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THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY


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PREFACE

THE present edition of the Ethics was planned on a more ambitious scale twelve years ago, and most of it was written before 1890. At that time I was unaware that Mr Bywater was so soon to give us a revised text, and that Mr Stewart was about to publish his "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics." When these facts came to my knowledge, I laid my own work aside, as I could not suppose it would any longer be required. But, when the publishers informed me that they intended to bring out an edition of a less elaborate kind, and asked me to undertake it, I felt that it might be worth while to bring the work I had already done into more moderate compass, especially as I was conscious that my method of interpretation was a somewhat novel one, and might possess a certain interest for students of Aristotle. I had come to the conclusion that most of the difficulties that have been raised about the Ethics were due to the fact that, though the dialectical character of many passages had long been admitted, commentators had never thoroughly recognised that the treatise was dialectical throughout. They had tried to find in it the scientific and metaphysical basis of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy, and when they discovered instead that the foundations of the doctrine here set forth were of the most shifting character, taken as they are at one time from the opinions of ordinary people, at another from

popular Platonism, they have been ready to accuse Aristotle of inconsistency, or to doubt the authenticity of the treatise in its present form. There are indications in the writings of Diels and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff referred to in the Introduction that a different view is gaining ground in Germany, and this edition is a humble contribution to its advancement.

From the nature of the case, the text I have given is a somewhat eclectic affair, and is not intended as a contribution to Aristotelian criticism. It would doubtless have been more convenient for the student if I had simply reprinted Professor Bywater's text as it stands, but such a proceeding would hardly have been justifiable. I have therefore taken as a basis my own revision of Bekker's text, made with the help of Susemihl's edition ten years ago. As was to be expected, it presents some points of resemblance to Professor Bywater's text, though I have been less decided in preferring K^b to L^b where these MSS. differ. I had published a few of my notes on the text in the *Classical Review* before the publication of Professor Bywater's edition, and had hit upon some of the corrections he has introduced, a fact which he has most generously acknowledged. It is, however, in matters of punctuation that I owe most to Professor Bywater. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the improved punctuation he has given us is as good as an exegetical commentary, based as it is on an unrivalled knowledge of Aristotle's use of language. It will be understood that I have not hesitated to adopt many of Mr Bywater's readings, including a considerable number that he has not received into the text himself. The text of the Eudemian extracts which, for reasons given in the Introduction, I have printed at the bottom of the page, is mainly Susemihl's. I regret that I have not been able to make more use of the notes which Dr Henry Jackson is now contributing to the *Journal of Philology*, though I have been able to incorporate a few of

his suggestions, and especially the admirable conjecture by which he has restored to us a new fragment of Eunikos (p. 375).

It is inevitable that, in a commentary like the present, most of the illustrations should be old, though I think I may claim to have added some new ones. I have, of course, made constant use of Bonitz's Index, and that indeed is the source of the greater part of my quotations. My own contribution to the illustration of the Ethics lies chiefly in the direction of tracing the originals of many passages in Plato and Isokrates. This was closely connected with my general method of interpretation, and I may fairly claim that some of the material has been collected for the first time; but no one can be more conscious than I am how much still remains to be done in this field.

I owe much to conversations with my friends, especially Mr J. A. Smith and Mr Joachim, on difficult points, and it has not always been easy for me to distinguish what is mine and what is theirs. Dr Latta gave me the quotation from Leibniz which illustrates 1166 a, 20–22. The Index is mainly the work of Miss E. M. Samson.

J. B.

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INTRODUCTION

I.

§ 1. AMONG the writings that have come down to us as Aristotle's, there are three that bear the title "Ethics." This makes it necessary to state at the outset the critical assumptions on which the present essay in interpretation is based, and which, so far as it is successful, it tends to confirm. Every interpretation implies some critical hypothesis, and our acceptance or rejection of that hypothesis must in turn depend mainly on its adequacy as a basis for interpretation.

§ 2. We may fairly take it for granted that the so-called Magna Moralia is a Peripatetic hand-book written after Aristotle's time; for all competent judges are now agreed upon this. Still, as it shows no trace of Stoic influence or of opposition to Stoic views, it cannot well be later than the third century B.C., and is therefore evidence of the school tradition at a time when there was still a school with a living tradition[1]. The other two treatises present a more difficult problem. They both profess to be Aristotle's; but the first of them is called after Nikomachos, his natural son, the other after one of his most illustrious scholars, Eudemos of Rhodes. It is true that these titles first occur in a quotation from the Platonist Atticus, who lived in the time of the Antonines, but they are certainly much older. Cicero knew the Nikomachean Ethics by its present title; for he is inclined to think Nikomachos was actually its author. Aspasios, the earliest of the Aristotelian commentators, has already to face the question whether the discussion of Pleasure in Book VII is the work of Aristotle or Eudemos[2]. We may be sure, then, that these titles go back to Alexandrian times at least, and that they were found in the edition of Andronikos; but there

is no authoritative tradition as to their meaning. We can hardly accept the statement that the present work is that of Nikomachos; for, according to the biographical tradition, which is founded on contemporary documents, he died while still a lad[3]. He would be too young, then, to write the Ethics, though he may have been old enough to edit his father's lectures under the guidance of Theophrastos. On the other hand, we cannot adopt the view of the later Greek commentators that the treatises were dedicated to Nikomachos and Eudemos respectively. This would imply that Aristotle himself prepared his lectures for publication, which is contrary to everything that can reasonably be inferred from the books themselves and others like them. Following the analogy of the Theophrastean and Eudemian Physics and Metaphysics, most modern scholars agree in regarding the Nikomachean Ethics as substantially the work of Aristotle himself, and in assigning the Eudemian to Eudemos; but the meaning of this conclusion differs widely according as the critic holds that the three central books are rightly placed in the one treatise or in the other. For the most serious difficulty is just this, that, according to our tradition, Books V—VII of the Nikomachean Ethics are identical with Books IV—VI of the Eudemian.

[1] Zeller's Aristotle, Eng. Trans. vol. ii, p. 497.

[2] Cicero de Finibus, v, 5, 12. Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristotelis, sed non video quare non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Aspasios, p. 151, 21 (Heylbut) *ἐπεὶ ἔν γε τοῖς Νικομαχείοις, ἔνθα διείληπται καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς Ἀριστοτέλης σαφῶς εἴρηκεν αὐτὴν μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἀλλὰ παρακολουθεῖν "ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀκμαίοις τὴν ὥραν." σημεῖον δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τοῦτ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλ' Εὐδήμου τὸ ἐν τῷ <δεκάτῳ> λέγειν περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς οὐδέπω περὶ αὐτῆς διειλεγμένου· πλὴν εἴτε Εὐδήμου ταῦτά ἐστιν εἴτε Ἀριστοτέλους, ἐνδόξως εἴρηται.* For the other references, see Zeller, vol. i, p. 97, n. 1.

[3] He died in battle as a *μειρακίσκος* according to the biographers. Cf. the will of Theophrastos in D. L. v, 51. We must remember that the wills of Aristotle and Theophrastos were preserved in the school as charters of foundation. A Greek philosophical school was a corporation like a college, and had to keep its titles.

§ 3. From the nature of the case, most arguments on this subject are apt to involve a *petitio principii*. If we suppose

that these three books are in any sense the work of Aristotle, or even a fair reproduction of his thought, it becomes very hard to maintain that there is such a thing as a distinctively "Eudemian" doctrine; for the undoubtedly Eudemian books only differ from their Nikomachean counterparts in matters of detail and emphasis. On the other hand, if we hold that the three books are the original and independent work of Eudemos, we have to admit that we know nothing of Aristotle's views on some of the most important subjects, and that we have therefore no means of telling whether Eudemos gives us a faithful account of them or not. Of course it would be a different matter if, as some critics hold, any real inconsistency could be detected between the teaching of the doubtful books and the remainder of either treatise. I have tried to interpret them on the assumption that there is none, with what success the commentary must show. It would also alter the case if it could be shown that the central books contain expressions and thoughts not to be found in the undoubtedly Nikomachean books but easily paralleled from the undoubtedly Eudemian. But this argument loses all force when it is shown that these suspicious phrases and ideas can be matched from other works of which the Aristotelian origin has never been called in question, and that some of them even go back to Plato. This I believe I have shown in all important cases.

The assumption made in this edition, then, is that the disputed books are really Aristotle's, an assumption which may be provisionally commended by two general considerations. The interpretation of Book V is notoriously difficult owing to the use made in it of mathematical formulas which are not always clear, and which seem to give the writer almost as much trouble as they have given to his editors. Now Mathematics was just the one province of human knowledge in which Aristotle did not show himself a master, while Eudemos was one of the foremost mathematicians of an age in which that science made more progress than it ever did again till the seventeenth century. We can understand that Aristotle felt bound by the Platonic tradition to treat

Justice mathematically, but we can hardly understand Eudemos of Rhodes discussing so simple a matter as proportion in a way which, whatever we may think of it, has certainly produced an astonishing divergence in the interpretations of the most competent editors. The other point is this. The difficulties of Books VI and VII arise, as we shall see, from the presence in them of a dialectical element and a neglect of formal symmetry far more characteristic of the master than the scholar. If we look at the way in which Eudemos has reproduced the substance of Books VIII—IX, we shall find it very hard to believe that he would not have given us a more neatly formulated account of the "intellectual virtues," and a less puzzling discussion of the relations between thought and feeling. There is a higher art in Aristotle's apparent confusion, and the spirit of the Platonic dialogue with its tentative arguments and provisional conclusions still lives in his dialectic procedure. He is seeking the truth along with his hearers and not expounding a ready-made system. We do not expect this from Eudemos, whose chief interest would lie in giving a faithful reproduction of his master's thought, and who would not feel in the same way the need of leading his audience step by step from the Academic standpoint to his own; but we do expect a more dogmatic and perspicuous exposition.

§ 4. Now, if this is the true account of the relation of Eudemos to Aristotle, it follows at once that we have in the Eudemian Ethics the most authoritative commentary on the Nikomachean. I have assumed that Eudemos gives us the thought of Aristotle, as he understood it, as faithfully as he can, though it is plain enough that he has added a good deal from other Aristotelian sources in order to bring out more clearly what he took to be the meaning, and even that he has here and there given a turn of his own to what Aristotle had said. The burden of proof certainly lies with those who maintain anything else; for it is clear that this is what Theophrastos and Eudemos did in the case of the Physics and the Metaphysics. They followed the main lines, passing

lightly over those parts where Aristotle was full and clear, but formulating more precisely and discussing more minutely those subjects he had left with a less finished treatment. This statement, which is made on good authority of Theophrastos[1], is true also of the Eudemian Physics, as we can see from the numerous quotations in Simplicius[2]. The Ethics of Theophrastos is unfortunately lost; but the few fragments we possess confirm the general impression so far as they go[3]. It is significant that one of these fragments is distinctly an amplification of a sentence in one of the disputed books[4].

In view of all this, I have thought it right to print the relevant passages of Eudemos under the text to which they refer, and I have always hesitated to adopt an interpretation different from his. We must remember that he was in all probability there when the lectures were given, and that he would talk over all the difficulties with the master. We really cannot expect to know what Aristotle meant much better than he did, and we should always make the most of first-hand evidence. The superficial paraphrases of Byzantine commentators are quoted to-day as if those Graeculi had any authority in the matter; but the Eudemian Ethics, which takes us back to the Peripatos itself, has been too much neglected.

[1] Boethius Hermen. ii, 12, 9 In omnibus de quibus ipse disputat post magistrum leviter ea tangit quae ab Aristotele dicta antea cognovit, alias vero diligentius res non ab Aristotele tractatas consequitur. Priscianus Lydus, 33, 6 (Bywater) *ἐκθέμενος τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους...ἐπιδιαρθροῖ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ ἐπαπορεῖ τινα.*

[2] Simplicius has preserved a significant fragment of a correspondence between Eudemos and Theophrastos with regard to the text of the Physics (Zeller, vol. i, p. 136). Further, Simplicius, who had the Eudemian Physics before him, says in one place (p. 411, 37 Diels) *μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Εὔδημος ὁ γνησιώτατος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων.* There can indeed be no doubt that he reproduced the teaching of Aristotle's Physics much more faithfully than Theophrastos. It is surely arbitrary to assume that he did anything else than this in the case of the Ethics, though no doubt his strong theological interest has coloured his account of the "Contemplative Life."

[3] On the Ethics of Theophrastos, see G. Heylbut in the Archiv, vol. i, p. 194 sqq. and the notes on 1100 b, 29. 1123 a, 19. 1144 b, 33. 1145 a, 6. 1153 b, 19. 1154 b, 13.

[4] Cf. 1154 b, 13 (from the "Eudemian" discussion of pleasure) *ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα* with Theophrastos quoted by Aspasios, p. 156, 17 (Heylbut) *ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τε ἐναντία, οἷον κ.τ.λ....καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τουτέστιν κ.τ.λ....*

II.

§ 5. All this is of course inconsistent with the widely-spread view that the Aristotelian corpus has come down to us in a more or less unauthentic form. Some recent scholars have gone great lengths in the assumption of "dislocations" and "duplicate passages," so far indeed that if they were right we could hardly say we possessed the works of Aristotle at all in any natural sense of the words. In its crudest form, this theory has been used to justify wholesale transpositions of sentences, paragraphs, and chapters to any place where, in the editor's opinion, they would be more appropriate. But it is very hard to see how the process of shuffling which this implies could actually have occurred[1]. Even the story of the cellar at Skepsis does not suggest that the works of Aristotle were picked up in little bits like an Egyptian papyrus at the present day and pieced together as well as might be. And the external evidence that the works of Aristotle were known substantially in their present form from the time of Theophrastos to that of Andronikos is overwhelming. The rise of Stoicism would be inconceivable unless we might assume that the more important works of Aristotle were easily accessible. In this extreme form, then, the theory may be dismissed[2]. But, in the form given to it by Professor Cook Wilson after Torstrik[3], the theory of "duplicate passages" requires more serious consideration. According to this, the Aristotelian matter with which the early editors had to deal was regarded as sacred, and their chief aim was to prevent the loss of any of it. So several different versions of the same discussion were combined into a single treatise just as a "harmony of the gospels" might be. The possibility of this is undeniable and the facts upon which the theory is based are certain. It is the case that, in certain parts of the work, Aristotle appears to discuss the same subject several times over, and that these discussions are frequently inconsistent and apparently quite independent of each other. But I have tried to show that this fact admits of another explanation. The

Ethics is, and from the nature of the case must be, a dialectical and not a demonstrative work, and it is, as we shall see, entirely in accordance with Aristotle's own view of the method which is appropriate in such a case to give as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without any regard to the real philosophical validity of those solutions. If it can be shown that these apparent duplicates are really successive applications of the different dialectical τόποι appropriate to the subject, the critical problem does not arise. Aristotle is not committed to all or any of the solutions he gives any more than Plato is committed to the successive definitions of knowledge given in the Theaitetos. Nor can we even assume that the true solution is necessarily given at all. It often is given; but it was contrary to Aristotle's own principles to base the exposition of Politics on his metaphysical system.

[1] I do not mean to deny that there are traces of editing, and clumsy editing too, in the Ethics. In particular, many of the summaries and transitions break the argument in a way that can hardly be attributed to Aristotle himself, and which we do not observe in his more finished works. But this does not detract seriously from the integrity of the text. We may ascribe these connecting tags to Nikomachos if we please.

[2] It is really impossible to resist the arguments adduced by Zeller (Aristotle, Chapter III.) in favour of the view that the works of Aristotle as we have them were known and used all through the period from his death down to the recension of Andronikos. The statement that the successors of Theophrastos were ignorant of the physical and metaphysical treatises is simply untrue, as is proved by the whole history of philosophy in the third century B.C.

[3] Aristotelian Studies, I (Oxford, Clarendon Press).

§ 6. The plausibility of all these theories is enhanced by certain undeniable peculiarities of style, and these must be explained at once if we are to judge the work fairly. It is clear to begin with that we have not before us a book intended for publication in the ordinary sense of the word. Primarily it is the manuscript of a course of lectures intended for the lecturer's own use, and also doubtless for consultation by members of the school. In any case the writings of Theophrastos and Eudemos had, so far as we can see, exactly the same character, and no account of that character

which applies only to the Aristotelian corpus can be accepted. What we have to explain is not the form in which Aristotle's works have come down to us, but the nature of the Peripatetic ἀκρόασις. "Now," as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff puts it[1], "there has been no lack of people who have tried to force upon Aristotle the pedantry of a well-paragraphed lecture note-book that sends the audience to sleep. We must allow, indeed, that as an oral teacher he had the vice of recapitulations and of declarations that now one subject has been exhausted and it is the turn of the next. But that is just the public speaker's vice, and if we take the akroamatic writings as spoken discourses, they lose much of what certainly annoys the reader. It is clear, however, that Aristotle was eloquent only with the pen, or he would not have written out all the indifferent stuff as well." The point of view here indicated appears to me the right one, and we may be glad that Aristotle found it necessary to write down what he was going to say word for word, and that his pupils, as was natural, caught the trick from him.

[1] Aristoteles und Athen, vol. i, p. 66, n. 37.

§ 7. But there is a further peculiarity in the style of such works as the Ethics which is of great importance for their right understanding, and which has been most distinctly brought out by Diels[1]. He has called attention to the curious fact that "we read on through long tracts of his ordinary dry prose, and are suddenly surprised by a charming oasis. It is observable too that in those more literary and popular passages we usually find a Platonic element, a reference to Platonic 'divisions' and Platonic dialogues. In this respect the Ethics holds a middle place between the purely scientific writings and the wholly popular such as the Rhetoric." How natural this is we shall see when we come to consider Aristotle's method in the Ethics; here it will be sufficient to quote the explanation given by Diels himself. He says:—

"I can think of no other ground for this alternation, to speak for the present only of the Nikomachean Ethics, than

a paedagogic one. Aristotle saw before him at the lecture on Ethics of which this treatise is the reflexion, hearers of riper years (1095 a, 1), whose minute familiarity with the Platonic dialogues he could count upon unconditionally, just as the audience at his course on Rhetoric must have had a number of model speeches, especially those of Isokrates, in their heads. So he gave them first the skeleton of his doctrine, and then tried to clothe it with flesh and blood by explanations in a more popular style and by instructive digressions, to bring it nearer to the understanding of his scholars by attaching it to what was familiar and exoteric. This certainly introduces some unevenness into the terminology and treatment, which has often had a confusing effect and has led some to assume a discrepancy of doctrine where there is really nothing but an accommodation of the expression to his Platonically schooled public."

Diels goes on to show the truth of this by a most skilful analysis of the opening of Book I, of which I have made free use in my notes. If I have succeeded in showing that the rest of the Ethics lends itself just as easily to the same treatment, the substantial unity and integrity of the work will become much more credible.

[1] Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i, pp. 494 sqq.

III.

§ 8. Besides the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia, there are several ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics. Only two of these are of real value, the commentary of Aspasios (2nd century A.D.) and the relevant parts of the Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις of Alexander of Aphrodisias. These two works contain genuine Peripatetic tradition and are often of service in interpreting the treatise. They also throw very considerable light upon the text by preserving readings older than those of our MSS. The commentaries of Michael (11th century A.D.) and Eustratios (12th century A.D.) with the 14th century Paraphrase now attributed to Heliodoros of

Prusa are of the usual Byzantine type and add little or nothing to our knowledge[1].

[1] The commentaries on the Ethics have been edited by Heylbut for the Royal Prussian Academy (Berlin, 1889). For Alexander's Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις see the edition of Ivo Bruns in the Supplementum Aristotelicum vol. ii.

§ 9. The modern commentaries on the Ethics of earlier date than the present century may be divided into two classes, those that throw light upon the argument and those that illustrate the language. Of the former class, the most valuable is the commentary of Giphanius, while the edition of Zell is a most useful summary of the latter. Michelet's edition (Berlin 1829) contains many good things, though his method of interpretation is somewhat arbitrary. Sir Alexander Grant's commentary was the first attempt to explain Aristotle's real meaning in accordance with the methods of historical criticism. However much we may differ from it in detail, it is a work of permanent value. Ramsauer's edition is difficult to work with and hardly marks an advance. Professor Stewart's "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics" is a work of great learning and provides a store of matter from which all subsequent writers on the subject will continue to draw. Dr Henry Jackson has given us an edition of Book V, and there is an admirable little edition of Book X by Monsieur G. Rodier (Paris, Delagrave, 1897). Fritzsche's editions of the Eudemian Ethics and of Books VIII and IX of the Nikomachean Ethics contain much interesting matter, and the tracts of Rassow and Susemihl may always be consulted with profit.

IV.

§ 10. With the Ethics we enter upon that part of Aristotle's system which has to do with Man, "the philosophy of things human," as he once calls it[1] in the popular phraseology of his time. From the nature of the case, the philosophy of Man as studied by men must be a practical and not a theoretical science; for that is the true division of the sciences and is rightly put in the forefront by Eudemos[2]. It is true, as Zeller has pointed out[3], that this particular

classification is nowhere expressly made by Aristotle himself, but that is only because it was a Platonic "division"[4] and might therefore be assumed. It is the only one recognised by the early Peripatetics and it is certainly implied by very many passages in Aristotle. Thought has only two forms; it is always either (1) theoretical or (2) practical and productive, and the difference between these is that the former has to do with things which are either immoveable or have their source of motion in themselves, while the latter deals with such things as require an external cause to set them in motion, things which have their efficient or motive cause in something else, that is to say in human will or skill[5]. We must not be misled by the minor distinction between practical and productive. Now and then it becomes desirable for dialectical purposes to mark the difference between those sciences which have some action as their end and those which produce some external product, and then the latter are more properly called arts than sciences. But this distinction is referred by Aristotle himself to "extraneous discussions,"[6] and he seldom or never makes serious use of it. As a general rule the terms "practical science," "productive science" and "art" are used quite indiscriminately.

[1] 1181 b, 15. [2] EE. 1214 a, 10 quoted on p. 7.

[3] Eng. Trans. vol. i, p. 181 sqq.

[4] Cf. Polit. 258 e *Ταύτῃ τοίνυν συμπάσας ἐπιστήμας διαίρει, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν προσειπών, τὴν δὲ μόνον γνωστικήν.*

[5] We find *θεωρητικὸς νοῦς* opposed to *πρακτικός* (De An. 407 a, 25. 415 a, 11. 432 b, 27. 435 a, 15), and so Met. 1026 a, 25 *πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ* (1) *πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ* (2) *θεωρητική.* Cf. also Met. 1025 b, 18 *ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνει οὖσα περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος (περὶ γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐστὶν οὐσίαν ἐν ᾗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ), δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε πρακτική ἐστιν οὔτε ποιητική. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ποιητικῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμίς τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι ἡ προαίρεσις.*

[6] Cf. 1140 a, 3. It is characteristic that the appearance of a threefold division is commonest in the Topics. Cf. 145 a, 15 *θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται (ἡ ἐπιστήμη)*; 157 a, 16 *τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μὲν θεωρητικαὶ αἱ δὲ πρακτικαὶ αἱ δὲ ποιητικαί.* But the true doctrine is given in EN 1139 b, 1 *αὕτη γὰρ* (sc. *ἡ ἕνεκά του διάνοια*) *καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει.*

§ 11. A practical science or art, then, such as that of the statesman[1] is essentially a source of change in something else,

the efficient cause of motion in something which has no motive cause in itself. Some things are wholly immoveable, and these are the objects of First Philosophy and Mathematics; other things, though moveable, have their source of motion and rest in themselves[2]. A tree grows of itself, a house is brought into being by the art of the housebuilder. Those things which have their motive cause in themselves are the sphere of Nature; Art or Practical Science has to do with things which have to be moved from outside. It is true, as we shall see, that in some cases the same result may be produced by Nature and by Art. Health, for instance, may be the result of the natural growth of the body, or it may be artificially produced by the doctor. There are other things, again, that can only be produced by art and do not come into existence by nature at all[3]. Any classification based solely on the nature of the objects would, therefore, be endlessly complicated. We must hold fast to the simple distinction based on the fundamental difference between theoretical and practical or productive intelligence.

[1] Plato had referred the science of the king or statesman to the cognitive class (Polit. 259 c); Aristotle, on the contrary, never tires of insisting on its practical character. This is a fundamental distinction, and is well brought out by Eudemos. Cf. EE. 1216 b, 3 *Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ὁ πρεσβύτης ᾤετ' εἶναι τέλος τὸ γινώσκειν τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ἐπεζήτει τί ἐστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τί ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς. ἐποίει γὰρ ταῦτ' εὐλόγως· ἐπιστήμας γὰρ ᾤετ' εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσθ' ἅμα συμβαίνειν εἰδέναι τε τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μεμαθήκαμεν τὴν γεωμετρίαν καὶ οἰκοδομίαν καί ἐσμεν οἰκοδόμοι καὶ γεωμέτραι. διόπερ ἐζήτει τί ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἀλλ' οὐ πῶς γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τίνων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν συμβαίνει τῶν θεωρητικῶν (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς ἀστρολογίας οὐδὲ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ γεωμετρίας πλὴν τὸ γνωρίσαι καὶ θεωρῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ὑποκειμένων ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἶναι χρησίμους αὐτὰς ἡμῖν)· τῶν δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἕτερον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ γνώσεως, οἷον ὑγίεια μὲν ἰατρικῆς, εὐνομία δὲ ἤ τι τοιοῦθ' ἕτερον τῆς πολιτικῆς. καλὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν ἕκαστον τῶν καλῶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμιώτατον τί ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδὲ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.*

[2] Met. 1026 a, 13 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.... ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική.*

[3] Cf. 1140 a, 18. Part. An. 640 a, 28 *ἔνια γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεται ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης.* Met. 1034 a, 9 *ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ' οὔ, οἷον οἰκία, κ.τ.λ.*

§ 12. Each of these kinds of science has its own good or end, something that makes it worth knowing; but this will be different in each case. The end of theoretical science cannot be to make any change in its object; for that object is either incapable of change altogether or at least of all change from an external source. In theoretical science we are, therefore, simply in the position of spectators, and this is the original signification of the word *θεωρία*. The end or good of such science lies in conformity to reality, and this conformity is truth. When we have reached this, we have reached the completion (*τέλος*) of the science, and there is nothing beyond it for us to attain[1].

If, however, the object of a science is something which has not its source of motion in itself, our relation to it at once becomes different. If the efficient cause is in ourselves, it becomes possible for us to realise the object of our science, and this realisation becomes the "end" or completion of the science. The object of it is no longer "what is" (*τὸ ὄν*), but the *γένεσις* of "what is to be" (*τὸ ἐσόμενον*); we are no longer spectators but actors[2]. Popular language already uses the word *δύναμις* for such a science[3], and this is quite correct; for the definition of *δύναμις* is just *ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ*[4].

[1] Met. 993 b, 20 *θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀλήθεια, πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον.* ib. 1051 b, 3 *ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα.*

[2] An. Post. 100 a, 9 *ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.* Part. An. 640 a, 3 *ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὄν, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐσόμενον.*

[3] Plato, Polit. 304 d *ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ δύναμις.* Isokr. Panath. § 30 *τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις διαφερόντων.* So Ar. Met. 1046 b, 2 *διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο.*

[4] Met. 1020 a, 4 *ὥστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο.* De Cael. 301 b, 18 *φύσις μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχουσα κινήσεως ἀρχή, δύναμις δ' ἡ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο.* The addition *ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο* is intended to provide for such cases as the physician healing himself.

V.

§ 13. We see that there are many practical and productive sciences or arts, just as there are many things that are good for Man; but we see also that the ends of some of those arts are subordinate to those of others. Plato had already divided arts into those that "make" and those that "use," those that make the tools and those that make the thing itself. The art of weaving uses the art of shuttle-making, and therefore the shuttle-maker must take his instructions as to the proper form of shuttles from the weaver, just as the weaver in turn takes his instructions as to cloth from the tailor. In the same way, to take an illustration which was in Aristotle's mind when he wrote the first chapter of the "Ethics," the maker of bridles must take his instructions from the horseman who uses them[1]. This relation of the higher to the lower arts is otherwise expressed by saying that the former are "architectonic" with regard to the lower, a term also of Platonic origin[2].

Now, for reasons which will be explained presently, there must be some one good which is in a pre-eminent sense the Good for Man, and to which all other goods are subservient, and it is the art of producing this we are to study now. Clearly, if we wish to know what this art is, we must ask what is the art that "uses" all the other arts, the most "architectonic" of the practical sciences, the science that has the plan of human life as the master-builder has the plan of the house. This point too has been settled by Plato; for he has shown that the two sciences which are most apt to claim the chief place, namely Rhetoric and Strategy, are both subordinate to Politics[3]. This, then, is the art or science we must study if we wish to produce the Good for Man[4].

[1] Plato, Krat. 390 c (of the *κερκίς*) *τίς οὖν ὁ γνωσόμενος εἰ τὸ προσῆκον εἶδος ἐν ὁποιῳοῦν ξύλῳ κεῖται; ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων, ἢ ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ὑφάντης;* The *χρησομένη τέχνη* is said *ἐπιστατεῖν τῇ ποιούσῃ*. In Polit. 281 d the distinction is expressed as one between *αἴτιαι* and *συναίτιοι τέχναι*. We read there *ὅσαι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργούσαις ὄργανα παρασκευάζουσιν,... ταύτας μὲν συναιτίους, τὰς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀπεργαζομένας αἰτίας.* The

example of *χαλινοποιική* in EN. 1094 a, 11 is a clear allusion to Rep. 601 c (where a third art, the imitative, is added) *Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡνίας τε γράψει καὶ χαλινόν; Ναί. Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; Πάνυ γε. Ἆρ' οὖν ἐπαΐει οἵας δεῖ τὰς ἡνίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὅ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος, ὅσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, μόνος ὁ ἱππικός; Ἀληθέστατα. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ περὶ πάντα οὕτω φήσομεν ἔχειν; Πῶς; Περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι, χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην; Ναί.*

[2] The term *ἀρχιτεκτονικός* is derived from Plato Polit. 259 e *καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργάτης ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων*. He furnishes *γνῶσις* and not *χειρουργία*. On the other hand he is not merely *κριτικός* but *ἐπιτακτικός*. So in Ar. Phys. 194 a, 36 we have *δύο δὴ αἱ ἄρχουσαι τῆς ὕλης καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι, ἥ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική*.

[3] The problem of Plato's "Statesman" is to distinguish by the use of dialectics the true King or Statesman from the countless claimants of the title. After the kingly art has been distinguished from the other arts of tending live animals in herds, we have still to distinguish it from the other arts within the state, both those which produce the things themselves (*αἱ αἴτιαι*) and those which produce the tools for making them (*αἱ συναίτιοι*). After enumerating seven classes of arts which produce inanimate possessions, we come to the animate. We pass in review slaves, hirelings, heralds, secretaries and priests, till at last we have left only *τὰ τίμια καὶ συγγενῆ*, namely *στρατηγία*, *δικαστική* and the highest kind of *ῥητορεία* (Polit. 303 e, cf. EN. 1094 b, 3).

Now, if we take any art, we find that there is a higher art which prescribes whether we are to learn it or not (Polit. 304 b, cf. EN. 1094 b, 1), and the other arts must yield precedence to this. So Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, must yield precedence to the art which decides whether persuasion or force is to be used, and Strategy, the art of war, must yield to the art which determines whether we are to be at war or at peace. That Aristotle had all this in mind when he wrote the first chapter of the Ethics is plain, not only from its general tenour, but from coincidences of language such as *πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις* (1094 a, 12 n.), the use of *δύναμις* (§ 12, n. 3), the phrase *αἱ τιμιώταται τῶν δυνάμεων* and the like. The argument was familiar in the Platonic school and is found also in the Euthydemos (289—291).

[4] The interpretation of the first chapter of the Ethics here implied is, so far as I know, a new one. It is generally supposed that the passage deals with ends in general and not simply with the distinction between the ends of theoretical and practical science and the proof that the end of the most architectonic of the practical sciences will be the good for Man. The external evidence for the interpretation I have adopted consists of (1) the obvious fact that Aristotle is simply reproducing the familiar argument of Plato given above, n. 3, (2) the brief syllogistic summary of the argument in the Politics, 1282 b, 14, quoted on p. 7, (3) the tradition of the school as represented by MM. 1182 a, 32 sqq., quoted on p. 6.

§ 14. A modern writer who wished to draw a distinction between Ethics and Politics would probably rest his case on the view that the good of the individual is something different

from the good of the state. It is significant that the only objection foreseen by Aristotle to his use of the name Politics for the science of human good is the objection that the good of the individual is the same as that of the state, and that some name should therefore be chosen which would include the whole subject instead of one that seems to emphasise unduly a single aspect of it. So far from apologising for "confounding Ethics and Politics," Aristotle excuses himself for appearing to separate them. His reason is that a science which dealt with the good of the individual alone would be incomplete, a mere makeshift[1]. It may be that circumstances prevent us from doing more than making an attempt to realise the good for a few or even for one, but that can never take the place of the full realisation of the good in a community which is the natural end of human nature.

[1] EN. 1094 b, 7 sqq., where observe that *ἀγαπητόν* has its usual sense of 'better than nothing,' *faute de mieux*.

§ 15. It will be seen from this that it is quite wrong to say the Ethics studies the Good for Man from the point of view of the individual, while the Politics deals with the realisation of that good by the agency of the state. The subject of both works is equally "Politics," and there is not a single word in either of them or anywhere else which could be interpreted as setting up any such science as *ἠθική* in distinction to *πολιτική*[1]. It is quite true that Aristotle himself in other writings, though never in the Ethics itself, refers to this first part of his course on Politics as *ἠθικοὶ λόγοι* and the like, but that is quite a different matter[2]. The work we are about to study may fairly be called *ἠθικά* because it is, as we shall see, a piece of dialectic based on *ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις*[3], that is to say, premisses derived from an examination of human character; but it is none the less a part of Aristotle's system of Politics, and has no special reference to the individual considered apart from the community.

It is true that we cannot consider the Ethics and Politics in their present form as parts of one work. They are not

a continuous whole, and the plan laid down for the Politics at the end of the Ethics is not the plan which the latter work carries out. There are, too, undeniable differences of standpoint and terminology, which have been well brought out by Mr Newman and need not therefore be enumerated here. But all that these differences imply is an interval of time between the two works and a consequent modification of Aristotle's views in some particulars. It still remains true that the Ethics everywhere looks forward to some such sequel as the Politics, and that the Politics everywhere presupposes the results of some such treatise as the Ethics. The Ethics asks the question "How is the Good for Man realised?" and the answer it gives is that legislation is the means of producing character, and that upon character depends the possibility of that activity which constitutes Happiness or the Good for Man. The Politics takes up the inquiry at this point and discusses everything connected with legislation and the constitution of the state[4]. The whole forms one *πραγματεία* or *μέθοδος*, and there is no word anywhere of *ἠθική* as a separate branch of study.

[1] The word *ἠθική* as a substantive does not occur once in Aristotle. In MM. 1181 a, 24 we have *λέγειν ὑπὲρ ἠθικῶν*, so that *τὰ ἠθικά* was already a separate science by that time.

[2] We have *ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς* in Pol. 1261 a, 31. 1280 a, 18. 1295 a, 36. 1332 a, 8. This is varied in Pol. 1332 a, 22 by *κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους*, and in 1282 b, 20 we have *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι ἐν οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν*.

[3] Top. 105 b, 20 *αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί. ἠθικαὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ τοιαῦται, οἷον πότερον δεῖ τοῖς γονεῦσι ἢ τοῖς νόμοις μᾶλλον πειθαρχεῖν, ἐὰν διαφωνῶσιν· λογικαὶ δὲ οἷον πότερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὔ, φυσικαὶ δὲ οἷον πότερον ἀίδιος ὁ κόσμος ἢ οὔ.*

[4] Aristotle himself generally refers to what we call the "Politics" by the more appropriate title *περὶ πολιτείας* or *περὶ πολιτειῶν*. Once only do we find the title *τὰ πολιτικά* (Rhet. 1366 a, 21), and there the reference is quite general. It may as well include the "Ethics" as not. Cf. for the details, Newman's edition of the Politics, vol. II, p. iii.

§ 16. This absolute identification of two things which, from the accident of the titles given to Aristotle's works, have come to be distinguished by the names of Ethics and Politics, is apt to suggest to us that the good of the individual is to be sacrificed to that of an abstraction called the state.

Such an idea, however, is wholly foreign to Aristotle's way of thinking. No one knew better than he did that a happiness which is not the happiness of individual souls is nothing at all. The state as such has no good that can be secured at the expense of the individuals who compose it. What Aristotle did hold was that, if we wish to find the Good for Man, we must seek it in a community of some sort; for man is by nature a being who finds his good only in a community, and can only find it completely in the most "full-grown" or complete community, that is, in the city-state. Lesser communities like the family and the village are enough for the needs of bare life; but Man's nature requires more than this for its full developement, and it is the state alone that can secure for him the good life[1].

On the other hand, it is true that the organisation of the state involves a restriction of happiness in the fullest sense to certain of its members. The state exists for the sake of the comparatively few rare souls that are able to lead the highest life, and it is undeniable that the rest are to some extent sacrificed to these. But in reply to this Aristotle would say that in a well-ordered state all the citizens have such happiness as they are capable of, and we cannot ask for more. Even slavery, which Aristotle regarded as necessary and natural, he at least attempted to justify on the ground that it is best for the slave himself to be the "living tool" which enables his master to lead the good life. Were it not that some men are "slaves by nature," slavery would be unjustifiable altogether[2].

[1] Pol. 1252 b, 28 (after a description of the οἰκία and the κώμη) ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἡ δὴ πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας (cf. below § 27).

[2] Aristotle therefore condemns the indiscriminate treatment of prisoners of war as slaves (Pol. 1255 a, 24); τήν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον.

§ 17. There is another mistaken view of the identification of Ethics and Politics which we have to guard against. We feel that somehow the ideal of a community is not always the same as that of the individuals who compose it. It may occasionally be higher, as most Greeks would have said was the case at Sparta; usually it is a good deal lower. Now Aristotle was keenly alive to this fact and the problems to which it gives rise. To the Greeks such questions were apt to present themselves in a personal form—a peculiarity which saved them from much confused thinking—and Aristotle therefore asks himself "Is the good man the same as the good citizen?" The answer which he gives to this is quite clear. The good man and the good citizen are not the same except in the case of the man who is leading the highest life in the ideal state[1]. Here we certainly have no lowering of the moral ideal to suit the middling practice of the ordinary state; for we may make our ideal state as ideal as we please. The only thing we must insist on is that, except in a community of some kind, man can never be complete, can never be all that he has it in him to be.

[1] Cf. EN. 1130 b, 26 sqq. with the notes, and the full discussion in Pol. 1276 b, 16 sqq. Newman's Politics, vol. i, pp. 234 sqq.

§ 18. Aristotle, then, was quite aware of the fact that the ideal was nowhere realised, and he knew that, as things were, there was a discrepancy between individual and social morality. But he did not separate Ethics and Politics because he did not despair yet of the Greek city-state. No one who reads these lectures can doubt that they were delivered as a serious contribution to the realisation of the ideal state as Aristotle conceived it. There is a hopeful tone in all he says which shows he really thought the thing could be done if only people would go about it in the right way. He is no idle speculator, but a man in all earnestness making practical proposals which he has hopes of getting adopted. We feel the contrast between this and the far less sanguine view that was natural to Plato's deeper nature. The fact is that Aristotle, with all his intellectual greatness, was a child to his

master in the understanding of human life. On the other hand, it may be noted that his strong sense of reality prevented him from ignoring altogether, as Plato was sometimes apt to do, the relative worth of the various imperfect ideals realised by the Hellenic states as he found them, and this enabled him to become the founder of Politics in the modern sense of the word.

§ 19. It is only another consequence of the personal way in which such problems presented themselves to the Greek mind that the question of how to save the city-state took the shape "How can we best train a lawgiver?" The whole course of Greek history illustrates the importance of personality. The laws of most states had been framed by legislators whose names were known, and where none was known a mythical one was soon invented. This was the only form in which a Greek could imagine a reformation, and we need not wonder if Aristotle thought he might be able to train a new Solon. The discovery of the long-lost "Constitution of the Athenians" has proved that the historical works of Aristotle were composed with the same idea. They were no mere collections of facts on which a generalisation of purely scientific importance might be based, but also political pamphlets intended to commend certain definite views to practical statesmen. As it has been well put by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Aristotle wished to train a generation that should be enabled, by insight into the nature and end of the state and into the forms it assumes, to have a practical effect in the right sense among the thousandfold different conditions which the Hellenic states presented....To this task he addressed his efforts, and he thought not a little of his performance[1]."

The strange thing is, as has often been pointed out, that Aristotle, himself a man without a city and closely connected with the Macedonian court, should never have suspected that the days of the city-state were numbered, and that the Diadochoi were creating a new political unity, the Empire, which was not indeed to reach its full developement on Greek soil, but was to act as the most powerful of the influences that led an Italian city-state to become the capital of the world.

[1] Aristoteles und Athen, vol. ii, p. 361.

VI.

§ 20. The question of method is always vital to Aristotle, and he seems to have found his hearers very deficient in a due sense of its importance. He complains in one place that people dislike any method of exposition they are not accustomed to, and mean by intelligible no more than familiar. It is just the same as with the ancient laws, which are often childish, but have been sanctified by long custom. Thus it is that some will not listen to a lecture unless it is put into mathematical form, while others demand examples and illustrations, and others again require the evidence of some poet. One class want everything put with minute exactitude; others are annoyed by precision, either because they are incapable of connected thought, or because they think it is mean and petty. There is something about it, in philosophy as well as in business, that repels them. What is wanted to remedy all this is Culture. We cannot be always looking for the method of knowledge and for knowledge itself at the same time. Neither is easy to find. It is clearly necessary, then, that we should have some preliminary training in these matters, so that we may know where we are entitled to demand mathematical precision and where anything of the sort would be entirely out of place[1].

[1] Met. 995 a, 3 αἱ δ' ἀκροάσεις κατὰ τὰ ἔθη συμβαίνουσιν· ὡς γὰρ εἰώθαμεν οὕτως ἀξιοῦμεν λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν ἀγνωστότερα καὶ ξενικώτερα. τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες γνωριμώτερον, ἡλίκην δ' ἰσχὺν ἔχει τὸ σύνηθες οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ παιδαριώδη μεῖζον ἰσχύει τοῦ γιγνώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ ἔθος. οἱ μὲν οὖν, ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγῃ τις, οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τῶν λεγόντων, οἱ δ' ἐὰν μὴ παραδειγματικῶς, οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιοῦσιν ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητήν. καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν. ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναί τισι δοκεῖ. διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης· ἔστι δ' οὐδέτερον ῥᾴδιον λαβεῖν. τὴν δ' ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτητέον, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην.

§ 21. We see that Aristotle calls this preliminary training παιδεία. This word in the fourth century B.C. was very commonly contrasted with τέχνη, to express the idea of culture as opposed to professional knowledge or skill. It was the proudest boast of Isokrates that he, alone among the teachers of his time, kept this end steadily in view; for to him it seemed that Plato and Aristotle taught a mere specialism, and that of no very exalted kind. In the Protagoras of Plato the young Hippokrates actually blushes at the suggestion that he is going to take lessons with any other view than to get that unprofessional culture which alone becomes a gentleman. It is clear, however, that Aristotle means something far more definite than this. With him the man of culture is above all things the arbiter of method. He is the judge of how much precision is fairly to be expected in any inquiry (EN. 1094 b, 23), and in the Metaphysics we are told that it shows want of culture not to know what can be demonstrated and what can not[1].

The clearest account of the matter, however, is to be found in a remarkable passage at the beginning of the treatise on the Parts of Animals. There we read that there are two ways of possessing any science whether it be humble or exalted, one of which may be called knowledge of the subject and the other a sort of culture. It shows culture to be able to form a right judgment instinctively as to where the speaker's exposition of a subject is methodically correct and where it is amiss. This is general culture, the power of judging all scientific method correctly. But there is another kind of culture which has to do with some definite part of knowledge only. In Natural History as in other branches of study there is a culture of this kind which enables us to approve or condemn the form of the exposition quite apart from the question of the truth or falsehood of the matter[2].

We have to do, then, with two distinct kinds of culture, general and special, and we must ask what precisely each of these is. Now, there is a passage in the Metaphysics where want of culture is identified with ignorance of "Analytics[3]."

This seems to be the key. Giphanius said long ago "Vocat ille παιδείαν habitum quendam recte iudicandi de rebus omnibus quod docet doctrina Analytica; contra ἀπαιδευσία contrarius ab illo habitus dicitur, hoc est ignoratio doctrinae Analyticae." This is quite correct; for "general culture" is evidently what we call Aristotelian Logic, a knowledge of which is, therefore, essential to a right understanding of the Ethics.

But, in addition to this, Aristotle demands a special kind of culture from the student of Politics, just as he demanded a special culture from the student of Natural History. In the Politics we are told that, just as a doctor must render his account to doctors, so must all others be judged by their peers. But by a doctor we mean not only the practitioner, but also the architectonic doctor and thirdly the man of culture; for, we are told, there are people of that class in nearly all the arts. We must allow the right of judgment to men of culture as fully as to men of knowledge[4].

The kind of culture referred to here is clearly not Aristotelian Logic. The "architectonic" doctor is the great physiologist or pathologist, to whom the practitioner is related as the builder is to the architect, and the man of culture must be the man who has an intelligent, but non-professional, knowledge of medicine, enough, let us say, to know a quack when he sees one. Just so in Politics. The architectonic politician is, as we have seen already, the lawgiver, the "practical politician" corresponds to the medical practitioner, and the man of culture to the citizen who, without necessarily taking an active part in political life, can form an intelligent judgment on political questions, and who knows what sort of treatment is applicable to so complex a thing as human society. Just as the man of medical culture will see at once through the quack's nostrum, even though he may be unable to justify his rejection of it on scientific grounds, so the man of whom we are speaking will at once distrust any talk upon such subjects which seems to suggest that good citizens can be made by theoretical instruction in the duties of citizenship, and any attempt to regulate the

state on the basis of rigid and abstract formulas like the axioms of the mathematician.

[1] Met. 1006 a, 6 ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο (the principle of contradiction) ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ.

[2] Part. An. 639 a, 1 Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τινά. πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. τοιοῦτον γὰρ δή τινα καὶ τὸν ὅλως πεπαιδευμένον οἰόμεθ' εἶναι, καὶ τὸ πεπαιδεῦσθαι τὸ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον. πλὴν τοῦτον μὲν περὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν κριτικόν τινα νομίζομεν εἶναι ἕνα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα, τὸν δὲ περί τινος φύσεως ἀφωρισμένης· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τις ἕτερος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ εἰρημένῳ διακείμενος περὶ μόριον. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσιν ἱστορίας δεῖ τινας ὑπάρχειν ὅρους τοιούτους, πρὸς οὓς ἀναφέρων ἀποδέξεται τὸν τρόπον τῶν δεικνυμένων, χωρὶς τοῦ πῶς ἔχει τἀληθές, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως.

[3] Met. 1005 b, 3 δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο ὁρῶσιν.

[4] Pol. 1282 a, 1 ὥσπερ οὖν ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατρὸς δ' ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γάρ τινες τοιοῦτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς εἰδόσιν.

VII.

§ 22. The first lesson we have to learn from our man of culture is that every science must have a starting-point (*ἀρχή*). Geometry, for instance, starts from certain definitions and axioms which define the nature of space, and we must have a similar starting-point for Politics.

From what has been said as to the nature of practical science, however, it follows that the starting-point of Politics will be a definition, not of something that is, but of something that is to be. It will not resemble the definitions from which deductive geometry starts, but rather the enunciation of a problem in geometrical construction, what in the older Greek geometry was called a *ὑπόθεσις*[1]. Now the method by which we solve a problem of this kind is analysis, that is to say, we assume that the construction is made, and then ask what are the conditions of its being made until we come to something that is in our power, just as in a theoretical analysis we go on until we come to something we know to be true.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle gives us an example of a theoretical analysis. Figures are resolved by making actual the divisions into other figures which are there potentially. If they were already actually divided the proof would be plain; as it is, we must make a construction which is always in the long run some form of division. For instance, why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? It is because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If the line parallel to the side were already drawn, the truth would be plain at first sight. Again, why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle? It is because, if you have three lines, the two segments of the base and the perpendicular raised on the centre, and if you know the previous proposition, the thing is clear at first sight[2].

