

*Major Genl. Sir William Nott, G.C.B.*

MEMOIRS AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF

MAJOR-GENERAL

SIR WILLIAM NOTT, G.C.B.

COMMANDER OF THE ARMY OF CANDAHAR,  
AND ENVOY AT THE COURT OF THE KING OF OUDE.

EDITED, AT THE REQUEST OF SIR WILLIAM NOTT'S DAUGHTERS, LETITIA NOTT AND  
CHARLOTTE BOWER, FROM DOCUMENTS IN THEIR EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION,

By J. H. STOCQUELER, Esq.

AUTHOR OF

THE 'LIFE OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,' THE 'HAND-BOOK OF BRITISH INDIA,'

&c. &c.

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
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
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LONDON:  
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TO  
THE SURVIVORS  
OF  
THE ARMY OF CANDAHAR,

The following Pages,  
DESCRIPTIVE AT ONCE OF THEIR OWN DISCIPLINE  
AND VALOUR, AND OF  
THE SKILL, FIRMNESS, WISDOM, AND INTREPIDITY  
OF THEIR DISTINGUISHED COMMANDER,  
TO WHOM  
(UNDER GOD'S BLESSING) WERE OWING THEIR  
SAFETY IN GARRISON AND THEIR GLORY IN THE FIELD,  
AT A MOST CRITICAL PERIOD OF BRITISH HISTORY,  
are dedicated

BY THEIR MOST OBEDIENT SERVANTS,

LETITIA NOTT,  
CHARLOTTE BOWER.

## P R E F A C E.

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Two or three years after the death of Sir William Nott there appeared in the 'Quarterly Review' a notice of the General's career in Affghanistan, illustrated by a few quotations from his private correspondence, to which the writer of the article had had access. In the course of that article the reviewer expressed his hope that the whole of the letters of the General would, at some subsequent period, be given to the public, for that they were worthy of the distinguished writer, and served to illustrate a very interesting part of the memorable campaigns in Affghanistan. For some time the daughters of Sir William Nott, the depositaries of his most secret thoughts and confidence, hesitated to give to the world what might, in a measure, wound the feelings or compromise the characters of some of the public functionaries of the time.

But knowing, as they did, that the General had during his last illness made a selection from his correspondence with the intention of publishing it, and feeling that certain passages of Mr Kaye's "War in Affghanistan" had placed the motives and actions of Sir William, in several particulars, in an unfavourable and unjust point of view, and that that work, although in a general way so excellent, graphic, and truthful, had embraced fewer records of the operations in the South of Affghanistan in 1839-42, than their intrinsic importance seemed to demand, the trustees of Sir William's correspondence deemed it a pious duty to wave all scruples and bring the documents before the public eye. With this view the MS. was confided to the Editor, leaving to his judgment the suppression or publication of certain portions of the collection, and the incorporation of the epistolary communications with a Memoir of the deceased General.

In the discharge of the delicate and responsible task with which he had thus been honoured, it has been the aim of the Editor to discard every letter that might unnecessarily give umbrage to deserving men. The commentaries on public officers of one who thought deeply, felt keenly, and spoke and wrote with "scorching vehemence," have, however, been considered by the Editor perfectly legitimate in a Memoir elucidatory of character, and as, in the lapse of time since the

scenes described in the following pages were enacted, most of the actors have passed away, the letters are rather calculated to prove the worthiness, foresight, and originality of the writer than to inflict pain upon the surviving friends and relations of the individuals to whom allusion has been made.

Taking advantage of the authority vested in him to write a biographical account of General Nott from such materials as were available, and to render such narrative the thread, as it were, on which the letters were to be strung, the Editor has dwelt with unmitigated pleasure upon the features of a life rendered illustrious by the practice of virtue and the assertion of mental independence. To the officers of the British army, and most especially that portion of it which is in the pay of the East India Company, the Memoir will read a peculiarly instructive lesson. General Nott was a model officer. All the finest qualities of the soldier were, as, it is submitted, the volumes continually show, embodied in his person, and developed in his actions. To yield and to exact obedience—to believe himself at all times the representative of the honour of his country, and of the profession of which he was a distinguished member;—to earn, by appropriate means, the love and confidence of those whom he commanded, and to hold in utter abhorrence anything

which savoured of meanness, trickery, poltroonery, and intrigue—were the tenets of Nott's military faith. If other soldiers learn from the study of his brilliant career to hold by the same exalted principles, the labours of the biographer will not have been thrown away.

The temptation to wander from the personal career of Sir William Nott into disquisitions upon political objects and measures, and descriptions of episodic occurrences, has been great,—but remembering that the highest praise awarded to the Editor's "Life of the Duke of Wellington" was, that he always kept the subject of his biography in view, he has resisted every inclination to deviate from the personal part of the narrative, and has placed all the supplementary matter in a copious Appendix.

THE LIFE  
OF  
SIR WILLIAM NOTT.

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CHAPTER I.

BIRTH, PARENTAGE, AND EDUCATION—NEATH—THE CAERMARTHEN  
MILITIA—NOTT OBTAINS A CADETSHIP—BECOMES A LIEUTENANT—  
IS SENT ON AN EXPEDITION—COURT-MARTIAL.

THE influence which a long line of noble ancestors has exercised upon men of well-regulated minds, is too notorious to make it a matter of indifference to biographers, whether the subject of their story can or cannot be heralded into notice by the display of a pedigree dating from the Conqueror. They are only too glad to show how each successive inheritor of a name famous for the prowess of its earliest possessor, has preserved it unsullied, transmitting it as an encouragement to the next generation to tread the path of honour, and how their special hero has, by the worthiness of his life, cast fresh lustre upon the roll of noble ancestry.

In the absence, however, of a "lang pedigree," the next best thing is to be able to show that the individual whose career it is proposed to describe, was the first great man of his name, the architect of his own fortune, the founder of the reputation of the family. We honour the fine pride of the Bourbons and the Howards, who regulated their lives by the chivalry of their progenitors; but much more do we love the men who, influenced by moral principle, and gifted with intellectual powers and noble impulses, carve out for themselves an independent path of action, and set up a light, whose extensive radiations cheer, illumine, and elevate all about and beyond them.

Of the latter order was William Nott, who, deriving nothing from his ancestors, has bequeathed to posterity a military reputation few modern soldiers have been enabled to achieve.

The father of William Nott was a native of the village of Shobdan, in Herefordshire. For many generations his forefathers had been settled in that county, enjoying universal respect as British yeomen of high character. To this hour there are several of the name still in the village, and likewise at Leominster, Bromyard, &c.; and they are not the less proud of the patronymic, in that, of late years, a halo has been cast around it by the deeds of the subject of this memoir.

Mr. Charles Nott, for such was the name of William's father, appears to have left his native village

early in life, and to have settled in London. Here he became acquainted with a Miss Bailey, and a mutual regard was soon established. Miss Bailey was a native of Seeding, near Loddon, in Norfolk. She derived the advantage of a good education, and almost parental care from her uncle, Mr. Harvey of Bungay, who was the proprietor of a large academy, and who married an aunt of England's greatest naval hero, the immortal Nelson.

Charles Nott married Miss Bailey at St. Andrew's Church, Holborn; and, almost immediately afterwards, went to Holt, in Wiltshire. Farming was his *métier*, and as he understood it as thoroughly as it was understood in those days, he anticipated a prosperous career.

On the 20th of January, 1783, William Nott came into the world. Another son had preceded him, but, though second, he became first in the "dear love" of his father.

Twelve years subsequent to this event, the late Sir Herbert Mackworth, of Gnoll Castle, near Neath in Glamorganshire, having had his attention drawn to the ability of Mr. Charles Nott as an agriculturist, invited him to go and establish himself upon an extensive farm near Neath, and Nott yielded to the invitation.

The vale of Nedd, as it anciently was called, may, in picturesque beauty, challenge a comparison with the most attractive spots in Wales. A river serpentine through the valley, and forms the boundary of Gower, a

tract of country which at one time constituted the limit of the lordship of Glamorgan. A ruined castle—erst the residence of the Granvilles, Lord Marchers of the principality—and the remains of an abbey (the Abbaty Glyn Nedd) form, with a succession of hanging woods and extensive plantations, shady walks and picturesque cascades, romantic adjuncts to the river; and thus present a spectacle which, if nature and the refinements of art had been left to themselves, would have stood unrivalled. But the business of civilized life has defaced the picture, in adding to the comforts and enjoyments of man. In the heart of the vale stands Neath, the Nidum of Antoninus, overhung with the smoke of factories, blackened by coalworks and railways. Blast furnaces and foundries, copper works and iron works, while they enrich the town and the fortunate proprietors, and contribute to our national prosperity, disfigure the natural charms of the valley. The tourist who is in search of the beautiful, turns away as the columns of smoke greet his vision; but he who seeks to acquaint himself with the extent of man's industry, and the geological riches of Wales, contemplates the active scenes in and around Neath with pride and pleasure.

It was at a little school in Neath that the future General received the rudiments of education. He afterwards passed a short time at the grammar school at Cowbridge; but at neither of these places did he drink deeply of the Pierian spring. The teachers, and their

system, like the great majority of those of the present day, were grossly defective and responded not to the aspirations of the pupils. "I frequently fancy," wrote William Nott, in long after years, "that if it had been my fortune to have received a proper education, I should have been exalted and conspicuous among the John Bulls; but I never received any schooling but what my own fist knocked into my own dull head after I left our fatherland."\* What he may have wanted, however, in *hic, hæc, hoc*, was more than balanced by the acquisition, in his father's fields, of a fine constitution, and of the stern and manly independence which distinguishes the yeoman. Active, shrewd, kind of heart, and upright in conduct, he became a great favourite at Neath; and would, as a writer in the "Quarterly Review" surmises, have lived and died a farmer had not accident turned the current of his life.

In 1794, Mr. Charles Nott removed to the town of Caermarthen, and renting two farms in the neighbourhood, became the proprietor of the "Ivy Bush Inn," entering at the same time into the business of a mail contractor. William was of great use to his father in his farming operations, for he inherited the paternal attachment to agricultural pursuits, and retained them, by the way, to the day of his death. He used frequently, when he had attained high military rank, to boast that he had often guided the plough.

His mother had at this time very delicate health, and

\* Letter to his children, dated Jan. 21, 1840.

the buoyancy of William Nott's spirits led him into a variety of little acts of mischief, which would often induce her to tell her husband, as he was setting out to visit his farms in the neighbourhood of Caermarthen: "You can leave all the children with me except William, but pray take him with you, for I cannot manage him." This was exactly what William wished, and it was by these means that he acquired the taste for agricultural pursuits which never afterwards forsook him. While, however, his youthful frolics were too much for the weak health of his mother, his good spirits and warm feelings were duly appreciated by his youthful companions, and they were not slow to discover the rising talent and decision of character which so clearly distinguished his subsequent career.

The year 1796 is memorable in the history of Great Britain. The aspect of the quarrel with Revolutionary France and Republican Holland had become exceedingly serious. The failure of the military expeditions under the Duke of York, which were entirely directed by incompetent Austrian commanders, had augmented the assurance of the armed democrats, that it was their mission to extend the extravagant liberalism of the hour to this country. An invasion of England was meditated—arrangements were even made to accomplish the aggression, and the disordered state of Ireland furnished at once the excuse and the opportunity. However supine and lukewarm the English had been in reference to the operations in the Low Countries, the

spirit of the nation revolted at the very idea of a hostile visit. Every true patriot now rallied around the minister, and Mr. Pitt found himself enabled to pass bills through Parliament which authorized the Crown to call out, and embody a supplemental militia, and sanctioned the transfer of militia men into the regular army. The whole country was inspired with military fervour; every boy girded on a sword, and longed to confront the enemy; even mercantile London forgot the vulgar selfishness of commerce in the chivalry of the moment, and not only gave her money but formed her citizens into urban soldiery to oppose the French regicides. But it was in Wales that the fire of patriotism burnt with the most intense brilliancy. The hardy Cambrians could not forget, in the ruins of castles scattered over the principality, how the land had once groaned under Norman tyranny and feudalism, and they dreaded a repetition of scenes which had prostrated their daring ancestors. The contiguity of the Welsh to the Irish coast rendered it more than probable that Wales would first receive the shock of invasion, and, in effect, the conjecture was justified by results. On the 22nd of February, 1797, fourteen hundred Frenchmen landed at Fisgard, and for several days held possession of the town; but the Pembroke Fencibles, the Cardiganshire Militia, the Fisgard and Newport Fencibles, and the Cawdor Yeomanry headed by the gallant Lord Cawdor, forced the invaders to surrender.

Foremost of the counties in the duty of arming to

resist invasion was Caermarthenshire. A volunteer corps was formed in Caermarthen, and in 1798, William Nott, sharing to a great degree in the general enthusiasm, enrolled himself a member, though he was but a boy of fifteen.

Often since has he laughingly told the tale of this his first and bloodless campaign; what heroes he and several of his companions thought themselves as they marched back from the scene of their first military essay into their head-quarters at Caermarthen. This brief taste of military glory determined his future destiny. Having once imbibed a military atmosphere, he "disdained a shepherd's slothful life," and nothing could or would content his soul but a commission in the army. Fortunately for him, no great difficulty was experienced in obtaining a Bengal cadetship. He was indebted to the late J. W. Twining for this appointment. He had an offer at the same time of a civil appointment; and in after life he often rejoiced that his youthful ardour had not outrun his more matured judgment. He always really loved his profession.

Commissions at this time were much more easily obtained than at the present day; for while William had the choice both of the military and civil service of the East India Company, his brother Henry, who was about two years his junior, obtained a commission in the royal army. He died after attaining the rank of Captain. This was in 1799.

Bengal was the destination of William Nott, and for

that Presidency he embarked in 1800, on board the 'Kent,' East Indiaman. It is worthy of remark that among his fellow-passengers was John Littler, an amiable, high-principled youth, who lived to witness the advancement of his friend to the highest attainable military position, and to become himself eminent in the field, and in the military councils of the East India Company.\*

The Indiamen in those days were either convoyed or sailed in company. The 'Kent' was accompanied by the 'Queen.' After crossing the Equator, tempestuous weather drove the vessels upon the coast of South America, and they were detained for some weeks at St. Jago. While there, the 'Queen' took fire, and was burnt to the water's edge. Her passengers were transferred to the 'Kent,' which vessel, singularly enough, experienced a similar disaster at sea some years afterwards when on her way to India, her numerous passengers and crew in like manner being rescued by a bark which providentially hove in sight.

Resuming her voyage, the 'Kent' in due time entered the Bay of Bengal. The war with France now raged fiercely, and the French fleets, having their rallying point at Mauritius, with singular activity and boldness carried on a predatory warfare against British commerce on the Eastern seas, capturing from first to last not less than two millions' worth of the property

\* Lieutenant-General Sir John Littler, K.C.B., of the Bengal establishment, Military Member of the Supreme Council.

of British and India merchants living under our flag. The 'Kent' did not escape the buccaneers. Sourcoff, who commanded a privateer, attacked the East India-man, and although the 'Kent' made a stout resistance, she was boarded by the Frenchman; young Nott, who, we may be sure, did his part gallantly, receiving a severe wound from a boarding-pike. Sourcoff then completing his capture, transferred all the prisoners to an Arab vessel, in which, weeks afterwards, they made their way to Calcutta.

The miseries endured on board this Arab vessel, Nott has often described as the most fearful that it had ever been his lot to witness. The 'Kent' was crowded to suffocation with passengers after the loss of the 'Queen,' and when to all these were added the crew of the Arab, some idea may be formed of the compact mass of human beings on board. Among the prisoners were many wounded and several ladies; the latter divested themselves of all the linen which they wore, to bind up the wounds of the sufferers who lay in numbers around them.

"O woman! in our hours of ease,  
Uncertain, coy, and hard to please,  
And variable as the shade  
By the light quivering aspen made.  
When pain and anguish wring the brow,  
A ministering angel thou."

The ration of water was but half a wine-glassful to each; and this scene of misery lasted for weeks.

Nott landed in utter destitution, sick and suffering, but he had happily reached a town where hospitality was proverbial, and he immediately received all the care and attention kindness could devise and his situation demanded.

Immediately upon William Nott's arrival he was appointed in General Orders an Ensign, from the 28th of August, 1800, and at once posted to the Bengal European Regiment, then stationed at Berhampore. Here he enjoyed great happiness, enhanced doubtless by the contrast with his recent sufferings. He set himself at once to the study of his profession, and soon became a great favourite of Colonel Mark Wood, who at that time was in command at Berhampore, and who rejoiced in the soubriquet of "Tiger Wood."

He had thus early learned what it is that endears an officer to the men under his command, and applied his knowledge on that subject, by becoming familiar with all their persons and names, and by writing for them to their friends, and showing them many other small acts of personal kindness. He was soon afterwards transferred to the 20th Native Infantry, or *Baillie ka Pultun* (Baillie's Regiment), which differed from most of the other corps in the Bengal Infantry, inasmuch as it was what is called a General Service regiment, liable to be sent beyond seas.

In February, 1801, Ensign Nott was promoted to a lieutenancy—rapid promotion for a beginning, sadly

counterbalanced by the long interval which subsequently elapsed before another step could be obtained.

In 1804, Lieutenant Nott was selected to command a detachment of volunteers then ordered to form part of an expedition under Captain Hayes of the Bombay Marine (now called the Indian Navy), against the tribes on the west coast of Sumatra, a Dutch settlement, who had seconded the French in their privateering attempts upon the commerce of the Eastern seas. The despatch in which Captain Hayes announced the success of his operations explains at once the nature of the service and the degree of assistance he had received from Nott.

TO JOHN SHAW, ESQ.,

SECRETARY TO THE MARINE BOARD.

SIR,

I have the honour to state, for the Board's information, that I quitted Bencoolen Road, agreeable to my intimation from thence by the Commissioners' despatches of June last, conveyed in the 'Clyde,' and proceeded along the west coast of Sumatra, conformably to their commands. In our way up, I looked into the following ports, all of which are known and visited by the French, viz., Port Chinco, Padang, Tappanooly, Poolo Doa, Tampatoan, Muckee, Laban Hadgee, Talapan, Tooso, and Analaboo, but without meeting with any of their cruizers.

It is necessary for me to particularize the port of Muckee, as the inhabitants of that place have been, in the first instance, brought to the notice of His Excellency the Most

Noble the Governor-General in Council, for barbarous treatment of the crew of the English ship 'Crescent,' and confiscation of her cargo, in violation of humanity and the law of nations; and, in the second instance, for an atrocious attempt to assassinate the Expedition sent out there by the Commissioners of Fort Marlbro', under His Excellency's sanction, to demand a reasonable and just satisfaction for the original outrage and insult offered to them and the British nation. This latter act of perfidy, cruelty and treachery, appears to be unparalleled in the history of the world, as it was attempted and partly executed—many of our countrymen being inhumanly butchered—after the existing parties had entered into a solemn treaty with our Government, and delivered up hostages as pledges of their good faith and for our security; in consequence thereof, the barbarians possessed themselves of the guns and other Government property, which the few survivors were obliged to abandon in their precipitate retreat from the intended general massacre, whereby the evil was one hundred-fold increased, instead of being eradicated or assuaged

On the 19th of June, the remainder of this unfortunate expedition arrived at Marlbro', during my presence there, which inclined the Commissioners to represent the affair personally to me, in such a manner as to lead to a determination not to pass that fort without asserting and fully establishing the superiority of His Excellency's Government over the daring and lawless courses of these formidable, cruel, and sanguinary savages; and in fixing such determination, I deemed myself strongly urged by the Board's commands, which clearly and distinctly enjoin every aid and protection in my power to be given for the general security of commerce; and I trust it will appear that I have followed up the spirit of their instructions with an energy

that will impress upon the minds of the most savage tribes upon the west coast of Sumatra, in future, a due respect, deference, and consideration for Government, as well as the rights and privileges of those trading thither under its countenance and protection.

In continuation, I beg leave to state, that the country ship 'Phoenix,' fitted out for the first expedition by the Commissioners of Fort Marlbro', joined us off Port Loa, to the northward of Passage Island, with William Grant, Esq., Hon. Company's civil service, who was employed at the head of the former, or original project. This respectable gentleman accompanied me in the frigate, and had under his charge forty sepoy, with two small tenders, the 'Albert' and 'Providence,' likewise to attend the present enterprise.

On the 26th we anchored in Muckee Bay, at 2 P.M.; soon after which, a seyd came on board, to treat, as he said—but it appeared afterwards to deceive—in order to satisfy Government, if possible, for the injuries and insults offered by the Muckee people as afore-mentioned. I sent him back with Lieutenant Burghall, and a flag of truce, to state that I would enter into terms with the chiefs only, in person, after being put into possession of one of their forts on shore, the Hon. Company's guns, and other property; but whether these preliminaries were accepted or not, I would instantly land the next forenoon, and do that justice to the cause of my honourable employers, which my duty pointed out as my first consideration.

After repeatedly receiving many evasive projects, merely to gain time, I finally returned this deceitful, treacherous priest, at nine o'clock next morning, and then made the signal for the divisions to embark in boats for storming the place. They had scarcely formed near the off-side of the frigate, when the faithless barbarians opened their fire upon

her from three batteries abreast, and within half a mile of us. I immediately caused a heavy cannonade to commence from the frigate, drawn up by a spring for the purpose, and was seconded by the 'Phoenix,' in like order, for three-quarters of an hour, when I put myself at the head of the corps, and pushed on shore, which we gained without loss. The enemy, on our rapid approach, abandoned their strong-works, and fled in every direction. Thus, in one hour, we gained complete possession of the whole, without accident of any kind; a rare instance of good fortune, altogether unexpected, considering the ferocious banditti we had to contend with, and dislodge from very strong positions.

After gaining the enemy's works, I secured them by posting the Bengal Volunteers, under Lieutenant Nott, on the right, in the battery containing the heavy guns, and most exposed; the Bombay Marines, under Lieutenant Lloyd, in the centre; and Marlbro' Volunteers on the left, or ground battery. During the afternoon of this day, I withdrew the guns and troops from the right to the centre battery, and gave the command of the whole on shore to Lieutenant Nott, of the Bengal establishment, where I re-embarked the two divisions of seamen belonging to the frigate and the 'Lord Castlereagh.' On leading up the advance, after landing, to the grand battery, I came within forty paces of the rear of the enemy, but from motives of humanity, desisted from firing at them.

Upon this occasion, forty-six pieces of cannon, from 18 lbs. to 4 lbs. calibre, fell into our hands, besides a large quantity of shot, some few shells, and various other articles adapted for the support and defence of the place. One wounded prisoner was brought in; him I sent off for medical aid. The numbers of killed we could not ascertain, as it is a sacred custom with these barbarians to carry off the bodies of the

slain, that they may be buried with their ancestors. Death has no terrors for these savages, but the dread of having their bodies exposed is insupportable; not only to the person affected, but every one of his connexions.

The next morning, at nine o'clock, I marched with the major part of the forces (the Bombay Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Lloyd) employed in capturing Muckee, to destroy the enemy's posts in the interior, and completely succeeded, notwithstanding they made a vigorous resistance, at different stations, from many pieces of small ordnance and small arms, wherewith every one of their strongholds were defended. In fact, every chief's residence was a complete fortress, only assailable by an European force. On this occasion we captured about twenty pieces of small cannon, from 3 lbs. to 16 lbs. calibre, thirteen of which we brought off, without any loss on our side, although the corps sustained a heavy fire from the enemy, in the performance of their duty. The enemy's loss has been irreparable, at least for years, if not utterly irreparable, as we reduced every description of building to ashes, and cut down all the plants producing the necessaries of life, which escaped the general conflagration. Many of the barbarians must have fallen during the conflict, but for the reasons afore-mentioned, added to our pursuit, which was incessant in the prosecution of the main object, only five dead bodies came within our observation. During the next day we shipped off the ordnance, &c., and in the evening embarked the troops, leaving the enemy's works, &c., at Muckee, under total conflagration and destruction. I take further liberty to state, that this important service to Government, and the British interest in general, was performed in forty-eight hours' space of time, by a handful of men, in opposition to a numerous host of daring, ferocious banditti, well equipped and secured by a succession of works

rendered so strong by nature and art as to set at defiance the attempts of every other nation if defended by Britons. Sixty-five pieces of ordnance, in all, fell into our possession; fifty-seven of which we embarked on board the 'Phoenix;' the remaining eight were rendered useless, and abandoned. To conclude my detail, I humbly commend the gallant officers and men, of every description, acting under my personal command, upon this arduous enterprise, to the consideration of the Board, for whose justice and liberality I have the highest veneration.

(Signed)

JOHN HAYES.

Hon. Company's Frigate 'Bombay,'  
Looso Roads, Aug. 3, 1804.

Nott's personal appearance, and his general bearing and conduct while engaged on this expedition to Muckee are thus described by one who was his companion at the time and remained his friend to the day of his death:

I was a great deal with Nott in 1803, 1804 and 1805. He was rather tall, but not lusty; neither was his figure such as indicated agility; still he moved about without awkwardness. He had a fine oval head, dark hair, sallow complexion, and not a joyous countenance; on the contrary, without being morose, it was expressive of a calm observation of what was passing, for he was rather a looker-on, than a delighted participator of the gaieties of his associates. His temper was impetuous, yet he could curb it so as not to be disagreeable to his companions; there was enough in it, however, to scare away indiscreet familiarity. I was his junior officer when on shore at Muckee, and passed the

nights with him shut up in one of the stockades; he was then, if I may so express myself, in his glory: no precaution was omitted to prevent a surprise; his unwearied vigilance rendered it impossible, and his preparations to resist any attack which might be made, proved what might be expected from him when he might become the commander of an army. Those nights welded us together for ever.

I cannot say whether he was studious or idle: at that period the world was in arms; life was passed in action rather than study; books seldom fell in our way; our minds were solely engaged with the General Orders of the day.

For some supposed offence committed by Lieutenant Nott, Captain Robertson, who commanded the 'Lord Castlereagh,' mentioned in the foregoing despatch, ordered him into arrest, and he remained under arrest, until the Expedition, on its return, was about to reach Calcutta. He then directed Nott's release, but of this Nott refused to avail himself, and so returning to Calcutta under arrest, he immediately demanded a court-martial against himself on the charges preferred by Captain Robertson.

It will be the fortune of the biographer to say many honourable things and describe many honourable actions of William Nott in the course of these volumes, but it may be fairly questioned if any single event of his life reflected greater brilliancy upon his character than the emanations of his lofty spirit disclosed in the defence before the court. Let it be borne in mind that he was at this time but nineteen years of age, impetuous and imperfectly educated. The sense of

wrong, however, inspired the intrepid youth with eloquence suited to the occasion, and reminded the hearers of the daring temper and fiery resentment of the immortal Clive.

Into a specification of the charges on which Nott was tried it is not necessary to go, because he has recapitulated their substance, and occasionally repeated their terms in the defence, which ran as follows:

Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court-Martial,

I am standing before you accused of crimes so unbecoming the character of a British officer, that, were I really guilty of the imputations contained in the charges, I should feel myself unworthy of being a member of the honourable army in which I serve, and certainly should not have persevered in demanding the present inquiry into my conduct. But I come here arrayed in the full consciousness of innocence, well convinced that no contrivance whatever, no art, nor any malice can be so refined, as to reach that honour, which is fairly committed to your care and protection.

Gentlemen, I hope to be indulged with a few minutes' attention to the situation in which I was placed on board the Hon. Company's ship 'Lord Castlereagh,' previous to my entering on the merits of the charges now before you.

I was placed under the command of a man totally unacquainted with military duty; a man called from a merchant vessel and raised to the command of a 50-gun ship; a man who never had a commissioned officer under his command; nay, who never had the honour even to serve with one, until I had the misfortune to be placed under him. Thus, Gentlemen, was I reduced to the hard necessity of either

abandoning a profession, to which I had dedicated my life, or receive the unofficer-like orders of a man, whose ignorance of military affairs rendered him incapable of judging whether an officer did, or did not, do his duty.

Impressed with the indignant feelings which have been roused by the recollection of the injurious treatment received by me and the detachment under my command, while on board the prosecutor's ship, I am induced to inquire of this Court, in case I should be honourably acquitted, what punishment is to be inflicted on my prosecutor for false imprisonment, and for preferring groundless charges? For the former, I can obtain reparation in a civil court; as to the latter, were he endowed with those delicate feelings peculiar to British officers, I would in that case leave him exposed to the infamy which must ever attach to an individual who prefers a groundless charge. But he is void of all sense of shame and regard to veracity; he is dead to every idea of justice, lost to all feelings of humanity. Were he indeed amenable to martial law, I should be enabled to bring him to a fair and open trial; and I have not the least doubt but he would, in that event, be dismissed the service with infamy for his cruel and inhuman treatment of the detachment under my command while on board his ship, and for his shameful behaviour in face of the enemy on the 27th of July last. But he well knew that he was not amenable to martial law, and therefore continued his ill-usage to the last, and seemed to triumph in his cruelty; but it was the short-lived triumph of a low, illiberal mind, uninspired by sentiment, untinged by humanity. Most assuredly, Gentlemen, he shall not escape with impunity.

Gentlemen, before I proceed to notice the charges, it will be necessary for me to inform the Court, that on the

27th of July last I received an order from Captain John Hayes, Commander-in-Chief of the Hon. Company's forces assembled before Muckee, to take possession of the forts evacuated by the enemy, as well as the command of the whole of the detachment employed on shore.

Gentlemen, my prosecutor has declared that he is unable to substantiate the three first charges in consequence of the absence of the evidences he wished to be able to produce in support of them; and he has moreover declared, that those witnesses are on board the 'Bombay' frigate, and he expects by this low subterfuge, to escape the infamy that awaits him for preferring malicious charges; for I pledge to this Honourable Court my sacred word of honour, which is dearer to me than life, that there was not a man (except Lieutenant Lloyd, who is now here) belonging to the 'Bombay' frigate, in the fort at Muckee, when the altercation took place between Captain George Robertson and myself; it is therefore impossible for him to call any evidence from that quarter to substantiate the charges. But if the gentleman is of opinion that the evidence of any person now on board that ship would tend to substantiate his charges, he certainly will confer on me a great obligation by deferring this investigation until the return of the 'Bombay' frigate, which will be in a few days. But this I am sure he will not do, well convinced it would be to no purpose.

Gentlemen, as my prosecutor has declared himself unable to substantiate the three first charges, it is not therefore my intention to trouble this Honourable Court with any evidence in regard to them; but as my prosecutor has taken the liberty to reflect on my character as an officer, I hope to be indulged with a few minutes' attention in order to state to this Honourable Court a few words with regard to them.

Gentlemen, the first charge is, in my humble opinion, so

very frivolous, as to be hardly worth my serious notice. On the morning of the 27th of July last, the Commodore made a signal for the troops on board the different ships, to embark in boats, and proceed to the shore in order to attack the enemy, who appeared to be drawn up ready to receive us. The troops were not in the boats above five minutes, when the enemy opened a brisk fire from three forts, which was immediately returned by every ship in the fleet except the Hon. Company's ship, 'Lord Castlereagh,' commanded by Captain George Robertson. When the boats from the different ships, with the troops under my command, approached the shore, a number of soldiers, eager to get on the beach, leaped breast-high into the sea; and as it was my wish to form them as soon as possible, in order to receive the enemy, I of course left my boat and proceeded with them. After we had taken possession of the enemy's forts, finding my red jacket (in consequence of the above circumstance) rather disagreeable from being wet and muddy, I took it off, and put my sash on over a white one, which was the only alteration made in my dress. I do therefore insist upon it, that I was not improperly dressed.

As to the second charge; on the 28th of July last, when I was at my post, a rabble of sailors, Lascars, &c., came running into the fort, and without saying a word to me, ordered my soldiers to quit their post. I immediately told them to desist; that my men were not to move. Gentlemen, my prosecutor charges me with "obstructing and preventing the orders he had issued from being complied with;" and he very gravely observes, that I did all this "without being addressed or spoken to on the subject." Gentlemen, I cannot pretend to say what orders Captain Robertson issued to his own men; he gave none to me, nor would I have obeyed them if he had; I well knew that it was my indis-

pensable duty to maintain the post committed to my charge by the commanding officer; and I now appeal to this Honourable Court whether I should not have been guilty of misconduct, had I allowed a set of people, in the most tumultuous manner, to turn my men from their post, for others to occupy it, and that too, for the sole purpose of drinking their grog in, and, as my prosecutor very wisely observes in his charge, "without my being addressed or spoken to on the subject."

Gentlemen, I have said thus much on the second charge, because it is in some measure connected with the third; but I defy my prosecutor to produce the smallest evidence to prove that I deviated in the least from the rules of this or any other service.

In the third charge, I am accused of "disobedience of orders before alluded to, after they had been given me by the prosecutor." Gentlemen, I know nothing about the orders alluded to, nor any other orders issued by Captain George Robertson on shore at Muckee; I received my daily orders from the Commodore of the fleet. On the 27th of July last, when I left the prosecutor's ship with the detachment under my command, he desired me to proceed to the Hon. Company's frigate, 'Bombay,' and put myself under the orders of the Commodore. I did so; and from that moment I conceived myself to be entirely from under the command of Captain George Robertson, except with regard to orders he might have brought me from the commanding officer. However, I never received any such orders, nor did I expect to see Captain Robertson on shore, for he kept at a wary distance during the whole of the engagement with the enemy on the preceding day, and seemed to have the greatest antipathy imaginable to the smell of the enemy's powder; nor did I see him on shore until

the coast was perfectly clear, although a brave example was set every person present by the Commodore. Gentlemen, I was ordered by the commanding officer to take possession of the forts, and defend them, and I now put one simple question to this Honourable Court: What right or authority had Captain Robertson, or any other officer whatever, to turn me from a post I was ordered to defend, except he brought me an order for so doing from the commanding officer, who had given me charge of the post?

Although Captain Robertson kept at such a wary distance during the engagement with the enemy, he afterwards acted a most gallant part; for, as soon as he was given to understand that we had secured the enemy's guns, he made his appearance on shore, armed cap-a-pie, when, like a true knight-errant, he adjusted his dirk, and with a majestic air approached my post; when within about twenty yards, he made a halt, clapped his hand upon his weapon, and turning to the rabble of sailors and Lascars that followed him, he cried with a very audible voice, "My brave followers, turn those fellows neck-and-heels from their post!"

Gentlemen, I must confess that I was at first rather inclined to amuse myself with this modern Quixote; but unfortunately, on looking round, I could neither see a flock of sheep nor even a windmill; and for fear he should take my poor soldiers for a set of wicked giants, I was under the necessity of ordering the furious knight and his followers out of the fort. And as Captain Robertson has founded two of his charges upon the above circumstance, I further inform this Court, that I did turn Captain Robertson and his men out of the fort, at the point of the bayonet, and would to-morrow, under the same circumstances, do the same by any officer, let his rank be what it would. A member of this Honourable Court has thought proper, since

the commencement of the trial, to say, "That I am a young officer, and did not rightly know what I was about at the time above-mentioned." What that honourable gentleman's ideas are respecting military discipline, is not my business to inquire; but young as he is pleased to think me, I wish to let him know that I acted according to the known rules and discipline of war; and I have not a doubt but the decision of this Honourable Court will convince him that no officer, let his rank be ever so high, can insult a young subaltern in the lawful execution of his duty with impunity.

Captain Robertson has informed the Court that I embarked from Muckee by his orders. On my honour, I never received such an order from Captain Robertson, nor would I have obeyed it if I had. I was on shore under the command of the Commodore of the fleet; consequently, could not have embarked without his orders.

Gentlemen, with respect to the fourth charge. On the evening of the 29th of July, the Commodore went on shore at Muckee, and ordered me to re-embark the Bengal Volunteers, and to return to him; Captain Robertson was present, and must have heard this order. Accordingly, I embarked in the boats and proceeded with them to the Hon. Company's ship 'Lord Castlereagh,' and immediately reported the arrival of the detachment on board to the officer then in command of the ship; which, I do insist upon it, was perfectly correct according to the rules and discipline of war. Gentlemen, it is not my intention to bring forward any evidence in regard to the fourth charge, as I deem the evidence already given by Mr. Macdougall quite sufficient for the satisfaction of this Honourable Court.

With respect to the fifth charge. On the evening of the 29th of July last, about half an hour after I had embarked

on the 'Lord Castlereagh,' a boat came alongside from the 'Bombay' frigate, with an officer, who informed me that the Commodore had sent to desire that I would go on board, as he wished to speak to me. It immediately occurred to me that the Commodore wished to be informed of what had passed on shore during the time I commanded the forts. I left my cabin and went on deck, when an officer brought me an order from Captain Robertson to bring his carpenter, who was then on board the frigate, back with me. After receiving such an order, I proceeded to the boat; for surely it was unnecessary for me to say anything further about going to the frigate, which was not above two hundred yards from the 'Lord Castlereagh,' and more especially as Captain George Robertson went to the gangway, saw me in the boat, and repeated the above order. If, therefore, he had the least objection to my leaving the ship, why did he not mention it at the time? For even admitting that he had the power of preventing my going, after receiving an order for that purpose from the Commodore, surely, even in that case, every unprejudiced person must have interpreted his silence on that head into consent.

About nine o'clock, I left the Commodore, in order to return on board the 'Lord Castlereagh,' having then been absent about two hours and a half, and not above two hundred yards off. But, on my approaching the ship, I was, to my great astonishment, told by the officer on duty, that he could not allow me to go on board; Captain Robertson had just before ordered him to prevent me. Captain Robertson desired the officer on duty to fire into the Commodore's boat, if she attempted to come alongside the 'Castlereagh;' and he moreover placed two additional sentries, with orders to fire at me, with evident intentions of wilfully taking away my life. However, when ordered not to approach the ship, and

after giving my name to the person who held the boat, I returned, and the following morning went on board the 'Lord Castlereagh,' and was desired by Captain Robertson to consider myself in arrest for quitting the ship without his knowledge; not recollecting, I apprehend, the orders he gave me on quitting her.

Gentlemen, my prosecutor has charged me with absenting myself from my post and remaining absent the whole of the night of the 29th of July last, without leave. It will appear by the evidence which has been given, together with what I have to produce, that the charge is unfounded; it is unfounded, because Captain Robertson gave me orders on my quitting the ship; it is false, because I was not then even on duty; there were two commissioned officers with the detachment, the other had charge at the time. The charge is false and malicious, because I was not absent from the ship the whole of the night of the 29th of July, but did return alongside within three hours from the time I was sent for by the Commodore, and was informed that if I attempted to go on board, the officer on duty had orders to fire at me.

Gentlemen, I am now come to the crisis in which I am to be judged; not by the wishes or intended imputations of the words in the charges, but by the evidence given on oath before you in support of them, and under all the circumstances attending them.

Gentlemen, into your hands do I commit my honour, which is dearer to me than life. I have suffered more from the unwarrantable, nay, inhuman conduct of the prosecutor, than my wounded and indignant feelings will allow me to relate before this Court. I am conscious of my own innocence; and when I consider that I am to be judged by the justice and virtue of this Honourable Court, I shall make

myself perfectly easy as to the event. I demand only justice, and justice I am sure I shall have.

WILLIAM NOTT,

Lieut. 2nd Battalion Bengal Volunteers.

Fort William, Dec. 27, 1804.

While the court-martial was pending, and before the trial took place—which, as has been stated, was demanded by Nott himself—the Most Noble the Marquis Wellesley, the Governor-General of India, who had received an accurate version of the whole affair, so far departed from usage as to invite the young officer, although under nominal arrest, to a ball at the Government House. Nay, that this invitation might not be interpreted into a matter of course or an accident, his Lordship sent an aide-de-camp privately to Nott, to convey his wish that he should attend the ball!

How much Nott was indebted to the Marquis Wellesley's kindness to him during this eventful period, was frequently narrated by him with deep feelings of gratitude in after-life.

Lieutenant Nott was of course acquitted upon all the charges. Not so well did it fare with his persecutor, Robertson. The man was reprimanded in the presence of the accused and all the officers of the fleet, who were summoned for that purpose. It is in the following words that the incident of the trial stands upon the Records of the East India House:

LIEUTENANT WILLIAM NOTT.—Tried and acquitted by Court-Martial on several charges of disobedience of orders

and neglect of duty whilst in command of a detachment serving as marines on board the 'Lord Castlereagh' in July, 1804. In conformity to the Marquis Wellesley's orders, Captain Robertson, the commander of the ship, and prosecutor, was admonished to use more caution in the course of his future service. The Court-Martial, in their admonitions to Captain Robertson, stated that the strict confinement which he inflicted upon Lieutenant Nott during four months, upon the ground of charges that have been proved to be frivolous or unfounded, was a measure highly unwarrantable, and comprehending a very great abuse of the power vested in him.

## CHAPTER II.

NOTT'S MARRIAGE—HIS STUDIES AND PURSUITS—IS PROMOTED TO CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT, AND AFTERWARDS TO CAPTAIN, IN 1814—OBTAINS THE APPOINTMENT OF SUPERINTENDENT OF FAMILY PENSIONS—SENDS HIS CHILDREN TO ENGLAND—IS PROMOTED TO MAJOR—RETURNS HOME ON FURLOUGH—PURCHASES JOB'S WELL—ATTAINS THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL—RETURNS TO INDIA—COMMANDS THE 20TH NATIVE INFANTRY—IS TRANSFERRED TO THE COMMAND OF THE 43RD, AND AFTERWARDS TO THE 16TH GRENADIERS—FULL BATTAL AND SUPERSESSION REMONSTRANCES.

THE effect of the vigorous public policy of the Marquis Wellesley, as Governor-General of India, was the establishment of such perfect tranquillity throughout the empire, that Nott could not contemplate the possibility of early employment in the field. With the prospect, therefore, of protracted leisure before him, he determined to apply himself to those general studies which would be the most likely to repair the defects of early education, impart vigour to his mind, and prepare him for the higher duties of a profession to which he had become ardently attached. Penetrating the character

of the sepoy, and mastering his language, he soon became an object of regard among the men of his corps, and was not the less liked and respected by his brother officers. His literary pursuits were naturally desultory, for it is rare in an Indian cantonment to find men of sufficient experience and reading to direct the studies of others. But it is clear, from some entries in a common-place book, which we find him keeping about this time, that Nott preferred the masculine writings of the best modern and ancient authors to the lighter productions with which young men solace their idleness. He knew little of either Latin or Greek; the best translations were the media of his intimacy with Cicero and Tacitus, Homer and Hesiod. The ponderous but sound philosophy of Samuel Johnson, the brilliant truths inculcated by Gibbon, the principles of government gracefully enunciated by Junius, these and the writings of the "Spectator" fascinated his understanding, and supplied him with elevated motives of action.

At the period of which we are now writing, female society was much more limited in India than it is at the present day, and in after life Nott has frequently been heard to say that he often, about this time, travelled fifty or sixty miles to see a single subject of nature's fairest handiwork. Society of this kind was far more congenial to his pure and virtuous tastes than the dissipation which unfortunately was too common in all cantonment visiting. Truly happy was he from the first moment he became acquainted with her, in whom

he soon had an opportunity of centring all his heart's best affections. She was sought by a crowd of admirers, but they, like his enemies in the battle-field, were routed by his presence. The pure and devoted attachment which animated their minds, at first sight, continued uninterrupted, until death, but too untimely, robbed him of his dearest earthly treasure. How deep his affection was, and how much his loss was deplored, later pages will clearly show. He married at Calcutta, on the 5th of October, 1805, Letitia, second daughter of Mr. Henry Swinhoe, formerly of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, but who was then practising as a solicitor in the Supreme Court. Fourteen children were the issue of the union, but not more than seven reached maturity, and five only survived him.

The tranquil life which Nott led from this period until the year 1811—nearly seven years—was not favourable to the development of high military qualities. Nevertheless it had its uses, and one who so much valued time as did the subject of this biography was not likely to disregard them. An officer may either pass a very idle or a very industrious life: it chiefly depends upon himself. If he determines to limit his exertions to the simple performance of such regimental duty as is comprehended in parades and field days, guard mounting, courts-martial, committees of inquiry, and so forth, he will have great reason to complain of the weariness of existence; but if he determines to devote a large share of his leisure to professional studies

and to qualify himself for the departments of account and supply, at the same time constantly holding as much familiar intercourse with the men he commands as to enable him to interpret their feelings and understand their prejudices, he will seldom find the day too long—especially if the joys of domestic life contribute to the embellishment of his being. So it was with Nott: *ennui* was unknown to him.

In the year 1811 the office of "Superintendent of Native Pensions, and Paymaster of Family Pensions," at Barrackpore, became vacant. It is precisely one of those offices which exact in the incumbent a familiarity with accounts, an acquaintance with the native character, and habits of diligence and patience. The pension in old age and infirmity, and the provision for the family, constitute the chief inducements to the sepoy to take service with the East India Company. The present wages and the honour of fighting for the European master are as nothing compared with the certain provision in the future. Thrift, and the hope of long years of idleness, when the *physique* has become enfeebled, are the grand characteristics of the native; and the Government having discovered the key to his loyalty and devotion, are rigidly punctual to those engagements by which that allegiance is to be maintained. Accordingly, it became a matter of importance that the officer to whom the payment of the pensions was entrusted should be a man in whose integrity and exactitude the fullest reliance might be placed.

The character which Lieutenant Nott had acquired in his regiment recommended him to the vacant office, and he immediately entered upon his duties with characteristic ardour.

On the 15th of June, 1814, Nott was promoted to Captain-Lieutenant; and on the 16th of December following, he was advanced to the rank of Regimental Captain.

Happily for Nott his military services were not required in those campaigns against the Pindarces and the Nepalese in which so little honour was won, until Sir David Ochterlony took the field to repair our reverses in the hills. He was the better enabled to fulfil his duties as the Pension Paymaster, and as the father of the family which now began to cluster around him. India, even in the districts the most favoured by a salubrious temperature, is indifferently supplied with the means of educating European youth; the schools being rarely conducted by competent individuals. But in the plains, the difficulties which must attend any attempt to cultivate the intellects of children are greatly enhanced by the enervating influence of climate upon their constitutions. Most parents, therefore, even at the risk of an expenditure beyond their immediate means, and the still greater risk of the alienation of affection from separation, make a point of sending their children to England.

Captain Nott was too fond of his offspring to neglect what seemed to him an imperative duty; and he had,

therefore, parted with them as they reached the ages at which it seemed right their education should commence. Charles, the eldest, and William, the second son, were sent to school with a Mr. Williams of Caermarthen. The letters written to the former in 1818 and 1819 sufficiently attest the fondness of Nott for his boys and girls, and the exalted notions which he entertained of the sacred paternal duty and obligation of counselling them as to their conduct in life. The second letter of the two following affords a powerful illustration of the lofty sentiments by which he was inspired, and the excellent style of composition he had cultivated.

MY DEAR CHARLES,

I have just received your welcome letter of the 19th of September last. I had been for some time extremely uneasy and anxious regarding you and William, as my brother's previous letter was dated as far back as January, 1817, upwards of twelve months ago.

I am happy in the assurance you give me that no one interferes in the composing of your letters, and I trust that you will always observe this rule; indeed, I hope you do not need the assistance of any person.

Your uncle mentions in his letter that you and William are in fine health, and that he has reason to be pleased with the progress you both make in your studies. This, my dear Charles, is all that your mother and myself could desire: to find that Providence continues you in health, and that you are fast acquiring that knowledge so necessary to your success in the great world of business, is indeed realizing our best expectations. Continue, my beloved boys, this

attention to the precepts of Mr. Williams, and, should I live to return to my native land, you will ensure happiness to the declining years of your fond mother and myself.

Edmund is now six years of age; and as I must remain in this country two years more, it would be highly improper to keep him so long from school. I shall therefore send him home by the fleet which will leave this country about December next, and you will probably see him about six or eight months after your perusal of this letter.

So your old friend Hodge wrote to your uncle from London! He went in charge of two of your cousins, William and Alfred, the sons of Captain Nicholetts (not Nicholls, as poor Hodge calls him). He is a good and kind servant, and I mean to send him to England with Edmund.

I suppose you and William run about famously during your leisure hours. You will be able to show me all the delightful walks, and the beautiful and highly picturesque views, of hill and dale, on the sides of the romantic Tawy; and I shall certainly call upon your taste to fix on a spot for the retirement of your parents.

Your mother joins in fervent love to you both. Edmund, Letitia, and the little Maria are quite well. Bless me, what a troop of children I have got! Well, I hope they will all be good, and then the greater the number, the more happiness will be the lot of your affectionate father.

W. NOTT.

Barrackpore, March 15, 1818.

MY DEAR CHARLES,

I have received your letter of the 19th of June, 1818. It affords me much pleasure to find that my father was about to reside at Pont-Carrag. I passed many a day on that spot, and hope again to meet you all there, comfortably

situated. You say that Job's Well has been sold. I was in hopes of getting it, and sent an order on a house of agency in London for the purchase money, but it seems I was too late; however, it is of no consequence; I dare say I shall be able to get some suitable place of residence on my arrival in England, and as I shall not be rich, I must not be very nice in my choice.

I hope I shall find that you and William have made great progress in learning. I should be sadly disappointed indeed were I to find it otherwise, as my best and fondest hopes of happiness depend upon the knowledge of my boys. You will, I trust, have seen Edmund before you get this letter. He left us on the 21st of December. We received a letter from him yesterday, dated at Madras, at which place the ship was to remain for some days. He is a fine-spirited boy, and after being in England a short time will, I think, be much admired.

I have requested your uncle to send you immediately to some public school, which will probably be Eton, where I fully trust your conduct will be such as I could wish, and that you will be conspicuous for your attention to the precepts of your learned teachers, and for your honourable and gentlemanly behaviour. *Qui non proficit, deficit.* Only think, my beloved Augustus, how anxious, how feelingly alive to your welfare, your fond father will be during your stay at that national institution; where, in the eyes of most people, your conduct will stamp your future character in the world, and according to that conduct, you will be noted dull, ignorant, unpolite and dissipated, or confer exquisite happiness on your parents, by being learned, gentlemanly and honourable. I am, my dear Charles, depriving myself of many comforts to enable me to see you well educated; but I shall feel myself amply, nobly repaid, if your conduct equals my fond expectation. I trust you will be particularly careful in forming acquaint-

ances while at Eton. Always bear in mind that virtuous poverty is far preferable to titled vice and indolence. Not but you may meet with those among the rich and great, who are possessed of every good and desirable quality; however, never lose sight of the old proverb—*noscitur a sociis*. It is not easy to get rid of evil companions where an intimacy has once subsisted with gay and dissolute young men. I would therefore have you be cautious in forming friendships. Never allow the supercilious smile of the idle and superficial, or the loud laugh of the ignorant, to lead you, even for a moment, from the path of learning, honour, truth, and virtue; the pride of the supercilious is even beneath contempt, and the loud laugh of the presumptuously ignorant will meet with self-punishment. But though you will meet with many such characters, you will also find every good principle and disposition combined in others, whose acquaintance will confer honour, and whose friendship I would have you cultivate. I know your nature will never allow you, even in idea, to utter an *untruth*; I will not therefore dwell on so base a subject. Banish, my dear Charles, from your mind and behaviour, arrogance, self-conceit, insolence, presumption, and egotism; these are the certain bane of genius, knowledge and politeness, and will not fail in the end to render the unfortunate possessor hated and despised. Oh! my beloved Augustus, how I long to be with you, to assist in guiding you free of the rocks and shallows you may meet with in your progress. I cannot commit to paper the ten thousand wishes, fears, anticipations, and anxieties, which I momentarily feel for your honour and welfare in life. But I fervently trust in Providence, that you will be generously good, deeply learned, and piously virtuous.

Tell Edmund that I received both his letters from Madras,

the one written by Hodge, and the other by himself with the assistance of Mrs. Cox. Tell him that I have not sold his pony (Jack), though we have no use for the animal now. Little Letitia is always inquiring after Edmund. Your sister Maria is much like Edmund, and very handsome. You and William must be great tall fellows by this time; your mother and myself anxiously look forward to the period of meeting. Farewell, my much loved boy. Your mother joins in love to all. Write to me frequently, and tell of all you see and think.

Yours, affectionately,

WILLIAM NOTT.

Barrackpore, Feb. 9, 1819.

The care with which the foregoing and several other letters of about the same time have been preserved reflects great honour on the filial feelings of the persons to whom they were addressed. Charles Nott—whom the writer of these pages had the pleasure of knowing twenty years later than the dates of these letters—became a practising barrister in the Supreme Court. He inherited much of his father's disposition, and his nice sense of honour. From Eton both Charles and William were sent to Trinity College, Cambridge, where the former graduated as LL.B., and the latter as A.B. Although the expense was considerable, the father's anxiety for their success in life induced him to submit to personal privations rather than deprive them of the advantages of a university education.

In 1821 Captain Nott meditated a return to England, and we find him requesting his sons to report upon the

eligibility, as a residence, of Job's Well, Caermarthen, a locality to which he was greatly attached from early associations.

By the time you get this letter you will have seen a good deal of England and Wales, and will be able to compare the situation, neighbourhood and scenery of Job's Well with that of other places, and to give me your opinion whether Job's Well suffers in the comparison, and whether you think I should give the preference (*with my small means*) to other counties for a fixed residence.

More than a year afterwards he reverts to the subject.

You allude to Job's Well. It is by no means likely that I shall reside there, and perhaps not even in Wales, but of this I can only judge on the spot. I suppose you will be at Cambridge when you get this letter. I trust you will steadily pursue those studies which will be of most use to you in the great world of business and *contention*, if you will admit of the *word*. Your situation is different from that of the hundreds you will meet with there. They have been born to fortunes, and can, if they wish, be idle and dissipated with impunity; you have to make your way in the world, and to fight your own battles; indolence and extravagance must, therefore, be banished from your vocabulary, and must never for a moment find admittance into your mind.

Late in 1822, Captain Nott sailed with his wife and his three daughters for England. His health had become somewhat impaired by a residence of twenty-

two years in a tropical climate, and as he was upon the eve of his promotion to a regimental majority, which would have caused him necessarily to have vacated his staff appointment, he conceived it prudent to quit India at once, taking the usual furlough on sick certificate.

Notwithstanding his anticipation that he should not reside at Job's Well, we find him there in February, 1824, writing to Charles: "If I could have had the least idea that Job's Well would have been so comfortable and so delightful a residence, I would have been in it six months ago. You would not know the old house."

Major Nott's stay in England did not extend beyond July, 1825. In the meanwhile the army was augmented, and he became, in consequence, a Lieutenant-Colonel. He hastened his return in the hope of being employed in the Burmese war. Upon his return to Calcutta he rejoined his regiment (the 20th), of which he was, of course, placed in command. It was then stationed at Barrackpore.

A few months subsequently, Lieutenant-Colonel Nott was transferred to the 43rd Regiment. These transfers in the India Army are frequent, and sometimes complimentary. Another regiment, perhaps, is indifferently commanded, or cannot be safely trusted to the Major, supposing the Lieutenant-Colonel to be withdrawn. A transfer of a Lieutenant-Colonel from another corps is then ordered, and on these occasions a selection is made of the officer most conspicuous for his drill and disci-

pline. On some such principles as these, Lieutenant-Colonel Nott was soon removed to the command of the 43rd Regiment. The quietude of his life as Superintendent of Pensions at Barrackpore had scarcely prepared the higher military authorities for the exhibition of so much talent as he now showed himself to possess for parade duties, and the interior economy of a regiment; but they were not long in discovering his merit, and he soon became noted as one of the most efficient commandants in the service.

A year or two subsequent to Lieutenant-Colonel Nott's assumption of the command of the 43rd Regiment, the 16th Bengal Grenadiers was in danger of suffering in its discipline from certain dissensions which had broken out among the officers. To restore order, and enforce due subordination, Lieutenant-Colonel Nott was now transferred to the command of the 16th Grenadiers.

During the tenure of this third command two circumstances occurred which occasioned very great dissatisfaction among the officers in the Company's service; and one of them is to this day a source of mortification and heart-burning, because it has disturbed a principle and given advantages to officers in Her Majesty's army which had never been previously contemplated. A general order appeared, giving the local rank of Colonel to certain Lieutenant-Colonels in the royal service, on the ground that the dates of their commissions being the same as those of certain Company's Colonels, they were

entitled to hold a similar rank in India. The remonstrances to which this gave rise, led to the rectification of the mischief, only that it might be revived, at a subsequent period, in a more formidable shape. The other circumstance which awakened general discontent among the European officers was the abolition of the Full Batta allowance, which had been enjoyed for so long a time as to be regarded as a vested right. The Court of Directors, in their anxiety to retrench expenditure, had given *carte blanche* to Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, and he had availed himself of it to the fullest imaginable extent, and not always with the soundest discretion. He curtailed charges which were of great value to the country, and allowed many old abuses to continue in existence. The Full Batta of the officers he swept away with a stroke of the pen. The effect of this measure was to bring the army to the verge of mutiny. The Government secretariat was beset with memorials; the press teemed with complaints and remonstrances; an agent was employed, at a heavy cost to the army, to champion their cause at the East India House; and the name of Lord William Bentinck was execrated throughout the country. If his health was proposed as a toast at any mess dinner, it was greeted with hisses; if he fell into the company of officers, away from his own house, they almost turned their backs upon him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Nott, always animated by a powerful *esprit de corps*, always indignant at injustice, but equally mindful of the obligation of obedience and the

influence of example, refused to be a party to any memorials from his own regiment alone. He disbelieved in their efficacy, and preferred taking part in a general memorial from all the field-officers in the presidency division of the army. His memorial, when drafted, was sent to General O'Halloran, who commanded the presidency division, for his perusal, before Nott had circulated it to the other field-officers. The General, however, declined to be the medium of submitting the document to the Government, and this refusal appears to have elicited from Nott the following expression of regret and indignation.

April 11, 1829.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I was from home when your note was received. I am exceedingly sorry to find that you disapprove of the memorial, knowing, as I do, the extreme agitation now prevailing, and looking, with the best judgment I am possessed of, to the ultimate consequences. I should have felt happy, indeed, had you consented to forward it.

I am equally sorry that you should, for a moment, have conceived yourself not consulted, as the memorial was sent to you, for perusal, before being circulated for signatures.

I may possibly err in judgment, but I think memorials from separate corps highly objectionable; nay, worse than useless.

After a service of near thirty years I now see, to say the least of it, the most gloomy prospect before me; and I think a very little knowledge of the present state of this army, and of human nature, will enable the most superficial to foretel the ultimate consequences.

In 1824, the Government, if my memory serves me, expressed in strong language their high displeasure of the native officers at the presidency station for not having made known, and reported on, the state of irritation and discontent of the troops. On the same principle, will not the Government highly blame the field-officers of this army, should they not represent the present feelings of the European officers of every rank? If my judgment is at all correct, it is highly expedient and desirable that the present agitation should be fully stated to Government immediately, and I think it the indispensable duty of field-officers to bring it in the most direct manner to the notice of their superiors.

No man can possibly feel greater regret than I do at the discontent created by a measure which the Government has deemed necessary; but with the rank I have attained in the service, and the responsible situation I am placed in, I should be supine, indeed, were I silently to look on that discontent, which meets me at every turn, and not make it known to you, as the chief military authority in the division, and, through you, to the Government.

Being perfectly convinced that you will do full justice to my motives, I feel assured that no excuse is necessary for the trouble I occasion by this note.

Yours,

WILLIAM NOTT.

To General O'Halloran, C.B.

Two years subsequent to the date of the foregoing, a similar promotion of four Lieutenant-Colonels in His Majesty's service to that which had excited so much just resentment, took place. This was the signal for

much memorializing from the Lieutenant-Colonels in the East India Company's army, thirty or forty of whom had thereby been superseded; and we find a document in Colonel Nott's hand-writing addressed to Colonel Fagan, the much-esteemed Adjutant-General of the Bengal army, forwarding a "petition" to the Court of Directors against the supersession thus inflicted. It would seem, however, that that memorial or petition was never forwarded to the Home Authorities, for no trace of it appears upon the records of the East India House. What Colonel Nott's feelings were in respect to this extraordinary and most unjust supersession, may be deduced from a passage of his letter to Colonel Fagan.

In transmitting this memorial I cannot avoid expressing to you, for the information of Government, my wounded feelings, and my deep regret, on finding that there should exist a necessity for my remaining under the painful influence of this supersession, during the long period which must elapse, pending a reference to England.

Whilst the 16th Regiment, N.I., was stationed at Saugor, Colonel Nott was temporarily transferred to the 71st, N.I., in order to restore it to a wholesome state of discipline. Circumstances had tended to unsettle the corps, and it needed a strong and resolute hand to bring it into proper condition.

In the course of the periodical reliefs the regiment under Colonel Nott's command was sent to Mhow in

Malwa. This station he did not like; he therefore sought, and obtained, an exchange into the 38th Regiment, N.I., which was cantoned at Benares. The officers and men of this regiment soon became much attached to their new commander, and he cordially reciprocated their friendly feeling towards him. Nott looked upon this corps as one of the most perfect in the service, and the regiment justly regarded him as an unapproachable chief.

No reply coming from the Court of Directors to the memorials which had been addressed to them in 1831, respecting the supersession of the Lieutenant-Colonels, Nott took an opportunity, in January, 1834, of proclaiming the continued existence of outraged feeling in a letter to the "Bengal Hurkaru and Chronicle," a paper which up to that time had for many years been the mouthpiece of the Indian army.

How long, Sir, are the field-officers of this army to groan under the degrading stigma of that order? How long are they to drag on their existence under the withering influence of injustice? When are they to receive even a simple reply to their respectful and humble petitions to the authorities in England, transmitted through the legitimate channel of the Bengal Government, as far back as 1831? Daily subjected as they now are, to be commanded by one or all four of the royal officers who are named in that famous order, I ask, in the name of all that is honourable and just, when or where is their degradation to end? Is it because they have for forty years faithfully served their country, at a distance of twelve thousand miles, that they have not a single friendly voice to

make known their grievances to their King and country? Yet, Mr. Editor, let us still hope, that such a state of things cannot last much longer. I, for one, feel assured, that it is only necessary for the Court of Directors to bring the subject to the notice of an all-just and gracious Sovereign, to put an end for ever to such a monstrous system of injustice and degradation—a system which destroys all zeal, paralyzes every effort, withers in the bud every generous and noble thought, and throws a blight over the dear and long-treasured hopes of the old Indian officer.

The hardy Russian, backed by the power, the resources, and the local knowledge of the ever restless Persian, is making long and hasty strides towards the Indus; the conduct and the bravery of the officers of the Indian army have given to England a great and splendid empire; but in the days of conquest and acquisition, their pride, their feelings, were never outraged by injustice. They were treated with consideration and generosity, and the greatest confidence was ever placed in their zeal and in their honourable and noble exertions. A long train of victories was the happy result. Let the same conduct be pursued towards them, they ask for nothing new; then, when the day of trial shall come, as come it most certainly will, the same zeal and courage which was displayed in the acquisition of empire, will shine forth with redoubled ardour in its successful defence against all our enemies, whether European or Native. But if the pernicious and deadly system of patronage and supersession is to continue, if the long-tried and experienced Company's officer is to be superseded and commanded by the silly and weak scions of aristocracy, or by the men of interest, whom the whim or caprice of the Horse Guards may send across the ocean; then, Mr. Editor, it will not be necessary that a man should be a prophet to foretel the sad result. Nor will

it be a difficult task for you, Sir, to calculate the future numbers of your New Year addresses as editor of a newspaper under the British sway, in the City of Palaces.

So far from the remonstrances of the army proving effectual, the promotion of King's Lieutenant-Colonels to the local rank of Colonel became a matter of course. With "bitterness unutterable," Nott was doomed, six months after the above letter had been published, to find that the pride and honourable feelings of the officers of the Bengal army had "again been insulted by degrading supersession." The Lieutenant-Colonels of the 3rd Buffs, and 49th Regiment had been promoted, thus superseding thirty-one Lieutenant-Colonels.

Colonel Nott was not much in the habit of writing to the newspapers. He was averse to anything that wore the appearance of a defiance of authority or a stimulant to disaffection. When, however, he wished for information which was only attainable through the columns of the press, or imagined that important professional objects could be achieved by a free discussion of their merits, he was less scrupulous. The Indian press was for the most part conducted by gentlemen who, being personally known to the community, were responsible to that community for the respectability of their pages. Colonel Nott, therefore, felt that he was safe from vulgarity of comment, or severity of stricture, and he was at the same time assured that his confidence would be honoured. Scarcely an instance is on record

of the disclosure by an Anglo-Indian editor of the name of his correspondent.

Among the subjects which, in 1834, interested Colonel Nott, and drew from him a communication to the press, was the difficulty of procuring recruits for the native army. This communication bears the impress of Nott's mind. He never forgot a grievance until it had been redressed; he never considered that enough had been said respecting a public wrong until justice had been done. Hence, even a few questions respecting the recruiting were but precursors of one of those honest philippics which the stinging remembrance of the wrongs of the service frequently suggested.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE BENGAL HURKARU AND  
CHRONICLE."

SIR,

1. May I ask whence proceeds the great difficulty of procuring recruits for the native army?

2. What measures are necessary to prevent men of an improper description being enlisted?

3. Is there not a necessity for committees of field-officers being immediately assembled at the head-quarters of each division of the army for the minute examination of all recruits enlisted during the last twelve months, with authority to discharge instantly and upon the spot, all those who may be found unfit for the duties of a soldier?

4. Is there a necessity for issuing rules and strict orders for the guidance of commanding officers in recruiting for their respective regiments?

5. Is it not advisable to increase the native army by ten

men per company, and desirable that none but boys of fifteen and sixteen be enlisted, and that they should be confined to the drill and to regimental duties for full two years? The reasons for this are many and obvious, and of vital consequence.

6. Looking to the present system, and to the heavy and incessant duties imposed upon the native troops, is not the time fast approaching when, instead of this army being filled, as in days gone by, with respectable volunteers, the Government will find it necessary to give large bounties, even for men of an inferior description? Can it be said that the present miserable economical system will offer anything in the shape of compensation for such a state of things? What an enormous ultimate drain, too, upon the revenues of the country! The Russians knocking loudly at your gates, the army deficient in numbers for the purposes of discipline and efficiency, the natives, once highly proud of being admitted into your ranks, declining and disgusted with your service. Your European officers discontented and impressed with the maddening idea that favouritism and sickening and deadly patronage is predominant and rides triumphantly, added to the deep-felt knowledge of supersession by the King's brevet; and then look to the well-known fact, that after a zealous service of from forty to fifty years, an old officer fails to gain admission, for even one of a large family, into that army in which he has passed a long life of toil and exile from his dear native land! To fill the measure of injustice, I have to blush with indignation while my pen writes the fact, that for forty years no Company's officer has been appointed by the Honourable Court or by the King, to the command of the India army. True, they originally conquered the country, but the command has been given to Parliamentary influence and to the connections of an overgrown and grasping aristocracy.

crazy. Now, Sir, under these circumstances, let us suppose a smart campaign in the vicinity of the Indus with the *probable* loss of one-third of the army engaged. Nay, start not, this is within the mark of casualties. May I ask how and from whence they are to be replaced? You cannot fill your ranks with proper men in time of profound peace, how then are you to accomplish it in time of war? how during such a war as that which is advancing upon you with giant strides, and when hordes of petty chieftains will be eager to augment the number of their followers, and ready with eagle eye to take advantage of times and circumstances? Will not your preparations for the *second* and *third* campaigns bear a gloomy aspect?—nay, again start not, the third will not be last—will not the Princes of India be on the watch, and closely analyze your proceedings and your means? and will these preparations be such as to carry the hope and even the firm conviction of victory, or will they be the *very* reverse? Will patronage then appoint the commanders, and will merit still enjoy obscurity?

7. Have you not, by reducing in an undue ratio *all* your military establishments, in a great measure paralyzed, if not destroyed, the main power of the State? The half Batta decree too, is, to say the least of it, a measure never to be forgotten. Did not the supersession of the field-officers of the Bengal army, by selfish and aristocratic orders from the Horse Guards, outrage the pride and bitterly disgust the feelings of every honourable man? When they committed that act, did they not think that it would again be necessary to “raise the battle cry?” Yet, Sir, the officers of this army love their country, they reverence the Government, but there still remains a proud conviction that the day will come when justice *must* be rendered to them, the day *will* come, when, unless generously forgetting the injuries and insults thus

heaped upon them, under the sanction too of the “Great Duke,” their cheerful and devoted aid be nobly and zealously given, the Anglo-Indian empire, purchased by their blood, will pass away like the dew of the morning, leaving behind *only* a great and warning lesson to future Kings and Rulers to the latest posterity, on the policy and necessity of acting with faith and justice—mark, Sir, only faith and *justice*—to those upon whom the defence of nations must ultimately devolve.

8. Every soldier is, or ought to be, well aware that comparative poverty must necessarily be his lot in whatever army he may serve, and may shame light upon that wretched man who enters this noble profession in expectation of riches, or from the abominable love of lucre. Rank, honours, medals, the applause of his countrymen, and strict and even-handed justice, comprise the legitimate objects and rights of a soldier; and he who can remain silent when basely robbed of these, is unworthy of the commission he holds. Should such a man unfortunately be called upon to act on any great emergency, he will be found as wanting and as unqualified to serve the State, as he showed himself incapacitated for the defence of his own and his comrades’ rights.

9. Depend upon it, Mr. Editor, that the man who has not the spirit to speak for his own honour and his own rights, will be found void of intellect, of energy, and of British spirit, whenever he may be called upon to defend the rights of his country, or to carry any great military measure of Government to a successful conclusion.

10. I merely intended to have put the four or five first questions, but, I know not why, my thoughts and my pen have been rambling far and wide for two full hours; and you, Sir, may now print or burn as likes you best.

N.

Four years elapse, and we do not find Colonel Nott taking any share in newspaper discussions. In the summer of 1838 he comes into the arena for the purpose of expressing his opinion of the impolicy and injustice of giving brigadierships to artillery officers. Here again are strong traces of that intensity of feeling which seemed to enter into every question in which apparent injustice had a share. It will be obvious from the extract of a letter, which was signed "W.," containing Nott's sentiments, that a discussion had been commenced in which a writer signing himself "Sempronius," had taken a part.

Although I, in common with my brother soldiers, deeply feel the insult which has been thus thrown upon us, it was not my intention to take up my pen on the subject, until the letter of the good and gentle Sempronius was brought to my notice. As there be many a Sempronius in the world, I would fain endeavour to remove a little of the mist of simplicity from before their eyes. But to-day, Sir, I have not time, nor would you afford me space, to detail the feelings which this and similar acts have engendered in the minds of the officers of this army. Let the Home Authorities, whose business it is to preside over and to direct the destinies of this vast and splendid empire, gained by the blood and toil of those whose best feelings are so frequently and so heartlessly outraged and insulted, look to these things. I can tell them, that there are those in this army who, could they possibly have foreseen such acts, would rather have given their services and their lives to the most petty of the petty Chieftains between the Sutlej and the Caspian Sea, than have

entered this army, and have subjected themselves, after the banishment and toil of upwards of the third of a century, to such cruel supersession and injustice. In the courts of such Chiefs, even if that cursed thing called patronage prevailed, if situations and commands were granted only by the pestiferous breath of some unprincipled courtier, or through the influence of some grasping old lady from behind the purdah, the soldier of fortune would not greatly feel it. He had entered the service of an unfeeling and petty despot with his eyes open to the notoriety of Oriental intrigue, prepared to run the career of chances in the service of tyranny, and whatever his fate, he would have no right to complain, nor to feel the pangs of disgust, surprise, and disappointment. Far better this, Sir, than to serve under the guise and semblance of just rule and dominion, and after a long life of zealous service, to find himself ultimately superseded and crushed to death, by the advancement of favoured mediocrity, under the blighting auspices of intrigue and deadly patronage.

It is impossible to advert in any point of view to this transaction, or in any way to contemplate the disgusting act, without the most painful feelings—impartial spectators will even call it a mere love of patronage. All honest and honourable men will view it as a lamentable shrinking from public duty—the whole army already mourn over it as the very worst of precedents, and as a death-blow to their legitimate rights, and to their long and dearly-cherished professional hopes.

The letter, from which the foregoing is an extract, appears to have impressed a writer, under the signature of "Civis," with an idea that the author desired

the brigadiership for himself. To this Nott rejoins:

Now, if it be of any satisfaction to Civis, I can inform him, as he appears to be ignorant of the fact, that W., from his standing in the army, and from the number of his seniors who were at the time available, could have had no claim whatever to the command, and if patronage had appointed him to it, the injustice of the Government would have been equally great; so much for your scale, good Civis. But it is true that W. deeply felt, and still feels, that as his seniors were passed over on that occasion, it is probable that at some future period, under the same blighting system, a similar fate may be dealt out to him and his brother officers, ay, and if Civis be indeed a soldier, it may, by possibility, extend even unto him.

This last passage was conceived in a prophetic spirit, for in 1837, when General Sir Henry Fane had become Commander-in-Chief of the Army of India, a number of Colonels in Her Majesty's service were promoted *by him* to the rank of Major-General "by brevet in the East Indies only," under the pretence of preventing the supersession of such King's Colonels. In garrison and cantonment the promotion exhibited only the anomaly of a Major-General commanding a regiment (if he did not happen to be on the staff), but in the field it was calculated to do a positive injury to the Indian officer, because it conduced to his being superseded in brigade and divisional command.

As the practice, in spite of all the protestations and arguments of the Company's officers and their friends, has now become permanent and uniform, it will not be out of place to state the question, *pro* and *con*, in a work which professes to narrate the life of one who was among the most vigorous champions of the interests of those officers. The case, as for the royal officers, was thus stated at the time by a writer who was known to hold a position on the staff of Sir Henry Fane, if indeed that distinguished soldier himself were not the individual who dictated the statement.

1. Some years ago (I will assume the year 1824), a certain number of Lieutenant-Colonels belonging to His Majesty's service were senior to a certain number of Lieutenant-Colonels in the army of the Honourable Company, and the gentlemen of both classes were then serving in the East Indies.

2. A stagnation in the promotion of the British army promised to give the advantage to the Lieutenant-Colonels of the Company's over their less fortunate brethren in the King's service. Some addition to the Company's army, or change of system, I know not which, promoted its junior Lieutenant-Colonels to the rank of full Colonel, by which their senior Lieutenant-Colonels of the King's army were largely to be superseded.

3. To prevent this supersession, a colonial or local rank of full Colonel was instituted, and it was appointed that whenever a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Company's service should be promoted to the rank of Colonel, all Lieutenant-Colonels of the King's service, who were senior to him, should be advanced to the *local* rank of Colonel, that they might retain their relative positions.

4. The principle of this local promotion, I gather from some letters, was deemed just by the several authorities concerned, at home and abroad. Letters discussing the principle seem to have passed between the military officers of the Crown, the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors.

5. It seems to have been established that the Royal officers *were* liable to be superseded by the quicker promotion of those of the Company to the rank of Colonel, and that it was therefore confirmed.

6. A final letter on the subject was written, I find, confirmed by every department it passed through, or sanctioned by the measure of giving it a free passage, in which it was set forth that it was His Majesty's command that no supersession of his officers should take place during their service in India, whether by the promotion of their juniors to the rank of Colonel or Major-General.

7. When an extensive Royal brevet took place, by which all of the local Colonels serving with the Queen's army in India were liable to be superseded, Sir Henry Fane issued a local brevet advancing the full Colonels to the rank of Major-General in the same manner and on the same principle, as the Lieutenant-Colonels had been advanced to the local rank of Colonel, viz. that they might retain their relative positions.

8. The operation of this local brevet seems to have had the effect of making Lieutenant-Colonel A., of Her Majesty's service, who was senior to Lieutenant-Colonel B. of the Hon. Company's army in 1824, his senior in 1839 under the denomination of Major-General instead of Lieutenant-Colonel.

9. Supersession is unjust. Every soldier must consider it so. No man of sense would sanction an injustice in his own

person even: therefore, the right of Colonel B. of the Company's army is maintained, by the preservation of Colonel A. of the Queen's army in his relative position. Colonel A. was senior yesterday, and he is senior to-day. What then, as far as my case goes, is the ground of complaint? Does Colonel B. repine at not having superseded Colonel A.? I conceive not. I date my case from the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel only. Colonel B. may go further back and say he was a Cadet of 1790, while Colonel A. only entered the service in 1805: this seems to have no relation to the matter at all. Regimental service is our constant supersession; the officers of a corps quartered at Almorah would scarcely be just in disputing the title to promotion that the casualties in Arracan might give their juniors in a regiment there. The rank of Colonel is the ocean into which all the regimental streams fall, and at length find their levels. It would be madness, surely, in the Ganges to cry, "Fie upon the Thames," for reaching the sea as soon! and yet the former stream makes an infinitely longer pilgrimage. As it is impossible therefore to take note of all the ups and downs the military rivulets meet in their course to impede or to impel them; from the period at which all waters find their level in the moral or the natural ocean, can the level be preserved. It is not unjust, therefore, to take no note of rank previous to the date of Lieutenant-Colonelcy.

