς 1161 a. 10.

1161 a. 10. ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς. *Cf.* below viii. 11. 7 δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. By νόμος we are to understand the social system of laws and customs into which individuals are born, and in which they as it were inhere, being thus not mere individuals—separate centres of force and caprice, but members of a body politic or commonwealth, having in common (*cf.* κοινόν § 6) a general rule of life which they are of one mind (ὁμονοοῦσι ix. 6) to observe in their various positions. But as men and beasts belong to different worlds, and cannot agree to live together under one system of general rules, so master and slave, *quâ* slave, belong to different worlds between which force is the only intermediary. The slave indeed belongs with his master to one great social system—the brotherhood of speaking men; and so far, just and friendly relations may subsist between a master and his slave; but *political* justice and its corresponding friendship cannot. The tyrant, again, as such, and oligarchs, as such, are external to any social system or body politic regulated by law and custom. They rule by mere force; there is no ὁμόνοια between them and their subjects. Hence justice and friendship are equally absent from the relation subsisting between them and their subjects. The action of their rule is, if the metaphor be allowed, mechanical, not physiological; they do violence to the 'social organism' from without; they do not preside within over its natural functions.

a. 11. **βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους**] As Ramsauer notes, the friendships corresponding to the various πολιτεῖαι are presented in this chapter as friendships between the rulers and the ruled. It is to be observed however that in a timocracy the distinction between the rulers and the ruled is very different from that in the two other ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι. In a timocracy the *same persons* rule and are ruled in rotation. There is therefore a certain ambiguity in the use of the term φιλία in this chapter. Ἡ φιλία ἡ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν is between one man—ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν between a few men, on the one hand, and the great body of the people on the other hand; whereas ἡ φιλία ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικήν has no reference external to the popular body, but is complete within it, uniting its equal members man to man. Indeed, it is not in



a very real sense that we can speak of 'friendship' existing between king, or aristocrats, and subjects; and probably Aristotle is led to use the expression merely in the interest of the parallels which he is anxious to make out between the king and the father, the aristocrats and the husband. The φιλία between king, or aristocrats, and subjects is not 'friendship,' but rather willing obedience and loyalty, on the one side, to those who administer laws which represent the ἦθος of the community; and, on the other side, moderation and public spirit shown in their powerful position by the hereditary administrators of such laws. That there can scarcely be φιλία, in the sense of 'friendship,' between a king and his subjects is admitted by Aristotle viii. 7. 4 δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι. 1161 a. 11.

**ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας**] The king guides and protects his people: they must honour and obey him in return. a. 12.

§ 2. **ἡ πατρική**] *sc.* φιλία. It is to be noticed that in *E. N.* v. 6. 8 it is laid down that the relation between a father and his children is not one involving justice (τὸ δίκαιον) in the proper sense of the term. Justice in the proper sense of the term exists where the relations are those of *contract* as distinguished from those of *status*. The φιλία which marks the latter relations is στοργή, and loyalty, rather than friendship. a. 15.

**καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται**] 'and we attribute these benefits to our ancestors also': ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται, ἤτοι συγκεχώρηται παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ ἀγαγεῖν εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ λοιπά, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀμέσως ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσων τῶν πατέρων (Asp.). Ramsauer thinks that the words καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται interrupt the sense and he accordingly brackets them. Fritzsche, Susemihl, and Bywater read προσνέμεται with $K^b$, $L^b$, $O^b$. Ramsauer reads ἀπονέμεται ($M^b$, Bek.), remarking that προσνέμω is a rare word in Aristotle. a. 17.

**φύσει τε ἀρχικόν κ.τ.λ.**] Fritzsche, Michelet, and Susemihl read γάρ after τε with $L^b$, $M^b$, Γ, Cambr.[1], CCC, NC, Ald. But, as Ramsauer points out, the clause beginning with φύσει adds (not a reason for anything) but a second point—viz. τὸ φύσει ἀρχικὸν a. 18.

[1] This part of Cambr. (from 1157 a. 12 to 1161 b. 19) is supplied by a later hand.

1161 a. 18. εἶναι—in which the father resembles the king, the other point of resemblance being τὸ εὐεργετικὸν εἶναι, ᾗ αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. The sense of the section may be stated as follows—The positions of the father and of the family ancestor are of the same kind. The father *benefits* his children by giving them existence, sustenance, and education; so also ancestors benefit their descendants. The father has a natural right to *rule* his children; so also the hereditary king, representing an ancestor, has a natural right to rule his people who represent the descendants of that ancestor. Accordingly, although I agree with Ramsauer that γάρ ought not to be read before ἀρχικόν, I cannot agree with him that the clause καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται (or προσνέμεται) is superfluous. I regard it as occupying a place in the first part of the section similar to that occupied by καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων in the second part.

a. 20. § 3. καὶ τιμῶνται] Καί emphasizes τιμῶνται. Τιμή is the proper due of such superiority as that of parents and gods. Ramsauer compares iv. 3. 19 ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον: viii. 14. 2 τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς (πλέον δεῖ νέμειν) . . . τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας: *cf.* also viii. 14. 4 τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γόνεις· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν ἀξίαν ποτ' ἂν ἀποδοίη, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

a. 21. οὐ ταὐτό] Williams brings out the meaning of this expression correctly—'Neither are the claims of justice in these . . . relations equally balanced on either side, but rather, as is also the friendship, proportioned to the benefits received.' The Paraph. has—εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ἐν ὑπεροχῇ· διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ ἀκολούθως τῇ φιλίᾳ οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. τὸ γὰρ πρὸς πατέρα δίκαιον ὑπερέχει τοῦ πρὸς υἱόν· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀποδοῦναι δεῖ. *Cf. E. E.* H. 9. 1241 b. 37 οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δίκαιον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.

a. 23. § 4. ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία κ.τ.λ.] A comparison more ingenious than instructive.

a. 25. § 5. ἑταιρικῇ] ἡ ἑταιρικὴ φιλία answers most nearly to what in modern times we understand by friendship. It subsists between those who, without being necessarily kinsmen, are of one age, have been brought up in close companionship, and have common tastes and pursuits.



1161 a. 25.

a. 27. ἔοικε δέ] Bekker reads δή. I prefer δέ, which Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater read, following $K^b$, $M^b$.

a. 28. ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι] *i. e.* in a timocracy 'the citizens wish to be equal and fair' (Peters), or perhaps better—'in a timocracy it is characteristic of (βούλονται) the citizens to be equal and fair.'

a. 29. ἐν μέρει δή κ.τ.λ.] *Cf. Pol.* iii. 2. 1277 b. 13 δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα.

a. 33. § 6. μηδὲν κοινόν] *i. e.* they do not participate in a common νόμος, or belong to the same social organism. In an ὀρθὴ πολιτεία every member, whether ruler or ruled, acts *within* the social organism in a manner conducive to the good of the whole. This is to act *justly*—see *Pol.* iii. 7. 1282 b. 16 ἔστι δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. But the tyrant's acts are not thus *functions* of the social organism. They are *assaults* from without upon that organism. Again, the social organism, like the physical organism, requires for its subsistence many things which are not part of itself: see *Pol.* H. 7. 1328 a. 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταὐτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως, ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς . . . κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως· πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεώς ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης. Slaves, who are ἔμψυχα ὄργανα τῆς ἀναγκαίας κτήσεως ἕνεκα, are not parts of the social organism, between the 'parts' or *members* of which alone just and friendly relations can subsist.

a. 35. ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων] Fritzsche and Grant compare *E. E.* H. 10. 1242 a. 13 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνῆλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινοῦ τινός (οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου ἕνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἧς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκέν ἐστι. 'The instrument,' says Grant, 'receives just so much care from its master, as will

1161 a. 35. keep it in proper condition for the exercise of its functions. The slave, who is treated not as a person but as a thing, receives the same kind of attention. Friendship and justice imply the recognition of personality; they imply treating men not as instruments, but as ends in themselves.'

The benefit received by slaves is thus, as Ramsauer remarks, an ὠφέλεια κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

b. 4. ἔμψυχον ὄργανον] See *Pol.* i. 2. 1253 b. 32.

b. 5. § 7. ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπος] Aristotle, writing in a reflective age, attempted to explain and excuse the historical institution of slavery by means of the abstract notion—φύσει δοῦλος: but the political and ethical difficulties encountered in the attempt were so great that he was obliged to admit the distinction ᾗ δοῦλος—ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, a distinction which the Roman jurists, with their theory of the 'natural equality of all men,' afterwards brought into prominence: see Ulpian, quoted by Zell *ad loc.*—Quod attinet ad jus civile servi pro nullis habentur, non tamen jure naturali: quia, quod ad jus naturale pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequales: *cf.* Justinian *Inst.* i. Tit. 2. § 2 jure naturali ab initio omnes homines liberi nascebantur. But this distinction between the *slave* and the *man* is presented by Aristotle and the jurists in too abstract a manner to furnish material for answering the questions—'*In what sense* then is he a man? What is meant by his *capacity* (τὸν δυνάμενον b. 7) for participating in νόμος and συνθήκη? Can there be a capacity of this kind which is not *actualised* in some definite way?' Aristotle, mainly concerned to find in the institution of slavery, as it existed, an economic basis for his brilliant Hellenic life, did not trouble himself much with the history of the institution. It suited his purpose to represent the slave as a *thing*. If, following his usual method in social enquiries, he had examined the history of slavery, he would have found that the slave is essentially a *person—i. e.* a member of the *particular* social organism to which the master belongs, not merely a 'human being'—ἄνθρωπος, as he vaguely admits, in much the same way as nowadays we admit that the lower animals are 'fellow-creatures.' Aristotle had little appreciation of the 'dignity of labour'; he did not see clearly that industry is an essential *function* of the social organism—something καλόν and not merely ἀναγκαῖον—and that the δοῦλος, the organ of this function, is as much a *member* of the organism as his master, who,



as μεγαλοπρεπής for instance, is the organ of another social function. 1161 b. 5.
The truth is that the Greek δοῦλος *actually* 'participated in' νόμος in a sense not realised by Aristotle at all, when he said that ᾗ ἄνθρωπος he '*can* participate.' The slave's position, though of course more open to the encroachments of violence than the positions of the other members of society, was secured as a tolerable one by guarantees of essentially the same kind as those which secured the free man against the arbitrary action of his legitimate rulers. They could not rule without the good-will of their free subjects, nor on other lines than those defined by the history and traditions of the community over which they ruled. Similarly, we may feel sure that 'slavery' would not have long continued to subsist, in the free and mobile Greek states, as the normal condition of a large part of the working class, if force had been the only reason for its continuance. The good-will of the slaves was necessary. They acquiesced in a well-defined historical status which was far from being intolerable. To that extent, *quâ slaves* they actually participated in νόμος and συνθήκη—were, in short, not *things*, but *persons* to be reckoned with—'parts' of that social organism which is held together by the ὁμόνοια of its members. Aristotle's theory of εὐδαιμονία prevented him from seeing this, and allowed him merely to make the vague, and in the context, almost unmeaning admission—δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλία δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. He left unanswered the questions which touch the root of the whole matter—'In what sense then is the slave a man? What is meant by his *capacity* for participating in νόμος and συνθήκη? Can there be a capacity of this kind which is not *actualised* in some definite way?'

The answers to these questions, as the 'Historical Method' enables us to give them, are indicated by Maine (*Ancient Law*, ch. v. pp. 162 sqq.) in a manner so conducive to a just estimate of the value of Aristotle's view regarding the personality (or impersonality) of the slave, that I venture to transcribe the passage.—'The legal rules by which systems of mature jurisprudence regulate the connexion of *master* and *slave* present no very distinct traces of the original condition common to ancient societies. But there are reasons for this exception. There seems to be something in the institution of slavery which has at all times either shocked or perplexed mankind, however little habituated to reflection, and

1161 b. 5. however slightly advanced in the cultivation of its moral instincts. The compunction which ancient communities almost unconsciously experienced appears to have always resulted in the adoption of some imaginary principle upon which a defence, or at least a rationale, of slavery could be plausibly founded. Very early in their history the Greeks explained the institution as grounded on the intellectual inferiority of certain races and their consequent natural aptitude for the servile condition. The Romans, in a spirit equally characteristic, derived it from a supposed agreement between the victor and the vanquished, in which the first stipulated for the perpetual services of his foe; and the other gained in consideration the life which he had legitimately forfeited. Such theories were not only unsound but plainly unequal to the case for which they affected to account. Still they exercised a powerful influence in many ways. They satisfied the conscience of the master. They perpetuated and probably increased the debasement of the slave. And they naturally tended to put out of sight the relation in which servitude had originally stood to the rest of the domestic system. This relation, though not clearly exhibited, is casually indicated in many parts of primitive law, and more particularly in the typical system—that of ancient Rome. . . . It is clear, from the testimony both of ancient law and of many primeval histories, that the slave might under certain conditions be made the heir, or universal successor, of the master, and this significant faculty . . . implies that the government and representation of the family might, in a particular state of circumstances, devolve on the bondman. . . . What then is meant by saying that the slave was originally included in the family? . . . When we speak of the slave as anciently included in the family, we intend to assert nothing as to the motives of those who brought him into it, or kept him there; we merely imply that the tie which bound him to his master was regarded as one of the same general character with that which united every other member of the group to the chieftain. This consequence is in fact carried in the general assertion already made that the primitive ideas of mankind were unequal to comprehending any basis of the connexion *inter se* of individuals, apart from the relations of family. The Family consisted primarily of those who belonged to it by consanguinity, and next of those who had been engrafted on it by adoption; but there was still a third class of persons who were only joined to it by



common subjection to its head, and these were the slaves. The born and adopted subjects of the chief were raised above the slave by the certainty that in the ordinary course of events they would be relieved from bondage and entitled to exercise powers of their own; but that the inferiority of the slave was not such as to place him outside the pale of the family, or such as to degrade him to the footing of inanimate property, is clearly proved, I think, by the many traces which remain of his ancient capacity for inheritance in the last resort. . . . The Roman law was arrested in its growing tendency to look upon him more and more as an article of property by the theory of the Law of Nature; and hence it is that, wherever servitude is sanctioned by institutions which have been deeply affected by Roman jurisprudence, the servile condition is never intolerably wretched.' 1161 b. 5.

**φιλία**] So Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater. Bekker reads *φιλίας* with the codd. b. 8.

**§ 8. ἐπὶ πλεῖον**] $K^b$ and Asp.; the other authorities, followed by Bekker, read *πλεῖστον*. Aspasius gives the meaning correctly—*ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλέον ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἥπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις παρεκβάσεσι.* b. 10.

## CHAPTER XII.

### Argument.

*It is always between those, then, who are joined together in some association or other, in which they meet on common ground, that friendship, in whatever form, subsists: although perhaps the friendship of kinsmen and comrades may be distinguished from the other forms; at any rate such friendships as those of citizens, tribesmen and fellow-voyagers seem to have more of the character of associations*—i.e. *they seem to involve a sort of agreement entered into to associate, while friendship between kinsmen and comrades subsists without any such agreement. To the class of friendships which seem to involve an agreement may be assigned also the guest-friendship between two men who are citizens of different states.*

*The friendship of kinsmen has many forms, but can always be traced back to that involved in the relation between parents and children. Parents and children, as stock and offspring, are bound together by ties of mutual affection:*

*parents, however, have a deeper consciousness than children have of the common nature which unites stock and offspring—a consciousness too which dates from the birth of the children, whereas children do not become conscious of union with the parent stock till they arrive at the years of intelligence. This explains the greater love of mothers. Brothers love one another because they spring from the same parents. Hence we speak of 'the same blood'—'the same stock.' Of course, their being of about the same age and being brought up together must also be taken as contributing largely to the friendship of brothers, which in these respects resembles the friendship of comrades. The friendship which unites cousins and other kinsmen is to be explained likewise by their common origin: it is greater or less as the common ancestor is near or remote.*

*The friendship of children for parents (like that of men for the gods) is a friendship which has the good, as presented by a superior, for its object—parents confer on their children the greatest of all good things—existence, nurture, education. This friendship is also more useful, in the ordinary sense of the term, and more pleasant than that with strangers, in so far as the common life to which it belongs is more intimate. The friendship between brothers has the characteristics of that between comrades—and if the brothers are good, is a comradeship of the best and most lasting kind. The friendship between husband and wife is natural, for man is naturally first a conjugal being, and only afterwards a political being, since the family is chronologically prior to the state, being materially necessary to it, and procreation is common to man with all other animals. Human beings, however, differ from other animals in not pairing merely for the sake of procreation, but also for objects which have to do with the proper conduct of life. Husband and wife have their separate functions and their separate virtues, and both contribute by division of labour to the common good. Thus the friendship between them is both useful and pleasant, and, if they are virtuous persons, has, as manifested by each, the goodness peculiar to the other for its object. But children are a great bond of union, being something common. Childless couples are more quickly estranged than those with children. To ask how a husband should regulate his life with his wife, and generally how one friend should behave to another, is to ask how justice requires the husband or friend to behave in the circumstances.*

1161 b. 11. **§ 1.**] 'All friendship, as we have already said, implies association; but we may separate from the rest the friendship of kinsmen and that of comrades. The friendships of fellow citizens, of fellow tribesmen, of fellow sailors, &c., seem, as opposed to these, to have more to do with association; for they appear to be founded on some sort of compact. The friendship of host and guest might also be included in this class' (Peters). All friendship is *ἐν κοινωνίᾳ*, or *κοινωνική* in the generic sense. There are three species under the genus—(1) *συγγενική*, (2) *ἑταιρική*, (3) *κοινωνική* in the narrower, specific sense, where a more or less express *ὁμολογία* exists. Thus in *E. E.* H. 10. 1242 a. 1 we have *λέγονται δὲ φιλίαι, συγγενική, ἑταιρική,*



*κοινωνική, ἡ λεγομένη πολιτική.* The Paraph. has—*πᾶσα μὲν οὖν φιλία ἐν* 1161 b. 11.
*κοινωνίᾳ ἐστί, καθάπερ εἴρηται· μόνη δὲ ἡ συγγενικὴ καὶ ἑταιρικὴ φιλία οὐ δοκοῦσιν ἐν κοινωνίᾳ εἶναι· κοινωνικαὶ γάρ εἰσι φιλίαι αἱ καθ' ὁμολογίαν καὶ συνθήκην τινὰ συνιστάμεναι, οἷαί εἰσιν αἱ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαὶ καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν. ἡ δὲ συγγενικὴ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ οὐ καθ' ὁμολογίαν ἢ συνθήκην τινὰ συνίστανται, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἡ φύσις συνέδησε, τοὺς δὲ τὸ τυχεῖν ἡλικιώτας εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα σπουδάζειν.* Asp. has—*ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις, φησί, τὴν συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, ἤτοι χωρίσειεν ὡς ἐχούσας τι διαφέρον τῶν κοινωνικῶν· λαμβάνει δὲ κοινωνικὰς τὰς καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινά.* Coraes' note is—*ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.*] *ἡ γὰρ συγγενικὴ καὶ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλόν εἰσι καὶ οὐ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὥσπερ αἱ κοινωνικαί.*

**τὴν ξενικήν**] See note on viii. 3. 4, a. 30. b. 16.

**§ 2.**] Ramsauer notes that we have in this § three separate reasons given for the superior love of parents—viz. (1) *μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασι*, (2) *μᾶλλον συνῳκείωται*, (3) *καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου sc. ἡ τῶν γονέων φίλησις διαφέρει τῆς τῶν τέκνων.* Victorius has a note to the same effect.

**αἱ μητέρες**] Zell, after Muretus, quotes in illustration of this b. 27.
remark—

Eurip. *Frag. inc.*—

*μήτηρ φιλόστεκνος μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ πατρός·*
*ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶδεν ὄνθ' ὁ δ' οἴεται.*

Menander—

*αὐτὸν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οἶδε τοῦ ποτ' ἐγένετο,*
*ἀλλ' ὑπονοοῦμεν πάντες, ἢ πιστεύομεν.*

Hom. *Od.* i. 215—

*μήτηρ μέν τ' ἐμέ φησι τοῦ ἔμμεναι, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε*
*οὐκ οἶδ'· οὐ γάρ πώ τις ἑὸν γόνον αὐτὸς ἀνέγνω.*

**§ 3. ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι**] 'a second self separately existing.' b. 28.
*Cf. E. E.* H. 12. 1245 a. 35 *βούλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος.*

*Τῷ κεχωρίσθαι* qualifies *αὐτοί* paradoxically—though indeed the paradox is already contained in the application of *ἕτεροι* to *αὐτοί*. I cannot agree with the interpretations which make *τῷ κεχωρίσθαι* give the reason for *ἕτεροι*. Thus Lambinus translates—'nam qui ex eis nati sunt, eo ipso quod separati sunt, tanquam alteri ipsi sunt'; and Victorius—'qui enim sunt ex ipsis, veluti alteri ipsi,

1161 b. 28. quia separati sunt.' The object of the clause is not to show how children, being *αὐτοί*, are at the same time *ἕτεροι*, but to state the paradox that, being *ἕτεροι καὶ κεχωρισμένοι*, they are yet **αὐτοί**. Peters too misses, I think, the exact force of the clause with—'for what proceeds from them is as it were a second self when it is severed.'

Ramsauer *ad loc.* remarks that, while Justice is *πρὸς ἕτερον*, Love is *πρὸς ἕτερον αὐτόν*.

b. 31. **πρὸς ἐκεῖνα**] 'sunt haec, unde generati sunt, parentes: id quod neutro genere propter superius *ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν* (quo item neutro parentes indicantur) positum est' (Fritzsche).

b. 34. **§ 4. ἥλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα**] *sc. τέρπει*, see *Rhet.* i. 11. 1371 b. 15, *E. E.* H. 2. 1238 a. 33.

1162 a. 1. **ἐκ τούτων**] 'Verba *ἐκ τούτων* intellige: *ex his causis, propter hoc.* Nam alias sequens *γάρ* languet' (Zell). Peters seems to agree with Zell in making *τούτων* neuter. He has—'Cousins and other kinsfolk become attached to each other for the same reason—I mean because they come of the same stock.' But it is better, I think, to refer *τούτων* to *ἀδελφοί* understood from the previous *ἀδελφική*. This is the view of Asp., the Paraph., Grant, Stahr, Williams, and Ramsauer.

a. 5. **§ 5. πρὸς θεούς**] Zell and Fritzsche quote *E. E.* H. 10. 1242 a. 32 *πατρὸς δὲ καὶ υἱοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ [φιλία ἐστὶν] ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον.* Ramsauer brackets the words *καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς* as probably spurious, on account of their inconsistency with Aristotle's doctrine (viii. 7. 4) that friendship cannot subsist between gods and men.

a. 8. **§ 6. μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων**] *i. e. μᾶλλον τῆς τῶν ὀθνείων φιλίας.*

a. 10. **καὶ μᾶλλον**] 'The friendship of brothers has all the characteristics of the friendship of comrades, and has them in a greater degree (provided they are good and generally resemble one another)' Peters. So Stahr 'und in noch höherem Grade.'

a. 12. **ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους**] 'Have an original love for one another.'

a. 15. **§ 7. ἀνάλογον κ.τ.λ.**] *αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι (συγγενικαὶ φιλίαι) ἀνάλογον ἔχουσι τῇ κατὰ γένος οἰκειότητι* (Paraph.).



**ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως**] See Grant's note *ad loc.* 'In point of time the family is prior to the state, but in point of idea (*λόγῳ*) and essentially (*φύσει*) the state is prior. *Cf.* Ar. *Pol.* i. 2. 12 (i. 1. 1253 a. 19) *καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως.* Aristotle argues that without the idea of the "state," the terms "man" and "family" would lose their meaning. Thus the idea of family presupposes that of the state, which will accordingly be prior. In the same way the family is more necessary as a means, the state as an end.' A thing is *ἀναγκαῖον* which is a means: *cf. Pol.* Θ. 2. 1338 a. 12 *τὰς μὲν μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων.* The *ἀναγκαῖον* is thus opposed to the *καλόν*, which is choiceworthy on its own account; *cf. Pol.* Θ. 2. 1338 a. 31 *ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς, οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν, φανερὸν ἐστίν.* Hence *ἀναγκαῖον* is descriptive of *ὕλη*, as distinguished from *εἶδος*, or *λόγος*, which is *καλόν*. See *Phys.* ii. 9. 200 a. 12 *ἀνάγκη ἄρα σιδηροῦν εἶναι, εἰ πρίων ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως οὖν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τέλος. ἐν γὰρ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.* The statement, then, *ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως* means that the family belongs to the matter of which the state is the form.

**ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον**] *sc. ἐφ' ὅσον ἔνι τεκνοποιῆσαι* (Paraph.). Zell and Fritzsche compare *Oecon.* i. 3. 1343 b. 13.

a. 20.

**§ 8. ταὐτόν**] *καὶ οὐ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται εἶναι δίκαιον φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον ἢ τὸν ἀδελφόν κ.τ.λ.* (Paraph.).

a. 31.

**συμφοιτητήν**] 'condiscipulus' (Victorius). Peters can hardly be right with 'Travelling companion.'

a. 33.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*We have seen that there are three species of friendship, and that each may subsist between those who are equal, or those who are unequal—that those who are equally or unequally good, useful, or pleasant may be friends. Those then who are equal must love each other equally, and render other services equally;*

*those who are not equal must put themselves on an equality by loving and otherwise remunerating each other in proportion to desert.*

*It is only, or chiefly, in the friendship for profit that friends bring charges against each other, and find fault with each other. Those whose friendship is based on virtue have no reason to find fault with each other or quarrel, for their object is to benefit each other, and each tries to outdo the other in this: nor is fault-finding common in the friendship for pleasure. The friends take pleasure in each other's society: it would be ridiculous to find fault with one's friend because his society does not give one pleasure, when one is at liberty to drop him. But in the friendship for profit fault-finding is very common. People are not easily satisfied with what is done for them.*

*As justice is either unwritten or embodied in written law, so friendship for profit relies either on character or on law. That which relies on law is concluded on express terms—a certain service is rendered for a return expressly stated; the return being made either at once or after a time: in the latter case, although a debt has been contracted about which there is no doubt, yet the element of friendship comes in with the permission to defer payment: and this is why in some states actions for recovery of such debts are not allowed.*

*In that form of friendship for profit which relies on character no terms are mentioned: A makes a present of something to B as to a friend, but expects (from his general knowledge of B's character) to receive in return as much, or more, for what is really not a gift but a loan; and if he does not come out of the transaction in the way he expected when he entered into it, he is sure to find fault with his 'friend'; for all, or most, men have a general wish to do the handsome thing, but, when it comes to the particular case, choose the profitable thing.*

*Accordingly, if one can, one must voluntarily make a return equivalent to that which one has received: one must act as though one had made a mistake at first about the service being rendered out of pure friendship, and make a return just as if there had been an express bargain: for one must not treat a man as a disinterested friend against his will. But of course it is advisable to consider at the beginning who it is who confers the service and in expectation of what return, and decide whether one will accept it in the circumstances or not.*

*The question arises whether the amount of the return should be measured by the benefit actually experienced by the receiver, or by the trouble, money, etc. expended by the giver. Where the friendship is for profit the standard according to which return ought to be made* (sc. *in the absence of an express agreement*) *is the benefit actually experienced by the receiver; but where the ground of the friendship is virtue, the intention of the giver is the standard: for intention, or deliberate choice, is the criterion of virtue and character.*

**1162 a. 34.** **§ 1. φιλιῶν**] Asp. has *τῶν φιλιῶν* which Byw. (*Contrib.* p. 61) thinks is probably right.

**ἐν ἀρχῇ**] viii. 3. 1.

**b. 1.** **ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς**] 'and a similar remark applies to friendships



based on pleasure and profit.' The full expression would be— **1162 b. 1.**
*ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁμοίως ἡδεῖς φίλοι γίνονται καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ διαφέροντες.*

**ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες**] 'conferring equal or un- **b. 2.**
equal benefits on each other.' This clause, though strictly applicable, so far as expression goes, to *οἱ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον*, must be taken to refer also to *οἱ ἡδεῖς*, as if it had been—*ἰσάζοντες τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες*. It ought not to be taken to refer to *ἀγαθοί* too, the precise distinction required under that head having been already marked by the expressions *ὁμοίως ἀγαθοί—ἀμείνων χείρονι*. Peters, I think, is wrong when he translates—'Sometimes two equally good persons make friends, and sometimes a better and a worse (and so with those who are pleasant to one another, and with those who are friends with a view to profit)—effecting equality by the services they exchange, even though they are themselves different.' Does Bywater also, with the comma after *χρήσιμον*, refer *ἰσάζοντες κ.τ.λ.* to the *ἀγαθοί*?

**κατ' ἰσότητα**] 'Those who are equal must effect the equality **b. 3.**
required in Friendship by making exactly equal returns in love and friendly offices.' Aspasius incorrectly takes *κατ' ἰσότητα* with *τοὺς ἴσους*. His words are—*τοὺς ἴσους κατ' ἰσότητα τὴν διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ χρήσιμον δεῖ καὶ κατὰ τὸ φιλεῖν ἰσάζειν*. But *ἰσάζειν τῷ φιλεῖν κατ' ἰσότητα* is contrasted with *ἰσάζειν τῷ ἀποδιδόναι ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς*.

**τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι**] *τῷ ἀνάλογον* **b. 4.**
is the reading of corr. cod. Par. 1417 accepted by Bek. and Sus., while $K^b$, $O^b$, $M^b$, $H^a$, $N^b$, Ald., and pr. Par. 1417 have *τὸ ἀνάλογον*, accepted by Bywater. Bonitz (s. v. *ἀνάλογον*) decides in favour of the latter reading; but Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 67) contends that *τῷ* is indispensable, because not *δεῖ* but *δεῖ ἰσάζειν* must be supplied after *ἀνίσους*, and remarks that the variation of the MSS. (which he exaggerates) rather points to *τῷ τὸ ἀνάλογον* as the original reading. Rassow quotes *Meteor.* ii. 5. 363 a. 11 *τὸ ἀνάλογον ἀποδώσει*, which he seems to take as an instance of the ordinary transitive use of *ἀποδιδόναι*, whereas it is given in the *Ind. Arist.* under the intransitive uses. I think that Rassow's *τῷ τὸ ἀνάλογον* is right.

**§ 2. χαρίεις**] a man of good taste. **b. 10.**

**τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται**] *i. e.* the friend who, in the competition **b. 11.**

1162 b. 11. (*ἀμιλλωμένων* b. 8), succeeds in conferring superior benefits, gets what he desires, viz. the good of his friend, and has no reason to complain. The other again who is defeated in the competition cannot dislike one who confers such benefits upon him—*τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' . . . ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν.*

b. 13. **§ 3. οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν**] *sc. γίνεται ἐγκλήματα.*

b. 21. **§ 5. τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον**] Ramsauer contends (without stating the reasons for his opinion, but merely giving certain references to the *Rhet.*) that this distinction is not (as Zell and Fritzsche take for granted) exactly that between *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον* and *τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον* of *E. N.* v. 7. Bonitz however (*Ind. Arist.* sub v. *δίκαιος*) makes *τὸ ἄγραφον δίκαιον* synonymous with *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον*. The following passages in the *Rhet.* (referred to by Ramsauer) will enable us to decide between these two views.—*Rhet.* i. 14. 1374 a. 18 sqq. *ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, ἐφ' οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαί* (the moral and social sanctions, as distinguished from the legal sanction), *οἷον τὸ χάριν ἔχειν τῷ ποιήσαντι εὖ καὶ ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα καὶ βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου καὶ γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀκόντων τὰ δὲ ἑκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθῃ, ἑκόντων δ' ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ᾖ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ᾖ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι δι' ἀπειρίαν, οἷον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποίῳ τινί· ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰὼν διαριθμοῦντα· ἂν οὖν ᾖ ἀδιόριστον, δέῃ δὲ νομοθετῆσαι, ἀνάγκη ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε κἂν δακτύλιον ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξῃ, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτό ἐστι. Cf. Rhet.* i. 14. 1375 a. 17 *τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δ' ἄγραφα οὔ*, and *Rhet.* i. 15. 1375 a. 31 *. . . τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινὸς (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις. ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνῃ· ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον·*

*οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε.*

These passages seem to me to support the view that the distinction



between *τὸ ἄγραφον δίκαιον* and *τὸ κατὰ νόμον* is not identical with 1162 b. 21.
that between *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον* and *τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον*. *Τὸ ἄγραφον δίκαιον* and *τὸ κατὰ νόμον* are of course mutually exclusive. The *δίκαια* and *ἄδικα* recognised under the first *εἶδος* of *τὸ ἄγραφον δίκαιον* —viz. *τὰ ἐφ' οἷς ὀνείδη καὶ ἔπαινοι*, where the sanctions are merely 'social,' cannot, from their nature, be brought within the scope of the written law. They belong essentially to the unwritten law. They cannot be enforced by 'legal sanctions.' The *ἐπιεικῆ* again included under the second *εἶδος* of the *ἄγραφον δίκαιον* cannot be embodied in the written law. The particular issues involved in them must be determined independently of, and even in spite of, the written law. But it does not follow from this that *τὸ ἄγραφον δίκαιον* is identical with *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον*. In a good state much of *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον* (*τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν E. N.* v. 7. 1) is embodied in the written law. *Τὸ ἄγραφον δίκαιον* is, in part, that residuum of *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον* which either cannot be, or has not hitherto been, embodied in the written code; in part, it consists of *νομιζόμενα*—local customs and etiquettes, which, so far from falling under the *φυσικὸν δίκαιον*, may conflict with it.

I take it, then, that we must not identify the distinction before us here with that between *τὸ φυσικὸν δίκαιον* and *τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον*, as described in *E. N.* v. 7. We have to think simply of 'unwritten' and 'written' regulations. The unwritten regulations may be 'naturally' just, or they may be only 'conventionally' just; they may be such as can, or such as cannot, be embodied in a written code. The distinction before us indeed seems to answer exactly to that between the Lacedaemonian and the Athenian *δίκαια* noted in the following passage of Justinian's *Instit.*—i. 2. § 9 'ex non scripto jus venit quod usus comprobavit. nam diuturni mores consensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur. et non ineleganter in duas species jus civile distributum videtur. nam origo ejus ab institutis duarum civitatium, Athenarum scilicet et Lacedaemonis, fluxisse videtur. in his enim civitatibus ita agi solitum erat, ut Lacedaemonii quidem magis ea quae pro legibus observarent memoriae mandarent: Athenienses vero ea quae in legibus scripta reprehendissent [comprehendissent?] custodirent.'

**ἢ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομική**] Williams brings out the force of this b. 23.
distinction very well with—'the friendship of confidence and the friendship of covenant.' *Cf. E. E.* H. 10. 1242 b. 31 *ἔστι δὲ τῆς*

1162 b. 23. *χρησίμου φιλίας εἴδη δύο· ἡ μὲν νομικὴ ἡ δ' ἠθική. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηται· μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν κατ' ὁμολογίαν ⟨ᾖ⟩ Spengel, Fritzsche, Susemihl⟩ ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία καὶ νομική· ὅταν δ' ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική.*

b. 24. **ὅταν μὴ κατά κ.τ.λ.**] 'complaints arise when a transaction is not ended in the spirit in which it was begun,' or in which at least one of the parties thought it was begun: *e.g.* A lends B a sum of money. When B repays it he does so without interest, thinking that A lent it as a friend; but A, it appears, lent it as a matter of business and expected the usual interest: see Asp. *ἐγκαλοῦσιν οὖν ὅταν μὴ διαλυθῶσιν ὡς καὶ συνήλλαξαν· εἰ γάρ τις ὡς φίλῳ δῴη τινὶ πεντήκοντα νομίσματα, μηδὲν περὶ τόκου εἰπών, ἀλλ' ἀγράφως συναλλάξας, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀπαιτεῖ τόκον, ἄλλως μὲν συνήλλαξεν, ἄλλως δὲ σπεύδει διαλυθῆναι.* We have here an illustration of the truth of the saying that 'understandings are misunderstandings.'

b. 29. **§ 6. διόπερ ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ.**] In addition to the passage quoted by Fritzsche from Nic. Damasc. (p. 314 Tauchn. *παρ' Ἰνδοῖς ἐάν τις ἀποστερηθῇ δανείου ἢ παρακαταθήκης, οὐκ ἔστι κρίσις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν αἰτιᾶται ὁ πιστεύσας*), see Theophrastus *περὶ συμβολαίων* apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. p. 168 ed. Meineke, *Χαρώνδας καὶ Πλάτων* (apparently *Legg.* 915 D and E) . . . *παραχρῆμα κελεύουσι διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ἐὰν δέ τις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ εἶναι δίκην, αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς ἀδικίας.* Charondas made laws for Catana and other cities.

b. 32. **§ 7. ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο**] *δωρεῖταί τι, ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ὠφέλειαν ὠφελεῖ* (Paraph.).

**κομίζεσθαι δέ κ.τ.λ.**] *i. e.* the motive of this *ἠθικὴ φιλία*, no less than of *νομικὴ φιλία*, is after all *τὸ χρήσιμον*.

b. 35. **§ 8. βούλεσθαι μέν . . . τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα**] We have here the difference between *the wish* for something remote and perhaps unattainable, and *the definite choice* of something immediately before us. The ideal of a noble life, though present intellectually to most civilized men, is practically too weak to regulate their conduct in the midst of objects appealing immediately to their desire for pleasure or profit. Therefore 'to choose profit'—*προαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ὠφέλιμα*—is here tantamount to acting *παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, i. e. κατὰ πάθος.*



**§ 9. δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν [καὶ ἑκόντι] ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον**] 'A man ought, then, if he can, to return the worth of what he has received, and to do so willingly (*i. e.* without waiting to be asked); for he ought not to make any one a friend against his will'—*e.g.* by retaining as a friendly gift what was intended (though not stated) to be a loan. There is a certain awkwardness in the proximity of *ἑκόντι* and *ἄκοντα*, referring, as they do, to different persons; and accordingly the words *καὶ ἑκόντι* (omitted by $K^b$, $O^b$, Cambr., Asp.) are bracketed by Fritzsche, Grant, and Bywater, as an interpolation. 'They may easily be conceived,' Grant says, 'to have arisen out of the following words *ἄκοντα γάρ*.' Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 102), however, lets them stand as genuine, and conjectures *οἰητέον* for *ποιητέον*, making *ἄκοντα* refer to the subject of *δυναμένῳ* and *ἑκόντι*. I cannot regard this conjecture (which is adopted by Susemihl) as at all probable; nor do I feel that the passage, as translated above, presents the difficulty which some of the commentators have found in it.[1]

a. 3. **διαμαρτόντα . . . παθόντα**] The accusatives are to be taken with *ἀνταποδοτέον* or *διαλυτέον*. Fritzsche quotes *E. N.* vii. 1. 1, viii. 14. 4, ix. 2. 1, and (for both dat. and acc. with the same verbal adjective) *E. N.* viii. 14. 3 *τῷ ὠφελουμένῳ . . . ἀνταποδοτέον ἀνταποδιδόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον*, and Plato, *Rep.* 453 D *οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον . . . ἐλπίζοντας.*

a. 4. **δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο**] *'i. e. δι' αὐτὸ τὸ εὖ δρᾶν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ'* (Ramsauer).

a. 6. **ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἄν**] I prefer *ὡμολόγησε δ' ἄν* in correspondence with *ἠξίωσεν ἄν* a. 7. The meaning is—If it had been put to the receiver when the benefit was conferred, he *would have* agreed to make repayment, if able; while, on the other hand, the giver *would not have* expected repayment from one obviously unable to make it—and, it must be supposed, would not have conferred the benefit. *Οὐδ' ἠξίωσεν ἄν* does not mean 'would not have asked him for repayment when he delayed to make it,' as the Paraph. and most of the commentators seem to suppose, but 'would not

[1] Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 61) thinks that *ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον* is an adaptation of Xen. *Mem.* ii. 6. 9 *ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον ἐλεῖν ἐργῶδες.*

1163 a. 6. have begun by expecting repayment from one obviously unable ever to make it.' In short, the fact of a benefit having been conferred raises the presumption that the giver expected, when he conferred it, to be eventually repaid. He believed that the receiver would be able to repay it; otherwise he would not have conferred it. There is no reference here, it seems to me, to the case of a friend διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, or creditor, finding out in course of time that the debtor is insolvent, and making him a present of the sum owed.

a. 9. **ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή**] *sc.* εὐεργετούμενος Rams., τὴν εὐεργεσίαν Coraes. 'Consent to receive the benefit on these terms, or decline it.'

**§ 10. ἀμφισβήτησιν κ.τ.λ.**] We must repay benefits καθάπερ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντας when no ῥητά exist. How are we then to determine what the ῥητά would have been had they existed? We must put ourselves back into the position we occupied before the benefit was conferred, and suppose ourselves to be making an express bargain for an advantage which we wish to get, but of course should be unwilling to pay too dear for. The price for which we could have got the advantage, supposing the question of price to have been raised, is what at least we ought to pay now in return. It is of course very difficult thus to construct ῥητά after an interval of time. The giver will maintain that the circumstances were exceptional and enhanced the value of the benefit, and that he would not have conferred it if he had known that so small a return would be offered for it. The receiver on the other hand will point out that the benefit has not come to much, and will maintain that he never thought that it would. The standard however which must be found, if an agreement between the parties is to be reached, is—What did the receiver think it worth *before he got it*? The giver cannot expect more than this: see ix. 1. 9 ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

From Theoph. περὶ συμβολαίων (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. ii. 166 sqq. ed. Meineke) we learn that understandings likely to develop into misunderstandings of the kind indicated in the section before us (viii. 13. 10) were discouraged by many Greek codes, which contained provisions for the payment on the spot of an ἀρραβών proportioned to the amount to be afterwards paid in full.



**§ 11. ἐπαρκεῖ**] *sc.* ὁ εὐεργέτης. In the friendship of Profit equal advantages are exchanged: the question is—What is the amount of the advantage received? for an equal advantage must be given in exchange for it. But the Friendship of Virtue is not a συνάλλαγμα, but a Life in which the friends stimulate each other to the manifestation of that which proceeds from virtue. 1163 a. 18.

**τῆς ἀρετῆς . . . κύριον**] 'for in choice lies that which is essential to virtue and character.' It is προαίρεσις which converts the δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων into the ἕξις (*Met.* Θ. 2 and 5), and ἀρετή is defined as a ἕξις προαιρετική (*E. N.* ii. 6. 15). In *E. N.* x. 8. 5 we read ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις. The answer had been given in iii. 2. 1 οἰκειότατον εἶναι δοκεῖ (ἡ προαίρεσις) τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. Taking these passages in connexion, we can see that in the section before us (viii. 13. 11) τὸ κύριον means that which, being essential to virtue, serves also as a κριτήριον, by means of which we may determine whether virtue is present in a given case. Accordingly in the friendship of virtue, the standard by which we measure the worth of a friendly office is the choice or intention of the agent, for this is a true expression of his virtuous character, to manifest which in fellowship with a ἕτερος αὐτός is the one object of the friendship. a. 22.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### ARGUMENT.

*People fall out in the unequal as well as in the equal friendships: for each of the unequal 'friends' thinks that he ought to get 'the larger share': the 'friend' who is better or more useful thinks that, as in a joint-stock business the larger contributor gets the larger share of the profits, so in friendship the better or more useful 'friend' should get a larger share of remuneration, unless the 'friendship' is to become a burden or tax. On the other hand, the needy and inferior 'friend' thinks that the only use of a good and powerful 'friend' is to help the needy. Each seems to be right—each ought to get out of the friendship 'a larger share'—but not, of course, of the same thing: the superior friend ought to get his larger share in honour, and the needy friend his larger share in material advantage. The same rule holds in public life as in friendship: it is in honour that those who spend money for the common good get their reward,*

*honour being what the community has to give for benefits received. A man cannot get at the same time both money and honour out of the community: and as no one cares to be a loser all round, if money is spent for the common good, honour is expected in return.*

*It is proportion, as we have said, which introduces equality into unequal friendships and preserves them: the friend who does more for the moral and material advantage of the other must get honour—this is what the other has to give: even honour is not really equivalent to the greatest benefits (such as those conferred by the gods and by parents): but it is the best thing which the other can give, and as such meets the requirements of friendship. We have said that the benefits conferred by parents have no real equivalent. This is why a father may disown his son (of course natural affection and interest will restrain him from doing so unless his son is very bad); but a son may never disown his father (if the son is bad he may think it his interest to disown his father), for he can never clear off the debt which he owes to his father.*

1163 a. 24. **§§ 1, 2.**] These sections are best illustrated by the parallel passage *E. E.* H. 10. 1242 b. 6 ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος ὥσπερ ἄρχων πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ λόγῳ. . . . ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τοὐναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν (on this see Jackson, *Book* v, pp. 95 sqq.). δόξειε δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. δεῖ ἄρα τινὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀνισάσαι, καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀνάλογον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δ' ἰσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν.

a. 29. **§ 1. λειτουργίαν**] properly a public service defrayed by a private citizen—a *τριηραρχία, χορηγία,* or *ἀρχιθεωρία.*

b. 7. **§ 3. ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν**] Fritzsche quotes i. 5. 4 *τιμὴ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τέλος.*

b. 8. **οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 26) brackets these words as merely a repetition of the words *οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται κ.τ.λ.* b. 6. The clause *ἐν πᾶσι γάρ κ.τ.λ.* b. 9 has no causal connexion, he thinks, with the bracketed words. Susemihl places the words *οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται . . . ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν* after the words bracketed by Rassow. I think that the received text is satisfactory, and that the connexion may be traced as follows—*ὁ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετῶν* gets a reward from the *κοινόν.* This must be *τιμή,* not money, for, *quâ εὐεργετῶν τὸ κοινόν* (*e. g.* as *ἀρχιθέωρος*) and not *ἑαυτόν,* he spends money—and that such a *εὐεργετῶν* must get *τιμή,* since he does not get money, is plain, for no one is willing to sacrifice himself all round.



1163 b. 8.

**ὠφελουμένῳ . . . ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα**] For the change of case see note on *διαμαρτόντα* viii. 13. 9, a. 3. b. 13.