The theoretical sciences cannot prove their starting-points or first principles. In the long run these must simply be perceived, and it is equally true that the practical sciences cannot deliberate about the end which forms their starting-point. The reason is that analysis, whether it takes the form of demonstration or deliberation, has to do only with the series of middle terms which appear in the theoretical sciences as causes, in the practical sciences as means. For instance, if we have to "demonstrate" an eclipse of the moon, we do so by finding the middle term *ἀντίφραξις γῆς*, and when we have found this, we know the cause of the eclipse[3]. In the same way, if we have to deliberate about health, we do so by seeking for middle terms or "means" till we come to one that it is in our power to produce[4]. And, on this side too, we are dependent on a simple "perception" or "intuition." If we are analysing a rectilinear figure, we simply "perceive" that triangles are the ultimate figures into which we can analyse it, a perception which is really identical with that of the axiom that two straight lines cannot inclose a space[5]. So too in practice. An act is always a particular act, and no particular can ever be reached by a process of reasoning. We simply "see" that this particular act which is within our power is a case of the general rule which we have found by deliberation. The whole process of analytic deliberation has

to do only with the middle terms which are intermediate between the definition of the end to be attained and the particular act, which is also an object of simple intuition. We start from an "immediate proposition" (*ἄμεσος πρότασις*), that is, a proposition which does not admit of any middle term between its subject and its predicate[6], and we end with a particular act, which in turn cannot be connected with the rule under which it falls by a middle term. At each end of the scale we are dependent on immediate perception.

[1] The precise signification of *ὑπόθεσις* is *ὃ ὑποτίθεταί τις*, that which one sets before oneself as a thing to be done or proved; for the meaning of *ὑποτίθεμαι* is not very different from that of *προτίθεμαι*. The *ὑπόθεσις* is properly the Q.E.D. or Q.E.F. of a geometrical problem. It is a conclusion assumed for purposes of analysis to be true, or an end assumed for purposes of deliberation to be realised. The method and terminology are alike Platonic, though in the Sixth Book of the Republic Plato insists that knowledge in the highest sense cannot be of this character, but must deduce everything from the Form of the Good. The analytic method proceeds *ἐξ ὑποθέσεων οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτήν* (510 b); the true method would not regard these *ὑποθέσεις* as *ἀρχαί*. It is evidence of the Academic origin of the theory that we have in [Plato] Def. 415 b *ὑπόθεσις ἀρχὴ ἀναπόδεικτος*. See Jowett and Campbell's Republic, vol. ii, pp. 333 sqq.

Met. 1051 a, 21 *εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ· διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν. εἰ δ' ἦν διῃρημένα, φανερὰ ἂν ἦν· νῦν δ' ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον. διὰ τί ἡ ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου; διότι ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἥ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῖνο εἰδότι.*

[3] An. Post. 93 a, 30 *ἔκλειψις ἐφ' οὗ τὸ Α, σελήνη ἐφ' οὗ Γ, ἀντίφραξις γῆς ἐφ' οὗ Β.* ib. 85 b, 23 *ἀπόδειξις μέν ἐστι συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί.* Met. 1041 a, 10 *ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί ἀεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει.* An. Post. (loc. cit.) *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι οἰόμεθα ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, αἰτίῳ δὲ τέτταρες,...πᾶσαι αὗται διὰ τοῦ μέσου δείκνυνται.*

[4] See EE. 1227 b, 28 sqq. quoted on pp. 323 sq. Cf. Met. 1032 b, 15 *τῶν δὲ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἡ μὲν νόησις καλεῖται* (the deliberative analysis), *ἡ δὲ ποίησις, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἴδους* (the *ὑπόθεσις* consisting of a formal cause or definition) *νόησις, ἡ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως* (the *ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει*) *ποίησις. λέγω δ' οἷον εἰ ὑγιανεῖ, δεῖ ὁμαλυνθῆναι. τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ὁμαλυνθῆναι; τοδί. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται εἰ θερμανθήσεται. τοῦτο δὲ τί ἐστι; τοδί. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοδὶ δυνάμει· τοῦτο δ' ἤδη ἐπ' αὐτῷ.*

[5] Cf. EN. 1142 a, 28 n. This passage, which has caused some difficulty, is well elucidated by Görland, Aristoteles und die Mathematik, pp. 79 sqq. The mathematical *ἔσχατον*, into which all rectilinear figures could be resolved, was the triangle. Cf. Met. 1054 a, 3 *καὶ εἰ σχήματα εὐθύγραμμα* (sc. *τὰ ὄντα ἦν*), *σχημάτων ἂν ἦν ἀριθμός, καὶ τὸ ἓν τὸ τρίγωνον.* De An. 414 b, 21 *οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνον ἔστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς...παραπλησίως δ' ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν*

σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ τρίγωνον κ.τ.λ.

[6] An. Post. 72 a, 7 *ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἀποδείξεως πρότασις ἄμεσος, ἄμεσος δὲ ἧς μή ἐστιν ἄλλη προτέρα.* 72 b, 18 *ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον...τὰ ἄμεσα...ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι.* ib. 76 a, 19 *φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὰς ἑκάστου ἰδίας ἀρχὰς ἀποδεῖξαι.* ib. 90 b, 24 *ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὁρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον.* ib. 93 b, 21 *ἔστι δὲ τῶν μὲν ἕτερόν τι τὸ αἴτιον, τῶν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἄμεσα καὶ ἀρχαί εἰσιν, ἃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ τί ἐστιν ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ποιῆσαι.*

§ 23. How, then, do we know these "first principles," these ultimate definitions from which every science must start? The answer given by Aristotle in the Ethics (1098 b, 3) is that some are apprehended by means of induction (*ἐπαγωγῇ*), some by perception (*αἰσθήσει*), and some by "habituation" (*ἐθισμῷ τινι*). It is by perception or intuition that the first principles of mathematics, for instance, are apprehended. The definition of a triangle is reached simply by looking at a triangle. No one can prove to us that a figure with three angles will also have three sides; we must simply see that for ourselves. If we cannot imagine a triangle, no one can help us to do so. When, however, we have once got the definition, we can go on to demonstrate mediate propositions about triangles to any extent by finding middle terms which lead to new conclusions. This process is analysis; but without the definition of the triangle as a starting-point we should have nothing to analyse.

In most cases, however, the subject is more complex, and a single act of intuition does not suffice to make the definition clear to us. In such cases we must be made to see the truth of the immediate proposition by being called upon to recognise it in a number of instances adduced for the purpose. It is this process which Aristotle calls *ἐπαγωγή*, a word which literally signifies the citation of witnesses in a court of law. It is not a method of proof; for the propositions which we arrive at by its help are not capable of proof in the proper sense of the word. It is simply a way of making us see for ourselves what we cannot know in any other way. If we have not the "sense" to see the truth of an immediate proposition

for ourselves, no number of instances will make us sure of it, and this is what Aristotle means when he says *νοῦς ἐστι τῶν ἀρχῶν*, and identifies *νοῦς* with *αἴσθησις*, which is the most general term for immediate perception whether sensuous or intellectual[1].

But there are still more complicated cases, and these include, for reasons we shall see presently, the greater part of human affairs, which require something more than this inductive process, the chief sphere of which is the study of nature. The operations of nature are always in the same direction, whereas human action is always the result of a capacity of opposites, and therefore implies a choice between alternatives. Now, if we are to see for ourselves the first principle of which all human action ought to be the application, we must be habituated in such a way as always to choose the right alternative of the two which are possible in every act. If we were habituated in such a way as always to choose the wrong alternative, we should arrive at some sort of a first principle too, but it would be a false one; while if we were to choose now the one and now the other, our "moral sense" would be blunted and confused. And this explains why we must attend to the unproved statements and beliefs of experienced and elderly people (1143 b, 11). Their experience has given them an eye for such things and they see aright. But we must remember also that it is the "eye" and not the experience that really secures the truth of these statements. The first principles of the science of human conduct are as incapable of demonstration as those of any other science. They too must in the long run be "perceived" immediately, and if we cannot see them for ourselves, no one can make us see them.

[1] This is the *ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις* of Speusippos, *ἡ μεταλαμβάνουσα τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας* (Sext. Math. vii, 145). Cf. EN. 1042 a, 27, where it is contrasted with *ἡ τῶν ἰδίων αἴσθησις* and compared with the perception of the "common sensibles," i.e. those *αἰσθητά* which are not the object of any special sense.

VIII.

§ 24. Assuming, then, that the necessary habituation has been secured, how are we to get at the starting-point of our science in a form that admits of deliberative analysis? In other words, how are we to find the definition of the Good for Man? The answer is that we must adopt the method of Dialectic. The word *διαλεκτική* properly means nothing more than the art of dialogue or discussion—it signifies the theoretical formulation of the practice of Sokrates. Little as we know with certainty of the teaching of the historical Sokrates, we do know very accurately the method which he adopted. It was to make people see the truth by talking to them, to elicit by means of question and answer that knowledge which they possessed without being clearly conscious of it, the truth which was in them already in the sense that they could be made to see it as soon as it was put before them in a clear and distinct way. Plato developed this method and, by the help of the theory of Reminiscence, made Dialectic the science of the Forms or "Ideas." In his hands it became the only instrument of all philosophical thinking, the ideal of a completed science. To this Aristotle could not agree. A dialectic proof was to him no proof at all; for it had no middle term[1]. It could not be the right instrument for arriving at mediate propositions; for we can only be said to know these in the true sense of the word when we know them as the conclusions of a syllogism. This was Aristotle's own contribution to Logic, and he is never weary of showing us that the syllogism is the only adequate form for the mediate truths of science. But it remains as true for him as it was for Plato that the dialectic method is the only way of arriving at immediate propositions, propositions which can have no middle term between their subject and their predicate, and we have seen that it is from such propositions that all science must start.

[1] The fault of the dialectic method as employed by Plato is just that it represents mediate truth in a form which is only right for immediate. Cf. An. Pr.

46 a, 31 ὅτι δ' ἡ διὰ τῶν γενῶν διαίρεσις (as in Plato's Sophist and Statesman) μικρόν τι μόριόν ἐστι τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου, ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις οἷον ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται, συλλογίζεται δ' ἀεί τι τῶν ἄνωθεν....ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ὅταν δέῃ τι συλλογίσασθαι ὑπάρχειν, δεῖ τὸ μέσον, δι' οὗ γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός, καὶ ἧττον ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ καθόλου τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἄκρων. ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις τοὐναντίον βούλεται· τὸ γὰρ καθόλου λαμβάνει μέσον.

§ 25. Dialectic is the subject of that part of the Organon called the Topics, and it is there that we shall find the theoretical justification of the method employed in the Ethics. The object of the science, we are told, is to enable us to draw conclusions from received beliefs on any subject that may be proposed. The dialectic syllogism differs from the demonstrative syllogism in having for its premisses, not scientific truths but received beliefs. These beliefs are those either of the majority or of the wise. It is useful to cultivate this science, first as an intellectual exercise, secondly as a preparation for discussions with those who do not accept our premisses, and it has a place even in sciences that admit of philosophic treatment. If we are able to raise all the difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily distinguish truth from error. But above all it is of use for the discovery of the first principles or starting-points of the different sciences, since it is impossible for any science to give an account of its own starting-point. That can only be discussed in the light of received beliefs on the subject. This, then, is the proper function of dialectic, which is a method of examination and affords a path to the first principles of all the sciences[1].

We begin, then, by "taking" (*λαμβάνειν*)[2] premisses from the beliefs of the many and the wise to serve as premisses (*ἔνδοξοι προτάσεις*)[3]. But our attitude towards these beliefs is by no means uncritical. We start from them, indeed, but we at once go on to raise all the difficulties which they suggest. As a general rule, we find that they are contradictory, and when we find such a contradiction between received beliefs, we have what is called an *ἀπορία* (literally "no thoroughfare"). Our thought is, as it were, fettered and we are obliged to look for some means of freeing it from its

chains. The technical name for a pair of contradictory *ἔνδοξα* is *πρόβλημα* and the solution of it is called the *λύσις*[4].

Our belief in the possibility of solving the contradictions between *ἔνδοξα* depends upon the conviction that neither the mass of men from ancient times down to the present nor the great thinkers of mankind are likely to be altogether wrong[5]. We usually find that if we develope their beliefs by criticism, if we make them "take a step further" (*μεταβαίνειν*), they come into agreement readily enough. "It is of advantage," we read in the Metaphysics, "to advance step by step to what is more known," that is, more known "by nature." "It is thus that all learning takes place, by an advance from what is less known by nature to what is more so. This is our real task, to turn what is more known to us into what is more known by nature, just as in action it is to turn what is good for us into what is good universally. What is first known to a given person is often very feebly known; but for all that it is from things known to oneself, however inadequately, that we must try to apprehend universal knowledge, shifting our ground and advancing step by step, as has been said, through these very things[6]."

The task of the dialectician, then, is to draw on the opposing parties to a consciousness of their real meaning, and thus to make them see their fundamental agreement. It is to lead them on, to use a phrase which has strangely been called "Eudemian," but which is really Platonic, from what is "true but not clear" to what is "true and clear[7]." This he does by assailing these beliefs (*ἐπιχειρεῖν*) from a number of positions or points of vantage (*τόποι*), which are applicable to every kind of subject, the positions of "the more and less," "the essential and the accidental," and so forth, which the skilled dialectician is always ready to occupy. They are in fact a number of ways in which the beliefs under discussion can be qualified so that the contradiction, which only arises from their being stated without qualification, will disappear.

It is sometimes said that the method just described amounts to taking our first principles on trust; but this criticism leaves out of account the other side of the doctrine,

namely that the *ἀρχή* is really apprehended immediately. To this extent we must always remember that Aristotle is a convinced "intuitionalist" in the true sense of that much abused word. Just as we must simply see by "looking at it" that a figure with three sides will have three angles, so in the long run we must simply "see" the truth of our definition of the Good for Man. But that is no reason for refusing the help of any method that will put us in a position to see more easily what is too complex a thing to be grasped at once like the axioms of geometry. Our belief in the truth of this definition rests on no other ground than our conviction of these axioms, and if any one chooses to deny it, we can have nothing further to say to him. We cannot prove it to him; he can only be converted, as Eudemos says, by the experience of advancing years or by being put under restraint. (EE. 1214 b, 28 sqq.)

[1] Top. 101 a, 25 *ἑπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰπεῖν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεία. ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτῶν καταφανές ἐστι· μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥᾷον περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνησόμεθα. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς, μεταβιβάζοντες* (cf. n. 6) *ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν ἡμῖν. πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν, ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶταί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἁπάντων, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ' ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.*

[2] The use of *λαμβάνειν* as a technical term of dialectics is Platonic, and is derived from the current phrase *λόγον λαμβάνειν παρά τινος*. So we have *λαβεῖν προτάσεις παρὰ τῶν ἐρωτωμένων* (Top. 154 a, 25), *λαβεῖν ὑποθέσεις* (An. Pr. 24 a, 24), *λαβεῖν ἀρχάς* (Top. 153 a, 9). Cf. also *λῆψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου* (An. Pr. 24 b, 11), *λῆψις τῶν ὅρων* (ib. 61 a, 28). The *ἐρωτῶν αἰτεῖται παρὰ τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου*, the *ἀποκρινόμενος ἀποδίδωσι τῷ ἐρωτῶντι*, and the *ἐρωτῶν* in turn *λαμβάνει, δέχεται, ἀποδέχεται.*

[3] Cf. EN. 1098 b, 27. Top. 100 b, 21 *ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις.* The mark of an *ἔνδοξος πρότασις* is the verb *δοκεῖ*, "is believed," "is thought," which must always be carefully distinguished from *φαίνεται*, "seems," "appears." Cf. Bonitz Ind. 203 a, 27 "inde *δοκεῖ, δοκοῦντα* usurpatur de iis opinionibus quae communi hominum sensu comprobantur, *τὰ δοκοῦντα* (syn. *τὰ ἔνδοξα, τὰ φαινόμενα*)."

[4] For *ἀπορία* cf. EN. 1146 a, 22 sqq. and the notes. A *πρόβλημα* (*προβάλλω*) only differs from a *πρότασις* (*προτείνω*) in form (*τῷ τρόπῳ*), cf. Top. 101 b, 29. The best commentary on the term *λύσις* is *δέδεται ἡ διάνοια* (EN. loc. cit.).

[5] This conviction of Aristotle's is most strongly expressed in such passages as EN. 1153 b, 32 where all creatures are said to have *θεῖόν τι* in them. This comes from Plato, Laws 950 b *θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς κ.τ.λ.*

[6] Met. 1029 b, 3 *πρὸ ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον. ἡ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίγνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν ἧττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον· καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως ἀγαθὰ ἑκάστῳ ἀγαθά, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῷ γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῷ γνώριμα. τὰ δ' ἑκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἠρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλως μὲν γνωστῶν, αὐτῷ δὲ γνωστῶν, τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ γνῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας ὥσπερ εἴρηται διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν.* For *μεταβαίνειν, μεταβιβάζειν* cf. EN. 1097 a, 24 n., EE. 1216 b, 30 (quoted ad loc.), Top. 101 a, 33 (quoted in n. 1).

[7] For *ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές* cf. EN. 1138 b, 26 n. The formula is technical in Plato's dialectical dialogues. Cf. e.g. Polit. 275 a *τὸ μὲν λεχθὲν ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν... σαφὲς ἐρρήθη*, 281 c *ἢ λέγοιμεν μὲν ἄν τι ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε;*

§ 26. Once we have got our definition, however, the procedure becomes quite different. Our analysis of it, though it is deliberative and not demonstrative, will proceed through middle terms and can only be expressed adequately in the form of a series of practical syllogisms. But here again the "man of culture" has an important warning for us. There cannot be more in the conclusion than there is in the premisses. We can make deductions from the axioms with absolute precision, because these axioms are eternal and necessary and even the mediate truths which we derive from them are quite free from matter. But the premisses of practical science are not of this kind. They are statements, not of immutable truth, but simply of what holds good "for the most part," and our conclusions will therefore have the same approximate character. It shows total lack of culture to ask for mathematical accuracy[1] in the discussion of human affairs. That is only to be looked for in sciences which deal with simple and primary truths[2].

It formed no part of Aristotle's programme to justify this distinction in a course on practical science, but it is really based on metaphysical grounds. We must carefully distinguish two classes of facts which may be the objects of science. First we have those that are of necessity and always,

such as the truths of mathematics. Then there are the things that happen "for the most part" or as a general rule. Thirdly, as this implies exceptions to the rule, there are those things that follow no rule, and are said to happen by "chance." These cannot be the objects of science[3].

In the Topics, the fact that reason rules over temper and desire is given as an instance of a thing that is true for the most part, and in the Prior Analytics, the fact that men grow gray[4]. The first is an *ἠθικὴ πρότασις*, the second a *φυσικὴ πρότασις*. Most investigations, we are told, have to do with facts of this kind, and this is especially true of the practical sciences. Rhetoric, for instance, deals with actions (*τὰ πρακτά*), and these all have this character. None of them are necessary, and "things which happen for the most part and admit of being otherwise must be inferred from premisses of a like nature[5]." This is just the other side of the proposition with which we started above. Again we are told in another passage of the Prior Analytics that "problems as to what is for the most part must be answered from premisses that are true for the most part. The conclusion of each is similar to its starting-point[6]."

From all this it follows that the starting-point of Politics cannot be anything more than a general truth; we cannot hope to find a universal and necessary axiom such as those from which the geometer starts. And it will be absolutely impossible to lay down universal rules of action. Every act is a particular act and for that reason cannot be brought under a universal rule. As in medicine and navigation, we must always take into account the particular circumstances of the case, and these cannot be formulated or predicted[7].

[1] The words which express the presence or absence of this precision are all metaphors taken from the arts, and this is the primary application of the adjective *ἀκριβής*, though we can only guess what a *κρῖβος* was. The opposite of *ἀκριβῶς* is *τύπῳ*, a word which expresses the outline of a solid as *ὑπογραφή* or *περιγραφή* expresses the outline of a plane. As Muretus says, "quod in picturis *ὑπογραφή*, in statuariorum similiumque artificum operibus *τύπος*." The adverb *παχυλῶς* is used of the thick, rough lines of a sketch in contrast with the fine outline of the *τελεία ἀπεργασία*. Cf. Plato, Polit. 294 e, 295 a, where *πως οὑτωσὶ παχύτερον* is opposed to *ἀκριβῶς* and the verb *λεπτουργεῖν*.

[2] The conditions of *ἀκρίβεια* are thus given in An. Post. 87 a, 31 *ἀκριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα* (1) *ἡ τοῦ ὅτι καὶ τοῦ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ* (2) *ἡ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ ἁρμονικῆς, καὶ* (3) *ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητική.* The "abstraction" (*ἀφαίρεσις*) of arithmetic is that of "position" (*θέσις*). Met. 982 a, 26 *ἀκριβέσταται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἳ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λαμβανομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας.* Met. 1078 a, 9 *καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἁπλουστέρων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τἀκριβές.*

[3] Met. 1065 a, 4 *ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐδετέρῳ τούτων ἐστίν.* ib. 1026 b, 3 *πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρία.*

[4] Top. 129 a, 10 *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις, καθάπερ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἴδιον πρὸς ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν τῷ τὸ μὲν προστάττειν τὸ δ' ὑπηρετεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λογιστικὸν πάντοτε προστάττει, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ προστάττεται, οὔτε τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν ἀεὶ προστάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστάττει ποτέ, ὅταν ᾖ μοχθηρὰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.* (Note here the dialectical use of Plato's psychology.) An. Pr. 32 b, 4 *διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων πάλιν λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ δύο λέγεται τρόπους, ἕνα μὲν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεσθαι καὶ διαλείπειν τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον τὸ πολιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι ἢ φθίνειν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ πεφυκὸς ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ συνεχὲς μὲν ἔχει τὸ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὄντος μέντοι ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστιν. ἄλλον δὲ τὸ ἀόριστον, ὃ καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ οὕτως δυνατόν, οἷον τὸ βαδίζειν ζῷον ἢ τὸ βαδίζοντος γενέσθαι σεισμόν, ἢ ὅλως τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὕτως πέφυκεν ἢ ἐναντίως.... ἐπιστήμη δὲ καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν μὲν ἀορίστων οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι τὸ μέσον. τῶν δὲ πεφυκότων ἔστι, καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ λόγοι καὶ αἱ σκέψεις γίνονται περὶ τῶν οὕτως ἐνδεχομένων· ἐκείνων δ' ἐγχωρεῖ μὲν γενέσθαι συλλογισμόν, οὐ μὴν εἴωθέ γε ζητεῖσθαι.*

[5] Rhet. 1357 a, 22 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὀλίγα μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συλλογισμοί εἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἑτέρων συλλογίζεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*

[6] An. Pr. 43 b, 33 *τῶν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προβλημάτων καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προτάσεων, ἢ πασῶν ἢ τινῶν· ὅμοιον γὰρ ἑκάστου τὸ συμπέρασμα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.*

[7] Professor Stewart quotes Hippokrates *περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰατρικῆς* § 9, a passage of which we seem to have more than one echo in the Ethics. *Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ ὑφηγέεται, ὅσα μὲν ἦν ἰσχυρότερα ἔβλαπτεν, ὅσα δ' ἦν ἀσθενέστερα ὠφέλεέ τε καὶ ἔτρεφε τὸν κάμνοντα καὶ τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, εὐπετὲς ἂν ἦν τὸ πρῆγμα· πολλὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀσφαλέος ἂν ἔδει περιλαμβάνοντας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσθενέστατον. νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔλασσον ἁμάρτημα, οὐδὲ ἧσσον λυμαίνεται τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢν ἐλάσσονα καὶ ἐνδεέστερα τῶν ἱκανῶν προσφέρηται· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ λιμοῦ μέρος δύναται ἰσχυρῶς ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ γυιῶσαι καὶ ἀσθενέα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἑτεροῖα μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ πληρώσιος, οὐχ ἧσσον δὲ ἅμα δεινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ κενώσιος· δι' ὧν πολλὸν ποικιλώτερά τε καὶ διὰ πλέονος ἀκριβίης ἐστί. δεῖ γὰρ μέτρου τινὸς στοχάσασθαι. μέτρον δέ, οὐδὲ σταθμόν, οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸν οὐδένα ἄλλον, πρὸς ὃ ἀναφέρων εἴσῃ τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἂν εὑροίης ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἴσθησιν· διὸ ἔργον οὕτω καταμαθεῖν ἀκριβέως, ὥστε σμικρὰ ἁμαρτάνειν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα· κἂν ἐγὼ τοῦτον τὸν ἰητρὸν ἰσχυρῶς*

ἐπαινέοιμι τὸν σμικρὰ ἁμαρτάνοντα· τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς ὀλιγάκις ἔστι κατιδεῖν· ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοί γε τῶν ἰητρῶν ταὐτά μοι δοκέουσι τοῖσι κακοῖσι κυβερνήτῃσι πάσχειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν ἐν γαλήνῃ κυβερνῶντες ἁμαρτάνωσιν, οὐ καταφανέες εἰσίν· ὅταν δὲ αὐτοὺς κατάσχῃ χειμών τε μέγας καὶ ἄνεμος ἐξώστης, φανερῶς ἤδη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισι δι' ἀγνωσίην καὶ ἁμαρτίην δῆλοί εἰσιν ἀπολέσαντες τὴν ναῦν.

IX.

§ 27. We have assumed that man has an "end," and it is desirable to say something at this stage about the conception of the Final Cause which is the ruling conception of our study. It is in accordance with the whole character of this treatise that Aristotle does not include in it any account of his teleological views, but it is necessary for us to refer to them briefly in order that their true bearing may be understood.

The existence of an "end," or more exactly a "completion" (*τέλος*)[1], is due to the fact that nature and man have not only a source of motion in themselves, but also a source of rest[2]. No animal or plant grows indefinitely; there is a point at which each is "complete" or full-grown. Still more will it be the case that for the human soul there is a point at which it has nothing further to attain, and this will be the perfection or completion or "end" of man.

To Aristotle's mind the existence of such a point is proved by the fact that otherwise we should be face to face with that most irrational of things an infinite progression[3]. It is one of his fundamental doctrines that the infinite exists potentially but not actually. We can always get a finite as large as we please, and that gives rise in our minds to the fiction of an actual infinite; but this is quite inconsistent with the idea of the "complete" (*τέλειον*), which is defined as that outside of which there is nothing (*οὗ μηδὲν ἔξω*), that which requires nothing more to make its form complete[4]. The actual infinite if it existed would destroy the possibility of human action by destroying the Good or Final Cause. "We cannot desire to walk for the sake of health and to be healthy for the sake of happiness, and that again for the sake

of something else and so on *ad infinitum*.....Those who set up an infinite do not see that they are destroying the Good. Surely no one would ever set about doing anything if he were never to reach any final result. There would be no sense in such action; for all men of sense act for the sake of something, and that something is a limit; for the end is a limit[5]." In other words, we should never desire anything at all, unless there were something which we desire for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. However long the chain may be, it must have its last link firmly attached somewhere.

[1] The Greek word *τέλος* has quite different associations from the English "end." We may see from its use in common speech (*τέλος ἔχειν, λαβεῖν, ἐπιθεῖναι*) that it implies the idea of completion. We must always think of it as the *τελείωσις* of an *εἶδος*.

[2] *Phys.* 192 b, 13 *τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἀρχὴν ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως.* Met. 1013 a, 29 *ἔτι (αἴτιον) ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως.* Gen. An. 776 a, 35 *ὥσπερ ἑστηκὸς ἤδη διὰ τὸ τέλος ἔχειν τὸ ἔμβρυον.*

[3] Cf. 1094 a, 20 *πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον*, a phrase which is regularly opposed to *ἵσταται, στήσεται.* This is derived from the "quasi-impersonal" use described in Riddell's Digest § 97. Cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 28 b *οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ*, "there is no fear of my being the last." So An. Post. 82 b, 11 *ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ἵσταται ὁδός, καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω στήσεται.* An. Pr. 43 a, 36 *ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω πορευομένοις ἵσταταί ποτε, πάλιν ἐροῦμεν.* An. Post. 72 b, 11 *εἴ τε ἵστανται καὶ εἰσὶν ἀρχαί.* Gen. Corr. 332 b, 12 *δεῖ μὲν γὰρ στῆναι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον τοῦτο ἰέναι.* Met. 1000 b, 28 *καὶ εἰ ἵσταται καὶ εἰ βαδίζει εἰς ἄπειρον.*

[4] Met. 1021 b, 21 *ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους.* 1055 a, 10 *ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέγιστον ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει τέλειον· μέγιστόν τε γὰρ οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή, καὶ τέλειον οὗ μή ἐστιν ἔξω λαβεῖν τι δυνατόν.* Phys. 207 a, 9 *ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὗ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεί τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω· οὗ δὲ μηδὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον...τέλειον δ' οὐδὲν μὴ ἔχον τέλος.* For a fuller account of *τελείωσις*, see Introductory Note to Book II, p. 70, n. 10.

[5] Met. 994 a, 1 *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γ' ἐστὶν ἀρχή τις καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρα τὰ αἴτια τῶν ὄντων,...δῆλον.... οὐδὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα εἰς ἄπειρον οἷόν τ' ἰέναι, βάδισιν μὲν ὑγιείας ἕνεκεν, ταύτην δ' εὐδαιμονίας, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ἄλλου, καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλο ἄλλου ἕνεκεν εἶναι.* ib. 994 b, 9 *ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τέλος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἄλλου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τἆλλα ἐκείνου· ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτόν τι ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' οἱ τὸ ἄπειρον ποιοῦντες λανθάνουσιν ἐξαιροῦντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν. καίτοι οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειεν οὐδὲν πράττειν μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἥξειν. οὐδ' ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις· ἕνεκα γάρ τινος αἰεὶ πράττει ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι πέρας· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστίν.*

X.

§ 28. There is nothing, however, in the conception of the Final Cause to justify us in saying that there is only one end of all existence, a universal good to which all others lead up. On the contrary, we seem rather to see that there are very many different forms, each of which has its own completion, a stage at which it is full-grown. A plant is complete when it flowers, an animal when it has reached the full stature of its kind, and we do not see that in this they are contributing to the completion of any universal form. There appear to be as many final causes as there are forms capable of completion, and if this is so, we can hardly agree with Plato who held that the Good for Man could not be studied apart from the good for all creatures and of the world as a whole. It follows at once from Aristotle's teleology that the good of each form must be studied by itself.

It must, however, be admitted that this is not exactly the ground on which Plato's universal good is rejected in the Ethics. We have instead a number of subtle arguments based on the doctrine of the "Categories" and a few remarks which look like appeals to the prejudices of "common sense." The latter we can understand at once; for it is in accordance with the method of the Ethics to go for premisses to the beliefs of the many. But what are we to make of the arguments drawn from the priority of one category to the others and the impossibility of anything being a common predicate in all the figures of predication? Are we to say that Aristotle for once has violated the rules of his own method and argued directly from his own scientific premisses, and then not even from those that really determined his views?

To understand this point, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what these "categories" are, a subject upon which much new light has recently been thrown. There are various names for the categories, but the most correct and technical is *σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας*, "figures of predication." The most obvious way of interpreting this term is to look at it in

the light of the analogous phrase *σχήματα τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ* or "figures of inference." Now what the figures of the syllogism really give us is the different relations in which two terms can stand to a third or "middle" term, and it would therefore seem natural that the figures of predication should give us the various relations that can exist between a subject and a predicate. The analogy is not quite perfect, however; for we should rather expect in that case to find the categories or "predicaments" identical with the "predicables," namely genus, species, property and accident, whereas they are really such things as quality, quantity and relation. This little discrepancy, we may note at once, is suggestive of a non-Aristotelian origin for the doctrine.

The whole theory, as Apelt has shown[1], is intended to solve the difficulties about predication which had caused so much trouble to "the more recent of the ancients," as Aristotle calls them. They were disturbed by the thought that a thing might turn out to be both a one and a many, and resorted to various devices to avoid this. Some, like Lykophron, abolished the "is" (the copula), some altered the form of speech and said *ἄνθρωπος λελεύκωται*, to avoid having to admit the proposition *ἄνθρωπός ἐστι λευκός*, which seems to violate the principle of contradiction. Man is man and white is white, and we must not say that man is white[2]. Now all these difficulties arise from a confusion between what we may call the substantial, the qualitative, the quantitative judgment and the rest. When we say that Koriskos is musical, we are not making the same kind of judgment as we make when we say that Koriskos is in the Lykeion or that Koriskos is sitting. We can quite well ask what Koriskos *is*, what he *is* like, how tall he *is*, and what he *is* doing, without implying that he "is" anything else than Koriskos. In this sense, then, Koriskos is a "one and a many," and the difficulties about predication disappear as soon as we recognise that it has many forms.

All these difficulties, however, were very ancient history indeed by Aristotle's time, and we can hardly suppose that he invented a theory of categories in order to meet them,

especially as that theory is something of an excrescence alongside of his own characteristic theory of the predicables. Not only so, but by the time Plato wrote the Philebos, this particular spectre had been finally laid to rest. This is what Plato himself said about it :—

So.—To say that the many is one and the one many sounds a strange statement, and it is easy to raise objections against anyone who lays down either of these propositions.

Protarchos.—Do you mean when anyone says that I Protarchos, who am one by nature, am again quite a number of "me's" and opposite to one another, and puts me down as tall and small and heavy and light and countless other things?

So.—What you mention, Protarchos, are only the vulgar marvels of the one and the many, and practically everyone is agreed now-a-days that it is better not to meddle with them. They are childish and easy and stand in the way of all reasonable argument[3].

Now, if once we realise the full meaning of this, we shall have no hesitation in admitting with Rose and Gercke[4] that the table of the categories is not Aristotle's at all, but simply part of his heritage from the Academy, and we shall have no difficulty in accepting the positive statement that Xenokrates reduced the categories to two only, Substance and Relation[5]. If that is so, we shall see that, in accordance with his method, Aristotle was bound to argue against the Platonic view from some position admitted by the Academy, and that it is this which has prevented him from doing what would doubtless have been more interesting to us, namely, from contrasting his own view of teleology with that of Plato.

Now that we can look at them in this light, the arguments themselves are not nearly so captious and unreal as they might appear at first sight. Aristotle is pointing out a real inconsistency in the Academic position, namely that the theory of the "one and many" is quite inconsistent with the doctrine of "forms," at least in its original shape.

All these arguments depend upon the fundamental position that the categories cannot be reduced either to one another or to any common genus[6]. It may be possible with Xenokrates to reduce all but Substance to the single category of Relation, it may be possible to class them all as accidents of

substance; but there is no common measure of a substance and of a relation or accident. Now the Platonic forms are substances, if they are anything, and cannot have any application beyond the first of the categories. A thing which could be predicated in all the categories can for that very reason have no substantial existence; it can form no true genus. But the Form of the Good professes to be just such a common predicate; we say that a thing is good in any category we please, and therefore good is no true universal. In particular it is impossible that the same universal should be predicated of two things, one of which is posterior to the other; for species are never prior or posterior to one another. Now all the other categories are clearly posterior to substance and they cannot therefore be coordinate species of the same genus. This is an *argumentum ad hominem*, certainly, but it goes to the root of the difference between Plato and Aristotle.

[1] O. Apelt, Beiträge zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie, pp. 201 sqq.

[2] Phys. 185 b, 29 *ἐθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἅμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἔστιν ἀφεῖλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μή ποτε τὸ ἔστι προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἕν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος.* The phrase *μοναχῶς λεγόμενον* (opp. *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον*) is exactly equivalent to *ἐν μιᾷ κατηγορίᾳ κατηγορούμενον*. The doctrine in question was maintained by Antisthenes and the schools of Megara and Eretria.

[3] Phileb. 14 c ΣΩ. *...ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.* ΠΡΩ. *Ἆρ' οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;* ΣΩ. *Σὺ μέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥᾴδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι.* Plato first published the solution of the problem in Soph. 251 a, sqq., where see Apelt's note. The "category" of *πρός τι* gets rid of this particular difficulty.

[4] Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iv, p. 424.

[5] Simplicius in Cat., Schol. Br. 47 b, 26 *οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ τῷ πρός τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσι.*

[6] Phys. 200 b, 34 *κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν, ὡς φαμέν, ὃ οὔτε τόδε οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐδέν.* Met. 1024 b, 10 *ἕτερα δὲ τῷ γένει λέγεται...καὶ ὅσα καθ' ἕτερον σχῆμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται·*

τὰ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων, τὰ δὲ ποιόν τι, τὰ δ' ὡς διῄρηται πρότερον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναλύεται οὔτ' εἰς ἄλληλα οὔτ' εἰς ἕν τι. ib. 1070 a, 33 ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον ἕτεραι ἢ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν πρός τι, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον εἰ ταὐτὰ πάντων· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔσται τὰ πρός τι καὶ ἡ οὐσία. τί οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται; παρὰ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ κατηγορούμενα οὐδέν ἐστι κοινόν, πρότερον δὲ τὸ στοιχεῖον ἢ ὧν στοιχεῖον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ οὐσία στοιχεῖον τῶν πρός τι, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐδὲν τῆς οὐσίας.

BOOK I.

HAPPINESS.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. To find the definition which is to be the starting-point of our science we must discuss the beliefs of the many and the opinions of the wise (Introd. § 25). Now all are agreed that the Good for Man is Happiness, but there is a great divergence between the many and the wise as to what happiness really means. We must therefore discuss their views, whether these are merely implied in the lives they lead, or formulated as theories of the good. This discussion will show us what sides of the truth each has laid hold of, and the definition of happiness will then emerge.

We need not hesitate to translate the word *εὐδαιμονία* by the English "happiness," but we must be careful not to ascribe to Aristotle any theory of "Eudaemonism." If we do, we make the mistake of supposing him to be setting up Happiness as the end of life in opposition to some other theory of that end. Now his whole point is that there is no other. Plato and his followers are quite at one with Sardanapallos as to this, and the only question is what we are to understand by it. In popular Greek *εὐδαιμονία* meant having a good *δαίμων*, and *δαίμων* means fortune or luck. Generally speaking, then, it meant an abundance of worldly goods, and this sense is given in Aristotle's Rhetoric along with others which seem to come from the Academy[1]. For the Greek philosophers had long been trying to deepen

[1] Rhet. 1360 b, 14 *ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία* (1) *εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἢ* (2) *αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἢ* (3) *ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ* (4) *εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων.* These definitions bear the stamp of the Academy. The first is a definition

the significance of the old term. Herakleitos had said "Man's character is his *δαίμων*," and Demokritos declared that "Happiness lieth not in flocks and herds: the soul is the dwelling-place of the *δαίμων*." This was of course the view of Plato too, and the final step in the ennoblement of the word was taken by Xenokrates. To him the soul itself was a *δαίμων*, and the term *εὐδαιμονία* thus acquired a new shade of meaning[2].

§ 2. If we look at the lives men lead, we see that they may be reduced to three. First there is the life of pleasure or enjoyment, then there is the life of action, which aims at honour or fame, and there is the life of the spectator, the artistic, scientific or religious life. The first two are easily disposed of, and so is the view which the seeker of honour may readily be made to adopt, that goodness is the real object of his life. A man may be good and never do anything with his goodness; he might as well be asleep or be a vegetable. We are getting nearer the truth, but we have not reached it yet. We are not now in a position to discuss the life of artistic and scientific contemplation, the life of the onlooker, and besides it can hardly be called a popular one; but we shall have to show later on that its aim is not mere amusement. All these views of life, then, are partial; but our definition must do justice to them all. Popular opinion cannot be altogether wide of the mark.

§ 3. Turning next to the opinions of the wise, we are met at once by the Platonic theory of the Good. This we are forced to reject, because it is based upon the impossible idea of a universal good. (Introd. § 28.) But, when we pass on from this, we find that Plato has expressed several views about Happiness which lend themselves to the purposes of our dialectic. For instance, in the Philebos, he has made it quite clear that Happiness must be complete, self-sufficient and more worth having than anything else. It must be something which is desired for itself

by *τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε* (cf. 1146 a, 27 n.). The second is to be explained from [Plato] Def. 412 b *αὐτάρκεια τελειότης κτήσεως ἀγαθῶν* (cf. Plato, Philebos 20 c sqq. and the definitions of Speusippos and Xenokrates in note 3). The third is possibly that of Eudoxos, while the fourth alludes to the *ὑπηρετικὴ δύναμις* of Xenokrates (see note 3).

[2] Herakleitos fr. 12 - *ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων*. Demokritos fr. 10, 11 (Natorp) *εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ' ἐν χρυσῷ· ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος*. Ar. Top. 112 a, 36 *εὐδαίμονα, οὗ ἂν ὁ δαίμων ᾖ σπουδαῖος, καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης φησὶν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα.*

and never as a means to something else. We cannot ask the question why we desire to be happy, and if that is so, Happiness cannot be identified with any partial form of life, but only with the good life as a whole.

But what is the good life? Here again the views of Plato help us. In the Republic he has shown that the good life and consequently the happiness of anything is identical with the good performance of its own proper task or function. Accordingly if we wish to find in what a good human life consists we must ask what is the proper function of man. Now man is an animal, a living creature, so his function will be life. But life merely as such cannot be his proper function; for a plant lives as well as a man. Nor can it be merely sentient and appetitive life; for every animal shares in that. The only kind of life which is peculiar to man is the life of rational activity, that is the life which knows the ground (*λόγος*) of its activities and can give an account of them (*λόγον ἔχει*).

The Good for Man, then, is to perform this function well, but what do we mean by "well"? We can only mean that the function is performed in such a manner as to exhibit the form of goodness proper to it. To be happy we must, then, be in such a condition that we can perform our proper function well.

§ 4. So far, we are in substantial agreement with the Academy. Speusippos defined Happiness as "the complete or perfect condition of beings in a natural state," and Xenokrates says it is the "possession of our proper goodness along with the power that ministers to it[3]." These definitions are, however, inadequate. If we ask Speusippos whether the good life is best defined as a

[3] The Academic definition of *εὐδαιμονία* as an *ἕξις* first appears in Plato Phileb. 11 d *ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν*. The definitions of Speusippos and Xenokrates are preserved by Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II, 21 p. 500 (Potter) *Σπεύσιππος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἕξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, ἢ ἕξιν ἀγαθῶν· ἧς δὴ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὄρεξιν ἔχειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας· εἶεν δ' ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικαί*. ib. 22 *Ξενοκράτης...τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως· εἶτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς δ' ὑφ' ὧν τὰς ἀρετάς, ὡς δὲ ἐξ ὧν ὡς μερῶν τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἕξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις, ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ* (surely *ὡς δ' ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ* as Zeller reads) *τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός*. We cannot understand the dialectic by which Aristotle reaches his own definition without keeping all this clearly before us.

condition or as the activity arising from that condition, he must allow that a life is strictly speaking an activity rather than the condition which gives rise to it. And, if we ask Xenokrates whether he means by Happiness the mere "possession" of goodness or rather its exercise and use, he must certainly admit that he really means the latter.

§ 5. After this discussion, the following definition will appear self-evident. In the first place, Happiness is "an activity of the soul," that is, as we have seen, of that part of the soul which "knows what it is doing" (λόγον ἔχει). But not every such activity is related to the function of man, but only good activities. For the purpose of our analysis it will be clearer to express this formally as the differentia, and say "an activity according to goodness." And, if there are more forms of goodness than one, we must say "according to the best and most complete form of goodness." We must add further, since an activity is always something complete, that it must be "in a complete life," meaning by that a life which has developed to its full stature, which has reached the form appointed for it by nature. The body is complete when it has reached the limit which nature fixes for the growth of its species, and the rational soul too is full-grown at a certain stage of its developement. But we must not imagine that when it has reached this completion, its life comes to an end; that was the mistake made by Solon, who confused the "end" of life in the sense of its full developement with the "end" of life in the sense of death. It would be truer to say that life is only beginning when the "end" in the former sense is reached; for now it is a complete or full-grown activity, or, to put the thing in a way which Aristotle is fond of in other connexions, though he does not refer to it here, we are dealing with an activity and therefore we can use the present and the perfect tenses at the same time of the same thing[4]. Seeing is such an activity, and we can say "he sees" and "he has seen" and they may both be true. In like manner, Aristotle might have said, we can say of the man who is active according to goodness both εὖ ζῇ and εὖ βεβίωκε, for the goodness of his life is fully present in every moment of it. And, in spite of Solon, we may say also εὖ βιώσεται, for such activities have an element of permanence in

[4] On this way of expressing the complete presence in any given moment of an ἐνέργεια, cf. 1174 a, 13 sqq. and the notes.

them, and are not wholly at the mercy of fortune. But we must not push this to an extreme; for an old age like that of Priam or King Lear is possible in a world not wholly independent of chance. The world is such that "on the whole" Happiness once achieved is permanent; but there are exceptions to this just as there are monstrosities and portents in nature.

§ 6. We see, then, that we must allow to a certain extent for chance, and this is precisely what we should expect from the account given above[5] of the subject-matter of Politics. But that is no reason for identifying happiness with good luck or embodying "external goods" in our definition of it as Xenokrates does. It is, of course, quite clear that Happiness, like everything else in this world, is dependent on certain material conditions, but that is no reason for including those conditions in its definition. It is true that a tragedy, however fine it may be, cannot be produced at all without a chorus and costumes and scenery; but these things are no part of the tragedy itself; they are the province of the choregos and not of the poet. We must admit, then, that Happiness is dependent on something which is not in our power at all, while on the other hand we must refuse to admit that these external conditions are any part of the happiness itself. In this respect the relation of Happiness to external goods is quite different from its relation to pleasure. Pleasure is not something external, but something in the soul itself, and therefore belongs to Happiness not accidentally but essentially. This indeed is the justification of the one-sided popular view that happiness is pleasure, just as the view of men of action that it is honour is fully satisfied by the doctrine that it is an activity according to goodness. For honour implies goodness in the honoured, or the belief in it by those who honour, and is only a secondary end.

We see, then, that the definition we have given meets all the requirements we can fairly make of it, and it can have no other proof than this.

[5] Introd. § 26.

ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ

Α

1094 a Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφή-

1094 a, 1. MM. 1182 a, 32 sqq. *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἰδεῖν δεῖ ὅτι πάσης ἐπιστήμης καὶ δυνάμεώς ἐστί τι τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν· οὐδεμία γὰρ οὔτ' ἐπιστήμη οὔτε δύναμις ἕνεκεν κακοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῆς βελτίστης*

I. § 1. **Πᾶσα τέχνη κ.τ.λ.** The passage 1094 a, 1—1095 a, 13 forms a *προοίμιον* (**πεφροιμιάσθω** 1095 a, 13) containing what Alexander calls *ἡ πρόθεσις τῆς μεθόδου* (**τί προτιθέμεθα** loc. cit.). The *πρόθεσις* also contains some remarks on the method of *πολιτική* (**πῶς ἀποδεκτέον** loc. cit.) and the student (**περὶ ἀκροατοῦ** loc. cit.). For the argument of this chapter, see Introd. § 13.

τέχνη...μέθοδος...πρᾶξις...προαίρεσις. The study of *πολιτική* is all four; for we must take these words here in their ordinary meaning, not in the technical sense given to some of them later on. The term **μέθοδος** is Platonic (for its origin cf. 1098 b, 4 n.) and signifies either (1) an *investigation* as here and in 1094 b, 11. 1098 a, 29 or (2) the *τρόπος τῆς μεθόδου* (Plato, Phaid. 97 b), the *method* of investigation as in 1129 a, 6. That *πολιτική* is also a **πρᾶξις** follows from the fact that it is a practical science, cf. below a, 12 *πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις*. Lastly, **προαίρεσις** is used of any study which is 'taken up,' as we say, and sometimes approaches closely in meaning to *πραγματεία*, cf. especially 1179 a, 35 *τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν;* 'are we to consider our task complete?' We may compare with this the use of the word by Demosthenes of the different departments of administration (foreign affairs, etc.) 'taken up' by a politician (De Cor. § 59). The sentence, then, means no more than that every scientific inquiry aims at some good. The argument is given succinctly in Pol. loc. cit. Cf. MM. loc. cit., which gives it according to the tradition of the school.

ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. This is just because no study is a mere *δύναμις* (*τῶν ἐναντίων*) but also involves a *προαίρεσις* (cf. 1127 b, 14 n.). This *ἔνδοξον* is quoted in opposition to the paradox that, as *δυνάμεις* (including *τέχναι* and *ἐπιστῆμαι*) are *τῶν ἐναντίων*

2 ναντο τἀγαθὸν Οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά, ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τού- 5
3 τοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. πολλῶν δὲ

βέλτιστον ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὥστε τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη <τὸ βέλτιστον> ἀγαθόν.

Pol. 1282 b, 14 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις.*

a, 3. EE. 1214 a, 8 *πολλῶν δ' ὄντων θεωρημάτων ἃ περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα καὶ περὶ ἑκάστην φύσιν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν συντείνει πρὸς τὸ γνῶναι μόνον, τὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικήν, λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρὸν ὅτιπερ οἰκεῖον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ.* (Cf. 1216 b, 3. Introd. § 12, n. 1.)

(cf. 1129 a, 13), the end of an art or science may be good or bad. Cf. Top. 143 a, 9 *ἔτι εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀποδέδωκε...πᾶσα γὰρ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δύναμις τοῦ βελτίστου δοκεῖ εἶναι.*

δοκεῖ, 'is believed.' The word marks an *ἔνδοξος πρότασις*. Introd. § 25.

ἀπεφήναντο, not 'defined,' but 'declared,' 'pronounced.' In his commentary on Top. 105 b, 12 sqq. Alexander (p. 93, 8 Wallies) gives *τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πᾶσιν ἐφετόν* as an instance of a *πρότασις* which we may pick out *ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων*. We shall see reason for thinking that it is taken from Eudoxos. Cf. 1172 b, 10 n. In Rhet. 1362 a, 23 it is given as one of the received accounts of the good—*ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθὸν...οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν.*

§ 2. **τῶν τελῶν**, i.e. the ends of different arts and sciences. For the difference between the ends of theoretical and practical science, cf. Introd. § 12.

τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι. Cf. Met. 1050 a, 34 *ὅσων δὲ μή ἐστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· ζωὴ γάρ ποιά τίς ἐστιν.* The word *ἐνέργεια*, 'activity,' does not occur before Aristotle. It is from *ἐνεργής*, a by-form of *ἔνεργος*, which is used of mines etc. that are being 'worked.'

ἔργα τινά. Met. 1050 a, 23 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἔσχατον ἡ χρῆσις* (i. q. *ἐνέργεια* cf. 1098 b, 32 n.), *οἷον ὄψεως ἡ ὅρασις, καὶ οὐδὲν γίγνεται παρὰ ταύτην ἕτερον ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως ἔργον, ἀπ' ἐνίων δὲ γίγνεταί τι, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία παρὰ τὴν οἰκοδόμησιν κ.τ.λ.*

βελτίω πέφυκε κ.τ.λ., i.e. *φύσει αἱρετώτερά ἐστιν*, 'are naturally more worth having.' Thus a house is 'better' than building and health than medical treatment. The example of ship-building recalls Plato's Philebos 53 b *πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα*

πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν, πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι 4
10 δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν—καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποιικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας—ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάν-
15 των ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς 5
εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

II. Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον
20 αἱρούμεθα—πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι

ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας; So πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις is from Polit. 304 e στρατηγικὴ καὶ πᾶσα ἡ πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις. Eudemos (loc. cit.) adds that the purely theoretical problems arising from practical science are to be treated also so far as they are relevant. This is Aristotle's practice too.

§ 4. **ὅσαι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This sentence is an anacolouthon; for ὅσαι δὲ is resumed after an intricate parenthesis by **ἐν ἁπάσαις δὲ** as if ἐν ὅσαις had preceded. This form of anacolouthon is very characteristic of the akroamatic style. In the parenthesis itself, as Professor Bywater points out (Contr. p. 22), **κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον** introduces the apodosis to **καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.** We might substitute ὥσπερ... οὕτως to bring out the sense.

τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. πρακτικῶν ἐπιστημῶν or τεχνῶν.

δύναμιν, practically equivalent to τέχνην or πρακτικὴν ἐπιστήμην as in Plato, Polit. loc. cit. Cf. Introd. § 12.

ἄλλαι...ἑτέρας. The pronouns are alternated for variety. Cf. 1158 a, 28. 1166 b, 7.

τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν Introd. § 13. The term is assumed to be familiar from Plato.

§ 5. **διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ.** In the case of the sciences just mentioned (**ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν**) the end is some ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. But the principle just stated will apply also in cases where the end is the ἐνέργεια itself. So, at the beginning of the Metaphysics it is shown that σοφία is ἀρχιτεκτονική with regard to all sciences, and its end is simply an ἐνέργεια. In the Ethics, too, we shall find that the end of σοφία is 'better' than that of any practical science.

II. §1. **τῶν πρακτῶν.** By τὰ πρακτά Aristotle means the objects of πρᾶξις, the things we do, just as by τὰ αἰσθητά he means the things we perceive by the senses. For another sense of πρακτός, cf. below 1096 b, 34.

πρόεισι, impersonal. 'There will be a process *ad infinitum*.' Cf. 1097 b, 13. The phrases εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι, προιέναι, πορεύεσθαι, βαδίζειν are opposed to ἵστασθαι, στῆναι. Cf. 1142 a, 29 n. For the argument, cf. Introd. § 27.

κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν,—δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀγα-
2 θὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ροπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν
3 ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος 25
4 τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης
5 καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται·

1094 a, 22. EE. 1214 b, 6 ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν,...πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις, ὡς τό γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρός τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημεῖόν ἐστιν.

κενήν, 'ineffectual,' like the λῆξ κενή of Thuc. ii, 49. So often κεναὶ εὐχαί, κεναὶ ἐλπίδες and the adverbial διὰ κενῆς.

ματαίαν, 'in vain.' A thing is μάτην, *frustra*, which does not attain its proper end. So μάτην γὰρ ὑπόδημα ...οὗ μή ἐστιν ὑπόδεσις· ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν (De Caelo 271 a, 32). We use the word μάτην when a thing which has a final cause does not attain it. Phys. 197 b, 22 σημεῖον δὲ τὸ 'μάτην,' ὅτι λέγεται ὅταν μὴ γένηται τῷ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα...ὡς τοῦτο ὂν τὸ 'μάτην,' τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ὅταν μὴ περαίνῃ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπεφύκει.

τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, 'the good and indeed the best.'

§ 2. **ἆρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.** This is one of Aristotle's literary passages and is reminiscent of Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Introd. § 7. Such passages are often introduced by the conversational ἆρ' οὖν, cf. 1163 a, 16. 1166 b, 3. 1171 b, 29. The subjects discussed in this section are, as Diels says, such as we should treat in a preface; but with Aristotle they "form a resting-point after the first fatiguing ascent."

καθάπερ τοξόται κ.τ.λ. This simile is found both in Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Rep. 519 c σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα οὗ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Ep. ad Iasonis liberos § 10 τοῦτον μὲν τὸν τρόπον ζητοῦντες καὶ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ὥσπερ σκοποῦ κειμένου στοχάσεσθε τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεύξεσθε τοῦ συμφέροντος. It recurs several times in the Ethics. Cf. 1097 a, 3. 1109 b, 26. 1138 b, 22 n.

τοῦ δέοντος, 'the right thing,' what is wanted in given circumstances, not 'our duty' which would rather be τοῦ προσήκοντος. So when Demosthenes urged the Athenians τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν he did not mean they were to 'do their duty,' but that they were to take the steps required by the situation.

§ 3. **τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν.** A Platonic phrase, cf. Rep. 414 a ὡς ἐν τύπῳ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας εἰρῆσθαι, 559 a ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς, Laws 718 c οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον ἐν ἑνὶ περιλαβόντα εἰπεῖν αὐτὰ οἷόν τινι τύπῳ. For the terminology of this passage cf. Introd. § 26 with the notes.

§ 4. **δόξειε δ' ἄν**, 'it will be admitted,' the usual phrase in a dialectical λῆψις. By **κυριωτάτης** Ar. means 'most authoritative' as the context shows. Cf. also Pol. 1282 b, 14 quoted on p. 7.

τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ 6
1094 b ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει· ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικήν· χρωμένης 7 δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς [πρακτικαῖς] τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ
5 νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν 8 γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ
10 θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων 9 ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα.

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§ 6. **τίνας γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Politics is most 'authoritative,' for it regulates what sciences, theoretical or practical, are to exist in the state, what each class of citizens (**ἑκάστους**) are to learn and up to what point (or up to what age). Ar. is referring to such regulations as those laid down by Plato, Rep. 539 d, sqq. Diels notes **χρεών** as a literary touch.

ὁρῶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is from Plato, Polit. 303 e, sqq. Cf. Introd. § 13.

§ 7. **χρωμένης δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Politics 'makes use of' the practical sciences, such as strategy and rhetoric; it does not 'make use of' the theoretical sciences, though it regulates them, cf. 1145 a, 6. I believe with Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 23) that *πρακτικαῖς* is a gloss from Aspasios, but I think it gives the true sense. Politics does not 'use' mathematics or astronomy.

§ 8. **εἰ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** This is not an apology for 'confusing ethics and politics,' but rather for appearing to separate them (Introd. § 14). The science of the Good is the same whether for one, few, or many, but it is called Politics *a potiori*. To secure the good of one is 'better than nothing' (**ἀγαπητόν**), but it is not the full realisation of the end of our science.

ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν, 'for a people,' such as the Macedonians, or for free Hellenic 'states.' The word *ἔθνος* is regularly used of peoples who had not developed so far as the city-state.

§ 9. **ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος κ.τ.λ.** 'This' (viz. to secure and preserve the good for man) 'is what our branch of science aims at.' Here we have a clear reference back to the beginning, *Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος...ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ*, and a confirmation of the view that that passage refers to the ends of sciences alone, and not to ends in general.

ἐφίεται...οὖσα. As Zell points out, the meaning really is 'Now the science which aims at this is Politics.' The Greek idiom allows of the leading idea being expressed by the participle (so regularly with *τυγχάνω* etc.).

πολιτική τις. The *τις* is added merely because popular usage confined the word to 'practical politics' and ignored the 'architectonic' art of the lawgiver (cf. 1141 b, 28). We must not translate 'a species of Politics'; for it is the whole of Politics.

III. Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς
2 λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, 15 πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον
3 εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες
4 ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν

III. § 1. **Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.** "This discussion of scientific *ἀκρίβεια* distinguishes itself from the gray uniformity of Aristotle's style by its choice phrases and words (*πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, παχυλῶς, χρεών, πιθανολογεῖν*)" Diels in Archiv 1, 495.

κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην, 'so far as the subject-matter allows.' Pol. 1256 a, 8 *λέγω δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντῃ μὲν ἔρια, ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν.* Met. 1029 a, 3 *λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην, οἷον τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας, τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων, τὸν ἀνδριάντα, τὸ σύνολον.* This is not only an Aristotelian technicality, but a Platonic image and therefore in place here. Cf. Phileb. 54 b *φημὶ δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντα ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσιν κ.τ.λ.* Tim. 69 a *ὅτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἷα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν παράκειται...ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λόγον δεῖ συνυφανθῆναι* (where note the shifting of the metaphor). Aristotle substitutes *ὑποκεῖσθαι* for the Platonic *παρακεῖσθαι* (cf. also 1104 a, 29 n.) because *ἡ ὕλη ὑπόκειται τῷ εἴδει* is a more important aspect of the thing to him than *ἡ ὕλη παράκειται τῷ δημιουργῷ*. The metaphor is kept up by **ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις** below. We do not expect the same finish in wood as in marble. It is worth noting that there is no properly attested instance in earlier literature of *ὕλη* meaning any other material than wood. That quoted in Liddell and Scott from Sophokles is illusory. The word *ὕλη* there belongs to Plutarch.

§ 2. **τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle does not mean to say that *τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια* are in themselves liable to variation and fluctuation,—that point is discussed below 1134 b, 18 sqq.—but that they give rise to variation and fluctuation in men's judgments. For the meaning of **ἔχει**, cf. *ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχειν, ἀπορίαν ἔχειν* and the like.

ὥστε δοκεῖν, 'that they are believed' by some of the sophists. For the history of the contrast between *νόμος* and *φύσις*, see my article in the International Journal of Ethics for April, 1897.

§ 3. **καὶ τἀγαθά**, i.e. the recognised good things of life, described later on (1129 b, 3) as *τὰ ἁπλῶς μὲν ἀγαθά, τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί.* For a characteristic Greek list cf. Plato, Rep. 491 c *κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει.* See too Meno 87 e *ὑγίεια, φαμέν, καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δή, ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὠφέλιμα.*

διὰ πλοῦτον...δι' ἀνδρείαν. For the first Diels compares Xen. Kyr. i, 6, 44 *πολλοὶ τὸν πολύευκτον πλοῦτον κατακτησάμενοι διὰ τοῦτον ἀπώλοντο.* Difficulties have been felt about the inclusion of *ἀνδρεία* among goods that may be bad. But the point is what the popular view is, and certainly it

οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος

1094 b, 22. EE. 1216 b, 35 διαφέρουσι δ' οἱ λόγοι περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον, οἵ τε φιλοσόφως λεγόμενοι καὶ μὴ φιλοσόφως. διόπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν περίεργον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν δι' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὸ τί φανερόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ διὰ τί· φιλόσοφον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον περὶ ἑκάστην μέθοδον. δεῖται μέντοι τοῦτο πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν φιλοσόφου εἶναι τὸ μηθὲν εἰκῇ λέγειν ἀλλὰ μετὰ λόγου, πολλάκις λανθάνουσι λέγοντες ἀλλοτρίους λόγους τῆς πραγματείας καὶ κενούς. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὁτὲ μὲν δι' ἄγνοιαν, ὁτὲ δὲ δι' ἀλαζονείαν, ὑφ' ὧν ἁλίσκεσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ τοὺς ἐμπείρους καὶ δυναμένους πράττειν ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ' ἐχόντων μήτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικὴν ἢ πρακτικήν.

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admits this. Diels points out that the reference is to Plato's Meno 87 e sqq. After enumerating the ἀγαθά, he says (88 a) ταῦτὰ δὲ ταῦτά φαμεν ἐνίοτε καὶ βλάπτειν,...οἷον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἡ ἀνδρεία, ἀλλ' οἷον θάρρος τι κ.τ.λ.

§ 4. περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων. For the phrase cf. 1095 a, 3. 1143 b, 10. According to the doctrine of the Analytics there are three things in every proof: (1) **περὶ ὃ δείκνυσι**, (2) **ἃ δείκνυσι**, (3) **ἐξ ὧν δείκνυσι** (An. Post. 75 a, 39 sqq.). The περὶ ὅ (1) is the ὑποκείμενον γένος or the ὑποκειμένη ὕλη, that about which something is proved. In the present case this is τὰ πρακτά or τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια. The ἐξ ὧν (3) are the ἀξιώματα, the principles from which we argue. In the present case, as neither (1) nor (3) is universal or necessary, it follows that (2) ὃ δείκνυσι, i.e. the conclusion, τὸ συμπέρασμα, cannot be so either. Tr. 'on such a subject and with such premises.'

περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. Phys. 196 b, 10 ὁρῶμεν τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως γινόμενα τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδετέρου τούτων αἰτία ἡ τύχη λέγεται οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης. If chance were the cause, there could be no science of them; ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (Met. 1065 a, 4). Nature and Man are the two causes which act ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ and stand between Necessity and Chance. Cf. Introd. § 26.

τοιαῦτα, sc. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. The conclusion (συμπέρασμα) must have the same character as the premisses (τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος).

ἀποδέχεσθαι. Correlative to ἀποδιδόναι. We pass from the lecturer to the student.

πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. On Aristotle's conception of παιδεία, see Introd. § 21.

καθ' ἕκαστον γένος. The clear distinction of γένη is the mark of παιδεία.

φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, 1095 a ἁπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.

Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι

πάσχουσι δὲ τοῦτο δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἀπαιδευσία γάρ ἐστι περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κρίνειν τούς τ' οἰκείους λόγους τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους.

παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ. This is taken from Plato, Theait. 162 e ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἑνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίᾳ τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τηλικούτων λεγομένους λόγους. On the other hand we have no right to ask more than τὸ πιθανόν from the rhetorician. Rhet. 1355 b, 10 sqq. (ῥητορικῆς ἔργον) τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον.

ἀποδείξεις. The ἐνθύμημα or rhetorical syllogism from εἰκότα or σημεῖα is sometimes called ῥητορικὴ ἀπόδειξις (Rhet. 1355 a, 6), but that is only καθ' ὁμοιότητα, 'by analogy.'

§ 5. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν ἄρα κ.τ.λ. The qualification καθ' ἕκαστον does double duty. Fully expressed the meaning is καθ' ἕκαστον κρίνει καλῶς ὁ καθ' ἕκαστον πεπαιδευμένος. For the brachylogy cf. Kühner § 597 f, and for the distinction between general and special παιδεία, Introd. § 21.

ἁπλῶς. The word ἁπλῶς, *simpliciter*, means without any πρόσθεσις or qualification. The πρόσθεσις which is dropped here is καθ' ἕκαστον. For the τόπος of πρόσθεσις and ἀφαίρεσις, cf. 1140 a 28 n. It is a favourite form of ἐπαγωγή.

Διὸ κ.τ.λ. This is because he has not the *special* παιδεία required as a preliminary training. The logical παιδεία is more within his reach.

ἐκ τούτων...περὶ τούτων. Cf. 1094 b, 20 n.

§ 6. τὸ τέλος, sc. τῆς πολιτικῆς, which is a practical science. Cf. 1103 b, 27.

§ 7. καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν. As we shall see in Book VII, the ἀκρατής is the morally weak man who εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος.

κατὰ λόγον, 'by rule,' 'uniformly,' 'consistently.' In 1169 a, 5 τὸ κατὰ

πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν 8
ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροι-
μιάσθω ταῦτα.

IV. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ
προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστιν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν
πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν
ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολο- 2
γεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες

1095 a, 14. EE. 1217 a, 18 *πεπροοιμιασμένων δὲ τούτων, λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων, ζητοῦντες ἐπὶ τὸ σαφῶς <προϊόντες> εὑρεῖν τί ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν, ὅτι τάχ' ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτίονος ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ζῴων, ὅσα χείρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινωνεῖ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ' ὄρνις οὐδ' ἰχθὺς οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθέν, ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θείου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ζῇ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· νῦν δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτὰ τὰ δ' οὐ πρακτά. τοῦτο δὲ λέγομεν οὕτως, διότι ἔνια τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν μετέχει κινήσεως, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (? πράξεων)· καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσως ἄριστα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἔνια δὲ πρακτὰ μέν, ἀλλὰ πρακτὰ κρείττοσιν ἡμῶν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ διχῶς λέγεται τὸ πρακτόν (καὶ γὰρ ὧν ἕνεκα πράττομεν καὶ ἃ τούτων ἕνεκα μετέχει πράξεως, οἷον καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον τίθεμεν τῶν πρακτῶν, καὶ τὰ τούτων πραττόμενα χάριν, τά θ' ὑγιεινὰ καὶ τὰ χρηματιστικά), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτῶν ἄριστον θετέον.*

λόγον ζῆν is opposed to *τὸ κατὰ πάθος*. Cf. Plato, Laws 689 d *ὁ...κατὰ λόγον ζῶν*. Tim. 89 d *ᾧ τις...μάλιστ' ἂν κατὰ λόγον ζώῃ*. What is meant is that the appetitions must be consistently directed so that they may be counted on; they must not be *παράλογοι* or such as to defy calculation. The phrase does not mean 'according to reason,' cf. 1100 a, 23 n.

IV. § 1. **Δέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες κ.τ.λ.** This shows clearly how we are to understand 1094 a, 1 sqq. As we saw, *πολιτική* is both a *γνῶσις* and a *προαίρεσις*.

§ 2. **τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν κ.τ.λ.** See Introductory Note. We now find a nominal agreement but a very real disagreement between the beliefs of the many and those of the wise. This *ἀπορία* must be solved by the dialectic method. The fact that

λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπο- 20
λαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τί
ἐστιν ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς
3 ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον
ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο—πολλάκις δὲ
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ
πλοῦτον—συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ 25
ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' ᾠοντο παρὰ τὰ

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a, 22—26. EE. 1214 b, 7 *θέσθαι τινὰ σποπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἤτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν.*

a, 26. EE. 1217 b, 2 *φασὶ γὰρ ἄριστον μὲν εἶναι πάντων αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸ δ' εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ᾧ ὑπάρχει τό τε πρώτῳ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ αἰτίῳ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχειν ἀμφότερα τῇ ἰδέᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. λέγω δὲ ἀμφότερα τό τε πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον ἀγαθοῖς τῇ παρουσίᾳ*

'most people' regard *εὐδαιμονία* as the Good for man raises a presumption that it is the *ἀρχή* we are seeking for. Introd. § 25.

οἱ χαρίεντες. This is the urbane equivalent of *οἱ σοφοί*, the name which is given to them below. The reference is mainly to the Platonists, who had already adopted the name *εὐδαιμονία* for man's highest good. See Introductory Note, § 1.

τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν. In the Politics Aristotle more and more tends to substitute this phrase for the name *εὐδαιμονία* which he had borrowed from the Academy. It emphasises the view that a good life is an *ἐνέργεια*.

τὸ εὖ πράττειν. In [Plato] Alcib. 1, 116 b the ambiguity of this phrase is similarly turned to account. *Ὅστις καλῶς πράττει οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;—Ναί.—Οἱ δ' εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες;—Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;* We must remember that Aristotle is here giving the views of others and is not answerable for the fallacy. He himself gives a very complete proof below 1098 a, 7 sqq. Cf. also the definition of *εὐδαιμονία* as *εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς* (Introductory Note, n. 1).

οἱ πολλοί, here opposed to *οἱ σοφοί*. But cf. 1095 b, 16 n.

§ 3. **οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** This is not answered till a, 26 **ἔνιοι δ' ᾠοντο.**

νοσήσας κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Rep. 583 c *ἆρα οὐ μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους;...ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἥδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει πρὶν κάμνειν ἥδιστον ὄν.*

συνειδότες...θαυμάζουσιν. We gather from EE. 1214 b, 7 (*θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἤτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ* **παιδείαν**) what these regard as happiness. For **ὑπὲρ αὐτούς**, 'over their heads,' cf. Gen. An. 723 a, 22 *λίαν ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τὸ λεγόμενον*, Isokr. Paneg. § 11 *ἐπιτιμῶσι τῶν λόγων τοῖς ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἔχουσι.*

ἔνιοι δ' ᾠοντο, sc. the Platonists. The imperfect tense is used because Aristotle is speaking from personal recollection of the school. So *ἠπόρει* a, 32. He sums up the Platonic view

πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τούτοις
πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν 4
τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα
ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. μὴ λανθανέτω 5

τοῦ ἀγαθοῖς εἶναι. μάλιστά τε γὰρ τἀγαθὸν λέγεσθαι κατ' ἐκείνης ἀληθῶς (κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ καὶ ὁμοιότητα τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνης εἶναι), καὶ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ μετεχομένου ἀναιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ἰδέας, ἃ λέγεται τῷ μετέχειν ἐκείνης, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸ ὕστερον. ὥστ' εἶναι αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ γὰρ χωριστὴν εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἰδέας.

1095 a, 28. EE. 1214 b, 28 πάσας μὲν οὖν τὰς δόξας ἐπισκοπεῖν, ὅσας ἔχουσί τινες περὶ αὐτῆς, περίεργον (πολλὰ γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς παιδαρίοις καὶ τοῖς κάμνουσι καὶ παραφρονοῦσι, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὐθεὶς νοῦν ἔχων διαπορήσειεν· δέονται γὰρ οὐ λόγων, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἡλικίας ἐν ᾗ μεταβαλοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κολάσεως ἰατρικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς· κόλασις γὰρ ἡ φαρμακεία τῶν πληγῶν οὐκ ἐλάττων ἐστίν), ὁμοίως δὲ ταύταις οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν (cf. 1095 b, 19 sq.) ἐπισκεπτέον (εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ εὐδαιμονίας· ἄτοπον γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγου μηθὲν δεομένοις ἀλλὰ πάθους). ἐπεὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀπορίαι περὶ ἑκάστην πραγματείαν οἰκεῖαι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ βίου τοῦ κρατίστου καὶ ζωῆς τῆς ἀρίστης εἰσίν. ταύτας οὖν καλῶς ἔχει τὰς δόξας ἐξετάζειν· οἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων ἔλεγχοι τῶν ἐναντιουμένων αὐτοῖς λόγων ἀποδείξεις εἰσίν. (Cf. Top. 104 b, 1—105 a, 9.)

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thus: 'Over and above the many good things we know there is another Good which is good in itself and the cause of the goodness of all the good things we know.'

καθ' αὑτό. One of the marks of τὸ καθόλου, An. Post. 73 b, 26 sqq.

ὃ καὶ...ἀγαθά. This implies κατὰ παντός, the other mark of τὸ καθόλου.

§ 4. **ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** We need not discuss mere θέσεις of the wise (cf. 1096 a, 2 n.), nor contradictions of τὰ δοκοῦντα by ὁ τυχών (cf. Top. 104 b, 23).

τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας, 'the most prevalent' (lit. 'those that come to the surface'), the common meaning of the word. Cf. προύχοντες, b, 18.

ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον, 'or are thought plausible.' The phrase λόγον ἔχειν regularly means 'to have something to say for themselves,' or 'to admit of something being said for them' and is exactly equivalent to εὔλογον εἶναι. It can have no other meaning here.

§ 5. **μὴ λανθανέτω δὲ κ.τ.λ.** A note justifying the dialectical method which is here used. This is not a case for syllogistic reasoning from the ἀρχή, but for dialectical search after the ἀρχή.

δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ
τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτει
πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός, ὥσπερ
ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. 1095 b
ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ
μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ
6 τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν
περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμε- 5
7 νον ἱκανῶς· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρ-

οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι, sc. οἱ ἀποδεικτικοί.

οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, sc. οἱ διαλεκτικοί.

εὖ γὰρ καὶ [ὁ] Πλάτων κ.τ.λ. The imperfect tense shows that Aristotle is still speaking from personal recollection of the Academy. He means that, before commencing any inquiry, Plato used to ask whether, in the given case, they were in a position to descend from the ἀρχή by διαίρεσις, or whether it was first necessary to ascend to it by συναγωγή. I prefer to omit ὁ with L^b; the article is generally added when Plato in his writings is meant.

ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. This is not to be found in the published works of Plato, but the simile is clearly taken from the δίαυλος. Are we in such a position that we have only κάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν (Aisch. Ag. 345), or have we first to run the first κῶλον? The πέρας is not the winning-post, but the καμπή.

ἀρκτέον μὲν γάρ. This reading (K^b) is preferable to **ἀκρτέον μὲν οὖν** (L^b). It makes what follows an explanation of the comparison, while μὲν οὖν would set it aside.

ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων. This cannot mean 'from the knowable,' as Muretus and others have thought. In Greek γνώριμος is the opposite of ἄγνως and means 'known.'

ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς, sc. γνώριμα λέγεται. This is the true Aristotelian distinction between reasoning *a priori* and *a posteriori*. The ἀρχή is the logical *prius* of all legislation and action, but current moral judgments and existing institutions are 'more known to us.' Cf. Top. 141 b, 5 ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν γνωριμώτερον τὸ πρότερον τοῦ ὑστέρου, οἷον στιγμὴ γραμμῆς καὶ γραμμὴ ἐπιπέδου καὶ ἐπίπεδον στερεοῦ ...ἡμῖν δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἐνίοτε συμβαίνει· μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ στερεὸν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν πίπτει.

§ 6. **διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.** The man who has been trained in good habits has the ἀρχή implicitly, and it can be made explicit by a dialectical process. For **ἦχθαι** cf. ἀγωγή 1179 b, 31.

ἤθεσιν, the reading of L^b, seems preferable to ἔθεσιν K^b. We have not settled yet that ἦθος comes from ἔθος.

§ 7. **ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.** The word ἀρχή is used in its regular sense, for which see Introd. § 22. Since the starting-point or first principle of Politics is 'the that,' i.e. the fact that the definition of Happiness is whatever we may find it to be, and since any one who has been well brought up either has that definition or can easily get it by a dialectical process, the one thing needful for the intending student is a good up-bringing. He need not know anything of First Philosophy or Physics; for in Politics we treat the definition of Happiness as ultimate

κούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. ᾧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου—

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήιος ἀνήρ.

V. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν—τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι

1095 b, 14. EE. 1215 a, 26 διῃρημένων δὲ τῶν βίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν <οὐδ'> ἀμφισβητούντων τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας, ἀλλ' ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας τὰς φορτικὰς καὶ τῶν περὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ τὰς βαναύσους (λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, βαναύσους δὲ τὰς ἑδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικάς, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ τὰς πρὸς ὠν<ὰς> [ἀγορὰς] καὶ πράσεις καπηλικάς), τῶν δ' εἰς ἀγωγὴν εὐδαιμονικὴν ταττομένων, τριῶν ὄντων

(cf. Introd. § 23). Aristotle uses **τὸ ὅτι** ('the that') as opposed to **τὸ διότι** ('the why'—*διότι* is the indirect form of *διὰ τί*;) especially of the definitions which form the *οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί* of any science, which assert existence but are not capable of demonstration by that science.

ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ. sc. *ὁ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἠγμένος καλῶς.*

λάβοι ἄν. For *λαβεῖν* used to express the result of the dialectical process, the *λῆψις* of a *πρότασις*, see Introd. § 25.

μηδέτερον, sc. *τὸ ἔχειν ἢ τὸ λαβεῖν ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως.* If a man neither sees that the Good for Man is what we shall find it to be, nor can be made to see it dialectically, we can have nothing more to say to him. He is, as it were, morally colour-blind.

τοῦ Ἡσιόδου. Ἔργα 291 sqq.

V. § 1. **Ἡμεῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The dialectical examination of the *ἔνδοξα* now begins. First we discuss the beliefs of the many.

ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν, 1095 a, 30.

οὐκ ἀλόγως, 'as might be expected' of *οἱ πολλοί*. The phrase is equivalent to *εὐλόγως* or *εἰκότως*.

ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων, 'appear from their lives,' 'to judge by their lives.'

§ 2. **οἱ μὲν πολλοί**, resumed by **οἱ μὲν οὖν** *πολλοί* (*b*, 19) and opposed by **οἱ δὲ** *χαρίεντες* (*b*, 22).

διὸ καί, 'which is just why.' It can be the only reason, though of course they do not formulate it as a theory of life.

τρεῖς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This classification of the 'three lives' was current at the time; for we find it both in Plato and Isokrates. Cf. Rep. 581 c *Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα τριττὰ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον,*

μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς
3 καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός—οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι,

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τῶν καὶ πρότερον ῥηθέντων ἀγαθῶν ὡς μεγίστων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς, τρεῖς ὁρῶμεν καὶ βίους ὄντας, οὓς οἱ ἐπ' ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες προαιροῦνται ζῆν ἅπαντες, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν. τούτων γὰρ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος βούλεται περὶ φρόνησιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν περὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς περὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς καλάς (αὗται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς), ὁ δ' ἀπολαυστικὸς περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς σωματικάς. διόπερ ἕτερος ἕτερον τὸν εὐδαίμονα προσαγορεύει, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος, Οὐθείς, εἶπεν, ὧν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ' ἄτοπος ἄν τίς σοι φανείη. τοῦτον δ' ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνος, ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον ταύτης τυγχάνειν

φιλόνικον, φιλοκερδές...Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ 'θέλοις τρεῖς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους...ἀνερωτᾶν τίς τούτων τῶν βίων ἥδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσεται; They are then referred to as *ὁ χρηματιστικός, ὁ φιλότιμος* and *ὁ φιλόσοφος*. Isokr. Antid. § 217 *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἡδονῆς ἢ κέρδους ἢ τιμῆς ἕνεκα φημὶ πάντας πάντα πράττειν*. Iamblichos (V. Pyth. § 58) says of Pythagoras *ἐοικέναι γὰρ ἔφη τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάροδον τῷ ἐπὶ τὰς πανηγύρεις ἀπαντῶντι ὁμίλῳ· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖσε παντοδαποὶ φοιτῶντες ἄνθρωποι ἄλλος κατ' ἄλλου χρείαν ἀφικνεῖται, ὁ μὲν χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ κέρδους χάριν ἀπεμπολῆσαι τὸν φόρτον ἐπειγόμενος· ὁ δὲ δόξης ἕνεκα ἐπιδειξόμενος ἥκει τὴν ῥώμην τοῦ σώματος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος καὶ τό γε ἐλευθεριώτατον, συναλιζόμενον τόπων θέας ἕνεκα καὶ δημιουργημάτων καλῶν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἔργων καὶ λόγων· οὕτω δὴ κἀν τῷ βίῳ παντοδαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ταῖς σπουδαῖς εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροίζεσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ τροφῆς αἱρεῖ πόθος, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἵμερος φιλονικίαι τε δοξομανεῖς κατέχουσιν· εἰλικρινέστατον δὲ εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνθρώπου τρόπον τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν τῶν καλλίστων θεωρίαν, ὃν καὶ προσονομάζειν φιλοσοφίαν.* This passage well brings out the metaphor underlying the phrase *θεωρητικὸς βίος*, 'the life of the spectator.' We know from Cicero (Tusc. v, 3) that the story was told also by Herakleides, and it is not easy to resist the impression that its source is some published work of Aristotle's such as the *Προτρεπτικός*, on which see Bywater in Journal of Philology, 11, 55 and Diels in the Archiv 1, 477. This impression is much strengthened when we read in Ar. frag. 58 (from the *Προτρεπτικός* of Iamblichos) *καὶ τὰ Διονύσια δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐχ ὡς ληψόμενοί τι παρὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ προσθέντες* (the reading is correct, cf. Plato Euthyphro 3 d, and it is not necessary to read *προσδόντες* with Diels).

§ 3. **βοσκημάτων βίον.** From Plato, Rep. 586 a, *βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες.* Cf. also EE. (loc. cit. p. 21) on Apis.

τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ 4
τιμήν· τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαί-

τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ' ἴσως ᾤετο τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινος θεωρίας κοινωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν μακάριον εἶναι.

περὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑτέρων οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸ κρῖναι καλῶς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ οὗ πᾶσι ῥᾷστον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς τὸ γνῶναι, τί τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν αἱρετόν, καὶ λαβὼν ἄν τις ἔχοι πλήρη τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων <δι' ἃ> προίενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἱρετὸν ἦν, εἴ τις αἵρεσιν ἐδίδου, διά γε ταῦτα τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις <τίς> ὁ βίος ὃν ζῶσιν ἔτι παῖδες ὄντες; καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνακάμψαι πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν εὖ φρονῶν, ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ τῶν τε μηδεμίαν

τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου, 'they get a hearing,' the regular meaning of the phrase. This whole passage is dominated by the metaphor of a *διαδικασία*.

τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις, 'those who are in power,' 'in high positions,' and therefore able to choose freely. For the phrase cf. 1158 a, 27; 1159 a, 19. So in 1176 b, 16 we have *τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις* in a similar connexion. Isokrates, Peace § 104 *τοὺς ἐν πλείσταις ἐξουσίαις γεγενημένους*, Nikokles § 18 *οἱ ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις ὄντες*. For the thought, cf. Herakleides of Pontos Περὶ ἡδονῆς ap. Athen. 512, a *οἱ τύραννοι καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς πάντων ἀγαθῶν ὄντες κύριοι καὶ πάντων εἰληφότες πεῖραν τὴν ἡδονὴν προκρίνουσιν*. This is perhaps another indication that here Aristotle is drawing on the Προτρεπτικός.

ὁμοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ. This again can be proved to be an allusion to one of Aristotle's published works. Cf. Cic. Tusc. v, 35 (of the epitaph of Sardanapallos) "quid aliud, inquit Aristoteles, in bovis non in regis sepulcro inscriberes?" De Fin. ii, 32, 106 "corporis autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non intelligo cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma tanto opere derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur omnes se secum libidinum voluptates abstulisse." The epitaph, as we may see from Athenaeus, was current in many versions and ascribed to different persons. Chrysippos (ap. Athen. 336 a) quotes one which runs as follows—

Εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι θνητὸς ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν ἄεξε,
τερπόμενος θαλίῃσι· θανόντι σοι οὔτις ὄνησις.
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδός εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας·
κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ σὺν ἔρωτι
τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια πάντα λέλυνται.

§ 4. **χαρίεντες**, here = *ἐπιεικεῖς*, *μέτριοι*, an urbane equivalent for *ἀγαθοί*, not as above (1095 a, 18) for *σοφοί*. When *χαρίεις* = *σοφός*, practical men belong to *οἱ πολλοί*, but here the division is different.

σχεδόν, 'roughly speaking.' The word is often used to show that what

νεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν δὲ 25
5 οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ἔτι δ' ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε
6 τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις 30
τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω ζῶντα 1096 a
οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. καὶ

ἐχόντων ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονήν, μὴ καλὴν δέ, τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ὥστε τὸ μὴ εἶναι κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν. ὅλως δ' εἴ τις ἅπαντα συναγάγοι ὅσα πράττουσι μὲν καὶ πάσχουσιν ἅπαντες, ἑκόντες μέντοι μηθὲν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτοῦ χάριν, καὶ προσθείη χρόνου πλῆθος ἀπέραντόν τι, οὐ μᾶλλον ἕνεκ' ἄν τις τούτων ἕλοιτο ζῆν ἢ μὴ ζῆν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεισῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἃς τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν, μὴ παντελῶς ὢν ἀνδράποδον. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῷ ταύτην ποιουμένῳ τὴν αἵρεσιν οὐθὲν ἂν διενέγκειε γενέσθαι θηρίον ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὁ γοῦν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βοῦς, ὃν ὡς Ἄπιν τιμῶσιν, ἐν πλείοσι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξουσιάζει πολλῶν μονάρχων. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ καθεύδειν ἡδονήν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει καθεύδειν ἀνέγερτον ὕπνον ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡμέρας μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἢ ζῆν ὄντα φυτόν; τὰ γοῦν φυτὰ τοιαύτης τινὸς ἔοικε μετέχειν ζωῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδία. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρὶ γένεσιν πεφυκότα μὲν διατελεῖ, καθεύδοντα δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον. ὥστε φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι διαφεύγει σκοπουμένους τί τὸ εὖ καὶ τί τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ ζῆν.

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is said is accommodated to popular notions. Honour is not the end of the true statesman as Aristotle conceived him, but of those of whom we read below 1141 b, 28, the *πρακτικοὶ καὶ βουλευτικοί*, to whom the name is usually confined. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 23.

ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι, 'dependent on the honourers.'

μαντευόμεθα, 'we divine,' a favourite word of Plato's. Cf. Rep. 349 a, 394 d, 506 a, 523 a, Lys. 216 d etc.

§ 6. **θέσιν διαφυλάττων.** Top. 104 b, 19 *θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις*

περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν. τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ 7
τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. ὁ δὲ χρηματι- 8
στὴς βίᾳ ὅστις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητού-

τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρός τινα διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκ' ἄν τις ἕλοιτο γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι, Τοῦ, φάναι, θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἕνεκα τὴν αἵρεσιν ᾤετο τιμίαν εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν· οἱ δὲ Σαρδανάπαλλον μακαρίζοντες ἢ Σμινδυρίδην τὸν Συβαρίτην (Hdt. vi, 127) ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς τῶν ζώντων τὸν ἀπολαυστικὸν βίον, οὗτοι δὲ πάντες ἐν τῷ χαίρειν φαίνονται τάττειν τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· ἕτεροι δέ τινες οὔτ' ἂν φρόνησιν οὐδεμίαν οὔτε

παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι ἓν τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ Μέλισσός φησιν. De Caelo, 306 a, 12 ἐοίκασι τοῖς τὰς θέσεις ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διαφυλάττουσι.

ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις. There can be no doubt that in Aristotle's time ἐγκύκλιος was a word applied to things that were a matter of 'routine,' that belonged to the 'trivial round.' Isokrates (De Pace § 87) says that during the war ἐν ἧν τοῦτο τῶν ἐγκυκλίων ταφὰς ποιεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτόν. Aristotle himself speaks of ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα (Pol. 1255 b, 25) and ἐγκύκλιοι διακονίαι (ib. 1263 a, 21). Cf. also the ἐγκύκλιοι λητουργίαι. With the present use of the word we may compare De Caelo 279 a, 30 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις φιλοσοφήμασι. The meaning will therefore be 'in everyday discussions or writings,' and will not be very different from that of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, on which see 1102 a, 26 n.

§ 7. **ὑπὲρ οὗ.** Like Demosthenes, Aristotle uses ὑπέρ to avoid the repetition of περί (cf. Sandys on Phil. i, § 1). We find it so used five times in the Ethics, viz. here and 1096 b, 30. 1112 a, 20. 1155 b, 16. 1172 a, 26. According to Eucken, this usage is commonest in the Topics, Rhetoric and Ethics, which means that it is an elegance belonging to Aristotle's more popular style (Introd. § 7). There is, therefore, no occasion to doubt the genuineness of passages where it occurs.

ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις, in the Tenth Book. The K^b reading ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις may be based on the notion (strangely revived by Ramsauer) that the discussion of the Platonic theory which follows is a discussion of the θεωρητικὸς βίος. Aristotle can dismiss this Life without vitiating his argument; for we have to do just now only with the beliefs of the many.

§ 8. **βίᾳ ὅστις ἐστίν.** I owe this emendation to Mr James Watt of Balliol College, Oxford. The MSS. have βίαιός τίς ἐστιν, but we may read ΒΙΑΙΟΣΤΙΣΕΣΤΙΝ as we please. It has long been seen that the meaning must be that the money-maker is not a free agent, and so his opinion does not count. But can a χρηματιστής, or even a χρηματιστὴς βίος, be called βίαιος in this sense? Elsewhere the word is only used of φορά, κίνησις and the like; and, though we can say βίᾳ

μενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω. 10

VI. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς

τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ἕλοιντο μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς πράξεις τὰς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. αἱροῦνται γοῦν οὐ μόνον ἕνιοι δόξης χάριν αὐτάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ μέλλοντες εὐδοκιμήσειν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γάρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολιτικὸς τῶν καλῶν ἐστι πράξεων προαιρετικὸς αὐτῶν χάριν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ χρημάτων καὶ πλεονεξίας ἕνεκεν ἅπτονται τοῦ ζῆν οὕτως.

ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντες ἐπὶ τρεῖς βίους φέρουσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πολιτικὸν φιλόσοφον ἀπολαυστικόν.

φέρεται and βίᾳ κινεῖται, we can hardly say βίᾳ ζῇ. The conjecture is confirmed by a reading of the Vetus Versio, *pecuniosus autem quis violenter est*. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 8.

καταβέβληνται. Cf. Plato Soph. 232 d δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν. The metaphor, as Gomperz has pointed out, is that of scattering seed. So Herod. i, 122 φάτιν καταβάλλειν, *rumorem spargere, disseminare*. So the καταβεβλημέναι μαθήσεις of Pol. 1337 b, 22 are the popular subjects of instruction. Of course **πρός** means 'against.' Though the thing is clear, yet diatribes against them like the Προτρεπτικός are widely circulated.

VI. § 1. **Τὸ δὲ καθόλου,** sc. ἀγαθόν. It has not yet been mentioned by this name, but the two marks of τὸ καθόλου are given above, 1095 a, 27 n. We should now go on to the beliefs of the wise; but first we must apply our dialectic to showing that Plato was wrong in speaking of a universal good. Introd. § 28.

καίπερ προσάντους κ.τ.λ. The word προσάντης literally means 'up hill.' This apology is thoroughly Platonic in tone and even in style. Cf. Rep. 595 b Ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.

εἰσαγαγεῖν, 'have imported.' The word is commonly used of introducing novelties, and suggests something arbitrary. Cf. De Caelo 271 b, 11 τοὐλάχιστον εἰσαγαγών, 'by importing the notion of a least magnitude into mathematics.'

δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως, 'it will surely be admitted' even by those who think it ungraceful of me to attack Plato. That Aristotle was sensitive to this charge appears from frag. 10, thus quoted by Proclus, καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγὼς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθεῖν κἂν τις αὐτὸν οἴηται διὰ φιλονικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας, another Platonic touch. Cf. Theait. 164 a εἰ σώσομεν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον. So 1104 a, 10 πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.

ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

2 Οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ

1096 a, 17. EE. 1218 a, 1 ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, οὐκ ἔστι κοινόν τι παρὰ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστόν. εἴη γὰρ ἄν τι τοῦ πρώτου πρότερον· πρότερον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ χωριστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὸ πρῶτον, οἷον εἰ τὸ διπλάσιον

καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν. Aristotle here as elsewhere partly identifies himself with the Platonic school. Cf. Met. 990 b, 8 ἔτι καθ' οὓς τρόπους δείκνυμεν ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, κατ' οὐθένα φαίνεται τούτων...ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἴδη γίγνεται κ.τ.λ. 997 b, 3 ὡς μὲν οὖν λέγομεν τὰ εἴδη αἰτιά τε καὶ οὐσίας εἶναι καθ' αὑτάς. Note that **ἀναιρεῖν** is used of cancelling a will.

ὅσιον προτιμᾶν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rep. 595 c ἀλλ' οὐ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, and, for ὅσιον, 368 b ὀέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσιον ᾖ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνῃ κατηγορουμένῃ ἀπαγορεύειν, 607 d ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. So in Met. 1073 b, 16 φιλεῖν μὲν ἀμφοτέρους, πείθεσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.

§ 2. **Οἱ δὴ κομίσαντες κ.τ.λ.** This word has the same associations as εἰσαγαγεῖν above. Cf. Top. 159 b, 30 οἱ κομίσαντες ἀλλοτρίας δόξας, Met. 990 b, 2 ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν (said of the ἰδέαι).

ἐποίουν. This word also suggests something arbitrarily 'set up.' Cf. Met. 995 b, 16 οἱ ποιοῦντες τὰ εἴδη. So κατεσκεύαζον below. For the tense see note on ᾤοντο 1095 a, 26.

ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. In a numerical series we have priority and posteriority. For instance 1 is prior to 2 because if there is 2 there must be 1, but not *vice versa*. For this sense of πρότερον cf. Cat. 14 a, 34 where the second kind of priority is given as τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν. If there were a 'form' of number, it would be prior to the first number of the series. Which is absurd. Met. 999 a, 6 ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἶναί τι παρὰ ταῦτα, οἷον εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ δυάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, 'in the category of οὐσία.' For the doctrine of the Categories see Introd. § 28. They too form a series the terms of which are 'not convertible according to sequence of being.' If there is quality there must be substance, but not *vice versa*. Substance is the *prius* of them all; but, if there were a common 'form' of which they all partook, it would be prior to Substance. Which is absurd.

τὸ...καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία, 'the essential, i.e. substance.' τὸ καθ' αὑτό

οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι—παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος—ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτοις ἰδέα.

3 Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ.

πρῶτον τῶν πολλαπλασίων, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν· ἔσται γὰρ τοῦ διπλασίου πρότερον.

a, 24. EE. 1217 b, 25 πολλαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ἰσαχῶς τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ὄν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις διῄρηται, σημαίνει τὸ μὲν τί ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πότε, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ μὲν ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ κινεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν πτώσεών ἐστι τούτων, ἐν οὐσίᾳ μὲν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὁ θεός, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, ἐν δὲ τῷ πότε ὁ καιρός, τὸ δὲ διδάσκον καὶ τὸ διδασκόμενον περὶ κίνησιν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν ἕν τί ἐστι περὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

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is what a thing is 'in (or rather 'by') itself,' as opposed to its accidents (συμβεβηκότα). Met. 1065 b, 2 οὐδὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς πρότερον τῶν καθ' αὑτό.