The objections to the foregoing line of argument are based upon the wrong done to the Company's officer in constituting the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel as the starting-post from which the respective services are to run the brevet course. So long as the present system

of promotion, by means of money and interest, obtains in the Royal army, its officers can arrive so much more rapidly than the Company's at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, that their being kept at an even pace in the after-progress is a virtual supersession of the Indian army. It is very true that those Royal army officers who have neither money nor powerful connections may be as long attaining the grade as if their service, too, were a seniority service, and perhaps even longer than if that were the case; but while a system does obtain, by which young officers of wealth and interest *can* reach the Lieutenant-Colonelcy in six or eight years, it is scarcely fair to establish a rule against the Indian army, by which those young men, if serving in India, can attain a brevet rank evenly with officers of four or five times their standing in regimental service, and before hundreds who had served while the others were, if in the world at all, but in the nursery or the school-room. The Horse Guards authorities say just this: "there are many disadvantages attendant on a seniority rise, and these we do not want our army to share; but if, in spite of them all, it happens that the officers of such an army should chance to pass some of our officers in promotion, we insist on neutralizing that advantage, by arranging so that ours, who got on, so far, rapidly by means of purchase, shall not be left behind when those means can no longer avail them." A Royal officer, who entered the army in 1830, might be a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1836, and a Major-General in 1853, while

the Company's Major-Generals of the same year would have entered the service even twenty years before them, and might still be commandable by them to the end of their military lives, for the Royal Lieutenant-Colonel's commission might be of an older date in 1836 than the Company's. The argument is therefore fallacious, though plausible, which maintains the reasonableness of making the last-named rank the one to start from, *pari passu*, because of its being the first one beyond the regimental line of promotions, and because regimental promotion is itself precarious. This reason is a bad one; for though, as between the regiments of the same service, and subject to the same general system, supersessions while working up to the rank of Major may and do take place, and need not be grumbled at (for it is a race on fair fundamental terms), the case is not at all in point as between regiments of distinct services, where the promotion is conducted on systems so essentially different as those of purchase and no purchase—exchanges and no exchanges—attached and unattached, and no such thing—alternate, half, and full pay, and no such thing—and so on in other respects connected with and influencing the regimental rise. The real truth is, the Horse Guards' *esprit de corps* does not choose that officers of the Royal army shall be superseded by those in the Company's service, and therein lies the secret cause of the unjust regulations. If this were not so, we should find, in the Royal army itself, the

cavalry and infantry equally protected against supersession by the Artillery, Engineers and Royal Marines, which, in reference to the former army, are just as much seniority branches as the whole Indian army is, in reference to the whole Royal army. That they are not protected, arises from the fact of their all being Royal officers. False pride does not come into play there, for it is only a supersession of one Royal officer by another Royal officer.

It is high time invidious distinctions were extinguished, for the Company's officer has demonstrated of late years his capability to perform all the responsible field duties which, at one time, none but the officers of the Royal army were supposed competent to execute. Brilliant names decorated the Indian Army List prior to 1838. We are now to enter upon a period when the opportunity presented itself to Colonel Nott of imparting to his own name a lustre scarcely less dazzling than that which adorned the names of Munro, Malcolm and Ochterlony.

We have hitherto traced in this chapter the few public circumstances which attended a considerable series of the years of Nott's life; it may not be inopportune to give a passing glance at the way in which he spent the many leisure hours which military duties left at his command. He took the opportunity thus afforded him of collecting a library, rather select than numerous—one for reading and not for ornament. "Torrens" was one of his great authorities, and to his family he

has said that the contents of that book were as familiar to him as the letters of his alphabet. During this time the "Wellington Despatches," by Gurwood, were published, and of these he made a perfect study. Frequently was he heard reading them aloud, and if he happened to hear any of his family at hand, he used to call them to read and admire too.

His devotion to his wife and family, who now clustered thick about him, was unbounded. He gave up much time to the education of his children, and was careful to insist rather on an intimate knowledge of what was read, than on a superficial acquaintance with a variety of subjects. He also gave hours daily to reading the Bible, and was very fond of Scott's "Commentary." He had presented this Bible to his wife in 1834, as the most acceptable present he could make her; and after her death, the two last volumes of it were his companions through the Affghan campaign. When lamps were lighted in the evening he was very fond of retiring into a dark room, and there ruminating on the treasures with which he had previously stored his mind. And in his wake he recommended his children to follow, saying: "Store your minds when you are young, and then if you live to be old, and eyesight should fail you, you will have something to feed upon."

He used to rise every morning before gun-fire, and spent some time in reading by candle-light while waiting for his horse to be brought round, in order that

he might take a ride round the race-course before parade time. His house used generally to be full of morning visitors, and often have his superior officers consulted him on the evolutions of an anticipated parade or field day, and afterwards looked coldly on him for the information which he was but too ready to communicate. If he knew or heard of any one, who, for some imaginary cause, was rather shunned than sought by others, to such a one he was sure to show marked instances of kindness, and to press on his family a similar course of conduct. To the haughty he was ever unbending, but he needed only to know that his aid was required, to stretch out a helping hand.

### CHAPTER III.

CAUSES OF THE EXPEDITION TO AFGHANISTAN—COLONEL NOTT TRANSFERRED TO THE 42ND N.I., AND APPOINTED TO COMMAND A BRIGADE OF THE ARMY OF THE INDUS—PROMOTED TO MAJOR-GENERAL—MARCH TO SHIKARPORE — SIR H. FANE RESIGNS — MAJOR-GENERAL NOTT APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE ARMY.

THE policy of Lord William Bentinck, in reference to native States in the heart and on the borders of India was of the most pacific character. The cost and the injustice of interference in their internal concerns, even upon the plea of protecting the British possessions from the remote or immediate consequences of a disturbance on the frontier, had been written in such painful characters on the page of history, that the Governor-General wisely and steadily lent a deaf ear to any proposal for intervention. The advancement of the interests of humanity in the fields of commerce; the promotion of general education; the establishment of easy lines of communication between the empire and neighbouring

countries; the purification of the courts of law, and the simplification of their practice; the abolition of horrible practices which had been hallowed and sanctified by religious prescription; these were among the great objects to which Lord William Bentinck bent his mind, and, as results have shown, with the most stupendously beneficial effect. In furtherance of great commercial objects, he even meditated dispatching Captain Burnes of the Bombay army to Affghanistan, to improve the opportunity created by Burnes' previous visit, and of opening the commerce of the Indus and extending the trading transactions of India with Central Asia. But his term of office did not admit of the adoption of this policy. It was reserved for another hand.

Lord Auckland, the immediate successor of Lord William Bentinck, possessed a mind cast in somewhat of the same mould; at all events, he entertained the same political views, and promised in all things to follow in Lord William's footsteps. He cherished the same notions of the duty of improving the condition of the people of India, and of cultivating the arts of peace. Accordingly, one of his earliest measures was to take steps for carrying out the policy in reference to the establishment of a commercial intercourse with Affghanistan, which Lord William Bentinck had chalked out; and there were stimulating motives to this measure which had not influenced Lord Auckland's able predecessor. Information had reached India, in 1835 and

1836, that aggressions upon Affghanistan were meditated by Persia, at the instigation of the Court of Russia. Dost Mahomed, the Emir of Caubul, was at issue with Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Sikhs, and desired the good offices of the British Government in India. In fact, the time had arrived when it was clear that relations must, sooner or later, be established with Central Asia; and to this end the accumulation of information and the existence of a good understanding with contiguous powers, were desirable.

These considerations led to the employment of Captain Burnes upon the long-contemplated commercial mission in 1836.

Burnes had not been long at Caubul before he discovered that Russian agency was at work to induce the Emir to form an alliance with Persia. Dost Mahomed was, however, averse to listen to any emissary but the commercial traveller from the East. The tenure of Peshawur by the Sikhs was a greater affliction to him than the prospective injury which ambitious Persia might inflict; and he hoped that the interference of the British Government would ultimately adjust his disputes with Runjeet Singh, and procure the restoration of the frontier town. Negotiations were carried on for some time, but Lord Auckland was averse to interfere in the quarrels of Sikhs and Affghans; for the Punjaub was then regarded as a capital barrier against the invasion of India by any northern power. The diplomacy entrusted to the hands of Burnes ac-

cordingly failed. The commercial envoy therefore returned to India.

By this time the designs of Persia—in which were also to be traced the purposes of Russia—began to develop themselves in very unmistakable colours. A powerful army laid siege to Herat, which has always been called the key to India, because it stands on the high-road between Affghanistan and Persia. The Shah of Persia had avowed, in the plainest terms, that it was not his intention to let his eastern conquests stop short at the possession of that city. He claimed the principalities of Caubul and Candahar, and opening out his scheme of operations to an ambassador, declared his intention of ultimately joining Dost Mahomed in a religious war against the Sikhs.

It was in the month of March, 1838, that the intelligence of the commencement of operations against Herat reached India, and that people began to speculate upon the aim and probable upshot of the Shah-in-Shah. It appeared clear to the public writers of the time that Russia had instigated the movement, and that she would reap the full political benefit of the success of the King of Persia, should success crown his endeavours. "The point being gained," said they, "and Russia virtually established in the emporium city, the fertile valley, and the favourable climate of Herat, we see no geographical obstacle to her advance upon Hindostan, and no obstacle whatever which can be reasonably deemed as insuperable by her arms or her intrigue."

"Our cheese-parers and non-interferers," added the journals of Calcutta, "have been too long neglectful of the only line of policy which could have checked and blighted her Eastern projects in time; and even now that their eyes are opened, there are no signs of real energy displayed—of efforts commensurate with the crisis, nor even so much as were called into action against a Mahratta league, a Nepaulese aggression, or even a Burmese threat to drive us from Calcutta." "If ever," said one of the most distinguished writers of the day, "the British power in India should be so reduced in political energy as to be able to do no more than merely beat off an aggressing enemy, then a small range of prophetic observation will suffice to render any person competent to predict the occurrence, and, within half a century's date, the time of its downfall. If ever our policy become so cautious that we shall hesitate to stretch forth our arm of power and crush incipient aggression in the place where it is being matured, as soon as we obtain a certain knowledge that aggression is contemplated; if our childish theory and more contemptible than childish practice of non-interference with the external policy of the States around us, induce us to await the blow instead of paralyzing the arm uplifted to inflict it; if we do not act, even while our enemies meditate; if the absurd fear of being deemed aggressors in a war, prevent us from asserting our strength in time; if the dread of expense should procrastinate all wise and necessary preparations; then

our Troy may be pronounced to be tottering, and its fall to be foredoomed."

While this line of argument found favour with the community of British India, and was operating upon the minds of the Governor-General, and the Secretaries and Councillors by whom he suffered himself to be in a great measure guided, the alarm had been sounded in England, and the Foreign Minister became urgent that measures should be taken to nip in the bud the dangerous schemes of the Russian autocrat. The best informed portion of the British press likewise advocated a prompt interference, and innumerable pamphlets disclosed the plan of Russian encroachment, and appealed to history in support of a conviction that the invasion of India was the ulterior object contemplated.

Our empire in the East is not founded on the love, but on the weakness or the fear of those whom it has rendered either tributary, secondary, or subject to its sway. It is self-evident, therefore, that political neutrality on our part is the source of eventual political weakness, and that the infliction of speedy and condign punishment upon all who can be convicted of compassing our overthrow, is our only salutary and becoming policy. To preserve peace at any sacrifice short of national honour, may be the proper policy of European cabinets; but the rule is not applicable to the British in India, where it is necessary for our power's duration, that our word should be law to the States around us, and where we should assume no position more pacific

than that of armed and ready arbitrators, or conquerors, whom it would be, by the teaching of uniform experience, most dangerous to oppose.

After long and anxious discussions carried on at Simlah in the Himalaya, not far from the banks of the Sutlej, the Governor-General came to the determination of sending a force across the Indus. With the ordinary caution of the Indian Council Chamber, no public hint was for some time given of the purposes of the Government; but the activity suddenly introduced into various public departments, left no doubt of the intentions that were formed. In June and July, Commissaries were directed to be upon the alert; the treasuries in the western provinces were largely supplied with specie which was to be held in deposit for an anticipated emergency; brigade parades were ordered at all the great stations in Upper India, and an unusual bustle distinguished the operations in the arsenals of Fort William, Agra, and Delhi. But it was not until the month of August that any official communication was made to the Bengal army of the purposes of the authorities. All had previously been the mere shadow of the later events.

On the 3rd of August doubts and surmises were set at rest. A circular order appeared which, though addressed confidentially to commanding officers of regiments, soon found its way into the hands of the hundreds interested. It requested the commanding officers to prepare their regiments for active service in the field. Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief,

declared that he felt satisfied that no exertions would be wanting on their part to bring the regiments forward in such a condition as should reflect credit on themselves and on the officers and men under their orders. Particular attention was directed to the state of the arms, accoutrements, and ammunition of the corps, the efficiency of the forage establishment, and the completion of the men's equipment. The women and families were ordered to be disposed of in the best way circumstances would permit, so that when the troops were required to march, they might move disencumbered of any article of baggage which could, without compromising the efficiency of the corps, be dispensed with.

The character of the country in which the troops were expected to serve, was referred to in the following paragraph :

The country in which operations are about to be conducted is not adapted to wheel-carriages, and you will bear this in mind when making arrangements for the transport of your baggage.

Then followed certain injunctions for the encouragement of Bunneeahs (grain dealers) to attach themselves to the regiments ; orders for the recall of the men who were on furlough ; arrangements for the security and accommodation of the sick who were to be left behind ; an invitation to the officers of the several corps who were on staff or civil employ to join their regiments ;

and an intimation that the whole of the troops were expected to be at Kurnaul, a few marches from the Sutlej—on the 31st of October following.

It is difficult to convey a notion of the enthusiasm which pervaded the Indian army when it became known that a force was to be assembled in the north-west. The army had been long inactive. Excepting upon the occasion of some small affairs in Rajpootana, and the southern part of India, no field operations of any moment had taken place since the capture of Bhurtpore, twelve years previously. "Cankers of a calm world and a long peace," the officers had, in a measure, degenerated into mere pleasure seekers, or carping critics of the measures of the Government. The only questions which had interested them for some time past concerned their pay and allowances, and the means of expediting a retirement from the service upon a comfortable pension. The extinction of some of their emoluments by Lord William Bentinck, and the supersession to which the service had been subjected by Sir Henry Fane, had chilled their energies, and created a strong feeling of general dissatisfaction. But the faintest sound of the war-trumpet produced a magical change in their feelings and the current of their thoughts. To fight with any power which had braved the British flag was agreeable, but to contend at the head of sepoy against the European cohorts of the Czar in regions beyond the Indus, was an honour so rare and unexpected, and was fraught with so much promise of

distinction and advancement, that not a soldier in the whole length and breadth of India could for a moment tolerate the idea of being left behind. There was no occasion to intimate to the holders of staff appointments in remote districts, that they were at liberty to rejoin their regiments. Volunteers for service came from every part of the country: the most lucrative appointments were abandoned in the presence of a demand for warriors. Commanding officers of distant regiments put in claims to be transferred to those which were likely to be employed, and younger officers addressed urgent petitions for occupation with such irregular and special corps as might be formed for the occasion.

The same enthusiasm extended itself to the native soldiery. The old Subadars recounted how Lord Lake had beaten Frenchmen with sepoy's thirty-five years previously, and predicted a similar issue to a conflict with Russia in the plains and mountains of Affghanistan. Much bad and some good poetry was born of the general excitement, and one interpreter of the sentiments of the natives—himself a lineal descendant of Lord Lake—paraphrased Thorn's history of the campaigning against Holkar, in some forty stanzas of unusual vigour. The concluding verses were *à-propos* to the prevalent enthusiasm. He supposes a Subadar to have been recounting the glorious tale:

But now, my men, the battle-cloud again o'erhangs our head;  
They say with murkier gloom than erst it wrapped the valiant dead.

From Ava and Nepaul they come, Affghan and rugged Russ;  
All, all unite to swell the battle torrent's impetus.

Well, let them come; stout hearts and thoughts of bygone fields, my  
men,

The valour of our sepoy sires lives in us o'er again.

The British banner in our keep, has never met with stain,

And as we stood by stout old Lake, hurrah! we'll stand by Fane.

Amongst the officers who expressed a wish to be permitted to join the army ordered to be assembled at Kurnaul, was the subject of this biography. In his retirement in the Mussooree hills, where he sought and obtained a restoration to health, he had heard the rumours of war, and animated by a sense of duty and a strong inclination, he addressed a note of his wishes to the Adjutant-General, Colonel Lumley, who was at Simlah. Within a week from the date of Nott's letter, the Deputy Adjutant-General, Major Craigie, answered him.\*

The Adjutant-General begs me to inform you, with his kind compliments, that you have been removed to the 42nd Regiment, with a view to being placed in command of a brigade during the contemplated field-service. He regrets not being able to submit your wishes in regard to the regiments in your brigade, as the arrangement of the force has already received the sanction of Government. No one can more deeply regret than I do, the circumstance of the Volunteers not having been named for service. I shall send you the brigading the moment I am at liberty to do so.

\* Letter dated Simlah, August 27, 1838.

Up to this time no adequate notion had been formed of the extent of the force that was to be employed beyond the frontier. It was only by a comparison of notes that the number of corps could be estimated, and even many of these believed that they were only destined to form part of a reserve. The most contradictory rumours, sometimes suggested by belief, and sometimes by hope, were consequently spread abroad. At length, the Government broke silence. Secret proceedings were no longer practicable, expedient, or necessary. Fresh intelligence poured into the country regarding the hostile and dangerous purposes of Russo-Persia and the *de facto* ruler of Caubul, and it became essential at once to inspire confidence by a public declaration of an intention to equip an army for field service forthwith. The subjoined order was accordingly published by the Government, and set at rest all doubts, surmises and speculations.

Secret Department, Simlah, Sept. 10, 1838.

It being the intention of the Government to employ a force beyond the north-west frontier of India, and His Excellency General Sir Henry Fane, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India, having acquiesced in the wish of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, that he should take upon himself the command of the troops to be assembled on the occasion, His Lordship avails himself of his services; and His Excellency is accordingly requested to issue such orders for the organization of the force as he may deem expedient.

In publishing this order to the army, the Commander-

in-Chief made the appointments of officers for the staff duties of the troops under orders.

At the head of the list of appointments appears that of Colonel W. Nott, 42nd Regiment of Native Infantry, to be a Brigadier of the Second Class, with Captain T. Polwhele of the 42nd Regiment as a Major of Brigade.

The force now enumerated was very considerable. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, separated into five brigades, a brigade of cavalry and a brigade of artillery. Three European regiments (two of which belonged to the Royal service) and twelve Sepoy regiments composed the infantry. In addition to this regular force, arrangements were made for raising a body of Irregulars, to form the army of Shah Soojah Ool Moolk; for it now became apparent that it was the intention of the Government to make the restoration of that Affghan monarch, who had for some years been living under the protection of the British Government at Loodianah, on the Sutlej, the excuse for entering Affghanistan. It was not, however, until the 13th of October that the manifesto of the Government appeared in the publications of the day.\*

Four days subsequent to the date of the publication of that manifesto, Colonel Nott experienced a sad bereavement. His wife, to whom he had been united for three-and-thirty years, and for whom and his children he lived and endured all the annoyances to

\* See Appendix.

which his professional life was exposed, died most suddenly, on the 17th of October, and was interred in the cemetery of Delhi.

She was a woman of considerable personal attractions, and sedulous in the discharge of all those social and domestic duties which entwine round home its peculiar fascination of happiness. Ever regardless of self, she was beloved by all who knew her, and was inestimably dear to her husband and children. To their interests and comforts her whole life was devoted, and the deep affection which they felt for her while living, prompts these too feeble remarks to her memory now that she is no more.

As the time approached for the assembling of the troops at Kurnaul, Colonel Nott quitted Mussooree and proceeded to Delhi, to bid farewell to the 38th Regiment, which he had commanded, so much to the advantage of the corps and the gratification of all its members.

The death of Mrs. Nott, to whom he was deeply attached, while it had the effect of depressing him, exceedingly augmented his anxiety regarding his unmarried daughters. How to place them during his absence, was a subject of grave consideration, and materially added to his cares at this momentous period. He at length determined upon sending them to Calcutta, to reside with their brother Charles, a barrister, and their natural protector, who had recently commenced practice in the Supreme Court. In a

journal briefly recording the events of each day after Colonel Nott's departure for Delhi, the following touching entry appears:

*Oct. 24, 1838.*—Marched from Delhi, after going to the Ghaut,\* to see my beloved daughters off for Calcutta. May Heaven watch over and protect them, and restore them to me the same dear affectionate children I now feel them to be. On my way from the city to the camp at Arcepoire I turned into the burying-ground and stood for some time over the grave of my beloved and lamented Letitia. Strange to say, I think my mind was in some degree relieved by the visit.

The scenes upon his route to Kurnaul, seven marches distant, did not tend to raise his drooping spirits. On the 25th, he writes:

Marched to Barota, ten miles. The road covered with troops, guns, gun-carriages, ammunition and treasure. It required patience in man and horse to wend their way between these hackeries and implements of war. When will man cease to destroy his fellow-man? Passed a miserable day in thinking of times gone by, and those I dearly love.

Nott, with his habitual punctuality, reached the encampment at Kurnaul one day earlier than had been appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. His arrival was hailed with real pleasure by all the officers who had ever served under, or with him, or who knew anything by report of his high military character. He

\* "Ghaut," landing-place on the river's bank.

was also cordially welcomed by Sir Willoughby Cotton, the Major-General commanding the division, and the Brigadiers and Staff.

With his accustomed energy, he at once addressed himself to the organization of his brigade, and we find him writing thus to his son and daughters with whom he thenceforth kept up a constant communication, freely opening his mind to them upon all points, secure in their affection and caution.

I have three fine regiments, but two of them most wretchedly commanded, which is really distressing, as finer corps I have not seen in the Bengal army. I have become a member of the 43rd mess.

I fear, my dear children, that my disposition and temper are greatly changed, as I this morning, on parade, closed my brigade and addressed the corps, telling them that I never saw finer regiments, that I was delighted with them, but that at the same time, I assured them that I had never seen corps so badly managed. I then gave the commanders what I would call an awful reprimand. Don't mistake me; I did this in gentlemanly, though severe language. You may rest assured that no annoyance, nor the sorrow and misery I suffer, shall ever allow me to make use of a single word to lower your father as an officer and a gentleman; but going on such a service, officers must and shall know their duty, or I will not hesitate to bring them to the notice of General Fane.

The business which had devolved on Nott was evidently great, and he devoted himself to it conscientiously and assiduously, but his mind continually

reverted to the domestic loss he had so recently endured, and which had tended so much to diminish his interest in the pending campaign.

I every moment expect my Brigade-Major with a thousand papers. Two days ago I got a very kind note from Captain Graham, in answer to mine from Delhi. I am sure he will be very kind to you. Yesterday evening I received your dear letters from Muttra, also a letter from E—, and one from Buttenshaw; these letters unfitted me for Cotton's dinner, but I was obliged to go, with a bursting heart and a lying face. Should you not get letters from me, don't be alarmed; I will write regularly, but letters may miscarry. The 38th, it is said, has been ordered to Kurnaul. I have written to General Fast about a monument over your dear mother; I have not an answer yet. God bless you, my dear girls! I will take all the care I can of myself for your sakes; otherwise, all would be blank to me. I would turn back to-morrow if I could. I once anticipated pleasure from this expedition—now all is exquisite misery.

Three days after the date of this letter an overland mail arrived from India, and Nott found himself entered in the Army List as a Major-General.

With the bearing of the Queen's officers in camp, who exercised command equal or superior to that which devolved upon Nott, he did not seem to be very favourably impressed. He abhorred vulgarity and pomposity, and had a wonderfully quick perception of professional incompetency. The coarse language and ribaldry of one, the affectation of another, the flippancy

and official insolence of a third, were too much for his straightforwardness and gentlemanlike feelings. It galled him that the members of his own service, of whose worthiness he entertained a high opinion, should be shelved by the partialities of the principal authority, and he more than once summed up his vexations and his judgment in such curt phrases as these :

The truth is, he is a Queen's officer, and I am a Company's. I am decidedly of opinion that a Queen's officer, be he ever so talented, is totally unfit to command the Company's Army.

Nevertheless Nott was alive to kindness, and could render justice to good and friendly intentions. Nothing but the deep depression under which he laboured at this period could have made him feel so sad during the hospitalities of the Buffs—a corps renowned not only for its distinguished services in the Peninsula of Europe, and its gallant bearing in the Gwalior campaign, in 1843, but also celebrated for its excellent mess. He writes :

Think, my children, under my present feelings, how much annoyed I must have been, at being obliged to dine with the Buffs last night ; yet I could not evade it. Brigadier Dennis and another officer waited upon me with an invitation. When about to take my seat, I found a lady in the next chair, Mrs. D—— of the Buffs, whom you, Letitia, must recollect as a Miss C—— ; she goes as far as Ferozepore, and so do two or three others, and then return. I think

there were at dinner some sixty or seventy persons. As soon as dinner was over, the Commander of the Buffs rose, and said there would be only one toast proposed during the evening, that of Major-General Nott. As I am become perfectly indifferent to everything good as well as bad, and really had no feeling on the occasion, as soon as the noise had ceased, I got up and returned thanks, and having, as I said, no feelings, I believe I never acquitted myself so well before. Under the plea of a severe cold, I retired at nine o'clock, glad to get away. I know not whether all mankind are alike, but really the people in this camp kill me with kind attentions ; did they but know how this oppresses me, the same kindness would induce them to desist, and leave me to my misery, which constitutes, I would say, my happiness.

The Major-General conducted the brigade under his command as far as Moodkee—a village since become celebrated as the scene of the first battle fought with the Sikhs after their unwarrantable invasion of the British possessions in 1845—without a single casualty. Under the excitement of the march, and the new cares which it produced, his spirits began to improve ; but a circumstance now occurred which cast a temporary damp upon himself and the troops at large. The Government announced that the Shah of Persia, yielding to the demands of the British Government, had raised the siege of Herat, and retired to his own dominions. It is true that the announcement was accompanied by a declaration of the Governor-General's intention to "prosecute with vigour" the measures that

had been commenced with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern provinces of Affghanistan, and the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon the north-west frontier; still, the grand basis of the zeal by which the army had, up to this time, been animated, was removed. The very idea of encountering and driving back a large force, instigated and led by Russian emissaries and officers, had cast a lustre around the expedition; this was now dissipated, and no fairer prospect presented itself than that of a long march through an uninteresting country, and the final occupation of a comparative desert. Nott's feelings and conjectures may be gathered from the following portions of a letter written at intervals during the march, and after the arrival of the brigade at Ferozepore.

Nov. 25, 1838.

I shall march my column into Ferozepore the day after to-morrow. We have a thousand reports in camp, but it would be useless my repeating them to you, and my time is so fully employed that I have no time to spare. I have been very lucky in bringing this large column thus far without a single casualty, either European or native, since we left Kurnaul, and without a complaint. Men and officers are in high spirits. I understand this has not been the case with the first brigade, and that disputes between Brigadier Sale and commanders of corps have been so high as to cause references to superior authority. It is now, I believe, certain that the Commander-in-Chief goes home immediately, and that only *part* of the force is to go to Caubul. I hear that great

intriguing and manœuvring, and disputes between the Government and Commander-in-Chief are going on, as to what officers and what corps are to go, and who to remain behind. As I have not a particle of interest, I suppose I shall be thrown overboard as mere lumber. Well, perhaps they will do right, and I care not. I hear that General T—— has been ordered up by dawk; he is senior to Duncan. The Commander-in-Chief is fighting to give his friend S—— a higher command, at least this is the report.

I like the Buffs, both officers and men, very much. I was six hours on horseback yesterday. I have had so many people in my tent, that it is too late to write more, or send my letter to-day.

26th.

Brigadier Dennis has just called at my tent, and is very much annoyed at a report of to-day, which says that his brigade is to be left behind. I also am sorry, for a finer corps than the Buffs *are now* I have not seen.

30th, Ferozepore.

You will see I wrote the above with the intention of sending it to Allahabad or Benares, but I have had so much to do that I could not; however, I will still send it, for I have no time to commence another letter, nor, at present, detail to you all the folly I have witnessed among men in high places. I called on the Commander-in-Chief the day I entered Ferozepore (27th). He received me in the kindest manner possible, and at once said: "Nott, you shall go on with your brigade." I made no answer to this, but changed the conversation. I did not thank him; perhaps he expected that I would have done so. When I got up to go away, he said: "Well, Nott, will you come and dine

with me to-day?" I said "Yes," and went. There were eight or ten others at dinner, and Sir Henry Fane made himself very pleasant.

I have just been called upon to name some officer as my aide-de-camp, and strange you will think it when I have named a man I never saw or heard of until I reached Kurnaul—Ensign Hammersley of the 41st Regiment, N.I., doing duty with the 31st Regiment. I have acted in the way you have heard me say I would upon such occasions, and I hope Government will confirm it. Mr. Hammersley was certainly surprised when I called him into my tent and offered it to him. Polwhele tells me that every man in camp wanted to get it, but I sent for Hammersley the moment I got the order. All the Brigadiers for Caubul are to have aides-de-camp.

The selection of Mr. Hammersley was another proof of the quick discernment of General Nott. The Ensign was an admirable horseman, one of the best steeple-chasers in India; a lively, animated, intelligent fellow, blessed with an excellent temper and much attached to his profession. He also had the advantage of being a very fair linguist.

One of the objects of the assembly of the force at Ferozepore was to enable the Governor-General to hold a state interview with Runjeet Singh, the ruler of the Punjab. A double purpose had to be achieved at this meeting. The old Lion of the Punjab was to be at once assured and conciliated. He was not without his fears, that with a British army to the west, and another upon the east of his possessions, his own

territory would ultimately be jeopardized; nor was he at all convinced that the passage of a part of the army through the Punjab would not be attended with offences prejudicial to the interests of his own subjects, and alien to their religious feelings. Some idea may also have crossed his mind that the example of moderation and order which invariably distinguish the movements of disciplined soldiers would force upon the minds of the Sikhs comparisons unfavourable to the irregular hordes which composed the army of Lahore. Diplomacy, however, modified the apprehensions of Runjeet Singh; and as he had been no inattentive observer of the general good faith of the British Government, and the fate of all States in India which had ran counter to its supreme will, he yielded, with a good grace, to all that was exacted of him, and accepted and reciprocated the splendid entertainments and presents, provided for the occasion. A review of the Army of the Indus, 15,000 strong, was held on the left bank of the Sutlej, and a similar one of Runjeet's army on the opposite bank. Nott did not seem to be very much enchanted with the skill displayed by the officers in handling their brigades and divisions.

"The whole army," writes he, "was manœuvred by General Fane this morning. Oh, how I wished, spite of my misery, to have done in half an hour what they all bungled at from six to ten o'clock."

Sir Henry Fane was a cavalry officer, and had served

with much distinction at the early period of the Peninsular war. Numerous passages in Nott's correspondence show how fully he participated in the general judgment of Fane's soldier-like qualities. One extract from a letter to his daughters, dated 31st of January, 1839, will show the tenour of his opinion. He says: "I am in hopes that Sir Henry Fane will assume the command of the army immediately that letters can be received from the Supreme Government. He is a fine soldier, and I always feel pleasure in being near him." As a cavalry officer, it may be that his experience in handling large bodies of infantry had been limited, but it is pretty clear that the chief point of the above remarks was intended to apply to others.

Soon after the arrival of the troops at Ferozepore, the suspense in which they had been held, as to what portion was to go forward, was terminated. The novel procedure of drawing lots was resorted to as the fairest method of obviating jealousy and discontent. It happily, for the interests of the service, fell to the lot of Nott's brigade to form part of the Army of the Indus.

But the Major-General was not destined to endure a restriction of his talent for command to the conduct of a brigade, although even that honour had never previously befallen him. Sir Henry Fane, believing that his services at the head of the force could now be dispensed with, applied to the Government for permission to return to England, and to resign his post; and as his health was rapidly waning, no objection was offered to a com-

pliance with his desire. Nott much regretted the loss of such a fine officer as the leader of the Army of the Indus. It had been previously arranged that a considerable force should ascend the Indus from Bombay, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, and form a junction with the Bengal detachment at Shikarpore, on the Indus, not many miles below the confluence of the streams which form the Punjab. Until the union of the armies of the two Presidencies, therefore, the command of the Bengal troops devolved upon Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, and that of the first division (temporarily) upon Major-General Nott. The next day, Nott communicated to his daughters the fact of his advancement in the subjoined characteristic passage:

I know not how long I am to keep my present command, or how they came to give it to me, when they could easily have placed their favourites, or men of interest, in command; however, one thing all must know, I did not intrigue for it, and it is equally certain that I never in any way, directly or indirectly, asked for it; nor have I said "Thank you," to any one for it. My keeping it even a month or two will be desirable. But, dear, dear children, my promotion has come too late; had it been otherwise, I perhaps might have felt gratified, but now I have no one to whom to impart it, and you know, *she* had a high and fine spirit. I have no wish for anything but retirement, which never can be mine. Take the greatest care of your dear mother's ring, and of her hair. In my letter from Ferozepore, I sent you a sketch of the building now erecting over her dear

remains, and I have to beg that you will get Charles to write an inscription containing her age, date of death, &c., and you can send it with a note to Major-General Fast at Delhi, who has been kind enough to superintend the building. Do not forget this, as I should like to hear from Fast that all has been done before anything can happen to me.

I now command nine regiments of infantry—two European and seven native—the camel battery, &c., and I have enough to do. Believe me, I would rather hide my grey head in some small clay-built cottage, did not others depend upon me. If it were not so, I would leave the army to-morrow, even if that army were in face of the enemy. I have lived long enough to despise the opinion of the world. Direct your letters to “Major-General W. Nott, commanding 1st Division of the Army of the Indus.” My dear wife left me before I got this, and now it is too late. Colonel D—— of the Queen’s 13th, has just called; he is to command my brigade as long as I command the 1st Division. I do not like him.

The movement of the Bengal column commenced on the 12th of December. The total strength, in fighting men, has been computed at nearly 10,000, and as each man in an Indian force requires four persons to wait upon him in some form or other, there were not, including the camel-drivers, less than 40,000 camp-followers and 30,000 camels. The movements and establishments of the Persians under Xerxes and Darius Codomanus were here repeated upon at least the same scale. The officers regarded the expedition as little else than an extensive pleasure promenade—an

enormous pic-nic. Justly estimating the unproductive character of the countries through which they were to pass, and preferring an accumulation of the ordinary comforts and luxuries of life to a timely Spartan self-denial that would fit them for any emergency, they had encumbered themselves with baggage, and laid out a great deal of money on the purchase of beasts of burthen.

The writer of these lines, who spent some time with the force when encamped at Kurnaul and Ferozepore, conceived that he would be gratifying some of his friends by the offer of a few boxes of cigars. He was, however, assured that the gift would scarcely be valued, “for,” said one of the officers, “our mess has two camel-loads of the best Manillas!” Sir Charles Napier’s valuable lesson on the subject of baggage had not then been read to the Indian army. Sir Henry Fane’s injunction, in the Circular to commanding officers, that the troops should be able to “move disencumbered of every article of baggage which could, *without compromising the efficiency of the corps*, be dispensed with,” had been read as a mere matter of form, and every advantage taken of the qualifying or conditional phrase. Jams, pickles, cheroots, potted fish, hermetically-sealed meats, plate, glass, crockery, wax-candles, table-linen, &c., were all deemed indispensable to the “efficiency of a corps.” Many young officers would as soon have thought of leaving behind them their swords and double-barrelled pistols as march without their dressing-cases, their perfumes, Windsor soap, and eau-de-Cologne. If

Juvenal had lived till this time, he would have found that this "speculum sarcina belli," instead of being thought a subject of satire, was considered an indispensable requisite. The present party little dreamt how soon, by the death of their camels, such commodities were destined to adorn the toilettes of Beloochees and Brahoos.

On the march, the division kept generally within a mile of the Sutlej. Little appears to have occurred to have diversified its progress. It was seldom that less than ten miles or more than thirteen were accomplished in the course of a morning, over a level country, with tolerably good roads, occasionally of a sandy character, which added much to the toil of the troops. Nott's journal describes the nature of the country and each halting-place; and from this we gather that the whole was an alternation of desert and gardens.

At Khairpore and Bhawulpore the Bengal column found the Khans at first a little indisposed to assist their advance in any way, either by contributing money or carriage (camels) or supplies. Sir Henry Fane, however, who was proceeding to Bombay in boats down the Sutlej, and had contrived to keep abreast of the army, had interviews with the Khans, and speedily brought them to reason. From the people of the country no molestation was experienced; on the contrary, they readily came into camp and sold their wares, apparently rather astonished at the honesty and punctuality of the advancing army, seeing that the

same notions of *meum* and *tuum* had not been in fashion among the other soldiery, with whom they had come in contact.

The letters of General Nott from the date of the departure of the army to its arrival at Roree presented no salient point of interest, for the best of all possible reasons, that nothing occurred to excite his curiosity or eliminate his criticism. Besides, the duties which devolved upon him after the division had reached its halting-ground, and breakfast had been prepared and eaten, left him little time for epistolary communication. The only *public* letter we find him writing was on the 16th of December (Sunday), the first halting day after the departure of the force from Ferozepore. He appears to have seized that occasion for intimating to Sir Willoughby Cotton, and General Lumley, the Adjutant-General of the Bengal army, the existence of some unreasonable expectations on the part of the sepoy, in regard to extra allowances on crossing the frontier. The sepoy had no firmer friend than Major-General Nott; but that would have been but a valueless friendship which consisted only in an indulgence of extravagant wishes, and the toleration of even the slightest symptoms of insubordination. Of the rights of the sepoy the General had ever been the earnest champion; of his indiscipline the most unrelenting foe. He knew what was due to the poor fellows who took service, and, abandoning home and kindred, were prepared to devote their lives to the interests of the British Government;

he knew the wants of the soldier on a campaign, and the wants of his family in the provinces; he also knew that it would be impossible to maintain due order and subordination if a timely check were not opposed to irrational demands. It was this anxiety to reconcile the claims of justice with the ends of discipline that dictated the subjoined communications.

Camp Mohunkee, Dec. 13, 1838.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Although my information on the subject of this note is not such as would warrant my noticing it in an official shape, yet I think it is desirable that I should intimate to you what has come to my knowledge. It appears that there has been a feeling among the sepoys, and some few men in different corps have given expression to this feeling to their officers, that as they formerly received extra allowances on passing the eastern frontier during the Burmese war, they hope that Government will grant a similar indulgence on the occasion of the march on the Indus, or on crossing that river. Major McLaren having stated to me that this feeling prevailed among a few of the men of his regiment, I immediately wrote to him, and requested that in the event of any native officer or sepoy giving expression to such sentiments, the officer commanding the company to which such men belonged, should fully point out and explain the impropriety and unreasonableness of such expectation; that every care had been taken to insure their comforts; that they have met with no difficulties or hardships; that no sickness had been experienced; that the allowance made to the troops on crossing the eastern frontier was granted under very different circumstances, and

under great hardship, privation, and sufferings from a bad climate; that their situation had since been greatly improved by increase of pay, &c., for length of service; finally, that if they supposed that any unreasonable expectations, emanating from bad men among them, would be granted by Government, they would find themselves most woefully mistaken.

These I believe are the terms of my hurried note of the 11th instant to Major McLaren.

\* \* \* \* \*

I ought to mention, that from all I can learn, this feeling originated in the 35th Regiment, but I have nothing like proof that it did so. The same feeling I have reason to believe prevailed in the 2nd Brigade, but the measure I took, without my personal interference with the men, has, I trust, put a stop to any improper conduct which might possibly have been contemplated by some few bad characters. I have now stated all that has come to my knowledge on the subject, and I leave it to your better judgment whether these expressed expectations of some of the men ought to be officially stated to the Government or not; if you are of opinion that they should, to save time, I beg that this statement may be taken as strictly official.

I will not close this letter without freely stating my opinion: If it should be the intention of Government to grant any little indulgence to the Bengal sepoy, in the event of this army crossing the Indus, or from the day on which the troops may actually encamp on the right bank of that river, the sooner it is published to the army the better. But if the Government should determine that these expectations are unreasonable and altogether inadmissible, officers in command should receive full and positive instructions to put a stop to such feelings and expectations, wherever and

whenever they may appear, and that too with a high and decisive hand.

To General Lumley.

This letter had its due effect. The Government decided to grant the Batta from the day the army should encamp on the right bank of the Indus. It was not, however, given to the Europeans, "Because," says Nott, in a letter written in March, 1840, fourteen months subsequently, "they had not mutinied." He adds: "Sir Willoughby Cotton does not to this moment know that I wrote to Government, and settled this awkward affair, in which every native regiment in the army was concerned, and pledged to each other. When we were at Bukkur I went to Sir Willoughby Cotton's tent, when his Adjutant-General, Craigie, came up to me and said, 'General, don't you think it was very generous in Government to give the men extra Batta, *without the least application?*' I did not undeceive him."

To the corresponding letter, addressed to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who was ahead of the division, the following reply was sent, signed by the Deputy Adjutant-General.

(Confidential.)

Deputy Adjutant-General's Office,  
Army of the Indus,  
Head-Quarters, Camp Tawukul, Dec. 16, 1838.

SIR,

I have the honour, by direction of Major-General Sir W. Cotton, K.C.B. and K.C.H., to acknowledge the receipt

of the letter you did him the favour to address to him, on the 14th instant; and with reference to the observation it contains of there being an impression abroad amongst the native troops, that their pay ought to be increased on quitting the British frontier, to inform you that your letter contained the first intimation which had reached him (the Major-General), of any such expectations having been entertained by the men.

The Major-General relies confidently on your exercising a wholesome discretion in your instructions to officers at the head of corps to discourage any such unreasonable expectations on the part of their men, and to exert themselves to the utmost to secure their comfort.

Whilst on this subject the Major-General has required me to state to you, that a report was brought to head-quarters yesterday by a young officer (Lieutenant Roche, aide-de-camp to Major-General Thackwell), of some unpleasant feeling having manifested itself in the 43rd Regiment, N.I., the men having, it is alleged, refused to strike their tents, in consequence of grain having been sold to them at only 8 seers per rupee.

This rumour, the Major-General places no reliance on, as you make no mention of it in your demi-official of the 14th —; but as there is an inexperienced Commissariat officer with your column, it is barely possible that through some misapprehension on his part, grain might have been issued to the troops at a higher rate than the regulations prescribe.

The Major-General feels assured that you will hold commanding officers strictly responsible that their men on every occasion receive from the Commissariat whatever they may be entitled to, and that any failure on the part of the Department of Supply is immediately reported for your

consideration and orders, and if need be, for eventual submission to head-quarters.

In conclusion, I have been instructed to invite you to communicate direct with the Major-General, and in the most unreserved manner, on all occasions in which it may appear to you necessary for the good of the service, that he should be in possession of the particulars of any case.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. M. CRAIGIE,

Major, D.A.G.

To Major-General Nott,

Commanding 1st Division, Army of the Indus.

The circumstance of the Commissariat officers having retailed supplies to the men at a much higher rate than the original cost of the grain, attracted the particular notice of the General; and we accordingly find him, four weeks later, addressing a formal remonstrance.

Camp Oobarah, Jan. 18, 1839.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have received the orders conveyed in the Deputy Adjutant-General's letter, No. 149, of the 16th instant, relative to the manner of issuing out supplies to the troops, and I think that the issuing of the different articles by the Commissariat officers to the Chowdries of corps on indent, is the best and only proper mode. But I think it necessary to acquaint you that much discontent exists as to the price charged the men: that is, the Commissariat at each village takes possession of all available supplies at the market-price of the day, and issues the same to the men at a considerably advanced rate. As the sepoy is perfectly aware of this, discontent is the natural consequence. But perhaps I shall

be better understood by stating, that at Surwal the Commissariat officer purchased attah at 24 seers the rupee in the camp, and offered to retail it to the sepoy at only 17 seers, so that the sepoy absolutely saw the public officer buying at the above-mentioned rate, and immediately selling it to him at 17 seers. Whether such a system as this could ever have been intended by Government, perhaps, I am not a proper judge; but I feel certain, that it cannot fail to engender serious discontent. For two days previous to the before-mentioned period, attah was purchased by the Commissariat officer at 21 seers the rupee, and he immediately and on the same ground sold it to the sepoy at 17 seers the rupee, although the men were perfectly aware that the sepoy of the 1st Brigade received their attah on the same ground on the previous day at 21 seers.

At Surwal, fire-wood was sold by the people in charge of the supplies, at 10 maunds for the rupee; the following march to Subzul Kote was only 6 miles, where there was great abundance of wood. But the Commissariat took possession of the whole, and sold it to the men at only 3 maunds and 5 seers; nor did the officers or men get this until one o'clock p.m., although I am certain, that had they been allowed to purchase it direct, the owners would instantly and gladly have sold it at 8 or 10 maunds. It is impossible to keep the men ignorant of these and similar facts, and I have therefore thought it proper to bring it under your observation.

I am, my dear General,

Yours,

W. NOTT.

To Gen. Sir W. Cotton, K.C.B. and K.C.H.

As the army approached the territories of the Khan of Bhawalpore, a number of Affghans came into the

camp, bringing camel loads of fruit from Caubul. General Nott admired the appearance and bearing of these men; their frankness was akin to his own soldier-like feelings, and he encouraged them to converse freely with him. In one of his letters to his "children," he records a conversation with an Affghan.

Several natives of Caubul came into our camp yesterday morning, some of them very fine-looking fellows indeed; they pretend to look upon our sepoys with the greatest contempt, but I imagine they forget the advantage of our discipline. I like them very much, and I wanted to take two or three of them into my service, but I could not succeed. One man, whom I met yesterday, was the finest-looking fellow I have ever seen, quite the gentleman. He spoke Hindostance very well; he said that he left Caubul two months ago, that he had come by the Mooltan road. He asked me, why we were marching into his country. I told him merely for the purpose of putting his rightful King upon his throne. He said: "We prefer Dost Mahomed." I said, "He has no right to the throne." I shall not forget the fine expression of his large black eyes: stepping up to me, and placing his hand on my shoulder, he said, in a bold, yet respectful tone: "What right have you to Benares and Delhi? Why, the same right that *our* Dost Mahomed has to Caubul, and he will keep it." From the manner and appearance of this individual, I strongly suspect he has come down for the purpose of viewing our columns as they pass this place, and that he will then return with his information by the nearer route of Mooltan. I think I have never seen a finer man in any country.

The sympathies of the General were not with Shah

Soojah, the puppet of the Indian Government. The supercilious demeanour and the frivolity of the Shah disgusted him, presenting, as it did, a powerful contrast to the manly behaviour of the Affghans. Referring to the reports which continually came into camp regarding the state of feeling in Afghanistan, he says: "I differ from the Government and from others, and I really believe that the people of Afghanistan will not give up their country without fighting for it, and *I know I would not were I in their situation.*" And again: "Lord Auckland cannot possibly back out of this undertaking, and I think the Khan of Herat will oppose that vain man, Shah Soojah, *to the very death*; I would, were I in *his* place."

At Roree, on the Indus, intelligence arrived that Sir John Keane and the Bombay division had been arrested in their progress up the river by the Ameers of Scinde, who had collected their forces at Hyderabad, the capital of Scinde, and assumed an attitude of hostility. Upon this, Sir Willoughby Cotton, with a portion of the Bengal troops, moved down to assist Keane. Nott's division formed a part of the force. The officers and men, who looked to plunder rather than glory, were glad of this temporary diversion, although it was attended with some inconvenience. Hyderabad was known to contain a vast amount of wealth in bullion and jewels, which would have fallen to the captors.\*

\* It was the fortune of Major-General Sir Charles Napier and a portion of the Bombay army to achieve the conquest of Scinde four years

Nott calculated that his own share of the expected prize would be two or three lacs of rupees. The Bengal division had not however proceeded above three or four marches to relieve Sir John Keane, when information was received that no reinforcement was required. The Ameers had been coerced into a treaty which bound them to admit the passage of troops through Scinde, to pay twenty-eight lacs of rupees towards the expenses of the expedition, and to allow of contingents officered by the British being formed and stationed at Hyderabad, Kurrachee, &c. On this, Sir Willoughby Cotton's force retraced its steps, and joined the detachment which had been halted at Roree,\* while Sir John Keane and his force moved upwards towards Shikarpore. In the meantime, Sir Alexander Burnes (for to this position had the previous exertions of the gallant Captain raised him) had effected an arrange-

subsequent to this period. The estimate of the wealth of Hyderabad had not been exaggerated in the least.

\* *Camp Noogath, Feb. 7, 1839.*—I had given out my orders last evening for the column to march this morning at four o'clock. I went to bed at nine last night, and was roused out of my sleep by an express, bringing a note from Sir Henry Fane, who is ten miles ahead of me, saying that the Ameers had come to terms, and directing me to halt the 1st and 2nd Brigades where we now are, until further orders. Thus I have lost two or three lacs of rupees by the timely wisdom of these violent Ameers. However, I have also lost the grilling I should have had in this horrible climate. I suppose we shall now retrace our steps to Bukkur, pass the bridge of boats which we have thrown over the noble Indus; and then, hurrah for the Bolan Pass and Afghanistan—for poverty, a fine climate and a gallant race of people!—*General Nott to his son, Charles Nott, Esq., Calcutta.*

ment with the Khan of Khyrpore for the complete cession to the British of the island and fort of Bukkur, which, standing in the middle of the Indus, not far from the confluence of the streams which bound and run through the Punjaub, gives the complete command of the whole of the great river and its tributaries above Shikarpore. This cession enabled our engineers to throw a bridge of boats across the Indus for the passage of the army to Shikarpore—a passage which was effected in the most orderly manner, Nott marching at the head of his division. One of the General's letters to his favourite correspondents at this time, lets us into the state of his mind touching himself and his prospects, the chance of success attending the expedition, the incompetency of the officers above him, the state of the country, and his wishes in respect to his son Robert, a youth.

I wish I could get Robert a cadetship, but the Court of Directors have made these appointments quite a family affair, and I shall probably go down to my grave without seeing one of my children in that army in which I have passed a long life. Little do those about me know the deep misery I am in; surrounded by all this warlike pomp, they think me fortunate, while I sometimes wish to step quietly out of this world and all its disappointments. Man without anything to hope for must be exquisitely miserable. I arise in the morning, and go through the duties of the day mechanically; at night I go to my couch without feeling the least pleasure, interest, or satisfaction of what that day has

brought forth. We shall see what the leaden messengers and keen swords of the gallant Affghans will do; or peradventure that black and ominous eagle, which has so long been perched upon the rocks overhanging the Caspian Sea, looking around with keen eye, and in imagination devouring the rich provinces of Asia, may at last take a daring flight towards the Indus, and at once settle all our worldly affairs. Yet, if our Indian Empire could again call into being a *Wellesley* or a *Hastings*, nothing but honour to Old England could result from such a bloody contact; but these are our dwarfish days, and the Russian *Bear* will not meet with a single *Giant* to hurl him back to his native snows.

We are thus far on our way back to Bukkur. The infantry of the army will commence passing over the noble Indus to-morrow morning; the cavalry, &c., will follow. Your father will be one of the first to cross this renowned stream; and, perhaps, the first European who ever passed it at the head of a body of disciplined soldiers. There was a time when the very idea of my ambitious dream being thus realized, would have caused my heart to beat with the wildest joy; but now, I am quite indifferent, or rather I wish myself in some clay-built cottage, far from the haunts of man: truly, I had better not be here, for this indifference makes me bluntly smile at the professional ignorance of my *superiors*. They cannot, in spite of their vanity, help seeing this, and depend upon it they will take an opportunity, *as far as they dare*, to repay it with all due interest! but as I am by no means anxious or ambitious of the praise or approbation of such men, so on the other hand, I shall be but little concerned at all they can do; yet if I had any vanity left I might, indeed, feel vain at the kind attention I daily receive from the officers of my division.

Camp Sukkur, Right Bank of the Indus,  
Feb. 14, 1839.

Here am I, after much excitement in passing the Indus this morning. The 2nd Brigade and camel battery passed the noble bridge of boats, thrown across the river by Captain Thomson and his brother engineers, without the least difficulty. We passed through the town of Sukkur to our encamping ground, and never shall I forget it; such filth I never witnessed! Dead animals, in a state of putrefaction, meeting the eye every moment, and throwing forth such a dreadful stench that it really almost overpowered me, and I am still sick from the effects of it. This continued for a full mile—and yet, human beings eat and live amidst such a scene as this!

The natives of Scinde are a fine, robust-looking race, but they are extremely dirty in their dress. I should think that they never wash their garments; perhaps this may be accounted for from the clouds of dust in which they continue to be enveloped from their childhood until they drop into their graves; you can have no idea of it, it penetrates everything. I have already given up calling my servants every two or three minutes to brush the dust from my table and my writing-desk. I believe the natives, finding they cannot possibly keep a dress clean above an hour, think it, therefore, useless to change or wash their garments, and never take them off until they become rotten and too old to wear. The infantry halt here to-morrow, and the following day move on to Shikarpore, which is two long marches from this. We halt there until the cavalry come up; how much longer, circumstances must decide. I would, if I commanded, push through the Bolan Pass at once; in military affairs a moment should never be lost, an opportunity never thrown

away. At this moment we could go through the Pass and enter Candahar as friends; but who knows what a month's delay may bring about among a high-spirited but fickle people, perhaps rendering it necessary for us to fight for every inch of the Pass, which I opine would be found no joke. A Queen's officer should never command in India; whatever his talents may be, he is for a thousand reasons unfit; he is moreover always a mere bird of passage, and a rich place, like Hyderabad, would often tempt him to forget his duty to the State. Sir John Keane's appointment was from the first a dirty job, and has paralyzed and nearly given a death blow to an enterprize which ought to shed a lustre over our councils, and the moral effect of which ought to be felt by the whole world. I hope the difference of atmosphere on this side of the Indus will tend to clear the faculties of our great men. I am writing to you with the paper placed upon my knees; and as I have much to do, and am very tired, I must close my scrawl.

For Robert he desired a cadetship; it was natural to wish that at least one son should be a member of the service in which he himself had risen to distinguished rank. These appointments are entirely in the gift of individual members of the East India Direction. Attempts have more than once been made to cause a portion of the patronage in this respect to be set aside for the sons of Company's officers, so that the claims of merit might be independent of the personal feelings of Directors. These attempts have been defeated; the personal patronage—the only real inducement to a man to struggle for a seat in the Direction—has been

found to be insufficient to answer the demands of friendship, of relationship, of assistance in various forms, not excluding the Proprietary votes by which the Director achieves his position. Any abatement of this patronage has, therefore, been stoutly resisted; and the resistance has received some colour and countenance from the fact of very many of the sons of old officers having been granted cadetships by the Directors individually. General Nott lived to see his wishes gratified in respect to his boy, without a departure from the "family affair" to which he refers.

After the passage of the army across the Indus, Sir Henry Fane took his leave. In his parting order, he gave expression to his admiration of the conduct of the troops on the march from Ferozepore. He regarded it as an example to soldiers on all other occasions. The excellent discipline and good behaviour of the troops had conciliated the inhabitants of the country wherever they had passed, and Sir Henry was glad to be able to point at the consequences.

"These have been," ran the order, dated Camp Bukkur, 16th of February, 1839, "not alone the exaltation of their fame and character as soldiers, but the circumstances have greatly conduced to their advantage, because the confidence of the inhabitants, which such good conduct has produced, has led to their freely resorting to our camp with the produce of their villages, by which means we have been free from all want of provisions."

During the halt of the Bengal column at Shikarpore, the troops were a good deal harassed with reviews and parades, for the especial gratification of Shah Soojah, who had hitherto been in the van with his newly-raised contingent, commanded by Colonel Simpson. All this needless display offended Nott, who never liked that soldiers should be exposed to unnecessary toil. His own time, off duty, was passed in rambling through the streets and bazaars of the city. The novelty of the scene amused him—the people, their manners and costumes, their dwellings—all were new to one who had never been out of India, and whose quickness and originality discovered a charm in all that was natural and true.

About this time (end of February, 1839) provisions began to get scarce in camp. There was “not a drop of beer with the army;” for besides that the mess tables, on the march, presented scenes of conviviality common to life in garrison and cantonment, camels had dropped on the road, and their loads, often consisting of provisions, were necessarily left a prey to marauders and followers who hung about the line of march. The loss of the beer was nothing to Nott: “This does not affect me,” he wrote to his daughters; “but the wine is nearly out, and the Bombay merchants have not yet arrived. *I can drink water*, but it is sometimes very muddy; however, I have a few bottles of Madeira left.” We find him saying on another occasion: “The servant has just brought my tiffin,

viz.: a piece of black bread and a glass of bad water, and this is my constant tiffin—that is, if I take any. I breakfast at the mess, where things begin to grow scarce; but most of us appear to be cheerful and healthy, and I have no doubt we shall give a good account of any enemy who may oppose us, *unless it be the fault of our Generals*. I am sure the troops will do their duty.”

In all his letters and journals on this long and tedious march, Nott is critical upon the bad generalship shown, as it was, at least, interpreted to his perception. Every now and then, expresses would come in from the front, directing an advance. Then, when he had issued his orders for the general move, another would arrive to countermand it, because it was discovered that there was not enough water at certain contiguous stages. The General chafed at the inconvenience all this occasioned, and particularly at the ill impression it created regarding the fitness of the Commander of the Bengal column; but the fact was, the country was very little known to the officers of the Quartermaster-General's department. The reports of travellers and natives, who could form no conception of the wants of a large army, had formed the basis of the routes delivered to the force, and it was not until the army had moved towards the Bolan Pass, and had got fairly into the jungle, that the deficiencies of the country became accurately known. This was rather the misfortune than the fault of Sir Willoughby Cotton.

But Nott could not acquit him of the error of sending the cavalry in advance. He looked upon it as against all military rule in an intersected country like Upper Scinde.\*

The annals of the British campaigns in India, or indeed in any other part of the world, do not furnish a parallel to the miseries and losses experienced by the unopposed "Army of the Indus." The marches from Shikarpore to Dadur, at the foot of the Bolan Pass, lay through extensive sandy deserts and dry jungles; the water was everywhere extremely scarce, and such as was obtained was muddy, brackish, stagnant, poisonous; forage was obtained with great difficulty; the camels died by fifties and hundreds; the Beloochee mountaineers plundered at every opportunity, assassinating stragglers and bearing off their burthens; the sun was powerful, the glare distressing; communication with the rear was seriously interrupted, for the marauding propensities of the Scinde robbers extended to the dawks (the letter carriers), and not one letter in a dozen ever reached its destination. One extract of a letter from the General before the column had got

\* Had Sir W. Cotton sent forward his infantry through this jungly and intersected country, and allowed his cavalry to have followed in bodies suitable to the quantity of water at the *two* next stages, this delay would not have occurred, and our speedy appearance at the Bolan Pass would have had a good moral effect throughout Afghanistan. Besides, there are certain rules in the trade of war, which no military man should ever deviate from, whether he has an enemy in front or not.—*Camp Sagon, Feb. 28, 1839.*

through the Pass gives some idea of the troubles incidental to the ill-managed move.

The 4th Brigade alone has lost during the last four days 244 camels by death—namely, starved. My horses have not had a blade of grass or any forage for four days. I write as I stand, and the top of a *Doolie*\* is my desk. The Bolan Pass, as far as we have come, is the dry bed of a river, or a ravine winding between high mountains; the road covered with loose round stones, a mountain stream running through it. We had to ford this river thirteen times on our march the day before yesterday, eighteen times during our yesterday's march; some places so deep, that a tall horse could scarcely keep his legs. One officer's horse was drowned, but not the rider. Yesterday, about four miles before we reached our encamping ground, a mountain appeared in our front, covered with snow, and the wind, blowing over it right in our faces, rendered it delightful after the great heat which we had recently experienced. This morning I contrived to erect my little hill tent, by tying the ropes to large stones, as not a tent-pin could be used. From my breakfast-table I had a view of a snowy mountain in my front, and on the left of my tent a clear mountain stream running over its pebbly bed; on my right, fifteen or twenty officers had placed their trunks together, and were merrily taking their breakfast in the sun, jovial in spite of the loss of baggage, &c.; but then again all is bleak and stony, not a blade of grass, not a tree to be seen.

A few days later the scene changes: the column

\* A common kind of palanquin, for the conveyance of sick soldiers.

has got through the Pass, and the General's spirits have been proportionately raised. He dates from Seriab, 27th of March, 1839.

Our last march through the Bolan Pass was very interesting. The Pass is so strong by nature, that 3,000 or 4,000 men could well dispute it against an army of 50,000. Just before we emerged from the Pass, and before we bid it adieu (I hope for ever), we came to a very steep and difficult ascent. I sat upon a rock, from whence I had a most lovely view: on one side, the Bolan mountains; on the other, a wide-extended plain, which latter we were about to enter, mountains all around in the distance, covered with snow. Here I sat to see the column, &c., pass into the plain. All at once, a cry was heard from the camp-followers, of marauders carrying off camels, even close to us. I immediately called to four troopers, who were my orderlies, mounted my bay horse, and I, Douglas, and Hammersley, set off at full speed across the plain in pursuit of these gentlemen; and although they had the start considerably, after a hard gallop of three miles, we headed them, when down they dropped at my feet for mercy. My horse behaved well, and soon outstripped the troopers. I can assure you, after our weary and slow march for so many days through the Pass, this race was most exciting. My horse is as fleet as the mountain wind. A day before we left the Pass, we came to a place where there was the finest spring of water I have seen for many a long year, gushing out of the side of a mountain in a very large body, and with great force—delicious water, clear as crystal, and close to our camp. What a treat after the quantity of muddy water we had lately swallowed! I know not how you are to read what I have been scribbling, as my fingers are really too cold

to write legibly, and it now looks like another fall of snow before night. You would have laughed, had you seen the officers a night or two ago at the mess table, amusing themselves with a basket of snow, and seeing who could bear the cold best. Plenty of ice this morning, everything frozen, and yet this is evidently *spring here*, as trees and flowers are budding, and the larks soar and sing delightfully, and in great numbers. I ought to tell you, that I am thought very fortunate in not having thrown away or lost any of my baggage or tents. But I went to an enormous expense in carrying forage for my camels, and in feeding them with grain. I also purchased a large quantity of ghee from some Affghan merchants, whom I met on the road, and gave a quantity of it to my camels, which kept them alive. However, I suppose, there may be a little good luck in the affair, as Douglas went to the same expense, and yet he lost all his camels. Yesterday, my servants looked cold and comfortless, and as they are on short allowance of attah and rice, and there is *none* for sale, I asked how many of them would eat mutton if they could get it. They said, "Every one of us." So I bought them mutton, and wood to cook it with. All did eat, Hindoo as well as Mahomedan, palanquin-bearers, and all. So much for caste.

In the course of the halts between the Bolan Pass and Quettah, Major-General Nott took the opportunity of manœuvring the 4th Brigade. It was quite a new thing in the Bengal army for a Major-General to go on parade and desire the Brigadiers to take up different positions, according to the nature of the ground, without having previously prepared them (or himself) for their

work by a programme on cards, in which every movement was minutely mapped out. But Nott had been a diligent student of his profession, and now that the time had arrived when the fruits of application and reflection were to be manifested, he was found to be acquainted with the art of practically developing the "bookish theoretic." He had never "set squadron in the field," but he nevertheless was found to know something of the division of a battle. Pity—as after events showed—that the same professional attainment, and the faculty of its application were not the characteristics of certain men of the sister-service, who were placed in commands superior to his own.

## CHAPTER IV.

1839.

SIR JOHN KEANE JOINS THE BENGAL COLUMN AND ANNOUNCES THE ASSUMPTION OF THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY—SUPERSESSION OF NOTT—HIS INTERVIEW WITH SIR JOHN KEANE—LEFT TO COMMAND AND SUPERINTEND THE VALLEY OF SHAWL—POLITICAL AGENCIES—AFFAIRS OF KHELAT—MR. ROSS BELL—HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE—NOTT'S DETERMINATION NOT TO OBEY MAJOR-GENERAL WILLSHIRE—THE GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION—THE RETRENCHMENT—NOTT SUCCEUMS UNWILLINGLY.

ON the 6th of April, Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane came up with the Bengal column at Quettah, and a junction now took place between that detachment and the Bombay column. A new arrangement and disposition of the force accordingly became, to a certain extent, necessary, and this had been previously announced in General Orders, dated Larkhana (in Scinde), March 4th, 1839. In this order, Major-General Willshire, C.B.—a *local* Major-General—was appointed to command the whole of the infantry of the Bombay

Presidency, formed into two brigades, and called the 2nd Division; Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton retaining the command of the Bengal Infantry, or 1st Division. The cavalry and artillery were likewise separated into divisions, and placed respectively under the command of Major-General Thackwell, C.B., and Brigadier Stevenson, of the Bombay Artillery.

Although Nott had contemplated supersession from the unfair and mischievous operation of the "Fane Major-General" order, to which reference has been made in a previous chapter, he could not feel otherwise than chagrined and indignant at being thus put aside to make way for a junior. True to his principle of action, which yielded and commanded obedience according to his subordinate or superior position, he felt that he would be wronging the whole service of which he was a most honourable member, were he to continue with the army after being thus unceremoniously shelved. He resolved, therefore, upon waiting on Sir John Keane, and remonstrating with him upon the injustice committed, and, failing to obtain redress, to return to India. He could not zealously perform the duties of a General Officer with feelings thus outraged, and prospects thus blighted.

Sir John Keane had been bred in rough schools. By the concurrent testimony of scores of officers with whom the writer has frequently conversed, he had retained all the manners of the Peninsular camp without benefitting by the gloss of courts and the society of

cities. His language too frequently reminded his staff and associates of the coarseness of the men who served under Marlborough in Flanders. Such a man was the very last with whom Nott, a perfect gentleman, would have liked to come into contact; for, though incapable of bandying phrases with Sir John Keane, he was liable to be irritated into expressions of anger which he might feel unsuited to their relative positions, and possibly give his senior (in rank) an advantage. Nevertheless he sought the interview, and in a letter to his son Charles, he gives a minute account of all that occurred upon the occasion.

Camp Quetta, in Shawl, April 9, 1839.

MY DEAR CHARLES,

I wrote to Letitia on the 6<sup>th</sup> inst., and informed her that I had lost the command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division; but as we are completely surrounded by the mountain marauders, I much fear my letter will never reach her. The first act of Sir J. Keane on joining the Bengal army has been to remove me out of the way of the Queen's officers, under the plea of giving me the command of the province of 'Shawl,' which place you will find visible enough on the map. Quetta is the chief town. As this act of Sir John's is a deadly hit at the officers of the Company's army, I dare say there will be some little sensation amongst the red-coats, in spite of that apathy which has ever blighted their hopes and their rights, and the affair may possibly find its way into the public papers, and in a variety of shapes. I therefore will note part of the delectable conversation which took place between Sir J. Keane and myself, and which I put on paper immediately

afterwards, so that you, and my dear Letitia and Charlotte may have the true version, especially as some people may say that I treated him haughtily and disrespectfully, which I certainly did not; but I freely gave him my opinion.

On the 6th instant I marched in command of the 4th Brigade, artillery park, &c., from Seriab to Quettah, in Shawl, on which day Sir J. Keane joined the Bengal column of the Army of the Indus. I immediately waited on *His Excellency*, when he informed me that he had it in contemplation to place Sir W. Cotton in command of the 1st Division of Bengal Infantry, and that I was to fall back to the 2nd Brigade. I stated that, under existing circumstances (which I particularized to him), I conceived that my situation was the command of that division. He declared that, "he had the particular orders of the Governor-General to remand Sir W. Cotton to the command of it," (which I don't believe). He also said that he had the special orders of the Governor-General to leave a whole brigade in Shawl, (which I don't believe), and that he intended that that brigade should be mine. I pointed out to him that there was only one regiment of my brigade at present with the army, and that I was the only Major-General of the Bengal army present, and that as those going forward were by far my juniors, I trusted he would direct me to accompany the army with the single regiment of my brigade then present; if not, that he would allow me to go without any charge. He said he "was very *delicately* situated, as he was acting upon the positive orders of the Governor-General, but that nothing had been yet decided." (How could *this* be, if he really *had* the orders of Government?) He then said: "If you will call upon me at three o'clock, we will coolly talk over the whole."

At the hour of three, I went to Sir John's tent, and was

shown into that of Colonel McDonald, his secretary, I believe. The Colonel commenced by saying that "Sir J. Keane could not comply with my wishes, as he had the positive orders of the Governor-General to the contrary." After some conversation, I said: "Sir, I am not come to discuss this affair with you; I am here by appointment to see Sir J. Keane; I suppose I *can* see him?" He said, "Yes," and then accompanied me to Sir John's tent. The Colonel, on entering the Commander-in-Chief's tent, commenced by addressing His Excellency, and saying: "Nothing will convince General Nott—" "Nothing that *you* can say can possibly convince me." I said that I waited upon His Excellency on the subject of our conversation of that morning. He immediately said that he "could not allow me to retain charge of the 1st Division," repeating that he had "received the orders of the Governor-General to the contrary." I expressed my regret that His Excellency had come to such a determination, as, under existing circumstances, I conceived that I had a just claim to that command; and I again particularized the grounds on which I claimed.

After much conversation of a similar nature, I said, that as far as I was *individually* concerned, I did not care about the *command*; that my only wish was to proceed with the army, and that as I was senior to all present, excepting Sir Willoughby, I should feel the hardship and injustice of being left behind when so many of my juniors were going forward. He said he "could not help it." "Your Excellency is aware that the column about to advance is composed almost entirely of Bengal troops; that in this column there will be no less than four of Her Majesty's General Officers, but not one Company's, unless I am to go." He then said that he had "received the orders

of the Government to leave a whole brigade in Shawl, and that the 2nd was to be that brigade, and was coming up from Shikarpore." I said that one regiment of my brigade was present in his camp, and that I trusted he would allow me to proceed with that corps. He said: "Your conduct, for an officer of your rank, is very extraordinary—the most extraordinary I have ever heard of." He then asked "whether I thought he could upset the orders of Government to please me?" Colonel McDonald and His Excellency then spoke together. "How do you know the orders of Government? You cannot know the orders *we* have received; you will be left in a more responsible situation than that of those going on. Your brigade is coming up, and how do you know the hour you may be ordered to take Khelat?" I thought this too much, and I fear that my laugh at such humbug expressed my feelings of contempt. I said: "Well, your Excellency, as you are determined to take the division from me, and equally determined not to allow me to proceed with the army in command of that portion of my brigade now here, I beg to tender my resignation of the command of the 2nd Brigade." He said: "You had better consult your friends before you do so." I told him that I had lived long enough to have a judgment of my own, and that no man's opinion was to be a rule of conduct for me; I see, and have long seen, through the whole affair. After some pause, he said: "I can only take your resignation in one shape; that is, to forward it to Government. I suppose, Sir, you will obey my orders in the meantime?" "I *must* obey your orders, whatever they may be; but my resignation being sent to Government can be of no use to me, as my object, pending such a reference, would be completely defeated—that of accompanying the army to-morrow as a private gentleman." He then again said: "Your conduct

is very extraordinary in an officer of your rank. Sir W. Cotton does not feel aggrieved; why should you?" "I am no judge of his feelings, nor shall his conduct ever be a rule for me; besides, he is going on. Well, your Excellency, as I find it to be determined that I am no longer to command the 1st Division, nor allowed to proceed with the army, I have nothing further to say on that subject. Your Excellency is aware that I hold the Queen's commission of Major-General?" "Yes." "I am therefore, by General Orders of Governor-General, March 9, 1838, publishing the Court of Directors' letter, dated December 19, 1837, entitled to the command of a division in preference to the local Generals Thackwell and Willshire, and yet you have placed General Willshire in command of a division?" He said he had "received the particular orders of the Governor-General to place that officer in command of a division," and added: "If you think yourself aggrieved, you can appeal to the Court of Directors. General Nott, I see clearly that nothing that I can say will convince you." "No, your Excellency, nothing that you *have* said on this subject can convince me." "You insult my authority." "I am not aware that I have; what I have said is my deliberate judgment, which nothing can change." After much more debate, *warm* on his part, *cool* on mine, I said, rising to retire: "Well, your Excellency, I trust that I have left no ill impression upon your mind. I see the whole affair; I am to be sacrificed because I happen to be senior to the Queen's officers." "Ill impression, Sir! I will never forget your conduct as long as I live!" "Oh! your Excellency, since that is the case, I have only to wish you a very good evening."

The interview resulted in Nott's remaining at Quetta

with only one regiment of his brigade (the 43rd, N.I.), a rissalah of horse, a regiment of Shah Soojah's infantry, and a troop of cavalry. Sir John Keane marched towards Candahar, with the bulk of the army, on the 7th of April, the day after the interview. "Some idea of the state to which the Army of the Indus had been reduced, may be formed from the fact of sixty horses having been shot, as too weak to proceed, while numbers of camp-followers were subsisting upon the fried skins of sheep, the congealed blood of animals, and such roots as they could pick up in the neighbourhood of the encampment."\*

It has been the office of the accomplished author of the "War in Affghanistan," to describe the operations of the army under Sir John Keane, from the hour of its quitting Quettah. Be it ours to trace the course of the not less important, and, as the sequel will show, the infinitely better commanded, force which gradually came under the orders of Major-General Nott.

While Keane and his attenuated columns struggled through the Kojuck Pass, experiencing severe privations, and heavy losses in ammunition, baggage, camels, tents, &c., Nott remained in the valley of Shawl, the climate and general aspect of which pleased him vastly.

This is the most delightful climate I have ever experienced—nothing like it in any part of the world—thermometer

\* "Memorials of Affghanistan," Ostell and Le Page, Calcutta.

about 58° morning and evening, and rises during the day to 66°. I am encamped in a rich and beautiful valley, which is about twenty miles in breadth, and forty-eight in length, commencing at the outlet of the Bolan Pass, and running up to this place. The plain on which we are encamped is intersected by rivulets of the finest water; the gardens filled with fruit-trees, among which are the apple, plum, apricot, &c.; the rose-tree and sweet-briar abound. I cannot walk in any direction from my tent without passing over a variety of flowers, and as this is the spring in Affghanistan, they are in full bloom. This rich valley is surrounded by lofty mountains, the tops of which are covered with snow. The wind is at this moment gently blowing from a high mountain on my right hand; this breeze qualifies the heat of the valley at mid-day, and renders it most delightful; but oppression, and cruelty, and plunder having for ages borne sway, the country is almost depopulated; villages are few, and the inhabitants appear to cultivate just enough to exist on. The mountains are filled with wild and savage marauders, whose ancestors were probably driven by tyranny and oppression from this lovely vale.

A fine climate and an ill-governed country, were not the only legacies bequeathed by Sir John Keane to the subject of this biography. He left him a very small protective force and the sense of wrong. Smarting under his supersession, and shocked at the general mismanagement of the expedition, he gives vent to his anger in such language as this:

I can depend upon the 43rd and the 4th Local Horse, but I cannot say as much for the Shah's men; however, the

fellows may possibly behave well. If I could get my brigade together, I should be able to snore in quiet, while the five Queen's Generals are gathering laurels at Candahar; but what has a Company's officer to do *but* to snore? what right can forty years service give *him* to command? *None*, as long as Commanders-in-Chief are appointed at the Horse Guards; but the Company's officers may thank their own apathy for this, and all the gross insults heaped upon them. Oh! I have witnessed such scenes on this grand expedition. By Heavens! 2000 disciplined troops would have sent this army back in disgrace; but good fortune, backed by many lacs of Jack Company's rupees, paves the way, and puts down opposition. During a long life I have read much, and have observed much, but I have never seen, heard, or read of such a shameful and entirely unnecessary waste of public money. As to the Commissariat, no language can describe it, nor give any idea of the rascality of its native agents. This department has moreover proved itself to be totally inefficient; there is not a native understrapper attached to it who has not plundered a fortune on this expedition, while the poor subaltern officer has been involved in debt, and half starved into the bargain. When the accounts come under the observation of our wise Government, will that Government resort to another Half Batta measure to replace the sums thus rascally plundered?

On the 19th of April, Nott addressed an appeal to the Governor-General in Council, against his supersession by Major-General Willshire. He considered that grievance to involve an infraction of the Orders of the Court of Directors of the 19th of December, 1837, and which had been published in General Orders,

to the Bengal army.\* The words of the Court's order, on which he evidently relied, were those we have *italicized*, although he forebore from particularizing.

"We have no objection to the promotion to the local rank of Major-General, of the Colonels of Her Majesty's army, &c. &c., *provided always that no interference be permitted with the commands on the general staff allotted to the Major-Generals, or Brigadier-Generals and Brigadiers of the Queen's and the Company's forces respectively.*"

This protest did not find its way to India until Nott had dispatched a triplicate, some months subsequently. At first, the General supposed the dawks had been robbed; but at length he discovered that there had been foul play in high places. The story of the miscarriage is rather curious. It is given in a letter dated late in the following July.