**§ 4. ἀπείπασθαι**] According to the Athenian law a father might dissolve the legal connexion between himself and his son by the process of *ἀποκήρυξις*:—*cf.* Plato, *Legg.* 928 E *ἐξεῖναί σφισιν, ἐὰν βούλωνται, τὸν υἱὸν ὑπὸ κήρυκος ἐναντίον ἁπάντων ἀπειπεῖν υἱὸν κατὰ τὸν νόμον μηκέτ' εἶναι.* He had to prove to the satisfaction of the court his son's deficiency in filial attention, riotous living, and profligacy generally. If the *ἀποκήρυξις* were not avoided by the father's subsequent pardon of his son, the latter was disinherited at his father's death. Apparently his privileges as to the tribe and state however were not affected by *ἀποκήρυξις* (*cf.* Plato, *Legg. l. c. ἐν μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ πολιτείᾳ παῖς ἀποκεκηρυγμένος οὐκ ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄπολις εἴη, ταύτης δέ, ἧς οἵδε οἱ νόμοι ἔσονται, ἀναγκαίως ἔχει εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐξοικίζεσθαι τὸν ἀπάτορα*). See Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities* article, Apokeruxis, (summarised above), and Lucian's (?) *ἀποκηρυττόμενος,* which opens as follows—'A son disinherited by his father studies Physick, and by a *specifick* remedy cures his father who was become distracted, and was given over by all other physicians. Thereupon the father cancels the will, and again declares him his heir. But afterwards upon the son's refusal of curing his mother-in-law that was fallen into the sam distemper, he is disinherited a second time, against which the son makes the following oration.' b. 19.

**ἅμα δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ.**] *ἴσως δ' οὐδεὶς πατὴρ ἀφίσταται τοῦ υἱοῦ εἰ μὴ ὑπερβαλλόντως εἴη μοχθηρός* (*i. e.* the son)—Paraph. *οὐδεὶς δέ ποτε ἀποστήσεται τοῦ υἱοῦ εἰ μὴ μοχθηρὸν ἴδοι αὐτὸν ὄντα*—Asp. b. 22.

**διωθεῖσθαι**] of the father. b. 25.

**τῷ δέ**] the son.

# BOOK IX.

*Introductory Note*] The Ninth Book may be described as a not very systematic collection of *ἀπορίαι* regarding Friendship, which are discussed and answered on the general principles laid down in the Eighth Book. Michelet (pp. 281 sqq.) thinks that this collection did not originally belong to the *Ethics*, and he identifies it with the *θέσεις φιλικαί β*, in the list of Diog. Laert. (No. 72, Rose), the *περὶ φιλίας α* of the same list (No. 24) being the Eighth Book. But although the Ninth Book undoubtedly consists, in main part, of *ἀπορίαι*, there are certain chapters (4–6, 1166 a. 1–1167 b. 16) of an expository character which seem out of place in a collection of *ἀπορίαι*. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* i. pp. 215 sqq.) calls attention to the fact that the Eudemian equivalent of these chapters, and of chapter 7—*E. E.* H. 6–8, 1240 a. 8–1241 b. 12 (= *E. N.* ix. 4–7, 1166 a. 1–1168 a. 27)—is inserted at a point which corresponds in the *E. E.* to that between chapter 8 and chapter 9 of *E. N.* viii—1159 b. 25. Whether the writer of the *E. E.* found *E. N.* ix. 4–7 in *E. N.* viii between chapter 8 and chapter 9, or merely altered the arrangement in his own version, is a question which, in Spengel's opinion, cannot be answered.

The writer of the *M. M.*, without following exactly the order observed by the writer of the *E. E.*, does not, in Spengel's view, deviate seriously from it. Susemihl however (*Nic. Eth.* p. 203) is of opinion that the writer of the *M. M.* must have read ix. 4–6 where we find them, and not in viii, because the order of his discussion (*M. M.* 1210 b. 32–1212 b. 23) is partly that of the *E. E.* and partly that of our *E. N.*



Why and how ix. 4–6 stand where we find them, whether the writer or editor of the Book intentionally placed them there, or they came there by some accident, are questions which, I think, cannot now be answered, and therefore need not be asked. As a whole however Book ix has a distinctive character of its own, and I see no reason for doubting that it was written to follow Book viii. As Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* i. pp. 215 sqq.) says, 'Das neunte Buch besteht aus Aporien: es sind Zweifel und Bedenken, die, nachdem die Erklärung von der *φιλία* im vorausgehenden Buche gegeben ist, entstehen können und gelöst werden müssen, wie etwa bei der *δικαιοσύνη*.'

## CHAPTER I.

### ARGUMENT.

*The proportion which equalises persons who are dissimilar and maintains friendship between them is the same as that which regulates the exchanges by which the shoemaker, weaver, and other members of the community receive due returns for their products. In commerce, however, the dissimilar products exchanged are all referred to a common measure—money: whereas the dissimilar services rendered by such 'friends' as lover and beloved have no common measure: hence recriminations, and dissolution of 'friendship.' The liking of such 'friends' is not for each other as persons, but for the stock of pleasure or profit which each has at his disposal; and if this comes to an end, or turns out to be different from what it was supposed to be—as when the musician found out that his patron had already paid him with the pleasure of expected payment—their friendship comes to an end.*

*Who ought to decide what is the worth of a service rendered, where no bargain has been made beforehand? The person who confers the service, or the person who receives it? The receiver surely, for the person who confers a service, without making a bargain, leaves the remuneration to the pleasure of the receiver. This is what Protagoras did: he let the pupil fix the amount of the fee: but in such matters some people like better the principle of 'fixed fees.' As for the teacher who begins by 'receiving' the fee, and then fails to fulfil the extravagant promises by which he induced his pupils to pay in advance—he naturally becomes the object of complaint: this is what the sophists have to do, for under no other system would people pay them anything for their knowledge. But those who confer benefits for the sake of the persons benefited (this is what they do in the friendship based on virtue), are, as we have said, never objects of complaint, and ought to get a return equivalent to their good intention, for*

*intention is the measure of true friendship and of virtue. The service rendered by a true teacher of philosophy must be estimated in the same way as that rendered by a true friend. It cannot be measured by the standard of money; honour cannot be weighed in the balance against it; but perhaps enough is done if the disciple gives in return what he can, as to the gods and to parents.*

*Where the service is rendered, not for the sake of the person to whom it is rendered, but in view of some return (which, however, has not been agreed upon beforehand), it is, of course, best that the return made should be one which both parties think adequate: failing unanimity on this point, it would seem to be not only necessary but fair that the receiver should fix the amount of the return, he being the only judge of how much benefit he has derived from the service: and this rule does not apply only in 'friendship,' for the price even of a thing that is bought is what the buyer will give for it: and in some states there is no legal recovery of debts—on the principle that if you begin by trusting a man you ought not to end by suing him.*

*When a service, then, is rendered without any arrangement as to the return, it is for the receiver to fix the amount of the return—the giver cannot be allowed to do so, for people put too high a value on the things which they give: but in fixing the amount the receiver must go, not by what he thinks the service worth now that he has received it, but by what he thought it worth before he received it: for people generally do not put the same value on a thing when they have it as they did when they wished to get it.*

1163 b. 32. **§ 1. ἀνομοιοειδέσι**] These 'heterogeneous friendships,' as Ramsauer points out, have not been previously referred to under this name. They are not the same as *αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν*, but exist where the object of the association is not the same on both sides, one party seeking for instance pleasure, and the other money in return for pleasure provided. *Cf.* viii. 4. 1 *μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ.* It is obvious that persons whom it would be impossible to distinguish as *ὑπερέχων καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος* may be *ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φίλοι*.

b. 33. **καθάπερ εἴρηται**] It has been said before (*e.g.* viii. 14. 3) that proportion equalises the difference between the superior and inferior, and so preserves friendship between them: but it has not been said (expressly at least) that it preserves friendship between those whose difference is not quantitative, but qualitative (*ἀνομοιοειδεῖς*). See Ramsauer *ad loc.* Grant's reference to viii. 13. 1 is thus hardly relevant.



The Paraph. simply identifies *αἱ ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φιλίαι* with *αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν* (*ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς κατ' ἰσότητα φιλίαις τὰ ἴσα ἀνταποδοτέον ἀλλήλοις τοὺς φίλους, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις, καθὼς εἴρηται, τὸ ἀνάλογον*), but the writer of the commentary on this Book styled Eustratius by Aldus (but identified with Mich. Eph. by Rose, *Commentare zur Ethik des Aristoteles, Hermes*, vol. v) sees the difficulty, and takes great pains to show *how* *αἱ ἀνομοιοειδεῖς* are *καθ' ὑπεροχήν*: *—ἀναμιμνήσκει τῶν ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου βιβλίῳ εἰρημένων καὶ δεδειγμένων· ἔδειξε γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ἀνάλογον σῴζει τὰς ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φιλίας. ὁμοειδεῖς δὲ φιλίαι εἰσίν, . . . αἱ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἀνομοιοειδεῖς* (the reading of $L^b$, $M^b$, Ald., CCC., Cambr., $B^1$, $B^3$), *ὅμοιοι γὰρ καὶ ἴσοι ἀριθμῷ καὶ δυνάμει οἱ ἀγαθοί . . . ἡ δὲ τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν φιλότης, ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς πατέρα, οὐχ ὁμοία οὐδ' ἴση ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ.* It is scarcely necessary to point out that this identification of *αἱ ἀνομοιοειδεῖς φιλίαι* with *αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν*, on the ground that *αἱ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*, being *ὁμοειδεῖς*, are not *καθ' ὑπεροχήν*, ignores Aristotle's plain statement that in all the three kinds of *φιλία* we have *ὑπεροχή* and *ἰσότης*—viii. 13. 1 *τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν . . . καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες) κ.τ.λ.*

**πολιτικῇ**] *sc.* *κοινωνίᾳ* Mich. Eph., Par., Fritz., Stahr, Peters. b. 34. Ramsauer however supplies *φιλίᾳ*, which is probably right, as it has certainly to be supplied in the next § with *ἐρωτικῇ*: *cf. E. E.* H. 10. 1242 b. 32 *βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηται*

*"μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ."*

*ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν ⟨ᾖ⟩ ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, [καὶ] νομική· ὅταν δ' ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική.* These words occur in a context extensively drawn from *E. N.* ix. 1.

**§ 2. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ κ.τ.λ.**] *i.e.* here there are misunderstandings 1164 a. 2. because there is no common measure.

**§ 3. ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ**] Peters with 'they do not both a. 8. get what they want,' misses the force of *ὑπάρχῃ* here, which (as may be seen from the use of *ὑπάρχοντα* below, a. 11) marks the subsistence of a quality—*τὸ ἡδὺν εἶναι* or *τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι*—in A, not the satisfaction derived by B from that quality in A. The Paraph.

1164 a. 8. is right with *συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅταν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν ἐρῶν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, εἶτα μήτε οὗτος πάνυ ἡδὺς ᾖ, μήτε ἐκεῖνος χρήσιμος.*

a. 10. **ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα**] Mich. Eph. has *συμβαίνει . . . τῆς φιλίας διάλυσις . . διὰ τὸ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν μὲν ἐραστὴν τὰ χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀκμήν, τὸν δ' ἐρώμενον τὸ κάλλος· οὐ γὰρ αὐτούς φησιν ἐφίλουν ὡς οἱ σπουδαῖοι ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῖς· ταῦτα δ' ἦσαν τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὰ χρήματα οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα.*

a. 12. **ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν**] Mich. Eph., the Paraph., Stahr., Rams., and Grant take this as equivalent to *ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία*, or perfect friendship. Victorius however refers to viii. 4. 1, where, speaking of the instability of the friendship between *ἐραστής* and *ἐρώμενος*, Aristotle says *πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες.* The words of Victorius are 'quod sequitur apud auctorem *ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει* ita accipio ut pertineat ad eandem amicitiam declarandam qua juncti sunt inter se amator deliciaeque ipsius: usu enim venit aliquando ut ipsa quoque maneat, cum pura atque integra est: neque colitur propter explendam libidinem, aut fructum inde aliquem commodumque auferendum: sed propter morum ingeniique similitudinem: nam quod addidit nunc hoc a se antea dictum fuisse, intelligit locum eum in quo primum superiore in libro de ipsa praecepit: usus enim quoque illic est in aliis iisdem quibus hic verbis, quae sunt haec *πολλοὶ δ' αὖ* κ.τ.λ. viii. 4. 1.' Zell takes the same view as Victorius, referring the words *ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν* κ.τ.λ. to the *ἐρωτικὴ φιλία* of the immediate context and quoting viii. 4. 1. *Ἐρωτικὴ φιλία* (as Victorius and Zell understand the present passage) is peculiarly unstable unless it happen that similarity of character (*ἤθη* whether good or indifferent) establishes a more lasting bond between the lovers.

Against this interpretation are the words *καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα*, which can scarcely be anything but an abbreviated expression for *ἐν ᾗ* (*i. e. ἐν τῇ τῶν καθ' αὑτοὺς ἀγαθῶν*) *δι' αὑτοὺς φίλοι εἰσί*: see *E. N.* viii. 3. 6—the passage, I take it, referred to here (ix. 1. 3) in the words *καθάπερ εἴρηται.* Of course *ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν φιλία* has, in any case, nothing to do with the *ἠθικὴ φιλία* of *E. N.* viii. 13. 5, which falls under the head of *ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον.*

a. 15. **§ 4. κιθαρῳδῷ**] See the notes of Zell, Michelet, and Grant, for the story.



**κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει**] *ἐκείνου* is *ὧν* a. 20 and *ταῦτα* what 1164 a. 21. he has to offer in return: *ὧν γὰρ ἕκαστος δεῖται τούτων ἕνεκα δίδωσιν ἃ τυγχάνει κεκτημένος αὐτός* (Paraph.). The reading *τὰ αὐτά* ($O^b$, and an authority known to Mich. Eph.) is accepted by Michelet with the sense—'he will be ready to give of his own an amount equal to that which he receives.' Coraes reads *τὰ αὐτοῦ*—the conjecture of Muretus. The change of number (*ὧν—ἐκείνου*) hardly calls for notice in a writer like Aristotle: at any rate I cannot think that Fritzsche's explanation adopted by Grant is satisfactory—'Pronomen *ἐκείνου* singulari numero ad priorem multitudinis numerum (*ὧν δεόμενος τυγχάνει*) refertur propterea quod una res, singulari desiderata occasione, exprimitur.' The passage viii. 3. 3 referred to by Fritzsche in illustration seems to me rather to be a good example of a change of number carelessly made without any reason.

**§§ 5–9. τὴν ἀξίαν** κ.τ.λ.] When a service has been rendered a. 22. without any previous *διομολογία*, or understanding between the parties respecting its value and the remuneration to be given in return for it, *διαφοραί* and *ἐγκλήματα* naturally arise. With whom, in such a case, does it rest to put an end to them by fixing the value or remuneration? With the recipient: for the other party cannot force a service (or whatever else), at his own price, on an unwilling recipient, and if (without an express *διομολογία*) he performs it, he evidently does so leaving the remuneration to be settled by the recipient. This is what Protagoras did; but what ordinary sophists do not venture to do. They even collect their fees in advance. It is to be carefully noted that, in these sections, Aristotle is speaking only of those cases in which no previous *διομολογία* exists. The *εὐεργεσία ἄνευ διομολογίας* of these sections may be compared with the *ἠθικὴ φιλία* of viii. 13. 7. When, in viii. 13. 11, Aristotle says generally that the standard of value in *ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλία* is *ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια*, he states the basis indeed on which the question of price must be discussed by *εὐεργέτης* and *παθών*, but does not of course mean it to be understood that the latter can (except in the absence of a *διομολογία*) fix the price of the *ὠφέλεια.* The unwillingness, due to various causes, of the prospective *εὐεργέτης* to perform the service has the effect of making the (prospective) *παθών* estimate the *ὠφέλεια* more highly. The unwillingness of the one to perform the service below a certain price, has as much to do with the result of the *διομολογία*, as

1164 a. 22. the unwillingness of the other to receive it above a certain price: or otherwise.—The ὠφέλεια of the buyer is the ultimate standard of value, but the application of this standard to a particular case, resulting in the naming of a price, is not left to the buyer alone. If it were possible for him to fix the price as low as he liked, it would be possible for the seller to go on always selling at a loss. It is therefore only of *αἱ ἄνευ διομολογίας εὐεργεσίαι*, or of transactions falling under the head of *ἠθικὴ φιλία*, that Aristotle's answer to the question asked here at the beginning of § 5 applies.

a. 23. **§ 5. προϊεμένου . . . προλαβόντος**] Zell thinks that *προλαβόντος* is simply equivalent to *λαβόντος*: but Coraes is right, I think, with *τοῦ πρώτου λαβόντος, ἀντιδιασταλτικῶς πρὸς τὸν ἀντιλαμβάνοντα καὶ ἀντικομιζόμενον τὸ ὑπηρετηθέν.*

a. 24. **Πρωταγόραν**] Coraes, Michelet, and Stahr quote Plato, *Protag.* 328 B *ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον, ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας, ὅσου ἂν ᾖ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.* But perhaps the pressure exercised by means of this method was more considerable than Protagoras wished it to be thought.

a. 26. **ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί"**] Ramsauer brackets these words as out of place. The context in which the quotation occurs in the *Eth. Eud.* (H. 10. 1242 b. 34)—viz. where *πολιτικὴ φιλία, ἤτοι ἡ τῶν πωλούντων καὶ ὠνουμένων*, is discussed—he considers more natural. But if we remember what the line (Hesiod *ἔργ. κ. ἡμ.* 368) is in full, and what its context is, it will appear, I think, that Ramsauer is wrong in bracketing the words before us.

> *μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω,*
> *καί τε κασιγνήτῳ γελάσας ἐπὶ μάρτυρα θέσθαι·*
> *πίστεις δ' ἄρα ὁμῶς καὶ ἀπιστίαι ὤλεσαν ἄνδρας—*

*i. e.* even with a friend, nay even with a brother, let there be no 'mere understandings'; let every contract be entered into *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς*. This is the advice of Hesiod. After mentioning that Protagoras allowed his pupils to fix the fee, Aristotle proceeds to say that in the matter of fees to be paid for philosophical instruction (*ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις*), some teachers (*ἐνίοις*) are of the opinion of Hesiod, that there should be a stated fee (to be paid after the instruction has been received), although the relation of teacher and pupil is one of friendship rather than of business.



Thus all *ἐγκλήματα* are avoided. Those Sophists however who, 1164 a. 26.
not satisfied with having a fair arrangement beforehand as to the remuneration to be paid afterwards, go to the extreme of requiring that fees proportioned to their extravagant pretensions be paid in advance, naturally become objects of complaint when their pupils find out that they have been swindled. We have thus three relations between teacher and pupils—(1) where the pupils fix the fee: (2) where the fee is fixed beforehand in a fair manner, according to the standard of remuneration commonly recognised for such instruction: (3) where the pupils are swindled by an impostor. The expression *οἱ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον* is to be understood in close connexion with the *τοῦ προλαβόντος* of line a. 23. Where there is no *διομολογία*, the *προλαβών*, not the *προϊέμενος* a. 23 (or *ἀντιλαβών* b. 11), fixes the return; but if the *πρόληψις* be of *money* received for services yet to be rendered, the transaction is a disgraceful one in which the rule laid down at the beginning of § 5 does not apply. *Οἱ προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον* (as distinguished from those *προλαμβάνοντες τὴν εὐεργεσίαν*) cannot be allowed to 'fix the price.' Their services would be dear at the lowest price.

If I am right in supposing that Aristotle has Hesiod's whole context in his mind here—viz. *μισθὸς δ' . . . ὤλεσαν ἄνδρας*—the superior appositeness of the quotation in the Eudemian connexion cannot be admitted.

**§ 7. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας**] The subject a. 33.
of *αἱ ἄνευ διομολογίας ὑπουργίαι* is now resumed after the digression about the teachers who act on the maxim *μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί*, and insist on a *διομολογία*.

**οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι**] those whose friendly services are a. 34.
rendered to and for the sake of the personality of their friends, not with a view to some advantage (*ἐπί τινι* § 8, b. 6) to be received in return: *οἱ ὠφελοῦντες τοὺς φίλους δι' αὐτοὺς καὶ προϊέμενοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα οἷοί εἰσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι*, as distinguished from *οἱ ἐπί τινι, ἢ διὰ χρήσιμον ἢ διὰ ἡδονήν* (Paraph.).

**ἀνέγκλητοι**] In Perfect Friendship a *διομολογία* is unnecessary. a. 35.
No misunderstanding is possible, because the value of a service consists in its being the true expression of a virtuous character, and as such it is immediately recognised by the agent's *ἕτερος αὐτός*.

1164 b. 1. **τὴν ἀμοιβήν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν (αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς)**] 'The return made must be for what the giver intended; for it is the intention which is the significant thing in a friend and in virtue.'

b. 2. **οὕτω δ' ἔοικε κ.τ.λ.**] *sc. ποιητέον εἶναι* according to the commentators; but Ramsauer suspects the passage. As we shall see later, the highest friendship is of the nature of philosophical intercourse—a kind of Dialectic.

b. 6. **§ 8. μὴ τοιαύτης**] *i. e. μὴ δι' αὐτούς.*

**ἐπί τινι**] 'for some return'—*i. e.* not *δι' αὐτούς*, 'for the friends' sake.' The expression *ἐπί τινι* does not necessarily imply that the transaction is *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς*, or founded on a definite *διομολογία*, as Mich. Eph. seems to take for granted—*ἀλλ' ἐπί τινι, τουτέστι δι' ἀντίδοσιν καὶ ἀντευποιΐαν τὴν διὰ χρημάτων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δι' ὁμολογίας.* An adequate return is expected by the giver, but no definite bargain has been made in the case which the section has in view—a case answering to the description of *ἠθικὴ φιλία* given in viii. 13. 7 *ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας.* There being no previous agreement, or *διομολογία*, the recipient, as an honest man, must try, if possible, to meet the expectations of the giver—*μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως κ.τ.λ.* b. 7; but if this be not possible, he has the matter in his own power, and must make what payment he thinks equivalent to the benefit received.

b. 9. **προέχοντα**]=*προλαβόντος* of § 5.

b. 12. **καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον**] 'for even when a thing is offered for sale, this rule holds good'—*i. e.* the buyer fixes the price: *a fortiori*, then, in the cases just mentioned, where a more or less friendly gift or loan has been made *ἐπί τινι*, but *ἄνευ διομολογίας*, the receiver fixes the amount of the return. It is not necessary to think, with Ramsauer, of a thing being bought *ἄνευ διομολογίας*—this would surely be an unusual case—but rather of the 'higgling of the market,' by which a *διομολογία* as to price is arrived at. Where things are not offered for sale 'at fixed prices,' the buyer rather than the seller seems to 'fix the price,' when he beats down the seller. Again, at an auction the highest bidder seems to fix the price. The Paraph. and Mich. Eph. both seem to understand the reference to be to the 'higgling of the market': the Paraphrast has *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον· ὁ γὰρ ὠνούμενος τάττει τὴν τιμὴν καὶ μετρεῖ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὠφελείᾳ ἢ τῇ ἡδονῇ, καὶ τοσούτου ἄξιον εἶναι λέγει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνιον*: and Mich. Eph. has—*ὁ γὰρ πιπράσκων πλέον ἀεὶ ζητεῖ τῆς ἀξίας, ὁ δὲ ὠνούμενος τοσοῦτον δίδωσιν ὅσον ἂν οἴηται γενέσθαι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὠνίου ὠφέλειαν.*



**§ 9. ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι κ.τ.λ.**] Having instanced the 'higgling of the market' to show how much power rests with the 'receiver' even as prospective *buyer*, Aristotle now adds that in some states the law declines to interfere with him as *debtor*—it may be even as fraudulent debtor.

The expression *ἑκούσια συμβόλαια* (*cf.* Plato, *Rep.* 556 A) seems to be equivalent to the *ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα* of *E. N.* v. 2. 13, viz. *πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, κ.τ.λ.*, with this difference perhaps that it calls special attention to *credit* given in these transactions. In Athenian law *συμβόλαια* (plur.) is a *bond* or *covenant*—more particularly with regard to money lent. Where credit was given, even *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς*, it would appear from this and the parallel passage viii. 13. 6 (where see note), that in some states there was no legal remedy against one who declined to fulfil the contract. See Newman's notes on *Pol.* 1263 b. 21 and 1267 b. 37, where he quotes Strabo 702—*δίκην δὲ μὴ εἶναι* (among certain Indians) *πλὴν φόνου καὶ ὕβρεως· οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ταῦτα, τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἑκάστῳ, ὥστε ἀνέχεσθαι δεῖ ἐάν τις παραβῇ τὴν πίστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέχειν ὅτῳ πιστευτέον, καὶ μὴ δικῶν πληροῦν τὴν πόλιν.*

b. 15. **ᾧ γὰρ . . . b. 20 λαμβάνοντες**] Ramsauer regards these words as out of place here, and in themselves confused, and brackets them: *νόμος*, or *νομοθέτης* (suggested by Mich. Eph.), is scarcely satisfactory, he thinks, as subject of *οἴεται*: and the comparison begun by *δικαιότερον* is not completed—*i. e.* the reason for the failure of the giver to make a just estimate of the value of the benefaction is indeed stated, but evidently the writer intended to go on to point out that the receiver's estimate is also prejudiced, though not to the same extent as the giver's, for he adds *ἀλλ' ὅμως κ.τ.λ.* In addition to these points noted by Ramsauer, I would call attention to the point that *οἱ ἔχοντες* in the suspected passage is used of *οἱ προϊέμενοι*, whereas in § 8 *προέχοντα* is the receiver, and

1164 b. 15. ἔχοντι and ἔχειν at the end of the present § also refer to the receiver.

If the passage suspected by Ramsauer be allowed to stand as it is, ἀλλ' ὅμως will mean, I suppose, 'notwithstanding the extravagant value attached by the giver to his gift, it is the receiver's estimate that he has after all to accept as final.'

b. 20. δεῖ δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ.] The statement that the receiver, in estimating the value of a service, must keep in view the distinction between ἔχοντι and πρὶν ἔχειν shows that the case here contemplated is one in which the service has already been rendered without previous διομολογία, and it devolves upon the receiver alone to determine as an honest man what return he will make. Ramsauer's suggestion to read the sentence τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν after ἐτίμα b. 21 seems to me an excellent one, and enables us to give οἱ ἔχοντες its proper meaning, which, as I have pointed out, we cannot give it where it now stands. I offer the following rearrangement, which not only allows us consistently to refer ἔχοντι, ἔχειν, and οἱ ἔχοντες to the receiver, but meets Ramsauer's difficulty about δικαιότερον, and places ἀλλ' ὅμως where its force is felt:—ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δικαιότερον τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος· τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια· δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα· τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. The difficulty of finding a subject for οἴεται, points, I think, to a lacuna between ἐκοινώνησεν and ᾧ γάρ b. 15.

## CHAPTER II.

### ARGUMENT.

*The following also are difficult questions.—Ought a man always to give the preference to his father, and obey him in all things? Or ought he, when sick, to obey his doctor rather than his father, and, in electing a general, vote for the candidate who has military experience? And again—should one do a service to a friend rather than to a good man? Should one recompense a benefactor rather than bestow a gift on a comrade, when one cannot do both? Well, it is not easy to give exact answers to such questions. Cases differ indefinitely, and what is right or necessary in one case is perhaps not so in another case. But this is plain—that one ought not to give the same person the preference in all things. Also, as a rule, one ought to treat services rendered as debts and repay them before one makes presents to one's associates—as a rule: for there are exceptions—A has been ransomed from brigands by B: should A ransom or repay B, or should he ransom his own father? There can be only one answer. He ought to ransom his father. Another case in which the general rule that services ought to be repaid like debts is perhaps inapplicable, is where A does a service to B whom he knows to be a good man, and B is thus put in the position of owing a return to A whom he supposes to be a bad man. Thus, if A lends money to B knowing that B is an honest man and will pay back the loan, B is not bound in turn to lend money to A whom he looks upon as a dishonest man and not likely to repay it. B's return does not stand on the same footing as A's original service, if B is right in his opinion of A's character; and if his opinion is mistaken, yet it is his opinion, and we need not be surprised at his acting on it. However, where circumstances vary indefinitely it is impossible to give definite answers: only thus much is clear—that the same returns are not to be rendered to all persons, and that all things are not to be rendered even to a father, any more than all things are offered to Zeus. There are things which are properly and fittingly rendered to parents, brothers, companions, and benefactors respectively—this is indeed commonly recognised: thus it is their kinsmen whom people invite to weddings and funerals, on the ground that these are important family events.*

*To parents, as to the authors of their being, children ought to render support, and also honour, as to gods: but not every kind of honour; for in the first place the honour due to a father differs from that due to a mother; and again the honour due to a father differs from that due to a philosophic teacher or to a general. Indeed, to all those who are elder honour is due according to age—in respect of seats and other such matters.*

*To comrades and brothers our bearing ought to be frank and open. To kinsmen, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-citizens, and all others we must try to give what is severally due to them according as they stand in different degrees of relationship to ourselves, and differ in virtue or in usefulness. Where people are of the same kind it is not very difficult to assign to each his due; but where they differ it is a harder task; still, we must not shrink from it, but do our best to assign rightly.*



*Introductory Note.*] In this chapter, Michelet remarks, we have the beginnings of Casuistry. 'Casuistry' has got a bad reputation because it has manufactured, in imitation of *bonâ fide* cases of moral perplexity, cases which no honest man would find perplexing—and this, with the concealed object of resolving them in a sense favourable to some dishonest inclination. The perplexing cases given in this chapter are all, however, *bonâ fide* ones, though

the form in which some of them are presented reminds one of the Debating Society. They are cases with which an honest man might find himself confronted—cases in which he has to choose between two courses of conduct, each of which alternately 'common sense' presents as a 'duty'—if it seems right to choose the one, it then seems wrong not to choose the other.

Common sense takes out of their real context certain points of view, presented by imagination, and recommended to the attention by feeling, and makes them into absolute and self-subsistent 'entities,' incapable, naturally, of reconciliation as parts of a rationally consistent system. To attempt to solve for himself 'the problems of casuistry' from the level of 'common sense' can accordingly only weaken the moral nature of the man who attempts it. He has to believe in 'two duties' in the same circumstances, to one of which he must needs be unfaithful. Haunted by the thought of unfaithfulness to a 'duty,' every time he is forced to make a choice in circumstances of moral perplexity he does violence to an honestly entertained moral sentiment, and brings himself gradually nearer a point at which it is no longer doubtful that his decisions have become dishonest.

'The problems of Casuistry' are only for the man who has risen above 'common sense' to the height of reason; who can see life clearly as a single organic whole. Of course the practical difficulties of distinguishing between the right and the wrong, and of choosing the right, remain for such a man; but the fallacy of the 'two duties in the same circumstances'—of the moral *imperium in imperio*—no longer imposes upon him. He now perceives that there can be only the one duty, however hard to find, in the one set of circumstances. His attitude towards the perplexities of life is a resolute and objective one. He is not paralysed by the thought that, when he does what is right, he is also doing what is wrong. His philosophy has not made life less perplexing in detail, but it has given him the great idea of the organic unity of the world—an idea which inspires him with fortitude and resignation. It is the clearness with which Aristotle presents life as a rational whole that makes the discussion of 'the problems of Casuistry' so satisfactory in his system. *Φαντασία* and *πάθος* break Duty into a multitude of 'cases of conscience'—Life, into a chaos of separate and repugnant items, making it 'a series of episodes, like a bad play.' The perplexities of 'Casuistry' represent the work of



*φαντασία* and *πάθος*. The resolution of these perplexities is the work of Reason. On the relation of Philosophy to Casuistry, see Green's *Prolegomena*, §§ 314–328.

§ 2. **τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ**] *τῷ καλῷ* marks the claims of the Form or Ideal which the good man strives to realize; *τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ*, the limitations imposed upon him by the *matter* of his circumstances. 'For the different cases differ in all sorts of ways, according to the importance or unimportance, the nobility or necessity of the act' (Peters). 1164 b. 29.

§ 4. **ἀπαιτοῦντι δέ**] *τὰ λύτρα* (Coraes). 1165 a. 1.

§ 5. **προϋπαρχήν**] 'the primary obligation' (Grant). a. 5.

**ὁ μὲν . . . τῷ δέ**] Both refer to the same person, viewed first as *προϊέμενος*, and then as *ἀντιλαμβάνων*. a. 6.

**οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα**] 'the claim is not equal' (Grant): *cf.* Mich. Eph.—*οὐδὲ γὰρ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν πονηρὸν δανείζειν ἐπιεικεῖ ἄξιον, τὸν δ' ἐπιεικῆ τὰ ἴσα καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸν μοχθηρὸν ποιεῖν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀξιώσειε.* Victorius has—Non est par postulatum. a. 10.

**οἴονται**] Coraes reads *οἴεται*, which the Paraph. seems to support with—*εἴτε τοίνυν ἀληθῆ περὶ τοῦ μοχθηροῦ νομίζει ὁ ἀγαθός, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο μοχθηρὸς ἔσται, καὶ οὐκ ἀποδώσει, εἰκότα ποιεῖ μὴ δανείζων· εἴτε μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οἴεται δέ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀμείβεται τοῖς ἴσοις, καὶ οὕτως οὐ πόρρω ποιεῖ τοῦ δικαίου.* Coraes also reads *δόξειεν* with Γ, $M^b$, $O^b$, Ald., instead of *δόξαιεν* given by $K^b$, $L^b$, Cambr., the subject of *οἴεται* and *δόξειεν* being the *σπουδαῖος*. There can be no doubt, however, that if we read *οἴονται* and *δόξαιεν*, their real subject is still the *σπουδαῖος*, not both parties. Ramsauer sees this, for on the words *οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν* he has—'*sc.* *οἱ ἐνίοτε τὴν προυπαρχὴν οὐκ ἀμειβόμενοι.*' The change from the singular *ἐλπίζει* to the plural *οἴονται* need not surprise us in Aristotle. a. 11.

§ 6. **πολλάκις**] i. 3. 1, ii. 2. 3. a. 12.

**τῷ Διί**] Grant refers to v. 7. 1. a. 15.

§ 7. **κήδη**] 'funerals.' Mich. Eph. is certainly wrong with *κήδη δ' εἰσὶ τὰ πρὸ τοῦ γάμου συναλλάγματα.* Why, as Michelet asks, if this is the meaning, are *τὰ κήδη* mentioned separately from and after a. 20.

1165 a. 20. the γάμοι? According to the *Ind. Arist.* the word occurs only here in Aristotle.

a. 22. § 8. τροφῆς . . . γονεῦσι . . . ἐπαρκεῖν] The genitive is partitive—'to supply one's parents with their due share of sustenance.' Zell and Coraes, following the Paraph., conjecture τροφήν. The regular construction of ἐπαρκεῖν is dat. of the person and acc. of the thing. The dat. of the thing however occurs. Perhaps we should read τροφῇ.

a. 24. τιμήν] *sc.* ἀπονεμητέον.

a. 27. § 9.] Fritzsche, Grant, and Ramsauer quote Plato, *Rep.* 425 A σιγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέρους, ὡς πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.

a. 32. συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα] 'to assign to each what is properly due on the ground of relationship, goodness, or usefulness.'

a. 33. χρῆσιν] Williams very plausibly translates this by 'intimacy'—*cf.* Latin *usus*; but the commentators are probably right with 'usefulness': χρῆσις is not quoted in the *Ind. Arist.* in the sense of 'intimacy.'

a. 34. § 10. ἡ σύγκρισις] So Bywater after Ruelle (*Rev. de Phil.* 12, p. 175), for the κρίσις of the MSS. 'The question,' says Bywater (*Contributions*, p. 62), 'here is not of "judgment" or "distinction" or any thing of that sort, but rather of combining the persons and their respective dues'—and he quotes *de Gen. et Corr.* 329 b. 26 for the usage, and compares σύγκρισις here with σύζευξις in *E. N.* v. 3. 12.

## CHAPTER III.

### Argument.

*Another difficult question is about the dissolution of friendship with those who do not remain the same.*

*Where friendship is for profit or pleasure, of course it is quite natural that it should be broken off when the profit or pleasure ceases: no fault can be found with the friend who then breaks it off, unless he has been pretending to like the other for his personal character, while all the time he was really in love with his usefulness: in that case the other would have a right to complain of counterfeit friendship—a much worse thing than counterfeit coin. But if a man make another his friend on account of that other's goodness and that other become bad, can he continue to have him as a friend? Surely not. He cannot love that which is evil, or be like it; for, as we have seen, like loves like. Is he then to break off the friendship at once? Not unless the other has become incurably bad. If the other's character can still be reformed, he could not do anything more worthy of friendship than trying to reform it. Again, if one of the two friends remain the same, and the other become a much better man, is the latter still to keep up his friendship with the former? He can hardly do so—at any rate not if his friend be a friend of boyhood who has remained a boy in understanding, while he has himself become a man of distinguished excellence; for what could the tastes of two such persons have in common? How could two such persons see much of each other? Is the distinguished man then to make no difference between his old friend and a stranger? Our answer is—he ought to remember the old intimacy. Something is due to bygone friendship where the separation has not been occasioned by the old friend turning out a very bad man.*



§ 1. διὰ τὸ ἦθος] δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ ἦθος (Mich. Eph.). 1165 b. 5.

ἐν ἀρχῇ] No remark exactly corresponding to this has been made. Zell, Coraes, Fritzsche, and Michelet however refer to ix. 1. 4, and Michelet regards the expression ἐν ἀρχῇ as showing that this collection of θέσεις φιλικαί constituting the Ninth Book was published separately. Ramsauer finds the ἀρχή in viii. 13. 5 γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται, where the discussion of διαφοραί begins. b. 6.

§ 2. κιβδηλεύουσιν] The commentators quote Theognis— b. 12.

χρυσοῦ κιβδήλοιο καὶ ἀργύρου ἄνσχετος ἄτη
Κύρνε, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν ῥᾴδιον ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ·
εἰ δὲ φίλου νόος ἀνδρὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι λέληθε
ψυδρὸς ἐών, δόλιον δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ ἔχει,
τοῦτο θεὸς κιβδηλότατον ποίησε βροτοῖσι,
καὶ γνῶναι πάντων τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότατον.

§ 3. ἀποδέχηται] 'receive into his friendship.' b. 13.

οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν ⟨τὸ⟩ πονηρόν] This is Bywater's reading, after Stahr, for Bekker's οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρόν. Ramsauer and Susemihl, however, rightly (I think) bracket the words (omitted by Γ), reading οὐδέ (Ramsauer's conjecture) before δεῖ b. 15. $K^b$ omits οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον. We may suppose that the scribe of $K^b$, b. 15.

1165 b. 15. with a text before him like Bekker's, accidentally omitted *οὔτε δεῖ φιλοπόνηρον*, because of the similarity of these words to *οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρόν* which he had already transcribed. They are very similar; and a reason for their similarity may be given as follows—The original text being *ἆρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ δεῖ; φιλοπόνηρον γάρ κ.τ.λ.*, an early blunder repeated the words *οὐδὲ δεῖ φιλοπόνηρον*. The blunder was then rationalised by the alteration of the first member of the dittograph into *οὔτε δὲ φιλ[ητέ]ο[ν] πονηρόν*, and of *οὐδέ* in the second into *οὔτε*. The scribe of $K^b$, with this rationalised dittograph before him (as we have it in Bekker's text), was led by the similarity between *οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρόν* and *οὔτε δεῖ φιλοπόνηρον* accidentally to omit the latter. Fritzsche omits *οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ*, supposing that these words represent two glosses on *φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι*, viz. *οὐ φιλητέον πονηρόν* and *οὐ δεῖ φιλεῖν πονηρόν*.

b. 16. **φιλοπόνηρον**] Zell and Coraes quote Theophrastus, *Char.* 14 (29) *περὶ φιλοπονηρίας. καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοπονηρία ἀδελφή ἐστι τῆς πονηρίας καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς παροιμίας τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον πορεύεσθαι.*

b. 21. **τῷ τοιούτῳ**] *τούτῳ ᾗ τοιούτῳ* is the reading adopted by Coraes, Fritzsche, and Susemihl, and found in Par. 1417, corr.$^2$ $K^b$, Cambr., and *γρ.* $O^b$. *Τούτῳ ᾗ τοιούτῳ* is the reading of $K^b$, $M^b$, $B^2$, $B^3$, Γ, Ald. Bekker's and Bywater's *τῷ τοιούτῳ* is the reading of $L^b$, $O^b$, CCC, and $B^1$. See Bywater's *Contributions*, p. 63.

b. 29. **§ 4. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταὐθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς**] *i.e. τὸ ἀρέσκεσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς*, &c. 'for not even in regard to each other's character will their tastes agree' (Peters).

b. 31. **εἴρηται**] *Cf.* viii. 5. 3, and viii. 7. 4.

**§ 5. ἆρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον κ.τ.λ.**] 'ought he then to place himself in no other relation towards him than towards one who had never been his friend?'



# CHAPTER IV.

## ARGUMENT.

*The characteristic marks of our friendship for others seem to be copies of those which belong to the feelings with which we regard ourselves. The marks popularly recognised as characteristic of our friendship for others are that we wish and try to effect the good of our friends, or what we think to be their good—that we wish them to exist for their own sakes (this is what mothers wish for their children, and friends who have had a difference wish for each other) —that we spend our time with them and choose the same things as they do, sympathising with their joys and sorrows (as, again, mothers especially do as regards their children). Now these are the marks which characterise the feelings of the good man towards himself, and the feelings of other men towards themselves, in so far as they suppose themselves to be good—for the good man, or his virtue, as we have seen, is always the standard. The good man is in concord with himself, and seeks after the same things with all parts of his soul. He wishes and tries to effect his own good for his own sake—that is, for the sake of the rational part of his nature: he also wishes to exist, and continue in existence, for to him existence is a good thing—that is, his own existence within the limits of human nature, for he does not wish to leave his old self behind, and become another being—not even God with all the good which God as God possesses. Such a man wishes to spend his life with himself: for what could be more pleasant! his life is full of happy memories and good hopes: his mind is richly stored with things worth thinking about. Moreover, he sympathises to the full with his own pains and pleasures. The same things always give him pain, and the same things always give him pleasure, without exception: for he never, we may say, feels regret.*

*Such, then, being the good man's relation to himself, his relation to his friend —his other self—will be similar. Whether his relation to himself is 'friendship' is a question which need not be discussed at present: thus much however may be said, that it seems to be friendship in so far as it has two or more of the characteristic marks of friendship just mentioned. Also, the expression, 'He loves his friend as himself'—meaning that his friendship for him is very great —seems to imply that a man can be his own 'friend.'*

*The characteristic marks of friendship which have been mentioned seem to belong even to the feelings with which men who are bad regard themselves; only, however, in so far as such men are pleased with themselves and think themselves good. The feelings with which those who are so utterly bad as not to be able to think themselves good regard themselves have certainly none of the characteristics of friendship; and, perhaps we ought to say, even the feelings of those who are bad without being utterly bad are destitute of these characteristics; for such men are at variance with themselves; their desires and wishes*

*conflict like those of the incontinent: instead of that which they recognise as good, they choose that which is pleasant and brings harm: or through cowardice and sloth they hold aloof from doing what they think right; and sometimes the thought of the evil deeds they have done, and the detestation in which they are held for their vice, make them flee life and destroy themselves. Also, the wicked seek associates, fleeing from themselves. When they are by themselves they remember and look forward to much that is disagreeable which they do not think about when they are with others. There is nothing in them to attract friendship, and so they have no friendly feelings towards themselves. They do not enter in a friendly way even into their own joys and sorrows. Their souls are broken up into factions; one part is grieved because it cannot get something, and another part is glad thereat: they are soon sorry that they have been glad: they are full of regrets. This is the state of the wicked—surely a wretched state: it behoves us therefore to flee wickedness, and try with all our might to be good, and so become friends to ourselves and others.*

[See *Introductory Note* to Book ix for the relation of Chapters 4–6 to the rest of the Book.]

1166 a. 1. §§ 1, 2.] Five φιλικά, or characteristics of Friendship, are enumerated in § 1, all of which are to be found in the good man's relations to himself, § 2. These are—

1. τὸ βούλεσθαι καὶ πράττειν τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.
2. τὸ βούλεσθαι εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὑτοῦ χάριν.
3. τὸ συνδιάγειν.
4. τὸ τὰ αὐτὰ αἱρεῖσθαι.
5. τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν τῷ φίλῳ.

The good man (§§ 3–5) (1) wishes good to himself for his own sake—*i.e.* for the sake of his Reason which is himself; (2) he wishes his own continued existence; (3) he dwells with himself in the pleasant memories of the past, and the good hopes of the future; (4) he is of one mind, always seeking the same things with all parts of his soul; and (5) the same things are always distasteful to him, and the same things pleasant; he does not now fail to sympathise with feelings which he entertained then; he has no cause for repenting. Bad men on the other hand (§§ 8–10) flee from themselves, even to the length of suicide. Their souls are full of disorder and regrets. As Eudemus says (*E. E.* H. 6. 1240 b. 16, a chapter to be read in connexion with the chapter before us)—ὅ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος (unstable).

These feelings, then, with which the good man regards himself



are said (§ 1) to be the source of the feelings with which a friend is regarded; or—the chief characteristics by which friendship is defined, find their explanation in the good man's attitude to himself; as Eudemus says (*E. E.* H. 6. 1240 b. 2)—ἅπαντα ταῦτα (*i.e.* τὰ φιλικά) ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα, and (1240 b. 17) ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The good man realises perfectly in himself that oneness of soul and life which characterises the relationship of those who are ἕτεροι αὐτοί to each other. But this derivation of the feelings of friends from the feelings of the good man towards himself must not be taken too literally. The *logical* order may be that stated by Aristotle in ix. 4. 1; but the *chronological* order is different. The good man himself is the result in time of that development of society from Family to City which φιλία or social feeling has rendered possible; or, to put the same truth otherwise—that Reason which gives the good man his unity of life, and in virtue of which he is his own constant 'friend,' is realised not in an isolated individual but in a citizen; it is the form under which, at last, after ages of incessant struggle with disintegrating forces, the good of men, as members of a society held together by utility and natural affection, has presented itself to the most gifted minds: or again—the 'self' which the good man loves so constantly is not the isolated self of sense which seeks its own good at the cost of others, but the rational self which consists in the happy consciousness of being joined together with others in a beautiful social order. 1166 a. 1.

The 'good man' therefore cannot be abstracted from the society in which he has his being, in order that the feelings with which he regards 'himself' may be represented as the source of those with which he regards his friends; for we can define 'himself' only as 'a being whose very essence is regard for others—devotion to Justice and Friendship.' Eudemus indeed (*E. E.* H. 6 *sub init.*), before beginning the remarks parallel to those in this chapter, points out that φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν can be spoken of only in the sense in which ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν is spoken of (see *E. N.* v. 11. 9). Friendship, like justice, is properly between man and man. Those whom it unites most perfectly are indeed similar in character and interests; but it is only by a figure of speech that those who are similar can be represented as one person.

