

# The Indian Journal of Sociology

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EDITORIAL

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Scientific sociology is a product of only recent times and its influences and the possibilities of its influences on practical social life have not yet been generally recognised or appreciated even amongst those most concerned with the direction of social organisation. We wish here to refer to one particular sphere of such influences, the political. In the past, political theory has centred far too much around the idea of sovereignty, and been absorbed in discussions of abstract principles of the justification of various forms of sovereign power and the limits of its exercise. In the future, it is to be expected that the main discussions will centre around the nature of human values and the forms of government most suited in particular regions for their best attainment.

Sociology seems at the present time to be tending towards a Humanism and Regionalism, which though marked by new characteristics, have much in common with the Humanism and the Civism of Mediaeval Europe. The Humanistic factor is to be seen in the demands for an analysis of human values and a concentration of effort upon their fullest realisation. The tendency to emphasise the importance of functional considerations in the formation of governing bodies reflects the influence of the idea of the

old trade guilds. Regionalism is but another, and somewhat broader consideration of the civic outlook of Mediaeval Europe. Though what is now becoming regarded as Humanism is in empirical basis and in ideal very different from what is implied in the thought of Auguste Comte, it can hardly be doubted that his work gave a definite impetus to the movement. So again the work of Le Play is becoming more and more evident in the Functionalism and Regionalism of modern Sociology. He first brought clearly into relief the implications of due detailed consideration of "folk, work, place" in regard to social life and organisation.

It cannot be said that yet there is any detailed or clear treatment sociologically of the varied contacts and forms of development of relationships between wide social groups such as is involved in an empire or in groups of allied nations. However feeble in actuality, compared with "local" feeling, the sentiment towards a wider cultural unity than the nation (or empire) may be, it would be false to facts to ignore its presence. It rests to no inconsiderable degree with sociologists, especially those concerned with the higher education of future citizens of the world, to cultivate sound opinions on these matters. For, though it may be true, as it appears to us to be that the happiness and culture of the individual depend most of all on the social organisation, government, and life of the city in which he lives and to a less extent upon his country as a whole, it is from outside that the greatest harm may come unless the needs of the wider whole of humanity are rationally considered, and inter-group conduct determined accordingly.

The ideas of modern Sociology are not without importance with reference to political problems in India. In the widest sense the main problem is self government. But here there

are at least two main questions : What should be the nature of government ? and What steps should be taken to reach the form of government most desirable ? In relation to the first question there are two tendencies which do not run parallel : one the traditional form of government and the other the actual forms due in part to the British administration, and along with this influences of Western political theory and practice. There are those who seem to think that the welfare of India is to be promoted by the development of forms of representative government such as are at present in vogue in the West. That some features of Western systems might be assimilated with advantage is probable, even perhaps indisputable, but it is open to serious doubt whether a close imitation is possible or wise. As a matter of fact there is amongst the Western peoples themselves considerable discontent with the present tendencies of representative government formed on the old basis, and there are attempts to formulate drastic changes which may eventually alter the whole character of government.

One would have thought that there would be no need to emphasise the great variety of local conditions in the different parts of India, geographical, racial, and linguistic, cultural and occupational. Yet these differences, and the intense local spirit, are too much neglected not merely by the supporters of the present regime, but even more by the opposing political leaders of the masses who have had little or no experience of practical administrative affairs. For, after all, the local officials of the present system are frequently compelled to attend especially to local circumstances whatever the attitude of the central governing power. It is certainly true to say that, apart from the peregrinating political leaders, and some of the more enthusiastic supporters of the National Congress, the great majority of

the millions of India are concerned first and almost solely with improvement in their local conditions, including the form of government and these local conditions are chiefly rural, for the vast majority of Indians are villagers. The doctrine of Regionalism must lead first to emphasis in India upon local self-government. It is interesting here to note the remark of the Director of the American Geographical Society Dr Bowman: "*India* is not in their minds when they find fault with British rule; they think only of the autonomy of their own district" (*The New World*, p. 46) and further: "The improvement of Indian conditions can be carried on only if attention is paid to the value of the village community as the basis of self-government." p. 48. And in the present condition of education it is partly on the basis of representation of villages, rather than of individuals that some of the members in the provincial and central assemblies should be elected. It is not for us to embark, in the narrow limits of an editorial, on the methods for carrying this out in practice.

The principle of the independent representation of distinct communities has already been admitted and in part carried out in practice. It may be further urged that there ought to be also some functional representation. Each clearly marked occupational group ought to have representatives, not, let it be emphasised, to promote the selfish interests, of the members of the group, but to champion the due consideration of the needs of this particular benefit of the doctors themselves, but to insist on measures necessary for the protection and improvement of health. In functional representation, the proportion of representatives need not vary in ratio with the number of voters. That is, if there were 10,000 doctors, qualified to vote and 50,000 teachers and other educationalists, it would not follow that the latter

would have five times as many representatives. Rather it is probable that for the portion of the Assembly so elected, each group would have an equal number of representatives. It is not improbable that political development in the West may be modified in some such way, as the true implication of modern sociological principles becomes understood, and the full meaning of a constructive rather than a *laissez faire* government appreciated. Considering the ignorance of the masses in India and the relatively high education of the members of many of the trades and professions, an adoption of the method in India might have very valuable results.

Modern Humanism is essentially one which believes in the wealth of life. Here there is a serious question to be settled by Indians. It appears that in the India of the past on the one hand the vast majority have lived in the simplest conditions, while on the other ruling princes and a few have enjoyed the best that could at the time be obtained. It appears almost as if for the masses there were a doctrine of *Maya*, of the transitoriness and illusoriness of "worldly" things, to reconcile them to their condition. On the other it appears almost as if for those in power and luxury there was a doctrine of "*Lila*", divine sport, divine energy manifesting itself in the joys of earthly life. The whole development of the modern democratic spirit, as of the new Humanism, is to go along with the vast machinery of modern civilisation in striving for a rich life for all human beings. For those persons who either from ignorance of or superficial acquaintance with the West call it materialistic, it must be said that the wealth of human life includes higher as well as lower values. The question, therefore, is whether India is to aim at a widespread enjoyment of the best that modern commerce, industry, and education can give, or whether these

are to remain, by principle, with the few while the many continue in lives of uniform almost unchanging simplicity? If the latter, then, the apostle of the spinning wheel is the apostle of India, and this symbol should be made a symbol of a principle to be applied to all sides of life. If not, then surely, there is a call not merely for the most intense development of India's own enormous economic possibilities, but also for the use of the latest help from the most advanced modern science and machinery, and with *this, not a policy of non-co-operation, but the closest co-operation with all peoples who are striving for the enrichment of humanity,—and shall we say, for an increasing participation in the divine sport*

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## AT THE ROOTS OF RACE PROGRESS

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Nothing holds back the individual from achievement more than does misery: nothing is ultimately more destructive of the most pleasing in human character than despair. In relief on a background of experience shot through with suffering, the gospel for the onward march of humanity must include full recognition of the spiritualising character and the motive power of joy. Not from a repulsion from sin, nor from a sympathetic shudder at suffering, but from the enthusiasm for the best and from the happiness of health are effective efforts for advance in culture and civilisation to be inaugurated. Joy, in all of its myriad forms, is an essential element in that ideal life the tendency towards which constitutes progress. And, unless the whole tree of life is to be contaminated, joy must be a cardinal factor in its roots.

There are two roots whence the individuals of the race spring forth which mankind may know indubitably: the emotional (or spiritual, if one will) experience of those who join in union in the act of procreation; and the physical contributions which come from both. Religious faith may reverently believe that the laws of nature in accordance with which births occur are indeed a manifestation of the intelligence, love, and power of a supreme spirit. The proper understanding of the first two factors may perhaps only

come to those who are prepared to recognise in the advances of knowledge of the laws of nature, and in the deeper and wider feeling of the character of love, the progressive revelation of the divine. Those who, hardened into habits of obsolete thought, or whose love and joy is warped must perchance undergo a regeneration, must themselves be 'born again', if they wish to participate in the joyous process of evolving a higher level of individual and social life.

Here, indeed, we are at the roots of progress. Here, we are concerned with those at the threshold and in the prime of manhood and womanhood. Let those who have passed beyond these stages help—if they can understand—help in the diffusion of the knowledge of a full and wholesome life. For the obstructions of the senile, we shall have pity: for the celibate priest who has never felt, we shall have silent good-natured indifference.

The first and most important root is a deep communion of feelings, a profound joyousness in the parents. In spite of exceptions which some may quote, we may accept it as a maxim, that from the most intimately happy relations of husband and wife the best type of parental experience is born. The only true startingpoint for the consideration of the production of a healthy race—sound in mind and body—is the relations of man and wife. It is essential that these be happy. But how much that term denotes we are only now beginning to discover and publicly discuss. For our immediate purpose we will bring some of the salient factors into relief, factors which in our time rightly assume fundamental importance.

Marital happiness depends most obviously on mental and physical health. One cannot look for ideal human happiness in men and women who far from being "a little lower than the angels" are only "a little higher

than the animals". The expansive influence of ideas of history, literature and science and the inspiring and deepening effects of religion, music, and art are necessary for the richest participation in the procreation of those who are to share not merely in the enjoyment of all these things but in their creation. None except the creator of these culture values experiences as he the joy of the creative process involved. And how few of mankind can or do create what is thus of great historic worth! Deeply as that may be deplored, there is a truth of far greater and far happier consequence. A human being has a far more inward, far more glorious, yet far more difficult task—that of the creative development of his own personality and a part in that of the personalities of others, not merely their physical embodiment but more especially their whole psychical character.

The highest human experiences, whether those of religious communion with a personal deity, or of love, or friendship depend almost entirely on the personal characters of those concerned. A broad intellectual outlook, a high moral tone, profound religious feeling, and a refined sensitivity for and an intimate appreciation of the beautiful, all these should be constituents of the personalities of those between whom the highest reaches of the relationship of love are to be attained. For, if we are essentially differentiated from the infra-human by our rational and spiritual nature, it is from this standpoint that the health required for love must first be considered. So regarded, love is first and foremost a uniting of personalities, a harmonising of purposes, a sharing of emotions, a co-operation of wills, an exchange of intellectual and aesthetic vision.

This spiritual health, this cultural outlook, is in large measure socially engendered, in the home, in the school, in the church, in the art gallery, in the theatre, and in the

enjoyment of music. These aspects of the social environment form the essential constituents from which this spiritual root of love must draw its nourishment. If these sources of nourishment are kept ideal, only a pure love will be tolerated. Once cultivate the human spirit up to the appreciation of "the breath of heaven pure and sweet", and it will not stoop to inhale the atmosphere of the sty of Circe.

At this point, it is impossible to refrain from reflection upon some defects of the formalism and the unsentimentalism of far too much of the modern education both of girls and boys, but especially of the former. Modern "Feminism", chiefly connoting that which ought rightly to be called "Masculinism", has been far too much occupied in the claiming of political power and equality and similarity in vocational pursuits. Undoubtedly the bad features of these movements are due to a considerable degree to the development of girls' educational systems along the same lines as those boys and men. One of the most depressing features, from the point of view of our present discussion, is the predominance as teachers in the educational establishments for girls, of women who from the above tendency have become almost unsexed. It is not re-actioary, but an endeavour to abandon an unfortunate path and to take up again with an aspect of the ideal, when we maintain that, except for the minority who look forward to a definite professional career, the home is, as of old, the best "finishing off" school, and the mother the best educatrice for the future lover and mother.

Our educational institutions neglect altogether the development even of the ideas of the companionship and the sentiments of the sexes. This neglect is only equalled by the almost total disregard of attention to the aesthetic. Many girls therefore resort to the cheap novel, and many

boys to idle if not indecent gossip. One doubts whether love is ever allowed to be mentioned in schools for girls; whether the mistresses concerned have ever opened their minds to the thoughts of the poets, supposing they are deprived of the more throbbing reality. Further, and more deplorable, the idyls of love in our prose literature, the beautiful love lyrics and the more powerful dramatic representation of the impulsive force of this greatest and most profound of all emotions, these gems of the products of the human spirit, how rarely do these ever form a part of the nourishment for youths and maidens in whom the tide of sentiment is beginning to rise!

Many of us have given up the idea that solitude can be an attribute of divinity; it certainly is not a characteristic of infra-human life to any marked extent. Thus the Greek adage is discarded. Solitude appears to be one factor in the general perversion of the ideal by a type of hermit. Companionship is a fundamental need of the human spirit. The soul, with its degree of culture, whatever its character seeks consciously or unconsciously for its mate. The higher and the more varied its achievements in the realms of culture values the more definite and persistent will be the demands which it will make in its search for the one who will be the companion in the closest intimacies of love: the stronger will be the repulsion from that which violates its standards. That should be the fundamental principle guiding those who in a positive manner would carry on a radical conflict with deteriorating sex tendencies in the race.

Rarely for those who have come to feel the appeal of personal character does physical beauty play the chief part in the attraction by which mates choose one another. The part it plays varies from individual to individual, and

from time to time. Nevertheless, it is an important factor. There is beauty in robust physical health, and it is an important consideration for race progress not merely to cultivate such beauty, but also to develop an appreciation and admiration for it. The prudery which tends to withhold the human figure from sight is racially detrimental. Children and growing youths and maidens should not be given so false an attitude, but allowed to grow up in natural simplicity in the contemplation of the human form at its best. This may be partly through sculptures and pictures: it may and should also be in the contemplation of the actual living person.

Who, even though he be a poet, may adequately describe the feeling of attraction with which the soul first meets its true mate! It may be but as the zephyr that blows in the early spring morn. Yet, as time brings its closer and more continuous association, it grows in strength, and varied are the manifold feelings which arise. Temperaments differ immensely, but it seems true to suppose that with most at the outset there is little if any conscious desire of physical expression. Nevertheless, men and women being physical as well as spiritual, the emotions eventually demand such expression, in which, with the reactions of body and mind, the feelings are intensified and love reaches its highest. Mere sensualism is only to be effectively overcome by the leading of men and women up to the emotional refinements of the expression of bodily union in genuine affection. At all times, forms of physical expression become a necessity, and as a necessity their satisfaction is not merely physically beneficial but spiritually stimulating and elevating. Times are passing when the healthy minded man and woman will be prepared, even capable, of believing any but good results can come from

the satisfaction of divinely given needs. Here, the physical union is of the happiness and joy of the lovers. That is the conscious purpose at this stage. And not merely at this stage, but as a constantly recurring factor in their lives together, as a manifestation of the eternal youth of their love.

It is surely of profound significance that amongst all peoples, as they have developed, social custom, even religious sanction has striven to protect the unity of relationship thus formed. This social recognition and protection is based on many grounds and is due to many influences: here it is simply necessary to insist on the conscious retention of a general social attitude which has proved so universally beneficial. And, if there is any meaning in religion at all, as affecting things of this earthly life, then the experiences of the relationship of love and all it stands for can hardly but be accorded a place amongst those values which it sanctifies. The institution of marriage is thus a form of protection of the roots of race progress.

As the rising current of sentiment leads to emotion and conscious desire for physical expression, so it appears as a rule only at a later stage that there grows up the desire for the child. For too often in the past and the present the child has come as the result of a conception which when first known was felt indeed as a shock. Fortunately, as so often, men and women have thus done better than they knew. The child, not consciously desired, has become precious and a source of added joy to those who had never dreamed it possible. That is something for which to be in thankful. But, how often is the reverse the case! The child may not only be undesired, but in the circumstances there may be inadequate provision for its healthy rearing.

It would be false to the facts to suppose that in the vast majority of instances of sex union there is a conscious desire for off-spring: we speak here of the intimacies of married love. Far more often and rightly they are the manifestations of feelings of affection. The practice of so-called normal men and women in this matter is likely to receive from science its justification against those who wrongly (and to the detriment of the religion they identify themselves with) maintain that there should be absolute control of sex passion save and except when it is desired that a child shall be born. These unions may, if rightly approached, be so fundamental an influence on the characters of both that the influence will be transmitted not merely physically but psychically (i. e. through the social psychical life of the family) upon any children who may be born.

The pro-creation of children is something distinct from the simple expression of marital affection, and should be treated as such. Here we reach the centre of our subject, to which all else, however significant in itself, is meant to lead up. Race progress depends essentially upon the production of increasingly advancing generations. For this reason now that we have arrived at a stage of human knowledge by means of which births may be more or less deliberately determined, prevented or promoted, the policy for us now and in future generations should be a conscious and deliberate one.

There is at the outset the question of the ages at which individuals should become parents. This does not necessarily correspond to the ages at which they should become lovers. Rather it would seem that the two ages differ to no inconsiderable extent. There are grounds for believing that not merely the joy of the individuals, but for their physical and psychical welfare an early age will come to be recognised as

best for them to enter upon a life of full expression as lovers. We have perhaps to wait a little longer before we can say with certainty that in the sex act there is a transmission of cells not only from the man to the woman but also from the woman to the man which have a beneficial effect on the organisms of both. Such interchange, if it tends to produce a stronger health and a keener vitality should perhaps, for the greatest advantage not merely of these individuals but also of the future children, be carried on for some considerable time before child-bearing is undertaken.

The question as to the ages of the parents of the most healthy children is one capable of being answered with more correctness than has hitherto been the case. The statistics are not yet available from sufficiently wide a range, nor the physiological and psychological conditions adequately understood to give a very definite answer now. But as work upon the question is undertaken in a scientific spirit the greater the probability of an increasingly correct and useful answer. The ages will probably vary with climatic and social conditions. The principle being taught that children should not be born until the individuals who are to be the parents are best fitted for this, it is important at the same time to reiterate that this does not mean the endurance for years of the suppression of the most intimate sex relationship between lovers. And yet this idea that marriage should be postponed till the age for parenthood is too frequently put forward by so-called social reformers. The results are sometimes the rejection of their teaching of a later age for parenthood, or with others a delay of marriage and a resort to prostitutes, or other illicit intercourse.

For race progress it appears to be important both that the joy and other benefits of sex relationship shall be had from a comparatively early age of manhood and woman-

hood and that the procreation of children shall be postponed for some time after marriage. There is thus the necessity for some means of controlling conception.

The fact that amongst most peoples there have been in use methods for limiting the number of children to be reared is in itself significant. To survey these methods would be an interesting and useful anthropological and sociological study. At the lowest levels have been the practices of infanticide and abortion. The development of civilisation has led to measures against both. Not merely law but social custom and individual sentiment have effectively checked the former, and, though unfortunately to a less degree, the latter also. That there is no small number of cases of procured abortions in even highly civilised communities is a fact which none with thought for the moral and physical effects on the mother—as of the moral effects on the father—can view with equanimity. If we are rightly informed the indigenous methods in India, the use of certain seeds and oils, have the effects chiefly of abortives. Some aboriginal tribes of Australia have a method of perforating the base of the male organ in such a manner that the semen flows out from the cavity made instead of being ejaculated into the woman's body. When conception is desired the cavity is filled and the semen takes its normal course. Again, it appears that even in Biblical times the method of withdrawal, so that "he spilled it on the ground" (Genesis xxxviii 9.) was in use. But all such methods may be regarded as pre-scientific, and for various reasons they have received condemnation. The Australian method mentioned, as well as that of withdrawal tend alike to deprive the woman of her satisfaction in the intercourse as well as benefits which it is becoming believed accrue through the absorption of the substance into her body. To other

effects of such methods on the nervous system we need not here refer.

The advances of knowledge have rarely in themselves correlative moral advances. Increased knowledge may often be turned to the increase of the effects of evil conduct as to the increase of the effects of good conduct. But this is no reason to deny or to refuse to use the knowledge for good ends. The modern methods of contraception, based on the advance in physiology are becoming generally known, and will become known, whatever the objection of "pious" opponents, by those given to licentiousness. And this is a thing to be thankful for; the fewer children such persons produce, the better for the race. But the information concerning these methods is needed also for those who can use it for good. It is needed for those who attracted by the highest ideals of love, and thus repelled from all base promiscuity which is so detrimental to the individual and the race, desire and we may almost say should desire to enjoy the bliss of marital affection before the time when either emotionally or from the point of view of physical and social circumstances it is fit that they should be parents. The giving of the best information on these subjects should be a part of the education of every adult citizen.

As with all individuals there is an age before which, in view of race progress, they should not become parents, so with some individuals on the ground of some certainly congenital disease on the part of one or both, it may be necessary for social advance that no children shall be born to them. But it must often be in the highest degree undesirable that they shall be deprived of their emotional expression in marital association. And it is indeed quite improbable that they would deprive themselves. For these the knowledge is necessary. Further there is also an age

with most individuals, which may come long before the age of physical impossibility, after which they are unlikely to produce more children healthy in body and of normal mentality. Here again resort of the best methods of control should be encouraged.

We are at the roots of race progress when we urge that the life of the sexes should be so regarded that from the time when the threshold of manhood and womanhood has been definitely crossed right up to the time of what we may, for want of a better term, call the death of sex desire, there shall be opportunity for full satisfaction within healthy and ideal marriage, that during the years of this life together children shall be procreated when and to the extent that total conditions so far as known make it probable that they will be healthy and have opportunities of satisfactory rearing. That is the aim, slow though the progress towards it may be. The greater the advances along these lines, the more will prostitution and all similar evils detrimental to race progress be undermined. This is the only constructive method of social reform in these matters, and the only one which does justice to the emotional and physical needs of men and women. It is naturally on these aspects of the subject that we would prefer to dwell: but it is impossible to limit ourselves to them if we are to face the difficulties fully.

There is another side to this subject, one the more distasteful and repulsive the more one enters into the spirit of the ideal relationships of the healthy family indicated in the previous paragraphs. This side is that of the sex diseases which strike at the roots of race progress. The matter is one of the most urgent social importance, and it is the obligation not merely of administrative officials, but of all who can influence social customs and practice to think

over the various problems raised and to use their power towards enforcing definite social policies.

Two problems arise in connection with sex diseases from the point of view of race progress: their prevention and their cure. These must be considered separately. Public opinion and legal enactments should be concerned with both. For here it is not merely those who are already affected or who lead licentious lives whose welfare is involved. It is the health of the innocent who may indirectly become contaminated. It is not simply a question of altruistic motives for the welfare of those who may be quite unrelated to us, but in self-protection and in protection of those beloved children who may be born to us in the circumstances of joy.

At the outset of the consideration of this matter from the social point of view it should be clearly understood that it is not one to be "played" with. Socially we must indeed be firm. He or she who steals my health, or that of those dear to me, steals from me just as truly as one who steals my physical wealth or my good name. The conscious spread of disease is as much a crime as stealing or assault, and it may be in its degree much worse. This is a subject for definite and rigorous legislation. It is not that everyone comes by the diseases in what we may call an immoral manner. This may frequently be far from the case. But while still suffering the disease to act so as to contaminate others, and not to take the best available steps to get cured—these should certainly be ranked with crimes. And rigorous punishment should be meted out to those who are discovered so acting.

As the first requirement in the systematic social effort to remove these diseases from the roots of race progress must be set the notification of the disease to the office of health for the district. This must usually be regarded as 'confi-

dential " information as regarded from the point of view of the medical profession. But it must be insisted that there are definite limits to the secrecy to be maintained. For example, the secrecy ought not to be kept in relation to the husband or wife, or prospective husband and wife. Either there must be isolation for a necessary period, and the secrecy kept, or if there is to be no isolation then the other party is so intimately concerned that the secrecy should not be maintained. It is to be hoped that as public opinion is educated up to it, it will be a custom to require as a normal practice before marriage a clean bill of health.

Prostitution is an old and wide spread evil. Considering human nature as it is at the present level, it is open to serious doubt whether any policy of Abolitionism could be successful, even whether it might not do more harm than good in that it would tend to drive the practices into even greater secrecy than at present. But something must be done with relation to this source of so much contagion. We are not concerned now with the treatment of those who seduce and entrap girls into this type of life : no punishment or social disabilities seem to us too severe for all such. The present laws of all countries are far too lenient. Penal servitude which will put an end to their activities in this direction is perhaps the most appropriate punishment. To stop the supply of prostitutes is to attack the root of the matter at a fundamental point. Procurers of all kinds should be most severely punished. If they are allowed to persist, brothels must be known and inspected. The inspection must have in view two things. It must be seen that none of the inmates are kept there against their will. It must insist on provisions to protect the health of the women and those who visit them. A fine should be imposed for every woman found there in a diseased condition and she

should be withdrawn to some hospital until her condition has sufficiently improved. The protection referred to must be the provision of means for proper cleanliness and for disinfection both before and after association.

Undoubtedly an important factor in relation to prostitution is alcoholic drink. If a man is under its influence he is less able to control himself and so more easily places himself in danger in these ways. Further, he will hardly be able adequately to protect himself through disinfection. It would therefore strike at another fundamental root of the evil if the consumption of alcoholic liquors were made illegal in brothels.

It may be long before marriage of sexually diseased persons can be prevented or those who contract disease isolated for a time for the possible degree of cure. And yet the evil of transmission of the disease is a present reality. It behoves us therefore to take what steps we can for the present to prevent its spread. There is, for example, the protection of the wife from a husband who has become contaminated, or vice versa. It is little use saying that a noble partner will then avoid association with the other; if there were "nobility" of character in any real sense there would rarely be such contamination. Some possibilities of accidental contamination through no fault of one's own must not be overlooked. There are urgent reasons why the knowledge of the most effective disinfectants and the ways in which they should be used should be widely diffused. On the other hand is the possibility of the production of contaminated children: this should be avoided by the use of methods of contraception.

To spread the knowledge of means of prevention, and to insist on them is only part of necessary social action in regard to this problem. Of equal importance is the cure of

those diseased. Notification, without provision of the best means of possible cure, is little better than useless. Those who are able will be allowed to notify through their family doctor, if he is included in the list of those qualified for such cases. Special wards in general hospitals should be provided for the worst cases, and there should be free treatment for all unable to pay for it. At the same time strong measures should be taken to suppress quack remedies and their advertisement in any form. It may be urged that the costs of the machinery for notification and provision of medical facilities for cure will be a high one. Nevertheless, there are sufficient reasons for believing that the costs would be far more than compensated for by savings effected on other sides as a consequence of thus attacking the problems of health at the roots.

If we now glance even rapidly over the conditions in India and consider them in relation with the preceding reflections, we shall notice at once some very definite requirements.

It has been urged above that the conditions most likely to lead to a physically and mentally healthy race include in large measure the genuine mutual attraction of the parents, in other words, on a cultured and romantic love. Not for a moment would any sane sociologist suppose that there is not this in a perhaps not inconsiderable measure in India, or that Indians are incapable of its highest reaches. The fact would seem to be that social customs have tended to suppress it, to make it for most virtually impossible. The purdah system, and the fact that marriages are nearly all simply arranged by parents or other mediators, and this not infrequently when the parties are quite young, militate effectively against any such development of romantic love. Then, even supposing there

were more freedom leading to the possibility of mutual attraction, caste restrictions would form a very rigid barrier in some instances. Undoubtedly caste restrictions with reference to marriage have had in the past, and may have in the present, good reasons and some good results, but their rigid application is detrimental. We see, therefore, that to apply the ideas of the former part of this discussion to Indian peoples involves very radical changes in the main attitudes to the steps leading up to marriages.

Supposing, again, that the knowledge of modern scientific methods of contraception were widely diffused in India, there would be a great need here for a supply of the commodities to be used, at very cheap rates, for the poverty of the masses of the people in India is indeed great. The use of the best means of birth control would result, it may be hoped, in reducing to some extent the pressure of population in the course of time, and thus to a decrease in poverty and an increase in the general level of physical health and strength. We believe that methods at once sound, generally effective, yet at the same time at a low price, can be devised to meet the conditions.

To judge by the large number and the frequency of advertisement for aphrodisiacs and quack remedies in relation to sex to be found in Indian periodical publications, there must be a great demand for them and, as the advertiser knows, the advertisements tend to increase the demand for aphrodisiacs. Some statistics in relation to these advertisements were given in a former issue of this Journal. Such advertisements, and the transmission of circulars of similar nature through the post should be made illegal. But along with this there must necessarily be adequate and known provision of the best means of cure for sex disease, impotency, etc.

We may now summarise the contentions of our discussion. Race progress depends both on the production of generations of increasing physical and mental health, and on the elimination of the physically and the mentally diseased. The most important factor in regard to both is the cultivation of the ideal aspirations of a cultured romantic love as giving the joy which should dominate family relationships, and be the most powerful preventative against modes of conduct likely to sully those relationships. For the physical and mental (including the emotional) welfare of the adults the relationship of married love should be entered into as early as circumstances allow after the threshold of manhood and womanhood has been crossed and a true mate and lover has been found. But only at a later date should children be sought from the relationship, and this should be deliberate at the time when there is a probability of a healthy child and satisfactory conditions for rearing. That this may be deliberate means of control of conception should be used, and these should be in accordance with the most advanced results of modern research. Such methods of control should also be used to prevent the birth of a probably diseased child. Besides this prevention of new unfit individuals, there must be a systematic warfare against the sex diseases which gnaw at the roots of race progress. An inevitable necessity in this connection is the compulsory notification of such diseases, and of the provision of the best means of cure. Further the means of disinfection should be known and their use insisted on as far as possible where there is danger. This would involve the inspection and control of brothels, so long as it may be regarded as the less of two evils to let them exist. To undermine these, rigorous steps should be taken to prevent the recruitment of women for them.

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## THE PROBLEM OF SELECTION IN HUMAN SOCIETY\*

Bernard Bosanquet

1. What right have we who are not expert students of the sciences of physical life to approach this difficult problem, involving, as it must, so much of the theory of evolution? We answer that we are compelled to act, and therefore it is inevitable that we should judge. *Who* are we that are compelled to act? In the first place, everyone, in some degree, aspires to influence, or at least to criticise, the behaviour of the social authority in face of fundamental social problems. Secondly, every individual has to govern his personal conduct and to frame his share of public opinion, and ought to desire to do it upon rational grounds; and, last but not least, the typical example of civic responsibility, the heads of every household, and the parents of every family, have to take action on all-important matters of the kind in question. Consider for a moment this last-mentioned case. It is at once the type and the justification of the citizen's continuous effort to subordinate to the general uses of life a complex of sciences and services which he is inevitably incapable of mastering in his own person. Every householder, more particularly if he is a parent, has to deal with a great variety of specialists, with none of whom he can compete upon their own ground. Clergymen, educators, doctors, dentists, architects, builders, sanitary engineers, or inspectors, all providers of special commodities, you may say—with all of these the citizen has to help

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himself to construct his life and that of his dependents. The ultimate judgment rests, and must rest, with him. It is impossible that he should allow any specialist to run, as the phrase is, his household or his family. In this respect the citizen is the type of the statesman and the social reformer. They, like him, stand for the main conduct and purposes of life. In view of these, they have to act, and inevitably, therefore, they must be allowed to judge. And the same thing is true of the social student, who is, as Aristotle would have regarded him, in training to be a statesman.

What he has to do, in problems where science most obviously impinges upon social practice, is to note and to survey the information which it appears to him to furnish, to point out the practical questions which it appears to him to raise, and further questions which in the light of social knowledge it seems to force him to ask, and ultimately to indicate the general line of social action which seems at the moment to meet the greatest part of the requirements which the discussion has brought to light.

Nothing could be more modest than the attitude required of him, but, also, nothing could be more decisive. He need not say he is right; but he must say that in the use of his discretion, from which he cannot escape, he is, in view of all considerations, acting for the best.

2. Following the method I have indicated, I will begin by trying to survey what we seem to learn from what is unambiguous in the utterances of recent science on the problem of selection in human society, and by trying to point out that the position of the thoughtful reformer is in some ways made more and not less perplexing by recent views of heredity. This point is only noticed to illustrate our need of self-consistent information from the

scientific side, and the sort of perplexity to which thoughtful men are liable in turning to practical account such information as they can obtain.

Forty years ago it seemed plainer sailing than now. Everything, we believed, might be inherited,<sup>1</sup> and there was a rising feeling for abstaining from marriage in the case of any defect which medical opinion pronounced 'hereditary.' I cite some sentences from Jowett's 'Introduction to Plato's Republic,' published in 1871. 'Owing to the very conditions of their existence (people) become emaciated, and hand on a similar life to their descendants.' 'When, again, in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day, 25 or 30 years before, on which, under the fairest auspices, amid the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined hands with one another?'—'The late Dr. Combe is said by his biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage because he knew that he was subject to hereditary consumption. One who deserved to be called a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing a black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him that, being liable to outbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the natural impulse of affection; he died unmarried in a lunatic asylum. These two little facts suggest the reflection that a very few persons have done from a sense of duty what the rest of mankind ought to

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1. Presumably it was believed (see first quotation from Jowett) that to an indefinite extent improvements or deterioration effected by the environment in individuals would pass into the inheritance of the stock, so that selection should have seemed not to be the unique method of improvement, but, for all that, its value was evident.

have done under like circumstances, if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were about to bring into the world.'—'The prohibition ( of such marriages ) in course of time would be protected by a *horror naturalis* similar to that which in all civilised ages and countries has prevented the marriage of near relations by blood.' We should certainly have counted alcoholism among these strictly hereditary taints.

I cite these sentences only to show how relatively simple the problem then appeared, when we held that practically everything was inherited, and how ready thoughtful men were to act as scientific opinion appeared to indicate. To-day, with an equal readiness to be guided on the part of thoughtful men, the matter has become to the layman rather more difficult to grasp. I suppose that no disease depending on a microorganism can be called strictly hereditary in the sense of being a character inhering in the continuous root-stock—the germplasm—on which all individuals are buds. ( Of course, certain terrible *infections* are transmitted direct to offspring, but that is another story. ) So that our old simple faith in hereditary disease has now to be replaced by a belief in inborn immunity on the one hand, or susceptibility on the other, to the assaults of the microbes. You do not inherit consumption; you may inherit a want of immunity against it, and this has to be the support of our good old conviction that people with phthisical tendencies had better not marry. So with other defects than zymotic disease; it is not so easy to obtain a unanimous verdict that alcoholism and lunacy, and feeble-mindedness itself are inborn peculiarities, root-stock attributes of particular strains, heritable in the normal course of things. Even if we are clear that a susceptibility 'to the charm of alcohol' ( Dr. Archdall Reid's poetic phrase ) is existent in certain strains,

and can only be extirpated by selection, we are discouraged on the whole from believing that the effects of alcoholism are handed down to children in the form of degeneracy, *e. g.* of mental defect.