The truth is this, I wrote a long and warm remonstrance, but in reading it over, I thought the Government would never *condescend* to wade through it, I therefore destroyed it, and merely forwarded the simple fact to Government, through Sir J. Keane, and hereby hangs a very pretty tale: I sent it, on the 19th of April, and being of a very impatient disposition, I, twenty days afterwards, wrote to the Deputy Adjutant-General Craigie, to know whether *my friend*, Sir John, had forwarded it to Government, when, lo and behold! they told me it had not been received! Now I have heard that in some regions of this very just world, there are men

\* Dated March 9, 1838.

who think there is no harm in what is called "burking" papers that are not exactly palatable! I, therefore, sent a duplicate; and, for reasons which I had, I caused a private letter to be put into the same post-bag, with the said duplicate, to an officer in the head-quarters' camp, begging he would immediately answer it. He did receive it, and his reply was duly received at Quettah. I waited some days, expecting certainly to hear some news of my unfortunate duplicate; but being, as I before said, of an impatient disposition, I wrote another letter to the Deputy Adjutant-General Craigie, to ask whether he had received and laid it before Sir John. I added: "However, I know you must have received it, as an answer has been received at Quettah to a private letter which went by the same dawk; and I long to know whether my appeal has been sent to Government." Think, and think again on the answer I received: "Sir John regretted that it had not been received, but that inquiry should be made at the post-master's, regarding the letters by that day's dawk." Well, on getting this, I immediately sent a triplicate, and a few days after, wrote to say that on such a date, I had sent a triplicate, and begged that my great anxiety might be removed, by being informed that it had been sent to Government; but up to this moment I have not received a line! Now I shall have to break through the rules of our service by sending a copy *direct* to Government; but it will be, of course, much too late to do me any good, and Sir John has gained his end.

From this period may, in a great measure, be dated General Nott's independence of action, as far as it was possible for a military commander to act who was merely the instrument of political negotiations and

management. It has been customary in India, upon all occasions of campaigns in hostile states or on the acquisition of new territory, to appoint officers to what is called the "political agency" of the country, and these have generally been selected from those civilians or military men who have had some experience of the character of the people, and on whose temper and discretion reliance might be placed. In most instances, the selection having devolved upon men younger in years and inferior in rank to the officer in command of the troops, collisions have arisen, or, at all events, unpleasant misunderstandings have taken place respecting their relative powers. The old soldier has fretted under the "orders" of the junior, and the young *diplomat* has either borne himself with a degree of superciliousness, engendered by his elevated position, or has displayed irritation at the presumption of the General in objecting to his requisitions for troops, or remonstrating with his ignorance of the usages of native Princes. Perhaps there have been faults on both sides. It is not, however, too much to say, that a system, involving anomalies and pregnant with mischief, is fundamentally erroneous. Weakness must invariably result from divided responsibility, and history shows that wherever military operations have been influenced or directed by civilians, delay and mismanagement have ensued. The examples of the Aulic Councils of Austria and the Dutch Commissioners, should

have read a lesson to the Indian Government. But custom and patronage are fierce enemies of innovation. Political Agents were countenanced by Lord Wellesley, and could not therefore be dispensed with by Lord Auckland.\* Accordingly, Captain Bean of the Bengal army, who was in command of the 1st Regiment of Shah Soojah's force, was selected by Mr. Macnaghten, the Envoy and Minister with Shah Soojah, to take temporary political charge of the Shawl province. The letter announcing to him his appointment, sufficiently demonstrates the needlessness of separating the political from the military authority. What was there which Bean was entrusted to execute that Nott could not have accomplished?

\* From some passages of the correspondence of the Duke of Wellington, when in India, it would seem that he thought political agents should have authority over the military: see his letters to Colonel Murray, dated Phoolmurry, October 13, 1803. In his later despatches, however, written in Spain, he had come to a very opposite conclusion, the consequence of his experience. In a letter to Don J. de Carrajal, Cadiz, Dec. 27, 1812, he speaks of the *practical evils* resulting from the system of *separating the military from the political authority*. "Experience," says the Duke, "has shown that whenever there exist authorities independent of each other, they must clash, and the service must suffer, unless their acts should be vigilantly controlled by the superintending authority of the Government." "Even in countries," he adds, "where the system of separating the local authorities is perfectly understood, and has been put in practice for centuries, it has frequently been necessary to place the political and military authority in one hand. How much more necessary, therefore, must it be in provinces in which the authority of the Government is imperfectly established?"

Camp at Shawl, April 6, 1839.

SIR,

It having been deemed expedient by His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane to leave a portion of the Army of the Indus and of His Majesty Shah Soojah's force at this place, and it being necessary to appoint some officer to the temporary political charge of the Shawl province, I have the honour to acquaint you that I have selected you for the performance of this duty, not having any other Political Assistant with whose services I could dispense.

2. In making this selection, I have been guided entirely by my belief that your experience of the native character and your temper peculiarly qualify you for the efficient discharge of the duties of this important trust.

3. You will consider it your first duty to conciliate the plundering tribes of this vicinity, commencing with those in the neighbouring hills. I have strongly recommended to Government the formation of a local corps, consisting of the various tribes of Caukurs, Beloochees, Murrees, Boogtees, &c., and I request that you will begin without delay to form such a corps. The duty of this corps will be to guard the road between Shawl and Dadur, experience having proved that we have nothing in this respect to depend upon in the exertions of the Chief of Khelat. The men enlisted should be young and able-bodied, and each armed with a sword or matchlock. If the corps should be permanently sanctioned by Government, the men will of course be properly armed, clothed and drilled. The number enlisted should not exceed 800, and the pay of the privates may, for the present, be fixed at five rupees per mensem. The pay of the Chiefs may be regulated according to your discretion, bearing in mind the rates received by native officers of the local corps in our provinces. One half of the corps should be mustered

every month at Quettah, and there receive from you their own pay and that of their comrades. Captain Johnson will be instructed to supply you with such funds as you may require. I leave with you two very intelligent natives, from whom you will derive great aid in this undertaking, viz.: Ameenoola Shah and Yar Mahomed.

4. Should you require assistance, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be requested to place the services of one, or even two, British officers at your disposal.

5. I can give you at present no detailed written instructions for your guidance in other respects. It will be your duty to listen to all grievances, and to redress them as far as it may be in your power, and to prevent any excesses being committed on the property of the peaceable inhabitants. There are some points on which I wish to give you verbal instructions.

6. You will of course consider it to be peculiarly your duty to report to me every occurrence which may come to your knowledge, and which you may deem of sufficient interest to be brought to my knowledge.

7. Herewith you will receive a credential from me, which you will cause to be delivered to the Governor of Shawl, and which you will observe, empowers you to act on my behalf.

8. I shall forward a copy of this letter to His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane for His Excellency's information, as well as to Major-General Nott, and copy of the 3rd paragraph to Captain Johnson.

9. The rate of remuneration which you are to receive for the extra duty now entrusted to you will be determined by the Right Honourable the Governor-General, and you are authorized to entertain such establishment as you may deem absolutely necessary for the efficient conduct of your duties,

reporting to me the extent of it at your earliest convenience.

(Signed)

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Envoy and Minister.

To Captain Bean,

Commanding 1st Regiment, Shah Soojah's Force.

The force at Quettah was gradually strengthened, and by the beginning of July, Nott had four regiments of infantry under his command, together with a few troops of cavalry and horse artillery, and a company of European artillery, altogether sixteen guns. Late in April he was attacked by fever, which reduced him exceedingly, and led to the most serious apprehensions; but under a good constitution, and the careful treatment of his medical adviser, he rallied, and resumed his duties with vigour. The brigade was sorely tried at this time. The fluctuations of temperature were violent, and therefore pernicious. In the night the air was cool and pleasant—thermometer 48°; in the daytime the heat rose, under a piercing sun, from 110° to 120°—a most intolerable range to men under canvas who had not been within a house for eight or nine months. The extreme difficulty which the convoys experienced in making their way from India through Scinde, rendered provisions scarce and dear. At one time there was not a bottle of wine, beer, or brandy in the camp for several weeks; neither were candles nor tea to be had, and when they did arrive, the candles sold for one rupee each, and the tea for twenty rupees the seer of two pounds! This

was ruinous to the officers—even the General declared that he would have been better off in India upon a regimental Colonel's pay and allowances. In some sort to compensate the absence of European supplies, the valley produced a great abundance of exquisite fruits, which the Beloochees freely brought for sale. When Shah Soojah's troops were encamped in Shawl and devastated the corn-fields, the people avoided them. Nott's moderation and strict justice ensured an opposite result; the people learned to know him—even the children became familiar with the good man's face, and they would seek his presence, and be delighted in his attempts to make himself understood in their vernacular.

The correspondence of the General during the three first months of his command in Shawl, chiefly referred to the foregoing matters. His receipt of letters from India was very irregular and uncertain, which distressed him exceedingly, as he felt great anxiety about his children, especially as he considered his own life to hang by a thread, and he had not a shilling to leave them. One of the recovered letters contained an intimation which appears to have delighted him exceedingly, as it proved how completely he had won the hearts of the 38th Bengal Native Infantry. British officers are keen to distinguish between the soldier who is prompted to the performance of his duty by conscientiousness and a love of his profession, and the mere martinet who delights in the exercise and display

of authority regardless of the pride and the feelings of those whom he may command. That Nott was held to belong to the former category, is clear from the annexed passages.

The same dawk also brought me a long letter of three sheets and a half, from Young of the 38th, who was at the time of writing it up at Mussooree, with four other officers of the corps. I had written to him, thinking he was still at Delhi, about having a small wall built round your dear mother's tomb. If you recollect, the gate leading to the ground, used to be continually thrown down or stolen, and cattle were always getting in. Is it not surprizing that the officers of the 38th Regiment should be so perseveringly kind to us? I never did anything for them, not even what most commanding officers do. Now, I will insert from Young's letter one act of theirs, which has touched me to the heart, and of which I was quite ignorant until now. When I left Delhi, I sent a note, begging that some of them would occasionally look at her grave, until the building was erected, as the gate was often thrown down. Now, only read their kindness, without their even giving me the least hint of it.

"We (38th) did all we could to shame the authorities into keeping a Chokadar for the burying-ground at Delhi. I even went the length of writing in the newspapers about it, but *seemingly* with no effect. So we (of the 38th) put a man there at our own expense. Some time after, one was placed in charge of the ground by Mr. Everest, by order of the Bishop we heard, and as the man we put there was then of no use, we discharged him."

Indeed, my dear children, there is no end to their kindness,

and I could fill this sheet in telling the many kind things they have said and done since I left them. Again, I say, is it not strange? You know, I was scarcely ever what I would call familiar with them. It is nearly the same with the officers here. I am almost afraid to open my mouth, or express any wish, for on the following day, where it is at all possible, I find the thing done. So you see, my dear children, the world is better than some people will admit it to be. If I could receive as much *justice* from people in power, as I do kindness and attention from the officers under my command, I should indeed be fortunate; but this, I know I shall never have, nor do I now care. Young tells me that the Scotts, with their large family, are now at Mussooree. I wish I could beg an appointment for Scott, he is so very deserving. It is really enough to disgust any one, to see a number of idle and silly boys placed in responsible situations, because they have interest, when a man like Scott is overlooked.

The Beloochees from whom the army suffered so much on its march through the Bolan Pass, and who, by the way, had sustained injury from the destruction of their crops, owed allegiance to one Mehrab Khan, a chieftain who occupied the fortress and province of Khelat in Beloochistan. To this chieftain Sir Alexander Burnes had been deputed with the double purpose of obtaining his assent to a treaty in which the supremacy of Shah Soojah was acknowledged, and of prevailing on him to assist in procuring supplies for the army. Mehrab Khan signed the treaty very reluctantly, but protested his inability to supply grain, though en-

gaging to do his best. It became evident, however, that, so far from using all reasonable exertion, he had really instigated the Beloochees to harass and plunder the army, and a loud cry for vengeance arose. Macnaghten, the Envoy, even wrote from Quettah, urging the Supreme Government "to annex the provinces of Shawl, Moostung and Cutchee to the Shah's dominions."\* The hour for vengeance was deferred. There was another game then in hand, but enough transpired to indicate that sooner or later the Khan of Khelat would be made to pay the penalty of his contumacy.

*Extract of a Letter from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, to Mr. Ross Bell, the Officiating Political Agent at Shikarpore.*

You are already aware of the causes which led to the determination of the Governor-General, to deprive Mehrab Khan of that power, which he has so flagrantly abused in innumerable atrocities, perpetrated by his dependants and under his direction, in plundering and murdering the followers of the British army on its advance into Affghanistan, and in the organized system of pillage by which our posts and detachments have been harassed ever since the main body of the army penetrated the Bolan Pass. These outrages commenced while Mehrab Khan was yet negotiating a treaty of friendship and alliance with the British Government, and professing unbounded devotion to our interests. They have been continued as long as the

\* Kaye's "War in Affghanistan."

season admitted of the march of troops, and travellers between Scinde and Afghanistan, with a spirit of perseverance, that clearly evinced the disposition of this chieftain to inflict upon us and upon our adherents all the injury that it lay in his power to do. The perfidy and malice of Mehrab having thus shown the impossibility of establishing with him any terms of alliance that would secure us for the future from his enmity, or that would afford any rational prospect of restoring order in those important districts, over which he rules, and in which protection and safety to the traveller and the merchant are indispensable to the prosperity of all the surrounding countries, the British Government is most fully justified in depriving this chieftain of his means of injury, and in taking measures to substitute a friendly power in his place.

In furtherance of this object, it was resolved, early in the course of our operations for the restoration of Shah Soojah Ool Moolk, that on the subjugation or expulsion of Mehrab Khan, those portions of his territory which are situated at either extremity of the Bolan Pass, and were formerly included in the Dooranee empire, should be given over to His Majesty Shah Soojah to be reannexed to his dominions. These districts are Cutchee and its dependencies, in the plain of the Indus, and Shawl and Moostung, at the north-western extremity of the Bolan Pass.

Late in June, or early in July, 1839, the Major-General being at Quettah, received the following confidential communication from Mr. Ross Bell, the political officer at Shikarpore, with whom the Government of India had been in communication respecting Mehrab Khan.

(Confidential.)

Camp Shikarpore, June 23, 1839.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have received private instructions from the Governor-General to communicate with you on the subject of the means *now* at your disposal for advancing on Khelat, should such a measure be determined on. Will you be so kind as to send me information on the following points:

1. The strength of the brigade under your command?
2. Whether, with reference to the information in your possession regarding the number of Mehrab Khan's troops and the character of the country between Quettah and Khelat, you consider your present force strong enough to admit of your occupying Khelat; and, if not, what reinforcement you consider necessary?
3. The state of your Commissariat, and whether you can collect supplies in Shawl sufficient to maintain the brigade during the march between Quettah and Khelat?
4. Whether you have a sufficient number of camels, and if not, what additional number you consider *absolutely necessary*. I lay emphasis on the two last words, because it is exceedingly difficult to procure camels in this neighbourhood?
5. The state of your military chest and the average monthly expenditure of the brigade, including Commissariat Department?

Writing in strict confidence, I think it right to mention to you that a movement on Khelat has been determined on, and that the only question which remains to be decided, refers to *time*. I am aware that your means of collecting information at Quettah must be very limited, but it may be in your power to collect *some*; and, in a country of which so little is known, every item of accurate intelligence is exceedingly valuable. I hope you will not consider it presumptuous in

me if I venture to offer advice as to the best means of collecting information, should you not be provided with a perfectly constituted intelligence department. I have had a good deal of experience in various parts of India, having been employed on duties which rendered it necessary that I should collect information from all sources. The class of men whom I have found most accurate in their information regarding the *character* of a country, and its resources in grain and water, is that of the Gwaluhs, or cattle graziers, and shepherds. I understand that Shawl and the country between Quettah and Khelat abounds in cattle and sheep. It may be in your power, therefore, to secure the services of some intelligent shepherds and herdsmen familiar with the country regarding which information is required. It would be worth while to pay them well. They could not only furnish details with which they are already acquainted, but, from being able to wander about without any suspicion attaching to them, would be enabled to collect fresh intelligence on such points as you consider advisable. The information they supply may be easily tested by employing three, four, or as many as you consider advisable, at different times, and unknown to each other, on the same duty.

Although I have applied to you for information on certain points specified, I shall feel exceedingly grateful for any details or intelligence relating to Shawl and the neighbouring countries with which you may be so kind as to furnish me. I have even asked whether your brigade would be a strong enough force to move against Khelat, and am actually ignorant of the number of *regiments* which compose it, nor can I ascertain that point from any one here. The only way in which I can procure any information to be relied on regarding the country beyond the Pass, is through yourself and Captain Bean, and I am in hopes that you will consider this

a sufficient apology for my asking you to take so much trouble.

The country between this and Dadur is impassable to camels, owing to the inundations having commenced. The Beloochees, in various quarters, are still roaming about in search of plunder, and they must be left to do so until the season admits of troops taking the field. The root of the evil, the Khan of Khelat, must be struck at first.

Believe me,

My dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

ROSS BELL.

To Major-General Nott, &c., &c.

There was enough in this communication to warrant an expectation that to General Nott would be entrusted the duty of deposing the Khan of Khelat. He immediately imparted to Mr. Ross Bell all the information in his power; and, although the number of troops under his command had been recently diminished by the withdrawal of his favourite regiment (the 43rd N.I.) and some of the horse, he nevertheless believed that he was sufficiently strong for the contemplated movement.

Having received information which led him to think the fortress was stronger than had been alleged by the political officers, he caused it to be *secretly measured*; he ascertained the capability of the roads for the transport of the artillery at his disposal, and computed the possibility of capturing the place with the force at his disposal. Still, he cherished very little hope that the

duty of chastising Mehrab Khan would be left to him. He conjectured that Sir John Keane would reserve the glory and advantage of that task for some Queen's General—and the event proved that his anticipation was "not without wit and judgment."

How the army under Sir John Keane got through the Kojuck Pass and possessed itself of Candahar as the Barukzye chieftains fled in affright; how Sir John subsequently carried the fortress of Ghuzni by a *coup de main*, suggested by an able Bengal Engineer, Captain Thomson, as the only means of taking a strong place in the absence of siege-guns, which Keane had unaccountably left behind; and how the worthless puppet, Shah Soojah, was placed upon the throne at Caubul, while the British flag fluttered on the ramparts of the citadel, the guns spat forth salvos of success, and the people shouted to order—for hatred was in their hearts—has long been matter of history. Recorded by a hundred pens, and published in a hundred forms, the easy conquest has been regarded as the first chapter of a tale whose sequel was unparalleled in its black and melancholy features.

And now came the fulfilment of Nott's prediction respecting Khelat. Enthroned at Caubul, Shah Soojah was no longer supposed to need the presence of so large a force; indeed, believing in the firmness of his footing, he disliked its presence as much as the Affghans disrelished the prospect of its maintenance. The Envoy, therefore, intimated to Sir John Keane that a

considerable portion of the army might retire to Hindostan at once; and Sir John gladly enough took the opportunity of removing himself, with a large escort, through the Khyber Pass and the Punjaub, while Major-General Willshire was directed by him to return by way of Candahar and Scinde, *calling at Khelat en route, to punish Mehrab Khan!*

In the meanwhile, however, Nott had continued his arrangements for a sudden move on Khelat, and had kept up an active correspondence with Mr. Ross Bell, from whose confidential letters it is evident that Nott's views were deemed correct, and that, in the opinion of the political officers, Sir John Keane was by no means a pattern of military skill. Writing from Sukkur on the 2nd of August, Mr. Bell says:

The view taken by you of the course which should be followed, notwithstanding your reduced force, is exactly what I anticipated, and I have not a doubt as to the movement on Khelat being completely successful under your guidance. The troops in Upper Scinde will be able to co-operate with you by occupying Cutchee, which is the most fertile and valuable province in the possession of Mehrab Khan, and stretches the whole way from Larkhana to Dadur. This will prevent any assistance from being rendered to Mehrab Khan, in his hour of need, by the Doomkees, Jakruncees, Boogtees and Murrees, who are the most powerful tribes of Beloochees on this side of the hills, and have been always staunch in their allegiance to the Khan of Khelat. They have also been our most bitter enemies throughout, and measures will be taken to chastise

them severely as soon as the waters of inundation retire and leave their country accessible to troops.

It is very much to be regretted that Sir J. Keane has diminished your force to such an extent. I may be wrong in recording my opinion, but I cannot help observing that his plan of operations has been injudicious throughout. His hasty advance might have been forgiven, had he left a secure base of operations behind him, and had his Commissariat arrangements and means of keeping his communications been complete. But why he should have neglected his rear and everything else in order to show a front, which, in consequence of the want of carriage and supplies, is rendered inefficient by its very numbers, I confess appears to me utterly unintelligible. The brigade in Upper Scinde is quite inefficient, and I wish heartily that Sir J. Keane had either taken it with him, or sent it back to Bombay, from whence it came. Our position in this country at the present moment is peculiarly delicate, and Brigadier Gordon, who commands the troops, is doing everything in his power to embroil himself with the Chiefs and their subjects. He has, in a public letter to me, declared that "martial law, and martial law alone, should be the ruling order" in this country, and has threatened me with the bayonet if I oppose him!

I can only say that I hope the movement on Khelat may be made before Sir J. Keane returns to mar any well-laid plan of yours.

In answer to his recommendation that Mehrab Khan should be proceeded against without delay, the Governor-General directed a suspension of operations until further communication could be had with the Envoy and Sir

John Keane. It was not enough that all the possible consequences of delay in communicating with the Government, then some hundreds of miles distant, should be encountered; further procrastinations, and a needless deference to officers who had already demonstrated incapacity for a great enterprise, were to be endured. On this point, a certain Political wrote vehemently, and barbed his pen with not unmerited satire.

Camp Sukkur, Sept. 30, 1839.

MY DEAR SIR,

Many thanks for your letter of the 6th instant, which contains information of so much interest and importance, that I have forwarded a copy of it privately to Lord Auckland. I hope you will forgive me for having taken this liberty; my object in doing so, was to show clearly at head-quarters the great value of *time* at the present moment. I have been inculcating the same doctrine for months past, but unsuccessfully, owing to its having been considered necessary to wait for further enunciations from Mr. Macnaghten and Sir J. Keane, and you have no doubt remarked, ere this, the demon of procrastination which presides at their Council Board.

It is really most vexatious that an expedition, which must be carried through, should have been postponed so long that still further delay, involving great additional expenditure, will probably become necessary. It would be out of the question to move troops in Khelat after the setting in of the snow; Mehrab Khan could, in winter, oppose a most effectual, although passive, resistance, by evacuating the place, and withdrawing the inhabitants. I do not even

see how you were to get through the winter in Shawl. I cannot send you any camels or supplies. The *whole of the carriage* in Upper Scinde has been taken up to carry stores to the Bombay army, now on its way back *vid Candahar*, and the brigade here is once more left without a *single camel*. This, too, at a time when our arrangements had been actually completed for its taking the field in Cutchee. I have laid two plans before Lord Auckland :

1. Should the arrangements of Sir J. Keane involve the return of your brigade to Bengal, that the occupation of Cutchee, and the punishment of the western Belooch tribes should be entrusted to you ; and,

2. Should you retain command of the troops in Shawl, Moostung, and Candahar, that the occupation of Khelat and the neighbouring country be left, of course, to you, and the return of the Bombay troops under General Willshire be taken advantage of to settle the affairs of Cutchee, and suppress the turbulent Beloochees.

I can form no opinion as to which, or indeed whether either, of these plans will be adopted. The plan of the campaign has been so confused and unintelligible throughout, that the uniformity of it would be broken by anything approaching to a systematic or economical arrangement. The hero of Ghuzni, too, is on his way to Simlah, where his sagacity and foresight may be consulted as to the cheapest and most judicious mode of conducting further operations. A new shield should be given him by our most gracious Sovereign. An empty grain bag, sable, parted and quartered with sabres, gules, and a treasure chest, or, in pale, with two dead camels, passant couchant, for supporters. Crest, a cornucopia, with the motto: "*O fortunatum natam me conduce Romam,*" would commemorate the exploits and generalship of the conqueror of Caubul.

The prospect of a winter at Quettah, under the privations tested by you, is certainly a melancholy one, and the sepoys will be hard sufferers. It is impossible for me to assist you with grain or supplies of any kind until the arrival here of the Bombay troops, or until the convoy, about to start, shall return. When that will be, I can form no conjecture, but am afraid, it will be too late to admit of its making a second trip to Quettah during the winter.

However congenial to Nott's feelings the confidence and the satire which pervade the foregoing may have been, they conveyed no balm to the wound he was now to receive in the realization of his worst fears. An official letter, dated Camp near Caubul, September 18th, reached him on the 13th of October. It announced that to Major-General Willshire was entrusted the conduct of any military operations which might become necessary for the deposition of Mehrab Khan ; and that he (Nott) was to hold the troops in readiness to be placed under Willshire's orders, and either to accompany the force from that station in support of the operations against Khelat, or be subject to any call for their services which Willshire might deem it necessary to make subsequently ! This was enough to break a spirit already much subdued by domestic affliction.\* The forewarning derived from a

\* At Quettah the news reached Major-General Nott, of the death of his son-in-law, and the consequently, as he then supposed, desolate condition of his daughter Maria.

knowledge of Keane's character, and the suspicious withdrawal of the 43rd Regiment, scarcely fore-armed him. He was shocked and hurt beyond measure, and it was expected by all around him that he would straightway have resigned. To have been left behind and thus to have missed sharing in the capture of Ghuzni was a heavy blow,\* but this was "th' unkindest cut of all." The calm, however, which Nott had enjoyed during his encampment at Quettah had had a powerful influence upon his mind. He had attained a degree of serenity for which he could not account. Perhaps his severe illness and the religious feelings which it had aroused, may have been the unconscious authors of the alteration in his temperament; for now, when a crisis might have been expected, he resolved to comport himself with dignity and maintain the principles of obedience by which his military career had always been governed and animated. Restraining his indignation, or reserving it for explosion in his private letters, he at once wrote to the Adjutant-General, Major Craigie, who was with Sir John Keane.

\* "I have just paid one hundred and three rupees for the little Queen's commission. I shall feel inclined to return it to her if they will not do me justice here. Justice! how can they? They cannot compensate me for not being present at Ghuzni. Never mind. 'If I live, I will,' as Nelson said, 'have a Gazette of my own some day!'"—*Letter to his daughter, August 26, 1839.*

Camp in Shawl, October 14, 1839.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 898, of the 18th ultimo, and which appears to have been forwarded to me through Captain Bean, enclosing to me an extract from a joint despatch addressed by the Commander-in-Chief, and the Envoy and Minister at the Court of His Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk, to Major-General Willshire, C.B., directing me so comply with that officer's requisition for troops from Quettah, should he require them in operations against the Chief of Khelat. To this order for troops, strict attention shall be paid, and also every other assistance I can afford from Shawl for the furtherance of the public service alluded to in your letter.

But I must distinctly state to you, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Indus, that by virtue of the Major-General's commission most graciously conferred upon me by Her Majesty, and by directions from the Court of Directors, bearing date the 19th of December, 1837, as published in General Orders to the Indian army by the Supreme Government under date the 9th of March, 1838, I conceive myself to be senior to local Major-General Willshire, and therefore can obey no orders originating with that officer, nor can I serve under him.

I have stated this because the wording of the last paragraph of the joint despatch now acknowledged, creates a doubt in my mind as to its real meaning.

His Excellency's order, directing me to furnish such troops as may be required from Shawl, is perfectly clear, and of course shall be implicitly complied with.

To Major Craigie,  
Deputy Adjutant-General, Caubul.

In writing this firm, but temperate letter, Nott felt that he was discharging a duty to the Indian army. He honestly conceived that he was not bound to obey a "*Fane* Major-General," and he imagined this direct avowal of his sentiments would bring the question to an issue. Pleasantly speaking of the matter to the loved depositories of all the secrets of his heart, he says: "This is bringing the affair to a test, and they must do something. I fancy in the nineteenth century they cannot cut my throat, but they may take away my command. Well, as the poor idiot who used to go about the streets of Caermarthen said, 'May God send no greater loss!'" Colonel Stacy, an old friend, who was then commanding at Candahar, fully shared the indignation which Keane's exclusion of Nott had caused in the hearts of the Company's officers, and he further did justice to Nott's character in anticipating a calm result.

It is evident to me, that Sir John Keane would make great sacrifices to injure you, or he would never have given up the honour of taking Khelat. He thinks to make you commit yourself by this infamous support of the shadow of a commission against the substance.

You can alone judge what is best to be done in the coming crisis—the collision Sir J. Keane contemplates. Depend upon it, Major-General Willshire has his instructions not to allow the opportunity to pass; therefore consider, like Ulysses, how to make the storm burst over the agitator's own head. What perfidy, to tell you to your face, you could not say how soon you might be ordered against

Khelat, whilst he recommends Government to send Major-General Willshire, not only to supersede you, but to attempt to draw you into the committal of yourself by some word or deed in a moment of irritation on finding your due given to a junior!

It is a severe trial, but I am sure you will not allow them to gain any victory by the stratagem they have planned. The question, I think, is, how can you avoid it? I need not say that I shall continue to give you the earliest information of anything worth your knowing.

To render unnecessary a recurrence to this affair in the chronological order of this biography, insertion may here be given at once to the reply of the Governor-General to Sir John Keane, who had forwarded Nott's protest against the authority of local Major-Generals.

Camp Chowmoah, Dec. 5, 1839.

I do not think it necessary, with reference to my letter of September 30th, that Your Excellency should do more than state to Major-General Nott, that I conceive Your Excellency in the appointment of command, to him, and to Major-General Willshire, to have acted with perfect justice and propriety.

The conduct of Major-General Nott, in declaring that he can obey no orders of Major-General Willshire, has greatly shaken the opinion, which I was disposed to entertain of him, and I agree with Your Excellency, that the evil to the public service would be great indeed, if every officer, in defiance of the instructions of his military superior, were to feel himself competent to place his own construction upon the orders of Government, and to act accordingly.

Your Excellency will be pleased to convey to him in such terms as may seem to you to be sufficient, the expression of my displeasure, and call upon him at once, either to declare his readiness to serve under such local Major-Generals as hold a commission senior to his, or to resign his command to the next senior officer, and to return to the Company's provinces.

To this Major-General Nott simply answered, that having received the decision of the Governor-General as to his relative position with local Major-Generals, he could not for a moment hesitate in obeying his Lordship's orders. He only regretted that it was not communicated to him at an earlier period.

In this reply, Nott bowed to a necessity. He was so entirely resolved upon throwing up his command, that he had actually begun to pack up for a return to Bengal, and had written to his family to prepare them for his visit, when, to his consternation, he receives a communication from the Auditor-General, directing him to refund the sum of *nine thousand rupees*, which he had drawn as the allowance for commanding the 1st Division of the Army of the Indus! He was galled at this—appealed against so iniquitous a retrenchment, but for the sake of his children, submitted to all the mortification and loss which it involved.

I told you, that in the nineteenth century, they would not dare to hang me, but they are not ashamed thus meanly to rob me. I am sorry for this great loss on your account, did it only touch myself, I should laugh in scorn. This, of

*necessity*, has put a stop to my immediately throwing up my command; so, I was obliged to write to Lord A—to say, that as Government had *ordered* me to obey Fane Major-Generals, I must do so, in the event of my serving with them, which yet, I never will, if I can avoid it in *any* way. To refund this large sum, the Pay Department coolly propose to take possession of my six-months Batta donation, and to deduct 1500 rupees a-month from my pay bill, leaving me 500 rupees to wend my way with. This is, I must confess, a very disagreeable affair. You will perceive, that economy will be necessary. I will live almost upon the wind, to pay this *very honourable* and *just* debt! They have done their worst; my bones will not rest a bit the sooner in the tomb for their rascally conduct. I was fully entitled to every rupee of it, but as they cannot cut my throat, they empty my purse! They kindly offer me 2000 rupees out of nearly 10,000, if I will humbly ask for it. How much like the generous robber on the highway, who takes your watch, your precious ring from off your gentlemanly little finger, your purse of £500, and then generously gives you 20 shillings from your own money, to carry you home. If I can possibly arrange money matters, I will still quit this, and march for Calcutta. Why should I remain here? as I never will, if I can possibly avoid it, serve under a Fane General, if fifty orders were to come from England. As to the officers of the Indian army, they are a set of helots, and bear kicks like asses.—  
*Letter to the Misses Nott.*

## CHAPTER V.

1839—40.

THE ATTACK UPON AND CAPTURE OF KHELAT—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL NEIL CAMPBELL—NOTT AT CANDAHAR—POLITICALS—THE GHILZIE REBELLION—CAPTAIN ANDERSON'S OPERATIONS—CAPTAIN NICOLSON—THE EXPEDITION TO KHELAT-I-GHILZIE—THE PLUNDER BY PRINCE TIMOUR'S PEOPLE—THEIR PUNISHMENT BY GENERAL NOTT—CORRESPONDENCE—RETURN TO CANDAHAR.

As winter approached (1839), the condition of the troops at Quettah began to excite the most lively apprehension in the mind of Major-General Nott. Forage had become so scarce in the valley, that he was under the necessity of sending the camels to a distance of twelve miles in order to procure their natural food; and, to prevent their being captured, a guard was necessarily sent with them. No material was to be had for the construction of huts to protect the men from the falls of snow that might be expected; no straw for their bedding was to be procured. Firewood was scarce—in fact, none was to be obtained

but what the people brought in from a distance, for sale at extravagant prices. The shoes of the soldiery were fast wearing out, and there was none in store to replace them; no medicines were in the chest—no ammunition in the magazine. This last and somewhat necessary *matériel* of war had been forgotten by Sir John Keane. A supply had been given to the regiments at Shikarpore, but the greater part was expended on the march to Quettah, and many rounds were injured and rubbed in pouch. To add to the difficulty of getting through a winter in the valley, and effectually defending the position, the 31st and 42nd Regiments were now weakened by sickness, the consequence of the hardships they had endured in marching through the Pass.

Under all these circumstances, General Nott addressed the Government of India, recommending that the regiments should either be returned to Hindostan, or furnished with clothing to enable them to proceed and winter at Candahar. His reason and apology for addressing the Government were, that Sir John Keane might perhaps have left the troops in Afghanistan under a junior officer, upon his return to India, without giving him precise instructions. But Sir John had not omitted this part of his duty. An order of the 9th of October reached Nott, instructing him to march with half of his brigade to Candahar without delay.

While the General was making preparations for his march, he was called upon by the Political Agent at Quettah, to act against Mehrab Khan, the chief of

Khelat. The order of Sir John Keane, the letter of the Government sanctioning the employment of Major-General Willshire, and the fact of Willshire's being within a few marches of Quettah, were a bar to a compliance with this application. Nott urged, first, the orders; then the absurdity, on a military principle, of sending out a small detachment; thirdly, the convalescent state of the two native regiments; and lastly, the "indelicacy" of assuming a command which superior authority had delegated to another.

Major-General Willshire reached Quettah on the 31st of October, five days previous to which Nott marched to Candahar. Willshire found the country, as Nott had described it, perfectly denuded of forage, and was therefore obliged to send his cavalry and a large portion of his artillery to Cutch Gundava. With the residue of the force which he had brought with him from Caubul (the 2nd Queen's Royals, 17th Foot, six guns, two rissalahs of Local Horse), and the 31st Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, he advanced to Khelat, attacked the fortress, and carried it in spite of the desperate resistance of the garrison. Mehrab Khan and many of his Chiefs fell sword in hand. The troops under General Willshire displayed great gallantry, and a considerable amount of prize booty fell into their hands.\*

In the despatch of Major-General Willshire descriptive

\* Major-General Willshire received for his services on this occasion the distinction of K.C.B., and many officers were otherwise distinguished and rewarded.

of his march towards Khelat and subsequent operations, a paragraph occurs which is deserving of such further publicity as these pages may give, because it acknowledges the merit of a Company's officer in a line of military duty rarely treated with sufficient consideration in a General's despatches, and because also it was, strangely enough, omitted in the copy of the letter sent to the Horse Guards. The officer to whom reference is here made, is the present Lieutenant-Colonel Neil Campbell, of the Bombay army, who, at the time was the acting Quartermaster-General of the army.

"It is with much pleasure," writes General Willshire, "I take this opportunity of acknowledging my obligations to Major Campbell for relieving me from the necessity of returning by the route by which the army advanced to Caubul, which, being entirely exhausted, must have subjected the troops to great privations and the horses to absolute starvation; the Quartermaster-General took upon himself the responsibility of leading my column through the heart of the Ghilzie and Koohal countries, never hitherto traversed by Europeans, by which our route was considerably shortened, a sufficiency obtained, and great additions made to our geographical knowledge of the country, besides great political advantages obtained in peaceably settling those districts."

The rewards conferred upon the members of our military services have, almost invariably, exclusive reference to their conduct in the field. It is seldom

that distinction reaches the man whose chief merit lies in a judicious and timely application of his scientific knowledge. Thus has it fared with Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell. Had he been accidentally wounded at the head of a storming-party, the casualty would have been marked with the Companionship of the Bath: his geographical attainment, which saved lives and secured political advantages, remains to this hour unrequited.

Nott's march to Candahar formed a striking contrast to the disorderly and miserable movements of his predecessors through the same difficult line of country. From the southern foot of the Kojuck Pass, he writes:

I marched from Quettah on the 26th ultimo, and yesterday crossed the famous Kojuck Pass, where all the previous columns suffered so much from the difficulty of getting over the mountains (which are really *nearly* perpendicular), and from the mountain marauders; and where they *all* lost much public property. I have been lucky. I have only lost four bags of grain, and did not fire a shot. I am obliged to halt at the foot of the Pass, to refresh both men and camels. We marched at daylight yesterday morning, and did not get to our ground before evening; but the mountain-breeze was delightful. I walked almost the whole way, and on the previous day's march I did not mount my horse at all, but walked the whole way, and was the only officer who did so.

I have not received an answer from Government to letters from Quettah, and know not whether I shall be ordered back. They shall not degrade me, and the army in my

person, without my protesting against it to the last. If the army would take my advice, and send a *little* letter, of one *little* paragraph to England, they would have a Commander-in-Chief from their own army before six months, and therefore an end to their degradation. When I reflect upon your probable situation in the event of my not living to see you again, believe me, I feel the keenest misery. It renders me unhappy by day, and deprives me of rest at night, and I cannot throw the heavy weight from off my mind. I often attempt to write on this subject; but I cannot, and in fact, what could I say or do? Yet when I reckon the years that I have lived, and look at my snow-white head, and think of the uncertainty of life, especially a military life in a country like this, as you may well suppose, my feelings are anything but pleasant. I always thought that your dear mother would have been here *many, many years* after my frail body had become dust, but Providence has otherwise ordained, and I have only to pray that God may watch over and protect you.

Nott reached Candahar on the 13th of November. All the officers of the garrison went out two miles to meet him, a mark of attention which he ascribed to the persecutions he had suffered at the hands of General Keane. A week afterwards he describes his new quarters.

Here I am, in a house for the first time during the last thirteen months. It is an upper roomed one, and belongs to His Majesty. My friend, Sir J. Keane, had sent an order from Caubul, directing this house to be appropriated for the Commissariat treasury, I suspect, merely to prevent my getting it; however, the house is in the citadel, and as

I command the garrison, I set Sir John's order aside, and declared to the functionaries, that I *would* have it, in spite of Sir J. Keane's order. I accordingly ordered it to be vacated, and I am now writing to you from a snug corner-room, upstairs.

This is a large and very filthy city, containing about 80,000 inhabitants. There is one street, quite through the city, which is some fifty or sixty feet broad; all others are narrow. The crowd is so great, that a man has some difficulty in making his way, and the Affghans think nothing of elbowing a man out of *their* way. They know me already, and they coolly lay hold of my horse's bridle, and stop me to decide their disputes. I never go out here without being attended by four or six troopers, and all my orderlies. Will this satisfy your fears, Miss Charlotte, for my precious life? Well, but speaking of life, it is indeed a precarious kind of thing. You know how in my late letters I have been exulting in my good health; yet the day before yesterday, I was suddenly taken very ill indeed; first with a giddiness, then with a *dreadful* shivering fit and excruciating pains, and then with great sickness. I sent for Dr. Walker, a very clever fellow, more so than any one I have ever met with of his *trade*, and I am now *quite* well. But, my dear children, life is always uncertain, particularly so at my age; but the will of Providence be done.

The General was scarcely installed in his new command before he narrowly inspected the "Army of Candahar." His impressions of the incompetency of the force which he had at Quettah to capture Khelat, had been confirmed by the stubbornness of the resistance which Willshire's larger and much more efficient

brigade had experienced, and he was determined that the authorities in the north should not labour under the belief that he was commanding an effective body of men at Candahar, when he felt tolerably persuaded that from sickness and indiscipline, it was nearly effete. To Mr. Macnaghten, the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Soojah, he accordingly wrote.

I believe you are aware of the number of troops stationed at this place, yet I think it proper to note the following circumstances. The 42nd and 43rd Bengal Infantry are the only regular regiments at Candahar, and the former corps is still very sickly; but I am happy to say that the men have been gradually leaving the hospital from the date of the march of the regiments from Quettah.

Captain Garbett's company of foot artillery is here, but without a field-battery; they appear to have been left in charge of the battering-train—but there are no cattle to move these guns in the event of their being required.

His Majesty's 2nd Cavalry and 5th Regiment of Infantry are, from great sickness, quite inefficient and incapable of taking the common duties of the garrison.

His Majesty's 2nd Regiment of Infantry, under Captain Macan, marched from Candahar previous to my arrival, taking with them two guns from Captain Anderson's troop of horse artillery, thus leaving the force with only four field 6-pounder guns.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the state of the surrounding country, or the feelings of the people, to enable me to form a correct judgment of the force it would be desirable and necessary to have at this station; but I have seen sufficient to induce me to regret that the 31st Bengal

Infantry, and Lieutenant Cooper's horse artillery, were not directed to march to this city; they are most certainly not required in Shawl, especially as His Majesty's 1st Regiment of Infantry, and the Bolan Rangers, are stationed in that province.

In the event of any occurrence here, either within or without the walls, I should not have more than 1400 or 1500 men available. You know the extent of the city and its population, and must be much better acquainted with the state and feelings of the country than I can possibly be. I am told that the inhabitants are peaceably inclined; this may possibly be the case, and should there be no reaction or excitement from their former Sirdars the force here may be sufficient, notwithstanding the present total inefficiency of His Majesty's regiments.

Should you think it desirable, I can see no impediment to the march of the 31st Bengal Infantry, and Cooper's horse artillery from Quetta, to this city, at any time before the 1st of January next, provided their cattle have not been crippled by their march upon Khelat.

And again, on the 3rd of December, 1839.

I have the honour to acquaint you that I have inspected the 2nd Regiment of Cavalry, of His Majesty's army, under the command of Mr. Walker.

I think it my duty to acquaint you that the regiment is quite inefficient. The majority of the men are of that description which assures me they never can be brought to any serviceable state. It may be possible to select 250 or 300 men who in time may be rendered fit for the duty of irregular cavalry. *Out of seven hundred and five horses I conceive that there are not at present more than fifty fit for*

any kind of duty, and not more than about two hundred that ever can, even if they were well fed, become efficient for the service. There are about eighty dismounted men who are without the means of purchasing horses.

Looking to the great expense which must be incurred by keeping up this corps, and being decidedly of opinion that the regiment never can be of any service to the state, I would strongly recommend that it should be ordered to return to Hindostan, and be disbanded; or that 300 of the best of the men and horses should be selected, and the remainder sent back and discharged.

I have also inspected Captain Anderson's troop of His Majesty's horse artillery, and I found it in every particular in the best possible order; this troop, and the troop under Lieutenant Cooper, now in Shawl, would do credit to any army.

No particular notice seems to have been taken of these representations. The authorities at Caubul had their hands full. Shah Soojah's throne was not destined to prove a bed of roses. The supporters of Dost Mahomed in the Hindoo Kosh, the perseverance of Russian intrigue, and the advance of a Russian army towards Khiva, added to the active hostility of the Affghan Chiefs, who were averse to the new order of things, kept the Head-Quarter force continually on the alert.

Nott, therefore, contented himself with taking steps to improve the health and the discipline of the force at his disposal, and to restore order and confidence among the peasantry of Lower Affghanistan. He

could not, however, escape the nuisance of a young "political" colleague. A Major Leech was appointed to look after the native chieftains, and to control the operations of the General,\* and for two or three months affairs proceeded smoothly enough, though it was quite apparent to General Nott that much dis-

\* Some notion may be gathered of the various duties which political officers are expected to perform in India from the following letter, addressed by Mr. Ross Bell to General Nott, in July 1839, when it was determined to have one of these hybrids at Dadur. It will appear that they are expected to be dawk or post-masters, grain dealers, and political negotiators.

"The duties to be performed by the officer whom you may depute to Dadur to officiate as Political Assistant there until relieved by Lieutenant Postans, are: first, to place the dawk between Bagh and the northern crest of the Bolan Pass on the same footing as has been arranged by Captain Bean on the side of Shawl; and, secondly, to induce the tribes who inhabit the country between Dadur and Kirta, to place themselves under the protection, and enter the service of the British Government.

"It will be of great advantage that the officer deputed by you, before proceeding to Dadur, should place himself in communication with, and receive advice from Captain Bean, by whom considerable progress has been made in conciliating the mountain tribes. I am desirous also that he should (while at Dadur) correspond with Captain Bean, and cooperate with him in all arrangements made with the native Chiefs, and for securing the dawk communication through the Pass.

"Another duty to be performed by the officer, whom you may depute to Dadur, is that of collecting supplies of grain from the neighbouring country. The object in establishing a depot at Dadur is to supply the troops under your command at a cheaper rate than can be done from the provinces of Shawl and Moostang, and to have provisions in readiness for a strong detachment which will march from hence early in October for the purpose of occupying the province of Cutchee."

content prevailed among the chieftains who had become attached to the rule of Dost Mahomed. The snow in and about Candahar falls heavily; this, while it interrupted communication between the different towns held by the British troops and those of Shah Soojah, kept the mountain tribes in check, and gave to the General improved health and elasticity of spirits. He writes very cheerfully on the 1st of February, 1840.

Candahar, Feb. 1, 1840.

MY DEAR CHILDREN,

The last letter I received from you was of the 17th of December. I fear that the dawks, if we get any, will be very irregular, and much delayed; the road between Candahar and Caubul is completely blocked up by snow. I believe the road *via* Shawl and the Bolan Pass may be passable still, with some difficulty by the dawk cossids, but we have had no post for some days. The day after I last wrote to you, we had a fall of snow here, which was succeeded by a most *biling* frost for several days. To-day we have had another fall of snow. I have had all my doors shut, and am now writing in a small room, with a large fire close on my left hand, and a small glass-door, which I had made on my arrival here, on my right, and I can assure you when I look out at the snow falling, I fancy myself very snug. It is cold for the Hindostanee servants; I give them all plenty of firewood to keep them alive; but it is a very dear article at this place. I expended forty maunds last month. I must confess that during the last ten days I have enjoyed this climate greatly; for although the frost has been severe, it is so different from the moist, foggy atmosphere of England, a fine clear sky, and such a bracing breeze, with

a bright sun, which, though you don't feel heat from it, renders everything delightful. For the last eight days I have been three or four hours each day on horseback, galloping in every direction, always at full speed, wrapped up in my large military cloak. I can assure you it is no *joke* for the orderly troopers who follow me in my rambles. I am delighted with my bay horse; he is so spirited that he sometimes troubled me during our march to the Indus; but we now understand each other, and my voice is sufficient to make him behave properly. I have only once mounted the grey Arab since my arrival at Candahar; but he is a great favourite, and what I call a good *stand-by* in the event of hard work coming. This, though somewhat similar, is really a much finer climate than England. Here we go to parade after breakfast, instead of the barbarous hour usual in Hindostan. Yesterday I had four regiments out at exercise. We did not commence before ten o'clock; and although I galloped for half an hour across the plain of Candahar, before the parade was ready, and a great deal during the movements of the troops, for upwards of two hours, I still remained cold.

As the season opens, the beauties of nature in the valley of Candahar expand before the eyes of the old soldier, in whom the charms of a country life had never been extinguished.

I went this evening to take a walk in a garden which belonged to the late Chiefs of Candahar, and on which very large sums of money must have been expended. It was the first time I ever wished you in this country. This garden is about a mile round. I will not attempt to describe it; it surpasses everything of the kind I could possibly have

imagined: the thousands and thousands of fruit-trees, all in full blossom, the apple, the pear, the plum, the apricot, various kinds of grapes, peaches, and a hundred other fruits, astonished me. Such a garden alone would be a handsome fortune in England. Then the flowers and the ten thousand rose-trees! It was a most enchanting scene.

Of the nature of Nott's frank intercourse with the people, we have a glimpse in the annexed paragraph of a letter of April, 1840.

I like the people, in spite of all that has been said of them. True, the poorest man you can meet places himself perfectly on a par with you; but though free and bold in their remarks, there is no want of respect; so different from the mean, cringing people of Bengal. I go into their villages and their gardens for ten miles around, and I always find the people very civil. Last evening, I passed through five or six villages, and people came running up to me with bunches of flowers, and if I merely took them into my hand, they appeared to be gratified. They are a warm and passionate people; but then they are so thoroughly *good-tempered*, and always cheerful. I must say that I like them; and if I were some years younger, and without the family motives for returning which I have, I should feel no objection to taking up my abode among them for good. I cannot believe that they have ever behaved ill to our officers, or to any of our people, unless where they were *first* injured or insulted. I have at this moment near 5,000 troops, and I dare say double that number of Hindostanee camp-followers in the garrison and city of Candahar, and of course among so many (there are full 70,000 inhabitants in the city) there must be some daily disputes and frequent com-

plaints; but on investigation, I have never once found the Affghan in the wrong, and am constantly obliged to punish the Hindostanee; nor have I ever yet found an Affghan telling an untruth, whereas the Hindostanee appears wedded to falsehood. The Affghans bringing in the produce of the country for sale, never ask but one price, and will not take less; the cringing Hindoo will not understand this, and thus disputes arise; but a mere child may go into the market, or a shop, and bring away any article, just as cheap as the most keen and knowing grown-up person could do.

The same cheerful spirit and generous disposition are apparent in later letters, and circumstances occurred to render existence more tolerable. Late in April, Nott received a Government order for the division allowance of which he had erroneously and illiberally been mulcted. The repayment of four thousand rupees formed, as he expressed it, the nest-egg of a little purse for his children, and enabled him to add to his own comfort. He placed glazed doors and windows in his house, and suspended a Bengal punkah—the first ever seen in Candahar—in the largest room.

In the beginning of April, 1840, Major Leech, the Political Agent at Candahar, discovered that the Ghilzie Chiefs, who were routed in the previous year by Captain Outram, and fled to Sultan Mahomed Khan, had now returned to, and re-occupied their forts, and raised the standard of rebellion. His report to this effect reaching the Envoy at Caubul, Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had succeeded to the command of the forces in

Affghanistan, on the departure of Sir John Keane, wrote privately to Nott for further information. The letter of Sir Willoughby, which displays a good deal of the *bonhomie* of his character,\* is curiously illustrative of the Russo-phobia which afflicted all orders of men at this time. Soldiers who had marched from India, through the inhospitable defiles of Affghanistan, were disinclined to relinquish the idea of finding a foe-man "worthy of their steel."

(Private and Confidential.)

Camp at Jellalabad,  
April 14, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I purpose breaking up the cantonment here on the 20th, and moving the different corps from hence as follows: Head-quarters and one squadron of cavalry (2nd Regiment), and the two companies of the 27th, on the 20th.

The 2nd N.I., the Depot, Abbott's battery, and the ammunition with Irregular Horse, on the 27th; the remaining two squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry, the 37th, and Treasure and Commissariat, on the 28th.

The European regiment and 48th N.I., under Lieutenant-General Wheeler will move on the 28th to Kiedjja, a desirable

\* Sir Willoughby Cotton was a good specimen of the British officer who had experience of camps and Courts. After serving in the Peninsula with the Guards, he had had the advantage of becoming an aide-de-camp of His Majesty George IV., who took pleasure in his society. He served with distinction in the Burmese war of 1824-5; was appointed Deputy Adjutant-General of the Royal forces; in 1839-40 went through the campaign in Affghanistan, and soon after his return home, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, in which capacity he won universal regard.

and elevated spot, twenty-seven miles from hence, under the Suffied Kosh.

We have long had vague rumours of the Russians having advanced a considerable force to Khiva, and the Emperor's manifesto announced that troops were ordered to march upon that territory, but the Government information did not make them more than 5,000 men. But despatches were received yesterday, by the Envoy and Minister from Calcutta, which announce that the recent overland mail had brought authentic information, that the amount of the force was 16,000 infantry, a considerable artillery (20 light pieces), and 1600 Cossack cavalry. The avowed intention is, that they are not to proceed beyond the Khiva territory, to which they have advanced to punish the Khan for entrapping and keeping in slavery a number of Russian subjects. But as the King of Bokhara has also men of that description in his dominions, I should not be surprised if they detached 5,000 men to that capital.

Although I have not the least idea they will move on Balk, or threaten our frontier, yet it behoves us to be prepared as far as our means will admit, which can only be done by the assembling a respectable force at Caubul, to be in readiness to move a brigade on to Bamean, and thence, if necessary, to seize the passes of the Hindoo Kosh. The great mischief of having the Russians on the Oxus will be, not the apprehension that they will advance beyond it, but its being the means of exciting the bad passions of every discontented Chief in Affghanistan, and calling into activity every one who is averse to the rule and dynasty of his present Majesty.

The Envoy has also reports, I believe from Major Leech, that the Ghilzie Chiefs, who were routed by Captain Outram last year, and fled to Sultan Mahomed Khan, have returned,

and reoccupied their forts, and are now in actual rebellion. If this is *really* true, the work must be done over again. Major Leech also wishes a regiment to be sent from Candahar to Khelat-i-Ghilzie. I should not think it expedient for you to break up your own force by sending one of the native regular corps, and hope one of the King's (Shah Soojah) corps may be available for this service, should the Envoy determine upon it.

But you will much oblige me by giving me your ideas upon this point, and also of the real state of the Ghilzie country, of which you will be a more competent judge where you are than I am here.

Believe me, my dear General,

Faithfully yours,

WILLOUGHBY COTTON,  
Major-General.

Major-General Nott,  
Camp at Candahar.

Nott replied to this communication in a kindred spirit. He had been no inattentive observer of the political horizon, and, apart from the subject which concerned his immediate command, he was enabled to take a tolerably broad view of the events passing to the North-west, and the North-east. His answer to Sir Willoughby may be given at length, for it repays perusal.

Candahar, April 25, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have had the pleasure of receiving your note of the 14th instant, and am thankful for the information you have so kindly given me. You will have received my despatch,

stating that Sultan Mahomed Khan had again appeared with another marauder, Gool Mahomed Khan (Gooroo), on the Ghuzni road, cutting off our dawks and wounding the cossids. I immediately detached a party of His Majesty's 2nd Cavalry, and a small party of the 4th Local Horse, in all 210 men, under Captain Taylor and Captain Walker. They were accompanied by Samud Khan, Chief of the Tuckee Ghilzies and a party of Affghans. As they are both active, zealous officers, I trust they will succeed in capturing Sultan Mahomed Khan. Gool Mahomed Khan (Gooroo) is an old offender and a clever rogue, and having his spies in Candahar and Caubul, I fear he will escape, although the march from Candahar of Taylor and Walker was secret and sudden, they having received their first orders late in the evening, and were off before daylight. I have just received a letter from Captain Taylor, saying that he had received information that the chiefs had left the Caubul road, and were in a walled village at some distance. Taylor had that day made a long march, and he intended to make an advance on that night, and surround the place. Should he not be able to enter the village with his Horse, he has been directed to keep a good look-out, and prevent all chance of escape until Captain Codrington's infantry joins him.

I am in hourly expectation of hearing from him, when I shall be able to judge whether it will be necessary to reinforce him. It will never do to allow these marauders to insult us at our very doors, and keep the country in an unsettled and agitated state; the revenue can never be fully collected and realized for His Majesty's Treasury, nor the merchant pass in safety, until these men are extirpated, and their forts destroyed. I am a strong advocate for conciliatory measures where practicable, but with the Ghilzies severe

coercion must precede conciliation. As forage is abundant in the neighbourhood of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, I think it would be desirable to station half the 2nd Cavalry there; however, this must depend upon the information of the next few days. Looking to the small force which you have in this country, I think, under present circumstances, that no detachments should be sent from the 42nd and 43rd Regiments; but that they should be kept together, and in the most complete and best order to answer any coming event; this will be prudent. I am happy to say that these two corps are now in excellent health; even if it were convenient to relieve them by troops from Hindostan, it would not be desirable; they are now acclimated, and therefore one regiment, in my opinion, is equal to two fresh from the provinces.

I am sorry that the 31st was ordered back; there was no necessity for it. But my opinion was not asked, nor was any reference made to me on the subject, and a corps was absolutely withdrawn from my brigade, and sent across the Indus, without my being honoured with the least intimation to this day, and I now only know from the newspapers and common report that they have returned to the plains.

With reference to the concluding part of your note, I would observe, that I have no means of getting information, but that of conversing with the people of the country, such as merchants, horse dealers, &c., whom I occasionally fall in with in my rides; and perhaps much reliance cannot be placed on their accounts. From these I draw the following conclusions: that the Russian force marching on Khiva is much more considerable than generally supposed, upwards of 24,000 men with 70 pieces of cannon; that Kamran's Minister, Yar Mahomed, is in close correspondence with the Russians; and that, under pretence

of sending his son into Persia on private business, these people tell me, that I shall find that the youth has been sent to the Russian head-quarters, where missions from Persia and Bokhara had actually arrived.

That Yar Mahomed will eventually sell his master to the highest bidder, I have no doubt. I should suppose that any advance of the Russians beyond Khiva, will depend entirely on European politics, unless, indeed, they make the slave case a pretext for sending half their large force to Bokhara; at any rate, should Russia differ with England in Europe, their army at Khiva will have reached a fair starting-post to annoy us. No man can be so blind as to believe for one moment, that Russia would send such an overwhelming force merely to recover some 200 slaves from the petty state of Khiva, when 4,000 or 5,000 would have easily accomplished such an object. Should the state of Europe be such as to induce the Russian army to advance, I think Herat will be the first and chief object; their game will probably be to advance two columns—the one upon Caubul, accompanied by Dost Mahomed; and the other upon Herat accompanied by the late Chiefs of Candahar. I really can see no great difficulty in a march from Khiva or Bokhara to Herat; water, certainly, would at times be rather scarce, but there is no impediment but what may easily be overcome, and in the present state of our information, they will have accomplished more than a third of their march, before we can hear of their move. If they gain Herat, the safety of Afghanistan must be precarious indeed, and the moral influence would be instantly felt throughout Hindostan, Nepaul, and Burmah; the whole of Asia would be in an agitated state, and the dormant enmity of every petty chief would be roused, and be brought into full activity.

You must be a better judge than I am of the feelings of the people of Afghanistan, but I will not conceal my opinion from you, however erroneous that opinion may be. I believe they would almost to a man join the chief, Dost Mahomed Khan, but I am of opinion, few would join the late Chiefs of Candahar. Then again, it must not, it cannot, be doubted, but that the Russian Government have large reserves ready to reinforce and support their Khiva army, already so far advanced. They have followed the trade of war too long, not to know the necessity of a strong base and good communications. I am, of course, in the dark regarding the political wishes or intentions of the British Government, but I should think, that if they advance any considerable force beyond Bamean, it would immediately afford a plausible excuse for the Russians, in connexion with the King of Bokhara (and that these powers are in close alliance, I have no doubt), to advance a column as far as Balk at least; and this is the game they wished to play, feeling their way by degrees, and intriguing with the restless and marauding disposition of the people of these countries, and keeping the whole of Asia in a state of agitation, until some favourable moment for striking a decisive blow at our power. And, indeed, under this view of the subject, if we had a larger force, it would be better that they should be induced to advance immediately; but our force on this side of the Indus, is not sufficient, nor could you depend upon any portion of the Shah's subjects, whereas the love of change, the hope of plunder, and the deadly hatred against certain princes, would give the Russian army 50,000 horsemen to cover their advance upon the Indus. Then the discordant elements in your rear, the rival chiefs of the Punjab! For, admitting that treaties and self-interests would confirm Kurruck Singh in our favour, there is a heavy

cloud in Cashmere ready to burst over our heads on the slightest check, or the least retreat.

But, after all, the fair chances are, that the Russians will not advance, unless some false move of ours should afford them an excuse; however, it is just possible, and in that case, with the small force at your command, you will have a difficult card to play. As to what you say, regarding our seizing the Passes, I would remark, that we are very ignorant of the country between Caubul, Bamean, and Syghan, and thence to Balk, and we have only heard of the old beaten road of traffic; but you well know, that there is no Pass in any country, no strong position, that may not be turned, and that a strong position turned, is equal, and perhaps more than equal, to a victory gained by mere fighting, especially when gained by an invading force, when the benefit becomes incalculable and probably decisive of a campaign, unless indeed you have a large reserve to receive and support the troops so turned; and, in your case, where is this reserve, this necessary support? Why, truly, on the left bank of the Suttlej, with a warlike and not very friendly nation, having an army of 100,000 men, besides four or five deep and rapid rivers between you and these supports. Under present circumstances, we have advanced too far by sending troops to Bamean; and yet some senseless, unthinking people talk of pushing a weak brigade as far as Balk; whereas, unless you get large reinforcements, it is possible that you will find some difficulty in holding your ground at Caubul and in the Kyber Pass.

I must apologize for writing thus freely; but, kept in the background, as I have been during the expedition to this country, I must confess your letter gratified me, and I have noted my crude ideas on the subject by return of hawk; but I dare say these ideas are very erroneous, as circum-

stances have not been such as to induce me to give that attention which, I admit, every officer of rank ought to pay to the subject.

I am,

W. NOTT.

Sir W. Cotton.

Within a fortnight of the dispatch of the foregoing letter, the rebel Ghilzie Chiefs, Gool Mahomed and Sultan Mahomed Khan assembled a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, with the view of cutting off the communication between Caubul and Candahar. Intelligence to this effect reaching Major-General Nott, he immediately detached Captain A. W. Taylor of the Bengal Europeans, with two rissalahs of the Shah's cavalry, and a party of the Bengal Local Horse, under Lieutenant Walker, supported by a detachment of infantry, under Captain Codington, to confront and disperse the rebels. Subsequent information induced the Major-General to reinforce these parties by detaching Her Majesty's 5th Regiment of infantry, under Captain Woodburn, and four guns of the 2nd troop of Horse Artillery, the whole under the command of Captain W. Anderson.

On the 16th of May, Anderson came up, at Tazee, with the force under the rebel Chiefs, consisting of 3,000 men. The infantry and guns marched direct upon Tazee, while the cavalry took circuitous routes for the purpose of surprising the enemy. Anderson formed on a neighbouring eminence, with Lieutenant Spence

supporting him on the left; but before Captain Woodburn, who had orders to form on the right, could get into position, the ravines in that direction were filled with men, from whom he suffered much, and who were only to be dislodged by a shower of grape and a smart attack from the rear. The guns, says an eye-witness, formed in fine style upon the horsemen, who twice crossed to attack Spence's flank, and suffered severely from the guns in passing. The enemy then charged, and were met gallantly at the point of the bayonet by Spence's men, which sadly discomfited them, and they presently fled. In the meantime Captain Taylor, hearing the report of the guns, changed the direction of his march, and took the enemy in flank. The loss of the Ghilzies was not under 200 men.

Nott, in communicating the result of these operations to Sir Willoughby Cotton, spoke in warm terms of the judgment, decision, and gallantry which had marked the arrangements of Captain Anderson, and the manner of their execution; and likewise praised the discretion of Captain Taylor in not attacking until he had received reinforcements. He, at the same time, urged as a reason for not delaying proceedings until he could hear from Caubul, the importance of preventing the tribes from assembling in greater numbers.

The defeat of the Ghilzies, at Tazee, had, however, but "scotched the snake." The main strength of the tribe was concentrated at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and an opinion was formed at Caubul that a very considerable

force, with a skilful commander would be necessary to crush the rebellion entirely. Sir Willoughby Cotton decided on entrusting the duty to Major-General Nott.

"I have confided," wrote Cotton from Caubul, on the 15th of May, "the command of the force to be employed in tranquillizing the Ghilzie country to you, having the fullest reliance on your experience, zeal and ability, and requiring, as it does, an officer possessing those qualities to guide it."

Sir Willoughby formed a force consisting of detachments from Caubul, under Colonel Wallace, and from Ghuzni, under Major McLaren, of the 16th Grenadiers, to unite with a body of the troops from Candahar. Nott, however, could not perceive the necessity for so large a force. His information, generally good in itself, but always received *cum grano*, did not make the Ghilzies so formidable as they had been represented to Messrs. Nicolson, Leech, and other Political Agents. Moreover, he had obtained, from the prisoners taken at Tazee, letters which had been addressed to them by chieftains residing in Candahar, urging the Ghilzies to draw out the General and the best part of his regulars, that they might in the meanwhile massacre the troops in the town, and he therefore judged that it would be most unwise to withdraw any troops from Candahar.\*

\* As I did not think it could interest you, I had determined not to mention the following; but as I have nothing to communicate, I may as well fill my paper with the little story, as it will show you the situation we are in here. We have not the least information of what is going on round us, and this story came to light by mere chance. I dare

Altogether he thought the expedition quite unnecessary; but as it was ordered, and his appointment to the command had been made agreeable to his feelings by a proper tribute to his professional worth, he did not scruple to go forth, taking with him, as a small escort, part of the 43rd N.I., his favourite corps.

The "political" settlement of the Ghilzies was entrusted to a young officer, named Peter Nicolson, who

say I have told you that the good city of Candahar contains 80,000 inhabitants, and that for their comfort, I had, before sending out detachments under Anderson, about 5,000 men to take care that no one should disturb the happy tenour of their days. Well, the two rebel Chiefs assembled their tribes, and certain head men in the city of Candahar took council how everything was to be carried on. On perceiving that I sent Shah's troops only against the Chiefs, they sent horsemen to congratulate these people, and in writing too (simple people), telling them "that the Shah's troops were low Hindostanees, with few officers, and that they would not fight; at least, that they, the Chiefs, would soon defeat them, which would oblige the General Sahib to march out with the 42nd and 43rd Regiments, when we, the good people of Candahar, will not fail to murder every individual, European and Hindostanee, belonging to the corps left in the city. All we ask is for you to amuse the General Sahib and the two regiments, whilst we do the work!" Great was their surprise, loud their wa! was! when the news arrived, that the Shah's regiments had fought bravely, and that their friends, the rebels, were destroyed, and that there was no occasion for the General Sahib to leave their sweet company. Now, unfortunately for these gentlemen, some of the prisoners have confessed the whole plot, and the letters of some of the chief men here will be returned for their trembling perusal. But the best of it is, a great man, placed by Shah Soojah to guide in the right path the two hopeful Princes at Candahar, is found to be one of the chief instigators to rebellion! Perhaps I have never told you that my next door neighbours are two grown-up sons of the Shah, one of them a preciously disreputable scoundrel.—*Letter to his children, June 2, 1840.*

had been an aide-de-camp on the staff of Lord Auckland. He was young, enthusiastic, tolerably clever, and not a little vain of his trust. There is a patronizing air about his private letter to the General, in which he announces his appointment, that is at least very amusing.

(Private.)

Caulul, May 13, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

The Envoy has announced to you my being entrusted with the settlement of the Ghilzie tribes; I need not therefore apologize for this intrusion. But permit me to express to you my great satisfaction at finding the force to co-operate in my endeavours under the command of one for whom I entertain so high a respect as Major-General Nott, and to assure you how willing a coadjutor you will ever find me; and that should fortune so far favour us as to give us really warm occupation, how rejoiced I shall be at the long-delayed opportunity of your acquiring those distinctions which have hitherto not been ceded to you! I propose quitting Caulul to-morrow with Christie's Horse, which I am happy to say is strong in numbers and far from bad in condition. Colonel McLaren, with a wing of the 16th N.I. and two guns, will join us at Ghuzni, and then we shall proceed towards Khelat-i-Ghilzie. I hope to reach that place early in June, and shall be much obliged by your instructing Captain Anderson, or the officer now in command there, whether he is to join our force previous to your arrival or await your coming. Sir Willoughby Cotton has sent a small party of sappers with the detachment, and Lieutenant Pigou, of the Engineers, has been ordered to join it.

I shall be obliged by a free communication of your wishes and intentions, which you will ever find me ready to attend

to, to the utmost of my power. Captain Christie's regiment is *en route* to join your division at Candahar, and Captain Anderson's is to come up to Caubul.

I much fear the Ghilzies will all have dispersed ere we reach Khelat. The crops being nearly ripe, renders any *permanent* gathering very unlikely at this season.

I remain,

My dear General,

With great respect,

Yours very faithfully,

P. NICOLSON,

In Political Charge of the Expedition.

To Major-General Nott,  
Commanding Force in the Ghilzie country.

The chief grounds for the expedition to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, were the determination of the Ghilzies not to recognise the authority of the Chiefs whom Shah Soojah had appointed to govern the district and collect the revenue. To be satisfied, however, of the integrity of the movement against them, Sir Willoughby Cotton requested Captain Nicolson to supply him with the fullest information in his power; and upon the replies to Sir Willoughby's queries, with the addition of certain *renseignemens*, which reached the Envoy from other private sources, the expedition was forwarded. The history of the expedition can scarcely be complete or even intelligible without these questions and answers.

*Memorandum for Sir W. Cotton, G.C.B. and K.C.H.,  
commanding in Affghanistan.*

Having been requested by Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, G.C.B. and K.C.H., commanding in Affghanistan, to furnish him with a memorandum of the opposition likely to be experienced by a force about to proceed to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, I proceed to answer the General's queries *seriatim*. But I may be permitted to mention, that as any information relative to countries unvisited hitherto by any Europeans must necessarily be crude and indefinite, and frequently erroneous, some of the remarks which I now submit should be received, not as certainties, but probabilities.

*Question 1.* What strength is the enemy the force is likely to be opposed to?

*Answer.* Possibly the mere presence of a commanding force, *in petto*, may obviate all necessity for actual operations, as His Majesty's object is to reclaim, rather than punish, his misguided subjects. But we should be prepared to encounter, if necessary, the whole strength of the Hotukee and Tohkee tribes. Past experience has shown us that the three tribes can muster 12,000 men, and that the Suliman Kheil, which is now detached from the alliance, mustered 6,000. The utmost force, then, that could (without external aid) be brought against us, would be the remaining. But the combination of all these is highly improbable, as feuds exist among them, and we would strive to widen the breaches. Moreover, the central position of Khelat would tend to distract the Ghilzies, and prevent the tribes on one side of it joining the others, since none could tell which would be the first object of attack.

*Question 2.* Where are they supposed now to be? what forts and what strength are they? and where situated?

*Answer.* The two clans above named occupy the territories south of Mookoor, between the Paropamisan range and that reaching to Mummye and the valley of the Turnack, sixty miles long by twenty broad. Their forts are very numerous, and some are very strong, especially that of the late Ghilzie King Abdoorraham, in Mummye. Previous, however, to troops being called upon to proceed against any of these forts, ample information shall be given the officer commanding, as to its position, strength and garrison; but to enumerate all would take reams of paper, and be unnecessary, since most, and I sincerely trust all, the tribes will quietly submit.

*Question 3.* What supplies may be looked for?

*Answer.* Wheat, attah, barley, sheep, grass and straw in abundance on the line of road and at Khelat. In the event of an attack on any fort or tribe, the ripe crops are at our disposal.

*Question 4.* Is not the force under Captain Taylor, at present acting against the refractory Chiefs, sufficient; or if not, will not the aid of the Shah's troops now moving up be enough to put down any symptom of insurrection, and also ensure the revenue being paid regularly to His Majesty?

*Answer.* Decidedly not, in a political sense. It was deemed competent to attack a small gang of robbers, but I am not aware of its having any orders to act against any refractory tribes or Chiefs. My inexperience, as well as my position, disqualify me from offering any military opinion of its fitness. I can only, therefore, enumerate what I believe to be the strength of the force now moving up—namely, one

troop of Christie's Horse and two companies of drafts for Captain Craigie's regiment.

The Chiefs of the above-named tribes are exiles. The new Chiefs have been unable to establish the King's authority over them; to effect which—namely, the establishment of His Majesty's power on a firm basis—was the object avowed in the Governor-General's proclamation of November, 1838, and I consider the immediate subjection of the Ghilzies a point of vital importance at the present moment, surrounded as we are by enemies, any of whom might be joined by the Ghilzies, if measures were not taken to secure them in our interests. All, therefore, who do not submit, should be deprived of the power of injuring us. Whether a portion of the Shah's force is competent to effect this, it would be presumptuous in me to say; but his high rank and great experience constitute Sir Willoughby Cotton the best judge of this point.

But to the consequences of any failure or mishap, arising from the want of heavy artillery, of scaling-ladders, or the inexperience of the troops, I cannot but be painfully alive, and should therefore regret most deeply to see the Shah's force, in its present state, employed without the experience of a veteran leader and the example of our oft-tried sepoys to direct and lead them to victory.

I neither anticipate nor advocate following the tribes into the hills. If they abscond, their strongholds will fall into our hands, and our objects be gained. But as I before observed, I anticipate universal submission to a powerful force, and fear that an inadequate one would encourage resistance.

(Signed)

P. NICOLSON,  
On Special Service.

Caulul, May 8, 1840.

The results of the movement towards Khelat-i-Ghilzie, were exactly what Nott had expected. There was little or no resistance; the forts were destroyed, and the rebel Chiefs fled to the hills, or submitted.

To preserve the tranquillity thus established, arrangements were now to be made for leaving a force in the Ghilzie country, and to this end the erection of cantonments, and the repair and strengthening certain fortresses became the question of the hour. So many and such contrary opinions were held by the political officers on this head, that the authorities at Caubul very properly consulted General Nott, and he submitted his views upon the subject, with his customary frankness and intelligence. Respecting the fort of Zohak, and station of Hoolan Robart, he wrote:

Zohak appears to me to have been a fortified city of great extent, I would say half as large as Candahar, surrounded by a broad high rampart, with certain outworks, the hillocks of which still remain, and would command and give cover to any force advancing against a fortified post erected on a smaller scale upon the site of the old fort and city. On a supposition that the contemplated post should be on a scale for 1,200 or 1,500 men, all the external hillocks must be levelled, and at least one-third of the old ramparts destroyed; and they are of that size and extent, that the levelling or removing them would be attended with enormous expense and great labour; besides, including the proposed new fort, it would cost ten times as much as would be necessary for buildings on another spot to give cover to 1,200 men, with certain works for their defence. These works would be very

trifling, always bearing in mind the improbability of artillery being brought against such a post.

I am aware that these ramparts and hillocks may be partially blown up, as stated by the engineer officer; but I conceive that this would not remove the evil, or much reduce the expense, as the quantity of rubbish must still be levelled or removed.

In regard to the situation of Hoolan Robart, taking into consideration the whole of the neighbouring country, together with the passes leading to the Urguandab River, I think no better could be selected for a cantonment to give protection to and keep in awe the whole district. The old fort of Zohak is, in my opinion, too near the range of western mountains, which are about eight hundred feet above the level of the plain, and from which the old fort is overlooked, but not commanded, as stated in your letter. The distance, I would say, is two miles and a half; still it would be desirable to have the new cantonment at least a mile farther from the mountain and entrance to the Hoolan Robart Pass.

I believe I am right when I believe that the intention of Government is to cause a fortified post to be erected, capable of giving shelter and protection to 1,000 or 1,200 men against any sudden attack or rising of discontented Chiefs, and this may be done at comparatively trifling cost; whereas I feel convinced that any attempt to revive the fort of Zohak, or to reduce its ramparts, would be attended with endless expense, and, after all, would not fulfil the intentions of Government. There are many eligible spots at and near Hoolan Robart for a fortified post.

Having thus stated my opinion on the fort of Zohak, I beg to note the following:

I conceive it is too late in the season to commence the

contemplated works, and quite impossible to get them ready to shelter the troops from the frost and snow, which must set in early at an elevation of eight thousand feet above the sea. The absence of material, and the difficulty of procuring workmen, would necessarily occasion great delay and render it a work of time.

2. As any great danger to the country can only arise from marauders, while the ripe corn is on the ground, I would suggest that Captain Woodburn's corps, 200 or 300 of Christie's Horse, and the two guns under Lieutenant Green, should take up a position at this place, and remain here until the bad weather, or frost and snow commences, and Woodburn's corps and the cavalry should then retire to Candahar, and Lieutenant Green with his guns to Ghuzni. Should the Envoy and Minister think it expedient, this force, or a similar one, could return early in the spring, which, I conceive, would answer every purpose, as the marauders would have no object in assembling as long as the snow may remain deep on the ground.