We must suppose therefore that Aristotle is describing the logical as distinguished from the chronological order, when he

1166 a. 1. writes (ix. 4. 1) *τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι.* Just as the State is said in the *Politics* to be logically or metaphysically prior to the individual, though chronologically subsequent, so here Reason is represented as prior to the State itself—the harmony of the rational soul within itself is represented as the source of those friendly relations which bind men together in the State. This is the logical or metaphysical, not the chronological order: and Coraes is, I think, much mistaken when, on the strength of this passage, he ascribes to Aristotle the view which derives the altruistic feelings in time from egoistic feelings—*ὅλον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον τῶν ἄριστα πεφιλοσοφημένων ἐστί· περιέχει γὰρ ἐν συντόμῳ τὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις τῶν φιλοσόφων διὰ μακρῶν πεπραγματευμένα περὶ τῆς λεγομένης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους συμπαθείας. ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἑαυτὸν γὰρ φιλικῆς διαθέσεως ἡ φιλαυτίας, ὡς ἀπὸ πηγῆς, ἐξέρχεσθαι λέγει τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλίαν.* Here, as I have said, Coraes is much mistaken. Aristotle is not concerned, in this chapter, with the Natural History of *φιλία*. This is one of the most metaphysical contexts in the whole of his writings. He insists exclusively on the metaphysical priority of *τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτόν* to *τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας*, because he wishes us to regard the Friendship of Good Men towards each other as the *mise en scène* of Reason. To know oneself, to be able to contemplate with the eye of Reason the System of Human Nature, and, in contemplating it, to maintain it as *καλόν* in the midst of the *ὕλη* of our passions and necessities, is Happiness or the Chief Good. But how shall a man 'know himself'? Only by seeing himself in his friends—*i. e.* by having friends towards whom he can act, and so realise himself; for he is what he is to his friends. As Eudemus puts it (*E. E.* H. 12. 1245 b. 18) *ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ* (*i. e. θεῷ*) *αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν.* It is in strict conformity therefore with the metaphysical basis of his ethical philosophy and in the interest of the development of his ethical philosophy on that basis, that Aristotle here derives *τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους* from *τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτόν.*

§ 1. **τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας**] Bywater's reading for *τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους.* These words are omitted by Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* i. 217), after Muretus and Scaliger, as superfluous. It seems to me that the antithesis to *ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν* requires us to retain them. I do not agree with Ramsauer, whose note on *ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν* is—'ne addas



cogitatione **φιλικῶν**. Rei prima sedes *τὰ πρὸς ἑαυτόν* dicuntur esse: 1166 a. 1.
nomina a duorum societate petita sunt.' Surely we ought to supply *φιλικῶν* here—*cf.* ix. 4. 10 *οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.*

**καὶ οἷς**] Spengel (*Arist. Studien* i. 217) suggests *οἷς καί.*

**οἱ προσκεκρουκότες**] 'friends who have had a difference' (Peters), a. 6.
but still are well disposed to each other at a distance. Mich. Eph. has *ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φίλων, φησί, οἱ προσκεκρουκότες, καίπερ μηδὲ συζῶντες, μηδὲ συνδιημερεύοντες, μηδὲ ἀλλήλοις συνόντες διὰ τὴν γεγονυῖαν διαφοράν καὶ πρόσκρουσιν, καὶ οὗτοι τοιούτως ἔχοντες βούλονται ἀλλήλους καὶ ζῆν καὶ καλῶς διάγειν.* Ramsauer regards the words *καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες* as spurious, on the ground that *οἱ προσκεκρουκότες*, who have omitted that which is most characteristic of friendship, viz. *τὸ συζῆν*, can hardly be adduced in support of a definition of friendship—'vereor ne absurdum sit, ad probandam aliquam amici definitionem eos laudare qui *τὸ μάλιστα φιλικόν* (*τὸ συζῆν*) sane parum amanter omiserint et *εὔνοι*, potius quam amici, appellandi sint.' To this it may be replied that Aristotle is here immediately concerned with only *one aspect* of friendship, viz. *τὸ βούλεσθαι εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν*, and *οἱ προσκεκρουκότες* are specially fitted to illustrate this one aspect, which they, as it were, isolate from the other aspects for separate examination. It is not implied that *οἱ προσκεκρουκότες* are perfect friends, any more than that the relation of a mother to her young child (to which Ramsauer does not object as an illustration) is, in the absence of *ἀντιφίλησις*, perfect friendship.

**καὶ τὴν φιλίαν**] *ἀπὸ τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς φιλίας ὁρισμός, ἀπὸ τοῦ* a. 9.
*ὁρισμοῦ τῶν ἐχόντων· καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς τοῦ σώφρονος τὸν τῆς σωφροσύνης ὁρισμὸν παρέχει* (Paraph.). *Cf. E. N.* vi. 5. 1 *περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους.*

§ 2. **ᾗ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι**] The effect of this false a. 11.
*ὑπόληψις* is explained below in § 7; they think that they are good, and so are pleased with themselves—*φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα* (*i. e. τὰ φιλικά*) *καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;* it is only by deceiving himself into the belief that his life has the unity of the good man's, that a bad man can feel on 'friendly terms' with himself. I think that Bywater's *δέ*, line 12, for *γάρ* is an improvement: see *Contrib.* p. 63.

1166 a. 12. **καθάπερ εἴρηται**] *e.g.* iii. 4. §§ 4, 5.

**ἑκάστων**] Bywater's reading after $K^b$ for Bekker's *ἑκάστῳ*. This is easier than Spengel's conjecture *ἑκάστου* neut., for which he quotes (*Arist. Stud.* i. 217) iii. 4. 5 *ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν*, and x. 5. 10 *εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός.*

a. 14. **§ 3. κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν**] *τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατά τε λογικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλογον· καὶ οὐ καθάπερ ὁ ἀκρατὴς τἀναντία ζητεῖ, καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν αὐτῷ τῷ λογιστικῷ πολεμεῖ* (Paraph.). *Cf. E. N.* i. 13. §§ 16, 17 *καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον . . . λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν . . . πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.*

*Τὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν* is *σπουδαία προαίρεσις—cf. E. N.* vi. 2. 2 *ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι, τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική.*

**ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δή**] Rams. and Susemihl put a full stop after *ψυχήν* instead of Bekker's comma, and write *δέ* for *δή*. This seems right. Having implied that the good man's *προαίρεσις* is *σπουδαία*, Aristotle proceeds (*καὶ—δέ*) to describe his *βούλησις*. His *ὀρέξεις* being *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*, the *λόγος* will be *ὀρθός* in relation to a rationally apprehended end which he wishes for (*βούλεται*). This rationally apprehended end which the good man wishes for is the perfection of his own nature as an organic whole—or as a rational system (*τὸ διανοητικόν*), *i.e.* as a system of harmonious relations not liable to be disturbed by passion. The good man, as the Paraph. expresses it, *τὴν θεωρίαν ἔχει τοῦ τέλους τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πράξεων*, whereas the bad man has only *φαύλη ἡδονή*.

a. 15. **τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα**] Explained by viii. 2. 2 *φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φίλητὸν φαινόμενον.* In the case of the good man, however, the difference between *τὸ ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* is merely a formal one; for *ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται* (*E. N.* iii. 4. 4).

**(τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν)**] added to explain **καὶ πράττει.** The good man does not stop at *βούλησις*, but goes on to *πρᾶξις*.



**τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν κ.τ.λ.**] We must not suppose Aristotle 1166 a. 16.
to mean that the good man devotes himself entirely to his 'intellect' strictly so called; that he gives himself up to the cultivation of his 'scientific faculties.' If he did, his life would be as onesided in its own way as that of the politician who sacrifices the good of his nature as a whole to his ambition, or as that of the tradesman who sacrifices it to his desire for gain. *Τὸ νοοῦν* or *τὸ διανοητικόν* is the whole nature of man *quâ* conscious for itself of the harmonious action of all its parts. These 'parts' are feelings, self-regarding and altruistic, as well as faculties and acts of knowledge. Reason realises itself in the discovery of truth, *and* in the regulation of the feelings.

**ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ**] The 'personality,' or self-identity, of a. 17.
man is not given in any separate impression of sense or feeling, or separate outgoing of desire; it exists only so far as impressions are related to one another, and desires are regulated. Reason (*τὸ νοοῦν—τὸ διανοητικόν*), as the source of all relations and rules, in the sphere of conduct as well as in that of science, is therefore the true man. *Τὸ βούλεσθαι . . . καὶ πράττειν . . . τοῦ διανοητικοῦ χάριν* is a life *κατὰ λόγον*, in which both knowledge and conduct have due place, as distinguished from a life *κατὰ πάθος*, whether the *πάθος* be an erroneous or prejudiced notion in the sphere of science, or the undue influence of a pleasure or pain in that of conduct. The order of Human Nature as a whole is, in short, here opposed to the disorder. *Τὸ διανοητικόν* is co-extensive with Human Nature as an orderly system.

**§ 4. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι**] *Cf.* Spinoza, *Eth.* iii. 6 a. 19.
and 7 'Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.'

**ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντ' ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον] (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν) ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα**] Susemihl brackets these words (*ἕκαστος* a. 19 . . . *μάλιστα* a. 23), and Ramsauer brackets *ἕκαστος* a. 19 . . . *ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν* a. 22. The passage may be a 'duplicate' of the preceding section: it is certainly obscure, and interrupts somewhat the otherwise straightforward account of the traits distinguishing the good

1166 a. 19. man's 'relations to himself.' I transcribe Stahr's translation, as fairly representing the interpretation given by those commentators (the majority) who do not make the words *ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν* parenthetical, but refer *ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν* to *ὁ θεός*.—'Ein Jeder wünscht sich aber das, was für ihn ein Gut ist; wird er aber ein Anderer, so wird kein Mensch wünschen, dass das neue, so entstandene Wesen noch Alles das fortbehalte, was es in seinem früheren Zustande besass. Freilich hat die Gottheit auch heute noch das absolut Gute in sich, aber eben nur darum, weil sie ewig ist, was sie ihrem Wesen nach ist; dies Wesen ist für Jeden das denkende, entweder schlechthin oder doch vorzugsweise.'

Grant and Bywater (see Bywater's text as quoted at the head of this note) differ from other commentators in making the words *ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν* parenthetical, and referring *ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν*, not to *ὁ θεός*, but to *ἕκαστος*. See Grant's note. Susemihl prints the passage thus—*ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα.*

If we are to assume, with Susemihl and Ramsauer, that the passage is an interpolation, we must, at the same time, recognise it (punctuated as in Susemihl's text) as the work of an 'interpolator' who understood well the metaphysical drift of the context which he thus ventured to interrupt in its even flow. We cannot help seeing that the present context, with its *τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι* (§ 5), and its *θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ* (§ 5), reminds this 'interpolator' of other descriptions of man's *ἀρίστη διαγωγή*, in which its shortness, and yet immeasurable worth, are pressed on our notice by the comparison with it of the life of God: perhaps we may suppose that *Met.* Λ. 7 (1072 b. 14–18), with its *διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὕτως γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα*—was specially in his mind, and that his 'interpolation' means that 'every man *wishes* good things for himself: for himself, as he is, not as having become another being: *wishes*—God, indeed, now and for ever *possesses* the good, but possesses it as being what He is.' The two points which the comparison of man's estate with God's brings out elsewhere (*e.g.* in *Met.* Λ. 7) would thus appear to be



brought out in this 'interpolation':—(1) Man touches the good 1166 a. 19.
in so far as he is a self-identical being, *i.e.* rational; and God also touches the good as a self-identical rational being. This is the point in which God and Man are alike: (2) Man, however, differs from God in the manner in which he touches the good. Man's good lies in the future, and he touches it after reaching forward to it in *βούλησις*. God's good is always present with Him in His continuous *μετάληψις τοῦ νοητοῦ*. The time which intervenes between Man's *βούλησις* and its realisation may change him (for he is immersed in *ὕλη*), and may make his *βούλησις* vain. He may not be present in his old person to welcome the good wished for, when at last it comes. God *ἐνεργεῖ ἔχων* (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 22); time does not elapse during which He possesses a capacity which is not yet actualised (on the expression *ἐνεργεῖ ἔχων* see Rosmini, *Opere* vol. viii. p. 525, Torino, 1857, and Schwegler, *Met.* vol. iv. p. 267). He has not an ideal, held up by *βούλησις*, of future good never fully realised. Capacity and actuality, the ideal and its realisation are one in Him: see *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 20 *ἑαυτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων.* (Here *νοῦς* is explained by Alexander *ad loc.* as *ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς*—God.) *Cf.* Plotinus, *Enn.* 3. 7. 4 (vol. ii. p. 286, ed. Kirchhoff)—*τοῖς δὲ πρώτοις καὶ μακαρίοις οὐδὲ ἔφεσίς ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος· ἤδη γάρ ἐστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς οἷον ὀφείλεται ζῆν ἔχουσι πᾶν· ὥστε ζητοῦσιν οὐδέν, διότι τὸ μέλλον αὐτοῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέλλον.*

I have tried, then, to show that the section before us (punctuated as in Susemihl's text), *if an interpolation*, is in perfect keeping with the philosophical associations of the context. The only reason, I venture to think, which can be fairly alleged for regarding it as an interpolation, and not as written by Aristotle to stand where it does, is that it interrupts somewhat (perhaps as a 'duplicate' of § 3) the even flow of the passage in which it occurs. But I do not think that it interrupts the sense seriously; and I should be unwilling to regard it as an interpolation, even if I could suggest no other excuse for its appearance here than that it contains a characteristically Aristotelian remark, which is not unnatural—though perhaps not strictly necessary—in the present context. I go further however than this: I think that it is not an interpolation, because I understand it to say about the good man's wish

1166 a. 19. for his own good what has already been said elsewhere about his wish for his friend's good, and the purport of the present chapter is precisely to show how closely the good man's feelings towards himself resemble his feelings towards his friend. The passage with which I compare the section before us is *E. N.* viii. 7. 6 *ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα· αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά.* In the light of the above passage I would explain the section before us as follows—'Every man wishes good things for himself, that is, for himself as remaining the same person; no man desires to become another being, and let that other being possess all good things—thus, no man desires to become God, in order to possess the absolute good which God possesses now and for ever in virtue of being what He is.' God's *possession* of the good depends on His self-identity; the good man's *wish* for his own good cannot overpass the limits of his self-identity—he cannot wish good for himself as having become God; nor (as we have seen viii. 7. 6) can he wish good for his friend—his second-self—as having become God. My explanation may be shortly described as consisting in the insertion after *γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος* a. 20 of *οἷον θεός* as a mentally supplied gloss; indeed, although on the whole I prefer Susemihl's punctuation to Grant's and Bywater's, I cannot help thinking that it is just possible that the words *ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν* were originally a marginal note explanatory of *οἷον θεός*, and that *οἷον θεός* once stood in the text after *γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος*, and afterwards fell out. On that hypothesis, of course, *ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν* would refer to *ἕκαστος*. Viewed as an original part of the text, however, the words *ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν*, I confess, appear to me pointless, unless *ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν* be referred to *ὁ θεός*, and taken closely with them.

The Paraphrast's explanation is peculiar. He thinks that the transformation marked by *γενόμενος ἄλλος* takes place when one identifies one's good with *τὸ ἄλογον μέρος*. His words are—*Ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος βούλεται ἑαυτῷ ζῆν· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι· τὴν γὰρ θεωρητικὴν διώκει ζωήν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ νοεῖν ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία συνίσταται, ἡ ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα. Ὃς δὲ τῷ ἀλόγῳ βούλεται τὸ εἶναι καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ*



*ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοῦ οἰκείου εἶναι παρατραπέντι, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται* 1166 a. 19. *τὰ ἀγαθά, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ, εἰς ὃ μετεβλήθη· καὶ ἕκαστος δὲ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται γενέσθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, οἰόμενος μένειν ὅπερ ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ συνίδοι ἑαυτὸν ἄλλον γενόμενον, οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γινόμενον· οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ἄλλῳ τινὶ βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, ἢ ἑαυτῷ μεταβληθέντι. Οὐδεὶς δὲ ἀγαπᾷ, ἐὰν ἄλλῳ τινὶ γένηται τὰ ἀγαθά· καὶ γὰρ τῷ θεῷ πάντα πρόσεστι τὰ ἀγαθά, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτὸς ὅ, τί ποτέ ἐστι.* Mich. Eph. explains in the same way.

In line a. 22, $K^b$ and CCC margin have *ἀλλ' οἷον ὁπότ' ἐστίν* for *ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν*, which may perhaps be thought to point to *ἀλλ' ὧν οἷός ποτ' ἐστίν*: *cf.* the *μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος* of viii. 7. 6.

As regards the bracketing of the words *ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον*—the clause reads more easily without them: the subject of *ἔχειν* is naturally that of *αἱρεῖται*.

**δόξειε δ' ἂν . . . μάλιστα**] This has been said before in § 3—*τοῦ* a. 22. *γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ.* Reason is the Form or *εἶδος* of man. This Form the good man preserves pure amid the *ὕλη* of circumstances, as plants and animals preserve their various *εἴδη* from generation to generation, realising *τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀεί* in the permanence of the race-type. It is as corresponding with his whole environment, and not merely as exercising his 'intellectual faculties,' that man is identified with Reason in this and similar passages, *e.g.* in x. 7. 9 . . . *ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος.* The qualification *μάλιστα* is added because man is not, like God, *pure* *εἶδος*, but a *σύνολον*, or an *ἔνυλον εἶδος*. See Mich. Eph. on ix. 4. 4—*εἰπὼν δὲ ἕκαστον τὸ νοοῦν ἐστίν, ἐπήγαγεν, ἢ μάλιστα τοῦτο, ὅτι συντελεῖ καὶ μέγα συμβάλλεται καὶ τὸ ἄλογον ἡμῶν εἰς σύστασιν τοῦ ἰδίως παρὰ τοῖς περιπατητικοῖς λεγομένου ποιοῦ· λέγουσι δὲ οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἰδίως ποιὸν τὸν ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνεστηκότα ἄτομον· οἷον τὸν Σωκράτην, τὸν Πλάτωνα, ὧν ἰδιοτήτων, τοῦ Σωκράτους τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλῳ ποτὲ γένοιτο· κοινῶς δὲ ποιὸν λέγουσι τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωπον.*

**§ 5. τῇ διανοίᾳ**] Bekker has a comma after *διανοίᾳ*. There a. 27. should be a full stop, the clause belonging to what has gone before, not to what follows (see Ramsauer). 'His mind is stored with objects of contemplation'; his rich experience supplies him with *θεωρήματα*, 'views of life,' pure from admixture with that merely

1166 a. 27. personal element which makes the experience of the bad man a source, not of pure 'views,' but of unhappy recollections and miserable forebodings. The good man's life is the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*.

a. 29. **ὡς εἰπεῖν**] 'in one word'—see Fritzsche, *E. N.* viii. 8. 5, on the use of the expression.

a. 34. **§ 6. δόξειε δ' . . . ὁμοιοῦται**] These words are bracketed by Ramsauer as the interpolation of a scribe who had in his mind *E. E.* H. 6. 1240 a. 8 sqq. and *M. M.* ii. 11. 1211 a. 33, where *ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία* is said to exist in so far as, there being different *μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς*, these agree—*ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πλείω μέρη, τότ' ἔσται μία ψυχὴ ὅταν συμφωνῶσι πρὸς ἄλληλα ὅ τε λόγος καὶ τὰ πάθη, οὕτω γὰρ μία ἔσται. ὥστε μιᾶς γενομένης, ἔσται πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία* (*M. M.*). If the words *δόξειε . . . ὁμοιοῦται* are an interpolation suggested by these passages in the *E. E.* and *M. M.*, as Ramsauer thinks, then it will be right to accept the explanation given by Mich. Eph., the Paraph., and others (*e. g.* Stahr and Peters), according to which *ᾗ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω* means 'in so far as man, or the soul, consists of two or more parts,' *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων* being 'in accordance with what has been said'[1]—*e. g.* in *E. N.* i. 13. 9. The clause being an interpolation, the occurrence of *τὰ εἰρημένα* in a different sense immediately afterwards (§ 7. 1166 b. 2) need cause no surprise. If, however, the clause is not an interpolation, no other interpretation seems possible than that of Victorius, Michelet, Grant, and Williams—'But whether friendship towards oneself is or is not possible, we may leave undecided for the present. It would seem to be possible in so far as two or more of the above-mentioned conditions (*i. e. τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθά—τὸ βούλεσθαι τὸ ζῆν—τὸ συνδιάγειν—τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν*) exist, and because the extreme of friendship resembles one's feelings towards oneself' (Grant). Against Ramsauer's view (that the passage is an interpolation) is the fact (noticed by Michelet, and apparently observed by Ramsauer himself) that the writer of the *M. M.* gives *both* interpretations, beginning with that adopted by Grant: see *M. M.* ii. 11. 1210 b. 33 *πότερον δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία ἢ οὐ νῦν μὲν ἀφείσθω, ὕστερον δ' ἐροῦμεν· πάντα δὲ βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ γὰρ συζῆν μεθ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βουλόμεθα κ.τ.λ.*

[1] Bywater, placing a comma after *πλείω*, adopts this interpretation, and suggests the insertion of *τε* after *ἐκ*: see *Contrib.* p. 63.



After dismissing the question thus (*νῦν μὲν ἀφείσθω*), the writer 1166 a. 34
almost immediately resumes it (1211 a. 16) with *ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη νῦν τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ἐστι πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλία ἢ οὔ*, and answers it, as Eudemus had done, by reference to the parts of the soul. We seem to have the compilation of one who had before him the text of the *Nic. Eth.* as we have it, *i. e. with δόξειε δ' . . . ὁμοιοῦται*, and the text of the *Eud. Eth.* I therefore see no reason for bracketing the clause in question with Ramsauer and Susemihl.

**§ 7. ᾗ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς**] see note on § 2, a. 11, above. Mich. b. 3.
Eph. has the following comment here—*ὃ δὲ λέγει τοιοῦτον ἂν εἴη· ὁ μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμῶν ἄλλα δὲ βουλόμενος δῆλός ἐστιν ὡς οὐκ ἀρέσκεται ἑαυτῷ· ὁ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρεγόμενος καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ θέλων καὶ βουλόμενος ἑαυτῷ ἀρέσκει· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ πολλοί. ἀρέσκουσι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βούλεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρῶμεν γινόμενον· ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγονται καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ βούλονται καὶ θέλουσιν ἀρέσκουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἀπαρέσκονται δὲ καὶ διαφέρονται ὅταν ὁ μὲν τῶνδε ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ τάδε βούληται, ὁ δὲ ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μηδὲ τὰ αὐτά· ἐπεὶ οὖν οἱ σπουδαῖοι ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκουσιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ σπουδαῖοι εἶναι ὅτι ἀρέσκονται ἑαυτοῖς, διχῶς ἁμαρτάνοντες· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκονται· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ ἄλογον ᾧ τὰ ἀρεστὰ πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος· ἔπειτα ὅτι μὴ ἀληθῶς ἀντιστρέφουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ σπουδαῖος ἀρέσκει ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι τὰ ἀρέσκοντα τῷ λόγῳ πράττει· οὐ μὴν καὶ ὁ δοκῶν ἀρεσκεῖν ἑαυτῷ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν.*

**§ 8. ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται**] 'The "desire" b. 7.
of the wicked as being of the particular, and subject to the domination of the senses (*Eth.* vii. 3. 9), is at variance with their "wish," which is of the universal and implies a conception of the good' (Grant).

**οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς**] The description of the *φαῦλοι* (as distinguished b. 8.
from the *κομιδῇ φαῦλοι* § 7) given in §§ 8 and 9, corresponds with sufficient accuracy to that of the *ἀκρατεῖς*, as distinguished from the *ἀκόλαστοι*, in Book vii. *Cf.* vii. 8. 5 *ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων ⟨ὢν⟩ τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή.* Similarly the *φαῦλοι* here *αἱροῦνται ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερὰ*

1166 b. 8. ὄντα, and in § 10 are said to be a prey to μεταμέλεια: so in vii. 8. 1 the ἀκρατής is described as μεταμελητικός. The ἀκόλαστος on the other hand is οὐ μεταμελητικός, in this respect resembling (for extremes meet) the σπουδαῖος who is ἀμεταμέλητος ὡς εἰπεῖν (ix. 4. 5).

b. 19. § 9. στασιάζει] 'This picture,' says Grant, 'of the mental struggles of the bad does not recall either the phraseology or the doctrines of Book vii, where μοχθηρία is contrasted with and opposed to ἀκρασία (*cf.* vii. 8. 1).' Grant here, I think, overlooks the fact that Aristotle is speaking of οἱ φαῦλοι = οἱ ἀκρατεῖς (b. 8 οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς, where οἷον = *scilicet*) as distinguished from οἱ κομιδῇ φαῦλοι = οἱ ἀκόλαστοι or μοχθηροί of Book vii. The word μοχθηρίαν occurring in this § is evidently used loosely and not in the more technical sense in which it is used in Book vii; for τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν κ.τ.λ. is opposed to τὸ δὲ ἥδεται which is the λόγον ἔχον μέρος, as the Paraph. explains—καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄλογον ἀλγεῖ τῶν μοχθηρῶν ἀπεχόμενον, τηνικαῦτα δὲ οὐ συναλγεῖ τὸ λογιστικόν, ἀλλὰ χαίρει. Thus, notwithstanding the use of the term μοχθηρίαν, the ἀκρατής (in whom a struggle between λόγος and πάθος goes on), not the μοχθηρός of Book vii, is here described.

For the expression στασιάζει in this connexion compare Plato, *Rep.* 352 A, quoted by Fritzsche and Grant—ἡ ἀδικία ἐν ἑνὶ ἐνοῦσα πρῶτον ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν αὑτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. *Cf. E. N.* i. 13. 15 φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ.

b. 26. § 10. εἰ δή κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle seldom addresses his reader, as here, in the language of direct exhortation.

## CHAPTER V.

### ARGUMENT.

*Well-wishing must be distinguished from friendship, which it resembles. We wish well to people whom we do not know, and who are not aware that we wish them well; but in friendship the parties must know each other, and be aware of each other's feelings. This however has been pointed out before. Nor is well-wishing affection, for it has not the intensity and desire which characterise affection. Again, affection grows up with intimacy; while we may wish well to a stranger, e. g. an athlete, all at once, taking his side, so far as feeling is concerned, without caring to do anything actively to help him. Well-wishing is thus a superficial liking for a man. It seems therefore to be the beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love. As no one falls in love without first being charmed by the sight of beauty; but, though charmed, is not necessarily in love—is in love only if he longs in absence for the beautiful one: so men who have not first been well-wishers cannot be friends; for, as well-wishers merely, they would not go out of their way to help each other, but confine themselves to good wishes. So we may transfer the name of 'friendship' to well-wishing, and call it 'inactive friendship.' As time, however, goes on, and intimacy grows, it becomes friendship in a sense no longer metaphorical—and true friendship, not that for profit or pleasure; for well-wishing has no place in the friendship for profit or pleasure, where it is oneself as the recipient of profit or pleasure, and not one's friend, to whom one wishes well. The object of genuine well-wishing is always another regarded as having some beautiful or good quality.*



§ 1. ἡ δ' εὔνοια κ.τ.λ.] Susemihl thinks that chapters 5, 6, and 7, 1166 b. 30–1168 a. 27 ought to be inserted after chapter 8, at 1169 b. 2. 1166 b. 30.

καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται] viii. 2. §§ 3, 4. b. 32.

φίλησις] Mich. Eph. has—φίλησις ἤτοι ὁδὸς εἰς φιλίαν· ἀνάλογον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φίλησις τῇ θερμάνσει καὶ λευκάνσει· ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ θέρμανσις καὶ ἡ λεύκανσις πρὸς θερμότητα καὶ λευκότητα καὶ ἡ ὑγίανσις πρὸς ὑγίειαν, οὕτω ἡ φίλησις πρὸς φιλίαν. καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἡ λεύκανσις μεταξὺ τοῦ μέλανος καὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὕτως ἡ φίλησις μέσον εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας.

§ 2. ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν] *i. e.* at the end of the first and beginning of the second section; ἐπιπολαίως referring to οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν. 1167 a. 2.

§ 3. τοῦ ἐρᾶν] *Cf.* ix. 12. 1 τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου. Stahr, Fritzsche and Grant refer to Plato, *Crat.* 420 A ἔρως ὅτι εἰσρεῖ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἡ ῥοὴ αὕτη τῷ ἔχοντι, ἀλλ' ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰσρεῖν ἔσρος τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο. *Cf.* Com. incert. apud Meineke *Frag.* iv. 645 a. 4.

ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ ἐσορᾶν γίγνετ' ἀνθρώποις ἐρᾶν

and Plotinus (vol. ii. p. 379, ed. Kirchhoff) ἔρως . . . ὅτι ἐξ ὁράσεως τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. Also Plot. (i. 341) καὶ οἱ ἔρωτες δὲ ἰδόντων

1167 a. 4. καὶ πρὸς εἶδος σπευδόντων. *Cf. Merch. of Ven.* iii. 2, quoted by Grant—

'It is engendered in the eyes,
By gazing fed.'

a. 10. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν] Mich. Eph., CCC marg. γρ., and Argyropylus read ἀρχὴν εἶναι φιλίας. But what μεταφορά (defined *Poet.* 21. 1457 b. 6 μεταφορά ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ γένος, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον) is implied in merely stating the truth that εὔνοια is the ἀρχὴ φιλίας? Whereas there is a μεταφορά of the term φιλία when it is taken over from its proper place, where it denotes a relation characterised by the φιλικά enumerated in ch. 4. § 1, and applied to an otiose state like εὔνοια. There is a μεταφορά of the term φιλία, when it is qualified as ἀργή, just as there is of ἀκρασία when it is qualified by θυμοῦ—*cf. E. N.* vii. 5. 9.

Victorius has a good note here, in support of ἀργήν against ἀρχήν—'qui dicit benevolentiam esse principium, non transfert verbum è sua in alienam sedem, quod manifesto facit qui concedit ipsam amicitiam esse, sed inchoatam et ignavam; indicatque quod non sinit eam absolutam perfectamque esse: caret enim eo quod requiritur in plena amicitia: id autem est quod non studet prodesse et opitulari benevolo.'

a. 12. οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ] *Cf. E. E.* H. 7. 1241 a. 10 δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν (to be distinguished from the ἠθικὴ φιλία of *E. N.* viii. 13. 5) ἡ εὔνοια ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εὔνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὔνους, ὁ δ' εὔνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος· ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.

Ramsauer points out the seeming variance between the doctrine laid down here (ix. 5. 3) and that of viii. 2. 4 πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους: either, he argues, if we may speak of φιλία for the χρήσιμον, we may speak of εὔνοια for the same; or both terms—φιλία and εὔνοια—should be reserved for relations δι' ἀρετήν.

a. 14. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθείς κ.τ.λ.] This gives the reasons for refusing to recognise εὔνοια in the 'friendship' of Profit. (1) The man who has been benefited *owes* εὔνοια. But εὔνοια thus *owed*, and not



arising spontaneously is not properly εὔνοια. (2) The man who 1167 a. 14.
expects to be benefited, though he may seem to wish well to his prospective benefactor, really does not wish well to *him*, but to *himself*; and this is not εὔνοια. Mich. Eph. describes Aristotle, in the words ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθείς . . . δρῶν, as χωρίσας τὴν εὔνοιαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀντευποιΐας—εὔνους μὲν οὐκ ἂν ῥηθείη διότι εὖ δρᾷ, δίκαιος δέ· δίκαιον γὰρ τὸ τὰ ἴσα ἀπονέμειν.

§ 4. 'Der ganze Schluss,' says Stahr (note *ad loc.*), 'dieses a. 18.
schönen Kapitels zeigt, dass Aristoteles unter dem Wohlwollen, welches der Ursprung (ἀρχή) der wahren Freundschaft ist, jenes rein menschliche, *uneigennützige*, nur durch das Schöne und Gute in der menschlichen Brust erweckte Empfinden versteht. Das Wohlwollen, das eines Anderen Glück und Erfolg wünscht, weil es davon zu profitiren hofft, ist gemeiner Egoismus, Gesinnung gemeiner Menschen.'

## CHAPTER VI.

### Argument.

*Unanimity also seems to be allied to Friendship. Accordingly it is not mere identity of opinion, for that may subsist between those who do not know one another, and between students of astronomy and other subjects in which agreement of views has nothing to do with the persons who agree being 'friends.' Unanimity subsists between citizens who are of one mind about important political questions which can be settled in a way pleasing to those who are said to be 'of one mind' about them. Thus, there was unanimity between the Mitylenaeans who wished Pittacus to rule over them and Pittacus, when he was willing to do so: there is unanimity between the lower and upper classes in a city when both agree that the best men should hold office: so unanimity may be described as the friendship of citizens. Now, there is unanimity like this in the soul of the good man, and between good men. The wishes of good men stand fast; they do not fluctuate like the Euripus. But bad men cannot be of one mind, any more than they can be friends, except for a little way, inasmuch as they are always seeking to get for themselves the larger share of advantages, and to put the burden of their duties on other people.*

[On ὁμόνοια see *E. E.* H. 7 and *M. M.* ii. 12.]

§ 1. περὶ ὁτουοῦν] *Cf. E. E.* H. 7. 1241 a. 16 ἔστι δ' οὐ περὶ πάντα 1167 a. 24.

1167 a. 24. ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει.

a. 26. τὰς πόλεις] Fritzsche and Ramsauer point out that we are not to think here of the concord of several cities, but of the unanimity between the πολῖται of one city.

a. 28. § 2.] There are three characteristics of ὁμόνοια mentioned here, (1) it is περὶ τὰ πρακτά, (2) περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει, (3) περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν.

On τὰ ἐν μεγέθει the Paraph. has—τοῖς ἀξιολόγοις . . . περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ μικρῶν οὐ λέγονται ὁμονοεῖν ἀλλήλοις οὔτε πόλις (πόλεις?) οὔτε φίλοι, οἷον οἴκοι μένειν, ἢ βαδίζειν εἰς ἀγοράν, ἢ τόδε εἰπεῖν ἢ δρᾶσαι, δι' ὧν οὔτε ὠφέλειά τις μεγάλη οὔτε βλάβη ἀκολουθεῖ.

The meaning of ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν is explained below by the words οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίνεται οὗ ἐφίενται b. 1. Unanimity is concerned with important practical questions which admit of a solution agreeable to the wishes of both parties, if there are only two, or of all the citizens where public interests are involved. *Cf. E. E.* H. 7. 1241 a. 27 οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὗ ὀρέγονται· ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ' οὐ μαχοῦνται. In this and the Nicomachean passage the word ὑπάρχειν is somewhat misleading as suggesting that both or all parties actually get the same thing, and that therefore the objects of ὁμόνοια are things which both or all can share in alike. But the examples given show that ὁμόνοια may exist with regard to the possession by one of the parties of an office which the other or others cannot hold. What is meant is that ὁμόνοια is concerned with things *about which* both or all parties, having the same wishes, may have these wishes satisfied. The People and Pittacus agree in wishing Pittacus to rule; Pittacus rules, and everybody, Pittacus included, gets what he wishes. Peters therefore is hardly right with 'people are said to be of one mind, especially with regard to matters of importance and things that *may be given to* both persons or to all the persons concerned.'

a. 32. ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν] Pittacus was elected Dictator by the Mitylenaeans. He ruled for ten years, and, having restored order into the affairs of the city, voluntarily laid down his office, although the Mitylenaeans wished him to retain it: see



Valerius Max. vi. 5—'Postquam autem pax victoriâ parta est, continuo, *reclamantibus Mitylenaeis*, (imperium) deposuit.' Hence the words ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. The Mitylenaeans wished him to rule, and so long as he consented there was ὁμόνοια: but when, at the end of the ten years, the people still wished him to rule while he wished to resign, the ὁμόνοια was at an end. On Pittacus see Susemihl's note to *Pol.* iii. 9. 1285 a. 35, and Grote's *Hist.* Part ii. ch. 14 end. 1167 a. 32.

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις] of Euripides, 588 sqq.—Eteocles and Polynices. a. 33.

τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] *i. e.* τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. τῷ αὐτῷ is probably masc. 'Unanimity does not mean merely thinking of the same thing whatever it may be, but thinking of the same thing in connexion with the same person.' *Cf. M. M.* ii. 12. 1212 a. 21 εἰ γὰρ ἐννοοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὑτόν, ὁ δ' αὑτόν, ἆρά γε ἤδη ὁμονοοῦσιν ἢ οὔ; ἀλλ' εἰ κἀγὼ ἐμαυτὸν βούλομαι ἄρχειν, κἀκεῖνος ἐμέ, οὕτως ἤδη ὁμονοοῦμεν . . . . περὶ ἄρχοντος ἄρα κατάστασιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ κυρίως λεγομένη. a. 35.

οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς] 'The upper classes,' *cf. Pol.* Z. 2. 1318 b. 35, where οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ γνώριμοι are opposed to the δῆμος, and *Pol.* Z. 2. 1319 a. 3, where οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς are opposed to τὸ πλῆθος. b. 1.

πολιτικὴ δή] The codd. have δέ: so Bekker. I prefer δή with Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater. This sentence draws out what is implied in the remark made above—περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσι. b. 2.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται] 'we see then (φαίνεται δή) that ὁμόνοια is πολιτικὴ φιλία, and indeed it is actually spoken of under this name—' or, 'and indeed the word ὁμόνοια is commonly used in this sense'—as *e.g.* by Arist. himself *Pol.* E. 5. 1306 a. 9 ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς: Thuc. viii. 75 ὤρκησαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἢ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαί τε καὶ ὁμονοήσειν . . . . ξυνώμνυσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: Thuc. viii. 93 ξυνεχώρησάν τε ὥστ' ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας. b. 3.

ἥκοντα] Cambr. agrees with $M^b$ in giving ἥκοντα. b. 4.

§ 3. ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν] the 'good' generally as opposed to οἱ b. 5.

1167 b. 5. φαῦλοι of the next §; although the narrower sense of ἐπιείκεια, as fairness causing its possessor to put himself on an equality with others, seems also to be present to Aristotle's mind; for he describes the ἐπιεικεῖς as ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, *i. e.* as 'standing on the same footing,' and in § 4 contrasts them with τοὺς πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους. *Cf.* viii. 11. 5 ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι.

b. 6. ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες] This phrase seems strictly parallel to ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων μένειν of *Pol.* E. 3. 1304 a. 38 ... στάσιν κινοῦσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες τιμωμένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων.

Lambinus however gives a different meaning to ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, which he translates—'Cum in iisdem (paene dicam) consiliis et factis versentur ac perseverent': and Stahr takes the same view, with 'da sie, so zu sagen, immer bei und mit denselben Dingen beschäftigt sind': and Fritzsche follows, quoting Dem. *Phil.* ii. p. 66. 15 ὡς κωλύσαιτ' ἂν Φίλιππον πράττειν ταῦτα ἐφ' ὧν ἐστὶ νῦν, *i. e.* 'on which he is now intent.'

Grant (followed by Williams) adopts an entirely different view. His note is '"Being on the same moorings, as it were," as opposed to the ebbings and flowings of a Euripus. *Cf.* Dem. *de Cor.* p. 319, § 281 οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς *sc.* ἀγκύρας.' Surely, if Aristotle had intended to use this nautical metaphor, he would have employed the proverbial expression, which seems to have been a very definite one.

b. 10. § 4. καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι] = καθάπερ οὐχ οἷόν τε φίλους εἶναι πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν.

b. 13. ἐξετάζει] τὸν ἕτερον εὐθύνει, περὶ τῶν λειτουργιῶν ἀκριβολογούμενος (Paraph.).



# CHAPTER VII.

## ARGUMENT.

*Why do benefactors love those whom they benefit more than the latter love them? The answer generally given is that benefactors are like lenders, and the benefited like borrowers; and that lenders are anxious about the welfare of borrowers, whereas borrowers do not care what becomes of lenders. Epicharmus would perhaps say that this is to look at the matter from a bad point of view; and yet, it might be replied, the explanation seems to be true enough to human nature, for the majority of men are ungrateful, and more anxious to receive benefits than to confer them. The cause, however, lies deeper. The analogy of lenders and borrowers is misleading. Lenders do not feel any affection for borrowers—only wish them to live, and flourish, and repay; whereas benefactors love those whom they have benefited, even when the latter can be of no use to them. The analogy to help us here is that of the artist and the thing which he makes, not that of the lender and borrower. The artist loves the thing which he himself makes more than the thing, if it were endowed with life, would love him: poets are perhaps the best instances—they are excessively pleased with their own works, loving them as parents love their children. Similarly, the object of his beneficence,* quâ *benefited, is the work of the benefactor, and he loves this object more than this object loves him. The cause of this is that a work is its maker actualised. A maker loves his work because he loves his own actual existence. Again, what the benefactor does is beautiful in his own eyes, and therefore he rejoices in it; but in the eyes of the person benefited it is, at best, only useful, not something beautiful for which he takes pleasure in the benefactor and loves him. His work therefore abides for the doer—the beautiful is lasting; but the profit of the receiver is soon a thing of the past. Further, a benefit is received without labour, but to confer it effort is needed, and men always love those things more which have cost them labour* —e. g. *money made, more than money inherited. For the same reason mothers are fonder of their children than fathers.*

§ 1. ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους] 'Looking at the matter from a bad point of view'—as from a bad seat in the theatre. This expression doubtless used by Epicharmus occurs only here; and it is impossible to determine with certainty its exact force; but Coraes' suggestion that it refers to a bad place at the play is very plausible. His note is—οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀκριβῶς γνῶναι τί λέγειν ἠβούλετο Ἐπίχαρμος, μόνου τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ χωρίῳ τῷδε χρησαμένου τῷ ῥησειδίῳ 1167 b. 26.

1167 b. 26. ἢ ἡμιστιχίῳ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου, ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους· εἰκὸς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς μετενεγκεῖν τὴν φράσιν τὸν Ἐπίχαρμον (εἴ γε ἐπὶ τῶν ἠθῶν ἐχρήσατο) ἐλλειπτικῶς τοῦ τόπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, οἱ μὴ καταλαβόντες χώραν ἐπιτήδειον, οὔτε τὸ δρᾶμα οὔτε τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους κρίνειν ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν, ὡς ἐκ πονηροῦ τόπου θεώμενοι, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ βίου σκηνῇ, εἴ τις ὑπὸ πονηρᾶς περὶ ἀνθρώπων δόξης προκατειλημμένος κρίνειν ἐπιχειροῖ τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας πράξεις, οὐκ ἔσται κριτὴς ἀδέκαστος, ὡς ἐκ πονηροῦ θεώμενος.

b. 29. § 2. φυσικώτερον] 'a deeper reason.'

καὶ οὐδ' ὅμοιον τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας] Byw. for Bekker's καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περί κ.τ.λ. For οὐδ' (K$^b$) he compares 1105 a. 26: see *Contrib.* p. 64.

b. 30. οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους] *i. e.* οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις τῶν δανεισάντων περὶ τοὺς ὀφείλοντας. Mich. Eph. has οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις τῶν δανειστῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀφειλέτας. This seems better than, as Stahr apparently does, to take ἐκείνους of *both* δανείσαντας and ὀφείλοντας—'meiner Ansicht nach dürfte . . . die Ursache . . . keineswegs dem Verhältnisse zwischen Gläubigern und Schuldnern entsprechen; denn zwischen diesen letztern findet überhaupt gar kein Verhältniss der Liebe statt, sondern nur auf der Seite des Gläubigers der Wunsch,' &c.

1168 a. 1. § 3. ποιητάς] *Cf.* iv. 1. 20.

a. 6. § 4. ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ] *Cf.* i. 7. 13, 14 διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης (*i. e.* τῆς πρακτικῆς ζωῆς) λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι . . . ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου.

a. 7. ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως] Mich. Eph. gives the true interpretation of these words—ἔστι δέ, φέρε εἰπεῖν, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους ἔργον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτὸς ὁ Σωκράτης, the subject being ἔργον, and the predicate ὁ ποιήσας. 'The work is in a sense the realisation of the workman.' Bekker's ἔστι (retained by Bywater) should accordingly be corrected (as by Susemihl) to ἐστί. For other renderings (which agree in making τὸ ἔργον acc. after ποιήσας) see the notes of Victorius, Zell, Grant, and Fritzsche. Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater read δέ for Bekker's δή, rightly I think: there is no inference.



ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει] These words are to be taken closely with τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν which they explain. The 'deeper reason' (φυσικώτερον § 2 above) is found in that law of nature by which δύναμις rises up into ἐνέργεια. A man *is really* what he *does*: *cf. Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 7 ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δ' ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις· τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται . . . ἔτι ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶ δυνάμει, ὅτι ἐλθοῦσα εἰς τὸ εἶδος· ὅταν δέ γ' ἐνεργείᾳ ᾖ, τότε ἐν τῷ εἴδει ἐστίν . . . τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον. διὸ καὶ τοὔνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον.

1168 a. 8.