We may take as a type of the advice now offered to us the conclusions of the Royal Commission on the Feeble minded. As regards congenital mental defectives, you can condemn—whether or no you legally prohibit—fertile marriages absolutely. As regards lunatics, you can justify no general prohibition, and you cannot set out clearly in general terms the conditions under which they are permissible. The practical instruction is more complicated by conditions than it was 40 years ago

The three great cases in which multiplication is now accepted as undesirable are, as I gather, those of people very susceptible to tuberculosis, those of people very susceptible to ‘the charm of alcohol,’ and those of congenital mental defectives. About *e. g.*, the ‘emaciation,’ to use Jowett’s word, of slum-dwellers, we have lost the simple faith that it naturally survives in the children of those who suffer from it, and this is replaced, as it seems to me, by no clear showing whether the fault is degeneracy and the remedy selection, or the fault is too little to eat, and the remedy more food,

The light we have to-day seems certainly to spring from a deeper truth than we possessed 40 years ago. But its range is very decidedly narrower, and surveyed as a whole, the unanimous guidance to be obtained from science on the principles of social selection is not enough to constitute a theory of the subject adequate to direct social practice. We can all see, we have all long seen, the enormous importance of carrying it into action by the discouragement or prevention of multiplication in such cases as those already

spoken of. But when we get beyond these rather simple points we find that the guidance is no longer unanimous

3. Passing beyond the attempt to arrest the multiplication of strains that are definitely defective in marked characters, taken with good reason to be inborn, we come to a further demand for a positive policy of social selection. I am glad here to quote with the heartiest agreement a sentence from Major Leonard Darwin's inaugural address of last year:—  
' In all cases where different lines of advance are open to us there is a danger in attaching too much importance to any contrast between them ; for the citadel of evil should be attacked on all sides at once if our forces are sufficient for such a movement. '

Still, our instructors, even those of them who most clearly maintain the non-inheritance of acquired characters and the general principle of natural selection, do not speak at all with one voice when they come to deal with problems of human society. Within their ranks, and without in any way reviving the problem whether or no the parents' acquirements are reproduced in the natural growth of the offspring, there is a division of opinion which for social practice seems to the layman to be absolutely fundamental.

(i) Starting from the doctrine that nothing but inborn characters are transmitted from parents to children, we yet know next to nothing for practical purposes unless we also can estimate the differences of reaction to which the same set of inborn characters will give rise under different surroundings. Do inborn characters, for example, determine the physical and mental development of persons with the same sort of fatality with which they determine the colour of their eyes or their power of twitching their ears? I will state the problem in a pre-scientific form in order to suggest that as a consequence of the work of science up to

to-day we have it upon us again. Robert Owen, at a public dinner given in Glasgow to Lancaster, the educationist, in the year 1812, expressed the following opinion:— 'If any number of children were exchanged at birth between the Society of Friends, of which our worthy guest, Joseph Lancaster, is a member, and the loose fraternity of St. Giles' in London, the children of the former would grow up like the children of the latter, prepared for every degree of crime, while those of the latter would become the same temperate, good, moral characters as the former.'<sup>a</sup> The passage does not mention physical characters; but, in fact, such physical characters as depend upon use for their development are included in the corresponding modern view, and I shall treat the problem as concerning them no less than mental and moral properties.

The question then is this: Ruling out *definite* inborn defect, with which we have already dealt, can it be said that the general difference of mind and body between one social stratum and another is a difference depending on inborn qualities, due to social sifting, and only to be removed by selection; or is it simply a difference produced by the environment, *e. g.* want of proper food and housing and parental care, in generation after generation as it arises, and capable therefore, *prima facie*, of being removed by alteration of the surroundings within the period of growth of any one generation? Could the members of one social stratum be transformed into members of another, mentally and physically, by an alteration of their circumstances from birth upwards? Or does the inborn nature, which it is now agreed that all creatures inherit, tie down the so-called inferior classes to a narrow groove of capacity and behaviour which distinguishes them permanently and inevit-

ably from their so-called superiors; almost, indeed, as a different variety of the human species? In yet another form of words: Can we judge from the social position and the actual fortunes of a man or woman—a pauper or a casual labourer, or a starveling—whether they are desirable physical parents for the coming generation, or is social misery and misfortune compatible with an inborn nature capable of very different responses to wholly different stimuli?

The question is, as I said, how far the same inborn characters may be capable of giving rise to widely different responses under widely different stimuli. When we believed that practically the whole parental life-history tended to be inherited by, to pass into, the child, the answer was a foregone conclusion. Now that we are taught that the child rather mimics the parent in consequence of a common germinal starting point, than carries over character out of the parents' actual development of brain and body, the question has to be restated. We now have it suggested that a leading inborn character of human beings, acquired by selection, actually consists in the ability to acquire by use enormously different dexterities and convictions and forms of intelligence. Thus, as I said, the layman appears to encounter within the ranks of the purest selectionist orthodoxy, and altogether apart from any revival of doctrines of use-inheritance, a difference of opinion which for his purposes is fundamental. Is all solid and permanent social improvement to be dependent on selection, and on such selection as shall favour the classes now considered 'superior' in character and ability? Or has selection, except in case of the definite defects above dealt with, really little to say to the development of characters socially and humanly desirable?

Here is a significant quotation from Mr. De Morgan's novel, 'Alice-for-Short':—

' "How came you to go in for Mental Cases?" she asked.

' "I was a Mental Case myself<sup>3</sup> Here. Acute suicidal mania. Then I married one of the attendants."... "Mr. Gaisford is at Witley just now, That's the Convalescent Home. That's where I met him. We've no children. But I shouldn't have been the least afraid. I saw you thought of inheritance?" Alice nodded.

"There was nothing to inherit. I was as sane as you are now. But under the same circumstances you would try to kill yourself. It was the only thing a girl of sixteen, in her senses, could try to do, that I can see." Then, dropping her voice, though there was no one near, the nurse told Alice her story.'

I think common-sense tells us that there must be cases like this. What proportion of the cases are like this is a further question.

I will cite a characteristic passage from Huxley<sup>4</sup>:—' In a large proportion of cases crime and pauperism have nothing to do with heredity; but are the consequences, partly of circumstances and partly of the possession of qualities which under different conditions of life might have excited esteem and even admiration...The benevolence and open-handed generosity which adorn a rich man may make a pauper of a poor one; the energy and courage to which the successful soldier owes his rise, the cool and daring subtlety to which the great financier owes his fortune, may very easily, under unfavourable conditions, lead their possessors to the gallows or to the hulks. Moreover, it is fairly probable that the children of a "failure" will receive from their other parent just that

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3. The nurse who speaks is a nurse in Bethlehem Hospital—'Bedlam.'

4. *Evolution and Ethics*, p 39.

little modification of a character which makes all the difference.' Dr. Archdall Reid, I gather, practically agrees. Bar the consequences of feeble-mindedness and susceptibility to alcohol, and certain terrible *infections*, and we may say that the lowest population has descended 'though sheer misfortune, including the great misfortune of a bad mental training.'

And, of course, we cannot help noticing for ourselves such extraordinary sudden changes as the adoption of a new civilisation by the Japanese within a single generation. So that, while by no means asserting that all men are equal in inborn capacity, we cannot help wondering whether the limitations of character and ability are so strictly drawn by inheritance as a purely selectionist policy would imply

(ii) This line of thought suggests interesting considerations regarding the recent diminution of the birth-rate, and its selective operation which is alleged to be unfavourable to the superior stocks.

I will take the second point first. The inferior stocks, we are told, are less affected by the diminution of the birth-rate than the superior stocks, and therefore the inferior type of man and woman is tending to predominate and the superior is tending to extinction. Now, I suppose that we are not to doubt the existence of stocks of superior capacity, and if we knew which they were, and if we knew in what degree their capacities were socially desirable, and those of others which we should call inferior could without danger be dispensed with, all possible discouragement of the multiplication of the latter and encouragement of that of the former would be a desirable social policy. But at this point there is a suggestion that strikes me very forcibly. This argument about the selective birth-rate is surely an old one, and originated in a controversy within the limits of which

it was an obvious truism. But in its present and wider application it is no longer a truism, but an allegation of fact which demands to be supported by strictly relevant evidence.

When the older Malthusian ideas were in the air, and prudence and self-control were held to be equivalent to the avoidance of a long family, it was a simple truism to retort: 'Then the selective birth-rate must always be unfavourable to the classes endowed with prudence and self control.' And this was an unanswerable objection to the pure prudential theory. But when we have come to consider that the question of population is not so much quantitative as qualitative ( because there are some people who would always be superfluous, and others who never could become so ), then, if we are going to identify the inferior stocks with the lower social strata, we have our work cut out for us. If we are convinced that the poorer classes, either by having long families or simply by being the poorer, have *ipso facto* established their lesser inborn capacity—their lesser degree of fitness—then we may lament the appearance of a selective birth-rate in their favour. But in the allegations current on this subject I seem to myself to see far too little discrimination, and I suspect this want of discrimination descended from the times when it seemed a truism that a long family proved inferiority. 'The feeble minded are highly prolific, though with a high death-rate.' Well, their case and that of one or two more types is clear, and we have dealt with it and ruled it out.

But when we go on to speak, for example, of casual labourers and criminals in the same breath with the feeble minded as a class whose relative fertility is a danger to society, we wonder to what precise proposition we are to be committed. Criminals are a very large class; we saw

what Huxley said of some of them. Casual labourers are a class including very many and varied elements. Bear in mind that we no longer hold the parent's acquirements during his life history to be transmitted to the child. From the point of view of heredity his fortunes only concern us as *evidence* of his transmissible qualities. From other points of view, of course, they concern us in other ways. But here we are speaking of heredity alone. I do not think we can be sure that our rough classification of types of labour corresponds with any sets of inborn qualities, desirable or undesirable. We must remember the history of the English labouring class. Their position is not the result of a general social sifting from an equal start. Historically, they have been handicapped,<sup>5</sup> and I do not believe that the social position of individuals among the body is a trustworthy index to their transmissible qualities. Besides, unless a man's inborn qualities are very highly independent of the stimulus to which they have to respond, any favouritism, so to speak, exercised in encouragement of the fertility of the so-called superior classes or stocks would tend to disturb and might destroy that very utterance of their capacities, which has made us think them desirable types of citizens. We will return to this below.

And when the fear of the selective birth-rate is dispelled the diminution of the rate of increase of population loses its principal terrors. Its true moral seems to me to be the extraordinary sensitiveness of the population rate and its amenability to fashion and prevalent conviction. Huxley, writing in 1894, still thought the increase of population a leading perplexity of statesmen. We had been taught this doctrine for nearly 100 years, and in the life-time of the older among us a whole-hearted crusade and propaganda

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5. T. H. Green, *Principle of Political Obligation*, sect. 220.

sprang up to enforce the doctrine. You will still find many people, who ought to be well informed, in the grip of the old population scare, and quite unaware of the diminishing birth-rate, or else welcoming it. The new state of things has hardly been for five years distinctly before the mind of society.<sup>6</sup> My point is that though many factors, some of selfishness, have co-operated, the facts and the fashion have, on the whole, adapted themselves to the doctrines and convictions are being, by the logic of facts, seriously modified. I see every reason to expect that the sensitiveness which has shown itself in one direction will show itself under modified influences in another. And considering the ultimate difficulties of the problem in both directions it appears to me that this extreme sensitiveness of the social reaction is a thing to be glad of. Its moral is, I believe, that the growth of population is very capable of adjusting itself to the needs and prospects of the human race, as presented to the social mind for any fairly continuous period.

(iii) Thus no need is made out, I venture to submit, for applying, in any direction, the method of positive artificial selection or encouragement of multiplication. I cite a judgment of extreme importance from Professor Bateson's work on Mendel's 'Principles of Heredity' :- 'To the naturalist it is evident that, while the elimination of the hopelessly unfit is a reasonable and prudent policy for society to adopt, any attempt to distinguish certain strains as superior, and to give special encouragement to them, would probably fail to accomplish the object desired, and would

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6. It must be remembered that the actual total increase of population, as distinct from the percentage rate, is so far--e. g., for England and Wales--enormously greater in the last decade than it ever has been before.

certainly be unsafe.<sup>7</sup>

I will only repeat that if the qualities which it is desired to promote are, as we have seen to be suggested, capable of widely different developments according to difference of stimuli, the means employed to promote selection or to endow motherhood—with whatever object—might very well be found to destroy what they were intended to elicit. The physical heritage might be the same, but its consequences different, both in parents and children.<sup>8</sup>

4. Our instructors seem then to have brought us to this point. They advise, unanimously, a definite acceptance of a policy of elimination, so far as parentage is concerned, with regard to certain very strictly limited types of unfitness. And we see every reason to put their instruction in practice. When we further ask whether the conceptions of the unfit and the fit can safely be applied in the comparison of social strata, with a view to the discouragement of certain strains as inferior apart from defects specially diagnosed, and of the encouragement of others as superior, there seems to be a fundamental division of opinion. And according to our attitude towards these opinions there would also be raised certain further problems as to the scare of the falling birth-rate, at least in English-speaking populations,<sup>9</sup> and of the alleged selective birth-rate which is held to be operating unfavourably to the superior strains. It is presupposed that here, as throughout, we treat separately the question of defects that can be

7. The continuation of the passage, in which the author assigns his reason, is cited by me in C.O.R. XXVII, p. 76.

8. I am glad to find myself here in agreement with Dr. Salceby, *Sociological Review*, October, 1910, p. 278.

9. Because for them we can date the rise and expansion of a certain propaganda,

diagnosed and that of presumptions drawn from social position and good or ill 'success.' We concede the fertility of the feeble-minded, and are prepared to take them out of the problem. But when this is done, it seems to us that a question remains whether other selective birth-rates are as bad as they are painted.

Evidently we are in a difficulty when we try to go beyond the elimination of certain very definite unfitnesses. A man's or woman's life-history does not tell us for certain what their inborn qualities are. We do not know how much is to be attributed to variation of environment. Nor do we know what inborn qualities are in the long run socially desirable. It is to some of us a repulsive idea that we should try to breed up a society of the general type of 'successful men.' The roots of good life, we feel, probably lie somewhat deeper than that.

In this uncertainty, then, we are recommended by very good advisers to operate on the individuals of each generation through the environment. Huxley and Dr. Archdall Reid urge this policy; and Major Darwin, as we saw, was careful not to repudiate it utterly. True, by this policy you primarily touch the individual only and the one generation only. But suppose the individual to be suffering, not from want of inborn qualities, but from want of the environment necessary for their favourable development! And we do not seem to know that it is not so; or that it is not so in a certain proportion of instances. A man may be thin because he is one who can never get fat, or because he has not enough to eat. If there are both kinds of cases, it is a serious matter to neglect the second kind. Then it would seem that a policy of improving the environment is necessary, certainly in some cases, and we cannot really tell in how many. Well, then, why not? Improve the

housing, the feeding, the sanitation, and the medical treatment of the people. Build up a perfect environment by force. This is what, in our doubt, we seem to be driven to ; and the authorities, who have brought us so far, leave us, we are inclined to think, without much further guidance.

But here we remember that there are other considerations—partly urged by some of our authorities, partly within our own experience.

(i) Outside the definite unfitnesses which we have admitted and supposed to be dealt with, everyone, as I understand, would agree that there would probably be a large, though unknown, amount of defectiveness and inferiority, which is really due to inborn characters, and can be amended by no variation of surroundings. This factor, whatever its amount, can be dealt with by selection.

It would be foolish to take up a method which should wholly abandon all regard for selection, *i. e.* to make no attempt at all to favour the predominance of good stocks in so far as they may be presumed to fulfil certain general conditions. Can we then lay down general conditions which will tend to differentiate our social methods in favour of good stocks, even when we cannot say precisely in what inborn characters the excellence of the stocks consists ? I believe that we can, and I shall endeavour, in concluding my remarks, to explain this possibility.

(ii) Our authorities<sup>10</sup> have named the *modus operandi* through the environment, but have not told us much about its nature. But it is plain, from what has just been said, that it cannot be without influence on the general problem of selection. If we proceed by guaranteeing the best surroundings equally and unconditionally to all comers, we shall lose every chance of differentiating in favour of the

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10. *E. g.* Huxley and Dr. Archdall Reid.

better element which we presume to exist, and we shall incur the dangers of promoting parasitism. Now we are not advocating a general *regime* of hardship. It is clear, I suppose, that where general hardship stamps out the weak, it often weakens those who would have been strong; so that as a selective agency it is wasteful and ineffective. But we are saying that in human society, when you set to work improving surroundings, there are many things to be thought of. You must secure certain safeguards. You must obtain certain responses and reactions. You must, in a word, maintain a standard demand on the objects of your treatment; and this standard demand, as we are now to see, will keep you straight from the point of view of selection, while guiding you, or by guiding you, in your operations on environment.

5. I suggest, then, in conclusion, that there is a social policy and attitude which will guide us fairly right in the main over the whole area of the problem of social selection, which is very much wider than the question of the elimination of the definitely unfit. To this policy and attitude I should give the name of maintenance of the struggle for existence in the social sense, or the maintenance of natural selection in the social sense of that term.

The conception is definite, and requires definite explanation. With a view to this we must revert to the full meaning, as Darwin laid it down, of the phrase, 'struggle for existence.'<sup>11</sup> The important point is that the expres-

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11. When Darwin says in the passage here referred to *Origin of Species*, ed 6, p. 48, that he uses the phrase in a metaphorical sense, he obviously means that it has a wider and pregnant significance. I think it is to be regretted that Dr. Ward has laid hold of the term 'metaphorical,' and used it to disparage the significance of Darwin's usage. *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 272.

sion does not, as is often stated, primarily imply the alternative of life or death for the individual. The struggle for existence, he tells us, is really a struggle for success in leaving progeny. And in dealing with creatures to whose progeny parental care is essential, we may surely at our own risk add to Darwin's words, 'Success in leaving progeny,' the further qualification, 'Themselves likely to be successful in leaving progeny.'

Now in the animal world, and also in a great degree among the human race, there are two kinds at least of success in leaving progeny. There is a high fertility, without special command of the resources of life or special parental care, and there is a high degree of parental care and command of the resources of life, with often a more moderate, but not necessarily a low fertility. It is plain that the former is relatively likely to fail in the second qualification of success, that the progeny left shall be likely themselves to succeed in leaving progeny. In other words, such fertility will be liable to a high death-rate, though not necessarily one which will destroy the whole preponderance given by the fertility. For that result we are looking to other causes.

The former kind of fertility is what we admit to exist in the feeble-minded, and perhaps in some other and analogous types<sup>12</sup>. But these types we have urged throughout, so far as definable, should be taken out of the problem by segregation. We could then go forward to lay down the nature of the social struggle for existence, with a view to the promotion of the other type of fertility (with its greater chance of success in leaving progeny themselves successful) on the basis of Darwin's statement. Success

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12. We saw that it is a very doubtful proceeding to apply this idea of undesirable fertility to whole social strata indiscriminately.

in the struggle for existence, in the social sense, would then mean success in leaving progeny, such as themselves to be successful in leaving progeny. And, mere excessive animal fertility being ruled out, we could say that on the whole the means to this success would be, on the one hand, such discharge of social function as would confer a command over the resources of life; on the other hand, the capacity for sound family relations and adequate parental care.

On this basis we could advocate a policy and attitude of what I have already called natural selection in the social sense, consisting in the maintenance of the struggle for existence in the social sense. This policy and attitude, conformably with the meaning which we have ascribed to the struggle for existence, has nothing to do with the maintenance of a hardship of conditions such as to endanger individual life. It is not true, as is often asserted, that natural selection operates exclusively through the destruction of individual existence. The point is not existence, but parentage. Social natural selection and the social struggle for existence operate essentially through the prevention or discouragement of mating, and may be brought into action through the most various forms of policy in matters of public assistance, through public opinion, and the education of the public mind, passing also into the province of private opinion and conduct.

The attitude and policy here advocated would be, in a word in every way to maintain and enforce the normal social demands as test-conditions of parentage. The normal social demands, I mean, on both sides; both in the discharge of social function as instrumental to an adequate command of the resources of life, and in the apparent will and capacity to enter upon parentage as a matter involving the foundation and government of a household, and complete parental care.

It is objected, I know, that these are not normal social demands; that as things are the individual has no difficulty in mating without conforming to any test-conditions whatever. To this I reply that the most frequent and alarming cases of such multiplication are ruled out by the policy which all through we have presupposed, and that though sound family life with high parental care may be outstripped in its results by this and that excessive fertility, yet it always tends to give a reliable birth-rate with a low death-rate—a strong probability of the progeny being themselves successful in leaving progeny—and must tend to become the normal and adequate source of sound population in as far as the lower types of fertility are socially discouraged and ruled out.<sup>13</sup> And it presupposes capacities and conditions which are perfectly well understood, and which have a sound claim to be recognised as the normal social conditions of mating. Such recognition, public and private, would constitute the healthy social policy and attitude which is here advocated.

The point in this conception which I am particularly anxious to insist upon, and to distinguish from other views, lies in the acceptance of actual social functions—of the power and will to render service in the given social commonwealth as a condition precedent of fitness for mating. This point makes our conception fundamentally distinct from all, of whatever school, which set up theoretical judgments, ethical or biological of qualities of persons, as grounds for accepting and endowing them with a view to mating; whether by endowment of motherhood (otherwise than through fatherhood),<sup>14</sup>

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13. We saw above what a sensitive thing the birth-rate is, and how capable according to all analogy, of recovering itself, if the desirability of a recovery should be urgent.

14. Here I agree with Dr. Saleeby, *Sociological Review*, l. c.

or by bonuses to selected families, or simply by a lavish policy of public assistance to those who without it could not maintain a household. This is why we insist on the term "natural" in our definition of social selection. We do not imply an infra-social struggle by remorseless competition; we do mean a maintenance of normal social responsibilities and demands. Society is not itself perfect, nor a perfect standard of human capacity. But it is the best we have, and infinitely more to be trusted than the theory of any individual. It springs out of our manifold needs and powers, and is far more liberal, many-sided, and natural than the knowledge and judgment of any man, or of any science. If this policy is here maintained, then, that we shall be right on the whole if we demand that the individual who aspires to parentage shall be *voll*, complete or adequate, as tested by *de facto* will and capacity to give a value in the way of social service for which a return adequate to self-support is received from society. This will and capacity, as tested in life, and the apparent will and capacity to found and govern a household, are the tests and pre-conditions of mating according to the policy and attitude of natural selection in the social sense.

This policy and attitude, as it appears to me, meets the requirements both of improvement through selection and of improvement through the environment. It maintains a standard, a social demand, as the pre-condition of mating. It rejects those who *cannot* come up to it, presumably owing to inborn defect, and so far, I suppose, satisfies the selectionist. It also adjusts the improvement of surroundings so as to reject those who, in spite of offered opportunities, *will not*, as we commonly say, come up to it. That is, those who, having nothing apparently to prevent them but a lack of their own exertions, fail *de facto* to meet the requirements

which it imposes. In this way it prescribes the right course for those who try to effect improvement through surrounding.

Thus it is the only kind of selection which is really practicable in the case of moral beings of apparently full calibre. At the same time it is the only guide to the true method of amelioration through the environment. You cannot select or reject moral beings by mere inspection at a given moment; you cannot possibly judge in that way of their capacities for development, always supposing the unfitnesses of which there are clear and direct physical or mental signs to have been eliminated by other methods. Again you cannot make moral beings into what you want by modifying their surroundings. They must co-operate; and to make them do this you must hold up a demand before them.

Thus the simple and adequate policy is to set the standard which you hold socially necessary, and which we say is provided for you by normal society. Then you 'select' by rejecting those who *cannot* come up to it; and you 'improve through environment' by requiring all who are to profit by your improvements to meet them by certain reactions and responses; and by rejecting those who *will not*. And for the application of the method it is not necessary to be able to distinguish those who cannot meet the standard because they have not capacity, from those who will not, because they will not use the capacity. Whether they cannot or whether they will not they are unfit for the social right and duty of parentage.<sup>15</sup> And selection, or the

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15. Therefore I am not so much alarmed as many good judges have been, if it is to be doubtful whether alcoholism is a cause of filial degeneracy. No one has said that an alcoholic person is a good head of a family, whether or no he may be a safe parent physically. And, not being likely to be a good head of a family, a social standard would reject him.

right kind of improvement through environment, takes place automatically if only the standard is maintained.

How is it possible to maintain a standard which requires you to reject people from mating? Well, all sorts of means of discouragement, public and private, are in our power. And it is all-important to note this, and not to fancy that you can do nothing unless you see the unsatisfactory individual. I have had in mind to a great extent the policy of public assistance authorities, and various proposals for the artificial encouragement of population. Against all these I advocated our 'natural' standard of selection. Then there is the action of parents and guardians dependent on the education of general opinion; and ultimately the action of the women themselves. Let them raise the standard which they demand of their mates, and the battle is won.

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( Sh. Br. II. 2. 2. 19 ) A man becomes sacrificially impure on account of his speaking untruth. ( Sh. Br. I. 1. 1. 1 ) Truth is the special virtue of gods, as lying is the vice of Asuras; and though truthfulness exposes its devotees to vicere trials at first, it ultimately triumphs. " Two-fold, actually, is this, there is no third, viz. truth and untruth. And verily the gods are the truth and man is the untruth. Therefore, in saying I now pass from untruth into truth, he passes from the man to the gods. Let him then speak only what is true; for this vow indeed the gods do keep, that they speak the truth; and for this reason they are glorious; glorious therefore is he who, knowing this, speaks the truth." ( Sh. Br. I. 1. 1. 4-5 ) " The gods speak nothing but truth, and the Asuras nothing but untruth. And the gods, speaking the truth diligently were very contemptible and very poor: whence he who speaks the truth diligently were very contemptible and very poor: but in the end he assuredly prospers, for the gods indeed prospered. And the Asuras speaking untruth diligently thrive as a salt soil, and were very prosperous: whence he who speaks untruth diligently, thrives indeed, even as a salt-soil and becomes very prosperous; but in the end he assuredly comes to naught, for the Asuras indeed came to naught." ( Sh. Br. IX. 5. 1. 16-17 ).

All deceit and falsehood are strongly condemned in the Rigveda " The gods Aryaman, Varuna, Mitra are the chastisers of all guilt and falsehood." ( Rg. VII. 60. 5 ) " Oh Indra, overcome and drive the false afar." ( Rg. IX. 45. 6 ) " Burn up the fool who ruins truth with falsehood." ( Rg. X. 87. 12 ) " Let arrows pierce the liar in his vitals." ( Rg. X. 87. 15 ) " Whatever sin is found in me, whatever evil I have wrought, if I have lied or falsely sworn, waters remove it from me." ( Rg. I. 23. 22 ) Gods

## TRUTHFULNESS

### *A Chapter in Hindu Ethics*

Maganlal A. Buch

The conceptions of Truth and Law were at first hardly distinguished from each other. Truthfulness is such a fundamental moral conception that it is often considered identical with morality itself. "The Law is what is called the true, and if a man declares what is true, they say he declares the Law; and if he declares the Law, they say he declares what is true. Thus both are the same." ( Br. U. I 4. 14 ) Truth is then conformity to Law; and falsehood is conscious breach of Law. "All falsehood, Mitra-Varuna! Ye conquer and closely cleave unto the Law eternal." ( Rg. I. 152. 2 ) "The Babe Unborn (Sun) supporteth the worlds' burthen, fulfillst Law and overcomest falsehood." ( Rg. I. 152. 3 ) "Thrice, Agni, let thy noose surround the demon who with his falsehood injures Holy Order." ( Rg. X. 87. 11 ) Law or Truth supports the very foundation of the universe. "Truth is the base that bears the earth; by Surya are the heavens sustained. By Law the Adityas stand secure and Soma holds his place in heaven." ( Rg. X. 85. 1 ) "And by his ( Indra ) truth supporteth earth's foundation." ( Av. XIV. 1. 1; Rg. X. 111. 4 ) "He lays it down so as not to be separated from the truth; he thereby establishes the earth on the truth; hence this earth is established on the truth; and hence the truth is this earth, for this earth is the most certain of these worlds." ( Sh. Br. VII. 4. 1. 8 ) Truthfulness gives a man as much strength as the performance of a sacrifice.

protect and strengthen the true people and punish the liars. "The prudent find it easy to distinguish the true and the false; their words oppose each other. Of these two truths which is the true and honest, Soma protects and brings the false to nothing." (Rg. VII. 104. 12) "Never does Soma aid and guide the wicked or him who falsely claims the warrior's title, Who slays the friend and he who speaks untruly, both lie entangled in the noose of Indra." (Rg. VII. 104. 13) "Agni, to us with speech that hath no falsehood grant riches." (Rg. III. 14. 6) Hell is the creation of the untrue and the faithless. "They who are full of sin, untrue, unfaithful, they have engendered this abysmal station." (Rg. IV. 5. 5) All double-dealing, slander, breach of contracts are considered different forms of falsehood. "Guile follows close the men who are untruthful" (Rg. II. 61. 5) "The sinful man who worships not Oh Agni, who offering naught, harms us with double-dealing, be this in turn to him a double sentence: May he distress himself by his revilings." (Rg. I. 147. 4.) "Whom accuses me with words of falsehood when I perceive no way with guileless spirit, may he the speaker of untruth be, Indra like water which the hollowed hand compresses" (Rg. I. 147. 4) "Men who lead evil lives, who break agreements, and injure Varuna, Aryaman and Mitra, against these foes, Oh, mighty Indra, sharpen as furious death the bull of fiery colour." (Rg. X. 89. 9).

Truthfulness was one of the fundamental essentials of moral life as pictured in the Ramayana. It was held in almost divine regard by the Hindus. "Kingdom is essentially based upon truth; and this world itself is established in truth. Saints and celestials regard truth alone as the most important. In this world a truthful person attains the regions of Brahma. Untruthful persons harass people a

such as serpents. In this world virtue, which is said to be the root of everything, is itself established in truth. In this world truth is the Lord; in truth is established righteousness. Everything has truth for its basis. No convention is superior to truth. The Veda, which inculcates duty, sacrifice, Homa and asceticism, is based on truth... We have heard that the gods and the Pitris (ancestors) do not accept offerings from one inclined to untruth, or who has unsteady and of volatile faculties. This duty of maintaining truth, whose influence radiates all over one's soul, I certainly find to be the prime one; and this burthen has (I presume this) been borne by worthy people... The earth, and fame, and renown, and auspiciousness pay court unto the truthful person. The good follow truth;—therefore, truth is to be sought by all." ( R. II. 109; 10-22 ) Rama says to the councillors:—“ That assembly is not an assembly where there are no old men, nor are they old men who do not dwell upon religious topics. That religion is not a religion where there is no truth, and that is not the truth where there is hypocrisy. Those councillors are liars who do not give proper replies in time on the subjects on which they are well-informed. He who does not give reply to a question under the influence of passion, anger, or fear, binds himself with a thousand nooses of Varuna and at the expiration of full one year he is released from a single sin.” ( R. VII. ऋक्षस्य सर्गः 3. ) Here the conception of falsehood is extended; *all suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi* ( suppression of truth and suggestion of falsehood ) is mere lying. Dasharatha Rama says: “ I desire neither dominion, nor happiness, nor the earth, nor any object of enjoyment, nor heaven, nor life, all I wish for is that you may not come by falsehood and abide by truth.” ( R. II. 4. 47-48 ) The regard for truth expressed itself in the

regard for one's promises. Vasishtha thus advises Dasharath, "Do thou maintain thy habit of adhering to promise; for does not behove thee to act unrighteously. If having promised 'I will do so' thou dost not act up to thy word the merit thou hast achieved by digging shall come naught, therefore do thou renounce Rama." (R. I. 21. 7-8) Kaikeyi asks of Dasharatha the fulfilment of his word, "Do thou by proving true to thy word become the king of kings; and preserve thy race, character, and birth. Truthful speech, say the ascetics, is of supreme welfare unto men in the next world" ( R II. 11. 29 ) " If, Oh monarch, having conferred the boon, thou repentest afterwards, how O hero, wilt thou speak of thy righteousness in the world? What wilt thou answer?...Surely Oh Lord of men thou wilt bring disgrace unto all the monarchs ( of thy line ), since having conferred the boons this very day thou speakest otherwise. Shaibya granted his own flesh unto the bird in the matter of the hawk and the pigeon. And Alarka having granted his eyes ( unto a blind Brahmin ) attained excellent state. And the ocean, having bound himself by promise, never passes beyond his shores." ( R II. 72 39-44 ).

The supremacy of truth over other virtues is spoken of in very eloquent terms in the Mahabharata : " Those cognisant with virtue and morals have said that truth and honesty are the highest virtues. Virtue that is eternal is difficult of being understood. But whatever it is, it is based on truth." ( Vana. 202 42-43 ) " Holding all the Vedas in memory, or ablutions performed in all the sacred waters, may or may not be equal to telling the truth everyday in one's life. A thousand horse-sacrifices and truth were once weighed in the balance. It was seen, that truth weighed heavier than a thousand horse-sacrifices.