Of course, the troops could not winter here in tents, and I feel convinced, that no buildings could be erected in time. Should it be the pleasure of Government to have a fortified post at Hoolan Robart, the engineer officer could collect his materials, and commence his works early in the spring.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Yours obediently,

W. NOTT.

To Captain Douglas,  
Adjutant-General, Caubul.

This soldier-like official letter was followed by a private communication to Sir Willoughby Cotton.

Camp Hoolan Robart, July 2, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have just received letter No. 283, of the 28th ultimo, from your Adjutant-General, Captain Douglas. The instructions therein contained, shall be strictly attended to. I regret that my report on the fort of Zohak had not reached you on the 28th; I lost no time in sending it, having dispatched it the morning following the receipt of your orders to report.

I have again examined the whole, and can only say, that in my opinion a lac of rupees would not accomplish the work proposed by the political officer and the engineer, and even then it would not be an eligible spot for a post; and yet, I hear, that an estimate has been sent in amounting to 11,000 rupees only! In consequence of circumstances which have occurred, I do not feel quite easy at leaving Captain Woodburn with his corps at this place. I will give it my best consideration, and act accordingly. At Khelat-i-Ghilzie he would be comparatively safe from all attack, and would be on the high road, and could be speedily supported from Candahar, and there is forage for the party of horse, which I must in prudence leave with him. Should I decide on directing him to take post at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and should you disapprove of my decision, the regiment can retrace its steps to this place.

The fact is, that the plunder, the robbery, and cruel oppression, committed by the servants and followers of His Highness Prince Timour, have been such as to outrage the feelings of the natives; and sure I am that, should opportunity offer, these cruel and shameful proceedings will be retaliated upon the troops left in this country. Never in all history have I read of such plunder, cruelty, and oppression as I witnessed in this camp. Not wishing to

interfere in the least with the camp-followers of His Highness, I continually referred these complaints to the Political Agent; but the system of robbery has not diminished, and is increasing daily. The houses and cornfields of the unfortunate inhabitants are entered, their property plundered, and the owners cut and wounded in the most cruel manner. The plundered property being brought into my camp, these people naturally come to me for redress; my whole time is taken up by their cries for protection. This very evening my tent was completely surrounded by a number of men, who, in endeavouring to save their property, were most cruelly beaten and wounded by the Shah Zadah's camp-followers, and they appeared before me streaming with their blood; and all this is done under shelter of British troops.

It is certain that if the Shah Zadah and the Political Agent were here without these troops, they would not dare to allow of such shameful and atrocious conduct on the part of their followers; but the misfortune is, that this vile stigma must, in the eyes of the natives, attach to our force! I am really fearful of leaving Woodburn's corps here: these people will, I am convinced, should opportunity offer, revenge themselves upon our soldiers (though they are innocent of the crimes, which have been committed under the shelter of our power) for the shameful oppression they have suffered. I am sick of such proceedings; the inhabitants, I am sure, will never forget or forgive it. As the circumstances stated in this note, are not at all exaggerated (indeed, no language of mine can describe the utter disgust I feel), I have not the least objection to your communicating this private note to the Minister and Envoy as my deliberate opinion; he will, I feel assured, use every possible means to prevent a recurrence of such scenes.

I perceive that an attack has been made on Captain Bean's

post at Quettah. I foretold this; several lacs of rupees being left at such a place on the open plain, the temptation was too strong for the half-starved, half-savage Kakurs of the mountains. My friend Bean should at first have taken possession of the town, and placed himself and treasure in the citadel, where a single company would have been sufficient for protection.

Yours,

W. NOTT.

General Cotton.

In a letter to Mr. Charles Nott the General gives the fullest particulars of his expedition, and enters upon several matters which could not very well form part of official despatches. He likewise mentions his conduct in respect to the punishment of Shah Zadah Timour's followers, which became, subsequently, the subject of angry correspondence between Nott and the Government.

Camp Hoolan Robart, June 21, 1840.

MY DEAR CHARLES,

Contrary to my repeated advice, the great people at Caubul *would* send a large force into the Ghilzie country, and they would drag me from Candahar to command it. In fact, they were terribly alarmed, and would not believe me when I told them that the detachment I sent out under Anderson would put down rebellion. They are very much annoyed. I have just seen documents for the first time, which show that as far back as January they expected the rebels to take the field, and—good, *easy* people—they have ever since been planning their campaign and referring their arrangements to wise Lord Auckland, but never thought

proper to give the least hint to me, or to the political authority at Candahar, of the coming storm, although it concerned us most, as they might have knocked their heads against the walls of Candahar before we got any information. By chance I heard that the Chiefs were assembling, and I took it upon me to crush rebellion in the bud, without waiting the orders of the Caubul authorities. Well, I did so, and the troops were marched out of Candahar twelve hours after I got the information. Two days later, and instead of 3,000 men, the Chiefs would have had 11,000 men in the field, according to *their* muster-list; but mark! the campaign which our wise people had been secretly arranging for six months, was to have commenced by the troops marching from Candahar on the 15th of last month, and on the 16th the detachment which had moved rapidly from hence had *finished* the *work*. Now these people are sore and angry because that was done in a few days which they had been talking and writing about for six months; so that they will not give Anderson one line of praise or approbation for a smart action, and the only one in which the so much talked of Army of the Indus met an enemy who fought daringly and bravely. The fellows threw themselves right upon the bayonets of our men, in spite of the plunging fire of our Horse Artillery. I selected Anderson because he is a clever fellow and a most excellent officer, and he had a few good officers under him. Well, after this action, the people at Caubul sent down political agents, troops, and the Prince Royal Timour, and they have, by their measures, done all in their power to goad the people into open rebellion.

I have not just now a moment to spare, or I could show you such a scene. In my opinion, the conduct of the English authorities has been so atrocious, that the press will be full of it. I have again written to Caubul, begging them to

withdraw the troops. I shall be obliged to move my camp in a day or two some three marches towards Caubul for forage and supplies. I have told Sir Willoughby Cotton that I shall take up a position, and will not go about in search of adventures. I know not what I am writing, as some fifty Affghans are at my tent door, crying loudly for justice. Now justice is a scarce article under the Shah's government, but these simple people fancy that the General Sahib, with an army at his nod, can do wonders for them. Here is one fellow calling out that the Prince's servants have taken four camels from him without payment—an Asiatic and princely performance! My tent has been full of officers, and I must write some other day, as I have a hundred things to say; but my head, as the great Dan O'Connell would say, is "bothered." I have had yesterday and to-day every officer in camp at my tent. I fancy many of them merely came to see the beast who annoyed and defied Sir John Keane and Lord Auckland, and ruined himself and all his prospects. Never mind—the grave will soon cover me.

Yours,

W. NOTT.

C. A. Nott, Esq., Barrister-at-Law,  
Calcutta.

Camp Hoolan Robart, June 22, 1840.

MY DEAR CHILDREN,

The Shah Zadah Timour has just sent me some plums and grapes, received from Candahar, and I must pay my respects to *them*.

23rd.

I have about 4,000 men here—infantry, cavalry and artillery—also a party of sappers under Lieutenant Pigou; but I do not think the rebel Chiefs will fight: however,

a day or two will show. They had better not; I have eleven guns with me, and a fine troop of horse artillery; so that if the fellows should show fight, we shall give them a severe licking, and as I have a good body of cavalry, I think few of the chaps will escape; but I dare say they will submit to the Shah's terms, and I shall send the Caubul force back, and return to my post at Candahar. I am near eight thousand feet above the sea, and therefore, although it is midsummer, the weather is bearable in tents—I would say *pleasant*—and the mornings and evenings quite cool. This Hoolan Robart must be a very healthy place; the surrounding country is beautiful, and there are some of the finest and strongest springs of clear water I ever saw. There is one in our present camp, which gushes out and absolutely forms a little river. When I quit the Ghilzie country, I am ordered to leave one of the Shah's regiments, and a body of cavalry here, and they talk of having a regular cantonment. I have just received orders from Caubul, to report upon a proper spot to build a fort here, and Pigou has received directions to build barracks; but the great people at Caubul write to say that they will not go to the expense until they get my opinion. Now, though I may stand alone, my opinion, for various reasons, will be against it, certainly for the present year, as it is too late to get men under cover before the snow falls, ten feet deep, &c.

Of course in this wild country we are badly off in the way of living; no bread, no butter, and we eat our fowls with dry rice; no vegetables of any kind. However, a good kind of person sent me some vegetables from Candahar, which, under these circumstances, I find a treat. I have just been writing a long military letter to head-quarters about forts, cantonments, &c. How pleasant, to be *ordered* to write on any subject!

Camp Hoolan Robart, July 4, 1840.

MY DEAR CHILDREN,

The high authorities at Caubul are alarmed beyond measure, and I have had occupation sufficient in answering their long and foolish letters. They are like small birds I have seen frightened in a storm, ready to perch upon anything, and to fly into the arms of the first man they meet for protection. Poor men! what will they do when *real* danger comes? and I think it is possibly at hand, owing to their false measures.

Ten days ago I sent in a long statement regarding this district, with arguments and arrangements directly contrary to what they had noted in their instructions. I have just received an answer agreeing to my proposals. But one thing they have not done—they have not pardoned one of the rebel Chiefs, who has taken refuge in the mountains, *because* the Shah has a personal dislike to him! So that this Chief, Sultan Mahomed Khan, is left as an outlaw, and will of course become reckless, and take the first opportunity of again erecting the standard of rebellion. However, I hope the Shah's bile will soon allow this Chief to return in quiet to his home, for which he is very anxious, and which he never would have left, had not the Shah *goaded* him to rebel. As they have agreed to the arrangements I proposed, I shall break up the field force, and order the troops to return to their different stations. I shall commence my march to Candahar to-morrow, where I expect to be on the 18th instant. I see they have had a small fight at Quettah. I foretold three months ago that such would be the case, unless they moved the treasure. Six lacs of rupees upon the open plain at a place like that, was too strong a temptation for the half-savage Kakurs of the mountains. They had two ladies there, and some

dear little babes—Mrs. Bean and Mrs. Travers—who might as well have been anywhere else than in this country. It is fortunate that Hammersley was at Quetta; his exertions saved them. He is an invaluable fellow; I was convinced of this the first day I saw him at parade at Kurnaul. Unless the Shah and his advisers turn over a new leaf, we shall have plenty to do in this country, and many of us will have our poor throats cut, and that would be a great loss to the world.

I have not heard from you for a very long time. I am perfectly well at this moment; my way of passing my time, however, renders life very precarious. Such plunder, robbery and murder I have never read of in all history, as I have witnessed here. Crowds of the unfortunate Affghans came round my tent the first two days after my arrival here. On the second day I flogged thirteen men belonging to the Caubul troops; but the greatest horrors were committed by Prince Timour's people. I soon stopped it in our army, but I did not like to interfere with *Royalty*. I referred the complaints made against the Prince's people to him, and the Politicals; but robbery, wounding and oppression went on, and the plundered property was brought into my camp. I informed the Shah Zadah and the Politicals that I would not allow such atrocious conduct to attach to a British camp under my command, and that if they did not punish their followers, *I would*. Well, immediately after this, a number of men surrounded my tent, crying for justice and protection, and appeared with their bodies wounded and covered with blood. I caused the plundered property and the plunderers to be seized, and they proved to be the followers of the Prince Royal. I sent to say what had occurred, and that I did not wish to interfere with His Highness's servants; but as the plundered property had been

brought into my camp, the inhabitants naturally looked to me for redress, and that therefore if he did *not* punish the robbers, I would. The Politicals blustered in the name of the Prince. My answer was short: "You are in possession of my determination, which I shall carry into effect at sunset, unless you send your people to punish the marauders in my presence, and as an example to all." Well, sunset came, when I had the fellows tied up and flogged, in presence of the poor inhabitants, who had been wounded and robbed. I restored their property to them, and they went away rejoicing. I told the Prince and Politicals, that unless a stop was put to such atrocious conduct, I would separate my camp from that of the Prince. I fancy they have represented the whole to the Caubul authorities, who will not, I should think, dare to write to me on the subject. Yet they *may*, and how it will end I neither know nor care. I will never allow of such scenes in a camp under my command.

Yours ever,

W. NOTT.

The measures taken by Major-General Nott to put a stop to, and chastise the plundering by the servants of Prince Timour, form so important an episode in the history of the General's command, that it is due to his reputation that the whole of the facts should be given. It is difficult to believe that any one can pronounce a verdict unfavourable to the General, and the whole correspondence establishes the impolicy of entrusting to young officers the power of judging how far a superior officer ought to go in the execution of his duty. It is

intolerable that the plain and obvious course of a soldier, holding cruelty and injustice in horror, should be thwarted, or attempted to be thwarted, by a false delicacy towards uncivilized Chiefs, such as Prince Timour, who were themselves too deeply tainted with the worst vices, to be capable of sitting in impartial judgment upon the conduct of their savage followers. The lofty courage and stern resolution of General Nott, in this instance, will be registered amongst the finest traits of his ungracious and most difficult command.

Captain Nicolson opened his complaint to Sir W. Macnaghten in the following communication :

Camp, July 3, 1840.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit for your consideration and orders, copies of letters which yesterday passed between Major-General Nott, commanding in the Ghilzie country, and myself.

The facts of the case are as follows: His Highness the Prince has furnished his people with money to pay for their soorsaad, and to my knowledge daily pays for the articles required for his own private establishment. Yesterday a Pishkhedmut came to me and requested me to settle the amount which ought to be paid for a load of forage, as the villagers demanded three rupees for the load, and General Nott had seized and confined the Yaboos and men who brought it in. I then addressed No. 1 to Major-General Nott, and the succeeding letters followed in the course of the evening. On receipt of No. 4, I waited on the Shah Zadah, to lay before His Highness the circumstances, and request

his orders; when he told me, in presence of Major Lynch and Captain Walker, that his Syce had been flogged. His Highness, though he spoke with the greatest consideration and kindness of the General, and said, "that he had no doubt the General intended it for His Highness's benefit, and that of his people," yet was evidently deeply hurt; and said, "that though he had accompanied Sir C. Wade from Loodianah, and spent much of his time with British troops, this was the first time he had met with conduct which would doubtless produce a very bad effect on the Kuzzlebashes about His Highness's person, and lower him in the estimation of all the subjects of His Majesty the Shah."

Agreeing, as I do, most fully in the sentiments expressed by the Shah Zadah, I make no comment on the Major-General's letters, but submit them for the consideration and orders of my superior authorities.

I have the honour to report that His Highness this morning moved into a separate camp.

(Signed) P. NICOLSON,  
In Political Charge, Ghilzie.

To Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart.  
British Envoy and Minister, Caubul.

No. 1.

Camp, July 2, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Several of the Prince's people, Yaboos, have been seized. As His Highness is always willing to pay for his corn, &c., I shall be obliged by your releasing them, if they are arrested by your orders. I inquired into the complaint of the villager this morning, and he himself stated that the

camels of the whole force were grazing in his roadway, but only those of the Prince were seized.

(Signed) P. NICOLSON,  
In Political Charge, Ghilzie.

To Major-General Nott,  
Commanding in Camp.

This first letter may not be correct to a word, as I kept no copy.

(Signed) P. NICOLSON.

No. 2.

MY DEAR SIR,

Numerous complaints are daily made to me by the inhabitants of the country, stating that people belonging to the camp plunder them, and that the plunder is brought within my pickets. On inquiry, I find that all or nearly all of these complaints are made against the servants and followers of His Highness the Shah Zadah. I have referred many of these complaints to you, not wishing in any way to interfere with the camp-followers of His Highness; but as their plundering system has not diminished, but is increasing daily, I must take measures to prevent such shameful and disgraceful proceedings attaching to the character of a British camp. I have now in confinement several men belonging to His Highness the Shah Zadah, and as the plunder has been brought into this camp, I beg to acquaint you that I intend to punish them as marauders unless the Shah Zadah should wish to send his own people to punish them in my presence. If a stop is not put to this shameful system of robbery and cruel oppression I must separate the British troops from His Highness's camp, as I will not allow

such a stigma to attach to the troops under my command.

W. NOTT.

P.S.—I have just been favoured with your note. Eight sheep have been stolen, and the owners cruelly beaten. I send you one of the robbers, who will point out the men who carried off the sheep.

To Captain Nicolson.

No. 3.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I enclose you the statement of the man your orderly has brought to me. I protest most strongly against your punishing any servant of the Shah Zadah's, and shall take care that the Prince's people do not punish any men upon inquiry made by others than the Prince himself, or his responsible adviser, myself, as such an act would be derogatory to the dignity of a Prince in his own country.

His Highness proposes marching to-morrow morning, and I shall, therefore, be obliged by your furnishing the necessary escort for the Prince, and the protection of my camp and treasure; a measure which is rendered necessary to prevent the repetition of threats similar to that contained in your present note. I shall, as in duty bound, forward copies of your letters and mine to the British Envoy and Minister; and having requested the release of the people and Yaboos, can only regret the occurrence which forces the Prince to move, and leave you to pursue such a course as you deem fit regarding them.

P. NICOLSON.

## THE STATEMENT OF SHAH ZADAH KHAN.

I went out with the Urzbegees people. In a village they wished to purchase eight sheep, and the men refused to agree to the terms; they replied the sheep were for the Prince's use, and they would pay whatever price the Prince put upon them. I came on, and the Urzbegees people have not yet come in.

P. NICOLSON.

## No. 4.

MY DEAR NICOLSON,

You must excuse my entering into a correspondence on this subject. You have my determination in my note of this evening, which I shall carry into effect at sunset, unless His Highness will order his people to do so as an example to the whole camp.

The punishment must take place in my presence.

W. NOTT.

## No. 5.

MY DEAR NICOLSON,

Will you kindly inform me where the Prince wishes to proceed to, that I may send a proper escort for His Highness's protection, and the hour at which it may be his pleasure to have the troops in attendance.

Yours, &c.,

W. NOTT.

MY DEAR SIR,

I regret to say that the complaints have been very numerous to-day, and the Vints are threatening again to quit the country, and take to the hills. I shall be obliged if you will

take such measures as you deem necessary to stop this, and have the pleasure to send a son of the Focundar, who has brought the complaints.

Yours, &c.,

P. NICOLSON.

To General Nott.

When this correspondence reached the Envoy at Caubul, he sent it to Sir W. Cotton with the subjoined letter.

Caubul, July 7, 1840.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward for your consideration and orders, the accompanying copy of a letter to my address from Captain Nicolson, in political charge of the Ghilzie Expedition, dated the 3rd instant, and its enclosures.

It will be observed that Major-General Nott, for the reasons assigned, took upon himself to order the infliction of corporal punishment on the Shah Zadah's servants, in defiance of the earnest remonstrances of the Political Officer. It is not stated by Major-General Nott that the complaints previously referred to Captain Nicolson had been unattended to.

It will further be observed, that Major-General Nott threatened to separate the British troops from His Highness's camp; a measure which, in my opinion, would have been less objectionable than that actually resorted to; and which, having been threatened, gave to his subsequent proceedings the appearance of a gratuitous indignity. It will be for you to judge whether the occasion was so urgent as to compel Major-General Nott to have recourse, on his own authority, to either of these harsh alternatives.

I need not dwell on the anxiety of the Governor-General in Council, that in the difficult and peculiar position we occupy in this country, the greatest possible respect and tenderness should be shown for the honour and feelings of His Majesty; and should you concur with me in thinking that in the act which has proved so offensive to the Prince, Major-General Nott has deviated from those principles, I have to request that you will be good enough to convey to him your opinion in such terms as may effectually prevent his falling into a similar error in future.

Should you differ with me in opinion, or should you deem the course necessary or desirable, I shall have the honour of submitting the correspondence in this case for the consideration and orders of Government.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Envoy and Minister.

To Major-General Sir W. Cotton, G.C.B. and K.C.H.,  
Commanding the Forces in Afghanistan.

Sir Willoughby Cotton sent the foregoing to Nott, and called for an explanation, which Nott lost not a moment in furnishing. It is due to the General, that his account of the transaction should be given without a syllable of deduction.

Camp Teerundaz, July 15, 1840.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, with its enclosures, and in obedience to your directions to note the following :

On my assuming command of the troops assembled at Hoolan Robart, my tent was immediately surrounded by a great number of the inhabitants of the country, calling aloud for justice and protection, and declaring that their corn-fields and their houses had been entered, their property plundered, and their persons beaten and ill-treated by people from the British camp. I immediately gave orders, and proclaimed by the usual mode, beat of tom-toms, throughout the camp, that any person being found guilty of such conduct as that above stated would be immediately seized and instantly punished. Notwithstanding this caution, plunder and oppression continued. On the second day after my arrival in camp, my tent was again surrounded by a number of natives with the same cry for protection, declaring that everything had been taken from them and brought into my camp. Some of these people were cut and wounded in endeavouring to defend their property; and they declared that they would again take to the mountains, as they saw that there was no justice to be expected from the "Sahibs." I immediately sent my orderlies with the complainants, to enable them to point out the marauders, and if possible, to recover the plundered property. From forty to fifty were pointed out, and from among these, thirteen, against whom clear and positive evidence was given, and who I found were attached to the British troops from the Caubul Division, were selected and immediately punished in front of the camp, and in presence of the people from whom the property had been plundered. It is worthy of remark, that these thirteen men complained of the hardship of being punished for that which they said they had been committing all the way from Caubul to Hoolan Robart. It was some consolation to me, that out of all the complaints, not one appeared against a single sepoy or camp-follower of the

Candahar Division. I was aware that many of the camp-followers of His Highness Prince Timour were concerned in this affair, and that they brought the plunder within my pickets; yet I refrained at the moment to notice the fact, but I mentioned it to the Political Agent the first time I saw him.

The punishment of the thirteen men, as above stated, put a complete stop to plunder and robbery on the part of the followers of the regular troops. But robbery and the most cruel oppression still continued on the part of the Shah Zadah's followers, and in many instances, by His Majesty the Shah's cavalry. The plunder being brought into my camp, the natives naturally called upon me for redress and protection. Day after day, almost the whole of my time was taken up by the cries of these people, and not a day passed without some of them appearing before me, cut and wounded in the most cruel manner. The complainants were frequently sent to the Political Agent, without any good result, nor to my knowledge was any one of the marauders ever punished. Seeing this, I subsequently sent orderlies with the complainants to the Political Agent's tents, and the usual answer brought was "Salam." Still the system continued and increased. On the morning of the 2nd instant, a Havildar, who was out in protection of camels at graze, saw many people plundering the villagers, and very properly seized and sent them into camp under a guard. They were brought before me, and as I found that they belonged to the Shah Zadah, I once more sent them to the Political Agent. He did not even send me a verbal answer until late in the evening, and after the occurrence which is made the subject of his complaint.

On the evening of the 2nd instant there was a great cry and uproar in front of my tent. I went out, and was imme-

diately surrounded by a number of natives, calling out, as usual, for redress from the General Sahib, for justice, and for protection, some of them upon their knees, and several of them streaming with blood, their arms and breasts cut and wounded in the most cruel manner. After obtaining some degree of silence, I found that their corn-fields and houses had been entered and their property plundered; that in their endeavours to save this property, they had been wounded in the manner now mentioned; and that the robbers, with the plunder, were then entering my camp. After some resistance, the marauders, with the plunder, were seized within my pickets; it consisted of several horse-loads and eight sheep. Finding that the robbers were the Prince's followers, I wrote to the Political Agent note No. 2 in the correspondence now under reply. His answer is No. 3. Seeing that the Political Agent was thus determined to screen and countenance the atrocious conduct of these people, I, as some example, and some little satisfaction to the plundered and ill-used inhabitants, slightly, and but slightly, punished two out of the ten marauders then before me, and restored the stolen sheep to the miserable villagers; but I did not, as I ought to have done, stop the horse-loads of plunder then standing before my tent. These are the simple facts of what occurred.

I do not wish to make any remark on the conduct of the Political Agent. He has declared that the Shah Zadah appeared hurt when he found that the plunderers had been punished, and said that he had marched with Colonel Wade without any such punishment having occurred. The Political Agent may be correct in these assertions, or rather surmises, I was not present, certainly, but my information states, that the Shah Zadah expressed himself thus: "My followers

behave very ill, and of course the General will punish all robbers alike. When I passed through the Punjaub, if Colonel Wade had not punished my camp-followers daily, what would have been, and how could we have passed?" But with that conversation I have nothing to do. I only know that the Political Agent did not do what he ought to have done for the honour of our country and for the sake of humanity; he did not do what was in his power to do by the least exertion; he did not put a stop to plunder and cruel oppression; nor did he, that I ever heard, pay the least attention to the complaints I referred to him. And yet this public officer, on a bare supposition (which was erroneous) that some of the troops had been plundering, complained to me that the inhabitants had declared their determination to fly from their villages. But it is not necessary for me to write more on the subject, the facts stated speak for themselves. But as the Political Agent has not in the correspondence, which I am now called upon to explain, intimated to the Envoy the circumstances which took place at Hoolan Robart, I must be allowed to recapitulate the substance of what I have already stated.

The plunder, the robbery, and the cruel oppression committed by the followers of Prince Timour (and of which I feel certain he was kept in comparative ignorance), was such as to outrage the feelings of the natives. Under such circumstances, it became a serious question whether I could venture to leave Captain Woodburn's detachment among this greatly irritated people, and I at the time mentioned these fears to Sir Willoughby Cotton; and sure I am, that should opportunity offer, these cruel and shameful proceedings will be retaliated on the troops left in this district. Never in all history have I read of such plunder, cruelty

and oppression as I witnessed in the camp at Hoolan Robart.

Not wishing to interfere with the followers of the Prince, I, day after day, referred these complaints to the Political Agent; but the system of robbery did not diminish but increased daily, and the robbers in my own camp openly and insolently set me at defiance. The houses and corn-fields of the unfortunate inhabitants were entered, their property plundered, and the owners cut and wounded in the most cruel manner. The plunder was brought into my camp; and to whom, but to me, as commanding that camp, could these poor people look up for redress, protection, and restoration of their property? Numbers of men, who in endeavouring to save their little all were cruelly beaten and wounded, daily appeared before my tent, crying for justice while their bodies were streaming with their blood. And all this was done under shelter of British troops. It is certain that if these troops had not been present, neither the Shah Zadah nor the Political Agent would have dared to have allowed of such shameful and atrocious conduct on the part of their followers; but the misfortune is, that this vile stigma, must, in the eyes of the natives, attach, not to the Political Agent who was alone to blame, but to the British troops, and to the British character. I rest convinced that they never will forget or forgive what they have suffered, and that should opportunity offer they will revenge themselves.

The above is a correct outline of what did occur. I do not, at present, think it necessary to state anything further on the subject, as I feel well assured that the Envoy and Minister will feel great regret to find that such acts should have been committed under the shelter and power of British

troops. I certainly can never feel a wish to command in a British camp for one moment if such scenes are to pass with impunity.

I will not make the least remark on the rather rude style of what the Political Agent calls his protest. He may be a very talented young man, but some years must elapse before his talents are softened down into correct and sober judgment.

I am, &c.,  
W. NOTT.

To Captain Douglas, Adjutant-General.

Sir Willoughby Cotton sent this letter to Sir W. Macnaghten, and to the Adjutant-General of the army. The official letters in which the Envoy and Minister and the officer commanding in Affghanistan, severally communicated their sentiments to the Government and the Commander-in-Chief in India, curiously exemplify the difference between a biassed and an unbiassed judgment. Although Sir Willoughby Cotton was a liberal-minded man, there was not that degree of friendship subsisting between him and Nott, which could induce him to depart from his convictions to help the Company's General out of a difficulty: on the other hand, Macnaghten was impatient of everything, and angry with everybody who could not contemplate the conduct of Shah Soojah and his detestable family through the *couleur de rose* medium he had delighted to cultivate.

*From Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, G.C.B. and K.C.H., commanding the troops in Affghanistan, to Major-General Lumley, Adjutant-General of the army. No. 136, dated Head-quarters, Camp Caubul, 25th of July, 1840.*

SIR,

I have the honour to transmit for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief a copy of a letter addressed by the Envoy and Minister, to the Government, on the subject of a complaint forwarded by Lieutenant Nicolson, Assistant Political Agent, against Major-General Nott, commanding the troops employed in the Ghilzie country, for having inflicted corporal punishment on two servants of the Shah Zadah Timour. I also beg to enclose Major-General Nott's letter, explanatory of the circumstances of the case.

In forwarding this correspondence, I would beg to remark that the system of plunder which appears to have been carried on in the camp by the followers of the Shah Zadah was atrocious; and although I regret that Major-General Nott was driven to the necessity of punishing the Prince's servants, yet as the Political Agent, to whom he states that he fruitlessly applied on several occasions, would not check the prevailing disorders, it became General Nott's duty to take measures to arrest proceedings so disgraceful and tending to alienate the feelings of the people, both from the British troops and from His Majesty's Government.

I need not point out how quickly the contagion of plunder spreads, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is well aware how vitally detrimental so mischievous an example must prove if permitted to prevail unpunished; and if it be

of the country has been assumed by us, and that Shah Soojah Ool Moolk is a mere puppet in our hands.

Captain Nicolson, it is true, is comparatively a young man, but he is a young man who, upwards of eight years ago, by the able discharge of the important political duties entrusted to him, earned for himself the high approbation of Government. It would only be an act of justice towards that officer, were I to forward to him a copy of General Nott's letter, charging him with gross neglect of duty; but I am unwilling to occupy the time of his Lordship in Council, or to swell the records of Government with documents of a recriminatory nature. It is remarkable that this serious charge was not hinted at by General Nott until he was himself called upon to reply to the complaint preferred against him by the Prince. I feel assured that it will not be admitted to the prejudice of Captain Nicolson without an opportunity of explanation being afforded to that officer. It is easy to draw a dark picture of the miseries inflicted on an unoffending population, by a mutinous and lawless soldiery, and unfortunately these excesses are too prevalent; but it is difficult, especially with troops accustomed to rapine and plunder, to prevent the commission of such excesses. Captain Nicolson has not had an opportunity of showing that he omitted no means in his power of seeing justice done to the people. The charge of gross neglect of duty in this respect was never before made against him; but I have been assured that the Prince's followers punctually paid for every article they took.

In whatever way that charge may be disposed of, I trust his Lordship will be of opinion, that Captain Nicolson did no more than his duty in bringing to my knowledge a serious complaint preferred to him by the Prince in the

presence of two other British officers, the truth of which, I deeply regret to find, has been fully established.

I have, &c.,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,  
Envoy and Minister.

P.S.—It can hardly fail to attract the notice of his Lordship in Council, that corporal punishment was inflicted on the Prince's servants, not only after Captain Nicolson's remonstrance, but after that officer had signified to Major-General Nott the intention of the Prince to separate his camp the next morning, and, consequently, that it was, as regarded its proposed objects, altogether gratuitous.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,  
Envoy and Minister.

Caulul, July 23, 1840.

Nott fully appreciated the generous view of the matter taken by Sir Willoughby Cotton. Early in August he wrote :

Candahar, August, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have just received Captain Douglas's letter of the 26th ultimo, and as the dawh hour is nearly up, I have only just time to say that I have received a copy of your letter to Major-General Lumley, Adjutant-General of the army. It is most gratifying to my feelings to find that you take such a view of the subject. It was deeply to be regretted that I was absolutely driven to inflict the light punishment I did in order to put a stop to the horrid scene. I beg to assure you that it was even much worse than stated in my public letter. When the marauders were brought before me, they even refused to pay for or restore the plunder to the owners,

who stood cut and bleeding at my tent, and they openly and insolently defied me in my own camp. Would you believe it, these robbers applied to me the most abusive language? But absence of punishment made them thus daring. I enclose you a note from the Political Agent, which will show you, in his own handwriting, the irritated state of the whole population, and calling upon me to take measures to stop such conduct; he also verbally requested me to do so. Upon inquiry, I found that upon this occasion also the marauders were the followers of Prince Timour, with three or four men of the Shah's cavalry; yet I never heard that Lieutenant Nicolson punished any of these people; and whenever I sent the plunderers to him, the answer, if any, was "Salam." I have good reason to believe that the Shah Zadah was so far from feeling annoyed, that he expressed pleasure, and said, "Of course the General will punish all robbers alike." Had I believed that the Envoy and Minister would have referred to Government after the facts stated in my letter, I certainly should have entered further into the subject, and stated many circumstances to prove that the measure I adopted was in every point of view unavoidable, and that I refrained until my camp was a scene of uproar, confusion and complaint. But I will not trouble you with all that occurred; for the honour of my country, I hope I shall not be urged to state what is in my power—it will perhaps be better for all that I should not—but I have lived too long to allow the shadow of dishonour to be reflected with impunity on my character. I feel that I acted as became a British officer, and as a man of some little humanity; for the rest, I am not anxious. I always endeavour to confine myself strictly to my military duty, and deeply regret that any reference should have been thought necessary; but should I be called upon to defend

my conduct, I can do so, and in that case delicacy towards others must cease.

Lieutenant Nicolson has, in his letter of the 3rd of July, boldly; but I think imprudently, appealed to two British officers who were there. Now, one of these officers I have not seen, the other I have, since writing the above; and as Sir W. Macnaghten has misstated the affair in his letter to Government, I no longer hesitated in asking the officer in question whether the Shah Zadah had expressed himself in the way stated by Lieutenant Nicolson. His answer is: "No, quite the reverse. He appeared to think you had acted properly, and said so. What Lieutenant Nicolson has stated as having been said by the Shah Zadah, is just what he, Lieutenant Nicolson, urged and endeavoured to impress upon the Prince, telling him that the General's conduct lowered him. Still the Prince did not appear annoyed, but said, of course his camp-followers must be punished. And when Lieutenant Nicolson urged him to move his camp, he said: No, it would have a bad appearance, as a Chief was expected the following day, &c. He repeatedly said that the General was perfectly right in punishing the robbers—that Colonel Wade always did so."

Yours ever,

W. NOTT.

General Cotton.

Nott's expectations that the Government would not venture to find fault with his bold and independent course of action, were not fulfilled in the sequel. The nervousness of Lord Auckland, and his anxiety to keep the Affghan Princes quiet at all hazards, led him to the expression of a greater amount of anger than the cir-

cumstances warranted. Instead of rejoicing that there was at least one man in the country who had the manliness to protect the people from outrage, and impress them with favourable notions of the stern sense of justice by which British officers were governed, his Lordship "in Council" suffered himself to be grievously ruffled, and authorised the transmission of the subjoined intimation of his high displeasure. We have no fear that such a judgment will be interpreted by the impartial reader to Nott's disadvantage. Pains had been taken by Sir W. Macnaghten, in his letter of the 23rd of July, to prejudice the Government against Nott, and to prepossess it in favour of Captain Nicolson. Every soldier was sacrificed that the "Politicals" might be upheld, and the Government of India was too completely led by the Envoy to judge fairly for itself. Here is Lord Auckland's judgment :

(Confidential Department.)

Fort William, August 17, 1840.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge your letter of the 23rd ultimo, on the proceedings of Major-General Nott in punishing, by his own authority, certain servants of His Highness, the Shah Zadah Timour.

In reply, I am desired to state that the Governor-General in Council has observed the conduct of Major-General Nott upon this occasion with great regret and displeasure. It was undoubtedly the duty of the Major-General to bring earnestly to the notice of His Highness, and of the Political Agent, in attendance upon him, the instances to

which he refers of oppression of the people of the country by His Highness's followers; and if such representations did not in his opinion receive due attention, to have made known the circumstances, through the Major-General commanding in Affghanistan, for the information of the Envoy and Minister; or, in extremity, it would have been open to him to separate the camp of the British force from that of His Highness. But that Major-General Nott should arrogate to himself the power of punishing the servants of the Shah's son and representative within His Majesty's dominions, where the Shah Zadah was actually in the exercise of vice-regal functions, cannot but excite extreme surprise, and create an impression unfavourable to the discretion, and perfect fitness for delicate duties in such a country, of the officer concerned.

You are aware how anxious is the desire of the Governor-General in Council to promote the independence, and uphold the dignity and honour of the Affghan monarchy. It is needless, therefore, to enlarge on the pain which his Lordship in Council must feel at a course of proceeding so entirely at variance with his wishes and principles as that which Major-General Nott allowed himself in this case to pursue.

From all the information which has been received of the excellent disposition of the Shah Zadah, there cannot be a doubt that on a proper representation being made to him, he would have hastened either directly to repress the violence of his followers, or to give a sanction to a due degree of interference by the British authorities, in extreme cases of wanton disorder and licence.

His Lordship in Council remarks that there is no appearance on the papers before him of Major-General Nott having endeavoured to obtain a personal audience from the Shah

Zadah, or of his having sought to cultivate those feelings of confidence and regard on the part of His Highness towards himself, which would best have removed the difficulties naturally attendant on the presence on a common service of two distinct authorities, and of regular troops and of the undisciplined bodies composing His Highness's escort and suite.

It is necessary, in recording the preceding observations on the part taken in the transaction in question by Major-General Nott, to require from Lieutenant Nicolson a full explanation in regard to the allegations, made by the Major-General, of the neglect by that officer of the references made to him on the subject of the cruel and marauding practices of the parties belonging to the Shah Zadah's camp. Those practices, as described in the correspondence, appear to have been of great atrocity, and must be viewed by his Lordship in Council with pain and abhorrence. This explanation you are requested to submit, without delay, to the consideration of Government.

A copy of this letter will be communicated from this office to Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, G.C.B. and K.C.H., who will, his Lordship in Council is aware, be anxious to impress upon every officer under his command, that constant and marked respect for the authority of the Shah, his family and officers, which will prove to the world our regard for the Shah's person, and the nature of the British policy and position in Afghanistan.

On your part, you will continue to employ all our influence unremittingly, in order to procure such an observance of the rules and usages of civilized nations, in the utmost practicable control of the irregular bodies of Afghan forces, as will best conciliate that respect, and can alone be deserving of British co-operation and support.

Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton will be requested to make the necessary communication of the sentiments of his Lordship in Council to Major-General Nott.

I have &c.,  
(Signed) H. TORRENS,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

To Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart.,  
Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Soojah Ool Moolk,  
Caulul.

Having placed Captain Woodburn in position at Hoolan Robart, Nott returned with his force to Candahar, late in July, not sorry to get back to his house, for the marches in the Ghilzie country had nearly burnt him to a cinder. He described his face and hands as "most horrible" from exposure to the sun. If he tucked up a sleeve, the hand, he said, "looked like a piece of ebony stuck on a piece of ivory." There seemed to be no medium in an Affghan climate. The cold was either so intense that there was no holding a pen, or the heat so fierce that the human frame was fairly baked.

The General flattered himself with the prospect of at least a little repose after his expedition to Hoolan Robart; but events had, in the meantime, taken place which directed his immediate attention to another quarter.

## CHAPTER VI.

1840.

CONFIDENCE OF THE POLITICAL OFFICERS—RISING OF THE BELOOCHEES  
 —ATTACK ON A CONVOY—INVESTMENT OF QUETTAH—RECAPTURE OF  
 KHELAT BY NUSSEER KHAN—GENERAL NOTT RETURNS TO CANDAHAR—  
 HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH SIR W. COTTON—REPULSE AND PARTIAL  
 DESTRUCTION OF THE CONVOY PROCEEDING TO KAHUN—NOTT PRO-  
 CEEDS TO QUETTAH—COLONEL DENNIE'S SUCCESS AT BAMEAN—  
 NUSSEER KHAN TAKES THE FIELD—MURDER OF LIEUTENANT LOVEDAY  
 —NOTT MOVES ON MOOSTUNG—REOCCUPIES KHELAT—RETURNS TO  
 CANDAHAR.

WHEN Khelat fell, the authorities placed one Shah Nawaz Khan, a Brahoe Chieftain, upon the *musnud*, because his views were supposed to be favourable to British interests. Lieutenant Loveday was appointed Political Agent at Khelat, to watch the conduct of the new ruler, and keep Mr. Ross Bell acquainted with his movements. In the meanwhile, the tribes to the west and south of the Bolan Pass, espoused the cause of the youthful son of the former Khan (Mehrab), and silently awaited their opportunity of hoisting the standard of rebellion.

A temporary cessation of plunder and violence was quite sufficient to satisfy the self-love of the political officers in Upper Scinde. They assured themselves that they had tranquillized the country, and saw, with remarkable complacency, the withdrawal of troops from Quettah to Candahar, and the substitution of weak detachments for compact and efficient bodies of all arms.

When the country had been sufficiently stripped of troops, or that they had been placed at such distances from each other, as to render prompt co-operation impossible, the signal for revolt was hoisted. The fiery arrow went through the land, the sword and dagger of Beloochee and Murree and Brahoe were unsheathed in a moment, and a guerilla warfare commenced. In the month of May, the first symptoms of hostility to the new order of things manifested themselves, and plunder and massacre became the order of the day. There was more, thought the tribes, to be gained by marauding, than by the paltry compensation reluctantly doled forth by the Government for a forced abstinence from predatory habits, and submission to the rule of the foreigner.

It is hardly necessary to endeavour to connect the plan of operations (if plan there were) adopted by the various tribes, to destroy the British detachments, obtain possession of the places they occupied, and annihilate the political authority which the Government of India had established.

If the attacks were not concerted, they were, at any rate, nearly simultaneous, and directed to our several strongholds. That they were fortunate in their results, must be ascribed to the weakness of the parties exposed to attack in detail. But the "political" incompetency and confidence which rendered the British name a byword, were more than counterbalanced by the numerous instances of gallantry and devotion to which the insurrection gave rise.

The earliest instance of a successful assault upon a British detachment occurred on the 7th of May. A convoy, under Lieutenant Clarke, of the 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, had proceeded to the fort of Kahun, in the Boogtee hills, in company with Captain Lewis Brown, of the 5th Regiment, N.I., who had been ordered to occupy and hold the fort with three hundred bayonets and two howitzers. On the return of Lieutenant Clarke to a post called Poolazie, situated in the level country, south of Kahun, he was attacked by 2000 Murrees, who put himself and the whole of his detachment of 50 horse, and 150 infantry, to the sword. Soon afterwards the Brahoes having organised their measures for the restoration of Mehrab Khan's son, revolted at Moostung, and mustering forces from all quarters, commenced a series of hostilities which terminated in the loss of Khelat to Shah Nuwaz Khan. Previous to this, however, the Kakur tribes invested the fort of Mirree at Quettah, blockading Captain Bean, and the small detachment of 230 of the Shah's infantry,

and a few Beloochee artillerymen. They were driven off after a vigorous defence, but a few days later the enemy assembled in still greater force, and laid siege to Quettah.

Matters had reached this critical point, when Major-General Nott was retracing his steps to Candahar. Letters from Captain Ripley, his faithful and active Fort-Adjutant, continually met him *en route*, descriptive of the state and progress of affairs. Captain Bean had sent to Candahar for reinforcements; Lieutenant Jackson had been dispatched with a detachment to secure the fort of Killah Abdoollah, and hold the Bolan Pass safe. A *chuppao*, or dash, had been made upon Moostung from Quettah by Lieutenant Hammersley, who had become Adjutant of a corps of Bolan Rangers, in order to relieve a detachment there, and it failed. Everybody was in consternation, no one at Candahar knew what course to take; to Nott alone all eyes were directed, and his arrival was most anxiously awaited.

Taking time by the forelock, Nott, while on the march, communicated his views to Sir Willoughby Cotton, in a letter which commands admiration for its wisdom and candour.

Camp Siri Usp, July 10, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

At every halting-ground I receive different and contradictory reports of the state of the country between Candahar and Sukkur; but all agree that rebellion is rife

in the land, and all the people in arms. Of course, authentic reports are made by the Assistant Politicals to the Envoy and Minister. I wish these gentlemen would not, by following the impulse of the moment, provoke attacks until we are in a state to sustain them, and successfully to accomplish any object they may have in view. Being on my march, I have not that information which would induce me to write my opinion fully and officially to you; and indeed, it would be too late, as I have no doubt all necessary arrangements and orders have been issued at Caubul, and I shall only have to carry strictly into effect whatever portion of these orders may fall to my lot. But as you formerly requested me to write my sentiments freely to you, I beg to make one remark in this note:—The state of the country has, I presume, been laid before you by the political authorities. You will recollect that there are only two regiments of regular sepoy in the wide extent of country from the Bolan to Ghuzni. The people of Shawl, Khelat and Moostung, are in arms, and the most distant Chiefs and tribes are said to be moving to these places, and I expect to hear that the Kojuck Pass is occupied. I would therefore, under all circumstances, strongly urge that no small detachments should be sent out; they would be beaten; and however small the party, however trifling the loss, it would be sent in the tone of wild exaggeration over the whole of Afghanistan and into Persia, with declarations that they had defeated a strong portion of the British army. Let no such detachment be sent out; we cannot at this moment afford the least check. I have written to Candahar, requesting that no part of the 42nd Regiment, or wing of the 43rd, now there, may be detached without an order from Caubul. If any accident should occur to these regiments by detaching parties from them

before reinforcements shall arrive at Candahar, I will not conceal my real opinion, and will declare that the game in this part of the Shah's dominions will be at an end. And, after all, what is the force which a set of political boys are loudly and foolishly calling upon us to destroy piecemeal? why, truly, two regiments of sepoy and six 6-pounder guns! Again I say, do not separate; keep them together, whether in garrison at Candahar or opposed to the enemy in the field, and all will end well; but if you do not do this, it appears to me that ruin will speedily follow.

Captain Bean confines his ideas to that miserable dog-hole, Quettah, and *dictates* the troops to be sent to that place from Candahar: "One regiment of regular infantry, four guns (out of six) and 300 horse" (all now at Candahar), without noting the object in view. I could earnestly wish the Envoy and Minister to impress upon these gentlemen the propriety of at all times confining their application to stating the object, and leaving the means to the officer in command. But they reverse the order of things, by calling for and particularizing the *number* of guns, infantry and cavalry, without stating the object in view. Now no officer of common understanding would pay the least attention to such a call. The officer placed at Killah Abdoollah, for the purpose of watching and keeping open the Kojuck Pass, quits his post, takes a trip to Quettah, from whence he is sent, with others, to beat the enemy (so report says) out of Moostung, without having the means of attacking 300 men. Away they gallop; and no sooner do they get in sight of the place, than they find it necessary to turn round and gallop back again, with the enemy at their heels! Even such a silly, paltry affair must have a ruinous effect among the half-savage, half-civilized, but brave mountaineers.

Whose orders is this gentleman at the Kojuck under? The province of Shawl was, in General Orders, placed under my command; yet a serious attack has been made on the post of Quettah, and other attacks foolishly provoked in its vicinity, and the officer commanding in Shawl never reports, never sends me a line on the subject, although the safety of the whole country from Ghuzni to the Bolan, and even to Sukkur, might have been compromised, and all this in consequence of the unmilitary and extraordinary orders issued to the Shah's troops. I repeat, that if this system is to be continued, disaster must follow. I shall direct the small force at Candahar to be ready to take the field at the shortest notice, and shall await reinforcements and orders from Caubul. But I am of opinion that no troops can move from Candahar with safety to that place and the surrounding country until a complete garrison be sent from Caubul to replace the troops which may be sent into the field. If Khelat is to be retaken, a large force will now be required and heavier guns than mere 6-pounders. It is now seven months since I strongly recommended that the 18-pounders should be put in a state to move, but nothing has been done, and the guns are now required and cannot be used for want of bullocks and the necessary establishment. There is a company of European artillerymen left at Candahar by Sir J. Keane, but they are without a battery, and therefore useless.

Yours,

W. NOTT.

To Sir W. Cotton.

Upon Major-General Nott's arrival at Candahar, he found that Major Leech had been succeeded as

Political Agent by Major Rawlinson,\* a man as much distinguished by his great scholarly attainments, as by his sound good sense, gentlemanlike bearing, and lofty spirit. Nott himself, not always disposed to judge favourably by first appearances, at once adopted a good opinion of Major Rawlinson, and during the two years' intercourse which followed, had never, upon a single occasion, the slightest reason to complain of either the presumption, the unfitness, or the interference of his political colleague. In one respect the two men were alike. They held opinions at variance with those of the Government they served. They saw the country was in a state of rebellion; they knew that the Shah (Soojah) was exceedingly disliked; and they firmly believed, that the country could only be held by the greatest caution, the most determined bravery, and the most decided distrust of the Affghans and the Beloochees.

Measures having been taken, at the instance of the Envoy and Minister, for the fortification of Candahar, attention was now directed to the defence of Quettah, and the recapture of Khelat. For the former purpose, Colonel Stacey was dispatched, with two Horse Artillery guns, the 43rd Regiment, N.I., and 200 of Christie's Horse. Upon the subject of the latter, Sir Willoughby Cotton wrote, under date 9th August, 1840:

The fall of Khelat is an unfortunate event, and the treachery exhibited by the garrison, should have been sur-

\* The present Colonel Rawlinson, C.B.

mised, I should have imagined, by the political authorities. Why Ross Bell and Captain Bean, at the first placing the man on the throne, did not at the same time leave either your 31st Regiment, or a Bombay corps there, I am at a loss to conceive.

The place must be retaken, and I have applied to Government, and the Envoy and Minister seconded the same, that Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, and two Bombay regiments, N.I., should be immediately moved to Quettah, which, with the assistance we can furnish from Candahar, will enable us to recover it to a certainty. I have as good an opinion as you can have of the valour of native regiments, but this place was taken by two Queen's corps, and since that the citadel has been strengthened by our engineers, and is naturally strong.

If it depends on me, I shall give you the command of the troops employed, and propose the same to Government, *as I am sure it cannot be in better hands.*

Pending the decision of the authorities relative to the command of the expedition to Khelat, Stacey was enjoined by General Nott, not on any account to enter upon operations against Khelat without instructions from Caubul.

Anticipating the determination of the British Government to recapture Khelat, the Chiefs, who had now obtained possession of the place, commenced strengthening the place by building up the gateways, levelling the walls and buildings outside the city gate which had given shelter to the Queen's Royals on the occasion of the previous attack, and repairing the

damaged portion of the defences. Information of these proceedings reaching Nott, he strongly counselled Sir Willoughby not to allow a small force to be sent against the place. He felt assured that the apprehension of the visit of a considerable armament would induce the enemy to abandon the fortress and take to the mountains; while, if a weak detachment only advanced to the recapture, they would probably defend every inch of ground most obstinately. It was one of the maxims of Indian warfare, which Nott had adopted from experience of the failure of others, that we should never in a hostile country move a detachment, which was not strong enough to place success beyond a doubt. He was more particularly anxious at this moment, because, as Willshire had been two or three times beaten back by the Khelatees, before he carried the fortress by storm, there was great probability of their repelling a much weaker attacking party, now that they had learnt to guard against the mistakes of their predecessors. His views are generally expressed in a private letter, of the 16th of August:

This country is in a very unsettled state. This very day I have received information which has induced me to order the whole of the 43rd, with some artillery and cavalry, to march to-morrow morning to Quettah, which is threatened by the Beloochees in some force. I suppose the Government will feel themselves bound in honour to retake Khelat as soon as they can collect a sufficient number of men.

But the place has been made *very strong*, and the fellows will not make the blunders they did last time; and even then, with their blunders, Willshire's men were beaten back *three* times. This is not generally known in Bengal, but it is true enough. It will require double the number of troops to take it now, should it be defended. Sir W. Cotton writes me, that the Queen's 40th Regiment and two Bombay native regiments are ordered to join the Quettah troops, which with assistance from Candahar and Caubul, will, he thinks, suffice to take the place; but I suspect the whole Beloochee nation will be in arms this time, and the Belooch is a very different fellow to the Affghan—he is *obstinately brave*. They are undoubtedly the best swordsmen in the world. In an affair where reckless Hammersley got wounded the other day, he declares that he saw *one* of these fellows keep sixteen or twenty of our cavalry at a distance for a considerable time, and cut some of them down. The dethroning of Mehrab Khan was a most shameful affair, and retribution has come. Sir W. Cotton has written to Lord Auckland regarding the retaking of Khelat, and he tells me that he has strongly recommended that the war shall be entrusted to me. We shall now see whether his Lordship has yet forgotten the “old ladies behind the purdah”—I fancy not. Sir W. Cotton has behaved very well indeed; he never interferes with my arrangements, and always tells me to act as I like. Sir W. Macnaghten asked him for a regiment in the Candahar Division the other day, and his answer was, “Let application be made to General Nott, and if he will spare one, I have no objection.” Now Sir W. Cotton could not have known that I should ever see his letter, but I did.

At the commencement of September, Major-General Nott received the necessary official authority for proceeding against Khelat.

Cabool, Sept. 3, 1840.

SIR,

Intelligence having reached us of the departure from Sukkur of a detachment of the 1st and 2nd Bombay Grenadier Regiments and 200 of the Queen's 40th Regiment, with a party of Irregular Horse, and having reason to believe that that detachment will be available for service against Khelat by the end of the present month, we have to request that you will immediately proceed towards Quettah, with the 18-pounders now in Candahar, and a sufficient escort, the nature of which you will arrange in concert with the Political Assistant at Candahar with reference to the exigency which may exist for the presence of troops at the latter place.

2. It is our wish that you should assume the command of the expedition to proceed for the recapture of Khelat. On your arrival at Quettah, you will decide in communication with Captain Bean, the Political Agent of that place, as to the best mode of operations. You will be pleased to enter into immediate correspondence with the officer commanding the Bombay Detachment, either instructing him to move up by the Gundava Pass, and meet your force on a specified day at Khelat, or to come up through the Bolan Pass and join you at Quettah, as may seem most advisable to yourself and Captain Bean, with reference to the state of affairs then existing. But you will understand,

that owing to the great distance from Caubul, you will exercise your own discretion in all matters connected with the duty now assigned to you, and you will not deem it necessary to await our instructions.

3. In the event of its being found necessary to attack the fort of Khelat, you will, after its recapture, place therein a garrison of one regiment of infantry. Captain Bean will be the proper authority to make arrangements for securing the peace of the country, pending the final orders of Government as to its disposal.

4. The terms to be offered to the rebels now in possession of Khelat are, first, unconditional surrender, and an assurance that the son of Mehrab Khan will be recognized by the British Government and His Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk as the lawful Chief of Beloochistan, on his agreeing immediately to proceed to Caubul to pay personal homage to His Majesty, and on his agreeing to subscribe to such other conditions as it may be thought proper to impose.

5. Captain Bean will select some competent individual to administer the affairs of the country during the absence of the young Khan, and pending his ministry, subject to such advice as he may receive from the Assistant to the Political Agent on the spot.

6. These instructions will of course have effect only in the event of none being received direct from Government.

7. It is needless to observe, that the sooner these operations are brought to a conclusion the better, not only because the moral effect of permitting the present state of affairs to last, must be highly injurious to our interests, but because the cold season sets in so early and with such severity in the high region of Khelat, that operations will

after the expiration of a month or two become impracticable.

We have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servants,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,  
Envoy and Minister.

WILLOUGHBY COTTON,  
Major-General,  
Commanding in Afghanistan.

To Major-General Nott, Commanding at Candahar.

While Major-General Nott and his political colleagues, were arranging the defence of Quettah and the recovery of Khelat, Mr. Ross Bell, the chief political authority in Scinde, dispatched reinforcements to occupy the different posts still in the possession of our troops, and to put down the insurrection in Moostung. The situation of Captain Brown at Kahun, beleaguered, and vigilantly watched as he was by hordes of Beloochees, was the primary object of solicitude. Reports from that officer announced, that his provisions were fast failing him, but that he was determined on holding his post until reduced to the last extremity. It was therefore resolved to throw supplies into the fort without delay, and with this view a convoy of 1,200 camels and 600 bullocks, was placed under the charge of Major Clibborn of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, who, with a force of 464 bayonets, 34 rank and file of

Bombay Artillery, and three 12-pounder howitzers, marched for Kahun.\*

The disastrous fate of this convoy is truly the most distressing episode in the history of the occupation of Beloochistan. In spite of the intense heat of the weather, the convoy started on the 12th of August, and by marching at night accomplished the distance to Poolagee, of one hundred and ten miles, across the burning and desert plains of Scinde, with less distress to the men than could have been anticipated. At Poolagee, Major Clibborn's force had increased by 200 Poonah and Scinde Irregular Horse, under Lieutenants Lock and Malcolm, and entered the hills by the southern Pass on the 24th. In five marches they reached the Surtoff Mountain. It took thirteen or fourteen hours—namely, from 2 A.M. to 3 or 4 P.M., to get the convoy and guns up the mountain; the latter had to be dragged up by manual labour, the road running up the steep face of the mountain, in many places nearly perpendicular, and which is said by those who have seen both, to exceed in difficulty the famed Kojuck Pass. The suffering of the sepoys employed in this service, and indeed of all, exposed as they were to the burning heat of an August sun, was distressing in the extreme, but it was borne cheerfully and without a complaint. The night was passed on the table land on the summit, with no water nearer than the foot of the Ghaut. The

\* Memorials of Afghanistan.

men had little rest; they were under arms the greater part of the night, the Beloochees keeping up a fire on the pickets and camp from the other side of an impassable ravine.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 31st of August, the march was continued to the foot of the second range of mountains, distant six or seven miles. The road lying along the foot of the mountain, was so cut up by ravines and nullahs, that one of the guns upset, occasioning considerable delay in righting and repairing it, the men being all the while exposed to a galling fire from the Beloochees, which wounded several. One of the officers engaged thus continued a description of the sad affair:

“Moving on again, we soon came in sight of the Pass of Nuffoosk, and here all our difficulties became apparent. The road which had been reported practicable for guns and camels, rose before our worried and exhausted troops in a zig-zag course up the side of a precipitous mountain; the crest crowned with the enemy, screened under shelter of the rocks, who on our appearance, set fire to a beacon light. It was now 10 A.M., and the heat fearfully oppressive. A letter from Captain Brown in Kahun, reported that abundance of rain had fallen, and that no doubt we should find a sufficiency of water at our ground. The reports of the guides on arrival were that there was no water! And the little remaining in the puckauls (skins) from the last halting-ground, on the top of the Surtoff Pass

(where neither water nor forage exists), was dried up. Under these circumstances, it was evident that the whole force and cattle must perish from thirst, unless the Pass of Nuffoosk were carried, beyond which, water was said to be procurable, and the Fort of Kahun distant about six miles.

“We waited anxiously till half-past one for the arrival of the rear-guard, consisting of the 1st and 2nd companies of the 1st Grenadiers, one howitzer, and the Poonah Horse under Lieutenant Lock. At two, the dispositions for attacking the Pass were made, and the left flank companies of the 1st and 2nd Grenadiers, and fifty volunteers, Poonah Auxiliary Horse, under Lieutenant Lock, were led with admirable coolness and order by Captain Raitt, followed by a strong support of the Grenadiers. An effective flanking party was posted at the foot of the Ghaut, on the right, who kept up a heavy fire on the crest of the hill. The guns were placed so as to throw shrapnel shells to clear the head of the Pass, while the storming party advanced up the steep face of the mountain. The remainder of the escort with the colours were drawn up upon the plain, facing the Pass, and protecting the guns. With the greatest anxiety we watched the progress of the storming party, as they steadily wound up, under a heavy fire from the enemy; in some parts they were only able to advance in single file. The road, at all times barely practicable for guns, had been altogether destroyed; and they found breast-

works, topped with thorny bushes, built across the road, in those places most exposed to the fire from the ridge. These they surmounted; the ledge of the head of the Pass was gained, and the party ready to rush on; one sepoy was seen to reach the gap and fire through, when from every side they were assailed by a tremendous fire from the enemy, and rocks and stones were hurled from the summit. The Beloochees, with a wild shout, rushed down sword in hand. Hundreds and hundreds poured over the ridges of the mountains, and leaping into the midst of the men, bore all before them. Sepoys and Beloochees were mingled on the hill.

“Seeing the attack completely repulsed, and that to make any stand on the face of the hill was impossible, the supporting and flanking parties retreated to the colours. The enemy rushed down the mountain, and although the guns were sweeping the plain with grape, advanced with such determination, gallantry and impetuosity, that there was barely time to form the men—a task rendered but the more difficult by the number of recruits necessarily placed in the ranks for the present service. The Beloochees, pouring round and round in all directions, attacked sword in hand, and throwing in showers of the heavy stones, with which the plain abounded, advanced to the very muzzles of the guns. The men, however, behaved admirably, and kept up so brisk a fire, that with well-applied rounds of grape from Captain Stamford’s howitzers, the enemy was repulsed

with great slaughter, dispersing in all directions, numbers falling in the flight.

“Our loss on the mountain was now found to be very severe. Nearly half the storming-party had fallen, and we had lost four officers. Raitt was shot through the thigh, about half-way up the mountain, when he turned round and asked Franklin to lead the advance; but seeing him supporting poor Williams, who had just been shot through the head, he bound his handkerchief round the wound, and again took his place at the head of his company, where he fell nobly when the rush took place, at which time also Franklin was killed. Little Moore received two shot-wounds, and was afterwards cut down by a Beloochee in passing Lock, who led the dismounted sowars; he was severely wounded, receiving a sword-cut and several severe bruises from stones on the head, but was forced down the hill by his orderly, and reached one of the guns in a fainting state. Out of the hundred dismounted sowars alone, fifty-three were killed.

“The enemy had been repulsed with great slaughter, and most of their influential men were lying dead around us, but the Pass remained in their possession, their numbers were still very great, and combined tribes of the Beloochees, amounting in fact to several thousands. To follow up our success was impossible; the heat was dreadfully intense, and the sufferings of the men and cattle, from exhaustion and thirst, became painfully apparent. The men grew clamorous for drink,

and the cries of the wounded and dying, for water! water! were unceasing. The few bottles of beer among the officers' baggage, given to allay the wants of the greatest sufferers, gave rise to scenes of frenzy and despair. Men of all castes rushed and struggled for it, and many a miserable wretch, on getting hold of a bottle and finding it empty dropped lifeless on the ground. The scene was agonizing to behold. Parties were sent to search for water; and Meer Hussain, one of the guides, having reported that they discovered some in a nullah, about half a coss off, the whole of the Puckaul Bheesties, and camel Puckauls, under the escort of the Irregular Horse, were dispatched to procure a supply. The gun-horses were sent with the party, being quite unfit, in their exhausted state, to take the guns back, and many of the officers' horses accompanied them. The evening was spent in collecting and bringing off the wounded, and occasionally firing shells into the hills, from which the enemy kept up a fire on the skirmishers in the plain. Party after party returned, reporting that no water was to be found; and, about sunset, some stragglers from Meer Hussain's party came in, reporting that the whole had been surrounded in a nullah, the greater part cut to pieces, and the horses carried off.”

“Under these circumstances,” Major Clibborn states in his official despatch, “it becomes necessary to determine what should be done. I had already lost about 150 men of my small force, (small, when the nature of

the country, and the size of the convoy are considered,) the remainder being enfeebled with thirst, and the exertions of the two previous days; and, to add to our different difficulties, most of the camel-men, dooly-bearers, &c., had absconded during the action, after plundering the Commissariat. The gun-horses were gone; and the men of the Golundauze, so prostrated from fatigue and thirst, that latterly they could scarcely rise to fire a gun. In this state I found it impossible, allowing that I made a successful attack on the Pass, to convey either the stores or guns over it, particularly as the road had been destroyed; and, after mature deliberation, I found that it would be impracticable to carry out the object of the convoy to throw provisions into Kahun; and further, that unless the water-party, horses, &c., returned soon, my whole force, cattle and followers, must perish of thirst. The sad alternative devolved on me of deciding on the abandonment of the unfortunate garrison of Kahun, the stores and materials of the detachment; and the choice presented itself by a rapid retreat to the water at Surtoff, of saving the remainder of my men and the numerous followers, with such carriages and stores as their enfeebled state would permit me to carry off. I therefore resolved, unless the gun-horses and water arrived by 10 P.M. to move off quietly with my troops.

“Such continuing to be the case at that hour, I directed Captain Stamford to spike his guns, and at eleven o'clock we moved with as much quietness as the

frantic state of the men would permit. I am grieved to add that we were obliged to abandon nearly everything—guns, stores, camp equipage, &c.; the desertion of the camel-drivers having put it out of my power to remove them.

“The wounded were carried on the few camels we could manage to take with us. We reached the top of the Surtoff, fortunately without obstruction from the enemy, for the men were completely knocked up. Here all discipline was at an end; the men rushing down the hill, leaped into the pools of water like madmen. The rear-guard was attacked by a large body of Beloochees, and the slaughter among the followers was very great. As soon as the men could be got from the water they were formed into square, as the Beloochees were reported to have shown themselves on all sides, and we waited for day-break, when it was found that the whole of the convoy and baggage we had been able to remove, had been carried off in the confusion and darkness of the night.

“The sepoy at Nuffoosk had been ordered in the evening to put three or four days' supply of flour in their horse-sacks, but most of the men had been too much exhausted to do so, and we now found ourselves absolutely without food. Not a single tent was saved, either for officers or men; and nothing remained but to make a forced march on Peolagee, distant more than fifty miles. Fortunately we had still a few empty camels, and were joined by others on the road, on

which we brought on the wounded. Lock had a narrow escape; he was carried to Surtoff, bound to the back of a sowar, and afterwards brought on lashed to the back of a camel.

“The sufferings of all on the march to Poolagee, from the intense heat of the weather, rendered more insupportable by the reflection of the sand and sandstone rocks, is not to be described. Poor Captain Heighington, of the 1st Grenadiers, died the day after we reached Poolagee, from the effects of the sun and fatigue, and many of the men died on the march. Major Clibborn, whose exertions were untiring, and whose courage and self-possession through these trying scenes were most conspicuous, and the admiration of all, would have probably shared the same fate, had not one of the sepoy, observing a change in his countenance on the march, begged of him to wrap a muslin sash (which he gave him) round his head in place of his chakoe. This, no doubt, saved his life. In his official despatch he deservedly notices the gallant bravery of Lieutenant Lock of the Poonah Irregular Horse, and Lieutenant Malcolm of the Scinde Horse. The great number of their men who fell, shows how nobly they did their duty; indeed, the conduct of all the men, many of the 1st Grenadiers raw recruits, who never before had been under fire, was exemplary.”

While these disastrous affairs were in course of occurrence, Captain Lewis Brown maintained his position in the fort of Kahun, in the Murree Hills, display-

ing in his beleaguered and almost helpless condition, a degree of heroism, patience, cheerfulness, resolution, discipline, and bravery, unsurpassed in the annals of war. The garrison consisted of three companies of Native Infantry, and one gun; Brown's only companion being Lieutenant Erskine of the artillery.

The loss of the camels and bullocks, more than the military reverse, determined the Government to abandon the idea of occupying places in Upper Scinde. Instructions were at once sent to Mr. Ross Bell to confine his attention to keeping clear the passes, that the communication between Lower Affghanistan and India might not be interrupted.

Major-General Nott moved from Candahar to Quetta, on the 9th of September, 1840,\* with a

\* A few days before leaving Candahar, the Major-General was obliged to part with his Commissariat officer, Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-Colonel and C.B.) Curtis. On this occasion he issued the following order, which is remarkable as being among the very few published by him in compliment to an individual officer. He held an opinion, that the fulfilment of common duty, required and deserved no thanks.

“District Orders by Major-General Nott, Commanding :

“*Candahar, Aug. 31, 1840.*—No. 28. Agreeably to Orders, dated Head-quarters, Caubul, August 5, No. 347, Lieutenant Curtis, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, is directed to make over his Commissariat charge to Captain Leeson of the 43rd N.I.

“*Candahar, Sept. 1, 1840.*—No. 29. Lieutenant Curtis having reported the Commissariat charge made over to Captain Leeson, all reports and applications to be made to the latter officer.

“Lieutenant Curtis is allowed to quit Candahar on medical certifi-

company of the 42nd N.I. and fifty horsemen, in an escort, leaving the heavy guns, which he considered necessary for the siege of Khelat, to follow him. It had been his wish to take the whole of the 42nd Regiment and the guns at once; but Major Rawlinson for a while urgently opposed the withdrawal of so large a proportion of the garrison of Candahar. Major Todd, the Political Agent of Herat, had awakened in Rawlinson's mind some apprehension, that Yar Mahomed, the Vizier of Herat, would attack Candahar.

After the relief of Herat, in 1838, the Governor of the province, Shah Kamran, had consented to receive a British officer at his court, to represent the interests of the country, and watch over the Russo-Persic designs; and Major D'Arcy Todd, of the Bengal Artillery, was appointed the Political Agent accordingly, with two or three artillery subalterns as his assistants, Major Pottinger having left the place after the Persian besieging army had withdrawn.

cates, agreeably to Orders, No. 347, dated Head-quarters, Caubul, 5th ultimo.

"The Major-General regrets that the indisposition of Lieutenant Curtis, S.A.C.G., renders it necessary for that officer to resign the Commissariat charge of the 2nd Brigade, to which he has been constantly attached from the date on which the Army of the Indus left Ferozepore, in 1838. The active zeal and great exertions invariably shown by Lieutenant Curtis in the performance of the duties of his department, did not escape the particular notice of the Major-General during the period in question, and has been such as to deserve his thanks and to call forth the expression of his regret at the loss of his valuable services."

The leading motive of the conduct of Shah Kamran was, as after-events well established, that he might obtain money from the British Government. He was aware of their anxiety to render Herat a barrier to north-western aggressions upon Affghanistan and India, and he determined to turn it to account. He soon found that to ask for pecuniary aid was to receive it, and, with genuine Asiatic cunning and covetousness, he gradually became extortionate. But this was not the worst part of the business. Had the money been legitimately applied, and the Shah continued faithful to our interests, the outlay would hardly have been regretted. The Shah, however, or rather Yar Mahomed, his minister, the *de facto* ruler of Herat, had soon become impatient of the contiguity of the British, and the presence of our officers, and gradually involved himself in innumerable intrigues with Persia, the late enemy of Herat, with the Dooranee Chieftains, whose power had been destroyed by the restoration of Dost Mahomed, and the Ghilzies to the west of Candahar. Nothing but good offices and the generous disbursement of lacs of rupees had marked the conduct of the British political authorities. The officers went upon dangerous missions to the courts of Khiva and Bokhara, embassies and missions were dispatched to Persia and Russia; to conciliate, and by conciliation to check, the dangerous designs of neighbouring powers, was the one great object to which the zeal, energies, and talents of all

who had been sent to Herat and Persia were applied. But nothing seemed to satisfy the cormorant appetites of the Heratees, and at length even the rupees of India ceased to possess a charm; their cupidity had been satiated, and rancorous animosity now marked the bearing of Yar Mahomed towards all who had befriended his master and himself.

It was not only from the Herat quarter, however, that Rawlinson contemplated danger. He considered the province of Zemindaur to need close watching; he expected to be called upon by the Envoy at Caubul to send a regiment to reinforce the army in the north, for Dost Mahomed was advancing from Bamean to reassert his pretensions, and there was an insufficiency of troops to resist him; and he (Rawlinson) did not think the people of Candahar at any time to be depended upon, if the garrison were further weakened.

To an unexpected event was owing the removal of the political officer's objections, and the enhancement of the moral strength of the British position at Candahar. Colonel Dennie, of the 13th Light Infantry, had gone out with a considerable detachment to Bamean, had encountered and defeated Dost Mahomed, and his followers, to the number of several thousand men. Great rejoicings took place at Caubul, and the opportunity was taken by the authorities at Candahar, to fire salutes and illuminate the town. The British

star was in the ascendant. The Candaharees quailed before its effulgence. Rawlinson no longer desired the retention of the 42nd.\*

\* Nott's anxiety to have the 42nd, and his generous appreciation of Rawlinson's objections, are apparent in the following demi-official of October 3, 1840.

Quetta, October 3, 1840.

MY DEAR MAJOR,

Many thanks for your kind letters of the 30th ultimo. I am indeed glad that you have dispatched the 42nd Regiment, and I feel that you did so the moment you saw that affairs had taken a favourable turn to the northward. I do hope that nothing will occur to prevent the regiment joining me with the guns. You and I differed a little in opinion regarding its march, but sure I am, our views were the same in the good of the service. I did not intend to write you until to-morrow's dawk-day, but I have this moment (4 P.M.) heard that an express is going off immediately to Candahar, and I will not omit the opportunity of sending you a few lines.

You may fully rely that whatever the course of events may be here, I will not fail to send you a regular regiment before severe winter sets in, and, indeed, I hope to return with both the 42nd and 43rd. I will send back the 42nd the moment it arrives, should any circumstances occur at Candahar to render it desirable. You will hear that Bell has promised to send corps from Scinde, and unthinking people may suppose that nothing will prevent their arrival in time for Khelat; but I know that the chances are against them; the one hundred and one impediments to the movements of troops, and even the possibility of their being defeated on their route. No, no, listen not to these stories, but let me have the 42nd, and you shall speedily have them back. I must conclude by repeating my thanks for sending the regiment, and I do hope that they have made their third or fourth march this day.

Yours very truly,

W. NOTT.

To Major Rawlinson, P.A.,  
Candahar.

[P.S.

Captain Bean, the Political Agent, at Quettah, alarmed for the safety of the different posts in Shawl, now pressed Colonel Stacey to place detachments at his disposal. Stacey was a man who had a reputation for singularity, but he was gifted with strong good sense for all that. An Oriental scholar and an antiquary, it was supposed that his military talents were of an indifferant order. Opportunity established the reverse; he was sagacious and determined; and following Nott's example, he positively declined to yield to Captain Bean's requisitions until he could hear from the General,

P.S.—Political circumstances may hourly arise in Scinde to delay the march of troops towards this.

To Hammersley, who had become a political officer at Quettah, he wrote on the same day.

MY DEAR HAMMERSLEY,

I can only repeat what I have been urging for the last two months, viz., that I think it absolutely necessary that the 42nd Regiment should come here, and if any measure should be adopted to prevent this, whatever bad result, occurs the responsibility will be removed from me.

Many accidents may prevent the arrival of the Bombay regiments, even their defeat on their route.

With regard to the time and manner and force of moving upon Khelat, that is a matter I must seriously weigh in my own mind, and act according to the best of my military judgment.

Yours truly,

W. NOTT.

P.S.—I will take good care that the 42nd is sent back to Candahar at the time Major Rawlinson requires it, whatever the course of events here may be; besides, the heavy guns cannot come without a whole regiment, which cannot be detached from this.

who had previously written to him, with the full knowledge that he would be obeyed.

“I have to request that you will not allow any of the troops under your command to be employed in operations against Khelat without receiving orders from me. On the arrival of my Bombay troops within the province of Shawl, should you find yourself the senior officer, you will, of course, assume command of the whole, when the above-mentioned request will equally apply to them.”\*

\* The superior authorities in the north of Afghanistan some time afterwards *wigged* Stacey, through General Nott, for his bearing towards Bean. General Nott hereupon sent the following letter to the Assistant Adjutant-General at Caubul.

Quettah, October 6, 1840.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 513, of the 24th ultimo, and to acquaint you that it has been communicated to Lieutenant-Colonel Stacey.

The accompanying document, No. 1, is a letter under date the 13th ultimo, addressed by Colonel Stacey to Captain Bean, Political Agent in Shawl, detailing at length the Colonel's reasons for thinking it unadvisable to advance on Moostung.

Taking into consideration all the circumstances which existed at the time—the total want of information on the part of the political authorities, their daily and hourly contradictory reports as to the numbers and position of the enemy, the small force which could be made available at Quettah, and the very great sickness prevailing, that if this small force had advanced, although they might and would have driven the enemy from the town of Moostung, still they would only have held the ground they stood upon without the means of keeping open the communication with Quettah, or advancing towards Khelat—the party being necessarily stationary at Moostung, would have caused the very worst impression, and enabled the Chiefs to persuade the

Nott reached Quettah in the middle of September without an accident. He escaped one peril by strata-

people that fear and weakness alone prevented further operations, and that the whole country would probably have been in arms, while no one possible good could have been the result. Whether the rebels may yet remain two or ten days at Moostung is of very little consequence when put in competition with the risk of a check with its following disasters; besides, I know that at the time these very authorities did not know whether the enemy consisted of 2 or 16,000 men, as these numbers with all their intermediates were from day to day inserted in their notes and letters. I therefore did, and still do, highly approve of Colonel Stacey's decision and firm conduct, and feel assured that no good could have resulted from his compliance, but that much disaster might have followed. Being on the spot, and having ascertained the feelings of the people, and the state of excitement of the whole country, had Colonel Stacey advanced, after my frequent warnings of caution, instead of expressing my satisfaction at his conduct, I should not have failed to attach to him the most serious blame, and have brought him under the notice of the General commanding in Afghanistan.

If an officer of Colonel Stacey's standing, zeal, and ability, is not to exercise any judgment on a military movement in a country where a handful of sepoy are surrounded by an enemy consisting of the whole population, then I will confidently declare that no operation can be undertaken with a prospect of a successful result.