πρότερον τῇ φύσει. For the posteriority of the other categories to the τί ἐστι, cf. Met. 1028 a, 13 τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερὸν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὃν τὸ τί ἐστι...τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητας εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ποιότητας, τὰ δὲ πάθη κ.τ.λ....τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ (Cat. ποιότης) ἢ τὸ καθήμενον (Cat. κεῖσθαι) οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου λέγεται.

τοῦ πρός τι. Met. 1088 a, 23 τὸ πρός τι πάντων ἥκιστα φύσις τις ἢ οὐσία τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

παραφυάδι—a biological metaphor. Cf. Rhet. 1356 a, 25 συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι.

τοῦ ὄντος, i.e. τοῦ τί ἐστι. The word is used in its narrower sense, not in that which it has in the next sentence.

§ 3. **ἰσαχῶς...τῷ ὄντι;** "in as many senses as the word 'is'." Τὸ ὄν is here used in a wider sense as the substantive corresponding to the copula ἐστί. In this sense it includes all the categories, which therefore are sometimes called γένη τοῦ ὄντος.

ἐν τῷ τί. The regular term is ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, cf. supra 19.

τὸ μέτριον...καιρός...δίαιτα. The medical sense of these words is chiefly in Aristotle's mind. Cf. Top. 107 a, 8. There does not seem to be any satisfactory parallel for δίαιτα in the sense of τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγομεν (Schol.).

30 Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ 4
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ
πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ
μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν
τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.

35 Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν 5
1096 b αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἕν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς
καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἦ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος,
οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν 6

1096 a, 30. EE. 1217 b, 34 οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ μία οὔτε τοῦ ὄντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι, οἷον τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα ἕτερον καιρὸν θεωρεῖ καὶ ἑτέρα ἕτερον μέτριον, οἷον περὶ τροφὴν μὲν τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον θεωρεῖ ἰατρικὴ καὶ γυμναστική, περὶ δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις στρατηγία, καὶ οὕτως ἑτέρα περὶ ἑτέραν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε σχολῇ αὐτό γε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς.

a, 35. EE. 1218 a, 10 ἔστι τοίνυν, φασίν, αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν. τὸ οὖν αὐτὸ πρόσκειται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν κοινόν· τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν εἴη πλὴν ὅτι ἀΐδιον καὶ χωριστόν; ἀλλ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον λευκὸν τὸ πολλὰς ἡμέρας λευκὸν τοῦ μίαν ἡμέραν· ὥστ' οὐδὲ <τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀΐδιον εἶναι· οὐδὲ> δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸ τῇ ἰδέᾳ· πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τὸ κοινόν.

b, 5. EE. 1218 a, 15 ἀνάπαλιν δὲ καὶ δεικτέον ἢ ὡς νῦν δεικνύουσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀνομολογουμένων ἔχειν

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§ 4. **καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κ.τ.λ.** Eudemos (loc. cit.) calls these τὰ ὁμοιοσχημόνως λεγόμενα.

οἷον καιροῦ. Καιρός is ἀγαθὸν ἐν χρόνῳ. For its use in strategy cf. Thucydides and Demosthenes *passim*, and for its use in medicine cf. Hippokrates Aph. 1 Ὁ βίος βραχὺς ἡ δὲ τέχνη μακρή· ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὀξύς, ἡ δὲ πεῖρα σφαλερή, ἡ δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή.

τοῦ μετρίου, i.e. τοῦ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ ἀγαθοῦ.

ἐν πόνοις. Cf. 1138 b, 28 n.

§ 5. **Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.** We have had three arguments to show that the good is not καθόλου, we now have two to show that it is not χωριστόν.

τί ποτε καί is impatient. 'Whatever they can mean by adding the prefix αὐτο- to things.' Cf. Met. 1040 b, 32 ποιοῦσιν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ εἴδει (sc. οὐσίας) τοῖς φθαρτοῖς—ταύτας γὰρ ἴσμεν—**αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτόϊππον**, προστιθέντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ **αὐτό**.

οὐδ' ᾗ ἀγαθόν, sc. διοίσει τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν. Mr Bury proposes to read οὐδὲ <τἀγαθὸν> ᾗ ἀγαθόν, but the brachylogy is quite Aristotelian.

οὐδὲ τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ
7 λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. πιθανώτερον δ' 5
ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ
τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος
ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ἐκείνων τὰ ὁμολογούμενα εἶναι ἀγαθὰ δεικνύουσιν, ἐξ ἀριθμῶν ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν· τάξεις γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί, ὡς τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς μονάσιν ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. δεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, οἷον ὑγιείας ἰσχύος σωφροσύνης, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλόν. πάντα γὰρ τάδε τάξις καὶ ἠρεμία· εἰ ἄρα, ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον· ἐκείνοις γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα μᾶλλον. παράβολος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ὅτι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ἐφίενται· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἐφίενται λέγουσι φανερῶς, ἀλλὰ λίαν ἁπλῶς τοῦτο φασι, καὶ ὄρεξιν εἶναι πῶς ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἐν οἷς ζωὴ μὴ ὑπάρχει; δεῖ δὲ περὶ τούτου πραγματευθῆναι, καὶ μὴ ἀξιοῦν μηθὲν ἀλόγως, ἃ καὶ μετὰ λόγου πιστεῦσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον. τό τε φάναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεσθαι ἑνός τινος ἀγαθοῦ οὐκ ἀληθές· ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται, ὀφθαλμὸς ὄψεως, σῶμα ὑγιείας, οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου.

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§ 7. **πιθανώτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Eudemos (loc. cit.) is fuller on this, but we do not know enough about it to be quite sure of the interpretation. Speusippos is criticised (1) for trying to prove things to be good because they are numbers instead of showing that number is good because admittedly good things are or imply number; (2) for saying that the One is the good because all numbers aim at unity. At the same time, Aristotle says that, strange as this theory may be, it is more plausible to say the One is the Good than to say the Good is one. But there must also be some reference to the theory of Speusippos that the good is not eternal. Cf. Met. 1072 b, 30 ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι. So ib. 1091 a, 33 we are told that some thought them ὑστερογενῆ and said that προελθούσης τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι. His superior plausibility consists, then, in this, that, instead of starting from one universal eternal good and deducing all other goods from it, he makes the One the good to which all things tend and places it not in the beginning, but in the end. A universal good seems more conceivable as a yet unrealised ideal than as a first cause.

ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ. Met. 986 a, 22 τὰς ἀρχὰς δέκα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰς κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγομένας—

1.	πέρας	καὶ ἄπειρον.	
2.	περιττὸν	,,	ἄρτιον.
3.	ἓν	,,	πλῆθος.
4.	δεξιόν	,,	ἀριστερόν.
5.	ἄρρεν	,,	θῆλυ.
6.	ἠρεμοῦν	,,	κινούμενον.
7.	εὐθύ	,,	καμπύλον.
8.	φῶς	,,	σκότος.
9.	ἀγαθόν	,,	κακόν.
10.	τετράγωνον	,,	ἑτερόμηκες.

Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· τοῖς δὲ 8
λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ
παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν
εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ
τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα
λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' 9
ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα.
χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ σκεψώμεθα
εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; 10
ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ
ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώ-
κομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. ἢ οὐδ'
ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.
εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὑτά, τὸν τἀγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν 11
ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν
χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ
φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ

§ 8. **τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν κ.τ.λ.**, 'We can descry a possible objection to our arguments on the ground that Plato's words do not apply to *every* good.' For *ὑποφαίνεσθαι* cf. Plato, Soph. 245 e *τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα*.

καθ' ἓν εἶδος, 'are so called because they are the same in species.' Aristotle opposes *τὰ καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα* to *τὰ πρὸς ἕν* which include *τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά* and *τὰ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικά*. See further b, 27 n. In Rhet. 1362 a, 27 we find among received definitions of the good *καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων... καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά*.

§ 10. **καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The argument is put in the form of a dilemma, the two horns of which are introduced by *ἢ* (b, 17 and b, 19). Things good *per se* either include something more than the Form of Good or they do not. If they do not, what is the use of the Form? If they do, in what does their specific identity consist?

μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. 'The species (of things good *per se*) will be purposeless,' seeing that there are no good things of which it is the *εἶδος*. It will be a species to which nothing belongs, a form of which nothing partakes, a type which is nowhere realised. This is one horn of the dilemma.

§ 11. **εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.** The other horn. If these too (i.e. *ὅσα μονούμενα διώκεται*) are good *per se* and *καθ' ἓν εἶδος λεγόμενα* (b, 10), the definition of good must be the same in all of them, or they will not be a real species at all. Snow and white lead are both called white *καθ' ἓν εἶδος*, and therefore the definition of whiteness (*χρῶμα διακριτικὸν ὄψεως* Top. 119 a, 30) is the same in both. Is this true of the Good?

τιμῆς...φρονήσεως...ἡδονῆς. These are the ends of the 'three lives.' Of

ᾗ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν 25
ἰδέαν.

Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ 12
τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς
ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ
ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.
ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ 13 30
αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

1096 b, 30. EE. 1217 b, 16 *ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ διασκοπεῖν περὶ ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἑτέρας τε διατριβῆς καὶ τὰ πολλὰ λογικωτέρας ἐξ*

course *φρόνησις* is used in its wide Platonic sense to include 'wisdom' of all kinds.

ταύτῃ ᾗ ἀγαθά. These are the emphatic words. The definitions of snow and white lead are different too, but not *ταύτῃ ᾗ λευκά*, in so far as they are regarded as belonging to the species of white things.

κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Note the preposition. Cf. § 12 and the notes.

§ 12. **πῶς δὴ λέγεται;** sc. *ἀγαθά*. If they are not *καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα*, in what sense are they all called by one name?

τοῖς...ὁμωνύμοις. *ὁμώνυμα* are defined as *ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος*. Cf. 1129 a, 30. The usage of the term, however, fluctuates somewhat. Here 'chance *ὁμώνυμα*,' where there is absolutely nothing in common but an accidental identity of name, are distinguished from certain other *ὁμώνυμα*, for which see next note.

τῷ ἀφ' ἑνός...πρὸς ἕν. This is the class called *παρώνυμα* in Cat. 1 a, 12, a name which merely implies modification of the name by some inflexion or suffix (*πτῶσις*). They form an intermediate class between *ὁμώνυμα* and *συνώνυμα*, the latter of which are also called *καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα*. For example, *τὸ ὑγιεινόν* means 'the healthy' in the sense (1) of what produces and preserves health (*πρὸς ἕν*), e.g. healthy exercise, (2) of what is a sign of health (*ἀφ' ἑνός*), e.g. a healthy complexion, (3) of what is capable (*δεκτικόν*) of health, e.g. a healthy man. Cf. Met. 1003 a, 33. So in Met. 1060 b, 37, we speak of an *ἰατρικὸς λόγος* (*ἀφ' ἑνός*) and an *ἰατρικὸν μαχαίριον* (*πρὸς ἕν*). As Professor Stewart well says: "A knife and a lecture may both be called 'surgical.' They are both called 'surgical,' not as an ox and a horse are both called 'animals' (*συνωνύμως*), nor yet as a key and the collar-bone are both called *κλεῖς* (*ὁμωνύμως*)."

κατ' ἀναλογίαν. This is Aristotle's own view. Things predicated in different categories can only be the same *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*, that is their sameness can be represented as a proportion. This meaning of *ἀναλογία* is illustrated by the example *ὄψις : σῶμα :: νοῦς : ψυχή*. This illustration would at once appeal to Aristotle's audience, as it comes from Plato Rep. vi. To take another illustration from the matter immediately in hand, we may say *καιρός : χρόνος :: τὸ μέτριον : ποσότης*.

§ 13. **ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.** Cf. 1096 a, 4 n.

ἄλλης...φιλοσοφίας, sc. *τῆς πρώτης*. As Ramsauer points out, we have hints of such a treatment in Met. 1078 a, 31 *τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἕτερον· τὸ μὲν*

περὶ τῆς ἰδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστὸν αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν **14**
1097 a αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθά, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν **15** οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον τοὺς τεχνίτας ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ **16** τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαθόν,

ἀνάγκης (οἱ γὰρ ἅμα ἀναιρετικοί τε καὶ κοινοὶ λόγοι κατ' οὐδεμίαν εἰσὶν ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην). εἰ δὲ δεῖ συντόμως εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν, λέγομεν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὸ εἶναι ἰδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς. ἐπέσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

1096 b, 32. EE. 1217 b, 23 ἔπειτ' εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἰδέαι καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, μή ποτ' οὐδὲ χρήσιμος πρὸς ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις.

γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐν πράξει, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. 996 a, 27 ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν, οὐδ' εἶναί τι αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. But we have no full discussion.

ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ. So Bekker with L^b. Bywater compares EE. 1218 a, 7 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πολλαπλάσιον τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον εἶναι χωριστόν. See too Top. 179 a, 8 φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι οὐ δοτέον τόδε τι εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τι σημαίνειν. K^b has καὶ for τό.

αὐτό τι καθ' αὑτό. For the order Bywater compares EE. 1218 a, 10 αὐτό τι ἀγαθόν and Met. 1045 a, 16 αὐτό τι ζῷον.

§ 14. οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα κ.τ.λ. Plato often substitutes the type to which things approximate for the form in which they partake. The meaning is not really different. Cf. Rep. 505 e, 519 c, 501 b.

§ 15. ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφιέμεναι. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n.

τὸ ἐνδεὲς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1337 a, 1 πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλεῖπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν. This is only the other side of ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεται.

§ 16. ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων. The regular Platonic instances. The τέκτων makes the κερκίς for the ὑφάντης (Krat. 388 c sqq.), and Plato himself had said that he looks to the εἶδος of the κερκίς, without bringing in the αὐτοαγαθόν, just as the ὑφάντης looks to the εἶδος of the ἱμάτιον.

ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν **10** αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

VII. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, **15** τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν; ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν **20** ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω,
2 ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται· τοῦτο
3 δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. ἐπεὶ δὴ πλείω φαί- **25**

τεθεαμένος, the Platonic word.

οὕτως, sc. *καθόλου*.

μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε. This is said not of the doctor's art but of its application. Cf. Met. 981 a, 14 μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων... a, 17 αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι.

VII. **§ 1. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν κ.τ.λ.** Having disposed of the universal good, we may now consider the beliefs of the wise (i.e. Plato) about the good, restricting it to the single πρᾶξις, τέχνη or προαίρεσις of πολιτική.

ἑκάστης, sc. *τέχνης*. This particularises the question. Even if we reject the universal good, the Platonists will still give answers about the ends of a particular art, of which we may make use.

οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπά. Cf. Top. 146 b, 10 οὗ χάριν τἆλλα.

§ 2. μεταβαίνων, 'shifting its ground.' The verb μεταβιβάζειν is technically used of the dialectic process. Cf. Top. 101 a, 33 μεταβιβάζοντες ὅτι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν. So EE. 1216 b, 30 μεταβιβαζόμενοι συνομολογήσουσι (Introd. § 25). Adopting the Platonic personification of the λόγος, we can say ὁ λόγος μεταβαίνει in the same sense. The meaning, then, is that, if the Platonists are 'moved on' or forced by criticism to take a fresh step, that is, to limit the good which we are seeking to that of some one art, their account of it comes into agreement with that from which we ourselves started.

διασαφῆσαι. This refers to another formula of dialectics, for which see 1138 b, 26 ἀληθὲς μὲν οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές and the note.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δή. So Hel. reads for the ἐπεὶ δέ of the MSS. Professor Bywater, regarding μεταβαίνων...πειρατέον as

νεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἱρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερον, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν 4
30 τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· 5
1097 b ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἑλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν,
5 διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ 6
γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ

"intrusive" (Contr. p. 24), thinks the reading δή an "attempt to disguise a structural flaw in the text."

αὐλούς. The soundness of this reading has been suspected, but, it now appears, without reason. Professor Bywater points out that in Plato Rep. 601 d the αὐλός is taken as a typical instance of the ὄργανον.

τέλειόν τι. The account of the good now given comes from Plato's Philebos (see Appendix G *τέλεον, ἱκανόν, αἱρετόν* in Bury's edition). We are still discussing *τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκοῦντα.* Cf. Phileb. 20 c Τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι; —Πάντων δήπου τελεώτατον.

§ 4. **καὶ ἁπλῶς δή,** i.e. without the πρόσθεσις implied by the πτῶσις of the comparative degree. For the τόπος of τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον here employed cf. Top. 115 b, 3 πάλιν εἴ τι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὑπάρχει.

§ 5. **τιμήν...ἡδονήν...νοῦν,** again the ends of the 'three lives.'

§ 6. **αὔταρκες,** cf. Phileb. 20 c Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν;—Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων. ib. 20 e δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι.

οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ, sc. ἀρκοῦν, understood from αὔταρκες. Aristotle is explaining the sense in which he takes the αὐτο- of αὔταρκες.

βίον μονώτην. The word μονώτης is peculiar to Aristotle (cf. 1099 b, 4. 1157 b, 21. 1169 b, 16. 1170 a, 5). It seems to be based on the analogy of ἰδιώτης. Cf. Demetr. περὶ ἑρμηνείας 144 καὶ ἐξ ἰδιωτικοῦ ὀνόματος γίγνεται (sc. χάρις), ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης "ὅσῳ γάρ," φησί, "μονώτης εἰμί, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα"· καὶ ἐκ πεποιημένου, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ "ὅσῳ γὰρ αὐτίτης καὶ μονώτης εἰμί, φιλομυθότερος γέγονα." τὸ μὲν γὰρ **μονώτης** ἰδιωτικωτέρου ἔθους

γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ 10
7 πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς <τῶν γονέων> καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον· τὸ δ' αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ 15
μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι·
8 ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην—συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον,

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ἥδη ἐστί, τὸ δὲ **αὐτίτης** πεποιημένον ἐκ τοῦ **αὐτός.** Cf. Poet. 1458 a, 21 sqq.

φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Pol. 1253 a, 2 ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷόν ἐστι. I have given the reading of L^b: for it seems most likely that the K^b reading πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος has been accommodated to the Politics.

§ 7. **τούτων,** sc. τῶν φίλων κ.τ.λ.

ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς. This is not consistent with 10, even if γονεῖς can stand for προγόνους. Rassow's γονεῖς τῶν γονέων (Forsch. p. 111) is a highly probable conjecture.

εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Cf. 1094 a, 20 n.

εἰσαῦθις, sc. in the discussion of φιλία, 1170 b, 20 sqq.

τὸ δ' αὔταρκες κ.τ.λ. By αὔταρκες we do not mean τὸ **αὐτῷ** ἀρκοῦν but τὸ **αὐτὸ** ἀρκοῦν 'what suffices by itself.' The αὐτό is explained by **μονούμενον.** Most MSS. (not K^b) have ἄρκιον καὶ αἱρετόν or αἱρετὸν καὶ ἄρκιον, which points to the true explanation.

§ 8. **ἔτι...αἱρετωτάτην.** Cf. Phileb. 20 d πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἐλεῖν κ.τ.λ.

μὴ συναριθμουμένην, 'not included in the enumeration' (of good things), 'not as one good thing among others.' It must include all particular good things, and therefore cannot be put on the same line with or made coordinate with them (*σύσστοιχον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς* Hel.). So in the Philebos Plato had shown that neither φρόνησις nor ἡδονή could be the good because φρόνησις + ἡδονή is better than either alone. Cf. 1172 b, 28 n. The best commentary is Rhet. 1363 b, 18 ἀνάγκη τά τε πλείω (sc. ἀγαθά) τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων· μεῖζον γάρ, τὸ δ' ἐνυπάρχον εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δ' ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερέχεται. It is only if all other goods are contained in it (ἐνυπάρχει), that we can be sure no πρόσθεσις is possible. If ὑγίεια συναριθμεῖται τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, then εὐδαιμονία + ὑγίεια will 'exceed' εὐδαιμονία alone. Cf. also Top. 117 a, 16 ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων (αἱρετώτερα), ἢ ἁπλῶς, ἢ ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις ὑπάρχῃ, τὰ ἐλάττω ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν, to which Alexander (p. 247 Wallies) notes as an exception ἀλλ' οὐδὲ εὐδαιμονία μετὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν αἱρετωτέρα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας μόνης, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ περιέχονται καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί...οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς περιέχουσί τινα τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὡς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ἐρρέθη, τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὐ συγκρίνεται· διὸ δεῖ προσδιορίζεσθαι τὸ ἐν τούτοις εἶναι τὰ πλείω καὶ περιέχοντα ἀγαθὰ αἱρετώτερα τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ περιεχομένων, **ἐν τοῖς συναριθμεῖσθαι πεφυκόσι.** This προσδιορισμός is made in Rhet. loc. cit.

ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον ἀεί. τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.

9 Ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον 10 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἐστί τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος 11 μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12 ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ
1098 a ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωήν.

1097 b, 24. EE. 1219 a, 5 ὥστε καὶ ψυχῆς (sc. ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις ἀρετή)· ἔστι γάρ τι ἔργον αὐτῆς. καὶ τῆς βελτίονος δὴ ἕξεως ἔστω βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον· καὶ ὡς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀπὸ τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐχέτω, καὶ τέλος ἑκάστου τὸ ἔργον.

τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος. Here again the leading statement is expressed by the participle (cf. 1094 b, 11 n.). 'Happiness, then, is complete and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.'

§ 9. **τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν.** 'To identify Happiness and the Best.' The addition of the article to both terms shows that it is indifferent which is subject and which is predicate.

ἐναργέστερον...ἔτι. Cf. *ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές* 1138 b, 26 n.

§ 10. **ληφθείη.** Cf. Introd. § 25. We are still 'taking' *ἔνδοξοι προτάσεις* from 'the wise.'

τὸ ἔργον. The following *ἔνδοξον* comes from Plato, Rep. 352 d, sqq., where the *ἔργον* of anything is defined as *ὃ ἂν ἢ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἢ ἄριστα.*

ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is an *ἐπαγωγή*. Its conclusion is 'If Man has an *ἔργον*, his good will depend on that *ἔργον*.'

§ 11. **πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Another *ἐπαγωγή*. We see that (1) every class of men has an *ἔργον*, (2) that every part of man has an *ἔργον*. It is therefore *εὔλογον* that Man as such should have an *ἔργον*.

§ 12. **ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.** The 'proper' function of man cannot be something 'common' to him and to vegetables.

τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωήν. The life of nutrition and growth, the presence of which differentiates the animate from the inanimate, life at its lowest. Cf. De An. 413 b, 7 *θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα μετέχει.* See the whole passage.

ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ
13 καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· [τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.] διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης 5 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγε-

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1098 a, 5. EE. 1219 a, 9 *φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον τὸ ἔργον τῆς ἕξεως· τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος· ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον, οὗ ἕνεκα τἆλλα πάντα. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν τὸ ἔργον βέλτιον τῆς ἕξεως καὶ τῆς διαθέσεως, δῆλον· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔργον λέγεται διχῶς. τῶν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερόν τι τὸ ἔργον παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν, οἷον οἰκοδομικῆς οἰκία ἀλλ' οὐκ οἰκοδόμησις καὶ ἰατρικῆς ὑγίεια ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑγίανσις, τῶν δ' ἡ χρῆσις ἔργον, οἷον ὄψεως ὅρασις καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης θεωρία. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη, ὧν ἔργον ἡ χρῆσις, τὴν χρῆσιν βέλτιον εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως.*

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too is late. The adjective *ἐπιπειθής* can hardly have been used by Aristotle. The interpolation refers to the distinction made at the end of Book 1, and is quite irrelevant here.

διττῶς ... λεγομένης. It may be either a *ἕξις* or an *ἐνέργεια* (in the language of the Academy a *χρῆσις*). The distinction between the two is the same as that laid down in the De An. 414 a, 4 sqq. See especially 417 a, 21 sqq. where the distinction is illustrated by the contrast of *τὸ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην* and *τὸ θεωρεῖν*.

κυριώτερον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reason is that the *ἔργον* is the end of the *ἕξις* and therefore better. Where there is an *ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν* that is better than the *ἐνέργεια* (1094 a, 5); but, when the end is the *ἐνέργεια* itself, it is the final cause, and the *ἕξις* is only a *δύναμις* in relation to it. Now the *δύναμις* is referable to the *ἐνέργεια* (1170 a, 16 sqq.) as that which determines it and makes it what it is (*τὸ κύριον*). Cf. Met. 1050 b, 6—34.

1097 b 13. **λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.** The active life of the rational part. Τὸ *λόγον ἔχον* is that part of the soul which 'can give an account of itself' and is therefore capable of *πρᾶξις* (including *θεωρία*) directed to an end. Observe that, though *λόγον ἔχον* may be translated 'rational,' *λόγος* does not mean 'reason' here any more than in ordinary Greek.

τούτου δὲ...διανοούμενον. This remark interrupts the argument and destroys the grammar. The language

σθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον 14
ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει
τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου
10 κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης
τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· κιθαριστοῦ
μὲν γὰρ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δ' οὕτως,—ἀνθρώ-
που δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν

1098 a, 7. EE. 1219 a, 18 τούτων δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένων, λέγομεν ὅτι ταὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως. οἷον σκυτοτομικῆς καὶ σκυτεύσεως ὑπόδημα· εἰ δή (l. δέ) τίς ἐστιν ἀρετὴ σκυτικῆς καὶ σπουδαίου σκυτέως, τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον ὑπόδημα, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

a, 12. EE. 1219 a, 23 ἔτι ἔστω ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ζῆν ποιεῖν, τοῦ δὲ χρῆσις καὶ ἐγρήγορσις· ὁ γὰρ ὕπνος ἀργία τις καὶ ἡσυχία (1099 a, 2). ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον ἀνάγκη ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς

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§ 14. **εἰ δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.** The definition of Happiness now emerges from the dialectic process.

κατὰ λόγον. This follows from its being *ἐνέργεια τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*. The activity of that part of the soul which 'has a ground' for its activity, will be explicable from that ground, and therefore 'according to rule.'

ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου. The phrase *λόγον ἔχειν* may mean 'to be able to give an account of oneself,' but it may also mean 'to admit of an account being given,' 'to be explicable.' If the *λόγον ἔχον* is only so in the latter sense, *κατὰ λόγον* may be too strong an expression; but, even in that case, a *λόγος* or 'ground' is *implied*, though it may not be explicit.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ...τῷ γένει, 'generically the same.' Aristotle is meeting the objection that to pass from the function of an individual of a given class (*τοῦδε*) to that of a good individual of the class (*τοῦδε σπουδαίου*), from the *ἔργον* of Man to the *ἔργον* of the good man, is a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. Eudemos takes the Socratic example of the shoemaker. If *σκυτοτομική* (the *ἕξις*) and *σκύτευσις* (the *ἐνέργεια*) have an *ἀρετή*, then (the *ἔργον* of the shoemaker being a shoe) the *ἔργον* of a good shoemaker will be a good shoe.

καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ κ.τ.λ. These words mark the *ἐπαγωγή*, like *καὶ ὅλως* 1097 b, 26. The only difference is that *καὶ ἁπλῶς* lays stress upon the elimination (*ἀφαίρεσις*) of the particular instances, while *καὶ ὅλως* lays stress on the inclusion of all other particulars.

προστιθεμένης κ.τ.λ., 'the excess in goodness (of the good individual over the individual simply) being added to the function.' We must make the same *πρόσθεσις* in both cases. If we say 'good shoemaker,' we must say 'good shoe.' Here **ὑπεροχή** is used in its usual mathematical sense of 'excess' or 'difference.' Cf. Index s.v.

ἀνθρώπου δέ...εἰ δ' οὕτω. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 24) thinks this is clearly a duplicate of what precedes. I confess that I hardly like to put a limit to the capacity of Aristotle for long and complicated protases even when they involve repetitions and grammatical awkwardnesses. He never seems to be sure that he has said all he meant to say and constantly 'tries back.' Cf. Zell's note.

καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ
15 καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται 15
—εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται
κατ' ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ
16 τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ
ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα
μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος. 20

καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἔργον ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀρετῆς ζωὴ σπουδαία. τοῦτ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ τέλεον ἀγαθόν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων (ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τέλη ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τὰ ἄριστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, * * * αὐτὴ δὲ ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια), ἐπεὶ βέλτιον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ τῆς βελτίστης ἕξεως ἡ βελτίστη ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ βελτίστη ἕξις, τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον. ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς ἐνέργεια.

a, 18. EE. 1219 a, 35 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τέλεόν τι, καὶ ἔστι ζωὴ καὶ τελέα καὶ ἀτελής, καὶ ἀρετὴ ὡσαύτως (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅλη, ἡ δὲ μόριον), ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν.

μετὰ λόγου. Like *κατὰ λόγον* (1095 a, 10 n.), this phrase belongs to ordinary Greek speech, where it means almost the same thing. It implies, however, that the agent is conscious of the rule he follows, that he acts not merely 'by rule' but 'with a rule,' and we shall see later (1144 b, 25 sqq.) that Aristotle insists on this distinction. For the phrase itself cf. Plato, Protag. 324 b where *μετὰ λόγου κολάζειν* is opposed to *ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται* to express punishment deliberately inflicted for a certain purpose clearly realised.

§ **16. ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ,** 'in a complete life.' The authoritative commentary on this is EE. 1219 b, 5 *τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μήθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν* ('any')...*ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὔδαιμον, οὐ γὰρ ὅλον*. (The parenthesis about Solon has obscured the meaning of this, cf. p. 48.) Cf. also 1101 a, 13 *ἐν πολλῷ τινι καὶ τελείῳ* (sc. *χρόνῳ*), ib. 16 *μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον*, 1177 b, 25 *λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τελείου*. It certainly refers, then, to duration, and the later Peripatetic way of putting it (cf. MM. 1185 a, 5 *τέλειος δ' ἂν εἴη χρόνος ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ*, Stob. Ecl. ii, p. 132, Wachsmuth *τέλειον δ' εἶναι τοῦτον ὅσον ὥρισεν ἡμῖν <τὸ> πλεῖστον ὁ θεός*) is not really wrong. For, if we bear in mind that nature as a rule (*ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*) fulfils her ends, it will not seem amiss to describe a 'complete' life-time, one in

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τἀγαθὸν ταύτῃ· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως 17
ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἶθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν
παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα
τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὑρετὴς ἢ συνεργὸς
ἀγαθὸς εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις·
παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον. μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν 18
προειρημένων χρή, καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν
ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ τέκτων 19
καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποῖόν τι·

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which the end of human life is attained, as the average life-time of man. If the θρεπτικὴ καὶ αὐξητικὴ ζωή were the truly human life, a βίος τέλειος would be one in which we had time to grow nearly six feet.

§ 17. **Περιγεγράφθω μὲν κ.τ.λ.** Cf. Gen. An. 743 b, 20 ἅπαντα δὲ ταῖς περιγραφαῖς διορίζεται πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ λαμβάνει τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰς μαλακότητας καὶ τὰς σκληρότητας, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἂν ὑπὸ ζωγράφου τῆς φύσεως δημιουργούμενα· καὶ γὰρ οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον.

ὑποτυπῶσαι.....ἀναγράψαι. The first word is a metaphor from sculpture, the second from painting. Introd. § 26.

προαγαγεῖν, 'to carry out,' 'advance.' Cf. Met. 985 b, 23 οἱ καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἁψάμενοι πρῶτον ταῦτα προήγαγον. Soph. El. 183 b, 28 οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς (τῶν τεχνῶν) εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες παραλαβόντες παρὰ πολλῶν οἷον ἐκ διαδοχῆς κατὰ μέρος προαγαγόντων οὕτως ηὐξήκασι. Poet. 1449 a, 13 κατὰ μικρὸν ηὐξήθη προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερὸν αὐτῆς. ib. 1448 b, 23 κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων. In fact προαγαγεῖν is the transitive verb corresponding to ἐπιδοῦναι.

διαρθρῶσαι, i. q. διακριβῶσαι.

τὰ...τῇ περιγραφῇ, 'what is well outlined.' For the dative with καλῶς ἔχειν, cf. Kühner-Gerth § 419.

παντὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 183 b, 17 τῶν γὰρ εὑρισκομένων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν παρ' ἑτέρων ληφθέντα πρότερον πεπονημένα κατὰ μέρος ἐπιδέδωκεν ὑπὸ τῶν παραλαβόντων ὕστερον· τὰ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εὑρισκόμενα μικρὰν τὸ πρῶτον ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν εἴωθε, χρησιμωτέραν μέντοι πολλῷ τῆς ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων αὐξήσεως. μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται· διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὂν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι. ταύτης δ' εὑρημένης ῥᾷον τὸ προστιθέναι καὶ συναύξειν τὸ λοιπόν ἐστιν· ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς λόγους συμβέβηκε, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πᾶσας τέχνας.

§ 18. **μεμνῆσθαι οὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** Rassow brackets from here to the end of the chapter. But see Introd. § 6.

§ 19. **τὴν ὀρθήν**, sc. γωνίαν. The verb ἐπιζητεῖν seems to be ambiguously used here. With ὁ τέκτων it means *desiderat*, with ὁ γεωμέτρης, *considerat*.

θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω
γίνηται. οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν
ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ 1098 b
περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ'
αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινι,
καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ᾗ πεφύ- 5
κασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὁρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην

1098 a, 33. EE. 1218 b, 17 ὁρισάμενοι γὰρ τὸ τέλος τἆλλα δεικνύουσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν· αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. οἷον ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοδί, ἀνάγκη τόδε εἶναι τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς αὐτήν· τὸ δ' ὑγιεινὸν ὑγιείας αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν, καὶ τότε τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεὶς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ ὑγίεια, ἂν μὴ σοφιστὴς ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἰατρός (οὗτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις λόγοις σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν.

θεατὴς γὰρ τἀληθοῦς, from Plato, Rep. 475 e τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας...φιλοθεάμονας.

ὅπως μὴ κ.τ.λ., from Plato, Theait. 177 b περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν· εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον, and Laws 807 c πάρεργον γὰρ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων διακώλυμα γίγνεσθαι. Cf. Agathon fr. 11 Nauck—

τὸ μὲν πάρεργον ἔργον ὡς ποιούμεθα,
τὸ δ' ἔργον ὡς πάρεργον ἐκπονούμεθα.

§ 20. **τὴν αἰτίαν**, i.q. τὸ διότι (1095 b, 7). We should not ask to have the definition of Happiness, which is the ἀρχή of Politics, deduced from anything higher. We must only expect to have **τὸ ὅτι**, the fact that it is so, exhibited to us (**δειχθῆναι** here opp. to ἀποδειχθῆναι) dialectically.

τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή. Cf. 1095 b, 6 ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι. We cannot demonstrate the definition of εὐδαιμονία, we cannot show *why* the Good for Man is what it is. All we can do is to make clear *what* it is by a dialectical treatment of the beliefs of those who have been trained in good habits.

§ 21. **ἐπαγωγῇ**, 'by induction.' See Introd. § 23. The ἀρχαί of physical science are apprehended by induction.

αἰσθήσει, 'by intuition.' See Introd. § 23. The ἀρχαί of mathematics are apprehended by intuition.

ἐθισμῷ τινι, 'by habituation.' The ἀρχή of Politics must be apprehended by habituation. The citizen whose character has been formed by habitual obedience to the laws of his state is the man who can apprehend it. Ἐθισμός, then, is a sort of practical ἐπαγωγή.

§ 22. **μετιέναι**, 'to go in the track of,' 'in quest of,' 'to investigate,' a Platonic metaphor taken from hunting, cf. Theait. 187 e πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν, Polit. 263 b καθάπερ ἰχνεύοντες μέτιμεν. So *indagare*, *investigare*. Hence the noun μέθοδος 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 23. **μεγάλην γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Cf. De Caelo 271 b, 8 τὸ μικρὸν παραβῆναι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφισταμένοις γίγνεται

γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα. δοκεῖ γὰρ πλεῖον ἢ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

VIII. Σκεπτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνᾴδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν 2

1098 b, 11. EE. 1216 b, 26 πειρατέον δὲ περὶ πάντων τούτων ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων, μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις. κράτιστον μὲν γὰρ πάντας ἀνθρώπους φαίνεσθαι συνομολογοῦντας τοῖς ῥηθησομένοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τρόπον γέ τινα πάντας, ὅπερ μεταβιβαζόμενοι ποιήσουσιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύναι πως περὶ αὐτῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶς μὲν λεγομένων οὐ σαφῶς δέ, προϊοῦσιν ἔσται καὶ τὸ σαφῶς, μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἀεὶ τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι συγκεχυμένως..... 1217 a, 10 καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ χωρὶς κρίνειν τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον καὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον, διά τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως, ὅτι προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις (νῦν δ' ὁπότ' ἂν λύειν μὴ ἔχωσιν, ἀναγκάζονται πιστεύειν τοῖς εἰρημένοις), καὶ διότι πολλάκις τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεδεῖχθαι δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς μέν ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἣν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.

b, 12. EE. 1218 b, 32 πάντα δὴ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.

πόρρω μυριοπλάσιον...τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει, διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρὸν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ γίνεται παμμέγεθες.

VIII. § 1. **περὶ αὐτῆς**, sc. τῆς ἀρχῆς, i.e. the definition of the Good for Man. The next step in the dialectical process is to show that the definition will explain all the λεγόμενα.

ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος κ.τ.λ. The **συμπέρασμα** is the conclusion (i.e. the definition of εὐδαιμονία), the **ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος** are the premisses. We have reached our ἀρχή by inductive syllogism. There is no inconsistency between this and the statement that we must not ask for the διότι. The inductive syllogism συλλογίζεται τὸ ὅτι not τὸ διότι. Its premisses are not αἴτια τοῦ συμπεράσματος.

τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, 'the data.' Here τὰ λεγόμενα, current moral judgments, are the data we have to deal with.

§ 2. **νενεμημένων...τριχῇ**. Plato, Laws 743 e ὄντων γὰρ τριῶν τῶν ἁπάντων περὶ ἃ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος σπουδάζει,

ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατά γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ 3 τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγα- 4 θῶν γίνεται καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός. συνᾴδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωία 5 τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα 6 τὰ περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς·

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b, 18. EE. 1219 a, 40 ὅτι δὲ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸν ὅρον αὐτῆς λέγομεν καλῶς, μαρτύρια τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἡμῖν. τό τε γὰρ εὖ πράττειν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὧν ἕκαστον χρῆσίς ἐστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις (καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρακτικὴ χρηστικη ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλκεὺς ποιεῖ χαλινόν, χρῆται δ' ὁ ἱππικός). Cf. Introd. § 13.

b, 23. EE. 1214 a, 30 τὸ δ' εὐδαιμονεῖν καὶ τὸ ζῆν μακαρίως καὶ καλῶς εἴη ἂν ἐν τρισὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱρετωτάτοις. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν φρόνησιν μέγιστον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθόν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔνιοι περὶ τοῦ μεγέθους αὐτῶν διαμφισβητοῦσι, συμβάλλεσθαι φάσκοντες θάτερον θατέρου μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτήν, οἱ μὲν ὡς οὖσαν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τὴν φρόνησιν τῆς ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ ταύτης τὴν ἀρετήν, οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ πάντων δοκεῖ τούτων, τοῖς δ' ἐκ δυοῖν, τοῖς δ' ἐν ἑνί τινι τούτων εἶναι τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως.

τελευταῖον καὶ τρίτον ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ὀρθῶς σπουδαζομένη σπουδή, σώματος δὲ πέρι μέση, πρώτη δὲ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς. A similar division is implied in Euthyd. 279 b and Phileb. 48 e.

κυριώτατα. Cf. 1098 a, 6 n.

καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο, 'our definition will be right.'

§ 4. **τὸ εὖ ζῆν κ.τ.λ.**, 'the belief that the happy man lives well and fares well,' which was referred to above 1095 a, 19.

§ 5. **τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα**, 'the *desiderata*.'

§ 6. **τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ.** Here again the reference is mainly to the Philebos. **ἕτεροι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This refers to Xenokrates who included ὑπηρετικὴ δύναμις in his definition (cf. Introductory Note, n. 3).

ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι 7
καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὔλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἕν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετήν τινα συνῳδός ἐστιν 8
ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει 9
δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἕξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται
1099 a μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε. πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμ-
πίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ'
5 οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι—τούτων γάρ τινες νικῶσιν—οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι
γίνονται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὑτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ 10
μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ

1098 b, 31. EE. 1215 a, 20 ἔσται δὲ φανερὰ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων καὶ διαπορουμένων, ἂν καλῶς ὁρισθῇ τί χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, πότερον ἐν τῷ ποιόν τινα μόνον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καθάπερ τινὲς ᾠήθησαν τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πρεσβυτέρων, ἢ δεῖ μὲν καὶ ποιόν τινα ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖ τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ποιὰς τινάς.

1099 a, 3. EE. 1219 b, 9 καὶ στεφανοῦνται οἱ νικῶντες, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ δυνάμενοι νικᾶν, μὴ νικῶντες δέ.

εὐετηρίαν. Aristotle affects pastoral and agricultural words in this connexion. For *εὐετηρία* (from *εὖ* and *ἔτος*) cf. 1155 a, 8. So *εὐημερία* 1099 b, 7 and *εὐθενεῖν* 1100 a, 7.

§ 7. **πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοί...ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι.** Introd. § 25.

§ 8. **συνῳδός.** Cf. *συνᾴδει* 1098 b, 20. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 25.

§ 9. **διαφέρει δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ.** This is where Aristotle parts company with Speusippos who defined *εὐδαιμονία* as *ἕξις τελεία* and Xenokrates who defined it as *κτῆσις τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς* (Introductory Note, n. 3). His advance on the Academy consisted in the substitution of *ἐνέργεια* for *ἕξις*, or what comes to the same thing, *χρῆσις* for *κτῆσις*. Cf. 1120 a, 8. 1129 b, 31.

πράξει γάρ, sc. *ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργῶν.*

§ 10. **τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν,** 'Pleasure belongs to the class of psychical states.' The point is as follows. All pleasure is a state of the soul, whether it arises from things external or from the activities of the soul itself. But pleasure, being a state of the soul, is more closely bound up with the activities of the

λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ 10
11 φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ
12 καθ' αὑτάς. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν 15
ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 20
13 εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὑτὰς ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει
14 δ' ὡς εἴπομεν. ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἥδιστον ἡ

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a, 24–30. EE. *init.* Ὁ μὲν ἐν Δήλῳ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφηνάμενος συνέγραψεν ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητῷου,

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soul which feels it, than with anything external. The life of the good man is therefore pleasant 'in itself' (*καθ' αὑτόν*), not accidentally (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*). Goodness is pleasant to him because he is a man, whereas horses are not pleasant to the *φίλιππος qua* man, but *ᾗ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ φιλίππῳ εἶναι.*

φιλοτοιοῦτος, 'φιλο-so-and-so.' This generic name for all compounds beginning with *φιλο-* occurs below 1118 b, 22. 1125 b, 14. It has been restored by Vahlen in Rhet. 1363 b, 1.

οἷον...καὶ ὅλως, an *ἐπαγωγή*. Cf. 1098 a, 10 n.

§ 11. **τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται.** Cf. 1166 b, 19 *στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δὲ ἥδεται.* See the whole chapter. As the pleasures are *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* they may be in conflict, *οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός* (1157 a, 35).

τοιαῦτα, sc. *ἡδέα.*

τοιαῦται, sc. *φύσει ἡδεῖαι.*

§ 12. **περιάπτου.** Camerarius quotes the Peripatetic Kritolaos (ap. Philon. 2, 492) *καταγοητεύουσιν ὀφθαλμοὺς αἱ ἄμορφοι καὶ εἰδεχθεῖς ἑταῖραι περιάπτοις καὶ νόθῳ κόσμῳ, χηρείᾳ γνησίου.* The idea here is surely rather that of a *postiche* than that of an amulet (for which sense cf. 1100 b, 29 n.).

πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. This completes the proof of the essential pleasantness of good activities. Not only (1) does the good man take pleasure in them, but (2) he is not good unless he does so.

§ 13. **ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** They fulfil the requirements not only of *τὸ ἡδύ*, but also of *τὸ ἀγαθόν* and *τὸ καλόν*, and each of these in the highest degree.

εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώρισται ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα—

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται,

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διελὼν οὐχ ὑπάρχοντα πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ, τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ποιήσας

κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
πάντων ἥδιστον δ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτῷ μὴ συγχωρῶμεν· ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον ἁπάντων οὖσα ἥδιστον ἐστίν.

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§ 14. κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα. Eudemos makes this the beginning of his Ethics with good literary effect. The *γνώμη* is also found in Theognis, 225, where, however, the pentameter runs *πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον, τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ, τὸ τυχεῖν*. Sophokles in his Kreousa (fr. 326) worked it up in his own way—

Κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοὔνδικον πεφυκέναι,
λῷστον δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἄνοσον· ἥδιστον δ' ὅτῳ
πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾷ καθ' ἡμέραν.

The authority of Aristotle is sufficient to prove that it was really inscribed on Leto's temple at Delos in the same way as the *γνῶμαι* of the 'Seven Wise Men' were set up at Delphoi. Cf. Preger, Inscr. Metr. p. 165.

§ 15. Φαίνεται...προσδεομένη. We now turn to the question of 'external goods.' In spite of its being an *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*, the good life evidently stands in need of something over and above *τὰ ψυχικά*. The word *προσδεομένη* is appropriate because external goods cannot be said to inhere (*ὑπάρχειν*) essentially (*καθ' αὑτά*) in the good life as pleasure does. Contrast 1099 a, 15 *οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς*.

καθάπερ εἴπομεν. No such statement has been explicitly made, but we have seen (1098 b, 26) that some *τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν*, and that they are not likely to be wholly wrong. We are still testing our definition by *τὰ λεγόμενα*.

ἀχορήγητον ὄντα, just as a tragedy cannot be produced unless its cost is defrayed by a *χορηγός*, though all he can do is really external to it and in no way affects its excellence as a tragedy (Poet. 1453 b, 7 *τὸ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστι*). The metaphor is a favourite one with Aristotle. Cf. 1101 a, 15. 1177 a, 30. 1178 a, 24. 1179 a, 11. Pol. 1288 b, 32 *ἀχορήγητον τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, 1295 a, 28 *φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς*. In the *κοινή* it was no longer felt as a metaphor. Polybius uses *χορηγία* for material of war, what Thucydides and Demosthenes call *παρασκευή*.

καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς 1099 b
δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητώμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλλους· οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης ἢ δυσγενὴς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἧττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

1099 b, 7. EE. 1214 a, 24 πολλοὶ γὰρ ταὐτόν φασιν εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν. b, 11 μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ διορίσασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ῥαθύμως, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὖ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν, ὧν τ' ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς καὶ ὧν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατὸν ζῆν καλῶς (ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἴδια τῆς ὑγιείας οὐδὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῶν πράξεων, οἷον ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν ἢ ἐγρηγορέναι ἢ κινήσεως μετέχειν οὐθὲν ἂν ὑπάρξειεν ἡμῖν οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τὰ δ' ἴδια μᾶλλον περὶ ἑκάστην φύσιν· ἃ δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως οἰκεῖον πρὸς εὐεξίαν τοῖς εἰρημένοις κρεωφαγία καὶ τῶν περιπάτων οἱ μετὰ δεῖπνον). ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτ' αἴτια τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως περὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν, τί ἐστι καὶ γίνεται διὰ τίνων· ὧν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἔνιοι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσι.

πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first class of external goods consist of the instruments (*ὄργανα*) of happiness.