It is by truth that the sun is imparting heat; it is by truth that fire blazes up; it is by truth that the winds blow; verily everything rests upon truth. It is truth that satisfies the deities, the Pitris and the Brahmins. Truth has been said to be the highest duty. The Munis are all devoted to truth. Their prowess depends upon truth. They also swear by truth. Hence truth is pre-eminent." (Anu. 110. 29-32) "He who is addicted to falsehood hath neither this world nor the next. Such a person fails to rescue his (deceased) ancestors. How again, shall he succeed in doing good to his (unborn) progeny? The (reward of sacrifices and gifts, as also of fasts and religious observances, are not so efficacious in rescuing (a person from evil and hell) as truth in both this and the next world. - Truth is the one undeteriorating Brahma. Truth is the one undeteriorating penance. Truth is the one undeteriorating sacrifice. Truth is the one undeteriorating Uadla. Truth is awake in the Vedas. The fruits attached to truth have been said to be the highest. From truth arise righteousness and self-restraint. Everything rests on truth." (Shanti. 197. 67-76) Truth is the foundation of all morality; because it leads to knowledge of what is right; and practice of what is right depends upon this mental illumination. "Untruth is only another form of darkness. It is darkness that leads downwards. Those who are afflicted by darkness fail to behold the lighted region of heaven. It has been said that heaven is light and hell darkness. The creatures that dwell in the universe may obtain both heaven and hell. In this world also, truth and untruth lead to opposite courses of conduct such as righteousness and unrighteousness, light and darkness, pleasure and pain. Amongst these that which is truth is righteousness; that which is righteousness is light; and that

which is light is happiness. Similarly that which is unrighteousness is darkness; and that which is darkness is sorrow or misery." ( Shanti. 188. 1-5 ) Even the Vedas cannot purify a liar. " The Vedas never rescue from a deceitful person living by falsehood. On the other hand they forsake him while he is on his death-bed, like newly fledged birds forsaking their nests." ( Udyoga. 35, 53 ) No association of men is possible if man cannot trust man and society will be dissolved. Even an association of robbers or thieves or rebels must be pledged to maintain truth among themselves; otherwise confidence, the only bond of union will be lost and they will collapse. " Even the sinful and ferocious swearing to keep the truth among themselves, dismiss all grounds of quarrel and uniting with one another set themselves to their tasks, depending upon truth. If they behave falsely towards one another, they would then be destroyed without doubt." ( Shanti. 265. 10-11 )

A spirit of uncompromising adherence to truth is commended. " But know, Bhima, my promise can never be untrue. I regard virtue as superior to life itself and a blessed state of celestial existence. Kingdom, sons, fame, wealth, - all these do not come up to even a sixteenth part of truth." ( Vana. 34. 22 ) " There is this, moreover that both the Kurus and the Brahmins assembling together, speak of thy firm adherence to truth, in that thou hast never from ignorance, from meanness from covetousness, or from fear uttered an untruth." ( Vana. 33. 77 ) " They that always speak truth in this world even when life is at stake and that are exemplars for all creatures to imitate, succeed in overcoming all difficulties." ( Shanti. 110. 11 ) " Oh Satyawati, I repeat the pledge I once gave, viz I would renounce the three worlds, the empire of heaven, or

anything that be greater than that, but truth I would never renounce. Earth may renounce its scent, water may renounce its moisture, light may renounce its attribute of exhibiting forms, the atmosphere may renounce its attribute of being unperceivable by the touch, the sun may renounce its glory, fire its heat, the moon her cold waves, space its capacity of generating sound, the slayer of Vritra his prowess, the god of justice his impartiality, but I cannot renounce truth." ( Adi. 112. 15-19 ) There is something inexpressively grand in this attitude. It is the spirit running riot, intoxicated with its own superiority over circumstance. Truth also raises its devotees almost to the height of divinities, when it is perceived in this lofty fashion. " Both the earth and the firmament *एतन्* owing to my truth and virtue; fire yet burneth in the world of men, owing to my truth and virtue. Never hath a word spoken by me been untrue. It is for this that the wise adore the truth." ( Adi. 87. 46 ) " I do not remember having told a single falsehood even in jest. Let my father-in-law and mother-in-law hold their lives by virtue of that truth." ( Vana. 298. 101 )

Lying is of various degrees of guilt, according as the circumstances under which it is practised vary. " He that speaketh a lie on account of an animal casteth from heaven five of his sires in the ascending order. He that speaketh a lie on account of a cow casteth from heaven ten of his ancestors. A lie on account of a horse causeth the downfall of a hundred, and a lie on account of a human being, the downfall of a thousand of one's sires in the ascending order. An untruth on account of gold ruineth the members of one's race, both born and unborn, while an untruth for the sake of land ruineth everything. Never speak an untruth for land." ( Udyoga. 35. 44-45 ) ( M. VIII. 98-99 )

The attitude of perfect honesty is especially necessary in the presence of very important or learned or intimate persons. "One should never appear deceitfully before a king; nor before a Brahmin; nor before one's wife when that wife is possessed of every wifely virtue. Those who appear in deceitful guise before these three very soon meet with destruction. The power of kings consists in their sovereignty; the power of Brahmins conversant with the Vedas in the Vedas. Women wield a high power in consequence of their beauty, and youth and blessedness. These three are powerful in the possession of these powers. He, therefore, that is desirous of accomplishing his own object should always approach these three with sincerity and candour. Insincerity and deceit fail to produce success." (Shanti. 325. 72-74) A king Lomapada by name, was guilty of a falsehood towards a Brahmin. The result was that all Brahmins deserted him and even there were no rains in his territory owing to his sin. (Vana. 111. 20)

There are certain occasions on which lying is allowable. "It has been said, Oh king, that it is not sinful to lie on the occasion of a joke, in respect of women sought to be enjoyed, on occasions of marriage, in prospect of immediate death and the loss of one's whole fortune. Lying is excusable on these five occasions." (Adi. 76. 24-23) A literal adherence to truth would make us all perhaps pure matter-of-fact fellows. Humour requires that there should be a certain elasticity in our talk, that the materials of our conversation must be a little malleable in the interests of social pleasure. The most truthful person can indulge, therefore, in untruthful statements by way of joke. Rama says to Surpankha that Laxman was unmarried and was desirous of having a wife. (R. III. 18. 3-5 etc.) In such pleasantries it was quite allowable to make statements which may

not be strictly true. " A falsehood spoken for saving the life of a good man ( falsely accused of an offence ), constitutes no sin; but such a lie for the sake of saving the life of a wicked person should never be told." ( Gautama. XIII. ) The magnitude of the guilt of falsehood varies with the motives of the agents or with his state of mind. " For giving false evidence out of lust one shall be punished with a fine of two thousand and five hundred Panas; for giving false evidence out of anger or spite, the penalty shall be a fine of three thousand Panas; for giving false evidence out of ignorance one shall be punished with a fine of two hundred Panas; while the penalty for giving false evidence through inadvertence shall be a fine of a hundred Panas." ( M. VIII. 121 ) " An untruth spoken by an angry, elated, frightened, agonised or a greedy person or insane person, constitutes no sin." ( Gautama. V. )

The anecdote of Yudhishtira shows that the ideal is this: Truth under all circumstances is preferable to falsehood; but that it is better to indulge in some falsehood for the sake of other important ends, to incur all the necessary sin on that account and to get the necessary punishment for it. Life is not a smooth, clear-cut thing; simple formulæ will not suit it. Its complexity would require a corresponding complexity in morality which is to guide it. " If Drona fighteth for even half a day, I tell thee truly, thy army will then be annihilated. Save us then from Drona ! Under such circumstances falsehood is better than truth ! By telling an untruth for saving a life one is not touched by sin. There is no sin in untruth spoken unto women, or in marriages, or for saving kine, or for rescuing a Brahmin." ( Drona. 191. 45-48 ) Drona was to be paralysed by the circulation of the report of the death of his son, Ashwathaman. At that time an elephant called

Ashwathaman was killed. Yudhishtira was asked to say that 'Ashwathaman was killed', because in him Drona had complete confidence. Fearing to utter an untruth, but earnestly desirous of victory, Yudhishtira distinctly said that Ashwathaman was dead, adding indistinctly the word 'elephant' (after the name). (Drona. 12. 54) For this act of deception he had to see hell. The following passage shows that it is not meant that lying even on exceptional occasions is quite an allowable thing. "Unto children, and women, in jest, danger, or calamity, in distress or at dice, I have never spoken a falsehood ! By that truth ascend thou to heaven ! I can, O king, give up all objects of desire and enjoyment, my kingdom, yea life itself, but truth I cannot give up ! By that truth ascend thou to heaven !" (Uhyoga, 122. 9-10).

There are three moments in truthfulness : the heart must sincerely feel one thing, or the head must clearly conceive one idea; then the tongue is to express it and lastly it is to be embodied in a concrete activity. It is when these three factors are closely interconnected that a man is said to be truthful. There must be first fidelity to fact or intuition of the heart; secondly fidelity to the inner idea in utterance; and lastly fidelity to both the idea and the utterance in the actual achievement. The Hindu view always insisted upon this unity of thought, word, and deed. "Having first settled a thing mentally, it is expressed in words, and then it is carried out in practice." says Savitri. The definition of a good man ( *सद्गुरु* ) is: "The speech reflects the soul and the action corresponds to the speech. In the case of good persons there is uniformity of thought, word, and deed." Truthfulness however is a delicate duty; and when other more important interests suffer, a bare adherence to truth cannot

be recommended. The concept of truthfulness, therefore, is widened; and this extended notion takes in all other important virtues. "It is the dictum of the ages that the ways of righteousness are subtle, diverse, and infinite. When life is at stake and in the matter of marriage, it is proper to tell an untruth. Untruth sometimes leads to the triumph of truth, and the latter dwindles into untruth. *Whichever conduces most to the good of all creatures is considered to be truth.*" (Vana. 213. 3-4) "Leniency is the best of virtues, and forbearance is the best of powers, the knowledge of our spiritual nature is the best of all knowledge, and truthfulness is the best of all religious obligations. The telling of truth is good, and the knowledge of it may also be good, but what conduces to the greatest good of all creatures is known as the highest truth." (Vana. 215. 46-47) It is by the application of this test that all apparent exception to the duty of veracity can be explained. "Righteousness was declared for the advancement and growth of all creatures...Sometimes men (robbers) desirous of obtaining wealth of someone, make inquiries. One should never answer such inquiries. That is a settled duty. If by maintaining silence, one succeeds in escaping, one should remain silent. If on the other hand, one's silence at a time when one must speak arouses suspicion, it would be better on such an occasion to say what is untrue than what is true. This is a settled conclusion. If one can escape from a sinful man by even a (false) oath, one may take it without incurring sin...When life is at risk, or on occasions of marriage, one may say an untruth. One who seeks for virtue, does not commit a sin by saying an untruth, if that untruth be said to save the wealth of others or for religious purposes." (Shanti, 109. 11-21) Truthfulness is not an isolated virtue; it must be rendered duly consistent

with or subordinate to the whole scheme of righteousness. " Silence, it is said, is better than speech; if speak you must, then it is better to say the truth; if truth is to be said, it is better to say what is agreeable and if what is agreeable is to be said, then it is better to say what is consistent with morality. " ( Udyoga. 36, 12 ) Truth is, in fact, fidelity to the highest order of Reality. It is therefore defined as " immutable, eternal, and unchangeable. " " Truth as it exists in all the world, is of thirteen kinds. The forms that truth assumes are impartiality, self control, forgiveness, modesty, endurance, goodness, renunciation, contemplation, dignity, fortitude, compassion, and abstention from injury. These are the thirteen forms of truth; *Truth is immutable, eternal, and unchangeable...* Those thirteen attributes, though apparently distinct from one another have but one and the same form, viz. truth. All these support truth and strengthen it " ( Shanti. 160. 3-10; 22-26. )

Truthfulness has a two-fold aspect; one has reference to society, and the other has reference to self. The former is frequently emphasised because it is the outer aspect of the question and the one which concerns society more directly. The social bond consists in mutual confidence which depends upon the amount of veracity in a people. But falsehood is not only the violation of what we owe to others it is also the violation of what we owe to ourselves. In this sense, veracity may be defined as fidelity to self; and this is sufficiently comprehensive :—

" To thine own self be true, Thou canst not then be false to any man. "

The social aspect of veracity is clear. Language is the one bond which makes society possible; and if this very language is perverted in the interests of a man's designs, it is evident that society loses its cohesion. " All

things are inherent in the meanings of ( spoken ) words, all things are founded on speech; all things emanate from speech; *he who speaks falsehood is said to be a universal thief.* " ( M. IV. 256 ) But one injures his own self as much as he injures society by misrepresentation. " His self is the witness to his own self ( i. e. to all his acts ); self is the refuge of self; hence by bearing false witness *one must not insult his own self.* Miscreants think that there is none to witness their secret vices; the gods and their inner selves are the witnesses to their misdeeds. " ( M. VIII. 84-85 ) " Knowing everything, O monarch, how canst thou, like an ordinary person, thus say that thou knowest not ? This heart is the witness to the truth or the falsehood of this matter. Therefore, speak truly without degrading thyself. He who being one thing representeth himself as another thing to others, is *like a thief and a robber of his own self.* Of what sin is he not capable ? Thou thinkest that thou alone hast knowledge of thy deed. But knowest not thou that the Ancient, Omniscient One ( Narayana ) liveth in thy heart ? He knoweth all thy sins, and thou sinnest in His presence ! He that sins, thinks that none observe him. But he is observed by the gods and by Him also who occupies every heart. The sun, the moon, air, fire, earth, sky, water, the heart, Yama, the day, the night, both twilights, and Dharma, all witness the acts of man ! Yama, the son of Surya, takes no account of his sins with whom Narayan the witness of all acts is gratified ! But he with whom Narayana is not gratified is tortured for his sins by Yama ! Him who degradeth himself by representing his self falsely the gods never bless ! Even his own soul blesses him not. " ( Adi. 98. 5-14 )

Perjury is a specially condemnable form of lying because through it, justice is liable to be perverted. " Giving false

evidence and killing a friend, these two crimes are equal to the drinking of spirituous liquor," ( Vishnu XXXVI. 2 )

" A witness, who has spoken in the assembly of venerables ( in court ) anything other than what he has actually seen or heard shall be ousted out of heaven, and fall headlong into hell after death. A witness, who alleges truth in his deposition, attains the exalted regions after death and acquires excellent fame in this life; this is a statement which Brahma has approved of. Truth purifies a witness; and it is truth that augments virtue; hence witnesses of all castes must speak truth." ( M. VIII 81-83 ).

" He ( i. e. the judge ) shall say unto a Brahmin ( witness ) ' speak ' ; ' speak truth ' unto a Kshatriya; by the sin of stealing the cow, gold, or seeds he shall charge a Vaishya witness to speak truth; and a Shudra ( witness ) by all sins". ( M. VIII. 88 )

Terrible punishment is the lot of the perjurers. " To regions which are said to be reserved for killers of Brahmins and women, for infanticides, for the violators of friendship and for the ungrateful, go ( the souls of ) those who speak falsehood." ( M. VIII. 89-90. 93 ).

False evidence given in respect of land is more sinful than that given in respect of gold, human beings, horses, kine, and other animals. ( M. VIII. 98-100 ).

Motives are also taken into account in adjudging the crime. " False evidence is said ( to proceed ) from greed, ignorance, fight, friendship, anger, desire, foolishness, and juvenile fickleness. For giving false evidence out of greed, out of mental agitation, out of terror, or out of affection, one shall be respectively punished with a fine of a thousand, two hundred and fifty, one thousand, and a thousand Panas." ( M. VIII. 118. 120 )

Here, too, in certain cases it is excusable to bear false witness. " A witness, who out of compassion, has knowingly stated a fact otherwise than it is in reality, shall

not be ousted out of heaven, since such a speech is called divine allegation. In cases where the allegation of truth would lead to the execution of a Shudra, Vaishya, Kshatriya, or a Brahmin, a witness is warranted to speak falsehood. In such a case a lie is greater than truth. Such ( false ) witnesses shall worship the deity of speech with offerings of sacrificial porridge, that being a good expiation for the sin of speaking such lies." ( M. VIII. 103-105 ). Wilful maintenance of silence is equivalent to perjury. " Those who, though acquainted with the facts, and appointed to give evidence, stand mute, are equally criminal with, and deserve the same punishment as false witnesses." ( Vishnu VIII. 37 ).

If any sin is committed in the presence of an assembly, the whole assembly becomes responsible for it. Men are not merely to do right and abstain from evil; they are to stop the actual evil if they are in a position to do so. A passive attitude in such circumstances is very iniquitous. An aggressive crusade against evil is what duty requires us to do. " If the members of an assembly are conversant with morality, nothing improper should be permitted by them to happen. Where, in the presence of the virtuous members of an assembly, righteousness is sought to be overpowered by unrighteousness, and truth by untruth, it is these members that are vanquished and slain. When righteousness, pierced by unrighteousness, seeketh the protection of an assembly, if the arrow is not extracted, it is the members themselves that are pierced by that arrow. Indeed, in that case, righteousness slayeth the members of that assembly like a river eating away the roots of the trees on its banks." ( Udyoga. 95 47-57 ). " All the members of the tribunal, in which truth ( or justice ) and falsehood is not pierced by the needle of justice, should be regarded as

smitten with impiety. Rather one should not attend a tribunal, but once there, he must speak nothing but truth; by keeping silent or speaking falsehood in a tribunal, a man becomes guilty of vice. The members of a tribunal, wherein truth is killed by untruth, and virtue by vice are killed by that sight. A quarter part of the ( sin of ) injustice goes to the person making the false complaint; a quarter part is attached to his false witnesses; a quarter part is attached to the members of the tribunal; and another quarter part is attached to the king. ' ( M. VIII. 12-14. 18. ).

Swearing is an allowable and even a necessary practice under certain circumstances. " In a suit without witnesses, the truth should be ascertained by causing the contending parties to swear or affirm an oath. The gods and great sages have sworn determining the truth (in suspicious cases); Vasishtha swore in the court of king Paivana. " (M. VIII 109-110 ). " An oath ( falsely made by a husband of many wives as to his preference to one of them, present at the time ), as well as that made in respect of a matrimonial ( negotiation ), in respect of forage for cattle, in respect of fuel, or the one made for the advancement of a Brahmin, does not entail any sin. " (M. VIII 112). Oaths should not be taken on any and every occasion. " A wise man should never wantonly swear for a small thing; by unnecessarily swearing a man is destroyed both in this world and the next. " ( M. VIII. 111 ). One should swear by that which is dearest to him. " A Brahmin shall be caused to swear by truth; a Kshatriya by his weapons and riding animals; a Vaishya by his cattle and seed-grains; and a Shudra by the sin of all the crimes. " ( M. VIII, 113 ).

Hypocrisy is mere misrepresentation of one's self. " Who sitteth, controlling the organs of action, but dwelling in his mind on the objects of the senses, that bewildered man is

called a hypocrite " (Bg. III 6.) Hypocrisy is one of the demoniacal properties. (Bg. XVI. 4.). Sacrifices offered out of hypocrisy are condemned as Rajasa. (Bg. XVII. 12). "One should achieve righteousness alone or single-handed. Verily, one should not proclaim oneself righteous and walk with the standard of righteousness borne aloft for purposes of exhibition." (Anu. 268. 41). Religious hypocrisy is shrewdly exposed in unmeasured terms by Manu. The ignorant world has suffered much through this form of deceit. "He, who, though extremely covetous of wealth carries a cloak of religion, is deceitful, arrogant, and envious, and cannot bear the praise of others, and hence tries to snub all men, is called cat-natured. (i. e. he is like a cat which assumes meekness only to decoy his prey out of his safe hold and then pounce upon it). With eyes cast down to conceal his ferocious purpose, he, who, to gain his own ends, roams about in deceit and falsehood, like a crane, is called Baka-vrati. Those Brahmins, who are cat-natured or crane-natured, fall into the hell of extreme darkness through the effects of their (treacherous deeds). After committing a crime, let him not practise the expiatory penance under the pretext of practising a virtue, for the purpose of duping females and Shudras. A vow or a penance practised out of hypocrisy goes to the monsters; those Brahmins are condemned by the Brahma-Vadins. A person, who tries to earn a livelihood by falsely wearing the badges or marks of an order he does not belong to, robs the sin of all that order, and is reborn in the womb of beasts. He, who gives himself out to honest persons as something different from what he really is, is called the worst of miscreants; truly he is a thief, inasmuch as he dissimulates his real self " (M. IV. 195-200. 256).

Honesty is the application of the principle of truthfulness.

ness into all the details of business. "All kinds of crookedness mean death, and all kinds of sincerity are called Brahma. This constitutes the subject of knowledge. The rhapsodies of system-builders cannot affect this." (Shanti 79. 21) Acquisition of wealth is not a bad thing; but the means employed for it must be honest. "One should not seek for advancement by achieving any wicked or censurable act. That wealth which is earned by righteous ways is true wealth. Fie on that wealth, however, which is earned by unrighteous means. Righteousness is eternal. It should never, in this world, be abandoned from desire of wealth." (Shanti 293. 18-19). "The man possessed of wisdom would not seek wealth for the performance of religious rites by ways that are unrighteous, and that involve an abandonment of morality. Wealth earned by such means can never prove beneficial." (Shanti. 300. 25).

Gambling is a dishonest way of gaining wealth; and the practice of it leads to many disastrous consequences. People were fond of it in the time of the Rig-Veda and realised the bitter result of it. It is the outcome of greed; it interferes with one's moral work. It brings into contempt healthy professions in society. It brings poverty and want into the house and all the consequent wretchedness. "Play not with dice, go cultivate thy corn-land." (Rg. X. 34. 13). "For the dice's sake, whose single point is final, mine own devoted wife I alienated. My wife holds me aloof. Her mother hates him; the wretched man finds none to give him comfort. Others caress the wife of him whose riches the dice hath coveted, that rapid courser; of him speak father, mother, brothers saying we know him not, bind him, and take him with you. The gambler's wife is left forlorn and wretched; the mother mourns the son who wanders homeless. In constant fear,

in debt, and seeking riches, he goes by night into the home of others." ( Rg. X. 34. 2-4; 10 ). Cheating at play is common. " If we, as gamesters cheat at play have cheated etc, " ( Rg. V 85. 8 ). The numerous evils of gambling are exposed in the Mahabharata. " I would have shown the many evils ( of dice ) through which thou hast fallen into such distress and the son of Virasena was formerly deprived of his kingdom. O King unthought of evils befall a man from dice...Women, dice, hunting, and drinking to which people become addicted in consequence of temptation, have been regarded as the four evils that deprive a man of prosperity. " ( Vana. 13. 5-7 ). It plants enmity between man and man and provokes dissensions. " From very olden times it hath been seen that gambling provoketh quarrels. Therefore, he that is wise, should not resort to it even in jest. " ( Udyoga 37 19 ). " It is evident that dice soweth dissensions. And dissensions are the ruin of the kingdom. " ( Sabha. 77. 11-12 ). Its dishonesty renders it specially immoral. " Deceitful gambling is sinful. There is no Kshatriya prowess in it There is no certainty in it... The wise applaud not the pride that gamesters feel in deceitful play. ' ( Sabha 84. 5-6 ). " To obtain victory in battle without cunning or stratagem is the best sport. Gambling, however, is not so, as a sport. Those that are respectable never use the language of the Mlechhas, nor do they adopt deceitfulness in their behaviour...I do not desire either happiness or wealth by means of cunning. The conduct of one that is a gamester even if it be without deceitfulness, should not be applauded. ' ( Sabha. 84 9 13). Gambling-houses are, however, tolerated by the Smritikars and a king is to derive revenue from these. Special keepers are appointed for these, to superintend them. ' The king should make those, who play fraudulently or with a

motive to cheat, first undergo the operation of the brand-iron, and then banish them." ( Yaj. II. 202-205 )

Honest industry and peaceful life cannot thrive as long as there is fear of theft, robbery or other misappropriation of one's well-earned property. " The fiend, O Agni, who designs to injure the essence of our food, kine, steeds or bodies, may he, the adversary, thief, and robber, sin to destruction with himself and offspring " (Rg. VII. 104-110) " Who lurks about the path we take, the robber with a guileful heart; Far from the road chase him away. " ( Rg. I. 42. 3 ). Robbers are enemies of all orderly society; they are not healthy parts of the social organism. " The robber has no connection with men, with the deities, with the Gandharvas and with the Pitris. What is he to them? He is not any one. This is the declaration of the Shrutis. The robber takes away the ornaments of corpses from cemeteries, and wearing apparel from men afflicted by spirits. That man is a fool who would make any covenant with those miserable wretches or exact any oath from them. " ( Shanti 273. 21-22 ).

Property is of three kinds : white, mottled, and black. " What has been inherited, through friendly gifts, and the dowry of a wife, that is called white property. What has been acquired as a bribe, as a fee, or by the sale of forbidden articles, or as a return for a benefit conferred, is denoted 'mottled wealth'. What has been acquired by servile attendance, by gambling, by thieving, by begging, by deceit, by robbery, or by fraud, is called 'black property.' ( Vishnu LVIII. 9-11 ). All forms of acquisition of 'mottled' and 'black' property are crimes and punishable as such. " A deposit-holder is not liable to make good the deposited article in the event of its being stolen by a thief or in the event of its destruction by water or fire. He

who refuses to give back a deposited article, and he who demands an article without having kept it as a deposit, both of them should be punished as thieves." ( M. VIII. 189. 191 ). All deceit as regards the bride is punished. ( M. VIII. 204-205 ) Servants must do their work regularly, they are liable to punishment otherwise. But they are entitled to their wages if they are ill. ( M. 215-216. ) Merchants should be scrupulously honest with regard to the quality and quantity and prices of their goods. " An article ( of one species ) mixed with another of a different ( species ), a worthless substance, an article weighing less than its surface or manifest weight, and an article that is under a cover, or lies at a distance, must not be sold. " ( M. VIII. 203 ). " ( In cases relating to ) the destruction of landmarks, transgression of the boundary lines, and misappropriation of a field, one should be punished with the lowest, middling, and highest penalty. " ( Yaj. II. 158 ). All property of others in land should be scrupulously respected; especially the property of Brahmins must not be touched. " The stealer of lands is not purified by ( the gift of ) a thousand wells and tanks, by ( the celebration of ) a hundred horse sacrifices, and by the gift of a crore of kine. " ( Brihaspati 39. ) " To speak false for land destroys all. Therefore, one should never utter a falsehood for land. One should never cherish an inclination for a Brahmin's property even if his vital breath comes up to the throat. That dreadful prison has no medicine and no physician...Poison kills only one man; but a Brahmin's property destroys even his son and grandson. One can digest iron, powdered stone, and even poison. what man, in three regions, can digest a Brahmin's property ? " ( Brihaspati. 45-48. )

All forms of thefts and robbery are to be put down;

punishment varies with the circumstances. The king shall assiduously endeavour to repress the thieves in his kingdom; by repressing theft the fame and a kingdom of a king are augmented " ( M. VIII. 302 ) A fine double the value of the stolen articles is inflicted on a thief in case of such things as cotton threads etc. ( M. VIII. 326 ) Theft of gold calls for the heaviest punishment. " Capital punishment should be inflicted on a thief for having stolen a Tola weight of gold, or silver, or precious clothes, weighing more than a hundred Talas. Mutilation should be the punishment for stealing the above said articles, numbering more than fifty and less than one hundred Tolas. Death should be the punishment for stealing jewels and precious gems belonging to high-born ladies and men. " ( M. VIII. 323 ) The forcible taking away of a thing constitutes what is called *Sahasa* ( robbery ) ( M. VIII. 323 ). It is a more serious crime than that of theft, " A robber should be regarded as a worse miscreant than a thief, assaulter or foul-mouthed person. The king who tolerates ( the depredations of a robber ) soon incurs the ill will ( of his subjects, and meets his doom. " ( M. VIII. 395-346 ).

Some other forms of misappropriation are mentioned. A washerman is to be punished, if he wears a cloth, belonging to another. All quacks are liable to punishment for humbugging the patients. All who make imitations of various articles and pass them as originals are fined eight times the value of the article. All tampering with scales or weights and measures brings a heavy fine upon the merchant. Forgery is dealt with seriously. " He who counterfeits or forges scales, or plates inscribing grants of land, or standards of measures and coins and makes use of them, should be punished with the highest form of pecuniary punishment. " ( *Yaj. II. 243* ). It is interesting to note

some rules touching commerce. The government was to stand between merchants and the public. It used to fix prices, the amount of legitimate profits and such other things. All monopolistic exploitation is to be prevented. " Sale and purchase shall be conducted daily according to the value fixed by the king. The surplus on the fixed value is to be recognized as the profit of the trade. On indigenous articles, the trader, who sells them immediately after purchase shall make a profit of five per cent; and ten per cent, on those coming from other countries. Calculating the intrinsic value of commodities and the charges for bringing them, the king shall so fix their price that the seller or buyer may not suffer any loss. " ( Yaj 254-256 ) The evils of trusts and huge combines are foreseen. " The highest form of pecuniary punishment is laid down for them, who knowing the standard value ( of a thing ) settled by the king, in a body so increase or decrease its value as is painful to the artisan. The highest form of pecuniary punishment is laid down for those merchants, who in a body obstruct the sale of foreign articles, and those who sell them ( at a higher price ). " ( Yaj II. 252-253 ).

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## THE GENERAL ETHICAL ATTITUDE IN ISLAM

F. S. Gilani

“Religion,” says Max Muller, “consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man.” The truth of the above allegation is evident: it is in the conception of the infinite that the seeds of the morality of religion are first to be looked for. The moral code of a religion, being chiefly based on the notions of the Divine attributes, occupies the second place in affording a student an opportunity of forming a right conception of the general value of a system.

In the religion of Islam the relation between God and man is that of the Creator and the created, of the master and the servant. God is the ‘Lord of the world,’ the ‘author of Heaven and the Earth;’ ‘who hath created life and Death;’ in whose hand is Dominion, ‘who cleaveth the Dawn and maketh the night to cover the Day;’ ‘the Thunder proclaimeth His perfection’, ‘the whole Earth is His handful’, ‘the heavens shall be folded together in His right hand’. “He is the ‘All-mighty’, ‘the All knowing’, the ‘All-just’. Irresistible power is His first attribute. He is ‘Wise’, the ‘Just’, the ‘True’, the ‘Swift in reckoning,’ ‘who knoweth every art’, the weight of good and evil that a man hath done, and who suffereth not the reward of the faithful to perish.”

The glory of God is perhaps best described in the following impressive verses of the Quran, which are so often recited by the Muslims: "God, there is no god but He, the Living, the steadfast. Slumber overtaketh Him not, nor sleep. Whatever is in heavens and whatsoever is in the Earth is His. Who is there that shall plead with Him, save by His leave? He knoweth what was before, and what shall come after, and none can compass aught of His Knowledge unless He wills it. His throne is a canopy over the heavens and the earth, and the keeping of them is no burthen to Him: for He is the High, the Great."<sup>1</sup>

These notions of the Divine attributes, combined with the belief in retribution, are sure to have a remarkable influence on the life of a Muslim, especially when he bears in his mind that the sole object of his creation was submission to his Creator.<sup>2</sup> God keeps a watch over every action of his, for He is nearer to him than even his jugular vein.<sup>3</sup>

Man is strictly enjoined not to corrupt his soul with evil actions. The soul of man is a created thing, the noblest of God's creations, and is immortal. There are differences of opinions among the Muslim scholars as to the time or the occasion of its creation, as the Quran is silent on this point. But they all agree upon it that at the time of birth the soul is in its pure form and its faculties are to be developed in this life. Revelation and reason go hand in hand in developing its dormant faculties, but the latter is to be directed and controlled by the former. Every action, good or bad, leaves a permanent impression on the soul of the doer, and the spiritual happiness or misery in this world as in the next entirely depends on these impressions. We have made every man's

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1. *The Quran* II, 256.    2. *Qr.* LI, 56.    3. *Qr.* L, 15.  
I. J. 10

actions", says the Quran "cling to his neck and we shall bring forth to him on the day of resurrection a book which he will find wide open"<sup>4</sup> On another occasion it says "whosoever is blind in this world, he shall also be blind in the next."<sup>5</sup> Faith in Divine retribution forms one of the fundamental articles of the Muslim religion.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps no other description in the Quran is more vivid than that of the Day of Judgment.<sup>7</sup>

So vivid a description of the horrors of Hell accompanied by the repeated threats of punishment may as well turn away a sinner if he is made to believe that nothing can save him at least for the sins already committed by him. It would be a very great mistake to consider the God of Islam as "a vengeance breathing tyrant towards his enemies (sinner) and an indulgent God of mercy towards his friends (the pious)"<sup>8</sup>, as T. J. de Boer has happened to describe Him. It should not be forgotten that the word *Rahman*, which, is generally rendered into English as the Compassionate, and which is more intensive in its significance than this equivalent, including in its objects believers and non believers alike<sup>9</sup>, has been used in the Quran a hundred and sixty times. Again the Prophet has talked of His tenderness towards men as greater than that of a mother-bird towards her young ones.

Hence, only two courses are left open to a sinner for his conversion to piety. He should repent sincerely for the evil actions he has been guilty of in the past, and the God of Islam promises to accept it, provided that the penitent is

4. *Qr.* XVII. 13.

5. *Qr.* XVII. 72.

6. *Qr.* II. 4

7. *Qr.* LXXXII; LXIV.

8. *Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion*. Vol. p. 504.

9. Lane's *Arabic English Lexicon*, London 1867.

not lying on his death-bed.<sup>10</sup> The provision made here shows that a firm determination to avoid the repetition of the evil is a chief factor in repentance. The second course is that of intercession, the part to be played by the prophet on the day of Judgment.<sup>11</sup>

With such a conception of God and His relation with man, it became possible for Islam to lay the foundation of a healthy morality and to enable its adherents to act according to it. The Ethics of Islam may be summed up in four words 'Believe and do right'.<sup>12</sup> Without belief all 'deeds are like mirage in a desert which the thirsty man deems to be water'.<sup>13</sup> But faith without works has no meaning. "This life is but a tillage for the next." 'Act' is the watchword in Islam. Although the word 'Islam' signifies 'resignation' of one's self to God', it denounces the renunciation of the world, 'There is no monasticism in Islam', says the Prophet. It is a religion to live with in the world. This activistic character is an inseparable accident of Islam. It is a work-day religion, and as much meant for the market-place as for the mosque. It is the wage-earner whom God would desire to befriend. The dignity of labour is emphasised by the Prophet in one of his sayings—'It is a duty of every Muslim to earn his livelihood by legitimate dealings.'

A Muslim is believed to have two kinds of duties to fulfil—his duties towards God and his duties towards mankind and animals. His duties towards mankind form the chief subject to be dealt with here.

The religion of Islam, as has been remarked by some writer 'recognises no geographical, ethnological, or political

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10. *Qr.* IV. 17, 18.

12. *Qr.* XVIII. 107

11. *Qr.* II. 255.