I hope I shall be excused when I say, that if officers in command are obliged blindly to follow every wild, crude, and absurd measure suggested to them, by unthinking and inexperienced people, without consulting their own judgment as to the probability of success, or looking to the force and the material they have to work with, they ought in common justice to be told so, and all responsibility be removed from them.

Since I have been here, I have had occasion to assure the political authorities, "that I shall always be ready, and most happy to meet and comply with their wishes, but that at the same time I must be allowed, where military movement is concerned, to use a little of my own judg-

gem. His last march would, according to the reports from his late aide-de-camp, Hammersley, have led him through a very dangerous Pass, where 2,000 Kakurs were concealed, with the object of intercepting and massacring the General and his escort.\* In the morn-

ment and discretion, and to look well at the material and force I have to work with before I act." Unless I am allowed this, I cannot be held responsible.

I am,

Your most obedient servant,

W. NOTT, Major-General,

Commanding Candahar and Shawl.

To Captain Douglas, Assistant Adjutant-General,  
Candul.

\* At Hykulzye, which the General reached on the 19th of September, he addressed Mr. Ross Bell, the chief political authority in Scinde, and his letter, strongly characteristic, is worthy of record, for the soundness of the advice which it contains and the intrepidity of his resolution to push on to Quettah.

Camp Hykulzye, Sept. 19, 1840.

MY DEAR SIR,

I left Candahar on the 10th instant with a small escort, for the purpose of assuming command of the troops which had been directed to assemble for the recapture of the fortress of Khelat. I have heard by private letters that you had left Hindostan for Upper Scinde, where I hope you have by this time arrived, as I believe your presence must be much required, and is indeed, if my information be correct, vitally necessary. I write a few lines in hopes of hearing from you, yet with some doubts whether my letter will ever reach you.

On my march, private letters and reports have made me acquainted with the unfortunate affair in which Major Clibborn's detachment has been engaged, but not of the particulars; I still hope that his loss has been exaggerated.

My instructions from Sir W. Macnaghten and Sir W. Cotton led me to hope that I should have found two Bombay native regiments,

ing of the last day the General moved close to the mouth of the Koochlauk Pass, and encamped, but during

200 Europeans, six guns, and a party of Poonah Horse, in Shawl, which, with the 43rd Regiment now at Quettah, would have given me possession of Khelat by the 10th of October; but I fear that this misfortune in Scinde will upset this arrangement and will greatly encourage the rebels. I fear there will be a general rise; the plunder of Major Clibborn's detachment will induce these savage tribes to take the field in great numbers, in hopes of similar results.

My information of last evening says: "The young Khan of Khelat is at Moostung with 1,600 men, waiting the arrival of guns from Khelat, for the attack of Quettah." But where there are so many daily and contradictory reports, it is our business to hear but not to rely on any of them.

By a note from Captain Bean, I fear I shall find some difficulty in getting to Quettah; I have only eighty sepoy with some few irregular horse; however, I will try hard to succeed. The Koochlauk Pass, eleven miles north-west of Quettah, is said to be occupied by a body of Kakurs; the Pass is not more than a quarter of a mile in length, but is one of the most ugly and awkward spots I have ever seen, and I must confess, with my handful of sepoy, I would rather see it unoccupied; but I must push through, or endeavour to turn it by taking to the mountain-top. Once through the Pass, I am in the vale of Quettah; but then I expect the young Khan and his army will be there; so you see that the chances are against me. They shall not have my little party without paying for them.

You will perceive that my only hope of attacking Khelat depends entirely on getting troops from your side, as none can come from Candahar. At Quettah I shall only have the 43rd Regiment and two very sickly and inefficient corps of the Shah's army, with four 6-pounder guns; however, I am in hopes that two 18-pounders from Candahar will reach me before the 6th of next month, as I had made all necessary arrangements for their moving before I left that garrison.

It is the business of every military man implicitly to obey all orders he receives from his superiors, and not to feel hurt that his own proposals are rejected, but I ought to have been now in possession of

the night he moved off by another road, the westward, and this outwitted the savage mountaineers.

Directing his energies in reference to Khelat, the General found that the young Khan, Nusseer, the son of Mehrab Khan, was in the field and determined on holding out to the last extremity. It had been proposed to him, by the Political Agent, to give in his adhesion to Shah Soojah, to go to Caubul and make submission, and then return to the occupation of Khelat, in a state of vassalage. This he peremptorily refused. Nott, whose sympathies were always with the brave, and, as he believed, the wronged, admired this spirit in the Khan; but he nevertheless, as a British officer, was

Khelat, and should have been if I could have acted on my own judgment.

Under present circumstances, as I have received no official information from Scinde, I should like to know your plans for the campaign, which I suppose must take place. I would observe as follows:

1. No operations can take place against Khelat before the troops now at Quettah shall have been reinforced from Scinde.
2. The season is, and will be for another month, much against any operations below the Bolan Pass.
3. The severe season will set in, in the neighbourhood of Khelat, by the first week in November, if not before.
4. I would suggest that two or three regiments should be pushed, with as little delay as possible, from Scinde towards the province of Shawl; that Khelat should be taken, and a garrison of one regiment left in it, pending the pleasure of higher authority; that the force should then countermarch upon Scinde, and carry into effect whatever measures your instructions may have in contemplation. But I would most seriously recommend that no small detachments should be sent out; that system has been ruinous, and if persevered in must lead to disaster.

anxious to bring him to task, and to get back the fort. At the end of September, the 24th, we find him writing to his daughters.

We are truly in a delectable situation; Sir W. Macnaghten suffered himself to be deceived, and he, in his turn, deceived Lord Auckland, and between them, they have endangered the life of every European in Central Asia. I wrote letter after letter, begging that they would not separate my brigade into small detachments; that if they did so, disaster must follow; but if kept together, everything would end well. They would not listen, and I know not what the result will be. The 38th Regiment is by this time at Sukkur. I have once more sent down to Scinde a plan of operations, but I suppose it will not be attended to. I am disgusted. They most unjustly dethroned Mehrab Khan, and placed a tool of Shah Soojah's in his place. Well, Mehrab Khan's son assembles his father's followers—retakes Khelat; our authorities talk big for a day or two, and then send me instructions to offer terms to the boy, declaring that they will place him on his father's throne; and thus they disgrace the character of our country! Had they taken this boy by the hand when he was a wanderer in the land of his ancestors, there would have been a generous and honourable feeling; but to bend the knee to him and his bloody Chiefs *now*, is disgraceful. The vain and rascally Shah Soojah has added a clause to the instructions I have received; the young hero boy must go up to Caubul, to prostrate himself before His Majesty, and to *beg* for his father's throne, which he has already *gained*! He will *never* do so. The terms were sent to him two days ago; his answer has not come in, and I hourly expect to see his army advancing, while

I have 600 men to receive him. What folly! I wish I could get the 38th Regiment here; with it and the 43rd, I would venture against the young Chief's 10,000 men.

The General's perfect confidence in the native regiments was worthy of a Company's officer, who had served all his life among the Sipahes, and the men repaid his just estimate of their value in the field by placing the most unbounded reliance in him. They would have followed him anywhere, and achieved almost anything within the compass of a soldier's power, under his auspices. The troops of Wellington had not more perfect dependence on his judgment and invincibility than the Sipahes had on the bravery and military talents of General Nott.

In a letter written on the 29th of September (five days later than the one last quoted), Nott repeats his sentiments. At the same time, he gives vent to his thorough disapprobation of the manner in which affairs are conducted by the British authorities, and indulges in a vein of prophecy which after-events sustained in a most melancholy manner.

The young Khan of Khelat has refused the terms offered to him by our wise Minister and Envoy, and still swears that he will revenge his father's death, and that nothing will satisfy him but the restoration of Moostung, Quettah, and all the princely land, even to the walls of Shikarpore; and at a grand durbar, all his Chiefs swore upon that very convenient book, the Koran, that they would have these terms, or die to a man. Poor people! if I had two good

Bengal regiments disposable, such ideas would never have entered their heads, and their gentle consciences would not have been burthened with this solemn oath, which I fear must be broken. However, seeing that I have not the means of attacking Khelat, they bluster, and even exert themselves a great deal, and they know that I have only 500 or 600 men to oppose them; but I do not think they will come within long musket-shot of my handful of sepoys, even to redeem their oath, but still they *may* come. It is certain they have just made two marches towards this place, with about 5,000 men, and are now within sixteen miles of my camp. To-day or to-morrow will show what they dare do. Had I been allowed to have acted on my own judgment when Khelat fell into the hands of the rebels, the fortress would now have been in my possession, and the country in comparative quietness; but the authorities are never right, even by chance, and although most of them are stupid in the extreme, they fancy themselves great men, and even possessed of abilities and talents. They drink their claret, draw large salaries, go about with a numerous rabble at their heels—all well paid by John Bull (or rather by the oppressed cultivators of the land in Hindostan)—the Calcutta treasury is drained of its rupees, and *good-natured* Lord Auckland approves and confirms all. In the meantime, all goes wrong here. We are become hated by the people, and the English name and character, which two years ago stood so high and fair, has become a bye-word. Thus it is to employ men selected by intrigue and patronage! The conduct of the *one thousand* and *one* Politicals has ruined our cause, and bared the throat of every European in this country to the sword and knife of the revengeful Affghan and bloody Belooch, and unless several regiments be quickly sent, not a man will

be left to note the fall of his comrades. Nothing but force will ever make them submit to the hated Shah Soojah, who is most certainly as great a scoundrel as ever lived. The Minister objected to my bringing the 42nd with me from Candahar, and Sir W. Cotton gave in to his opinion. The consequences are, the young Khan of Khelat is insolent; Khelat is not taken, my hands are tied, and the whole country in rebellion! Oh! they are a precious set, and a precious price John Bull will have to pay for all their fantastic tricks.

How deeply is it to be regretted that, instead of listening to the reports of the credulous and sanguine Macnaghten, the Government had not the advantage of such a mentor as Nott! His, indeed, was not the tongue that dropped manna—he loved plain dealing—dared to look truth in the face, and to proclaim it. The blind and the timid pronounced him a “most profane and liberal counsellor,” but honest and courageous men, who dreaded the tarnish of their country’s honour, “relished him.”\*

The valley of Quettah or Shawl, lies in lat. 30° 10' N., and long. 67°. Fifty miles or so, from that point in a south-easterly direction, is Dadur, at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. Twenty miles due south of Quettah is Moostung, and south by west of Moostung, at a distance

\* CASSIO. He speaks home: you shall relish him  
More in the soldier than the scholar.

of sixty miles, is Khelat.\* At Dadur and Moostung were weak detachments of troops, with political officers, whose duty it was to keep General Nott informed of the progress of events in their neighbourhood, and to seek his co-operation.

The destruction of the convoy, and the defeat of the detachment under Major Clibborn, which was moving to Kahun (ninety miles east of Dadur), had given confidence to the young Nusseer Khan, who had, as before stated, taken the field, moving out of his stronghold to attack Dadur and Moostung. When he obtained possession of Khelat, he took prisoner young Lieutenant Loveday, who was the Political Agent at the fortress, and at once placed him in chains, and otherwise treated him with the greatest barbarity. When Nusseer Khan went on any of his expeditions, Loveday was invariably taken with him, being carried about in a khadjavah (a sort of chair, placed like a pannier on either side of a camel), to which he was chained, exposed to the burning heat of the climate, and almost entirely divested of clothing. As Nusseer Khan moved about the country, he was continually joined by large numbers of Brahoes and Beloochees, who remained with him or dispersed according to the extent of forage available for their horses and cattle.

\* There is an admirable map of the whole of the countries which were now the scene of operations. It is published by W. Allen and Co., of Leadenhall Street, and is derived from the surveys of Lieutenant-Colonel Neil Campbell, Major Leech, and others.

The state of Upper Scinde now filled the Government with the most anxious concern, and it was determined that renewed and vigorous efforts should be made to restore tranquillity. Major-General Brooks, of the Bombay army, was appointed to command the troops in Scinde; to Major-General Nott was confided the conduct of such military operations as might be found necessary above the Pass. Nott was at the same time invested with *concurrent political jurisdiction* with Mr. Ross Bell. So much confusion had arisen from the antagonistic advice and appeals of the political officers at Candahar, Quettah, and Scinde, that Nott had become perfectly bewildered. The only remedy against a continuance of such contradictory orders, applications and counsel, lay in the connecting Nott with Ross Bell. From Bombay and Cutch, troops, consisting of two European and several Native regiments, were dispatched towards Upper Scinde, and everything looked well for an early settlement of the country.

The instructions sent to Major-General Nott by the Envoy and Minister, were to the effect, that he was to proceed to Khelat, obtaining a sufficient force from Upper Scinde, and sending back the 42nd Regiment to Candahar, as soon as the 18-pounders, which Captain Anderson was conveying to Quettah, escorted by that regiment, should arrive. From the interruption of the dawks by the enemy, Nott could get no accurate information respecting the reinforcements from below.

As soon therefore as he was in possession of the guns, the General yielded to the entreaties of Captain Bean, the chief political officer at Quettah, that he would move on Moostung, for the young Khan had invaded the province, which formed part of the dominions of Shah Soojah. Nott lost no time in proceeding thither, reaching Moostung on the 25th of October. The enemy had fled to the eastward, and was in the neighbourhood of Dadur, much nearer, indeed to that post than the political authority imagined, and that post they furiously attacked.\*

\* "Recollections of Four Years' Service in the East with H.M.'s 40th Regiment." By Captain J. M. Bladen Neill.

Here is the account of the attack and the gallant defence of the post.

Camp Dadur, November 1, 1840.

SIR,

I have the honour to report, for the information of the officer commanding in Upper Scinde, that on the 28th ultimo, about 2 P.M., the whole of the rebel force, headed by the young Khan, emerged from the Pass of the Bolan, and pitched his camp about two miles south of the entrance.

On the following day, the 29th, about 2 P.M., the enemy, amounting in number to 3,000 or 4,000 horse and foot, formed and advanced *en masse* towards the camp, evidently with the intention of making an immediate attack.

For some time they appeared to advance but slowly, when they suddenly came on, making a simultaneous movement upon our position, and we commenced, by opening a fire upon them, of spherical case, round shot, and canister, with evident effect; on their nearer approach they divided into two parties, one of which advanced along our front, whilst the other proceeded towards the right and rear of our breastworks. Observing the party to our front was making towards the position of

To Dadur the right wing of Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, the 38th Bengal N.I., 200 of the Scinde

the Bengal Local Horse, I directed Captain McPherson, commanding the detachment of Bengal Locals, to charge them, which order this officer executed in gallant style and spirit. On his approach, they turned and fled, but he succeeded in cutting to pieces from 30 to 40 of the enemy, and immediately returned into position, his small number of men (about 120 sowars) not permitting him to act with more effect in their farther pursuit, being himself wounded severely in the charge, and having one of his Rissaldars killed, and the other, together with 6 Duffadars and 18 men, wounded. Meantime Captain Heath had previously plied the enemy with spherical case and round shot, which, united to the charge, completely cleared our front, and the rebels drew off, taking up a position in a deserted village out of the range of our shot.

The enemy formed again about sunset, and took up their position on our right, amongst the remains of the sowar lines, from whence we could not dislodge them; from this point they kept up a continued fire of matchlocks, which was returned from the breastwork and fortified summit of the Commissariat store-room, and continued until about two o'clock, when the enemy again advanced in a line to attack the breastworks, but the fire from the right and the summit of the store-room, drove them back with severe loss; one of their leaders fell, and they retreated to their camp.

On the 31st, the enemy again formed, and advanced upon the camp about 3 P.M., in number estimated to about 5,000. At some distance from our position, they separated into two divisions; one of which, accompanied by the flag of the young Khan, took up a position to our right and planted it in the ground at the distance of two hundred or three hundred yards; when a few shots, of spherical case, from the 6-pounder in the bastion, dispersed them with some execution. Upwards of 1,000 made direct for the town, which opened its gates for their reception, and the people assisted the enemy in getting up the bastions. The Naib fled without making the slightest opposition; in consequence, he assented to treachery on the part of those whose bounden duty it was to defend it. About six o'clock a large body took up their position about two

Horse and two 6-pounders, under Major Boscawen (who had preceded the head-quarters of the corps), repaired, and arrived on the morning of the 30th of October. The soldiers having been dismissed after their long march, were busily engaged in pitching their tents, when, to the surprise of all, intelligence was brought in that Nusseer Khan, with a large force, was still encamped within one or two miles of the fort. Orders were instantly given for the troops to fall in, and advance on the enemy. It was, however, too late; for "His Highness," now apprised of the proximity of this detachment—which, it would appear, had come upon him as unexpectedly, as the news of His

hundred yards from the Dawk Bungalow, in the enclosed compound of which the Bengal Locals were picketed, but were almost immediately dislodged, by a well-directed fire of canister from one of the 6-pounders, which Captain Cartwright had run up to the breastwork, and the enemy finally retreated towards the town.

During these attacks made upon our position, I beg most particularly to bring to the notice of the commanding officer the steady behaviour and conduct evinced by all ranks: for the space of five or six days the men had been previously constantly under arms, had scarcely any rest night or day during this period, being in hourly expectation of an attack from the immediate vicinity of the enemy, and consequently obliged to be always prepared to move to their positions. Accompanying is the return of killed and wounded on our side; the loss of the enemy during the two days is estimated to have amounted to about 150 men, one of their principal Sirdars, and several others of inferior note.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

J. WATKINS, Captain,  
Commanding the 23rd Regiment, N.I.

To the Major of Brigade,  
Sukkur.

Highness being so near had on the "Political"—had commenced his retreat, and long before Major Boscawen could get near his camp, had fled. A few camels, tents, &c., fell into the hands of Boscawen's party, but the regret at having lost the opportunity of bringing the young Chief to action, was heightened when, on entering his camp, our troops found the mangled body of Lieutenant Loveday. Mr. Hall, in his "Scenes in a Soldier's Life," has given the following painful description of the horrible fate of the young political officer:

"In the meantime we advanced cheerfully and eagerly, but slowly, towards the line of cavalry, as we had to cross a plain intersected by deep and strong streams of water, and broad nullahs, or ditches, which greatly increased the harassing nature of the ground over which we had to pass. And as we did, the enemy's cavalry still continued to retire before us, at intervals, and very slowly. By the time that we had come within musket range, they perceived that their object had been attained; their remaining infantry had gained the Pass, and they immediately faced about and fled with the rapidity of a rout, leaving their camp equipage entire, and a large quantity of treasure. It was, however, not without vexation that we beheld the majority of the enemy we had taken so much pains to get at, thus scampering off almost unharmed, and unscathed, dashing up the, to us, apparently almost inaccessible sides of the mountains; our guns played at intervals

with grape and spherical shot, admirably aimed, so as to burst and meet the ascending foe on the sides of the cliffs, and it was the only satisfaction left us to see them fall by dozens on the explosion of each shell, as they were driving furiously in to the Bolan Pass by a route which secured them from the attack of Mahomed's cavalry, even had they been strong enough to venture upon a pursuit, which they were not in any one particular, principally owing to the long and fatiguing march which their horses had performed the night before. Our skirmishers, who consisted of about one-third of the Europeans, being called in, and who, we were glad to find, had met with little loss, and being once more together, our attention was now turned towards the deserted camp, in the midst of which we perceived a very handsome European officer's tent, which had met our gaze on our first set out towards their encampment, and which we supposed to be one taken in the overthrow of some small force, which was now become a daily occurrence.

"On our arrival at the deserted camp, I with two or three others, ran immediately to the tent, and, alas! what a spectacle presented itself! There lay the body of poor unfortunate Loveday, with his throat cut, and who had about that moment breathed his last. A native boy was weeping across his mangled body, who turned out to be his servant, the only one allowed him, and that in consequence of his being a Mahomedan, and who used to cook for him, which none of the Brahoe or

Murree tribe, composing the enemy, would. This native, who had faithfully followed and served his master in oppression as well as in affluence, gave a most melancholy narrative of the treatment of Lieutenant Loveday during his career as a prisoner in their hands. We found the body in the tent laid on a small piece of carpet, with nothing to cover him save a pair of cotton 'pajamas' or drawers. He was barefooted, and his ankles were lacerated, owing to the friction of the chains then upon him. Two pieces of paper were near him; one was addressed to his dear sister, and the other, a partly written one, to a friend.

"It appeared from the tale told by the servant, that every time the enemy moved their camp, poor Loveday was placed on a camel, a most uncomfortable beast to ride, and taken with them, well watched, and often had to walk in the state mentioned, except that his man sometimes gave him his turban to protect his head from the heat of the sun. Often after arriving in camp has he been exhibited in the bazaar, and buffeted by new comers of their tribes, and beaten if he attempted to remonstrate. And often has he expressed a sincere wish for them to serve him as they did the small force he commanded at Khelat; but as often they refused, and seemed to take delight in being insolent and oppressive. He uttered exclamations of delight, when he heard the report of the shots from his friends, and his heart throbbed with joy at the prospect of being so soon amongst them, little dreaming his fate was allotted,

and the assassin in waiting, so barbarously to take his life; for it was arranged, on the appearance of our forces in the front of Dadur, that should they prove victorious, Loveday should be killed; but the servant stated positively that Nusseer was against the murder, Gool Mahomed being the sole instigator—for early at the time of our advance, Nusseer, with his mother, were the first that fled into the Pass, and Gool gave directions that the last leaving the ground should cut the prisoner's throat, which was most peremptorily carried into effect; a deed of double shame on the perpetrators of so foul and cowardly an act. Revenge seemed to call aloud from every breast; and, although upwards of forty-four hours had passed since the men had tasted food or slept, and were of course extremely fatigued, and, in fact, almost exhausted, they would cheerfully have pressed forward, had they been called upon to join in the pursuit of the ruthless and cold-blooded murderers. In the same tent were found four boxes containing valuables, which, together with the camp military chest, &c., were seized upon as prizes."

From Moostung, Major-General Nott proceeded to Khelat, and took possession of the fortress without opposition,\* the enemy having evacuated the place as

\* Nott had written many letters to Mr. Ross Bell with the view of seeking information regarding the progress of affairs south of his position; but neither his letters to Mr. Bell nor Mr. Bell's letters to himself, reached their destination: certainly not at the expected time. The General was consequently compelled to act according to the dictates of his own judgment. He moved on Khelat because of the late period

he approached. Indeed, nowhere upon the march did they attempt to oppose him; only five men, one trooper, one sepoy, and three camp-followers having been shot. Owing to the compact order of march observed by the General, not a single camel or a particle of baggage was lost. The officers and men of the detachment, were rather disappointed at not having to storm Khelat, ascribing the smoothness of the enterprise to Nott's *nusseeb* (luck, fate)—wherever he went the people retreated without fighting. Nott, however, told them, that it was not Fate, but military management, which made the thing easy—no opportunity or advantage for attack had been given to the enemy.

From what follows (private letter of the 13th of November), it is evident that Nott had not studied the "Wellington Despatches" without a resolution to adopt the humane principles of conduct which invariably animated the mighty Duke. It is also clear, that he viewed with great concern the treatment to which the people of Khelat had been subjected by the previous

of the season, and his fears that the moral effect throughout Central Asia would be decidedly injurious, were the rebel Chief allowed to hold the fortress until the ensuing spring.

The public correspondence of Nott at this time was most extensive, and peculiarly illustrative of the activity of his mind and his skill in military combination. Innumerable copies of his letters are preserved, addressed to Mr. Ross Bell, Captain Bean, Sir Willoughby Cotton, Major Rawlinson, his own family, Captain Hammersley, and the officers commanding the regiments from Bombay. To the latter who, on entering the Bolan Pass, would come within his jurisdiction, he addressed admirable cautions and suggested strategical movements.

expedition, and was in no mood to allow of any interference by "boy politicals," although the one referred to in the subjoined extract, was his friend Hammersley.

Again I say that I am ashamed of my countrymen, and I prefer the much-abused Beloochee. This very morning, on the march, I heard two Englishmen, calling themselves honourable men and gentlemen, declaring that they thought every native of the country should have his throat cut! And why? Because these poor, wretched people sometimes shoot our people in defence of their *wives, children* and property. When I was within three marches of Khelat, I sent in proclamations, assuring the inhabitants that if they remained quietly in their houses, their persons and property should be protected, that no plunder or violence should occur, and that every article should be paid for. On my arrival within one march of the city, the principal men came to my camp in the night, trembling and supplicating to know whether this could be true, and whether, after all that they and their families had suffered, they could place reliance upon my promises? I assured them: told them that nothing could resist the force I had, and said: "Go back to your city, and let me find the gates open on my arrival, and rest assured of complete protection." They believed me. On approaching the city I sent Colonel Stacey on with four companies, to take possession of the gateways if he found the city vacated, with strict orders not to allow a single individual to enter, either European or native, without my orders. This applied to all, and was absolutely necessary to quiet the fears of the people. Stacey did his duty firmly and humanely, and the people were full of gratitude. Well, while he was doing this, I was giving directions for pitching the camp, and placing the

artillery in case of attack, when a silly Political, who was not allowed by Stacey to enter the city, came galloping into camp, and addressed me, in presence of my officers, in the most rude manner possible, saying: "What right have you to order ME not to enter the city? I must have your orders in writing." The fellow annoyed me, and I told him he had better go to his tent. He again rudely and loudly said: "You have no right." I replied: "Sir, not another word, or I will place you in close confinement, and you know me well enough to be aware that I will do so." He said no more, but went to his tent; but I dare say he will write a long story to the Envoy, and *he* will inform the Governor-General that he is horrified at my conduct to a public functionary, and I shall in due time hear *something very wise* from his Lordship, which I shall not care so much about, as my old grandmother would for a brass farthing. I have a sweet consolation, which neither the praises nor the censures of Governors can take from me—the devoted gratitude of an oppressed people. For two days, my tent was surrounded by the people of the city, pouring forth their thanks; and when I went into the town, the whole mass came, and in their way, blessed me for protection. Three days afterwards, when I put my troops in march on our return, a mile and a half from the city, the inhabitants were on the side of the road to bid me farewell, and many of them placed their hands on my horse, uttering lamentations and sorrow at my departure.

Major-General Nott, after placing Colonel Stacey in political charge of Khelat, returned to Quettah; and, on the 18th of November, marched to Candahar, with the 43rd N.I., having left the 42nd N.I., and fifty cavalry to garrison Khelat; the Shah's 2nd Regiment

of infantry, and fifty cavalry, to protect Moostung; and the Shah's 1st Regiment of infantry, 6 Horse Artillery guns, and a party of cavalry to aid in the protection of Quettah.\* Previous to his departure from Khelat, the General wrote to Sir Willoughby Cotton, reporting his proceedings, and bearing, in the following paragraph, a generous tribute to the conduct of the sepoy, and the officers employed in the enterprise.

Although the Bengal sepoy have not had on the present occasion an opportunity of distinguishing themselves in action with the enemy, yet I beg to assure you that nothing could be better than their conduct. The zealous and cheerful manner in which they conveyed the battering train during a march of nearly three hundred miles of the most difficult country in the world, dragging these heavy guns over the Kojuck Mountains, through beds of rivers and deep ravines,

\* Nusseer Khan still continued in arms in the hills. To crush the chieftain and restore tranquillity to the whole of Upper Scinde, Major-General Brooks dispatched an aide-de-camp to Colonel Marshall, with orders to attack the Khan's camp at Kohat with the greatest possible promptitude. Marshall commanded the 25th Bombay N.I. Taking with him a detachment consisting of 500 bayonets of that corps, 150 of the 2nd Bombay Grenadiers, 180 of the 21st N.I., and two guns, he advanced upon the Khan and attacked him at daybreak, on the 1st of December. The surprise was most complete; Nusseer Khan himself fled in consternation at the first appearance of our troops; but his Chiefs held out desperately, and not until 500 Beloochees were slain was the enemy put to flight. The defence was most gallant, and the position held by the enemy so strong that the Bombay troops must have fought with the utmost steadiness and the most persevering bravery to have achieved a victory against such advantages.

exceeds all praise, and has called forth the admiration of their European officers and of the European artillerymen attached to the battery. Their patience under fatigue and privation, and their soldier-like and orderly conduct deserve my warmest thanks; and their anxious and active zeal to hasten the march and to encounter the enemy, has confirmed me in the conviction that they are, when they perceive that confidence is placed in them, fully equal to any troops in the world.

I cannot close this letter without bringing to your notice the great assistance I have received from Colonel Stacey, commanding the 43rd Regiment, Major Clarkson, commanding the 42nd Regiment, Captain Macan, commanding the troops of His Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk; and my best thanks are due to that excellent officer, Captain W. Anderson, in command of the artillery, and to Captain T. Walker, commanding the cavalry. My best thanks are also due to Captain Polwhele, Brigade-Major, and to Lieutenant W. F. Tytler, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, for their constant exertions in the public service.

During Major-General Nott's return march, he received intelligence that the Ameer Dost Mahomed had surrendered to Sir William Macnaghten. This was considered so conclusive of the operations in the north, that Sir Willoughby Cotton applied to the Government for permission to resign his command, and return to England, a measure rendered necessary by the state of his health, and which he had only deferred until the service on which he was engaged could be brought to a satisfactory close.

As Nott approached Candahar, he was greeted with a letter from Major Rawlinson, who most anxiously desired his return with the 43rd Regiment.

"I shall be most thankful," wrote Rawlinson, "when you re-enter this town with the 43rd Regiment, for it is anything but pleasant to see a spirit of opposition to the Government showing itself through all the districts, and to feel that, happen what may, there is no possibility of employing force in support of the royal authority. Within the last few days the prospect of affairs has been brighter than for some time past, and I think it very possible that the entrance of the 43rd into Candahar, and the rumour which will be immediately spread abroad of the reinforcement of our garrison, will have the effect of settling the two disturbed districts of Derawut and Zemindaur, without further trouble."

The year 1840 was now fast drawing to a close; and as far as the tranquillisation of the country between the entrance to the Bolan Pass and Candahar was concerned, General Nott considered that the military movements had not been altogether unproductive. Yet he was not destined to witness a serene finale. As he had anticipated (in his letters to his children), the Government sent him certain admonitions on his advance to Khelat without authority from Mr. Ross Bell; on his haughty treatment of the minor political officers; and on his exclusion of Captain Hammersley from Khelat. Some disagreeable feeling was excited by

the issue of a district order, turning the 2nd N.I., out of their barracks, to make way for the 43rd N.I.; and Major Rawlinson announced the growth of disaffection to the westward, and the necessity for sending out troops.

Upon all the subjects, on which he had been taken to task, Nott defended himself with great talent and earnestness; maintaining the integrity and propriety of his proceeding, which, in after-letters, the Government had the grace partially, but clumsily and ungracefully, to admit.

The correspondence with Rawlinson on the insurrection in Zemindaur, may be given at length, for it brings us upon a new phase of the history of the war of Affghanistan, and establishes, that when Nott had to deal with a political officer who understood his character, could respect his motives, and was not puffed up with a sense of his own importance, he could take pleasure in being courteous and considerate. Rawlinson's letters are much to his credit, and honourable to his understanding and his modesty.

Candahar, Dec. 13, 1840.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I regret to say affairs to the westward are assuming so alarming an appearance, that I begin to fear the employment of regular troops will be found necessary in support of the authority of the Government. Ackter Khan, of Zemindaur, who, as you know, is at the head of the present rising, has set us fairly at defiance, and expressed his determination

to meet the Government forces in the field rather than abandon his position as Chief of Zemindaur and Nouzad, which he has for some time held in opposition to our wishes and in defiance of our means of ejecting him. He is busily employed in raising the men of his own tribe, in securing partizans among the discontented clans in his vicinity, and in other preparations for making good his avowed intention of fighting. At present his followers do not amount to a greater number than about 300, but at the most moderate computation, if the Chiefs who have declared their espousal of his cause really stand by him, he will be able shortly to muster 1,500 armed men, and in the event of his being joined by the Igmunees, which is rumoured, but which I do not believe, the numbers will perhaps be swollen as high as 5,000.

Considering that it is always objectionable to employ Hindostanee troops against the Affghans, if it can possibly be avoided, I have adopted such means as were in my power in the meantime to try and settle this business quietly. The rival Chiefs of the Alezye tribe, to which Ackter Khan belongs, have been sent into Zemindaur, backed by a strong demonstration on the part of the local Government, in the hope that they will have influence sufficient to detach numbers of the tribe from the rebel standard; and if defection once commences, it is not impossible that the whole body may take a panic and disperse, while Ackter Khan also has been offered such terms of security of life and property as were consistent with the dignity of His Majesty's Government, and the communication has been entrusted to individuals who are highly interested in the prevention of a hostile issue.

Still, however, all these efforts at pacification may not improbably be unavailing, and I would therefore suggest the

expediency of your ordering a regiment and two guns to be held in readiness for service, provided you consider the withdrawal of the same from Candahar consistent with the safety of the garrison. Whether, under the circumstances, it may be proper to employ the services of Captain Woodburn's corps, or of one of the regiments of the Bengal Infantry, I cannot pretend to offer an opinion. The Envoy lately informed me, that from the reports he had had of the state of Captain Woodburn's regiment, he thought it would be better to sacrifice any amount of revenue than to send it to Girishk; but the present is not a question of revenue, nor would the regiment visit Girishk, except *en route* to Zemindaur or Nouzad. Should you decide upon employing this corps, it might, after dispersing Ackter Khan and his followers, take up the position in Zemindaur occupied last winter by Captain Macan, unless indeed more commodious quarters should offer in Nouzad, and I could ensure ample supplies of grain, forage, &c., from the Government stores at Girishk.

On the other hand, should there be any military objections to employing Captain Woodburn's corps at the present time, I consider the state of affairs such as fully to authorize the detachment of a regular regiment. The lawless assemblage in Zemindaur presents rather the appearance of an organized conspiracy against the Government than a mere tumultuary rising to resist the collection of the revenue. If allowed to gain head, it may swell into a formidable rebellion, and I consider, therefore, the crushing of it at the outset as a service upon which the troops of the regular army may be legitimately employed. To show its true political character, and to divest it of all appearance of mere revenue or police, I may also mention that I have proof, which I consider satisfactory, of Ackter Khan being

in correspondence with Yar Mahomed Khan of Herat; and I further take the opportunity of mentioning that Major Todd is so well aware of the disposition of the Wuzeer to intrigue upon the Candahar frontier, that he has repeatedly of late, both publicly and privately, urged the detachment of at least a regiment to the forts in the vicinity of the River Helmund, as a point of first-rate political consequence. In the event of a regular regiment being employed, it would perhaps be found most convenient after the dispersal of the insurgents in Zemindaar or Nouzad, for the men to go into winter quarters at Girishk, the position being sufficiently near the disturbed districts to hold them in awe, and to prevent the reassembling of the rebels, the climate being at this season perfectly salubrious, and the accommodation the best that is to be found between Candahar and Herat. But arrangements of this kind would necessarily be dependent, in a great measure, on the progress of events after the force had taken the field. I have only farther to add, that the 20th of December is the latest date I can allow for the chance of a pacific adjustment. Should intelligence reach Candahar by that date, of Ackter Khan having surrendered himself and dispersed his followers, there will of course be no occasion for a military movement; otherwise, I would propose that the troops were ordered to march on Zemindaar on that day.

Believe me,

My dear General,

Yours very truly,

H. N. RAWLINSON.

P.S.—I should wish, with your approval, that the political charge of the movement against Ackter Khan were entrusted to Lieutenant Elliot, in whom I have perfect confidence, and

who from his acquaintance with the language, and his long residence upon the Herat frontier, is particularly well qualified to give effect to my wishes in the ultimate arrangement of the business.

Candahar, Dec. 14, 1840.

MY DEAR MAJOR,

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, and with reference to the statements therein contained, I am decidedly of your opinion that a regular corps ought to be employed in the performance of the service you require. I shall therefore have a detachment ready by the day you mention, of one regiment of infantry and two guns; it will be desirable to send a small party of cavalry, but their number must depend upon the quantity of forage likely to be available, and you will oblige me by stating your opinion on this subject; if forage is scarce, the party of horse must be as small as possible, or they may not only be inconvenient, but do mischief.

Under all the circumstances noted in your letter, I think, if not too late in the season, it would be desirable to get the 42nd back into the Candahar district; or, perhaps, as the 38th, now at Dadur, is, I understand, eventually to come to this garrison, it would be much more convenient, if that corps was ordered to march immediately for this station. If my memory serves me, I think Mr. Ross Bell, in a letter to Captain Bean, a short time ago, stated that the 38th was to march to Candahar in all this month.

The 2nd is the corps to proceed on the service in question, and as the officers are all strangers to the people and the country, it would be very desirable, that your Assistant, Lieutenant Elliot, who is so well acquainted with the district, and the language of its inhabitants, should be as much with

the detachment as possible, and I hope you will be able so to arrange.

I believe supplies of grain will be plentiful in the direction the troops are about to take; but you will oblige by giving me your opinion on this subject—the great drawback and impediment to the rapid operations of troops in this country, is their being encumbered with so many grain camels, which, I hope, may in a great degree be dispensed with on this occasion.

I am,

My dear Major,

Yours sincerely,

W. NOTT.

To Major Rawlinson, Political Agent,  
Candahar.

Candahar, Dec. 15th.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I beg to return you my best thanks, for your so readily falling in with my views, regarding the expediency of employing a regular regiment in Zemindaur.

With regard to forage, no doubt considerable difficulty will be experienced in procuring a large supply. A party of 400 or 500 Affghan Horse have already been sent out in the direction of Zemindaur, to support with their presence the Alezye Chiefs, whom I mentioned to you had been sent to try their influence in the tribe against Ackter Khan, and their consumption will have been considerable. I should also wish, should you have no objection, to send Gudoo Khan's *dusta* of 100 Affghan Horse, now in our regular pay, and on whom I think we may depend, to accompany the troops, and act under the orders of the commanding officer; so that perhaps there will be no

occasion, in your opinion, for more than 100 of the Hindostance cavalry, and for this small number forage, no doubt, would be procurable.

5,000 maunds of grain have already been stored at Girishk, and there is more than double that amount collected in Zemindaur and Nouzad, and due to the Government on account of revenue, so that I do not apprehend any difficulty whatever in supplying the troops to any extent that may be required.

Perhaps it would be most advisable for the force to march the direct route to Girishk, and in that case I should say, if they left Candahar with ten days' supply, it would be ample. At Girishk, Lieutenant Elliot would fill up the grain bags from the Government stores, and would make arrangements for the transport of further supplies (for which, camels might be furnished him from this place), at regular periods, either to Zemindaur or Nouzad, according to the movement of the troops, and in the event of there being any unexpected scarcity in those districts.

Believe me,

My dear General,

Yours very truly,

H. N. RAWLINSON.

Candahar, Dec. 17th.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I received a letter last night from Elliot, which makes me think it possible that Ackter Khan may come in after all of his own accord, and thus save us the trouble of employing troops against him. A deputation of Chiefs went out the day before yesterday to Zemindaur, to try and bring Ackter Khan in, and I should like much to hear the result of their mission, which, as I say, judging from Elliot's

intelligence, may just chance to be favourable, before the troops move.

I hope therefore, you will not think me changeable, if I request you to countermand the march of the troops, until the 23rd; by that day, I *must* have a definite answer, and if Ackter Khan remains obstinate, there will be no resource but sending out the troops. I am just starting for a few days' residence at Bulea Wulce, for change of air, but I will keep you daily informed of the state of affairs to the westward.

Yours very truly,  
H. N. RAWLINSON.

In conformity to Rawlinson's wishes, Captain Farrington was sent out with a detachment of the 2nd Regiment N.I., two Horse Artillery guns, a rissalah of the 1st Cavalry, and a party of Affghan Horse. The result is given in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER VII.

1841.

OPERATIONS IN ZEMINDAUR—MAJOR-GENERAL ELPHINSTONE ARRIVES TO COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN—SERIOUS ASPECT OF AFFAIRS AT HERAT—ACKTER KHAN—THE FORT OF GIRISHK—GOVERNMENT APPROVES OF THE MOVEMENT ON KHELAT—GENERAL ELPHINSTONE AND THE STAFF OFFICERS AT CANDAHAR—ROBERT NOTT—DEATH OF MR. CHARLES NOTT—WOODBURN AT GIRISHK AND GRIFFIN AT SECUNDERABAD—WYMER AT EELMEE—THE EXPEDITION TO DERAWUT.

THE dawn of 1841 was sufficiently auspicious. Upper Affghanistan was tranquil. Destitute of a Chief, whose cause formed a rallying point for disaffection, the various tribes put aside their arms, moodily awaiting the turn of events, which might provide them with opportunity for renewing hostilities. The only disturbed part of the country was the province of Zemindaur—the single cloud in the summer sky. And this solitary dark spot was soon obliterated. A detachment sent out under Captain Farrington came up with the rebel Ghilzies, under Ackter Khan, at the

village of Lurdie Nowah, and after a short action succeeded in defeating and dispersing them. The rebels had taken up a strong position amongst sand hills, with a canal in their rear. Their advanced posts having been driven in, Lieutenant Hawkins got his guns into position, and delivered a sharp fire of shrapnel and grape, under cover of which the infantry advanced, and drove the enemy from the vicinity of the village. As they fled, the cavalry were let loose upon them, and completed their rout. The standard was taken, and the enemy left sixty men dead upon the field. After half an hour's halt, Captain Farrington proceeded to the stronghold of Ackter Khan, and recaptured some guns, which had been taken by him a few days previously from Mohamed Allum Khan. In this action, two Lieutenants of the 2nd Regiment of Native Infantry were wounded. The sepoy's behaved, as usual, extremely well, notwithstanding the intense cold of the weather,\* and the galled and blistered state of their feet from long and rapid marches over a stony country. The expedition under Mohamed Allum Khan, consisting of the Shah's troops and two of Her Majesty's guns, had been sent out by the political officer in General Nott's absence. When Nott returned from Khelat, his first exclamation, when he heard of the nature of the force that had been sent out, was, "Well, then, you have lost your two

\* The thermometer was twenty degrees below freezing-point; rather a severe trial for men accustomed to ten and twenty degrees above blood-heat.

guns." Ten days afterwards, his impression was confirmed, and he then ordered out the detachment under Captain Farrington.

Sir Willoughby Cotton, having quitted Affghanistan, a considerable amount of curiosity arose as to his probable successor. Public opinion pointed to Nott as unquestionably the most fitted for the appointment, and the wishes of the officers of the force corresponded with their anticipations. The wish, indeed, was "father to the thought." But Nott himself cherished no such expectations. He had had large experience of the jobbery of the Auckland administration; he knew that his plain speaking had made him unpalatable to the folks in power; and he could not conquer the impression that if there was a Queen's officer to serve, neither the experience, nor the seniority, nor the service claims of a Company's General could avail him. To add to this general conviction that the command would not be given to him, the General received a letter, early in January, reprehending his strictures on political officers. He gives an explanation of the circumstances which led to the communication in one of his usual familiar epistles to his children.

It appears that a *private* letter of mine, freely commenting on the proceedings of the Politicals in this country, was *kindly* sent to Government, and I am called upon to state my reasons for having written it. I have done so in ten lines, saying that it was a *private* letter, not intended to go further than the individual to whom it was addressed, and

written under the impression of what was passing before me at the moment. But the fact is, they want to get rid of me, and they are raking up all kinds of things for an excuse, and trying to goad me into disrespectful language. My language shall be firm and independent, but not disrespectful. Now, to explain all these things to you, and to show all the ill-natured nonsense in the papers, in a proper light, would require a volume, and I have scribbled the above to make you guess at the whole.

I cannot alter my nature, I cannot change and divest myself of the independent disposition God has given me. I cannot conceal my hatred and indignation at oppression, cruelty, and dishonourable conduct, and therefore, I am unfit for the scenes passing in this country. I cannot bend my spirit, or bring my mind to *their* level, consequently I must suffer the injustice of those dressed in authority. It might be said, why not do as others do, and smile, and with a smooth tongue outwardly approve and praise those deeds, which my mind condemns, and my heart abhors? My short answer is, "I cannot. I could not even to gain a kingdom. I will not," and therefore poverty must be the lot of me and mine.

A day or two after the dispatch of this letter to India, Nott sees the name of Major-General Elphinstone in orders to command in Afghanistan. He evinces neither surprise nor annoyance. The General was his senior, and it was discretionary with the Government to confer the command on Nott himself or a Queen's officer. "But," said the subject of this memoir, true to his attachment to the service, and his assurance of the worthiness of many of the older

officers, "they might as well have called forth one of the Company's Generals." Alas, for the interest and honour of the army! alas, for the interests of humanity, and the character of Great Britain! the choice fell on the most incompetent soldier that was to be found among the officers of the requisite rank. General Elphinstone was a favourite of fortune. He had held commissions in the Guards, and was one of the most gentleman-like of the members of the household brigade; but he had no experience of service; he lacked health and strength, and infirmity brought with it its usual concomitants, indolence and feebleness of purpose. His want of energy, resolution, and capacity was soon to develop itself in the total prostration of the Caubul force. Nott knew that our position in Afghanistan had become most critical, albeit appearances favoured an opposite notion. He considered that we "sat upon a barrel of gunpowder," and thus forewarned he was ever guarding against any sudden surprises. The infatuated Government of Lord Auckland, lulled by the specious representations of Sir William Macnaghten, himself a weak and confiding man, imagined that little more was required of an officer at the head of the troops in such a country than to pay due court to Shah Soojah and occasionally parade the troops kept up to swell the pageantry of the reviled and justly hated monarch. Therefore Elphinstone was elected to command, and Nott left to the alternative of continuing at Candahar or resigning.

Happily for the welfare of the force, and the ultimate advantage of Great Britain, he decided to continue at his post.

The Ghilzie rebellion had been suppressed but not extinguished. The ashes of revolt still smouldered, and it needed but the exertion of a few weeks to fan them into a flame. In the middle of February the rebels were again in the field, and circumstances now arose to render it expedient that strong measures should be adopted for completely crushing the insurrection.

In a former chapter (treating of the events of September, 1840,) allusion has been made to the situation of Major d'Arcy Todd at Herat, and the designs of Shah Kamran upon Candahar. From that time onwards Major Todd had been urgently representing the serious state of affairs at Herat to Sir William Macnaghten, and the Government of India. His position had become most embarrassing and critical, and finally he felt himself compelled to quit Herat. That event, and the probable consequences of its occurrence upon the affairs of Western Afghanistan, are thus set forth in a letter which Major Rawlinson now addressed to General Nott.

Candahar, Feb. 18, 1841.

SIR,

I have had the honour of laying before you a despatch of Major Todd, under date the 10th instant, reporting that our political relations with the Herat Government have been

broken off, and that the officers and servants of the British mission have been compelled to leave the city. Major Todd has also given it as his opinion, that the rupture will be followed up, on the part of Yar Mahomed Khan, by an immediate hostile movement in the direction of Candahar, and that an attempt will be made to surprise the fort of Girishk.

Under these circumstances, it appears to me of a first-rate importance, that the insurrection in Zemindaur should be crushed before the acquisition of further strength may render its co-operation of any essential service to the Wuzeer of Herat in his projected advance; and I also consider, that the strengthening of our position upon the Helmund, and the indication of readiness upon our part to meet any such advance, would be the most effectual way of checking the movement, and of frustrating its object. I would therefore suggest that a force of artillery, infantry, and cavalry, to the extent that may be spared from the garrison of Candahar, without endangering its safety, should be forthwith directed to march upon the Helmund with a view of co-operating with the garrison of Girishk in a combined movement upon the rebel position in Zemindaur.

I further take occasion to mention that an intercepted letter of Ackter Khan, which has just been brought into me, announces his proposal to move from Zemindaur by the direct route towards Candahar, if encouraged by the tribes occupying the intervening country, and I would therefore suggest to you, whether it would not be advisable for the force now proceeding to the westward, to take this direct route, which is perfectly practicable to artillery, in preference to joining the other party at Girishk, beyond the Helmund, and thus leaving the approach to the Urgundab

Valley, where the Dooranee inhabitants are notoriously disaffected, open to the possible advance of the rebels.

If the force now detached from Candahar consist of one regiment of infantry, two guns, and 300 Hindostanee Horse, they will be in sufficient strength to carry out the object of the movement, even should Ackter Khan (who, by the last accounts, has not more than 1,300 men with him) put in practice his proposal to cross the Helmund, and thus meet there in their progress, whilst the Girishk garrison strengthened by 200 Hindostanee Horse, which might be ordered at once to proceed to that place, with the camels required for the carriage of the troops, and place themselves under Captain Farrington's orders, marching at the same time up the right bank of the Helmund, would cut off the retreat of the rebels, and place them between two fires.

Supposing the 200 Horse, with the Girishk camels, to leave Candahar to-morrow evening, they ought to reach Girishk on the 23rd, and Captain Farrington marching from Girishk on the 25th, would reach Duhan-i-Dooab, the present rebel position, on the 26th. The force moving direct from this place by the upper road on the 20th, would arrive at the same point in seven easy marches, if they meet with no opposition in their progress, and thus unite with Captain Farrington's force in a combined attack upon the rebel position on the 26th. Two companies might also be left in the fort of Girishk as a garrison, an attack on that place in any strength being almost impossible, whilst our troops are in the field in Zemindaur.

By the time that the rebel force under Ackter Khan has been dispersed, Major Todd will probably have arrived at Girishk, and I should wish to take his opinion on the time when an invasion from Herat may be expected, and in what

strength, before addressing you on the subject of the future movement of the troops.

In conclusion I may mention, that it is possible that Ackter Khan's levies may disperse on learning of our preparations for sending a force from this place to Zamindaur, accompanied, as the intelligence will be, with information of the removal from power of the obnoxious ministers, charged with the revenue management of Candahar, to whose exactions the late disturbances have been ostensibly attributed by the parties concerned; in that case, our attention would be entirely directed to checking the designs of the Herat Government against this place, and I believe the presence of the force, which would be concentrated by the arrangements now under consideration, on the Helmund, would greatly tend to the furtherance of the important object.

I further take the opportunity of mentioning, that I have written both to Mr. Ross Bell and to Captain Bean, strongly urging on their attention the necessity of reinforcing Candahar without delay; and I should hope, that they would take measures for this purpose, before troops can be assembled by Yar Mohamed Khan for a hostile movement on Candahar, in sufficient number to cause us any serious apprehension.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. N. RAWLINSON,

Political Agent, Candahar.

To Major-General Nott, Commanding at Candahar.

In compliance with the suggestion contained in the  
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foregoing, the General, denuded as he was of troops, nevertheless sent out a regiment of cavalry and one of infantry to give battle to Ackter Khan. He knew the value of promptitude, and had confidence in small bodies of troops well commanded. Still the aspect of affairs suggested the importance of increasing the strength at Candahar, and as he had had sufficient experience of the inutility of applying to higher authority and the "Politicals" for reinforcements he resolved upon acting on his own responsibility. Accordingly, he dispatched orders for the troops in Shawl to march immediately to Candahar with the full assurance, however, that nothing that he did would be approved "until the knife had touched our throats." His orders were promptly complied with, and by the 1st of March he had seven regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, two troops of Horse Artillery, and one company of Foot Artillery at his immediate disposal. He did not expect that operations would take place against Herat, as the political officers seemed to surmise and even to desire, but he was satisfied that sooner or later the active services of a strong force would be required in the neighbourhood.

The fort of Girishk, to which allusion is made in Major Rawlinson's letter, stands on the high road from Candahar to Herat. It is built on a mound two miles from the right bank of the Helmund, a deep and rapid river in the spring, and when at the highest a thousand yards wide, but in autumn, when lowest, easily fordable

and not more than three hundred and fifty yards wide.

To this fort the General dispatched a sufficiency of troops. In a few days—and before any operations could take place—Ackter Khan submitted to the Government. Nott, as usual, had been right in his conjecture that a very small detachment would suffice, and he now urged the recall of the greater portion of those he had sent out. A wing of a regiment was all for which cover could be found at Girishk, and this, with a detail of Horse, he deemed ample for all probable purposes, to say nothing of the objectionable, unmilitary position of those who were not quartered in the fort. Major Rawlinson, however, conceived a larger force was necessary, and urged the point so strongly upon Nott, that the General consented to leave Captain Woodburn, with his regiment of infantry, 300 or 400 of the 1st Regiment of the Shah's cavalry, and two guns.

In the correspondence which arose out of this difference of opinion, we are furnished with another illustration of the difficulty of accommodating military and political duties. Nott esteemed Major Rawlinson for his personal qualities, but would concede no part of his military prerogative without a protest. At the same time, he felt disposed to pay a good deal of deference to his colleague's opinion.

"While I protest," he wrote, "against the troops (with the exception of the number mentioned) remaining to the right of the Helmund, I shall certainly not, in

opposition to your view of the subject, recall any part of the force pending your reference to the Envoy and Minister. Yet I would remark that, after your having particularized the nature of the service required from the troops, *the number of men and guns requisite fell within my province, and became a matter entirely for my military judgment and discretion.* \* \* \* \*

You must be aware that I am always most anxious to meet your views and wishes, yet in the mere detail and movement of troops I ought to use a little of my own judgment, especially as the Right Honourable, the Governor-General, has declared that every movement of troops must be made by the directions and on the responsibility of the senior military officers, but in the present instance I relinquish that judgment pending your reference to higher authority."

Rawlinson, in reply, deprecated any supposition that he wished to interfere in what strictly concerned the General, and gave a very satisfactory explanation of his real object. Nott was as ready to accept an *amende* as he was prompt to vindicate his own authority.

The Tooran tribes in the Ghilzie country manifesting a feeling of discontent, threatening hostility to the Shah's government, Major Rawlinson, in the middle of March, intimated a wish that one regiment of infantry, two guns, and 400 horse should be located at Khelat-i-Ghilzie to preserve tranquillity during the ensuing summer while arrangements might be in progress for erecting a fort at that spot. The General at once com-

plied,\* for the Envoy had intimated that no troops could be spared from Caubul for the purpose. They were needed for some intended movement on Herat! Moreover, as reinforcements were moving towards Candahar, there was less occasion to detain those who were in the town and cantonments.

During the three or four weeks which followed upon the execution of this arrangement, Nott received a letter from the Government, approving of his proceedings at Khelat. It is instructive as demonstrating the readiness with which people at a distance from a scene of action are apt to sit in judgment upon the conduct of the executive before they have become acquainted with all their motives.

"Whatever," wrote Mr. Secretary Maddock, "may have been the previous impressions of Government with regard to the inexpediency of moving your force on Khelat without sufficient provision for the protection of Moostung, and

\* The force, consisting of two corps of infantry, a party of Captain Christie's cavalry and a few guns, was commanded by Captain Macan. On his arrival at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, Major Lynch requested Macan to move out and attack a small fort in the neighbourhood. On the arrival of the party at the fort at 11 P.M., Captain Sanders of the Engineers, supported by a storming-party, under Lieutenant Hoppe, placed a bag of powder at the gate and blew it down. Hoppe then rushed forward with his party, but was felled to the earth by a stone. Macan and Sanders, more fortunate, got into the fort and went to work in first-rate style. The chief of fifteen men were slain, five were wounded, and a few prisoners were captured, the rest of the garrison escaping over the walls. Captain Macan was slightly, and Captain Sanders very severely, wounded; the latter had three distinct hurts.

without forming a preconcerted plan of operations with the Major-General commanding below the passes, and ascertaining the views of the political authority in Scinde, the Governor-General is generally satisfied by the explanation that you have offered on the subject, and feels that the result of the operations against Khelat has been highly beneficial, both in a military and political point of view, and does not appear to have been attended with the evil consequences which were thought likely to result from it, and the Governor-General has, therefore, only to express his approbation of the decision and energy with which the movement was planned and carried to a successful issue."

This letter was a triumph for Nott—but it was only one of the many triumphs his sagacity and resolution earned for him in the course of his career. Had the letter been sent at an early period, it would have been received as an agreeable proof that his endeavours to do his duty had been duly appreciated: coming late, he indignantly regarded it as an unwilling tribute to the success which had followed his measures. Nott could discover no virtue in the tardy repentance of his weak-minded masters. His own words, in a letter to his daughters, will best express his feelings.

Now had I received such a letter in the first instance, it might have been very well, but they allowed ignorant and insolent Politicals to prejudice the Government by *false* and *foolish* representations, and injured me by appointing Elphinstone, *viz.*: they *first* do the injury, and *afterwards* call

upon me for explanation! And this they call justice, and thus a military man's reputation is to be *whispered* away by a set of ignorant, insolent and rascally underlings; and all because I have an opinion of my own. Had the letter from the Council-chamber been the very reverse of what it is, I should have felt no concern, as I most certainly shall always prefer my *own* military judgment to *theirs*, however much they may abuse me for it. But if, as they say, the move on Khelat was so beneficial—and it certainly was, and is, *more* so than their wise heads have conceived—their approbation ought in *justice* to have appeared in Public Orders, and not in a letter direct to me; but never mind.

Major-General Elphinstone entered upon the command of the troops, in Affghanistan, in March, 1841. His first communication with Nott is dated from Jellallabad, where the Envoy and Shah Soojah were wintering, and it referred to the occupation of Girishk. Elphinstone expressed a wish, in a postscript, to hear from Nott on anything connected with his command, with his *opinions* thereon; but Nott confined himself to a public report upon the advantage of withdrawing the troops from Girishk, for he had had enough of the consequences of confiding his private opinions to strangers. The second communication from General Elphinstone was the signal for an explosion of honest wrath in Nott's private letters (the true reflections of his feelings), and for the display of that dignity in public, which sat so well upon him, and must have raised him in the esteem of the very persons who had,

for the moment, reason to be annoyed with his resistance to their wishes. A report had reached head quarters that a Staff Officer, at Candahar, had appeared in public with a Mussulman woman, who had eloped from the house of a man of rank. Elphinstone requested that *private* inquiries might be instituted into the fact, and the result reported to him. The idea of private investigation was repugnant to Nott's ideas of fairness. He replied at once that, if the officer had so offended, it must have come to his knowledge; that he had no way of privately gaining the information unless he was permitted to put the question to the officer himself. Elphinstone's bile was stirred at this reply, and he caused his Adjutant-General to inform Nott that he had "adopted another channel" for obtaining the particulars he sought. Hear Nott, writing on the 9th of May to Calcutta.

As I have no news to give you, I will relate a little anecdote which will prove that I am not fit to act in the world in its present state, and that the sooner I retire to my cottage the better. I have had a letter from General Elphinstone, headed "private and *confidential*," intimating that it had been represented to him that a certain officer at Candahar had been guilty of grossly improper conduct. He directed me to go *privately* to work, and thus *privately* to ascertain whether it was true, and if so, to send the officer forthwith to Hindostan! Thus *I*, a General Officer, was expected to go about among the idlers of Candahar, to pry into the *private* affairs of an officer under my command, and if any man, his *enemy* perhaps, told me "yes, such was

the case," I was instantly, without any public investigation, to blast the said officer's character and prospects by ordering him in disgrace to the provinces! It now turns out that General Elphinstone was directed by Government to get the information; *they*, I suppose, must have received the report from one of the many sycophants seeking for patronage. I am sorry to say that these kind of animals appear to have increased in the army of late years. I know not, nor do I care, what the Government will say to my letter; but if they were the Governors of the whole of mighty Europe, they could never make me mean enough to go prying into the private life of any officer; it is sufficient for me to notice what may publicly and officially come before me. I hate the words "privately inquire." I thought that *great* people knew me better; but General Elphinstone is a new man, and perhaps he thought he was doing me honour, in allowing *me* to join *him* in his *private* inquiries.

About this time Major-General Nott received intimation that an East India Director had bestowed a cadetship on his son Robert. This was a source of intense satisfaction to the General, and he hastened to express his gratitude. A fine field was now open to his boy, and he pointed out the way in which it might be tilled to advantage. In those days young gentlemen were nominated to infantry cadetships, without any reference to their fitness. The most unlettered youth was as acceptable as the best scholar. Military preparation was quite undreamt of in the philosophy of the Direction—it was enough that a boy's father had a

claim of some sort on their individual patronage. Nott, in advance of his time, recommended Robert to study the languages of the country, and surveying—the latter especially; for in the month of February, when he wished for a survey of the neighbourhood of Candahar, there was not an officer who could supply him with one! Robert had not been unmindful of the parental injunction, and was therefore well qualified to take up a commission. Moreover, nature had been bountiful to him in imparting a *physique* which enabled him to encounter the rough and laborious duties of the profession, and to realise the popular notions generally entertained of the form of the cavalier. Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis—to whom allusion has already been made, and who had become Commissary at Allahabad, in 1841—describes Robert Nott in a letter to the father, which at the same time demonstrates the kindness of the Colonel's nature and the regard in which he held his late chief.

I was on the point of starting to the Commander-in-Chief's camp when your boy arrived in Calcutta, and beyond asking him to one or two dinner-parties it was out of my power to pay him any attention. I am happy to say, however, I have been able to render him some slight assistance by having his camp equipage prepared in the Commissariat yard at Cawnpore. I consulted with Colonel Swinhoe\* some days ago, and he this day called on me, when we agreed that Robert should be sent over by dawk.

\* General Nott's brother-in-law.

I'll see that he has everything comfortable, and shall give him letters to all the Commissariat officers *en route*, so that he shall have no trouble about his cattle, &c. All who saw him were much struck with his appearance and manners. He is quiet, gentlemanly, and very handsome.

Robert was appointed to the 64th Regiment, N.I.

The pleasure which the General derived from the appointment of Robert was soon to be neutralized by a domestic calamity which affected him deeply. Charles, the barrister, died at Calcutta—a most untoward occurrence as the Misses Nott were thus bereft of their immediate protector. The General bore the announcement with becoming firmness and resignation. He could offer his poor daughters no comfort—he trusted in the protecting hand of Providence.

I can offer you no consolation. I am two thousand miles away from you, and can do nothing, nor, *at present*, come to you—the roads are not open. How could I have expected such a blow! You know, my children, what I would say, though I cannot *now* write. I wish to be with you. I have so often written; but I do not yet know whether those in power will give me leave. Write to me immediately. Tell me everything concerning poor Charles. I will pray to be able to preserve myself for you; but how much misery have I suffered! This stroke is most dreadful. Farewell, my children. Bear up, and trust in God, as I do.

Shortly previous to the date of the letter whence the foregoing extract is made (8th of July, 1841,) Major-

General Nott had applied to the Government for leave to return to Calcutta for nine months, as soon as the season should admit of his moving. He had become perfectly sick of the thankless service on which he was employed. He saw that the British cause was on the verge of ruin. The worry arising from the oscillating conduct of the political authorities, and the mortification to which he had been subjected in military supercession had besides reached their climax. The Government allowed him to leave the command, but would not assent to regard him as eligible to return to his post hereafter, nor promise him a brigade in the provinces of India. In communicating his sanction to Nott's departure, Lord Auckland, "in Council," vouchsafed the expression of his approbation of the General's conduct.

Should the Major-General so retire, the Governor-General of India, in Council, will greatly *regret his relinquishment* of a post in which he has *rendered valuable and important services*, and given *much satisfaction to the Government*.\*

Well might Nott exclaim, on reading this passage: "This to a man† whom they have ill-treated and insulted in every possible way merely because he was independent and upheld the honour and character of his country as far as he could, amidst everything that was oppressive, cruel, and dishonourable! Even now," he

\* Official Letter from Calcutta, July 7, 1841.

† Private Letter, August 12, 1841.

adds, with melancholy truth, "they are blind to the state of this country, where we have *become* hated with a deadly hatred owing to the conduct of \* \* \* \* We are so detested that the din of war will never cease so long as there is an Affghan left. The Government are deceived, and never hear the truth."

If the Government of India, composed as it was of inflated counsellors,\* disliked Nott's "sour fashion" of telling the truth, and braving their displeasure, when he believed the vital interests of the country were at stake, the Court of Directors of the East India Company were not insensible to his true worth, and the integrity of his claims. In the middle of August he received the gratifying information that his right to fifteen thousand rupees, for the period he exercised a divisional command, had been allowed by the Court. With his thoughts ever fixed upon his children, the opportunity which this sum offered of contributing to their comfort was hailed by the General with thankfulness.

In replying to the Government of India, Nott decided not to avail himself of a leave of absence which was to deprive him of a command worthy of his rank and professional ability.

The capture of the fort in the neighbourhood of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, by the troops under Captain Macan, had of course tended to irritate the Ghilzies and to raise

\* Mr. Kaye, in his "War in Affghanistan," has vividly portrayed the characters of Lord Auckland and his immediate advisers, Messrs. Torrens, Calvin, &c.

well-founded expectations that the rebellion would spread. Khelat-i-Ghilzie was therefore placed in such a state of defence as would admit of its being occupied by a strong garrison, that might keep the surrounding country in check and effectually resist a siege or other attack. This increased the irritation of the Ghilzies, who attempted to interrupt the works by surrounding the post. Major Lynch, one of the political *coterie* under Macnaghten's orders, gave notice to Major Rawlinson of the circumstance, and expressed his apprehension that it "might shortly appear necessary to the military authorities to attack them." Rawlinson, who had received information from the Envoy of his inability to detach troops from Caubul, and his desire that reinforcements should be sent from Candahar, now urged Nott to send out a regiment of infantry, a detachment of artillery and cavalry. Nott's answer offers a fine illustration of the happy manner in which a general officer, encumbered with 'Politicals,' may sustain his own military reputation and at the same time recognise the authority of his diplomatic colleague.

Candahar, May 22, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 44, of this date, and to acquaint you I have not received the least intimation from the officer in command of Khelat-i-Ghilzie of the probability of any attack being made on his detachment, or that any considerable number of rebels are collected in his neighbourhood. I believe Major

Lynch in his note mentions that about 1,000 rebels have assembled somewhere, but even this is not clear; and if it be the case, Captain Macan having two complete regiments of infantry, four guns, and 200 or 300 cavalry in a very strong position, will be fully able to repel any attack.

If Major Lynch contemplates any offensive warfare, he should particularize its nature and object, to enable me to judge what reinforcements it will be proper and necessary to send.

If Captain Macan, who is on the spot, is still of opinion that no increase of infantry is required, I can really see no necessity for a reinforcement. However, as you seem to think it desirable, I will order four companies of infantry, two guns, and His Majesty's 1st Cavalry, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer, to proceed in charge of Commissariat supplies to Khelat-i-Ghilzie, for the use of the troops at that post, with directions to return to Candahar, should their services not be required by Major Lynch.

Having this large force at Khelat-i-Ghilzie will be very inconvenient, as their supplies must be sent from Candahar, necessarily requiring large escorts and constant employment of public cattle, and heavy expense to the State.

The weather was fearfully hot at this period, 108° in the tents, 100° in a darkened room in a house in Candahar, 120° in the sun. It galled the General to be obliged to send out troops on such a service, and at such a time; but sepoy fight in spite of climatic influences.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer lost no time in moving from Candahar, and reached Eelmee on the 29th of

May. In the evening his scouts brought him intelligence that the whole of the rebel forces, headed by two Ghilzie Chiefs, were in full march for the purpose of attacking the detachment. He immediately placed the troops in position, and, in less than half an hour, the enemy advanced to the attack. When about nine hundred yards from Colonel Wymer's force the two 6-pounders were opened upon them "with beautiful precision and effect," on which the Ghilzies separated into three distinct columns, and moved upon Wymer's position, with the evident intention of making a simultaneous attack upon both his flanks and centre. They were permitted to approach to within a very short distance, when a cool and destructive fire was poured into them from the infantry line, which, after some continuance, caused their troops from the right and centre to unite with those on their left, resting upon the steep banks of the Turnuck River. This caused a corresponding change in Wymer's position to be necessary, which, although under a galling fire, was effected with the greatest steadiness. During the execution of this movement, the left of the 38th was attacked in the most determined manner by a large body of infantry with drawn swords; who, seeing the troops in motion, must have supposed they were retreating, and uttering a loud shout, rushed in upon them. The 38th re-formed and repulsed them with determined gallantry.\* The battle

\* Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer's despatch, dated Khelat-i-Ghilzie, May 31, 1841.

continued until about 10 P.M., without the Ghilzies gaining a single advantage, when they were finally and completely dispersed. The Ghilzies were not fewer than 5,000 in number during the engagement, for reinforcements continually reached them. Wymer had not more than 400 bayonets, two guns and the Shah's cavalry. Wymer was justly prodigal of his praise and thankfulness. Hawkins, whose guns created "awful havoc" in the ranks of the enemy; Leeson and Moorcroft of the cavalry; Scott, Pocklington, Waterfield, Tyler, Farquharson, of the 38th; Jeremie, the staff-officer of the detachment; and Dr Jacob, all came in for a share of his approbation.

After the battle, Colonel Wymer proceeded without further interruption to Khelat-i-Ghilzie.

The conduct of the 38th Regiment in this affair was particularly gratifying to General Nott. It has been already shown that the officers and men of the corps were much attached to him, and had particularly manifested their regard after the death and interment of Mrs Nott. When, however, the regiment joined the General at Candahar, it had become so disorganized, that a Court of Inquiry was ordered to ascertain the causes of its condition, and to devise a remedy.

It may interest the non-military reader to be made acquainted with the form of inquisition adopted on these occasions. The interrogatories and replies on this occasion are, therefore, subjoined. It is to be presumed that where no answers are given negatives are to be implied.

*Confidential Report of the Inspection of the 38th Regiment of Native Infantry by ———.*

Candahar.

COMMANDING OFFICERS.

What officer or officers have been in command of the Regiment since the date of the last Confidential Report; not advertng, however, to any casual command of a few days?—*Lieut.-Colonel Mosely, Major Hawkins, Lieut.-Colonel Chabners, Captain Burney, from 21st August to the 13th December, 1840.*

Whether the officer usually in command of the Regiment appears to discharge his important duties with zeal and ability?

Whether, by a firm but temperate exercise of his authority, a well-regulated discipline is established in the Corps?

Whether his mode of carrying on the established system is such as to command the respect and esteem of the officers, and the cheerful obedience of the men?

What degree of attention has been paid by him to the instruction and training of the officers and men in the field exercise and movements which have been prescribed for the practice of the Army?

Whether the orders which have been issued from time to time are consistent, and in conformity with the General Orders and regulations of the service?—*Yes.*

Whether the officers who may have been placed in the temporary command of the Regiment have evinced ability, and a due attention to the maintenance of the system and discipline of the Regiment?

FIELD OFFICERS.

Whether the Field Officers, from their talents and acquirements, appear to be properly qualified for command, and whether they render due support and assistance to the Commanding Officer in the various details of Regimental duty?

OFFICERS OF COMPANIES.

Whether the Captains and officers commanding companies appear to be well acquainted with the interior economy of their companies, and competent to the command of them in the various situations of service?

Whether they are duly qualified, and are habituated to exercise and discipline their companies?—*Yes.*

Whether they are acquainted with the names and characters of their men.—*Generally.*

SUBALTERNS.

Whether the subalterns are active, obedient, and intelligent, and have acquired the requisite degree of information on subjects connected with their duty?

Whether the systems prescribed in the standing orders for the Native Infantry, for the training and instruction of young officers on their first joining, are regularly pursued?—*Yes.*

Whether the young subalterns who have been appointed to the charge of companies have acquired such knowledge of Hindoostanee as to understand their men easily, and be easily understood by them, and whether they appear in other respects qualified for the charge of a company?—*Yes.*

ADJUTANT.

Whether by his talents and acquirements he is duly qualified for his situation?

Whether the general appearance of the Regiment on parade and in the field evinces his zeal and ability in the discharge of his duty?

Whether he has that fluency and command of language in Hindoostanee, without which he cannot efficiently discharge his duty?

Whether the Regimental books prescribed by the regulations are properly and neatly kept?

## QUARTERMASTER AND INTERPRETER.

Whether he appears competent to his situation?

Whether the books consigned to his care are kept with accuracy and regularity?

Whether he has passed the prescribed examination?—*Passed a district examination.*

## EUROPEAN OFFICERS IN GENERAL.

Whether the officers in general appear to understand their duties in the field and in quarters, and are intelligent and zealous in the performance of them?

Whether, according to their several situations, they afford the commanding officer the support he is entitled to from them?—*Yes.*

Whether unanimity and good understanding, so essential to the discipline and reputation of every military body, prevail in the Corps?—*Yes.*

Whether the officers are generally conversant in Hindoostanee?

Whether each officer is in possession of the books prescribed by the regulations?

Whether any of the officers appear, from age, infirmity, or any other cause, to be unfit for the service?

Whether any officer has been absent from the Regiment for an unusual length of time?—*None but those on Staff employ.*

## SERGEANT-MAJOR AND QUARTERMASTER-SERGEANT.

Whether the Sergeant-Major is sober, active, intelligent, and qualified for the duties of his situation in the field and in quarters?—*Sober; since tried by Line Court-martial in Feb. 1839, at Delhi. An active and intelligent soldier, but his health undermined.*

2. Whether the Quartermaster-Sergeant is sober and attentive, and fulfils the duties required of him with regularity?—*Sober, attentive, and fulfils the duties required of him to the best of his ability.*

3. Whether he appears to be qualified for advancement to the situation of Serjeant-Major?—*Not qualified.*

## NATIVE OFFICERS.

4. Whether they are a respectable body of men?

5. Whether they are active, diligent, clean, and smart in their dress and appearance?

6. Whether they are acquainted with their duty, both as regards field exercise and the interior economy of the Corps?

7. Whether they pay manly and ready obedience to their European officers?—*Yes.*

8. Whether their habits are such as to ensure respect and confidence?—*Yes.*

9. Whether any of the officers appear, from age, infirmity, or any other cause, to be unfit for the service?—*Some are worn-out and unfit.*

10. Whether any officer has been absent from the Regiment for an unusual length of time?—*No.*

## NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

11. Whether the non-commissioned officers are properly instructed, active, and intelligent?

12. Whether they are alert, well set up, and perfect in their drill?

13. Whether, in their dress, and in the mode of cleaning their appointments, and carrying their arms, they set a proper example to the men?

14. Whether they are respectful and obedient to their officers, and whether their deportment and conduct are such as to secure the respect of the men?—*Yes.*

15. Whether they perform their duties in the field and in quarters with promptitude and energy?

## BUGLERS AND DRUMMERS.

16. Whether they appear to be fit for the duties of their situations, and to be perfect in the different soundings of the bugle, or the calls and beats of the drum?

## MUSICIANS.

17. Whether they play marches in correct time ?  
 18. Whether the number of men borne on the strength of companies has been sanctioned, and whether they have been trained to the use of arms ?—*Yes.*

## PRIVATES.

19. Whether they are a good body of men, and of the proper standard ?  
 20. Whether they have an appearance of health and cleanliness ?

## NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS IN GENERAL.

21. Whether they are well drilled, attentive and steady under arms, obedient and respectful to their officers ?  
 22. Whether their conduct in quarters is orderly and soldierlike ?—*Yes.*

## MEN TO BE DISCHARGED.

23. What number of men are found to be unfit for the service of the Regiment ?

## RECRUITS.

24. What number of recruits have joined since the last inspection ?  
 25. Whether from their appearance they are an acquisition to the Corps, and whether due attention appears to have been paid to their training and instruction ?  
 26. Whether they are of the standard prescribed by the regulations ?

## FIELD EXERCISE AND MOVEMENTS.

27. Whether the formations and movements are performed according to the revised regulations, and with precision and celerity ?  
 28. Whether the Regiment is properly instructed and practised in the duties of out-posts, patrols, guard, and picquet-mounting, rounds, and the relief and duty of sentries ?

## EXERCISE OF ARMS.

29. Whether the men are well drilled in the use of their arms, and whether the soldiers have been properly instructed in firing with ball ?

## ARMS.

30. Whether they are in a serviceable state, and clean ?  
 31. Whether all are regularly marked ?—*Yes.*  
 32. Whether the prescribed system of fixing the flints is adhered to ?

## AMMUNITION.

33. Whether due attention is paid to its security and preservation ?

## COLOUR.

34. Whether they are in strict conformity with the regulations, and in what order ?—*Yes, in good order.*

CLOTHING, ACCOUTREMENTS, AND APPOINTMENTS.<sup>1</sup>

35. Whether those of the officers, non-commissioned officers, drummers, and privates are strictly according to the regulations ?  
 36. Whether they are in good condition ?  
 37. Whether the clothing, accoutrements, and appointments of every description are properly fitted ?

## REGIMENTAL NECESSARIES.

38. Whether the regimental necessaries are according to the regulations ?—*Yes.*

## INTERIOR ECONOMY.

39. Whether a well-regulated system of economy is established in the Corps, and the interior arrangements of the companies is duly attended to ?  
 40. Whether the men appear to be cleanly in their lines ?  
 41. Whether the attention of the commanding officer, and of the captains and officers commanding companies, is directed to the maintenance of a minute and steady discipline ?