The Form of Reason is realised perfectly and purely—as ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως—in One Eternal Being; is immersed—as an ἔνυλος λόγος—in many mortal beings, in the best of whom it strives resolutely to free itself from its condition of passivity by creative acts—by embodying itself in external works, which may last for the use and joy of future generations, and especially by reproducing itself in Persons whom it reverences as Ends because they realise itself: see *E. E.* H. 12. 1245 b. 14 ὁ θεὸς οὐ τοιοῦτος οἷος δεῖσθαι φίλου . . . οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ' αὐτὸς αὑτόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστίν.

a. 10. § 5. καλόν] The καλόν is the orderly work of νοῦς, or the active Reason. Being νοητόν it can be apprehended for what it is only by νοῦς, or the active Reason. An act which, for the rational agent who has performed it, takes its due place as καλόν in an orderly system of life, appears as an isolated and transitory occurrence to the person who is merely affected by it (τῷ παθόντι)—the person whose mere πάθος or αἴσθησις has been called forth by it. This state of mere passivity is the mental attitude of the great mass of the uneducated, and of the self-seeking among the educated, towards the social good which the leaders of human progress have placed at their disposal, and towards the conveniences of daily life devised for them by science. Nothing to them is καλόν or θαυμαστόν. They have an eye only for the narrow field of the personally συμφέρον. Their life is one of passive reception and feeling, as distinguished from the life of active Reason, which thinks and organises. *Cf.* Alex. on *Met.* Λ. 6. 1071 b. (p. 660, 26 ed. Bonitz) τὸ καλὸν ἐν τῷ εἴδει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ποιοῦντι

1168 a. 10. μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι· καὶ ἔστι πάσχον τὸ δυνάμει ὄν, ποιοῦν δὲ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν.

a. 13. **§ 6. ἡδεῖα κ.τ.λ.**] Every *ἐνέργεια* has its own pleasure—see x. 5. 6 *καθ' ἑκάστην ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστιν*, or pleasure and *ἐνέργεια* are identical—see vii. 12. 3. Hence *ἐλπίς* and *μνήμη* are pleasant, *quâ* suggesting *ἐνέργεια*. See *Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 13 *ἐκ τοιαύτης* (*i. e.* *ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως, ὅτι ἄνευ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εὖ* Alex.) *ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις. διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα*: on which Alex. has the following commentary: *λέγει οὖν ὅτι οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρίστη ἡμῖν διαγωγὴ ἐπὶ μικρὸν χρόνον (οὐ γὰρ ἀεί, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς τὰ νοητά) ταύτην τὴν ζωὴν ἀεὶ ἔχει τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον . . . . ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ νοεῖν ἑαυτόν, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἡδονὴ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄρα ταύτην ἀεὶ ζῇ τὴν ζωήν, λέγω δὴ τῷ νοεῖν ἑαυτόν . . . καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, φησί, καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν ἐγρήγορσιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἥδιστά φαμεν, ὅτι ἐνέργειαί τινες οὖσαι ἰνδάλματά τινα καὶ σκιαί εἰσιν ἣν ἐνεργοῦμεν ἐνεργείας καὶ ἣν ζῶμεν ζωήν, ὅταν ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς γένηταί πως τὰ νοητά. τὰς δὲ ἐλπίδας πάλιν καὶ μνήμας φιλοῦμεν διὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας· μεμνημένοι γάρ τινος ἐνεργείας ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ἐνεργῆσαι φιλοῦμεν τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ τὴν μνήμην.*

a. 18. **ἡ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν**] *τουτέστι, τῶν μὲν χρησίμων ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ καλῶν οὐ πάνυ* (Coraes). If *καλά* as well as *χρήσιμα* are referred to here, the inferiority of the pleasure attending the anticipation of the former will be due to the fact that they are *χαλεπά*: but perhaps only *τὰ χρήσιμα* are referred to.

a. 20. **τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν**] *i. e.* *τοῖς εὐεργέταις.*

a. 21. **ἔπεται**] 'are attributes of,' see note on vii. 9. 6, b. 34, and Bonitz on *Met.* A. 1. 981 a. 27.

a. 25. **§ 7. φιλοτεκνότεραι**] *sc.* *τῶν πατέρων*: *cf.* *E. E.* H. 8. 1241 b. 7 *καὶ (μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν) αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων.* Hence the Paraph. is wrong with *αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι μᾶλλον . . ἢ οἱ παῖδες φιλομήτορες.*

a. 26. **καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν**] Ramsauer brackets these words as out of place here, where Aristotle is concerned to show why benefactors love more. Surely, he argues, those who receive know as well what they receive as those who give know what they give,



while the connexion in which the similar words occur in viii. 12. 2 1168 a. 26. is quite different. The parallel passage, however, *E. E.* H. 8. 1241 b. 7, which Ramsauer does not regard as making against his view, seems to me to indicate that the writer had the text of the *E. N.* with *καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν* before him. His words are *καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων ὅτι μᾶλλον οἴονται αὐτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διορίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.* See note on *αἱ μητέρες* viii. 12. 2, b. 27.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Another question is, whether a man ought to love himself or some other most. Not himself, some argue, for 'self-love' is bad: bad men are noted for their 'self-love'; good men for their love of what is beautiful and right, which makes them forgetful of 'self,' and devoted to their friends. But facts, it may be urged, are against this view. Self-love is not bad: a man is his own truest friend, if a true friend is one who wishes the good of the object of his friendship disinterestedly, or for that object's own sake; and if it is his truest friend whom a man ought to love most—whom ought he to love more than himself, his own truest, most disinterested friend? Our statement that a man's love for his friend is merely an extension of his love for himself may be taken as favouring this contention; and all the proverbs about friendship accord with it—'one soul'—'things in common'—'equality'—'knee nearer than shin'—these are all most truly applicable to a man's friendship for himself. Which of these two opposite views then must we follow? Both are plausible.*

*In dealing with such views we must draw distinctions, and try to see how far, and in what sense, each is true. Let us see then in what sense each view understands 'self-love.' The view which understands it in a bad sense takes it to mean the habit of assigning to oneself the larger share, where money, honour, and bodily pleasure are concerned. These are the things which the majority of men think best, and compete keenly for—in their selfish pursuit of them living for the satisfaction of their desires and the irrational part of their nature. The 'self-love' of such men then is justly held up to contempt; and it is it which those who say that a man ought not to love himself most, have in view.*

*But if a man were seen to be always bent on acting virtuously and identifying himself with all that is beautiful and good, no one would blame him for this kind of 'self-love'—'self-love' too, in the truest sense, inasmuch as it is the true*

*'self'—the governing principle in him—which such a man obeys and lives for. That Reason is the True Self is shown by the use of the terms 'continent' and 'incontinent'*—i. e. *able and unable to 'contain himself,' or govern his passions; also by the fact that the most rational acts are thought to be the most voluntary; and by the fact that the good man loves his Reason most.*

*There would seem, then, to be two kinds of self-love, which differ as widely as the life according to Reason and the life according to Impulse. The good man therefore ought to love himself. In so doing he will benefit both himself and others; but the 'self-love' of the wicked man is hurtful both to himself and to his neighbour, for it consists in following evil passions. The wicked man does what he ought not to do; the good man does what he ought to do, for Reason always chooses that which is best for itself, and the good man obeys the rule of Reason. For his friends too the good man will do much, and for his country—even laying down his life, if need be. He will give up wealth, and station, and all the good things which men compete for, so that he may make the glory of well-doing his own. He will prefer the great joy of a short time to feeble satisfactions continued throughout a long time: he will prefer one glorious year to a long lifetime of ordinary doings—one great and glorious deed to many small performances—dying, it may be, for his country, and winning what he chooses for himself—to be the doer of a glorious deed. Or, he will let his chance of making money slip, that so his friend may come in for a larger share; for thus he secures for himself what is better than money —the glory of performing a virtuous action. Similarly, he will let honours and offices go past him in favour of his friend; nay, it may be that he will sometimes leave even good actions to be performed by his friend, where there is more virtue in being the cause of his friend's performing them than in performing them himself. In short, where virtuous actions are concerned the good man will always take to himself the larger share. This is the sense in which he loves himself most—rightly, we have seen, not as the many 'love themselves.'*

[*Cf. M. M.* ii. 13, 14, where ὁ φίλαυτος is discussed in much the same way as here; but there is no corresponding discussion in the *E. E.*, H. 6 περὶ τοῦ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή going over the same ground as *E. N.* ix. 4. Indeed the term φίλαυτος does not occur in the *E. E.* It is pretty evident that Eudemus had not *E. N.* ix in exactly its present shape before him.]

1168 a. 32. **§ 1. οἷον**] introduced into the text by Susemihl and Bywater, is given by Cambr. and CCC, as well as by $K^b$ and Γ.

a. 33. **ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ**] πόρρω ἑαυτοῦ (Mich. Eph.); 'without thinking of self.'

b. 2. **§ 2. ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται**] For ᾧ $K^b$ and Cambr. have ἤ ὃ. Bywater's conjecture ἦν ᾧ is very likely. The ἦν would refer to 1155 b. 31: see *Contrib.* p. 64.



**καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δέ κ.τ.λ.**] τούτοις δὲ καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι πᾶσαι μαρ- 1168 b. 6.
τυροῦσι. Τοὺς γὰρ σφόδρα φίλους δηλοῦντες, μία ψυχή φασι· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων εἰς τοῦτο φέρει, καὶ ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ κοινόν, καὶ ἡ ἰσότης, καὶ τὸ ἔγγιστα, φιλία, τί γένοιτ' ἂν ἑκάστῳ φιλικώτερον ἑαυτοῦ; (Paraph.). These proverbs all go to show that Friendship is a very close relation; and to whom can a man stand in a closer relation than to *himself*?

**γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον**] Stahr and Fritzsche refer to Theoc. xvi. 18, b. 8.
where ἀπωτέρω ἢ γόνυ κνήμα is put into the mouth of one who excuses himself for keeping his money to himself.

**δή**] So Bywater for δέ—'to indicate that the statement is a b. 11.
conclusion drawn from what precedes it in the text—' *Contrib.* p. 64.

**§ 3. διαιρεῖν**] What is the precise force of διαιρεῖν here? Does b. 12.
it mean that we are to 'analyse' each view by itself? or that we are to 'distinguish between' the two views? Peters, adopting the first alternative, translates—'Perhaps the best method of dealing with conflicting statements of this kind is to analyse them, and then clearly distinguish how far and in what sense each is right.' Stahr adopts the other alternative and translates—'Allein ich denke, man muss dergleichen Raisonnements scharf von einander halten und genau bestimmen, wie weit und in welcher Art sie wahr sind.' I am inclined to Stahr's opinion, on account of what follows. It turns out that each of the two λόγοι is concerned with a *different* φίλαυτον. Instead of being contrary theories on the same subject, they are theories relating to entirely different subjects. This being clearly seen, the two theories are properly 'distinguished,' *cf.* Ramsauer's note—'Dirimentur autem certantes (διαιρεῖν) atque utrique rem non male gessisse videbuntur, si apparuerit, diversa eos censuisse de nomine quidem vel titulo uno, sed de re vel hominum genere diverso.'

**εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ.**] Both Mich. b. 13.
Eph. and the Paraph. in their commentaries on these words seem to take διαιρεῖν in the sense of 'analysing' first the one and then the other of the two theories. While, I think, on this particular point they are hardly right, their remarks are useful for the general understanding of the present passage. Mich. Eph. has—δεῖ διαι-

1168 b. 13. ρεῖν τούτους, τουτέστι δεῖ διαιρεῖν τὸ τῆς φιλαυτίας ὄνομα ὅπερ ἀμφότεροι προίσχονται εἰς τὰ σημαινόμενα πράγματα· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν ἡ φιλαυτία ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμον, ὡς ὁ κύων, καὶ διαιροῦντας, λέγειν ὅτι ἀμφότεροι καλῶς λέγουσι οἵ τε φιλεῖν ἑαυτοὺς λέγοντες καὶ οἱ μὴ φιλεῖ(ν). χρὴ οὖν διαιροῦντας λέγειν ὅτι τὸ φίλαυτον διττόν ἐστιν ὡς εἴρηται ἀγαπᾶν καὶ θεραπεύειν τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν δῆμον τὴν ἀλογίαν . . . ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτο τῶν τῆς φιλαυτίας σημαινομένων ὅπερ ἐστὶ φαῦλον καὶ αἰσχρόν· καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλαυτος ὃς οὐδὲ κυρίως φίλαυτός ἐστι κάκιστος τῷ ὄντι καὶ αἰσχρότατος· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἡ αἴσθησις ἣν αὐτὸς φιλεῖ ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς ὃν αὐτὸς ἐκτετύφλωκε . . . ἄλλο δὲ φιλαυτίας σημαινόμενον τὸ φιλεῖν τὸν ὄντως ἄνθρωπον ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν φρονοῦν· ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλαυτος οὐκ αἰσχρός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ κάλλιστος. The Paraph. has οὕτω τοίνυν ἀμφοτέρων μὲν λόγων ἀληθῶν εἶναι δοκούντων, εἰκότως ἀπορεῖται ποτέρῳ δέον ἀκολουθεῖν. εὑρήσομεν δὲ διελόντες καὶ διορισάμενοι ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ πῶς ἑκάτερος ἀληθεύει (which Heinsius translates, doubtless correctly, Nos igitur si diligenter dividamus rem ipsam et distinguamus &c.) κ.τ.λ.—to the same effect as Mich. Eph. above.

b. 15. §§ 4, 5.] The two kinds of φίλαυτοι contrasted in these sections may be compared with those who act from *ideae inadaequatae* or are *passionibus obnoxii*, and those who live *ex ductu rationis*, as distinguished by Spinoza. The former are dominated by the abstract and onesided views presented by passion and imagination, which hold up the same thing in different lights to different persons, between whom accordingly dissensions and conflicts arise. But those who live *ex ductu rationis* see nothing partially; they understand everything truly as its nature is determined by the place it occupies in the universal system. Between men who look at things in this way there can be no disagreement. Aristotle's ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖσθαι (§ 5) is Spinoza's 'Acting in a manner suitable to that rationally constituted and apprehended Human Nature in oneself which is common to oneself with all men.' In seeking his own highest good a man seeks *ipso facto* the highest good of all other men; the distinction between 'his own' highest good and that 'of other men' being merely a formal one. See Spinoza *Eth.* iv. 18, Schol.—'Quum ratio nihil contra naturam postulet, postulat ergo ipsa, ut unusquisque se ipsum amet, suum utile, quod revera utile est, quaerat, et id omne, quod hominem ad majorem perfectionem revera ducit, appetat, et absolute ut unusquisque suum esse, quantum in se est, conservare conetur . . . Deinde quandoquidem



virtus nihil aliud est quam ex legibus propriae naturae agere, et 1168 b. 15. nemo suum esse conservare conetur, nisi ex propriae suae naturae legibus; hinc sequitur . . . virtutis fundamentum esse ipsum conatum, proprium esse conservandi, et felicitatem in eo consistere, quod homo suum esse conservare potest.' . . . iv. 35 'Quatenus homines affectibus, qui passiones sunt, conflictantur, possunt esse natura diversi et invicem contrarii . . . sed quia unusquisque ex suae naturae legibus id appetit, quod bonum, et id amovere conatur quod malum esse judicat; et quum praeterea id, quod ex dictamine rationis bonum aut malum esse judicamus, necessario bonum aut malum sit: ergo homines quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, eatenus tantum ea necessario agunt, quae humanae naturae, et consequenter unicuique homini necessario bona sunt, hoc est, quae cum natura uniuscujusque hominis conveniunt: atque adeo homines etiam inter se, quatenus ex ductu rationis vivunt, necessario semper conveniunt.'

§ 6. τῷ κυριωτάτῳ] *i. e.* τῷ νῷ. *Cf.* x. 7. 9 δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι b. 30. ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον.

ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ.] 'As the ruling part in it seems to *be* b. 31. the state, or system, in the truest sense, so his ruling part is the man in the truest sense.' Mich. Eph. says—ὡς πόλις κυρίως ἐστὶν οὐ τὰ τείχη οὐδὲ αἱ οἰκίαι, οὐδὲ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἐν αὐτῇ οἰκοῦντες . . . ἀλλὰ πόλις ἐστὶ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ ἐξουσιάζον· οἷον ἐν τοῖς βασιλευομένοις πόλις ἐστὶν ὁ βασιλεύς, (l'état c'est moi) ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημοκρατουμένοις ὁ δῆμος, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις οἱ εὔποροι . . . οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος κυρίως ἐστὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἐν ἡμῖν μέρος ἄρχειν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον ἡμῶν καὶ φρονοῦν· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ κυρίως ἐστὶν . . . ὁ τοῦτο φιλῶν.

ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος] ὥστε τοῦ μὲν νοῦ κρατοῦντος αὐτός τις λέγεται b. 35. κρατεῖν, τῶν δὲ παθῶν κρατούντων, οὐκ αὐτὸς κρατεῖν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κρατεῖσθαι. (Paraph.).

καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα] The acts of the rational agent represent a consistent and single personality to which we always refer them; whereas the acts of the ἀκρατής represent merely the prevalence for the time of certain ἐπιθυμίαι, and are regretted and as it were disowned, by the man 'when he comes to himself' again. On this ground the acts of the rational agent are spoken of here as *voluntary* in a higher sense

1168 b. 35. than those of the *ἀκρατής*. But it must be remembered that the doctrine of the Third Book (and we have no reason to suppose that Aristotle wishes to modify it here) makes no *practical* difference between acts done *κατὰ λόγον*, and those done *δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ διὰ θυμόν, qua* voluntary. If our good acts are voluntary so are also our bad acts: see iii. 1. 20 *τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις*. This description applies as well to acts caused by mere *πάθος* as to those due to *βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις*. *Πότερον* (iii. 1. 23) *οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος*; We may perhaps say that while this is the *practical* view as it recommends itself to the sociologist, the statement *πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα* is made in the spirit of 'the *metaphysic* of Ethics.'

1169 a. 5. **καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν**] Coraes, following the Paraph., is doubtless right with *ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ἡ τοῦ καλοῦ ὄρεξις τῆς ὀρέξεως τοῦ συμφέροντος*. The writer's careless use of *ἤ* before *τοῦ δοκοῦντος* has betrayed some MSS. ($K^b$, $M^b$, Cambr., CCC, Ald. followed by Bywater) into the insertion of *ἤ* before *τοῦ καλοῦ*.

a. 6. § 7.] With this § *cf.* again Spinoza *Eth.* iv. Prop. 36—Summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur, omnibus commune est, eoque omnes aeque gaudere possunt. *Demonstr.* ex virtute agere est ex ductu rationis agere, et quicquid ex ratione conamur agere est intelligere. Atque adeo summum bonum eorum qui virtutem sectantur est Deum cognoscere, hoc est, bonum, quod omnibus hominibus commune est, et ab omnibus hominibus, quatenus ejusdem sunt naturae, possideri aeque potest.

a. 11. **εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν**] *i. e.* each man individually will have the greatest of good things, 'for such is virtue.'

a. 17. **§ 8. πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ**] Νοῦς in its perfect purity, as God, contemplates and eternally realises that which is best and highest—itself: see *Met.* Λ. 9. 1074 b. 25 *δῆλον . . . ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει· εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή . . . αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον*. In man *νοῦς* is the principle which maintains the *ἔνυλον εἶδος* of his nature, to maintain which is his chief good; while in the organisms of animals and



plants the same formative principle appears as an effort, cha- 1169 a. 17.
racterised as *θεῖον*, to preserve and perpetuate the type of the race. A divine Reason thus penetrates Nature, producing *εἴδη* out of *ὕλη*—*ἐκ τοιαύτης* (*i. e.* *ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ὅτι ἄνευ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ εὖ*—Alex. *ad loc.*) *ἄρα ἀρχῆς* (*i. e.* the divine *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*, or *νόησις νοήσεως*) *ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις*. (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 13): *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν* (*E. N.* i. 9. 5): *ἐπειδὴ ὥρισται τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστου τῶν φύσεως γινομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἵππου κ.τ.λ., καὶ ἡ ταῦτα δημιουργοῦσα ἀρχὴ μέχρι τοσούτου πρόεισι κινοῦσα τὴν ὕλην μέχρις οὗ τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο καὶ τὴν μορφὴν τελείως ἐναρμόσαι τῇ ὕλῃ* (Themist. *in Phys.* vol. i. p. 171, ed. Spengel): *cf. Rhet.* i. 6. 1362 a. 24, quoted by Ramsauer—*ἀγαθὰ δ' ἐστὶ) ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ*. Mich. Eph. remarks on *πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ* as follows—*πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αὐτοφυῶς μὴ πειραθεὶς ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἢ νόσου αἱρεῖται καὶ διώκει τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ συμφέρον ἑαυτῷ· δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων· ἔστι γάρ τις ἅπασι τούτοις ἔλλαμψις νοῦ· ὡσαύτως ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀλλαχοῦ λέγει* (Aristotle does not seem to use this expression anywhere) *τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δὲ ἧττον, δι' ἣν ἔλλαμψιν αὐτοφυῶς ζητεῖ καὶ εὑρίσκει τὰ ὠφελοῦντα . . .* (Mich. Eph. then gives several examples of the 'instinct' of animals; and proceeds—) *τί δεῖ πολλὰ γράφειν· πλήρεις τοιούτων αἱ περὶ ζῴων Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματεῖαι· καὶ ἐξ ἐκείνων ὁ βουλόμενος λαμβανέτω τὰς πίστεις τοῦ πάντα νοῦν αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ· ὥστε καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἐπειδὴ πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ, ἀποσείεται δὲ τὰς ἀλόγους ὀρέξεις, τὰ βέλτιστα καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αἱρήσεται καὶ πράξει.*

§ 9. **αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς**] We see how far removed a. 26.
the *φιλαυτία* of the good man is from ordinary self-seeking. For the sake of the *καλόν* the *φίλαυτος* will lay down his life. He will not cast it carelessly away as inferior men, falsely called courageous, do under the influence of anger or other excitement, but will lay it down rationally for the sake of his ideal of Human Perfection. He knows that Human Perfection, unlike the Divine Perfection which is realised in One eternal Being, is realised in a succession of mortal beings. The mere prolongation, as such, of a mortal life he sees to be a matter of little moment, because Human Perfection is secured by the succession of lives. He cares only for Human Perfection, and if he finds that he can further it by doing something that can be done only at the cost of his own bodily life, he gladly

1169 a. 26. lays down his life. Here all the ordinary motives operating within the region of the sensibility are left behind, and the agent rises into the sphere where action is determined by 'reverence for law universal.' Thus the doctrine of φιλαυτία, which in its highest form amounts to 'self-sacrifice,' belongs to what may well be called 'the Metaphysic of Ethics.' That there is such a 'Metaphysic' is surely a great practical truth, attested by the fact that men are found thus ready to lay down their lives.

a. 32. § 10. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι] If the μεγαλόψυχος—the form under which the highest excellence is presented in the Fourth Book—be compared with the form under which it is presented here, certain, perhaps not unnatural, misunderstandings will be avoided in connexion with the earlier account.

a. 34. § 11. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων] not at the expense of others, but for the sake of our common Humanity. By ἐπαινετά we are to understand the virtues: see *E. N.* i. 12. 6 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης. The 'larger share,' then, which the good man 'takes to himself' is a larger share of καλαὶ πράξεις, some of them involving the sacrifice of all that is dear to flesh and blood. The good man takes to himself a 'larger share' of 'self-sacrifice.' Grant well compares with this account of the φίλαυτος 'the elevated description of the self-sacrifice of the brave man in Eth. iii. 9. 4–5.'

## CHAPTER IX.

### ARGUMENT.

*Another question is whether the Happy Man will need friends or not. No, say some: he is self-sufficient: he has the good: why, then, should he need a second or supplementary self to help him to attain a good which he already has? 'When Heaven is kind, what need of Friends?' To this it is replied that it seems absurd to assign all good things to the Happy Man with the one exception of—friends, the greatest of external good things. Also, since the good man is essentially a benefactor, and it is better to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will need friends to be the objects of his beneficence. Hence another question arises—Whether it is in prosperity or adversity that friends are more needed? In adversity a man will need benefactors; in prosperity, objects for his beneficence. Again, are we to make the Happy man a Solitary? Surely this would be absurd. Man is naturally social. No one would choose to have all by himself the whole list of good things. The Happy Man, then, must have society, and, plainly, the society of good friends—for that is better than the society of strangers.*

*What, then, is the truth contained in the first view—that the Happy Man is self-sufficient, and does not need friends? The view is true so far as friendship for profit, and friendship for pleasure are concerned. The Happy Man does not need to make the former kind of friendship, because his material necessities are otherwise sufficiently provided for; nor does he need to make friends for the sake of pleasure, for his life is in itself pleasant, and has no need of imported pleasure. But it is not true to say, without qualification, that he does not need friends, for he must have good friends, since Happiness is a Life—a function performed, not a possession treasured, and this function is good and pleasant in itself for the good man who performs it, and pleasant too, because it is his own function, but he can contemplate the like function in his friend better than he can contemplate his own function. The Happy Man thus needs the mirror of Friendship in which to see clearly that which is his joy—the Life of good action—his own Life. Further, it being admitted that the life of the Happy Man ought to be pleasant, it could hardly be this were he a Solitary, for by himself he could not easily perform his function continuously. With others, and in relation to others, however, he will be able to do so more easily. A function pleasant in itself will thus be more continuously performed; and this accords with our notion of Happiness. Again, a man gets practice in virtue by associating intimately with good men, as Theognis tells us.*

*But there is a still deeper reason in the nature of things, from which we infer that a good friend is naturally the object of the good man's choice. We have seen that that which is naturally good is good and pleasant in itself for the good man. Now, Life, which is the power of perceiving and thinking—or more strictly, the exercise of the power, actual perception and thought—is good and pleasant in itself, for it is definite; it is therefore good and pleasant for the good man—all men indeed strive after it, but the good man especially strives after it, inasmuch as it is best and most blessed as realised by him. Further, he who sees or hears or walks perceives that he sees or hears or walks: there is a faculty in him which perceives that he exercises the various functions of sense-perception, and of thought: but to perceive that he perceives or thinks is to perceive that he exists (for existence or life, we saw, is perceiving or thinking): now, to perceive that he exists or lives is pleasant in itself, and especially to the good man whose life is especially choiceworthy: since, then, the relation in which the good man stands to his friend is the same as that in which he stands to himself, the good man who, perceiving himself as good, makes his own existence the object of his choice, will necessarily make the existence of his friend also the object of his choice, perceiving his friend's existence and goodness in perceiving his own—for a friend is a second self. This common perception of his own existence and of his friend's the good man will realise in that common-wealth of speech and thought which constitutes the social life of man, as distinguished from the gregarious life of cattle grazing together in the same pastures.*

*Our conclusion, then, is that the Happy Man must have good friends.*

[The subject of this chapter (excellently summarised by Grant *ad loc.*) is discussed in *E. E.* H. 12 (a chapter the interpretation of which labours under great textual difficulties), and in *M. M.* ii. 15.]

1169 b. 6. **§ 1. τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ**] *i. e.* the notion of the **ἕτερος** *αὐτός* or supplementary self, who supplies what the *αὐτός* by himself cannot obtain, is inconsistent (*a priori*) with the notion of the **αὐτάρκεια** of the **αὐτός**.

b. 7. **ὅταν ὁ δαίμων κ.τ.λ.**] Eurip. *Orestes* 667.

b. 9. **§ 2. ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι**] I cannot recall any passage in which Aristotle explicitly pledges himself to the view that friends are the greatest of external good things. The value of the *ἕτερος* **αὐτός** as he is characterised in the present book is scarcely that of an *external* good; while in *E. N.* i. 8. 15 and *Rhet.* i. 5, friends are simply enumerated among other external good things, without being placed in a position of marked superiority. Thus in *E. N.* i. 8. 15, 16, we have—*φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν*, and *Rhet.* i. 5. 1360 b. 18 sqq. *εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν πολυφιλίαν χρηστοφιλίαν πλοῦτον εὐτεκνίαν πολυτεκνίαν εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετὰς οἷον ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχὺν μέγεθος δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικὴν δόξαν τιμὴν εὐτυχίαν . . . οὕτω γὰρ αὐταρκέστατος εἴη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα· ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή. ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀσφαλέστατος ὁ βίος εἴη.*

b. 16. **§ 3. μονώτην**] *Cf. E. N.* i. 7. 6 *τὸ δ' αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.*

b. 22. **§ 4. οἱ πρῶτοι**] *οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις* (Paraph.).

b. 24. **τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος**] *Cf.* Menander (apud Plut. *de Aud. Poet.* 13)—

*μακάριος ὅστις οὐσίαν καὶ νοῦν ἔχει.*



**ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν**] *κἂν ἴσως ποτὲ διὰ νόσον ἢ τοιοῦτό τι δεήσεται, ἐπὶ μικρὸν* (1169 b. 26.) *δεήσεται* (Mich. Eph.).

**ἐπεισάκτου**] *Cf. E. N.* i. 8. 12 *οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.*

**§ 5. ἐν ἀρχῇ**] *E. N.* i. 7. 15, where *εὐδαιμονία* is defined as *ψυχῆς* (b. 28.) *ἐνέργεια κ.τ.λ.*

**ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται κ.τ.λ.**] The Paraph. has—*ἡ ἐνέργεια φανερὸν ὅτι γίγνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, καὶ οὐ γέγονε καὶ ὑπάρχει ἤδη καθάπερ τι κτῆμα· συνίσταται μὲν οὖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ πράττειν.* (b. 29.) Mich. Eph. has—*εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλον τι καὶ ὑφεστηκός, ὡς οἰκία ἢ ἱμάτιον ἢ ἐγὼ ἢ σύ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ὥσπερ ἡ κίνησις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστιν ὁμοῦ ξύμπασα, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς γέγονε τὸ δὲ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλει γενέσθαι· οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ὅλον τι, ἐνέργεια οὖσα, ἀλλ' οἷον ἡ κίνησις καὶ ὅρασις.*

Happiness is a function performed, not a thing possessed. This function, as performed by the good man, is pleasant on two grounds—as *good*, and as '*his own*'—and invites contemplation. But the good man stands, as it were, too near himself to see properly 'his own' as realised in himself. He sees 'his own' better at the distance of his 'second self.' **σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὑτήν** b. 32 I understand to mean 'good and *consequently* pleasant in itself,' the good being one source of true pleasure (*cf.* viii. 3. 7 *τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν*), while in the next line b. 33 *τὸ οἰκεῖον* is stated to be the other source. Actions which are *σπουδαῖαι* and *οἰκεῖαι*, to be experienced as pleasant, must be contemplated (*θεωρεῖν*), *i. e.* must be clearly realised in consciousness (*cf.* for the use of *θεωρεῖν*, in the sense of 'being fully conscious,' *E. N.* vii. 3. 5 *διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δέ κ.τ.λ.*). This consciousness of one's own actions—*ἡ τῶν οἰκείων πράξεων θεωρία*—becomes explicit in the contemplation of the actions of a good friend. The actions of such a friend are *good*, and, although not **οἰκεῖαι** in the narrow personal sense in which actions often stand too near the observer to be objects of clear vision, they are in the sense of being *ὅμοιαι*, and realising the one law of rectitude common to all good men: *cf.* viii. 3. 6 *καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσὶν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι.*

In God 'subject and object' are one. He realises and sees

1169 b. 29. Himself in Himself. But man realises and sees himself in and through others—*E. E.* H. 12. 1245 b. 18 *ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ* (*sc. θεῷ*) *αὐτὸς τὸ εὖ ἐστίν.* For man, as immersed in *ὕλη*, 'subject and object' are two. Hence, to fulfil the injunction *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, he must place himself at a certain distance from himself, as it were. He must by an effort make himself an *object* to himself. This he does by universalising his own conduct, by regarding it not as the conduct of himself only, but also of others. Thus the idea or ideal of 'conduct' is abstracted from the *ὕλη* of the individual's sensibility, and made an object of contemplation. It is no longer *his* conduct, but the conduct of *all good men.* *Πράξεις* performed by the individual with the consciousness that they are such as all good men perform are pleasant *par excellence*; true pleasure either being (book vii), or attending (book x), the consciousness (*θεωρία*) of good actions, and this consciousness being vastly heightened in each individual, when he sees other rational agents obeying the same Law of Rectitude with himself: as Spinoza says *Eth.* iv. 37 'Bonum, quod homo sibi appetit et amat, constantius amabit, si viderit, alios idem amare. Atque adeo conabitur, ut reliqui idem ament. Et quia hoc bonum (*i. e.* bonum quod unusquisque qui sectatur virtutem sibi appetit) omnibus commune est, eoque omnes gaudere possunt; conabitur ergo ut omnes eodem gaudeant, et eo magis quo hoc bono magis fruetur.'

b. 35. **αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δέ**] I prefer *δή*, beginning the apodosis here. Zell and Michelet, however (and apparently also Susemihl and Bywater who read *δέ* with CCC, Cambr., Ald.) make it begin with *ὁ μακάριος δή* 1170 a. 2. It seems to me necessary to state as a *conclusion* from (1) *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα*, (2) *τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων*, and (3) *θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας*, that 'a good friend's actions are pleasant to the good man': then, from the premisses *εἴπερ κ.τ.λ.* a. 2, follows the different conclusion that 'the *μακάριος* will need good friends.'

1170 a. 1. **ἄμφω**] *i. e.* *τὸ ἐπιεικές* (or *τὸ σπουδαῖον*) and *τὸ οἰκεῖον.* *Cf.* below *εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας.* Zell and Fritzsche are evidently wrong in making *ἄμφω* nominative, *i. e.* *ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ φίλος αὐτοῦ σπουδαῖος ὤν.*

a. 6. **συνεχῶς**] *Cf.* x. 4. 9 *πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.* *Cf. Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b.



14 *διαγωγὴ δέ ἐστιν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνό* 1170 a. 6. *ἐστιν. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον . . . φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον· ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.*

**μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον**] The form of God is realised in one Eternal Being: the form of man in a multitude of contemporary and successive examples. Each individual man realises himself only by looking away from his own mere particularity, and assimilating into his consciousness the form of man's reason as other examples—his friends and fellow-citizens—by their cumulative influence impress it more purely upon him. The great embodiment of human reason, the social order into which he has been born, exists independently of himself. It is there already as an object for him to contemplate and identify himself with. It has not to be held up, as it were, in actual existence by his own unaided reason, as the abstractions of Philosophy have to be maintained (and cannot long be maintained at a stretch) by the thinker himself: see *E. E.* H. 12. 1245 b. 16 *οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλό τι νοεῖν αὐτὸς παρ' αὑτόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστί.* To contemplate, and in contemplating to identify himself with, the social life is a thing which a man can do almost continuously, because his *οὐσία* or *φύσις* is to be a person who sees himself in others and lives in others. But to identify himself with *νοητά* which involve no social reference is a godlike act, which he can only at rare intervals, and for a short time, perform. *Cf.* Alex. *in Met.* p. 671 (ed. Bonitz)—*ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς, δυνάμει ὢν τὰ νοητά, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς ἄκρας ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς ἄγαν εὐζωΐας ἐνεργείᾳ γένηται τὰ νοητά, τότε ζῶμεν τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ μακαριωτάτην καὶ πάσης ἡδονῆς ἐπέκεινα ζωήν, ἥτις λόγῳ μέν ἐστιν ἀνερμήνευτος, γινώσκεται δὲ τοῖς τὸ μακάριον τουτὶ παθοῦσι πάθος. . . .* p. 687 *οὐκ ἔσται ἐπίπονον αὐτῷ* (*i.e.* *τῷ πρώτῳ νῷ*) *τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς νοήσεως εἰ νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ νόησις. ἀλλὰ πῶς τῷ ἡμετέρῳ νῷ οὐσιωμένῳ ἐν τῷ νοῦς εἶναι ἐπίπονόν ἐστι τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς νοήσεως; ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦς καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὡς ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει;* As Alex. quaintly says, it is not difficult for a man to be always a man, *ὅτι ἐν τῷ εἶναι ἄνθρωπος οὐσίωται*: but it is difficult for him always to walk, *διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν οὐσιῶσθαι* (p. 687). So it is difficult for man to think continuously, as God does, because man's *νόησις* stands to his *νοῦς* as his walking does to his physical power—it is something which tends to sink

1170 a. 6. back into the potentiality (*δύναμις*) from which it springs; whereas God's *νόησις* is an *ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως*. *Cf.* Themistius, vol. ii. p. 211 (ed. Spengel)—*ἡ ἐλάττωσις αὐτῷ* (*i. e. τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ νῷ*) *πρὸς τὸν θεῖον νοῦν οὐχ ὅτι μηδέποτε δύναται νοεῖν τὰ ἄϋλα εἴδη, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὴ συνεχῶς καὶ ἀεί*. But in his own lower sphere—that of conduct, man is able *ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς* more easily and successfully. The weakness of the individual is aided by the strength of the race; the law of rectitude is embodied in the good men of the race, and in the institutions which have held their ground, and does not depend much for its actuality on the efforts of any single individual. The efforts of the individual are rendered easier and more continuous by the stimulation which they receive from an object which they have not themselves, with pain and weariness, to hold up in actuality.

a. 7. **§ 6. συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὑτήν**] These words are to be taken in connexion with *οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα* a. 4. The *μονώτης* cannot well be *εὐδαίμων* on account of the difficulty (as explained in the foregoing note) of an approach in his case to *τὸ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν*. But, sustained by society, the individual can make an approach to it. The words *μονώτῃ . . . ῥᾷον* a. 5, 6 have thus nothing directly to do with the statement *οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα*, being rather an assertion of the general truth that *εὐδαιμονία* as a *συνεχὴς ἐνέργεια* requires (in man's case) friends and society. But having thus almost parenthetically hit upon *τὸ συνεχές* as distinctive of *εὐδαιμονία*, Aristotle then proceeds in regular course to point out that the requirement *οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα* is justified by the law that 'his function, *because* pleasant in itself, will be more continuous'—*συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή* (x. 5. 2): and we are to understand that the pleasure of friendship contributes—a good friend making the good man take increased pleasure in his own *πράξεις*. I understand the *ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι* a. 9 to be not only those of the good man himself, but also those of his friend; and, although the passage (like other passages in this chapter) is somewhat confused (whether by the fault of Aristotle or his editors it is impossible to say), I do not think it necessary, with Ramsauer, to bracket the words a. 8 *ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος ᾗ σπουδαῖος . . .* a. 11 *λυπεῖται*. They seem to be fairly enough suggested by *ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὑτήν*—'The function of the *εὐδαίμων* is *truly* pleasant—he rejoices or takes pleasure in *virtuous* actions, his own and his friends'.' Susemihl places 1169 b. 33 1170 a. 7. *ἔστι δὲ καί . . .* 1170 a. 8 *μακάριον εἶναι* after 1170 a. 11 *λυπεῖται*.



a. 11. **§ 7. ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς**] This consideration seems to owe at least the form in which it is presented to the words *ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι* in the passage a. 8 *ὁ γάρ . . .* a. 11 *λυπεῖται*, bracketed by Ramsauer.

a. 12. **Θέογνις**] *i. e.* as quoted at the end of this book—*ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ* (*διδάξεαι, ἢν δὲ κακοῖσι | Συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον*); *cf.* Menander's *φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρησθ' ὁμιλίαι κακαί*.

a. 13. **φυσικώτερον**] It is difficult to see in what respect the enquiry contained in this section and the subsequent sections of the chapter is more 'concrete' (see note on vii. 3. 9, a. 24) than that in §§ 5 and 6. Both are concerned with the manipulation of abstract formulae; unless it be said that the second enquiry, by its use of the psychological terms *αἴσθησις* and *νόησις*, is rendered more concrete. It must be admitted, however, that these terms are used in a very abstract way.

a. 16. **τὸ δὲ ζῆν . . . δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως**] *Cf. de An.* ii. 2. 413 b. 2 *τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως*: *cf. E. N.* i. 7. 12 and 13.

a. 17. **αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως**] Zell reads *καί* which gives the sense which *ἤ* must bear if retained; and there seems to be no ground for rejecting *ἤ*: *cf. de An.* ii. 3. 414 b. 14 *νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω ὅτι τῶν ζῴων τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἁφὴν καὶ ὄρεξις ὑπάρχει· περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν· ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικὸν καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἕτερον, ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον*.

a. 17. **ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται**] 'a faculty results in a function.' Fritzsche and Grant compare *Met.* Θ. 9. 1051 a. 29 *τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὑρίσκεται*.

a. 18. **τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ**] 'The reality is in the function; life, then, in the real sense (*κυρίως*), is perceiving or thinking.' *Cf. Met.* Θ. 5. 1048 a. 10, where it is said that the *δύναμις* must be realised by a determining cause external to itself—*ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ κύριον*, and *Met.* Θ. 8, in which it is laid down that *ἐνέργεια* is prior to

1170 a. 18. δύναμις both λόγῳ and τῇ οὐσίᾳ. The priority οὐσίᾳ is set forth thus 1050 a. 7 *ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τέλος. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις. τέλος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν ἔχωσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ ζῷα, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν.*

a. 19. **τὸ δὲ ζῆν . . . § 8, a. 25 φανερώτερον**] This is a very confused passage, which Ramsauer proposes to mend by omitting the half of it—viz. from *διόπερ* a. 22 to *φανερώτερον* a. 25: indeed he practically recommends the omission of the whole of it, for he suspects the clause *ὡρισμένον γάρ* a. 20 . . . *φύσεως* a. 21, leaving only *τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν (καὶ ἡδέων), τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ.* Of course the argument which proceeds from the beginning of § 9 would not suffer if the whole passage, *τὸ δὲ ζῆν* a. 19 . . . a. 25 *φανερώτερον*, were omitted, for the parenthesis *ἔοικε δὲ καί* a. 26 . . . a. 29 *ζωή* contains all of material importance that would be thus lost; and indeed, by making *τὸ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους* a *σημεῖον* of *τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ*, puts the matter much more clearly than it is put in § 7, where the corresponding *τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι* appears as a *deduction* from *τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων.* Notwithstanding all this, I cannot bring myself to think that the passage, with its references to *τὸ ὡρισμένον* and to *λύπη*, ought to be omitted. These references are not of material importance to the argument, but are just such as may naturally be made in passing without interrupting it.

a. 20. **ὡρισμένον**] *Cf. E. N.* ii. 6. 14. Life is unthinkable except as the realisation of *definite* forms and functions.

a. 22. **§ 8. οὐ δεῖ δὲ . . . λύπαις**] When we say that life is naturally good, because 'definite,' and naturally pleasant, we must remember that vice and pain make it 'indefinite' and bad, and that they connect it with bad pleasures—for *all* men, not only good men, find life *pleasant*—with the pleasures of excessive indulgence and of relief from pain.

a. 24. **ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον**] Grant says—'This must be after all (see vol. i. p. 49), undoubtedly an interpolation. The editor probably had in his mind a confused



reference to x. 3. 2.' Ramsauer urges that there is nothing in x about pain being *ἀόριστος*. It may be replied that there are frequent references to pain in x; and that indeed the promise made here does not pledge Aristotle to speak more fully of pain being *ἀόριστος*: moreover the epithet *ἀόριστος* used here applies to the *μοχθηρὰ καὶ διεφθαρμένη ζωή* as well as to that *ἐν λύπαις*. Vice with its pleasures destroys the *ἀρχή* or *λόγος* of man's nature, and makes it chaotic—*ἀόριστος*: similarly, pain distorts it; although here we do not attach blame; *cf. E. N.* iii. 12. 2 *καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν.* 1170 a. 24.

§§ 9, 10.] The apodosis of the sentence **εἰ δ' αὐτό κ.τ.λ.** begins a. 25. with *οὕτω* b. 8. See the notes of Fritzsche, Michelet, and Grant: *cf.* also § 10 b. 14 *εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ . . .* b. 17 *εἴη*—a sentence which epitomises the sense, and reproduces in skeleton the grammatical construction of the more diffuse reasoning which precedes. The apodosis of this sentence begins with *κἂν ὁ φίλος* b. 16.

**§ 9. ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται**] *Cf. de An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 12 a. 29. *ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἑτέρᾳ. ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου χρώματος. ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔσονται ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς. ἔτι δ' εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ τῆς ὄψεως αἴσθησις, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἢ αὐτή τις ἔσται αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἐπὶ τῆς πρώτης τοῦτο ποιητέον.* See also *de Somno* 2. 455 a. 15 *ἔστι δέ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ᾗ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ*: see Edwin Wallace's *Aristotle's Psychology*, note on *de An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 12, and *Introduction* § ix, 'common or central sense'—especially his excellent remarks on pp. lxxxi–ii, where he reconciles the passage in *de Somno* 2. 445 a. 15 with *de An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 12: 'unless,' he says, 'we are prepared to credit Aristotle with a wonderful amount of inconsistency we must regard the one passage as illustrative of the other. So taking them we cannot but allow that if Aristotle asserts in the one passage "it is not by sight mind sees that it sees," and in the other passa writes "sight perceives that it perceives," he is using sight in the former passage as the mere particular organ, whereas in the other it is identified with that original faculty of sense which serves as basis to the whole system of the senses. The consciousness of sense-perception is then, we may conclude, an attribute of that same central sense

1170 a. 29. which enabled us to compare and distinguish the different reports transmitted by our isolated senses. The two functions are in fact but different aspects of one and the same process; for the comparison of the reports of sense involves as its presupposition the conscious recognition of them as our own, the faculty, in other words, of holding them before the mind.'

In seeing, hearing, walking, etc., a man is conscious of himself—of his own existence: 'he perceives that *he* sees, hears, etc.' This perception of self, however, would hardly be possible to man if his only objects of experience were his own sensations. In that case the sensation and the perception of the sensation as *his* sensation would coalesce, as they practically do, we may suppose, in the experience of the lower animals, or of most of the lower animals. Even his experience of his own *actions* would be accompanied by only a dim consciousness of a self distinguished from them. But man is not confined to his own actions. He has a 'sympathetic consciousness' of the actions of his friend—of actions which are still in a sense 'his own' (for his friend is a ἕτερος αὐτός), and yet are not in such a way 'his own' as to make it difficult for him to distinguish 'himself' from them. The distinction between 'himself' and 'his friend' (for his friend is a ἕτερος αὐτός) helps him to the distinction between 'himself' and 'his own sensations and actions.' In other words—it is in the consciousness of the existence of another that a man becomes truly conscious of himself. τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος b. 9 cannot be realised apart from τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν b. 10. Man is distinguished from the brutes by the mental distance, as it were, at which he places his sensations and actions. He stands behind them and observes them: but this he does because he is a social being; because he can recognise, and takes pleasure in the recognition of, acts, thoughts, and feelings, not 'his own' but '*like* his own.'

There can be no doubt that the term συναισθάνεσθαι, as employed in §§ 9 and 10, is intended to be accurately distinguished from αἰσθάνεσθαι[1]. The term αἰσθάνεσθαι marks a man's consciousness of his own life; συναισθάνεσθαι his consciousness of his friend's

[1] The two terms are carefully distinguished in *E. E.* H. 12. 1244 b. 23 δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.



life — his 'sympathetic consciousness' of his friend's existence, 1170 a. 29. as Grant well puts it. Where the term συναισθάνεσθαι occurs in § 10, b. 10, this is clearly its meaning: but συναισθανόμενοι at the end of § 9, b. 4, in its present context seems to describe merely the consciousness which the individual has of his own life, and to be equivalent to the simple αἰσθανόμενοι: hence Ramsauer is of opinion that it is employed after the analogy of ἑαυτῷ συνειδέναι, and stands for ἑαυτοῖς συναισθανόμενοι τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ—*i. e.* 'being conscious of . . .' Consistently with this view he remarks that συναισθάνεσθαι in the next § is used in a different sense. But is it likely that συναισθανόμενοι b. 4 has a different sense from συναισθάνεσθαι b. 10? Perhaps something has dropped out before συναισθανόμενοι b. 4 which served to make the transition from the individual's simple αἰσθάνεσθαι of himself to his συναισθάνεσθαι of his alter ego. The words αἱρετὸν δέ b. 3 . . . b. 4 καὶ ἡδύ (which Ramsauer brackets) certainly do not serve to make the necessary transition, but may perhaps be a fragment of the lost passage, τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς being the good *friends* required as the subjects of συναισθανόμενοι. I am more inclined, however, to think that συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ is an interpolation; for the words ὡς δὲ πρός b. 5 . . . b. 7 φίλος ἐστίν seem to be written as if nothing had been said before to justify the transition from αἰσθάνεσθαι to συναισθάνεσθαι, a circumstance which makes it difficult to suppose that the ἀγαθοί, regarded not as separate individuals, but as συζῶντες, are the subjects of συναισθανόμενοι b. 4.

Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 65) explains his reading a. 31 ὥστε ἂν αἰσθανώμεθ', ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, κἂν νοῶμεν, ὅτι νοοῦμεν (Bekker has ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν) by saying 'it would be strange indeed if, with αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι νοοῦμεν in the immediate context, he lapsed into different language in l. 32 and said, what the vulgate makes him say, νοεῖν ὅτι νοοῦμεν.'

§ 10. ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας] *Cf. Pol.* iii. 5. b. 11. 1280 b. 29 φανερὸν τοίνυν, ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἁπάντων ἤδη

Cf. 1245 b. 21 ἐνδεχομένου γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείστοις αἱρετώτατον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι.

1170 b. 11. πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις· διὸ κηδεῖαί τ' ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν· πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους χάριν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν.

## CHAPTER X.

### ARGUMENT.

*Should a man try to have an indefinitely great number of friends, or must he draw the line somewhere in the number of his friends, as in the number of his guests? As regards useful friends, he must certainly draw the line at the number which he finds useful: to have more is to burden himself with the duty of recompensing supernumeraries, and hinders the life of noble action. As to friends for pleasure—a few will be enough, like a little sweetening in food. But what shall we say about the number of friends chosen because they are good men? Here again there are limits. The circle of true friendship, like the city, must not be too large or too small. Its extent cannot be accurately fixed, any more than the size of a city; it varies according to circumstances, within definite limits. This is the sense in which its extent is definite. Perhaps we may say that it ought to include as many as it is possible to live on intimate terms with; but, plainly, a man cannot live on intimate terms with, and distribute himself among, many: further, one's friends must be friends also to one another, if all are to meet together constantly in one's company; and it is a difficult matter to get many people to be thus all friends of one another. Again, it is hard to make the joys and sorrows of many people one's own, for one would often have to sympathise with the pleasure of this friend, and the distress of that friend at the same time. So perhaps it is best not to try to have a great many friends, but to limit oneself to the number sufficient to make up a circle of intimate friends, for it is impossible to be on terms of intimate friendship with many, as it is impossible to be in love with many. Wherever friendship is strong it is for few: take for example the friendship of comrades—it does not extend to many; and the famous cases of it are between two. Those who have many friends, and treat everybody they meet as 'My dear friend,' are recognised to be nobody's friends. Their friendship, if it is friendship at all—some people call it fawning complaisance—is friendship in the sense in which we speak of a man's 'friendship' for his fellow-citizens. A man may indeed have many citizen 'friends,' without being chargeable with over-complaisance—nay, a truly good man may have many 'friends' of this sort; but it is impossible to have many friends of the sort who are chosen for their goodness, that is, for* themselves. *We must be satisfied if we have been able to find even a very few friends of this sort.*



§ 1. **μήτε πολύξεινος κ.τ.λ.**] Hesiod. ἔργ. κ. ἡμ. 660. 1170 b. 21.

§ 2.] 'This section may be said to retract upon further consideration what was admitted *Eth.* viii. 6. 3—διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι' (Grant). b. 23.

**ὁ βίος**] may be 'their means,' which seems to be the view of Mich. Eph., who has *βίος γὰρ καὶ περιουσία ἑνὸς οὐχ ἱκανὴ οὕτω πολλοῖς ὑπηρετεῖν*: but the more ordinary sense of the word is, I think, preferable. b. 25.

§ 3. **ὥσπερ πόλεως**] *Cf. Pol.* H. 4. 1326 a. 9 sqq. οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλεῖστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀγνοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ ποία μικρὰ πόλις· κατ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος, εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον· ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην . . . ἐξ ἧς δὲ βάνασοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὁπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν ἔργων φανερὸν ὅτι χαλεπόν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης· ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις· πολιτείαν γὰρ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὑπάρχειν . . . διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὔταρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν . . . δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὅρος ἄριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος. The State is an organism, and like all other organisms must observe definite limits. As realising τὸ καλόν, however, it must be on as great a scale as is consistent with order—see *Poet.* 7. 1450 b. 36 τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί: *Pol.* H. 4. 1326 a. 29 ὁ γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν εἶναι· ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως· θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο b. 30.

1170 b. 30. δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν· ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ πόλις, ἧς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος ὑπάρχει ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῴων, φυτῶν, ὀργάνων. καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἕξει τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν κ.τ.λ. Similarly, the friendly circle is of the nature of an organism, and cannot include an indefinite number of persons.

b. 31. **οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.**] Plato, in a passage in which he is concerned with the logical analysis of the present conditions of society, rather than with the natural history of the origin and growth of society, says, *εἴη δ' ἂν ἥ γε ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἢ πέντε ἀνδρῶν Rep.* 369 D.

**οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων**] *Cf. Pol.* iii. 1. 1276 a. 28 *Βαβυλὼν . . . ἥτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως κ.τ.λ.* 'This extremely limited idea of the size of a state,' says Grant, 'is based on the Greek notion that each citizen must personally take part in the administration of affairs. On this hypothesis, a state consisting of a hundred thousand citizens might easily appear unwieldy.'

According to the allegation of the 400 in Thuc. viii. 72, the actual attendance at the Athenian Assembly always fell short of 5000. Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, Part 2, ch. 2, vol. v. p. 392 note: ed. 1862) remarks on this—'That *no* Assembly had ever been attended by so many as 5000 (*οὐδεπώποτε*) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that 5000 was an unusually large number of citizens to attend.' Xenophon (*Mem.* iii. 6. 14) tells us that the city of Athens consisted of more than 10,000 houses—*ἡ μὲν πόλις ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ μυρίων οἰκιῶν συνέστηκε.* Boeck (*Staatshaush. d. Ath.* i. p. 43, quoted by Kühner on Xen. *Mem.* iii. 6. 14) estimates the population of Athens (including the Piraeus) at 180,000—citizens, women, children, and slaves.

b. 32. **τὸ δὲ ποσόν**] *i. e.* the size of the city.

1171 a. 2. **ἐδόκει**] viii. 5. 3 *οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν.*

§ 4. **ὅτι**] Fritzsche reads *διότι* with $K^b$; but *δι-* is to be explained as a dittograph of the preceding *-αι*.

a. 3. **οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν**] *Cf.* i. 7. §§ 6, 7



*τὸ δ' αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ* 1171 a. 3.
*γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον.*

§ 5. **οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι . . . a. 13 ὀλίγους**] 'For it would a. 10.
appear that it is not even *possible* to be a great friend of many persons; and this for the same reason that (*διόπερ*—'eandem ob causam ob quam,' Ramsauer) it is impossible to be in love with several persons; for, as love, which may be described as an excessive friendship, is for *one* person, so (*δή* a. 13) great friendship (*τὸ σφόδρα φίλον εἶναι*) is entertained towards *a few*.' As the *ὑπερβολὴ φιλίας* limits itself to one, *τὸ σφόδρα* limits itself to a few.

§ 6. **αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι**] Mich. Eph. has—*ἢ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως καὶ Πατρό-* a. 15.
*κλου, ἡ τοῦ Πυλάδου καὶ Ὀρέστου, ἡ τοῦ Θησέως καὶ Πειρίθου. Cf.* Plutarch *de amicorum multitudine* 2 *τὸ προσαγορεύειν ἑταῖρον, ὡς ἕτερον, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο πλὴν μέτρῳ φιλίας τῇ δυάδι χρωμένων.*

**πλὴν πολιτικῶς**] 'except in the sense in which fellow-citizens are a. 17.
"friends."' Mich. Eph. cautions us against referring *οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους* to *πολιτικῶς*, the words *πλὴν πολιτικῶς* being a parenthesis, the subject of which is taken up in the next sentence—*πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* a. 17. On *πολιτικὴ φιλία* see ix. 6. §§ 2 and 3. On the *ἄρεσκος* see iv. 6. 9.

**δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτούς**] *αὐτούς* is Bywater's reading for the a. 19.
*αὑτούς* of the codd. I think that *δι' αὑτούς* is right here, while *δι' αὐτούς* is right in viii. 4. 2, a. 18: see note on that passage.

**τοιούτους**] worthy of being loved *δι' αὐτούς*. a. 20.

# CHAPTER XI.

## ARGUMENT.

*We come now to the question, Whether friends are more needed in prosperity or in adversity; for they are sought in both—in adversity, to render assistance, and in prosperity, as associates and recipients of beneficence. Well, our answer is that in adversity it is more* necessary *to have friends—accordingly in adversity men look out for useful friends; but* better *to have friends in prosperity—hence men are anxious to have good friends in prosperity, for these are more worthy associates, and recipients of beneficence: not but that the very presence of one's friends is sweet in adversity, as well as in prosperity; for those who are in sorrow are lightened by their friends grieving with them—whether they are lightened because their friends take a share of the burden, as it were, or whether it is because the sorrow is made less by the sweetness of friends' presence and by the thought of sympathetic grief, need not be discussed here: the fact, at any rate, is that the presence of friends lightens sorrow. And yet the sweetness of their presence is a mixed sweetness. The very sight of one's friend, especially when one is in distress, is indeed sweet, and helps one to restrain sorrow; for the sight and word of a friend give one courage, if the friend have tact: he knows one's disposition so well, and the things which give one pleasure or pain. On the other hand, to see another in pain for one's misfortunes is painful. Everybody avoids being the cause of pain to his friends. Hence stout-hearted natures shrink from making their friends share pain with them, unless some great relief be thereby gained: indeed such natures cannot endure companions in lamentation, because they are not themselves given to lamentation. Lamentation they leave to weak women, and men as weak, who delight in it and love as friends those who join with them in their distress. It is these stout-hearted natures that we ought to copy; for we ought to copy, in all things, the better example.*

*In prosperity, however, the presence of friends gives sweetness to the employment of leisure, and it is sweet to think that they are near to take pleasure in one's well-being: wherefore it would seem right to be forward in calling in one's friends to share one's prosperity, but backward in calling them in to take part in one's adversity—'One for sorrow is enough': but if they are to be called in in adversity, let it be when, with a little trouble, they are likely to do great good. On the other hand, a friend ought to come uncalled, where adversity may be aided; but, unless to help in carrying out some noble work, ought to be slow in coming where there is prosperity, and good things are to be enjoyed: but here again he must be careful not to seem churlish in rejecting advances.*

*Our conclusion then is, that the presence of friends is always desirable.*



**§ 1. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν . . . κάλλιον δέ]** In adversity a man struggles with matter which opposes itself to the form of his *εὐδαιμονία*: in prosperity he realises the beautiful form without hindrance. In the former case friends are means—instruments by means of which he grapples with his difficulties; in the latter case they are ends—persons in whom the object of his contemplation, human nature as a rational system, is adequately represented. 1171 a. 24.

**§ 2. ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις]** Bekker omits the words *καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις*. The authorities for their omission are $K^b$ and CCC (CCC omits them in the text, and a later hand supplies them on the margin). They ought to be restored to the text: see Rassow, *Forsch.* pp. 67, 68. For *δυστυχίαις* $L^b$, $O^b$, and Ald. give *ἀτυχίαις*. a. 28.

**βάρους]** Victorius, followed by other editors, quotes Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7. 1 *Σωκράτης Ἀρίσταρχόν ποτε ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα· ἔοικας, ἔφη, βαρέως φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βάρους μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τί σε ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.* Fritzsche quotes N. T. *Gal.* vi. 2 *ἀλλήλων τὰ βάρη βαστάζετε.* a. 31.

**ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, κ.τ.λ.]** Perhaps one's friend does not relieve one of any part of the burden of one's sorrow, but encourages one (*παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος* § 3) to bear the whole weight manfully.

**§ 3. παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ]** Coraes, Michelet, and Fritzsche quote Eurip. *Ion* 732— b. 2.

*εἴ τι τυγχάνοι κακόν,*
*εἰς ὄμματ' εὔνου φωτὸς ἐμβλέψαι γλυκύ.*

*Cf.* Menander (apud Stob. *Flor.* iv. 65, ed. Meineke)—

*ἡδύ γε φίλου λόγος ἐστὶ τοῖς λυπουμένοις.*

**§ 4. κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ]** 'unless there be a great balance of relief'—otherwise expressed at the end of the next section, b. 19 *ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν.* I cannot agree with the interpretation offered by Grant and most of the editors—'unless he (*i.e. ὁ ἀνδρώδης*) be excessively impassive.' The change from the plural *εὐλαβοῦνται* b. 7 to the singular *ὑπομένει* b. 8 is awkward, but need not surprise us. Bywater suggests that the clause b. 6 *διόπερ* . . . b. 7 *αὐτοῖς* should be placed after *θρηνητικός* b. 10. b. 7.

**§ 5. εὐεργετικόν]** *εὐεργετητικόν* given only by $O^b$ is accepted by b. 16.

1171 b. 16. Bekker. The word is a ἅπαξ εἰρημένον. All other MSS. recorded give εὐεργετικόν, which is rightly restored to the text by Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 68).

b. 18. ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν] The Paraph. says—ὁ τραγῳδός φησιν. The words, however, do not occur in any extant play; and Ramsauer is perhaps right in thinking that too much has been made of the Paraphrast's remark, and that we have here a common phrase, which it is not necessary to ascribe to a particular poet. Mich. Eph. refers the words to Euripides, whose ἄλις ἔχω τοῦ δυστυχεῖν (Orest. 240) is quoted by the editors.

b. 22. § 6. καὶ [τὸ] μὴ ἀξιώσαντας] Rassow (*Forsch.* pp. 68, 69) advocates ἀξιώσαντος the reading of $K^b$ (and CCC). This reading makes the τό (which is difficult with ἀξιώσαντας, and is omitted by $M^b$, and bracketed by Bywater, and gives place in Ald. to τούς) quite natural. Bywater's suggestion, τό before εὖ ποιεῖν b. 21, ought, I think, to be accepted.

b. 26. διωθεῖσθαι] *sc.* τὴν εὐπάθειαν.

## CHAPTER XII.

### ARGUMENT.

*As sight is the sense dearest to lovers, being, above all other senses, the seat and origin of their love; so, to spend their lives together is that which for friends is most choiceworthy, for friendship is communion. Now, as a man stands related to himself, so he stands related to his friend. The perception of his own existence is choiceworthy; therefore the perception of his friend's existence. This latter perception he realises in spending his life with his friend. It is natural, then, that he should seek to spend his life with his friend. It follows that, in whatever a man makes his existence to consist, in that he wishes to spend his time with his friend. Wherefore some spend their time in drinking together, others in gambling together, others practise athletics, or hunt, or study philosophy together—all, according to their sorts, spending their days together in the pursuits with which they identify their lives.*

*Thus the friendship of bad men is an evil thing, for they are unstable, and share in things that are bad, becoming evil and like to one another: the friendship of the good is a good thing, and grows with intercourse; they become better by practice and mutual correction, being moulded to one another's tastes.*



§ 1. ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν] *i. e.* ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως περὶ τὸν φίλον ὅτι ἔστιν. For αὐτῆς, restored to the text by Susemihl and Bywater, Bekker reads αὐτοῖς: αὐτῆς is given by NC, and by corr. CCC. 1171 b. 35.

§ 2. οἷς οἴονται συζῆν] 'haec faciunt haecque inter se communicant, quibus se arbitrantur communi vitae societate inter se copulari' (Lambinus). I think that the words are corrupt. I suggest ἐν οἷς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ζῆν. NC and Paris. 1853 have οἷς οἴονται ζῆν. The Paraph., with οὕτω γὰρ συζῆν δυνατόν, seems to have had before him the blunder ὡς οἷόν τε which appears in $K^b$. 1172 a. 8.

§ 3. ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες] See viii. 8. 5. a. 9.

ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἁρέσκονται] Fritzsche quotes Aristoph. *Ranae* 1040 ὅθεν ἡ 'μὴ φρὴν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐποίησε Πατρόκλων Τεύκρων, and Alciphro *Ep.* iii. 64 ὁ παῖς ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον ἐξεμάξατο τὸν διδάσκαλον. Mich. Eph. has ἀπομάττονται γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐπισπῶνται πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τὰ ἀλλήλων ἔργα. These examples of the use of ἀπομάττεσθαι, or ἐκμάττεσθαι, seem to me to support Ramsauer's remark—'ἀπομάττεσθαι παρά τινός τι minus est "formam exprimere ex aliquo ut epistola obsignatur anulo," quam "ea quae placent imitando (quasi digitis) apud se effingere."'—'For they copy from each other those traits which please them.' Grant's rendering—'For they take the stamp of one another in those things which they like'—scarcely gives the exact force of ἀπομάττονται, or brings out the construction, which is ἀπομάττονται (middle) παρ' ἀλλήλων ταῦτα οἷς ἁρέσκονται. a. 12.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά] Theognis: see above ix. 9. 7, a. 12: quoted by Plato, *Meno* 95 D. a. 13.

# *BOOK X.*

## CHAPTER I.

### ARGUMENT.

*Our next subject is Pleasure—admittedly a most important one: for Pleasure is inbred in our nature; pleasure and pain are the rudder-bands of education; there is nothing so important for morality, and consequently for the attainment of the Happy Life, as learning to like and dislike aright.*

*The subject then must by no means be omitted, especially as it is one on which there is great difference of opinion: for some maintain that Pleasure is the Chief Good, while others—whether from conviction, or by way of pious fraud (pious frauds, it may be remarked, are generally found out, and do harm in the end—there is nothing so useful as the plain truth)—maintain that it is utterly bad.*

1172 a. 19. **§ 1. περὶ ἡδονῆς**] See *Introductory Note* to vii. 11.

a. 20. **συνῳκειῶσθαι**] 'to have an intimate connexion with our nature' (Peters). Mich. Eph. has—*οἰκεία τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς οἰκείαν ἅπαντες αἱρούμεθα καὶ διώκομεν.*

a. 21. **πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετήν**] $K^b$, $M^b$, $N^b$, and Cambr. read *ἀρχήν*. Mich. Eph., however, seems to have had *ἀρετήν* before him. His note is—*μέγιστον δή φησι καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ· ἤθους ἀρετὴν εἰπὼν αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρετήν· ὡς εἰ ἔλεγε, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν μέγιστα συντελεῖν τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ κ.τ.λ.* *Cf.* Plato, *Legg.* 653, and *E. N.* ii. 3. §§ 1–4, also *Pol.* Θ. 5. 1340 a. 14 sqq., where the principle *ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς*



*καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν* is applied to determine the place of Music in 1172 a. 21. education, and the kinds of music that are to be taught.

**§ 2. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων**] For *ὑπέρ=περί* with gen. in the *Ethics*, a. 26. see notes on i. 5. 7, i. 6. 13, iii. 3. 2, iv. 2. 4.

**οἳ μὲν . . . οἳ δέ**] Eudoxus . . . Speusippus. 'In all probability,' a. 27. says Grant *ad loc.*, 'Aristotle here alludes immediately to two sections of the Platonists, (1) the party represented by Eudoxus, whose arguments are quoted; (2) that headed by Speusippus, whose antihedonistic arguments were contained in two books mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, under the titles *περὶ ἡδονῆς α'· Ἀρίστιππος α'*, and which are now passed under review. Under the class of those who "call pleasure the chief good," Aristotle less directly refers to Aristippus, who, though he belonged to a bygone era, still lived in the pages of Plato's *Philebus*, and in the book of Speusippus bearing his name.'

Ramsauer has a pertinent observation—that in the parallel passage vii. 11. 3 *οἱ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγοντες* are not mentioned. Mich. Eph. has a very interesting note here—*Εὔδοξος μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν ταὐτὸν ᾤετο τἀγαθῷ· εἰδικὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐτίθετο, ὡς οἱ τὰς ἰδέας πρεσβεύοντες τὸ αὐτοζῷον τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὸ αὐτοὸν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὸν αὐτοάνθρωπον τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ αὐτοκάλλος τῶν καλλῶν*[1]. According to this account the doctrine of Eudoxus concerning pleasure was a development of, or perhaps only another way of stating, Plato's doctrine of the *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ*. If it was this, Aristotle is unfair to it when he insinuates (as he does below ch. 2. § 1) that it was a doctrine of mere hedonism (in the Cyrenaic sense)—a doctrine which was not supposed to be so immoral in tendency as it really was, only on account of the temperate character of its author. Aristotle is too much inclined to criticise Plato and the Platonists *au pied de la lettre*. Is his criticism of Eudoxus a case in point?

**οἳ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι . . . οἳ δέ**] Two classes of *οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας* a. 29. *κομιδῇ φαῦλον λέγοντες*. So the Paraph.

**διὸ δεῖν . . . μέσον**] *Cf.* ii. 9. 5. 'Aristotle does not approve of a. 32. this being done by means of a sacrifice of truth' (Grant).

[1] Cf. the *marginale* in $L^b$ on i. 12. 5 (where see note) *ἔλεγε γὰρ (ὁ Εὔδοξος) τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν.*

1172 a. 36. § 3. τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν] 'palpable facts' (Peters).

b. 2. τοιαύτην] *i. e.* ἐφετήν understood from ἐφιέμενος. Mich. Eph. has—λέγοντες τὴν ἡδονὴν φαύλην, εἶτα ἀποφαίνοντες ἀγαθὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιδιώκειν αὐτήν. The Paraph. has—ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονὴν ὀφθεὶς ποτε ἐφιέμενος αὐτῆς, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἡγεῖσθαι· καὶ οὕτω δόξαν ἐντίθησι τοῖς ὁρῶσιν οὗ τινα ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς ἅπασαν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸ γὰρ διορίζειν καὶ διαιρεῖν καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν κρίνειν, ἐνδέχεσθαι δὲ ἄλλην φαύλην εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν· ἀλλ' ἅμα τε εἶδον τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἡδονῇ τινὶ χαίροντα, καὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἱρετὸν ᾠήθησαν εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως οὐ μόνον ἃ ἐβούλοντο οὐκ ἔπεισαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν προσαπώλεσαν—*i. e.* they say without qualification, by way of pious fraud, that all pleasure is bad; but when they are seen to seek some pleasures, they are thought to intimate that all pleasure is good. They thus not only fail to get people to enter into their pious fraud—to believe the general proposition 'all pleasure is bad'—but they also discredit the particular proposition 'some pleasures are bad,' which, as their own actions show, is what they really believe to be true, and wish people to act upon. It would have been wiser to say at first that '*some* pleasures are bad'—to distinguish for the benefit of those who, unable to distinguish for themselves, generalise hastily from ἔργα. For ὡς τοιαύτην Ald., NC, Paris. 1853, and $B^3$ read ὡς οὐ τοιαύτην (= ψεκτήν).

b. 3. § 4.] But a distinction which is consonant with ἔργα is of great practical use to those who understand it (τοὺς συνιέντας); of course, only those can understand moral distinctions placed before them, who have had the preliminary moral training insisted on in *E. N.* i: *cf.* i. 4. 6 διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. Without such moral training no one can display the σύνεσις which consists ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς (*E. N.* vi. 10. 3). It is in connexion with the doctrine of σύνεσις thus laid down that we must understand the expression τοὺς συνιέντας in the present passage. For the practical value of λόγοι, or γνῶσις, to those who have received good moral training, see note on i. 3. 7—τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πυλυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.



# CHAPTER II.

## ARGUMENT.

*Eudoxus thought that Pleasure was the Chief Good,* (1) *because all creatures, rational and irrational, pursue it* (*his doctrine was accepted as true, not so much on its own merits, as because it came from one who, being very temperate, was supposed to take an impartial view of Pleasure*); (2) *because all creatures avoid its contrary, Pain. Further, he argued that no one asks* why *Pleasure is desirable; and that added to any good thing,* e. g. *the performance of justice, it makes that good thing better. This last argument, we may say in passing, proves that Pleasure is* a *good thing, but not that it is* the *good—indeed it is the sort of argument that Plato employs to show that Pleasure is not the Chief Good—the Chief Good, he argues, cannot be enhanced by the addition of any other good, and Pleasure with Wisdom is better than Pleasure without Wisdom.*

*Those who meet Eudoxus with the objection—that what all pursue is not good, commit themselves to an untenable position. What all pursue must be good: manifestly what all rational beings pursue; and even the irrational creatures are divinely impelled to seek after their own good.*

*Nor is there any force in the objection raised against the argument which Eudoxus draws from the universal avoidance of Pain, the contrary of Pleasure. The objection is—'that it does not follow from Pain being evil, that Pleasure is good; for evil may be opposed to evil, and both evils to that which is neutral.' This formula of opposition is all very well as a formula, but it is not applicable to Pleasure and Pain: for if both were evil, we should find both avoided; if both were neutral we should find neither avoided, or both avoided alike; whereas we see plainly that men avoid the one as evil, and seek the other as good.*

§ 1. Εὔδοξος] of Cnidus, one of Plato's disciples, a celebrated 1172 b. 9.
astronomer, mentioned in *Met.* Λ. 8 as the author of a theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies, which is described; and in *Met.* A. 9. 991 a. 15, as holding the view that the ideas are mixed in sensible things, like the ὁμοιομερῆ of Anaxagoras—*cf.* Alex. *ad loc.* (p. 72. 4) καὶ Εὔδοξος τῶν Πλάτωνος γνωρίμων μίξει τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰς τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἡγεῖτο ἕκαστον εἶναι: of which view he proceeds to give the refutation contained in the second Book of Aristotle's περὶ ἰδεῶν, but omitted in the *Metaphysics*: see *Alex. Met.* 73. 11 (ed. Bonitz). Eudoxus' theory of pleasure,

1172 b. 9. discussed here, has already been mentioned *E. N.* i. 12. 5, on which see note.

Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* i. *Nic. Eth.* pp. 218, 219) and Ramsauer complain, unnecessarily I think, of the confused manner in which the argument of Eudoxus is here presented.

b. 15. **διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετήν**] Grant sees in this 'a pleasing reference to the personal character of Eudoxus': but see note on x. 1. 2, a. 27.

b. 20. § 2. **ὁμοίως**] *i. e. καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσιν* (Ramsauer).

**ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν**] The latter of these expressions seems to be added merely as an alternative for the former. They seem to have exactly the same meaning.

b. 25. **αὔξεσθαι δέ**] Bekker reads *καὶ αὔξεσθαι δή*. $K^b$ and $L^b$ omit *καί*. Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater read *αὔξεσθαι δέ*, the *δέ* being Ramsauer's conjecture for the *δή* of the codd. Spengel (*Arist. Stud.* 218) asks with some force—How could Eudoxus, who wished to prove that *ἡδονή* is *τἀγαθόν*, have used this argument as Aristotle here (§ 3) understands it? What Eudoxus really meant, Spengel thinks, was something very different—viz. When *ἡδονή* is added to any good thing however small, that good thing surpasses all other good things however great, to which *ἡδονή* is not added. That which can thus enhance the smallest good above the greatest, must itself stand higher than the greatest—must be, in short, *τἀγαθόν*. This view of the relation of *ἡδονή* to *ἀγαθά*, attributed to Eudoxus by Spengel, agrees substantially with the account of his theory given by Mich. Eph. (see note on *E.N.* x. 1. 2), and with the marginal commentary on i. 12. 5 in $L^b$ (see note *ad loc.*) *ἔλεγε γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν.*

b. 28. § 3. **Πλάτων**] See *Philebus* 60 D, E, where it is shown that the best life for man is *ὁ μικτὸς βίος ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως.*

b. 31. **οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.**] 'For the highest good is not made better by the addition of anything.' For *αὐτῷ* $K^b$ (alone it would seem) gives *αὐτό* preferred by Bekker and Susemihl.

b. 34. § 4. **τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ.**] 'What good is there, then, which is thus incapable of addition, and at the same time such as men can participate in it?' (Peters.)



**οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι κ.τ.λ.**] Those who bring against the first argument of Eudoxus the objection, or *ἔνστασις* (*An. Prior.* ii. 26, 69 a. 37 *ἔνστασις δ' ἐστὶ πρότασις προτάσει ἐναντία*), that 'what all seek is not good,' commit themselves to an untenable position in Aristotle's opinion; *ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν—securus judicat orbis terrarum.* Their *ἔνστασις* is *παράδοξος*, and, as such, is dialectically inadmissible, dialectic admitting only *ἔνδοξα*, save when the paradoxes are those of great philosophers (*θέσεις*); as for the paradoxes of ordinary men, it would be silly to pay attention to them—*Top.* i. 11. 104 b. 22 *τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φροντίζειν εὔηθες.* 1172 b. 35.

**ὀρέγεται**] Bekker's *ὠρέγετο* is the reading of $L^b$, Paris. 1853, and apparently of Mich. Eph. and the Paraph. All other authorities (including CCC, Cambr., $B^1$, $B^2$, $B^3$) have *ὀρέγεται*, adopted by Bywater. For *εἰ* in this line and in the next, we perhaps ought to follow Michelet in reading *ᾗ*. 1173 a. 2.

**αὐτῶν**] Cambr. has *αὐτῆς*. a. 3.

**ἣν ἄν τι λεγόμενον**] Bekker's *τό* before *λεγόμενον* is omitted by $K^b$, $L^b$, $M^b$, $O^b$, Cambr., NC, Paris. 1853, $B^3$.

**φαύλοις**] the 'inferior,' or irrational animals—*τὰ ἀνόητα.* a. 4.

**ἔστι τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν**] Susemihl, following Thurot, brackets *ἀγαθόν*, and Bywater's note is—'*φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν* fort. secludenda.' I think that it is likely that both words come from the margin.

**τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ**] 'their proper good' (Peters): *i. e.* when they seem to be indulging merely their own caprices, as individuals, they are really maintaining the *εἶδος* of their race—striving after *τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον.* At the end of the *Philebus* (67 B) Socrates says that to go to the lower animals for arguments in favour of pleasure is to trust 'the augury of birds,' instead of 'the Muse of Philosophy—**ΣΩ.** *Οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.* **ΠΡΩ.** *Ἔοικεν.* **ΣΩ.** *Πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τἆλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν. οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν Μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων.* Aristotle may have had this passage in his mind here. a. 5.

1173 a. 5. § 5. οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι] 'nor is what the opponents of Eudoxus say about "the contrary" (*i. e.* about his argument from the contrary—viz. pain—*οὐκ ἧττον δ' ᾧετ' εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου* § 2 above) satisfactory either.'

a. 6. οὐ γάρ φασιν, κ.τ.λ.] See notes on vii. 13. 1. Mich. Eph. has the following commentary here—*ὁ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου συνιστῶν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν λόγος τοιοῦτος ἦν· εἰ ἡ λύπη ἐναντία οὖσα τῇ ἡδονῇ κακόν ἐστιν, ἀγαθὸν ἄρα ἡ ἡδονή. πόθεν δέ;—ὅτι ἡ λύπη κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ πάντα φεύγειν αὐτήν. πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου συνιστῶντα τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν, ἐνίσταται ὁ Σπεύσιππος λέγων, οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐπειδὴ κακόν ἐστιν ἡ λύπη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀντικειμένην αὐτῇ ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀντικείμενον κακῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῇ θρασύτητι κακῷ ὄντι, ἡ δειλία, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἡ δειλία, ἀλλὰ κακόν . . . ἀντίκειται οὖν φησὶ Σπεύσιππος καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, τουτέστι καὶ ἀμφότερα τὰ κακὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· μηδέτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν. αἱ γὰρ ἀρεταὶ μεσότητες οὖσαι οὐδέτερον τῶν ἄκρων εἰσί· ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία οὔτε δειλία οὔτε θρασύτης ἐστί . . . καὶ λέγει ταῦτα καλῶς, ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀντίκειται κακὸν κακῷ, καὶ ἀμφότερα τὰ κακὰ τῷ ἀγαθῷ· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν λέγουσι καλῶς· τὸ δ' ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ὡς κακὸν κακῷ ἀντίκειται τῇ λύπῃ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς. οὐ γὰρ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἡδονὴ τῇ λύπῃ ὡς κακὸν κακῷ ἀλλ' ὡς ἀγαθὸν κακῷ· εἰ γὰρ ἦν κακὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ ἦν καὶ φευκτὸν καὶ μισητὸν ὡς ἡ λύπη· νῦν δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην φεύγει πάντα . . . ὡς κακόν, διώκει δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθόν.*

a. 8. ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ] *τῷ μηδετέρῳ* seems to be the reading only of Γ, Mich. Eph., and Ar. All other authorities apparently read *τῷ μηδέτερα* (so $K^b$, $L^b$, $O^b$, $B^1$, $B^3$, CCC, NC, Cambr., Ald.) or *τῷ μηδέτερον* ($M^b$, $B^2$). The reading *τῷ μηδέτερα* is strongly supported by Plato, *Rep.* 583 E *ἢ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι*—words which occur in a context which, I think, Aristotle has in his mind here.

a. 10. ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν ⟨τῶν⟩ κακῶν] Bywater adds *τῶν*—a distinct improvement to the clause. The *ὄντων κακῶν* of $K^b$ (and $B^2$), accepted by Bekker and Susemihl, shows us how the original *τῶν* dropped out.

a. 11. τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως] The construction apparently is *τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ ὄντοιν* (if both pleasure and pain belong to the class of neutral states), *μηδέτερον* (neither of them) *ἔδει φευκτὸν εἶναι, ἢ ὁμοίως, ἑκάτερον φευκτόν*:—or as Coraes puts it—*εἰ ἦσαν*



*ἄμφω κακά, ἥ τε ἡδονὴ καὶ ἡ λύπη, ἐχρῆν καὶ ἄμφω φεύγειν· εἰ δ' ἦσαν* 1173 a. 11. *μηδέτερα, μήτε κακά, δηλονότι, μήτ' ἀγαθά, ἐχρῆν ἢ μηδέτερον φεύγειν, ἢ ὁμοίως ἑκάτερον.* Mich. Eph. gives what seems to me a less satisfactory explanation of *μηδέτερον—τουτέστιν οὔτε φεύγομεν οὔτε διώκομεν*: while *ἢ ὁμοίως* he explains—*ἤτοι ἐπίσης ἢ διώκομεν ἢ φεύγομεν.*

As directed against Speusippus the words before us are pointless. Speusippus did not regard pleasure and pain as *μηδέτερα*, but as *κακά*—'Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dixerunt opposita inter se, bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret'—Aul. Gell. ix. 5. In fact, only the words *ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν ⟨τῶν⟩ κακῶν* are referable to Speusippus. As regards the words *τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως*, one would be tempted to accept the latter of the alternatives offered by Ramsauer—'aut corrigenda, aut secludenda'—were it not possible to point to the discussion in *Rep.* 583 sq. (mentioned above), where *ἡσυχία*, or *τὸ μεταξύ* is spoken of as sometimes 'painful,' sometimes 'pleasant.' It will be seen that Plato's attitude to the supposition *τῶν μηδετέρων δέ* is practically the same as Aristotle's—*Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε, οἶμαι, πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνει γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. Τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία. Καὶ ὅταν παύσηται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται. Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφότερα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή. Ἔοικεν. Ἦ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι; Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἐστόν· ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἡδὺ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοιν ἐφάνη ἄρτι; Ἐφάνη γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις. Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει. Ἰδὲ τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡδονάς, αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰηθῇς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς. Ποῦ δή, ἔφη, καὶ ποίας λέγεις; Πολλαὶ μέν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δ' εἰ θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς. αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσιν. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα καθαρὰν*

1173 a. 11. ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύπης ἀπαλλαγήν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς. Μὴ γάρ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἵ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί, σχεδὸν αἱ πλεῖσταί τε καὶ μέγισται, τούτου τοῦ εἴδους εἰσί, λυπῶν τινὲς ἀπαλλαγαί.

It remains only to note that, for μηδέτερον, $K^b$, r, CCC, Cambr., $B^1$, $B^2$, $B^3$ read ἢ ἕτερον.

a. 13. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται] ὡς τὸ μὲν αἱρετὸν τὸ δὲ φευκτὸν ὄν (Ramsauer). I think that λύπη is the subject of ἀντίκειται: see the Paraph.—ὅθεν φανερὸν ὅτι ὡς κακὸν ἀγαθῷ ἡ λύπη ἡδονῇ ἀντίκειται. $M^b$ gives the easier reading ἀντίκεινται.

## CHAPTER III.

### ARGUMENT.

*The argument that 'Pleasure is not good, because it is not a Quality' proves too much:—virtuous actions are not qualities, nor is Happiness a quality.*

*To those who argue that 'Pleasure is not good, because it is indefinite, and indefinite because it admits of degrees' we answer*—(a) *Perhaps your conclusion relies on the circumstance that* people are pleased *in various degrees: but you cannot infer that there are degrees in Pleasure itself because people are pleased in various degrees, any more than you can infer degrees in* δικαιοσύνη *because* δίκαιος *admits of comparative and superlative degrees*—δικαιότερος, δικαιότατος. (b) *Perhaps you will reply that you look, not at people pleased, but at pleasures themselves, and find that they admit of degrees: then, we answer, it is at the mixed pleasures you look: they indeed admit of degrees; but it is not to the mixed but to the pure pleasures that you ought to go for evidence.* (c) *Finally, if you maintain that even the pure pleasures admit of degrees, we may grant that they do, without allowing your inference that therefore they are indefinite and bad: a thing may admit of degrees* within definite limits—*health,* e. g. *varies, without ceasing to be the definite thing that it is: so may pleasure too.*

*The argument that the good is perfect, or has realised the end, whereas Pleasure is only a Motion or a Process which is imperfect, we meet by pointing out that it is unmeaning to speak of Pleasure, which is neither quick nor slow, as a Motion; or as a Process of generation—for what, it may be asked, is generated out of what by the so-called process, and what is resolved back into what by the reverse process, Pain? To say that 'Pain is the dissolution of that of which Pleasure is the generation' is to use words without meaning. Where, it may be asked, are the elements organised by the so-called 'generation,' and separated by the so-called 'dissolution'?*



*Again, to describe Pleasure as Repletion is to confound Pleasure itself and a bodily process with which certain pleasures are associated—those lower pleasures which are felt when want is being satisfied; for the higher pleasures—those of thinking and some of the bodily pleasures—are not associated with the repletion of want and the relief of pain.*

*To those who bring forward the disgraceful pleasures as evidence against Pleasure in general, we have to point out that it is only to ill-conditioned natures that the objects of these pleasures are 'pleasant': in short, that there are* good *pleasures and* bad *pleasures—those being good which attend good functions, or are raised by good objects, bad, which attend bad functions, or are raised by bad objects.*

*That pleasures differ specifically as their objects differ is, in short, our final answer to those whose arguments we have been examining. It is unmeaning to say 'Pleasure is good,' or 'Pleasure is bad.' Pleasure* in what objects? *we ask. There are objects in which we ought not to take pleasure, and there are objects which we should pursue even if no pleasure were connected with them.*

*We see, then, on the one hand that Pleasure is neither the Chief Good nor all desirable, and on the other hand that some pleasures are desirable.*

§ 1.] See *Cat.* 8. 8 b. 27, where ἕξεις are given as the first and most important kind of ποιότητες. The ἀρεταί, or virtuous ἕξεις, are, it is true, ποιότητες—and, as possessing such ποιότητες, we are ποιοί τινες καὶ ἀγαθοί (*E. N.* i. 9. 8); but there are things which are not ποιότητες, and yet are good. The ἐνέργειαι which spring from ἀρετή are not ποιότητες: *cf. Poet.* 6. 1450 a. 18 καὶ γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστὶν οὐ ποιότης· εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον. To be good, a thing need not be a permanent state (ἕξις), like virtue or health. The act of vision, *e.g.*, is good and perfect within the limits of a moment. So also is the experience of pleasure (see x. 4. 1). The argument which Aristotle here opposes is founded on a very natural feeling—viz. that to be good, and worth having, a thing must endure permanently; especially the conscious life of the individual to be worth having at all, must endure permanently. But Aristotle does not share this feeling. Consciousness, he would tell us, is fully good within the limits of an indivisible moment; its essential goodness is independent of time: let those who maintain that, if the individual consciousness is ever to be extinguished, then it is not worth having at all, look at Nature. Why does Nature produce the individual organisms of plants and animals, and allow them to perish without possibility of revival? Is it not 'good' for these individuals to live while they live, and are their lives less perfect and good, because they are not permanent? 1173 a. 13.

1173 a. 13. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀΐδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου.

It will be observed that the position combated in the present § (x. 3. 1) is really that which the writer of vii. 12. 2 attacks—the simple identification of ἕξις and ἀγαθόν: see note there on τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις 1152 b. 33.

a. 15. § 2. λέγουσι . . . ἧττον] See Plato, *Philebus* 24 E ΣΩ. Νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σημεῖον, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μηκύνωμεν. ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις; ΣΩ. Ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι: see also *Philebus* 31 A νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενὴς καὶ τούτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἕξοντός ποτε γένους.

a. 17. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι] 'If it is from observing *people pleased* that they come to the conclusion that *pleasure* admits of degrees and is therefore not good, they will have, by parity of reasoning, to conclude that *justice* admits of degrees and is therefore not good, because *people are just* in various degrees.' *Cf. Cat.* 8. 10 b. 33 δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ δεῖν λέγεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας· ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειαν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἕτερον ἑτέρου . . . δικαιότερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται. Thus τὸ ἥδεσθαι, 'the being pleased'—for which we may substitute ὁ ἡδόμενος, 'the man who is pleased,' answers to the adjective δίκαιος in the passage quoted from the *Categories*; and as δίκαιος may become δικαιότερος, so ὁ ἡδόμενος may be '*more* pleased'; but as we do not infer from δικαιότερος that δικαιοσύνη itself is indefinite and bad, so we must not infer from ἥδεταί τις μᾶλλον that ἡδονή is indefinite and bad. The Paraph. has ἡ ἐπίτασις καὶ ἡ ἄνεσις ἐν τῷ ἥδεσθαι γίνεται ὅτι ἡδόμενοι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἥδονται· τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς συμβαῖνον φαίνεται· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἀνδρεῖοι . . . ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἀόριστοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ αὐτὴ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀόριστος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἡδομένοις τὴν ἐπίτασιν καὶ τὴν ἄνεσιν ἐπιδέχεται. Similarly Mich. Eph. speaks of the εἶδος or τί ἦν εἶναι of ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, or ἡδονή, as being τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστίν, and as ἀνεπίτατόν τε καὶ ἀνάνετον. The distinction drawn here and in *Cat.* 8. 10 b. 33, between δίκαιος and δικαιοσύνη is now familiar as that between an adjective which admits of 'degrees of comparison,' and an abstract noun which does not.



But this and other distinctions of the kind did not present themselves to Aristotle and his contemporaries as 'grammatical' distinctions. Grammar, as a separate πραγματεία, did not as yet exist. Much that seems out of place, and even frivolous, in Aristotle's discussions of physical and other questions, and especially in his refutations of the views of opponents, is to be explained by this circumstance. Distinctions not clearly recognised as grammatical were thought to be germane to subjects with which we should say at once that they have nothing to do. But although the scientific subjects immediately in hand often derived little benefit from such verbal discussions, language, the instrument of all science, was being perfected by them for future use. One of the most interesting achievements of the Greeks was the abstraction of the Form from the Matter of Speech, as we find it made by Apollonius and his brother-grammarians; and not the least important aspect in which Greek philosophical activity (and notably Aristotle's philosophy) may be regarded is as the process by which the abstraction was gradually effected, and language made an instrument of fine thinking. The services of the schoolmen, too, in this respect must not be ignored. 1173 a. 17.

εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς . . . μικταί] I agree with Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 69) that the correct reading is that of $K^b$, εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς *sc.* τοῦτο κρίνουσι. With κρίνειν either ἐκ or the dat. may be used in cases like this, but not ἐν, which Bekker reads before ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. 'But if they come to the conclusion that pleasure is bad from looking not at people pleased, but at the nature of the various pleasures themselves, I fear that they have not got hold of the right premisses for their purpose, if there be any truth in their own distinction between pure and mixed pleasures'—*i. e.* although the mixed pleasures may be indefinite, the pure pleasures certainly are not: and it is to them, rather than to the mixed pleasures, that we have a right to ask οἱ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς κρίνοντες to go for their premisses. *Cf. Philebus* 52 C, where ἀμετρία is assigned as the characteristic of the mixed, and ἐμμετρία of the pure pleasures. 'Speusippus,' says Grant, ii. p. 319, 'forgetful of this distinction appears to have made ἀμετρία a universal predicate of pleasure.' The μικταὶ ἡδοναί of Plato are the bodily pleasures which involve pain and want, the ἀμιγεῖς or καθαραί the intellectual pleasures and those bodily pleasures which involve neither pain nor want—the a. 22.