13. *Qr.* XXIV. 39

divisions as barriers to the widest human sympathies and the freest human intercourse. The Prophet of Islam, as has been remarked elsewhere in the chapter, said, "God loves his creatures more tenderly than a mother-bird loves her young ones." The word creatures includes even irrational animals among those who are to be treated kindly; although, unlike a Brahmin, the Muslim would entertain a reptile with a stroke of his cudgel instead of a cup of milk, and would still call himself a dutiful son of Islam. The above saying of the Prophet, however, leaves a large scope for a Muslim to treat a non-Muslim with tender regards.<sup>14</sup> The Quran supports the view by impressing on the minds of its followers that the entire humanity are the children of the same parents.<sup>15</sup> According to an injunction of the Quran Muslim and non-Muslim neighbours are to be treated alike. Islam entitles both of them to benefit equally from justice and charity in Muslim countries. The Muslim law makes no exception for the Muslims.

Hence, a Muslim is taught by his faith to be a peaceful, law-abiding citizen of the world. The Quran as well as the Hadith does not allow a Muslim to disturb the peace of the world.<sup>16</sup> But Islam does not look upon the military art with contempt like Buddhism, nor can it appreciate the Christian gospel of offering the other cheek when the one cheek is smitten. Self-defence in Islam is a religious duty.<sup>17</sup> Fighting for God's sake is highly extolled,<sup>18</sup> and martyrdom is regarded as the surest passport to Heaven.<sup>19</sup>

14. *Qr* IV I. XLIX. 13.

15. *Qr* II. 10

16. Trs. quoted in Amir Ali's *Ethics of Islam*, p. 21

17. *Qr*. 11. 173.

18. Trd. by Bukhari and Muslim quoted in the *Mishkwad* p. 321

19. Trd. Bukhari p. 282.

Everything a loss of blood or making a war in defence of faith, life and property is enjoined, though justice and equity at the same time are not to be lost sight of. "Retaliation" says the Quran, is prescribed for you in the matter of the slain, the free for free, the slave for slave and female for the female." "And there is life for you in retaliation, O men of understanding, that you may guard yourselves"<sup>20</sup> "Fight in the way of God with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits (of justice)"<sup>21</sup> "The limits of justice are never to be transgressed, the passions for brutal actions are not to be permitted to have the upper hand in war. The weak, the old, the unarmed and females are to be spared under the strict injunctions of the Quran and the Hadith. As for children, they are always regarded as Muslims (whether born in a Muslim house or not) so long as they have not attained maturity, and there is no greater crime than slaying a Muslim. The captives that fall victim to Muslim slavery are to be accorded the best treatment ever meted out to them in the world. Much stress is laid on this point in the Quran and the Hadith. To grant them liberation is a high kind of virtue, and the Muslim dynasty of slave kings is a unique instance in the history of the world. However, the fact that the sale of slaves, for which the Muslims of the later centuries should be ashamed, came into existence. But neither the Quran nor the Prophet can be held responsible for it.

Islam, as has already been said, allows and enjoins defensive war alone. Syed Amir Ali and other apologists of Islam have tried to prove that the early wars of Islam which appear to be offensive began with the defensive,

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20. *Qr.* II. 178, 179.

21. *Qr.* II. 190, 191.

and that those who conducted the warfare in foreign countries were as little responsible for their invasions as the French generals when the first French republic was threatened by the imperialism of the adjoining countries. The Quran however, enjoins defensive wars alone. There is no mention of offensive wars in the book. The fact that the religion does not allow any undertaking on the part of the Muslims that might lead to the destruction of mankind, animals and even plants, shows divine prohibition of at least such offensive wars as are likely to involve any of the three evils. Disturbing the peace of the world after it has once been established is a sin. A Muslim, when he is entirely disappointed as to the possibility of safe-guarding his faith, his life and property, is advised by his sacred book to 'migrate to some peaceful land,' 'for Allah's earth is spacious.'<sup>22</sup>

Another activistie characteristic of the adherents of Islam consists in their optimism. Hopelessness with regard to the Divine succour is something entirely opposed to the spirit of Islam. It is held as nothing short of infidelity.<sup>23</sup>

This activistie character exhibited its full force during the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries particularly in their political progress. It was chiefly due to the spirit inculcated by the pure Islamic teachings imparted by the Quran and the Prophet. It was at the same time consistent with the natural character of the sons of the Arabian desert. With the conquests of Persia and Syria and the study of foreign philosophies grew up the order of Sufi saints. If the activistie nature of Islam did not altogether disappear in the Sufi system, it at least outwardly appeared as shrouded in mysticism. The Sufi saints traced the origin

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22. Qr. IV. 97.

23. Qr. XII. 87.

of their ideas in the Quranic verse " And those who walk meekly on the earth, and when the ignorant speak to them answer, Peace, shall be rewarded with the highest place in Paradise;<sup>24</sup> and in the well-known saying of the Arabian Prophet " Die before you die ". The order first appeared in a distinct form in 150 A. H., when the first monastery ( *Khaniqah* ) for preaching Sufiism was started. Sufiism is perhaps the only religious institution developed under the influence of foreign ideas that has survived so long and which has changed so much the tone of Islamic literature of the later centuries. The activistic character which Islam formerly possessed has been thus much affected. Inclination was shown towards the renunciation of the world, and poverty became a highly extolled virtue. Mortification of the self was added to it, and *Jihad* ( fight against the infidels ) gave its place to *Mujahada* ( fight against the self ).

Truthfulness and charity are the chief virtues in Islam, and, in fact, the edifice of a healthy morality can be raised mainly on these foundations. " Allah is Truth "<sup>25</sup> says the Quran. God demands of a believer sincerity in obedience to Him and uprightness in his every-day life.<sup>26</sup> A liar incurs the displeasure of God most and is cursed by Him.<sup>27</sup> The Arabian Prophet greets a truthful man with the happy news of his admission to Paradise.<sup>28</sup> A Muslim writer on ethics says " He is the Jesus of his time who treads on the path of sincerity.<sup>29</sup> Uprightness in our daily life consists in our being truthful in our speech, true to our promises and honest in our trusts<sup>30</sup>

24. Qr. XXV. 64, 74. ( Quoted in the *Kashf-al-Mahjub* ).

25. Qr. XXII. 62, XXXI. 30

26. Qr. XCVIII. 5.

27. Qr. II. 40.

28. Tirmadhi. Vol. II. 44

29. *Akhlaq-i-Muhsini*. Ch. 2.

30. Ghazali. *Ihya* Vol. III. Ch. IV. para. 14.

There are, however, some exceptional occasions when a believer may set aside his truthfulness in speech for a short time, for otherwise he might prove false in spirit though true in words. These occasions are three in all—first, when reconciling one's wife, for it is to secure the peace of one's household; second, in war, as it is a game of deceit; third, to avoid a hot scuffle between two persons, which might otherwise result in bloodshed. But the motive should always be true, and the lie that the believer passes on such occasions should in no way lead to the breach of any promise or trust. As for the violation of truth in covenants and trusts, it is never tolerated by God.

Hypocrisy, which amounts to a grave lie in every respect,<sup>31</sup> is condemned by Islam with even greater force.<sup>32</sup> The Prophet calls it small *shirk* (infidelity)<sup>33</sup>. The hypocrites are believed to be the worst types of unbelievers. They are allotted the lowest stage of Hell wherein tortures most abound, "God", says the Prophet, "does not accept any thing done in His name if there is hypocrisy in it, even by the weight of an atom." The great Sufi writer Imam Al-Ghazali whose writings exercise up to the present day the strongest influence over the minds of Muslims, goes so far as to divide hypocrisy, in his Sufi way, into two kinds—perceptible and imperceptible. What he means by imperceptible hypocrisy is the performing of an action, the insincerity whereof is not perceived even by the doer of the action. He illustrates the statement with the example of a pious and praying fasting man who happens to feel an extraordinary pleasure in his usual religious practices in

31. Trd. Mishkwat ( Delhi. 1273 A. H. ) Bukhari quoted.

32. Quran. IX. 73, XXXIII. 73.

33. Trd. Baihaqi quoted in Ghazali's *Ihya*. Vol. III. Ch. 8.

the presence of a stranger, and yet assures himself that the pleasure involves no hypocrisy, as there is nothing unusual in his performance.

The second important virtue, which has been taken in its widest sense in Islam, is charity. All good actions in relation to others are included in it, however insignificant they may be. The Prophet extends the virtue so far as to say that to remove thorns from the road is charity; to show the right path to one who has missed it, is charity; and even to cast an affectionate glance on the face of one's own brother is charity.

' Goodness towards one's parents ' is the foremost duty of the believer in his own household. The Prophet places Paradise at the feet of a mother and at times prefers her service even to *jihad*; while the doctors of Muhammadan law forbid the followers of Islam from performing funeral prayers of parricide or matricide,—as the gravest breach of filial piety. The good treatment that one accords to his wife is regarded by the Prophet as a criterion for judging his own all-round goodness, and one way of finding favour with the Prophet is to love one's own children.<sup>34</sup> " He who severs the ties of relationship ", says Muhammad " shall not enter Paradise." <sup>35</sup>

Islam establishes a religious brotherhood among its followers.<sup>36</sup> Blood, money and reputation of one Muslim are forbidden for the other. Three persons should be sure to enter Paradise: a just and virtuous king, an affectionate man of a tender heart to others, and a righteous man. The circle of charity is still further widened; God is not kind to him who is not kind to others irrespective of caste,

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34. Amir Ali *Ethics of Islam* p. 29.

35. Trd. Tirmadhi. Vol. II. p. 30.

36. XLIX, 10.

colour or creed.<sup>37</sup> " God's creatures " the Prophet remarks, " are His family; and he is most beloved of God who tries to do most good to God's creatures ".<sup>38</sup>

Charity to orphans, captives and to the poor is likened by the Quran to a steep path that is difficult but which leads to spiritual progress. " It is setting free of a captive, or giving food in a day of hunger to an orphan.....or to the poor man in the dust ( in humiliation ). "<sup>39</sup> The captive slave is to be dressed with the same clothes and fed upon the same food as his master uses for himself. As for the orphan when he weeps, the Prophet says, ' his tears fall into the hand of the Beneficent God '. The Prophet never said ' no ' to any beggar.<sup>40</sup>

Side by side with the extirpation of slavery, the Quran made an attempt to raise the status of the weaker sex in the society. Woman was assigned as good a soul as that of man, which was hitherto denied her at least in the Islamic regions. Her rights to inheritance and dowry were acknowledged. She became an independent proprietress in Islam, even in her married life, which she was not then in most other systems. A Muslim husband could not touch his wife's estates without her permission, and could not deny a divorce. It may be remarked here that polygamy in Islam was exclusively based on the noble principles of charity, and was never meant for sexual enjoyments. Fornication and adultery are, perhaps, nowhere so severely punished as in Islam. The use of strong drinks that might lead a nation to profligacy and other social evils is strictly forbidden.

Islam has pointed out to its adherents a simple and

37. Trd. Tirmadhi, Vol. II. p. 33.

38. Trd. quoted Amir Ali *ibid* p. 24

39. Qr. XC. 12-16.

40. Qr. Shifa of Qazi Ayaq. p. 84.

straightforward life. A Muslim whose fears and hopes lie in some person other than God does not deserve to be called such. He is required to cultivate a dauntless spirit, without which it is well-nigh impossible to act upon any good principles of life.

Summing the moral attitude up briefly, the Quran says "Righteousness is not in turning your face to the East or the West; but this is righteousness—to believe in God and the Last Day, and Angels, and Scriptures, and the Prophets, and to give your substance for the love of God to your kindred, and the orphans and the needy, and the son of the road ( traveller ), and all who ask, and for the freeing of slaves, and to be insistent in prayer and give *Zaqqat* ( the prescribed alms ), to fulfil your covenant when ye covenant, to be patient in adversity and affliction and in time of violence. These are the true in heart, and these are they who fear God".

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## POLITICAL THEORIES : ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL

It is to-day a commonplace to maintain that a true study of anything includes the consideration of its origin and growth. A historical study either of institutions or of ideas is perhaps the most difficult way of approaching them. Dr Dunning has therefore done a distinct service to the cause of scientific knowledge by his attempt to trace the history of political thought in ancient and mediaeval periods of European history.\*

Politics emerges as a distinct science when the idea of the state as distinct from the family and the clan becomes a determining factor in the life of the community. A history of political theories is not the same thing as a history of political science. It should be remembered that books on politics may have high worth as pieces of literature but their influence on political development may be nil. Political theories, on the other hand must be in close touch with political facts. Dr. Dunning has limited the scope of the book to the political thought of the European Aryans on the ground that other peoples did not free their politics from theological and metaphysical environment. He excludes the treatment of such subjects as international law, constitutional law, economics, finance, as these have become independent studies in these days.

It is quite refreshing to follow the author from the Greek to the Mediaeval Period and almost to the Modern Period as he surveys the rise and growth and modifications of political thought in close connection with the particular historical conditions which were responsible for these. All histories of the thought of Europe begin naturally with Greece. In the field of political thought especially the contribution of the Greek thinkers was remarkable. The great thinkers of Hellas explored the height and depth of human political capacity and outlined the principles which at all times and in all circumstances must determine the general features of political life.

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\* By William Archibald Dunning Ph. D. New York, The Macmillan Company 1919.

Constructive political thought begins with Plato. There are three faculties of the soul : appetitive, spirited, and rational, and corresponding with these are the three classes of society, producers of sustenance, warriors, and magistrates. Plato brings out three ideas in highest relief : 1. The necessity of an organic unity in political life; 2. the importance of systematic education as contrasted with haphazard legislation in regulating the common interest; 3. the rational basis of aristocracy and government.

Plato thinks that the ideal unity of the state can be secured by communism. All causes of discord, such as private property and the family should be rooted out. The whole work of government begins and ends with education. The Platonic idea of government is aristocratic. Kings must be philosophers or philosophers must be kings. The state should be governed by the greatest wisdom. The foundations of the Republic, Plato's ideal state, are indeed laid in abstract ethics and dialectic, but the superstructure discloses the lines of Lycurgean institutions.

Plato's conception of the state is that of a small group of persons trying to realise a high ideal of moral and intellectual attainment, through self-discipline. To him the state exists only in the select few devoted exclusively to its service. No citizen, he holds, should engage in mechanical pursuits or mechanical trades. These occupations are limited to slaves and to aliens. Nor is the attainment of great power or great wealth an end to be considered for either the city or the citizens. Not dominion by land and sea but excellence and happiness must be the aim of the true legislator. Plato fixes the number of citizens at 5040. The aristocratic city state was thus the limit of Plato's political thought.

The establishment of politics as an independent science was the work of the Hellenic genius of Aristotle. It is a science treating of the highest good of man. The good of man is the perfect development of his powers. This result is impossible of attainment without association with his fellows. Therefore the good of the individual is merged in that of the state. But the state is self-sufficing. Hence politics is the architectonic science.

The household precedes the state in the order of time. The

household exists for the physical needs of life : the state for the moral and intellectual needs. Aristotle gives a philosophic defence of slavery and justifies it on the ground that some are born to command and others are born to obey. All men are not fitted for all things. Aristotle vindicates the institutions of private property and the family. The unity of the state does not mean the obliteration of all diversities in individuals. It means unity in variety. The state is an assembly of citizens. The enjoyment of political rights is the essential condition of citizenship. Aristotle rules out mechanics and labourers on the ground that they are too dependent on others to have any independent outlook on political questions. What is the seat of sovereignty ? The answer to this question will depend on the view we take of the purpose of the state. The state has for its purpose good living, living happily and nobly : virtue, especially justice, is to be its criterion rather than freedom or birth or wealth.

Sovereign power must then belong to the mass of the people for the aggregate virtue of the whole people exceeds that of any particular part. The sovereignty of the whole people, therefore, subject to the qualification that it be manifested in the election of magistrates and in holding them to account for their conduct in office is primarily the solution of the problem of the location of the ultimate power in the state. If, however, there be any one of them, or a small number, who are overwhelmingly superior to the rest in general virtue, then logically the sovereignty belongs to the preeminently virtuous few or one. Above this sovereignty there should be the sovereignty of law, for the rule of law is the rule of God and reason; in the rule of man there appears in addition something of the brute.

The ideal state is ruled by the best man or men. It is a royalty or aristocracy. Generally, polity is best because it embodies the principle of the mean. Stability is the best criterion to adjudge the suitability to the existing conditions. Democracy is best where the poor greatly exceed the rich in numbers; oligarchy where the superiority of the rich in resources and power more than compensates for their inferiority of numbers; polity where the middle class is clearly superior to all the rest. The ultimate function of the state is educational. A system of uniform compulsory public education is the

first essential of the best state. Causes of revolution are set forth by Aristotle. The general cause is the craving for equality, the surest way to satisfy both the classes and the masses is to throw the offices of public honour both open to all, but without salaries, a sort of balance to be observed because extremes always provoke resistance. Above all, the true foundations of the stability of a state are to be laid in a sound system of education. The postulates of Aristotle's thought as of Plato's were, the general superiority of the Greeks over other races, the inherent necessity and justice of slavery as the basis of social organisation; the typical character of the city state in political organisation, the incompatibility of bread-winning pursuits with the moral and intellectual attributes of good citizenship, the supreme importance of state education and training in the maintenance of political virtues, and finally the subordination of all personal motives and conduct to the dictates of law.

With the advent of the Stoic there came a wider outlook on human affairs. The value of civil and social distinctions on the basis of petty race and state lines faded away and world-citizenship with all its far-reaching social corollaries became an acceptable doctrine to reflecting men. The Roman state made universal law and universal citizenship practical facts. Primarily these results were due to the military and administrative genius of the Romans and were not in the least determined by abstract philosophy. The Roman genius rose to its height in evolving a body of principles which constitute today the basis of European law.

The Middle Ages were unpolitical. Their aspirations and ideals centred about the form and content of religious belief. Mediæval political theory is exhausted when it has propounded the theory as to the relation of secular and ecclesiastical authority. The starting point in all mediæval theorising on politics was the dogma of the two powers. A theory of sacerdotal pre-eminence was gradually matured. The argument followed two lines: 1, that from the essential character of the two species of authority, the greater dignity appertained to the spiritual and hence gave precedence to those in whom its exercise was vested, and 2, that God had directly conferred upon the Church such power of inspection and correction in referencé to the character

and motives of secular rulers as carried necessarily the control over their acts. As opposed to this attitude the secular rulers developed the doctrine of the divine right of kings. Kings were responsible to God alone, and they were the instruments of divine purpose. The culmination of Papal influence in European politics was synchronous with the widespread revival of speculative philosophy. Philosophical expression of it was the literature of scholasticism. The task of the Scholastic philosopher was to reconcile the products of reason and revelation. This is the key to the philosophy of St. Thomas. His definition of law marks a stage in the development of the concept, Greek philosophy had regarded law as impersonal in origin, as a conclusion of reason and not an expression of will. Roman jurisprudence had explained the character of law as either a conclusion of reason, or an expression of will. St. Thomas defined law as at once a conclusion of reason and an expression of will. This is his most original contribution. He emphasises the importance of volition in comparison with mere ratiocination in the definition of law. St. Thomas goes beyond Aristotle and declares that a province including a number of city states has a higher degree of self sufficiency because of the greater resources for defence against enemies. It is treated as a natural organisation and as embodying a rational principle of the characteristic mediaeval entity—the empire. He traces all political authority to God. Society requires order, order implies inequality, and therefore directive authority rests upon divine sanction. He looks upon slavery as designed to stimulate the bravery of soldiers. He prefers monarchy as much as Aristotle prefers democracy to other forms of government, on the ground that unity is the end of society, and hence his essential principle in governmental organisation. St. Thomas maintains that the repository of judgment and authority in respect to all matters was the Church whose voice is final and is the voice of God himself. To govern, said Aristotle is to bring the thing governed to its true end. But the true end of man is the eternal enjoyment of God. Since the end transcends mundane life the government through which it is reached must be of a higher that is, a sacerdotal kind.

The fifteenth century marked the close of the Medieval era in

politics. In the first place the national as distinct from the imperial idea became increasingly potent. In the second place the period witnessed first an exaggeration and then a great decline in the political power of the feudal aristocracy. A third element was the increased political significance of the towns manifesting the influence of commercial and industrial development. The whole trend of thought was towards limitation and qualification in their conception of plenary authority in the monarch which had been prevalent in the preceding century. The signal for a change in the whole spirit of political theory was sounded, just after the end of the fifteenth century by the genius of Machiavelli. True method in the science of politics was in Machiavelli's opinion the historical method. But his method was historical more in appearance than in reality. The actual source of his speculation was the interest he felt in the men and conditions of his own time. His conclusions were reached empirically and were then re-inforced by appeals to history. His philosophy is the study of government rather than a theory of the state. He views things from the standpoint of the governing and not of the governed class. The centre of his thought is the method of those who wield the power of the state rather than the fundamental relations in which the essence of the state consists. While the ideal of Aristotle was a state in which immobility and philosophical calm constituted the supreme end to be kept in view the ideal of Machiavelli was a state whose end was expansion of widespread dominion. It is by his attitude towards morality and religion that Machiavelli is best known. In no philosopher of either ancient or mediæval times were the dictators of religion and morality so frankly relegated to a subordinate and even insignificant position in relation to the theory and practice of politics. This position expressed itself variously in his thought. There is in it in the first place formal and conscious separation of politics as a science from the science of ethics. Machiavelli's political man is as entirely politically dissociated from all standards of conduct save success in the establishment and extension of governmental power as is the economic man of the orthodox school from all save success in the creation of wealth. "I believe that when there is fear for the life of the state both monarchs and republics to preserve it will break faith and display

ingratitude", Machiavelli is not immoral but un-moral in his politics. He is not irreligious but unreligious. The necessity of the existence of the state is the first principle of his political philosophy. "Where the safety of one's country is at stake there must be no consideration of what is just or unjust, of merciful or cruel, glorious or shameful." Another influence at work was his admiration for power and efficiency in man. Finally the separation of politics from ethics is maintained by him as a result of the conviction that this corresponds most closely with the facts of human existence. On the whole it must be said that his attitude was scientifically justifiable and contributed greatly to the clarification of the problems of politics. His theory of political motives co-incides with that of Hobbes. A narrow self-interest affords for him a sufficient explanation for all political phenomena. The monarch must therefore aim rather to be feared than to be loved. Material prosperity is his idea of the chief conscious basis of political life among men: a high degree of appreciation for the commonwealth based on the mass of equal citizens is the distinguishing feature of his political philosophy. But he fully recognises that circumstances require different forms of organisation at different times and in different places, and he is particularly attracted by the problem as to what system of organisation and action is best adapted to the establishment of far-reaching dominion. The influence of Machiavelli upon the history of political theory can hardly be exaggerated. By far the foremost among the views that the Florentine made prominent in political science was that of a distinction between the standards of public and private morality. Next in importance was his union of theory and practice. His relentless empiricism gave an impulse to the method of observation and experience, which was not exhausted till the last vestiges of Mediaevalism in political theory had vanished. Finally in the assumption that extension of power was a test of the excellence of government he established a philosophic basis for accepting as rational and as a fit subject for reflection that consolidation of states which was so prominent a fact of the times. Nationality had proved merely a temporary and transitional phase of the trend towards expansion on Machiavellian lines which has in fact no logical limit save that of power.

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## NATIONALISM IN HINDU CULTURE

It is not possible to over-estimate the value of publications on Nationalism and Hindu Culture at a time when India is trying its very best to discover its own soul. The author of the book before us\* did a distinct service to the cause of Indian nationality by pointing out a few years ago, how beneath all apparent diversities, there can be discerned an unmistakable unity of ideals, of culture in Bharata-Varsha. It is a pity that we require to be told in so many words that there is such a thing as unity in India from times immemorial; and in spite of serious interruptions from without India has been able to maintain substantially an inner core of oneness, which will be manifest to the very blind in the fulness of time. The author develops his original thesis further and endeavours to show in his fresh and charming style the very sources of our national life.

Not long ago it was a regular habit with Western writers to find the alpha and omega of civilization in European culture and to ignore absolutely the contributions of the ancient Hindus in various fields of cultural activity. This illusion is now being slowly dispelled. Among the few scholars who are doing the very first-rate work in the field of the interpretation of Eastern thought must be placed the name of the learned Professor Radhakumud Mookerjee of the Mysore University. The vague belief that the Hindus had little to show to the world except some philosophy is now an exploded myth. It is possible for us now, with the work of such scholars as these, to understand the proper significance of ancient Hindu culture and to adjust it properly in the history of the civilization of the world. "Vague and conflicting notions about the mere external accidents and superficial aspects of Hindu life have now yielded their

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\* Nationalism in Hindu Culture: Mysore University Extension Lectures. 1920. By Radhakumud Mookerjee M. A. Ph. D. Theosophical Publishing House.

place to a genuine, systematic, and scientific appreciation of Hindu philosophical and religious systems, and a due recognition is at last made of the special contributions made to the progress of humanity as a whole by the Hindu people."

The ancient Hindu culture was a many-sided culture. It could not be otherwise. An extra-ordinary development of spiritual civilisation presupposes corresponding economic and material development. India was great not only in her philosophy and her religion, but also in her arts and crafts, in her industry and commerce, in the science of war as well as peace. How was such a rich and splendid evolution without the growth of the feeling of nationality?

An intense passion for the fatherland animates all the ancient Sanskrit literature. Praises are sung of the mother-country as the land girt by the sea and fertilised by the rivers that pour down their bounty in streams of plenty, the land of hills and snowy mountains and forests giving protection to her sons "unharassed, unsmitten, and unwounded;" "the all-producing mother of herbs maintained by the auspicious and the pleasant; the land where our forefathers lived and worked, where the Asuras succumbed to the might of the Devas; the land of agriculture, of horses, of birds, of elephants; the land bearing in many places people of different speech, of diverse customs according to their homes, yet yielding a thousand streams of property like a steady, unresisting milch-cow". The last passage brings out the realisation of this supreme truth so early, viz. that nationalism here must be unique; its strength always lies in its unity in differences; its identity in the midst of varieties.

The Mahabharat as well as the Vishnu-purana record the expression of a deep-seated sentiment in the Aryan heart—the love for Bharata-varsha. It is "the best of all countries" where "it is only after many thousand births, and the aggregation of much merit that living beings are sometimes born as men"—about which the gods themselves exclaimed: "Happy are those who are born even from the condition of Gods as men in Bharata-Varsha, as that is the way to the pleasures of Paradise, or the greater being of final liberation". In fact the specific title of our Aryan home is Karma-Bhumi—the place where men who all born there are free to mould their own

destinies in the best of all ways. This land is indeed meant to be a heaven on earth. Well does an old Sanskrit sloka say :

“ The Mother and Mother-land are higher than heaven itself.”

The Ancient Aryans had a very deep sense of gratitude to the country to which they owed so much.

“ O ye Ganga, Yamuna, Saraswati, Satadru, and Parusni receive ye my prayers. ”

“ On whom food, ploughing, came into being; the all-producing mother of herbs on whom is food, rice and barley. ”

“ Bearing treasure and gold in many places hiddenly let the earth give me jewel, gold. ”

“ Both heaven and earth and atmosphere have given me this expanse ; fire, sun, waters, and all the Gods have together given me wisdom. ”

“ On whom the people of old formerly spread themselves; on whom the Gods overcame the Asuras. ”

Outpourings such as these clearly point to an unmistakable existence of a powerful feeling of patriotism in the hearts of the Vedic ancestors of ours. Patriotism, however, is elevated and refined into religion. The contemplation of the profound economic significance of these natural agencies led the poet's mind from nature up to nature's God. To think of the mother-country, to adore her as the visible giver of all good becomes a religious duty; the fatherland is allotted its rightful place in the nation's daily prayers, the fatherland of which the most important manifestation is constituted by the river systems.

However, the Vedic seers took care to see that patriotism should not degenerate into a mere craving for material possessions. It must be duly subordinated to higher feelings. “ O Mother Earth, do thou kindly set me down well-established : In concord with the heaven, O sage, do thou set me in fortune, in prosperity. ” Patriotism itself is thus Indianised, receiving a distinctive expression of its own under the peculiar idealising and spiritualising process of Hindu thought.

The institution of pilgrimage is one of the distinguishing characteristics of ancient Hindu civilisation and culture. It is ultimately an expression of love for the motherland. The feeling for the

fatherland, in the intensity of its fervour, has sought to create thousands of holy places all over the country so that every part thereof may be held sacred and worthy of worship. To a Hindu, the beauty of place is not to suggest any ideas of self-indulgence or social enjoyment of the mere sensuous kind, for it is to him the place for self-restraint, for solitary meditation leading from Nature up to Nature's God. As the late sister Nivedita well pointed out, had Niagara been situated on the Ganges, how different would have been its valuation by humanity! Instead of picnics pilgrimage of worshipping crowds. Instead of pleasure groves, ashramas, small sylvan homes of hermits. Instead of hotels, temples. Instead of excesses of self-indulgence, the simplicity and severity of self-restrained asceticism.

The institution of pilgrimage, besides being the Hindu mode of expression of the universal sentiment of patriotism, is calculated to produce another most remarkable effect upon the national character. It not merely strengthens and sustains the love of the country but it also expands their geographical consciousness. It serves as a most powerful agency of popular education, of wakening the popular mind of India to a consciousness of the geographical limits of their country, their real home, the home of homes. It was this supremely Indian institution in fact which serves in the days of yore in place of the modern railway and other facilities for travel to promote popular movements from place to place and active intercourse between parts, producing an intimate knowledge of the whole. The great movement of Indo-Aryan civilisation, of Buddhism, the *dig-vijaya* of Shankara, the spread of the preachings of Kabir and Nanak were largely helped by this institution.

Just as Hindu religion has been instrumental in spreading the conception of a common fatherland in the whole of India from the Himalayas to cape Comorin among the masses by means of appropriate prayers, ceremonies, and obligatory visits to the numerous places of pilgrimage which do not recognise at all the divisions of provinces, similarly Hindu politics in ancient times also did not encourage the growth of any narrow notions limiting the extent of the motherland. The name Bharatavarsha is not a mere geographical expression like the term India, having only a physical reference, but it has a deep historical significance. It signifies the complete accomplishment of

the work initiated by the Aryan forefathers of colonising the whole country and bringing its different parts under the unifying influence of a common culture and civilisation. It becomes the natural and legitimate ideal of the Hindu king in ancient India to make the area of his authority coincide with that of the whole country, to make his actual jurisdiction embrace the entire territory which he morally claimed as his own native land. Thus we read in the Aitareya Brahmana: "Monarchy at its highest should have an empire extending right up to natural boundaries; it should be territorially all-embracing up to the very ends uninterrupted, and should constitute and establish one state and administration in the land up to the seas." The territorial synthesis leads the way to the political synthesis, and is in turn emphasised by it. The cyclical reappearance of these overlords in the course of Indian history served to keep clear and fresh in the popular consciousness a sense of the unity and individuality of the mother-country as it uttered itself in politics, just as it has always been clear and fresh by means of religion. Thus both politics and religion helped to fix in the popular mind of ancient India the consciousness of the possession of a common country to live, and to serve, which is the primary and indispensable basis of an abiding nationalism.

In this way, the country becomes a spiritual entity, because the spiritual enters more into its conception than the material. The country is adored because it is but the embodied type of a living culture. Accordingly, its physical limits were always corresponding with its ideal limits: the country was spreading with the spread of the culture and ideals it stood for. It is thus that Brahmvarta, that 'holy land' and original home of the Indo-Aryan between the Saraswati and the Drishadvati (Manu. 11. 17) extends and expands into Brahmarshi-desa (comprising Kurukshetra) and the country of the Matsyas, Paachalas, and Surasenakas (ib; 19), and this again into Madhyadesa (between the Himalayas in the North, the Vindhias in the South, Prayag in the East, and Vinascana in the West) and Aryavarta (lying between these two mountains and extending as far as the eastern and western oceans (ib. 21 22), 'that land where the black antelope naturally roams'. Beyond that lay 'the country of the Mlecchas', only to be

absorbed in the course of historic evolution in the 'holy land' which is continuously spreading until it attains the full limits of its size and stature in the continent of Bharatavarsha, defined in the Puranas as the whole stretch of space between the Himalayas and the Southern seas. The country follows the culture; nay, the culture is one's country and the country is one's culture.

This peculiarity has its own effects upon the course of Indian history. Where the country is more a cultural than a material possession, it appeals less to the instinct of appropriation. There is more of community of life and enjoyment. India thus became the happy home of many races, cults, and cultures, consisting in concord without seeking overlordship or mutual extermination. Such composite systems are built up necessarily on the basis of an extended unit of society. Here the social and political composition is based on the group, and not the individual, as the unit; e. g. the family, the village community, the caste, and various other similar corporations. Such a principle of social construction minimises the atomic units and helps to harmonise the parts in and through the whole.

Accordingly, it should be further noted it is the quasi-instinctive postulates and conventions of group-life which come to be formulated as *law*, and not the mandate, command, or decree of a single, central authority in the State. Law, under these conditions is not an artifice, but a natural growth of consensus and communal life. The nationality formed on such principles is a composite nationality, and not one of the rigid, unitary type. The relation of the state to its constituent groups, becomes, under this scheme, one of co-partnership, each maintaining the others in their place. It is not the state that, by its sanction or charter, creates its own constituent bodies or corporations, but on the other hand, the groups establish, and are established by the state.

M. A. Buch

## REVIEWS

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE. By R. M. Maciver. Methuen London, 1921.

Readers of Professor Maciver's book *Community* with has reached a well deserved second edition, will expect to find this new book interesting and well written. They will not be disappointed. It is essentially a readable book, which can be strongly recommended to the general reader. There is a marked absence of pedantry. Nevertheless, though there are very few literary references in the book, the widely read student of Sociology will recognise that Mr. Maciver has taken into account all the main principles urged by various outstanding sociologists. He has used these in a constructive manner, avoiding explicit criticism, but by carefully giving them their place in the whole treatment implicitly modifies them in the manner required. For this reason, that it is constructive, well balanced, and so clearly written, it forms an excellent book to put into the hands of the beginner in the subject. It would give some satisfaction to the present writer if the book could be included in the philosophy courses for the B. A. degree in India, as supplying some reading on an entirely neglected subject.