42. Whether the officers mess together, and whether the regimental mess is established upon such a system of economy as enables the subaltern officers to belong to it?—*Yes.*

43. Whether the field-officers belong to the mess?—*Yes.*

#### BOOKS AND ACCOUNTS.

44. Whether the regimental, as well as the different company books, are kept with accuracy and regularity, and according to the regulations?

45. Whether the officers commanding companies settle with their men in person?—*Yes.*

46. Whether the acquittance rolls are signed by the men?

#### COURTS-MARTIAL.

47. Whether any irregularity has occurred in the conduct of the proceedings of courts-martial, or in the execution of the sentences awarded by them?—*No.*

48. Whether the sentences appear to have been proportionate with the crimes, and within the limit of the regulations?

#### MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

49. Whether the medical officer is zealous and regular in his attention to the sick, and whether the native doctors are competent to the share of the medical duties?—*Yes, very zealous and attentive to his duties. The only man belonging to the regiment who is very attentive and competent to the discharge of his duty.*

50. Whether the establishments allowed for the hospital are complete, and constantly in attendance?—*Yes.*

51. Whether the proportion of sick has been large, or the mortality considerable, and if so, what are the alleged causes?—*Yes, great sickness has prevailed on the march from Sukkar to Candahar, but not many deaths.*

#### REGIMENTAL SCHOOL.

52. Whether the mouluvee and pundit are respectable men, and duly qualified for their situations?—*Yes.*

53. What number of native officers and men in the regiment can read and write?

54. What number of soldiers are now attending the school?—*None since leaving Hindostan.*

55. Whether it is attended by any children or relations of the native officers and soldiers?—*Not since leaving Hindostan.*

#### BAZAR.

56. Whether the bazar establishment is complete and efficient, and a good bazar maintained in the regiment, on principles which will facilitate the movement of the Corps?—*Yes.*

The conclusion to which Nott came, was that the discontent in the corps was attributable to a frequent change of commanding officers during a few years, the occasional absence of many of the old captains and subalterns, and the enlistment of a great many bad men in the course of the previous two years. "At present," writes the General, after the inquiry, "the men are alert and smart in all their duties, respectful and obedient." Of the officers of the regiment, Nott was most especially attached to Captain Scott, who had been his Adjutant at Delhi. Scott, at the battle of Eelmee, immediately commanded the wing of the regiment. Wymer publicly thanked him for the assistance he had afforded, and Nott writes to his daughters:

Scott had, I understand, a narrow escape. Some Ghilzies got into the rear, and were in the act of cutting him down, when some sepoy orderlies made use of their bayonets and killed these daring chaps. Mrs Scott will call this *Providence*, and *rightly* so. Who deserves protection if Scott

does not? He behaved very well in the action; so you see, religion does not prevent a man's fighting. Indeed, I have always thought that the truly religious man *must* be the best soldier.

The dispatch of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer's detachment to Khelat-i-Ghilzie had very much diminished the strength of the garrison of Candahar, and increased General Nott's anxiety for the safety of the place. He had ascertained that 400 of the armed population had left the city to join in the attack upon Wymer, and he had therefore very little faith in the fealty of the people at large. Nevertheless, he was soon called upon for a further drain upon his reduced resources.

Zemindaar was in rebellion. Rawlinson wished that more troops should be sent to Girishk, for he considered our position on the Helmund peculiarly critical. Rawlinson had set forth his views with much circumstantiality in a letter of the 13th of March:

Candahar, 13th March, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date.

2nd. In my communication to you of the 18th ult., I had the honour to observe, in reference to the threatened advance of Yar Mahomed Khan, from Herat, that "I considered the strengthening of our position upon the Helmund, and the indication of readiness to meet any such advance, to be the most effectual way of checking the movement, and of frustrating its object." This consideration certainly weighed as much with me in making a requisition for reinforcing Girishk as the immediate object in contemplation, of crushing the

Zamin-Dawer insurrection, and, although the latter purpose has been partially effected by your ready compliance with my requisition, the former motive of the application continues at present in as active operation as ever.

3. I do not hesitate to record my conviction that the withdrawal of the troops from Girishk, with the exception of a wing of an Infantry regiment, and of a small detail of horse, as proposed by you in the letter now under acknowledgement, would be a measure fraught with consequences of the greatest political importance, and of the most dangerous tendency; and to enable you to weigh the extent of the political dangers to be apprehended from the withdrawal against the military objections which you entertain to the maintenance of the position, and to decide accordingly, I do myself the honour to submit the following remarks:—

4. The rebellion in Zamin Dawer is not crushed. It has merely been exchanged for a state of temporary and deceitful quiet. According to our latest accounts Akter Khan had not even fulfilled his promise of totally dispersing his followers; a considerable body still remained in arms around him, and, to all appearance, he was merely temporizing, in alarm upon one side at the extensive military means that were ready at hand to attack him, and in expectation upon the other of any aggressive movement from the westward that might promise a more favourable settlement of his affairs than would be likely to result from his immediate and complete submission. It has been my particular desire, in the present state of affairs beyond the frontier, to avoid any second collision with the Dooranees, which, in the event of invasion, might swell the ranks of our enemies; and it was in this view that I preferred the hollowness of an arrangement which merely promised a forbearance from active hostility to the settlement of Zamin Dawer by force of arms, and on the strong footing of a coercive policy.

5. I have also reason to believe that Yar Mahomed still entertains the design of aggressive hostility, and that he has only been withheld from the more active development of his views by the indication which our reinforcement of Girishk afforded of our readiness and ability to meet him, and by the frustration of his hopes of a cordial and extensive co-operation in the paralyzing influence of the concentration of our troops beyond the Helmund upon the disturbed districts in the vicinity, and the little alacrity which was consequently shown to realize those promises of assistance that had been greatly instrumental in inciting him to threaten our frontier.

6. Putting out of the question the consideration of whether a state of peace or war with the Herat Government may be advisable, I assume it to be my duty, as intrusted with the superintendence of our political interests at Candahar, to exert every means in my power to prevent an invasion of His Majesty Shah Shujah's territory by a foreign and hostile power. I consider the attainment of this end to be favoured, if not secured, by the maintenance of an attitude of strength and confidence beyond the Helmund, while I regard it as endangered, if not compromised, by the adoption of any measures which may produce an impression of our weakness.

7. Were the withdrawal of the troops contemplated by you to be carried into effect, I should apprehend that the motive for the measure, throughout the country, could be misconstrued into timidity; it would, in fact, while the Government of Herat is employed in making a demonstration upon our frontier, be considered an evidence of our inability to meet an invading force in the field. Akter Khan, being reassured by this manifestation of our weakness, would, in all probability, reassemble his followers and renew his negotiations with Herat and Yar Mahomed Khan, with restored prospects of co-operation; and, with the prestige attaching to his cause of having obliged the British to retreat on Candahar, would, not impos-

sibly, fulfil the design which he previously entertained of invasion, and of which I consider it to be my duty as Political Agent at this place, to use all my efforts to prevent the successful accomplishment.

8. It is altogether out of my province to discuss the question of the military propriety of retaining a force on the right bank of the Helmund, beyond the proportion for which shelter may be found within the walls of the fortress of Girishk. I may observe, however, that after consultation with Major Todd, I am disposed to believe that as long as the Brigade retains its present position (and if reinforced with the addition of two more guns), there is no prospect whatever of a force being brought to attack it from the westward of sufficient strength, in any degree, to compromise its safety; nor do I consider that whilst the force maintains that position there is any possibility of danger immediately attaching to the city of Candahar which can call for the concentration of more troops than we at present possess in garrison at this place to provide for our security.

9. I further beg to observe that I do not contemplate any immediate occasion for the employment of the Girishk force on operations of offence. I merely regard the position as defensive, and of value, on account of the important political considerations above adverted to. Girishk, I may also remark, is at present anything but unhealthy, and should the same reasons exist as at present for the location of troops beyond the Helmund, when the sickly season commences, there are many spots in the vicinity which offer conveniences for encampment, and which would effectually secure the troops against being rendered inefficient by disease.

10. In conclusion, I do myself the honour to request, that should you still consider the political reasons alleged by me for maintaining the position to be over-ruled by your military objections, you will at any rate defer carrying your

measures into effect in opposition to my views, until answers can be received from the Envoy and Minister, in communication with the Officer commanding in Afghanistan, to whom references may be made upon the subject.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. RAWLINSON,

Political Agent.

To Major-General Nott,  
Commanding at Candahar,

Nott was of opinion that a better and healthier spot than Girishk should be occupied; still he believed the place to be perfectly safe from the attack of Ackter Khan, unless the garrison should prove treacherous. Observing, however, that Rawlinson was anxious upon the subject, he consented, against his judgment, to the reinforcement of the post with Captain Woodburn's corps, two guns, and a body of Janbaz and Dooranee Horse, although Candahar would then be left with one regiment and a half and four guns, without cavalry, "so contrary to the expressed wishes and directions of the Governor-General."

As Captain Woodburn neared Girishk, he learnt that Ackter Khan was before the place with 3,000 men. After a little manœuvring to cross the Helmund, in which he was baffled by the depth and rapidity of the current, which had rendered the river unfordable by infantry, Woodburn was compelled to pitch his camp at the village of Sumboolee, opposite the position taken

up by the enemy to oppose his passage. Upon the hills in his rear, he placed horsemen to watch the movements of the Ghilzies. In the afternoon of the 1st of July, Woodburn perceived a stir in the rebel camp. He accordingly struck his own and detached Lieutenant Golding with a Janbaz regiment, to oppose their re-crossing the river. But the enemy moved three miles higher up, crossed, and moved down upon Woodburn in large bodies. He immediately changed his front and took ground to the left. He placed his guns between two companies of the 5th Regiment of the Shah's infantry, with the two Janbaz regiments on his flank. Coming up rapidly, the Ghilzies boldly attacked his left, but were repulsed by the well-directed fire from the guns of Lieutenant Cooper and the three companies under Lieutenant Clark. The Ghilzies then moved off to the right of the little force, but were again met by a most destructive fire from the guns and five companies of infantry under Lieutenant Ross. The numbers of the enemy enabled them to bear up against this. Large bodies of them, horse and foot, rushed upon the Janbaz Horse, forced them back among the baggage, and got in the rear of the infantry and guns. The Janbaz Horse got into confusion, notwithstanding all the exertions of the officers, Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding. At this crisis, Clark faced his rear rank to the right about, and gave the enemy a volley; Woodburn moved back one of the guns with the Grenadier Company of the 5th Regiment, and sent

three rounds of grape and another volley of musketry among the assailants. This was enough for them; they immediately fled, pursued by Hart and Golding, with a few only of the Janbaz Horse, the remainder lagging behind, crowding in upon the baggage and the rear of the infantry, and refusing to yield to any entreaty that they should follow their officers. Woodburn now got his infantry into a melon enclosure, defended by a low wall. Here he awaited further attacks from the enemy, several of which were made, but in every instance steadily repulsed. The Ghilzies, retiring, recrossed the Helmund, and made their way to Hyderabad, *en route* to Zemindaur. Woodburn then sent his grain across the river on camels, and causing his infantry to be carried over on the Janbaz horses, he reached Girishk on the morning of the 5th of July. In a military and political point of view, it would have been advantageous to have followed up and dispersed the rebels, but with reference to their numbers (ascertained to be 6,000), and the notoriously disaffected state of the country, Woodburn would not have been justified in moving with so small a force against them. Nott, therefore, increased his force, and received from Woodburn a grateful acknowledgement.

Camp, Girishk, 6th July, 1841.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 5th instant, and for the readiness with which you have complied with my wishes in respect to the ammunition and increase of

Infantry, as I think I may now follow the rebels into Zemindaur—900 Hindostanee Infantry ought to do good service against tremendous odds of Affghans, and as to Cavalry they are rarely of much use except as escorts for the baggage.

Akhter Khan is now at Sharuck, endeavouring to collect his followers for another trial, but I should hope soon to be able to give you a good account of him, as I strongly suspect the rebellion is far more extensive than the politicals are willing to admit; and I have not the least doubt but that one-half of the population of Candahar are quite as disaffected as the rebels on the Helmund. The Chiefs are obviously intent on getting up a religious war; and if we do not adopt more energetic measures than have hitherto been pursued, there is no saying where matters will end. I believe it is quite certain that the Dooranee Horse sent out here sometime ago had agreed to cut up every man of us in the event of Akhter Khan having succeeded in the night attack, and I think the sooner they are turned out of employ the better.

The enemy's force on the 3rd instant consisted of six divisions of 1,000, and at the head of each they had a Moollah and a standard with an inscription, "We have been trusting in God; may he guide and guard us."

The best thing that could be done with the fort of Girishk would be to blow it to pieces, as it is of no use to us, and I am of opinion we should never have had troops beyond the Helmund, for they can do no good unless of sufficient strength to be independent of support from Candahar.

I am sorry to say that a good deal of my men's baggage was plundered during the action of the 3rd, not by the enemy, but by the camp-followers of the Jan Baz Regiments, who, like the men of these corps, are more fitted for such work than anything else; they are worse than locusts in a country cursed with their presence.

I shall not fail to report everything I hear worthy of being known regarding the enemy's movements.

I hope we shall get rid of the Jan Baz, for they are of no use, and sad hands at looting.

Yours sincerely,

J. WOODBURN.

Nott, in forwarding Woodburn's account of the action of the 1st July to the Assistant Adjutant-General at Caubul, wrote the following letter:

Candahar, 7th July, 1841.

SIR,

My letters, Nos. 354 and 367, will have informed Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., commanding in Affghanistan, of my having detached his Majesty Shah Sujah Ool Moolk's five Regiments of Infantry, and two Horse Artillery guns, under Captain Woodburn, to aid the Dooranee Horse, and the two Jan Baz Corps, recently arrived from Cabool, in putting down the rebellion in the district of Zamin Dawer.

I have now the honour of forwarding to you a despatch from Captain Woodburn, under date the 5th instant. I feel assured that the Major-General commanding will highly approve of the conduct of that excellent officer, and of the officers and men under his command.

When the political authorities called upon me to detach Infantry and guns, I understood that from 1,500 to 2,000 horse would join them, viz. upwards of 1,000 Dooranees and 700 or 800 Jan Baz. The Dooranee Horse did not join, and I strongly suspect that many of them aided the rebel Chief Ackter Khan, in his night attack on our Infantry and guns. The sooner they are discharged the better.

It does not appear that the Jan Baz Corps were of much

use in the action, whether from treachery or cowardice must be matter of opinion; I believe the former, perhaps both.

Under these circumstances, I shall decline any future requisition for troops, unless the number under my command be such as to admit of my detaching a force sufficient to act with a certainty of success, without looking for the least assistance from the Dooranee and Jan Baz Corps.

In the attack made upon Colonel Wymer's convoy, on the 28th ultimo, it is certain that several hundred men from Candahar joined the Ghilzie rebels, and then coolly returned to this city, and even brought some of their wounded back with them. It is generally stated, and I feel convinced it was the case, that numbers from Candahar assisted Ackter Khan in his attack on Captain Woodburn's detachment.

Our information is sadly defective; when I detached Captain Woodburn I was led to believe that Ackter Khan mustered from 1,200 to 1,600 men; he had 6,009 in the field.

To Captain Grant,

Officiating Assist. Adjutant-General, Cabool.

The conduct of the Janbaz and Dooranee Horse, the latter of whom were placed in charge of the baggage and aided the Ghilzies in getting into the rear, determined Nott never to rely again upon troops whose treachery was as obvious as their cowardice. But this was not a sufficient reason for withholding *every* assistance in the great object of suppressing the rebellion. At all risks, therefore, the General sent the Shah's 1st Regiment of infantry, a party of cavalry, and two guns, to reinforce the garrison of Girishk; and by the middle of August, Captain Griffin, who

commanded, was enabled to give a very good account of the enemy.

On the 16th of the month, the rebels had assembled at Secunderabad, within ten miles of Griffin's camp. He at once moved out to attack them, found them in great force entrenched behind a succession of walled gardens and forts, under cover of which they opened a fire of jazails and matchlocks on the detachment. After a few rounds from Cooper's guns, parties were detached from the 2nd Bengal N.I., and the 1st Regiment of Shah Soojah's infantry, to clear and take possession of the enclosures, while the Shah's 5th Regiment, flanked by a wing of His Majesty's 1st cavalry, deployed into line, to attack a large party of the enemy's skirmishers. The enclosures were carried with great spirit. The whole force then united and advanced to attack the enemy *en masse*; but before they could near them, the Ghilzies fell into confusion, and were immediately attacked by the cavalry, who charged and broke them, and then followed them "with fearful vengeance" for several miles, Prince Sufter Jung, at the head of his own regiment, leading the attack. In this spirited affair the Janbaz cavalry redeemed their lost honour; they behaved most gallantly under the eyes of their commanders, Hart and Golding.

Nott was much pleased at the success of this enterprise, and he was especially delighted with the Bengal Native Infantry. In his despatch to General Elphin-

stone, forwarding Captain Griffin's report of the action, he says :

It affords me the greatest pleasure and pride, in again bringing to the notice of the Major-General, commanding, the steady discipline, noble conduct, and devoted gallantry of the Bengal sepoy, proving that they are far superior to three times their number of the finest and most determined Affghan soldiers that can be brought against them. Nothing could withstand them; two companies of the 2nd Bengal Infantry, led by the Lieutenants Cook and Travers, rushed into an enclosed garden, and after a desperate affair bayoneted 100 of the enemy.

The whole detachment behaved admirably.

After the defeat at Secunderabad, the Chiefs, Amzal Khan of Tireen and Akram Khan of Derawut returned to their forts, and there continued in undisguised rebellion. Sultan Mahomed Khan, the Ghilzie refugee Chief from the Urgundab Province, also took up his abode in the immediate vicinity of Tireen, and busily employed himself in collecting men and in concerting with the turbulent Dooranees measures for the resistance to the Shah's authority.

To reduce these men, and bring the districts under proper subjection, the Envoy directed Major-General Nott to equip a force without delay. Major-General Elphinstone, in conveying the expression of the Envoy's wishes, intimated his own desire that Major (late Captain) Sanders should accompany it as Engineer. The Envoy attached much importance to the suc-

cess of the expedition. He declared that it would materially "affect the position and prospects" of the British occupation of the country, and he was the more anxious for its rapid accomplishment, because it was desirable that the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of Bengal N.I., should return to India on or before the 1st of the ensuing November.

Assistant Adjutant-General's Office,  
Cabool, August 22nd, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding in Afghanistan, to forward the copy of a letter of yesterday's date, received from the Envoy and Minister, relative to the employment of a force from Candahar against the Doorances of Nish Dehrawut and Tereen.

2. The Major-General requests you will, in communication with Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, make every necessary arrangement for the above expedition, and should the same necessity for its proceeding continue to exist when the 43rd Regiment, N. I., and the Artillerymen from Kelat-i-Gilzie reach Candahar, you will consider this your authority for acting upon the requisition, and according to the information which it is stated you are to receive from Major Rawlinson, Political Agent at Candahar.

3. The Major-General further requests you will report for his information, so soon as matured, the plan of operations you propose, and the amount of force you intend employing; also, from time to time, any changes which the nature of your intelligence may suggest.

4. The Major-General trusts that the settlement of the above-named districts may not require the absence of the troops from Candahar for any considerable length of time, as it is highly

desirable that the corps destined for Hindostan should commence their march by the 1st of November next, if possible, although the 1st of December has been given as the latest safe date.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. GRANT, Capt.,

Officiating Assistant Adjutant-General.

To Major-General Nott,  
Commanding at Candahar.

SIR,

The Ghilzie country *being now happily settled*, and the presence of troops being no longer requisite in that neighbourhood, the 16th and 43rd Regiments Native Infantry will, I presume, conformably to the arrangements agreed upon between us, have proceeded to Candahar.

2. The Northern districts of that province (Nish Tereen and Dehrawut), have been in a state of rebellion, and the Chiefs of those districts (of whom *one Akrum Khan* is the head), have refused to wait upon His Majesty's representative; have been in constant correspondence with the *rebel Akhter Khan*, and have assembled a considerable number of armed followers, with a view to defy His Majesty's authority.

3. The arrival of the 16th and 43rd Regiments Native Infantry, will admit of a force being detached from that garrison; and I am officially made acquainted with the opinion of the Political Agent at Candahar, to the effect that it is necessary to send an expedition into the disturbed districts, with a view either to expel the offending Chiefs, or to enforce their submission.

4. May I request, therefore, that you will be so good as to

instruct General Nott to comply with Major Rawlinson's requisition for troops, should he concur as to the feasibility of the measures proposed, which will be more fully detailed to him by that officer. I understand there are one or two strong Forts in the country of the proposed operations, which it would require eighteen-pounders to breach, and it might be advisable to have the services of the European Artillerymen now at Khelat Ghilzie. With your concurrence I will direct a party of the Shah's Artillerymen to proceed from hence to the latter place, with a view to relieve the detachment of Europeans, should their services in the field be called for.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Envoy and Minister.

To Major-General W. R. Elphinstone, C.B.,  
Commanding in Afghanistan, Cabool.

Assistant Adjutant-General's Office,  
Cabool, 23rd August, 1841.

SIR,

By desire of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding, I have the honour to annex, for your information and guidance, copies of letters relative to the projected expedition to Nish Dehrawnt and Tereen, and to say, that in the event of its being decided that a force shall be sent into these districts, the Major-General would wish Major Sanders to accompany it as engineer.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. GRANT, Captain,

Officiating Assistant Adjutant-General.

To Major-General Nott,  
Commanding at Candahar.

(Copy.)

Cabool, 23rd August, 1841.

SIR,

In continuation of my letter to your address, under date the 21st inst., I have the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a letter to my address from Major Rawlinson, under date the 18th inst.

2. The measures advocated by Major Rawlinson are, in my opinion, not only expedient but essentially necessary to the tranquillity of His Majesty's dominions, and I am further of opinion that the policy of the authorities of Herat, and even of the court of Tehran, will be mainly guided by the nature of the proceedings which we may adopt at the present crisis.

3. I would venture to suggest that Major-General Nott should be recommended to avail himself of the professional ability of Captain Sanders, who is now at Candahar, and whose well-known zeal would, doubtless, prompt him to wish for the duty of accompanying the expedition to Dehrawut as Engineer Officer.

4. I shall take immediate measures for sending a party of the Shah's Artillerymen to relieve the European detachment now at Kelat-i-Gilzie, in case the services of the latter should be called for, to proceed with the eighteen-pounders from Candahar.

5. It is my intention to apprise Major Rawlinson that I am aware of no objection to the junction of Shah Zudah Sufter Jung with the Dehrawut force in the manner proposed, provided the measure has the concurrence of the military authorities.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Envoy and Minister.

To Major-General W. R. Elphinstone, C.B.,  
Commanding the Forces in Afghanistan.

(Copy.)

Head-Quarters, Cabool, 23rd August, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, written in continuation of yours of the 21st inst., to my address, together with the accompanying copy of Major Rawlinson's letter to you, dated Candahar the 18th inst.

I agree with you in thinking that the rebels under Akhter Khan and Akram Khan ought to be attacked and dispersed in Zimindawur, and that it is advisable also that an expedition should be sent to destroy the strongholds of the latter Chief, to the northward of Candahar, if it be ascertained that he has returned to Dehrawut from Zimindawur with his armed followers.

My instructions to Major-General Nott, the substance of which was communicated to you in my letter of yesterday's date, seem calculated to meet every emergency.

But if the rebels have met with the punishment I expect they have from Captain Griffin's detachment, in Zimindawur, then I submit to you that the expedition to Nish Dehrawut and Tereen had better be deferred, because I am apprehensive that if undertaken now, the orders of Government for the return to Hindostan of the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of Native Infantry may be frustrated, on account of the advanced season of the year, and I feel that I would not be justified in sanctioning any measure at all likely to have this effect.

As relating to the danger of delay, I beg leave to refer you to Major-General Nott's letter of the 18th inst., which I have just sent you, and by which it appears we were wrong in fixing so late a date as the 1st December for the march of the three Regiments in question.

Should the expedition be finally decided on, I quite agree

with you that Major Sanders should accompany it as Engineer.

I am still sanguine enough to expect, that by to-morrow's date we shall have such good accounts from Captain Griffin as will render unnecessary any further employment of the regular troops this season.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

W. R. ELPHINSTONE,

Major-General, Commanding in Afghanistan.

(True Copy.)

To Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart.,  
Envoy and Minister, Cabool.

Assistant Adjutant-General's Office,  
Cabool, August 24th, 1841

SIR,

In continuation of my letters Nos. 360 and 362, of the 22nd and 23rd inst., I have the honour, by desire of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding, to annex for your information a copy of a letter of this day's date, from the Envoy and Minister, and with reference to the earnest wish therein expressed, the Major-General requests you will take measures for the movement of the force destined to proceed against the districts of Nish Dehrawut and Tereen, immediately on the arrival of the 43rd Regiment Native Infantry at Candahar.

Should the Shah's second Infantry Regiment reach you in time, from Kelat-i-Gilzie, the Major-General suggests that it should form a portion of the force.

In the event of the eighteen-pounders being required in the disturbed districts, the European Artillerymen now at Kelat-i-Gilzie may be withdrawn, as you suggested to Major Raw-

linson; a detachment of Shah's Artillery being under orders to replace them from hence.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. GRANT, Capt.,

Officiating Assistant Adjutant-General.

To Major-General Nott,  
Commanding at Candahar.

(Copy.)

Cabool, August 24th, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date.

2. This morning, I forwarded for your perusal an express dispatch from Major Rawlinson, announcing an important victory gained over the rebel force in Zimindawur. You will have seen from that dispatch, that, in the opinion of Major Rawlinson, the expediency of sending a force into the districts of Nish Tereen and Dehrawut is by no means lessened by this event, and in this opinion I entirely concur.

3. I have informed you in my second letter of yesterday's date, that according to Major Rawlinson's calculation, the duty in question would occupy the troops employed more than a month, and if our recent success were promptly followed up, there is every reason to hope that a still shorter period would be occupied.

4. I feel that I can add nothing to the sentiments already expressed, as to the extreme importance which I attach to the projected expedition, as affecting our position and prospects in this country and beyond it; and I have only, therefore, to reiterate my earnest wish that instructions may be issued by you to Major-General Nott for giving effect to it, should the objects contemplated appear susceptible of accomplishment

in time to admit of the march towards India of the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments of Native Infantry, on or before the 1st of November next. Between that period and the receipt of Major-General Nott of your instructions more than two months will intervene.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Envoy and Minister.

(True copy.)

Wm. Grant, Captain,  
Officiating Assistant Adjutant-General.

Candahar, 29th August, 1841.

SIR,

Having been favoured with the perusal of the correspondence which has passed between the Envoy, Major-General Elphinstone, and yourself, on the subject of the expedition to Tireen and Dehrawat, I do myself the honour to observe that the necessity of dispatching troops to those districts becomes daily more apparent to me, for not only do the Chiefs, Amzal Khan of Tireen, and Akram Khan of Dehrawat, who returned to their forts after the defeat at Secunderabad on the 17th inst., still continue in undisguised rebellion, but Sultan Mel Khan, the Ghilzie refugee Chief from the Arghundab, has also taken up his abode in the immediate vicinity of Tireen, and is now busily employed in collecting men, and in concocting with the turbulent Dooranees measures of further resistance to his Majesty the Shah's authority.

2. It is quite impossible that I could state specifically the number of days that will be occupied in reclaiming these districts, but taking into consideration the distance at which Tireen and Dehrawat are situated from Candahar, the nature

of the roads, and the difficulty of transporting heavy ordnance, together with the opposition to be expected at the different forts, and the advisability of maintaining a strong attitude of power for a short time subsequent to the cessation of hostilities, I am inclined to allow fifty days for the extreme duration of the absence of the troops from Candahar. You will perceive from this computation, that I am under no apprehensions of the expedition to Tircen and Dehrawat interfering with the return of the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments to India by the 1st of November, in consequence of the detention of the troops in the field beyond that date; but should circumstances even cause the unexpected prolongation of hostilities beyond October, there will still, with Captain Manin's Regiment, which is about to return to Candahar, and the force now in Zamin Dawer, be three Corps of the Shah's Infantry available for the completion of the service; and arrangements, it appears to me, will thus always be practical for relieving the regular troops that may be now dispatched, and *ensuring* their return to Candahar from Dehrawat by the 1st of November, so as to admit of the march of the other three Regiments to India by that date.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. RAWLINSON, Political Agent, Candahar.

To Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar.

Within a week from the receipt of the instructions of General Elphinstone, Nott had prepared his force for the field. He had taken every precaution to fit it out in the most efficient manner, and was particularly anxious that it should not be frittered away into small detachments.

Candahar, 7th September, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., commanding in Affghanistan, that the troops,—4th Company 2nd Battalion, Artillery, with two 18-pounders, two of her Majesty's Horse Artillery Guns, Regiment of Shah's Cavalry, Detachment of Sappers, 2nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, 38th Regiment Native Infantry,—moved into camp this morning, and that they will commence their march on the 9th, or morning of the 10th instant, on the service noted in your letters, Nos. 360, 362, and 363, of the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th ultimo.

I regret to state that I have not been able to gain any information that can be at all depended upon, regarding the country in which the troops are to act, the nature of the roads, passes, forts, &c. Major Rawlinson has taken much pains to collect intelligence on the subject, but I must repeat there is nothing that the troops can depend upon to aid them in their movements.

I have taken every precaution to fit out this force in the most efficient manner, and if it should not be frittered away into small detachments, it must be successful. I hope the orders which I shall give on this subject will be attended to by the officers in command and by the political authorities, as I am of opinion that the least check given to our troops in this country would lead to the most serious consequences.

Having carried into effect the Major-General's orders as far as it depends upon me, I have now only to express my deep regret that so large a portion of the force under my command should have been ordered on what may prove to be a difficult service, without my being permitted to assume the command. In the absence of positive orders to the contrary, I should certainly have proceeded with the detachment, had it not been for the directions continued in the first and second paragraphs

of your letter No. 209, of the 7th of June, 1841; it is not necessary for me to say how much my feelings were hurt upon that occasion.

I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,  
W. Nott, Major-General.

To Captain Grant, Officiating Assistant Adjutant-General, Cabool.

P.S. Copies of the orders I have issued for the movement of the detachment shall be forwarded to you.

The above-mentioned detachment will be joined on the march by two Horse-Artillery guns, four Companies 2nd Regiment Native Infantry, His Majesty's 1st Regiment of Cavalry, and the 1st Janbaz Corps, now with Captain Griffin, in Zamin Dawur.

General Nott's letter of instructions to Colonel Wymer, who was to proceed in command of the force, is a model for General Officers. It exhibits a rare amount of professional knowledge, and a becoming jealousy of the independence of a commanding officer of a military detachment engaged on a responsible duty.

Candahar, Sept. 7, 1841.

SIR,

I am directed by Major-General Nott to acquaint you that the detachment placed under your command, has been formed on the requisition of Sir W. Macnaghten, Envoy and Minister, and the orders of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., commanding in Afghanistan, for the purpose of coercing the disobedient and refractory chiefs of Zemindaur, Tireen, and Derawut, and, if found necessary, to capture and destroy their forts,

The Major-General has been informed that Lieutenant Elliot,

Assistant Political Agent, is to proceed with the detachment under your command, who will of course be in possession of the orders of the Envoy and Minister, and with whom you will be in constant communication. He will state to you from time to time the services which the Envoy and Minister may wish the troops to accomplish; when the manner of performing and carrying them into full effect, must depend entirely upon your own military judgment, and for which you alone will be responsible to Government.

The Major-General has taken every precaution in his power to fit out your detachment in the most efficient manner; and provided you keep your detachment together, and not, unless absolutely necessary in your own military judgment, allow of its being divided or frittered away into parties, it must be successful. The Major-General desires that you will constantly bear this in mind, as the least check given to your force, would at present lead to most serious consequences.

The Assistant Political Agent will procure guides for your detachment, and furnish you from time to time with whatever information he may be able to obtain regarding the strength and position of the rebel forces, the nature of the country, and the practicability of the passes and roads.

Your detachment will march from this with supplies for one month, and Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, has arranged for 3,000 maunds of flour, being available at Zumbooruck, five marches from Candahar. As there may be some resistance and delay at the Pass of Kotul, and no water procurable until you shall have forced or passed through it, the Major-General has directed all the puckhals procurable to be sent with the detachment.

A portion of the troops have been directed to move from the right bank of the Helmund, and to join you at Zumbooruck. The Major-General does not deem it necessary to lay down any rule, or point out any particular manner of march, to an officer of your rank and standing in the service; but as the country through which you will have to pass is so entirely unknown, he would observe the necessity for the most compact order and regularity, to enable you to repel any sudden attack without delay and on the spur of the moment.

The Major-General has, in general, found it convenient *en route* to place the greater part of the cavalry in front, with orders to drop two or four vedettes facing outwards on each front of the column at intervals of one mile, with directions to fall in, and come up with the rear-guard; these men will have an eye to the safety of the baggage, &c.

As you will have a large body of His Majesty's 1st Cavalry and Janbaz Horse, the Major-General would recommend a free use of patroles.

On being joined by the troops from Zemindaar, you will have a strong force; and looking to the predilection of the enemy you will have to encounter for night attacks, the Major-General feels confident, you will see the great necessity of every precaution being observed in posting your pickets, sentries, and vedettes, and for constant patroles.

The General has, whenever the nature of the country admitted of it, found it convenient for the whole of the cattle and baggage, to move on the reverse flank, so that the troops can at all times wheel up, or form to any point without impediment; and strict orders should be given that no camp-follower, or any person whatever, should head

the column without the special directions of the officer commanding.

Major Rawlinson, the Political Agent, has intimated a wish that the Janbaz corps should be in attendance on the young Prince during your march; but you are to understand, that they are available and at your orders for any duty which may become necessary.

You will keep the Major-General in constant knowledge of your movements for the information of General Elphinstone, C.B.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer,  
Commanding a Detachment.

In communicating to Elphinstone the measures he had adopted for rendering the force efficient, Nott expressed his deep regret that so large a portion of the force under his command should have been ordered on what might prove to be a difficult service without his being permitted to assume the command. To this Elphinstone replied by declaring his astonishment that Nott did not use his discretion in the matter. Nott was perfectly at liberty to have commanded the force, and Elphinstone now begged that he would do so. Only two months previously, both the Envoy and General Elphinstone had expressly stated that they did not think it prudent that Nott should on any account leave Candahar, but as the words "at present" (June) had been used in the communication, they held that Nott was released from any obligation to continue under restriction in August.

Assistant-Adjutant-General's Office,  
Candahar, 12th September, 1841.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th inst., and to convey to you Major-General Elphinstone's entire approbation of the arrangements you have made for the expedition into Dehrawut, as well as of the very judicious orders you have given to the Officer commanding the force; but he much regrets to find that all the information you have been able to obtain respecting that country is so very defective.

The Major-General cannot, however, but express his astonishment at your now stating your regret at not having been permitted to assume command of so large a portion of the force under your orders, when going upon what may prove a difficult service. With respect to positive orders to the contrary, he is at a loss to conceive to what you allude, as he left the whole arrangement of the expedition to yourself, and had you been desirous of commanding it, which he also meant to leave to your own judgment, there was ample time, should you have had any doubts upon the subject, to have submitted your proposition for instructions thereon, instead of sending in a complaint of not having been employed, just as the detachment was about to march.

He begs me to call your attention to the 1st and 2nd paragraphs of my letter, No. 209, of the 7th of June last,\* which

\* Assist. Adjutant-General's Office, Cabool, 7th June, 1841.

SIR,

I have had the honour this day to submit to Major-General Elphinstone, commanding, your letter of the 31st ult., No. 229, with its inclosures, and in reply I am instructed to acquaint you that neither he, nor the Envoy, think it prudent

distinctly states "that neither he nor the Envoy think it prudent that you yourself should on any account leave Candahar at present," by which you must perceive that these instructions had reference merely to then existing circumstances, when it was not deemed advisable that you, with hostilities going on on both sides of Candahar, namely, on the Helmund and in the Gilzie country, should quit the most important post within your command with a detachment not requiring the presence of an officer of your rank. I am now directed to say that the Major-General has no objection to your immediately proceeding to take the command of the force

that you yourself should on any account leave Candahar at present.

The Major-General hopes that on your learning the success of Lieutenant-Colonel Wymer's detachment, you will have changed your intention of leaving Candahar, but on the contrary, should you have left, he requests that on receipt of this letter you will immediately return to that important post.

The works at Kelat-i-Gilzie must be completed, but the Major-General trusts that the necessary measures for this purpose may be effected without your being obliged to weaken the garrison of Candahar too much, and advises the return of the 38th Regiment of Native Infantry, so soon as the 43rd Regiment may reach Kelatt-i-Gilzie.

I am directed to add that no military operations are contemplated in the neighbourhood of Kelat-i-Gilzie, further than the completion of the works in progress at that place, and as to all measures for provisioning the garrison there, these he leaves entirely to your discretion.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. GRANT, Capt., Officiating Assist. Adj.-General.  
To Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar.

on march to Dehrawut, making over the command at Candahar to the next senior officer, with such instructions as you may deem proper to give him for his guidance during your absence.

In conclusion, I am desired to add that the Major-General regrets that your supposing yourself precluded from assuming the command of the expedition had not been made known to him on your receipt of my letter, No. 360, when he would have had much satisfaction in doing whatever was most agreeable to you.

You will have the goodness to acquaint me, for the Major-General's information, whether you have decided upon assuming the command of the expedition or not.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. GRANT, Captain,

Officiating Assistant-Adjutant-General.

To Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar.

Fortified with this interpretation of their new sentiments, Major-General Nott instantly proceeded by forced marches to take the command of the force from Wymer.

Nott reached the camp at Meeran, in the province of Neesh Derawut on the 23rd of September. Here is his account of his march and the force in the districts.

MY DEAR CHILDREN,

I sent you a line from Candahar, on the 18th instant, saying that I was leaving that place for field service. After a most horrible march, the particulars of which I have not

time to tell you, I yesterday got over one of the most difficult mountain passes I ever beheld, called the Kotul-i-Paj. The Bolan and Kojuck Passes are nothing in comparison. I had a narrow escape, and ought to be thankful. In ascending a very steep part over shelving rocks, my horse fell, and my left leg (the wounded one) received the weight of his body; however, I only feel a little stiff. It might have been otherwise. It was my own fault; I have always been, and still am, a reckless rider. I have with me six guns, 1st Regiment Cavalry, 2nd Regiment N.I., 38th Regiment N.I., 5th Shah's Infantry, two Regiments of Janbaz or Affghan Horse, a Company of European Artillery, a party of Sappers, &c. I should not think, that the enemy would oppose this force in the open field, whatever they may do in mountain passes, and in their forts. I hope to manage so as to be back at Candahar by the 25th of October, and then march to India.

A week later, he writes:

The troops have halted here for the last three days, as about ten of the Chiefs are now in camp with their numerous followers, and we are trying to come to some amicable settlement, but they do not like having their forts destroyed. These Chiefs are of Derawut, Tereen, and the Hazarah countries. The latter are wild men of mountain regions, with Tartar features, viz., savage-looking in the extreme. Some of them strolled through our camp yesterday, and narrowly inspected our guns, and said they were glad that we *could not* take them into their mountains. They were told, "that there was *nothing* that *Englishmen could not do*, and that if our Government gave the order, they would see them there."

I do not think these Chiefs will oppose this force, at least not in the open field; yet they are daring fellows, not given to reflection, and think not much of ultimate consequences. I am a soldier, and the system of our Government in this country is no business of mine; but it is, and has always been, wrong, *very* wrong, and never will be right until Macnaghten is withdrawn. *His* measures have drawn down the deadly hatred of the people of Afghanistan upon us, and he has drained the Company's Treasury, all which *might not* have been, had *he* not accompanied the Army of Indus.

After judiciously distributing his force, and *apparently* bringing the Chiefs to a sense of their duty to Shah Soojah, Major-General Nott returned to Candahar on the 1st of November. Ackter Khan had fled to the Hindoo Kosh.

Nott had left Captain Anderson in command in the districts, and twelve days after his own departure received from that officer the following account of the state of the country:

Durawut, November 3.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I am happy to say all continues quiet in these districts. I lately made a detour up the river and found the people civil, no appearance of arms among them. The population is scattered about, still the aggregate would be large. Everything depends on the well tempered conduct of the person appointed Hakim; I should say, the preference among the lower classes is for a European. All who have come by the river from Zumeendawur, agree that there are several points of the rocks which would require much labour, hence I must in return again face the Pach Kotul. We are all ready to move on

Patterson's arrival, and it is full time, for the cold is great at night, and fodder scarce for so large a number of horse. The Jan Baz are willing, and must improve, but should receive great attention. The Hindoo Cavalry is in great repute with the people, from their being quiet and good-looking. On all occasions the request is made, "pray send the Hindoostanee Horse, and not Jan Baz." This is a sad and melancholy affair, the destruction of Woodburn, one of our best officers; I yet entertain hope that he may have escaped, unless the rising was more than accidental. *Alas, our muskets and aimless firing are no match for these men*, well posted, beyond the reach of the bayonet. The poor and merchants are with us, but all men in authority, or of rank, are, by a natural consequence, in opposition. I had supposed you were on the road to Kabul. I trust you will kindly impress on the Political Agent the necessity of covering for the artillery, an arm daily of more importance, as the natives find the true range of our musket.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN ANDERSON.

## CHAPTER VIII.

1841 (CONTINUED).

THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CAUBUL AND CANDAHAR CLOSED—THE REVOLT AT CAUBUL—SIR ROBERT SALE IN THE PASSES—THE FORCE AT CANDAHAR INCREASED—ARRIVAL OF THE 40TH FOOT—COLONEL MACLAREN'S BRIGADE PROCEEDS TO INDIA—IS RECALLED—DISPATCHED TO RELIEVE CAUBUL—COMPELLED BY THE SNOW TO RETROGRADE—THE APPEAL TO THE MAHOMEDANISM OF THE BELOOCHEES AND BRAHOES—GHUZI INVESTED—NOTT PLACES CANDAHAR IN A STATE OF DEFENCE—TREACHERY OF THE JANBAZ—DEPARTURE OF PRINCE SUFTER JUNG.

WE approach the most critical period in the history of our occupation of Affghanistan. The clouds had long been gathering. The storm, long foreseen by General Nott, was about to burst.

While the General, in his quiet, but firm and masterly way, was subduing Tireen and Derawut, events were taking place at Caubul and its vicinity which were completely to alter the position of the British mission and the British force, and to change the plans which Nott had formed for his own departure from Candahar.

Before the General had quitted to assume the command of the force in the Derawut district, Rawlinson had written him the following ominous note :

(Private.)

Sept. 7th.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Coupling the extraordinary delay of the Caubul dawk with information that I have from the Envoy of the discovery of an extensive conspiracy among the nobles of the Court in favour of Dost Mahomed, I cannot help giving way to an indefinite sort of apprehension that something untoward has occurred at the capital. Under these circumstances, would it not be as well to caution commanding officers privately to be on the alert? For, were any news of a revolution, or indeed any serious disturbance at Caubul to reach this place, it could not fail to produce a great sensation, though a show of preparation on our part would serve, I think, to prevent any general rising.

It would be very desirable, on the other hand, supposing even my suspicions to be well founded, to avoid any premature show of alarm; and any precautions that are taken, had better thus be conducted, so as to attract as little as possible the attention of the townspeople.

I have not expressed an apprehension to any one but yourself that the delay in the dawk is other than accidental, and even in communicating my suspicion to you that it may arise from a more serious cause, I beg to state that I have no other ground for the opinion than the coincidence in time between this delay and the very critical state in which I know affairs to have been at Caubul.

Major Lynch, from whom I heard last night, reports that the country is quite quiet in his vicinity; and in reference

to the delay in the dawk says, "Something wrong must, I think, have taken place at Caubul." I may also mention the report of the dawk messengers, that the Ghuzni country has risen *en masse*, though I do not pay much attention to this story.

Yours, very sincerely,

H. N. RAWLINSON.

This interruption of the dawks was *le commencement de la fin*; all later events illustrated the *facilis descensus*. Yet so great was the infatuation of the misguided and confident Sir W. Macnaghten, that at this very moment he believed the whole country was in such a state of happy subjection, that he might make his arrangements for his departure for India, to assume the government of Bombay (to which lucrative and honourable office he had been appointed as a further reward of his services); and that the presence of a British force might soon be altogether dispensed with! The profound confidence of Macnaghten was shared by Sir Alexander Burnes, his immediate assistant and intended successor. To the author of these pages, Burnes wrote in 1841, "whatever may be thought and said of the Politicals in this country, we have now brought matters to such a point, that in the next season the troops may go back to India." To such a point indeed! The real state of affairs was not obvious to men who had resigned themselves to the luxuries of the Affghan Court, and whose omnipotent self-love perverted every hostile fact, but to all around

them the danger of our position was imminent. Circumstances were every day occurring to impress impartial observers with the conviction, that the farce of "British occupation" was approaching the *dénouement*. The manifestations were numerous. The people of Chareekar had refused to pay *kist* to the Government; the inhabitants of Caubul were continually exhibiting their antipathy to the Europeans by frequent murders; Shah Soojah was alienating his subjects by his *hauteur*, his cruel punishments and oppressions; and one of Dost Mahomed's sons was still in arms in the North. But to this minatory state of things, Macnaghten and Burnes were so insensible, that in one fatal moment they concluded they might safely commence a reduction of the sums agreed to be annually paid to the Eastern Ghilzies and other tribes inhabiting the hills between Peshawur and Caubul, for the sake of keeping the passes open, and putting a stop to plunder. The resolution having been come to, the reduction was immediately carried into effect. The consequences were, as might have been expected, most serious.

Ghuzni, 14th October, 1841.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

This act of the Affghans proceeds, I believe, from the black mail of 40,000 rupees having been withheld by orders from Calcutta. The insurgents must be bold and thoughtless, for had they deferred their attack for another month we should have been minus one European and five Native Infantry

corps, but they have selected the period of the pride of our strength to dispute the passage, and certainly the country is capable of being held by a handful of men against thousands. The Affghans have made a great mistake in not allowing the Regiments to proceed separately further from Cabool, when their taste for revenge might have been more easily gratified. I see not how General Sale's Brigade is to leave the country. Of course they might force their way through, but the enemy would close on their rear, and cut off our communication with India as completely as it has been done for the past fortnight.

With many thanks, believe me,

Yours, very truly,

T. PALMER.

The mountaineers rose as one man, occupied the Khoord Caubul Passes, lying between Caubul and the Punjaub, in great force, and at once cut off the communication between Caubul and India.\*

Major-General Sir Robert Sale was on the point at this time of returning to India with the 13th Light Infantry, for the 44th Foot under Colonel Shelton—a brave but unpopular officer—had arrived to relieve it. Advantage was taken of the circumstance to reopen the communication. He accordingly marched with his own corps, and the 35th Regiment, N.I. He found the task a severer one than he had expected; but the troops accomplished it under their distinguished leader, and Sale moved on to Jellallabad. In the various fights, which took place in the Pass of Khoord Caubul, the Valley of Tereen and the Pass of

\* Memorials of Afghanistan. Calcutta, 1843.

Jugdulluck, several officers were killed, and Sir Robert Sale himself very severely wounded.

Simultaneously with these operations, an expedition was sent into the Zoormut country which succeeded; but new causes of disquietude were elsewhere arising. Major Pottinger, who was in Kohistan, reported the existence of a most uneasy feeling arising from the same cause as that which had aroused the Eastern Ghilzies.\*

But in spite of all these warnings, General Elphinstone was so perfectly satisfied that his mission had been fulfilled in quieting the country, that he now talked of returning to India, and on the 31st of October wrote to Nott, officially, to inquire whether he intended to accompany his brigade to Hindostan, or to remain in Candahar; and in the latter case, to take the command of the troops in Afghanistan. Nott replied that it was not his intention to relinquish his post, until he could hear from Government, and that he was therefore prepared to assume the general command of the troops.

During Major-General Nott's absence in the Derawut district, the garrison of Candahar had been augmented by the arrival of Her Majesty's 40th Foot, a remarkably

\* Acting in accordance with the known wishes of the Government, Macnaghten began to retrench the stipends or subsidies paid to the Chiefs. He knew how distasteful this measure would be; he was apprehensive of its results. But money was wanted, and he was compelled to give it effect. The blow fell on all the Chiefs about the capital; upon the Ghilzies, upon the Kohistanees, upon the Caubulees, upon the Morrunds, and upon the Kuzzlebashes.—*Kaye's War in Afghanistan.*

fine and efficient regiment. It had come, with four guns, under Captain Blood of the Bengal Artillery, to replace the 16th and 43rd Regiments N.I.\* On the 2nd of November, Nott paraded 5,000 men—Skinner's Horse, the Shah's 1st Cavalry, the Shah's Horse Artillery, the Bengal and Bombay brigades of Artillery, Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd and 43rd Regiments of Bengal N.I., and there were five good bands; but, adds the General, with the true courtesy of the officer, in writing to his daughters, "I am sorry we have no ladies to look on."

On the 8th of November, the General, following instructions from head-quarters, sent off the Bengal Artillery, and the three native regiments, *en route* to Hindostan, under Colonel Maclaren. But they had not proceeded more than one march, before tidings came from Caubul of a most alarming character. The Affghans had risen at Caubul *en masse*, murdered Sir Alexander Burnes and others, burnt and destroyed their property, and surrounding the British cantonments and the Bala Hissar (citadel), where Shah Soojah resided, had commenced a blockade of the British. Nott

\* On the 22nd of September we dined with the 43rd N.I., the officers of which, like those of the 16th, were delighted to see us, not only from hospitable feelings, but as the arrival of the 40th was to be the signal for their return to India. Little did we think that night, that in a few months we were to perform, under the illustrious Nott, a series of operations, which have won for this distinguished and lamented officer the gratitude and admiration of his country.—*Captain Neil's Recollections of Four Years' Service in the East with the 40th Foot.*

instantly sent off an express to halt the brigade until he could hear farther.\*

That the reader, who has not made himself familiar with the history of our occupation of Affghanistan, may quite understand the position of the British at this critical juncture, we will borrow a page or two from Mr. Kaye's interesting work. Mr. Kaye's narrative for the most part relates to the operations in the north of the country, and he has therefore touched but incidentally upon the operations in Scinde and Lower Affghanistan.† In like manner we are obliged to treat cursorily and briefly of the occurrences he has recorded, for Nott's command in the South has been our proper and agreeable field.

"The English had by this time begun to settle themselves down in Caubul. Indeed, from the very commencement, they had done their best, as they ever do, to accommodate themselves to new localities and new circumstances, and had transplanted their habits, and, I fear it must be added, their vices, with great

\* See Appendix for Sir R. Shakespeare's account of the proceedings at Caubul.

† "I have not attempted in this chapter to give a *minute* account of the march of the three columns of the invading army to Candahar. It is no part of my design to render this work conspicuous for the completeness of its military details."—*Chap. I, Vol. I.* Again: "The defence of Kahun by Captain Lewis Brown, and of Quettah by Captain Bean, are among the most noticeable incidents of the war, and deserve more extended notice than I can give them in this place. I am compelled to leave it to others to chronicle more minutely the progress of events in Upper Scinde."—*Book IV, Chap. I.*

address to the capital of the Dooranee empire. It was plain that they were making themselves at home in the chief city of the Affghans. There was no sign of an intended departure. They were building and furnishing houses for themselves, laying out gardens, surrounding themselves with the comforts and luxuries of European life. Some had sent for their wives and children. Lady Macnaghten, Lady Sale, and other Englishwomen, domesticated in comfortable houses within the limits of the great folly we had erected on the plain. The English, indeed, had begun to find the place not wholly unendurable. The fine climate braced and exhilarated them. There was no lack of amusement. They rode races; they played at cricket; they got up dramatic entertainments; they went out fishing; they went out shooting. When winter fell upon them, and the strong frost covered the lakes with ice, to the infinite astonishment of the Affghans, they skimmed over the smooth surface on their skates. There is no want of manliness among the Affghans; but the manliness of the Feringhee strangers quite put them to shame. They did not like us the less for that; the athletic amusements of our people only raised their admiration. But there was something else which filled them with intensest hate.

“I am not writing an apology; there are truths which must be spoken. The temptations which are most difficult to withstand, were not withstood by our English officers. The attractions of the women of Caubul they did not know how to resist. The Affghans

are very jealous of the honour of their women; and there were things done in Caubul which covered them with shame and roused them to revenge. The inmates of the Mahomedan Zenana were not unwilling to visit the quarters of the Christian stranger. For two long years, now, had this shame been burning itself into the hearts of the Caubulees; and there were some men of note and influence among them who knew themselves to be thus wronged. Complaints were made; but they were made in vain. The scandal was open, undisguised, notorious; redress was not to be obtained. The evil was not in course of suppression; it went on, till it became intolerable, and the injured then began to see that the only remedy was in their own hands. It is enough to state broadly this painful fact. There are many who can fill in with vivid personality all the melancholy details of this chapter of human weakness, and supply a catalogue of the wrongs, which were soon to be so fearfully redressed.”

The fire of rebellion being now ignited, the flames spread with amazing rapidity. The sword of each Ghazee, Ghilzie, Kohistanee, &c., was unsheathed, and every European, and all who served them—every spot they occupied—was threatened. The Kohistanees cut to pieces the Ghoorkha Battalion under Major Pottinger and Lieutenant Haughton, who alone escaped to Caubul covered with wounds. Captain Ferris of the Shah's service, was attacked at Pesh Bolak, near the Khyber, and after exhausting his ammunition, was forced to

escape under cover of the night. [For an account of these calamities, see Appendix to 2nd volume.] A body of 130 men, under Captain Woodburn, was set upon between Candahar and Ghuzni, and annihilated, Woodburn himself falling desperately and mortally wounded.\*

The General received the account of this catastrophe from Lieut.-Colonel Palmer, commanding at Ghuzni.

Ghuzni, Half-past Eight p.m., 1841.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

In my letter of this day I mentioned to you that Captain Woodburn had left this on the 2nd for Cabool, with an escort of 108 sepoy and natives, composed of non-commissioned

\* This country is in a sad state. Poor Captain Woodburn, who was proceeding on sick leave to Caubul, has been killed. It appears that on the road he joined 130 sepoy of the Shah's, who were also going to Caubul, and I believe on furlough to India. They were attacked by the rebels near Ghuzni, and excepting *six* men, were *all killed*. I regret Woodburn much; he was a noble soldier, and is a great loss. Had I been at Candahar I would have endeavoured to persuade him not to have gone. All communication between this and Caubul is cut off, and it is said the country all the way to that place is up in arms. We have sad and strange reports from the natives of affairs at Caubul. They say that a great battle has been fought there. This *may* be false; but our affairs, I fear, are as bad as bad can be, and unless a little more talent, and energy, and decision should arise in our camps and councils, I think, *if* we can find a qualified head for it, we shall soon have to play the card of the 10,000 Greeks; to what number the phalanx may be reduced is another thing, I opine. I have had some difficulty in keeping my servants, and six of them have left to go with the troops to Hindostan. The servants who remain will do for me, but I have been obliged to increase their pay, and I am now giving each man warm clothing for the winter.—*Nott to his children*, 1841.

officers of the 3rd Shah's proceeding on furlough. Little did I then suppose there was the slightest chance of his meeting with any opposition. Two sepoy, however, of his detachment have just come in wounded, and state that they were attacked near Saidabad yesterday—that poor Woodburn, for they heard he was killed from another sepoy, took refuge in a fort and placed their baggage in it. At night a large party of Affghans assembled at the gate, and said they were sent for his preservation; they were not, however, admitted. During the night the fellows of the fort commenced firing on them from the towers. Woodburn proposed that they should take the field, so they left the fort and drove the enemy outside off, but from the enemy's guns carrying much further than the musquets, they suffered dreadfully. The whole country is said to be up towards Cabool, and they describe the force that attacked them as very large. Woodburn separated the party into two divisions. These men belonged to that under the Soobadar, who these men saw shot; at that time there were not above eight or nine sepoy left out of his fifty, and when he fell twenty fellows rushed on him for his gold necklace. These sepoy say they can give no account of the fate of the other portion under Woodburn, except that a sepoy came to them from it and said Woodburn had been shot. They don't think they can have escaped from the host by which they were attacked. Of course the communication is cut off from Cabool, and I think it very possible that the road between this and Kelat-i-Ghilzie will not be long open.

I will avail myself of any opportunity of writing to you. The report among the Affghans is that there has been a rise at Cabool, but as we received letters of the 1st yesterday, I don't think they can have heard of it, although it is likely enough to have occurred. May I request you to make the contents of this known to Major Rawlinson, as I have not

time to write to him, or any further data than I have stated. Adieu, with every kind wish.

Believe me, my dear General,

Yours sincerely,

T. PALMER.

At the time the Soohadar fell the men had expended all the ammunition they had in pouch. No Dawk from Cabool to day.

Nott's opinion of the cause of these disasters is given in a letter to his daughters, of the 1st of November, 1841 :

This country is in a sad state, I mean the Caubul side. Sir William Macnaghten's mistakes and weak system begin to tell most wofully ; it must be changed, or we must walk out of this part of the world. Lord Auckland should long ago have placed all power here, civil and military, in the hands of a General officer, who would have used it humanely, honourably, but when needed, roughly, and even sternly. *Half* measures will *not* do here, among an indignant, half-civilized race, who have had a hated King forced upon them. Three years ago, I told you, there never was a man so detested as the Shah, Macnaghten's "*good King!*" It would take many years to *undo* what that man, Macnaghten, has done. How could Lord Auckland allow such a person to remain in authority here, bringing into contempt everything connected with the name of Englishmen? It is horrible!

I sent off the Bengal Artillery, 16th, 42nd, 43rd Regiments, on the 8th instant ; and in consequence of news from Caubul, I was obliged to send an order to halt them on their first march towards Hindostan. Danger is come! and

now, these authorities who were so haughty, are completely paralyzed, and fear to act, and the military have not sufficient authority. The responsibility of halting this large home-ward-bound column, is great and heavy, but some one must *act*, and *suffer* the consequences. I hope we shall get some information in a day or two from Caubul, or that the political authorities will sufficiently regain their senses to enable them to act, or I must, at all risks, let the column move towards Hindostan, agreeably to the orders I have received. I am not the Government, nor am I clothed in their authority, therefore I cannot even follow my judgment for the benefit of the State. Macnaghten and General Elphinstone have made a pretty mess of it in the neighbourhood of Caubul ; and what is worse, the moral influence of their doings is fast extending over the whole country from Persia to the Attock. Deep snow *may* put a stop to it for a few months, but the seeds will remain beneath, and spring upon us with redoubled force.

On the 14th of November, a small scrap of paper which had been enclosed in a quill, reached General Nott by a native messenger. The scrap had been eleven days in transit from Caubul, had passed through the hands of Colonel Palmer at Ghuzni, of Major Lynch at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and of Major Leech, each of whom had endorsed it with a few lines. A transcript of the document is subjoined.

Assistant Adjutant-General's Office,  
Caubul, Nov. 3, 1841.

SIR,

I have the honour, by direction of Major-General Elphinstone, commanding in Afghanistan, to request you will

immediately direct the whole of the troops under orders to return to Hindostan from Candahar, to march upon Caubul instead of Shikarpore, excepting any that shall have got beyond the Kojuck Pass; and that you will instruct the officer who may command, to use the utmost practicable expedition. You are requested to attach a troop of His Majesty the Shah's Horse Artillery to the above force, and likewise half the 1st Regiment of Cavalry.

I have the honour, &c.,

(Signed) J. PATON, Captain, A.Q.M.Gl.

To Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar.

(True copy.) H. BELLEW, Captain, A.D.Q.M.Gl.

On the back are the following mems. :

The country here getting more disturbed every day. Burnett came in yesterday, after being attacked on the road; he was pursued, when he fortunately fell in with some Horse I had sent after the fifty-two camels from Candahar, which had been taken off. No tidings of Crawford.

Yours ever,

T. PALMER,  
Commanding at Ghuzni.

Khelat, Nov. 12th.

The whole of the Ghilzie prisoners escaped from Caubul, and the family of Hussein Khan from this neighbourhood. Ackbar Khan and Monsoon Khan in custody, and all the other families expected by this evening to be safe at this place.

R. LYNCH.

What are we to say to the appearance *en route* to Candahar, at this crisis, of Saifoodun, nephew of Atta Mahomed Surdar? He was here on the evening of the 8th.

R. LEECH.

There was no time to be lost. Nott promptly recalled the brigade under Maclaren, and dispatched it towards Caubul. The snow was on the ground; commissariat cattle were scarce and feeble, and might be expected to die *en route*, thereby endangering the supplies. But Elphinstone's orders left him no alternative. With what reluctance he complied with them, his letter to his children of the 17th of November 1841, will show.

I have received a *positive* order from the Envoy and Elphinstone to send troops to Caubul, and therefore the 16th, 42nd and 43rd N.I., some cavalry, a company of foot artillery and a troop of horse artillery marched from this for Caubul this morning. This is *against my* judgment; 1st, because I think at this time of the year they *cannot* get there, as the snow will probably be four or five feet deep between that place and Ghuzni; besides which, it is likely they will have to fight every foot of the ground from the latter to the former place; at any rate, they will arrive in so crippled a state as to be *totally* unfit for service; and 2ndly, they will be *five* weeks in getting there, before which everything will be settled one way or the other; 3rdly, could I have kept the troops here, which left this morning, I could ultimately have preserved the whole of Affghanistan, whatever the result at Caubul may be, and now these troops can be of no use *there*, and their removal will I fear ruin us

here, for the people to-day openly talk of attacking us. How strange, that from the time we entered this country, up to the present moment, we have never had a man of even common sense or energy at the head of affairs. They have now reduced the force here to such a degree that if the people rise, which I think they will—nay, if things go against us at Caubul, they *certainly* will—we shall be in a very awkward situation, surrounded by 100,000 armed Affghans, perhaps 200,000. But we must do our best, that is all, and we *will* do so too; but it is provoking that I am obliged strictly to obey the orders of such stupid people, when I know these orders go to ruin the affairs of the British Government, and to cut the throats of my handful of soldiers and my own. Had they not divided my force, this country would have been safe—now it is very doubtful. How strange that Macnaghten has never been right, even by chance!

To ensure the safety of Candahar, Nott proposed to call in all the troops which had been left at Derawut and Neesh, and those encamped at Zemindaur. He likewise strengthened the post at Girishk, and took precautions against any rising in and about Candahar. The public treasure was, at Nott's suggestion, removed into the citadel by Rawlinson, and the sentries were everywhere doubled and directed to be on the alert.

On the 15th of November, Rawlinson prepared to send Prince Sufter Jung to Caubul with McLaren's Brigade. Nott opposed it from the conviction that the Brigade would not reach Caubul.

15th November, 1841.

MY DEAR MAJOR,

Under all circumstances, and the difficulties which I foresee Lieut.-Colonel McLaren's detachment will have to encounter, I am of opinion that should Shazadah Sufter Jung accompany the troops, with his followers and the Jan Baz, it would be attended with the greatest inconvenience, and perhaps prove fatal to the success of the force. It is necessary that the column should move in the most close and compact order, which will be impossible if the Prince and his followers join it.

This is purely a military move, or reinforcement from one station to another, and I really do not see the necessity for the presence of a political officer.

Yours, sincerely,

W. NOTTS.

To Major Rawlinson.

Nott now reported his proceedings to the Government of India direct.

Kandahar, 19th November, 1841.

SIR,

As all communication between Kandahar and Cabool has been cut off since the 3rd instant, and as I have reason to believe that the whole country between Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and the latter place is up in arms, I think it my duty to report the following direct to you, *viâ* Sukkur, for the information of Government :—

Agreeable to the orders of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., Commanding in Afghanistan, the troops noted in the margin (+) marched from Kandahar on the 8th instant, *en route* to Hindostan, *viâ* Shikaspore, but in consequence of native reports on the state of affairs at Cabool I halted the column on the 9th, pending some certain information from that city.

On the 14th I received a letter from Captain Paton, Assis-

tant Quartermaster-General, when I immediately recalled the troops, and directed them to march upon Cabool, according to the orders in Captain Paton's letter.

Major Rawlinson, Political Agent at Kandahar, at the same time received a short letter from Sir W. McNaghten, merely stating that there had been a serious rising at Cabool; that they (the British, I presume) had been shelling the city the whole of the day, the 3rd, but with little effect, and that he was apprehensive of their supplies being cut off. These letters came by a special messenger, and ought to have been received on the 7th or 8th; you will perceive that they did not reach Kandahar until the 14th.

I fear that M'Laren's Brigade will not be able to reach Cabool, as the snow between Ghuznee and that city will probably render their progress impossible, from the dearth of commissariat cattle, and consequently the loss of all supplies; at any rate, should the weather be severe, they will reach Cabool in a crippled and inefficient state; but General Elphinstone's orders left me no discretion.

In consequence of the feeling and agitation which I conceive to be apparent in and around Kandahar, I have, in communication with the political authority, thought it proper to recal his Majesty the Shah's 2nd and 5th Regiments of infantry from Dharawut and the district of Nesh. His Majesty's 1st Regiment of Infantry and two horse-artillery guns are now in Zamin Dawar, where it was intended that they should have wintered; but, under present circumstances I fear I must recal them, as, in the event of an attack being made upon their post I could not spare troops to support them.

The troops now at Kandahar are the 2nd and 5th Regts., his Majesty the Shah's Infantry.

It is now my painful duty to state that the people in this city already talk among themselves of attacking the British

troops, and I believe that they will attempt it should affairs at Cabool have an unfortunate result.

I beg you will do me the honour to assure the Right Hon. the Governor General of India that every precaution shall be observed, and that whatever may be the result of the outbreak at Cabool and its neighbourhood, I have no doubt of being able to hold the country. Could I have detained Colonel M'Laren's detachment at Kandahar it would have afforded me the greatest satisfaction, as it would have prevented, in my opinion, any rise in this part of Afghanistan.

I take this opportunity of acquainting you that, in the present state of affairs, I have directed Major Saunders, of the Bengal Engineers, to remain here until further orders.

A copy of this letter has been addressed to the Officiating Adjutant General of the Army, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Lieut.-Colonel J. Stuart,  
Military Secretary to the Governor of India, Calcutta.

Maclaren's brigade had not been gone many days before it was compelled to retrace its steps. A great number of the cattle had perished from exposure to frost and snow. Nott hailed its return with undisguised pleasure. He had entertained very little hope of its proving of utility, even had it reached Caubul, indifferently as it would have been handled there by Elphinstone; but he felt satisfied that, concentrated at Candahar, it would have enabled him to take the field, if at any time necessary, with an irresistible force. Indeed, he writes to the Government of India on

the 9th of December, "I am concentrating at Candahar all the troops available, where they will be ready to act, according to circumstances, to march upon Caubul, when the season will admit, or to operate in any direction the Government may think necessary."

And now reports came thick and fast that the British cause at Caubul was desperate. The Affghans had surrounded the city and the cantonments; skirmishes were of daily occurrence, the advantage rarely being on our side; provisions became scarcer, the troops fell into despondency, the military leaders were disunited; Elphinstone, sick and infirm, refused to act boldly on the offensive. The crisis was at hand. Direct communication with the Envoy and Elphinstone had been completely cut off, and the interception of the following document seemed to show that the investment of Candahar and Ghuzni was to be attempted.

*To the high and exalted Nobles, Leaders and Moslem Followers of the Chief of all Prophets (on whom be peace) among the Belooch and Brahoë tribes.*

Be it not concealed, that when the Christians of England took Shah Soojah Ool Moolk by the hand, and invaded, with a large force, Moslem countries, it was evident to the followers of Islam, that as His Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk had for thirty years enjoyed the protection of the English Government, and was fully assured of the good faith and sincerity of this Christian nation, it was not unreasonable that they should put forth their strength and assist His Majesty, the hereditary King of Moslem

countries; but, after establishing him in his dominions, return to their own countries.

In confirmation of which, His Majesty often remarked in public Durbar, that the English advanced no claims of their own, but would retire.

The followers of Islam believing His Majesty in full possession of uncontrolled power, joined him with all their strength.

But few understood the real truth; so the English threw aside the veil, and day by day employed themselves in uprooting the religion and causing separation among the followers of Islam, and by the force of their power carried into execution whatever they pleased, from the day of their arrival up to the present moment. They have, on false accusation, confined guiltless Chiefs, both Dooranees, Ghilzies and Persians, intending to send them prisoners to Hindostan.

The Moslem nation, viewing all this, and considering it opposed to its interests, plainly see that the King was entirely without authority.

Hence the warriors and champions of Islam from among the Dooranees, Ghilzies, Persians, Kohistanees and Lohuzurees, with men of other districts, girded up the loins of valour for the restoration and strengthening of the Moslem religion, and spared neither their lives, their honour, nor their wealth in their holy cause; but according to the Sacred Book, placing not regard on the smallness of their worldly means, have drawn forth the sword of honour and commenced performance.

On Tuesday, the 7th of the month of Rumzan, Sir Alexander Burnes, a leading man of the English, and a cause of much injury to the Moslem religion, with several other men of rank, were killed; all the forts of strength constructed in

the city of Caubul, taken, destroyed, and their dust scattered to the wind; while lacs of rupees in money and property have fallen prize to the champions of the Faith. In all the daily fights, up to the present moment of writing, victory has constantly followed the brave followers of Islam; several guns have fallen into their hands; the Mahomedan classes who had assisted the English, have deserted them, and are daily added to the number of the Faithful.

At last, tired and unequal to contention with the victorious Ghazees, many of the English have taken refuge with the King, surrounded in the Bala Hissar, without food for men or animals; some few are shut up in their cantonments, victims of their own pride and insolence. By the favour of the Lord, these shall soon be destroyed.

At Chareekar, a district of the Kohistan of Caubul, 2,000 horse and foot had established themselves in a strong fort; every one was destroyed by the Ghazees of the Kohldaman, Pungshur, Nizrab, Safee, &c., on the intelligence of the insurrection of Caubul, the cantonments burnt, and three guns captured.

In the same way 2,000 or 3,000 men had established themselves with guns at Gundamuk, in the district of Jellallabad. These have been annihilated by the warriors of Khoozean, Ghilzie, &c., excepting a few who are now invested in Jellallabad, where 20,000 Ghazees are employed in their complete destruction, which by the favour of God will be effected in a few days. Two guns were here captured.

Moreover, it is expected that in a few days Ghuzni will fall to the prowess of the Undurees, Turukees and Wurduks.

The Hotukee and Tohkee prisoners and hostages have all been released from their confinement and have returned

home; so that the various tribes of the Turnuks are also engaged in the destruction of the fort built at Ghilzie.

It is also anticipated that on this news the city of Candahar will be invested by the Doorancees; and by the favour of God, not an Englishman left.

Although by the wise ordering of the Almighty, the association of the Faithful and the unity of their hearts is perfect, still it is necessary and proper that, for all affairs of importance, there should be a leader; therefore, the exalted in dignity, the Nuwab Mahomed Zuman Khan, Barukzye, Ghazee, in kindness the flower of the times, and in religious sentiments the wonder of the age, has been selected by the Moslems of all tribes, under the title of Ameer of the Faithful and Emam of the Holy Warriors, and as such recognized by all.

By the favour of God, the numbers of the Faithful will daily increase, and become countless.

To the True Followers it is therefore addressed, that all brothers in the religion of the Sacred Prophet, rejoiced in heart at these glad tidings, may continue firm and faithful to the Holy Cause.

(True translation.)

WM. ANDERSON.

The fall of Ghuzni followed rapidly upon the circulation of the foregoing appeal. The importance of the position had never been sufficiently considered by Macnaghten. A weak detachment of the 27th Bengal N.I. occupied the place under Colonel Palmer. Repairs and alterations were requisite in the citadel after the British had obtained possession of the fortress, but they were not sanctioned, nor was Palmer permitted to lay in provisions. At the eleventh hour, the Colonel took the

responsibility upon himself, and set to work; but most invaluable time had been suffered to pass unimproved, and when the enemy made their appearance under the walls of Ghuzni, they found the garrison but ill prepared for a siege, especially when it was not man alone they had to combat with, but the rigours of a winter as intense as those in Canada. The enemy and the snow made their appearance together. On the 20th of November, the town was surrounded with the one, and the ground covered with the other. In a week afterwards, the insurgents had broken up their investment of the place, on the report of Maclaren's brigade advancing to their relief. This permitted of the destruction of the villages and buildings within musket-shot of the walls, and also afforded the officers a week's skating on the ditch of the fortress; but on the 7th of December the enemy returned in increased numbers, and the garrison were then closely confined to the walls.

The necessity and advantage of turning the inhabitants out of the town, was not lost sight of; but unfortunately an idea had got abroad that the townspeople were strongly attached to the garrison, and that the sending out so many poor people to perish in the snow was an act of cruelty too great to be dreamt of. The consequence was that the townsmen entered into a correspondence with their countrymen on the outside, and on the night of the 16th of December, having dug a hole through the town, they admitted their friends

who poured in by thousands, and compelled the garrison, after fighting all that night and the next day, to retire into the citadel. From that day the winter set in with increased severity, and its effect soon told fearfully on the men. The snow fell heavily and lay deep; often in the course of a single night falling to the depth of a couple of feet. The thermometer sunk to *fourteen degrees below zero*—and, as provisions began to fail, the officers and sepoy were reduced to half rations of bad flour and raw grain, on alternate days, and a couple of pounds of wood per man each day for cooking and for warmth. The sepoy were constantly soaked, and unable to dry themselves, got sickly, and the hospital was crowded with men whose feet had ulcerated from frost bites. In this state they remained until the end of the year. The enemy did not rush upon the walls and carry them, as they might have done, but simply kept up a fire from their rifles on every one who showed his head above the walls.

In connection with the history of this period, although it had little or no operation upon the course of events in Candahar, it is proper to make mention of the endeavours of the Shah of Herat to move the British authorities to afford him assistance in regaining possession of the musnud whence he had been ejected by the Minister Yar Mahomed.

It appears that, in the middle of November, Sultan Mahomed Khan, a Sirdar in the confidence of the

royal family of Herat, came to Ghirisk, and subsequently to Candahar, armed with credentials from Shah Kamran and the heir apparent. He was received by Major Rawlinson with becoming courtesy, and an interview took place, the conversation at which is minutely detailed in one of the Major's communications to the Envoy and Minister. This conversation is of a highly interesting character, and creditable to the diplomatic skill of the interlocutors. As a document illustrative of one of the features of Oriental diplomacy, apart from its bearing on the story of the time, it merits the attention of the reader.

*Abstract Report of Conversations between Sultan Mahomed Khan Sirdar, of Herat, and Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, Candahar.*

Sultan Mahomed—"You have now perused the credentials which I have brought from his Majesty Shah Kamran, from his Royal Highness Syfool Moolk Mirza, and from my elder brother Deen Mahomed Khan. Are you satisfied that the documents are genuine, and that I am duly accredited to treat with the British Government?"

Major Rawlinson—"I have no reason to doubt but that the documents are genuine, and that his Majesty Shah Kamran has duly accredited you to treat for him, but I am not so confident that the British Government will be inclined to recognize you as the representative of the state of Herat; for we are bound by engagements to respect the ministerial authority of Yar Mahomed Khan as an integral part of the Government of Herat; and not only does the acquiescence of that officer in your mission appear to be wanting, but as far as I can judge by the tenor of the letters which you have brought, and by

the reported state of your domestic affairs, the Minister whose participation in the present negotiation would seem indispensable, is your enemy, and opposition to him is one of the principal objects of your deputation."

Sultan Mahomed—"Certainly; your conjecture is quite right. I am commissioned to open my communications with you by denouncing Yar Mahomed Khan as an enemy to his Sovereign, and by declaring that the emancipation of his Majesty Shah Kamran from the thralldom in which he is held by his ambitious and rebellious Minister, must be conceded as a preliminary to all friendly engagements between the Governments. The removal of Yar Mahomed Khan from office indeed is the measure which I propose as the actual means of effecting the reconciliation of which his Majesty Shah Kamran is so desirous; and it is a measure, I assert, as righteous in principle, as it is easy of execution and pregnant with beneficial consequences."

Major Rawlinson—"Before discussing this point, I think it as well to tell you that I am altogether without instructions from my Government as to the conduct of the somewhat embarrassing question which you seem so eager to press forward; my language must be therefore considered unofficial, and with this proviso I shall argue unreservedly, and reduce the matter in debate to the simplest forms of which it appears to be susceptible.