§ 16. ἐνίων δὲ κ.τ.λ. The second class of external goods are the necessary conditions (*ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ*) of happiness. The same division occurs below 1099 b, 27.

τητώμενοι. A tragic word occurring nowhere else in Aristotle. The use of such words in passages like this is characteristic of his style. So we have it in Plato's Laws 810 b *τητώμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας*.

ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον. Another poetical touch. Cf. 1100 b, 28 *θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον*.

οἷον εὐγενείας κ.τ.λ. Cf. the list of what are called, in a popular sense, *μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας* in Rhet. 1360 b, 18 *εὐγένεια, πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, πλοῦτος, εὐτεκνία, εὐγηρία, κάλλος, ἰσχύς, μέγεθος, δύναμις ἀγωνιστική, δόξα, τιμή, εὐτυχία, ἀρετή*. It is from such lists we may best gather the Hellenic ideal of life.

μονώτης. Cf. 1097 b, 9 n. Here it is contrasted with *πολυφιλία* etc. in the Rhetoric (see last note). Aristotle has a strong sense of the pain of the *μονώτης βίος*. Cf. 1169 b, 16 sq.

§ 17. εὐημερίας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n. The word became hackneyed in the *κοινή*.

τὴν εὐτυχίαν. The proper word in connexion with external goods.

IX. Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθισ-
τὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ
καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι 2
θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσ-
δοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, 3
φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν

1099 b, 9. EE. 1214 a, 14 πρῶτον δὲ σκεπτέον ἐν τίνι τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ πῶς κτητόν, πότερον φύσει γίγνονται πάντες εὐδαίμονες οἱ τυγχάνοντες ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ μεγάλοι καὶ μικροὶ καὶ τὴν χροιὰν διαφέροντες, ἢ διὰ μαθήσεως, ὡς οὔσης ἐπιστήμης τινὸς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ἢ διά τινος ἀσκήσεως (πολλὰ γὰρ οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε μαθοῦσιν ἀλλ' ἐθισθεῖσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φαῦλα μὲν τοῖς φαύλως ἐθισθεῖσι, χρηστὰ δὲ τοῖς χρηστῶς), ἢ τούτων μὲν κατ' οὐδέν τῶν τρόπων, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἤτοι καθάπερ οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοίᾳ δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ἢ διὰ τὴν τύχην....ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ παρουσία διὰ τούτων ἁπάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ τινὸς ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἄδηλον (ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ γενέσεις σχεδὸν πίπτουσιν εἰς ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς· καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς διανοίας ἁπάσας πρὸς τὰς ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ἄν τις συναγάγοι πράξεις).

Cf. Rhet. 1362 a, 5 ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ' οἷς ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος.

ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν. These words depend very loosely on ὅθεν, but that is no reason for expunging them. The meaning is 'while others identify it with goodness.' The remark is relevant as giving the two extreme views. And it is necessary to connect the argument with the next section.

IX. § 1. **Ὅθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ.** 'It is just this (viz. the fact that some identify Happiness with εὐτυχία, others with ἀρετή) which gives rise to the difficulty.'

πότερον...ἀσκητόν. These are the views of those who identify Happiness with goodness. Cf. EE. loc. cit.

ἢ...παραγίνεται. These are the views of those who identify it with εὐτυχία. Cf. EE. loc. cit. For the two views cf. Archilochos fr. 15 Πάντα τύχη καὶ μοῖρα, Περίκλεες, ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν, and fr. 16 Πάντα πόνος τεύχει θνητοῖς μελέτη τε βροτείη.

§ 2. **εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle admits the *prima facie* plausibility of the naive religious view that εὐδαιμονία is good fortune sent by dispensation of divine providence. Θεία μοῖρα is the religious equivalent of τύχη, and is commonly so used by Plato.

§ 3. **ἄλλης...σκέψεως,** sc. τῆς θεολογικῆς. "Haec magis sunt declinantis quam pollicentis. Ubi enim ad dei deorumque vel naturam vel voluntatem perventum est, Aristotelem constat plerumque ἐπέχειν." Ramsauer.

καί τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι
φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύ- 4
κοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις
πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν 5
οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὔλογον ἔχειν
οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν οὕτω 6
πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν,
καὶ μάλιστα <τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ
κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς 7

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b, 18. EE. 1215 a, 8 ἔτι δὲ πρὸ ἔργου τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ λανθάνειν, μάλιστα πρὸς ἃ δεῖ συντείνειν πᾶσαν σκέψιν, ἐκ τίνων ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς ζῆν, εἴ τῳ μακαρίως ἐπιφθονώτερον εἰπεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τὴν περὶ ἕκαστα γενομένην ἂν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γινομένοις ἢ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστίν, ἀνέλπιστον ἂν εἴη πολλοῖς (οὐ γάρ ἐστι δι' ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὑτῶν πραγματείας)· εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα εἶναι καὶ τὰς κατ' αὐτὸν πράξεις, κοινότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ θειότερον, κοινότερον μὲν τῷ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, θειότερον δὲ τῷ κεῖσθαι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζουσι ποιούς τινας καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

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§ 4. **εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ κ.τ.λ.** 'But, at the same time, it must be—.' This is not an argument, but a reservation. Aristotle wishes to guard against a common and easy perversion of the religious view. We may call Happiness θεῖον and the like; but we must regard it as in the reach of all, not as confined to the favourites of heaven, a Polykrates or Croesus, as Stewart well says.

τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις. Nature aims at the best, but is sometimes forced by Matter to remain at a lower stage of perfection. This Aristotle calls πήρωσις. Cf. Zeller (Eng. Trans.) vol. 1, p. 466.

§ 5. **εὔλογον.** Aristotle simply opposes one plausibility to another in accordance with the dialectical character of the passage.

§ 5. **εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν κ.τ.λ.** The higher we ascend in the scale of causes, the more evidence do we find of teleology. The four chief causes are Chance, Nature, Mind (Man) and Necessity (1112 a, 31). The works of Nature are as good as they can be (cf. Phys. 260 b, 22 τὸ δὲ βέλτιον ἀεὶ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἐν τῇ φύσει ὑπάρχειν, ἂν ᾖ δυνατόν). Much more will this be true of the works of Man.

§ 6. **<τὰ> κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην,** sc. αἰτίαν, i.e. διάνοιαν, Intelligence or Man.

πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. This is a simple appeal to cultivated feeling. The word is Platonic.

δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια [κατ' ἀρετὴν] ποιά τις, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· 8
τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως 9
οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον
1100 a λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· 10
οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ
εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ 11
μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθενοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου

1100 a, 1. EE. 1219 b, 5 καὶ τὸ μήτε μίαν ἡμέραν εἶναι εὐδαίμονα μήτε παῖδα μήθ' ἡλικίαν πᾶσαν (διὸ καὶ τὸ Σόλωνος ἔχει καλῶς, τὸ μὴ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονίζειν), ἀλλ' ὅταν λάβῃ τέλος· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτελὲς εὔδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον.

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§ 7. **καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου,** 'as a consequence of the definition,' as well as dialectically. Note how the style changes at once from the literary to the scientific. Introd. § 7.

ποιά τις, i.e. κατ' ἀρετήν, which I take to be a gloss.

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, sc. τῶν ἐκτός.

τὰ μὲν...ὀργανικῶς. A scientific description of the two classes of goods described in a literary way above, 1099 b, 1 sqq. They are (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖα (1) as ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, (2) as ὄργανα.

§ 8. **τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ·** 1094 a, 27 sqq.

αὕτη δὲ κ.τ.λ. As an ἐπιστήμη, Politics must know the best way of attaining its own end. We may therefore draw inferences from the actual practice of lawgivers. As they try to make the citizens good, it is evident that they think it possible to produce Happiness thus.

ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθούς, 'of a certain quality, i.e. good.'

§ 9. **εἰκότως οὖν** κ.τ.λ. Some additions of a dialectical character loosely appended.

τοιαύτης, sc. πρακτικῆς τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.

§ 10. **ἀρετῆς τελείας,** goodness fully developed in a complete life.

§ 11. **πολλαὶ γὰρ** κ.τ.λ. The question of τύχη brings us back naturally to that of the βίος τέλειος.

εὐθενοῦντα. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n. Theophrastos, Hist. Plant. 2, 5, 7 (of trees) τότε γὰρ εὐθενεῖ μάλιστα.

μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

Χ. Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμο- 10
2 νιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἆρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς
3 λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, 15
ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἄν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ, οἷον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ 20
4 ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ

Χ. § 1. **Πότερον οὖν** κ.τ.λ. The best way of bringing out the relation of τύχη and external goods to the good life is by discussing Solon's dictum. We shall find that the true solution of it is that, though we must have a τέλειος βίος, we are only bound to accept Solon's view in its extreme form if we identify εὐδαιμονία with εὐτυχία.

οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα, 'not even any one else,' though he may not meet with Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι.

κατὰ Σόλωνα. Hdt. i, 32 σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται. The dictum was a commonplace of the Age of the Seven Wise Men, and passed into Athenian tragedy, like so many other γνῶμαι. Soph. Trach. 1 calls it λόγος...ἀρχαῖος ἀνθρώπων φανείς.

§ 2. **ἄτοπον.** The word marks the dialectical character of the argument. It is the opposite of εὔλογον. Popular opinion would at once reject the idea that a man is happy after he has died.

§ 3. **τηνικαῦτα,** 'then and not till then.' Usually τηνικαῦτα ἤδη or τότε δή, *tum demum*.

ἔχει ... ἀμφισβήτησιν, 'admits of dispute.' Cf. Index s.v. ἔχειν.

δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There is no question here as to the departed being aware of what goes on in this world. On the contrary, the point is that what happens after a man's death may affect our estimate of his life in just the same way as what happens in his lifetime without his being aware of it. Neither makes any difference to the man himself, but the popular belief is (δοκεῖ) that it must affect our estimate of it. We cannot call that life a success which leads to failure, even though the man himself may never know of his failure, or may die in time to escape it. So with the fortunes of children. Even now we say 'what would his poor father think, if he were alive?'

εἴπερ καί, 'just as much and just as little.' If Happiness consists in external goods, a man may very well lose it without being aware of his loss δι' ἀποδημίαν ἴσως ἢ διὰ χρόνιον καὶ σφοδρὰν ἀσχολίαν πρὸς ἕτερα (Eustratios).

καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον δὴ γίνοιτ' ἂν εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς καὶ γίνοιτο ὁτὲ μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπί τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐ-

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§ 4. **κατὰ λόγον**, 'accordingly,' 'consistently with his life.' The editors as a rule see that 'according to reason' will not do here, but it has not always been seen that this use of the phrase determines its meaning in such passages as 1095 a, 10. The original sense of the phrase is 'in proportion' and hence it is used of anything that, being 'according to rule,' can be calculated upon and is uniform or consistent. The opposite of *τὸ κατὰ λόγον* is *τὸ παράλογον*, that which violates all rules of probability and is therefore incalculable. Cf. Plato, Polit. 283 c *ἵνα κατὰ λόγον ἐπαινῶμεν* κ.τ.λ. Rep. 500 c *κόσμῳ... πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα.*

τοῖς ἀποστήμασι, the different degrees in which the descendants are 'removed' from their ancestor.

ἄτοπον. Cf. 1100 a, 13 n. This sentence shows clearly that there is no question of the dead man being aware of what takes place. If he were, there would be no absurdity in his being at one time happy, at another wretched. What is absurd is that our estimate of the success or failure of his life as a whole should be indefinitely subject to revision.

§ 5. **συνικνεῖσθαι.** The use of this word is, of course, flatly inconsistent with the view that the dead man *οὐκ αἰσθάνεται*. The inconsistency, however, is not Aristotle's. We may learn from Rohde's 'Psyche' how very inconsistent and illogical popular views on this subject were. Cf. e.g. Isokr. Aigin. § 42 *εἴ τίς ἐστιν αἴσθησις τοῖς τεθνεῶσι τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων.*

§ 6. **ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον κ.τ.λ.** The *λύσις* of the first *ἀπορία*, viz. *πότερον οὐδένα εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ;* (1100 a, 31...1101 a, 21).

τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον, sc. the *ἀπορία* raised in § 3. Cf. § 4 *ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει.*

§ 7. **ἀληθεύσεται**, passive. Cf. Bonitz, Index s.v. *ἀληθεύω.*

τὸ ὑπάρχον, 'the fact.'

μετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις, "χαμαιλέοντά" τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες "καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον." ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετήν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώτεραι διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετήν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ "τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου." πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ

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§ 8. **χαμαιλέοντα κ.τ.λ.**, changing colour with the changing ground of external circumstances. The words *χαμαιλέοντα καὶ σαθρῶς ἱδρυμένον* seem to come from some poet.

§ 10. **τῷ λόγῳ**, viz. that activities according to goodness and not fortune determine happiness. The difficulty just discussed (*τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν*) confirms this; for it has arisen *διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι.* Now fortune does not abide; goodness does.

καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Cf. 1140 b, 28.

αἱ τιμιώταται, sc. *αἱ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*, as we shall learn later on.

συνεχέστατα. Cf. 1177 a, 21.

§ 11. **τὸ ζητούμενον**, sc. *ἡ βεβαιότης.*

τοιοῦτος, sc. *εὐδαίμων.*

πάντων. Masculine. The reservation is made because *τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν.*

καὶ θεωρήσει. All through this passage, Aristotle has the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* distinctly in view.

ὅ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς κ.τ.λ., from Simonides. The passage is quoted and discussed in Plato, Protag. 339 b.

Ἀνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι
χαλεπὸν
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ
τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γινόμενα μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει—καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίνεται—ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὢν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, 13
οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς
1101 a ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν 14
οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥᾳδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἔκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν

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§ 12. **λύπας τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** A fragment of Theophrastos preserved by Plutarch seems to belong to this discussion. Cf. V. Per. c. 38 *ὁ γοῦν Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς διαπορήσας εἰ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἤθη καὶ κινούμενα τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξίσταται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἱστόρηκεν ὅτι νοσῶν ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπισκοπουμένῳ τινὶ τῶν φίλων δείξειε περίαπτον ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν τῷ τραχήλῳ περιηρτημένον, ὡς σφόδρα κακῶς ἔχων ὁπότε καὶ ταύτην ὑπομένοι τὴν ἀβελτερίαν.* Cf. Usener, Analecta Theophrastea, p. 23 and 1153 b, 19 n.

μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν. The *ἀνάλγητος* (1115 b, 26) is the man of stupid insensibility, insensibility to pain being regarded as the mark of a coarse nature. He is closely akin to the *ἀναίσθητος* (1104 a, 24 n.), but the insensibility of the latter is intellectual rather than moral. Kleon bids the Athenians not to show themselves *ἀναλγητότεροι* than the Mityleneans (Thuc. iii, 40), and Demosthenes (De Cor. 35) quotes Aischines as speaking of the *ἀναλγησία* of the Theban power. See also 1126 a, 3 n.

§ 13. **οὐδέποτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** His *ἐνέργειαι* will never be of the kind called *αἱ ἐναντίαι* supra 1100 b, 11, and it is these alone which can make a man positively *ἄθλιος*.

εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.
15 τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον 15
μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν ἐστιν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ
16 τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως; εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους 20
δ' ἀνθρώπους. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω.

XI. Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἁπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ
2 ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνου- 25
μένων τῶν δ' ἧττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν
3 ἱκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δή, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βρῖθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως 30

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§ 15. **ἢ προσθετέον κ.τ.λ.** Rassow thought this a later Peripatetic addition, inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle's criticism, though in harmony with the view of MM 1185 a, 5 that a *τέλειος βίος* is *ὅσον ἄνθρωπος βιοῖ*. If we make this addition, it seems we might as well accept Solon's dictum at once, as Eudemos appears to do (1219 b, 6). But the difficulty disappears if we keep what is said about *Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι* clearly in view. These are first mentioned (1100 a, 5 sqq.) before the discussion of Solon's dictum has begun, and that discussion itself is limited to the question whether we may or may not call any *other* man—other than the man who meets with *Πριαμικαὶ τύχαι*—happy so long as he lives. We must, then, make this particular reservation whatever conclusion we come to on the main question.

κατὰ λόγον. Cf. 1100 a, 23 n.

§ 16. **μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους**, another reservation. Happiness is an *ἐνέργεια* and therefore complete at any moment or in the whole (1174 a, 13 sqq.), but *τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν*.

XI. § 1. **τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων κ.τ.λ.** The *λύσις* of the second *ἀπορία*, viz. *πότερον συμβάλλονται αἱ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχαι;* (1101 a, 22...b, 9).

συμβάλλεσθαι, sc. *πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἢ μή*.

§ 3. **εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ.** A complex protasis, the two members of which are *καθάπερ...ἅπαντας* and *διαφέρει...πράττεσθαι*. The apodosis begins at *συλλογιστέον δή*. The answer to this question is made to depend upon

ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ 4
τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα
καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι,
συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφοράν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως 5
35 τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινω-
1101 b νοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων. ἔοικε γοῦν ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διικνεῖ-
ται πρὸς αὐτούς ὁτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοὐναντίον, ἀφαυρόν
τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν
γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
5 μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι 6
μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φί-
λων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα
ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο
τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

10 XII. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς
εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστιν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν

1101 b, 10. EE. 1219 b, 11 *ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τἆλλα, ἢ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι ἢ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἕτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον.*

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what is laid down above 1100 b, 23—25.

§ 4. **ἕκαστον**, accusative with *συμβαίνειν*.

προϋπάρχειν, 'to be assumed' *ἔξω τοῦ δράματος* (Poet. 1460 a, 29 sqq.). To take place 'behind the scenes' or 'before the curtain rises.' The murder of Laios, for instance, does not affect us as it would do if it formed part of the action. The regular word for 'action' in this sense is *πράττεσθαι*.

§ 5. **συλλογιστέον**. 'We must estimate' or 'allow for this difference too.' The word is not used in its technical sense. L^b and the Vetus Versio (*ita*) read **ταύτῃ** for **ταύτην**, which would mean 'we must allow for the difference in this way too.'

τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι, sc. *συλλογιστέον*. 'We must allow for the fact that a difficulty is felt.' Lambinus conjectured *τόδε δεῖ διαπορεῖσθαι*, Rassow *τόδε δεῖ ἀπορεῖσθαι*. But the difficulty has been already alluded to above 1100 a, 11.

γοῦν. This seems to be implied by the *γὰρ* of K^b and the *οὖν* of L^b.

ἐκ τούτων, sc. *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*.

ἀφαυρόν. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 26) points out that this is a poetic word and suggests *ἀμαυρόν*, 'obscure,' cf. De An. 403 a, 19.

ἢ ἐκείνοις, sc. *ἢ κεκμηκόσιν*.

εἰ δὲ μή, sc. *διικνεῖται*. This shows clearly that the question is not mainly one of the dead man's own feelings, but only of our estimate of his life.

XII. § 1. **ἐπισκεψώμεθα κ.τ.λ.** Happiness is not a mere *δύναμις*. Is

2 τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. φαίνεται
δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρός τί πως ἔχειν
ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὅλως τὸν
ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ 15
ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγα-
3 θόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς
θεοὺς ἐπαίνων· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερό-
μενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' 20
4 ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιού-
των, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν
τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς
μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειο-
τάτους [μακαρίζομεν]. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς 25
γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργου· ὁ δ' ἔπαινος <τοῦ> τοιοῦτον εἶναι καθόλου· ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμὸς τέλους.

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it *ἐπαινετόν* or *τίμιον*, i.e. has it a relative or an absolute value?

τιμίων, 'precious.' Cf. MM. 1183 b, 20 sqq. *ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια, τὰ δ' ἐπαινετά, τὰ δὲ δυνάμεις. τὸ δὲ* **τίμιον** *λέγω τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ θεῖον, τὸ βέλτιον, οἷον ψυχή, νοῦς, τὸ ἀρχαιότερον...τὰ δ' ἐπαινετὰ οἷον ἀρεταί...τὰ δὲ* **δυνάμεις** *οἷον ἀρχὴ πλοῦτος ἰσχὺς κάλλος· τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εὖ ἂν δύνηται χρήσασθαι καὶ ὁ φαῦλος κακῶς, διὸ δυνάμει τὰ τοιαῦτα καλοῦνται ἀγαθά.* If this is correct, the *δυνάμεις* here are identical with *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά*. Cf. also Topics 126 b, 4 *καὶ εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ τιμίων ἢ αἱρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἢ ποιητικὸν* (cf. 1096 b, 11) *ἔθηκεν*.

§ 2. **τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι κ.τ.λ.**, 'in virtue of some quality and relation.'

§ 3. **ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων**, 'from the praises *of* the gods.' Here we see *περί* c. acc., used as in 1098 b, 14 *περὶ ψυχήν* and 1101 a, 28 *περὶ αὐτόν*, develope into a regular genitive equivalent, just like the Latin *de*. Though barely noticed in the grammars, this construction is quite common in Plato, being used chiefly to avoid a cumulation of genitives. For other examples see Index s.v. *περί*.

γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται, sc. *οἱ θεοί*. 'It strikes us as absurd that the gods should be referred to our standard' (personal construction). The goodness of the gods is independent of their relation to us, and so praise of them based on a reference (*ἀναφορά*) to human needs and desires is absurd.

§ 4. **τῶν τοιούτων**, sc. *τῶν πρός τί πως ἐχόντων*, the 'relative.'

[μακαρίζομεν], suspected by Susemihl and bracketed by Bywater.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν, sc. *τὰ θειότατα μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν*.

θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος 5
καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ
ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὖσαν μηνύειν ᾠετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι
30 τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν· πρὸς
ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τἆλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος 6
τῆς ἀρετῆς, πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης, τὰ δ'
ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν
ψυχικῶν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν 7
35 τοῖς περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις· ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
1102 a εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τελείων.
ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ 8
χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ
καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

5 XIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις
κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα
γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν.
δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα 2
πεπονῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ

1101 b, 31. EE. 1219 b, 8 ἔτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων.

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§ 5. **δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος κ.τ.λ.** 'And Eudoxos is thought to have pleaded ably the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence.' On Eudoxos see 1172 b, 9 n. This reference probably indicates the real motive of the paragraph.

§ 6. **ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος κ.τ.λ.** Rhet. 1367 b, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν... ἔστι δ' **ἔπαινος** λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται· τὸ δ' **ἐγκώμιον** τῶν ἔργων ἐστί... διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας· τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς εἰσιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον. EE. 1219 b, 14.

§ 8. **ἀρχή**, sc. πράξεως, for it is τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, the Final Cause of human activity.

τίθεμεν. *Hoc loco clausulam imponere debebant libro primo*, Susemihl.

XIII. § 1. **τελείαν.** Cf. 1100 a, 4 n.

περὶ ἀρετῆς. The first step in the analysis will be to deliberate about the production of goodness. See Introductory Note to Book II. The first point to note is the distinction between the two kinds of goodness.

§ 2. **δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** A confirmation of our view from the practice of the masters of our science. If πολιτική is a science, the true πολιτικός must know how to secure its end. Cf. 1099 b, 29 n.

3 τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς 10
Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι
4 τοιοῦτοι γεγένηνται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστιν ἡ σκέψις
αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
5 προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον
ὅτι· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαι- 15
6 μονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν
τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ
7 ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι
δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν
ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον 20
ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἡ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς· τῶν δ'

1102 a, 18. EE. 1219 b, 26 μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρητέον· ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀρετὴν ζητοῦμεν, ὑποκείσθω δύο μέρη ψυχῆς τὰ λόγου μετέχοντα, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον μετέχειν λόγου ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἐπιτάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν πεφυκέναι. εἰ δέ τί ἐστιν ἑτέρως ἄλογον, ἀφείσθω τοῦτο τὸ μόριον. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν οὔτ' εἰ μεριστὴ ἡ ψυχὴ οὔτ' εἰ ἀμερής, ἔχει μέντοι δυνάμεις διαφόρους

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§ 3. **τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας.** In his Laws, Plato had already introduced a Spartan and a Cretan to discuss legislation with an Athenian. Spartan and Cretan institutions alone seemed to be deliberately designed with reference to an end, and therefore seemed to be alone scientific. Plato and Aristotle were both aware that the end they strove to realise was but a partial one and that they were therefore onesided. But that did not alter the fact that they alone set an end consciously before them.

§ 4. **ἡ σκέψις αὕτη**, sc. ὅπως τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσει.

ἡ ζήτησις, sc. ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς.

τὴν...προαίρεσιν. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n. Here προαίρεσις is almost equivalent to πρόθεσις.

§ 7. **εἰδέναι πῶς**, sc. ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα (infra 24).

τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα. Suggested by Plato, Charm. 156 b ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἕξειν, καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴεσθαι ἄν ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος, πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι· ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσι θεραπεύειν.

καὶ πᾶν <τὸ> σῶμα, sc. δεῖ εἰδέναι πως. Ramsauer's insertion of the article is generally accepted, see Byw. Contr. p. 26. The phrase comes from the passage of the Charmides quoted above.

ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, 8
θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ
25 ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως
ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων. λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς 9
ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον
τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πό- 10
τερον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ
30 μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα καθάπερ
ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει

καὶ τὰς εἰρημένας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ καμπύλῳ τὸ κοῖλον καὶ τὸ κυρτὸν ἀδιαχώριστον, καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· καίτοι τὸ εὐθὺ οὐ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ οὐκ οὐσία τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

οἱ χαρίεντες, i.e. *οἱ σοφοί* (cf. 1095 a, 18), scientific physicians as opposed to mere practitioners.

τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν, i.e. the 'theory' of the body, or physiology, as opposed to practical therapeutics.

§ 9. **ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις**, 'in extraneous discourses.' The only question that can arise is 'extraneous to what?' The different views which have been maintained are conveniently summarised in Susemihl-Hicks, Politics p. 561. There can be no doubt, I think, that Diels has given the right answer, and that the meaning is 'extraneous to the Aristotelian school.' I believe, further, that this is in almost all cases merely another way of saying 'in the writings of the Academic school.' That is certainly the meaning here.

τὸ μὲν ἄλογον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle himself did not believe in 'parts of the soul' at all: Plato did, but this is not his division, for it is practically certain that it was first formulated in this way by Xenokrates. There is a part of the soul which 'knows what it is doing' and a part that does not. Cf. 1098 a, 3 n.

§ 10. **τῷ λόγῳ δύο**, 'verbally two.' This phrase is often opposed to *ἀριθμῷ ἕν* (cf. 1131 b, 16 n.). Cf. Phys. 262 a, 21 *τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἀρχῆς μέσου τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἄμφω ἐστί, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἕν, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ δύο.* 263 b, 12 *τὸ σημεῖον μὲν οὖν ἀμφοῖν κοινόν, καὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ τοῦ ὑστέρου, καὶ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐ ταὐτόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τελευτή, τοῦ δ' ἀρχή.* Gen. Corr. 320 b, 12 *βέλτιον τοίνυν ποιεῖν πᾶσιν ἀχώριστον τὴν ὕλην ὡς οὖσαν τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ μὴ μίαν.*

ἀχώριστα. Cf. De An. 413 b, 14 *καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ' εἶναι χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ.* 429 a, 10 *περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς... εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον.* 432 a, 19 *πότερον ἕν τι μόριον αὐτῆς χωριστὸν ὂν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγῳ.*

πεφυκότα, i.q. *φύσει*. The distinction, then, is between the dialectical and the physical account of the soul. Cf. below 1147 a, 24 n. for *λογικῶς* and *φυσικῶς*.

11 πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν
τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις
θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ 1102 b
12 ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης
μὲν οὖν κοινή τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ
γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ
ἡ δύναμις αὕτη, ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ' 5

1102 a, 32. EE. 1219 b, 36 *ἀφῄρηται δὲ καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἐστὶ μέρος ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ φυτικόν. ἀνθρωπίνης γὰρ ψυχῆς τὰ εἰρημένα μόρια ἴδια· διὸ οὐδ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ αἱ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ ἀνθρώπου· δεῖ γὰρ εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος, λογισμὸν ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ πρᾶξιν· ἄρχει δ' ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ' ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ' ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. καὶ ὥσπερ ἡ εὐεξία σύγκειται ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μόριον ἀρετῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ ᾗ τέλος.*

b, 5. EE. 1219 b, 16 *καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δ' ἐνίοτε δῆλον ἐκ τούτων, διὰ τί ποτ' οὐθὲν βελτίους οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν φαύλων τὸν ἥμισυν τοῦ βίου· ὅμοιοι γὰρ καθεύδοντες πάντες. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀργία ψυχῆς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια. διὸ καὶ ἄλλο εἴ τι μόριόν ἐστι ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ θρεπτικόν, ἡ τούτου ἀρετὴ οὐκ ἔστι μόριον τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ τοῦ σώματος· ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐνεργεῖ τὸ θρεπτικόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ὀρεκτικὸν ἀτελῆ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ. ὅσον δὲ τοῦ μὴ (πῃ Casaubon) κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσιν, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ νόσον ἢ πήρωσιν.*

πρὸς τὸ παρόν. For our purposes the *λογικὴ πρότασις* furnished by the theories of the Academy will be sufficient. It is not necessary to base *πολιτική* on *φυσική*.

§ 11. **κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ.** Cf. supra 1097 b, 33 *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.*

καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. The argument is that the sort of soul we find in all organisms kept up by nutrition (including plants), and in the embryos (of animals) where there is nothing besides, we may reasonably assume to exist also in developed animals, though in them there is something besides.

εὐλογώτερον. Cf. 1100 a, 13 n. The word shows that this is purely a *λογικὴ σκέψις*.

§ 12. **ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις.** Cf. De Somno 454 b, 32 *τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον, ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως.*

ὕπνον—ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων· συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία 13
γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη
—πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων,
καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν 14
τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν
ἐατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, με- 15
τέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς
τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν—ὀρθῶς
γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ—φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς
καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται καὶ
ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυ-
μένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι
τοὐναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς

ὅθεν φασὶν κ.τ.λ. This is probably a free quotation from some comic poet.

§ 13. **πλὴν εἴ πῃ**, to be taken closely with *ἥκιστα διάδηλοι* above. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 26) reads *πλὴν εἰ μή* with Aspasios and M^{b}. In EE. 1219 b, 24 (p. 59) we have *ὅσον δὲ τοῦ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μετέχουσιν, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι βελτίους αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων.* Here *μή* gives no sense, and Casaubon was surely right in reading *πῃ*. But, if so, *πῃ* must surely be right here too. It should be noted also that the reading of M^{b} may be simply an instance of the tendency of scribes to substitute the vulgar *πλὴν εἰ μή* for the more correct *πλὴν εἰ*.

τινὲς τῶν κινήσεων, i.e. the 'motions' of the senses ('impressions'). Cf. *Περὶ ἐνυπνίων* 462 a, 29 *τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν αἰσθημάτων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν ᾖ, ᾗ καθεύδει, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐνύπνιον.*

ἐπιεικῶν...τυχόντων. Attic 'litotes' for *ἀγαθῶν* and *κακῶν*. For *ἐπιεικής* cf. 1137 a, 35 n. For the difference between the dreams of good and bad men, see Probl. 957 a, 25.

§ 15. **φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς.** Aristotle in his Platonic passages uses *φύσις* with the genitive in a somewhat vague sense. Often it seems merely periphrastic. See Ind. Ar. 838 a, 8 sqq. Here it is equivalent to *μόριον* or *δύναμις*.

τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς. The meaning of these terms is fully discussed in Book VII. Both the 'continent' and the 'incontinent' man have a right *λόγος* or rule of action, though the one follows it and the other does not. The fault of the *ἀκρατής* does not lie in the *λόγον ἔχον*, there must therefore be something else.

ἐν αὐτοῖς, i.e. in the *ἐγκρατής* as well as in the *ἀκρατής*. The *ἐγκρατής* does not follow his *λόγος* or rule without a struggle. It is in this that he differs from the *σώφρων* whose desires are in complete harmony with his principles. See infra § 17.

ἀντιτείνει, a Platonic word. Cf. Phaidr. 254 a.

οὕτως· ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν 16
τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυ-
χῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομι-
στέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντι-
βαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 17
φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ
τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς—ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώ-
φρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται 18
δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινω-
νεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει
πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ
τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ
ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου
τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησίς τε
καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, 19 1103 a

ἐπὶ τἀναντία κ.τ.λ., sc. *τῷ λόγῳ*. The argument is the same as that by which Plato proves that *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* are distinct.

§ 17. **πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν κ.τ.λ.** As the fact of *ἀκρασία* showed it to be *ἄλογον*, so the fact of *ἐγκράτεια* shows that it *μετέχει πῃ λόγου*. We have now proved the existence of a higher part of *τὸ ἄλογον*, which is simply the *ὀρεκτικόν* of Aristotle's own system.

τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου, i.e. the irrational part of the man who has the *ἀρεταί* of the irrational part, i.e. the *σώφρων* who has the *ἀρετή* of *ἐπιθυμία* and the *ἀνδρεῖος* who has the *ἀρετή* of *θυμός*. See below 1117 b, 24. The fact that the irrational part may not only 'obey' the rational, but may even be 'in harmony with' it, shows that it *μετέχει λόγου*.

πάντα...ὁμοφωνεῖ, 'it is in complete harmony with—.'

§ 18. **καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν.** This is a hint for those who know the De Anima. The force of *ὅλως* is to include *θυμός* and *βούλησις* as well as *ἐπιθυμία*.

οὕτω δὴ τοῦ πατρός κ.τ.λ. Theon of Smyrna, p. 72, 21 (Hiller) sqq., quotes an interesting Peripatetic enumeration of the various senses of *λόγος* which mentions *inter alia* *ὁ τῶν τιμώντων καὶ τιμωμένων, καθ' ὃ τῶν τιμώντων καὶ τιμωμένων ἢ μὴ ἔχειν. ὃν φαμεν λόγον τινὸς ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν.* This is clearly the sense referred to here. The *ὀρεκτικόν* may be called *λόγον ἔχον* inasmuch as it *λόγον ἔχει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*, 'pays heed to the *λόγος* of the *λόγον ἔχον*.'

οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν, 'not in the mathematical sense,' in which *λόγον ἔχειν* means to be 'rational' in the sense of commensurable. For the idiom cf. Riddell, Digest § 25. We must not 'understand' any definite word to 'govern' *τῶν μαθηματικῶν*.

§ 19. **εἰ δὲ χρὴ κ.τ.λ.** The insufficiency of the twofold division is now brought out from the other side. If, to save the unity of *τὸ ἄλογον*, we say that *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν* belongs to *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*, then that in turn will split up into two 'parts.'

διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾷος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

1103 a, 3. EE. 1220 a, 5 ἀρετῆς δ' εἴδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ διανοητική. ἐπαινοῦμεν γὰρ οὐ μόνον τοὺς δικαίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς συνετοὺς καὶ τοὺς σοφούς· ἐπαινετὸν γὰρ ὑπέκειτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ ἔργον, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν αὐτῶν ἐνέργειαι. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ διανοητικαὶ μετὰ λόγου, αἱ μὲν τοιαῦται τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος, ὃ ἐπιτακτικόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾗ λόγον ἔχει, αἱ δ' ἠθικαὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου μέν, ἀκολουθητικοῦ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν ποιός τις τὸ ἦθος, ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ δεινός, ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾷος ἢ θρασύς.

§ 20. **διορίζεται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** The whole discussion leads up to this. See Introductory Note to Book II.

κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην, sc. τῷ μετὰ λόγου and τῷ κατὰ λόγον as it is expressed later on.

ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ., a short proof that σοφία really is an ἀρετή. The middle term is ἐπαινετὴ ἕξις.

BOOK II.

GOODNESS.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We have seen that Happiness is an activity of the soul according to goodness, and this definition is the starting-point of Politics. But before we can analyse it into its conditions we must know something of the soul itself, just as the doctor must know something of the human body before he can deliberate how to produce health. It is not necessary, however, for the lawgiver to be a specialist in psychology any more than it is necessary for the medical practitioner to be a specialist in physiology. It will be sufficient for our purpose, which is not theory but practice, if we take those accounts of the soul which are commonly accepted, in other words, the psychology of the Academy. They cannot be wholly wrong, though they may require a little dialectical treatment to fit them for our use.

First of all, then, we find a generally received distinction between a "rational" and an "irrational" part of the soul[1], that is to say between a part of the soul which can give an account of

[1] It is true that this distinction is ascribed to Plato by the writer of MM. 1182 a, 24, but it is not to be found in any of his writings. Plato does, indeed, speak of a twofold division of the soul in his later works, but the division is not the same. It is rather a distinction of the everlasting, immortal soul from the animal and mortal soul (see Polit. 309 c. Tim. 69 c. 72 d). And in the De Anima 432 a, 22 Aristotle distinctly implies that the present division was due to some one other than Plato. He says ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πόσα· τρόπον γάρ τινα ἄπειρα φαίνεται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες (i.e. Plato) λέγουσι διορίζοντες λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, οἱ δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον.

itself and a part of the soul which can not. This distinction has been adopted by Xenokrates, the present head of the Academy, and will therefore make a good starting-point[2].

We must, however, note at once that the part of the soul which is strictly speaking "irrational," the part which has to do with nutrition and growth, cannot be the seat of the goodness or badness of man as such. And yet there is a case where a part which we must call irrational does affect human conduct. If we consider what happens in the case of the man who does what he knows to be wrong, we are forced to admit that the judgment (λόγος) which he forms is right, and therefore that the rational part of his soul is in just the same state as if he resisted the temptation. His weakness must accordingly be attributed to the irrational part. On the other hand, if we look at the case of the man who does not yield to the temptation, we see that this part of the soul cannot be wholly irrational either, seeing that it is capable of understanding and obeying a judgment.

Perhaps, then, it will be thought better to call this part of the soul "rational," and there can be no objection to that, provided we remember the cases of moral weakness and moral strength, and do not confuse it with the rational part in the strict sense of the word. We must say in that case that the rational part has two parts, one rational in the strict sense, and the other in the sense that it is able to understand and follow a rule given it from without. We have, then, by means of dialectic, discovered the existence of a part of the soul which we may call either the higher part of the irrational soul or the lower part of the rational, as we please.

This discussion is an admirable example of what Aristotle means by the dialectic method. All he wishes to bring out is the existence of what in his own psychology is called the "sentient and appetitive soul,"[3] and it might seem to us that a reference to

[2] Heinze, Xenokrates p. 140 sqq., makes it extremely probable that the division was due to Xenokrates himself.

[3] See R.P. 336 and Zeller, Aristotle, II, pp. 21 sqq., for the relevant references. Aristotle's own psychological division crosses that of the Academy chiefly in this respect, that, while he assigns Desire, Temper and Wish alike to the appetitive soul, the Academy had to refer the latter to the "rational," and thus to separate it in an arbitrary way from the other forms of Appetition. Aristotle's advance upon the earlier theory was his recognition of the appetitive character of goodness as well as of badness. Here, however, he does not care to insist. So long as we recognise the existence of this

the De Anima would have been more satisfactory than an attempt to twist the doctrines of Xenokrates into a new form. But Aristotle does not wish to assume a knowledge of his own system in the course on Politics, and he therefore tries as best he may to make the popular psychology of the Academy the basis of his argument. The way in which he does this is most ingenious, though to our minds much less convincing than a brief exposition of his own psychological views would have been. The use which he makes of the Platonic term μετέχειν and the way in which he takes advantage of the different senses of the phrase λόγον ἔχειν are particularly instructive.

§ 2. These two parts of the soul will each have its proper form of goodness, and this distinction will correspond to that drawn in ordinary speech between goodness of character and goodness of intellect. For the present it is with the latter, the goodness of the sentient and appetitive soul, that we have to do.

The recognition of a form of goodness which was not in the strict sense of the word intellectual and reflective had already been forced upon Plato as a result of his criticism of the Socratic paradox that "Goodness is knowledge." In his earlier dialogues[4] Plato had taken the various recognised forms of goodness one by one and had discussed the question whether they were knowledge or not. The result of all these dialogues is practically the same. The recognised forms of goodness are not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word; for as soon as we draw all the conclusions which follow from the assumption that they are, we find ourselves unable to hold fast the distinctions between them. Any single form of goodness, if regarded as knowledge, turns out to be knowledge of the good, and therefore identical with goodness as a whole.

Now it is evident that this view will prevent us from giving the name of goodness to almost everything that commonly goes by that name. By working out to its logical result the doctrine that goodness is knowledge we have really proved at the same

appetitive soul, and distinguish it clearly from the principle of nutrition and growth on the one hand and from the thinking soul on the other hand, we may call it "rational" or "irrational" or what we please. Nor does he insist upon its identity with the "sentient" soul, though that also, as we shall see, is of fundamental importance for the psychological groundwork of his Ethics.

[4] See especially the Laches, Charmides and Protagoras.

time the existence of another kind of goodness which is not knowledge. In the Phaedo[5] this distinction between two kinds of goodness appears already, though there "popular goodness" is rated very low, and the only true goodness is still wisdom or "philosophic goodness." But if we follow the course of Plato's ethical thought we find that the reality and worth of this secondary form of goodness is more and more fully recognised. The "first education" in the Republic aims solely at the training of character (ἦθος), and the whole of the Laws is practically directed to the same end.

§ 3. The distinction between goodness of character and goodness of intellect does not correspond, then, to that between knowledge and conduct, which the traditional rendering "moral and intellectual virtues" is apt to suggest to us. As a matter of fact, Aristotle held that conduct depended upon intellectual goodness just as much as knowledge did, while on the other hand he admitted the existence of a kind of art and a kind of knowledge which were not strictly speaking intellectual, but depended on something more closely resembling character[6]. There is conduct which is intellectual and art which is not.

Though it is beside Aristotle's purpose in the Ethics to insist upon the point, we know that the soul with which we are now concerned is not only appetitive, but also sensitive, and we shall therefore expect to find an analogy between the developement of goodness from appetition and the developement of knowledge from sense. It is worth while to point out in what this consists.

The object of sensation[7], though it is always individual, "a this" (τόδε τι), necessarily implies a universal element. What we perceive is not strictly speaking the "this" which is the object of sensation, but always "a such" (τοιόνδε τι). We perceive Kallias, indeed, but our perception is of certain things which "mean" Kallias, that is of a man having certain qualities which enable us to identify him as Kallias. The whole content of our perception

[5] Phaedo 68 d sqq.

[6] Cf. Rhet. 1354 a, 7 where we are told that many orators succeed διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως. The chief example is, of course, the medical ἔμπειρος.

[7] On all this see Zeller, vol. II, pp. 58 sqq. It seems necessary to draw attention to the fact that τόδε τι means "a this." The Greek for "this somewhat" would be τὸ τί τόδε.

is therefore universal in character, and the function of sense-perception is just the discrimination of those universal qualities.

In the case of creatures endowed with memory, these sense-perceptions remain in imagination (φαντασία), and a number of such memories make up an experience (ἐμπειρία). For instance, we say that a man has experience when he has an idea that this or that was good for Kallias when he had this or that disease, and for Sokrates, and so on for other individuals. Aristotle rates experience very high indeed for practical purposes, and he is never tired of citing its value in the practice of medicine. Practice has to do entirely with particulars and is therefore the peculiar province of experience.

But nevertheless experience does not reach the level of Art or Science. These do not arise till the universal implicit in experience is made explicit, till we pass from "This was good for Kallias and Sokrates and so-and-so when they were too hot" to "This is good for the human body in a fever."

The developement of goodness is precisely parallel to this. The object of appetition is individual like that of sense, but it too implies a universal. For, though we desire or wish for a particular thing, we really desire it because it is "a such." For instance, we desire this food or that honour, but only because they are pleasant or beautiful, and these are universals. These are the qualities which appear in imagination (φαντασία) and so move appetition.

Now the retention in memory of a number of such images of the pleasant or beautiful produces an ἦθος, that is a tendency to desire or wish for similar things as pleasant or beautiful, and this is precisely parallel to experience. And it is of the utmost value in practice; for it is with particulars that practice has to do.

At the same time, this is not human goodness in the full sense any more than experience is science or art. We do not reach the stage of intellect till the implicit universal has been made explicit, till we pass from "This, that and the other thing is pleasant or beautiful" to "This kind of feeling or action is good for the human soul."

§ 4. Closely connected with the question of the two kinds of goodness was the question "Can goodness be taught?" or does it come by nature or the grace of heaven, as was believed in early times? Clearly, if goodness is knowledge, it can be taught: but

the criticism of Plato's earlier dialogues[8] is largely directed to showing that there are no teachers of goodness in the ordinary sense of that word. In Aristotle we find the solution of the problem taken for granted. It is impossible to teach goodness of character; that can only be acquired by habituation. But goodness of intellect can be taught, with this reservation, however, that the intellectual capacity is presupposed, and that a good character has already been formed. You cannot make any one good by teaching; but, if a man has the gift, his goodness of character may be raised into an intellectual form and become the practical wisdom of the lawgiver.

Aristotle does not even tell us in the Ethics what habituation is, and we have to turn to Eudemos for a definition of it[9]. The main point about it is that habituation must be in acts of the same quality as the acts which issue from the character when formed. It is this which makes it necessary for us after all to discuss the nature of goodness; for it is only if we know what goodness is that we shall be able to stamp the actions of those for whom we are legislating with the right quality. Before, however, we go on to discuss the definition of goodness, it may be well to sketch briefly the ideas which underlie Aristotle's doctrine of habituation as we may gather them from the Physics and elsewhere.

The sentient soul has the natural capacity of being moved by the imagination of pleasure and pain. These imaginations are constantly being presented to it; for every act of sensation is accompanied by pleasure or pain, and the images of these feelings are stored up in memory. But the capacity of the soul to feel pleasure and pain is a rational capacity which may become active in two opposite ways. The capacity of taking pleasure in a good act is also the capacity of taking pleasure in a bad act. The capacity will therefore remain dormant unless there is something to determine it in the one direction or the other. This something is to be found in appetition, which converts the mere capacity of pleasure and pain into a desire to have the pleasure and avoid the pain.

But the soul is not in a perfectly neutral state as regards the pleasures and pains which it feels. Its life is a process, and it has

[8] On this point see especially the Gorgias and Meno.

[9] Cf. 1103 a, 17 n.

its source of motion and rest in itself. Now every continuous process implies an end to which it is directed, and the qualitative changes in the soul which we call feelings are only the incomplete processes which mark its growth. They are all really directed to the soul's completion, to its attaining the true nature or true form of the human soul. Hence the need of guidance from one who knows this form, and can decide in the light of it which of two alternative possibilities of feeling to actualise.

§ 5. We have asked how goodness is to be produced and we have seen that it is produced by habituation, and by habituation in the same acts which result from goodness when it has been produced. We must, then, ask what goodness is, and first of all we must find its genus.

If Aristotle had been basing his account of goodness on his own philosophical system, there would have been no difficulty about this. We have seen that goodness is a "completion" (τελείωσις) of a thing which is by nature capable of such a completion, and we know that such completions are called ἕξεις or conditions, a word taken from medicine and gymnastics. The acquisition of such a ἕξις is no mere motion (κίνησις) or alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) like the feelings which are its matter; it is a "form," and displays all the characteristics of forms. But the fact is that we must go to the Physics for Aristotle's moral philosophy; here we only arrive at the knowledge that the genus of goodness is ἕξις by a dialectical argument from the "division" of the category of quality. Here is another instance where the doctrine of the categories is assumed as familiar to Aristotle's hearers. (Cf. Introd. § 28.)