Mr. Maciver has done well not to make this book critical: its great value lies in its clear, comprehensive, balanced exposition. Starting from a consideration of the nature of society as community, "a state or quality of mind" he passes to the differentiating yet integrating fact of the division of labour, following the work of Durkheim. He then distinguishes his use of the terms *Society* "including every kind and degree of relationship entered into by men"; *Community* "any whole area of social life, as a village, town, or country"; an *Association* "an organisation deliberately formed for the collective pursuit of some interest or set of interests which the members of it share"; and *Institutions* "established and recognised forms of relationship between social beings". In the section on The Method of Social

Science emphasis is placed on the recognition of "immanent purpose in the members of society", and a warning is given against trusting society as though an enlarged organism or a greater mind. Turning to the stages of society, the author surveys the village community, the city, feudal community, the nation. The third chapter on Society and Environment is in some ways the most important in the book, though the treatment is inevitably inadequate in so small a volume. In the discussion of Interests and Associations the influence of the modern humanistic consideration of values asserts itself, as does Regionalism in the chapter of The Structure of Society. Professor Maciver is to be complimented on his consideration of the various stages of co-ordination, a subject too often neglected by Regionalists in Sociology. Here he remarks: "The world is now ripe for the recognition of the greater community beyond the state". In the section on the co-ordination of classes a suggestion of a sort of "guild" plan is made. It is further maintained that "The inheritance of capital, more than any other external thing, prevents the nearer fulfilment of the ideal of opportunity, that the fittest should exercise the highest functions and so contribute the most to a society within which all are free to offer of their best." The last two chapters deal with the evolution of society, and Mr. Maciver ends with a paragraph which excellently sums up his position: "Society appears in its true nature, as the co-operative production and enjoyment of things worth while, and their worth is found only in the free conscience, the sense of values, of every member seeking that truth and that beauty which offers whatever degree of happiness, whatever permanence of good, human life, in the great stream which bears it along through change, is qualified to attain". This is in every way an admirable book, and we heartily congratulate the author on the excellence of his achievement.

A. G. W.

WORK AND WEALTH: A HUMAN VALUATION. By J. A. Hobson  
New York. The Macmillan Company. 1919.

There are two main epochs in the development of the science of economics. In the first stage of the science emphasis was placed on production as the central aim of the subject. In the second stage a due account began to be taken of the personality as well as the produce

and the science became so far humanised. Money indeed is the most convenient standard of valuation for all purposes of the economist; but all utilities have an ultimate reference to man. All values are in the last resort subjective: they may be translated in the terms of the psychologist. It is the special aim of this book to translate the whole economic science in terms of human welfare. Mere augmentation of wealth can never be an end in itself: it must seek ultimate justification by being interpreted in terms of human well-being. Vital values and their detailed consideration form the theme of this book. The specific characteristic of this attempt is a human valuation of industry, giving equal attention to Production and Consumption, expressing Cost and Utility in terms of human effort and satisfaction, and substituting for the monetary standard of wealth a standard of human well-being.

The author analyses the productive process and finds that not all 'economic' costs have human costs attached to them. Two bodies of economic wealth, possessing the same pecuniary value, may differ enormously in the quantity of human cost they carry. For that cost will depend upon the nature of the work, the nature of the workers, and the distribution of the work among workers. A sound human economy conforms to the organic law of distribution, 'from each according to his power, to each according to his needs,' and that precisely so far as the current processes of economic distribution of work and of its product contravene this organic law, waste accrues. The distinction between costs and unearned surplus is a faithful measure of the divergence between the economic and the human 'law' of distribution. Here, to this surplus, can be traced all the defects of our economic system. If humanity is to come to its own, this surplus should be utilised in the interest of the working-classes and the enrichment of the public life.

The vital need of the time, therefore, is a reconstruction of the present industrial structure on a humanistic basis, a reconstruction in which the respective interests of labour and capital, of producers and consumers may be adequately represented and all the wider antagonisms between business and business, trade and trade, nation and nation may be duly reconciled. The nations are not economic units: already a world-state on an economic basis is making its appearance. Labour

as well as capital are becoming mobile every day: and the apparently rigid barriers of states and nationalities are giving way to the growing pressure of economic forces. It is neither wise nor safe to set a limit to the possible developments of human nature under new conditions.

“For all experience is an arch where through  
 Gleams that untravelled world whose margin fades  
 For ever and for ever as we move.”

M. A. B.

**TERRORISM AND COMMUNISM:** A contribution to the Natural History of Revolution. By Karl Kautsky. The National Labour Press Ltd., London.

This book is an attempt to show historically the type of government represented by the Commune of France and the Soviet Republic of Russia. The author starts with the central problem of modern Socialism, the attitude of Social Democracy to Bolshevik methods. But the Paris Commune was the prototype of Bolshevism, hence it was necessary to see the working of both of them. Another position discussed in the book is Terrorism. The two appear interconnected with each other in history.

The Paris Commune as well as the Soviet of 1917 were the result of War and military defeat, but are fundamentally different in their organisation and methods. “The industrial soldiers” of the factory had only to substitute for the officers, placed in command by the capitalists, similar officers of their own choice. Thus arose the institution of the Workmen’s Councils among the proletariat of Russia. But Paris Workmen had no such measure. Parisian industry was not for the masses. Their substitute was the National Guard.

The Bolsheviks came as a result of the war. The soldiers would no longer fight. The complete collapse of the army gave complete freedom to the lower classes. The peasants seized landed property. The working classes were similarly won over and the whole edifice of Russian capitalism lay in ruins. But it is not so easy to organise as to expropriate. Compulsory labour was imposed on those who had been deprived of all privileges under the excuse that they did not work, namely, the bourgeois. Only those who worked should have political

rights; only they should be fed and protected by the State.

The Bolsheviki have anchored all their hopes on a *World-Revolution*. It may mean the triumph of the Socialist idea. Or it may mean the conquest of political power by the proletariat in all the great States. It would mean the dictatorship of the communist party, and as a consequence, the letting loose of a civil war throughout the whole world for at least a generation to come.

Whatever one may think of the Bolsheviki methods, the fact that a proletarian government in a great state has not only come into power, but been able to maintain itself for nearly two years under the most difficult conditions conceivable, naturally increases the feeling of power among the proletariat of all countries. For the world-revolution, therefore, in this respect, the Bolsheviki have rendered an enormous service. The proletariat of the whole world has now been set in motion, and its international pressure will be strong enough to cause all economic progress of the future to develop on socialist, and no longer on capitalist lines.

M. A. B.

CONVERSION IN INDIA : A Study in Religious Psychology. By E. A. Annett. Christian Literature Society, Madras.

This book is much more interesting and valuable than one is first led to suppose from its cheap paper cover and its small price of fourteen annas. It is written in a tone which has little of the proselytizing spirit which many have become inclined to expect from the Christian Literature Society. Nevertheless, it bears distinct features due to the place of its origin. I mean in the term "Conversion".

First as to the similarities between this study and that of Professor Starbuck, whom the author definitely accepts as indicating method. It was pointed out at the time of the publication of Dr. Starbuck's work, as often since, that he took his examples chiefly from certain circles influenced by particular conceptions of what the religious life might be expected to include. Roughly, if we exclude the Unitarians, they are circles such as the so-called "Non-conformist" churches and perhaps also some extremely "Low Church" Anglicans. The environment in which many of Dr. Starbuck's examples lived had probably led them to expect some kind of crisis in the

religious life, such as is called by these sects: "Conversion". It appears to me that the present study is influenced by a similar character of the Christian forces concerned: see e. g. the table on page 193. Seeing that in the Roman, Greek, and Anglican Churches, as also the various Unitarian Churches do not expect or regard this as a characteristic of the normal religious life, it may reasonably be asked whether it is not in large measure a cultivated state of mind amongst the Non-conformist sects. There are some interesting passages on pages 86 ff which support the view. On page 175 it is definitely stated "...Conversion, in the full sense of the term, is comparatively rare in India, and that when it occurs it does not in many cases mean as much as it should."

It is unfortunate that the author has had in this book to use the term "Conversion" for two things, which however similar, have a great difference and ought to be indicated by separate terms. There is on the one hand conversion in the sense of a change resulting in an alteration in one's religious creed and community. This is the sense of the two very interesting "Striking Cases" described in Part I. It is also used in the sense of a crisis involving a break from a life of religious non-satisfaction to one of more satisfaction, religious effort and peace. In this sense it is applied to some non-Christian instances, as for example to Tukaram, Devendranath Tagore, and Dayananda.

There is not in this small book, and one could hardly expect it, very much reference to the character of the creed of the persons concerned. It seems more or less clear that few conversions are made of educated adult non-Christians, and it may be suggested here that however much Indians may be religiously appealed to by Christianity, it is improbable that they will accept the faith as expressed in the obsolete dogmatic theology which is the stock in trade of far too great a proportion of Christian missionaries.

A. G. W.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FUTURE. By A. G. Gardiner. Oxford University Press. 1921.

I must confess that before reading this excellent brochure the character of the problem of the relation between the people of the

British Empire and the peoples of America must undoubtedly have been misunderstood in my mind. Of course, I knew that there were large numbers of Germans, Italians, and peoples of various races emigrated to America, but somehow or other I had grown up to think of America as racially and almost in every way like another England and its people. Mr. Gardiner has made me feel that however alike America may be in its predominant language and customs and manners, we are here in fact in face of a fusion of peoples which must eventually, perhaps more than now, have a different collective feeling from that of the British. It is in view of such a difference of general collective character that Mr Gardiner surveys the problems of the future relations of the two peoples. There is one chapter to which in recommending the book especially to Englishmen in India, I would refer especially: that entitled *The English Manner*. The demands for self-government in India cannot be suppressed or subordinated whatever the manners of the English, but surely it is true that the question as to whether that will eventually be within or without the Empire will receive an answer coloured by personal feelings. So, therefore the sentiment expressed in the sentence following might be applied *mutatis mutandis* to India: "We need in Washington, not Foreign Office officials, but great Englishmen, who understand America, love it, and sympathise with its culture and ideas."

A. G. W.

DOMINION HOME RULE IN PRACTICE. By A. B. Keith D. C. L., D. Litt. Oxford University Press, 1921.

Dr. Keith, although engaged as professor of Sanskrit in Edinburgh has already made a name for himself in the realm of political thought. Indian scholars have much to thank him for the work in the realm of Sanskrit philosophy. Indian politicians may gain equal benefits from his political writings. He has already on many occasions shown his sympathetic support of Indian aspirations to self-government and just treatment. For these reasons Indians might well be urged to buy the above small brochure. But there is another, the excellence of the publication itself. This, as the book above is indeed admirable and the Oxford University Press are to be thanked and congratulated

for the publication. Here in a nut shell is all that the busy man seriously affected by the political course of his country may require to know about what is called " Dominion Home Rule " The book is of only 64 pages so that we may dispense with any further discussion of it, and simply urge our readers to read it.

A. G. W.

SHORT TALKS TO INDIAN MOTHERS : Christian Literature Society, Madras. 1920.

This is a very useful little pamphlet at the very small price of two annas. It should be widely circulated, and might be used with great advantage in hygiene and health lessons in the higher classes of High Schools for Girls. It would be of much more usefulness if translated into the Vernaculars.

A. G. W.

MAN IN INDIA. Edited by Sarat Chandra Roy, Ranchi, India.

This is a new quarterly devoted to anthropology, with special reference to India. It is scarcely necessary to remind our readers of the great importance of anthropological data for the scientific sociologist. Our own journal wishes to concern it self with the constructive and practical aspects of sociology and we welcome the appearance of Mr. Roy's publication as working in an allied branch of research. We wish it deserved success and continuance. The fortunes of such publications are very often far from happy in India. There is a lack of financial support, and what is even more disheartening, a lack of intellectual enthusiasm and co-operation in such matters. In this first number almost fifty-eight pages out of eighty are by the Editor. But there are many educated administrators living periods in contact with interesting castes and tribes, and if they would learn something of modern methods in anthropology they might gather information not merely interesting to themselves and others, but sometimes beneficial for their work. The subscription is Rs. 8 per annum.

A. G. W.

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## EDITORIAL

Surely it is remarkable that amongst a people, whose highest religious experience is represented by a certain school of philosophers who somewhat arrogantly regard themselves as the only adequate and true exponents of Hindu thought, as a mystic experience of identity with an impersonal absolute, the doctrine of divine incarnation has flourished most and the attitude of personal loyalty to a personal ruler has been the main factor in political life. For ourselves we have few grounds, if any, for hesitation in rejecting the claims of these thinkers, but this is not the place for a philosophical examination of their claims. We would turn to the characteristic of actual Indian civilisation mentioned: the fact of devotion to the ruler, the personal character of government.

The progress of democratic government does not necessitate a breaking away from the sentiment of personal loyalty. Undoubtedly the power and the privileges of kings and princes must undergo changes with the increasing education and political responsibilities of the people but there need be no lessening of devotion. Rather in so far as the ruler becomes absolved from the exercise of autocratic power, he may become the object of

more sincere sentiment. Loyalty begets loyalty. The ruler has to be loyal to his subjects : only thus can the loyalty of subjects be generated and retained. In the modern developments of political life it must be a sign of the loyalty of the ruler to his people that he himself give up some of his autocratic power and privileges, in order that while thus promoting the general political and administrative advance he will retain his position in the sentiments of the people. The individual's loyalty to a ruler who is loyal to his people should mean a strengthening of the individual's loyalty to the people.

We believe that the English language has done more to promote and make possible unity of purpose and action among Indians than any other factor in modern times. If through it they are enabled to attain to a form of political self-government such as prevails in the British Colonies, it is to be hoped that in co-operating within the Empire they will bring into it their traditional respect and loyalty for its sovereign head. The visit of H. R. H. the Prince of Wales, a Prince of great personal attractiveness with high hopes of taking his part in progressive peace and goodwill, should contribute much to bring about that unity of feeling which is the necessary source of energetic co-operation.



## CULTURAL TRANSITION IN INDIA

M. A. BUCH

It is not our intention here to take stock of the various ways in which India is influenced by the British institutions. Such a task can be only taken up by the future historian of India, for it is impossible at this stage to summarise the effects of what we may call the greatest event of the modern period. Here it is our humble business to try to understand the meaning of the great Revolution produced in the soil and subsoil of the Indian intelligence by the contact of the East and the West.

There has always been patent to historians the very clear line of demarkation, marking off the East from the West, from the 'grey, lampless depths of time' to the present day. The physiognomy of each of these hemispheres has certain peculiar characteristics. The local, geological and climatic differences have worked themselves into the roots of the human and social character. Thus the secular process of the world civilization runs through its cycles on the two different theatres of the great drama of the history of the world.

The civilization of the East developed itself with grandeur and brilliance at a time when the West was sunk in comparative darkness and ignorance. China, Persia, Egypt, and India were the great theatres of ancient oriental history. The human development attained in the East a meridian height while that peculiar phenomenon, the modern European civilization was yet unborn. India lay isolated both by its position and its special type of development, from the rest of the world, with now a

Darius, and now an Alexander, 'to molest her ancient solitary reign.' There was something very attractive and impressive in the brilliant march of the Aryan civilization in India. The human mind scorned the earth and pretended to tread the air. The investigation of Truth, the search of the permanent behind the temporary, the real behind the phenomenal, the majestic unity behind the Heraclitean multiplicity, was the be all and the end all of the Brahmin sages. In the words of Bishop Bunsen: "Nothing is near, but the far; nothing true but the highest; nothing credible, but the inconceivable; nothing so real as the impossible; nothing clear but the deepest; nothing so visible as the invisible; and no life is there but through death."

But this civilization did not bear a charmed life. The springs of creative energy were gradually dried up. The lights of originality became extinct. The Eastern brain became imitative and ceased to be creative. Stability degenerated into stagnation. The result was that India became a cipher in the political sphere, while at the same time, Europe was undergoing a succession of changes, which made for a development on a gigantic scale of both nations and governments. The West then precipitated itself upon the East.

It was impossible for the Indian mind to stand still and mark time under the sway of the dynamical forces which everywhere began to make themselves felt. The Brahmin pundits heard the death-knell of their cobweb-spinning metaphysics. The days of the Eastern scholasticism, which by its heaping one commentary upon another, did more than anything else to retard our progress, were numbered. All 'the infinite agitation of wit,' which produced the barren books of theological controversy, came to an end. The people began to transfer their worship to new gods which were set up everywhere. The study of things began to take the place of the study of words. Men can no longer live *in vacuo* or feed upon air. The study of facts became

in every department the watch-word of the new movement.

This was an event of the utmost importance to the national life of the Indians. The one of the many causes leading to the Decline and Fall of the Indians lay in their attitude towards politics and history, which was only an outcome of their general attitude towards all sublunary things. Our people had been constitutionally colour-blind to the usefulness of historical ideas. The Hindu intellect, being in bondage to the Infinite, neglected the Finite. But the Finite in its turn avenged itself upon the Hindu. It came to pass that the small cities of Greece had more of political speculation in them than the continental India. And politically the people came to be ciphers and remained a prey to every passing wind and coming tide.

The ideal of nationality on a large scale is mainly a modern growth; it was unknown to us here and almost incomprehensible. But the contact with the ambitious spirits of the West gave to an Indian new conceptions as regards his place and destiny in the world, and held up before his mind the ideals of a fundamentally different type than those which inspired the ancient, orthodox minds. The old organization of society began to undergo a radical modification. All the world lay transfigured in the changed vision of the Neo-Indian.

The first result was a great expansion of the native mind. The human mind which was moving hitherto in the stereotyped grooves of thought and action, began to free itself from the slavery to the old forms and formulæ, and make excursions into every field of intellectual activity. The movement was analogous to the Reformation of the West. The centre of human activity was shifted from the study of forms to that of facts. The long, exclusive, and absolute dominion of the sacerdotal class came to an end. Men became free for the first time from ecclesiastical thralldom. The growing intelligence of the Indian mind was not willing to be handicapped by a foolish,

overfed class, and its movements regulated by the check-strings of the Brahmin pharisees. But this was not all. The rising mind of youth was emancipated as much from the theological controversies and philosophical commonplaces as from the empire of the superstitious priestcraft. The new voices began to be heard from the West, resounding like a great trumpet in the hollow vaults of our brains. The Indian mind began to be opened to the necessity, utility, and truthfulness of the new studies. The Eastern mind began to move along the multitudinous channels of intelligence, opening on all sides. There is no doubt, that the Western education has done more to enlarge the intellectual horizon and mental outlook of our people than anything else.

The result was a great change in our customs and institutions, in our daily life, in our very hopes and fears, in the very recesses of our soul. The old belief in authority is completely shaken,—a belief responsible for much mischief in our society. The West laboured under it for centuries. It required great upheavals to be free from it. Here, too, we witness the same battle between the old and the new,—between reason and authority, between stratification and innovation. The chains under which human spirit groaned for centuries are now being shaken. Thus our minds have obtained a freedom unknown before,—a freedom which sooner or later will bring about a reconstruction of our life in its many-sided range on a higher and surer basis. This freedom of mind, this spirit of criticism, this rationalistic mood we have got from our contact with the Western thought, and no small gain it is.

The immediate effects of this enfranchisement of human intellect had a negative as well as a positive side. The new forces had a disruptive influence upon a host of superstitious dust which had been accumulating for twenty centuries on all human ideas. It is true that this movement was now and then

carried beyond just limits. It was forgotten that—in the words of Burke—it is no inconsiderable part of human wisdom to see how much of evil should be tolerated. This was natural. The innovators of the new school are seldom the best interpreters of the old. Their views must be essentially one-sided and reactionary; their characters are hard and dogmatic; they have the spirit rather of lawyers than of legislators. The immediate effects of every revolution are, in the words of Macaulay, “atrocious crimes, conflicting errors, scepticism on points the most clear, and dogmatism on points the most mysterious.” Thus we see that the first generation of neo-Hindus were very violent and one-sided in their strictures upon the old culture. But the progress of time, and the wider spread of education brought with it its natural results, wisdom, moderation, and a catholic appreciation of the due claims of the ancient and the modern, the Eastern and the Western ideas. The impartial spirit of criticism has come with a later age. The cry of “Back to the past” began to be heard every where. The Eastern authors were interpreted by the application of the European methods of scholarship and criticism. Books like *Arthashastra* and *Shukra-Niti* are critically studied and it became well-known that the Eastern genius had been the author of rich, massive and splendid treasures in various departments of thought.

In the religious sphere, we find that the spread of Western thought had at first a disintegrating influence over the beliefs of the people. The study of Mill and Spencer, of Locke and Hume may have helped to sow broad cast over the minds of youth a spirit of agnosticism and scepticism. A shock was given to the uncritical credulity of mankind. Here as elsewhere men became *critical*. Their eyes were opened to the inconsistencies and accretions that had gathered round the ancient creed. A war of Reason vs. Authority began to wage in every part of the country—and the whole fabric of prejudices began to

crumble, when the fierce light of advanced logic was suddenly brought to bear upon it. But this movement had its constructive side. *Samajes* arose; and even persons who remained under the wings of the orthodox faith became very reasonable. The oscillation of the mind was not from faith to scepticism, from reason to unreason, but from an uncritical faith to a faith wellgrounded in the intelligence of men.

In the social sphere, the influence of the West was no less iconoclastic. To minds trained in the conceptions of 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity', and elevated from its grovelling attitude by the lofty conceptions of individual liberty and social order, the whole structure of society appeared rotten to the core and deserving of a radical revolution. Many old institutions had become lifeless formalisms. The steam-roller of the reformer is levelling down all barriers which sharply separate the privileged few, and the unprivileged many. The socialistic spirit, the humanitarian sentiments, and the cry of a united nationality made people intolerant of the inveterate vices of the social organism, which not only allowed, but glorified by association, and sanctified by religious mandates, the absolute and eternal precedence of the Brahmins over the untouchable *pariahs*. The blood of the reformers began to boil at the useless tortures of the suttee on the funeral pyre, at the unendurable sufferings of the helpless widows, at the illiteracy of the females, at the anomalies of arbitrary and ill-matched wedlocks of infants, at the suicidal prohibitions of crossing the 'black water,' and above all, at the tediously elaborate and uselessly cumbrous ceremonialism of "gay religions full of pomp and gold."

How far this movement will go, is a different question. But there is no doubt that it has opened our eyes to all the strong and weak points of our social structure. It rendered us remarkably sensitive to the iniquity or the inapplicability of certain social customs. It awakened our slumbering ideals of

humanity, broadened, enlarged, and modernised our vision, and reminded us of the potentialities lodged in a woman, a lowclass man, or a *Chandala*. It lay before us not only the goal, but also pointed out distinctly the means to it. It indicated the possibility of social organizations, created congresses and conferences, and taught the modern methods of agitation in the Press and on the Platform.

This new movement struck a similar note of renovation and resurrection in the realm of letters and arts. As we have pointed out, the springs of inspiration, initiative, and originality, had long been dried up. This was due to a servile reverence for the past. Now the human mind became free. The characteristic of the modern way of thinking is its universality. All things in heaven and earth, all the inner and outer world, the provinces of mind and matter became the objects of the newly awakened intelligence of the native mind. The West gave to us an audacity of spirit which we lacked. Hitherto the human mind here respected certain limits. But now there was not a single department of thought, which did not resound with 'open sesame' where the cries of 'open rye' and 'open barley', were formerly heard. The new vernacular literatures which burst into existence and note, are being largely moulded by the new influences. Here and there we find an echo, a reminiscence, an imitation now feeble, now vigorous of the classical poetry of the English literature. But the new spirit is, above all, an examining, criticising, and measuring spirit. Men began to cultivate at once history and novel, essay and drama, the books famed for scientific thought, and the books famed for their beauty of style and sentiment. The effect of the new studies was not only to introduce change, but the spirit of change, not only progress, but the principle of progress.

The study of a common language and literature over the whole of India by all ranks and classes did much to bring about

the consolidation of diverse races. The Western thought became a unifying factor in our national development. Blood is said to be thicker than water; but thought is thicker than blood. Hence no small value can be attached to the ties of intellectual kinship which began to be established between men of diverse castes, creeds and colours. The religious impulses and the racial antagonisms began to give way to a centralising impulse, which drew together the diverse minds under a common standard. All sorts of prejudices and passions which created a breach between one section and another have begun to melt in the fuller light of modern civilization. A unity of aims and ideals began to be established. Kant says that when we are dreaming, the world of each of us is different from that of our neighbour; but when we are awake we live in a common world. The people of India passed from a dreaming to a waking state; they began to move in a common world of aims and aspirations. The West taught us the modern methods of political organization like the Conference, the League, and the Congress. A new nation has begun to emerge, rendered conscious by political affinities and social sympathies, of its own existence. This self-consciousness, this *cogito ergo sum* is the prime condition of our nationhood. It is also the *sine qua non* of our well-being, prosperity, and growth.

The Western political thought and practice has given a rich and varied content to our political ideals. India began to be alive to what Gladstone calls 'the profound principle of liberty' as an indispensable factor in all progress. Such doctrines as 'the right divine of kings to govern wrong' and 'the people are for governments and not governments for the people,' which Europe exorcised with fire and blood, came to us in an undisguised form, as abominable heresies and exploded fallacies. With the growth of the educated mind of the Indians, and the extension of the circle of the educated classes, the absolute

despotisms, the personal tyrannies, so common in our past history, became less and less possible. A clear-cut distinction began to be established in the Asiatic mind between the personal terrorisms of the old type and the governments by means of constitutions containing an element of superiority, generality, and permanence hitherto unknown to us. Everywhere, in academies, in private houses, in little towns and villages, in large cities, in the country at large 'the village Hampdens' sprang up to raise their voice against the petty unconstitutional acts, in smaller or larger circles. In this lies the immense importance of the Western thought to us.

Liberty may be said to be the one cornerstone of the Western thought, and equality another. Wherever Banana grows, writes Emerson, there is usually little of civil freedom. But now there is the turning of a new page in the history of Asia. The lethargic and unprogressive East has become active and progressive. The people are breaking their withes, like Samson in mythology, and finding themselves free, and free in one of the highest senses in which the term freedom is used. They began to be morally and mentally emancipated from the dreadful tyranny of custom, of long-continued traditions, of the much-abused authority, of the perpetual incubus of superstition,—the excess of religion, and of the metaphysical spirit, the excess of philosophy. They began to acquire a love of liberty, tempered by a love of order, virtue, and restraint. From India under the influence of the medieval East, to India under the influence of the modern West, the change is as great as the transition from Europe under the dominion of the Holy Roman Empire, to Europe under the spirit of nationality. There was the same passion in both the cases for the ideal of ecclesiastical unity. But now variety and diversity of views is declared to be a positive good. The right of dissent is as much admitted in the intellectual world, as the sacred right of

insurrection in the body-politic. The subject everywhere is growing into a citizen. The people are emerging from the swaddling-bands into the light of day.

We shall not dilate upon the economic transformation which has come over the East. The old isolated village—a republic in itself—is now coming into ruinous contact with the outside world. The Railways—though important from the strategic and commercial point of view—have ruined many industries and hastened the process of poverty and ruin. The economic policy of the state consisting in *Laissez faire* has brought about a ruinous competition of the local industries with the foreign ones and ended disastrously. The currency policy of the state by which India is switched on to the gauge of the rest of the world, has raised prices and largely ruined trade and industry. The great evil India is suffering from is the evil of her ruralisation. She is becoming merely a plantation where raw goods are to be raised for other countries and a market for the manufactured goods of the outside world. She is thankful to the West for her capital but not for the Western capitalist. Her salvation lies in an encouragement on the part of the state of the industries suitable to her by a policy of active help and protection. “But the lack of initiative on the part of the people is the natural outcome of the disappearance of their means of livelihood. It is a misconception of the doctrine of the survival of the fittest merely to view with complaisance the deaths of those that succumb. It is a misconception of the doctrine of free trade to refuse to regulate industrial development.” (Loveday)

The great problem before India is whether she will allow herself to drift along the Western lines of industrial evolution or whether she will try to preserve the spirit of her culture by treading on a different path. Prof Radhakamal Mukerjee is the greatest exponent of the latter view. The capitalistic regime of the West is ill-suited to our condition. Western Industrialism,

he says, presupposes the existence of other moral qualities and a different social environment. As long as there is no fundamental agreement of these in India and the West, the line of economic evolution will be different. The West believes in the multiplication of wants; a high standard of life means a high standard of civilization. But we believe in the ideal of plain living and high thinking. Further, the Indian outlook is spiritualistic; its one aim is the development of the inner self. Now there is no doubt, that if India merely produces a replica of the Western civilization, it would ultimately ruin itself. Dr. Coomarswami also repeats this warning. "Do not let us compete with Western nations by evolving for ourselves a factory system and a capitalist ownership of the means of production corresponding to theirs. Do not let us toil through all the wearisome stage of the industrial devolution—destruction of the guilds, elimination of small workshops, the factory system, *laissez faire*, physical degradation, hideousness, trusts, the unemployed and unemployable and what may be to follow." Such is the picture of the industrial organization of the West. It means the exploitation of the poor and the helpless at the hands of the rich and the organized classes. It means all the conflicts of labour and capital, strikes, lockouts and such other things. It means the subordination of man to the machine, of the personality to the products, of the process of distribution to that of production. But above all, such a top-heavy system of industrialism brings in its train in its turn its sisters, militarism and imperialism.

But if India is to enter into an effective competition with the rest of the world, she must to some extent accept the Western organization. It is impossible to preserve our indigenous culture our political independence, our national integrity in a world constituted as it is at present, by reverting to our pristine simplicity of life. Can we hope to stand alone and unconnected

in this world? All that we can hope to achieve is to moderate the excesses of the capitalistic regime, and to counteract its working by means of various expedients. A country devoted to agriculture alone is bound to remain a backward country. Its labour is generally unskilled, primitive in its aims and methods, conservative to a degree, and tenacious of old ideas. Large-scale production cannot take place; and the whole system becomes one-sided. It means poverty, operation of the law of diminishing returns, and a general incapacity of defence against foreign enemies. Nor is the ideal of a purely manufacturing country suitable to India. India must steer a middle course and develop those industries for which she is fitted by nature and temperament; and vast and continental as she is, she can easily become self-sufficing by assuring to her manufactures an unlimited supply of labour and raw materials, and to her agriculturists, a safe, sufficient, and stable home market.

It is not meant here to deny the enormous importance of 'the ancient and poetic simplicity of life.' We do not want "that our millions of autonomous works should degenerate into mill-hands, packed together in over-crowded cities as the brainless drudges of automatic machinery." (Havell) Who can contemplate with self-complaisance the prospect of the destruction of the old village organization, of family life, of the physique and morals of our simple, naive, unsophisticated peasants? All that we can suggest as a remedy to stem the sweeping tide of industrialism, tends to encourage the growth of our dying and decaying cottage industries. The day for small industries is not yet quite gone. These must be properly financed and organized by cooperative efforts; a suitable provision may be made for the training of artisans and for the marketing of their produce. And above all, they should be supplied with cheap motive power. Thus fortified, these are capable of proving the salvation of India. In the West, too, the Neo-technic City

of electricity and hygiene, of architecture and art is emerging from the Paleotechnic City of coal, steam, and iron, of overcrowding, dirt and squalor. (Prof. Geddes) In the East, the communist spirit is rooted in the habits and traditions of the people. If we organize cooperation on a large scale here, by reviving old village communities, old village panchayats, old guilds or *Shrenis* and such other indigenous machinery, we may be able to keep within due limits the spreading wave of capitalistic regime.

The whole of Asia is in ferment at present. It is rising up in revolt against the Western economic imperialism which is spreading its nets everywhere. The problem is:- Is Asia permanently inferior to Europe and America? The Asiatics are disposed to challenge this supremacy. The future of the world depends upon the struggle. If once the Asiatics are declared competent the tide cannot rest there. Asia, with its man-power, with its unlimited natural resources, cheap labour, a low standard of living can easily turn the scale against the West, if it is allowed to go on uninterrupted in its own development. It is a question of self-preservation for Europe and America. We, however, share the faith of one of the prophets of England, of the man who laid the foundation-stone of the Western culture in India. "It was, as Bernier tells us, the practice of the miserable tyrants whom he found in India, when they dreaded the capacity and spirit of some distinguished subject, and yet could not venture to murder him, to administer to him a daily dose of the pousta, a preparation of opium, the effect of which was in a few months to destroy all the bodily and mental powers of the wretch who was drugged with it, and to turn him into a helpless idiot. The detestable artifice, more horrible than assassination itself, was worthy of those who employed it. It is no model for the English nation. We shall never consent to administer pousta to a whole community, to stupify and paralyse a great people

whom God has committed to our charge, for the wretched purpose of rendering them more amenable to our control.....We are free, we are civilised to little purpose, if we grudge to any portion of the human race an equal measure of freedom and civilization.

“Are we to keep the people of India ignorant in order to keep them submissive? Or do we think that we can give the knowledge without awakening ambition? Or do we mean to awaken ambition and to provide it with no legitimate vent? I have no fears. The path of duty is plain before us; and it is also the path of wisdom, of national prosperity, of national honour.

“The destinies of our Indian empire are covered with thick darkness. It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has out-grown that system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity of better government; that having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history.....The sceptre may pass away from us. Unforeseen accidents may derange our most profound schemes of policy. Victory may be inconstant to our arms. But there are triumphs which are followed by no reverse. There is an empire exempt from all natural causes of decay. Those triumphs are the pacific triumphs of reason over barbarism, that empire is the imperishable empire of our arts and our morals our literature and our laws.” ( Macaulay )

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## OPTIMISM \*

Bernard Bosanquet

1. Optimism and pessimism are current names for opposite attitudes to life, and we are apt to think of these attitudes as matters of temperament and circumstance, as just tendencies and occasions to look upon the bright and upon the dark side of things respectively. And no doubt this is in a measure true. There are such moods and temperaments, and health has a good deal to do with them, and success and worldly prosperity also play a part. But if I believed that optimism and pessimism meant this and nothing more—a rose coloured or sombre view of life depending upon mood and circumstance—I should not venture to stand up before you for an hour in order to express what would then be just my fancies—whether sick fancies or healthy. Such arguments are always more or less like those of Tartarin of Tarascon, clinging to the side of a crevasse, and roped to a disciple of Schopenhauer, who has just expressed the view that it would be a fine opportunity to be done with life, by letting go and pulling the whole party down. Tartarin appeals to him 'L'existence a du bon, que diantrel a votre age, un beau garcon comme vous.' That is optimism in fear of its life. It is a clever old joke that whether life is worth living depends upon the liver; but one of its meanings is true, and that very imperfectly so. It depends on the man who lives whether he lives worthily, but not whether life is worth living.