1stly. Then we are bound by treaty to acknowledge the ministerial authority of Yar Mahomed Khan at Herat, and to respect the exercise of that legitimate influence which belongs to his position. 2ndly. We are at present in communication with Yar Mahomed Khan, with a view to the renewal of friendship with Herat; there is a probability of the success of our negotiations, and as, in the event of that success our political ends would be attained, in the manner which we consider most conducive to our interests, so, pending the issue, we could

neither with honour nor advantage enter into any arrangements which might be at variance with the avowed objects of our negotiations. And 3rdly. Acquiescence with the demand for the removal of Yar Mahomed Khan from office appears to involve a direct war with Herat; for the Minister will not, of course, willingly abandon his position, and being by your own admission the *de facto* ruler of the country, he will naturally bring all his available forces to resist the measure which you propose. Now war with Herat being a measure to which our Government is systematically opposed on considerations of the gravest nature, it is comparatively immaterial whether the immediate object which threatens to provoke that evil may be the emancipation of Shah Kamran from the Minister's controul, or the support of the Minister against the King or an other fancied ground of quarrel; the effect being distasteful to our policy, the cause must be carefully shunned, and I can give you no hopes, therefore, of our embarking in such a Quixotic enterprise."

Sultan Mahomed—"I will endeavour to answer your objections *seriatim*. 1stly. With regard to principle or the federal engagements by which you are bound, you have agreed to respect the ministerial authority of Yar Mahomed Khan, so long, and so long only as he may observe the conditions of the treaty drawn up at Candahar in 1839, and may act in accordance with the views of the British Government; he has flagrantly violated the conditions of that treaty, and has exerted himself to the utmost to the injury of your interests, you are therefore absolved from the continued recognition of his office; nor in point of argument would his possible return to friendliness subject you to a resumption of the engagement. 2ndly. I admit the propriety of your observing a strict neutrality in the quarrel between Yar Mahomed Khan and the Shah, during the progress of your negotiations with the former for a reasonable time; but after having allowed the Minister

every opportunity of explanation, and having failed in inclining him to friendliness, I hold that you are not to be debarred by these unsuccessful negotiations from availing yourselves of any other mode of settlement that may offer, although opposed to the former views which you expressed and entertained. As we feel convinced of the impracticability of the restoration of confidence between Yar Mahomed Khan and the British Government, so we are by no means averse to await the issue of the negotiations now pending; we only protest against the unlimited protraction of an unmeaning and unprofitable correspondence. I now come to the third point, the mode of action. I do not by any means admit the necessity of your being involved in war. I am not even commissioned to ask for the movement of a single Regiment across the Herat frontier; we merely want pecuniary assistance, and your avowed countenance of the enterprise. We have friends and influence fully equal to the undertaking; the general execration in which the Minister is held throughout the territory of Herat is a tower of strength to us, and the name of Shah Kamran will still further augment our followers; but we are without the sinews of war. The King has hardly wherewithal to support his limited establishment: in our own abrupt flight from Herat we have lost everything, and we have been obliged to refuse the proffered services of numbers of Chiefs from our inability to feed a body of any magnitude. I will give you, however, detailed statements of our plans and resources when we have discussed the more important matter, as to whether it is for your interest or otherwise to assist us; for, as the justifiableness and practicability of the enterprise are now disposed of, into this single consideration must the question resolve itself."

Major Rawlinson—"I may perhaps admit for the sake of argument, that in the event of the prolonged unfriendliness of Yar Mahomed Khan, we should be justified in supporting his Majesty Shah Kamran, against him, but I am by no means

satisfied that the undertaking would be as easy as you predict, nor do I perceive that its successful accomplishment would secure to us any advantages of a character decidedly superior to those we might expect from an accommodation with the present Minister, or at all commensurate with the heavy expenditure, and still heavier risk, which would be entailed on us during its progress."

Sultan Mahomed—"If you will permit me I will put together, in as few words as possible, the leading feature of my argument on your connexion with Herat, considered with regard to the past, the present, and the future, and I hope to convince you that your honour and interests are alike concerned in assisting us. Your treaty with Herat was contracted with Shah Kamran as the acknowledged ruler of the country. His Majesty has kept faith with you, throughout. The circumstances connected with the suspension of relations, took place, not only without his consent, but in direct opposition to his wishes,—he now repudiates those, as well as the subsequent acts of his Minister, and invites you to the resumption of friendliness on the terms to which you have pledged yourselves. It is clear that you must either hold him irresponsible for the violation of the treaty, or must place him in a position in which he may acquit himself of the responsibility which attaches to him. In the former case, that is supposing Shah Kamran to be irresponsible for the acts of his Minister, and your obligations to his Majesty to be thus undisturbed by the tender of allegiance to Persia, it is difficult to understand upon what ground you can now resist the appeal which is made to you to adhere to the engagements of your treaty. His Majesty claims from you the pecuniary assistance which you have promised to the Herat Government. He claims also your assistance to realise the condition which you have recognized of the Government of Herat, being vested in his person, a condition which has lapsed by the

violent usurpation of all power, nominal as well as virtual, by Yar Mahomed Khan. In the other case, that is in the event of your holding Shah Kamran to be responsible for the acts perpetrated in his name, it is still more incumbent on you, on all principles of fair and honourable dealing, to interfere in his behalf, in order to obtain for him an uncontrolled liberty of action; but this may be considered casuistry. Let us now come to the proximate and practical question of whether this interference is for your advantage or otherwise. Your political object is that Herat should be a strong and independent kingdom, and that its ruler should be unequivocally attached to your interests, to the exclusion of all other foreign connexion. This political status, I assert to be, unattainable so long as Yar Mahomed Khan remains in power. That he has hitherto been actuated by unfriendly feelings to you, and has striven to do you injury in many instances, no one will question; and the only reasonable expectation of this conduct is that he has been afraid of you. But, if fear has thus been his leading principle of action, when there was nothing to excite that fear but a vague apprehension of your cupidity, how can it be hoped that the feeling will be so abated as to admit of his acting with sincerity, now that he has multiplied his offences against you to an almost indefinite extent, and has been led on to betray a bitter spirit of hostility which may be forgiven, but cannot be forgotten. You know that for obligations he has no gratitude, for treaties no respect; you may hope that by obtaining hostages from him on the one hand, and by removing any opening for intrigue on the other, in the re-establishment of your position at Teheran, you may control his fidelity and compel him, however reluctantly, to rectitude; but if you will believe the judgment of those thoroughly conversant with the politics of Herat, you may rest assured that your position at a Court where he exercises supreme control, will ever be most insecure

and most unprofitable,—he has too far committed himself to render possible the re-establishment of confidence; the very checks which you may hold over him, will be so many proofs that you mistrust him; knowing that you mistrust him, he will necessarily fear you; fearing you, he must hate you; hating you, he must ever be watching for an opportunity to injure you, and constituted as are the Courts of Central Asia, who shall say, notwithstanding the present favourable aspect of affairs, that such opportunities will be wanting for any two or three consecutive months? In this line of argument, however, I am supposing the most favourable settlement that you can possibly expect with Yar Mahomed Khan; my own opinion is, that you will not even succeed in establishing a restoration of outward friendship. Should the Minister be disappointed of the Persian alliance, he may perhaps be inclined to accept your money as the price of the residence of an agent at his Court; but he will fetter himself with no pledges of his sincerity, and I hardly think you will be disposed to purchase a temporary forbearance from hostility by another fruitless sacrifice of treasure and by a second liability to insult and deception. The alternative, therefore, is, will you forfeit your engagements with the Shah and be content with the possibility of hollow compromise with the Minister, or will you adhere to your recognition of the sovereignty of Kamran with its annexed conditions, coalesce with his Majesty in denouncing the treason and perfidy of Yar Mahomed Khan, and avail yourself of the opening that is now afforded to place your relations with the Government of Herat on a permanent footing of friendliness?"

Major Rawlinson—"You appear to have overlooked a third and still more obvious course which is open to us, even on the supposition that your judgment of Yar Mahomed's character and conduct may be correct; we may have Herat altogether to itself. The re-establishment of your position at Teheran

and the tranquilization of the province of Candahar divest the Herat connexion of all immediate consequence, and it appears to me that we may very safely permit the continued suspension of all intercourse with this Government if Yar Mahomed evinces a disinclination to seek for our friendship."

Sultan Mahomed—"We have a proverb which says, 'he who is not my friend is my enemy,'—Yar Mahomed has already repeatedly shown himself hostile to you. If there is a cessation of all intercourse between the Governments that hostility must still be considered to be in force; and putting out of the question the possibility of a second quarrel with Persia, the injury which will be inflicted on you by the understood hostility of Herat, in necessitating the permanent maintenance of an attitude of power at Candahar, will alone, as regards expense, become a very serious subject of consideration; and the suspension of relations will, moreover, embarrass trade, keep the public mind in a state of constant agitation and cripple your efforts to improve the internal condition of the province of Candahar."

Major Rawlinson—"No doubt these evils would to a certain degree have to be encountered, in the event of a continued suspension of our relations with Herat; but the case is merely suppositious, and in the mean time before making even a speculative comparison between the risk of having Herat entirely to itself and the embarrassment attending either of the other courses which you have brought forward, I should like to hear further particulars of the scheme of operations which you are authorised to propose."

Sultan Mahomed—"Our plans are sufficiently simple; we ask, in the first place, for the countenance of the British Government—if open and avowed, it will be more effectual, but at any rate it must be clearly understood by the leaders of the enterprise. We then ask for money,—you disbursed three lakhs of rupees in the vain attempt to incline Yar Mahomed

Khan to attack Ghonan. We will engage to place Herat at your disposal for a less sum, and I will myself remain as a hostage in your hands pending the fulfilment of our promises. Shah Pusund Khan, of Laush, with whom we are in communication, will, at your instigation, be a joint leader in the enterprise; but he also requires money for the maintenance of his troops. We calculate that a lakh of rupees advanced, either at the outlet or at intervals, as occasion may require, to Shah Pusund Khan, and a similar sum advanced to Deen Mahomed Khan will enable us to drive Yar Mahomed Khan from Herat. We propose, in the first instance, to attack and capture Furrak. I have brought with me to Candahar the sons of all the Dooranee Chiefs of the frontier, who will if necessary remain here as pledges for the faithful conduct of the tribes that may engage in the enterprise. Furrak is garrisoned by only 200 men, and Yar Mahomed Khan cannot come from Herat to succour it with a prospect of holding the capital. Ibrahim Khan Tymunnee is pledged to join us from the outset, and we can certainly assemble a good fighting force of 300 men for the commencement of our operations. On the fall of Furrak the Dooranees will rise *en masse*. Keneedad Khan the Begleibeygee of the Hazarehs is our sworn brother, and he will come down upon Herat with at least 2,000 horse. The Jemshidees, the Zoorees, the Firozhohies, we can also depend upon; their hatred to the Minister, and the respect which all the tribes have for the name of Kamran, pledging them to our support; the Minister will thus remain at the head of his own immediate dependants and will principally rely upon his Alekozye soldiers; but we, as the elder branch of the Alekozye family, have naturally a strong tribe influence, and numbers of the Minister's best troops may thus be expected to desert to our standard. If Yar Mahomed should take the field and fight us, the issue of course must be in the hands of God; but we shall no doubt

greatly outnumber him. My own impression is, however, that he would neither risk an engagement nor await our advance upon Herat; but that on the fall of Furrak and the rise of the Dooranees he would abandon Herat and fly to Mushed. Our movements throughout would be conducted in the name of Shah Kamran, and Syfool Moolk Mirza would head our army as his Majesty's representative. Upon the Shah's regaining his legitimate power in his capital, I would at once accompany a British officer to congratulate his Majesty on his success. Your former treaty would come into immediate operation, and you might append any fresh articles you thought desirable for the increased stability of your position. I am not authorised to make any demands for personal rewards to my brother and myself; we should be entirely obedient to the orders of his Majesty, but we should hope not to be assigned subordinate capacities to any other Dooranee nobles. At the same time we do not aspire to the civil administration of officers, for we do not think ourselves qualified for the office. We should be better pleased to see an officer appointed to the Wuzership who might be uninfected with local jealousies, and a stranger to factions of the place. We do not attempt to conceal that we are actuated by strong personal feelings in pressing these matters on the attention of the British Government. We have been grievously persecuted by Yar Mahomed Khan, and we are in consequence his bitter enemies; but we feel at the same time that in assisting us to avenge our quarrel, the British Government will only be acting in consistency with its own engagements, and in furtherance of its own interests."

Major Rawlinson: "I have now heard you to the end; and I admit that you have made a sufficiently plausible case. The question, at the same time, is one of great importance and cannot possibly be decided without a special

reference to the Governor General of India. I may, however, mention to you a few of the objections that it occurs to me may be taken to your pleading. That we have bound ourselves by treaty to recognize the Sovereignty of Herat, as vested in the person of Shah Kamran, is undeniable, but this does not by any means entail on us an obligation to support his Majesty's right of sovereignty if assailed by a foreign power, much less if merely impaired or superseded by the virtual authority of his Minister. We are, therefore, clearly at liberty to prosecute or abstain from an interference in his Majesty's behalf, as may appear most conducive to our interests; whether those interests may be best consulted by coming to an accommodation with Yar Mahomed Khan, by abandoning altogether the Herat connexion, or by taking an active part in the measures which you propose for driving the Minister from power; it is not for me to decide, and perhaps, indeed, pending the receipt of the answers which I am daily expecting from Herat, it is premature to consider the question; but I cannot, at the same time, avoid seeing that the implication which the avowed recognition of your enterprise involves is one of a far more serious extent than you are willing to admit. Were we to advance funds for the declared purpose of enabling Shah Kamran to emancipate himself from the control of a hostile Minister, and were the efforts which we had instigated to be unsuccessful, our national honour would be so far concerned that we could hardly avoid the adoption of more active measures of interference to carry out the object which we should be supposed to have originated, and the risk of being thus drawn into military operations in the Herat territory must weigh powerfully against our being tempted to acquiesce in the claim for pecuniary support, even supposing the advantages derivable from your success, unassisted by our arms, to be worth the original outlay. Although it may, perhaps, be granted that

our position at Herat would be more stable and satisfactory under another administration than that of Yar Mahomed Khan, I am still, under the present aspect of affairs, strongly inclined to believe, that in the event of the Minister continuing to evince a disinclination for, or an indifference to, our friendship, the Right Hon. the Governor General of India will prefer incurring the permanent but definite expense of preparation within the province of Candahar, to the risk of being involved in hostilities beyond the frontier, and of being subjected to the indefinite expense, and the inexplicable difficulties to which such hostilities might lead. As I have before, however, mentioned to you, I am without instructions regarding the difficult and delicate case which you have proposed to me. I have argued the matter with you altogether unofficially, and I can promise nothing more than to forward a reference on the subject for the consideration of higher authorities."

This dialogue was, as we have said, duly reported to Sir W. M'Naghten, and, pending his decision Major Rawlinson took upon himself to give honourable treatment to Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan, allowing him two thousand rupees per mensem for the maintenance of himself and followers.

There is no trace of any reply from the Envoy to the communication of Major Rawlinson—in fact, it is more than doubtful if the original despatches ever reached the hands of Sir William M'Naghten, the communications between Caubul and Candahar having been effectually cut off by the Affghans. It is at all events certain that nothing was done in fulfilment of the wishes of Shah Kamran, to judge from a letter written three or four months later by Sultan Deen Mahomed Khan, at Herat,

to Sultan Mahomed Khan, iterating in strong terms the entreaty for pecuniary assistance on the project of maintaining the integrity of the Affghan dynasty at Herat.

You must represent the following matters to the officers of the British Government at Candahar. The determination of Persia to reduce Herat to the condition of a dependency is becoming daily more apparent, and Yar Mahomed Khan seems well enough inclined to meet the views of Mahomed Shah. Sheer Mahomed Khan, on his return from Teheran, was most honourably received, and his first business was to persuade his brother to send six or seven of the most respectable females of all the family to Meshed, to be held there as hostages—he has brought letters from Mahomed Shah, promising to make over to Yar Mahomed Khan, the revenues of the rich districts of Koochan and Chinarau, in return for acknowledging allegiance to Persia. Yar Mahomed has, in consequence, actually struck coin in the name of Mahomed Shah, and he has ordered the Uakhana Khana (royal band) to be sounded for the Persian Monarch. By the last accounts the name of Mahomed Shah had not been included in the Khootba (read in the mosques), but preparations are being made for that last sign of dependency being carried into effect. All this has greatly disgusted the Affghans, and other Soonee Chiefs, and I receive daily applications from all the influential men in the Government to raise my standard, dispossess Yar Mahomed of Herat, restore his Majesty Shah Kamran, and endeavour to preserve an independent Affghan kingdom. The threatened advance of a Persian army into Khorassan, makes people more than ever anxious on this head, for they believe Yar Mahomed Khan aware of his own unpopularity, will invite a Persian garrison to occupy the city, and support his authority as Regent on the part of Mahomed Shah. Will the English Government permit this? I only

want a small sum of money, twenty or thirty thousand rupees, to pay the troops, and I will still save Herat from falling into the hands of Persia. If the British will not interfere, I must follow the example of others, and make my own terms with Mahomed Shah. Let me hear from you on this subject directly, for there is no time to lose.

(True abstracts.)

H. RAWLINSON,  
Political Agent.

Another episode, or connecting link of the history of the British expedition to Affghanistan, is the establishment of the young Chief Meer Nusser Khan in the Government of Khelat, and the conclusion of a treaty with him regulating the future intercourse of the Government of India with that state. From a variety of documents illustrative of this event, a preference may be given to the description of Major Outram, the chief actor on the behalf of our Government, of the concluding scenes of the Khelat drama. Outram's letter is addressed to Mr Colvin, the private secretary to Lord Auckland, and divested of all semi-official parentheses, runs thus :

(Copy.)

Kelat, 7th October, 1841.

MY DEAR SIR,

Having waited till the last moment, in the hope of receiving his Lordship's instructions for my guidance, in framing the treaty with Meer Nusseer Khan, which as there has been ample time, I conclude must have miscarried in one of the packets plundered in the Bolan Pass, and in the expectation that ere this I would have been favoured with his Lordship's sentiments, I had consented to yesterday being fixed for the

investiture of the young Chief, which was selected by the Moollahs as a fortunate day; consequently, it would have had a bad appearance to delay the ceremony, neither would it have been advisable to delay the execution of the treaty till *after* the ceremony, for it is politic that Nuseer Khan's accession to the Khanate should clearly appear to be the *consequence* of his acceptance of the terms which we consider it just to impose. I was desirous also, that the act of the young Chief should be most public, which this occasion gives,—that, instead of the treaty appearing to be smuggled from a mere boy, as it were under thralldom, it should be openly exacted in the presence of his assembled Chiefs, and entirely unawed by British troops (with which object I sent away the 25th Regiment of Native Infantry, and guns, formerly stationed here, some days ago).

Under these circumstances, I decided on executing such a treaty, as I am pretty confident will be approved by his Lordship, while at the same time, it leaves the right of adding thereto, whatever his Lordship pleases. As it may be a day or two before my official report can be dispatched, I herewith forward a transcript of the treaty, which you will observe embraces everything proposed by Sir William Macnaghten, in the draft of treaty he sent to Colonel Stacey, with slight verbal alterations only, and an addition which you will find at the termination of the 5th article, the object of which is to obtain an equitable arrangement of tolls, the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th articles are added by me for the following reasons. The 6th, more to give us the right to prevent any foreign power interfering with the Brahooc nation, than from any idea that the foreign intrigues of this petty State could affect us seriously. The 7th, I consider necessary to our good name and in justice to Shah Newaz Khan. The 8th, I deem indispensable to our honour; and the 9th requires no comment.

The only article that created any difficulty was the 8th; but, finding that I would on no account dispense with it, it was acceded to, and through the influence and exertions of Colonel Stacey, I have every hope that the murderer of Lieutenant Loveday will soon be secured, without compromising the young Chief in the eyes of his followers by giving up the man *himself* apparently, though *really* he will cause the criminal's seizure, and being given up to the Colonel; or rather, will heartily aid the Colonel's exertions, who ostensibly will be the capturer. I am bound to express my obligations to Colonel Stacey in this matter (as I shall have the pleasure to do hereafter, in many others, officially) which would have been a stumbling-block in my way, otherwise not easily removed.

The Khan, on his having been previously made fully acquainted with the nature of the treaty, was invited to a public Durbar I held yesterday forenoon, for the purpose of concluding the compact, and came accordingly, attended by the whole of his Sirdars and principal people, excepting one or two individuals absent, sick. The treaties were produced in public Durbar, and read over to the Khan by his Minister Moolah Mahomed Hussein, the words being repeated by the Khan, who, when finished, said "I agree" (Kubool), and taking his signet from his bosom (which he always wears attached to a string round his neck, and never entrusts it to any one), put on the ink, and applied the seal with his own hand.

On the previous evening the Khan visited me, and made the following request—after premising that he was the faithful servant of the English, and ready to subscribe to whatever conditions we chose to impose—that, he was aware of the articles of the intended treaty, which he heartily agreed to; he wished for two additions, which if I could make to the terms, he would feel very grateful for; first, that our troops should not be withdrawn from his country for two or three

years, until his Government had become sufficiently strong to put down the factious spirit of the Chiefs, which late years of anarchy had fostered to an extent which he, a weak boy, could not overcome without the aid of the English. Secondly, that it should be stipulated that the British Government would protect him from enemies, domestic and foreign, and guarantee his possessions, as were those of the Ameers of Scinde.

To this I replied, that, with a view to placing his power on a really secure footing, that of the feeling of the nation in his favour, I was anxious to remove our troops, which, if they remained, would inevitably cause an impression in his disfavour, that I apprehended no difficulty in his securing the affections of his people, if he emulated the example of his grandfather and namesake; that he evidently at present was the choice of the nation, and it would depend on his own actions either to improve his popularity or decrease it; that I relied on the former, and, at any rate, were British troops to remain in the country, they would never support misrule.

I asked if he had any definite apprehension of disaffection on the part of any particular individual or tribe. He replied "No," but that such might possibly arise, and as yet he was too weak and poor to maintain troops for his own protection in such an event. I replied, "Do you apprehend any immediate symptoms of opposition?" The Khan said "No, and that at any rate not above the passes during the winter." On which I observed, "You can write a representation of your wishes on this subject, which I will forward to the Governor General with my recommendation that one Regiment may continue for the present at Dadur, which, with that at Quetta, will aid you in preserving the Bolan Pass, which is a reasonable object not calculated to excite jealousy; but, for your own sake, I shall not advise any troops being stationed in the heart of your country, or that they should ever be intervened between you

and your people." (N.B. It was not the Khan, but his Ministers, who really wished the continuance of the troops; in the hope to effect which, they persuaded the Chief to make the request; their object being to uphold their own power, not that of the Khan, and reap the benefit of riches which our troops bring.) With regard to guarantee against foreign enemies, in the same manner as the Ameers of Scinde enjoy, I advised the Khan also, to intimate his wishes to me in writing, which I would submit to his Lordship, with whom it rested to add an article to the treaty to that effect, or not, as he pleases. On the latter point, I beg to observe, that I should have had no scruple to include an article of guarantee against foreign enemies, as such is stipulated in the treaty proposed by his Lordship with Shah Newaz Khan, or promise of support in case of invasion, had not such pledge been omitted in Sir William Macnaghten's draft, which leads me to infer that his Lordship may have since deemed it better to avoid the guarantee. I would, however, myself recommend that the Kelat state should be admitted within the protection of the British Government, which it seeks, as the best check to the intrigues of foreign powers with it, and to complete our advanced political frontier, which otherwise might be turned through Beloochistan.

Should his Lordship be pleased to add an article pledging assistance against the open attack of foreign powers, or good offices in the event of differences arising, it will be received as a gratifying evidence of our desire to uphold the nation, and thankfully acknowledged by the Khan as a gracious boon.

At four p.m., yesterday evening, I proceeded to the Khan's Durbar, accompanied by Brigadier England, and all the gentlemen of the Agency, and escort. We were received by the Khan, and Colonel Stacey, who had preceded us to prepare what was required for the ceremony, and a large assembly of his Sirdars and principal people. After the

usual inquiries, the ceremony of investiture was gone through (much the same as that of Mahomedan Courts in India). On its completion, every British officer heartily congratulated and shook hands with the Prince, followed by every individual in the room, while a royal salute was fired from the Khan's own guns in very good style. The young Chief was visibly affected (almost to tears), by the good feeling displayed towards him by the English gentlemen, and general and sincere were the thanks, loudly expressed by the principal natives to Colonel Stacey, for his friendly exertions in bringing about so happy a consummation. We then accompanied the Khan on horseback to an open space without the walls, where the Brahoos exhibited their horsemanship; after witnessing which, for a short time, we escorted the Khan to the town gate, where he took leave. At nine p.m., we again proceeded to the Meerce, to see the national dance, which all ranks and classes heartily joined.

The feeling displayed by the people to the young Chief was peculiarly gratifying, especially their hearty prayers and blessings as he passed through the streets invested with the garb of royalty for the first time. Their demeanour towards ourselves is always particularly civil and friendly (an amazing contrast to our cut-throat reception in the neighbouring valley of Shawl) especially when it is remembered how we were occupied here two years ago. *That*, however, has left no impression in our disfavour. It is well known we were driven to hostilities, and our mercy to those who submitted, and forbearance to the women and prisoners, are remembered to our credit.

To J. R. Colvin, Esq.

A copy of the treaty will render clear the references in the foregoing.

*TREATY entered into between Major Outram on behalf of the Government of India and Meer Nusseer Khan, Chief of Kelat on his own part.*

WHEREAS Meer Nusseer Khan, son of Mihrab Khan, deceased, having tendered his allegiance and submission, the British Government and his Majesty Shah Shoojah Ool Moolk, recognise him, the said Nusseer Khan, and his descendants, as Chiefs of the Principality of Kelat, on the following terms:—

1st. Acknowledges Meer Nusseer Khan himself and his descendants, the vassals of the King of Cabool, in like manner as his ancestors were formerly vassals of his Majesty's ancestors.

2nd. Of the tracts of country resumed on the death of Meer Mihrab Khan, namely Cutchee, Moostung, and Shawl, the two first will be restored to Meer Nusseer Khan and his descendants through the kindness of his Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk.

3rd. Should it be deemed necessary to station troops, whether belonging to the Honourable Company or Shah Soojah Ool Moolk, in any part of the territory of Kelat, they shall occupy such positions as may be thought advisable.

4th. Meer Nusseer Khan, his heirs and successors, will always be guided by the advice of the British officer residing at his Durbar.

5th. The passage of merchants and others into Affghanistan, from the river Indus on the one side, and from the seaport of Sommeecanee on the other, shall be protected by Meer Nusseer Khan, as far as practicable, nor will any oppression be practised on such persons, nor any undue exactions made beyond an equitable toll, to be fixed by the British Government and Meer Nusseer Khan.

6th. Meer Nusseer Khan binds himself, his heirs, and successors, not to hold any political communications, nor

enter into any negotiation with foreign Powers, without the consent of the British Government and of his Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk, and in all cases to act insubordinate, co-operating with the Governments of British India and of the Shah, but the usual amicable correspondence with neighbours to continue as heretofore.—Article 8 of Ratified Treaty. Vide Article 7 of Ratified Treaty.

7th. Meer Nusseer Khan will make due provision for the support of Shah Nuwaz Khan, either by pension, to be paid through the British Government, on condition of that Chief residing within the British territory, or by grant of estates within the Kelat possessions, as may hereafter be decided by the British Government.

8th. Meer Nusseer Khan engages to give up the murderer of Lieutenant Loveday to the British Government, for condign punishment, within one month from this date.

9th. Should his Lordship the Governor General of India in Council deem any additional stipulations necessary, Meer Nusseer Khan will not hesitate to agree to his Lordship's wishes, specified on the return of this treaty.

Done at Kelat this 6th day of Oct. A. D. 1841.

Corresponding with the A.H. 1257.

The above treaty was ratified and signed by Lord Auckland on the 10th day of January, 1842, with the following alterations:

Articles 8 and 9 struck out (the conditions of the former having been fulfilled, and the latter provisional stipulation being, of course, no longer necessary), and an additional article being inserted, as Article 7, to the effect recommended, as follows:—Article 7. In case of any attack on Meer Nusseer Khan by an open enemy, or of any difference arising between him and any foreign Power, the British Government

will afford him assistance, or good officers, as it may judge to be necessary or proper for the maintenance of his rights.

To return to the affairs of Candahar. The events which occurred in the town and provinces between the return of Maclaren's brigade and the close of the year cannot be better described than in General Nott's own words.

Candahar, Nov. 27, 1841.

The road between Candahar and Caubul is still closed, and I have not received the letters I before told you that I expected, nor my audited bill for the 15,400 rupees; rather provoking, certainly. The good people here are anxiously looking for the result of the affairs at Caubul, when, should they be against us, they will try their strength here; but their eyes are open I know, and they have seen the simple arrangements I have made, to do them honour if they make the attempt, and I think these arrangements have hitherto prevented that taking place, which they had determined upon. However, they are a strange race, and there is no knowing how soon we shall have to come to blows. Macnaghten's system of *buying* off danger has ruined everything in this country; for no sooner do the Chiefs find themselves in want of money, than they assemble their followers, and forth come lacs and lacs from the British treasury; they take our money, and go home laughing at our folly, but with a determination to play the same game next year. Is it not surprising that all history, that the annals of the whole world, that a common insight into human nature, have not been a sufficient lesson to deter our Envoy from such weak and horrid conduct? The history of our own country ought to have been sufficient; the rude Dane and the warlike

Norman *did* return year after year to collect the spoil or tribute from our timid ancestors; and at last, when there was no more plunder, and nothing left but the beloved soil of our dear Saxon country, they *did* sit themselves down upon it, and keep it for themselves and for their children. Our system here must be changed, we cannot now recede; if we do, the whole of British India will be in rebellion, backed by the Punjaubees, Nepaulese and Burmese, the Affghans kindly bringing up the rear of the marauders. No, no, the battle for the safety of our Indian empire must now be fought on *this* side of the Indus—a river we ought *not* to have passed; but having done so, we have nothing left but to fight it out manfully, *not* with *gold*, but with the *British bayonet*. In by-gone days, a King of France did wish to invade fair Italy, and assembled his council to consult on the way and means. The Court jester, a man kept to laugh at kings, on breaking up of the council, did laugh right merrily. The good King said, "Fool, why laugh you?" "Oh, nothing, only your great functionaries have told your Majesty how to put your foot into the boot, but you forgot to ask them how you were to take it out, and they, in their wisdom, did not tell you." So it fared with Lord Auckland and Sir W. Macnaghten and the silly functionaries at Simlah in 1838. You know that Italy, as our maps will tell you, is in the shape of a boot; Affghan hath no shape at all, or rather, is the most misshapen land my eye did ever drop upon; but the merry jester's story *tells*.

Candahar, Dec. 21, 1841.

I caution you against evil reports from this place, I am not to be caught sleeping as my Caubul friends were. I have made every preparation for the safety of this part of

the country, and when the season for military operations shall arrive, I think I shall give a good account of the enemy—that is, if I am not interfered with by men in power, and should I not get what they call their positive orders to separate the force now under my command. If the very wise men, my seniors, insist upon it, why they must take the consequences: the country may be lost, and I may not see you. If they leave me alone, the country will be safe, and I shall hope to meet you again. I have hitherto turned a deaf ear to those around me. I dare say they think themselves right; but I will act according to my own judgment for the present. I am not going to sit quiet and see the throats of my officers and men cut, owing to the folly of others.

I am three months in arrears of pay, and have no money. I am sorry to find that so many of my letters miscarried; don't be alarmed if you do not get letters from me. The weather is fine here, and I go to parade daily. It is cold and frosty; we go to parade at ten, and remain at exercise till twelve o'clock. I have concentrated all my troops here, and have 9,000 of *all kinds*.

Candahar, Dec. 27, 1841.

I am quite well. *At present* we have only the ground we stand upon. When the weather will admit of field operations, I hope to make the people of this part of the world know our power; however, the orders of those who have the direction of affairs may supersede my arrangements and upset my intentions. They have brought things to a pretty pass truly; not an European can move twenty yards without the chance of being shot or cut down. There were two Janbaz corps (Affghan cavalry) at this place, encamped at a short distance from the city walls; these are regiments

belonging to the "good King," His Majesty Shah Soojah Ool Moolk, and the prime pets of Sir W. Macnaghten. They are called political corps, and it is expected that no man will presume to say a word in their dispraise. Well, some of these dearly-beloved *political regiments* fired upon *our* troops near Caubul, but they were not punished for it. Last night the Political Agent at this place ordered two of these regiments to occupy a fort at a short distance from Candahar. He did this, after coaxing and flattering them for some twenty days, and paying them in advance, and having placed some of our treasure, with a large quantity of gunpowder (a scarce article here) under their charge. Two or three hours before the time ordered for their march, viz.: before daylight, they rushed into a tent, where Lieutenant Golding and Lieutenant Pattenson were asleep, being the only two European officers with the regiment, and cut them down. However, the officers contrived to get out of the tent, but were followed by Macnaghten's pets. Golding was killed, and Pattenson is now on his couch, having received *thirteen* wounds. The whole corps then fled. They must have saddled their horses and prepared everything, under pretence of getting ready for the march, and as soon as the bloody deed was committed, they were off. I have sent two regiments of Horse in pursuit of them, but I fear they are beyond reach. They carried off the ammunition and money entrusted to them. So much for political corps, or *soldiers* placed under the control of the civil and political authorities. It is strange that, four or five months ago, I wrote officially to Government, stating my opinion of this very regiment, and declaring that they were useless, and not to be trusted; for which, as usual, I received from the Supreme Government a most severe reprimand for reflecting on these pets of

Macnaghten, and was told that they were "*brave and trustworthy soldiers*, and valuable to the State," that my conduct was "highly injudicious," viz., the word of Macnaghten was taken, and, as usual, my opinions and assertions thrown to the winds. If the honour and good of my country were not involved, I could sit and laugh at the blind folly of men in power, notwithstanding the fact of their conduct having brought the sword and the knife of the Affghan to the throat of every European on the right of the Indus, and most shamefully squandered heaps of British treasure on the rascally Chiefs, which has from time to time enabled them to raise their tribes, plunder the country, and oppose and destroy our soldiers. \* \* \* The cavalry have just returned; they came up with the Janbaz mutineers, defeated and destroyed numbers of them, and chased them fifteen miles. Among the killed, is the Chief who cut down poor Golding in his tent; his head now adorns one of the public buildings in the city. There is another regiment of Macnaghten's pets here, which I suspect will meet the same fate in a day or two, unless indeed this affair should tend to keep them a little within proper bounds.

Dec. 31.

I have had no opportunity of sending off this letter, the dawk road over the Kojuck being in possession of the marauders. There is a small fort at the eastern foot of the Kojuck Mountain (Killah Abdoollah), in which three or four companies had been placed to keep the communication open; but a young Political at Quettah got frightened at some vague report, and took it upon *himself* to withdraw the garrison. They *fled*, leaving their ammunition behind them. The natives of the country naturally thought all was up with

us, and they immediately assembled, and cut off our dawk communication. How pleasant! Now, if Lord Auckland would do his duty, he would immediately cause the young Political to be deprived of his appointment; but his Lordship is not a man of decision, and is therefore unfit to govern Asiatic nations. The good people of this country declare that *the day* for their assembling is near at hand, and that few of us Feringhees shall live to tell the tale of our disasters. If they should assemble, I think I shall tell them a different story, and give a very fair and decent account of them.

Last night, Prince Sufter Jung, the third son of the "good King" Shah Soojah Ool Moolk, fled from the city of Candahar, for the purpose of raising the Affghans to attack us. What his intentions are, I know not: whether he is acting under secret orders from the dear Shah Soojah, or whether he means to set up for himself; but we shall soon see. I suppose he will give us some trouble; he is the most intelligent of his family, very bold and daring, and fancies himself the greatest warrior in the world.

Jan. 1, 1842.

Many happy returns of the day to you, fair ladies! I suspect it will prove a very troublesome year to me, I hope nothing *worse* than troublesome. The Affghans keep us on the alert this frosty weather, but they have not yet assembled in what I would call a tangible shape; when they *do*, we shall give them a good licking. I fancy they do not like our state of preparation. Ah! well, they are funny fellows, and so I go to tiffin.

## CHAPTER IX.

1842.

NOTT'S POSITION AT CANDAHAR—PRECAUTIONS—DESSERTION OF PRINCE SUFTER JUNG—NOTT ATTACKS THE DOORANEEES—MURDER OF SIR WILLIAM MACNAGHTEN—THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA RESOLVES TO EVACUATE AFFGHANISTAN—NOTT'S IMPRESSIONS—ELPHINSTONE AND POTTINGER COMMAND THE SURRENDER OF CANDAHAR—NOTT REFUSES TO OBEY THEIR ORDER—THE CAUBUL MASSACRE—THE GOVERNMENT LEAVE A DISCRETION TO NOTT—SHAH SOOJAH AND THE BARUKZYES AND DOORANEEES.

HITHERTO we have traced the career of Major-General Nott in a comparatively subordinate capacity, acting under orders from irresolute and ill-advised functionaries, armed with superior political and military authority. We have seen him chafing under a sense of repeated injustice and persistent folly, but at the same time obeying with alacrity and co-operating zealously, even when remonstrance has failed to turn the course of those to whom he felt bound to yield. It will now be the pleasant task of the biographer to

exhibit Nott assuming an independent position and establishing his thorough capability of encountering great responsibility, and acting wisely and courageously in great emergencies.

As yet—January, 1842—only a part of the disasters which had befallen the force at Caubul was known to Major-General Nott. But he had learnt enough to expect the greatest amount of calamity. He had studied the disposition of the people of the country; he knew they only wanted opportunity, and that opportunity had arrived. To attempt to relieve Caubul or any of the intermediate fortresses, was now impossible; the snow had isolated each post: the particular care of Candahar was the only immediate object of the General.

It was an anxious task; but Nott faced his difficulties with characteristic heroism. His supplies of forage were scant—without a sufficiency the cattle would be starved to death, and without the cattle the force would be ruined. There was abundance of *bhoosa* in the country; how to get it was the puzzle. Rawlinson declared that he could not, in the then state of affairs, oblige the villagers to bring it in. Nott dreaded to risk the safety of the camels by sending them out in the charge of small parties of troops, and he apprehended that the employment of a large force would produce much excitement. Various conversations between the Political Agent and the General ensued in reference to this matter and to the continued tenure of Candahar, and upon the 8th of

January, Nott, feeling the importance of taking a decided course, wrote as follows to Major Rawlinson:

Candahar, Jan. 8, 1842.

MY DEAR MAJOR,

I have been favoured with your note of last evening. In the many conversations I have had with you on the present state of this country, I have endeavoured to point out to you my opinion, and to show the inexpediency and perhaps ruin which would follow a division of the troops which I have, after due consideration, concentrated at Candahar, or frittering them away into small parties. After attentively perusing your note now acknowledged, without troubling you with a repetition of my reasons, I will merely say that I am still of the same opinion as I before stated to you.

I conceive the whole country to be in a state of rebellion, and that nothing but the speedy concentration of the troops at this place has saved the different detachments from being destroyed in detail, and the city of Candahar from being besieged.

In the event of Sufter Jung assembling any considerable number of men, I never even contemplated waiting for the attack of that Prince under the walls of Candahar, as mentioned in your note. I repeatedly told you, that if he approached within twelve or fifteen miles of this station, I would move out and disperse the rebels.

Because this young Prince is said to have assembled 1,000 or 1,500 followers, at a distance of forty miles from Candahar, it would indeed be truly absurd were I, in the very depth of winter, to send a detachment wandering about the country in search of the rebel fugitive, destroying my men amidst frost and snow, killing the few carriage cattle I

have left, and thus be totally disabled at the proper season of moving ten miles in any direction from the city, or even have the means of falling back, should that unfortunately ever become necessary.

I am sorry that I have not the same confidence in Meerza Ahmed which you appear to have. The force under this man has been in the immediate vicinity of Candahar for the last month; why this has been permitted, I know not. He has a very considerable body of men with him both of horse and foot, and my information tells me that they are increasing daily and hourly. I understand he has made another move and taken up a position about six or eight miles south or south-east of the city; as long as he is in that position, it would not be expedient for me to detach a force from this, forty miles to the north-west across the Urgundab River, which is liable to be flooded hourly, and there being neither boat nor bridge, the detachment would be cut off from all support. You ought to be the best judge of this man's fidelity; but I believe him to be a traitor, and I should not be surprised to hear of his being joined by his expected confederates, and before twenty-four hours shall have elapsed marching off, and forcing the young Prince Secunder to accompany him. Yet he is on the watch, and will play his game according to circumstances.

I have no right or authority to interfere with Meerza Ahmed; but, under present circumstances, it is my duty to see that the safety of the troops under my command is not compromised by his conduct. Until something decisive is ascertained of this man's intention, and as long as he is posted so near the city, I shall deem it necessary not to move more than twelve or fifteen miles from Candahar. When you a few days back urged me to send a brigade to the Herat frontier, it was fortunate that I did not

comply; if I had, the move you now call for, or any other, would have been impossible, Candahar would have been besieged, and such brigade would have been far beyond support. I mention this merely to show that in military affairs it is necessary to look to coming events.

I would strongly advise that the young Prince Secunder should be called into Candahar immediately; if not, I feel convinced he will be carried off by the force under Meerza Ahmed.

It is not necessary for me to answer other parts of your note, as you are in possession of my sentiments on the subject of it. I have no right to interfere in the affairs of the Government of this country, and I never do; but in reference to that part of your note where you speak of political influence, I will candidly tell you that these are not times for mere ceremony, and that under present circumstances, and at the distance of two thousand miles from the seat of the Supreme Government, I throw responsibility to the winds, and tell you that in my opinion you have not had for some time past, nor have you at present, one particle of political influence in this country.

I am truly sorry to find by your note of yesterday's date, that you can render me no aid in procuring food for the public cattle. I was in hopes that with the assistance of the Government servants under your control, and your own presumed influence over the heads of villages, to have procured bhoosa without being necessitated to resort to the unpopular and perhaps dangerous mode of sending troops for it. The camels are now on half rations; there is abundance of forage in the country, and if I allow my cattle to be starved, my force will be paralyzed and become useless.

Yours sincerely,

W. Nott.

To Major Rawlinson.

To render clear and intelligible the references to Prince Sufter Jung and Meerza Ahmed, it should be stated that, two days after the mutiny of the Janbaz Horse who had killed their officers, Prince Sufter Jung, jealous of his brother, Prince Timour, who exercised supreme authority at Candahar, and disgusted at his own removal from authority in Zemindaar, had yielded to the persuasions of an intriguing Chief and fled from the city, to place himself at the head of a body of insurgents, whom Mahomed Atta Khan was assembling on the eastern frontier. This gave great additional strength to the rebel cause.\* Meerza Ahmed, to whom allusion is made in the General's letter, was an able Affghan, a species of minister and adviser of Sufter Jung. "He appears, from the breaking out of the Caubul insurrection, to have guessed that the contest would terminate in our compulsory abandonment of the country; and thus, while he honestly played for a season the temporising game that I enjoined upon him, he still took care so to strengthen his position with his own party, that, in the event of our adversity, he might keep the lead in the Affghan cause, which had been entrusted to him whilst acting under our own auspices." Rawlinson admits, whilst stating this, that he had been deceived with regard to him.

Four days after the date of the letter quoted above, Sufter Jung, Atta Mahomed, and others advanced to

\* Major Rawlinson's despatch to Mr. Herbert Maddock, March 6, 1842.—*Blue Book*.

within fifteen miles of Candahar. Nott moved out of the city, with five and a half regiments of infantry, the Shah's 1st Cavalry, a party of Skinner's Horse and sixteen guns; and after a march of four hours over a very difficult country, he came in sight of the rebel army, from 15,000 to 20,000 men, drawn up in a strong position, on the right bank of the Urgundab. He immediately crossed the river, marched to the attack, and in twenty minutes carried their position and dispersed their whole army. As they retreated, the cavalry and a troop of horse artillery were launched against them, and cut up a great many of the fugitives. Major Rawlinson was in the field, and acted as one of the General's staff. The loss of Nott's force was trifling.

After this affair the camp of the Doorancees became the nucleus of rebellion. Meerza Ahmed fled from Candahar, joined Prince Sufter Jung, and became the active director of the councils of the Doorancees, placing them out of danger of a surprise, and yet sufficiently near to have an appearance of menacing Candahar. Nott longed to pay them a visit, but from the snow-clad state of the country he was constrained for a time to hold his hand.

The private correspondence of the General had undergone no abatement, notwithstanding the severity of the weather which interfered with the faculty of writing, and caused the miscarriage of a great many letters. Unfortunately, however, the mass of his communications at this time were either lost or carried off

by marauders. The first (of 1842) which appears to have been preserved, is dated the 30th of January. On that day, the dreadful news reached Candahar of the murder of Sir W. Macnaghten. It appears that after the Envoy had heard of the return of Colonel Maclaren's brigade to Candahar, and all hope of getting Sir Robert Sale's brigade from Jellallabad was at an end, he reluctantly complied with the wishes of General Elphinstone, and Brigadiers Shelton and Anquetil, and entered into overtures for a treaty with the enemy who beleagured Caubul. Several conferences took place between the Envoy, attended by Captains Lawrence and Trevor and all the Chiefs, outside the cantonments; and eventually some twenty articles, drawn up by the Envoy, in Persian, were read and approved of. On these occasions, Mahomed Ackbar, the son of Dost Mahomed, took the most prominent part. Other meetings followed, at which the Chiefs expressed an earnest desire to bring matters at once to a conclusion, and a message to this effect was brought on the evening of the 22nd of December, and on the following morning, Sir W. Macnaghten, accompanied by Captains Mackenzie, Lawrence, and Trevor, proceeded to an appointed conference; but the party had scarcely been seated five minutes when, at a signal, all were seized—excepting the Envoy—bound to horses, mounted behind Affghans, and borne off. Trevor was cut to pieces by the Ghazee Chiefs. Macnaghten refusing to mount a horse was dragged down a hillock, shot by Mahomed

Ackbar, and his body afterwards mutilated in a shocking manner.\*

The most profound horror and indignation were excited throughout India and England when the intelligence of this frightful catastrophe was received. Every honest voice called aloud for vengeance. Nothing less than the most complete vindication of the British honour was talked of. The name of Affghan became synonymous with treachery, villainy, cruelty, and every other vice that can stain and degrade humanity. But the cup of sorrow was not a quarter full. The murder of the Envoy was but the prologue to a more hideous tragedy.

To say that Major-General Nott did not share in the intense grief and resentment arising out of the calamity, would argue a very imperfect acquaintance with the excellence of his heart, and his fine sense of honour. But it would also be an impeachment of his understanding to pretend that the dire intelligence came upon him by surprise. He had long been prepared for the worst. In the letter of the 31st of January, to which reference has been made, he wrote to his daughter.

We have just heard of Macnaghten's death. Poor fellow!

\* Sir William Macnaghten, always a confident, sanguine, and trusting man, of high personal courage and integrity, was the victim of his reliance on the excellence of his own policy, and a belief in the probity of the Affghans, and the vacillation of the military commanders. If Nott had been at his elbow, Caubul would never have been beleaguered for so many days, and no conference would have been held with the Chiefs. The Supreme Government deeply deplored Sir William's fate, and bear high testimony to his patriotism and private worth.

his end was like the rest of his proceedings from the day we entered the country. He ought *not* to have trusted those wretched half-savage people; but his system was always wrong. It has always appeared wonderful to me how Government could have employed so very weak a man. I fear his three years' doings cannot be retrieved, and that our blood must flow for it. You well know that whenever I even alluded to the British character being disgraced, my answer was always a reprimand; yet, every little puny fellow stuck up as "Political" was allowed to write his ignorance to Government; but I have no time to write. Yet one thing I *will* write: a letter of mine now before me, dated in July, 1841, has among many other observations, "Never in all history have I read of such plunder, cruelty, and oppression. I rest convinced that they never will forget or forgive what they have suffered, and that should opportunity offer they will *revenge themselves*." The answer was Lord Auckland's severe displeasure. This quotation applies to the whole system followed in this country. Have I not for two years in my letters told you that we were drawing down the deadly hatred of these people upon us?

When the news reached India of the attack upon Sir Robert Sale's brigade, and the outbreak at Caubul, the Government at Calcutta, then represented by the Earl of Auckland, Mr. W. W. Bird, Sir W. Casement, and Mr. H. T. Prinsep, (Lieutenant-General Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-in-Chief, being absent up the country,) came to the resolution of withdrawing all the troops from Affghanistan. On the 3rd of December, 1841, they accordingly wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, requesting that he would forward a brigade to

Peshawur to give succour to the troops on their expected retirement. They declared that in the event of the military possession of the city of Caubul and the surrounding territory being lost, it was not their intention to direct new and extreme operations for the re-establishment of our supremacy. They could not contemplate that there could be any circumstances of sufficient weight to induce the Government to desire to retain possession of the remainder of Affghanistan, and they wished "the military and political officers so to shape their proceedings as would best promote the end of retiring with the least possible discredit." They desired "of course," that the retirement should be deliberate and "the result of arrangements that would leave some political influence in the country." Meanwhile, anticipating a general rise of the population in the southern districts, the Government directed that the commanding officers of different positions should fall back on the nearest support to prevent their being isolated.

The impression produced upon the mind of General Nott when a copy of the letter to the Commander-in-Chief reached him "for his guidance" was, that the Government would alter its resolution to evacuate the country when the later and more disastrous news should be in its possession. Rawlinson, however, conceived that the time had arrived for withdrawing from the country, and establishing a political influence; and under this idea called at Nott's quarters to say that he could not see any objection to entering into a treaty

with certain Chiefs in arms in the district. Nott differed with him : but he shall speak for himself.

I immediately differed with him, and stated that I did not view these instructions in the light that he appeared to do, and that the course of events had not yet been such as to warrant his entering into a treaty for our retiring from this country. He then said that by entering into a treaty before we had come into any serious collision with the Dooranees, a certain political influence would be left in Affghanistan. In this I also entirely differed with him, saying: "Major Rawlinson, you are the representative of the British Government. I can only candidly give you my opinion and advice, which I have fully done, but I will not give my consent to any treaty for retirement." He then said that he must give some reply to the Persian document which he held in hand. I observed that it was not necessary, but that at any rate it would be sufficient to say that he was not in possession of authority from his Government. After some further conversation to the same purpose, which it is not necessary to relate, he at length seemed to coincide in opinion with me and took his departure.

Rawlinson subsequently expressed his concurrence in the sentiments of the General, who now began to be very anxious for further instructions from the Government. He had four months' supplies in reserve, and felt confident of his ability to hold Candahar and the neighbourhood, and to reoccupy Caubul in the spring, with a little aid from Scinde. The shape which Rawlinson's views took—honourable at once to his pa-

triotism and his sagacity—will be best understood from an extract from his letter to the General on the 1st of February, 1842.

On the authority of Major Pottinger's letter to Captain Macgregor, announcing the intended evacuation of Caubul on the following day, added to our knowledge of the troops being altogether destitute of provisions, we may, I think, fairly say that the contingency contemplated by Government has arrived ; and it only remains for us, therefore, to consider two primary questions. Have circumstances arisen from the course of local events which can be supposed to have modified the views of Government with regard to the policy of retirement ? And if such circumstances have not arisen, how and where can the retirement be effected so as to meet the views of Government, with regard to incurring as little discredit as possible, and retaining some political influence in the country ?

In reference to the first question, I submit that the settlement of amicable relations with the Court of Persia, and the prospect of a successful revolution at Herat in favour of Shah Kamran, remove the only embarrassments of external policy which could be supposed to influence our Government in desiring to retain possession of Candahar after the loss of Caubul, whilst the internal condition of the province, becoming daily more inimical to us, must necessarily render our future maintenance of a position in it, on the same footing as formerly, less practicable, as well as less desirable. I am thus of opinion that, as a general question of policy, the views of Government, which have been deliberately adopted and avowed, of the inexpediency of endeavouring to retain the occupation of Affghanistan, will remain unchanged. But at the same

time, the progress and result of the Caubul revolution appears to me very seriously to have affected the second question, as to how and when the retirement may be carried into execution.

The objects which the Government evidently have in view in the retirement are, primarily, the safety of the troops; and, secondarily, the avoiding discredit, and the maintenance of some political influence in the country after its evacuation; and the consideration, therefore, of how these objects may be best consulted must be our guide in determining the most eligible time and method of retirement. We must reflect that if we are to retire, every day's delay will increase the difficulties of carrying the measure into effect, both by augmenting the numbers of our enemies and diminishing our own means of carriage. We must also consider that by an immediate convention with the Ghilzie and Doorance Chiefs, rendering our evacuation of Candahar conditional upon the unmolested retreat of the garrisons of Ghuzni and Khelat to this place, we may possibly provide for the safety of our troops at these two posts, whereas if we prosecute hostilities against the Affghans during the spring and summer, the isolated garrison of Ghuzni will in all likelihood be sacrificed. To these few points are, however, I think, to be confined the advantages of making any immediate arrangements for retirement. The evils of such a measure are manifold and obvious.

So far from hoping to maintain anything like a political influence in the country, we must expect our retirement from Candahar at the head of 10,000 men, following immediately upon the loss of Caubul and the treacherous and barbarous assassination of our Envoy (which is an aggravating circumstance that could never possibly have been contemplated by the Indian Government), to reflect the

most unmitigated discredit upon the British name throughout all Asia. I cannot indeed help thinking that the Indian Government, on learning of the murder of Sir W. Macnaghten, will deem the exaction of a severe retribution from the Affghans an indispensable step before proceeding with any further arrangements for the evacuation of the country. In the meantime we are perfectly safe at Candahar; and in communication with the authorities to the south, our retirement from hence to Quettah can, I think, at any time of the year be arranged with sufficient practicability; so that whilst by our immediate retirement we must certainly sacrifice important political views, to which the Government has drawn our attention, and may possibly defeat the object of retribution which it is natural to suppose the Government will adopt on learning the gross outrage that has been perpetrated at Caubul; the maintenance of our position here for the present cannot, on the other hand, in any way interfere with their views further than by risking the sacrifice of the garrison of Ghuzni. I am not prepared to say with certainty if we continue at this place during the summer, engaged in hostilities with the Affghans, and return to India in the autumn, Caubul remaining during the interval in the hands of the enemy, we shall be able to meet the views of Government with regard to preserving a political influence in the country subsequent to our departure; but I can say that, according to all reasonable calculation, the prospect will be more favourable to us than that which is presented by a retirement under existing circumstances. I am thus led to believe that we should avail ourselves of the discretion which is left to us by Government, and shape our proceedings rather with a view to prospective than immediate retirement, aiming to create such an impression of our power in the minds of the

nhabitants of this part of Afghanistan while we may remain in the country, as shall efface the memory of the disasters at Caubul, and lead the people to respect our national character, if not to remember with gratitude the many benefits we have conferred upon them.

I submit this opinion to you however with much deference, and shall be anxious to learn if your sentiments correspond with my own.

On the 7th of February, Nott called upon Rawlinson for information regarding the numbers at the command of Sufter Jung, as he and his people were becoming bold, and approaching the town. "We must beat up their quarters," said Nott. But Sufter Jung and his rabble were not the only care of the astute custodian of Candahar; the forts of Ghuzni and Khelat-i-Ghilzie were objects of his solicitude, and he wrote admirable and encouraging letters to their respective Commandants. We may safely claim the reader's attention to productions which reflect so much credit on the public spirit and generalship of the subject of this memoir.

Candahar, Feb. 13, 1842.

MY DEAR SIR,

I write to say that I have no doubt that every vigilance is observed by you to ensure the safety of the post under your command, it is of the greatest importance for our future communication with Ghilzie; and in the event of disaster attending Colonel Palmer, Khelat-i-Ghilzie will be the point for him to fall back upon *en route* to Candahar; but I hope affairs will take a favourable turn. It is our part to uphold the honour of our country to the last, and at every sacrifice,

which I am determined to do, and I expect and feel assured that all those serving under me will aid and assist me in this sacred duty. I am confined to a slip of paper, and cannot write all I wish. I would point out the necessity of your being very careful of your ammunition, and not *expend a round* without absolute necessity. Your supplies must also be your constant care. Should Colonel Palmer be obliged to retire (which I hope not), the safety of his garrison will greatly depend on our being in possession of Khelat-i-Ghilzie. You may rely on my not losing sight of your garrison for a moment. I never will retire unless I receive orders from Government; at any rate, come what may, I never will enter into a treaty for retiring, and hope no Englishman will. If worse come to worse, I will secure your garrison; and then, if I must fall back, I will do so with honour. I have five months' supplies *in reserve*, and the market still supplies our daily consumption. If necessary, keep your sepoy *cool* by telling them that aid shall reach them from Candahar if requisite.

Yours,

W. NOTT.

To Captain Craigie, Khelat-i-Ghilzie.

MY DEAR PALMER,

I have not received a line from you since November. We had many native reports; one said the town of Ghuzni had been taken, and that you had retired into the citadel. I hope you will be able to hold out till spring, when I trust things will take a favourable turn, and that relief will reach you. Recollect you have a fine opportunity of distinguishing yourself and getting a name. If, unfortunately, you should be obliged to retire, recollect that the strong post of Khelat-i-Ghilzie is in our possession, and that will be the point for

you to fall back upon *en route* to Candahar. I mention this as an extreme case, which I hope will never be necessary. I understand the citadel of Ghuzni is very strong, and therefore I have no fears for you. Be very careful of your ammunition, do not allow a round to be expended without absolute necessity. Soldiers are thoughtless, and generally throw away their ammunition without effect on the enemy, and constant caution is requisite. I cannot write all I wish on this slip of paper. Remember we have the sacred duty of upholding the honour of our country, which I am determined to do to the last and at every sacrifice, and I am well assured that you will do the same. Believe me I will not for a moment lose sight of your garrison. I am deeply anxious to know what supplies you have; I have five months *in reserve* in Candahar.

Yours,

W. NOTT.

P.S.—Should you, contrary to my best hopes and expectations, be obliged to retire, remember a small body in compact order can beat off and march *in presence* of thousands of undisciplined rabble. Keep your sepoy cool by telling them they fall back upon their friends.

Colonel Palmer,  
Commanding Ghuzni.

Upon the 21st of February a letter was brought to Candahar. It bore the signatures of Major Eldred Pottinger and General Elphinstone. The former officer had succeeded to the charge of the Caubul mission on the death of Sir William Macnaghten; the latter still continued to hold the shadow of military command. The letter was addressed to Rawlinson, and intimated

the wish of the writers that the troops at Candahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzie should return to India. It stated that Nuwab Jubber Khan had been appointed Governor of Candahar on the part of Shah Soojah; and it told Rawlinson that if two or three days were required to make preparations, he and the troops were not to remain in the city, but to proceed to cantonments, making over to Jubber Khan whatever it might be found necessary to leave behind.

A few days later the Doorancees, taking heart from the state of affairs at Caubul, wrote thus to Rawlinson:

*Abstract of a letter to the address of Major Rawlinson, from Meerza Ahmed and the Doorancee Chiefs.*

We are the bounden servants of Shah Shuja, and in his service will sacrifice our lives.

On leaving Candahar we delivered a sealed paper to you, pledging ourselves to stand by Shah Shuja, and to support him against the Barukzyes, and you asserted that you only retained troops in the country for the same purpose. We have, throughout, acted honestly, and have kept our words. We refused to join with Mahomed Attu Khan because he had no documents to show that he was acting in concert with Shah Shuja, when he claimed our protection as a fugitive we could not decline to receive him from considerations of Doorancee clanship, but we carefully avoided implicating ourselves in any hostility with you, because we considered you friends of the Shah.

The case, however, has now become very different. The contest against you, at Cabool, has terminated in favour of the Affghans, and although the Shah, from feelings of gratitude to your Government, refused to participate in the revolution

during its progress, still, when the Afghan nation, subsequently to your departure, tendered to him the order he accepted it thus, pledging himself to the Musselman cause. He has now addressed letters to the Princes and Chiefs at Candahar, calling on all parties to stand firm to their allegiance, and we are prepared to obey him.

We have all received kindness from you, both publicly and privately, and we should wish to remain on terms of friendship with your Government. We therefore call upon you to depart in peace, and we will assist your retirement to the utmost of our ability.

You can have now no plea for remaining but the desire to conquer the country for yourselves, and if you avow this desire we shall, of course, oppose you to the utmost of our power. You will have learnt, by the affair at Cabool, the power which the Afghans possess, when united in one national cause, and if you were beaten by us in the first trial, when success was doubtful, what can you expect now that we have felt our strength, and are determined to conquer or die? If hostilities are once fairly commenced the contest must end in the extermination of one party or the other, and we leave it to you to decide in whose favour the chances lie.

Take warning from the result of the Cabool revolution, and depart in peace while you yet may. If you determine upon war expect no further overtures from us.

We shall then leave our fate in the hands of God, and exert ourselves to the utmost in defence of our liberty and religion.

(True abstract.)

H. RAWLINSON,  
Political Agent, Candahar.

Candahar, February 24th.

Major Rawlinson, on receipt of the letter from the authorities at Caubul, consulted Nott, and they mutually came to the conclusion that Pottinger

and Elphinstone had written under coercion, that the Caubul Convention was in no way binding upon the officers at Candahar, and they determined to enter into negotiations with no one pending the receipt of definitive instructions from Calcutta. Rawlinson regarded the letter either as a forgery, or the result of menace and restraint. The person who was represented as its bearer did not present himself.

A similar letter—its very counterpart indeed—had been addressed by Pottinger and Elphinstone to Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor the political officer at Jellallabad, and they had replied in exactly the same spirit.

The Government of India were justly indignant at General Elphinstone's procedure. They viewed it "with the most severe displeasure," directed that a full military inquiry should be instituted into all the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of the troops at Caubul, superseded Elphinstone in his command by Major-General Pollock of the Bengal Artillery, and directed that the authority of the former should wholly cease.

While these orders were being issued, their needlessness was undergoing the most cruel practical exemplification. Capitulating to the Affghans, the troops commanded by General Elphinstone evacuated Caubul under a pledge of *sauf conduit* from Mahomed Ackbar Khan. The snow covered the ground, the officers and soldiers were depressed, half-starved, ill-clothed and badly sup-

plied with ammunition; the Affghans, the Ghazees, the Morrunds, the Ghilzies, accompanied them into the passes; here the treachery of the tribes disclosed itself in fearful colours. From the heights, where thousands of Affghans were assembled, a deadly fusillade was poured upon the columns, and bodies of furious horsemen charged them in the defiles, and blocked up their passage. Bravely and desperately they fought in spite of bad leadership; but numbers, the snow, and their disorganized condition, were against them. Step by step was their slow and irregular advance resisted; vainly did the 44th Foot, the 5th Cavalry, the 54th N.I., the artillery, display undaunted courage, heroism, patience, and discipline. The savage hordes were unremitting in their attacks, nothing could slake their thirst for the blood of the infidels. For three or four days the contest continued, and only terminated with the massacre of some 17,000 officers, soldiers, and followers; 150 were made prisoners, including several ladies and children, and only one man, a Dr. Bryden, escaped during the conflict to tell the piteous tale. He made his way to Jellallabad, and nerved the gallant garrison to more resolute efforts of defence by the mournful details he had to communicate.

The whole of this melancholy story has been circumstantially related by Lady Sale, Captain Eyre, Captain Melville, and others, but by none so eloquently as the late Captain Mackenzie, of the 41st, who, in a beautiful

poem ('Zeila'), has eloquently paraphrased the tale of the march,—

“Burst through the wild, uncertain gloom,  
 One vivid flash—then came the boom  
 Of the arousing, morning gun,\*  
 Telling the fatal day begun—  
 That day all dedicate to shame,  
     Which viewed the pent-up British host,  
     Launch'd mid the realms of snow and frost,  
 Wend to its grave of shattered fame,  
 Companion'd e'er by treachery,  
 Fulfil a recreant destiny,  
     With hope and honour gone and lost!

Long ere that signal-gun was heard,  
 The broad cantonment was bestir'd—  
 Confusion, turmoil, and dismay  
 Had heralded the approach of day,  
 And knee-deep snow, and biting cold,  
 Full many a warning tale had told,  
 How winter's scaith might more defeat  
 The planning of their dread retreat,  
 Than might, or vengeful ire and sword,  
 Or prowess of sad Ghilzye horde!

Men, women, children,—all, alas!  
 Thus early, an incongruous mass  
 Of moving life, prepare to face  
 Their march of horror and disgrace,

\* \* \* \*

\* A gun is fired at dawn of day at the British garrisons abroad.

Thus onward, reckless all, they rush,  
Each seeking foremost to attain  
The readiest path across the plain!

\* \* \* \*

Still, still the head pours forth amain,  
Its rabble, and unceasing train—  
Affrighting e'en the very skies  
With objurgations, curses, cries.  
Vociferous—hideous, godless noises,  
A Babel of itinerant voices.

Like scene ne'er mortal saw,  
A dense, huge horde of men and beast  
From order and control releas'd,  
For discipline hath wholly ceas'd,  
Nor may restrain or awe!"

He goes on to describe the breaking of the bridge as the wretched multitude crosses a river, and the sufferings at the fording at that inclement season:—

"Left far behind the river's ford—  
And now toiled on that monster horde  
Slowly along the marshy way,  
Ice-crust'd, which before them lay,  
Till reach'd, as fast clos'd in the day,  
Far Begram's cheerless halting ground.\*  
Confusion dire here reign'd around—  
Confusion, baffling human art,  
Tithe of its horror to impart

\* Five miles only from Caubul, but several hours were consumed in reaching the spot. The rear-guard did not get to the ground till two a.m. of the next day.

In dreariest parlance—wholly lost  
All power to rule that motley host—  
Nor were the troops, to order train'd  
From mingling with the mob restrain'd.  
Native and European now  
Brush by the thick, fast falling snow,  
One common resting-place to share,  
And side by side seek slumber there,  
With nought of covering to shield  
From the intensely freezing air—  
And here doth misery prepare  
Death's first-fruits on that dismal field."

The horrible night scenes which follow when cold and hunger assailed the host, are powerfully delineated:—

"In vain the ravening groups demand  
Slight succour from some generous hand,  
'Till lash'd to wildest frenzy, they  
To plunder's reckless search give way—  
Not for its heaps of precious ore—  
Nor treasures as their amplest store.  
The scattered baggage they explore,  
Of value tenfold greater view'd  
The smallest particle of food—  
Yet nothing yields that baggage scant  
To appease the frenzy of their want;  
And hopeless, full of misery,  
They lay them down to sleep and die!"

The living renew their march, and on the third day enter the Koord Caubul Pass, and are soon amidst

"A wilderness of crag and gloom."

“ Hung’ring, and smitten by the frost,  
 Still struggles on the fated host—  
 While every onward track is lost  
 Amid the baffling drift of snow—  
 On they struggle, sad and slow,  
 Bow’d in weariness and woe ! ”

A storm assails the way-worn masses, but its terrors and inflictions are nothing compared with what follows :—

“ Now crown’d each hill-top’s rifted crest  
 With dastard band, or lengthen’d file  
 Of barbarous foemen.  
 Where’er the gaze is casual cast,  
 It tremblingly recoils aghast !  
 Heap upon heap around are strewn  
 Of weltering corpses—mangl’d—hewn.  
 Merciless doom—pierc’d through and gor’d  
 By matchlock ball, and trenchant sword !

\* \* \* \*

Burst forth the sun ! Oh ! ne’er before  
 Did his broad eye like scene explore !  
 High borne upon the rushing wind  
 The conflict’s din affrights the ear—  
 The yell of triumph wild, combin’d  
 With the loud wail of woe and fear—  
 The shriek of death, the echoing shout,  
 The hustling volley, cannon’s boom,  
 Rise mid the dense, commingl’d rout,  
 In one chaotic note of doom.”

The poet follows the progress of the slaughter, and the manly defence of the troops in the terrible defiles, until the fight at Gundamuck—

“ That last and fatal battle ground.”

And with a melancholy hand he traces the scene of death which is visible by the moon’s light :—

“ There lives upon each cold, still face,  
 A proud nobility of mien,  
 Which death, e’en mid that closing scene,  
 Had fail’d to vanquish, or erase.  
 Oh ! placid all, each visage seems  
 As though ’twere trac’d in happy dreams—  
 And spake, all silent eloquence,  
 Each dying thought’s omnipotence—  
 Those thoughts, the glorious consciousness,  
 Which martyrdom could not repress—  
 That they had nobly fought and died,  
 True to each other, side by side—  
 True to each impulse which may lend  
 A glory to the soldier’s end—  
 True to the banners which they bore—  
 True to the laurels which they wore,  
 Reap’d on the battle-fields of yore—  
 True to their fealty’s high command—  
 A dauntless, proud, devoted band—  
 Thrice worthy of their father-land ! ”

We have seen that the Government had begun to alter its opinion of General Nott, and to substitute compliments and confidence for reprehension and neglect.

In the very letter to the Commander-in-Chief, in which Elphinstone's supersession was announced, another opportunity was taken of doing justice to Nott.

"*We do not doubt,*" said the Supreme Council, "that Major-General Nott will have rejected the authority of any directions which may have been sent to him by Major-General Elphinstone of a like tenor to those sent to Jellallabad; and we could request your Excellency expressly to instruct him to act for himself, independently of such directions, upon his own distinct military responsibility. Your Excellency will communicate to Major-General Nott that it is of the highest importance that he should maintain his position at Candahar, in concentrated strength, until he shall receive the further orders of the Government."

Some twenty days previous to the dispatch of the letter whence the foregoing extract is made, the Government had come to a resolution to centre all political authority in the general officers now to be employed in Affghanistan, and a communication on this head was made to Major-General Nott.

*Extract from a resolution of the Government of India, in the Secret Department, dated the 6th of January, 1842.*

1. In the conduct of military operations at the present crisis in Affghanistan and the adjoining countries, it appears to the Governor-General in Council, to be of all things most essential to attend to the expedience, the safety, and the necessity of military movements, with reference to military

considerations in the first place. These will doubtless always be affected more or less by political circumstances, but they should be under the control of such circumstances no further than commanding officers, responsible for their own military arrangements, and for the honour and success of the troops committed to their charge, may see fitting. His Lordship in Council has come to this resolution, in no mistrust of our political officers in that quarter. He is conscious that they are for the most part possessed of much talent and information, that they are ever actuated by unbounded zeal in the service of the State, and that they have the means of procuring the best intelligence for the guidance of the military commandants; but in the present circumstances of great difficulty, and in the absence of all means of receiving orders from Sir W. Macnaghten, the constituted representative of Government in that country, his Lordship in Council would throw upon each military commander a more than usual discretion in whatever may regard military movements, or the safety of the troops, or the defence or abandonment of the positions occupied by our forces.

2 The Generals commanding divisions will not hesitate to give the weight that is due to the advice of the political officers, who will also put them in possession of these instructions, and all their intelligence; and in the absence of any competent political superior, they will consider themselves under the direction of the military commandants, and will address to them all those communications which would formerly have been addressed to the Envoy and Minister.

3 The commanding officers to whom these observations may be fully applicable, are Major-General Nott, commanding at Candahar, and Major-General Pollock, proceeding to take the command on the Sikh frontier, towards Jellallabad.

7 Major-Generals Nott and Pollock, and Brigadier Eng-

land will address the Government of India, in the Secret and Political Department, direct on all matters of a military and political nature, connected with their present commands, and will either forward their despatches under flying seals, to the address of His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, or will furnish His Excellency with copies of their despatches to the Government, according to the circumstances of position of His Excellency's camp which may render one course or the other most convenient.

(True extract.) T. H. MADDOCK,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

(Secret Department.)

Fort William, Jan. 6, 1842.

SIR,

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council to transmit for your information and guidance, the enclosed paragraphs, 1, 2, 3, and 7, from a resolution passed by the Government regarding the conduct of military operations at the present moment in Afghanistan and the adjoining countries, and to request your particular attention to the same.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

T. H. MADDOCK,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

To Major-General W. Nott,  
Commanding at Candahar.

Major Rawlinson, in a becoming spirit, bowed to the resolution of the Government, and, as he himself expressed it in a long narrative despatch to Mr. Secretary

Maddock of the 6th of March, conducted his political duties in cordial communication with, but still in direct subordination, to Major-General Nott's authority.

Under the authority thus given to communicate direct with the Government, General Nott, under date the 25th of February, expounded his views in relation to the measures which had become necessary, and described the state of his force. It will be observed that Nott felt very strongly the necessity for avenging the outrages committed upon the unfortunate Caubul force, and maintaining the honour of the country; a feeling which was almost universally echoed in India, in spite of the vast expense which it was well known would be incurred in retributive measures.

The lamented disasters which have occurred at Caubul, the murder of the British Envoy and Minister, and the reported fate of the force under Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., retiring under the supposed safeguard of a deliberate and sacred convention, are of so unheard-of and atrocious a nature, as to induce me to conceive that the instructions of Government, under date the 3rd of December, 1841, are no longer applicable to our position in this country. I shall not therefore think of acting upon them, and shall await the determination and orders of Government, which no doubt will have been transmitted subsequent to the receipt in Calcutta of these sad events.

Whatever the orders of the Supreme Government may be relative to our abandoning this country, it appears to me that it will be expedient, indeed absolutely necessary, that the troops should remain at Candahar until the end of

September; or if that should become impossible, that they should take up a position in the neighbourhood of Moostung until the 1st of October next. Any attempt to move below the passes before that period, or to march through Scinde and *via* Bhawalpore, during the hot and unhealthy season, would, in my opinion, be attended by the destruction of the greater part of the troops and public cattle.

Should it be the wish of Government to hold this part of Afghanistan for any period, I have no doubt of our power, with a little aid from Scinde, of retaining it; at present we are in want of cavalry, the Candahar Treasury is exhausted, and the troops are three months in arrears; we have but a small quantity of musket ammunition, and scarcely any medicine for the sick.

I must not conceal from the Government that every means has been resorted to by the rebel Chiefs to undermine the fidelity of our Native troops. I have no fears for our regular regiments: nothing can be finer than their conduct; but the Hindostanee corps, denominated "the Shah's," are composed of low-caste men, in whom I cannot place implicit faith. A few of them have gone over to the enemy; they complain of not receiving the same allowances as the regular regiments.

Unless the force now assembled at Jellallabad should push on to Caubul as soon as the state of the roads admit, the rebel army now assembled near that city will march upon Candahar, strengthened by the artillery unfortunately given up by the British troops under General Elphinstone, when they will join the rebel army in this district, commanded by Prince Sufter Jung and Meerza Ahmed. It will then become a serious consideration whether it will be necessary for me to retire to Shawl, and there await the

determination of Government, or draw the whole of my force into the city of Candahar, and defend it. If I could for a moment feel that the British Government would not think it necessary to punish the murderers of their Envoy and Minister, and the atrocious attack made upon General Elphinstone's force, retiring under confidence of a deliberate and sacred convention, my course would be clear, and I should immediately retire. But my mind is deeply impressed with a conviction that the honour of my country and the interest of British India are in the balance, and I will therefore wait for instructions.

I have managed to deposit in Candahar a reserve supply of grain for five months. Supplies are still in the market, but we have no money.

I have not received a line from Ghuzni for three months. The post of Khelet-i-Ghilzie is safe. I should be sorry to be obliged to withdraw it before the fate of the garrison of Ghuzni shall be known; I have done all in my power to open the communication, but the fall of snow has been greater than any known for the last thirty years.

Anticipating the possibility of Nott's being obliged to withdraw from Candahar, *via* Shawl and Scinde, the Government of India now dispatched orders to Major Outram, who had succeeded Mr. Ross Bell as Political Agent in Scinde, to arrange for having the disposable part of the troops under Brigadier England's orders moved above the Bolan Pass as early as practicable, in order that the troops might be marched forward to the foot of the Kojuck Pass in the Quettah side, so as to

support and facilitate General Nott's movements. It was added that the troops thus falling back were to remain at Quettah and Moostung until the season should arrive for their descending the plains.

Fort William, January 31st, 1842.

SIR,

In consequence of demi-official information received from you under date the 14th instant, respecting the condition of things in the Candahar Province, I am desired by the Governor-General in council, to request that you will, in communication with Brigadier England, and if the condition of the tracts under your immediate charge will admit of it, arrange for leaving the disposable part of the troops under the orders of that officer, moved above the Bolan Pass as early as practicable, in order that in communication with Major-General Nott, if that officer should decide on withdrawing from Candahar, the troops in question may be marched forward to the foot of the Khojah Pass, on the Quetta side, so as to support and facilitate General Nott's movement.

2. You will send intimation to Major-General Nott, of your receipt of this letter, and of the arrangements that may be made in consequence of it, so as to ensure every possible certainty that the intimation will reach him.

3. All troops falling back to Quetta, can, it is believed, be maintained at that place and Mustong; and it is desired that they should be posted at these places, or other convenient points near, until the return of the favourable season for descending to the plains, or the receipt of further orders. But the exact positions of the troops on this side of Khojuck Pass, must be determined by the General Officer commanding,

according to practicability of supply, and other local considerations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,  
(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK,

Secretary to the Government of India.

To Major J. Outram,

Political Agent in Scinde and Beloochistan.

(True copy.)

T. H. Maddock,

Secretary to the Government of India.