The differentia of goodness, the "Mean," is more scientifically arrived at, doubtless because both the doctrine itself and the metaphysical groundwork on which it rests were quite familiar in the Academy from the days of Plato's Philebos onwards at least. Quality is a category that admits of quantitative determination or degree, "the more and less" as the Academy called it: it is continuous and therefore infinitely divisible, at least potentially. Now, feelings and acts, which are the matter of goodness, being qualitative motions, are continuous, and the degree of feeling which is right for a given person in given circumstances may therefore be quantitatively expressed. This is all that is meant by the doctrine of the mean; for the Greek word μεσότης does

not mean only or even primarily the arithmetical mean: it is the oldest word for a proportion of any kind and however determined. We must admit that a feeling like fear is capable of such determination; for we must fear either more or less or equally. And the same is true of an act like giving away money; for we must give away either more or less or an equal sum. But to say that Aristotle makes only a quantitative distinction between goodness and badness is to miss the whole point. Aristotle has expressly refused to identify goodness either with the feeling or the outward act. It is the permanent condition of soul, and conditions of soul do not differ quantitatively, nor are they motions. They do not come into being or cease to be by motion or alteration, though they are and are not in virtue of an alteration in something else, that is, in the soul[10].

[10] The locus classicus on this subject is Phys. 245 b, 3 sqq. *Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον ἅπαν ἀλλοιοῦται ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ ἐν μόνοις ὑπάρχει τούτοις ἀλλοίωσις ὅσα καθ' αὑτὰ λέγεται πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μάλιστ' ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι ἔν τε τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἕξεσι καὶ ταῖς τούτων λήψεσι καὶ ἀποβολαῖς ἀλλοίωσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἐν οὐδετέροις δ' ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σχηματιζόμενον καὶ ῥυθμιζόμενον ὅταν ἐπιτελεσθῇ* (i.e. τελειωθῇ, *τέλος λάβῃ*), *οὐ λέγομεν ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν, οἷον τὸν ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸν ἢ τὴν πυραμίδα κηρὸν ἢ τὴν κλίνην ξύλον, ἀλλὰ παρωνυμιάζοντες τὸ μὲν χαλκοῦν, τὸ δὲ κήρινον, τὸ δὲ ξύλινον. τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς* (sc. *ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν*) *καὶ ἠλλοιωμένον προσαγορεύομεν* (sc. *ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗ ἐστιν*)· *ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ θερμὸν καὶ σκληρὸν τὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν καὶ τὸν κηρόν. καὶ οὐ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν χαλκὸν λέγομεν, ὁμωνύμως τῷ πάθει προσαγορεύοντες τὴν ὕλην. ὥστ' εἰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν μορφὴν οὐ λέγεται τὸ γεγονὸς ἐν ᾧ* (i.e. the *ὕλη*) *ἐστι τὸ σχῆμα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἀλλοιώσεις λέγεται, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἶεν αἱ γενέσεις αὗται ἀλλοιώσεις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἄτοπον ἂν δόξειεν, ἠλλοιῶσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν γεγενημένων· ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως ἕκαστον ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τινός, οἷον τῆς ὕλης πυκνουμένης ἢ μανουμένης ἢ θερμαινομένης ἢ ψυχομένης, οὐ μέντοι τὰ γινόμενά γε ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐδ' ἡ γένεσις αὐτῶν ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἱ ἕξεις οὔθ' αἱ τοῦ σώματος οὔθ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλοιώσεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρεταὶ αἱ δὲ κακίαι τῶν ἕξεων· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ ἀρετὴ οὔτε ἡ κακία ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις* (*ὅταν γὰρ λάβῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρετήν, τότε λέγεται τέλειον ἕκαστον· τότε γὰρ μάλιστά ἐστι τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥσπερ κύκλος τέλειος, ὅταν μάλιστα γένηται κύκλος καὶ ὅταν βέλτιστος*), *ἡ δὲ κακία φθορὰ τούτου καὶ ἔκστασις. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τῆς οἰκίας τελείωμα λέγομεν ἀλλοίωσιν* (*ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ ὁ θριγκὸς καὶ ὁ κέραμος ἀλλοίωσις, ἢ εἰ θριγκουμένη καὶ κεραμουμένη ἀλλοιοῦται ἀλλὰ μὴ τελειοῦται ἡ οἰκία*), *τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων ἢ λαμβανόντων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ τελειώσεις αἱ δ' ἐκστάσεις εἰσίν, ὥστ' οὐκ ἀλλοιώσεις. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φαμεν ἁπάσας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐν τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐεξίαν, ἐν κράσει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν τίθεμεν, ἢ αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτὰ τῶν ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας. ἑκάστη γάρ ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη εὖ ἢ κακῶς διατίθησι τὸ ἔχον· οἰκεῖα δ' ὑφ' ὧν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ πρός τι οὕτε αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλοιώσεις, οὔτε αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἀλλοίωσις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδ' ὅλως μεταβολὴ οὐδεμία, φανερὸν ὅτι οὔθ' αἱ ἕξεις οὔθ' αἱ τῶν ἕξεων ἀποβολαὶ καὶ λήψεις ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἴσως αὐτὰς καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν ἀνάγκη, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν μορφήν, οἷον θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν ἢ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν, ἢ ἐν οἷς τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πρώτοις. περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἑκάστη λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑφ' ὧν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἔχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὡς δεῖ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ἐναντίως* (i.e. *μὴ ὡς δεῖ*) *ἀπαθές. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεων· ἅπασαι γὰρ καὶ αὗται τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ τελειώσεις, αἱ δὲ κακίαι ἐκστάσεις· ἔτι ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ εὖ διατίθησι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, ἡ δὲ κακία κακῶς. ὥστ' οὐδ' αὗται ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποβολαὶ καὶ αἱ λήψεις αὐτῶν. γίνεσθαι δ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους. ἀλλοιοῦται δ' ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικάς .....ἐπεὶ δ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἐγγιγνομένης καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίνεται* (περὶ ταύτας γάρ εἰσιν), *αἱ δ' ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λῦπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀλλοιουμένου τινὸς ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀποβάλλειν καὶ λαμβάνειν. ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν γένεσις αὐτῶν μετ' ἀλλοιώσεως, αὗται δ' οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀλλοιώσεις.*

§ 6. It is important to remember that the theory of goodness as a "mean" or ratio between opposites is only one case among others of a principle which served to explain all the difficulties which earlier thinkers had felt about becoming, the difficulties which Plato had expressed in the Phaedo, and which he finally settled in the Philebos by his doctrine of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*. Matter to Aristotle is that which is potentially, and it comes to be actually under the influence of that which is already actual. This is just because it is a *στέρησις*, and only attains its own *ἕξις* when it reaches its proper form or *τέλος*. By its very nature it is that which is capable of receiving opposites; it is the substratum in which opposites inhere. Such a substratum we must assume because it is impossible that the one opposite can become or approximate to the other. Cold iron may become hot iron, but cold can never become heat. Now the form which is the cause of all becoming is always a ratio (*λόγος*) or mean (*μεσότης*) between the two opposites, it is a definite "interval" as musicians call it, a fixed proportion in which the opposites neutralise one another and give rise to a new product. If Aristotle had only known the theories of modern chemistry, they would have seemed to him a most perfect exemplification of the principle; for what the modern chemist calls atomic weights are just of this nature, and a chemical formula like H_2O is the most typical instance of

what he calls a λόγος or μεσότης. Unfortunately he did not know this remarkable confirmation of the theory he had inherited from Plato, and we can only quote examples which seem less striking because biology has not yet been reduced to organic chemistry.

Health had been regarded since the times of the Pythagoreans as a sort of ἁρμονία ("tuning" or "pitch," not "harmony") of the opposites warm and cold, dry and moist, in the human body. The formula or ratio of this proportion exists in the soul of the doctor, and its presence there is the efficient cause of health in the human body as well as its formal and final cause. It is exactly in the same way that the lawgiver has in his soul the formula or λόγος of goodness, and it is the efficient cause of goodness in others.

Again, in discussing the fact of growth, Aristotle is met by some old difficulties which were raised for the first time, so far as we know, by Empedokles and Anaxagoras. As the latter put it "How can flesh arise from what is not flesh, or bone from what is not bone?"[11] How, in fact, do the opposites, hot and cold, moist and dry, become organic tissues (ὁμοιομερῆ)? Aristotle says "If flesh arises from both of them but is neither of them, nor yet a compound in which both are preserved, what remains but that the product of them should be matter? The destruction of one opposite either produces the other opposite or matter. Surely then, since there are degrees of heat and cold, when the one is in actuality it will be potentially the other; but when it is not completely actual, but cold as compared to heat, and hot as compared to cold, since things that are mixed destroy one another's excesses, then neither will the matter nor either of the opposites be completely actual, but something intermediate. In so far as it is potentially more hot than cold or the opposite, in that ratio it will be three times as hot potentially as cold, or twice, or whatever the ratio may be.....That which is actually hot is potentially cold, and what is actually cold is potentially hot, so that if they are not equal they change into one another—and so with the other opposites—the elements first change in this way, and after these flesh and bones and the like, the hot becoming cold and the cold hot, when they have reached the mean (τὸ μέσον)."[12]

[11] Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 286, sqq.

[12] I have selected this passage from many others which might have been quoted as being, perhaps, specially instructive; but the main thing to remember is that "the Mean" is no isolated ethical doctrine, but the regular Platonic and Aristotelian way of explaining the Formal Cause. The misleading view of it as a mere *medio tutissimus ibis* is due to the unfortunate isolation in which Aristotle's ethical doctrines are commonly studied; and this in turn is due to the peculiarities of Aristotle's own method. The passage is as follows:—

Gen. Corr. 334 b, 2 sqq. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσι μίαν αὐτῶν ὕλην ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν πῶς ἔσται τι ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οἷον ψυχροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ ἢ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ σὰρξ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν καὶ μηδέτερον ἐκείνων, μηδ' αὖ σύνθεσις σῳζομένων, τί λείπεται πλὴν ὕλην εἶναι τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνων; ἡ γὰρ θατέρου φθορὰ ἢ θάτερον ποιεῖ ἢ τὴν ὕλην. ἆρ' οὖν ἐπειδή ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ὅταν μὲν ἁπλῶς ᾖ θάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ, δυνάμει θάτερον ἔσται· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παντελῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς μὲν θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ὡς δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν (διὰ τὸ μιγνύμενα φθείρειν τὰς ὑπεροχὰς ἀλλήλων), τότε οὔθ' ἡ ὕλη ἔσται οὔτε ἐκείνων τῶν ἐναντίων ἑκάτερον ἐντελεχείᾳ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει μᾶλλον εἶναι θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τοὐναντίον, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον διπλασίως θερμὸν δυνάμει ἢ ψυχρόν, ἢ τριπλασίως, ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον τοιοῦτον. ἔσται δὴ μιχθέντων τἆλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ἐκείνων δυνάμει πως ὄντων, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον· καὶ ἔστιν οὕτω μὲν μίξις, ἐκείνως δὲ ὕλη τὸ γινόμενον. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πάσχει τἀναντία κατὰ τὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις διορισμόν· ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ θερμὸν δυνάμει ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ψυχρὸν δυνάμει θερμόν, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ ἰσάζῃ, μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων) καὶ πρῶτον οὕτω τὰ στοιχεῖα μεταβάλλει, ἐκ δὴ τούτων σάρκες καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοῦ μὲν θερμοῦ γιγνομένου ψυχροῦ, τοῦ δὲ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ μέσον ἔλθῃ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέτερον—τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον—ὁμοίως δὴ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τἆλλα.

It is in this sense, then, that goodness is a mean; it is the form which is the true nature of the human soul when fully developed. To say that Aristotle makes the distinction between goodness and badness a quantitative one is like saying that music is merely mathematics, or that the distinction between the different compounds of an acid and a base is only one of degree.

B

Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς
15 *δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου· ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεγκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.*

1103 a, 17. EE. 1220 a, 39 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ' ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαί πως οὕτως ἤδη [τὸ] ἐνεργητικόν, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις οὐχ ὁρῶμεν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν μυριάκις ῥίψῃς ἄνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τοῦτο μὴ βίᾳ), διὸ ἔστω τὸ ἦθος τοῦτο ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον <τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν> δυναμένου δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης.*

I. § 1. **Διττῆς...τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης,** as shown above 1103 a, 3 sqq. We take up the question of how goodness is produced without asking what it is; for this is a practical investigation. We shall, nevertheless, be forced to ask what it is later on.

τὸ πλεῖον. This is a necessary reservation; for we shall see that besides teaching goodness of intellect implies (1) cleverness, which comes by nature, and (2) goodness of character, which comes by habit. Cf. 1144 a, 20 sqq.

ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. Aristotle simply assumes the solution of this old problem (cf. Introductory Note) to which Plato finally came. Cf. Laws 729 e *πᾶν ἦθος διὰ ἔθος.* We have to go to Eudemos (loc. cit.) for a definition of habit. That is habituated which "from being often moved in a certain way under guidance which is not innate, is now active in that way."

περιγίνεται, 'is gained,' 'is the result of.' Contrast *φύσει ἐγγίνεται, παραγίνεται* below, which imply no previous process.

παρεγκλῖνον. This is the reading of K^b and Hel. There seems to be no instance of *παρεκκλῖνον*, the usual reading, in the present sense, while *παρεγκλίνω* is used transitively in Athenaeus 701 b and the scholiast on Ar. Knights 956, where it refers as here to a change in *προσῳδία.* The

2 *Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται,* 20 *οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως*

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a, 20. Met. 1046 a, 36 *ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δ' ἄλογοι μία ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν, πλὴν οὐχ ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ἀμφοῖν, ἔστι δ' ὡς τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος μᾶλλον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπιστήμας εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, εἶναι δὲ τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰς τοῦ δὲ μὴ καθ' αὑτάς· καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ μὲν καθ' αὑτό, τοῦ δὲ τρόπον τινὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀποφάσει γὰρ καὶ ἀποφορᾷ δηλοῖ τὸ ἐναντίον· ἡ γὰρ στέρησις ἡ πρώτη τὸ ἐναντίον, αὕτη δ' ἀποφορὰ θατέρου. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω. λόγος γάρ ἐστιν ἀμφοῖν μέν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δέ, καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ ἔχει κινήσεως ἀρχήν· ὥστ' ἄμφω ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς κινήσει πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συνάψασα. διὸ τὰ κατὰ λόγον δυνατὰ τοῖς ἄνευ λόγου δυνατοῖς ποιεῖ τἀναντία· μιᾷ γὰρ ἀρχῇ περιέχεται, τῷ λόγῳ. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῇ μὲν τοῦ εὖ δυνάμει ἀκολουθεῖ ἡ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ παθεῖν δύναμις, ταύτῃ δ' ἐκείνη οὐκ αἰεί· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα καὶ ποιεῖν, τὸν δὲ μόνον ποιοῦντα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν.*

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intransitive use, though not found elsewhere, presents no difficulty. Observe the etymological theory implied by the use of *παρά* (*ἦθος παρὰ τὸ ἔθος*). The Greeks did not think of words as 'derived' from other words, but as deflexions or declensions (*πτώσεις, ἐγκλίσεις, παραγωγαί*) from a normal form. Cf. Plato, Crat. 400 b *ἂν μὲν καὶ σμικρόν τις παρακλίνῃ,* 410 a *σμικρόν τι παρακλίνοντες,* 398 d *σμικρὸν παρηγμένον.* So *παρώνυμος* cf. 1096 b, 27 n.

§ 2. **Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον κ.τ.λ.** That *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* comes *ἐθισμῷ* is assumed, but Aristotle digresses a little to show the inconsistency of this with the view that it comes *φύσει.*

οὐθὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The first argument is that *τὰ φύσει* are not affected

ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ 3
25 ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις
δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς 4
δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ

1103 a, 26. Met. 1047 b, 31 ἁπασῶν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δ' ἕθει οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἕθει καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν τὶ δυνατὸν καὶ ποτὲ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ, καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ λόγον δύναται

by habituation, goodness is, therefore goodness does not come by nature. This really depends on the distinction between ἄλογοι δυνάμεις and δυνάμεις μετὰ λόγου, for which see Met. loc. cit. Every λόγος expresses both the thing and its negation (the first essentially and the second accidentally), and therefore every δύναμις of the λόγον ἔχον, the part of the soul that can give an account of itself, is also a δύναμις of its opposite. But where there is no λόγος the δύναμις can only become actual in one way.

§ 3. **πεφυκόσι...δέξασθαι**, i.e. φύσει δεκτικοῖς οὖσιν αὐτῶν.

τελειουμένοις. Though stated almost parenthetically, this is meant as a hint to those hearers who are acquainted with Aristotle's system. Cf. Met. 1021 b, 20 καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τελεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους. Nature has not only its ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in itself, but also its ἀρχὴ στάσεως (Introd. § 27). The process of growth stops when the form is fully embodied in the matter. The ὑποκείμενον is then said to be complete (τέλειον εἶναι, τέλος ἔχειν) or to have attained its true nature (ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν 1152 b, 13 n.). It is for this reason that the γένεσις of ἀρετή is not an ἀλλοίωσις—the εἶδος is not capable of alteration—but takes place ἀλλοιουμένου τινός, in this case by alteration of the soul. Cf. Phys. 246 a, 10 Introductory Note n. 10.

§ 4. **ἔτι ὅσα κ.τ.λ.** In things that come by nature, the capacity precedes the act, in things that come by habit the act precedes the capacity. For the full explanation of this we must refer once more to the Metaphysics (loc. cit.). Capacities are either congenital (συγγενεῖς) or acquired, whether by habit or teaching. The reason why, in the case of the latter, the act precedes the capacity is just that they are μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, and accordingly of opposites. They will not, therefore, become active as soon as they are brought into contact with the appropriate object. They cannot act in two opposite ways at once, so they will not act at all till something else determines in which way they are to be active. As we are dealing with the δυνάμεις of τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, this something will be some form of ὄρεξις, or at least something which has an appetitive element in it (προαίρεσις).

ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. Cf. Met. (loc. cit.), but we see from Met. 1049 b, 10 and De An. 415 a, 16 that πρότερον

ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι 30
ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 1103 b
σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

5 Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς, καὶ τὸ

κινεῖν καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν μετὰ λόγου, τὰ δ' ἄλογα καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ἄλογοι, κἀκείνας μὲν ἀνάγκη ἐν ἐμψύχῳ εἶναι ταύτας δ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας δυνάμεις ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὡς δύνανται τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν πλησιάζωσι, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ πάσχειν, ἐκείνας δ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη. αὗται μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαι μία ἑνὸς ποιητική, ἐκεῖναι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἅμα ποιήσει τἀναντία· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ κύριον· λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὄρεξιν ἢ προαίρεσιν. ὁποτέρου γὰρ ἂν ὀρέγηται κυρίως, τοῦτο ποιήσει, ὅταν ὡς δύναται ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πλησιάζῃ τῷ παθητικῷ. ὥστε τὸ δυνατὸν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέγηται, οὗ τ' ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὠδὶ ἔχοντος [ποιεῖν]. εἰ δὲ μή, ποιεῖν οὐ δυνήσεται. τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἔξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεσθαι οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ· τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἔστι δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἔστι δ' οὐ πάντως ἀλλ' ἐχόντων πως, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἔξω κωλύοντα· ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἕνια. διὸ οὐδ' ἐὰν ἅμα βούληται ἢ ἐπιθυμῇ ποιεῖν δύο ἢ τἀναντία, οὐ ποιήσει· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦ ἅμα ποιεῖν ἡ δύναμις, ἐπεὶ ὧν ἔστιν οὕτως ποιήσει.

here is only χρόνῳ πρότερον. In another sense πρότερόν εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις (sc. τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι) κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, 'in the case of the arts as well,' e.g. ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐλεῖν (Met. loc. cit.). This is the point in which teaching and habituation resemble one another.

οὕτω δή is the apodosis to **ὥσπερ καί** above. "The clause of comparison ὥσπερ κτέ. does duty twice over." Bywater, Contr. p. 27, referring to Riddell, Dig. § 209.

§ 5. **Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** This is not a third argument to show that goodness does not come φύσει, but a reinforcement of the original statement that it comes ἐθισμῷ. For the appeal to the practice of νομοθέται, cf. 1099 b, 29. 1102 a, 7.

μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα 6
ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, 7
ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾷοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· 8

§ 6. **Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.** This is summed up 1105 a, 14 by the words *ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων*. There is no real difference of meaning between **ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν** and **διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν**, and the same idea is expressed below (1104 a, 28) by **ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν**. Aristotle might have said that the *ποιητικὰ ἀρετῆς* and the *φθαρτικὰ ἀρετῆς* were the same.

καὶ [οἱ] ἀγαθοὶ κ.τ.λ. I have bracketed *οἱ* as suggested by Professor Bywater. Tr. 'people become—.'

§ 7. **τοῦ διδάξοντος.** We are still speaking of *τέχναι*.

ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ, 'in short,' a Platonic phrase, apparently only here in Aristotle. Cf. Sandys on Dem. 3, 18. 'Like dispositions arise from like activities.' The attribute has to be understood with both members of the phrase, as often, cf. 1094 b, 28 n.

§ 8. **ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι**, i.e. *ἀποδεικνύναι*. This use of the verb is derived from that which we see in 1103 a, 27. 'We must qualify our activities.' For the use of terms here cf. Met. 1020 b, 17, where the two meanings of quality are given as (1) *διαφορὰ οὐσίας*, and (2) *διαφορὰ κινήσεως*. The latter meaning is thus explained: *τὰ δὲ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων ἢ κινούμενα καὶ τῶν κινήσεων διαφοραί· ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι· διαφορὰς γὰρ δηλοῦσι τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καθ' ἃς ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσι καλῶς ἢ φαύλως· τὰ ἐν κινήσει ὄντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὠδὶ δυνάμενον κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἐνεργεῖν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ὠδὶ καὶ ἐναντίως μοχθηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν*. The meaning, then, is that we must 'give our activities a certain *quality*.' It is important to notice the introduction of this category.

κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

II. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ 2
τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθω [ῥηθή-

1103 b, 26. EE. 1216 b, 20 *οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε περὶ ἀρετῆς οὐ τὸ εἰδέναι τιμιώτατον τί ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ γινώσκειν ἐκ τίνων ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι βουλόμεθα τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐδὲ τί ἐστι δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' εἶναι δίκαιοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν μᾶλλον ἢ γινώσκειν τί ἐστι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν.*

II. § 1. **Ἐπεὶ οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The genuineness of this passage has been suspected, and it is certainly true that (1) it says over again much that has been said already, and (2) that it anticipates much—especially the doctrine of the Mean—that will find its proper place later on. It is also true (3) that § 8 is continuous not with this but the preceding passage, and (4) that this passage is not referred to in the recapitulation 1105 a, 13. But these are all characteristics of the akroamatic style. It is to be noted also that there is a great difference between the discussion of the Mean here and later on. Here it is explained dialectically by a mere analogy; later on it is discussed *φυσικῶς*. Now this is a very characteristic procedure, as we shall see.

πραγματεία, *ἡ περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματεία, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν* (Rhet. 1356 a, 26). In this sense of a 'branch' of philosophy the word is a synonym of *μέθοδος*. Cf. 1094 a, 1 n.

οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα. Contrast Phys. 194 b, 17 *ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία*. The statement that a theoretical study of goodness would be of no use will not seem too strong if we remember that in a practical science the product is 'better' than the activity. From this it follows that such a study would not completely attain its end.

§ 2. **κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.** The least misleading translation is 'according to the right rule.' The phrase comes from the Academy (see next note), and was too familiar to need explanation.

κοινόν, 'is common ground,' i.e. common to us and other schools, especially the Academy. That this is the meaning appears clearly from 1144 b, 21 sqq. For the meaning given to *κοινός* cf. *κοιναὶ γνῶμαι, δόξαι, κοινὰ ὀνόματα*, 'received beliefs,' 'accepted names.'

ὑποκείσθω. Cf. 1129 a, 11 *ὡς ἐν*

σεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς].

1104 a 3 Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτέων λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι, τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν 4 ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος 5 λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι 6 τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις

τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. 'Let it be assumed as the basis of our discussion.' Hel. and some inferior MSS. read *ὑπερκείσθω*, but no parallel to this expression can be found in Aristotle. The words which follow in brackets are justly suspected by Professor Bywater. They imply the identification of the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* with *φρόνησις*, which in this bald form is post-Aristotelian. See, however, 1144 b, 27 n.

§ 3. **περὶ τῶν πρακτέων.** *περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν* Bekk. Sus. Byw. with Hel. I have reverted to the reading of all the best MSS. Aristotle is not here speaking of the difficulty of practical science in general, but of the difficulty of laying down rules as to how we should 'qualify our activities.'

τύπῳ ... ἀκριβῶς ... κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Cf. 1094 b, 11 sqq. The comparison goes down to **τὰ ὑγιεινά**, which are here substituted for the products of the arts in the former passage. This is because an example of *τὰ ποιητικά* is wanted, and *ὑγιεινόν* has for one of its meanings *ὑγιείας ποιητικόν* (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.).

§ 4. **περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα.** General rules of conduct are hard to give: a system of casuistry is still less capable of exactness.

ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, 'it comes under no professional tradition,' as medical treatment, for instance, does. Cp. Probl. 885 b, 27 *οἱ ἰατροὶ παραγγέλλουσι*, Rhet. ad Alex. 1421 b, 4 *παραγγέλματα πολιτικά, δικανικά*. For **πίπτει** cf. *ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίπτει* (Top. 102 a, 37).

It is curious to note that, in the hands of the Church, casuistry became just such a professional tradition.

ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Mr Stewart is doubtless right in supposing that Aristotle had in mind the passage of Hippokrates quoted in the Introduction, § 26.

§ 5. **πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.** A Platonic touch. Cf. 1096 a, 14 n.

§ 6. **τὰ τοιαῦτα,** 'things like goodness.' There is no need to seek a definite reference for the pronoun. Aristotle is here employing the dialectical method of *σκέψις ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων*.

δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Isokr. Dem. § 34 *τὸ γὰρ ἀφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ*

χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ 7 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σῴζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι, ἀναίσθητός τις. φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σῴ- 8 ζεται. ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος·

1104 a, 27. EE. 1220 a, 22 *ὑποκείσθω δὴ πρῶτον ἡ βελτίστη διάθεσις ὑπὸ τῶν βελτίστων γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πράττεσθαι ἄριστα περὶ ἕκαστον ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκάστου ἀρετῆς, οἷον πόνοι τε ἄριστοι καὶ τροφὴ ἀφ'*

ταχίστην ἔχει τὴν διάγνωσιν. The parenthetical clause introduces the reason for what follows (i.e. the choice of health and strength as instances) according to the common idiom. The dialectical method here employed consists in finding the things that are 'productive and destructive' of goodness by finding what is productive and destructive of things similar. This is quite without prejudice to the more 'physical' account of the matter later on.

§ 7. **ἀναίσθητός τις.** Here and in some other places (1107 b, 8. 1108 b, 21. 1109 a, 4. 1119 a, 7) Aristotle uses this word, though with some hesitation, in the special sense of 'insensible' to pleasure. In this sense it is contrasted with *ἀνάλγητος*, of which it is more commonly a synonym. Cf. 1114 a, 10 n.

φθείρεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 27. The particle *δή* is here inferential. Tr. 'then.'

§§ 8—9. **ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.** **Ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ** (1105 a, 16). This section is continuous with c. i, §§ 6—8, cf. c. ii, § 1 n. Note that **ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν** is substituted for *διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν* with no difference of meaning, *γίνεσθαι* being treated as the passive of *ποιεῖν*. Bekker has **καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις**, but the article is omitted in K^b and obscures the sense. The **γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις** on the one hand are opposed to the **φθοραί** on the other.

καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, sc. *αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*, i.e. *ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς*.

γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ' αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ 9
τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ
1104 b καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

III. Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος

ὧν γίνεται εὐεξία, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς εὐεξίας πονοῦσιν ἄριστα· ἔτι πᾶσαν διάθεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πῶς προσφερομένων, ὥσπερ ὑγίεια ὑπὸ τροφῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ ὥρας. ταῦτα δὲ δῆλα ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσίς ἐστιν ἢ γίνεταί τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων περὶ ψυχὴν κινήσεων καὶ ἀφ' ἧς πράττεται τὰ ἄριστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργα καὶ πάθη, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν πῶς μὲν γίνεται, πῶς δὲ φθείρεται, καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὰ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑφ' ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται, πρὸς ἃ βέλτιστα διατίθησιν.

1104 b, 4. EE. 1220 a, 34 σημεῖον δ' ὅτι περὶ ἡδέα καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία· αἱ γὰρ κολάσεις ἰατρεῖαι οὖσαι καὶ γινόμεναι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τούτων εἰσίν.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν...ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται, 'will be *in pari materia*.' This way of expressing the ὕλη is Platonic. Cf. Polit. 288 d ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦσιν, Phileb. 59 d τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ....εἴ τις φαίη καθαπερεὶ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῖν ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι παρακεῖσθαι (cf. 1094 b, 12 n.), καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι. "Bricks are made *out of* clay, while a potter works *in* clay" (Bury in loc.). Among the senses of ἐν given in Phys. 210 a, 14 sqq. we find *inter alia* ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. Here the particular meaning of ἐν ᾧ is ἐν ᾧ ἡ κίνησις, which may be space, quantity or quality. Cf. Phys. 227 b, 25 καὶ ἕν τινι τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν πάθει. The ἐνέργειαι here described are (fully-developed) κινήσεις ἐν τῷ ποιῷ (ἀλλοιώσεις) and in particular, κινήσεις ἐν πάθει. For πάθος is the ὕλη alike of the γένεσις and φθορά of goodness and also the ἐν ᾧ of good activities. Note that ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς is replaced in the summary by **περὶ ταῦτα**, and that Eudemos says **πρὸς ταῦτα** ἡ χρῆσις (i. q. ἐνέργεια) αὐτῆς.

III. § 1. **Σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. "Οτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας** (1105 a, 13).

σημεῖον...ποιεῖσθαι. It is in accordance with the practical character of this discussion that the theory of the relation of goodness to feeling should apparently be introduced only to justify a practical rule for diagnosing ἕξεις by their symptoms. For **σημεῖον ποιεῖσθαι,** 'to take as a

τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή· διὰ μὲν γὰρ 10
τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν
2 καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ·
3 ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. ἔτι δ' εἰ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ 15
4 ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμε-

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symptom,' cf. Isokr. Nikokles § 28 τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ μέγιστον σημεῖον ποιούμεθα.

ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε. The reason for this reservation appears from the discussion of Courage below. Cf. esp. 1117 b, 15.

περὶ ἡδονάς. For the preposition cf. περὶ ταῦτα 1105 a, 16.

διὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Eight arguments in favour of the position advanced. The important argument is the fourth (§ 5). The first three lead up to this, while the remaining four are supplementary and illustrative of it.

§ 2. **ἦχθαι.** Cf. 1095 b, 4 and ἀγωγή in 1179 b, 31.

ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν. The article and the present tense show that Plato in his writings is meant. The idea is found already in Rep. 401 e ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων...καὶ χαίρων, but Aristotle is no doubt alluding to Laws, 653 a Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι· φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους, εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τέλεος δ' οὖν ἔστ' ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθά. παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον συμφωνήσωσι τῷ λόγῳ, ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐθῶν· αὐτῆς θ' ἡ συμφωνία σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς, ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις. So Ar. Pol. 1340 a, 15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν (συμβέβηκε) περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν.

§ 3. **ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Supplementary proofs that ἀρετή is περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη. That ἀρετή has to do with πράξεις is clear from the account of it given above (1103 b, 13 sqq.); that ἠθικὴ ἀρετή has to do with πάθη is clear from the fact that it belongs to τὸ ὀρεκτικόν.

ἕπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη. This important doctrine is assumed throughout. Every feeling can be reduced to pleasure or pain, and the difference between feelings is due solely to the differences of the φαντασίαι which give rise to them. The relation of pleasure to πρᾶξις or ἐνέργεια is discussed in the Tenth Book.

§ 4. **μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** In medicine cures are effected by op-

ναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρῴην 5
εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι
χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύ- 20
σιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς

1104 b, 18. EE. 1221 b, 27 εἰλημμένων δὲ τούτων, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον ὅτι ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διῄρηνται, καὶ αἱ μὲν τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος διανοητικαί, ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια, ἢ περὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει ἢ περὶ γενέσεως, αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ' ὄρεξιν (οὐ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν μέρος ἔχει τῆς ψυχῆς ὄρεξιν, εἰ μεριστὴ ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη δὴ φαῦλον τὸ ἦθος καὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις τῶν παθημάτων, τὰ δὲ πάθη λύπῃ καὶ ἡδονῇ διώρισται· ὥστε διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὰς ἔμπροσθεν θέσεις συμβαίνει πᾶσαν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας. πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς ὑφ' οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν

posites (e.g. fever is cured by a cold remedy). If the remedy is pain, then pleasure must be the cause of the disease. The medical παράγγελμα expressed in such phrases as βοηθεῖν τῷ μὲν θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν etc. is often discussed in medical writers. See Mr Stewart's note.

§ 5. **πρῴην.** This is the reading of K^b and is not likely to be an invention. The other MSS. have the more commonplace πρότερον. The reference is to 1104 a, 27 sqq., and the principle there laid down, ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ. This shows that pleasure and pain are the οἰκεῖα πάθη of ἀρετή. Cf. Phys. 246 b, 10 οἰκεῖα δὲ (πάθη) ὑφ' ὧν γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν.

πρὸς ταῦτα. Another variation of the phrase expressing the object to which the activity is relative. Cf. the note on p. 82 and Eudemos there referred to.

τὴν φύσιν ἔχει. A variation of ἐνεργεῖ which is easily explained if we remember that the οἰκεία φύσις or τελείωσις of any ἕξις is its ἐνέργεια. Things are said ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν, εἶναι ἐν τῇ φύσει (opp. ἐξίστασθαι) when they are complete. Translate 'shows its true nature.'

ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, 'by the rule.'

διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται κ.τ.λ. Comm. Anon. ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῶν Στωικῶν ἦν ἡ δόξα αὕτη. The word ἀπάθεια is found once only in what remains to us of Greek philosophy before the Stoics; but we can hardly be wrong in supposing that the reference here is to Speusippos. Cf. Clem. Strom. ii, 21 (Σπεύσιππός φησι) στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας. Eudemos (l. c.) refers the definition to πάντες,

καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ 25
ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται.
6 ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική, ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον.
7 γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ἔτι περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν 30
τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ [τριῶν]
τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ ταῦτα
μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρ-
τητικός, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη
τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· 35
8 καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἔτι 1105 a
δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀπο-

ἡ ἡδονή (l. ἕξις Bonitz). δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαύλους εἶναι φαμέν, τῷ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν ἢ ὡς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ διορίζονται πάντες προχείρως ἀπάθειαν καὶ ἠρεμίαν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς, τὰς δὲ κακίας ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.

and this must mean the Academy (cf. 1144 b, 21). It is noteworthy, then, that ἀπάθεια τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς occurs in [Plato] Def. 413 a.

ὁπλῶς, ἄνευ προσθήκης Hel., 'without addition' or 'qualification.' Cf. ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται below. Cf. also Phys. 246 b, 17 περὶ ταῦτα γὰρ ἑκάστη λέγεται κακία καὶ ἀρετή, ὑφ' ὧν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι πέφυκε τὸ ἔχον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ ἢ ἀπαθὲς ἢ ὡς δεῖ παθητικόν, ἡ δὲ κακία παθητικὸν ἢ ἐναντίως ἀπαθές.

§ 6. **ἡ τοιαύτη,** sc. ἠθική. Mr Stewart follows Hel. in understanding ἡ τοιαύτη as ἡ οὕτως ἔχουσα and taking it closely with περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. In that case I should regard τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική as an adscript.

§ 7. **ἔτι.** K^b has ὅτι which Professor Bywater adopts. But would not ὅτι require περὶ τὰ αὐτά as Mr Stewart suggests? Hel. read ἔτι.

τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις, a prepositional equivalent of τῶν αἱρετῶν. So just below we have **τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν** in the same sense.

καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος. This is an ἔνδοξον. Cf. Top. 105 a, 27 and 118 b, 27 ποσαχῶς τὸ αἱρετὸν λέγεται καὶ τίνων χάριν, οἷον τοῦ συμφέροντος ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος. It is used later in the discussion of φιλία. Often τὸ συμφέρον or χρήσιμον is dropped (e.g. 1110 b, 9). In that case it is regarded merely as a means towards the other two.

κατορθωτικός. A word coined to form an opposite to ἁμαρτητικός. The verb κατορθοῦν means 'to succeed.'

κοινὴ...τοῖς ζῴοις. The point is that pleasure is possible to all creatures, even though they may not understand beauty or use.

§ 8. **συντέθραπται,** i.e. σύντροφός ἐστι, 'has grown up with us.' Hippokrates (p. 306, 24) κίνδυνος δὲ συντραφῆναι καὶ συναυξηθῆναι, ἢν μὴ

τρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἧττον,
5 ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα 9
τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις
εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον 10
ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ
δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή·
10 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ
ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ
τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται,
ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

"Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας, καὶ 11
15 ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ
ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

IV. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν
δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα
σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα,
20 ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ
καὶ τὰ μουσικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ 2
τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι

θεραπευθῶσι τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις, (p. 307, 23) ᾧ δὲ ἀπὸ παιδίου συνηύξηται καὶ συντέτροφεν (of diseases).

ἀποτρίψασθαι ..... ἐγκεχρωσμένον. The metaphor is taken from washing out stains. The figurative use of ἀποτρίψασθαι occurs more than once in Demosthenes, and is worked out at length by Plato, Rep. 429 d sqq.

κανονίζομεν. The verb occurs only here in Aristotle, but the metaphor of the 'rule' occurs several times and is still felt as a metaphor (cf. 1113 a, 33). The word κανών did not become technical till a later date.

§ 10. **καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος.** Fr. 105 (Byw.) Θυμῷ μάχεσθαι χαλεπόν· ὅτι γὰρ ἂν χρηίζῃ γίνεσθαι ψυχῆς ὠνεῖται (Early Greek Philosophy, p. 140). No doubt θυμός was here used in the Ionic sense in which it is equivalent to ἐπιθυμία.

περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον κ.τ.λ. For this test cf. 1109 a, 12 sqq.

§ 11. **ὅτι...λύπας,** 1104 b, 4—1105 a, 13. **καὶ ὅτι... γινομένων** 1103 b, 6—25 and 1104 a, 10—26. **καὶ ὅτι...ἐνεργεῖ** 1104 a, 27—b, 9. The section on the Mean (1104 a, 11—27) is not specially referred to. Cf. 1103 b, 26 n.

IV. § 1. **πῶς λέγομεν.** 1103 a, 31, 34. b, 2. This ἀπορία serves to bring out more fully the character of ἐθισμός. It falls under the general principle that what exists δυνάμει can only be made to exist ἐνεργείᾳ by something already actual. The form

ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν
ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ
γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμ- 25
3 ματικήν. ἔτι οὐδ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν
ἀρετῶν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ
κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δι-
καίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων 30
πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαι-
ρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ
βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς
μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλὴν 1105 b
αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν
ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν
δύναται, εἴπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ
4 σώφρονα περιγίνεται. τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώ- 5
φρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώ-
φρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα
πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώ-

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of goodness existing in the soul of the lawgiver tends to reproduce itself as ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ.

§ 2. **κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικήν,** i.e. by realising the form (εἶδος, λόγος) of γραμματική in his own soul. If he acts ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου he is realising the λόγος or form which exists in that other's soul.

§ 3. **ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν...κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς.** Note the change of the prepositions, which correspond to the distinction between ποιεῖν and πράττειν, ἔργον and πρᾶξις.

εἰδώς. It is essential that he should know what he is doing. The conditions of this knowledge are analysed below 1110 b, 18 sqq.

προαιρούμενος. The act must be willed or intended. Προαίρεσις is analysed below 1111 b, 4 sqq.

δι' αὐτά, i.e. ὅτι καλόν, as we shall see later on. We should not praise an act if it was willed not for itself, but to win our praise.

βεβαίως...ἔχων, if the act is ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως, the outcome of a constant character, not an isolated effort.

τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. The idiomatic use of ἄλλος.

τὸ εἰδέναι. In the sense of theory (γνῶσις) knowledge is not essential to goodness, though of course it is essential if we mean simply knowing what we are doing. This is discussed fully in Book III.

τὰ δ' ἄλλα, sc. προαίρεσις and ἕξις.

εἴπερ. I have adopted Professor Bywater's correction of MS. ἄπερ. The subject of περιγίνεται is τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν (Contr. p. 29).

§ 4. **οὐχ... ἀλλὰ καί.** Cf. 1130 a, 7. For the reading see Bywater (Contr. p. 29).

φρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράτ- 5
10 τειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς 6
15 κάμνουσιν οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

V. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν
20 τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν 2

1105 b, 19. EE. 1220 b, 7 λεκτέον δὴ κατὰ τί τῆς ψυχῆς ποιότης τὰ ἤθη. ἔστι δὲ κατά τε τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πως ἢ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι. μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδῶ

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§ 6. **ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοί κ.τ.λ.** This practical exhortation brings the discussion of how goodness is produced to an appropriate conclusion. There is no Royal Road to goodness. We cannot become good by studying moral philosophy or listening to sermons.

V. § 1. **τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή.** The connexion of thought is left to be inferred as usual, but it is quite plain. We found (1103 b, 22) that δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι, seeing that they are κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις (ib. 31). And that means further that the acts which are to produce goodness must be τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ ἀγαθὸς πράττοι (1105 b, 6). We cannot therefore know what sort of acts make a good ἐθισμός till we have defined this ποιότης of the appetitive soul which we call goodness.

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα, sc. ἐν τῇ ὀρεκτικῇ. The explanation given of πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις would be too narrow without this restriction which is easily supplied from the context. The vague expression τὰ γινόμενα is used because τὰ πάθη in the sense here explained are not ποιότητες, as Eudemos rightly points out. At the same time, the διαίρεσις is certainly derived from that of ποιότης, which is said in Cat. 8 b, 25 sqq. to comprise (1) ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις, (2) ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν, (3) παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, (4) σχῆμα καὶ μορφή.

§ 2. **πάθη.** The word πάθος is very ambiguous. It may be used of almost all συμβεβηκότα, and especially of qualities, so that it is often equivalent to ποιότης. But even in ordinary Greek it had a more restricted application to what we call 'feelings,'

ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις

ἐπιθυμίαν, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη καθ' αὐτά. καὶ κατὰ μὲν ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι ποιότης ἀλλὰ πάσχει, κατὰ δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ποιότης. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς λέγονται κατὰ τὰ

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and this is the sense in which we are using the word here. Now in this sense a πάθος is not a ποιότης, but a κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποιόν or ἀλλοίωσις. We can see the distinction well from Met. 1020 a, 33 sqq., where the two senses of τὸ ποιόν are given as (1) ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας (cf. 1106 a, 14 n.), and (2) τὰ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων. As goodness and badness are said to be πάθη in this sense (b, 19 ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος τι), this is clearly not the meaning of the word here. Nor can the πάθη here mentioned be identified with the παθητικαὶ ποιότητες of the Categories, which are temporary qualitative affections (such as tastes and colours) accompanying a πάθος, but not the πάθος itself. The latter is there described thus. "Οσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίνεται πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενός τις ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι. ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δ' οὔ.

ἐπιθυμίαν, i.e. ὄρεξιν τοῦ ἡδέος (Top. 140 b, 27 etc.) μετὰ λύπης (1119 a, 4). This is one of the three main forms of ὄρεξις.

ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος. Following the Platonic division, these are all ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ (Top. 126 a, 8 sqq.). The dialectical definition of **ὀργή** is ὄρεξις τιμωρίας (Rhet. 1378 a, 31) or ἀντιλυπήσεως (De An. 403 a, 30) arising from a feeling of pain caused by the idea of a slight (μετὰ λύπης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν). Cf. also Top. 127 b, 30. 151 a, 15. 156 a, 32. The popular definition of **φόβος** is προσδοκία κακοῦ (1115 a, 9), but we ought rather to say it is the ὄρεξις of self-preservation accompanying a λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. The opposite of φόβος is **θάρσος,** which therefore involves a feeling of pleasure arising from a φαντασία of the opposite kind.

φθόνον χαράν. The latter seems to be used here in a special sense as the opposite of φθόνος, which is λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ εὐπραγίᾳ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν τινός (Top. 109 b, 36).

φιλίαν μῖσος. As βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ (cf. 1155 b, 29) φιλία is ἐν τῇ βουλήσει (Top. 126 a, 13), and so we should understand the classification of all seven from φθόνος onwards. They are all κινήσεις produced by the φαντασία of something good or bad, and therefore belong to βούλησις. As a πάθος, φιλία is more correctly called φίλησις (1157 b, 28). It is a disinterested feeling of pleasure when good happens to another or pain when ill befalls him (Rhet. 1381 a, 4), and μῖσος the opposite.

πόθος, intense feeling of the pleasantness of the absent and pain of the present.

ζῆλος is the pain a man feels at seeing good things in the possession of another like himself, not because the other has them but because he himself has not (Rhet. 1388 b, 30), while ἔλεος is pain at the φαντασία of evil happening to another like oneself (ib. 1385 b, 13).

οἷς ἕπεται κ.τ.λ., i.e. κινήσεις or ἀλλοιώσεις which are necessarily either μεθ' ἡδονῆς or μετὰ λύπης (see the foregoing notes).

δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυ-
25 νατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις δὲ καθ'
ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργι-
σθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ
μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν 3
οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα
30 κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς
καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα—οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φο-
βούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργι-
1106 a ζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς—κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβού- 4
μεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ
ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη
5 κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας
οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ 5

πάθη οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον ὀργίλος ἀνάλγητος ἐρωτικὸς αἰσχυντηλὸς ἀναίσχυντος. ἕξεις δέ εἰσιν ὅσαι αἰτιαί εἰσι τοῦ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ λόγον ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἐναντίως, οἷον ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη δειλία ἀκολασία.

δυνάμεις. In the present context, these are *φυσικαί*, and therefore *ἄλογοι*, *δυνάμεις*. Cf. Cat. 9 a, 16 *ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγονται.* They are susceptibilities or insusceptibilities to feeling.

ἕξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Note that *ἕξεις* here are not only qualities, but also relations. Cf. Cat. 11 a, 20 *οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν πρός τι εἶναι ἐλέγομεν.* The *γένος* is *ἐν τῷ πρός τι*, for we say *ἐπιστήμη* (or *ἀρετή*) *τινός*, but the particular is not. We do not say *γραμματική* (or *ἀνδρεία*) *τινός*.

σφοδρῶς, sc. *ἔχομεν*, a natural brachylogy for *ἔχομεν ὥστε σφοδρῶς ὀργισθῆναι.*

§ 3. πάθη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Three arguments to show that goodness is not a *πάθος*, (1) feeling is not in itself good or bad, (2) feeling does not imply will, (3) feeling is a motion (or process), while goodness is a state or disposition. All this comes simply to saying that *πάθη* are not *ποιότητες*.

§ 4. προαιρέσεις. The meaning of *προαίρεσις* is explained in Book III. Cf. for the present Met. 1020 b, 23 *μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.*

κινεῖσθαι. Cf. Met. 1022 b, 15 *πάθος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ποιότης καθ' ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται.* In Phys. 226 a, 26 *ἀλλοίωσις* is defined as *qualitative motion* (*κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*).

διακεῖσθαι is synonymous with *ἔχειν* in the Ethics, though in the

δυνάμεις εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι
πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, [οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγό-
μεθα·] ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ
6 οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ 10
οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται
ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστι τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή,
εἴρηται.

VI. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ
2 ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, 15
αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδί-
δωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπου-
δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ
ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε
σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπι- 20

Categories 9 a, 8 *ἕξις* is distinguished from *διάθεσις* as being more permanent. Knowledge and goodness are *ἕξεις*, health and disease are *διαθέσεις*. Both are originally medical terms.

§ 5. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Two arguments to show that goodness is not a *δύναμις*, (1) a capacity is not in itself good or bad, (2) capacities are purely natural.