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I said that success and worldly prosperity have something to do with these attitudes. But certainly they have not everything to do with them. And this truth, universally recognised, begins to take us a little deeper into our subject. The facts do not bear out our first commonplace idea, that optimism and pessimism are just moods induced by health and ill-health, by success and failure, respectively. Think of Wordsworth and the lesson he learned from the leech-gatherer on the lonely moor. There is a deeper secret underlying facts like these. There is a real difficulty in what we might call the interpretation of life. Its values seem not to reveal themselves quite simply. The 'pros' and 'cons' and their sources do not range themselves as we might have expected. Both for instinct and for reflection there is a deal of perplexity. We not only get opposite judgements about the worth of life, but we get judgements on the same side which show very different degrees of appreciation. We often have to sympathise with our opponent more than with our partisan.

If we could even begin to trace the source of this paradox it would well repay an hour's consideration. For superficial answers are not without danger, especially in social work and problems, which I suppose interest all of us; it is all important to have our heads in the right direction on these matters. It makes a difference, I am convinced, to every detail of our everyday effort, to the spirits of our endeavour, to our sense of value, and therefore to our dominant aims.

In truth, the facts themselves, the facts of the value of life are paradoxical—that is, they are two-sided; and to hold the two sides together, to accept the paradox and work it out is essential for sanity of judgement.

I will outline at once in two or three words the conclusion I mean to suggest. I believe, then, in optimism. But I add that no optimism is worth its salt that does not go all the way with pessimism and arrive at a point beyond it. This, I am

convinced, is the true spirit of life; and if anyone thinks it dangerous, and an excuse for unjustifiable acquiescence in evil, I reply that all truth which has any touch of thoroughness has its danger for practice. It must be many-sided; and what is many-sided is always liable to be wrongly grasped, and is quite easy to caricature. But that is just why it seems worth while to take a little trouble to find the right way of approaching it. Great truths are great forces, and great forces are apt to be dangerous; but that is an argument not for neglecting them, but for handling them attentively and with precision. But I am leading you to expect too much, and I daresay—I almost hope—that when I have come to an end you will ‘say, Is *that* all?’ I almost hope it, for if you can say that, why then some important things are matter of more general agreement than I had supposed.

2. The use of the superlative in the words ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ is extraordinarily bold, and seems obviously to imply things that go beyond our knowledge. I will say a little about their history, to *explain* this use, though I do not assert that it can be justified. It is connected, of course, with the phrase ‘the best of all possible worlds.’ I take it that the word pessimism embodies a retort provoked by this. The former phrase has become commonplace, and I suppose is generally thought a little ridiculous. In using it we think of the word ‘possible’ as an enlarging term, an equivalent to imaginable, or ‘something that one could dream of.’ The best of all possible worlds means, then, in popular use, a world so obviously delightful and super-excellent to our simplest apprehension that our dreams and wishes could in no way go beyond it. And then we think this a ridiculous thing to say of the world as we fancy that we know it. We often meet with this impatient denial that our world can be the best possible world—the world we should like best. Now I by no

means admit that this denial is right—that is, I do not think people always know what a tremendous pretension they are making when they think that their dreams and fancies can figure something better than the world as it really is. But at all events it is worth noticing what Leibniz probably meant by the words we are apt so impatiently to deny. When he said this world was ‘the best of all possible worlds,’ he did not mean chiefly we could dream of nothing better. His word possible was a restricting, not an enlarging, epithet. I think we may put what he meant in this way. It is no use talking about unless it is at least *possible*. Possible is not an idle word; it does not mean anything you can dream or fancy; it fixes a distinct condition without which no world can so much as be a claimant for reality. The condition is this: For a world to be possible, all the things in it must be such as can fit together—what Leibniz called ‘compossible.’ You cannot just imagine one thing or another that you would like, and say that *that* is part of a possible world. No world is *so much as possible* unless all its parts—that is, supposing it to be real, everything—are such as to belong together, no one feature excluding any other. When you have seen this condition fulfilled, so we seem to hear Leibniz saying, then you may begin to talk about what is best—what presents most perfection or satisfaction to spiritual beings. ‘The best of all *possible* worlds,’ then, was for him not an idle phrase. This tremendous condition of possibility—the coherence, compossibility of all that is—being presupposed, then, within the universes that might fulfil it, the creative will, he thought, would surely choose the *best*. I am not saying that the view commends itself to us to-day. All I say is that the words were not used lightly. They had for their author a grave meaning, to the effect that a real system is not like a capricious fancy; things must have their consequences, and a world of our dreams would be sure to contradict itself.

The extraordinary point to us is the notion of a *number* of possible universes. What is possible, I suppose we think, is a part of or depends on what is real, and not *vice versa*. Let us, then, give effect to this idea. Strike out then the possible universes which never became real. Then only one universe was ever possible, and that is the universe which is real—the universe in which we live. With this alteration the meaning of our superlative is gone; or, if you like, both superlatives, both optimism and pessimism, become true. For I suppose that if the real world is the only possible world, we may call it, if we like, at once the best world and the worst world that is possible, the best and the worst of all possible worlds being the only possible world. And this bit of pedantry gives us two suggestions which are not valueless: that the use of the superlatives is unnecessary, as involving comparisons for which we have no material; or else that we have to find what both of them meant to express, our best and worst, within the single universe we know.

3. Thus, giving up the idea of comparing our world as it is with something different which might have existed, we come to ask the question which interests us in a more modest form. Our superlatives, if they still mean anything, mean now something different from what they did before. We are no longer speaking of the best or worst among a number of worlds supposed possible. We are asking for a guide to the study and understanding of the world in which we live—we are asking what our attitude to it is to be. And that, after all, is what we wanted from the beginning. The comparison with other possible worlds was only a roundabout way of expressing our inquiry what the governing intention, so to speak, in our own world really was; and that is only an indirect way of asking what the nature of our own world at bottom really is. Thus, as I said, our superlatives have

changed their meaning. What they mean, when we look at our difficulty in this way, is much more practical and direct. It is this: We accept the position that our ideas, both of what is best and of what is worst, must be drawn from the world in which we live, and we want to know, in a word, which of these we are to *believe in*. The question of optimism and pessimism now means: Are we to *believe in* the best as our guide to judgment and as typical of what we can expect, or are we to frame our views and anticipations on the type of the worst that we meet with? Optimism and pessimism, then, mean belief *in* the best we know and belief *in* the worst we know. Belief *in*, not belief *of*. I will return to this. Why not, it may be said, believe in just what we seem to find—that is, in a mixture of the best and worst? Why not suppose that they just exist side by side as they seem to, like the urns beside Homer's Zeus, into which he dipped at random, scattering blessings out of the one and plagues out of the other? Well, I mean to set aside this third alternative. I think absolutely good reasons can be given for disregarding it, but for to-day it is enough to say that it means giving up our inquiry. We are interested to know and believe something more than we can gather at first sight. But if we are told just to take things as they come—and there is no more to it than that—we are being told to give up the use of our minds, and to behave as we never do in face of any difficulty whatever of all those which confront us in life. We never believe in any ordinary case that contradictory appearances just lie side by side in the world without any possibility of in the smallest degree getting behind or understanding their inconsistency, and it is not likely we are going to believe it in this case either. We all have an attitude to the world, and we must have one. The world is not a world if we cannot. But here just a word of caution is necessary. In these

great questions, in a sense, every belief is true that has ever influenced mankind, and all depends on understanding how and in what precise sense any belief is true. And so even this alternative has a good meaning if you know what you mean by it, as we shall see directly. I will state it at once in a word or two, for clearness' sake. It is perfectly true that we do not know what to expect of the world, if we mean by that that we cannot foretell the particular circumstances and destinies of particular persons or of nations or of our globe. The chapter of accidents is a necessary chapter in human life. Poetic justice is not the rule of events; and a great deal of what we call justice is merely poetic justice—a gratifying but artificial scheme of retributions. It is true that you cannot explain the world by any scheme so simple as that. The sun shines on the evil and on the good. Nevertheless, it is impossible to believe that things are really disconnected, and that the 'happenings' which seem to us so opposite have at bottom no coherence in their nature. There is not the least presumption in favour of first appearances. There is no branch of experience in which we accept them.

Well, then, we reject the idea of a mixed or incoherent world and return to the two first alternatives. And if we think only of them, then, as I said, the question comes to this: Are we to believe *in* the best or the worst? Belief *in*, we said just now, means more than belief *of*, or belief in the existence of. I believe a great many things and persons to be facts which and whom I do not believe *in*. To believe *in* a person or a fact or a way of things is in some degree to take it for your guide, to accept it as typical, to accept it as important and as likely to prevail.

Thus we seem to have brought down the problem of optimism and pessimism to a simple statement. Within our own world, the world of our own experience, what is it that we believe in? Do we believe in the best or in the worst?

But we are not yet at the end of our preliminaries. We have to recall something that we noticed quite at the beginning. We found that cheerful and sombre views were not distributed as first appearances would have suggested. We found cheerful views with a hard life, and sombre views with an easy one. And now we know that what we are discussing is within our own experience, and not the difference between our world and others; this fact comes back upon us. We were asking as if it were a simple question. 'Which are we to believe in, the best or the worst' of what we meet with in the world? But now we see that there is a prior question. Do we know, at starting, what is the best and what is the worst among the things we meet with? All of us, I take it, modify our judgments of value as we go through life. So that, since our best and our worst are both of them within our own world, and since we all admit that first judgments and first appearances are usually wrong, our problem seems likely to be a good deal more fertile than it seemed at first. It seems not to be merely a question whether things might have been better than they are, nor yet whether what we like or what we dislike is commonest in our experience, but a question of where we are to look for our best and worst—for our values—within the varied experiences which make up our lives.

4. And this brings me to the first of the two principal points which I should like, if I could, to leave with you for your consideration. It is the danger of hasty answers, or, what is the same thing, of taking sides under first impressions. The root of this attitude, I am convinced, lies terribly deep. It lies in a misunderstanding of a claim which in a sense is quite real and just. Man has a right to take a part, and a free and critical part, in the activities of the universe. But he is apt to construe this as meaning that as he first finds himself in the world he is a fully created being, and has only to go forward to assert himself

and to judge. But experience suggests something else: it suggests that he is a soul only in process of creation, and essentially a learner, though a learner by acting as well as by suffering. So when he takes sides under his first impression, and picks and chooses within reality what suits him and has no use for the rest, he is very probably carrying out a necessary phase of the creation of his soul, but yet his judgments, which express it, may have but a trifling place in the true valuation of things. Perhaps we might even say that the great work of the universe is soul-making, and that the central significance of soul-making is just that we have slowly forced upon us the truth about values, and that in learning it we learn to maintain them. Then our best and our worst become problems rather than data, and our optimism and pessimism have a chance to become different sides within our single appreciation of the world in which we live. But our first picking and choosing, whichever side we believe in, is the root of the hasty answers that I deprecate. I will sketch three main types of these, as pairs corresponding with one another.

First, some have started from the most obvious and apparently simplest of standards, and asked whether the world has in it more of pleasure or of pain. It is a question that could not possibly be settled by direct experience, by counting or measuring; but there are arguments on both sides which are interesting and important. For instance, it may be urged on the one side that pleasure is a condition of life, and must be as universal as life itself; and on the other side, that desire, too, is essential to life, and is painful and insatiable, so-called satisfaction being only momentary, and the pain of desire in its nature recurrent.

This first pair of alternatives is on both sides a flagrant case of what I call the hasty answer. And so I only mention it to deny that, taken either way, it gives answer to our quest-

ion. It is, to begin with, very hard to say whether pleasure and pain can be compared in magnitude at all. But our difficulty is deeper. We shall say the question of value is not whether you have had, or think you have had; more of pleasure or of pain. It is rather of this kind: whether the continued making of your soul, whatever instruments the universe may have used, has on the whole advanced its, perfection. That is, we shall say that both answers—(i) there is more of good because pleasure predominates, and (ii) there is more of evil because pain predominates—are hasty and premature, and neither reveals a sense of the question at issue.

Secondly, we find, throughout all the region of reflective commonsense, an enormous influence exercised by the idea that the existence of failure and suffering is somehow counter-balanced by *compensation*; or on the other side, if not so, is a demonstrative proof in favour of pessimism. It is to me, I must confess, most painful and terrible to observe throughout our serious fiction and popular philosophy an apparent inability to conceive that endurance or self-sacrifice can have a value if they are genuine realities and not recompensed or paid for. I refer to the perpetual wail and clamour after some form of compensation for every suffering and endurance and self-sacrifice, by a simple over-balance in the way of happiness; so that, for instance, the fact of bearing one another's burdens may be made an illusion and wholly removed from the universe. Compensation theories of course, take many forms. There is the reward of goodness in common life and the future millennium or the Utopia on earth; and there are conceptions extending into another world. Of all this I will only say that the *theoretical reliance* on such conceptions, or the introduction of them as *essential props* of the belief that good is stronger than evil, is strictly self-contradictory. I will explain this directly. And also it leaves a terribly heavy bill to pay should they at any time become doubtful in fact.

That very discontent of to-day and the clamour for poetic justice arises, I suspect in the main, from our minds having for centuries been trained and fashioned upon theories which deal with suffering on the basis of compensation. And I emphasise the point that the idea of progress as such, the idea of a millennium or a Utopia, if alleged not as an anticipation grounded on facts but as in principal an indispensable prop for your belief in the best, is not much more certain or more relevant than doctrines of a hereafter.

The real point to be noted here, I suggest, is that you cannot compensate for evil except in so far as you can transform it. Or rather, compensation means accepting the evil as what it is and trying to make up for it in another coin. It throws no light on it, and does not pretend to show how it can be undone. It is an expedient for such evil as is admittedly irreparable. That is why I say that as a theory of optimism it is self contradictory. You compensate a man for the loss of his leg or arm by giving him money. That, of course, is a makeshift. The loss is irreparable but you do your best by giving him something quite different to make up for what he has lost. You compensate just because it is impossible to undo. Thus, in appealing to compensation, you are saying there is incurable and irreparable evil. It is an over-hasty answer; and the pessimist hardly needs to point out that your compensation is uncertain in fact, in order to show that your answer has in principle admitted his case. And if *his* answer at this point is no less over-hasty than the optimist's it is only because he accepts the ground the optimist has taken.

Thirdly, then, you are driven up to the pitch of the old optimistic contention: evil, suffering, failure is an illusion; it does not exist; it is nothing. 'The evil is null, is nought is silence implying sound.' It is somehow good in disguise. We remember Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire's 'Candide': 'Les

malheurs particuliers font le bien general, de sort que plus il y a de malheurs particuliers et plus tout est bien.'

This is really the climax of the hasty answers, and it sets their principle in the clearest light. Beyond a doubt you have two overwhelming impressions---of good and of evil. And each of you, Optimist and Pessimist, has been trying to make believe all through these alternative answers that one or the other is somehow not to count. The impression he does not approve of is somehow to be outvoted, so to speak, or overbalanced, or covered up and hidden away by the other. And in this third alternative you get the real position plump and plain. Each disputant says the other's impression is simply an illusion; his facts do not exist; they are to be conjured away. The plain English of this is that you run off with a first impression, and try to explain away everything else. Those which we have considered, I say, are three pairs of hasty answers, in which the one side simply says, 'It is all A, and B (which is there) is not to count,' and the other 'It is all B, and A (which is there) is not to count.'

Unquestionably this irrepressible instinct for explaining away one or other experience does point to a truth. It points to the truth that we cannot and will not tolerate a flat contradiction in the nature of things. We will stand anything, any makeshift, however transparent, rather than that. And so far we are right. Our world is *one* world. Only this irrepressible instinct lays a task upon us which so far we have shirked. We have not tried to see whether our ideas of the best and worst are sound and right. We have taken them from first impressions and found that they conflicted. But the real task, as both life and logic tell us, is to revise our valuation, and see whether this double-edged experience of ours has not some significance which we have missed.

5. We have seen so far, I hope, two simple things: first,

that the question is one of learning to construe, learning to read, as Plato so simply and splendidly put it, the world of our experience—learning, that is, to see where its values lie; and, secondly, that in this learning we are really and honestly to be ready to *learn*; to learn by action and enjoyment, but no less, if occasion offers, by suffering and endurance. No optimism, we said, is worth its salt that has not gone all the way with pessimism, and beyond. The paradox, the double-edgedness of life, we said, has not to be rejected at starting, but to be accepted as a problem to work through.

And now, what leader, what Virgil, shall we rely on to take us by the hand through the Inferno of suffering and failure? Shall we turn to some Browning or Tennyson, possessed with a robust or partly sentimental faith in the happy ending of the story; or shall we entrust ourselves to some rationalist with a workmanlike prospectus of compensation like John Locke or Bishop Butler? No; we will try, I think, to be faithful to our logic, and we will go all the way with pessimism, and see where it brings us out.

Let us put before ourselves, then, shortly and in general, the thoughts which we can gather from the arch-pessimist of Germany, from a brilliant mathematician and philosopher who is a leader among the younger men to-day, and from the Russian apostle of humanity who, whether pessimist or optimist, has more seriously perhaps than any other of his day made his own the labour and sorrow of humanity—Schopenhauer, Mr. Bertrand Russell, and Tolstoi. Let us follow their lead, and see where they will take us.

All pessimistic writing is pale before the fourth book of Schopenhauer's famous treatise on 'The World as Will and Idea,' the book which is entitled 'Assertion and Denial of the Will.'

The reality of human nature—here is the sum and sub-

stance of the book—is the will to live ; and the reality of the will to live is inherently pain and failure. For will is insatiable ; so-called satisfaction is but recurrent disappointment. ‘ Optimism,’ Schopenhauer writes, ‘ when it is not merely the thoughtless talk of such as harbour nothing but words under their low foreheads, appears not merely as an absurd, but also as a really *wicked* way of thinking, as a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity. The will to live, we said, is for him the root of all evil, of that unending ‘ deception,’ to use the extraordinarily pregnant French word for disappointment, which is the character of all satisfactions.

But there is, he tells us, a remedy. And what is the remedy ? Necessarily, the denial of the will to live. Not suicide, for that is an extreme manifestation of the yearning and discontent which are the essence of that will. The denial of the will to live has many forms and degrees. It begins with justice and sympathy, when you penetrate the illusion of separation, when you see that the suffering of all is one, and that to inflict misery is to endure it.

If the red slayer thinks he slays,  
 And if the slain thinks he is slain,  
 They know not well the subtle ways  
 I keep and pass and turn again.

It continues when you grasp the central nature of the vital illusion, and annihilate it in its essence through renunciation and spiritual discipline. I quote ‘ He who has attained to the denial of the will-to-live, however poor, joyless, and full of privation his condition may appear when looked at externally, is yet filled with inward joy and the true peace of heaven.’ But there is more than this. The denial of the furious and passionate will to live is found once more in the contemplation of the beautiful. In other words the insatiate craving which is the source of our suffering is ‘ *quieted*,’ to

use Schopenhauer's favourite word, in so far as in any mood or any degree we have a grasp of the deep reality with which our true nature is at one.

Or let us turn to the radical pessimism of the modern philosophical mathematician. It is striking how, in the essence of the matter, Mr. Russell's remarkable essay, 'The Free Man's Worship,' follows, I should think involuntarily, the track of Schopenhauer, and both, I may add, follow a part of the track of greater philosophers before them. 'Only,' we read, 'only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.' 'In this way,' he continues, 'mind assures its subtle mastery over the thoughtless forces of Nature. The more evil is the material with which it deals, the more thwarting to *untrained desire* [notice the expression], the greater is its achievement in inducing the reluctant rock to yield up its hidden treasures, the prouder its victory in compelling the opposing forces to swell the pageant of the triumph. Of all the arts, Tragedy is the proudest, the most triumphant, for it builds its strong citadel in the very centre of the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest mountain.'

Of what nature the soul's habitation is to be we may partly see from that account of its supreme achievement. But here is more: 'To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship. And this liberation is effected by the contemplation of Fate: for Fate itself is subdued by the mind which leaves nothing to be purged by the purifying fires of Time.'

True knowledge we find—the recognition of eternal things—is 'the quieter of desire.' It was originally Dante's phrase. It is Schopenhauer's watchword. It is Mr. Russell's firm

foundation of despair. It is not easy to remember that with the two latter we are supposed to be in the world of pessimism. Let us look round us in the country to which we have been guided, and see if it has no familiar features. We were told that we should reach a land where the will to live was annihilated; where the universe would seem accidental in origin and regardless of our values; where the only resource remaining was the firm foundation of despair. But what do we actually find in the new landscape? The air has been cleansed as by a storm, and the outlines are abrupt and austere but the great features of man's inheritance stand out all the more distinct. Here we have sympathy and self-sacrifice, love, duty, and beauty, courage, endurance, and eternal truth. Assuredly we would leap to the side of such a pessimism, in contrast with many an over-hasty optimism.

What is it that has really happened to us in our pilgrimage, to some extent without our understanding it? The answer is not difficult. We have surrendered our first impressions; we have become disciples of the universe; we have transformed our standard, and tried to adjust it to the whole instead of a part. In a word, we have seen what it is to pass through the furnace in which souls are made, and to feel some little touch of real values. We made our pilgrimage, as we promised hand in hand with pessimism, and we have reached a point at last where optimism, is founded on the rock. The path through despair to security is an old beaten track in philosophy, as in religion, and the pessimist has led us by it, because there is no other road, and because he could not help himself. It is argued that our gains are but accidents in an indifferent universe? It is difficult not to smile at the suggestion. What we have seen is the very necessity of things, and that it inevitably reveals itself in irrefragable and eternal values. Or are we, you and I,

with our proper names and separate biographies, perhaps—we do not know—to come to an end? Who cares? You remember the song of Chevy Chase:

I trust I have within my realm

Five hundred good as he.

The universe is well able to carry forward what it has expressed in little through us by better men and better worlds and races.

For one further point we may turn to Tolstoi. What, in the main, he gives us is this. The saving knowledge which we have spoken of does not come solely in intellectual form, nor is confined to a clan or caste. That it may come in this form, and indeed has done so without any exception whenever a great thinker has appeared among mankind, is a plain and obvious fact which I fear that Tolstoi denies. But we forgive him this for his championship of the mass of humanity. I borrow a passage of Tolstoi from William James: 'The more I examine the life of these labouring folks, the more persuaded I become that they veritably have faith and get from it alone the sense and the possibility of life. . . . Contrariwise to those of our own class, who protest against destiny and grow indignant at its rigour, these people receive maladies and misfortunes without revolt, without opposition, and with a firm and tranquil confidence that all had to be like that, could not be otherwise, and that it is all right so. . . . The more we live by our intellect, the less we understand the meaning of life. *We* see only a cruel jest in suffering and death, whereas these people live, suffer, and draw near to death with tranquillity, and oftener than not with joy. . . . There are enormous multitudes of them happy with the most perfect happiness, although deprived of what for us is the sole good of life. Those who understand life's meaning, and are content to live and die thus, are to

be counted not by twos, threes, tens, but by hundreds, thousands, millions. They labour quietly, endure privations and pains, live and die, and throughout everything see the good without seeing the vanity. I had to love these people.' Here again is optimism founded on a rock.

Now, I said, in handling these high explosives in the way of truth, we were to be careful and precise. And here is a point that needs great care. Our hard-won optimism seems so powerful as to make us independent of any particular facts and destinies, of success and failure, of pleasure and pain. But can it be right to be indifferent to the material progress of humanity, and to the increase of justice and mercy and common sense in social arrangements? Can an optimism be justified which does not rest on a definite faith in positive ameliorations of life, to be realised in the future? If we say there is more nobility and a higher optimism the more there is to endure, are we not dangerously near the charming creed of Dr. Pangloss?

Now, first, I want to insist on a distinction. Our nature binds us to work for progress, that is for removing all definite evils that we can see and feel; and we must believe that they can be removed, and that so far the world and mankind will be the better. But if we rest our progress on optimism—that is, if we believe that the deep-laid grounds of pessimism will disappear because of changes still in the future, and that these changes in the future are what justify us in believing in the best, then I think we are plainly wrong. We are getting back towards the notion that the future can compensate for the past; and also we are assuming that *on the whole, and all round, the future will be better than the past, and that the rooted evils of man's condition can totally and in principle be got rid of, and that it is desirable and necessary to our optimism that they should be got rid of, and further, that the sufferings of some are to be the joy*

of others who are not to suffer—a most mediaeval doctrine.

I take it, the real betterment will be other. It will lie in the experience by which the relative failure of mechanical civilisation will lead man to that true sense of values which we have indicated. But we must add, to be precise, that this sense of failure in mechanical civilisation to offer the highest values will itself be the condition of the adaptation of our increased resources in the service of such values. Yet, I believe, we shall always be fighting new and probably subtler evils. Our faith ought to promote progress and betterment, but it ought not to be one which the persistence of evil can stultify.

Next, I will put the case against progress, such progress as we most easily anticipate, by a quotation from William James, out of his work already referred to. It is a suggestive passage. I dare say you all know it.

'A few summers ago,' James writes, 'I spent a happy week at the famous Assembly Grounds on the borders of Chautauqua Lake. The moment one treads that sacred enclosure one feels one's self in an atmosphere of success. Sobriety and industry, intelligence and goodness, orderliness and ideality, prosperity and cheerfulness pervade the air. It is a serious and studious picnic on a gigantic scale. Here you have a town of many thousands of inhabitants, beautifully laid out in the forest and drained, and equipped with means for satisfying all the necessary lower, and most of the superfluous higher, wants of man. You have a first-class college in full blast. You have magnificent music—a chorus of seven hundred voices, with possibly the most perfect open-air auditorium in the world. You have every sort of athletic exercise, from sailing, rowing swimming, bicycling to the ball-field and the more artificial doings which the gymnasium affords. You have kindergartens and model secondary schools. You have special religious services and special club-houses for the several

sects. You have perpetually running soda-water fountains, and daily popular lectures by distinguished men. You have the best of company, and yet no effort. You have no zymotic diseases, no poverty, no drunkenness, no crime, no police. You have culture, you have kindness, you have cheapness, you have equality, you have the best fruits of what mankind has fought and bled and striven for under the name of civilisation, for centuries. You have, in short, a foretaste of what society might be if it were all in the light, with no suffering and no dark corners.

‘I went in curiosity for a day. I stayed for a week, held spellbound by the charm and ease of everything, by the middle-class paradise, without a sin, without a victim, a blot, without a tear.

‘And yet what was my own astonishment, on emerging into the dark and wicked world again, to catch myself quite unexpectedly and involuntarily saying, “Ouf! What a relief! Now for something primordial and savage. . . . Let me take my chances again in the big outside worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings.”’ And then he recurs to the unidealised heroic life of the working classes, the heroic element of which such a civilisation as he has just described is tending to abolish, and, as we seem bound to say, is rightly tending to abolish. I suppose the answer is that evil can take care of itself. We may quite safely, and should, abolish all the evil we can; but if we think this means that there will one day be a life on earth with no ground for pessimism, and still more if we rest our optimism on this anticipation of history, it looks very much as if we must be wrong. It looks as if true bedrock optimism not merely is undefeated by pessimism, but actually depends in part upon the grounds of pessimism and would vanish if they were withdrawn. And I have no doubt that this is somewhere near the truth. Some failure is essential to our best success. Nothing else will

teach us where the true gold lies.

If these things, or anything like them, are true, they have a serious bearing on social work. They would govern our attitude and direct our aims and our sympathy. There is no fear of anyone inspired by them neglecting to set right offences against good management and good sense and humanity. But yet—the difference is difficult to describe—but some of us know it well at work—they would take up ground more akin to that of the working class themselves than to that of the ordinary helper or philanthropist. They would accept with simplicity their courage and self-denial and kindness, adopting its high level as natural, and not spoiling it by treating it as heroic. The spirit that went out from them would be one not so much of commiseration for hardship as of sympathy in fortitude and cheerfulness. If you meet a person with endurance and nobility greater than your own, the least you can do for him is to play up to it, and not to pull it down. By the help of such workers the people may be made happier, without diminution of the great qualities that *seem* only to be guaranteed by hardship. 'Seem,' I say, for irrational hardship clamours to be abolished ; there will always be enough to bear. If the best things in life are what we really value, if we have arrived at our optimism through a due schooling in pessimism, our faith will shine through us, and communicate itself to all we touch.

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## ON LOTTERIES, BETTING, AND GAMBLING

A time which is conspicuous for its examination of all sides of life, striving to map out courses in harmony with a higher and more comprehensive ideal, cannot afford to omit consideration of betting and gambling, and of one of their particular forms, the lottery. It is surely significant that many of the great religions have forbidden games of chance such as are here frequently implied, and that lotteries have been prohibited by the governments of many modern countries. In view of the beginning of serious efforts at social reconstruction the whole question requires to be carefully discussed. And here at the outset, it is well to emphasise that the general social welfare is what we have in view, not the amusement or advantage of particular "fortunate" individuals.

To doubt that the person addicted to putting money into lotteries does so chiefly for any other reason than from the desire to win is ludicrous. The desire, the chance, the hope, of attaining some increase to one's possessions, gives rise to a feeling of excitement. The drawing of the lots might change the whole character of the external conditions of his life, and the excitement is natural. Even the most prosaic must feel something of it. This is the element urged by some defenders as the ground of justification. A game of cards is supposed by many to have no real interest apart from the excitement of the possible gains. To be added to this excitement are the feelings of chagrin of those who lose. Seeing that in most lotteries

many persons put in money which they can only just afford, and that the number of prizes are few compared with the tickets, the total result if it could be worked out would seem even on a basis of hedonistic calculation, a predominance of chagrin over joy. Even supposing the two equalled one another, there remains to be considered the feeling of excitement.

Is this feeling of excitement at the idea of the possibility of obtaining wealth with no effort except what is implied by the fee, - is this feeling a noble one? Is it one of which a person really conscious of his own dignity and manliness would approve? Certainly not, if he took the trouble to consider its nature for a moment. The sorry fact is that on such matters men and women rarely think. For, the desire for wealth, position, power, luxury or enjoyment, without the honest work which alone gives one the moral right to these things (except they are a free gift) is a desire to be despised and controlled by a man of self-respect. This is the individual personal aspect of the question, and in the end it is on this that the whole question will turn even in its social implications. The one claim to wealth in any form by the man of fine character should be his own honest effort at serious work of advantage to the social whole in relation to which the wealth has been produced.

The important statement may be accepted that the best men in a society, the type which a society should encourage, are those who strive with genuine effort to forward the good things of the society, and endeavour as far as possible to make the bad as rare and insignificant as possible. Supposing that we leave out of consideration those persons who scorn with contempt the idea of obtaining money in a lottery and assume that the chances of a good man, (i. e. who will use the money for good social ends) are equal to that of a bad man (i. e. who will use the money for merely selfish ends): this is a result which all who are inspired with the desire for social reconstruction

must deplore and oppose. For one thing is certain - that from the moral point of view - the *obtaining* of wealth by a person ought to cost him some equivalent good work for the society, however he may afterwards spend that wealth. Lotteries are in contradiction with this principle, because they may and frequently do put wealth and so power into the hands of persons who are the least deserving and most opposed to real social welfare.

Betting comes under the same strictures, but it is open to still more serious criticism as found especially in the forms in which it appears in connection with games or sports like horse-racing. The lottery, when fairly carried out, is a mere matter of chance. Betting as a rule is not. The person who stands the most likelihood of winning a bet in a horse race is the man who has been spending much of his time studying the records of the horses entering, obtaining information as to the fitness near the time of the race, and in general making a more or less serious occupation of it. This in itself, and especially in the type of persons addicted habitually to it, is of no social usefulness whatever. To say, that horse racing is necessary in order to encourage the breeding of good horses is futile. The argument is not against horse racing, but against betting which is not an inevitable and necessary adjunct. The conditions of betting on horses in horse-races gives that man the best opportunity of gaining money who devotes himself (at least in the time in which he is free from his vocational occupation, if he has one) to matters of no social advantage. The man who has the least opportunity of gaining wealth thus is one whose energies are turned to the accomplishment of some social good.

The same type of evil exists in connection with gambling; but here the results are still worse than in betting. For gambling has its chief sphere in the realm of the Stock Exchange and business investments. And here it is clear that the ordinary man

engaged in a useful social occupation, spending his leisure hours in the joys of his family or in the pursuit of knowledge, art, or of some form of social movement for the advance of the people, will not be able to follow out all the machinations of those concerned on the Stock Exchange. In the investment of his savings, for his own old age, or more important for his children's education, he will have to be guided by the little advice he may be able to glean here and there. And the gambler is frequently the person to set the advice "on foot"! The consequences, to put them at the least bad, are to give to the non-productive man, the man who does nothing to organise industry, considerable portions of the product of the men who work. Frequently also the unsophisticated honest person is in the position of having lost the legitimate earnings of his toil.

To all these objections may be added the great uncertainty of absolute fairness in lotteries, betting, and gambling. In spite of rules and regulations, it can hardly be doubted that there are always possibilities of a lottery being unfairly conducted, or of a jockey being bought in a race to hold back a favourite. Of the evils of the Stock Exchange, the less said the better for our reputation for honesty and sanity in the eyes of our successors in the task of civilisation. The records of innumerable judicial proceedings in this connection, company failures, companies within companies, and all that type of thing, provide sufficient illustration.

There is only one healthy dignified attitude with regard to wealth and power: to obtain it by the best exercise of one's talents which may increase social welfare. The sooner mankind comes to the decision to allow money to be obtained and kept only on a basis of honest work, the sooner will there be more self-respect, a more healthy and vigorous manhood, and a more beneficent application of wealth to the raising of the general level of civilisation. As public opinion affects this question it behoves all

who can to assume towards the supporters of lotteries, of betting, and of gambling, the most profound contempt. The very basis upon which our whole objection is founded seems, paradoxically enough, to provide a good reason for lotteries one part of the object of which is public usefulness. The balance for good is obviously arranged for on the provision that at least one half of the proceeds of a lottery is to be given to a good cause. For with regard to the amount which goes to the ticket holders it may be agreed that there is an even probability that half of this also will be devoted to a good purpose. There is a very large amount of truth in this contention: but the general argument for lotteries on such grounds is not established in favour of lotteries. So much may be admitted: that one of the worst feature of lotteries is overcome, and a positively good feature is introduced. Nevertheless, the possibility for the bad man to get wealth unearned by himself still remains, and anything tending in this direction should be avoided, especially if it is possible to obtain the good without the bad consequences. The position may therefore be stated as follows. The good cause is one which does or does not concern the State. If it does not concern the State, then at least the possibility of much money getting into the hands of socially undesirable persons does affect the State. The State should thus prohibit the lottery and direct that other means shall be adopted for raising the desired funds: and there are many means. Appeal ought rather to be made to the highest moral motives than to the motives of cupidity, to which the lottery appeals. If a cause is a worthy one it should arouse support on that ground.