The success of the insurrection in Caubul inspired the Dooranee Chieftains with confidence, and they prepared, as we have seen, to play the same game in the South which had proved so favourable to the Affghans in the North. Shah Soojah having accepted the crown subsequently to the evacuation of Caubul, the Dooranees believed that he tacitly approved of the progress and result of the revolution, and made use of his name to endeavour to persuade the British authorities to evacuate Candahar. Prince Sufter Jung made the proposal to Major Rawlinson in a characteristic communication. His letters form a striking contrast to the spirited reply of Major Rawlinson; the former is replete with casuistry, and imbued with a strong religious antipathy; the latter is mild, firm, courteous, and straightforward.

*Translation of a letter from Prince Sufter Jung to Major Rawlinson.*

From the enlightened understanding of the high in rank, exalted in station, Major Rawlinson, let it not be concealed:

And whereas in the service of His Majesty (titles), may I be his sacrifice, the truth, integrity, and disinterestedness of the English gentlemen have been greatly displayed; His Majesty moreover has received many benefits from the English; and whereas at Caubul, the whole of the tribe of Islam, with their united strength, resolved, unknown to His Majesty, to sacrifice themselves for the honour of their religion; notwithstanding which, the King, on account of the English gentlemen, committed himself with the followers of Islam, a rise of the people *en masse* ensued, and of the whole of the English gentlemen who were in Caubul, several were killed, and the remainder taken prisoners; and whereas the followers of Islam, having all along looked upon His Majesty as their legitimate King, came with ropes round their necks, and tendered their allegiance.

For these reasons it is made known, that there being now none of the English gentlemen remaining in any part of the country of Islam, and as on account of former kindnesses and benefits received from that gentleman, I am most anxious to give some return.—Enough! If you look upon me as your friend, know this to be the best thing you can do. Leave alone the country of Islam, and depart, you and your people, in safety. By the blessing of God, so long as life remains to me, no harm shall befall you either in life or property. Moreover, you will depart with perfect honour. On the other hand, should you view this advice as contrary to your interests, utter ruin will ensue, because when once you become engaged with the people of Islam, your rescue and your departure will be very difficult.

Enough! it remains with you to decide; and further, letters with the royal sign-manual for myself, and for my brother the Prince Mahomed Timour, and for the Dooranee nobles

have arrived. The other royal letters have been sent in all directions, but the one for my brother I send in order that you may read it, and become acquainted with its contents. As from the first your service has been solely on account of His Majesty, so do we now wish that friendship should remain between us. If you decide on going, Chiefs will be appointed to conduct you to the frontier of the kingdom, and be of service to you. Certainly, under these circumstances friendship will remain.

(True translation.) E. K. ELLIOT,  
Assistant Political Agent.

Candahar, Feb. 23, 1842.

*Translation of a letter addressed by Major Rawlinson to Meerza Ahmed and the Dooranee Chiefs.*

I have received your letter calling on us to evacuate Candahar, and I reply as follows:—Your letter embraces two subjects. You assert, firstly, that we have no pretext for desiring to retain occupation of Candahar, now that Shah Soojah has put himself at the head of the Caubul party; and you endeavour, secondly, to intimidate us into retirement by bringing forward our disasters at the capital as a warning of what we may expect at this place.

With reference to the first point, I admit that we entered this country only in support of Shah Soojah's authority, and that if His Majesty, having duly kept faith with us throughout, were to signify to the Indian Government, of his own free will, his desire to be left entirely to the protection of his Affghan subjects, there might be some reason in your argument; but at present everything tells against you. We know the Shah to have exerted himself actively for the suppression of the Caubul insurrection at the outset. We

know him to regard the Barukzyes of Caubul as his natural enemies. The only letters that have been received from him are couched in vague terms, merely intimating that the Affghans have again tendered to him their allegiance, and we have every reason for further supposing that he has been placed in his present position contrary to his inclinations, and that he must desire the assistance of our troops to support him against the factious nobles who are aiming to usurp his power. When you can produce an authenticated document bearing His Majesty's seal, and proved to have been spontaneously executed by him, which shall distinctly call upon us to quit the country, and leave him to the support of his Affghan subjects, it will be time enough to discuss the question whether or not there may be any legitimate reason for our desiring to remain.

With regard to the second point a few words will suffice. If you experienced such loss and difficulty at Caubul in overcoming a small detachment of our troops, isolated from support, without provisions, and in the most inclement season of the year, while you were amply supplied with money and munitions of war, and the whole country was in your favour, what can you expect at Candahar, where we have 10,000 men in garrison, a favourable season before us, ample provisions, a strong walled town to protect us, and an open country, at all times practicable for troops, between us and our supports, where a large part of the population have already openly declared in our favour, and where, when it becomes known that the Shah is but a puppet in the hands of the Barukzye Sirdars, all true Doorancees will coalesce with us for his support. You are altogether without money or any of the materials of war; you are jealous of each other. The voice of the country is so little with you, that after months of agitation you are almost where you set out. Our

Jellallabad force must hold the Caubulees most effectually in check, and prevent the possibility of their assisting you; and thus, although you may harass us, put a stop to trade, and cause a useless expenditure of blood, it is quite impossible that you can expel us from the country by force.

Why should we struggle then? You admit to have received many benefits from us; and you profess a desire to cultivate our future friendship. It can neither tally, therefore, with your wishes, nor your interests to engage with us in unprofitable hostility.

Although I am without any direct instructions from my Government, I will take upon me to say that we do not desire to conquer this country for ourselves. Our object is to be on friendly terms with its ruler, and to enjoy a political influence in it superior to that of any foreign power. At present we hold Shah Soojah to be King of Afghanistan, and Shah Zadah Timour to be His Majesty's representative at Candahar; and as the friends of His Majesty, we are bound to consider those who appear in arms against us, as the enemies of the Shah and the Prince.

When we receive letters from the Indian Government, written subsequently to their being informed of the late affairs at Caubul, we shall better understand the line of policy that is to be adopted for the future, and I shall then be able to address a more definite reply to such parties as may be duly constituted to receive it. I can only conjecture at present that the Government will desire to see Shah Soojah rescued from the state of pupillage, in which he is now held by the Barukzye Sirdars, and that having restored to him the independent exercise of his power, a treaty will be entered into with him, or with his constituted authorities,

by the provisions of which our future proceedings, with reference to this country will be regulated.

(A true copy of the translation.) EDWARD KING ELLIOT,  
Assistant Political Agent.  
Candahar, Feb. 25, 1842.

Candahar, Feb. 26, 1842.

SIR,

Agreeably to Resolution No. 2, passed by the Government of India on the 6th ultimo, I do myself the honour to submit to you translations of two letters received by me from Prince Sufter Jung, and the Dooranee Chiefs, respectively, together with a translated copy of the answer which, with your approval, I propose to send to these communications.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

H. RAWLINSON,  
Political Agent, Candahar.

To Major-General Nott,  
Commanding at Candahar.

After this correspondence nothing but the most active hostility could be expected from the Affghans without and within the walls of Candahar. On the 27th of February General Nott drew up a proclamation, stating explicitly the identity of our interests with those of Shah Soojah, and his determination to treat as enemies all who had assembled in arms under Prince Sufter Jung. This was done with the consent of Prince

Timour. All possible publicity was also given to a Government notification of the 31st of January, which ran as follows :

Intelligence having been received, which leaves no room to doubt that, after the British force at Caubul had maintained its position against overpowering numbers of insurgents for more than six weeks, the officer commanding had judged it necessary, in consequence of a failure of provisions, to agree to a convention of the enemy, and to retire, in reliance on the faith of that convention, towards Jellallabad ; when the troops, exposed to the worst rigours of cold and privation in the mountain defiles, and harassed by treacherous attacks, suffered extreme disaster ; the Governor General in Council deems it proper to notify, that the most active measures have been adopted, and will be steadfastly prosecuted, for expediting powerful reinforcements to the Affghan frontier, and for assisting such operations as may be required in that quarter for the maintenance of the honour and interests of the British Government.

The ample military means at the disposal of the British Government will be strenuously applied to these objects so as at once to support external operations, and to ensure efficient protection to its subjects and allies. A faithless enemy, stained by the foul crime of assassination, has, through a failure of supplies, followed by consummate treachery, been able to overcome a body of British troops in a country removed by distance and difficulties of season from the possibility of succour. But the Governor General in Council, while he most deeply laments the loss of the brave officers and men, regards this partial reverse only as a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of

the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British-Indian army.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

T. H. MADDOCK,

The next measure which appeared essential to the safety of Candahar, and the success of such operations as might become advisable, was the expulsion of the Affghans from the city. There were at this time some 6,000 Affghans within the walls, who were decidedly inimical to the British interests. They had been in active communication with the Dooranee camp, and no reliance could be placed upon their abstaining from a treacherous movement at any hour that might suit their purposes. Aided by Rawlinson, the General therefore turned them out of the town, and though, as Rawlinson expressed it, the measure had increased the national exasperation against the British, still they had secured a position in which they might resolutely and confidently meet it. The Sheeahs of Candahar, who had always been at enmity with the Dooranees, were suffered to remain, as it was expected that in the event of the war assuming an inveterate character they would be of great utility.

We have alluded in a previous page to the reappearance upon the stage of a man whose name is justly held in unqualified regard throughout India. Major Outram, who, we have already said, had succeeded Mr. Ross Bell, in the capacity of Political Agent

in Scinde, opens a communication with General Nott, and announces in the detail of the arrangements he had entered into for sending reinforcements, a noble resolution to support the General to the uttermost in the maintenance of Candahar. Outram had attracted much admiration by his gallant pursuit of Dost Mahomed at the commencement of the campaign in 1839. But he was not alone brave and daring; he had qualities of judgment, patience, and temper, which had found extensive development in his later employment in the political line. In a private letter to him dated 20th of February, 1842, Lord Auckland—a most honourable and excellent, but nervous and somewhat pliant Governor—writes:

This is probably the last letter that I shall have to write to you, and I would take my leave of you with an assurance to you that you have, from day to day, since your late appointment, added to that high estimate with which I have long regarded your character, and which led me to place confidence in you. It is mortifying and galling to me to feel that plans, which you had nearly brought to successful maturity, for great improvements, for the consolidation of security and influence, for the happiness of the population of immense tracts, and for your own and our honour, should be endangered by events of which our military history has happily no parallel. You will, I know, do well in the storm, and I trust, that as far as the interests confided to you are concerned, you will enable us to weather it.

Outram was feverishly anxious that the British should remain in Afghanistan until the cruel outrages com-

mitted in the North had been avenged, and the army could retire with honour, credit, and safety. This feeling was shared by all the political officers throughout the country and its vicinity. Colonel (now Sir H. M.) Lawrence, Mr. (now Sir) George Clerk, and Colonel Mackeson, were most earnest for the vindication of the British name. They saw vast peril to our Indian dominions if the prestige of our arms were once lost.

Outram's letter and its accompaniments are subjoined. We can imagine the exultation under which he wrote.

Dadur, 16th February.

MY DEAR RAWLINSON,

I wrote a long letter to Hammersley this morning, for the purpose of being conveyed to you if possible, urging everything I could against General Nott obeying any orders he might receive from General Elphinstone, enjoining examination, &c. &c. I am delighted now to have to forward a direct order from Government to that effect to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commander-in-Chief's to General Nott in consequence, and so anxious I am that this should reach, that I try sending a duplicate *via* Kelat. If it reaches, you may safely entrust your answer to the same channel. I trust you will receive my letter through Hammersley, which contains my ideas on our position, and what I have advised being done, but I have no time to enter fully on the subject here.

(Signed)

J. OUTRAM.

P.S.—What a noble opportunity General Nott has of earning distinction! The eyes of the world are on him. Attack

the enemy on every occasion, and disabuse the opinion which now obtains ground, that the Afghans are a match for us in fair field.

(Signed)

J. OUTRAM.

(Copy.)

Adjutant-General's Office,  
Head-Quarters, Camp at Loodiana, 7th Feb. 1842.

SIR,

I have the honour, by direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 446 of the 18th December, with the half-monthly return of the troops under your command.

The Commander-in-Chief directs me to acquaint you that Major-General Elphinstone being in the hands of the enemy, all orders given by him are null and void—and that even if released he is not to retain, or to resume any command of the troops west of the Indus. The Governor General in Council does not doubt that if any order was directed to you by Major-General Elphinstone to evacuate any of the southern fortresses or positions, you have rejected the authority of any such directions, in the same manner in which Sir R. Sale rejected the order to retire from Jellalabad. You are hereby relieved from receiving any further orders from Major-General Elphinstone, and empowered, by the orders of Government, to act for yourself, and upon your own distinct military responsibility.

His Excellency is convinced that you have the same views and feelings on the subject which are entertained by Government, but it is necessary that he should apprise you that it is considered by his Lordship in Council, to be "of the highest importance that you should maintain your position at Candahar

in concentrated strength until you shall receive the further orders of Government."

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. LUMLEY, Major-General,

Adjutant-General of the Army.

To Major General W. Nott, Commanding in Candahar.

(Copy.)

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

We have received an express dispatched from Mr Clerk, of the 18th instant, with copies of the letter from Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone to the address of Captain Macgregor of the 29th December, and of the reply of that officer and of Major-General Sale of the 9th inst.

2. We request that your Excellency will instruct Major-General Pollock to inform Major-General Sale and Captain Macgregor that we highly approve of the judgment and spirit shown in their reply to the directions conveyed to them from Caubul; and it is our anxious hope that the post of Jellalabad may have been maintained until it could have been effectually succoured by the forces proceeding from India. We do not doubt that Major-General Nott will have rejected the authority of any directions which may have been sent to him by Major-General Elphinstone of a like tenor to those sent to Jellalabad; and we would request your Excellency expressly to instruct him to act for himself, independently of such directions, upon his own distinct military responsibility. Your Excellency will communicate to Major-General Nott that it is of the highest importance that he should maintain his position at Candahar in concentrated strength until he shall receive the further orders of Government.

3. We have not received since the commencement of the insurrection at Caubul any dispatch, either in the Political

or Military Department, from the British authorities at that place, and on our present information we are disposed to view the conduct of Major-General Elphinstone, in command of the force there, with the most severe displeasure and indignation. Your Excellency will, of course, cause a full military inquiry to be made into all the circumstances connected with the direction and conduct of our troops at Caubul, at the earliest period at which such an inquiry may be practicable. In the meantime we think it right to direct that Major-General Elphinstone shall not retain the command of the troops to the west of the Indus, but that the command of the force at and beyond Peshawur shall remain with Major-General Pollock. It is our direction also that the local command at Jellalabad should be vested in Major-General Sale, subject only to the direction of Major-General Pollock, and that the authority of Major-General Elphinstone should at once wholly cease.

4. We have to desire your Excellency to consider the resolution to send another complete Brigade as a reinforcement to the Peshawur frontier as definitively adopted, and to request that you will hasten all the arrangements for the march of that brigade, with such amount of treasure and equipments as may be indispensable to the maintenance and comfort of the troops in that quarter. Your Excellency will give the orders which you may think the most suitable in respect to the return to India of any portion of the troops which has served for the longest period in Afghanistan.

5. We shall communicate to your Excellency, without an instant's delay, the views which we may be led to form, when more complete information of the melancholy events which have happened in Afghanistan, and of the actual condition of affairs shall be before us.

(Signed)

AUCKLAND, W. CASEMENT,

W. W. BIRD, H. T. PRINSEP.

To his Excellency General the Hon.

Sir Jasper Nicolls, K. C. B., Commander-in-Chief.

March 1st, 1842.

The feeling of the Government of Lord Auckland was this. His Lordship was on the point of retiring from office—in fact, his successor, Lord Ellenborough, was then on his way to India; and it was his (Lord Auckland's) most anxious wish not to compromise his successor as to any course of policy, either of retention or retrogression in the Affghan countries, which he might think it expedient to pursue. With this view Lord Auckland declared it of the highest importance that Major-General Nott should maintain his position in concentrated strength at Candahar until his receipt of further instructions. The abandonment of Candahar would have sealed the fate of Jellalabad; and in like manner it was felt that Candahar would be endangered if Sir Robert Sale, by retiring to India at once, diverted the whole attention of the Affghans from the Northern passes to the South.

More fully than the foregoing public letters the following private communication develops Lord Auckland's views:

Dudar, 16th February, 1842.

MY DEAR HAMMERSLEY,

I wish you could contrive to convey to Rawlinson the following extract of a letter from Mr Colvin, dated Jan. 18, which I received last night:—

“We have the most distressing intelligence from Cabul. I do not speak only of the horrible murder of Sir W. Macnaghten but of terms of surrender, which I much fear that nothing but great military misdirection could have rendered inevitable. Directions had been sent by General Elphinstone to General Sale to retire from Jellalabad to Peshawer, and he

had asked in reply what security he should have for safety in retiring, appearances being against an intention to observe good faith on the part of the enemy. We conclude that similar directions will have been sent by General Elphinstone to General Nott, and that General Nott will have been guided wholly by his own judgment in acting upon them. The Commander-in-Chief has been desired officially to communicate to General Nott that the Government will approve of his having guided his past conduct, and desired him to guide it, in future, in his own distinct military responsibility, it is added—*‘It is of the highest importance that Major-General Nott should maintain his position in concentrated strength at Candahar until he may receive further instructions from Government.’* This injunction you will easily understand is in no way inconsistent with an intention of ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan. We shall withdraw better if we withdraw deliberately, and upon some guarded and fair terms, and you will be sensible also that as Lord Auckland is very shortly to relinquish the Government into other hands, he does not wish to compromise his successor as to any course of policy, either of retention or of early retrogression, in the Affghan countries, which he may think it expedient to pursue. A third fresh brigade is being hastened on to Peshawer, where we shall have assembled 10,000 fresh troops. Our hope is thus to leave it in Lord Ellenborough's power, either to prosecute hostilities or to support negotiation by a powerful demonstration, as he may determine.”

Make the portion I have *underscored* as public as you please, but keep all the rest profoundly secret, for I still hope that Lord Ellenborough will be for going forward till our honour is redeemed, in which case it should never be known that we thought of aught else. If General Nott retires, he will have to summer at Quetta, for it is impossible he can leave Candahar so as to arrive in time to pass through Cutchee before the hot season. He will not, I trust, think of retiring until he receives

Lord Ellenborough's instructions, whom you see the Government have left unfettered as to his future course, whereas the Candahar force retiring in the mean time, would completely place it out of his power to pursue hostilities, should such be his wish, for any movement on Caubul from Peshawer must be met by a corresponding advance from Candahar. Should General Nott capitulate, an indispensable article of the terms will be the relinquishment of all claims on the part of the Affghans to Shawl and Srabee; without this is conceded to it is impossible his army can descend the Bolan, for, until that point is secured, I shall consider it indispensable to detain all troops above the Passes. We are bound to protect the Khanate of Khelat which is not complete, and could not be afforded military protection unless Shawl is restored to the Khan, and it is equally necessary that we should hold Srabee either on his or on our own behalf, to remove the only footing of the Affghans below the Passes, and their key to Cutchee and Scinde. I am convinced such will be ordered by Government when my representation of the necessity is received. The following extract from Mr Colvin's letter, above quoted, declares the determination to give military support to the Khan, which rejoices me much, for low indeed should we have been degraded had we attempted to back out of our pledge to Kelat—"You will have observed from the ratification of the treaty with Meer Nusseer Khan, of Khelat, that it is intended, under all circumstances, to maintain a powerful position in Beloochistan, and we may rely, I think, on having with us the Brahoee and Beloch tribes, to whom we give aid, and from whom we exact nothing in resisting aggression from Affghanistan, and the effect of which must be to bring destruction on their most valuable possessions."

My intention is to advise keeping our armies in force at Peshawer and Candahar until next season, calling out in the mean time for more troops from England to such parts of India as call most for observation; and a brigade of the same to be

landed at Kurachee, and brought up in steamers to Sukkur, where, in the mean time, we shall have prepared sufficient carriage; have that brigade ready here by about this time next year, to push on to Candahar, united with the Horse Artillery and such portions of the Scinde troops as may be added. At the same time, a strong brigade to advance from Candahar, while the Peshawer troops force the Khyber Pass, and move on to Caubul, which would most probably submit without a blow. For the imposing attitude we should maintain at Candahar and Peshawer, and the knowledge of the vengeance preparing, must cause an eager desire on the part of the rebel leaders, to avert the storm by early submission, and the rest, who may consider themselves too far compromised to hope for clemency, to fly beyond reach. We could then dictate our own terms, and retire with honour from Affghanistan. I really think this is the policy that Lord Ellenborough is likely to pursue, for not only is it the only means for recovering our position and credit, but the maintenance of armies at Candahar and Peshawer another year, will not only cause a break up of the rebels, but also hold the Sikh and Scinde Ameers, and the disaffected throughout India in check; who will all pause in their machinations until they see the result. We shall thus obtain repose for a year, during which valuable time we can secure everything in India, and receive our return troops from China and Burmah, and reinforcements from England.

I trust at Candahar they will be able to temporize, till the views of Government are made known, when I shall take care that Generals Nott and Rawlinson shall be easily informed of them, for besides sending through you, I shall also send through the Khan.

(Signed) J. OUTRAM.

To Outram's first letter, after his appointment, Nott replied characteristically:

Believe me, I never for a moment contemplated retiring without positive orders from Government; and as to treating with these people, I never will, and I hope no Englishman will think of doing so. I have now got the determination of Government to hold on by Candahar; and if an army from Caubul should come down, or any other cause arise to make me too weak to keep the field, I will enter the city and defend it as long as one stone stands upon another, and then cut my way to Quettah. But I hope yet to assert the honour of Old England in this mountain land. If there was no chance of reinforcements, I would dash at the enemy daily; but now I have a card to play, and must calmly keep my eye on the ultimate object.

At this time Nott was agreeably apprized that he was thenceforth to draw the allowance of a General commanding a division—40,000 rupees (£4,000) per annum.

Nott's disinclination to move against the enemy until he was reinforced, especially in cavalry, caused him to allow the Doorances to become exceedingly bold and insolent. They approached the city, plundered the camels, cut up stragglers, impeded the transit of supplies from the villages to the city, prevented the garrison from foraging, and destroyed the villages of Chiefs who were friendly to the English. At length the General's impatience was worn out; he resolved to strike an effectual blow at the hordes of marauders. Assembling 4,000 fighting men, Skinner's Horse, the Shah's Cavalry, two troops of the Shah's Artillery, six 6-pounders, Captain Blood's company, four 9-pounders, His Ma-

esty's 40th Regiment, the 16th, 38th, and 42nd N.I., six companies of the 43rd N.I., and a wing of the Shah's 2nd Regiment, Nott at once marched out on the 7th of March. The result of his expedition is best described in his own words.

Candahar, March 12, 1842.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, that during the month of February considerable numbers of the rebel forces, under the command of Prince Sufter Jung and other Affghan Chiefs, assembled in the vicinity of Candahar, plundering the villages, and by every possible means urging the inhabitants to join in an attack upon the British troops. In the beginning of the present month the enemy approached close to the city of Candahar.

I made the necessary arrangements for the safety of the city, and leaving a garrison of about 2,600 men in it, I on the 7th instant moved with the remainder of my force against the enemy. They retired as I advanced; they were driven across the River Turnuk, and then across the Urgundab. They would not allow our infantry to come in contact with them. On the 9th, we got near enough to open our guns upon them with great effect. They were soon broken, and fled. My want of good cavalry only saved them from being totally destroyed. They were dispersed in every direction.

During a march of five days, opposed to upwards of 12,000 of the enemy, who had upwards of 6,000 well-mounted cavalry continually moving round our column, not a camel was taken or a particle of baggage lost. The troops marched without tents, both officers and men, and the conduct of my artillery and infantry was excellent.

I think this dispersion of the rebel force will have the best effect, as it will convince the inhabitants that the Chiefs cannot face us in the field with any chance of success. I am now doing all in my power to conciliate the villagers and to induce them to return to the cultivation of their lands, and to live in peace under the assurance of protection.

During my absence, a strong detachment of the enemy made an attempt upon the city, and succeeded in burning one of the gates; but they were repulsed with great loss by the gallantry of the troops in garrison, under the command of Major Lane, of the 2nd Regiment N.I., whose report I shall forward, for the information of Government, by the first opportunity.

I am, Sir,

Yours most obediently,

W. NOTT, Major-General,  
Commanding in Candahar.

To T. H. Maddock, Esq.,  
Secretary to the Government of India.

The defence of Candahar in the absence of Major-General Nott forms so interesting an episode in the history of the War of Afghanistan, that it is deserving of more minute notice than is bestowed upon it in Nott's laconic and soldier-like despatch. Perhaps the best account is to be found in Captain Neil's narrative, to which allusion has already been made.

"Early on the 10th large bodies of the enemy began to assemble near Candahar, occupying the gardens in the vicinity, and the cantonments also; during the day their numbers increased, and it was evident that their

object was to attack the city. All the gates were shut, and everything was deemed secure. After sunset a villager, professing to have come from a great distance, but who must have been well aware that the regulations of the garrison allowed no one to enter after that hour, came to the Herat gate, which was commanded by Lieutenant Cook, 2nd Regiment Bengal N.I., and requested permission to take in a donkey-load of faggots he had with him; this of course was refused, upon which the villager said he would leave the wood till the next morning, and, throwing it down against the gate, he departed. Nothing was then suspected; but about eight o'clock a party of the enemy stole up unobserved, and pouring oil and ghee over the faggots set them on fire, and the flame communicated itself to the gate, which burned like tinder. The stratagem having proved successful a most spirited attack was made on the gate; but the measures of the Commissary-General were as admirably devised. Seeing the danger he threw open the stores, and procuring all the assistance he could succeeded just in time in forming a barricade on the gateway of the bags of flour taken from thence. The enemy rushed boldly in, the barricade was gained, but they were driven back; again and again they renewed the assault, but the destructive fire kept up by the gallant defenders at length prevailed, and the Affghans retired discomfited over a rampart formed by the bodies of their own countrymen.

"It is curious to observe how very often the success

or defeat of our plans depend on events in, themselves most insignificant; how often the slightest accidental circumstance operates momentously on our destinies. To use a common phrase, our possession of Candahar on the night of the 10th hung by a thread. The enemy's plan was to have fired the gates at once, and made a simultaneous attack on them; and that this was not carried into effect was certainly the result of a most fortunate accident. Mr Philips, Quartermaster of the 40th, who had been left behind sick, was intrusted with the charge of the citadel gate; before fastening it for the evening something fortunately induced him to look outside, and on opening it he saw two or three faggots laid against it; immediately it occurred to him that they could have been placed there for no good purpose, and he brought them inside. But for this the gate of which he had charge would in all probability have been fired, and an equally spirited attack made on it as on the Herat gate, in which event I cannot doubt for a moment that the city of Candahar would have fallen, and the enemy become possessed of all our stores and ammunition, two 18-pounders, &c."

General Nott's movement against the Dooranees, leaving Candahar thinly garrisoned, has been called "a military error," and some discontent was expressed that he did not lay greater stress upon the circumstances attending the defence. We confess that we cannot detect the error. The General had seen the fatal effects, exemplified at Caubul, of allowing an enemy to ap-

proach and beleaguer a cantonment and city; he knew that every day would increase the strength of his opponents without adding to his own, and all experience had taught him the value in war of the infliction of a sudden blow. The strategy of Sufter Jung in drawing off the General was an after thought. His first movement was a cowardly retreat, and he did not dream of sending off bodies of men to attack the town until he was satisfied of the hopelessness of trying conclusions with Nott in the field. That Nott had justly calculated the adequacy of the garrison, well officered as it was, to resist an attack was demonstrated by the issue. Ramparts and parapets, and gates zealously defended, are a match for very heavy odds. The loss of the town because the portals were burnt might have reflected on those whose duty it was to keep a vigilant watch over those weak and accessible points, but could in no way have impeached the judgment of the General, who had left a sufficiency of men for the protection of the town, and justly relied upon the valour and discretion of the Commandant. Indeed, so much a matter of course did Nott consider the defence, that when a party of his friends came out from Candahar to meet him on his return he expressed no surprise at the attack, or joy at its successful repulse. On the contrary, he caused a military inquiry to be instituted into the cause of the incendiarism at the gate, which he regarded as the result of a grave dereliction of duty. When the inquiry had been concluded, and Nott was satisfied that

all had been done which could have been expected of the garrison, he transmitted Major Lane's detail of the defence, accompanied by approving comments.

*From Major C. R. W. Lane, commanding Candahar Garrison, to Captain Scott, Major of Brigade, March 12, 1842.*

SIR,

For the information of Major-General Nott, commanding, I have the honour to report the following particulars of an attack made upon Candahar on the night of the 10th instant. During the forenoon of the above date, large bodies of the enemy, horse and foot, were observed assembling from all quarters, taking up a position near old Candahar and the adjoining villages; and in the course of the day their number rapidly increased, parties from the main body moving round and establishing themselves in front of the Shikarpore gate. As their object was evidently to attack the garrison, the Political Agent directed the inhabitants to shut their shops and remain within their houses, and precautions were taken to secure the gates by piling bags of grain inside.

About 8 o'clock, P.M., a desperate attack was made upon the Herat gate, and owing to the darkness of the night, some combustibles were placed near it and ignited unperceived, and in a few minutes the gate was in flames. I immediately ordered a party of 100 rank and file from the 2nd Regiment, and a company from the Shah's 1st Infantry, to support the guard at the gate, and two guns were also placed in position commanding the entrance.

Dense masses of the enemy had now collected at this point, keeping up an incessant and heavy fire, which was

returned with great effect from the ramparts; but so reckless and daring were the assailants, that notwithstanding the fearful havoc among them, eight or ten men actually forced their way, by tearing down the burning fragments of the gate, and scrambling over the bags of grain. These were instantly shot; and their fate, together with the galling fire from the walls, dismayed the attacking party, who retired about midnight, after four hours' resolute fighting.

Another attack took place at the Shikarpore gate about 9 P.M., and a similar attempt was made to fire it, which, however, failed, and the assailants were driven back. A small party also approached the Caubul gate; but the garrison being everywhere on the alert, the enemy were compelled to retire about 1 o'clock A.M. of the 11th, and when the day broke, not a soul was visible.

The guards over the several gates were so completely sheltered, that not a single casualty occurred; whilst the well-directed and destructive fire which was maintained for nearly four hours, must have done great execution. Upwards of fifty dead bodies were found in and near the Herat gate, and from the determined assault of the enemy, who came close up to the walls, their loss must have been immense; report estimates it at 1,000 killed and wounded. And I am informed by Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, that Prince Sufter Jung, Meerza Ahmed, and other Sirdars were present, encouraging their assailants.

A considerable quantity of grain was unavoidably destroyed at the Herat gate; but as it presented a strong barrier, I trust the sacrifice will be considered unimportant. This gate has been built up, and the others have been temporarily barricaded with grain bags.

Before concluding my report, I would beg to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered me on this occasion by

Major Rawlinson, Political Agent, and Captain Ripley, Fort-Adjutant. The exertions of every officer and soldier in garrison were unremitting, and it affords me infinite pleasure to bear testimony to the admirable conduct of all parties during the attack.

I have, &c.,

CHAS. R. W. LANE, Major,  
Commanding Candahar Garrison.

## APPENDIX.

*(Referred to in page 19 of Vol. I.)*

### CHARGES.

Lieutenant William Nott, of the 2nd Battalion of Bengal Volunteers, commanding a detachment serving as Marines, on board the Honourable Company's late armed ship, Lord Castlereagh, put in arrest by Captain George Robertson, Commander of that ship, on the 30th July, 1804.

- 1st.—“For unsoldierlike conduct on the forenoon of the 24th July, 1804, in being improperly dressed whilst on shore on duty.”
- 2nd.—“Obstructing and preventing the orders I had issued, as Commanding Officer, on shore, at that time, from being complied with, without his being addressed or spoken to on the subject.”
- 3rd.—“Disobedience of the orders above-mentioned, after they had been given to him by me.”
- 4th.—“Neglect of duty, on or about the 29th July, 1804, in not having reported himself to me, as Commanding Officer, on board the Lord Castlereagh, after the re-embarkation of the detachment on board that ship.”

5th.—“Absenting himself from his post in an enemy’s port, without leave, the whole night of the 29th of July, during the conflagration of the enemy’s Stockade Forts.”

(Signed) GEO. ROBERTSON, Captain,  
Hon. Company’s Ship, Lord Castlereagh.

By authority of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, and Captain General.

(Signed) H. L. CALCRAFT, Colonel,  
Judge Advocate General.

Fort William, 10th December, 1804.

#### SENTENCE.

The Court, upon mature consideration of the whole matter before them, are of opinion that the prisoner, Lieutenant William Nott, is not guilty of the first, second, third, and fourth charges, of which he is hereby acquitted.

In respect of the fifth charge, the Court are of opinion that Lieutenant William Nott left the Honourable Company’s ship, the Lord Castlereagh, on the evening of the 29th July last, without permission formally obtained; but, as it also appears to the Court that Captain Robertson was fully apprised of Lieutenant William Nott’s intended departure, to which no objection was made, notwithstanding the high importance of his (Lieutenant Nott’s) presence on board, which the terms of the charge and the evidence of the prosecutor both imply: The Court are further of opinion, that Lieutenant Nott was warranted in inferring Captain Robertson’s consent to his going on board the Bombay frigate, and upon that ground the Court honourably acquit him, the said Lieutenant Nott, and he is hereby honourably acquitted of the whole of the fifth charge, viz:—

“Absenting himself from his post, in an enemy’s port, without leave, the whole of the night of the 29th of July, during the conflagration of the enemy’s Stockade Forts.”

(Signed) J. MORRIS, Colonel,  
President.

(Signed) H. L. CALCRAFT,  
Judge Advocate General.

Fort William, December 29th, 1804.

I approve and confirm the sentence of the Court, and I direct that Lieutenant Nott be released forthwith from arrest. I further direct

that the prosecutor, Captain Robertson, be admonished by the Court, in my name, to use more caution in the course of his future service, in preferring accusations against officers who may be employed on board of his ship.

(Signed) WELLESLEY.

By command of His Excellency,  
(Signed) J. ARMSTRONG,  
Military Secretary.

(True extract.)

(Signed) G. C. HATCH, Captain,  
Deputy Judge Advocate General,  
In charge of Judge Advocate General’s Office.

Judge Advocate General’s Office,  
Calcutta, 3rd January, 1805.

## PROCLAMATION.

(Referred to in page 77 of Vol. I.)

1. The Right Honourable the Governor General of India having, with the concurrence of the Supreme Council, directed the assemblage of a British force, for service across the Indus, his Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure.

2. It is a matter of notoriety, that the treaties entered into by the British Government, in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Scinde, the Nawab of Bahawalpore and Maharajah Runjeet Singh, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the extension of Commerce, and to gain for the British nation, in Central Asia, that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce.

3. With a view to invite the aid of the *de facto* rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Capt. Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the Chief of Cabul. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature.

4. Whilst Capt. Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabul, information was received by the Governor General, that the troops of Dost Mahomed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally, Maharajah Runjeet Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that His Highness the Maharajah would not be slow to avenge this aggression; and it was to be feared that the flames of war, being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Governor General resolved on authorizing Capt. Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahomed Khan that,

if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, his Lordship would exert his good offices with His Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor General, to the effect that, in the mean time, hostilities, on his part, should be suspended.

5. It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor General, that a Persian army was besieging Herat, that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of Her Majesty's mission, in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.

6. After much time spent by Capt. Burnes, in fruitless negotiation at Cabul, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in using the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of His Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, so injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of these schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately, he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs, in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Capt. Burnes to leave Cabul without having effected any of the objects of his mission.

7. It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and the hostile policy of the latter Chief showed too plainly that, so long as Cabul remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our

neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate.

8. The Governor General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of the city has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause, and the Governor General would yet indulge the hope, that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor General has recently ascertained, by an official despatch from Mr McNiell, Her Majesty's Envoy, that His Excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of Her Majesty's Government.

9. The Chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British nation in India, and have been openly assisting in the operations against Herat.

10. In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our Envoy from Cabul, the Governor General felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories.

11. His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture to the position and claims of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the Bri-

tish Government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British dominions.

12. It had been clearly ascertained, by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the Barukzye Chiefs, from disunion and unpopularity, were unfitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British Government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings so injurious to our interests and security, the British Government acknowledged and respected their authority. But a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those Chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our Western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity, in the place of Chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement.

13. After a serious and mature deliberation, the Governor General was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Governor General was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that His Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations. Mr Macnaghten was accordingly deputed, in June last, to the Court of His Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a Tripartite treaty by the British Government, the Maharajah, and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whereby His Highness is guaranteed in his present possession, and has bound himself to cooperate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all. Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subject of discussion between the British Government and His Highness the Maharajah, the identity of whose interests with those of the Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the surrounding states. A guaranteed indepen-

dence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Scinde; and the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected; while, by the measures completed or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence of the British Government will gain their proper footing among the natives of Central Asia; that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India, and that a lasting barrier will be raised against intrigue and encroachment.

14. His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk will enter Affghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army. The Governor General confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents, and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Affghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn. The Governor General has been led to these measures by the duty which is imposed upon him for providing for the security of the possessions of the British crown; but he rejoices that, in the discharge of this duty, he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Affghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit; to reconcile differences; to secure oblivion of injuries; and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Affghans have been impaired. Even to the Chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country.

By Order of the  
Right Hon. the Governor General of India,  
W. H. MACNAGHTEN,  
Secretary to the Governor of India, with the Governor General.

## THE DEFENCE OF KAHUN, BY CAPTAIN LEWIS BROWN.

(Referred to in page 242 of Vol. I.)

The life led by the garrison during the five months of their painful blockade has been described in a journal kept by Captain Lewis Brown. A more romantic and interesting story is scarcely on record. The introduction of such an episode in the history of the campaign in Upper Scinde is more than justifiable—it is indispensable to the completeness of the narrative. Brown was a good soldier, and an excellent, single-hearted man. The writer of these pages knew him while yet a cadet (they were shipmates and friends for several months) and though the simplicity of his character did not then furnish warranty of the sagacity and intelligence he subsequently displayed, there was always ground for the assurance that in the contingency of war he would be found comporting himself with all courage and constancy.

May 12th.—I got the detachment into the fort during the day, and found the inside of all the bastions destroyed, some still smoking. A sepoy, strolling out without his arms, was cut down within 500 yards of the fort, and his head severed from his body. Clarke, with twenty horsemen, had a long chase after the enemy, but could not touch them. However, he sent in information of some grain still standing, and I sent out a party, and secured fifty camel-loads of wheat in the stalk. The party also found the gates of the fort in a field about two miles off.

13th.—During the night the Beloochees commenced burning the wheat they could not carry away in the day-time, so I sent out another party and secured fifty more camel-loads. I commenced clearing out the large well, into which the Beloochees had thrown large logs of

timber, and other kinds of lumber. An unfortunate dooly-walla was smothered in going down to fasten on a rope.

14th.—I was busy all day in repairing bastions and putting up the gates; in the former I found layers of cow-dung covered over with earth, some still smoking, and water seems to have no effect in putting out the fire.

16th.—The return convoy under Clarke started this morning at two a. m., *en route* to Poolgee. I had received instructions from the brigadier to increase the number of infantry, if I thought it necessary. I did so, with a subedar's party, consisting of five havildars and eighty rank and file. Clarke took them over the first hill, when I suppose, finding no opposition at the difficult pass of Nuffosk, he sent them back, proceeding on himself with the original party, and 700 empty camels. About twelve o'clock a dooly-walla (a dooly and six accompanied the subedar's party) came running in with the dreadful report that every man of the subedar's party had been massacred!

21st.—Despatched a cossid on return to the plains; and knowing the anxiety that would be felt, regarding not only our present but our future fate, reported to Brigadier Stevenson my having still four months supply of provisions left, and that I would do my utmost to hold the fort.

24th.—Thinking there was not much chance of another convoy coming up, I took a strict account of the provisions, putting the men on half rations. All hands were busy strengthening the fort. I divided the detachment into four divisions, giving each a side to defend, and was obliged to bring every man on duty at night for fear of a surprise. From this to the 27th we were busy clearing the ground in the shape of trees or shrubs for 200 yards round the fort outside.

27th.—An express from Lieutenant Loch arrived in town to-day, saying he was coming up with 200 horse, to see what had become of us and to open the communication. Sent back the cossid immediately, to tell him on no account to attempt it, as, if defended, he could never force the Nuffosk Pass, particularly with horse.

28th.—This morning, when the foraging party were out, some horsemen were seen prowling about the bed of the river. The "assembly" was sounded, and some seven or eight horsemen, more bold than the rest, came within long musket-range, and a sepoy shot one. They then moved off at speed, Erskine getting a long shot and killing another.

29th, 30th, and 31st.—Busy clearing out tank, which had become most offensive, and also commenced digging deep trenches along the foot of the walls, inside, planting sharp-pointed stakes in them, pulled down all houses touching the walls, to prevent the enemy landing, should they succeed in mounting the walls in overwhelming numbers. This gave them a drop-leap of twenty-five feet, on to a body of stakes.

June 4th.—Commenced digging a fresh well, the other wells containing very bad water, causing bad ulcers on the men; but finding water at all in the fort was a most fortunate circumstance, as any party sent down to the river would certainly have been cut up. Received an express from the Political Agent, intimating that I must not expect reinforcements from Sukkur, but that a request had been made to Capt. Bean, at Quetta, to obtain, if possible, the assistance of a tribe called Kahurs, inhabiting the hills in the Bolan, and deadly enemies of the Murrees.

7th, 8th, and 9th.—Nothing new stirring, and working parties are employed strengthening an old inner fort, which, in case of our being hard pushed, will contain all the supplies, and two wells out of the thirty. The Banyans employed in filling all the empty grain bags with sand; Lascars busy cutting good stout clubs for all the followers. I commenced bringing the latter on duty at night, as look-out men, a fourth part of them being attached to each division. The enemy are getting more harassing daily, firing at every man who appears 200 yards from the walls. I finished the new bastion, on the opposite fort, for a gun. We can now ply it from both sides, having a good road made from one bastion to the other.

15th.—Cossids came in this morning, bringing intelligence of the Murrees and Boogtees having agreed to stand by each other, and attack us on the approaching dark nights, with their whole force. I got the front of the gateway well palisaded; from this to the 25th, nothing new, all working at the defences most cheerfully, and every man seeming to think that the safety of the whole depends on his individual bravery. Treat sepoy kindly, and I do not think they will ever fail at the push. Nearly fourteen years of uninterrupted regimental duty, I think, entitles me to give an opinion on this point, and that, before formed, is now fully confirmed.

29th.—No appearance of any night attack, as reported, but this

morning about 150 Beloochees came sweeping round the fort. Unfortunately, 20 bullock drivers were out foraging, more than a mile across the river, contrary to my most positive orders. The consequence was, they were cut off, and surrounded by the enemy, who commenced a regular slaughter. Fortunately, Erskine managed to screw round the gun, and threw out about forty men in the direction, well flanked by the bastion. By these means we managed to save ten out of the twenty. A shell from the gun sent the enemy to the right-about, and the party served as a rallying point for those who could manage to escape. One of the latter, who managed to conceal himself under a bush, heard our poor fellows beg for mercy, but Kurreen Khan, the Chief, who was superintending the slaughter, kept crying out "Maro, maro." This all took place in the bed of the river, and was not visible from the fort. He also says, he saw the shrapnel burst, right in amongst them, knocking over three, and dispersing the rest. I had an opportunity this morning of promoting two sepoy, for bravery. They were out cutting forage, near the fort, with some eight or ten camel-men, when about twenty Beloochees, at speed, attacked them. Instead of running for it, the two sepoy coolly stood still, and fired into their faces, wounding one of them. This was quite sufficient for the Beloochees, who turned and fled. Had the sepoy retreated under the walls, the camel-men must have been cut up. This morning was full of adventures. We nearly lost the only sheep we had left. The Beloochees got between them and the fort, but were too eager to cut up the camel-men to see them. They would have been a sad loss to us, for not another could we get.

July 7th.—An express arrived from Capt. Bean at Quetta, offering assistance, and regretting the position in which I was placed. The same post also brought a letter from the Political Agent at Shikarpoor, to say it was intended to act on the defensive until the season opens. Fifty Beloochee horsemen kicked up a great dust this afternoon. Erskine emptied three of their saddles. They had been snugly hid all day in the river, ready to cut off any parties who ventured outside.

9th.—We are getting used to the Beloochees' visits. Indeed, we are glad of anything in the shape of excitement to change the monotonous life we are leading. Unfortunately, we cannot afford to expend much gun ammunition; we can therefore only take a shot occasionally, which is always a source of great amusement to all in the fort, particularly

when it falls in amongst the Beloochees, who retaliate by heaping abuse on us, as they scamper off.

14th.—The men are suffering very severely from ulcers, upwards of ninety of all ranks being laid up with them, and several not able to put on their belts in consequence. Still they all manage to go to their posts at night, although several cannot stand sentry. The dobeewallas, camel-men, and bullock drivers now become useful, having gone through a kind of drill.

18th.—A tremendous storm of wind and rain came on, and lasted the whole night. I thought the old fort was going to be washed away. At day-break, got all hands to work to drain the fort, the water having lodged in every direction, and threatening to undermine the walls. The tank filled, and country around completely flooded.

25th.—At twelve o'clock to-day, about 200 horsemen came galloping round the fort at a quick pace. I thought at first they were going to assault the fort, but after a shell or two they retreated. They have now become very cunning, and instead of appearing in a large body as formerly, they sail along "Indian File," like a flock of wild ducks, and it is very seldom we can get a shot at them. In the afternoon they were seen cultivating the fields in all directions,—quite an enlivening scene.

26th.—A horse was this morning found dead where Erskine's shell fell yesterday, so it is to be hoped there was some mischief done amongst the enemy at the time; there was so much dust that we could not see any distance. The Beloochees have now completely surrounded the fort, but little parties, like pickets, appear seated around in every direction. This looks bad for our communication; but as yet the tapaul has arrived pretty regularly once in eight days, and has been a source of great amusement to us. Much fever is now prevailing amongst us; I am myself attacked, and Glasse is also very sick. The sepoy and followers are coming into hospital as many as six and seven a-day. The Beloochees are advancing closer and closer every day. Their matchlocks, I really believe, carry twice as far as our muskets. From this to the 6th of August, nothing new. The same daily routine of duty, with generally a "fall" of rain in every twelve hours. I am laid up with fever, and prevented writing.

August 8th.—Had a slight skirmish this morning with Beloochees. When taking our walk, some Beloochees appeared about the Nulla,

evidently up to mischief. We enticed them out with a few men, when fifty or sixty of them immediately sprang up, and a little file-firing commenced. I withdrew the party to allow Erskine to have a shot, which fell into the middle of them, whether with any damage, we know not, the jungle being so thick; however, they immediately bolted at their best pace.

10th.—For the last four or five days the flocks have been coming closer and closer to the walls, eating what little grass there was left. I had warned Hybutt Khan of this three or four times, and had also offered to purchase 100 at his own price, but he declared that I should not have one. Erskine and myself had finished the last but one of those we procured from old Sheer Bheg. We have both excellent appetites, although shut up in a fort. To-day two large flocks of sheep and goats came most temptingly near, and the sepoy earnestly entreated for some fresh meat. Watching our opportunity (no Beloochees being then in sight), we slipped out about thirty sepoy, flanking them with two bastions filled with men, and Erskine got the gun round to bear in the direction. There were only three Beloochees just then in charge. They immediately ran off for their lives, and the goats by some instinct, and to our great annoyance, followed them at speed, like dogs. Two horsemen then came up, looking very fierce, but soon rode off on getting a shot. To describe the delight of all on getting this flock inside the fort is impossible; there was a perfect uproar. On counting our plunder, we found we had secured 300 sheep, and 57 goats. Most of the latter were milch goats, so that the highest castes shared the enjoyment; we immediately made a division of the whole, charging one rupee on the head of each, for the benefit of the widows of those who fell on the 16th May. That evening the fort became one large cook-shop.

11th.—Hybutt Khan came to-day to try and recover his sheep, and told us that Nusseer Khan had driven all our detachments into Sukkur. He also brought a note from Dodah, the Chief, desiring us to leave his fort forthwith, and that he and his army would escort us down to the plains! When Hybutt found he could not get back his sheep, being told that most of them were already killed, he flew into a great rage, and declared he would come and attack the fort, for which threat, I told the sentry to give him a shot, when he quickly departed.

16th.—Another cossid this morning. The system mentioned yesterday of throwing in supplies is discarded, being found impracticable.—And

the welcome, most welcome intelligence of the following detachment leaving Sukkur for our relief,—

Detachment of H. M.'s 40th Regiment,	
1st Grenadiers . . . .	4 guns,
2nd Ditto . . . . .	200 horse,

Under the command of Major Clibborn, 1st Grenadiers. We received intimation that it was arranged between Hybutt Khan and the rest of the Chiefs, that the former, in making a truce, should encourage us to go out foraging, and then cut us up.

17th.—Two Beloochees disarmed a sepoy most beautifully to-day. He was sitting down, and had placed his musket and pouch-box a little on one side. The two Beloochees dashed up at speed, dismounted, picked up the musket, &c., before the sepoy could jump up, and went off, waving their booty in triumph. A sharp touch of an earthquake to-day.

24th.—Another cossid arrived to-day, bringing the welcome intelligence of the convoy being actually on their march up, with a reduced detachment having left behind detachment 40—all but the Light Company, 2nd Grenadiers, and one gun. To describe the joy of all hands, on my immediately giving out this news, is impossible. Those only who have suffered a four months' imprisonment, with the addition of never lying down to sleep without the chance of having to turn out for an attack, can conceive it.

26th.—Captured two bullocks, which we found a great treat, not having tasted beef for a long time. The convoy can only be two marches off—cheering news!

31st.—A day of great and almost overpowering excitement. It commenced about five o'clock last evening, when the plain and hills became alive with Beloochees, and at dark, large signal fires on the tops of all the hills. At day-break, large parties of horse and foot were seen hurrying across the plain to the Nuffook Pass, on the opposite side of which, we soon learnt of the arrival of our convoy, from the firing of their guns, a signal agreed upon between us. About sun-rise, we saw collected on the very top of the pass, about 2000 Beloochees, and others prowling about in all directions; the distance, as the crow flies, from the fort to the pass, is about four miles. In fact, we were completely behind the scenes, and saw all that the Beloochees were at; and fully expecting to see our comrades crown the top every hour. We were highly amused and excited. Two, p.m.—No sight of convoy coming

over the pass—they must be repairing the road up. Three, p.m.—Saw the shrapnel flying over the hill, and bursting in the midst of the enemy with the most beautiful effect. Five, p.m.—Still no sight of the convoy. Beloochees still crossing the plains towards the seat of action. Erskine scattered a small body of them with a shell. Eight, p.m.—Heavy firing of guns and musketry for ten minutes, when all was silent for the rest of the night. I should be very sorry to pass many days of my life like this. I would ten thousand times sooner have been in the thick of it; the excitement and suspense was beyond anything I ever felt before. Knowing the difficulty of the pass, and not seeing our people crown the top, I felt certain there must be much bloodshed going on.

September 1st.—Not a single Beloochee to be seen on the top of the hill at day-light, but several passing across the plain in that direction. No sight or sound of the convoy at all; I am sadly perplexed to know what has become of them, and conclude that, finding the pass too strongly defended yesterday, they had fallen back to go round by the Deeyrah road, as I first recommended.

2nd.—Beloochees in all directions, and busy as bees. Another day of suspense and excitement. After eleven o'clock they pitched one of our sepoy's tents about half way up the hill, up and down which batches of loaded and unloaded camels are going. I suppose the convoy must have dropped some of their baggage and stores in the hurry of their departure. About twelve o'clock much firing commenced, and continued, with intervals, until two p.m. From the sound it would appear that the convoy had fallen back in the direction of the Deeyrah road, some twenty miles. Cannot now expect to see them for the next six or seven days. How tantalizing, when they were so close! Not a drop of spirits, a cheroot, or a cup of tea left, nor have we, indeed, tasted any for some time. The sepoys are very weak from short rations; there are only six bags of flour left. A bad look-out. Cannot help thinking of our having got our convoy over so snugly in May, when we had only a third of the number of the present convoy.

3rd.—Still in suspense. No communication from outside, but all are on the look-out, particularly at night. Upwards of 100 loaded camels are going across the plain, being some distance off. Whether these are horses or camels cannot be clearly ascertained without a glass. I persuaded the people in the fort that they were the former, although sepoys

make the shrewd remark that they never saw horsemen look so large, or go along one after the other, so regularly. About twenty horsemen, with eight or ten spare horses, came down from the hill to water near the fort. This looks as if the owners of the latter had been killed. Two bodies are carried across the plain on charpoys, with a kind of funeral party following them. I suppose they are two Chiefs. At three p.m. saw a large party of Beloochees pitching a sort of camp within one mile and a half of the fort. There is no mistaking our sepoys' tents, also one officer's tent—five of the former and one of the latter, exactly the number they took from Clarke's party. I trust they are these only, but appearances are very suspicious. Just as it was getting dark, we saw the whole body assemble in one dense mass in front of their tents. I warned all hands to keep a bright look out when the moon goes down.

4th.—To-day some horsemen came and informed us "that they had cut up our convoy, taken the guns, and all the stores and supplies, and had killed all the Sahib-logue, except three, who were prisoners in their camp." In proof of this assertion, they offered to show the guns to any person I chose to send, who could also bring a chit from the prisoners. This offer, however, I refused, firmly believing the report to be altogether untrue, and made with a view of getting hold of one of my people for information. They also said, that if I would leave the fort and go into the plain, they would not molest me. We had a very heavy fall of rain about four p.m. More tents are springing up in the Murree camp. About 300 Beloochees are seated on a rising ground on our flank, and I have great amusement in watching their movements. Having a good glass, we could almost see into their tents.

5th.—A person came under the fort, calling out, wishing to give us the news; but we had already quite enough of these people's stories, so sent a bullet or two after him to hurry his departure. All in the fort are sadly perplexed to know what to think of affairs. Beloochees are on the move in every direction—100 passed this morning in the Deeyrah direction, the road from which we are expecting the convoy. The Beloochees do not seem in good spirits, not like men who have destroyed a large convoy; there has evidently been mischief somewhere. A storm occurred about four o'clock, which, to our great delight, blew down all the Beloochee tents; they, however, soon had them up again.

6th.—No grain is left for camels or bullocks, and little or no forage—they must take their chance, poor creatures. Nothing is now left

but a few bags of rice, and three or four of flour; ten bags of the latter, which were thrown aside as being half sand, now came into use, and were greedily devoured by the sepoys. A camel-man shot himself, being detected in a theft.

7th.—I half expected, on taking a look at the Beloochee camp this morning, to find them all decamped, but a sad reverse met our sight—the three guns belonging to the convoy staring us in the face! They are placed on a rising ground on one flank of their camp, their muzzles pointed towards the fort. What can have become of Major Clibborn and his convoy? Many officers and men must have lost their lives before they gave up the guns. There is no doubt now that something most disastrous must have occurred, and we must prepare for the worst. The sepoys keep up their spirits amazingly well, not the slightest sign of flinching being developed, although they seem to be aware that their salvation is rather perilous. Luckily they cannot see the guns with the naked eye, on account of the jungle. There are chances in our favour yet,—that the guns will not be of much use to them: first, they may be spiked; secondly, they may have no ammunition; and lastly, that they know not how to load or fire them. Luckily, they are howitzers instead of field pieces. Ten a.m.; all the Beloochees are assembled round the guns, and peeping into their muzzles,—quite playthings to them.

12th.—I saw a very pleasing sight this morning, nothing more or less than the Murrees moving away the guns. They appear to be taking them to pieces, and away. This looks very like a bolt on their part. Perhaps they have got intelligence of another convoy coming up. The Beloochees are rather quiet, and allowed two camel-men to loot them of three mares, out grazing. One hundred and sixty killed and badly wounded would make a hole in their tribe.

17th.—About twelve o'clock last night, a cossid arrived with an official letter from the Brigade Major at Sukkur, informing us of the full particulars of Major Clibborn's disaster, and leaving me to my own resources, it being found impossible to send me any further relief. Well, this decides the matter at once: The number of sick, and the weakly state of the rest of the detachment, give little chance of escape by a night march, and I do not suppose the Murrees will agree to any terms I may offer. We put the best face we could upon the matter, and, on making a calculation, find we can last out until the 15th October,

on quarter rations, and the gun bullocks. We decided on holding out, unless we got honourable terms. Perhaps something will turn up in the mean time, and if it comes to the worst, we must try and make our way down to the plains. Replied to the Brigade Major, but, in conformity with my decision, did not allow the cossid to enter into the fort, knowing he would not have the most cheering news for the people inside. The sepoys are in excellent spirits, although well aware that there is some mischief in the wind. From this to the 22nd instant nothing extraordinary occurred.

23rd.—Sheer Bheg returned from the plains to-day, but without any reply to my letter, having had it taken from him. He tells me that "Dodah sent twice to him, immediately after the fight, knowing he had access to the fort, to say, he should be happy to make any terms with me, as long as I would leave his fort, and that he had sent two people to me, but that I would not listen to them, firing upon them and driving them away." The Beloochees, who came on the 5th, and whom we treated so roughly, must have been one of these peaceable messengers. Well, this seems an opening for obtaining favourable terms, particularly as old Dodah has made the first advances, and knowing the impossibility of holding the post much longer, for want of supplies, I opened a communication with the Chief, Sheer Bheg and Myhaib being the bearers of the following proposal:—

"Dodah Murree,—I will give you back your fort, on condition, viz.: that you give me personal security for my safe arrival in the plains. If not, I will stay here two months longer, having provisions for that time."

24th.—The deputation returned, informing me that, on receiving the communication the whole of the Chiefs had assembled together, and, after some consideration, took a solemn oath on the Koran, that if I would leave the fort in three days, they would protect me from opposition down to the plains, ending by saying, that "whatever my wishes were, should be their law." Two hours afterwards, a cossid came and brought a letter from Dodah himself, in answer to mine, containing an agreement, on oath, to my proposal. He said he would send his nephew to pay his respects to me, and to see the agreement conformed to by all his people.

25th.—I replied to Dodah's letter to the effect, that I would give up the fort three days' hence, on the above terms. I am surprised at their letting us off so easily, namely, simply to return to the plains without

let or hindrance from his people, on condition of giving up the fort, which Dodah must well know we cannot hold a month longer. There is plenty of room to suspect treachery, but we must run the risk. This evening, Guomaul Khan came near the fort, and sent a message to say, that he feared to venture inside; that if I would meet him outside, without my troops, he would ratify the agreement. Wishing at once to see whether it was to be "Treachery, or no treachery." I agreed, and with Erskine and four native officers, met him about a mile from the fort. I never saw a man in such a fright in my life. Although he had thirty horsemen, armed to the teeth, and there were only six of us, he retreated twice before he would venture near us. He thought, from our coming alone, there must be treachery; that some men were hidden somewhere. Even, after we had met, he had his horse all ready, close by, for a start. Down we all sat in a circle. A wild scene. His followers appeared to be exceedingly well armed, and all fine, stout-built men. After compliments, etc., the nephew began to talk very reasonably. He expressed a hope that "there would now be a lasting peace between his tribe and the British. That they had only fought at the Nuffosk Pass to save their country and their lives. That it was the least they could do, when they had the fate of Bejah Khan staring them in the face. That they had never killed any of our people after the fight, and that all the prisoners had been fed, clothed, and set free." He concluded by saying that he should remain near the fort until we left, to prevent any disturbance between his people and mine, and that he would furnish me with trustworthy guides down." There was not the slightest appearance of treachery. Thus ended this most interesting conference. It will not, I think, be easily forgotten by either Erskine or myself, so much depended on it, to ourselves and the whole of the detachment. We found these Beloochees the most civil and polite of men. The confidence placed in their word, by meeting them in the way we did, seemed to please them much, and, from having been deadly enemies five long months, became, in one hour, the best of friends. No doubt their joy was just as great in getting rid of us, as ours was in obtaining our freedom.

26th and 27th.—We are most delightfully employed in preparing for a start. Only ten public camels are left, and those as thin as rats; none are here procurable—the number of sick amounts to forty, and these require carriage. Then there are the rations, ammunition, both

gun and musket, water, and tents. In fact, I found I could not move without sacrificing *all* private property, and half the ammunition and tents. I was obliged to call on officers and men to give up what private camels they had. This was most willingly agreed to; and all kit, even to our bedding, was left behind,—the gun ammunition I was obliged to take, as I rather expected opposition from the Boogties, through whose country we had forty miles to go. At first we were almost afraid we should not be able to bring down the gun, from the wretched state of the bullocks, and weakness of the men. However, we determined to try, and leaving the waggon and forage-cart behind, picked out thirty of the best for the gun alone. The sepoy thinking we were going to leave it behind, came and begged me not, as they themselves would drag it down, and defend it with their lives! When Erskine was burning the forage-cart and waggon, the Beloochees outside thinking we were setting fire to the fort, sent to beg us to spare it.

28th.—We turned our back on Kahun this morning at two o'clock.

[The detachment reached the British territory in safety. In reward for the courage and constancy displayed by Brown under such trying circumstances, he was promoted to the rank of Major by Brevet, and the Queen conferred upon him the distinction of C.B. He was also appointed to a Staff situation at Baroda.—EDITOR.]

## THE INSURRECTION AT CAUBUL.

SIR RICHMOND SHAKESPEARE TO MAJOR OUTRAM.

(Copy.)

Camp, Jellalabad, May 4th, 1842.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have been busy of late, getting off copies of documents relating to the late disasters at Cabool. These papers consist chiefly of letters from the late Envoy, General Elphinstone, and Major Pottinger, Captain Macgregor, and Moonshce Mohun Lall. They are too voluminous to transmit, but I will endeavour to give you, in as few words as possible, the information they contain, coupled with the remarks which have been suggested by reading them.

The policy which dictated the invasion of Affghanistan has long since been acknowledged to have been defective, but I do not think its defects have ever been sufficiently brought forward.

Dreading a supposed friendship for a rival power, we invaded this country, where we had theretofore been rather popular than otherwise, and in the course of four years we have managed to have a blood feud with each tribe, and to make an individual enemy of each of the inhabitants. Surely history ought to have taught us that such would be the necessary consequence of supporting a King by foreign bayonets.

We find ourselves entangled in this remote and desolate region, and are surprised at the difficulty we have in withdrawing! But surely our career in India has shown us that we cannot retrace our steps; and here I would remark that, had the heads that planned this campaign

commenced by asserting that they saw that the steps that they were about to take would involve the necessity of keeping possession of the country; that they saw also the enormous expenses which must be incurred, but that the danger which threatened was so imminent as to render the measure one of necessity; we might then, though differing, have argued the point, but when they commenced by avowing, and really believing that they could withdraw from the country, they showed an utter forgetfulness of Indian history.

Another blunder was that we supposed Shah Soojah would be a popular, and could be an independent King, to say nothing of the error of imagining that he would patiently endure our making him a mere cypher.

The above may be considered as arguing after the event, and I acknowledge that it is so, in some measure, though, before I left England, I argued many of the arguments in almost the same words, and I won a lottery ticket wagered at Herat, that ere three years elapsed Shah Soojah would intrigue against us.

You saw and know more of the campaign than myself, and I leave it to you whether its success was not owing to the fortune of war. You will not have failed to have noticed that the greatest praise, and most substantial rewards, were received by those who merited censure. I think Sir J. Keane's making his fortune by blowing open the gates of Ghuzni, instead of receiving censure for leaving his siege guns at Candahar, is one of the most amusing instances of good luck that can be found in truth or fiction.

For a short time we managed, by enormous outlays, to bribe all parties to keep peace, and in fulfilment of our plan of quitting the country, we commenced withdrawing the troops; but we were speedily compelled to replace them by reinforcements from India.

The Chiefs, who had ever been all but independent, soon fretted under our strict discipline, and as they could not cope with our troops, they soon perceived that their very existence depended on driving us out of the country.

The Supreme Government and the home authorities, startled at the enormous expenses of the campaign, urged economy in the strongest terms: owing to some mistake in the calculations, it was found in the eleventh hour, that the revenue did not equal the expenditure by a considerable sum, which error it was decided to make good, by re-

trenching the monthly allowances paid by the Cabool Government to the Chiefs. The payment of these sums had been guaranteed to the Chiefs, and their retrenchment was looked upon by them, with justice, as a direct infringement of a solemn engagement.

Our Levies of Jan Baz and Hazir Bash tended in some measure to give employment to the soldiery, but this body must have looked with dislike to a Government which evidently intended to introduce order and good rule, and to check the system of robbery and oppression, which they had so long carried on successfully under their various Chiefs.

The Ryots and merchants were grateful to us for the protection and security they enjoyed under our rule, but the merchants compose but a small and unimportant portion of the community, and the religious prejudices of the Ryots were easily roused against us. It is not difficult to discover the motives that induced the Moolahs to exert their influence against us.

I have noticed all the classes of the population, and have endeavoured to show the motives which caused their enmity towards us, strong as the motives were, as certain was their development in the course of time. Our military superiority, and our military fame were so great, that we might have slipped through a few years of doubtful security, had we not been guilty of the injustice (to say nothing worse of it) of reducing the pay of the Chiefs. This very impolitic measure could, had it succeeded, but have saved us a very considerable annual expense, while it was certain to cause a strong and very general feeling of enmity against us, which, according to Pottinger, MacKenzie, Macgregor, and Mahun Lall, was the immediate cause of the conspiracy which preceded the insurrection. The nobles complained to the King, who, irritated at finding that we had made him a mere cypher, retorted by taunting the nobles with want of spirit; His Majesty is said to have replied to them on this occasion "Ay rool shoamah nech na me shawud," which was considered that His Majesty would not be sorry if something was done to show the power of the nobles. I think the above is almost the extent of His Majesty's treachery towards us, and that when he discovered the extent to which the conspiracy had spread he heartily repented, and there certainly is proof of his having urged our troops to go into the Balla Hissar, and also of his having prevented the advance of an army from Cabool to Jellalabad during

the siege, a step, by the bye, which seems to have caused his murder. But to return to the conspiracy. The incensed nobles swore and sealed the Koran, to effect our destruction, and they arranged that the Ghilzys should strike a blow near Jellalabad, which should induce us to send a force from Cabool against them; this was done by plundering a large Kaffillah, and by their plot they succeeded in withdrawing Sir R. Sale's force from Cabool, where, shortly afterwards, the insurrection commenced, by the murder of Sir A. Burnes, all the particulars of which are too well known to require repetition.

The lamentable want of vigour and energy amongst the military authorities at Cabool has also been prominently brought forward. General Elphinstone says that the situation of the cantonment was so bad that it was commanded on all sides, while, owing to its defective defences, and their great extent, nearly the whole of the force was required to defend the walls. Allowing all due weight to this circumstance, it does not explain to us how it happened that 6,000 British troops, with Artillery, and ample supplies of ammunition, should be compelled to capitulate. This is so humiliating a fact that an inquiry into the causes of it is well worthy of attention.

General Elphinstone, who commanded, had been an invalid since his arrival at Caubul. He had sent in a sick certificate, and received permission to return to the provinces, before the insurrection commenced. During the whole time it was not in his power to go out and examine the state of things himself, and he could not from personal observation discover what orders it was necessary to give, nor see that such orders that were issued were promptly obeyed. He was so debilitated by sickness that he had no confidence in his own judgment, and was easily guided by all about him, and induced to change any resolution which had been decided on. The fate of the force, therefore, under his command depended more than usually on the zeal and devotion of his second in command. General Elphinstone has himself recorded that he did not receive the assistance which he had a right to expect from the next senior officer, Brigadier Shelton, whose conduct is stated to have been "most contumacious." "He never gave me information or advice, but invariably found fault with all that was done, and canvassed and condemned all orders, before officers, frequently perverting and delaying carrying them into effect." Here we have the senior officer unable to superintend, and the second in command thwarting as much as pos-

sible; and, to add to the difficulties, the next senior officer, Brigadier Anguétil, was on the sick list, a circumstance much regretted by Gen. Elphinstone. That, under such circumstances, mismanagement should have occurred, is hardly matter of surprise, but it is hardly possible to account for some of the errors, such as allowing the granary to fall into the hands of the enemy, and also sending out a small force of between 800 and 1,000 men with ONE gun. This last affair appears to have sealed the fate of the garrison; the men were kept out, exposed in squares, to the fire of overwhelming numbers; they stood for a considerable time, at last they rushed for cantonments, and dashing down their arms, swore they would never again be led out to be uselessly slaughtered. Shortly after this the Envoy was urged by the military authorities to capitulate. A document was signed by General Elphinstone and the three next senior officers, giving it as their opinion that the Envoy should lose no time in entering into negotiation, which was accordingly done, and terms were settled, the particulars of which we have from Captain Mackenzie:—

1st. We are to evacuate the country, the nobles finding us provisions and a strong escort.

2nd. Shah Soojah to have the option of accompanying us or remaining.

3rd. Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan and all other Afghans detained in India to be allowed to return.

4th. We should never return to Afghanistan in military array, unless required to do so by the existing government.

5th. Mutual exchange of representatives from the governments, and hostages from both parties for the fulfilment of the terms agreed upon.

Such were the principal articles of the negotiation; but the nobles, finding the army in their power, daily increased their demands, and threatened to stop supplies unless these demands were complied with.

According to Captain Mackenzie, the conduct of the nobles "had, in fact, virtually released the" Envoy from any obligations to adhere to any of his original propositions. At this time Mohammed Akbar, like a second Satan, tempted the Envoy and drew him into a snare, which not only caused his own murder, but has laid the British Government open to the charge of breach of faith. Mohammed Akbar's proposal was to this effect—That he and his particular friends, the Ghilzies, should either come over in a body into the cantonment, placing them-

selves under the orders of the Envoy, or that, at a preconcerted signal, without giving warning to the other confederates, in concert with a body of British troops, take possession of Fort Mahommed Khan, then seizing the person of Ameenollah Khan Lagaree, who, for a pecuniary consideration, they promised to murder; that the Sirdar should acknowledge Shah Soojah as his Sovereign, his reward being the Wuzeerut, a present bonus of twenty lacs of rupees, and a stipend of four lacs per annum for life; that the British troops should be allowed to remain unmolested, as if with the perfect concurrence and by the express wish of the so-formed Afghan Government, for a period of eight months, at which time they were to evacuate the country as if by their own free will. Captain Mackenzie, from whom the above is derived, is of opinion that two months of excessive fatigue of mind and body had completely unhinged the Envoy's strong mind, or he would not have fallen into this snare, but he states that the Envoy shrunk from the proposal "to murder Ameenollah with abhorrence, with disgust," assuring the Ambassadors that, as a British functionary, nothing would induce him to pay a price for blood. Mahommed Akbar involved him in this intrigue on the 22nd December, and immediately proceeded to Ameenollah, to whom he laid open the whole plot. It was then arranged by them that on the next day the Envoy and the other English gentlemen whom he was in the habit of consulting should be seized. But the Envoy refused to mount his horse, and Mahommed Akbar, to hasten him, pushed him violently. Sir William threw him off indignantly, and this was resented by a pistol-bullet through his breast. Trevor was subsequently killed by Sooltan Jan, a cousin of Mahommed Akbar.

After the Envoy's murder the political duties devolved on Major Pottinger, who had arrived from Churrakur, wounded, a short time previous. General Elphinstone says, "Major Pottinger informed the Council of War that he considered any treaty with the Chiefs as exceedingly doubtful, and that he thought it was our duty either to hold out or to force a retreat to Jellalabad, so as in no way to bind the hands of our Government by promising to evacuate the country, or to waste so much money to save our own lives and property under such doubtful circumstances of faith being kept with us. The Council, one and all, were of opinion that Major Pottinger's views were impracticable—that we could not hold out for want of provisions, and from

having surrendered the forts commanding the cantonments—and that we could not force a retreat to Jellalabad; also that it was better to pay any sum of money than sacrifice the troops then at Cabool. It was consequently decided, *nem. con.*, that Major Pottinger should enter on negotiations, and pay the money to the different Chiefs, which was accordingly done. Had Pottinger's advice been taken, the result might have been different. As it was, trusting to the good faith of Mahommed Akbar, and distrusting their own power of defending themselves, the military authorities were induced, under various pretences, to delay on the road, until the Native troops, from snow and frost, were entirely helpless; and out of this large force not a hundred fighting men, including officers, have survived. Within 160 miles of us lie the bones of 15,000 men, slain by Afghan treachery through the imbecility of their leaders. May God forgive us! There is not in all this ocean of disaster a single circumstance from which we can derive a drop of comfort. Our troops behaved ill. Conceive the conduct of her Majesty's 44th having been such that the 37th Native Infantry refused to act with them, saying that they retreated on their ranks and threw them into confusion! Our breach of faith has been asserted by Pottinger and Mackenzie.

I have endeavoured to trace the whole affair from its commencement to its tragical and humiliating termination, and it now remains to sketch an outline of what I imagine to be the best means of retrieving our character. We should always remember that we entered this country with the view to strengthening our position in India; that we erred grossly in such a supposition has been abundantly proved, but it must be allowed that we cannot, after the disasters we have suffered, leave this country until, in the eyes of India, we have reasserted our Military superiority.

This can alone be done by an advance on Cabool, and the more speedily the advance is made the greater will be the effect in India.

This force and General Nott's require but carriage, cattle, and grain to enable them to advance at once, but, before the movement is made, Government should come to a decision as to the exact line of policy they intend to pursue. They have two courses open to them. The first is, to retain possession of the country permanently. The second, to advance both forces on Cabool, level it with the dust, and withdraw both forces by this road.

The first will entail an enormous expense, but it will, if carried through, prevent any doubt in India of the decay of our supremacy.

It would, however, be necessary to have several European Regiments in the country, and to raise several Regiments of the natives of Hindoostan, similar to those formed for Shah Soojah's service, until, by the gradual process of our system, the spirit of Clanship was destroyed, when the natives of Afghanistan would form as good soldiers as any in the world.

I have heard it stated in England, that to retain possession of Afghanistan involves bankruptcy in India; this then, like most other worldly affairs, dwindles down to a mere matter of pounds, shillings, and pence.

Afghanistan, firmly held and well managed by us, would be very valuable as a barrier, but it may be, and very likely is, more than we can afford to pay for; however, there is one thing clear, that if we are to remain, we ought to do so avowedly for our own objects, and not as the allies of a nominal King.

The second plan which I have proposed, I confess, seems to me very practicable, and requires but 15,000 camels to put it into immediate operation. We can here command any quantity of grain from Peshawur; what we want is carriage for it, with 50,000 maunds of grain stored at Jellalabad, and 5,000 camels carrying on an additional supply of grain. This force and General Nott's would, at Cabool, be entirely independent of the country, and we might do whatever was deemed expedient. We could spare the city, and content ourselves with hoisting the British Flag, and put up a King, or we could destroy every house and drive a plough over the Market-place. But the advance must be made both from Candahar and Jellalabad, while the retreat must be by one road. Ghuzni certainly should be destroyed, and the Quetta force should return the day that the Candahar force started.

Unless very skilful arrangements regarding the Quetta force were made, we should meet with some disaster there, but I hope yet, ere next Christmas-day, to find this force and General Nott's at Peshawur, and the Quetta force at Dadur. But all depends on supplies and carriage, and I think it great matter of congratulation that we have you to assist General Nott and Mr Clerk to look after our interest in these most important points. I should not be surprised if you have frequently blamed me for not writing; the fact is, that until lately I have

not had a single writer, and my time has been incessantly employed, a circumstance which has hitherto saved you from such a visitation as the present. I am of opinion, that unless discussion is quite unreserved it is but of little use.

I have given you my opinion on many points which relate to matters under your control, and I have not thought it necessary to apologise to you for so doing, as I am sure you will not misunderstand my motives. If I do not tell you my opinions you cannot correct the errors of judgment which I may have formed, a correction which I beg you will not hesitate to bestow with an unsparing hand. We have not heard from Captain Mackenzie since he left our camp, to return to Mahommed Akbar; poor fellow, the trial must have been a severe one, but he bore it like a hero.

The Prince Fattch Jung has been put on the throne at Cabool, by Ameenoolah Lagaree, and the Populzyes, and the Kuzyaulashes; he swore to us that he will seize the chief conspirators if we will promise to advance immediately on Cabool, but that he would have, after the seizure, to stand a siege, and that he could not hold out above a month. We are very much hampered by not knowing what are the views of Government and what Rawlinson is doing about Timour Shah; and we have only been able to say to Futtch Jung that our Army is here in good spirits, and that we are about to advance, though some delay will occur ere we arrive at Cabool.

Our receipts this day, in atta and rice, are 1,445 maunds, and we receive 3,000 maunds to-morrow from the 31st Queen's and 6th Native Infantry, on their arrival. Our consumption daily, on half rations, is 250 maunds.


This is a very fine force, and it is heart-breaking to think that we are tied by the leg for want of a few beasts of burden.

(Signed) B. SHAKESPEARE,

To Major Outram, &c., &c., &c.

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