1173 a. 22. pleasures of smell, sight, and hearing. Mich. Eph. is, therefore, entirely wrong when he says λέγει δὲ ἀμιγεῖς μὲν ἡδονὰς αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ χωρὶς τινὸς ὑποκειμένου τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἡδονῆς νοούμενον . . . μεμιγμέναι δ' αἱ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ ἐν ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει ἵστανται.

a. 23. § 3. καὶ τί κωλύει, κ.τ.λ.] Bekker's τί γὰρ κωλύει is the reading of $M^b$ alone. $O^b$ has τί γὰρ κωλύεται, but γάρ is not given by any other MS. $K^b$ has καὶ τί κωλύεται, Γ τί δὲ κωλύει, and $L^b$, CCC, Cambr., $B^1$, $B^2$, NC, $P^2$ all have τί κωλύει δέ. The authority therefore for Bekker's γάρ is of the slightest. Γάρ seems to have been substituted for καί or δέ to make the clause explain the erroneous meaning attached to μικταί, which were taken (as by Mich. Eph. quoted at the end of last note) to be αἱ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί, while αἱ ἀμιγεῖς were thought to stand for τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἡδονῆς. But if we read τί δὲ κωλύει (see Rassow, *Forsch.* pp. 69, 70), the clause is seen to contain not an explanation of a. 22 εἰ δὲ . . . a. 23 μικταί, but a new argument against the view τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι. The first part of § 2 argued that the fact that *people are pleased* more and less does not imply that *pleasure itself* admits of more and less, or is indefinite: the second part of § 2 argued that even though the mixed or lower bodily pleasures may themselves admit of more and less and be indefinite, yet the pure pleasures are not indefinite: while the clause beginning τί δὲ κωλύει goes further, and questions the validity of the inference ἀόριστον εἶναι ὅτι δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ [τὸ] ἧττον, and suggests that the εἶδος of even a pure pleasure may display degrees without ceasing to be the εἶδος that it is, or becoming ἀόριστον.

a. 25. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία] These words seem to me to prove that Aristotle is not thinking of the mixed pleasures in this section, as most of the commentators suppose, but of the pure pleasures which involve ἐμμετρία or proportion (*Phil.* 52 C). Aristotle, using for the occasion Platonic language, points out that the definite proportion which constitutes a pure pleasure may be realised and maintained in different ways, just as the balance of health or virtue may be effected by many different arrangements of the elements which are organised. Grant seems to me to be wrong when he says in his note here—'even the mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit the idea of proportion (συμμετρία).'

a. 29. § 4. τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες] Plato, *Philebus* 53 C–54 C: see notes on vii. 12. 3. Aristotle's argument against the view that



pleasure is a κίνησις is—If pleasure is a 'motion,' it must be *quick* 1173 a. 29. or *slow*. Can we speak of pleasure as quick or slow? We may pass into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly; but the pleasure actually felt is not quick or slow: see *Phys.* E. 1. 225 b. 8 for the three kinds of κίνησις—(1) ἡ τοῦ ποιοῦ=ἀλλοίωσις: (2) ἡ τοῦ ποσοῦ=αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις: (3) ἡ κατὰ τόπον=φορά.

καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο] The κόσμος a. 32. is here the universe, as one whole, moving with the πρῶτος οὐρανός, or ἀπλανὴς σφαῖρα, the κυκλοφορία of which is uniform, and therefore cannot be called either quick or slow, when regarded *per se*—καθ' αὑτήν, although πρὸς ἄλλο—compared with the proper motions of the inner planetary spheres—it is quick. With οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου we must understand οὐκ ἔστι τάχος καὶ βραδύτης καθ' αὑτήν. On the motion of the πρῶτος οὐρανός see *de Coelo* ii. 6. 288 a. 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ ὅτι ὁμαλής ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνώμαλος, ἐφεξῆς τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν· λέγω δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς πρώτης φορᾶς: see notes on iii. 3. 3. The comment of Mich. Eph. on the present passage is—ὃ δὲ λέγει ἐστίν· εἰ μὴ πᾶσα κίνησις αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν τὸ θᾶττον ἐπιδέχεται, οἷον ἡ τοῦ κόσμου, λέγων νῦν κόσμον αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπλανῆ σφαῖραν· ἀνεπίδεκτος γάρ ἐστι τάχους καὶ βραδύτητος διὰ τὸ ὁμαλῶς κινεῖσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην σφαῖραν, ὡς ἐν τῷ περὶ οὐρανοῦ δέδεικται· ἀλλ' οὖν πρὸς τὰς τῶν πλανωμένων κινήσεις εἴ τις αὐτὴν παραβάλλοι, εὑρήσει θάττονα πάνυ πολλῷ τῶν κινήσεων ἐκείνων.

τούτων οὐδέτερον] Pleasure has τάχος καὶ βραδύτης neither καθ' a. 33. αὑτήν, nor πρὸς ἄλλο.

ἡσθῆναι] 'to become pleased' = μεταβάλλειν εἰς τὴν ἡδονήν a. 34. 1173 b. 2.

ἥδεσθαι] 'to have the feeling of pleasure'=ἐνεργεῖν κατ' αὐτήν b. 1. b. 3.

§ 5.] In this section Aristotle deals with the view that ἡδονή is b. 4. a γένεσις, in the same way as he has dealt with the view that it is a κίνησις. If it is a γένεσις, he argues, there must be certain definite elements which this particular γένεσις called ἡδονή organises; and the disorganising process, or φθορά, contrary to this γένεσις—which is λύπη according to the Platonists, for they say οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά—will leave these same elements in separation for our inspection. Where are the elements in question?

1173 b. 4. They are not to be found. The term *γένεσις* is used with as little regard for its real meaning as the term *κίνησις* is when applied to that which is neither quick nor slow. It is to be carefully noted, that *καὶ οὐ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά* is the statement of the Platonists. See Grant's note *ad loc.* to which I am much indebted. Mich. Eph. has the following comment on this section—*εἰ οὖν καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἦν, ἦν ἂν ὁδός τις καὶ μεταβολὴ ἔκ τινος εἴς τι, ὡς ἡ μέλανσις ἐκ λευκοῦ εἰς μέλαν . . . οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὸ ἀφ' οὗ οὔτε τὸ εἰς ὅ, οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ οὔτε τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον καὶ γιγνόμενόν τι διὰ ἡδονῆς, οὔτε τέλος τι εἰς ὃ τελευτᾷ ἡ ἡδονή, ὥσπερ ἡ ὑγίανσις εἰς τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ ἡ θέρμανσις εἰς τὸ θερμόν· καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως συμβαίνει, οὐ γάρ ἐστι γένεσις ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια, ὡς δείξει, καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι τέλη εἰσὶν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁδοὶ πρὸς τέλη . . . οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ μόριόν τε τοῦ χρόνου καθ' ὃν ἥδεται ἐν ᾧ οὐ τέλος ἦν ἐν τῷ ἡδομένῳ ἡ ἡδονή. τὸ δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου τέλειόν τι καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὂν οὐ γένεσίς ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἐνέργεια.* See x. 4. 4.

b. 7. § 6.] The following passage in the *Philebus* (31 E–32 B) presents the doctrine criticised in this section, as well as that disposed of in § 5—**ΣΩ.** *Πείνη μέν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;* **ΠΡΩ.** *Ναί.* **ΣΩ.** *Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;* **ΠΡΩ.** *Ναί.* **ΣΩ.** *Δίψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή. διάκρισις δέ γ' αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη; κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἡ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψύξις ἡδονή.* **ΠΡΩ.** *Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.* **ΣΩ.** *Καὶ ῥίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζώου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις λύπη· πάλιν δ' εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.*

b. 11. **οὐ δοκεῖ δέ**] 'but nobody thinks so.' Aristotle speaks here as if Plato differed. Plato is entirely at one with Aristotle in holding *all* pleasure to be psychical.

b. 12. **ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτ' ἄν τις**]—And this was what Plato meant after all. Any one but a very captious critic can see that when Plato says *ἐδωδὴ δὲ πλήρωσις γιγνομένη ἡδονή*, he merely uses an abbreviated expression, as when we say 'work is a pleasure to him,' meaning that work gives him pleasure. Again, when Aristotle says b. 13 *ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν*, he merely states what Plato himself



consistently maintains—that the pleasures which are *ἀναπληρώσεις* or 1173 b. 12.
*ἀπαλλαγαὶ λύπης* are those of eating and drinking; but that they are not the only pleasures—there are pure pleasures which are not associated with pain and want:—a statement which Aristotle makes in § 7 as if it were an original correction of his own necessitated by the onesidedness of the Platonic theory, which he allows his readers to infer took its idea of all pleasure from the *ἀναπλήρωσις* of eating and drinking. All this strikes one as being very disingenuous; unless indeed it be that, not Plato, but Speusippus is criticised, and that Speusippus entirely ignored the 'pure pleasures' of his master—which is unlikely.

**τεμνόμενος**] Spengel conjectures *κενούμενος*, Zeller *δεόμενος*, Bywater *⟨ἐνδεὴς⟩ γινόμενος*. I hardly think that any alteration is necessary. The parallel—'pleasure goes with filling, just as pain goes, *e. g.* with cutting'—seems to me to be satisfactory enough.

§ 7. **αἵ τε μαθηματικαί**] 'the pleasures of knowledge.' That b. 16.
Plato recognised as fully as Aristotle the existence of pleasures which do not arise out of pain is shown by the passage in the *Rep.* (583 sq.) quoted above in note on x. 2. 5, a. 11 *q. v.* The passage in the *Philebus* (51 B) in which the *καθαραὶ ἡδοναί* are described is as explicit as that in the *Rep.* in its doctrine that they are *ἄλυποι—τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας παραδίδωσι.* It will be noticed that Plato still speaks here of certain 'pure pleasures' as *πληρώσεις*: so also in *Rep.* 585 B *οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ' ἂν ὅ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἴσχων*—although the terms in which the pleasures of smell are described in 584 B, *ἐξαιφνῆς ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται*, seem to be inconsistent with the view that they are *gradual πληρώσεις*. The truth is that we must not press the word *πληρώσεις* as applied to 'pure pleasures': the essential part of Plato's theory of the 'pure pleasures' is not affected by the retention of the word.

§ 8.] *Cf.* vii. 11. 5. b. 20.

§ 9. **ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἄν**] This is Bywater's correction for b. 25.
Bekker's *ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἄν.*

**αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων**] 'The pleasures b. 26.

1173 b. 26. in question are in themselves choiceworthy, although not when viewed with reference to the source from which they are derived,' Williams: *i. e.* as *pleasures* they are desirable, but not as *disgraceful*—or, as he puts it more clearly in the next section, there are *good* and *bad* pleasures.

b. 28. § 10. ἢ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί] 'pleasures differ specifically.' This is the best expression of Aristotle's answer to τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν: and in support of the doctrine thus expressed he points out (§ 10) that different classes of persons have their own pleasures which others cannot enter into: that (§ 11) the pleasure which the Flatterer aims at giving to his Patron is a very different sort from that which sweetens the intercourse of virtuous Friends; and (§ 12) that when we become men we put away childish pleasures as unworthy of us. To these considerations is added the remark (§ 12) that indeed there are many pleasures which we consider it to be our duty to avoid, and do avoid; for, after all, we are more independent of pleasure than might, on a superficial view, be supposed—there are many actions and functions performed by us independently of the pleasure attending them. This last remark I do not regard as made with the special object (as some commentators suppose) of showing that pleasure is not the *Summum Bonum*, but as flowing naturally from what the writer has just said about the power we have of detaching ourselves from certain pleasures. Our power of detaching ourselves from these particular pleasures is, of course, a special case of the law of our nature, that function is primary and pleasure only attendant.

b. 32. § 11. ὁ φίλος] as described in viii. 3. §§ 6, 7.

1174 a. 3. § 12. ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα] CCC, NC, and Cambr. read ὡς οἴονται μάλιστα, an obvious blunder (although Zell tries to make sense out of it: 'significat opinari quidem pueros maximis se gaudiis perfrui, sed decipi in hoc') which occurs elsewhere—*e.g.* in *E. N.* i. 9. 5 $K^b$ reads οἴονται, in iii. 3. 13 $M^b$ reads οἴονται, in iii. 5. 17 $K^b$ and CCC read οἰόνται, and in iv. 2. 11 $K^b$, CCC, and Cambr. read οἷόν τε.

a. 8. § 13. ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . a. 11 ὦν] bracketed by Ramsauer, who thinks that hitherto Aristotle has argued rather in favour of, than against, the view of Eudoxus which makes pleasure the *Summum Bonum*, and that if, in §§ 11 and 12, he seems to argue against the view, he merely goes the length of pointing out that not only are some pleasures not good, but some good things are not pleasures. Susemihl follows Ramsauer in bracketing the words before us. I see no sufficient reason for suspecting them. The distinction drawn at the end of § 12 between vital functions and their attendant pleasures is exactly that of which so much is made later on (see x. 5. 7), and which enables Aristotle to distinguish between εὐδαιμονία, or the Chief Good, and even the highest experience of ἡδονή. Accordingly the abrupt ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονή seems to me to be in favour of the genuineness of the clause. The remark § 12, a. 4 περὶ πολλά τε σπουδήν . . . . a. 8 ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή, though, as I believe, directly suggested by the terms in which the reasons for supposing ὅτι εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί have been stated, is, as soon as made, recognised by the writer as having a bearing on the other question (only incidentally, and as yet insufficiently answered in x. 2. 3), whether ἡδονή is the *Summum Bonum*. Hence οὔτε τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονή escapes him, although certainly no sufficient proof of it has as yet been brought forward. In a. 9 τἀγαθόν which the sense demands is given by $L^b$ and Γ: other authorities (including the Paraph.) read ἀγαθόν.



1174 a. 8.

## CHAPTER IV.

### ARGUMENT.

*Now let us start again from the beginning, and try thus to make the true nature of Pleasure plainer.*

*Pleasure is like Seeing—something indivisible, and perfectly realised at any moment you take it: therefore it is not Motion, for Motion* (e. g. *that of building*) *is always in time, and towards an end, and perfect, not in its parts* (e. g. *not in the processes of fitting the blocks, and fluting the columns—these 'parts' traverse different ground, and thus differ specifically from one another and from the whole Motion to which they belong*), *or at any moment, but—if to be called 'perfect' at all—only in respect of its whole duration,* i. e. *only conceived as a process which has at last 'come to its end' in attaining the object* (e. g. *the completed temple*) *for which it started. Of Pleasure, on the contrary, the*

*specific form, or nature, is perfect at any moment you take it—a finished indivisible whole, like seeing, or the mathematical point, of which we cannot say 'it moves towards, or grows up to, the perfection of its nature.'*

*Every faculty of sense and understanding puts forth its function in relation to an object; perfectly, when, its condition being perfect, it meets with a perfect object; and, if perfectly, then with the fullest pleasure. Every function of sense and understanding has its own pleasure. This pleasure perfects the function—not, however, as organ and object, by their excellence, 'perfect' it—they 'perfect' it as the doctor 'causes' the patient's health; but pleasure 'perfects' function, as the principle of health 'causes' the patient's health. If object and faculty be perfect of their kind, and perfectly suited to each other, there will always be pleasure in the function; the pleasure 'perfecting' the function, not as the faculty does by its permanent subsistence, but as a sort of supervening end, like the bloom of youthful prime.*

*As long as perfect faculty is perfectly related to perfect object, there will be pleasure in the function. But man's nature is weak. He cannot keep up this perfect relation continuously: function flags, and with it pleasure is dulled.*

*It may be thought, that the reason why all strive after pleasure is that all seek life—the performance of function, which, as we have seen, is perfected by pleasure. We will not at present go into the question whether it is for the sake of Pleasure that we seek Life, or for the sake of Life that we seek Pleasure: enough has been said to show that the two are so bound up together that they cannot be separated: without function there is no pleasure; and every function is perfected by its pleasure.*

1174 a. 13. **§ 1. τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποιόν τι**] not the same as *τί ἐστι καὶ ποιόν τι*: see note on i. 7. 19, a. 31.

a. 14. **δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις . . .** a. 19 **εἶδος**] Ὅρασις is an *ἐνέργεια* as distinguished from a *κίνησις*; see *Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 b. 18 sqq. and Bonitz's important note, p. 396. Ἐνέργεια, strictly so called, is action or function which contains in itself the end for the sake of which it is performed, and does not, like *κίνησις*, cease to be when its end has been attained. In the case of a *κίνησις* such as *οἰκοδόμησις*, which has an external end, *viz. οἰκία*, and ceases when that end is attained, we cannot say *ἅμα οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν*, as we can say *ὁρᾷ καὶ ἑώρακεν ἅμα* in the case of *ὅρασις*, which is an *ἐνέργεια* strictly so called. A *κίνησις* is *ἐνέργεια μέν τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι* (*de An.* ii. 5, 417 a. 16), whereas in an *ἐνέργεια* strictly so called *ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος* (*Met.* Θ. 6. 1048 b. 22). Such an *ἐνέργεια* is perfect (*τελεία*), or realises its end (*τέλος*) at every moment of its duration—*καθ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία ἐστί* (*E. N.* x. 4. 1): *cf. Soph. El.* 22, 178 a. 9 *ἆρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; οὔ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁρᾶν γέ τι ἅμα καὶ ἑωρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται.* The passage (*Met.*



Θ. 6. 1048 b) referred to at the beginning of this note runs in part 1174 a. 14. as follows, according to the emended version given by Bonitz, p. 397 . . . *ὁρᾷ ἅμα καὶ ἑώρακε, καὶ φρονεῖ καὶ πεφρόνηκε, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν, ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ' ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται. εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα* (*i. e. εὖ ζῆν* is perfect in itself: its 'present tense' is a 'perfect tense') *καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ· νῦν δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὴ δεῖ τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία, μάθησις, βάδισις, οἰκοδόμησις. αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε· οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖ τε καὶ κεκίνηκεν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.* *Cf.* also *Met.* Θ. 8. 1059 a. 23–1050 b. 2.

**τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή**] *i. e.* ἡδονή is *like ἐνέργεια* as described a. 16. in *Met.* Θ. 6. That he does not *identify* it, however, with *ἐνέργεια* is plain from the explicit statement in ch. 5, § 7. Mich. Eph. has the following comment here—*ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ νῦν τὸ ὁρᾶν τέλειόν ἐστι καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑφεστώς· εἰ γὰρ ἐν χρόνῳ τινὶ τόδε τι ὁρῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μερῶν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀτόμῳ νῦν παντελῶς βλέπομεν, καὶ οὐ δέχεταί τι ἡ ὅρασις ὃ οὐκ εἶχεν ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ νῦν ἐν τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα νῦν· ὅλη γὰρ ἅμα πάρεστι, καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς οὐκ ἀτελές· ὡς οὖν ἡ ὅρασις οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἡδονὴ οἷον σωρεία τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ σύνθεσιν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν· οὐδὲ μενούσης τῆς προτέρας ἡ δευτέρα ἐπιγίνεται, καὶ μετ' αὐτὴν ἡ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ τά τε προηγούμενα καὶ ἑπόμενα μέρη πάρεστιν αὐτῇ ἅμα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκβαλλομένης εὐθείας, μενόντων τῶν προτέρων μερῶν, ἐφίσταται τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ οὕτω τελειοῦται ἡ γραμμή· ἀλλ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς νῦν παντέλειός ἐστι, καὶ οἵα ἦν ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ τοιαύτη καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ ἐν τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς νῦν.*

**§ 2. καὶ τέλους τινός**] 'for the sake of some end,' *sc.* external to a. 20. itself.

**οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται**] This is Bywater's correction of Bekker's *οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται*, and, I think, a great improvement. The *καί* before *τελεία* seems to exist only in $K^b$. For *οἰκοδομική* Ramsauer conjectures *οἰκοδόμησις*. This is plausible; *cf. Met.* Θ. 6, quoted in note on x. 4. 1 a. 14, where we find *ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις*.

1174 a. 20. $M^b$ has *οἰκοδομή*—a late form meaning the same thing as *οἰκοδόμησις* or *οἰκοδομία*. The Paraph., in explaining the present passage, uses *οἰκοδομία* and *οἰκοδόμησις*, but not *οἰκοδομική*. I think that *οἰκοδομική* (= the *art* of building) is not quite in place here, where we are to think of the *process* of building. Perhaps the *οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία* of the MSS. is a corruption of *οἰκοδομία, καὶ τελεία*.

a. 21. **ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ**] So Bekker, Susemihl, and Bywater, the meaning being—'it (*i. e.* motion) is perfect, then, viewed either in the whole time of its duration, or at the moment when it reaches its end.' This meaning is quite satisfactory; but I am not at all sure that the text on which it relies is sound. $L^b$, $M^b$, and $B^3$ have *ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ*. Instead of the second *ἤ* of Bekker's text, $O^b$ and Paris. 1417 have *δή*, which they omit after *ἅπαντι*. This misplaced *δή* was perhaps the origin of the second *ἤ*. This supposition seems to be supported by $K^b$, Cambr., and $B^2$, which, omitting *δή* with $O^b$ and Paris. 1417 after *ἅπαντι*, read *ἤ* not *δή* before *τούτῳ*. Of recorded MSS. only CCC, NC, and $B^1$ have *both* *δή* (after *ἅπαντι*) *and* Bekker's second *ἤ*. The MS. authority for *ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ* is thus decidedly weak. The reading of $L^b$, $M^b$, and $B^3$—*ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ*—accepted by Michelet, requires us to explain *ἤ* as = *ἤτοι*: 'motion is perfect when it has effected its end—*that is*, it is perfect in respect of the whole time needed for effecting its end,' —*τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ* being, as Michelet explains, equivalent to *τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦ ποιῆσαι* or *οἰκοδομῆσαι*.

a. 22. **καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ**] introduced into the text by Bywater from $K^b$ instead of the *τοῦ χρόνου* of the other MSS. It seems to me that we must either retain *τοῦ χρόνου*, or accept Bywater's 'fort. *τῷ χρόνῳ* secludendum.' I hardly think that one can go the length of saying with Bywater (*Contrib.* p. 67)—'The vulgate reading *ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου* may be dismissed at once as implying an erroneous view as to the sense of *μέρεσι*, which stands for the various parts of the *work*, as is shown by the explanation which follows, *ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις . .*' Notwithstanding the 'explanation,' I think that the context, with its contrast between *ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ* and *ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ*, allows us to retain (if otherwise desirable) the vulgate *ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου*.

**πᾶσαι**] *sc.* *αἱ κινήσεις*.



**ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις**] 'the fitting together of the stones' after they have been hewn; not, as Grant says, 'the collection of the stones.' I believe that here *ἡ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις* means the fitting together of the separate drums composing one column. 1174 a. 23.

**ῥαβδώσεως**] Coraes' note here is '*ῥάβδωσις κίονός ἐστιν ἡ τῇ τῶν Γάλλων φωνῇ cannelure* (*i. e.* fluting) *λεγομένη, καὶ ῥαβδωτὸς κίων ἡ colonne cannelée.*' What does Mich. Eph. mean by saying here—*ῥάβδωσιν δὲ κίονος λέγει τὴν κατὰ μῆκος τοῦ κίονος πῆξιν ἡ γίγνεται ὅταν πρὸς ὀρθὰς γωνίας ἵσταται?* See *Facciolati* and *Forcellini* s. v. *stria* =*πτύξ*=*ῥάβδωσις*. Hesych. has *πτύξις*=the act of making a *πτύξ* or fold. Is the *πῆξιν* of Mich. Eph. a corruption of *πτύξιν*? a. 24.

**τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως**] I think that Stahr is wrong in translating —'die Herstellung der Tempelcella.' *Ναός* is indeed sometimes used technically for the cella, or inner part of the *ἱερόν*—as perhaps by the Schol. (cod. H) on Thuc. iv. 90 *ἱερὸν ναοῦ διαφέρει· ἱερὸν μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ προσιερωμένος τόπος τῷ θεῷ· νεὼς δὲ ἔνθα ἵδρυται αὐτὸ τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦ θεοῦ*. But here since the *ποίησις τοῦ ναοῦ* is contrasted, as *τελεία*, with the *ποίησις τοῦ μέρους*, *οἷον τῆς κρηπῖδος*, which is *ἀτελής*, it is necessary to understand by *ναός* the *whole temple*: so the Paraph.—*τῆς γὰρ ὅλης ποιήσεως, φέρε εἰπεῖν, τοῦ ναοῦ ἑτέρα ἡ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις κ.τ.λ.*

**ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία**] At the last moment of the whole *ποίησις* there exists a perfect product, which has just burst into existence as a perfect product; the last touch has been given which makes the *ποίησις* the *ἐσχάτη ὕλη* of the resultant *μορφή*—and, except as logically distinguished, identical with that *μορφή*, or *εἶδος*—see *Met.* H. 6. 1045 b. 18. The words *καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ ποίησις τελεία* are thus equivalent to *καὶ ἡ μὲν ὅλη ποίησις τελεία—τουτέστιν ὅταν ποιήσῃ τὸν νεών*: 'when the temple is made, the process of building has realised its end; the plan requires nothing more: but the processes of constructing the foundations, and carving the triglyphs, do not realise the end of the work.' a. 25.

**κρηπῖδος**] 'the foundation'—lit. 'the boot.' a. 26.

**τριγλύφου**] 'the triglyphs' (in the Doric temple)—tablets divided into vertical flat bands by grooves—were placed above the architrave at equal intervals (one over every column, and one between) along the frieze. They probably represent the ends of beams in the old wooden temples. The spaces between them were originally open

1174 a. 26. (ὀπαί, hence the term μετόπη), but afterwards filled in and ornamented with sculptures.

a. 27. ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ] 'at any moment' (Peters).

a. 28. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι] 'In the whole time of its duration.' I agree with Grant that these words are against reading ἢ τούτῳ in a. 21.

a. 30. § 3. ἡ φορά] See *Phys.* vii. 2. 243 a. 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς εἰσὶ κινήσεις ἥ τε κατὰ τόπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποσόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ κινούμενα τρία εἶναι· ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόπον φορά, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἀλλοίωσις, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις.

a. 32. τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ τὸ αὐτό] 'the whence—whither,' *i. e.* 'space traversed,' is not the same: and sometimes, of course, κινήσεις will differ as taking place in opposite directions over the same space.

a. 34. γραμμήν] Ramsauer appositely quotes Eurip. *El.* 953—

ὧδέ τις κακοῦργος ὢν
μή μοι, τὸ πρῶτον βῆμ' ἐὰν δράμῃ καλῶς,
νικᾶν δοκείτω τὴν δίκην, πρὶν ἂν πέλας
γραμμῆς ἵκηται καὶ τέλος κάμψῃ βίου.

b. 3. ἐν ἄλλοις] in the *Physics*.

ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς] 'motion is not perfect at any time you take it (ἐν ἅπαντι = ἐν ὁτῳοῦν), but the many motions into which a given motion may be resolved (*e.g.* the whole motion from starting-point to goal in the course may be resolved into the motion over the first hundred yards, the motion over the second hundred yards, and so on) are imperfect, and differ specifically, since different spaces traversed, or different directions over the same space, make the motions traversing them, or it, specifically different.' So the Paraph.—τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀκριβεῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγους ἐν ἄλλοις ἐποιησάμεθα. Τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτι οὐκ ἐν παντὶ χρόνῳ τελεία ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. Αἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου χρόνου κινήσεις, ἀτελεῖς εἰσί, καὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων τῷ εἴδει. This interpretation seems to me to be that required by the context, in which 'a whole motion' and the 'parts' into which it may be resolved have been distinguished. I take it that the clause b. 5 εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν can be explained only in connexion with a. 32 τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ τὸ αὐτό



κ.τ.λ., where the specifically distinct motions are the 'parts' of a 'whole motion.' Another interpretation is given by Mich. Eph., who takes αἱ πολλαί to mean 'most motions,' *i. e.* all motions except circular motion, which alone is 'perfect.' He says—τὸ πολλαί πρόσκειται διὰ τὰς κυκλοφορίας· αὗται γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀεὶ ἐν τέλει, καὶ εἴρηται πῶς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς περὶ οὐρανοῦ πραγματείας. Ramsauer, adopting this interpretation, conjectures b. 3 οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ (NC and Paris. 1853 support this conjecture so far as οὐδ' is concerned), and explains by reference to *Phys.* Θ. 8. 264 b. 27—'hoc quidem ὅτι αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν κινήσεων s. φορῶν οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τέλειαι per Physicorum auctoritatem stat ("ἔοικε"): v. Θ. 8. ἡ δὲ τοῦ κύκλου συνάπτει καὶ ἔστι μόνη τέλειος 264 b. 27 s.; cujus rei causa est quod reliquae, quum in infinitum abire nequeant, necessario aliquando sistantur et interpositâ quiete de novo incipiantur (ἵστανται, ἀνακάμπτουσιν).' I think it is very unlikely that, if Aristotle had wished to say that all motions, except κυκλοφορία, are ἀτελεῖς, he would have begun with the general statement that '*motion* (κίνησις—not Ramsauer's αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν κινήσεων) is not perfect even (οὐδ') in the whole time of its continuance.' Of course if Aristotle had written the αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν κινήσεων οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τέλειαι of Ramsauer's note, I should have had nothing to say. 1174 b. 3.

§ 4. ἕτεραι] ἡδονή and κίνησις. b. 6.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ] This is another argument to show that ἡδονή is ὅλον τι, and therefore not κίνησις. b. 8.

τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι] Mich. Eph. has—χρόνου τὸ ἄτομον εἶπε νῦν. δέδεικται δ' ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ βιβλίῳ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀμερεῖ καὶ ἀτόμῳ νῦν οὔτε κινεῖσθαί τι οὔτε ἠρεμεῖν δύναται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι ἢ φθείρεσθαι. See *Phys.* vi. 3. 233 b. 33 sq. b. 9.

τὴν ἡδονήν] so Bekker and Bywater with the codd. Susemihl, following Ramsauer's conjecture, reads τῆς ἡδονῆς. This reading, I think, has much in its favour. The καί (b. 9) before ὅτι seems to introduce a new point (the words b. 6 δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων mean οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονὴ κίνησις: he now adds ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἔστι κίνησις), and the words b. 13 οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς seem to give the conclusion of the argument establishing the new point. b. 10.

In b. 13 the reading οὐδενός (cod. Turnebi) for οὐθέν is plainly a

1174 b. 10. blunder: *οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδενὸς κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις* would merely repeat what has just been said.

**οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται**] *ταῦτα* are *κίνησις* and *γένεσις*.

b. 14. **§ 5. Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης κ.τ.λ.**] The apodosis of this sentence begins b. 18 with *καθ' ἑκάστην δή* (Bekker and Susemihl read *καθ' ἕκαστον δέ*; Bywater restores *ἑκάστην* from $M^b$ and Alex.—see Bywater's *Contrib.*, p. 68, and reads *δή* with Lambinus and Rassow—see *Forsch.* p. 102). After *αἴσθησιν* b. 16, Γ, $L^b$, $O^b$, Ald., $B^1$, $B^2$, CCC, NC, and Cambr. read *κειμένων*. Of recorded authorities only $K^b$, $M^b$, and apparently Alexander Aphrod. (who quotes this passage *ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις* iv. 14. p. 258 sq. Spengel) omit *κειμένων*.

The doctrine of this section is shortly, that pleasure attends functions which are in correspondence with environment; and that functions which maintain the most perfect correspondence with the best environment open to the organism are the most perfectly pleasant. For J. S. Mill's estimate of this doctrine (*Examination of Sir. W. Hamilton's Philosophy:* ch. 25), see note on vii. 12. 3, a. 15.

b. 17. **ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί**] *τὸ ζῷον* (Mich. Eph.).

b. 23. **§ 6.**] Pleasure perfects function; but not as the object and faculty of sense (*τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις*), if good, 'perfect' it. The difference between these two modes of 'perfecting' function is like that between the ways in which health is 'caused'—by a healthy constitution, and the doctor respectively. A healthy constitution (*i. e.* the principle of health within a man) is the 'formal cause,' and the doctor is the 'efficient cause' of health. It is by operating as a formal principle, then, that pleasure 'perfects' function; whereas the object and faculty of sensation 'perfect' it by their efficient operation. According to the doctrine of *de An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 25 the sensible object, as actually perceived, is identical with the actual perception exerted by the faculty of sense—the two are only different aspects of the same thing: *ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς*. The *αἰσθητόν per se* is *δυνάμει ὄν*, and the *αἴσθησις* (or *αἰσθητικόν*) *per se* is likewise *δυνάμει ὄν*: they are two *relata* which have no actual existence, or *ἐνέργεια*, apart from each other: 'environment' has no meaning except in relation to 'organ,' and



'organ' has no meaning except in relation to 'environment.' The reality of the two is 'correspondence' or 'function.' *Τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις*, then, 'perfect' *ἐνέργεια* in the sense of 'effecting' it. It is the outcome of the joint efficiency of these two *δυνάμεις*. But pleasure does not 'perfect' *ἐνέργεια* in the sense of 'effecting,' or producing it. Pleasure is that without which the form of *ἐνέργεια* produced, would not be *perfect*. It is the 'formal perfection' of *ἐνέργεια*—a perfection, however, which in § 8 is described as supervening (*ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος* b. 33): which means that it is not the immanent *τέλος*, or ultimate *raison d'être* of the *ἐνέργεια*—that lies deeper—but a sort of beauty (*ὥρα* b. 33) which reveals *ἐνέργεια* to sense, and may indeed easily be mistaken for the reality of *ἐνέργεια* itself (§§ 10, 11, and ch. 5, §§ 6, 7); for the illusion of sense—'Beauty is its own excuse for being'—is always powerful within us. 1174 b. 23.

Mich. Eph. has an instructive comment on this section, which he understands as I have explained it above—except that he falls into the error (I think) of making the construction—*οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή, καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις*: after remarking that *τὸ αἰσθητόν* 'perfects' the *αἴσθησις* (or *αἰσθητικόν*) *ὡς ἄγον αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, καὶ ποιοῦν αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαν*, and referring to *de An.* iii. 2. 425 b. 25, he goes on to draw the parallels *αἰσθητόν—ἰατρός* (both external to *τὸ ἐνεργοῦν*), and *ἡδονή—ὑγίεια* (both in *τὸ ἐνεργοῦν*)—*καὶ ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐκτός αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου καὶ ἐνεργοῦντος, καὶ πρότερον τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῆς ἐκτός, οὐδὲ πρότερον ταύτης, ἀλλ' ἅμα τέ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι· καὶ χωρισθῆναι τῆς ἐνεργείας ἐφ' ᾗ ἐστὶν οὐ δύναται, τελειοῦν δὲ λέγεται τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ ὡς συναύξουσα . . . ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἰατρός φησι καὶ ἡ ὑγεία· αἴτιον τοῦ ὑγειαίνειν τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς ἐκτός ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος· καὶ πρότερος ὁ ἰατρός· ὅτε γὰρ ἐνόσει ὁ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὑγιασθείς, ἰατρὸς μὲν ἦν ὁ ἰασάμενος τὸν νοσοῦντα, ὁ δὲ ὑγιασθεὶς ὑγιὴς οὐκ ἦν· ἡ δὲ ὑγεία οὐκ ἐκτός ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνοντος, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ὡς μέρος ἢ ἕξις· ἐν γὰρ τῇ συμμετρίᾳ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ χυμῶν ἡ ὑγεία καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἐστί, καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῇ ἀχωρίστως ἡ ὑγεία, ἕως ἂν ὑγιαίνῃ· οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ συνυπάρχει τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐφ' ᾗ γίνεται . . . τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν τελειοῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὡς ἐκκαλούμενον καὶ ἄγον αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ἐκτὸς ὂν καὶ πρότερον τῆς ἐνεργείας . . . ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὡς συναύξουσά τε καὶ συντηροῦσα καὶ μένειν οἱονεὶ ἀναπείθουσα.*

The Paraphrast falls into the strange error of making the doctor,

1174 b. 23. or efficient cause (§ 6), answer to pleasure in the comparison, thus ignoring the point on which Aristotle's whole theory hinges—that pleasure is a sort of immanent final (or formal) cause—something, at any rate, which can only with difficulty be distinguished from the final cause of the *ἐνέργεια*, and indeed was identified with the *ἐνέργεια* at its best by the writer of Book vii. The Paraphrast's words are—*καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτιά εἰσι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνέργειαν, ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ ζητεῖ. Ἔτι δὲ οὐδ' ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τελειοῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἢ τὸ διανοητὸν τὴν διάνοιαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτῶν. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἕξις, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ προάγουσι τὴν ἐνεργείαν· ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ γενομένῃ συμπεφυκυῖα συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει. Πείθει γὰρ ἐνεργεῖν ἡ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδονή.* According to this, *ἡδονή* is 'called in,' like a doctor, by *ἐνέργεια*. Peters seems to understand the relation between *ἡδονή* and *ἐνέργεια* in the same way, for in a note on p. 329 he says—'the only analogy between pleasure and the doctor is that both "complete the activity" from outside,'—but see *E. N.* i. 8. 12 *οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ*—a statement which the theories of Book x and Book vii merely expand and develop. The reason why the Paraph. falls into the error noticed is that he does not see that the words b. 25 *ὥσπερ . . .* b. 26 *ὑγιαίνειν* are merely parenthetical, giving *ὑγίεια* and *ἰατρός* as familiar instances of a formal and an efficient cause respectively. It so happens that *ὑγίεια* is a *ἕξις*; and, as in § 8 *ἡδονή* is said not to 'perfect' *ἐνέργεια* as *ἕξις* does, the conclusion is drawn by the Paraph. here that it must do so as the *ἰατρός* does! But it is *τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις* (parallel to the *ἰατρός*) of § 6 to which the *ἕξις* of § 8 corresponds; while *ἡδονή*, which in § 6 is parallel to *ὑγίεια*, is described in § 8 as *ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.*

b. 26. § 7.] This section (Susemihl is wrong in saying that it is omitted by the Paraph.—see his *καὶ μάλιστα* p. 216. 34 Heylbut) is bracketed by Zell, Ramsauer, and Susemihl, because it repeats what has already been said in § 5. It may be noted that there is another repetition of the same in the latter part of § 8, b. 33 *ἕως ἄν . . .* 1175 a. 3 *γίνεσθαι*. Are the passages § 6, b. 23 *οὐ τὸν αὐτόν . . .* § 7, b. 31 *πεισομένου* and § 8, b. 31 *τελειοῖ . . .* a. 3 *γίνεσθαι* 'duplicates?'



§ 8. **οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα**] 'Pleasure perfects its function, not as a habit does by subsisting in the agent, but as a supervening end.' Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 70) and Susemihl omit *ἡ* with $L^b$, $M^b$. I think that *ἡ* is necessary. We are to think of a given *ἐνέργεια* in connexion with *its own* parent *ἕξις*, as we are to think of it in connexion with its own (*οἰκεία*) *ἡδονή*. A formed habit, subsisting permanently in the agent, 'perfects' the *ἐνέργεια* which proceeds from it, in the sense of easily 'effecting' it (see note on x. 4. 6), or constantly realising itself in it: *cf.* iii. 7. 6 *τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*. Thus, the *ἕξις* of the *ἀνδρεῖος* realises itself in certain *ἐνέργειαι*—*τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν*—which it tends to produce as perfect (*τέλεια*) as may be, *i. e.* as well fitted as may be to take their place in the permanent system of things in relation to which all virtuous *ἕξεις* are formed. *Ἐνέργειαι* externally indistinguishable from *τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν*, but not proceeding from the *ἕξις*, are *ἀτελῆ*—in the sense of failing to fit into that permanent system of *καλαὶ πράξεις* in relation to which all virtuous *ἕξεις* are formed. *Ἕξις*, then, is the *organic source* from which *ἐνέργεια* springs; and the 'perfection' which it confers on *ἐνέργεια* is that of permanence and fitness for a permanent system. But *ἡδονή* is not the organic source of *ἐνέργεια*; it is rather a sort of *end*—the beauty of *ἐνέργεια* itself, when once it has 'risen up into the borders of light.' As such, it sustains and strengthens *ἐνέργεια* (see x. 5. 2)—in some such way as the *πρῶτον κινοῦν* moves the universe—not mechanically, but by the attraction of beauty (*Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 3 *κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον*). As was remarked on vii. 12. 3, a. 15, Aristotle's theory does not profess to tell us what *ἡδονή* is as a psychological or physiological phenomenon, but what it does. It is a theory with a directly practical aim. 1174 b. 32.

**οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα**] *sc.* *ἐπιγίνεται*. b. 33.

**τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν**] *τὸ κρῖνον* answers to *τὸ αἰσθητόν* (*αἴσθησις* is *κριτική*: see note on ii. 9. 8 *ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις*), and *θεωροῦν* to *νοητόν*. b. 34.

**ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων**] see note on vi. 1. 5, a. 8 *πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα κ.τ.λ.* 1175 a. 1.

**καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων**] This means that, if the relation between such corresponding (*ὅμοια*) faculties and objects

1175 a. 1. experienced as pleasant, remains unchanged, it will continue to be experienced as pleasant.

a. 3. **§ 9. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται;**] Why then does the relation not remain unchanged? Why is it that no man experiences pleasure continually?

a. 4. **ἢ κάμνει;**] 'Is it not that man grows weary?' Grant quotes appositely *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 b. 22 *διὸ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κάμνει ταῦτο δρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἡ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις οὖσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου.* See notes on vii. 14. 8.

a. 5. **οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή**] Ramsauer reads in the text after *ἡδονή* the *συνεχής* required by the sense. The Paraph. has here *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πῶς οὐδεὶς οὕτως ἐνεργῶν συνεχῶς ἥδεται. Πρὸς ὃ ῥητέον, ὅτι κάμνει πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπεια, καὶ οὐ δύναται συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ ἥδεσθαι δύναται συνεχῶς, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ*—as if he read in the text:—*πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει πάντα τὰ ἀνθρώπεια καὶ ἀδυνατεῖ* (or *οὐ δύναται*) *συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν; οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡ ἡδονὴ συνεχής· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ.* NC omits *γάρ* after *πάντα* a. 4, and reads *καὶ οὐ δυνατεῖ* (sic). Paris. 1853 has *καὶ ἀδυνατεῖ*. I think that some such reconstruction of the text as that suggested by the Paraphrast's version is necessary.

**ἕπεται**] see notes on vii. 9. 6, b. 34 and ix. 7. 6, a. 21.

a. 7. **διὰ ταὐτό**] $K^b$, $O^b$—*i.e. διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς ἀδυνατεῖν συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.* Other authorities have *διὰ ταῦτα* or (NC and Paris. 1853) *ταῦτα* alone.

**παρακέκληται**] v. l. *παρακέκλιται.*

a. 9. **μετέπειτα δ' οὐ**] After *οὐ* CCC, NC, Cambr., and other authorities (see Susemihl and Bywater) read *γίνεται.*

a. 16. **§ 10. καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή**] Bekker, following the codd., has *δέ.* Susemihl and Bywater, following Aretinus, read *δή.*

**εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται**] 'All seek after pleasure'—this is only what we might expect from the intimate association of



pleasure with life: it does not prove the position of Eudoxus that 1175 a. 16.
'pleasure is the chief good.'

**§ 11. ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι**] Of course there can be no doubt a. 19.
about the answer. As a biologist, Aristotle would tell us that function is the end, not the pleasure of function. At the bottom of the series of *ἔμψυχα* we see plants performing function without the inducement of pleasure; and at the top of the series we see the *ἀνδρεῖος* doing a last act of duty which involves the renunciation of all that is dear to sense. Mich. Eph. has an interesting comment here—*εἰ μὲν ἦν ἡ ἡδονὴ τέλος τῆς ἐνεργείας ὡς ἡ οἰκία τῆς οἰκοδομήσεως καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ὑγιάνσεως . . . ἦν ἂν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ ζῆν χάριν τῆς ἡδονῆς . . . ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἔστι τέλος, ἀλλ' οἷον τέλος, ὡς εἴρηται, οὐκ ἂν εἴημεν αἱρούμενοι τὸ ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ταύτην διὰ τὸ ζῆν.* He goes on to argue that *ἡδονή* is not the end, but *ἐνέργεια,* because there are virtuous actions which we choose to perform, although they are not pleasant, but painful—*ὅτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ἡδονὴν διὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὸ ζῆν διώκομεν ἐκ τῶνδε μᾶλλον ἄν τις πιστεύσειε· καὶ πρῶτον ἐκ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν αὗται, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα σπουδάζονται· πολλὰς γὰρ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν αἱρούμεθα καίτοι λύπης καὶ πόνων αἰτίας οὔσας, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐνεργειῶν· καίτοι ἔδει ταύτας μισεῖν καὶ φεύγειν εἰ τὰς ἐνεργείας χάριν τῆς ἡδονῆς αἱρούμεθα· καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν μετὰ σπουδῆς ἐνεργεῖν ᾗ ἕπεται ἡδονή· ἀλλὰ τίς ἂν εἰ μὴ μαίνοιτο, πράττειν ἂν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἀνάσχοιτο, οἷς ἕπονται τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ αἰσχρότητες; . . . . ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς ἡδονὰς αἱρούμεθα διὰ τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας.*

## CHAPTER V.

### ARGUMENT.

*Since each function has its own pleasure which perfects and augments it, and since functions differ specifically—*e. g. *thinking, seeing, hearing, differ, as functions, specifically—it follows that Pleasures also differ specifically.*

*That this is so is plain, not only from the fact that its own pleasure perfects and augments a function—*e. g. *pleasure in working out geometrical problems makes one work them out better—but also from the fact that one function is impeded by the presence of the pleasure which belongs to another function—*e. g.

*a person who is fond of music cannot attend to a philosophical discussion, if he overhear some one playing the flute: indeed an alien pleasure interferes with a function almost as much as its own pain does—by 'its own' (whether describing a pleasure or a pain) I mean that which attends the performance of the function itself.*

*Functions, then, differing as good and bad, Pleasures will differ as good and bad. The Pleasures which belong to good functions are good, those which belong to bad functions are bad.*

*Its own Pleasure belongs more intimately to a function than does the appetite which actuates the function: the appetite is distinct in time and in nature from the function, but the pleasure is so closely bound up with the function, that some would identify them—erroneously, of course, for pleasure is not thinking or seeing—but naturally enough, because they always go together.*

*The senses differ in purity—*e.g. *sight is purer than touch—so also do their pleasures: and the purest pleasures are those of thought.*

*Animals have different pleasures, as they have different functions, according to their races: asses prefer hay to gold, as Heraclitus says. Within the human race, however, individuals differ much in the pleasures they prefer. Here our standard must always be the Good Man. The pleasures which he prefers—those which perfect the performance of the good functions in which Happiness consists—are good. They are real—distinctively* Human *pleasures: those preferred by disordered natures are not really pleasures.*

1175 a. 22. § 1. **ἑτέρων**] *sc.* τῷ εἴδει.

a. 23. **οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται**] *sc.* τελειούμενα.

a. 24. **καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἄγαλμα**] Bekker has ἀγάλματα. Bywater restores the singular from $K^b$. Cambr. has καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ γραφή.

a. 28. § 2. **αὗται**] αὗται, the reading of $K^b$, is accepted by Bekker and Bywater. All other authorities (except Γ which has αὗται αὗται) give αὗται (=αἱ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις), accepted by Susemihl. Reading αὗται, we are to understand that there is a generic difference between αἱ τῆς διανοίας ἐνέργειαι and αἱ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, and that under each genus there are specific differences.

a. 29. **φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι κ.τ.λ.**] τοῦτο is τὸ τὰς ἡδονὰς τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν, and another reason (καί) for accepting this statement is that pleasures are 'akin' to (συνῳκειῶσθαι) those ἐνέργειαι (and ἐνέργειαι differ τῷ εἴδει) which they 'perfect.' That they are 'akin' to them (οἰκεῖαι) is shown by the fact that they 'augment' them (συναύξουσι a. 36)—the conclusion being a. 36 τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. The distinction between ἡδονή as τελειοῦσα τὴν ἐνέργειαν and as συναύξουσα τὴν ἐνέργειαν is evidently



a very subtle one; perhaps it may be sufficiently explained, if we 1175 a. 29.
say that the term συναύξουσα seems to express, more distinctly than the term τελειοῦσα, what ἡδονή *does*: *e.g.* in the case of the φιλόμουσοι—μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν (§ 2): ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ (§ 5).

**ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον**] 'improve in their work.' a. 35.

**συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί**] Susemihl reads δή. I prefer δέ. a. 36.

§ 3. **τοῦτ'**] τὸ τὰς ἡδονὰς τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν. b. 2.

**κατακούσωσιν**] 'overhear.' b. 4.

§ 4. **ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον καί**] Bekker after $K^b$ and $M^b$ omits οἷον: b. 11.
but οἷον, the reading of $L^b$, $O^b$, CCC, Cambr., NC, $B^1$, $^2$, $^3$, accepted by Susemihl and Bywater, is probably right.

§ 5. **δῆλον ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν**] *i.e.* ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή and ἡ ἀλλοτρία. b. 15.
They differ (*sc.* in relation to a given ἐνέργεια) almost as much as ἡδονή and λύπη.

**σχεδὸν γάρ κ.τ.λ.**] Mich. Eph. explains—τὸ σχεδὸν πρόσκειται b. 16.
ὅτι αἱ οἰκεῖαι λύπαι αἰεὶ καὶ πάντως εἰσὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν φθαρτικαί, αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ οὐκ ἀεί: *cf.* πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως at the end of this section, b. 24. Οἰκεία λύπη, as a rule, puts a stop to the ἐνέργεια: ἀλλοτρία ἡδονή only retards it.

**οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὑτὴν γινόμεναι**] 'by "its b. 21.
own" pleasure or pain I mean that which attends the function itself'—as distinguished from that which is associated with consequences which may eventually result κατὰ συμβεβηκός from the function.

**εἴρηται**] so Bekker, Susemihl, and Bywater. $L^b$ alone, among b. 22.
recorded authorities, gives this reading. All other authorities apparently have εἴρηνται: so Cambr., CCC, NC.

§ 6.] Ἐνέργειαι differ as good and bad (some perhaps are in- b. 24.
different); hence there are good and bad ἡδοναί. If we confine ourselves to the subjective point of view—if we look only at the pleasures themselves, as felt, we shall be unable to distinguish them as good and bad—as higher and lower. We shall be able to distinguish them merely as more or less pleasant—as differing

1175 b. 24. quantitatively. It is only when we view them as 'augmenting' functions which put us in relation to the objective order, or environment, that we can distinguish pleasures as differing qualitatively (*τῷ εἴδει*), and say with Mill, 'It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied' (*Utilitarianism*, p. 14). It is sometimes urged that Mill has no right 'on his own principles' to say this—to recognise, as he does, a qualitative difference between pleasures. I venture to maintain that few moralists have a better right. His critics seem to forget that his standard of conduct is the public good. His standard of conduct is emphatically not pleasurable feeling. Only an eristic treatment of isolated phrases (phrases which need not surprise any one who looks at Mill's system in its place in the History of English Ethics) could represent it as such. Mill's 'hedonism' is pretty much on a par with that of the writer of *E. N.* vii. 11–14.

b. 30. **οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων**] 'the pleasure involved in (*ἐν*) a function is more akin to the function than is the appetite which prompts the function (the genitive *τῶν ὀρέξεων* depends on the comparative *οἰκειότεραι*: *αἱ μέν* b. 31 are the *ὀρέξεις*, and *αἱ δέ* b. 32 the *ἡδοναί*), for the appetite is separated from the function both in time and in nature, whereas the pleasure is close to the function, and it is so difficult to draw the line between the two (*ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως* b. 32) that the question may be argued whether the function is not identical with the pleasure.' *Ὄρεξις* precedes *ἐνέργεια* in time (*τοῖς χρόνοις*), and differs from it in nature (*τῇ φύσει*), being a *πάθος*.

b. 34. **§ 7. διάνοια**] regarded here as an *ἐνέργεια* = *διανόησις*: see Ramsauer *ad loc.*

**(ἄτοπον γάρ), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν**] It would appear, then, that the view set forth in vii. 11–14 was held when x. 1–5 was written: also, if we assume that vii. 11–14 was written by one who had x. 1–5 before him, it would appear that he was not deterred by the *ἄτοπον γάρ* here. The difficulties suggested by these considerations will not escape the student.

b. 36. **διαφέρει**] here means 'surpasses.'

1176 a. 1. **καθαρειότητι**] so Bywater for the *καθαριότητι* of other texts. The codd. for the most part seem to give *καθαριότητι*—CCC, so far as I know, is the only cod. which gives *καθαρειότητι*.



Mich. Eph. has the following comment here—*ἡ μὲν ὄψις τῶν* 1176 a. 1. *εἰδῶν ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ δίχα τῆς ὕλης ὡς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς πραγματείας δέδεικται* (*i. e. de Anima* ii. 12. 424 a. 17) *ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ κηρὸς τὴν σφραγῖδα μόνην τὴν ἐν τῷ χρυσίῳ δακτυλίῳ ἀπομάττεται χωρὶς τῆς ὑποκειμένης ὕλης· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο ὁ κηρὸς εἰ σὺν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς ὕλῃ τῷ χρυσῷ τὴν σφραγῖδα ἐδέχετο, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ὄψις τῶν ἡδυόσμων ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ χωρὶς τῆς ὑποκειμένης αὐταῖς ὕλης· ἡ δ' ἀκοὴ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις σωματοειδεῖς οὖσαι καὶ παθητικώτεραι μεθ' ὕλης εἰσδέχονται τὰ αἰσθητά. μετὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ σὺν τῷ ἀέρι οὗ πάθος ἐστὶν ὁ ψόφος καὶ ἡ ὀσμή, ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν οἰκείων αἰσθητῶν . . . καθαρωτέρα ἄρα ἡ ὄψις, ὡς ἀΰλων ἀντιληπτική, ἀκοῆς καὶ ὀσφρήσεως.* The least pure is *γεῦσις*, because its *ὕλη* or material vehicle, is the crass *ὑδατῶδες ὑγρόν*, which it takes in along with the sensible form: see also notes on iii. 10.

**καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν**] *i. e. καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις* a. 2. *διαφέρουσιν αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.*

**καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων**] The meaning is that 'within each of the a. 3. two classes (pleasures of sense, and intellectual pleasures) the pleasures differ from one another in purity'—*e.g.* in the class of intellectual pleasures, the pleasures of *τὸ ἐπίστασθαι* are purer than those of *τὸ λογίζεσθαι*: and among the pleasures of sense, those of sight are purer than those of taste. In all cases the less *ὕλη*, the greater *καθαρειότης*.

**§ 8. καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ** a. 6. **χρυσόν**] see Bywater, *Heracliti Reliquiae*, Fr. 51, who gives the fragment as *ὄνοι σύρματ' ἂν ἕλοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν*. This seems to be the only place where the saying is quoted. Bekker and Susemihl read *ὄνον*: Bywater reads *ὄνους*, which is given by $K^b$, Ald., Mich. Eph. (?), $B^1$, $B^s$, CCC, Cambr., NC. Michael Ephesius has an interesting remark here—*τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως Ἡρακλείτου τοῦ Ἐφεσίου καὶ ἐμοῦ πολίτου, τὸ ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν, σύρματα τὸν χόρτον Ἡράκλειτος λέγει, ὃς κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύς ἐστι τῷ ὄνῳ. Σύρματα* means 'sweepings': hence litter, or fodder.

**§ 9. ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων**] 'in particulâ *γε* latet vastum illud a. 10. discrimen naturae inter homines et inter bestias' (Ramsauer). All the animals of the same species, we may suppose (*εὔλογον* a. 9),

1176 a. 10. find pleasure in the same things: but men do not present such a uniformity of taste. Good men and bad men find pleasure in different things. The distinction of good and bad is not found among the lower animals—*οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή* vii. 1. 2.

a. 11. *τέρπει*] The mass of text beginning here with *τέρπει* 1176 a. 11 and ending with *ἱκανῶς* 1177 a. 30 is omitted by $K^b$. For the quantitative relation between this mass of text and (1) v. 10. 1137 a. 31–1138 a. 3, (2) v. 11. 1138 a. 4–b. 12, (3) v. 9. 1136 a. 9–1137 a. 30, see *Introductory Note* to v. 10.

a. 15. § 10.] See notes on i. 8. 11, iii. 4. 4, and vi. 12. 6.

a. 22. *τούτοις*] For Bywater's explanation of his conjecture 'fort. *τοῖς* vel *τοιούτοις*,' see *Contrib.* p. 68.

a. 27. § 11. *αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός*] 'Transit ad disquisitionem de beatitudine' (Michelet).

a. 28. *κυρίως . . .* a. 29 *πολλοστῶς*] Peters brings out the force of these terms very well—'. . . will be called "pleasures of man" in the full meaning of the word, and the others in a secondary sense, and with a fraction of that meaning.'

## CHAPTER VI.

### Argument.

*The Virtues, Friendship, and Pleasure having been discussed, we shall now end our Treatise with a sketch of Happiness.*

*It will save time, if we recapitulate what we have already said about Happiness. We said that it is not a Habit, but a Function—not one of the functions which are 'necessary as means,' but one desirable for its own sake: we accordingly identified it with the Function of the Good Man—with his virtuous and beautiful actions, which are desirable in themselves.*

*But why, it may be asked, identify Happiness with virtuous actions? Is not Amusement chosen (often at the cost of health and money) for its own sake—simply for its own pleasure, not for the sake of any thing beyond? To this we answer—Yes, by tyrants, for instance; and this is one of the chief reasons why it is identified with Happiness in people's minds: but tyrants, and those like*



*them, are no evidence in this matter—men without virtue or intelligence, who have never tasted pure pleasure. It is to the Good Man, as we have often said, that we must refer, and he prefers the life of virtuous action. Therefore Happiness does not consist in Amusement. The life of virtuous action is Happiness or the Chief End; and the proper place of Amusement is as means to this. 'Play that you may work,' as Anacharsis said, should be our rule. Amusement is relaxation; and relaxation is not an end in itself, but—since we cannot always be working—a means to the better performance of serious duty.*

*It is in the performance, then, of the highest functions of Man, that Happiness consists: if it consisted in bodily enjoyment and amusement, any sensualist—even a slave, to whom no one thinks of ascribing 'Happiness' any more than 'citizenship'—would have to be called 'Happy.'*

§ 1. *εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς*] 1176 a. 30. Ramsauer compares x. 9. 1 *εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις*: and says—'agnosci his verbis videtur disputatio quaedam de amicitiae generibus, posita illa inter *τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς* et inter *τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς*: negligi quae vii. 11–14 *περὶ ἡδονῆς* acta sunt.' Connecting-passages like these must be interpreted with great caution. They are evidence only for the order which existed when they were written, and, in many cases, are demonstrably late interpolations. The two passages before us may well belong to the time when the Nicomachean Corpus, as we have it, with the *two* Treatises on *ἡδονή*, was made up; for the editor, having just left the subject of *ἡδονή* (as treated in x. 1–5), would naturally put it last in his list of subjects hitherto discussed.

NC and CCC have *εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς* (*τὰς ἀρετάς* first hand CCC, *τῆς ἀρετῆς* corr.) *τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς*.

§ 2. *εἴπομεν*] *e.g. E. N.* i. 8. 9. a. 33.

*τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι κ.τ.λ.*] See note on i. 1. 2, b. 2. and *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 23 sqq. quoted there.

*δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν . . .* b. 5 *αὐτάρκης*] See i. 7. 7. b. 3.

§ 3. *καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι*] *sc.* *δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρεταί*. This, of course, is not Aristotle's own opinion. His answer to the arguments for regarding amusement as an end in itself begins with *οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν* § 4, b. 17; and in § 6 he states his own view of the place of amusement in life—that it is relaxation, a means to the better performance of earnest work—*παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ* b. 33. b. 9.

1176 b. 10. **βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.**] *καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι οὐ δι' ἄλλα ζητοῦνται· οἱ γὰρ αἱρούμενοι αὐτὰς οὐδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὠφελοῦνται· βλάπτονται μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον* (Paraph.).

b. 17. **ἀποσχολάζειν**] *ἀπασχολάζειν* ('to be entirely engaged with,' 'to make one's business in life') is the reading of $H^a$, $L^b$, $M^b$, NC—a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον* apparently, although *ἀπασχολεῖν* occurs[1]. $K^b$ is defective here (see note on x. 5. 9, a. 11); but *ἀποσχολάζειν* is the reading of Cambr., which has much in common with $K^b$ in Book x (see *Anec. Ox.* vol. i, part i, *English MSS. of the Nicomachean Ethics*, pp. 74–83): also of $B^1$, $B^2$, $B^3$.

b. 20. **§ 4. ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς**] Mich. Eph. has *λέγει δὲ εἰλικρινεῖς ἡδονὰς αἷς οὐ μέμικται ἢ μετὰ βραχὺ ἕπεται λύπη καὶ μετάνοια.*

b. 24. **§ 5. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται**] *e.g.* x. 5. 10.

b. 27. **καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δή**] So Ramsauer, Susemihl, and Bywater, for Bekker's *δέ*.

**§ 6. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία κ.τ.λ.**] See *Pol.* Θ. 2. 1337 b. 22 sqq.—*αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικήν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἥδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς.—εἰ δ' ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἱρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας, καὶ τέλος ζητητέον ὅ τι δεῖ ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας· τέλος γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδιὰν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς παιδιαῖς (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἡ δὲ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδιὰς εἰσάγεσθαι καιροφυλακοῦντα τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς προσάγοντα φαρμακείας χάριν. ἄνεσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις.*

[1] CCC has *ἀπασχο[λάζειν] οὐδέν κ.τ.λ.* The letters within [ ] seem to be later, and the [ ] represents space between *ἀπασχο-* and *οὐδέν* for only two, or at most, three letters. Was the original reading *ἀπασχολεῖν*? *Cf.* intr. use of *ἀσχολεῖν* *Pol.* Θ. 2. 1337 b. 31.



*Cf.* also *Pol.* Θ. 5. 1339 b. 11 sqq., where the relation of Music to *παιδιά* is discussed. It is shown that music is not merely useful as a relaxation—*πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν*, but that it has also a higher function —*τιμιωτέρα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρῆσιν* 1340 a. 1, being a great educational instrument—*ποιοί τινες τὰ ἤθη γινόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς* 1340 a. 7. This point, however, is not before us here, nor its value *πρὸς διαγωγήν*—as one of the modes of 'employing and enjoying' that *σχολή* which is the end (see *Pol.* Θ. 4. 1339 a. 25)[1]. 1176 b. 27.

**ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται**] *Cf.* x. 4. 9 b. 34. *πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν: Met.* Λ. 7. 1072 b. 14 *διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεινό ἐστιν, ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον.*

*Παιδιά* is a necessity imposed upon man by his composite nature. It is a foolish mistake to make this necessity the end. On *εὐτραπελία*, as contributing to *ἀνάπαυσις*, see *Introductory Note* to iv. 8.

**§ 8. εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου**] *βίος* is here the life of a citizen, as distinguished from *ζωή*, animal life. This distinction, however, between the two terms is not always observed. On the position of the *δοῦλος*, see note on viii. 11, 7, b. 5. 1177 a. 9.

## CHAPTER VII.

### ARGUMENT.

*Happiness consisting in virtuous function, Perfect Happiness will consist in the function which proceeds from the highest virtue—that of the principle which is best in Man, and naturally authoritative in him, and most divine—Reason. That Perfect Happiness is speculative function is a conclusion in accordance with what has already been laid down and with the truth: for speculative function is the* highest, most continuous, *and* most pleasant *of all functions: further, the* most self-sufficing—*for, though the Philosopher and the Just Man both need 'the necessaries of life,' the just man needs other people on whom to*

[1] The three functions of music are distinguished in *Pol.* Θ. 5. 1339 b. 13 *πότερον παιδείαν, ἢ παιδιάν, ἢ διαγωγήν· εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν.*

*exercise his virtue, but the Philosopher, though perhaps it is better for him to have friends to help him in his thinking, can yet think by himself, being of all men the most self-sufficing. Again, speculative function is the only function which is* loved for itself alone; *thinking, and nothing but thinking, results from it; whereas in the sphere of moral conduct there are objects attained beyond the actions which we perform. Again, Happiness is thought to be* realised in leisure: *we are busy in order that we may have leisure—we wage war in order that we may enjoy peace. Now, the moral virtues manifest themselves in war and in the performance of civil duties—in actions with which men 'busy themselves'—actions, indeed, of pre-eminent nobility and grandeur, but yet aimed at some end beyond themselves—at the acquisition of power it may be, or of honour, or—of* Happiness *for oneself and one's fellow-citizens. But to the life of speculative function belong all the prerogatives which we assign to the life of the Blessed—it is its own end, it has a pleasure all its own which augments it, it is self-sufficient, it is the employment of leisure, it is—so far as man's estate allows—unwearied. This life, if it attain to its perfect duration, is Perfect Happiness. It is a life which is higher than human. It is not as concrete men, but as having in us a divine principle, that we shall live this life. Let us not then listen to those who tell us that we are human, and ought to mind human things—that we are mortal, and ought to mind mortal things; but, so far as in us lies, let us bear ourselves as immortals, and do all for the sake of living in accordance with that which is highest in us—that part of us which, though small in bulk, is, in power and worth, exalted far above all the rest. This part—Reason—being his sovereign part,* is *the man. He, therefore, who lives according to Reason, lives according to what he truly* is. *His life* is his own—*therefore naturally the best and sweetest for him:* 'his own' in this eminent sense—*therefore realises the highest Happiness.*

*Introductory Note.*] Mich. Eph. introduces this chapter with the following comment: ἐπεὶ διττὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ θεωρητική, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία διττή. ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ βιβλίῳ εἶπε περὶ πολιτικῆς εὐδαιμονίας . . . ἐν τούτῳ δὲ λέγει περὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν εὐδαίμονος, ὃς ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὄντως ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν δηλονότι νοῦς καὶ ἐπιγινόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος εὐδαίμων τῷ πολιτικῷ εὐδαίμονι· ἀδύνατον γάρ ἐστιν ἕν τινι γενέσθαι νοερὰν ζωὴν μὴ μετρήσαντι τὰ πάθη διὰ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν, καὶ κατὰ πολιτικὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ζήσαντι· ἀόριστα γὰρ τὰ πάθη τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει καὶ ἀστάθμητα . . . εἰ οὖν ἄμετρα τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀόριστα καὶ ὄχλου καὶ ταραχῆς ἐμποιητικά, πῶς οἷόν τε νοερῶς ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων παθῶν περιελκόμενον; . . . καλῶς ἄρα εἴρηται τοῖς εἰποῦσι τὴν πρακτικὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπιτηδειοτάτας τινὰς εἶναι πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τῆς θεωρητικῆς εὐδαιμονίας.

1177 a. 13. **§ 1. κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην**] See i. 7. 15 *κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην.*



**εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι**] What is the alternative to *νοῦς* suggested here? The words a. 15 *εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον* seem to help us to the answer. *Τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον* is man's *νοῦς*: see x. 7. 8 *θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον*: accordingly something higher than man's *νοῦς* must be marked by the words *εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτό*—some immediate presence of God in each man, to guide him providentially, like the inspired *ἀρετή—θεία μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται*—of the *Meno* (99 E). This alternative is, of course, rejected by Aristotle. 1177 a. 13.

On *τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον* Mich. Eph. has the following—*εἶπε δὲ· εἴτε δὴ τὸ θειότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἔθος αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ ὅλως τὴν φύσιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα προσαγορεύειν—ἡ γὰρ φύσις φησὶν αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλοις· θεὸς μὲν οὐκ ἔστι· θεῖον δέ τι καὶ δαιμόνιον· ὥστε ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις θεῖον· οὐ θειότατον, τὸ δὲ λογιζόμενον θεῖον καὶ θειότατον.*

**ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία**] This phrase has not occurred before in the *Ethics*; but *κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν* occurs in the definition of the *εὐδαίμων* in i. 10. 15. a. 17.

**ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται**] 'at haec nusquam sic leguntur: lacunae igitur habes in libro vi indicium' (Susemihl). Perhaps, in the absence of the Nicomachean original of Book vi, we may be allowed to refer to *E. N.* i. 5. 2 *καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός*. There is no mention of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* in *E. N.* i. 7, §§ 3–8—a passage which has much in common with the chapter now before us; but we must assume that Aristotle had not forgotten the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* when he wrote i. 7, §§ 3–8.

**§ 2. καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.**] *i. e. καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς κράτιστός ἐστι τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τὰ γνωστὰ περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς κρατιστά ἐστι τῶν γνωστῶν.* For the use of the epithet *κράτιστος* in connexion with *νοῦς* and *τὸ νοητόν*, see *Met.* Λ. 9. 1074 b. 33 *αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.* Reason is the principle which prevails (*κρατεῖ*) in the world. It has might as well as right. a. 20.

**πράττειν**] as distinguished from *θεωρεῖν*: see note on i. 10. 10, b. 15—*τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους*: but *cf.* note on ix. 9. 5, a. 6—*οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον*—a statement which seems to conflict with the doctrine of this chapter. We must, however, allow much for the difference in the a. 22.

1177 a. 22. point of view. In ix the good man is viewed as *κοινωνὸς βίου*, in x as *ὁμοιωθεὶς τῷ θεῷ*.

**ὅτιοὖν**] Instead of Bekker's comma, Susemihl and Bywater rightly place a full stop after *ὅτιοὖν*.

a. 25. **§ 3. ἡ φιλοσοφία**] *σοφία* is the reading of $P^b$, Ald., CCC, Cambr., $B^1$, $B^2$, $B^3$. Of course *φιλοσοφία* is right, the argument being—'if the pursuit of wisdom (*φιλοσοφία*) is so pleasant, how much more pleasant must the possession (*σοφία*) be?'

a. 26. **καθαρειότητι**] $L^b$, $O^b$, and CCC give this spelling. Mich. Eph. explains as follows—*ἀϋλοτέρων αἰσθήσεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καθαρώτεραι*: the *πολιτικός* is immersed in matter, and often repents that he has done this, or not done that: *ὁ δὲ θεωρῶν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπισκεπτόμενος οὐδέποτε ἐν μετανοίᾳ γίνεται.*

**εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι**] The contrast marked by *τοῖς εἰδόσι* and *τῶν ζητούντων* here is not that between the mere *ἕξις* of *σοφία* as a treasure (*cf.* Grant's note here) and the *ἐνέργεια* of *μάθησις* by which that treasure is accumulated—for Aristotle would certainly tell us that of these two the *μάθησις* is the more pleasant; but that between the *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*, and the *ἐνέργεια* by which the *ἕξις* is formed. The *σοφός* derives more pleasure from the *use* which his trained faculties make of his accumulated knowledge, than the learner derives from the process by which faculties are trained and knowledge is accumulated. Similarly, it is the perfectly formed *δίκαιος*, and not the man who is becoming *δίκαιος*, who finds the greater pleasure in the performance of *τὰ δίκαια*. We must be careful, then, to understand the *εἰδότες* here as *συνεχῶς ἐνεργοῦντες*, not as merely *πῶς ἔχοντες*. The accumulation of knowledge—in the head, or, more conveniently, in the library—is as false an ideal of life as the accumulation of money. An instructive discussion—partly in relation to academical education—of the question 'Is Truth, or is the mental exercise in the pursuit of Truth, the superior end?' will be found in Sir W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lect. i. vol. i. pp. 8–18. Hamilton describes it as 'perhaps the most curious theoretical, and certainly the most important practical, problem in the whole compass of philosophy. For according to the solution at which we arrive, must we accord the higher or the lower rank to



certain great departments of study; and what is of more impor- 1177 a. 26.
tance, the character of its solution, as it determines the aim, regulates from first to last the method which an enlightened science of education must adopt.'

§§ 4–7.] In these sections it may perhaps be thought that the a. 27.
*θεωρητικὸς βίος* is presented as a career distinguished from the *πολιτικὸς βίος*—the career of the savant, as distinguished from that of the man of affairs. That the savant needs less *χορηγία* than the man of affairs, and so is *αὐταρκέστερος*, is true in a sense—although we must remember that the savant is himself the highest product of civil life, and the order and amenity of that life are materially necessary to his form, being, in a way, his *χορηγία*. That the career of the savant was partly what Aristotle understood by the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is most likely—it was his own career; but here, I take it, he asks us to look at the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, not as a separate career side by side with other careers in the city, but rather as *the form of the* **πολιτικὸς βίος**, that is, of all life in the city. Accordingly, when he distinguishes *ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην ἀρετήν* (x. 7. 1) from *ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν* (x. 8. 1), he does not distinguish two lives, but rather two points of view. The *εὐδαιμονία* of the *σοφός* is higher than that of the *ἀνδρεῖος*, as the *ψυχή* is higher than the *σῶμα*—but there is no *ψυχή* without *σῶμα*, and no *σῶμα* without *ψυχή*. The 'city' exists for the sake of its 'thinkers,' but the 'thinkers' are no caste apart: they are the leaven in the mass. We must remember that it is of *ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία* that he is speaking here. Pure *θεωρία* constitutes *ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία*. But man cannot engage in this *θεωρία* continuously, or, even at intervals, perfectly. Only God can continuously and perfectly. The life of pure *θεωρία* is too high for man, because he is concrete. *Ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία*, then, being beyond the reach of man, he is left with *εὐδαιμονία to the extent of* his *θεωρία*: see *E. N.* x. 8. 8. This means that *θεωρία* is the *formal element* in his *εὐδαιμονία*. The *σοφός*, as distinguished here (x. 7. 4) from the *δίκαιος*, is this formal element abstracted and personified for the sake of clearer presentation. But we must not make 'a material use of a merely formal principle'—we must not suppose that the *σοφός*, as described here —*E. N.* x. chapters 7 and 8—*exists as an individual* to bear away the prize of actual *εὐδαιμονία* from the *δίκαιος*. The *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is not a separate life coordinate with the *πολιτικὸς βίος*, but a spirit

1177 a. 27. which penetrates and ennobles the latter. When the 'political' life is said to be ἄσχολος (x. 7. 6, b. 12), this is doubtless true of the lives of ordinary politicians, who make politics a trade, subjecting themselves to the vicissitudes of party fortune, and placing their end in its domain; but it is not true of the life of the 'good man,' whose σχολή consists in the quiet of a well-regulated mind, not in an impossible immunity from the 'interruptions' of practical life. Unless we understand σχολή in this sense, we must suppose that in the *Ethics* the life of the good man is depicted as a more or less troubled and unsatisfactory public career, in which he is painfully conscious of the difficulty of finding occasions for the exercise of his temperance, justice, liberality, and other virtues—ending, if he is ever to reach the highest kind of happiness, in withdrawal from social activity, and the attainment of *Nirvana*, such as the Neoplatonists understood the θεωρητικὸς βίος to be. Nothing could be more opposed than this to Aristotle's view of life as social from beginning to end.

I take it, then, that when he contrasts the θεωρητικὸς βίος and the πρακτικὸς βίος, Aristotle sometimes thinks especially of the difference between the life of the student or savant and that of the public man—and sometimes (as here, x. 7, §§ 4–7) wishes rather to call attention to the τί ἦν εἶναι, or οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης, as distinguished from the concrete manifestation, of man's life as a whole. But these two ways of looking at the βίος θεωρητικός scarcely present themselves to him as two. The result is a confusion of expression which enabled the mystics of a later age to quote Aristotle's authority for their extravagances—the δίκαιος is contrasted, as a man who has difficulty in finding people on whom to exercise his δικαιοσύνη, with the σοφός, who has something better to do than to exercise δικαιοσύνη!

For more on Aristotle's view of the relation of the θεωρητικὸς βίος to the πρακτικὸς βίος, see note on i. 5. 2, also notes on vi. 1. 1 and vi. 13. 8.

Plutarch discourses on the inseparability of these two βίοι in an interesting passage—*de liberis educandis*, 10—τελείους δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἡγοῦμαι τοὺς δυναμένους τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν μίξαι καὶ κεράσαι τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ· καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν μεγίστοιν ἀγαθοῖν ἐπηβόλους ὑπάρχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, τοῦ τε κοινωφελοῦς βίου, πολιτευομένους, τοῦ τε ἀκύμονος καὶ γαληνοῦ, διατρίβοντας περὶ φιλοσοφίαν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων βίων, ὧν ὁ μέν ἐστι πρακτικός, ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός, ὁ δὲ ἀπολαυστικός, ὁ μὲν ἔκλυτος καὶ δοῦλος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ζωώδης καὶ μικροπρεπής ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός, τοῦ πρακτικοῦ διαμαρτάνων, ἀνωφελής· ὁ δὲ πρακτικός, ἀμοιρήσας φιλοσοφίας, ἄμουσος καὶ πλημμελής. πειρατέον οὖν εἰς δύναμιν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, κατὰ τὸ παρεῖκον τῶν καιρῶν. οὕτως ἐπολιτεύσατο Περικλῆς, οὕτως Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντῖνος, οὕτως Δίων ὁ Συρακόσιος, οὕτως Ἐπαμινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ὧν ἑκάτερος Πλάτωνος συνουσιαστής. When Plato (*Rep.* 520 A) *compels* his philosophers to re-enter the cave, he asserts the soul-and-body like connexion between the θεωρητικὸς βίος and the πρακτικὸς βίος. I understand Aristotle to believe in the same intimate connexion, although, as a professed savant, he probably differed from Plato as to how the savant or 'philosopher' ought to make his influence felt in society; he probably attached more importance than Plato did to the mere presence of 'thinkers'—of an academic element—in the city. He would probably not have wished to see his 'thinkers' take to 'politics'—even if, by so doing, they might have become 'philosopher kings.'



§ 4. ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν . . . a. 30. ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν] The σοφός, as thus contrasted with the δίκαιος, is, for the moment, taken out of the human environment. He is not the savant, actually existing in society, but the personification—or even deification—of the theoretic element in man. Then follow immediately the words a. 34 βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, which refer to the savant, as an actually existing member of society. Aristotle, as I have said, looks at the θεωρητικὸς βίος from two points of view—as *the form of human life*, and as *the career of the savant*; but the two points of view sometimes tend to merge in each other.

συνεργούς] The special reference is probably to ἡ τελεία φιλία, a. 34. and the βοήθεια afforded by its 'Dialectic': see *Introductory Note* to Book viii. So far as the remarks made in this section apply to the σοφός, as an actually existing savant, it seems to me that his independence of ἡ ἐκτὸς χορηγία is exaggerated. Not to mention the remoter social conditions of his existence, he owes much to educational institutions; and, if he is a student of nature, as Aristotle himself was, he will require the special χορηγία of the laboratory.

§ 5. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι] See *Met.* A. 2. b. 2. 982 b. 11 διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περί τε τῶν

1177 b. 2. *τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον [καὶ περὶ ἄστρων] καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ δ' ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων)· ὥστ' εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον, καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. μαρτυρεῖ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός· σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη, μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις.*

b. 3. **πρακτικῶν**] so Rassow, Susemihl, and Bywater, for Bekker's *πρακτῶν*. Besides $K^b$ and Hel., quoted by Susemihl, Cambr. gives *πρακτικῶν*. Rassow (*Forsch.* 70) describes *πρακτικῶν* as 'das allein richtige.'

The statement *ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν . . .* b 4 *πρᾶξιν* does not conflict with the *ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος* of vi. 2. 5, for *εὐπραξία* is the whole system of *καλαὶ πράξεις*, whereas the *πρακτικαὶ ἐνέργειαι* of the present section are actions performed as means: *cf.* iii. 3. 15 *αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα.*

b. 4. **§ 6. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι**] 'It is a sort of repose, as it were, the fruit of our exertions' (Grant). 'One of the Aristotelian ideas,' says Prof. Jowett (*Politics*, vol. i. p. cxliv), 'which we have a difficulty in translating into English words and modes of thought is *σχολή* or *ἡ ἐν σχολῇ διαγωγή*. To us leisure means hardly more than the absence of occupation, the necessary alternation of play with work. By the Greek, *σχολή* was regarded as the condition of a gentleman. In Aristotle the notion is still further idealized, for he seems to regard it as an internal state in which the intellect, free from the cares of practical life, energizes or reposes in the consciousness of truth.' See also his note on *τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν Pol.* viii. 2. 1338 a. 10, vol. ii. p. 295, where he says that the expression is nearly equivalent to *τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν* 1338 a. 21: the first sense of the word *διαγωγή* is 'that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman' . . . 'Further it is joined with *φρόνησις* (*Pol.* Θ. 4. 1339 a. 25), and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from *παιδιά* and *ἀνάπαυσις*, "amusement" and "relaxation," which are properly, not ends, but only means to



renewed exertion (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6, § 6); and so means to 1177 b. 4. means, whereas *διαγωγή* and *σχολή* are ends in themselves. The idea of "culture," implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to *διαγωγή*.'

**τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν . . .** b. 8 **παντελῶς**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 32) b. 6. places this sentence after *φόνοι γίνοιντο* b. 12. Thus b. 9 *οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται . . .* b. 12 *γίνοιντο* immediately follows *πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν* b. 6, which it explains. This is a great improvement to the run of the passage; but perhaps (since transposing sentences is always risky work) we ought to be satisfied with the amount of improvement produced by Bywater's parenthesis *οὐδεὶς* b. 9 . . . b. 12 *γίνοιντο.*

**φόνοι γίνοιντο**] $K^b$ has *γίνηται*, and Cambr. has *φόνος.* b. 12.

**ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς**] *πολιτική* (=*αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι* b. 13) b. 14. is itself an *ἀτελὴς ἐνέργεια*—it results in a *τέλος* external to itself.

**δῆλον ὡς**] Ramsauer proposes *δὴ ὡς*, or *δῆλον ὅτι ὡς*. I do not b. 15. think that any change is necessary.

**§ 7. εἰ δὴ τῶν μέν κ.τ.λ.**] The apodosis of this sentence begins b. 16. with b. 24 *ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία.*

**καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους**] See *Met.* A. 2. 982 b. 27 b. 20. *μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν*: *Met.* Θ. 8. 1050 a. 34 *ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γάρ ποιά τις ἐστίν.*

**καὶ ἔχειν τὴν ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν)**] See x. 5. 2.

**δή**] So Bekker and Bywater. I prefer Susemihl's *δέ* given by $M^b$ b. 22. and $O^b$. On *καὶ . . . δέ* see Eucken *de Arist. dic. rat: Pars* $1^a$: *de particularum usu*, p. 32 'adjungit *καί—δέ* rem novam saepe tam leni modo ut idem fere valeat atque *τε*.' He remarks that *καί . . . δέ* is more frequent in *E. N.* iv, viii, ix, and x, than elsewhere in the Aristotelian writings.

**τὰ κατὰ ταύτην**] The *τά* is introduced by Bywater from $K^b$, $M^b$. b. 23. The sentence seems to me to run better without it.

1177 b. 25. **λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον**] This means that the life of the *εὐδαίμων* must have a *reasonable* duration; that it must be long enough for him to do his life's work in: see note on *ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ* i. 7. 16, a. 18.

b. 26. **§ 8.**] The *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is an ideal; it cannot be realised by man, for he is concrete. But the effort to realise it, as far as possible, is all-important in human life. The effort to realise it coordinates man's powers, and exalts their vitality—it gives him *élan*, and carries him on to the attainment of many things within his reach, which he would not otherwise aspire to. Perhaps we may venture to translate the doctrine of this section into the language of modern philosophy, and say that Aristotle makes 'the Idea of God' the 'regulative principle' in man's life. Indeed Eudemus puts the doctrine hardly otherwise in a passage which is the best commentary on this section—*E. E.* H. 15. 1249 b. 6—*δεῖ δὴ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζῆν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος, οἷον δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότου καὶ ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος φύσει συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καὶ ἕκαστον ἂν δέοι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν ζῆν (αὕτη δὲ διττή· ἄλλως γὰρ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἄλλως ἡ ὑγίεια· ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα ἐκείνη)· οὕτω δ' ἔχει κατὰ τὸ θεωρητικόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτακτικῶς ἄρχων ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιτάττει (διττὸν δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· διώρισται δ' ἐν ἄλλοις), ἐπεὶ κεῖνός γε οὐθενὸς δεῖται. ἥτις οὖν αἵρεσις καὶ κτῆσις τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν ποιήσει μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν, ἡ σώματος ἢ χρημάτων ἢ φίλων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, αὕτη ἀρίστη, καὶ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος κάλλιστος· ἥτις δ' ἢ δι' ἔνδειαν ἢ δι' ὑπερβολὴν κωλύει τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, αὕτη δὲ φαύλη. ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ οὗτος τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρος ἄριστος, τὸ ἥκιστα αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾗ τοιοῦτον. τίς μὲν οὖν ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔστω εἰρημένον.*

b. 28. **τοῦ συνθέτου**] 'man's concrete nature,' 'man as concrete.' *Ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία* is the concrete thing—the union of *ὕλη* and *μορφή*, as distinguished from the *μορφή* which is *οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης*. Thus *ζῷον* as *ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι* is a *σύνθετος οὐσία* of which *ψυχή* is the *οὐσία ἄνευ ὕλης* or *τί ἦν εἶναι*: see *Met.* H. 3. 1043 b. 29 sqq.

b. 32. **ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν κ.τ.λ.**] The editors quote *Rhet.* ii. 21. 1394 b. 24 where '*θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν*' is given as a *γνώμη*, and Pindar, *Isthm.* v. 20 *θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει*: *cf.* also Antiphanes (apud Stob. *Flor.* vol. i. p. 316 ed. Meineke) *εἰ θνητὸς εἶ βέλτιστε θνητὰ καὶ φρονεῖ*: Sophocles (*Tereus* Fr. 515 Dind.) *θνητὰ φρονεῖν χρὴ θνητὴν φύσιν*: Anonym. apud Nauck (*Trag. Gr. Fragm.* p. 690) *ἄνθρωπον ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπινα*. The saying was evidently proverbial. 1177 b. 32.



**ἀθανατίζειν**] answers to the *θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν* of *E. E.* H. b. 33. 15. 1249 b. 20 quoted above.

**τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν**] Νοῦς is 'small in bulk' as compared with the *σύνθετον* which it rules. Of course we must not press this statement. The *θεῖόν τι ἐν ἡμῖν* is an immaterial principle without *ὄγκος*—like God in the *οὐρανός*, Who has no *μέγεθος*: see *Met.* Λ. 8. 1073 a. 5: so, Dante (*Paradiso* xxviii) sees God as a point of piercing light, so small that the smallest star would seem a moon beside it— 1178 a. 1.

La Donna mia, che mi videva in cura
Forte sospeso, disse: Da quel punto
Depende il cielo e tutta la natura.

Zell quotes *Soph. Elench.* 34. 183 b. 22 *μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ πάντων, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὂν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι.*

**τιμιότητι**] $K^b$ stands alone, so far as I know, in reading *ποιότητι*. This is a plausible reading, the contrasted *τῷ ὄγκῳ* being equivalent to *κατὰ τὸ ποσόν*. The conjunction *δυνάμει καὶ ποιότητι* occurs in Plutarch *de Virt. Mor.* 5 *ἀρετὴ . . . ἀκρότης μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσότης γίνεται.*

**§ 9. εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον**] *Cf.* ix. 8. 6 *ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος.* a. 2.

**τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον**] the reference may be to x. 5. 8. a. 4.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### ARGUMENT.

*It is but a second-best—a merely human Happiness—that is realised in the life of moral action; for man's moral nature, rooted as it is for the most part in the passions, belongs to him as 'Concrete Human Being,' not as 'Pure Reason.'*

*The life of Pure Reason—the Happiness of speculative function—would seem*

*to need external equipment to a less extent than that of moral action. The 'necessaries of life' thinker and moral agent may perhaps need to an equal extent: but in what each needs for the performance of his proper function they differ widely. The moral agent needs money for his Liberality and Justice (good intentions are not enough for the manifestation of these virtues), power for his Courage, opportunity for his Temperance: but the thinker needs none of these external things for the performance of his function—nay these things even hinder thinking. It is as concrete man, and member of society, and as choosing to live the life of moral action (for he does not separate himself from the life of moral action), that the thinker will need these external things.*

*That Perfect Happiness is speculative function may be seen also from this—that to the gods, whom we deem most Blessed and Happy, we do not ascribe moral actions—how ridiculous it would be to think of them as restoring deposits* justly, *facing danger* courageously, *expending money* liberally, *tempted by no bad desires forsooth, and conducting themselves* temperately *!—no: if we go through the whole list of the moral actions we shall find none worthy of the gods: yet we all hold that they live and therefore put forth some function—they do not sleep like Endymion—: what function, then, remains to a living being, when moral action, and with it, of course, the action of the artificer, have been set aside? Only speculative function remains. Such is the function of God. His whole life is blessed; man's life is blessed so far as he realises something like to the function of God; the other animals are outside the pale of Happiness, because they have no part in Speculative Thought. Happiness is co-extensive with Speculative Thought. He who has Speculative Thought in fuller measure has Happiness in fuller measure—not as something following upon Speculative Thought, but as involved in the very essence of Speculative Thought: for Speculative Thought is in its own essence precious—it is an end in itself.*

*Happiness, then, may be defined as a manifestation of Speculative Thought.*

*But human nature is not self-sufficient as regards the performance of speculative function. The thinker, as concrete man, needs external wellbeing—bodily health, sustenance, service: not that he will need great appliances: nay, the performance of those functions in which Happiness consists, is often hindered by too many appliances—a man may do noble deeds without being lord of land and sea: we more often see men in private stations doing that which is good than men in positions of power: Solon was right when he declared those to be Happy who have been* sufficiently *furnished with external good things, and have achieved the noblest actions, and lived temperately: Anaxagoras too seems to agree with this view that moderate possessions, not great wealth and power, are most conducive to Happiness, or the life of good action; for he speaks of the Happy Man as 'a strange figure in the eyes of the many' who judge by what alone they can see—a man's external condition. Thus the opinions of the wise men of old seem to agree with our view. Such opinions, of course, have their weight; but after all our ultimate appeal must be to the facts of life: by agreement or non-agreement with these our theories must stand or fall.*

*The man who lives the life of Reason, and serves Reason seems to be at once the best man and the best beloved by the gods. If the gods care for men—and it is believed that they do—it is natural to suppose that they take pleasure in*



*Reason, which is best in man, and most akin to themselves, and that they recompense with good those who love and honour it. The Thinker then, will be the best beloved by the Gods—another reason for holding that he is the most Happy.*

§ 1. **ἀνθρωπικαί**] The θεωρητικαὶ ἐνέργειαι are θεῖαι: but we must 1178 a. 10.
be careful not to misunderstand Aristotle here. When he contrasts the δίκαιος as πράττων πρὸς ἕτερον, and the σοφός as θεωρῶν καθ' αὑτόν, and declares the life of the latter to be happier, he is really contrasting man in the concrete, and reason the form of man (see note on τοῦ συνθέτου x. 7. 8, b. 28). This form, he would tell us, is realised in the concrete life of the just man, as well as in the concrete life of the savant, the μεσότης of the just man's moral nature being determined in relation to the same σκοπός which regulates the speculation of the savant. Man's concrete life (which, as concrete, is always ἐν κοινωνίᾳ and πρὸς ἑτέρους) is 'happier' in proportion as it realises this σκοπός more purely. The savant, therefore, who realises the σκοπός theoretically as well as practically (he must have realised it as φρόνιμος before he can realise it as σοφός) stands higher than the just man who realises it only practically. But the conditions of human existence make the comparatively withdrawn life of the savant impossible except for a very few. When Aristotle tells us that the life of the savant is 'happier' than the life of the man of affairs, he does not imply that it is open to the bulk of mankind to choose this 'happier' life. The exhortation χρὴ δὲ . . . ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν is addressed to the bulk of mankind, because it is open to every man who is not πεπηρωμένος πρὸς ἀρετήν to contribute—if not in some brilliant way, as politician, or soldier, or leader of fashion, or athlete—at least as honest man, to the εὐδαιμονία of a city in which savants are produced and held in honour.

**τὰ ἄλλα**] So Susemihl and Bywater: Bekker has ἄλλα. The τά is given by $L^b$, Ald., CCC, Cambr., NC.

**χρείαις**] 'services.' a. 12.

**καὶ πράξεσι**] Rassow (*Forsch.* p. 33) places καὶ ⟨ταῖς⟩ πράξεσι after πάθεσι a. 13.

**τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ**] τὸ πρέπον τῷ πλησίον (Paraph.). a. 13.

§ 2. 'Again, moral virtue seems, in some points, to be actually a. 14.

1178 a. 14. the result of physical constitution, and in many points to be closely connected with the passions' (Peters). Michelet understands *ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή* as that *morum rectitudo*, from which as principle the *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί* spring: but in § 3 *ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή* and *αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί* seem to have exactly the same meaning. The reference in *ἔνια* seems to be to *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*—inherited good tendency, *εὐφυΐα*—see vi. 13. 1; in *πολλά*, not only to the general connexion between *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* and the *πάθη*, so often insisted on (*e.g.* in ii. 6. 10), but also perhaps to those *μεσότητες ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν* (ii. 7. 14) which are not strictly *ἀρεταί*—such as *αἰδώς*.

a. 16. **§ 3. συνέζευκται . . . .** a. 17 **φρονήσει**] See vi. 13. 6 *οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς*, and note there with references.

a. 17. **εἴπερ . . . .** a. 19 **φρόνησιν**] See note on *ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κ. τ. λ.* vi. 12. 6, a. 6. The Paraphrast's explanation here is—*φρόνησις μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὸ τέλος ἐκεῖθεν· ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ πῶς δεῖ τοῦ τέλους τυχεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς φρονήσεως λαμβάνει.*

The motive of the present section (which Grant regards as containing 'the germ of much that is expanded in the Eudemian books, *cf. Eth.* vi. 12. 9–10, 13. 4') is thus given by Mich. Eph.—*Δείξας τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς οὔσας, δείκνυσι καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ οὖσα τοῦ λογιστικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τοῦ νοῦ ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐ τοῦ συνθέτου· δείκνυσι δὴ καὶ ταύτην ὅτι μὴ τοῦ ὄντως ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ ἀλλὰ τοῦ συνθέτου.*

a. 19. **συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι**] $K^b$ has *συνηρτημένη* (*sc.* *ἡ φρόνησις*) *δ' αὐταῖς* (*sc.* *ταῖς ἠθ. ἀρεταῖς*) *κ. τ. λ.* Ramsauer conjectures *συνηρτημέναι* (*sc.* *αἱ ἠθ. ἀρεταί*) *δὲ ταύτῃ τε* (*sc.* *τῇ τε φρονήσει*) *κ. τ. λ.*, or *συνηρτημέναι* (*sc.* *ἥ τε φρόνησις καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί*) *δ' ἀλλήλαις τε κ. τ. λ.* Susemihl conjectures *συνηρτημέναι δ' αὐτῇ τε κ. τ. λ.* I think that *συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται* is right: the *ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί*, notwithstanding their close connexion with the intellectual faculty *φρόνησις*, are *περὶ τὸ σύνθετον*, for they are implicated with the *πάθη*: *καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι* means 'not only with *φρόνησις*, but also with the *πάθη*.' I think that Grant is wrong in making *αὗται* take up *φρόνησις* and the *ἠθ. ἀρεταί*.

a. 22. **ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη**] We are reminded of *de An.* iii. 5. 430 a. 17 *καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς* (*i. e.* the *ποιητικὸς νοῦς*, or *τί ἦν εἶναι* of *ὁ νοῦς ὁ*



*ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοί*) **χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ.** 1178 a. 22. See Edwin Wallace's interesting discussion of 'Aristotle's Theory of Thought'—*Aristotle's Psychology*: Introduction, Chapter xi.