If, however, the matter is one which affects the general welfare of any large body of people, the State will be affected in two ways if a lottery is decided on: the obtaining funds for the good cause, and the possibility of putting money into the hands of bad persons. Can the State obtain the former

without the latter? In most instances, certainly yes. The contention is simple: either a person can afford to buy tickets or he cannot (that is, with due regard to the fulfilment of his obligations to his family and to the maintenance of his own physical and intellectual development). If he cannot afford, then it is a sign of weakness or cupidity in the face of temptation, for him to buy such tickets. Considering that the habit of buying tickets for lotteries grows as easily as the habit of drinking intoxicants, the State must recognise here a strong objection to giving the person the opportunity or even the inducement to take part in a lottery. It is bad for the man himself, it is bad for his dependents, and frequently it leads to bad effects in the State. If the man can afford to buy tickets for a lottery (that is, without depriving his family or himself from any of the things which go to make up a life at a good normal standard judged by existing circumstances of civilisation), then the State is justified in saying, You have the means by which increased revenue can be obtained for these particular needs of the State. In other words: for a purpose of State and social importance the State should raise the money on a basis of the taxation especially of those whose incomes are above that amount judged to be necessary for a good healthy life in the existing circumstances. The principle of the super-tax will have this advantage, that it will take all superfluity of wealth from the bad man. And it will be urged: from the good man as well. The result will be that as the bad man and the good man are reduced as far as finances are concerned to virtually the same level, the conflict will be one in which the good will have to meet simply on the basis of its goodness the bad on the basis of what it also can bring forward. If we believe that the rank and file of the electorate are more good than bad, then the good should be able predominantly to control the State and

thus of all individual "super-fluous" wealth, which it collects and so advance towards a higher level of civilisation. If the motive of cupidity has thus been largely counteracted the desire for power will undoubtedly remain, but that society will deserve its reward which does not accord the power to those whose main motive is to advance the general level of civilisation on all sides for all those who observe the country's laws.

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# SOME RESULTS OF THE CENSUS OF 1921 BARODA STATE

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1. The Census of 1921 was taken on the 18th March last; the tables in connection with it, that have been prescribed, are now being compiled. The Tables Volume is expected to be out by the end of November; and the report which is being written will, it is hoped, be before the reader some time in March or April of next year. But in the meanwhile, it will not be out of place to embody the main results of the Census in a short note for the information of the public. Although some of the tables, e.g. on Occupations, have not yet been compiled, sufficient material is at hand to enable us to present some of the main features of popular interest.

2. *Area and Population*: The total area of the State is 8,127 square miles, distributed among the five administrative divisions as shown below with the population as disclosed in the Census also similarly distributed. The Table also shows variation (in absolute figures) as also proportional variation from the figures of 1911.

Name of Division	Area	Population in 1921			Increase or Decrease over the figures of 1911	Plus or Minus
		Males	Females	Total	Persons	Per cent.
Baroda City with Cantonment...	13	51,555	43,157	94,712	- 4,633	- 4.6
Baroda Division ...	1,909	324,887	287,913	612,800	+ 25,245	+ 4.3
Kadi Division ...	3,046	461,952	439,526	900,578	+ 68,416	+ 8.2
Navsari Division ...	1,807	171,002	169,370	340,372	+ 4,905	+ 1.4
Amreli Division ...	1,077	78,502	74,083	152,585	- 236	- 1.8
Okhamandal Division	275	13,566	11,909	25,475	+ 77	+ 0.3
	8,127	1,100,564	1,025,958	2,126,522	+ 93,724	+ 4.61

The total population has thus increased by 93,724 or 4·6% on the population of 1911. The increase in the previous decade (1901-11) was 4·1%. Thus this Census shows that the movement of population has been tending towards the normal, as a result of the progressive recovery of the State from the famine of 1899-1900. The Census of 1872 on the same area showed a population of 1,997,598. The population increased by 9·2% in 1881, and by 10·7% in 1891. But since that date, the terrible years of 1899-1900 with their tale of famine and pestilence have left such an indelible impress on the people that the State has not yet recovered from that shock completely. In 1901 the population decreased by 19%. Since then the population has tended to be progressive but at much slower rates than between 1872 and 1891. It is undeniable however that a portion of the increase between 1872 and 1891 is due to better enumeration in the latter date. Secondly, up to 1891, the balance of migration was in favour of this State. The Censuses of 1901 and 1911 showed however an adverse balance, proving how the growing stress of economic conditions had led to the deflection of our adult population particularly in the Kadi district towards the lucrative labour centres of Ahmedabad and elsewhere. The migration figures for 1921 are not yet to hand, and it is impossible to state how far the balance is against. Imperial Table XI showing the immigrants to the state has been prepared and it shews that 232,494 immigrants have been enumerated within the State against 222,957 in 1911, giving an increase of 9,537 or 4%. The emigration figures have not yet arrived from other provinces or states, particularly Bombay Presidency and States with which our exchanges are the most important and the most numerous. The number of emigrants in Census of 1911 was 242,771. Thus if this total is assumed to be the same for this Census also the adverse balance will be seen to have been considerably reduced in our favour. The increase

in immigrants in Kadi is remarkable (from 45,168 in 1911 to 59,613 in 1921), showing that perhaps the balance in migration turned in favour of that district in the decade; and a portion of the increase in the population in that district (which is 68,416) must be ascribed to this cause.

3. *Movement of Population* : The following tendencies in the movement of population may be therefore summarised briefly :—

- i. In Baroda Division, the large increase in the Chorasī Talukas in the north and north-east ( Savli 23·8% Waghodia 24%, Sankheda 7·7% ) are ascribable to two reasons. The overflow population of the Charotar tract has migrated to these areas, because there is there a greater scope for cultivation. Charotar has always supported a dense population but its continued decrease in population since 1901 shows that a critical point has been reached in the agricultural potentialities of its soil. Kahnām or the Cotton Area has also declined with the exception of Dābhoi Taluka. The reason is the great increase in the cotton grown in the areas in the north and north-west in the decade. This has resulted in the migration of people from the south to the hitherto-food-growing areas in the north and north-east, particularly to Savli and Waghodia Mahals.
- ii. In Navsari Division, the population has been more or less stationary except in towns. The *Rasti* or fertile areas show a very high density ( 753 in Gandevi, 476 in Navsari, 291 in Palsana ). On the other hand the *Rani* or Jungle mahals have had a uniform decrease, except Vyara which shows a slight increase.

The submontane areas of Songadh and the forest regions of Mangrol, Mahuva and Vyara are notoriously malarious and unfavourable for settlement. The general conclusion for this division seems to be that in the Rasti Mahals the critical point for population has come, while in the other areas, unless widespread measures for stamping out of Malaria are undertaken, there is no scope for much increase in population.

- iii. In Kadi Division, the B. B. and C. I. Railway seems to divide the district into two unequal portions, the Eastern talukas being populous and fertile, and the Western half being more sparsely inhabited. The population has increased everywhere in this division except in Atarsumba in the extreme south-west. In 1901, this district suffered most from famine, the result being a considerable thinning away of the population at the extreme ends of life. Very few young and old men remained. The bulk of the population being of the healthy ages, it was expected that a rebound should happen in the next decade by the consequent decrease in deaths and therefore increase of survival rate. This rebound was, however, retarded by the next decade again proving generally unfavourable. In 1911-1920, the tide of immigration turned in its favour mainly from Kathiawad; and it seems also that the staying power of the people, tried by such a succession of misfortunes, seems to have hardened. In spite of the severe influenza epidemic in 1918, the decade of 1911-20 was a little more favourable than the previous decade which began with a succession of bad years right on till 1906; from 1907 till 1918 except

for the disastrous frost of 1911 and the fodder famine of 1915, there was a little breathing time. The famine of 1918 and the economic distress of the closing years of the decade did not however affect the natural increase to the same extent that previous afflictions of a similar magnitude had done. The result was that the rebound retarded in the previous decade, began to operate in this; with the consequent increase of 8·2 % in the population in 1921.

- iv. Amreli (including Okhamandal) is an inhospitable region of moribund rivers and precarious rainfall. Except for three favoured spots, the area round Damnagar, the region of the Shetranji valley comprising the southern villages of Amreli and the north east of Dhari, and the little oasis near Kodinar town which is of exceptional luxuriance,—the soil generally is shallow and on the coast largely impregnated with salt. For centuries, this region has only supported a population of a moderately low density, content to live on the margin of subsistence and clinging tenaciously to the land. Its history has not favoured density in this area. Before the settled regime of present days it had more or less been the perpetual cockpit of internecine strife, and the favourite haunt of outlawry. To the inhumanity of man are to be added the afflictions of Providence. Since 1872, a period of 49 years, there have been 7 famine years, 3 of scarcity and economic distress and 5 of deficient rainfall. It is no wonder therefore that the population in this district has been almost stationary, in fact showing a slight decrease since 1911. The net

increase since 1872 has been only 12·3 % and a great part of it is due to the balance of migration which is in favour of this Prant.

- v. The general conclusion on the movement of population of the whole State seems to be that except in north east Baroda and east Kadi, there is not much scope for expansion in the future. The industrial enterprises that are now in the making—particularly the 14 cotton mills that are foreshadowed in the different Prants of the State—may lead to an increase in certain urban centres, like Kalol, Billimora, Kadi and Petlad. But any large increase in the population generally need not be expected as the pressure of population on land seems to have reached more or less a critical point in areas which have hitherto favoured high density; and within the State itself except for the two areas just mentioned, there is little chance of any migration possible to ease this pressure. All the circumstances indicate that we are on the eve of a new era when the national energies hitherto passionately concentrated on agriculture will now have to be diverted more and more to industrial pursuits.

4. *The Urban Population* : The urban population shows an increase of 13,642, on the 1911 population in areas regarded as towns in this Census. The comparative figures of certain towns are indicated in the table below; of the 15 typical towns taken for comparison ten may be said to be more or less progressive since 1872. Of the decaying towns, the City of Baroda and Pattan are the chief. The decrease in the City's population which has been continuous since 1891 is one of the most disquieting features of successive Censuses. To the old causes

of decaying industries, the decreasing attractions of court life

Town	Popula- tion in 1921	Popula- tion in 1911	Popula- tion in 1872	Town	Popula- tion in 1921	Popula- tion in 1911	Popula- tion in 1872
All Towns	440,823	427,181	447,253	Visnagar ...	18,855	14,137	19,127
Baroda City	94,712	99,345	116,274	Kadi ...	11,919	11,556	16,725
Pattan ...	27,017	28,339	31,523	Mehsana ...	11,888	10,141	7,825
Navsari ...	19,437	17,982	14,700	Vadnagar ...	11,671	11,228	15,914
Amreli ...	17,713	17,443	15,998	Padra ...	9,006	7,853	7,985
Sidhpur ...	16,887	15,447	13,534	Bilimora ...	7,321	6,462	5,218
Dabhoi ...	15,870	9,117	14,898	Kalol ...	7,259	6,376	5,585
Petlad ...	15,159	14,863	15,109	Dwarka ...	7,977	6,548	4,712

population which has kept pace with the times and consistently discouraged the growth of hangers on, the increasing outflow of emigrants and so on, may be added now the widening of public highways, necessitating the demolition of hovels and the shifting of the labouring classes to the environs not included within the City area. The City improvements were seriously undertaken only during the last decade. Apart from these circumstances, one must remember the low proportion of females, particularly of married females of the child bearing ages to the total population of the City as compared to the whole of the State. This points to a low birth

rate, particularly as children in the age-period 0-1 are 320 in the whole State (per 10,000 of the population) as against 288 in the City of Baroda.

Division	Married Females 15-50	Proportion to total Population
State ... ..	410,034	19.2
City ... ..	17,554	18.5

5. *Distribution by Religion* : The population is distributed

Religion	1921	1911	Variation in the decade
Hindu ... ..	1,742,160	1,697,146	+ 45,014
Animist ... ..	163,077	115,411	+ 47,666
Musalman ... ..	162,328	160,837	+ 1,441
Jain ... ..	43,223	43,462	- 239
Parsi ... ..	7,530	7,955	- 425
Christian ... ..	7,421	7,203	+ 218
Arya Samaj ... ..	645	598	+ 47
Brahmo ... ..	35	6	+ 29
Jew ... ..	27	40	- 13
Sikh ... ..	70	90	- 20
Others ... ..	6	...	+ 6

as in the margin by religion. All the main religions show increase over the figures for 1911, except Parsis and Jains. The decrease in these two religions is probably due to the emigration of many male members of these communities to trading centres like Bombay City and also in a great measure to their decreasing

birthrate. The large increase in the figures for Animists is perhaps more apparent than real. A great deal in the discrepancy in figures of Animists must be ascribed to the discretion left to the enumerators to include those Animists under Hindus who desired to call themselves such, "after due enquiry that they were really Hindus." This discretion does not seem to have been much exercised in the Census of 1911. In 1921, however we have evidence of such discretion being widely exercised. For instance, in Navsari Division, where the Animists are most to be found, their number has increased from 84,894 to 147,450; and in Baroda Division, the number on the other hand has declined from 30,317 to 15,118. These fluctuations cannot be explained by any other way than that the enumerators have attempted in this

Census to exercise their discretion instead of indiscriminately counting every Animist a Hindu, who chose to call himself one. The number of such "Anaryas" returned as Hindus have therefore declined from 130,144 in 1911 to 94,353 persons in this Census.

6. *Sex, Age and Civil Condition:* The number of females in this State is on the whole less than that of males, by 74,606 or by 68 per 1000 males. Males are in excess by 194 per thousand females in the City of Baroda. The sex comparisons for the

Division	Proportion of males per 1000 females.
Baroda ... ..	1,129
Kadi ... ..	1,048
Navsari ... ..	1,009
Amreli ... ..	1,060
Okhamandal.....	1,139

other Prants of the State are indicated in the margin. The sexes almost approach equality in Navsari, while in Okhamandal, the males are most in excess. Of the total population, 848,579 or 40 per cent are unmarried, 1,014,844 or

48 per cent are married and 263,099 or 12 per cent are widowed. 3,215 persons under 5 years of age are married; 272 persons aged 0-5 are widowed. These infant marriages are happily now on the decrease. In 1911, no less than 19,240 persons aged 0-5 were declared to have been married; and 587 of this age period were widowed. The age constitution of the people when compared with the two Censuses enables us to make one or two broad inferences. The age-returns as crudely given in the Census schedules are most unsatisfactory. There is the tendency to plump on multiples of five and ten; and even numbers are preferred to odd. These age-returns require smoothing. The method employed in this Census is the columnar method of Mr. Hardy, by which individual ages adjoining quinary ages were subjected to a series of differences from which

a corrected figure for the quinary group was obtained and then figures for the individual ages in the group were deduced by drawing a curve through after the manner of Mr. Milne's Graphic Method described in Newsholme's Vital Statistics (p. 266, 3rd Edition). The age figures for both 1911 and 1921 were subjected to this process and the marginal table was thus compiled.

Age-groups	Percentage of Total Population.	
	1911	1912
0-15	36.0	39.6
15-50	55.7	51.1
50-	8.3	9.5

The middle age group shows a decrease while the young and old have increased in this Census foreshadowing a lower birthrate and a higher death-rate in the coming decade. The age curve for 1921 males has been plotted; and a distinct

depression is noticeable therein from the 15th till the 27th year; the depression is at its deepest in the age-period of 20-25 for 1921. This shows the traces of the havoc wrought by the famines of 1899-1900 on those who were born in those dark years. A comparison of the male figures (proportioned to 100,000) for the age-periods 0-5, 10-15, and 20-25 for the years 1901, 1911 and 1921, shows how the traces of famine have persisted through these two decades. In 1921, in the age group 20-25, there were 8,092 males per 100,000 males. This corresponds to the 1911 age group

Year	Age-groups		
	0-5	10-15	20-25
1901	9,376	12,563	10,033
1911	15,206	9,556	10,315
1921	14,131	12,036	8,092

of 10-15, and 1901 group of 0-5. Thus the depression in 1901 in the first age group is seen also in 1911 in the age-group 10-15 and in 1921 in the age group 20-25.

7. *Literacy.* The next group of Tables that have been so far compiled refers to literacy. The question of literacy is very

Age period	Total population.	Literate.	Literate in English
0-5	274,840	...	...
5-10	294,841	9,486	49
10-15	255,421	49,798	1,588
15-20	170,211	41,060	3,859
20-	1,131,209	172,074	10,164
Total.	2,126,522	272,418	15,660

important for this State and the results which this Census have disclosed in regard thereto are no doubt awaited with keen interest. The main results may be tabled in the margin. The total number of literates has

increased from 204,947 (184,883 males, 20,064 females) to 272,418 (231,118 males, 41,300 females). All these literates are of 5 years of age and upwards. No person below that age has been reckoned as a literate even though shewn as such in the Enumeration books. The increase in absolute figures in literacy since 1911 amounts to nearly 33%—while the increase in the total population during the same period has been only 4.6% so that the literates have progressed at a much faster rate than the population. The number of literates

Division	Number of literates per mille of population aged 5 and over		
	Persons	Males	Females
Baroda State ...	147	240	47
Baroda City ...	405	562	213
Baroda Division (excluding city)	157	256	43
Navsari ...	148	245	51
Kadi ...	108	184	27
Amreli and Okhamandal ...	167	264	63

in the English language has nearly doubled since 1911, when there were only 9,741 English literates (9,304 males and 437 females). Now there are 14,773 male and 887 female literates in English in the

State. An idea of the diffusion of literacy in the different districts and the City of Baroda may be got by reference to the marginal table where the number of literates is proportioned to 1000 of population aged 5 years and over. The general percentage of literacy is 15 for the whole State. Roughly one male in every four, and one female in every twenty, aged 5 years and over, is literate. But this proportion for the whole State represents the mean of a range which is at its highest in the City and at its lowest in Kadi district. In the City 40% of the total population (5 and over) is literate; more than half the number of males and one female in five of that age and upwards is literate in the City. An even better idea of the remarkable results achieved in the diffusion of literacy is obtained by a comparison of the figures of this Census with those of previous Census. For proper comparison, literates below the age of 10 have been excluded. The following table has been prepared on this basis:-

Division	Number of literates per mille of persons aged 10 and over					
	Males			Females		
	1921	1911	1901	1921	1911	1901
Baroda State... ..	278	229	199	52	25	9
Baroda City ... ..	600	473	427	218	84	27
Baroda Division ... ..	293	260	238	48	21	7
Kadi ,, ... ..	215	173	137	30	12	3
Navsari ,, ... ..	389	226	219	58	33	25
Amreli with Okhamandal	311	260	187	71	43	7

Some of the increases in the above Table are striking: female literates have multiplied nearly six times proportionately to the female population 10 years and over since 1901 in the State. In Kadi and Amreli, they have multiplied tenfold. The increase

has been of course highest where there has been the greatest scope. The highest advance in literacy is attained as expected in the City where the educational facilities have been the best that the State can afford, and the enforcement of the Compulsory Education Law has been the most rigorous. The proportional increase in male literacy has been also faster in this decade than in the one previous. There the male literates have increased from 427 to 600 per mille since 1901.

8. *Infirmities*: The other Tables so far compiled refer to Infirmities, the Languages, the Census of Live-Stock and the Size of Families. They may be briefly described. The tale of infirmities in this Census is a dismal record. The infirmities with which we are concerned in this Census were the same as in the last, with the exception that while in 1911 only deaf-mutes from birth were recorded, in this year, we have extended our researches to *all* deaf-mutes. The blind of one eye, the only deaf, the persons suffering from white leprosy, the cripple and other infirm not included in the above four categories, were not counted. The numbers show an alarming increase over

Kind of Infirmity	1911	1921
Insane ... ..	528	994
Deaf-mute ... ..	425	598
Blind ... ..	3,361	6,794
Leper ... ..	445	552
Total persons afflicted. ... ..	4,748	8,901

the figures of 1911. The comparative figures are indicated in the margin. It may be noted that the total of persons afflicted differs from the crude total of absolute figures under the individual infirmities, because several persons are afflicted with more than

one infirmity, some with three and others with two infirmities. The figures show a large increase under every one of the heads especially amongst the blind whose number has more than doubled since 1911. The increase in the deaf-mutes may be

explained by the extension in the definition of deaf-mutes above referred to. The increase under the other heads is due to two reasons :- (i) improved enumeration, and (ii) a real increase. That there has been an improvement in the enumeration is proved by a reference to the age-distribution of infirmities in the Censuses of 1911 and 1921. The age-periods

Age periods	Persons afflicted	
	1911	1921
35-40	333	477
40-45	357	621
45-50	323	479
50-55	453	989
55-60	165	481
60-65	506	1,177

selected are in the higher groups, where death-rate is very high, and a substantial diminution in this Census might have been expected. Instead, there has been a large increase in every case. The infirm aged 35-40 numbered 333 in 1911.

But the infirm aged 45-50 in 1921 (who are presumably their survivors) number 479. Similarly the 50-55 group of 1911 numbered 453 while the 60-65 group of 1921 numbered 1,177. In this connection the factor of mis-statement of age may be conceded, as the infirm of these age periods are notoriously unable to state their ages, but at the same time, the facts presented above, testify unmistakably to a more searching enumeration in this Census. On the other hand, that there has been a real increase cannot be denied also. It is not possible to tell how many of these infirm are immigrants, and to what extent immigration has led to the increase in their number. But improved communications within the decade must have enabled many of these afflicted persons to come to this State. The high prices of food, which have led to malnutrition, the deficient rainfall, one of the effects of which is the increase of dust and glare, and the lax administration of the Lepers' Act must be among other contributory causes to the real increase.

9. *Languages* : The Language Census has not led to any

striking deviations from the state of things presented in the Census of 1911. The only noticeable feature of it is the increasingly predominant spread of Gujarati amongst the people.

Language.	Number of speakers.
Gujarati ... ..	1,867,343
Bhil dialects. ...	145,856
Marathi ... ..	33,165
Western Hindi...	62,367
Other languages...	17,791

The number of speakers of Gujarati proper has increased from 1,756,307 to 1,867,343 or by 6.3%. The increase in population of State during the decade has been only 4.6%, which indicates that Gujarati has progressed at the expense of other dialects. A clue to the direction in which such absorption has

taken place is furnished by the figures for Bhili dialects. These dialects show a decline in the number of its speakers from 146,347 in 1911 to 145,856 in 1921. This decline is in spite of the real increase in the number of these forest tribes. There were, including the Hindu Anaryas, 245,555 of these tribes in 1911; while the total in 1921 was 257,430. Thus the number of Gujarati speakers among these may be presumed to have increased from 99,184 in 1911 to 111,574 in 1921. It is true that some of these Bhili speakers towards the Khandesh border have now adopted Marathi, but their number is too small to affect the conclusion just stated. It remains in this connection to note that the number of Marathi speakers has declined from 36,145 in 1911 to 33,165 in 1921. The speakers of Western Hindi have also declined a little during the decade.

10. *Census of Livestock:* In connection with the General Census, a census of live-stock was taken in October 1920, along with the work of numbering of houses which was then going on. The same form as the Bombay Presidency Census of Livestock was adopted and joined on to the house list. Along with each numbered household with the name of its head,

the number of its cattle, and of its ploughs and carts were also

Kind	Total in	
	October 1920	July 1920
Cows ... ..	194,541	248,374
Bulls and bullocks	426,258	388,813
Calves ... ..	162,769	Not separately recorded.
Buffaloes. ...	334,228	336,363
Young buffaloes.	227,906	Not separately recorded.
Sheep and Goats.	379,324	301,278
Horses, donkeys etc	47,857	45,055
Camels etc. ...	5,898	Not counted.
Ploughs. ...	199,640	137,715
Carts ... ..	86,541	76,669

recorded. It was the completest and the most comprehensive Cattle Census that State has ever undertaken, and the results recorded in the margin when compared with the figures of the July Census undertaken by the Revenue Department testifies to the accuracy and the completeness of the Census enumeration. In regard to certain items of the record such as bullocks and calves, no proper

comparison is possible with the revenue figures of July 1920, as they were not separately recorded; the Departmental Census only counted under "cows", "bulls", "bullocks" and "buffaloes" such of the young of these animals as are available for agriculture, leaving the rest unenumerated. But wherever a proper comparison is possible, there is observable an increase in numbers. Thus the number of sheep and goats increased from 301,278 to 379,324; the number of ploughs increased from 137,715 to 199,640; and of carts from 76,669 to 86,541. These increases within three months could not have been actual, and their only cause is improved and more accurate enumeration. From the above reasons, it is to be regretted that no conclusions can be formed as to whether the export of cattle has been going on to any large extent. The total number of cows is shewn to be 194,541 in

October 1920. In the July Census of the same year, the number under cows is shown to be 248,374; but this number must include a large proportion of the young calves which were separately enumerated in October: or else the earlier estimate is entirely erroneous. It could not be that within three months such a large decrease of over 50,000 cows should happen. The number of inhabited houses in the State is 512,845; so that for every 100 inhabited houses or families, there were in October 1920, 35 cows, 83 bulls and bullocks, 65 buffaloes, 73 sheep and goats, 39 ploughs and 17 carts.

11. *Other Tables: The Size of Family:* The other Tables that are in process of compilation refer to the statistics of industries, the different aspects of the occupations of the people, the division of the population by castes, the classification of homesteads according to standards of comfort and accommodation, the size and the kind of tenements in the City of Baroda, and lastly the Tables in connection with the special enquiry into the size and sex constitution of families. The results of these inquiries will be duly embodied in the Report. In connection with the last named enquiry, nearly 150,000 slips containing details of the duration of marriage, the ages of wife and husband and the number and sex of children have been collected. These are being compiled in tables which have been devised on the lines of the Scottish Census of 1911. It is trusted that the facts therein disclosed will be a substantial contribution to the subject of comparative fertility. In connection with this question, however, an additional enquiry was conducted along with the Preliminary Census into the number of persons per Census "house" which has been defined to be identical with "family". These results have been compiled into a separate Table. Care has been taken, in regard to this table, to exclude from the calculation all servants, casual visitors etc; the inmates of hospitals, asylums and jails, and the residents of Dharmashalas, hotels, Dak

bungalows and other places of temporary residence were also excluded, so that an idea may be obtained of the size of the normal family in the State. The following summary Table gives the results for the State as a whole and the City of Baroda (excluding the Cantonment and the Railway area) :—

Size of Family containing.	Number of families in each class		Number of persons in each class	
	The State	Baroda City	The State	Baroda City
One person...	63,604	5,944	63,604	5,944
Two persons	79,022	5,299	158,044	10,598
Three persons	83,729	4,189	251,187	12,567
Four persons	84,078	3,461	336,312	13,844
Five persons	72,578	2,695	362,890	13,075
Six persons	51,982	1,672	311,592	10,032
Seven persons	31,587	1,089	221,109	7,623
Eight persons	17,031	532	136,248	4,656
Nine persons	8,755	322	78,795	2,898
Ten persons	4,562	188	45,620	1,880
Eleven persons	2,500	121	27,500	1,331
Twelve persons	1,512	97	18,144	1,164
Thirteen persons	1,012	56	13,156	728
Fourteen persons	651	56	9,114	784
Fifteen persons and over	1,279	85	21,311	1,501
<b>TOTAL...</b>	<b>503,832</b>	<b>25,776</b>	<b>2,055,126</b>	<b>88,625</b>

The Table shows that there are 503,832 normal families in the State. The average number of persons per family in the State is four. The City has however an average of three persons per family. The size of family which is the most favoured or the mode in the State is that containing four persons; but in the City, the mode is the family of only one. It is a curious commentary on the social constitution of families in the State that in the capital, the largest number should consist of one person only. The number of families containing from one to three persons in the City

is 15,432, or nearly 60% of the total number of families in that place. It is a very strong indication of the fact that economic and prudential considerations have ruled in the size of families in the City and it is also the reason why a low birthrate has been the feature in its vital statistics. A large number of families resident in the City, it must also be stated, are here for exigent reasons. They have in many cases left their families at home and live singly in the hope of returning after their connections with the State are over. This is also proved by the large proportion of the City population being foreign born. The proportion of the foreign born per mille in the City is 258 in this Census, as against 263 in 1911. But on the whole the conclusion seems to be that the tendency is more and more towards the reduction of the size of families. This aspect of the problem of population will be discussed in the Report when the results of the Sex Enquiry are compiled and ready at hand. In the meanwhile a broad inference is merely stated.

12. The above note is only the briefest summary of the Census results and can only be accepted as a first review of the facts disclosed. The conclusions now stated may have to be revised when all the facts are at hand, but in the meantime, this note is presented to the public in the hope that it may be of interest.

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## THE FUTURE OF THE INDO-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Any work which seriously discusses subjects connected with the the social and political future of the Indian peoples must arouse interest at the present time in India. Mr. J. C. Wedgwood, who has treated of the Future of the Indo-British Commonwealth is well known to the Indian public as a frank and outspoken critic of Indian administration and Indian aspirations. His views, therefore, will be especially interesting to those who wish to know what an intelligent, independent outsider thinks of some of the Indian demands. This book has an importance all its own at the present juncture. At a time when the question : Freedom within or freedom without the Empire ? is being earnestly discussed, the opinions of a prominent member of the Labour Party about the future of the Empire are particularly welcome.

Mr. Wedgwood thinks that only two great powers are left by the war : America and the British Empire. The old idea was that there are a number of Great Powers, whose rivalries must be harmonised into a Concert of Europe. The League of Nations is the posthumous child of this view. But the only powers which now count are England and America, and America will not support the League. Hence the future of the peace of the world depends on England and America.

In such circumstances the British Empire is full of possibilities. Wedgwood's idea is that she can become the nucleus of a world union—a Chakrabarti Rajya—by becoming herself the centre of a commonwealth of free peoples enjoying equal rights.

Two things are necessary : American friendship and co-operation. This can be done by fundamentally reforming the Empire and by freely extending to America those equal rights which British subjects will enjoy. The old imperialism must give way to a new. Most imperi-

alism, all imperialism in the past, has been inspired by selfishness—forcibly to seize, jealously to hold, and ruthlessly to exploit. But the Indo-British Commonwealth will be based on freedom and equality.

A factor of importance in the situation is British credit. Wedgwood boasts that Eastern Europe now looks to Britain as the only saviour against the anarchy within or the Bolsheviks without. Equally striking is the financial soundness of the Empire. There is indeed a colossal debt to be reckoned with: America alone is the creditor to the extent of a thousand million pounds. A printing press, and a few organised bayonets to induce the peasants to take your paper, are the necessary stock in trade of the adventurous modern Governments that rule and do not govern. But British credit is sound. Another proof of the stability of England is the comparative state of contentment of Labor. In war, all the colonies rushed to the rescue of the Empire. Voluntary co-operation is the keystone of the British Commonwealth. The relations between white and white in the British Empire are rosy because they form the commonwealth. But it was an Empire only of white co-operation.

The safest bond is then that of freedom: our own special invention is the self-governing dominion—it is strongest in war and most harmonious in peace.

The League of Nations was to produce world-peace. But unfortunately the war did not end in a draw. The peace then will not crystallise. America will have nothing to do with the making permanent of injustice. Nor could Germany ever consent to come in and help to make permanent her own collapse. The League of Victors can neither command the confidence or the respect of mankind. Well, indeed, has Tagore called it a league of robbers.

A League of Nations with no weapon, with no authority, without America or even Germany, above all without any of the unselfishness the private man shows in private, cannot possibly become a super-state. It cannot impose peace. It is a Bench of Magistrates without a policeman; it is a Board of Delegates with no common interest.

Is it not possible, however, to get to the Super-state via an Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth on the model of the free Dominions of the British Empire? How far could the other nations tolerate an Anglo-American world-peace?

It all seems to Wedgwood to rest upon equal citizenship, bringing equal rights and equal good conduct. We have widened the

family to the self-governing Empire. We are widening the family to the race. Can we widen the family to the world?

Insolence, selfishness, and ignorance wrecked all the previous attempts to unite mankind in one community. But now things are changed. Even the Roman had no such universal language. The printing press, the vast common literature, the telegraph, the publicity of Parliaments and Councils have minimised the blank universal ignorance in which past empires floundered. The English are less selfish according to Wedgwood than the empires of the past and England and America have a larger altruistic element than other countries. The third test—insolence? Insolence has been the vane of Spaniard, German, Frenchman in the past. But none of these is insolent to-day. Insolence is peculiar to a dominant race. The people of the East do not like clawing now and are tired of bad manners. Insolence is peculiar to the English middle class animal. Insolence destroyed Carthage, Rome, Spain, and Potsdam. Insolence may destroy Britain. The English require a change of heart. The only way to get that change of heart is self-government and equal rights. There is little serious difficulty in the way of equal rights for all white British citizens. Ireland will soon have finished with Dublin Castle and Sir Edward Carson, and Martial Law. The real struggle is going to be over equal rights for white and 'coloured' British citizens.

Ireland has a right to secede. An unwilling partner is a greater danger to any country than a separate country free and no longer held by force. In any case whether the danger be greater or less, the right to secede is the right to govern oneself: it is primary. Viewed from the perfectly democratic standpoint, Ireland has a right to secede from the British Empire, and the five counties or the greater part of them have a right to secede from Ireland—provided that the seceding Irish will take their share of the National debt for the incurring of which they are as responsible as are the rest of us. Here also expediency coincides with right. If we do the right thing it must help our world-union. That world-union depends primarily upon America. It will be a pledge of good faith to the peoples in America.

But for the wider work of the new Commonwealth, the basis of world-union and peace, Indian co-operation is vital. The Non-co-operation of India takes away the keystone of the arch. We need Asia. In Asia is the danger to peace.

Europe has gorged at leisure for four hundred years: and gradually Asia has been learning—learning via the West—not only how to loathe, but how to shake off the West, even how to shake it off by suicide, if necessary.

The boycott of Western rule, of Western civilization, that is the danger to the West and to any world-union. "Beware of the people" said Mirabeau, "the people who, to become dangerous, have only to fold their arms." The East under the influence of a saint-leader, half religious, half nationalist, is becoming dangerous to the West, and to itself.

What is needed is no more gifts to India, but co-operation with the Indians. That, however unpleasant it may be, means consultation with and deference to the wishes of the Indian leaders. We need the first 'coloured' Dominion as evidence and proof of what the British Empire stands for in the world, the first step towards an Indo-British commonwealth of nations. If we take this road, all the nations of the East will gradually come in. What they fear is domination and exploitation. What they need is protection and credit. All hangs upon the admission of India as a partner. Remove gradually the injustice of arbitrary rule, of unequal citizenship, of racial insolence, of opportunities for exploitation. But keep the end in view that end is Brotherhood. There is no other road to it, but the road that is called Democracy, yet one cannot be too sanguine even for democracy. Lenin may be wiser to believe in force directed by Marxian Socialists, Gandhi may be right to base his hopes on Tolstoian anarchy. Democracy seems to be more just than Bolshevism and therefore better. It seems to be more practical than preaching a return to nature's anarchy and reliance upon individual conversion.

"With malice towards none, with charity for all, it is for us to resolve that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

M. A. BUCH.

## THE REFORM OF PENAL LAW IN ITALY

We wish to draw attention of Indian readers to *The Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*. It is published by the North Western University Press in Chicago and is in its production up to the highest standard of University publications. We regard it as the foremost Journal in English devoted to these Subjects. It is broad in its range of articles and studies, and is in the best sense "philosophically scientific." The sociological point of view is always given its due both in the interpretation of facts and in the proposals of a remedial and preventive nature. We highly recommend it to students of sociology in this country as indicating both scope and methods for research in India. In the August 1921 issue there is an article by the Italian sociologist Enrico Ferri. We give below an abbreviated edition of the article:—

Italy has always been to the fore in the "sad and severe discipline of crimes and punishments"

The Decree of September 14th, 1919, which institutes the Royal Commission for the reform of penal laws, indicates as cardinal points in the reform of penal justice in Italy, the two fundamental conceptions which for forty years the positive criminal school has been affirming in the field of thought. These two cardinal points are the defence of society and the perilousness of the criminal.

The defence of society is understood to mean the daily practical duty of the functions of the state outside and above philosophical doctrines, religious beliefs and scholastic polemic. The state has a positive function of preserving and defending the community from crime, which is one of the many social diseases that endanger and offend the binding ties of civil society.

This then is the first fundamental conception with which this decree is inspired.

The second point is that penal justice in its concrete form of the sanction established by the judge in his sentence, should be adapted and proportioned to the personality of the criminal, without whom the crime could not take place. Crime is not a natural phenomenon such as lightning or a flood or an earthquake which disturb the conditions of social existence by natural forces beyond control. Crime is always the work of a man and is the symptom revealing the personality of the criminal.

Those two fundamental criteria are the official recognition of the formal criteria of the positive criminal school which in the sphere of criminal anthropology owes its foundation to Cesare Lombroso, what a man of thought can leave as an indelible rule to humanity, is above all a method of study, a method of investigation.

That positive method, the method—that is to say—of observation and of experiment, is the light of thought and scientific method revealed to us though the agency of Galileo Galilei in his admirable dialogue "Saggiatore," and from the Italian renaissance onwards has received the most enlightened confirmation. The Galilei method of observing the criminal is a Lombrosian innovation not destined to perish.

That the criminal, to say nothing of cases of evident and declared madness, is an abnormal being, is a conviction which it is not going too far to say has taken root in the public conscience precisely owing to this infiltration of ideas and scientific observations of the Lombrosian school. And it is a concept which has penetrated also into the conscience of the magistrates.

For thousand of years humanity has not believed in the moral liberty of man, in free will. All the mystic East and Greece before Socrates were convinced that "Ananke"—"Fatum"—was the great power which hurried along willingly or unwillingly both men and gods. But, with the post-Socratic philosophy and especially with the moral doctrines of Christianity, has taken root in the common conscience of western civilization the conviction of the moral sin in the man who commits a crime and therefore of his moral responsibility before the authority of the state, which exercises the function of penal justice.

The new penal code of Japan of 1910, the modifications in the penal code suggested in Germany, in Austria, in Switzerland, in Servia, in the Argentine Republic and in Sweden, waver between this traditional sentiment of the moral offence of the criminal and the positive

and objective criterion of the perilousness ("pericolosità") of the criminal quite apart from the judgment of moral offence.

To measure, to weigh, to punish the moral offence of the criminal is not a function of the state. The state, acting through its functionaries, the magistrates, has no means of weighing and of knowing the moral offence of a human being.

Religious belief in the moral sin of man is foreign to the function of penal justice, because both Catholic and Protestant believers know that there is a word and a precept of great wisdom in the Bible which says "Judge not." And there is the word of Jesus, too, that no man can judge another. And this belief is perfectly logical. To measure and weigh the offence of a human being, nothing less than the omniscience of God is needed. To know through what hereditary vices of past generations arise in the soul of a living creature the instinct of blood, or of violation, to know by what changes of his life, by what conditions, family or social that man has brought himself to commit homicide, arson, violation is not a question that the limited mind of a judge, born of woman, can decide. To claim this, is to claim omniscience. It needed not to be repeated that the problem of proportioning the punishment to the crime has never been solved and several criminalists, such as Ellero, Conforti, Tissot, frankly declare it insolvable.

A reform of penal justice carrying out the ideas of the positive criminal school—social defence and perilousness of the criminal, wholly apart from all research and measure of moral offence of the accused—does not therefore oppose, nay is in full accordance with these religious beliefs, which as to the moral offence of the criminal have doctrines of their own, which we have here neither opportunity nor means of judging. And these criteria of the criminal anthropological school do not contradict philosophical doctrines either, for they are on two different planes.

While on one hand, these penal laws, brought to the high level to which Cesare Beccaria raised them borne on the wings of his genius, were being theoretically and technically perfected, on the other hand this phenomenon became clear: that crime increased and is increasing in all civilized countries of the world. In other words, we have on the one hand the (I might say) academic perfection of penal laws and hence of the regulations of penal justice, and on the other hand complete

bankruptcy of the practical function which these regulations should exercise in defending the majority of honest people from the minority of criminals. This means, then, that the foundation on which the traditional doctrines were placed is wrong. This first step taken, we must also have a second clear conception of the task which awaits this commission. It is called to reform penal laws; therefore it is not called to solve the whole problem of crime. Crime has causes which produce it and effects which it produces. To eliminate the causes of crime, penal laws dealing only, or in part, with the effects of crime, are not complete. For forty years I have affirmed, and I am never tired of repeating, the remedies for the causes which spur men on to commit crime are nine-tenths of them outside the penal law—they are in the civil code, in economic legislation, in the better regulation of family, in the systematization of the school and of education, in all those precautions of social life which eliminate or attenuate the causes which make men commit crime. If we wish to have a complete idea of the problem of crime, we can make a kind of guiding plan of what the action of the state against crime should be. The first part of this guiding plan, which demands very powerful and watchful agents, concerns what might be called the social prevention of crime: indirect and remote prevention which finds out and studies the causes of crime and indicates remedies to eliminate it if possible or to weaken its malignant power. All these are laws which concern the conditions of the physical and moral existence of the individual in society, beginning from his birth and going on to the hygiene of infancy, to scholastic and educative rules, to the conditions of labor, to family life, material and moral. A municipality which builds houses cheaply for the people does much more to prevent crimes against good morals than one which doubles the penalties for these crimes, while continuing to allow parents, children, brothers and sisters to sleep in the same room in a cramped confusion of human organisms. Besides this function of social and indirect prevention of crime, there is also that of direct prevention, which is generally called police prevention, in other words, immediate, prompt upon the manifestation of the crime. And here also I think that radical reforms, which experience has been calling for decades, should be made in our country. The abolition, for instance, of the old police methods, which are inefficacious and harmful, such as admonition, surveillance, compulsory confinement, will, in my opinion

need no long consideration on the part of our commission, for these methods when opposed to the modern methods of crime are like so many flint muskets. But for these we shall have to substitute disciplinary measures of preventive defence for minors, beginning for instance with the elementary schools. Imagine what power the modern state has in the regulation of the instruction of the people to get to know all the individuals who make up the nation. Every citizen, of whatever sex, must pass through the elementary school, then the state could make its own anthropological census of the population. In some countries, especially in North America (for the Anglo-Saxon countries are those where practical applications are most easily made without being lost sight of amid academic discussions), this has already been partly done. In Italy we have a partial application of the system of school doctors. We believe that in the elementary schools of the future every pupil will have his anthropological chart on which the doctor will mark the characteristics of his body and of his psychology, of his hereditary precedents and of his school conduct, and this will serve as a preventive scrutiny for all those pupils who, morally deficient, are candidates for crimes.

Besides all this, there remain the provisions for habitual drunkards, idlers by profession, vagabonds, the criminal classes, etc, all those who are either candidates for or reduced to crime; and all the precautions against dangerous industries and sales, such as arms, of poisons, etc., and the measures against gambling houses, etc.

And all this mass of rules for police action is exercised by the state without any consideration of moral guilt, with the criterion of perilousness. But when in a state all the rules are applied in every branch of legislation for the social and direct prevention of crime, crimes will still be committed. Even when the greatest source of crimes—i. e., misery—is dried up, there will always be crimes, if from no other cause than an explosion of mental alienation or through an impulse of erring passion. It is necessary, then, for the state to exert a repressive action on crimes committed. But for crimes committed, too various are the branches of that plan for social defence which I mentioned a while ago. Before all there is, especially for our country, the problem of judicial circumscriptions, and there is the problem of the personnel for the laws are what the functionaries are who apply them. As to the personnel, it is necessary to modernize above all the recruiting, technical

instruction, guaranties and responsibility in the judicial police as well as in the magistrates who judge and in the personnel who execute the sentences of the magistrates.

And this is why I have maintained for a long time that the Management of Prisons, instead of being under the Minister for Home Affairs (no one knows why) should be under the Minister of Justice, if, as is the fact, the Management of Prisons represents the last step in the action of the state against crime, that action which, beginning with judicial police, runs its course through all the wire-drawn processes that have to be wrought out from the notification of the crime to the action of the investigating and judging legal authority, until the execution of the sentence.

Once this personnel, which applies the penal laws, is organized and established, what presents itself in our regulating plan, the more particular work confided to the new commission is this, the work of reform the penal code and also of the code of penal procedure, especially with respect to judicial police and judicial examination, which are more intimately connected with and dependent on the reform of the penal code. And after this, that regulating plan is completed with rules for prisons, for it is not sufficient to write prison rules in the penal code, but they must be applied and put into practice. Besides the regulations for prisons, this regulating plan, it seems to me, demands a last field of action of the state, and this is state measures of control and vigilance over those set free from prisons to help them to readapt themselves to the social life of free and honest labor.

Given the two fundamental principles laid down by the decree which institutes the commission, social defence and the perilousness of the criminal, certain logical and inevitable consequences follow. The first is this: that in the rules of the penal code it will be necessary, from now on, to make two clear and preliminary distinctions. The first consists in the distinction and division between common criminals and political social criminals. A common crime is always caused by an egoistic sentiment in the man who commits it; On the other hand political-social crime, although it may assume repugnant, violent or sanguinary forms, is always actuated by an altruistic sentiment; an erring altruism, may be, but altruism none the less.

In a preliminary and partial scheme of a penal code which I had the honour to present to the commission, I have proposed two forms of

punishment for political-social criminals: exile and simple imprisonment. Exile from the state for the less dangerous political-social criminals. If, on the other hand, the manifestation of the political-social crime is of the more dangerous type, because it is accompanied by acts of violence against things, it seems to me, there should be a punishment of prison segregation, but with a different discipline from that used for common criminals.

The second preliminary distinction that should be made in the general rules of the code is that for criminals over 18 years of age and criminals under age. For those over 18 years of age the criterion of the greater or less perilousness of the criminal is of the greatest importance; for minors, on the other hand, the action of penal justice should aim above all at aid and moral and professional improved training, besides, of course, special provision for minors abnormal and defective.

The question will simply be, once the accused has been declared the author of the crime by the judge, to decide what is the best method adapted to his personality, according to his personal precedents, his preceding honest or dishonest life, his physical and psychical conditions, according to the material circumstances of the act, according to the family and social conditions of the criminal, according to the mode of committing the crime, in so far as this is a revelation of the greater or less moral insensibility of the criminal, and so on. It will be a question of adapting one form of punishment or another within the limits laid down by the law. But the criminal must always answer before the law, apart from every philosophical doctrine or religious belief, not because of the moral sin in the criminal act committed by him, but because of the perilousness that he has revealed through the doing of it. It will be the fundamental principle that will place penal justice on a new basis. Then there will be the different forms of punishment to be assigned to this legal responsibility of the actual authors of a criminal act.

Isolation must be obligatory only at night for obvious reasons; but in the daytime there is only one hygiene for all criminals, mad or not mad, dangerous or not dangerous, and it is the hygiene of work in the open air, workhouses, agricultural colonies, isolation buildings for the most dangerous criminals, special houses for the victims of alcohol, for lunatics, for neuropathies, and so on: all should have

work as the law of their daily life. All these forms of imprisonment will have no fixed term. There should be arrangements for the abbreviation of a criminal's imprisonment, according to the conditions of reducibility, of correction and of amendment which each criminal shows. Incurable criminals are only a small minority in the great mass of crime ; whereas the majority of criminals (the occasionals) may yet become useful citizens.

It is indeed certain that in this reform of penal justice, in which the personality of the criminal is made the first consideration and is not left in the shade as up to now, the judge will have increased powers to adapt the form of punishment to the personality of the criminal. We shall put side by side with such wide and necessary powers of the judge, greater guarantees for individual right. Penal justice should progress but we cannot allow the progress of penal justice to coincide with the diminution of individual guarantees and rights which modern civilization has irrevocably recognized and established. Such guarantees may be found above all in the choice of judges, in their technical capacity, in their conditions of independence and correlative responsibility. In the second place, we have the rules which will be fixed in the penal code to decide the conditions according to which the judge, may exercise his powers for the judicial individualization of the repressive sanction.

My proposal, then, and my idea is this: While the criminalists think that the provisions, for example, against criminals who are insane or habitual drunkards, are administrative provisions, measures of security, as they are called, different from the penalty, which, according to them, is moral retribution for the crime by means of punishment, my view is that there is no substantial difference between the penalty and the measure of security, and that the latter, instead of being administrative provisions should be jurisdictional provisions. If my view prevails, when the criminal is not dangerous, the form of punishment will not be prison confinement. To put in prison for five, ten or fifteen days a criminal who has committed slight and not dangerous offences, means putting him in a Pasteur stove for the culture of criminal microbes. And this is why we are against short prison penalties. There are other forms of punishment which will be enough and which I cannot now enumerate to you, but which, as the positive school has always held, will always be accompanied by the obligation

to compensate for the damage caused by the crime. Such compensation every condemned person will make even in prison with his own labour organized not only for an educational and hygienic purpose, but also for economic profit, with hours and salary equal to those in the open market. Of this salary, half is to be destined to compensate the party, injured by the crime, and half for the family of the condemned, and as a sum put by for himself; while the economic profit of prison work will go as indemnity to the public treasury.

The management of the prison will say whether the individual is improved or not, whether readapted to a free life or no. The judge will hear the advocate of the state and the advocate of the condemned and the advocate of the injured party, too, who may present records and facts that may show whether the individual may be exonerated from the rest of his penalty or no.

But although for forty years I have had a passion for studies of criminology, my insight is always sufficiently keen to force on me the profound conviction that no legal reform of civil justice or of penal justice can be useful in a country if it is not rooted in the ground of social justice. A progressive social justice is, in my opinion, the necessary condition, if the application of civil laws and of penal laws is really to lead to that ameliorating elevation of humanity which is the aim of each one of us, no matter what our religious, philosophical or political belief may be.

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## NOTES

C. B. C.—The Society for Constructive Birth Control.

On May 31st 1921 there was held in London a meeting which may indeed prove historic. It was convened by Dr. Marie Carmichael Stopes, whose books and work are becoming known in India as in most countries. We may refer to the account of her books *Married Love* and *Wise Parenthood* given in an earlier issue of this Journal. The meeting assembled at the Queen's Hall, which, from the accounts received must have been well filled. From expressions of opinion which are included in a small brochure entitled: *Queen's Hall Meeting on Constructive Birth Control*, it appears that some doubted the possibility of filling that Hall. There could be little ground for such doubt, for this is a problem which is increasingly exercising the minds of thinking adults, especially in the West where information, some good some bad, is being diffused widely. It is because they are in the vanguard of a wide-spread tendency, carried forward on a wave of genuine public sentiment, that Dr. Stopes and her admirers and supporters may safely hope for great results from the work thus begun.

Of the importance of the movement there can be no question. The meeting at Queen's Hall is symptomatic of the reception it will obtain. Yet it must be given the support of each and everyone who has the courage of sympathetic opinions and are anxious that all that can be done in this

direction and manner for the race shall be done. In soliciting this support on behalf of the movement, we give here some extracts from the brochure mentioned above.

First, so that the purpose of the Society shall not be misunderstood, we emphasise that it is one to aid in the giving of sound information for the obtaining of a desired child as much as it is to instruct those who for one reason or another rightly should prevent the conception of an undesired child, or probably unhealthy child. In this, we are sure that Dr. Stopes is right in saying; "The vast body of thinking people in this country is really with us." It is a movement to promote the birth of healthy children to loving parents, and to prevent the birth of those who must inevitably fill the hospitals, prisons, and lunatic asylums. "Constructive birth control", says Dr. Stopes, "is the key of all racial progress." It is the most radical of all efforts at social reform. Thus, the movement gets the support of an Admiral like Sir Percy Scott who wants Class A men; of Sir James Barr, Vice-President of the British Medical Association, who hopes this "great movement will eventually get rid of our C3 population and exterminate poverty"; of Dr. Killick Millard, a pioneer medical officer of health, who says: "I am convinced myself that an excessive fertility and too much child bearing is an evil, and if that is right then I submit it is the duty of those who profess to be concerned with the welfare of humanity to consider seriously how this evil can be minimised". Mr. Roe, who with his wife Dr. Stopes, is a pioneer in this work, relates how years ago in times of distress in Manchester the misery of the very poor with families too large had impressed itself upon him. "Gradually I came to the conclusion that the key to happiness in the home and to the race, the solution of many of our most serious problems, was to have the happy mother with just the number of children for which she and her husband had strength and could afford to raise properly."

Dr. Stopes, the chief speaker at the meeting, referred first to the Birth Control Clinic which she and her husband have started in London. "One of the features of our Clinic is our sympathy towards the childless wife who longs for a child. They are many. We gladly help the childless woman with knowledge which may bring, and often has brought the conception so ardently desired." Thus, for the diseased unwanted babies whose birth is to be prevented as far as is humanly possible, the births of healthy, desired babies are to be encouraged. The possibilities for good, both physically and spiritually, of healthy married relations are far too rarely appreciated, and there is sometimes a surprising ignorance on such matters. Here again the Clinic has a task to perform. "We desire to give helpful information on all the aspects of the great problems of sex and marriage which are at present overlooked and yet are the most urgent matters on which help can be given." Turning to a most important side of the question, the speaker affirmed: "We have already to-day sufficient sound physiological knowledge, from this moment (if one could only get everyone to know of it) to check the birth of every diseased, unhealthy, unprepared for child." It is the aim of the movement that the rising generation, and as many as possible of the present generation, shall get the best in the varied aspects of the life of married love.

Dr. Stopes ended with a passage which we quote in full: "The evolution of mankind in the past has been blind and blundering; our race has been recruited by accident, by chance, by misery, by crime; but from to-day we who are here may go forth as missionaries to increase the number of people who realise, and who will then make a feasible and possible thing, this great era of humanity. An era in which the race will be recruited only when love and knowledge combine for the conception and when man and woman will no longer torture each other, but profoundly understand and intensely love, and

understanding will bring forth an entirely new type of human creature, stepping into a future so beautiful, so full of the real joy of self-expression and understanding that here to-day we may look upon our grandchildren and think almost that the gods have descended upon the earth."

Mr. Aylmer Maude, the translator of Tolstoi, contended that we cannot today continue to determine our practice in these matters on the lines of the precepts of Moses which were promulgated in view of very different needs 3000 years ago,

We give below the names of some of the officers of the Society for Constructive Birth Control, and some of the details of its present organisation:

*President:*

MARIE CARMICHAEL STOPES, D.Sc., Ph.D., F.L.S.

*Vice-Presidents:*

WILLIAM ARCHER, ESQ.

SIR W. ARBUTHNOT LANE, BART.,

SIR JAMES BARR, C.B.E., M.D.

C.B., M.B.

EDWARD CARPENTER, ESQ.

MRS. PETHICK LAWRENCE.

THE REV. H. G. CORNER, D.D.

SIR ARCHDALL REID, M.B., F.R.S.

HAROLD COX, ESQ., M.A.

RT. HON. G. H. ROBERTS, J.P., M.P.

H. G. WELLS, ESQ. B.Sc., J.P.

*Hon. Secretary:*

COUNCILLOR H. V. ROE.

*Hon. Treasure*

AYLMER MAUDE, ESQ.

The temporary office is 61, Marlborough Road, Holloway, London, N. 19.

1. NAME: The name of the Organisation shall be The Society for Constructive Birth Control and Racial Progress.

2. MEMBERSHIP: Shall be open to all who approve of the objects and subscribe to its funds, without regard to Nationality, Religion or Politics.

3. OBJECTS: The objects of the Society are (a) to bring home to all the fundamental nature of the reforms involved in conscious and constructive control of conception and the illumination of sex life as a basis of racial progress; (b) to consider the individual, national, international racial, political, economic, scientific, spiritual and other aspects of the theme, for which purpose meetings be held, publications issued,

Research Committees, Commissions of Enquiry and other activities will be organised from time to time as circumstances require and facilities offer; (c) to supply all who still need it with the full knowledge of sound physiological methods of control.

4. FUNDS: The funds of the Society shall consist of the subscriptions of its members, and of donations and bequests from its members and others, and shall be in the control of the Executive Committee.

[The minimum subscription is placed at one shilling per annum, so as to enable the very poorest to join, but it is pointed out that the work of the Society will enormously reduce both the need for charities, hospitals and a variety of State aids, so that those who desire to see misery eliminated should contribute in accordance with their means and the fundamental effectiveness of the work. The founder, Dr Marie Stopes, has undertaken a personal guarantee for any deficit on all charges of the Society for the first year of its foundation so as to allow work at once to proceed while its organisation is being initiated. She greatly desires, however, that the Society should be independent of any one individual, and should be self-supporting and on a sound financial basis.]

## REVIEWS

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE John  
Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. By William L. Wan-  
lass Ph. D

It is possible for us to profit by the experience of other countries in almost all departments of national activity. In India, it is recognised by all, that agriculture is the key industry overshadowing all others in its importance. It employs directly or indirectly nearly three-quarters of our man-power. It is the chief source of State-revenue. It is also one of the main sources of national livelihood, supplying food to the population, besides raising an amount of raw agricultural produce, the export of which to other countries is at the bottom of the whole Indian trade with other countries. Increasing attention, must be paid therefore to its organisation : because here as elsewhere much can be done by private effort, but the major part of the responsibility lies on the State in India. It is so curious to find that it was not only in Germany that militarism was fatal to the growth of peaceful industries. On the other hand Germany found it possible to combine huge military organization with an equally elaborate agricultural and industrial organization. But the Government of India while it spends nearly half the amount of revenue on the army, allots only a trifle to agriculture.

Irrigation schemes starve while millions are squandered away on all sorts of schemes to protect the so-called 'vested interests' from all possible dangers, within and without. It is also interesting to find the Baroda Government spending something like twenty lacs on its Army, while a paltry sum of Rs. 75,000 is assigned to agriculture. It would

be a considerable relief to see a radical revision in the near future in the Government's attitude regarding the fundamental principles of its financial policy. It is for the higher statesmanship to see which is a more reliable arm of defence and security — the bayonets and machine guns or the happiness and contentment of a solid peasantry. "The bold peasantry, their country's pride when once destroyed can never be supplied."

It is therefore, very edifying to find that America, a country where agriculture remains one of the pivotal industries just as in India, devotes considerable energy and money to the organization of its agricultural department. America also began with *Laissez faire*, a policy of stupid indifference to the conscious and organized development of agricultural industry. But its apathy gradually melted down and in 1862, an Act was passed authorizing the Department "to acquire and and diffuse. . . useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and most comprehensive sense of the term." What is this broad sense of the term? It is "the art or science of cultivating the ground, especially in fields or in large quantities, including the preservation of the soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and the rearing, feeding, and management of live-stock." The Department is primarily educational and investigational; but there can be no doubt that the more recent expansion of its activities has been on the side of the regulation of the conduct of citizens.

The most significant and far-reaching piece of agricultural legislation is that of 1914, known as the Smith Lever Act. By the year 1923, there will be appropriated under this law an annual sum exceeding five million dollars, to be expended in co-operation with state institutions, for practical instruction and demonstration in agriculture and home economics. The Department of Agriculture has cost America nearly two hundred and eighty-five million dollars. This sum, however, is a trifle when compared to the huge increase in agricultural production directly attributable to better and more scientific methods of farming. In 1917 not less than eighteen thousand seven hundred and fifty men and women most of them specially trained for their respective tasks, were devoting their time to the multitudinous duties of the Department of Agriculture.

From the time of its establishment as an administrative unit of the first rank in 1889 to the fiscal year 1917, the Department of Agriculture enjoyed a more rapid comparative growth, both in the amount of its appropriations and in the number of its personnel, than any other of the executive departments. The Department of Agriculture, like the other federal executive departments and unlike the corresponding institutions in the various states is a smaller hierarchy within a larger one, with the Secretary of Agriculture at its head, who is responsible to the President for the work of all of his subordinates and of the departments as a whole. Perhaps no other department of the Government is so nearly free from evils of political appointments. The expert scientific and technical knowledge which bureau chiefs and other important officials must have for the proper performance of their duties, and the added value which long and certain tenure of office gives to their services, have operated to remove these positions almost entirely from the domain of politics. Four principles have been specially observed in the organization of the Department : first, the avoidance of all unnecessary duplication of effort : second, the assignment of each activity to that subdivision which was best adapted to the proper handling of it; third, the provision of more and better facilities of performing those functions which it was desired to emphasize : fourth, the division of the activities of each bureau into three distinct groups comprising respectively its regulatory, its research, and its educational functions.

M. A. Buch.

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. By R. N. Gilchrist M. A. Longmans Green and Co. 1921. Rs. 10. 8.

Professor Gilchrist is well known to those who read the quarterlies, as the author of some able and sympathetic articles on Indian Nationality in the *Calcutta Review*. The power of clear exposition which he showed in these articles again impresses one in the present volume. It is especially valuable here in that this book is meant to provide a textbook for the courses of the University of Calcutta. It may be said at once that the volume is wide in its range and for any university of the Indian type - where textbooks are so much in vogue - can be confidently recommended. The author has contrived as far as possible to keep his information up to date. We may presume that he has endeavoured,

to keep any particular individual views of his own in the background. But in some sections, especially the more controversial ones, for example, like Socialism, we have an array of the usual superficial arguments of the daily press type. Chapter XX is an excellent specimen of the superficial character of the thought of the book, the failure to think out a position. We will content ourselves with one quotation: page 496 "The political argument (i. e. against Socialism) we must speak of". And then he thus speaks of it: "Even if socialism were brought into practice, it would be a most irksome and undesirable system. In the words of Herbert Spencer - "Each member of the community as an individual would be a slave of the community as a whole" Such a statement is typical of the inadequacy of analysis which is the fault of the whole book. The question here is whether a socialistic regime based on an organised condition of society is going to be more "irksome and undesirable" for the vast majority than prevailing conditions, whether life and work in a social cosmos would not be more satisfactory for the majority, even though abused as *slavery* than the so-called liberty of the existing largely chaotic disorganisation of society which gives to the few different degrees of - not true liberty - but license. Mr. Gilchrist may find it "irksome and undesirable" but we would advise him to think through the problem again, or even better, discuss it with a socialist thinker. Similar objections might be made concerning his discussions of other controversial topics.

The section on the Government of India is a useful summary and deserves to be read by Indians and Europeans who may not yet be accurately acquainted with the details of this subject. Here may be seen the condition as it appears to a "Professor of Political Economy and Political Philosophy" one who may be supposed to be endeavouring to express things as they are. But what may be thought of the statement: "the Native 'States' are only 'States' by courtesy" (682).

TRUTH ABOUT VENEREAL DISEASE By Marie Stopes D. Sc., Ph. D.  
Putnam. 1921 2s. 6d.

Dr. Stopes can hardly have left room for doubt in the mind of any reader of her books, of the earnestness of her efforts for the improvement of the race, and of her passion for a healthy form of life. Nevertheless, as a student of science she has learned to face facts, and

as a sociologist she knows that society has to be treated *as it is* in order that it may become what it ought to be. Thus, in spite of the disagreeableness of the whole subject she has in the work before us given a calm, unsensational, and sane account of venereal diseases and given some of the best advice with regard to them. Her whole constructive effort is to undermine the conditions which may tend to these diseases. This effort is to promote that healthy married love which will repel the suggestions of conduct liable to promote disease. But as such a condition is far from being attained in far too many instances, she sees the necessity for social welfare of all steps which may prevent the spread of these evils. Thus the present book is occupied chiefly with information as to the nature and the means of prevention of the diseases. It is at once a powerful appeal for moral rectitude in sex relations and an invaluable book for those who from any cause fall from this standard and should for the protection of themselves and others learn how to disinfect themselves.

A. G. W.

THE HUMAN FACTOR IN EDUCATION; By James Phinney Munroe S. B. Litt. D. New York. Macmillan Co

The purpose of this book is to make some suggestions regarding the educational system of America with a view to improve it in the light of the new experience gathered during the War. The aim of education is here taken to be the promotion of national efficiency. All the problems which have risen for due consideration after the war depend in part for their solution upon the right handling of the human factor in the situation. The best thing for a nation to meet the new situation is therefore to concentrate its attention on its educational system and to revise it in such a way as to bring it to the required level of efficiency.

War has brought about a wonderful change in men's outlook. The new world-situation requires a race of supermen. More wealth should be spent on education. Every man - from the purely economic point of view - is worth nearly 80,000 dollars. Penny wisdom means waste of human treasure: by preventable disease, by avoidable accidents, by vices that never should have been allowed to get root, by failure to fit the boy or girl for the work suited to his or her capacity. Socialism may be good for a time: but there would ensue under it loss of the precious individuality of man. Work there is bound to be for most

men : strenuous, arduous work; but to redeem it, there is necessary for every worker 'the joy of living' and a sound philosophy of life. Much depends upon home and family life. All training in 'civics' must be bottomed on knowledge of and experience in a real and effective family life. The real fulfilment of both the individual and the family life is in the communal life, life of society. A special training in business leading to the development of specialized knowledge, and yet breadth of grasp, efficiency in work, due sense of responsibility, and a sound body is the urgent need of the society. There will be a shortage of labour in America and especially will there be a shortage of men and women competent for leadership, for the exercise of initiative, for the carrying of industry out of those ruts into which it has fallen. The only way in which that shortage of leadership can be made good is for school and industry to work shoulder to shoulder in educating boys and girls to assume responsibility.

M. A. B.

SWAMI RAMA TIRTHA The Poet Apostle of Vedanta. By S. R. Sharma. K. T. Meha Vidyalaya, Mangalore.

This is a very interesting booklet on a powerful personality who was born in the district of Gujranwala in 1873 and died at the early age of 33 years. With great hardship due to poverty he went through his college courses at Lahore and attained to the degree of M. A. and the position of a professor. Later turning himself entirely to the cause of the spiritual life he spent his time in meditation and in writing chiefly in the Himalayas. Once he paid a visit to America. From the passages from letters and from excerpts from his works given in this publication the strength and the joyous confidence of his nature — qualities too frequently absent in Indians — may be clearly seen, and with this his genuine poetic gift. We may give his own "final verdict on his entire philosophy" : "Pushing, marching labour and no stagnant indolence; enjoyment of work as against tedious drudgery; peace of mind and no canker of suspicion; organisation and no disintegration; appropriate reform and no conservative custom; solid real feeling as against flowery talk; the poetry of facts as against authority of departed authors; living realisation and no mere dead quotations"

A. G. W.

Popular Education and National Prosperity.

Art and Industrial Training.

Moral Instruction and How to Impart It.

The Claims of Science in National Life I. and II.

Intellectual Culture or the Pleasures of Science I. and II.

First Steps in Evolution.

1920-1921. By R. D. Patel. The Mission Press, Surat; Series Rs. 5.

These are eight small brochures by Mr. R. D. Patel, late First Assistant, Rajkumar College, Rajkot. They are compilations of passages chiefly from Western writers, with a few additions from leaders, reports and letters from Indian papers. It would be very easy to criticise any such collections of extracts, and Mr. Patel's selections are probably as good as any we might expect to get. In so far as they aim at cultivating a certain broadmindedness and a progressive attitude towards educational matters they are to be highly commended. The titles indicate the general scope. The first two mentioned appear to me to be by far the best. The first has a valuable section dealing with agricultural instruction in schools and I believe that some advances along these lines are an essential reform of rural education and the education in small towns in India. In the second emphasis is placed on manual training in schools, an aspect of education sadly neglected in India. The book contains practically nothing of Art in the aesthetic sense. One would have expected to find something on history, literature, and the social sciences, in the brochures on Intellectual Culture, but there is nothing. The author should add another number to his series devoting it to these sides of culture. But what I think is more needed than books of this type is a clearly thought out general treatment of the practical problems in carrying out the spirit of genuine culture in the educational efforts of India.

A. G. W.