**διακριβῶσαι**] $K^b$ has *ἀκριβῶσαι*, probably omitting the *δι-* because a. 23. of the immediately preceding *-αι*: for $K^b$, with all MSS., reads *εἴρηται* which Sus. accepts.

**§ 4. δόξειε κ. τ. λ.**] From this point onwards to the end of § 8, 1178 b. 32, the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is discussed in much the same way as it has already been discussed in ch. 7: see Rassow, *Forsch.*, p. 26.

**προσποιοῦνται κ. τ. λ.**] Coraes has—*δεῖ χρημάτων τῷ δικαίῳ εἰς τὰς* a. 31. *ἀνταποδόσεις, ἵνα δῆλος γένηται δίκαιος ὤν· τὸ γὰρ βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν ἄδηλον· καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι γάρ, μὴ εὐποροῦντες χρημάτων, προσποιήσαιντ' ἂν εἶναι δίκαιοι, τὴν ἀπορίαν φάσκοντες ἀναγκάζειν αὐτοὺς ἀμελεῖν τῶν δικαίων.*

**δυνάμεως**] The Paraph. has—*δεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀνδρείῳ καιροῦ τινὸς κατ-* a. 32. *αλλήλου καὶ τῆς ἐν σώματι δυνάμεως ὅθεν ἐπιδείξεται τὴν τόλμαν καὶ τὴν καρτερίαν*: Ramsauer, however, thinks of a general with forces at his disposal.

**ἐξουσίας**] *sc.* *τοῦ ἀκολασταίνειν* (Coraes). a. 33.

**πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις;**] 'for how else can he, or the possessor of any other virtue, show what he is?' (Peters.)

**§ 5. ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε . . . .** b. 1 **ἂν εἴη**] This is a remark a. 34. made in passing, to show the importance to *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* of *πράξεις* and the opportunity of performing them. *Ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* realises its end (*τὸ δὴ τέλειον*) only when good intentions are carried out in good actions.

After *ἀμφισβητεῖται* $L^b$, $O^b$ read *δέ*, accepted by Bekker; and CCC, $B^1$, $B^2$ read *δέ τι*, which may perhaps be regarded as supporting *τε*, given by $K^b$, $M^b$, and accepted by Susemihl and Bywater. For *ἀμφισβητεῖται*, $L^b$, r, CCC, NC, $B^1$, $B^2$, $B^3$ have *ζητεῖται*.

**πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς**] 'which has more to do with constituting virtue'—'which is the more important element in virtue.'

**§ 6. πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν**] The *θεωρῶν*, *quâ θεωρῶν*, needs no b. 4.

1178 b. 4. χορηγία—no well-appointed stage, as it were, for the exercise of his θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια: but, *quâ* ἄνθρωπος, he chooses to exercise πρακτικαὶ ἐνέργειαι also, and for them he will need χορηγία.

Indeed the qualification '*quâ* ἄνθρωπος,' applies to him not only when he exercises πρακτικαὶ ἐνέργειαι, but also when he exercises his θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια: if he does not require for the latter an elaborate χορηγία, he requires at least fellow-actors—sympathetic and stimulating friends. See *Introductory Note* to Book viii.

The words b. 6 αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν (*sc.* ἠθικὴν) ἀρετὴν πράττειν are to be carefully noted, as stating explicitly the inherence of the θεωρητικὸς βίος in the πρακτικὸς βίος. The θεωρῶν is a man, and *chooses* to live the social life. Aristotle's θεωρητικὸς βίος was travestied by those who afterwards made it a life of actual withdrawal from the flesh. Aristotle's ideal of θεωρία is a 'regulative idea' of which the Neo-aristotelians made a 'constitutive use.'

b. 7. ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι] Coraes has an interesting note here—τῶν σπανίων ἡ λέξις, σημαίνουσα τὸ παρὰ τοῖς Γάλλοις *s'humaniser*. ἔσωσε δ' αὐτὴν καὶ ἡ συνήθεια, κατὰ μετοχὴν μάλιστα· ἀνθρωπευμένον γὰρ ἐπαινοῦντες λέγομεν, τὸν ἀστεῖον τὰ ἤθη, καὶ ἀγαπητῶς τοῖς ἄλλοις συμπεριφερόμενον.

§ 7.] Grant remarks on this section—'Aristotle argues here that we cannot attribute morality to the Deity without falling into mere anthropomorphism; but it might be replied that there is the same difficulty in conceiving of God as engaged in philosophic thought . . . If it is conceded that the life of God is only *analogous* to that of the philosopher, we might then ask, why not also analogous to the life of the good man?' With this criticism which amounts, as I understand it, to saying that Aristotle's notion of God is not anthropomorphic enough, it is instructive to compare the criticism of Plotinus—that Aristotle errs in attributing νόησις to the First Principle: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ χωριστὸν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ νοητόν, νοεῖν δὲ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ λέγων πάλιν αὖ οὐ τὸ πρῶτον ποιεῖ (p. 490), for the First Principle is ἐπέκεινα νοῦ (p. 541).

b. 13. ὑπομένοντας] It seems better simply to accept this bad anacoluthon than to suppose a lacuna after ἀνδρείους—unless indeed we follow Bywater's suggestion (*Contrib.* p. 69) and read ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείου ὑπομένοντος τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντος ὅτι καλόν;

b. 15. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες] To $L^b$, the only authority quoted by Susemihl for αἱ, may be added Cambr. All other MSS. apparently read εἰ.



1178 b. 17. μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν] Muretus (*var. lect.* vii. 22, cited by Zell) quotes Cic. *de nat. deor.* iii. 15 as a passage modelled on this section—Jam justitia, quae suum cuique distribuit, quid pertinet ad deos? hominum societas et communitas, ut vos dicitis, justitiam procreavit. Temperantia autem constat ex praetermittendis voluptatibus corporis, cui si locus in coelo est, est etiam voluptatibus: nam fortis deus intelligi qui potest? in dolore? an in labore? an in periculo? quorum deum nihil attingit.

b. 21. τοῦ ποιεῖν] 'vide quam procul abesse jubeatur dei creatoris imago' (Ramsauer).

ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια . . . θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη] See *Met.* Λ. 7.

b. 30. § 8. καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν] Ramsauer's conjecture καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν is supported by NC, which reads τό.

οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν τιμία] Θεωρία is *itself* εὐδαιμονία: it is not a means which produces εὐδαιμονία, as the doctor produces health. For the meaning of τιμία, see *E. N.* i. 12.

b. 33. § 9.] With this section begins a discussion of the relation of ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐημερία to εὐδαιμονία. The discussion is not confined strictly to the relation of τὰ ἐκτός to the εὐδαιμονία of the θεωρητικὸς βίος. It is suggested that τὰ ἐκτός are not nearly so important for the εὐδαιμονία of the πρακτικὸς βίος as is vulgarly supposed; and we are allowed to infer *a fortiori* that their influence in the θεωρητικὸς βίος (so far as that βίος can be distinguished as a separate career in the city) is very small.

1179 a. 1. εὐδαιμονήσοντα . . . a. 2 μακάριον] I think that these two words are used here with exactly the same meaning.

a. 3. αὔταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις] This is the reading of $K^b$, Ald., and $B^3$. All other authorities recorded, so far as I know (Susemihl gives Γ, $L^b$, Mich. Eph., Heliod., Aret., $M^b$, $O^b$, and I can add $B^1$, $B^2$, Paris. 1853, CCC, NC, Cambr.) interpolate οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις between αὔταρκες and οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις. It has been conjectured that κρίσις represents χρῆσις. Coraes adopts χρῆσις in his text. Mich. Eph. has—οὐδ' ἡ κρίσις· τουτέστιν οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δεῖ κρίνειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων ὑπερβολῆς. I cannot attach much weight to the mere circumstance

1179 a. 3. that $K^b$ omits the words; I believe that they represent something original in the text.

a. 8. § 10. τοσαῦθ'] *μέτρια.*

a. 9. § 11. Σόλων] See the conversation between Solon and Croesus Herod. i. 30–32, especially ch. 30, where Solon says that Tellus the Athenian was the happiest man he had ever known. Tellus was well-off, he lived to see his children's children, and he died gloriously in battle, and his countrymen erected a monument to him where he fell.

a. 11. πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ'] $K^b$ omits *τά*: so also do Cambr., NC, and Paris. 1853—thus, apparently, making *πεπραγότας* intransitive. The intransitive use of *πέπραγα*, according to Veitch (*Greek Verbs*) is found in Pindar, Euripides, and Plato: but the intransitive use of *πέπραχα* is late. Accordingly NC—the only MS. which supports Spengel's conj. *πεπραχότας*, so far as I know—can hardly be right with *πεπραχότας δὲ κάλλιστα.*

ὡς ᾤετο] om. NC, Paris. 1853. Bywater has an important suggestion here (*Contrib.* p. 69)—'I incline to think that we should revert to the $K^b$ Γ reading, *πεπραγότας δὲ κάλλιστ' ᾤετο*, and understand *ᾤετο* in the sense of "he thought" or "meant," so as to mark a certain distinction between the actual words (*ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς*) and what they meant by implication. Compare E. E. 1215 b. 11 for a similar use of *ᾤετο.*'

a. 12. σωφρόνως] Mich. Eph. has—*εἶπε δὲ σωφρόνως ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ πάσας ζῶντα τὰς ἀρετάς.*

a. 13. Ἀναξαγόρας] *Cf. E. E.* i. 4. 1215 b. 6 *Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, 'οὐθείς,' εἶπεν, 'ὃν σὺ νομίζεις· ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἄν τίς σοι φανείη·' τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως ᾤετο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.*

a. 16. § 12.] The opinions of men like Anaxagoras and Solon are *probably* true; but we must *verify* them by direct reference to the facts of human life, as given in our own experience; if they do not agree with these facts, they may be set down as mere theories—λόγους a. 22.



§ 13.] Ramsauer suggests that this section has been added by another hand. I think that the suggestion is well worth making. The section has no connexion with what immediately precedes; and the view which it seems to favour of a personal relation between the gods and men is hardly what we expect from a writer who has described the godhead as in § 7. We seem to have to do with a Platonising Aristotelian, rather than with Aristotle. Mich. Eph. has caught the ring of the section in his commentary—*θεοφιλὴς* (*ἴ. e. ὃν φιλεῖ ὁ θεός* Mich. Eph.) *ἆρα ὁ σοφός· εἰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς φιλοῦμεν τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας τοὺς ἡμῶν παῖδας ἢ συγγενεῖς, πῶς οὐ δεῖ τὸν πανάγαθον θεὸν φιλεῖν τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας τὸ συγγενὲς αὐτῷ;* 1179 a. 22.

## CHAPTER IX.

### Argument.

*We have now completed our Theory of Life: but have we fulfilled the intention of this Treatise? No: this is a* practical *Treatise, and cannot stop short with a mere Theory of the Good Life, but must indicate how we can be made good men.*

*If the mere Statement of Theory were in itself enough to make men good, then indeed Theory would have a right to all those 'great fees' that Theognis speaks about: but the truth is that Theory, though it may have some good practical influence on generous youths, and may help to place natural nobility of disposition in the safe keeping of Virtue, is powerless to incite the ordinary man towards the highest goodness: he abstains from evil, not from respect for what is good, but from fear of punishment: he lives as passion dictates, following his own pleasures and avoiding the pains opposed to them: he has no conception of the good and of that which brings real pleasure, for he has never tasted it. What Theory could transform such a nature?*

*Three agencies whereby men become good are commonly recognised—Nature, Habit, Teaching.*

*Natural endowment plainly does not depend on ourselves: it belongs by the operation of divine causes to those who are truly fortunate.*

*Theory and Teaching are not effective unless the hearer's mind has been prepared beforehand, by a course of habits, to like and dislike aright, as a field must be tilled for the seed.*

*This preparation—beginning from the earliest years, resulting in the formation of a good moral character—can scarcely be carried on except by the State. We must accordingly have Laws regulating the education and conduct*

*of the young—yes, and of adults too, throughout the whole course of their lives—for the majority of men do what is right, not because it is right, but because they are constrained to do it. Law—expressing the Practical Reason of the community, has that power to constrain obedience which no father—no individual man, who is not an absolute monarch, possesses.*

*Only in the Spartan State and a few others has the lawgiver given any attention to the nurture and habits of the citizens: most States neglect these matters entirely, and allow each man to rule his wife and children as he pleases, like a Cyclops.*

*Where the State neglects its duty, it would seem to be incumbent on the individual to do what he can for the moral education of his own children and friends. He will succeed best if he have made himself* capable of legislating— *if he can educate his own children by unwritten laws as the written laws of the State, did they exist, would educate all the citizens.*

*This system of paternal education, though only second-best, is not without its peculiar advantages: it has the basis of natural affection in the children to build upon, and it can suit itself to the special needs of individual cases. These special needs may indeed be met, in a way, by merely empirical knowledge; but if they are to be met in the right way, they must be met by a knowledge of general principles—the father must, as we have said, make himself capable of legislating.*

*How, then, is a man to make himself capable of legislating? Can the practical politicians teach him? It would appear not. The political art is not like the other arts, which are taught by those who practise them. Those who profess to teach the political art are the Sophists, who do not practise the art: and those who practise the art rely on knack and personal experience—the secret of their success they do not attempt to explain in speeches or books, and cannot communicate to their sons or friends—they surely would do so, if they could. Only this seems plain—that experience has not a little to do with their success—for we see that those who live in political surroundings become politicians.*

*Experience, then, is clearly necessary, as well as theory, to one who would become 'capable of legislating.'*

*As for the professed teachers of the political art—the Sophists, they are far from being teachers of it: they do not know even what it is, or what it is concerned with: if they knew, they would not identify it with Rhetoric or even place it beneath Rhetoric; and they would not think that it is easy to legislate by making a collection of famous laws, and selecting the best of them—as if the selection did not need intelligence—as if all did not depend on deciding rightly! Who, we would ask, is the intelligent judge of the product of any art—of a musical composition, or a painting? The experienced musician or painter. Now, laws are the products of the political art. How, then, is one to become capable of legislating—capable of deciding which are the best laws—without experience? Collections of constitutions are like collections of medical cases—useless to those who have not got the discerning faculty which comes from the experience of practice: to those who have such experience they are likely to be very useful.*

*Our predecessors, then, having left the subject of Legislation unexamined, we perhaps ought now ourselves to consider it—and with it the whole subject of the government of the State—that our Philosophy of Man may be made as complete as we can make it.*

*First then let us try to recount what is good in the various statements of our predecessors: then, looking at the collected Constitutions let us try to see what things preserve and what destroy States and Constitutions, and what are the causes of good and bad government. When we have seen these causes, we shall be better able to see clearly what sort of Constitution is the best, and how each Constitution may be best ordered, and what laws and customs it is best for it to use.*

*Let us then begin.*



*Introductory Note.*] The *Ethics* may be said to end with chapter 8. The present chapter introduces the subject of the *Politics*. In the *Ethics* the theory of life has been set forth. But the object of the Treatise was not simply to supply a theory. A theory of life, which is only a theory—which we cannot see our way to realising at all—is not worth setting forth, even as a theory. It is not interesting, to say the least. The theory set forth in the *Ethics* has all along awakened interest, because we have seen that it is set forth in order to be applied in practice; but the Treatise, as a practical manual, would be incomplete, unless it ended by indicating more precisely, to those concerned with moral education, for whose use it is intended, *how* the theory may be applied in practice—how human beings, constituted as they are, may be got to act up to the principles which have been shown in theory to be the true principles of conduct. We accordingly find the *Ethics* ending with a chapter which indicates (for details we must go to the *Politics*) the lines on which practical effect may be given to the theory of life which has been set forth.

The gist of the chapter is this:—It is vain to begin by *preaching* the true theory. The hearers must be first prepared to hear. The moral nature must be trained; and direct appeals to the understanding cannot train the moral nature. Nor can home influences—at least, unaided. They have not sufficient force. Νόμος alone is strong enough to enforce the dictates of reason. Hence it is νόμος which those interested in carrying out the true theory into practice must try to enlist in their service. It is not by the ill-directed and feeble agency of individuals, but only by the institutions of the State, that citizens can be trained to live up to the true theory of conduct. Let us, then, try to embody the true theory in Legislation. This has not hitherto been done effectively.

The circumstance that this chapter, written so entirely in the spirit of the First Book (see especially *E. N.* i. 2), follows immediately on the discussion of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* is very significant, showing that Aristotle does not regard his doctrine of the supremacy of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* as in any way inconsistent with his doctrine of *πολιτική* as the *ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ ἐπιστήμη*.

1179 a. 33. § 1. **περί τε τούτων**] So Susemihl and Bywater, with $L^b$, $O^b$, CCC, NC, $B^1$, $B^2$, $B^3$. Bekker reads *περὶ τούτων* with $K^b$, $M^b$.

With regard to the list given here of subjects which have been discussed in the *Ethics*, see note on x. 6. 1.

a. 34. **τοῖς τύποις**] This is the only instance, apparently, in Aristotle of the plural = *τύπῳ*, or *ὡς ἐν τύπῳ*: see Eucken, *Über den Sprachg. des Arist.* (*die Praepositionen*) p. 26.

b. 3. § 2. **ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα**] Mich. Eph. has—*εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν χρήσεως γινόμεθα ἀγαθοὶ χρηστέον αὐταῖς· εἰ δέ τινα ἄλλον τρόπον, ἐκεῖνον ζητητέον· πάντως δὲ χρηστέον ἐκείνοις δι' ὧν ἀγαθοὶ ἐσόμεθα*: *e.g.* attention to the rules of health contributes indirectly to morality.

b. 6. § 3. **Θέογνιν**] The editors quote *εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ' ἔδωκε θεὸς | ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν, | πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον*. *Cf.* Plato *Meno* 95 E, where the last line is cited.

b. 8. **ἰσχύειν**] The construction is—*φαίνονται ἰσχύειν προτρέψασθαι τοὺς ἐλευθερίους*.

b. 9. **κατοκώχιμον**] This is the reading of $K^b$ and Ald. adopted by Bekker and Bywater. Susemihl adopts *κατακώχιμον*, the reading of all other authorities apparently. In *Pol.* ii. 6. 1269 b. 30 we have *κατακώχιμοι* (apparently in all MSS.), on which see Newman's critical note, vol. ii. p. 88. There seems to be no doubt that *κατακώχιμος* is a corrupt form. Coraes gives the meaning of the phrase *κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς* as follows—*σημαίνει δ' οὖν κατὰ λέξιν ἡ φράσις, οὕτω διαθεῖναι ὥστε κατέχεσθαι ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ, καὶ οἱονεὶ ἐνθουσιᾶν καὶ θεόληπτον γίνεσθαι*.

b. 10. **καλοκαγαθίαν**] This word occurs only twice in the *E. N.*—here, and in iv. 3. 16, in neither place with the technical meaning which it has in the *E. E.*: see notes on *E. N.* vi. 1, §§ 1–3 for the



connexion of the *σκοπός* of that passage with the *ὅρος τῆς καλοκαγα-* 1179 b. 10.
*θίας* of *E. E.* H. 15.

§ 4. **αἰδοῖ**] See *E. N.* iv. 9, where the moral value of *αἰδώς* is b. 11.
discussed. It is a praiseworthy *πάθος* in the young.

§ 5. **ἀγαπητόν . . .** b. 20 **ἀρετῆς**] There are so many difficulties b. 18.
in the way of acquiring *ἀρετή*, that we must be satisfied if, with all the agencies which produce it at our disposal, we succeed in getting some share of it.

§ 6. **φύσει . . . ἔθει . . . διδαχῇ**] The identification of *τὸ τῆς φύσεως* b. 20.
b. 21 with *τὸ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχον* b. 22 enables us to see that the agencies mentioned here are those mentioned in *E. N.* i. 9. 1 *ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν . . . ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται*—where see notes. It was not necessary of course for the argument of i. 9 to contrast *μάθησις* and *ἐθισμός* as moral agencies; both together, as involving human effort, were contrasted with non-human agencies —*θεός* and *τύχη*.

**διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει**] See *E. E.* b. 22.
H. 14, and *M. M.* ii. 8, where *εὐτυχία* is discussed—(1) as the gift of God, and (2) as the result of natural endowment—*φύσις*. The writers refuse to make the gods the authors of the so-called *εὐτυχία* of the undeserving, and prefer to consider the *εὐτυχής* as one who has a happy natural endowment or instinct (described, however, as *τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον E. E.* 1248 a. 27), which prompts him to do the right thing: thus the writer of the *M. M.* says (1207 a. 36) —*ὁ γὰρ εὐτυχής ἐστιν ὁ ἄνευ λόγου ἔχων ὁρμὴν πρὸς τἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων ἐπιτυγχάνων, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φύσεως· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ ἔνεστιν τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτον ᾧ ὁρμῶμεν ἀλόγως πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχωμεν*. *Cf.* the suggestion thrown out in the *Meno* 99 E *ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ οἷς ἂν παραγίγνηται*.

The statement b. 21 *τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει* must be taken with this qualification—that it is one of the recognised duties of the *νομοθέτης*, according to Aristotle, to see that a bad *φύσις* does not grow up in the citizens by the multiplication of the diseased and the weak. It is within the power of the *νομοθέτης*, as it is within the power of the breeder of domestic animals, to improve the breed.

1179 b. 23. **ὁ δὲ λόγος κ.τ.λ.**] On the uselessness of supplying theory to those whose moral natures have not been trained, see i. 3, §§ 5–7. On *τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν* b. 25, see ii. 3. 2 and x. 1. 1.

b. 26. **ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα**] Coraes quotes Hippocrates *Νόμος* § 2—*ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἡμέων ὁκοῖον ἡ χώρη· τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων ὁκοῖον τὰ σπέρματα· ἡ δὲ παιδομαθίη τὸ κατ' ὥρην αὐτὰ πεσεῖν ἐς τὴν ἄρουραν.*

b. 27. § 7. **αὖ**] *ἄν* is the reading of most MSS., but $K^b$ has *αὖ*.

b. 28. **ὅλως τ'**] CCC and NC have *ὅλως δέ*. The Paraphrast may have read *ὅλως γάρ*: he has *δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐ λόγῳ δύναται τὸ πάθος ὑπείκειν ἀλλὰ βίᾳ τινί.*

b. 30. § 8. **οἰκεῖον**] *Cf.* the *οἰκεῖος ἀκροατής* of i. 3. 5. Aristotle is perhaps not thinking here so much of the *ἦθος εὐγενές* (x. 9. 3) which *ἔθος*, or habituation, presupposes, as of the *ἦθος* formed by habituation, without which the pupil cannot derive solid profit from *λόγος*, or an appeal to his *σύνεσις* (*cf. συνείη* § 7, b. 27).

b. 31. **ἐκ νέου . . .** b. 32 **νόμοις**] Here Aristotle comes to the point. The really potent influence in moral training is that exerted by the rules, written and unwritten, and the institutions of the State as a whole. It is these, then, that we must reform, if we wish to improve the morality of the people.

1180 a. 1. § 9. **οὐχ ἱκανόν . . .** a. 4 **βίον**] 'In a spirit the very opposite of this remark,' says Grant, 'Pericles is reported (Thucyd. ii. 37) to have boasted of the freedom enjoyed by the Athenians from all vexatious interference with the daily conduct of individuals . . . On the one hand Thucydides praised the free system of Athens; on the other hand Aristotle praised the organised and educational system of Sparta; see below § 13, and *cf. Eth.* i. 13. 3, and note. He was probably led into this political mistake, partly by the state of society in Athens itself, partly by the influence of Plato, from whom he imbibed one of the essential ideas of communism,—namely, that the State should arrange as much as possible, instead of as little as possible.'

a. 3. **αὐτά**] *ἅττα* is an obvious correction (see Susemihl's *E. E.* Append., p. 176) if correction is needed. The *αὐτά* of the MSS. is explained by most editors, as by Coraes—*τὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ὀρθῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας προδεδιδαγμένα*: but the words *καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι*, and **καὶ περὶ** 1180 a. 3. **ταῦτα**, may be thought to refer us to new habits which have to be acquired by adults, as distinguished from those which have been acquired in youth. I think that *αὐτά* is so obviously the right word after *ἐπιτηδεύειν*, that we must not make too much of the difficulty of connecting it with *καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι*, or of explaining *καὶ περὶ ταῦτα*. I feel that to write *ἅττα* (which occurred to me independently) after *ἐπιτηδεύειν* is to credit Aristotle with a rather weak remark. The words § 11 *εἰθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν* also seem to me to be in favour of *αὐτά*. The Paraph. has—*ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας ἐπιτηδεύειν δεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἑαυτοὺς ἐθίζειν.*



§ 10. **αἷ μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς**] *Cf.* a. 13. Bentham, *Principles of the Penal Code*: Part 3 (of punishments), ch. 6 (the choice of punishments). 'Search out . . . the motives of offences, and generally you will recognise the dominant passion of the offender, and you may punish him, according to the proverbial saying, with the instrument of his sin. Offences of cupidity will be best punished by pecuniary fines, when the wealth of the offender admits it; offences of insolence, by humiliation; offences of idleness, by compulsory labour, or forced rest.'

§ 11. **ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἄν**] The apodosis begins here; on the a. 17. construction, see note on i. 1. 4, a. 14.

§ 12. **ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρόν**] 'Romanus a. 18. antiqui temporis aliter judicasset' (Ramsauer).

**λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ**] *Cf. Pol.* iii. 11. 1287 a. 28 a. 21. *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.*

§ 13. **ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει κ.τ.λ.**] *Cf. Pol.* Θ. 1. a. 24. 1337 a. 31 *ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην*, and Jowett's note (vol. ii. p. 293)—'Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the quality of their education, . . . but for the circumstance that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general

1180 a. 24. standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters, . . . and according to Plato, or rather according to the author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), "not many of them could count."'

a. 25. ⟨ἢ⟩ μετ' ὀλίγων] The ἤ, inserted by Bywater, is of course logically necessary; at the same time, *μόνη μετ' ὀλίγων* does not seem an ungreek way of saying 'almost the only.' The Cretan system is mentioned along with the Spartan in *E. N.* i. 13. 3, where see note.

a. 28. κυκλωπικῶς] *Od.* ix. 114:

*θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος*
*παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.*

a. 29. § 14. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθήν] because, as we have seen, only the State can enforce obedience, and because—this has not been actually mentioned, but is implied in the words *κοινῇ, νομοθέτης, νόμος*—the education of each individual is part of a single system; the individual does not belong to himself, so that his education may be conducted with reference only to himself. He is a member of the body politic; and it is for *πολιτική*, as *ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ ἐπιστήμη*, to see that he is educated for his function in the organism to which he belongs: see *Pol.* Θ. 1. 1337 a. 21 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἓν τὸ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὃν τρόπον ἕκαστος νῦν ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὑτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. δεῖ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἑκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν.*

a. 30. καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι] Grant translates—'and that it should have power to effect the object in question': Stahr translates—'und dass diese die Kraft habe, sich Geltung zu verschaffen.' The words are added, like a quoted phrase, with little regard for grammatical connexion. Bywater brackets them here a. 30, suggesting that they should follow *συμβάλλεσθαι* a. 32. This suggestion has the merit of bringing the words *καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι* close to *μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν.*



1180 a. 31. ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι] The Paraph. has—*προσήκειν ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν βοηθεῖν ἢ βοηθεῖν προθυμεῖσθαι.* Where the State neglects the education of its citizens, it is incumbent on the private individual to do what he can to help his own children and friends to become good. He will succeed best in this task, if he brings to it the legislator's point of view (*νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος* a. 33)—if he remembers that he is educating *citizens*.

a. 35. γεγραμμένων κ.τ.λ.] In the passage which begins here, and goes down to the end of § 17, b. 28, Aristotle says nothing inconsistent with the statement b. 29 κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθήν, but points out how, in the absence of State-education, home-education, conducted from the legislator's point of view, may make the most of certain minor advantages which it has—its power of appealing to the family affections (§ 14), and its being able to suit its system to the special needs of particular cases (§ 15). Mich. Eph. misses the point of the passage—*ζητητέον πῶς πρὸ ὀλίγον εἰπὼν μηδὲν ἰσχύειν τὰς πατρικὰς προστάξεις, νῦν φησὶν ἐπίσης τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἰσχύειν· καὶ ῥητέον ὅτι περὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ μοχθηρῶς ζώντων εἶπεν ἐκεῖ μηδὲν ἰσχύειν· ἐνταῦθα δὲ περὶ τῶν καλῶς ἀναγομένων τοῦτο λέγει.*

b. 4. ἤθη] Bywater, following $K^b$, $L^b$, $O^b$, for *ἔθη* ($M^b$) accepted by Bek. and Sus. I think *ἤθη* is right. The reference is to the 'national character.'

οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη] not that their authority is equal to that of *νόμος* (see § 12). Aristotle is making out as good a case as he can for home-education, as second-best. It was doubtless his opinion that even with a good system of State-education, something is left for home-education to do.

b. 8. § 15. ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς] After these words Coraes conjectures *καὶ γυμναστικῆς*, on account of the example *ὅ τε πυκτικός* which follows.

b. 10. οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθησιν] Stahr has an important note here. He points out that *περιτιθέναι* means 'to put on as a garment,' and suggests *μειλίχην* (the cestus) for *μάχην*. I do not think that this is a happy suggestion; but I think that *παρατίθησιν*, which he mentions as preferable to *περιτίθησιν* if *μάχην* be retained,

1180 b. 10. is probably the right reading. Where *περι-* and *παρα-* are concerned, we need have little hesitation in neglecting MS. authority, and giving full weight to internal reasons (see note on vii. 3. 14, b. 9). Here *παρατίθησιν* gives the exact meaning required—'the doctor does not prescribe the same treatment to all fever patients; and the boxing-master does not put before all pupils, for their imitation, the same style of defence and attack.'

b. 17. **§ 16. καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα**] *τὸν μὴ τὸ καθόλου εἰδότα* (Paraph.).

b. 18. **δι' ἐμπειρίαν**] The editors quote *Met.* A. 1. 981 a. 12—*πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθόλου γνωρίζῃ, τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσιν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν, οἱ δ' οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.*

b. 23. **§ 17. τάχα δὲ καί**] *τάχα δ' ἂν καί* is the reading of Γ, $L^b$, Ald., $O^b$, CCC, Cambr., NC: *τάχα δὲ καί*, of $K^b$, $M^b$, accepted by Bekker and Bywater. I incline to *τάχα δὴ καί* read by Susemihl after Ramsauer.

b. 30. **§ 18. παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι**] See vi. 8. 2 *τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική.*

b. 31. **ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον κ.τ.λ.**] The editors note that Aristotle is indebted here (§§ 18, 19) to Plato, *Meno* 91 A–100 C, where it is shown that if the sophists cannot teach *ἀρετή*, neither can statesmen themselves, otherwise they would try to teach their own sons. *Cf.* also *Protag.* 319 D, E, 320 A, B. Aristotle's view, we know, is that a father may, as *νομοθετικός*, teach his son *ἀρετή*: it is assumed that, if *νομοθετικός*, he will be able to do so; but the question formally proposed at the beginning of § 18 *πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν*



*τις*; is not distinctly answered here. Indeed, Aristotle seems to 1180 b. 31. forget, in the heat of his attack on the sophists, that this question is before him. The only approach to an answer is (§ 21) that, to people with political experience, the study of codes and constitutions may be profitable.

**οἷον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖς**] So Susemihl and Bywater following $M^b$, Γ b. 34. (so also NC and $B^2$. Bekker reads *οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς*, because $K^b$ and $L^b$ (also CCC and Cambr.) give *ἰατρικοὶ γραφεῖς*.

**δυνάμει τινὶ . . . καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ**] Plato says 1181 a. 2. *Meno* 99 B, C—*εἰ μὴ ἐπιστήμῃ, εὐδοξίᾳ δὴ τὸ λοιπὸν γίγνεται, ᾗ οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἄνδρες χρώμενοι τὰς πόλεις ὀρθοῦσιν οὐδὲν διαφερόντως ἔχοντες πρὸς τὸ φρονεῖν ἢ οἱ χρησμῳδοί τε καὶ οἱ θεομάντεις.*

**καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικοὺς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς**] a. 4. The Paraph. seems to have caught the force of *κάλλιον* here—*μεῖζον γὰρ ἂν ἦν αὐτοῖς εἰς φιλοτιμίαν τοιούτους συντιθέναι λόγους ἢ δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς.* Ambition would urge them to produce such treatises rather than speeches in the law courts and assembly; if they do not produce them, it is because they cannot: just as they do not teach their sons, because they cannot.

**§ 19. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι**] The art a. 9. of statesmanship cannot be formally taught; but this does not mean that it is incommunicable. It can be picked up informally, by those who live constantly in political surroundings: this shows how much 'experience' has to do with its acquirement. We may safely conclude that any one who wishes to become *νομοθετικός* must have 'experience' in addition to (*προσδεῖν* a. 12) 'theory.' Aristotle seems here practically to agree with Anytus, in the *Meno* 92 E–93 A, who says that the young Athenian acquires the *ἀρετή* of an Athenian citizen by associating with the *καλοὶ κἀγαθοί* of Athens, his elders: see the Paraph.—*φανερὸν τοίνυν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο διδάσκειν τὰ πολιτικά, ὅτι καὶ ἐβουλήθησαν ἄν, καὶ ἐδίδασκον· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ φαίνονται διδάσκοντες, φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε ἐδύναντο διδάσκειν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ λόγῳ τινὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀλλὰ ἐμπειρίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν ἡ ἐμπειρία πρὸς τὸ πράττειν συμβάλλεται· γίνονται γὰρ διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας μᾶλλον πολιτικοί. Διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐμπειρίας τινὸς χρεία καὶ συνηθείας.*

**§ 20. ὅλως γάρ . . . a. 15 ἐτίθεσαν**] See note i. 2, §§ 5–7, a. 27, on a. 14. the position of *ῥητορική*.

1181 a. 16. **νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων**] Spengel (on *Rhet.* 1399 b. 9) thinks that Isocrates (*περὶ ἀντιδόσεως*, 82, 83) is alluded to here—*ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐνταῦθα προεληλύθαμεν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους ἀναριθμήτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν νόμων ἐπαινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχαιοτάτους, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς καινοτάτους, οὐκέτι τῆς αὐτῆς διανοίας ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι προαιρουμένοις προῦργου γέγονε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κειμένων, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς δεῖ ζητεῖν ἑτέρους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας πειραθῆναι συναγαγεῖν, ὃ ῥᾳδίως ὅστις ἂν οὖν βουληθεὶς ποιήσειε, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους πραγματευομένοις διὰ τὸ προκατειλῆφθαι τὰ πλεῖστα τοὐναντίον συμβέβηκε· λέγοντες μὲν γὰρ ταὐτὰ τοῖς πρότερον εἰρημένοις ἀναισχυντεῖν καὶ ληρεῖν δόξουσι, καινὰ δὲ ζητοῦντες ἐπιπόνως εὑρήσουσιν.* Much that is interesting and suggestive with regard to the personal relations between Aristotle and Isocrates will be found in Teichmüller's *Literarische Fehden im vierten Jahrh. vor Ch.* Dritter Abschnitt: Fehde des Isocrates gegen Aristoteles und Plato. For a vigorous attack on the 'sophists,' however, see Isocrates *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*. Grant has a good note here—'Aristotle's account of the sophists' method of teaching politics is precisely analogous to his account of the way in which they taught dialectic. He here speaks of their taking a shallow view of politics and making it an inferior branch of rhetoric; and he adds that they adopted a superficial eclecticism, making collections of laws without touching upon the principles from which legislation must depend. They thus imparted mere results, which to those who are uninstructed in principles are wholly useless. In the same way (*Soph. Elench.* 34. 183 b. 38 sqq.) he says that they gave various specimens of argument to be learnt by heart, and that this was no more use than if a person who undertook to teach shoemaking were to provide his pupils with an assortment of shoes.' The method of the modern 'crammer' could not be better described than it is at the end of the *Soph. El.*

a. 17. **ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν**] acc. abs.

a. 21. **τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητόν κ.τ.λ.**] The *ἄπειροι* here, so far as they are capable of passing a correct judgment on the general result, may be compared with the 'amateurs' mentioned in *Pol.* iii. 11. 1282 a. 1 sqq. quoted (vol. i. p. 36) in note on *πεπαιδευμένου* i. 3. 4, b. 23. Or perhaps the Spartans of *Pol.* Θ. 4. 1339 b. 2 may be thought a closer parallel—*ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν.*



At any rate, the point is that only persons practically acquainted with the conditions of a given city can select the right laws for it. 1181 a. 21.

**οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν**] Good laws are produced by those who know the art of *πολιτική* in its highest branch—*νομοθετική*. How, then, can the mere study of these products make *νομοθετικός* one who is *ex hyp.* not yet *νομοθετικός*? It can no more do so, than listening to good music can make one a composer—or reading the 'Lancet,' a doctor. a. 23.

*Τῆς πολιτικῆς* is the reading only of $K^b$. All other authorities seem to have *τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*—except indeed NC, which has *τῆς πολιτικοῖς*.

**§ 21. οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται . . .** b. 5 **ἕξεις**] Grant has a good note here, in which he says that *συγγράμματα* (frequently mistranslated 'prescriptions') are perhaps 'reports of cases' or monographs on particular diseases. b. 2.

**ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ**] See note on i. 3. 7, a. 10. b. 5.

**ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαί . . .** b. 9 **εὔχρηστ' ἂν εἴη**] See *Rhet.* i. 4. 1360 a. 30 *χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαίειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἁρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστιν τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς τὰς τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίας· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.* b. 6.

**ἄνευ ἕξεως**] By *ἕξις* here we are to understand the trained eye which comes from long familiarity with a subject—*διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς* (vi. 11. 6). b. 9.

**εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον**] *Cf.* Philemon (Meineke *Fragm. Com.* vol. iv. p. 34)—*ἥκουσα τούτων αὐτός, οὐδὲ φύεται | αὐτόματον ἀνθρώποισιν, ὦ βέλτιστε, νοῦς | ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγρῷ θύμος· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ | ἑτέρων ἀκούειν καὶ θεωρῆσαι . . . | κατὰ μικρὸν ἀεί, φασί, φύονται φρένες.* b. 11.

**εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.**] *εὐσυνετώτεροι δέ* is contrasted with *τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς* b. 10. Those who have not the critical *ἕξις* which comes only from familiarity with the actualities of

1181 b. 11. political life cannot be trusted to arrive at sound practical decisions regarding the laws and institutions which it is best to select from the *compendia*, although perhaps their study of these *compendia* may sharpen their intelligence for political questions. The merely literary study of politics cannot give a man practical insight (*τὸ κρίνειν καλῶς*), although it may give him a power of superficial appreciation (*εὐσυνεσία*). I think that it is necessary thus to distinguish between *τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς* and *εὐσυνετώτεροι δέ* here, although in vi. 10 *εὐσυνεσία* is simply the faculty *τοῦ κρίνειν καλῶς*.

b. 12. §§ 22, 23.] These sections, evidently added to connect the *Ethics* with the *Politics*, fall under the *prima facie* suspicion which attaches to all such connecting-passages in the Aristotelian writings.

As was pointed out in the *Introductory Note* to this chapter, the theory of life set forth in the *Ethics*, is set forth as one which can and must be realised in practice. The *Politics*, as describing in detail the way in which the theory of the *Ethics* may be realised, thus logically follows the *Ethics* in Aristotle's system. But we do not know what was the chronological order in which the two treatises were composed. The references in the *Politics* to the *Ethics*, as to a work already in existence, count for little or nothing: they are probably due to later editors. But the question of the order in which the two treatises were written—a question which perhaps cannot be settled—is not before us here. If the *Politics* were written after the *Ethics*, they were evidently not written as a mere continuation, starting from the *λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι*, with which the *Ethics* now end. The *Politics* begin (in much the same way as the *Ethics*) as an independent work. The first book of the *Politics* has nothing to do with the list of subjects given here in *E.N.* x. 9. 23. According to this list the *Politics* ought rather to begin with the second book (see Susemihl: *Aristoteles' Politik griech. u. deutsch*, vol. i. p. 72). If Aristotle having written, in whatever order, the *Ethics* and *Politics* as separate treatises, afterwards collected his works into a corpus, he might, of course, add a passage to connect the two treatises. It is indeed highly improbable that he ever collected and arranged his works; but if he did, would he have written a connecting-passage like this? With the *Republic*



in existence—not to mention the *Laws*[1]—could he have said 1181 b. 12. *παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας*? *Aristotle*, I feel sure, could not have said this; whereas the exaggeration would be natural from the pen of an editor in later times anxious to present his Philosopher as the creator of a great self-contained system. A small point may be noticed in passing — it would not perhaps be worth noticing unless suspicion attached otherwise to the passage—the word *ἀνερεύνητον* is a *ἅπαξ εἰρημ.* in the Aristotelian writings[2]. Another (perhaps smaller) point noticed by Ramsauer, is that the phrase *ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια* (Byw., *ἀνθρώπινα* Bek. Sus.) *φιλοσοφία* does not occur in the *Ethics* or *Politics*.

The commentators point out that § 23 is a *διαγραφή*, or rough table of the contents of the *Politics* (omitting the contents of *Pol.* i), according to the traditional arrangement of Books. Thus

*πρῶτον μέν* b. 15 = ii.
*εἶτα* b. 17 = iii–vi.
*θεωρηθέντων* b. 20 = vii, viii.

The epitome of the *Politics* in Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 6. 17—ascribed to Didymus, the instructor of the Emperor Augustus—seems to follow the traditional order of the Books, at any rate, it puts Books vii and viii at the end. For this epitome, see Mullach *Fragm. Phil.* vol. ii. 100, 101, and Newman's *Politics*, vol. ii. p. xvii.

The circumstance that a *διαγραφή* of the contents of the *Politics* is given here (*E. N.* x. 9. 23) is, I think, against the genuineness of

[1] Teichmüller (*Lit. Fehden*, pp. 187 sqq.) founds on the words b. 12 *παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας*, the conclusion that the *E.N.* were published before the *Laws*. He thinks that the *Rep.* is not *περὶ νομοθεσίας*. I cannot agree: and the words b. 14 *καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας* seem to me to ignore the *Rep.* instead, as Teichmüller argues (p. 188), of recognising it.

[2] Teichmüller (*Lit. Fehden*, p. 188 note) makes a very ingenious use of this circumstance in the interest of his theory referred to in the foot-note above—'Ramsauer sagt: "*ἀνερεύνητον* vocabulum apud Aristotelem me legere omnino non memini." Ich meine nun, dass Aristoteles, da er mit den *οἱ πρότεροι* grade den Plato meinte (i. e. the *Rep.*, as distinguished from the as yet unpublished *Laws*), absichtlich einen Platonischen etwas gesuchten und pretiösen Ausdruck wählte, um damit ironisch auf Plato's tiefe Forschung anzuspielen, dessen Gesetze erwartet wurden, aber noch immer nicht erschienen waren (Vergl. Platon. Hippias, p. 298 C). Bei Aristoteles kommt das Wort, wie auch Bonitzens Index zeigt, sonst nicht vor; dagegen ist es Heraclitisch und Platonisch.'

1181 b. 12. the passage. An editor, it seems to me, would be much more likely than Aristotle to give us a *διαγραφή* of this kind.

The last point to notice is b. 17 *ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν*[1]. Grant, following other commentators, understands these words to refer to the now lost collection, known in antiquity as *αἱ πολιτεῖαι*, and ascribed to Aristotle, containing, it would appear, descriptions of 158 Constitutions, Hellenic and non-Hellenic—see Berlin Aristotle, p. 1535 sq. for fragments. Rose (*de Arist. libr. ord. et auctor.* pp. 57, 58) brings forward, as it seems to me, conclusive reasons for refusing to ascribe this collection to Aristotle. If, then, the reference in *ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν* is (as Grant and others suppose) to this collection, we have an additional ground for considering the passage before us to be non-Aristotelian. In the *Politics* Aristotle never refers to a collection of *πολιτεῖαι* as having been made by himself—in the *Politics*, if anywhere, he would be likely to do so, if such a collection had existed; and in the present chapter (*E. N.* x. 9) his tone towards *αἱ συναγωγαὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν* (1181 b. 7) is not that of a man who had himself laid a trap for the unwary by making a *συναγωγή*. On the other hand, if the *συνηγμέναι πολιτεῖαι* mentioned here (§ 23) are merely the *πολιτεῖαι* instanced and discussed in *Pol.* iii–vi, then it must be said that these *πολιτεῖαι* are not accurately described as 'a collection of *πολιτεῖαι*'—*συνηγμέναι πολιτεῖαι*. The writer of this section seems somehow or other to have connected in his mind the *πολιτεῖαι* instanced in *Pol.* iii–vi with the collection known to him as 'the *πολιτεῖαι* of Aristotle.' He probably supposed that Aristotle used that collection as a book of reference when he wrote the *Politics*.

I agree, then, with Susemihl (see *Aristoteles' Politik griech. u. deutsch*, vol. i. p. 71 sqq. Einleitung) that §§ 22, 23 ought to be bracketed.

[1] This paragraph was written before the publication of the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, and is printed without alteration.

# INDEX TO NOTES

[The references are to the pages of these volumes, except under the head 'Textual conjectures, &c.,' where the pages of the Berlin Aristotle are quoted.]

THE END.