ἁπλῶς. Before we can give praise, we must make a *πρόσθεσις*, viz. *ὡς δεῖ*. Cf. 1104 b, 25 n.

οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. As Professor Bywater says, these words have no conjunction to connect them with what precedes, and seem to be an otiose repetition of 1105 b, 32.

πρότερον, supra 1103 a, 18 sqq.

§ 6. λείπεται. This assumes that the enumeration is exhaustive which implies (1) that the *ὑποκείμενον* is the appetitive soul, (2) that we are considering it *κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*.

VI. **§ 1. ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις**, i.e. to define Goodness we must give its *differentia* as well as its *genus*. The *διαφορὰ ποιόν τι σημαίνει.*

§ 2. ῥητέον οὖν κ.τ.λ. The argument is that the differentia of goodness will be the same as the differentia of the activities which (1) produce goodness, and (2) result from goodness. Now we have seen above (1104 a, 11 sqq.) that the *ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά* of goodness are activities in a mean, and also (1104 a, 27 sqq.) that activities in a mean are the result of goodness. They are both *πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν* and *ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*. Therefore goodness will be a *ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι*. So far, then, the differentia *ἐν μεσότητι* has been reached in a purely dialectical way. That it was the differentia of good acts was found by *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων* (cf. 1104 a, 12 n.), and that it is the differentia of goodness is shown *ἐπὶ τῶν συστοίχων* (cf. Ind. s.v.).

ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετή. The illustration is from Plato, Rep. 353 b, *ἆρ' ἄν ποτε ὄμματα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον καλῶς ἀπεργάσαιντο μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν αὑτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν* κ.τ.λ.

ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετή. The illustration is suggested by Plato, Rep. 335 b.

βάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων 3
οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ'
ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔρ-
γον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι 4
25 δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν
ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι
λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα
ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον
τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγμα- 5
30 τος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ
ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονά-

1106 a, 26. EE. 1220 b, 21 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, ληπτέον ὅτι ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστιν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οἷον ἐν γυμναστικῇ, ἐν ἰατρικῇ, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ, ἐν κυβερνητικῇ, καὶ ἐν ὁποιᾳοῦν πράξει, καὶ ἐπιστημονικῇ καὶ ἀνεπιστημονικῇ, καὶ τεχνικῇ καὶ ἀτέχνῳ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχές, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τὸ μέσον τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς βέλτιστον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος. πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην ἕξιν· καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ τοῦ λόγου. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθείρει ἄλληλα, τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ μέσῳ ἐναντία. τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἴσον τοῦ μὲν ἐλάττονος μεῖζον, τοῦ μείζονος δὲ

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§ 4. **ἤδη**, supra 1104 a, 10 sqq.

ἡ φύσις. We now show *φυσικῶς* that the differentia of *ἀρετή* is *ἐν μεσότητι*. Cf. Introductory Note. With the change of method, the Platonic reminiscences disappear. Introd. § 7.

συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ, 'continuous and (infinitely) divisible.' The current rendering of *διαιρετόν* by 'discrete' is a mere blunder and makes nonsense of the argument. The word for 'discrete' is *διωρισμένον*. Everything which is continuous is also potentially divisible *ad infinitum*, and the point is that *πάθη καὶ πράξεις* which are the 'matter' of goodness are just such infinitely divisible *continua*; for, regarded as *κινήσεις*, both *πάθη* and *πράξεις* are *συνεχῆ*. We shall best understand the doctrine of the mean by thinking of a scale which is capable of infinite graduation. There is one right degree, and all below it down to zero are *ἐλλείψεις*, all above it up to boiling-point *ὑπερβολαί*.

ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. This distinction entirely removes the objection that Aristotle makes the difference between right and wrong a quantitative one. The bad man feels and acts more or less, as the case may be, than the good man, but this does not imply that the good man's feelings are always 50° centigrade and his conduct middling.

ζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν.
6 οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα
λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ
ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν 35
7 ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ
εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλεί- 1106 b
πτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ
τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ
ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ
8 πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ 5
τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖ-
ται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.
9 εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ
μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώ-
θασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτ' ἀφελεῖν 10
ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλ-
λείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σῳζούσης,
οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες
ἐργάζονται), ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ
ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στο- 15
10 χαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη
καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις
καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπι-

ἔλαττον. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν περὶ μέσ' ἄττα εἶναι καὶ μεσότητά τινα. ληπτέον ἄρα ἡ ποία μεσότης ἀρετή, καὶ περὶ ποῖα μέσα.

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§ 6. **κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν**. Theon of Smyrna p. 85, 10 quotes from Thrasyllos the definition *τὴν ταὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπερέχουσαν καὶ ὑπερεχομένην*. This is not what we call a 'proportion,' but a series in arithmetical progression. Cf. ib. p. 106, 15 *τούτων δέ φησιν ὁ Ἄδραστος μίαν τὴν γεωμετρικὴν κυρίως λέγεσθαι ἀναλογίαν καὶ πρώτην...κοινότερον δέ φησι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας μεσότητας ὑπ' ἐνίων καλεῖσθαι μεσότητας*.

§ 9. **ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις**. Cf. Part. An. 639 b, 19 *μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης*. If we find that the excellence of a work of art consists in this, that you cannot add to it or take anything from it, then *a fortiori* this will be true of goodness as it is of nature.

θυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι
καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα
οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ 11
ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς
ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ 12
καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ
πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ
ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται], τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦ-
ται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν 13
ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρ- 14
τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ
Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ
δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ χα-
λεπόν, ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν
δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ
ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα 15

1106 a, 36. EE. 1227 b, 5 *ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ αὐτή τε μεσότης τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα, ἡ δὲ*

§ 12. **ψέγεται.** Cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 29.

§ 14. **τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου.** Aristotle here makes an ingenious use of a Pythagorean idea which had at first a cosmological rather than an ethical signification. According to the Pythagoreans, the world was built up of geometrical figures, and these arose from the limitation of the unlimited (space). The unlimited once limited was a point, twice limited a line and so forth (Early Greek Philosophy, p. 312). The limit was thus the principle of order. Just in the same way the infinitely divisible continuum of feeling and action requires to be determined according to the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*. There are infinite possibilities of wrong in it, but there is a certain degree in it which is right, and that is the limit, the *μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς*.

ἀποτυχεῖν ... σκοποῦ ... ἐπιτυχεῖν. For the metaphor of the *σκοπός* cf. 1094 a, 22 n. Goodness is *στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου* and we may think of the *μεσότης* as the bull's eye in the target. The possibilities of missing are infinite, there is one right place to hit.

ἐσθλοὶ κ.τ.λ. The authorship of this verse is unknown.

§ 15. **ἕξις προαιρετική.** We have seen that the *genus* of Goodness is *ἕξις* (1105 b, 19), that is, a habitual attitude towards feeling, developed by habituation from a neutral *δύναμις*. We have seen too that we cannot say

τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος 1107 a
ὁρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβο-
16 λὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν
τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν
ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ 5
17 αἱρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ
τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ

κακία ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ ἀρετῇ, τὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν ἠθικὴν ἕξιν προαιρετικὴν μεσότητος τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐν ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς, καθ' ὅσα ποιός τις λέγεται τὸ ἦθος, ἢ χαίρων ἢ λυπούμενος· ὁ γὰρ φιλόγλυκυς ἢ φιλόπικρος οὐ λέγεται ποιός τις τὸ ἦθος.

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a man is good unless he acts *προαιρούμενος*, 'with purpose' and *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων* (1105 a, 31). This gives us *ἕξις προαιρετική*, 'a condition of the will.'

ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. The *differentia* of this *ἕξις προαιρετική* is that it aims at the mean relative to ourselves (1106 a, 14 sqq.). The word *οὖσα* implies that *τὸ εἶναι* of the *ἕξις* is *ἐν μεσότητι*, so Eudemos is quite right (loc. cit.) in saying *προαιρετικὴ μεσότητος*.

ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ. We took as the basis of our discussion that we must act *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* (1103 b, 32). It is now indicated that this is what determines the Mean. The Mean is, in fact, a provisional formula. We cannot yet say what determines the proportion. There is still an unknown quantity in our "Rule of Three" problem. See the beginning of Book VI.

καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. This is added as a hint of the direction in which we are to look for our standard. We know already that *φρόνησις* is a *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή* (1103 a, 6), and now we are told that the Mean is determined 'by what the wise man would determine it by,' a sufficient *ἔνδοξον*. We must, then, be content for the present with our provisional formula, the Mean. We shall learn more when we come to Goodness of Intellect.

§ 16. **καὶ ἔτι** sc. *μεσότης ἐστί*. **τὰς μὲν...τὰς δὲ** sc. *κακίας*.

τοῦ δέοντος. See 1094 a, 24 n.

§ 17. **διὸ κ.τ.λ.** We have seen that Goodness is a Mean in its essential nature (*οὐσία*) and by its definition (*τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα*), but from the point of view of what is best it is an extreme. When we go beyond the Mean, though we are ascending towards the upper extreme of our scale of feeling, we are yet descending in the scale of excellence. The explanation of this is to be found in the fact that goodness is a *τελείωσις*, and that therefore all badness, whether of excess or defect, is opposed to it as *στέρησις* to *εἶδος*.

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This curious phrase means the real nature (*οὐσία*) of a thing as expressed in its definition by *genus* and specific difference. Its origin is easily understood if we take such a phrase as *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ* lit. 'what it was for him to be a man,' 'what his being a man was.' The imperfect is to be explained as a "philosophical" imperfect (Goodwin, Greek Moods and Tenses, § 40), and represents the definition in a

ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις 18
οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται
συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία
ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ
ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται
τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν
οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατ-
ορθοῦν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἢν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν,
ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. 19
ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν
καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλ-
λειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως με-
σότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. 20
ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδ'
ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδ' ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν
πράττηται ἁμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὔθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ
ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
ἔλλειψις.

VII. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ

1107 a, 8. EE. 1221 b, 18 *οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἔνια τῶν λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πῶς λαμβάνειν, ἂν πῶς λαμβάνηται τῷ μᾶλλον πάσχειν. οἷον μοιχὸς οὐ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ πρὸς τὰς γαμετὰς πλησιάζειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ μοχθηρία τις αὐτὴ δὴ ἐστίν. συνειλημμένον γὰρ τό τε πάθος λέγεται καὶ τὸ τοιόνδε εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ὕβρις. διὸ καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦσι, συγγενέσθαι μὲν φάσκοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι—ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἢ ἀναγκαζόμενοι—καὶ πατάξαι μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα.* (Cf. Rhet. 1374 a, 3.)

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living way as the result of a process, not as a dead formula. This is characteristic of Greek philosophy all through, based as it was on discussion and debate.

§ 18. **εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται κ.τ.λ.**, 'have names which at once involve badness.' For **συνειλημμένα** cf. EE. l. c., Met. 1025 b, 32 *τὸ μὲν σιμὸν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης.*

VII. § 1. **Δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The definition must now be tested by its applicability to particulars, i.e. particular forms of goodness. So the

καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς
πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ 30
μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις,
δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν * * * ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς
2 διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης·
τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν <ἐν> τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος 1107 b
(πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων

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a, 32. EE. 1220 b, 36 *εἰλήφθω δὴ παραδείγματος χάριν, καὶ θεωρείσθω ἕκαστον ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς.*

ὀργιλότης	ἀναλγησία	πραότης
θρασύτης	δειλία	ἀνδρεία
ἀναισχυντία	κατάπληξις	αἰδώς

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definition of *εὐδαιμονία* was tested by its applicability to the relevant facts. Cf. 1098 b, 9 sqq. and De Mot. An. 698 a, 11.

κοινότεροι, 'of wider application.' This is the reading of the best MSS. and the Greek commentators (*πλείοσιν ἐφαρμόζουσι* Par.). Cf. e.g. De An. 414 b, 23 *γένοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ' οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος.* The reading of the Vetus Versio and inferior MSS., **κενώτεροι**, is not so appropriate; for, as will be seen from the references in Eucken, Methode pp. 46—47, *κενός* and *κενολογεῖν* (De An. 403 a, 2 *διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς*) refer chiefly, if not solely, to arguments not based on the *οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί* of the science. Here Aristotle is pointing out the respective advantages of both universal and particular.

δέον can hardly be anything else but an accusative absolute: it cannot stand for *δέον ἐστί*. Bonitz would therefore delete *οὖν* in the next clause. There may be a lacuna in the text. Cf. 1145 b, 28.

ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. In EE. 1220 b, 37 it is called a *ὑπογραφή*, though we have *διαγραφή* 1228 a, 28. Cf. *διάγραμμα*. We have references to a *ὑπογραφή* in De Interpr. 22 a, 22: Hist. An. 510 a, 30 and elsewhere. It seems, then, that Aristotle's *ἀκροάσεις* were illustrated by a sort of syllabus. In the case of the Analytics this must have been quite necessary, and there are other parts of the Ethics that are not intelligible unless we assume a *διαγραφή*.

§ 2. **περὶ...φόβους καὶ θάρρη.** Both fear and its opposite are mentioned because they form a single continuum. It is possible for the soul to pass by continuous *ἀλλοίωσις* from the one to the other. We may therefore look at the Mean from two points of view, and there are thus two excesses and two defects. For it does not follow that *ὁ ἐν τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ἐλλείπων* (which is what Aristotle means by *ὁ ἐν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ὑπερβάλλων*) will be the same as *ὁ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων*. They are different *ἕξεις* altogether; for we are not dealing with the mere *ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές*. It may well be, however, that one or other of the *ἕξεις* has no special name, or that the same name is given to both; but this must not blind us to the qualitative distinction between them.

θρασύς, ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσας, 3
ἧττον δὲ καὶ <οὐχ ὁμοίως> περὶ τὰς λύπας—μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δό- 4
σιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, 5
ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐ-

ἀκολασία	ἀναισθησία	σωφροσύνη
φθόνος	ἀνώνυμον	νέμεσις
κέρδος	ζημία	δίκαιον
ἀσωτία	ἀνελευθερία	ἐλευθεριότης
ἀλαζονεία	εἰρωνεία	ἀλήθεια
κολακεία	ἀπέχθεια	φιλία
ἀρέσκεια	αὐθάδεια	σεμνότης
τρυφερότης	κακοπάθεια	καρτερία
χαυνότης	μικροψυχία	μεγαλοψυχία
δαπανηρία	μικροπρέπεια	μεγαλοπρέπεια
πανουργία	εὐήθεια	φρόνησις

τὰ μὲν πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ταῖς ψυχαῖς, πάντα δὲ λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν. ὀργίλος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος καὶ θᾶττον καὶ πλείοσιν ἢ οἷς δεῖ, ἀνάλγητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ οἷς καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς· καὶ θρασὺς μὲν ὁ

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§ 3. **οὐ πάσας.** We shall see which later on.

καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως. I have adopted Mr Bywater's suggestion to insert *οὐχ ὁμοίως* from 1117 b, 26. The *καί* in the common text has no meaning. Here is another determination which shows we are not dealing with mere quantity.

οὐ πάνυ γίνονται, 'cannot be said to be common.' Cf. Ind. s.v. *οὐ πάνυ.*

ἀναίσθητοι. This is not the usual meaning of the word. Cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

§ 4. **περὶ δὲ δόσιν κ.τ.λ.** We pass now from *μεσότητες ἐν πάθεσι* to *μεσότητες ἐν πράξεσι.*

ἐν αὐταῖς. See Byw. Contr. p. 30.

6 τῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν 20
7 ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία·
8 ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, <τῷ> περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ 25
πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ 30
τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν

μήτε ἃ χρὴ φοβούμενος μήθ' ὅτε μήθ' ὡς, δειλὸς δὲ ὁ καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ * * ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκόλαστος * * καὶ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς καὶ ὁ ὑπερβάλλων πᾶσιν ὅσοις ἐνδέχεται, ἀναίσθητος δὲ ὁ ἐλλείπων καὶ μηδ' ὅσον βέλτιον καὶ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἐπιθυμῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπαθὴς ὥσπερ λίθος· κερδαλέος δὲ ὁ πανταχόθεν πλεονεκτικός, ζημιώδης δὲ ὁ μηδαμόθεν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαχόθεν (?)· ἀλαζὼν δὲ ὁ πλείω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος, εἴρων δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ κόλαξ μὲν ὁ πλείω συνεπαινῶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχει, ἀπεχθητικὸς δὲ ὁ ἐλάττω· καὶ τὸ μὲν λίαν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀρέσκεια, τὸ δ' ὀλίγα καὶ μόγις αὐθάδεια· ἔτι δ' ὁ μὲν μηδεμίαν ὑπομένων λύπην, μηδ' εἰ βέλτιον, τρυφερός, ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν ὁμοίως ὡς μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀνώνυμος, μεταφορᾷ δὲ λέγεται σκληρὸς καὶ ταλαίπωρος καὶ κακοπαθητικός· χαῦνος δ' ὁ μειζόνων ἀξιῶν αὑτόν, μικρόψυχος δ' ὁ ἐλαττόνων· ἔτι δ' ἄσωτος ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν δαπάνην

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§ 6. **διαθέσεις**, i. q. *ἕξεις.* Cf. 1106 a, 6 n.

§ 8. **τῷ περὶ μικρά**, sc. *εἶναι*, 'differing in being concerned with small things.' The insertion of *τῷ* is due to Ramsauer.

ἐπιδικάζονται, a legal metaphor. For the *κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδικασίαι* see *Ἀθ. πολ.* c. 43, 4. 56, 6 with Sandys's notes.

1108 a ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ 9
τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν
δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρό-
πον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ 10
5 μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον
πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν
δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀορ-
γησία. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μέν 11
10 τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων·
πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν,
διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς,
αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν
πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα
15 μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ
δ' ἄκρα οὔτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὔτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν

ὑπερβάλλων, ἀνελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἅπασαν ἐλλείπων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ
μικροπρεπὴς καὶ ὁ σαλάκων, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον, ὁ δ'
ἐλλείπει τοῦ πρέποντος· καὶ ὁ μὲν πανοῦργος πάντως καὶ πάντοθεν
πλεονεκτικός, ὁ δ' εὐήθης οὐδ' ὅθεν δεῖ· φθονερὸς δὲ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι
ἐπὶ πλείοσιν εὐπραγίαις ἢ δεῖ (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄξιοι εὖ πράττειν λυποῦσι
τοὺς φθονεροὺς εὖ πράττοντες), ὁ δ' ἐναντίος ἀνωνυμώτερος, ἔστι δ' ὁ
ὑπερβάλλων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν,
ἀλλ' εὐχερὴς ὥσπερ οἱ γαστρίμαργοι πρὸς τροφήν, ὁ δὲ δυσχερὴς κατὰ
τὸν φθόνον ἐστίν.—τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὖ τως
ἔχειν περίεργον διορίζειν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, οὔτε θεωρητικὴ οὔτε
ποιητική, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε πράττει τοῦτο προσδιορίζουσα, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'

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§ 9. **κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον**, 'according to the method we have traced out.' This seems more natural than to take the participle in an active sense. Cf. Pol. 1252 a, 17 *κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον*. Some, however, translate 'the method which has hitherto guided us.' There is no difficulty in taking the perfect participle of a deponent in a passive sense, though this is avoided in other tenses.

§ 11. **ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν κ.τ.λ.** Note the motive assigned. It is most important all through the discussion of the *ἀρεταί* to remember that Aristotle's aim is not mere description, and still less to set up ideal types for our edification. It is to show that the *ἀρεταί* are all *μεσότητες* and therefore imply a *ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων*. This must be shown in small things as in great.

οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ' ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνε-
12 κα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς
ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, 20
ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ
ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ
13 εἴρων. περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος
εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βω-
μολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων 25
ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ
τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσό-
της φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρε-
σκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
14 καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ 30
ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ
αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων.
καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλ-
λων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
15 ἢ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. νέμε- 35
σις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ 1108 b
λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας
γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνα-
ξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ
πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ 5

ἔστι πρὸς τὰς συκοφαντίας τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς λογικάς. ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν
διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἀκριβέστερον δ' ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἕξεων
λέγωμεν τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

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§ 14. **ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι** is exactly equivalent to **περὶ τὰ πάθη**. For *ἐν c. dat.* i. q. *περὶ c. acc.* cf. Ind. s.v. *περί*; and for the declension of *πάθος* in the plural cf. Ind. s.v. These *μεσότητες* differ from e.g. *ἀνδρεία* and *σωφροσύνη* in not being *ἕξεις*, but mere *παθητικαὶ ποιότητες* (cf. 1105 b, 21 n.). It is interesting to note, however, that the principle of *μεσότης* applies here too.

§ 15. **νέμεσις** is the feeling of satisfaction at people getting their deserts. It is not further discussed in EN., but its association with *αἰδώς* is as old as Homer. Here too our principle holds good.

λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρει. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ 16
ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς
λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν
πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· [ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν
ἀρετῶν].

VIII. Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς
μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς
τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ
μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλατ- 2
τον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι
ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς
ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρά-
ξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνε-
ται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων
πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον

1108 b, 11. EE. 1222 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δ' ὑπόκειται ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν βελτίστων καὶ καθ' ἣν ἅριστα διάκεινται περὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, βέλτιστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστον τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέσον ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἕκαστον μεσότητα εἶναι καὶ περὶ μέσ' ἅττα ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἡδέσι καὶ λυπηροῖς. ἔσται δ' ἡ μεσότης ὁτὲ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς (καὶ γὰρ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις), ὁτὲ δ' ἐν λύπαις, ὁτὲ δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέραις. ὁ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλων τῷ χαίρειν τῷ ἡδεῖ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ὁ τῷ λυπεῖσθαι τῷ ἐναντίῳ, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ πρός τινα ὅρον, οἷον ὅταν μὴ ὡς οἱ πολλοί· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς ὡς δεῖ.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστί τις ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς τοιοῦτος ἔσται ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ὥστε τοῦ

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§ 16. **ὁμοίως...ἀρετῶν.** The term λογικαὶ ἀρεταί occurs nowhere else in Aristotle, and the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί are not μεσότητες.

VIII. § 1. **Τριῶν δὴ κ.τ.λ.** The question of the nature of the ἀντίθεσις between the three conditions is of cardinal importance to Aristotle. The extremes are opposite to each other and also to the means. We shall see that Speusippos made much of this and drew unwarrantable conclusions from it. It is necessary to guard against such arguments as that, since intemperance is a vice, insensibility must be a virtue.

διαθέσεων, not distinguishable from ἕξεων. Cf. 1106 a, 6 n.

§ 2. **ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον κ.τ.λ.**, the stock illustration of this form of ἀντίθεσις. Cf. 1153 b, 5.

ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσω-
3 τος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται
τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι
τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ
4 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις
τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ
πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων
ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν
5 τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον
ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς
τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα. τοῖς
δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεῖ-
στον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὁρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ
6 μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον

αὐτοῦ πράγματος οὗ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν οὗ δὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ἀνάγκη, ὡς ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ.

EE. 1234 a, 34 ἔστι δ' ἐναντιώτερον τοῖς ἄκροις τὸ μέσον ἢ ἐκεῖνα ἀλλήλοις, διότι τὸ μὲν μετ' οὐδετέρου γίνεται αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ πολλάκις μετ' ἀλλήλων, καί εἰσιν ἐνίοτε οἱ αὐτοὶ θρασύδειλοι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄσωτοι τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθεροι, καὶ ὅλως ἀνώμαλοι κακῶς. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ὦσιν, οἱ μέσοι γίγνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστί πως τὰ ἄκρα.

EE. 1222 a, 22 συμβαίνει μέντοι τὰς ἀντιθέσεις ἔνθα μὲν φανερωτέρας εἶναι πάσας, ἔνθα δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ὅτι οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ (?) τῆς ἀνισότητος ἢ ὁμοιότητος (?) πρὸς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν θᾶττον ἂν μεταβαίη ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν, ὁτὲ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ἧς <ὂς> πλέον ἀπέχει οὗτος δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτερος εἶναι, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν τοῖς πόνοις ὑγιεινότερον ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἐλλείψεως καὶ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ μέσου, ἐν δὲ τῇ τροφῇ ἡ ἔλλειψις ὑπερβολῆς. ὥστε καὶ αἱ προαιρετικαὶ ἕξεις αἱ φιλογυμναστικαὶ φιλοϋγιεῖς

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§ 5. **ἔτι πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ.** This is another peculiarity which has a great interest for Aristotle, and is worked out in detail with regard to each ἀρετή. It is evident that rashness is 'liker' courage than cowardice is. This again shows we are not dealing with mere quantity.

τὰ δὲ πλεῖστον κ.τ.λ. The full definition of ἐναντία is τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (Cat. 6 a, 18).

1109 a ἀντικειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ- 5 βολὴ οὖσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν 7 μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον 10 δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέ- χοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν 8 οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον ῥέπομέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον 15 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν

μᾶλλον ἔσονται καθ' ἑκατέραν τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἔνθα μὲν αἱ πολυπονώτεραι, ἔνθα δ' αἱ ὑποστατικώτεραι, καὶ ἐναντίος τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ὡς ὁ λόγος ἔνθα μὲν ὁ ἄπονος καὶ οὐκ ἄμφω, ἔνθα δὲ ὁ ἀπολαυστικὸς καὶ οὐχ ὁ πεινητικός. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἅπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου, ἀλλ' ἧττον μὲν φιλόπονοι ἐσμέν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀπολαυστικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς. ἐναντίαν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν ἕξιν ἐφ' ἣν τε ἁμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐφ' ἣν οἱ πολλοί (ἡ δ' ἑτέρα ὥσπερ οὐκ οὖσα λανθάνει· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον ἀναίσθητος ἐστίν), οἷον ὀργὴν πρᾳότητι καὶ τὸν ὀργίλον τῷ πράῳ. καίτοι ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴλεων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καταλλακτικὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ῥαπιζόμενον. ἀλλ' ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο δὲ πάντες ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον.

1109 a, 1. EE. 1234 b, 6 αἱ δὲ ἐναντιώσεις οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς τὸ μέσον ὁμοίως ἀμφότεραι, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· αἴτια δὲ τά τε πρῶτα ῥηθέντα

§ 7. **ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος.** This *αἰτία* is generally given in some such short form as *χεῖρον γάρ*. So 1122 a, 14 (*μεῖζόν ἐστι κακόν*), 1125 a, 34 (*χεῖρόν ἐστιν*), 1126 a, 31 (*οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους*), 1127 b, 32 (*χεῖρων γάρ*).

§ 8. **ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.** This second *αἰτία* is made use of 1122 a, 15 (*μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἁμαρτάνουσιν*), 1125 a, 34 (*καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον*), 1126 a, 30 (*καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γάρ*), 1151 b, 30 (*διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις εἶναι φανεράν*).

ῥέπομεν, Professor Bywater's conjecture for *ἔχομεν* K^b, *πεφύκαμεν* L^b. Contr. p. 30. Cf. EE. above.

πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

IX. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ 20 πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκα- 2 νῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παν- 25 τὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ 3 καλόν. διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν 30 ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
νῆα.

δύο, ὀλιγότης τε, οἷον τῶν πρὸς τὰ ἡδέα ἀναισθήτων, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ο ἁμαρτάνομεν μᾶλλον, τοῦτο ἐναντιώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιότερον ἧττον ἐναντίον φαίνεται, οἷον πέπονθε τὸ θράσος πρὸς τὸ θάρσος (?) καὶ ἀσωτία πρὸς ἐλευθεριότητα.

a, 20. EE. 1222 b, 5 ἐπεὶ δ' εἴληπται ἡ διαλογὴ τῶν ἕξεων καθ' ἕκαστα τὰ πάθη, καὶ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων, καθ' ἃς ἔχουσι κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον (τίς δ' ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πρὸς τίνα δεῖ ὅρον ἀποβλέποντας λέγειν τὸ μέσον, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον), φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσί, καὶ ἡδοναὶ καὶ λῦπαι ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἕξεων καὶ παθημάτων γίνονται, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἥ γε βελτίστη ἕξις ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα μέσῃ ἐστίν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἢ πᾶσαι ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἔσονται τῶν μεσοτήτων.

ἐπίδοσις, 'growth,' tr. 'in the direction of our growth.'

IX. § 1. **Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** After the recapitulation which, as usual, breaks the argument, we have some practical rules for attaining the mean. This is a practical science.

§ 3. **πρῶτον μέν,** Rule I.

ἡ Καλυψώ. The words are really said by Odysseus, Od. xii, 219. Some

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἧττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον, φασί, πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν—ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν—τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοὐναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἧττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον, ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ

1109 b

inferior MSS. have Κίρκη which is more nearly right, as it is Circe's warning which Odysseus is communicating to the steersman. Aristotle, like Plato, quotes Homer from memory and often makes slips like this.

§ 4. **τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως** has almost the effect of an oxymoron. But *τὸ μέσον* is *ἄκρον πως*.

κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 99 d *τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ζήτησιν*,

Menander says—

ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστι δήπου λεγόμενος, ἂν ἀποτύχῃ τις οὐρίου κώπαισι πλεῖν.

σκοπεῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Rule II.

§ 5. **τὰ διεστραμμένα**, from Plato Protag. 325 d *ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσι.*

§ 6. **ἐν παντὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Rule III.

πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην. See Il. iii, 156.

§ 8. **ὁ μὲν μικρὸν...παρεκβαίνων.** The verb *παρεκβαίνειν* is the *vox propria* for any deviation from a *μεσότης* (cf. 1160 a, 31 n.). Aristotle is here stating in a popular form his doctrine that the *μεσότης* is not an indivisible point but has magnitude. Cf. 1155 b, 14 n.

ἐπὶ πόσον, sc. *παρεκβαίνων*, cf. the parallel passage 1126 a, 32 sqq.

γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾷστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

9

ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα...ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει. The first *ἐν* expresses the *matter*, the second that on which the *κρίσις depends*.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. In Aristotle's psychology, *αἴσθησις* is a *δύναμις σύμφυτος κριτική* (An. Post. 99 b, 35). We do not perceive what is *ὁμοίως θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν*, but only the *ὑπερβολή* and *ἔλλειψις*, *ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναντιώσεως* (De An. 424 a, 4). Just in the same way the good man, the man who has been well trained, will at once 'feel' any serious deflexion from the mean, any excess or defect in feelings and actions. He will feel that he is too angry or not angry enough, just as he might feel that his bath is too warm or too cool. No general rules can be given for particular cases (*τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*). We must trust to the trained habit of feeling in a mean. On the Aristotelian theory of the moral 'sense,' cf. 1113 a, 1. 1126 b, 4. 1142 a, 26 sqq. 1143 b, 5. 1147 a, 26. 1149 a, 35.

§ 9. **δηλοῖ** intrans. = *δῆλόν ἐστι*, as often.

BOOK III.

THE WILL.—COURAGE, TEMPERANCE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our deliberative analysis of Happiness has shown us that it mainly depends upon goodness of character, and we have seen that goodness of character is produced by habituation. We had to ask in the next place what quality our acts must have if their repetition is to produce goodness of character, and we found that acts which are to produce goodness must be of the same quality as the acts which proceed from goodness when it is formed. This made it necessary for us to define goodness, that is, to ascertain its "formal cause," and now that this is done, the next step will clearly be to discuss its "efficient cause."

It cannot be said that this connexion of thought is explicitly marked by Aristotle himself, and the commentators have generally failed to see it. But we must always remember that the reasons given by Aristotle for undertaking any inquiry are not necessarily or even usually the real motives of that inquiry. It is characteristic of him (1) to keep the metaphysical groundwork of his practical science in the background as much as possible, and (2) to enumerate all the incidental advantages, especially those of a practical character, that are likely to follow from the discussion. We shall have occasion to notice this peculiarity more than once in the sequel.

§ 2. In the first place, then, it is clear that a good act must be voluntary. An act of which we can truly say "I couldn't help it" is neither a sign of character nor productive of it. We must first of all, then, determine the limits of the voluntary. This was a question much discussed in the Athenian courts, especially in

connexion with charges of homicide. Homicide was primarily a religious offence since it carried with it religious impurity or blood-guiltiness, and therefore every form of it, from the accidental or involuntary up to deliberate murder, came under the cognisance of the courts. The speeches of Antiphon are specially instructive with regard to the moral consciousness of the Athenian dikast on this subject, and it is from this, in accordance with his usual method, that Aristotle starts. For us the chief interest of the discussion lies in his anticipation of some of the most important distinctions of Roman and later law. This goes far to justify his claim to be regarded as a teacher of lawgivers. It would have been well for Athens if law had been administered consistently on principles such as those here laid down.

§ 3. It is clear, however, that to call an act voluntary is merely a negative description of it. The acts of children and the lower animals may be voluntary in the sense that they are not done under compulsion or from ignorance; but they are not acts in the full sense of the word at all, and are therefore no sign of character. To be this an act must be willed, that is it must be "intended" or deliberately adopted as a means to some end which forms the object of a wish. This distinction too was already recognised by the Athenian law of homicide, which distinguished *φόνος ἐκ προνοίας* from ordinary homicide even of the voluntary kind. What we want, then, as the efficient cause of action is something related to acts in general as what lawyers call "malice" is related to wrong-doing. This Aristotle calls by the name *προαίρεσις*, a word which was much used in his own day to express the deliberate adoption of any course of conduct or line of action.

By a piece of dialectical argument we are led to see that Will—for this is after all the best rendering of the word—is neither a purely intellectual nor a purely appetitive function. It is the union of an intellectual element, Deliberation, with an appetitive element, Wish. Further, as we only deliberate about things "in our power," we may say that it is a "deliberative appetition of things in our power."

§ 4. We have come at last in our deliberation to something in our power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*), and so our practical analysis of a good act is complete. The only doubt which can arise as to the question whether an act of will is in our power or not is with regard to

the object of Wish. Is it in our power to wish for the good? Aristotle answers this question in the affirmative, though with an important qualification. It is character that determines the object of wish, and character is produced by activities which are willed and therefore voluntary. We have, therefore, the formation of character in our own hands, though it is true that when the character is once formed we may not be able to change it.

The efficient cause of action, then, is Will. In willing man is an efficient cause just as he is the efficient cause of his children (*ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*). To produce Happiness we have only to reverse the order of the series which our deliberative analysis has revealed; though, as our aim is to produce it for the State, that is, for others, we have not yet fully solved the problem with which we started.

§ 5. Now that we know what goodness of character is, the next step will be to go through all its recognised forms and show that our account holds good of each. If we are right we must be able to show that every kind of goodness has as its matter some feeling or act which admits of quantitative determination, that it has as its form a "mean" or proportion in the sense explained, and that its efficient cause is a deliberative wish or will.

So far as we can trace any principle in Aristotle's treatment of the various forms of goodness, he seems to proceed from the more self-regarding virtues to those which have to do with others. This can be the only reason for separating justice from its usual companions Courage and Temperance. The reason given for taking the two latter first is purely "exoteric." They are, we are told, the forms of goodness proper to the "irrational parts," i.e. Temper and Desire, a purely Academic "division."

We notice at once in the treatment of Courage and Temperance a striking difference between Aristotle and Plato. Plato always tries to extend the scope of these virtues as widely as he can, while Aristotle's chief endeavour is to narrow them down to their most literal meaning. Partly, no doubt, this may be attributed to a difference of temperament between the two thinkers, but it is primarily due to the different objects each was aiming at. Plato was seeking for principles of universal application to life, Aristotle is looking for facts by which to test his theory of goodness, and it was important for that purpose to have facts as definite and unmistakeable as possible.

Γ

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
2 ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις.
3 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα· βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμ-

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1109 b, 30. EE. 1223 a, 9 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἥ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά (ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλ' ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐσμέν· ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστιν ὧν αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. λεπτέον ἄρα ποίων αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσα μὲν ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἑκάστου, ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ' ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἴτιον. πάντα δ' ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἐκὼν δῆλον ὅτι. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἑκουσίων ἂν εἴησαν.*

1110 a, 1. EE. 1224 a, 10 *τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, καὶ τὸ*

I. § 1. **Τῆς ἀρετῆς**, sc. *τῆς ἠθικῆς*.

συγγνώμης...ἐλέου. Cf. Antiphon e.g. *Περὶ τοῦ Ἡρῴδου φόνου* § 92 *τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἔχει συγγνώμην, τὰ δ' ἑκούσια οὐκ ἔχει.*

§ 2. **χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** A characteristic touch. Aristotle never forgets that we are learning to be lawgivers.

§ 3. **βίᾳ...δι' ἄγνοιαν.** Aristotle is followed by all subsequent writers in making compulsion and ignorance the two conditions of an act being regarded as involuntary.

ἡ ἀρχή, sc. *ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις.*

τοιαύτη οὖσα κ.τ.λ. The effect of this restriction to cases where the agent contributes nothing to the mo-

βάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι
ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων 4
5 κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι
αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πρά-
ξαντος μὲν σῴζοιντο μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνῄσκοιεν, ἀμφισ-
βήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἑκούσια. τοιοῦτον δέ 5

ἀκούσιον πᾶν βίαιον εἶναί φαμεν. ὥστε περὶ τοῦ βίᾳ σκεπτέον πρῶτον τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἡ βία καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ τῇ πειθοῖ ἐπὶ τῶν πραττομένων. καθόλου δὲ τὸ βίαιον καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν· καὶ γὰρ τὸν λίθον ἄνω καὶ τὸ πῦρ κάτω βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενα φέρεσθαί φαμεν, ταῦτα δ' ὅταν κατὰ τὴν φύσει καὶ τὴν καθ' αὑτὰ ὁρμὴν φέρηται, οὐ βίᾳ, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἑκούσια λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἀνώνυμος ἡ ἀντίθεσις. ὅταν δὲ παρὰ ταύτην, βίᾳ φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ὁρῶμεν βίᾳ πολλὰ καὶ πάσχοντα καὶ ποιοῦντα, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν ἔξωθέν τι κινῇ. ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἁπλῆ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις πλεονάζει· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ ὄρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ. ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἁπλοῦν τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐναντίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ζῇ)· ἐν δ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἔνεστιν ἄμφω, καὶ ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ, ᾗ καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἀποδίδομεν. οὐ γάρ φαμεν τὸ παιδίον πράττειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἤδη διὰ λογισμὸν πράττοντα. δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ βίαιον ἅπαν λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐθεὶς βίᾳ μὲν ποιεῖ χαίρων δέ. διὸ περὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ πλείστη ἀμφισβήτησις ἐστίν· ἐναντίας γὰρ ὁρμὰς ἔχων αὐτὸς ἕκαστος αὑτῷ πράττει, ὥσθ' ὃ τ' ἐγκρατὴς βίᾳ, φασίν, ἀφέλκει αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐπιθυμιῶν (ἀλγεῖ γὰρ ἀφέλκων πρὸς ἀντιτείνουσαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), ὅ τ' ἀκρατὴς βίᾳ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ἧττον δὲ δοκεῖ λυπεῖσθαι· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ᾗ ἀκολουθεῖ χαίρων, ὥστε ὁ ἀκρατὴς μᾶλλον ἑκὼν καὶ οὐ βίᾳ, ὅτι οὐ λυπηρῶς. ἡ δὲ πειθὼ τῇ βίᾳ καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ἀντιτίθεται. ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐφ' ἃ πέπεισται ἄγει, καὶ πορεύεται οὐ βίᾳ ἀλλ' ἑκών. ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία

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tive cause is to limit compulsion as a condition of the involuntary to actual *vis maior*. Where the agent contributes to the cause, the case is more complicated. The contribution may be of two kinds, either fear of greater evils (*metus*, 'duress *per minas*') or hope of greater goods, as in the case of the man who does a wrong thing to save his parents or children. Are these voluntary agents?

ἢ ὁ πάσχων. This is added as a sort of correction. It is really a *πάθος*, not a *πρᾶξις*.

§ 4. **ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει**, 'admits of dispute.'

τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἁπλῶς
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ 10
6 τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσιν

οὐ πείσασα ἄγει· οὐ γὰρ μετέχει λόγου. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν οὗτοι μόνοι βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες ποιεῖν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ὅτι καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα τοῦ βίᾳ, καθ' ἣν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων λέγομεν, εἴρηται· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴ τις προσθῇ τὸ ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσκείμενον, κἀκεῖ λύεται τὸ λεχθέν. ὅταν μὲν γάρ τι τῶν ἔξωθεν παρὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν κινῇ ἢ ἠρεμίζῃ, βίᾳ φαμέν, ὅταν δὲ μή, οὐ βίᾳ. ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀκρατεῖ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖ ἡ καθ' αὑτὸν ὁρμὴ ἐνοῦσα ἄγει—ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχει—ὥστ' οὐ βίᾳ οὐδέτερος ἀλλ' ἑκὼν διά γε ταῦτα πράττοι ἄν, οὐδ' ἀναγκαζόμενος. τὴν γὰρ ἔξωθεν ἀρχήν, τὴν παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἢ ἐμποδίζουσαν ἢ κινοῦσαν, ἀνάγκην λέγομεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα τύπτοι τινὰ ἀντιτείνοντος καὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ὅταν δ' ἔσωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, οὐ βίᾳ. ἔτι καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἔνεστι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐγκρατευόμενος λυπεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττων ἤδη, καὶ χαίρει τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος ἡδονήν, ὅτι ὕστερον ὠφεληθήσεται, ἢ καὶ ἤδη ὠφελεῖται ὑγιαίνων· καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς χαίρει μὲν τυγχάνων ἀκρατευόμενος οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ, λυπεῖται δὲ τὴν ἀπ' ἐλπίδος λύπην, οἴεται γὰρ κακὸν πράττειν. ὥστε τὸ μὲν βίᾳ ἑκάτερον φάναι ποιεῖν ἔχει λόγον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἑκάτερον ἄκοντά ποτε πράττειν· κεχωρισμένα γὰρ ὄντα ἑκάτερα ἐκκρούεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ὅλην μεταφέρουσι ψυχήν, ὅτι τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τι τοιοῦτον ὁρῶσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μορίων ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο λέγειν· ἡ δ' ὅλη ἑκοῦσα ψυχὴ καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πράττει, βίᾳ δ' οὐδέτερος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τι, ἐπεὶ καὶ φύσει ἀμφότερα ἔχομεν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος φύσει ὑπάρχει, ὅτι ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως καὶ μὴ πηρωθείσης ἐνέσται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, ὅτι εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ἔνεστιν. σχεδὸν δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει διορίζομεν, τῷ τε ὅσα εὐθὺς γιγνομένοις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσι, καὶ ὅσα ἐωμένης τῆς γενέσεως εὐθυπορεῖν γίγνεται ἡμῖν, οἷον πολιὰ καὶ γῆρας καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. ὥστε μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερος πράττει, ἁπλῶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάτερος, οὐ τὴν αὐτήν.

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§ 5. **ἐκβολάς**, *mercium iacturas*. In a contract quoted by Demosthenes against Lakritos § 11, we have the reservation *πλὴν ἐκβολῆς ἣν ἂν οἱ σύμπλοι ψηφισάμενοι κοινῇ ἐκβάλωνται*.

ἁπλῶς is to be taken closely with **ἀποβάλλεται ἑκών**. 'No one, except in special circumstances, voluntarily sacrifices his property.' The word ἁπλῶς merely marks the absence of qualifying circumstances, such as are indicated in the clause **ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ κ.τ.λ.**

§ 6. **μικταί**, because the efficient

αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, ἐοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑκουσίοις· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ὅτε πράττει λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἑκών· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστιν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μή. ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. ἐπὶ 7 ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν, ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἴσχιστ' ὑπομεῖ-

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1110 a, 11. EE. 1225 a, 2 λέγονται δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι, οὐ διαφωνοῦντος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ὀρέξεως, ὅταν πράττωσιν ὃ καὶ λυπηρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ἂν μὴ τοῦτο πράττωσι, πληγαὶ ἢ δεσμοὶ ἢ θάνατοι ὦσιν. ταῦτα γάρ φασιν ἀναγκασθέντες πρᾶξαι. ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἑκόντες ποιοῦσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο; ἔξεστι γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ὑπομεῖναι τὸ πάθος. ἔτι ἴσως τούτων τὰ μὲν φαίη τις ἂν τὰ δ' οὔ. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' αὑτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μὴ ὑπάρξαι ἢ ὑπάρξαι, ἀεὶ ὅσα πράττει ἃ μὴ βούλεται,

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cause lies partly outside the agent (the tyrant's order or the storm) and is partly contributed by the agent (fear and desire).

αἱρεταὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'they are preferable at the time of the action, and the end of the act varies with the occasion.' We cannot call an act which is at a given moment the preferable alternative an involuntary act, simply because, regarded apart from the circumstances (ἁπλῶς), it would not be performed. 'We must use the terms *voluntary* and *involuntary* with reference to the time of the act.'

ὅτε πράττει. This use of the third person in an indefinite sense is specially common after *εἰ*, *ὅτε* etc. Zell quotes 1117 b, 16. 1128 b, 26. 1130 a, 29. 1132 b, 28. 1139 b, 33. 1141 b, 18. 1164 a, 15. 1166 b, 23. 1175 b, 8.

καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. There is no *force majeure* and therefore no compulsion. The agent is free to move his limbs or not. In the 'Parts of Animals' Aristotle distinguishes the 'instrumental parts' of the body from the 'sensory' parts (*αἰσθητήρια*) and the *περιττώματα* (secretions and excretions). Zeller (Eng. Trans. vol. II, p. 39).

ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια, 'though they may be involuntary if we regard them apart from the special circumstances of the case.' They are not *αἱρετά per se* (*καθ' αὑτά*), though they may become so as an alternative to something else.

§ 7. καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται. The fact that praise is sometimes given to such acts shows they must be voluntary.

ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, i.e. if they accept great dishonour for a trifling advantage.

ναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μη- 25
8 δεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντα τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγ-
9 κάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρῖναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου αἱρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι 30 δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ ἐστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρά, ἃ δ' ἀναγκάζονται αἰσχρά, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ τοὺς
10 ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μή. τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἁπλῶς 1110 b

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ἑκὼν πράττει καὶ οὐ βίᾳ· ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἐφ' αὑτῷ τῶν τοιούτων, βίᾳ πώς, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἁπλῶς, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο προαιρεῖται ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ' οὗ ἕνεκα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐστί τις διαφορά. εἰ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ λάβῃ ψηλαφῶν ἀποκτείνοι, γελοῖος ἂν εἴη εἰ λέγοι ὅτι βίᾳ καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ μεῖζον κακὸν καὶ λυπηρότερον εἶναι, ὃ πείσεται μὴ ποιήσας. οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ [μὴ] βίᾳ πράξει, ἢ οὐ φύσει, ὅταν κακὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἕνεκα ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ, καὶ ἄκων γε· οὐ γὰρ ἐφ' αὑτῷ ταῦτα. διὸ καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα πολλοὶ ἀκούσιον τιθέασιν, καὶ θυμοὺς ἐνίους καὶ τὰ φυσικά, ὅτι ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχομεν ὡς πεφυκότα βιάζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειε βίᾳ καὶ ἄκων πράττειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ

ἐπ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. In this case the act is all but involuntary; for the agent's contribution is at a *minimum*. It is only the weakness inseparable from human nature.

§ 8. ἔνια δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. Still, even in this case, the act is not really involuntary; for there is no external compulsion, and the act may be such that the most painful death is preferable and will, therefore, be faced voluntarily.

τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα. The Aldine scholiast quotes the lines—

μάλιστα μέν μ' ἐπῆρ' ἐπισκήψας πατήρ,
ὅθ' ἅρματ' εἰσέβαινεν εἰς Θήβας ἰών.

Alkmeon killed his mother Eriphyle to escape the curse of his father Amphiaraos. The lines quoted below 1136 a, 13 on the same subject probably come from the 'Alkmaion' too. See note in loc.

§ 9. ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ. The fact of the difficulty and of the consequent praise or blame proves the acts voluntary.

§ 10. τὰ δὴ ποῖα κ.τ.λ. This is a recapitulation rather than a duplicate passage.

μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; ἃ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἑκουσίοις· αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἑκούσια. ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἱρετέον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραί εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια 11 εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν βίᾳ καὶ ἄκοντες λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς· γελοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτός, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὑτὸν εὐθήρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτόν, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βί- 12

ἵνα μὴ ἠρέμα, καὶ ὅλως ἵνα μὴ ἀλγῇ ἢ ἵνα [μὴ] χαίρῃ. τὸ γὰρ ἐφ' αὑτῷ, εἰς ὃ ἀνάγεται ὅλον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις οἷα τε φέρειν· ὃ δὲ μὴ οἷα τε, μήδ' ἐστὶ τῆς ἐκείνου φύσει ὀρέξεως ἢ λογισμοῦ, οὐκ ἐφ' αὑτῷ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας καὶ προλέγοντας, καίπερ διανοίας ἔργον ποιοῦντας, ὅμως οὔ φαμεν ἐφ' αὑτοῖς εἶναι, οὔτ' εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον, οὔτε πρᾶξαι ἃ ἔπραξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε καὶ διάνοιαί τινες καὶ πάθη οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ἢ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας διανοίας καὶ λογισμούς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Φιλόλαος ἔφη εἶναί τινας λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν.

νῦν is equivalent to *ὅτε πράττει* above and opposed to *ἁπλῶς*, *ἀντὶ τῶνδε* is opposed to *καθ' αὑτά*.

αἱ γὰρ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This is fundamental. There is no such thing as an act which is not this particular act in these particular circumstances. It is, therefore, a false way of speaking to say that a certain class of acts is involuntary. An act performed is always *this* act. Hence too the difficulty; for there can be no scientific rules about particulars.

§ 11. εἰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ. A caution against an error which language is apt to lead us into. The truth is that it is not *τὰ καλά* or *τὰ ἡδέα* which are the motive or efficient cause of our acts, but our own *ὄρεξις*, which is an internal, not an external, *ἀρχή*.

καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν κ.τ.λ. This distinction in our attitude towards *τὰ καλά* and *τὰ ἡδέα* has not been mentioned above, but the want of logical connexion is merely formal. Aristotle is dealing with real life, and we know that it is only bad acts of which men try to shake off the responsibility in this way. No one ever declines to be responsible for a fine act on the ground that it was so fine he couldn't help doing it.

αιον εἶναι οὗ ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχή, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.

13 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών· 14 ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν ἀλλὰ διά τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται· τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις 15 ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου

1110 b, 18. EE. 1225 a, 36 *ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχει τέλος, καὶ οὔτε τῇ ὀρέξει οὔτε τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ ἑκούσιον ὥρισται, λοιπὸν δὴ ὁρίσασθαι τὸ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. δοκεῖ δὴ ἐναντίον εἶναι τὸ ἑκούσιον τῷ ἀκουσίῳ,*

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§ 13. Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. We now pass to Ignorance, the second condition of the Involuntary, and consider the limits of its application.

ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν κ.τ.λ. If he is not sorry for the act, he makes it his own by his acquiescence in it. Cf. the plea in Antiphon, *Τετρ.* B, *β*, 8 *οὐ συνηδομένων μὲν οὐδὲ συνεθελόντων ἡμῶν, συναλγούντων δὲ καὶ συλλυπουμένων.*

τοῦ δὴ...ὁ μὲν...ὁ δὲ... For the construction cf. 1127 a, 7.

οὐχ ἑκών, 'non-voluntary' as opposed to 'involuntary.' The contradictory is substituted for the contrary.

§ 14. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε κ.τ.λ. To be involuntary the act must be performed not merely *in* ignorance but *from* ignorance.

ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is not the case of the *ἀκρατής* who knows the right and does the wrong, but that of the *ἀκόλαστος* to whom wrong is right.

§ 15. βούλεται λέγεσθαι, 'really means.'

ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια...οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου. Grant and Stewart seem right in refusing to draw a distinction between these two in the present passage. Ignorance shown in the deliberate preference of bad acts to good, and ignorance of the universal rules of conduct, come to the same thing, ignorance of the major premiss of the practical syllogism. Προαίρεσις has nothing to do with the minor premiss as such.

(ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν
1111 a οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ
συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει.
ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς 16
τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ
5 τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς,
οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν 17
ἀγνοήσειε μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα·
πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε; ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον
†λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρ-

καὶ τὸ εἰδότα ἢ ὃν ἢ ᾧ ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἶδε μὲν ὅτι πατήρ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἵνα ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀλλ' ἵνα σώσῃ, ὥσπερ αἱ Πελιάδες, ἤτοι ὡς τοδὶ μὲν πόμα, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλτρον καὶ οἶνον, τὸ δ' ἦν κώνειον) τῷ ἀγνοοῦντα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὃ δι' ἄγνοιαν, μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν, καὶ ὃ καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὅν, ἀκούσιον· τὸ ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἑκούσιον. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ὂν μὴ πράττειν πράττει μὴ ἀγνοῶν καὶ δι' αὐτόν, ἑκούσια ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἑκούσιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν· ὅσα δ' ἀγνοῶν, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ἄκων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διττόν, ἓν μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, ὁ ἔχων μὴ χρώμενος δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δικαίως <ἂν> ἀγνοῶν λέγοιτο, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ δικαίως, οἷον εἰ δι' ἀμέλειαν μὴ ἐχρῆτο. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχων τις ψέγοιτο ἄν, εἰ ὃ ῥᾴδιον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν μὴ ἔχει δι' ἀμέλειαν ἢ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην. ταῦτ' οὖν προσδιοριστέον.

ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, i.e. ignorance of the minor premiss of the practical syllogism.

ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἅ, 'the persons or things which are the objects of the acts.' As we cannot use *πράττω* by itself with an external object accusative, we are forced to use a prepositional equivalent. Thus *ἐν οἷς πράττομεν* means the persons *on* whom we act.

§ 16. **τίς**, 'the agent'; **τί**, 'the act'; **περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι**, 'the object'; **τίνι**, 'the instrument'; **ἕνεκα τίνος**, 'the effect'; **πῶς**, 'the manner.' The phrase **ἕνεκα τίνος** does not mean that the agent may be ignorant of the right end,—that would be *ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια*,—but merely that from ignorance he performs an act which leads to a different result from the one intended. He performs an act *ἕνεκα σωτηρίας* which, but for his ignorance, he would only perform for the sake of destroying its object. Cf. 1135 b, 14.

§ 17. **τὸν πράττοντα**, i.e. *τὶς πράττει*.

λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν. The simplest way of dealing with this *locus vexatissimus* is to delete *αὐτούς*, and to translate 'they say they were put out (or 'flustered') when speaking,' and so did not know what they were

ρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος 10
ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν
υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι
τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ
σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείναι ἄν· καὶ θῖξαι βουλόμενος,
18 ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ 15
ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης, [ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις,] ὁ τούτων τι

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saying. The verb *ἐκπίπτειν* is sufficiently attested in this sense, though not common, and is doubtless a metaphor from the chariot-race (*ἐκπίπτειν ζεύγους, λόγου*). A clear instance is Lucian, Nigrinos § 77 *πολλῇ συγχύσει καὶ ἰλίγγῳ κατειλημμένος, τοῦτο μὲν ἰδρῶτι κατερρεόμην, τοῦτο δὲ φθέγξασθαι βουλόμενος ἐξέπιπτόν τε καὶ ἀνεκοπτόμην, καὶ ἤ τε φωνὴ ἐξέλειπε καὶ ἡ γλῶττα διημάρτανεν.* This is just the condition in which a man *ἀγνοεῖ τί πράττει*. This interpretation, though it has been neglected, is old; for Heliodorus has *λέγοντας γὰρ περὶ ἄλλων συγχυθῆναί φασιν, καί τι καὶ περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων παραφθέγξασθαι*, and Camerarius renders *non esse apud se*. There is no authority for *ἐκπίπτειν c. acc.* in the sense implied by the common version 'they say it escaped them unawares while they were speaking' (reading *λέγοντας* and *αὐτούς*).

ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος. This is the earliest reference to the accusation of Aeschylus for revealing the mysteries. Aspasios tells us that Herakleides of Pontos gave the details in Book I. of his *Περὶ Ὁμήρου*. The indiscretions complained of were in the *Τοξοτίδες*, *Ἱέρειαι*, *Σίσυφος*, *Ἰφιγενεία* and *Οἰδίπους*.

ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος κ.τ.λ. This may refer to some rhetorical exercise on *φόνος ἑκούσιος* in the style of Antiphon's Tetralogies.

οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ. Ignorance of the object (*ἐν τίνι ἡ πρᾶξις*). For *ἄγνοια* of the person as a *πρόφασις* of *συγγνώμη*, cf. Dem. Meid. § 38.

ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη. Cf. Poet. 1454 a, 5 *ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη μέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν· ἀποκτείνει δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισεν.*

ἐσφαιρῶσθαι... κίσηριν εἶναι. Ignorance of the instrument (*τίνι*). Xenophon (Eq. viii, 10) speaks of *ἀκόντια ἐσφαιρωμένα*.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πίσας. We see from a, 5 above that this is the explanation of what is there called ignorance of the *οὗ ἕνεκα*. For the reading here see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. In MM. 1188 b, 31 a similar illustration is given—*οἷόν φασί ποτέ τινα γυναῖκα φίλτρον τινὶ δοῦναι πιεῖν, εἶτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ φίλτρου, τὴν δ' ἄνθρωπον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ ἀποφυγεῖν κ.τ.λ.* There is a case just like this in Antiphon *Κατηγορία φαρμακείας κατὰ τῆς μητρυιᾶς*. Cf. § 9 *οὐκ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ φάσκουσαν διδόναι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ φίλτροις*. See also EE. 1225 b, 4 quoted on p. 118.

θῖξαι βουλόμενος. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 32. The word means 'just to touch' and is appropriate in connexion with 'sparring.' The mistake here is ignorance of the manner (*πῶς*). The man thinks he is touching *ἠρέμα*, whereas he really strikes *σφόδρα*.

§ 18. **ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις.** I bracket these words with Ramsauer. They are awkward here and occur in their proper place two lines below, where the phrase means, as it ought to do,

ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα. τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου 19
20 λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.

Ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' 20
ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκού- 21
25 σια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ 22
οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἑκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν 23

1111 a, 24. EE. 1223 a, 21 ληπτέον ἄρα τί τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀκούσιον, καὶ τί ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία ὁρίζεται τούτοις. πρῶτον σκεπτέον τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον. τριῶν δὴ τούτων ἕν τι δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι, ἤτοι κατ' ὄρεξιν ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ διάνοιαν, τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον κατὰ τούτων τι, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον παρὰ τούτων τι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὄρεξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν· ὥστε ταῦτα διαιρετέον, καὶ πρῶτον κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν.

δόξειε δ' ἂν πᾶν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ ἀκούσιον πᾶν δοκεῖ εἶναι βίαιον, τὸ δὲ βίαιον λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἀναγκαζόμενοι ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνός φησι

πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ,

ὥστ' εἴ τι λυπηρόν, βίαιον, καὶ εἰ βίαιον, λυπηρόν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πᾶν λυπηρόν (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος), ὥστε βίαιον καὶ ἀκούσιον. τὸ ἄρα κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον· ἐναντία γὰρ ταῦτ'

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the object of the act. It is true, indeed, that in § 20 it seems to be used in a wider sense to include all the particular circumstances of the act other than the agent, but this will hardly justify its use in two meanings within the limits of the same sentence.

§ 21. **ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** The reference is to Plato's Laws 863 b, sqq. where the discussion of *τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον* starts from the enumeration of three *αἰτίαι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων*, viz. *θυμός*, *ἡδονή* and *ἄγνοια*.

§ 23. **εἶτα πότερον κ.τ.λ.** There are certain acts proceeding from temper or desire which ought to be performed, and for the performance of which we are praised. It is absurd to say that such acts are involuntary; for there is no sense in saying that it is right to perform an involuntary act. Are we, then, to adopt the convenient doctrine that only the bad acts which proceed from temper and desire are involuntary while the good acts are voluntary? On what principle can we

καὶ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκου-
24 σίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι· δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι 30
ἐπί τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινων, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως.
25 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυ-
26 μίαν ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ

ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικώτερον πᾶσα ποιεῖ, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν οἷος πράττειν, ἀκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατ' αὐτήν, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖν ἑκούσιον, ὥσθ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἀδικήσει τῷ πράττειν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν· ἑκὼν ἄρα πράξει, καὶ ἑκούσιον τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἰ δικαιότεροι ἔσονται ἀκρατεῖς γενόμενοι. ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτων δόξειεν ἂν τὸ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε τοὐναντίον. ἅπαν γὰρ ὃ ἑκὼν τις πράττει, βουλόμενος πράττει, καὶ ὃ βούλεται ἑκὼν βούλεται δ' οὐθεὶς ὃ οἴεται εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος οὐχ ἃ βούλεται ποιεῖ· τὸ γὰρ παρ' ὃ οἴεται βέλτιστον εἶναι πράττειν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκρατεύεσθαί ἐστιν. ὥστε ἅμα συμβήσεται τὸν αὐτὸν ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον. ἔτι δ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μᾶλλον τῆς ἀκρασίας. ἡ γὰρ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ. ἐγκρατεύεται δ' ὅταν πράττῃ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ μὲν δικαιοπραγεῖν ἑκούσιον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (ἄμφω γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῦτα ἑκούσια εἶναι, καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ θάτερον ἑκούσιον, καὶ θάτερον), τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀκούσιον, ἅμα ἄρα ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ αὐτὸ πράξει ἑκὼν καὶ ἄκων.

ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ θυμοῦ. ἀκρασία γὰρ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καὶ θυμοῦ δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸν θυμὸν λυπηρόν, καὶ βίαιον ἡ κάθεξις, ὥστ' εἰ τὸ βίαιον ἀκούσιον, τὸ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη πᾶν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ βλέψας ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἡ κώλυσις αὐτοῦ· "χαλεπὸν γάρ," φησι, "θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖται." εἰ δ' ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸν ἑκόντα καὶ ἄκοντα πράττειν ἅμα τὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦ πράγματος,

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justify this when we have admitted that both proceed from the same source?

§ 26. **ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.** If, on the other hand, we say that all wrong acts proceeding from temper and desire are involuntary, and that the only voluntary misdeeds are those which proceed from the rational part of us, we seem to be making an unwarrantable abstraction. 'Irrational' acts are, to say the least of it, as much incidents of human nature as the 'rational,' and it is absurd, therefore, for a human being to say he is not answerable for them.

λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω,
1111 b δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα [πάθη], ὥστε 27
καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.
ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

II. Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου,
5 περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι
δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. ἡ 2
προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ'

μᾶλλον ἑκούσιον τὸ κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν. τεκμήριον δέ· πολλὰ γὰρ πράττομεν ἑκόντες ἄνευ ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίας.

λείπεται ἄρα εἰ τὸ βουλόμενον καὶ ἑκούσιον ταὐτὸ σκέψασθαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ μοχθηρία ἀδικωτέρους ποιεῖν, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία μοχθηρία τις φαίνεται· συμβήσεται δὲ τοὐναντίον, βούλεται μὲν γὰρ οὐθεὶς ἃ οἴεται εἶναι κακά, πράττει δ' ὅταν γίνηται ἀκρατής. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἑκούσιον, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅταν ἀκρατὴς γένηται, οὐκέτι ἀδικήσει, ἀλλ' ἔστι δικαιότερος ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι ἀκρατής· τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον.

1111 b, 4. EE. 1225 b, 18 περὶ δὲ προαιρέσεως μετὰ τοῦτο λέγωμεν, διαπορήσαντες πρῶτον τῷ λόγῳ περὶ αὐτῆς.

EE. 1228 a, 11 ἔτι πάντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ψέγομεν εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλέποντες μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς τὰ ἔργα—καίτοι αἱρετώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς ἀρετῆς—ὅτι πράττουσι μὲν φαῦλα καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, προαιρεῖται δ' οὐδείς. ἔτι διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ἰδεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις, διὰ ταῦτα ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἀναγκαζόμεθα κρίνειν ποιός τις. αἱρετώτερον μὲν οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐπαινετώτερον δ' ἡ προαίρεσις. ἔκ τε τῶν κειμένων οὖν συμβαίνει ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι ὁμολογεῖται τοῖς φαινομένοις.

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§ 27. **ἀνθρωπικός** is used, like the Latin *humanus*, with special reference to the weaknesses of mere human nature.

τὰ ἄλογα, i.e. *τὰ μὴ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἁμαρτηθέντα*. The word *πάθη* is omitted by the first hand of the best MS. (K^b), and is better away. If we retain it, we must assume that *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* are called *ἄλογα πάθη* in a loose popular way. Really, they are forms of *ὄρεξις*.

II. § 1. **περὶ προαιρέσεως.** See Introductory note.

μᾶλλον...κρίνειν, 'to be a better test of character.' This has been shown above, 1105 a, 26 sqq.

§ 2. **οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ.** This distinction becomes of great importance later on in the discussion of moral weakness (*ἀκρασία*). A man may perform a wrong act voluntarily and therefore be fully answerable for it, and yet it may not show that his character is depraved. The acts of children and the lower animals are of this sort, and

ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ
τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης
3 ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὔ. οἱ δὲ λέγοντες 10
αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἤ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰοί-
κασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν
4 ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυ-
μῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς δ' ἀνά- 15
5 παλιν προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ. καὶ προαιρέσει
μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ. καὶ ἡ
μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυ-
6 πηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ

EE. 1225 b, 19 διστάσειε γὰρ ἄν τις ἐν τῷ γένει πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ποίῳ θεῖναι αὐτὴν χρή, καὶ πότερον οὐ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ προαιρετὸν ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. μάλιστα δὲ λέγεται παρά τινων, καὶ ζητοῦντι δόξειε δ' ἂν δυοῖν εἶναι θάτερον ἡ προαίρεσις, ἤτοι δόξα ἢ ὄρεξις· ἀμφότερα γὰρ φαίνεται παρακολουθοῦντα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄρεξις φανερόν. ἢ γὰρ βούλησις ἂν εἴη ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἢ θυμός· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀρέγεται μηθὲν πεπονθὼς τούτων. θυμὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις ὑπάρχει, προαίρεσις δ' οὔ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἷς ὑπάρχει ἄμφω ταῦτα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας προαιροῦνται· καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες οὐ προαιροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καρτεροῦσιν. ἔτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμὸς ἀεὶ μετὰ λύπης, προαιρούμεθα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης.

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so are acts done when we are taken unawares. Full moral, as distinct from legal, responsibility—to use a modern distinction—only arises when we adopt the act as our own as a means to the realisation of some end.

§ 3. **οἱ δὲ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ.** We do not know who gave these inadequate definitions or whether there is any reference to particular people at all. The passage is dialectical, and could be expanded into a Platonic dialogue on the model of the first part of the Theaitetos with its successive definitions of knowledge.

οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν κ.τ.λ. The argument is directed first of all to showing that *προαίρεσις* cannot be identified with any form of appetition. In the first place, it cannot be the same as Temper or Desire; for they are found also in irrational creatures, while *προαίρεσις* is not. Observe that this argument does not apply to Wish, the third form of appetition; for it, like *προαίρεσις*, is only found in rational creatures.

§§ 4—5. The next three arguments are specially devoted to showing that *προαίρεσις* is not identical with Desire. For (1) in the case of the morally weak man and of the morally strong man we find a conflict between *προαίρεσις* and Desire. This is fully worked out in Book VII. (2) Desire never comes into conflict with Desire, but *προαίρεσις* does. This does not mean,

θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς 7
γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη
ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ <καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον
ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς 8
δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν·
προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι
ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, 9
ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα,
προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα
μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως
γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. οὐδὲ δὴ 10

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταὐτόν. βούλονται μὲν γὰρ ἔνια [ταὐτὸν] καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαιρεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' ὅλως ἃ δυνατὸν μέν, μὴ ἐφ' αὑτῷ δ' οἴεται πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν φανερόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφ' αὑτῷ τι εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐδ' ἁπλῶς εἴ τις οἴεταί τι. τῶν γὰρ ἐφ' αὑτῷ τι ἦν τὸ προαιρετόν, δοξάζομεν δὲ πολλὰ καὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οἷον τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον. ἔτι οὐκ ἔστι προαίρεσις ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡ τῶν ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὄντων πρακτῶν δόξα, ᾗ τυγχάνομεν οἰόμενοι δεῖν τι πράττειν ἢ οὐ πράττειν. κοινὸν

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of course, that there can be no conflict of desires, but merely that there cannot be conflicting desires with regard to the same object. We cannot desire both to be asleep and to be awake; but we may desire to be asleep and intend to keep awake.

§ 6. **θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον.** If it cannot be identified with Desire, *a fortiori* it cannot be identified with Temper. Everyone can see that acts proceeding from Temper are *ἀπροαίρετα* in the highest degree.

§ 7. **ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ.** We have seen that Wish, the third form of appetition, is, like *προαίρεσις*, confined to rational beings; but we cannot identify *προαίρεσις* even with Wish. For (1) we may wish for what we know to be impossible, but we cannot will it. (2) We may wish for what, though possible, is not in our own power, but we cannot will it. (3) We wish for the end, but we will the means.

<καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων. The **καὶ** comes from Aspasios and is confirmed by EE. above. See Bywater, Contr. p. 32.

§ 10. **οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ.** We see, then, that *προαίρεσις* cannot be identified with any form of appetition, and that it is distinguished even from Wish by being confined to what is in our own power (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*). We have now to consider the possibility of its being

δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι,
καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ'
ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ
καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν
11 δόξῃ ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τινι· τῷ γὰρ 1112 a
προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ
12 δοξάζειν οὔ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν [ἤ] τι
τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς·
13 λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προ- 5
αίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ
δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα
14 ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν· δοκοῦσι
δὲ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ'
ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ 10
15 δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ,

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δὲ περὶ δόξης τοῦτο καὶ βουλήσεως· οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐδὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· λέγω δ' οἷον οὐθεὶς ὑγιαίνειν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ περιπατεῖν ἢ καθῆσθαι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἕνεκεν, οὐδ' εὐδαιμονεῖν, ἀλλὰ χρηματίζεσθαι ἢ κινδυνεύειν τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἕνεκα· καὶ ὅλως δηλοῖ ἀεὶ προαιρούμενος τί τε καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν τίνος, οὗ ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρεῖται ἕνεκα ἄλλου. βούλεται δέ γε μάλιστα τὸ τέλος, καὶ δοξάζει δεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν. ὥστε φανερὸν διὰ τούτων ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ δόξης καὶ βουλήσεως. βούλεσθαι μὲν <γὰρ> καὶ δόξα μάλιστα τοῦ τέλους, προαίρεσις δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

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identified with the intellectual state known as Belief. In the first place, it cannot be identified with Belief in general; for that has to do with every kind of object, and not merely with things in our own power. Belief is true or false, while *προαίρεσις* is good or bad.

§ 11. **ἀλλ' οὐδέ τινι.** Nor can it be identified with any species of Belief, that is, not even with belief as to things in our own power as right or wrong. For (1) Belief does not determine character. (2) To believe that a thing is good for us is not the same as to will it. (3) We praise a belief for its truth, an act of will for its rightness. (4) We only will what we are fairly sure is good for us, we believe without knowing very well. (5) We find that some persons have excellent beliefs, but that their *προαίρεσις* is bad.

§ 12. **τι των τοιούτων** sc. *ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν*. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 32.

§ 15. **εἰ δὲ προγίνεται κ.τ.λ.** This we shall find to be the case. The

οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταὐτόν
ἐστι δόξῃ τινί. τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων 16
οὐθέν; ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προ-
αιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προ- 17
αίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ
τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.

III. Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βου- 2
λευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως
βουλευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ μαινό-
μενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδεὶς 3
βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, 4
ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ

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dialectical argument, by showing that *προαίρεσις* cannot be identified either with appetition or thought in any form, prepares us for the view that it is the union of both.

§ 16. **τί...ἢ ποῖόν τι**; what is its genus and differentia?

ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. This gives the genus, the *τί ἐστιν*. **τὸ προβεβουλευμένον.** This word seems still to be chosen under the influence of Attic legal terminology. Antiphon, *κατὰ τῆς μητρυιᾶς* § 5, uses *προβουλή* as a synonym of *πρόνοια*. Cf. also the use of the verb below 1135 b, 10—20.

§ 17. **μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας,** 'is accompanied by a reason (ground) and thought,' i.e. is based upon consciousness of a ground.

ὡς ὄν, sc. *τὸ προαιρετόν*. The fact that the object of *προαίρεσις* is a choice between two alternatives proves that it implies a *λόγος*; for it is only *λόγος* that can express at once a thing and its opposite. Cf. Met. quoted on p. 75.

III. § 1. **Βουλεύονται δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We have seen that *προαίρεσις* contains an intellectual element, namely Deliberation. We have first to examine this, and to determine its scope.

§ 3. **περὶ...τῶν ἀιδίων.** The examples given show that the objects of First Philosophy (or Theology) and Mathematics are meant. Both of these are eternal and immovable, though the objects of the first are separate from matter (*χωριστά*), while those of the second are 'in matter,' though separated in thought. Met. 1026 a, 13 sqq. Zeller (Eng. trans.) I, 33.

περὶ τοῦ κόσμου. The *κόσμος* here means the spherical *πρῶτος οὐρανός*.

τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς. The incommensurability of the side of a square with its diagonal was the companion difficulty to the incommensurability of the diameter of a circle with its circumference, which makes it impossible to square the circle.

§ 4. **περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει.** These will be the objects of *ἀστρολογική* or *φυσική* according as they happen *ἐξ ἀνάγκης* or *φύσει*. The 'solstices and risings (of the constellations)' are an example of the first, the growth of an animal would be an example of the second.

φύσει ἢ διά τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατο- 25
5 λῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμ-
βρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως.
6 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἁπάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύ-
θαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται.
7 οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. βουλευόμεθα δὲ 30
περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐπίλοιπα.
αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι
δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι

1112 a, 18. EE. 1226 a, 17 *ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε βούλησις οὔτε δόξα οὔθ' ὑπόληψις ἁπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσις, δῆλον· τί δὲ διαφέρει τούτων, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἑκούσιον; ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται καὶ τί ἐστι προαίρεσις. ἔστι δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνατὰ μέν ἐστι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ἡ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας γίνεται, περὶ ὧν οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐγχειρήσειε βουλεύεσθαι μὴ ἀγνοῶν· περὶ ὧν δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ μόνον τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ * * βουλεύσασθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι πρᾶξαι ἢ μὴ πρᾶξαι. διὸ οὐ βουλευόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς, οὐδὲ πῶς ἂν ὁ κύκλος τετραγωνισθείη. τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· τὸ δ'*

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§ 5. **περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.** This must be equivalent to *ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*. Rains and droughts are not regulated by an internal motive or efficient cause like organic growth. We have the phrase in Part. An. 641 b, 19 *τὸ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν*, where it is opposed to *τεταγμένον*.

περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης. When *τύχη* is distinguished from *τὸ αὐτόματον*, it is what happens by chance in the province of human thought or purpose. It is, in fact, related as an *αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκός* to Thought just as *τὸ αὐτόματον* is related to Nature. The finding of the treasure might have been due to design if the man had any reason to believe that there was a treasure buried in his vineyard. See Bonitz on Met. 1065 a, 30.

§ 6. **ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ.** The successive elimination of Nature, Necessity and Chance from the sphere of Deliberation would leave us with the remaining cause, Man. But even here there is a limitation.

Σκύθαι. Eudemos substitutes 'Indians.' We may perhaps see in this a trace of the extension of the Macedonian Empire.

§ 7. **ἐπίλοιπα.** For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 33.

αἰτίαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For this popular and traditional analysis of causation see Newman's 'Politics,' Introd. pp. 16—20.

ἕκαστοι, 'each class of men.'

βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὑτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς 8
1112 b ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον
περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ'
ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' ἀεί, περὶ τούτων βου-
λευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατ' ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικήν,
5 καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικήν, ὅσῳ ἧττον
διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ 9
καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ
αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 10
πολύ, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς <τὸ πῶς δεῖ>
10 ἀδιόριστον. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, 11
ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. βου-

ἄλως οὐ πρακτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν περὶ ἁπάντων (ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα ἁπλῶς ἡ προαίρεσίς ἐστιν)· τὰ δὲ προαιρετὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τί δή ποθ' οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ βουλεύονται περὶ ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, οἱ δὲ γραμματικοὶ οὔ; αἴτιον δ' ὅτι διχῇ γινομένης τῆς ἁμαρτίας (ἢ γὰρ λογιζόμενοι ἁμαρτάνομεν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτὸ δρῶντες) ἐν μὲν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται ἁμαρτεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῇ γραμματικῇ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ πρᾶξιν, περὶ ἧς ἂν σκοπῶσιν, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξουσιν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησίς [ἐστι] προαίρεσίς ἐστιν ὡς ἑκάτερον, οὐδ' ἄμφω (ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαιρεῖται μὲν οὐθείς, δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται)· ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἄρα. ἄμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρουμένῳ ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ πῶς ἐκ τούτων σκεπτέον; δηλοῖ δέ πως καὶ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτό. ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἵρεσις μέν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δέ, ἀλλ' ἑτέρου πρὸ ἑτέρου· τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄνευ σκέψεως καὶ βουλῆς. διὸ ἐκ δόξης βουλευτικῆς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις.

1112 b, 11. EE. 1226 b, 10 περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ τέλους οὐδεὶς

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§ 8. **ἀκριβεῖς.** Cf. Introd. § 26.

οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων, 'for instance about spelling.' This is explained more fully by Eudemos (loc. cit.). The doctor may go wrong (1) in the treatment he adopts, an error of διάνοια, (2) in applying it to the particular case, an error of αἴσθησις. The latter kind of error alone is possible in the case of spelling; for it is not an open question how a particular word is to be spelt.

§ 10. **τὸ πῶς δεῖ.** I have followed Rassow in inserting these words. It is true, as Bywater says (Contr. p. 33), that we can interpret the text as it stands, by supplying πῶς ἀποβήσεται in thought. But the fact that MM. (1189 b, 24) has τὸ ὡς δεῖ seems to decide in favour of Rassow's proposal.

λευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.
οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει,
οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς
περὶ τοῦ τέλους, ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων 15
ἔσται σκοποῦσι· καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι
διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπι-
τελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν
ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν
12 ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν 20
εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα—φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν
ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαί, ἡ
δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις—καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀνα-
13 λύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐν-

βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κεῖται πᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων, πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένου τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται. βουλευόμεθα δὲ τοῦτο πάντες ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν. εἰ δὴ προαιρεῖται μὲν μηθεὶς μὴ παρασκευασάμενος μηδὲ βουλευσάμενος εἰ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον, βουλεύεται δὲ ὅσα ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ προαίρεσις μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' αὑτῷ βουλευτική. ἅπαντες γὰρ βουλευόμεθα ἃ καὶ προαιρούμεθα, οὐ μέντοι γε ἃ βουλευόμεθα, πάντα προαιρούμεθα. λέγω δὲ βουλευτικήν, ἧς ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία βούλευσίς ἐστι, καὶ ὀρέγεται διὰ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι. διὸ οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἐστὶν ἡ προαίρεσις, οὔτε ἐν πάσῃ ἡλικίᾳ, οὔτε πάντως ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύσασθαι, οὐδ' ὑπόληψις τοῦ διὰ τί. ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν εἰ ποιητέον ἢ μὴ ποιητέον οὐθὲν κωλύει πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ λογισμοῦ οὐκέτι. ἔστι γὰρ βουλευτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θεωρητικὸν αἰτίας τινός. ἡ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα μία τῶν αἰτιῶν ἐστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τί αἰτία, οὗ δ' ἕνεκά ἐστιν ἢ γίγνεταί τι, τοῦτ' αἴτιόν φαμεν εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ βαδίζειν ἡ κομιδὴ τῶν χρημάτων, εἰ τούτου ἕνεκα βαδίζει. διὸ οἷς μηθεὶς κεῖται σκοπός, οὐ βουλευτικοί. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ

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§ 11. **οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν.** This is fundamental. Cf. Introd. § 22.

θέμενοι, or more usually ὑποθέμενοι, is a term of geometry. We assume the Q. E. F. of the problem and then seek for the construction.

πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων. These two phrases are equivalent. Below we have πῶς alone (b, 18) and πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος (b, 30).

§ 12. **ὥσπερ διάγραμμα.** See Introd. § 22.

25 τύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ
οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνηται, ἐγχειροῦσι
πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ
τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πώς ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζη- 14
τεῖται δ' ὁτὲ μὲν τὰ ὄργανα ὁτὲ δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως
30 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὁτὲ μὲν δι' οὗ ὁτὲ δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ
τίνος. ἔοικε δή, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ 15
τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὑτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ
δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ 16
τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη· οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα

μὲν ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὂν ἢ πράττειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν, ἐάν τις πράττῃ ἢ ἀπρακτῇ
δι' αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἑκὼν πράττει ἢ ἀπρακτεῖ, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν
τοιούτων πράττομεν οὐ βουλευσάμενοι οὐδὲ προνοήσαντες, ἀνάγκη τὸ
μὲν προαιρετὸν ἅπαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον μὴ προαιρετόν, καὶ
τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν πάντα ἑκούσια εἶναι, τὰ δ' ἀκούσια μὴ
πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. ἅμα δ' ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι καλῶς
διορίζονται οἳ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ
προνοίας νομοθετοῦσιν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριβοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἅπτονταί γέ
πῃ τῆς ἀληθείας. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐροῦμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν
δικαίων ἐπισκέψει· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὅτι οὔτε ἁπλῶς βούλησις οὔτε
δόξα ἐστί, δῆλον, ἀλλὰ δόξα τε καὶ ὄρεξις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι
συμπεράνθῶσιν.

1112 b, 34. EE. 1227 a, 6 ἐπεὶ δὲ βουλεύεται ἀεὶ ὁ βουλευόμενος ἕνεκά τινος, καὶ ἔστι σκοπός τις ἀεὶ τῷ βουλευομένῳ πρὸς ὃν σκοπεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις (εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ βραχέως, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς δι' ἀκριβείας), περὶ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερόντων ἡ σκέψις καὶ μετὰ τέχνης καὶ ἄνευ τέχνης πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ πολεμῶσιν ἢ μὴ πολεμῶσιν τοῦτο βουλευομένοις. ἐκ προτέρου δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τὸ δι' ὅ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον πλοῦτος ἢ ἡδονὴ ἤ τι ἄλλο

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§ 14. **δι' οὗ** i.e. *τὸ ὄργανον*. **πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος**, i.e. *ἡ χρεία*. See b, 15 n.

§ 16. **οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ.** Deliberation, like Demonstration, has its limits. Cf. Introd. § 22. We cannot demonstrate first principles nor yet particulars. In the same way we cannot deliberate about ends nor yet about particular acts. The latter are a matter for *αἴσθησις*. In neither case is there an infinite progress or regress.

οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθήσεως γὰρ 1113 a
17 ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἥξει. βουλευ-
τὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφωρισμένον ἤδη τὸ
προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν προαιρετόν
ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει ὅταν εἰς 5
αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον·
18 τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν

τοιοῦτον ὃ τυγχάνει οὗ ἕνεκα. βουλεύεται γὰρ ὁ βουλευόμενος, εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἔσκεπται, <ἢ> ὅτι ἐκεῖ συντείνει ὅπως εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγάγῃ, ἢ αὐτὸς δύναται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

τὸ δὲ τέλος ἐστὶ φύσει μὲν ἀεὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ κατὰ μέρος βουλεύονται, οἷον ἰατρὸς βουλεύσαιτο ἂν εἰ δῷ φάρμακον, καὶ στρατηγὸς ποῦ στρατοπεδεύσηται, οἷς ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς ἄριστόν ἐστιν· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν οὐ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπ' ἄλλῳ χρήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν, οἷον ὄψει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' ἰδεῖν οὗ μή ἐστιν ὄψις, οὐδ' ἀκοῦσαι οὗ μή ἐστιν ἀκοή· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης ποιῆσαι καὶ οὗ μή ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νόσου, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις φύσει μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστι, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, καὶ βούλεται φύσει μὲν τὸ ἀγαθόν, παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ διαστροφὴν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

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§ 17. **ἀφωρισμένον**, 'determined,' i.e. it is no longer in the form of a problem. For the expression cf. 1142 b, 11.

κριθέν. Cf. a, 12 *κρίναντες*, Bywater, Contr. p. 83.

ὅταν ... ἀναγάγῃ, 'when he has reduced the efficient cause to himself,' when he has traced back the series of causes to something internal to himself.

τὸ ἡγούμενον, 'the commanding part.' This shows that *προαίρεσις* is really what we call the will, though the idea is, generally speaking, foreign to Aristotle's thought in this form. In the Stoic philosophy *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν* plays a very important part. There is no need, however, to suspect that this is a later interpolation; for Aristotle is using popular language, and *ἡγεῖσθαι* was already familiar from Plato in a similar metaphorical sense. In like manner Aristotle calls it *τὸ κύριον* in Met. 1048 a, 10 (p. 77). Translated into Aristotelian language, this literary phrase means that *προαίρεσις* is the *ἀρχὴ πράξεως*, the *ἀρχὴ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*. Cf. De An. 406 b, 24 *φαίνεται κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον ... διὰ προαιρέσεώς τινος καὶ νοήσεως*.

§ 18. **τοῦτο**, sc. that *τὸ προαιρούμενον* is *τὸ ἡγούμενον*, and that *προαίρεσις* is subsequent to *βούλευσις* and the cause of *πρᾶξις*. The union of the imperative with the deliberative power arises from the fusion of thought and appetition in this 'part of the soul.'

ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασι-
λεῖς ἃ προέλοιντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ 19
προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις
ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι
γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν 20
προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἐστι καὶ ὅτι τῶν
πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

IV. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἴρηται,
δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν τἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου
ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλητὸν τἀγαθὸν λέγουσι 2
μὴ εἶναι βουλητὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἱρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ
ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν),
τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν βουλητὸν λέγουσι μὴ 3
εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ'
ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τἀναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ 4
ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλή-
θειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;
τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ
τὸ τυχόν—ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ δια-

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§ 19. βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις. The definition of *προαίρεσις* as a 'deliberative appetition of things in our power' is really the fundamental doctrine of the Ethics.

κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν, 'in the direction of (on the lines of) the deliberation.' Appetition follows all the steps of deliberation, but in the reverse order. Cf. the phrases *κατ' εὐθεῖαν, κατ' εὐθυωρίαν.*

IV. **§ 1. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις κ.τ.λ.** We now come to the appetitive element in *προαίρεσις*, which has problems of its own.

εἴρηται. Cf. 1111 b, 26.

§ 2. τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is the Academic view derived from Plato's Gorgias 466 e sqq. where *ποιεῖν ἃ βούλονται* is distinguished from *ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ.*

ἦν. For this idiomatic use of the imperfect, cf. 1115 a, 2. 1117 a, 16. 1147 b, 11.

§ 4. τῷ...σπουδαίῳ, exactly equivalent to *τῷ ἀγαθῷ* or *τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ.* Cf. 1099 a, 23. So *τῷ φαύλῳ=τῷ κακῷ.*

τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, sc. *ἀγαθόν,* **εἶναι,** sc. *βουλητόν.*

ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων κ.τ.λ. The argument in favour of relativity drawn from morbid conditions is Cyrenaic. Cf. Sext. Math. 192 (RP § 210) *καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς* (suffering from vertigo) *καὶ ἰκτεριῶν* (jaundiced) *ὠχραντικώς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμιῶν ἐρυθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ μεμηνὼς δισσὰς ὁρᾷ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσὸν φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον* (from Eur. Bacch. v. 918 sqq.) *κ.τ.λ.* From our present point of view it is a sufficient answer to this to say that health is the normal condition.

κειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς
δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ
θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα—τὸν σπουδαῖον γὰρ
ἕκαστα κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνε- 30
5 ται. καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ
διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις
ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. τοῖς πολλοῖς
δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα
6 ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ 1113 b
λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

V. Ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ

1113 a, 31. EE. 1227 a, 31 *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἑκάστου γε φθορὰ καὶ διαστροφὴ οὐκ εἰς τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ μεταξύ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τούτων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη οὐκ εἰς τὰ τυχόντα γίνεται, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ὅσοις ἐστὶν ἐναντία, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἃ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐναντία ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ τὴν ἀπάτην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία γίνεσθαι* (ἐναντία δὲ τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον). *αἴτιον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὥστε τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἥδιον ἄμεινον, καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κακὸν καὶ τὸ λυπηρότερον χεῖρον. ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὰ προαιρετὰ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, τοιαῦτα δὲ φύσει ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη.*

τὸν σπουδαῖον...κρίνειν. This is the reading of K^b and seems to be more original than the *ὁ σπουδαῖος... κρίνει* of L^b. I have therefore adopted it, marking the preceding sentence as parenthetical.

§ 5. καθ' ἑκάστην...ἕξιν. It is well to remember here that *ἕξις* and *διάθεσις* are medical terms. Cf. *τοῖς εὖ διακειμένοις* above.

κανών. The *κανών* is the builder's rule, the Latin *norma*. The metaphorical use of the word seems to occur first in Euripides. Cf. Hek. 602. El. 52.

μέτρον. This is a clear reference to the dictum of Protagoras.

§ 6. αἱροῦνται...ὡς ἀγαθόν. All men, the good included, *desire* pleasure; the mistake made by ordinary people is that they *wish* it, i.e. it appears to them in the light of good. Cf. Mot. An. 700 b, 28 *δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθοῦ χώραν ἔχειν, καὶ τὸ ἡδύ· φαινόμενον γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθόν.*

V. **§ 1. Ὄντος δὴ κ.τ.λ.** We know that our deliberative analysis of Happiness will be complete when we reach something which is *ἐφ'*

καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις
κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι. αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν
ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως 2
δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ
τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστ' εἰ τὸ
πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν
ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν,
καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ 3
καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράτ-
τειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα
τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν 4
πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψεύδει τὸ δ' ἀλη-
θεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκού-

1113 b, 13. EE. 1223 a, 4 *ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' αὑτῷ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ' ἐφ' αὑτῷ ἐστι ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἴτιος τούτων αὐτός ἐστιν· καὶ ὅσων αἴτιος, ἐφ' αὑτῷ.*

ἡμῖν. It is therefore important to show clearly that good acts are *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. They are so because they have *προαίρεσις* as their efficient cause, and all *προαίρεσις* is *ἑκούσιον*.

περὶ ταῦτα, sc. *περὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος*. This is the middle term of the syllogism. All acts concerned with the means to an end are *προαιρετά* and therefore *ἑκούσια*, the activities of goodness are concerned with the means to an end, therefore the activities of goodness are voluntary.

§ 2. **ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ.** The conclusion of the deliberative analysis of Happiness. We have at last come to something *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. If the activities which produce goodness are voluntary, then goodness is in our power.

ἐν οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is because our capacities are *μετὰ λόγου*, and every *λόγος* implies both 'yes' and 'no.' Cf. above 1103 a, 20 sqq.

§ 3. **ἦν**, 'is, as we saw.' For this idiomatic imperfect cf. 1117 a, 16. 1129 b, 11. 1134 b, 14.

ἐπιεικέσι...φαύλοις. This passage shows clearly that the various Attic equivalents for *ἀγαθός* and *κακός* are used without any distinction of meaning.

§ 4. **οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κ.τ.λ.** The Aldine scholiast quotes a fragment from the *Ἡρακλῆς ὁ παρὰ Φόλῳ* of Epicharmos, in which occurs the line *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄταν ἔχων*. Whoever wrote the verse as we have it no doubt meant only 'wretched' by *πονηρός*, as Muretus and Camerarius already saw. Victorius substituted *μάκαρ* for *μακάριος* to make an iambic line on the authority of [Plato] *περὶ δικαίου* 374 a. Cf. Tim. 86 d *κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδείς*.

σιον. ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων
ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν 6
εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ
αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσια. τούτοις 7
δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν
τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶν-
τας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ
αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν
προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ'
ἡμῖν ἐστι μήθ' ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν
πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ

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b, 17. Cf. EE. 1222 b, 15 *εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἑκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷον ὂν ὅλως ζῷα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅ γ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεών τινών ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζώων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἴποιμεν ἂν πράττειν. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν ὅσαι τοιαῦται, ὅθεν πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις, κύριαι λέγονται, μάλιστα δὲ δικαίως ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, ἢν ἴσως ὁ θεὸς ἄρχει. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀρχαῖς, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κύριον, καίτοι λέγεταί γε καθ' ὁμοιότητα· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κινουμένης τῆς ἀρχῆς πάντα μάλιστ' ἂν τὰ δεικνύμενα μεταβάλλοι, αὐτὰ δ' αὐτὰ οὐ μεταβάλλει ἀναιρουμένου θατέρου ὑπὸ θατέρου, ἂν μὴ τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ δι' ἐκείνης δεῖξαι. ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς τινος· ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις κίνησις. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ ἀρχὴ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῶν δι' αὐτὴν ὄντων ἢ γινομένων, δεῖ νοῆσαι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων. εἰ γὰρ ἔχοντος τοῦ τριγώνου δύο ὀρθὰς ἀνάγκη τὸ τετράγωνον ἔχειν τέτταρας ὀρθάς, φανερὸν ὡς αἴτιον τούτου τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν τὸ τρίγωνον. εἰ δέ γε μεταβάλλει τὸ τρίγωνον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τετράγωνον μεταβάλλειν,*

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§ 5. **ἀρχὴν...τῶν πράξεων**, sc. *ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις*.

ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων, i.e. as *ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*. Cf. above, p. 110.

§ 6. **εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.** We have 'reduced' the efficient cause to something internal to ourselves, namely *προαίρεσις*. Not only so, but there is no other *ἀρχή* to which we could refer it; for neither Necessity, Nature nor Chance could produce human actions. Now that of which the *ἀρχή* is *ἐν ἡμῖν* will itself be *ἐφ' ἡμῖν*.

§ 7. **τούτοις δ' ἔοικε κ.τ.λ.** The usual appeal to the practice of *νομοθέται*. Cf. above 1102 a, 7 n.

πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον πεισό-
30 μεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν 8
αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ
ἐπιτίμια. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυ-
σθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι
τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι,
1114ª κολάζουσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα δι' ἀμέ- 9
λειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὂν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν·
τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. ἀλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε 10
μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι
5 ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν
κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες·
αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ 11
δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν·
διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ 12
10 ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου.

οἷον εἰ τρεῖς, ἕξ, εἰ δὲ τέτταρες, ὀκτώ. κἂν εἰ μὴ μεταβάλλοι, τοιοῦτον δ' ἐστί, κἀκεῖνο τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. δῆλον δ' ὃ ἐπιχειροῦμεν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν· νῦν δ' οὔτε μὴ λέγειν οὔτε λέγειν ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τε, πλὴν τοσοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν ἄλλο αἴτιον τοῦ τὸ τρίγωνον οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀρχή τις ἂν εἴη τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ὕστερον. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἕνια τῶν ὄντων ἐνδεχόμενα ἐναντίως ἔχειν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τοιαύτας. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβαῖνόν ἐστι, τὰ δέ γε ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τἀναντία, καὶ ὃ ἐφ' αὑτοῖς ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν τοιούτων εἰσὶν αὐτοί.

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§ 8. **διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια.** A law of Pittakos. Cf. Pol. 1274 b, 19 *νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἂν τι πταίσωσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων.* Rhet. 1402 b, 10 *εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσι, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.*

§ 10. **τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν,** sc. *οἷαι αἱ ἐνέργειαι.* Cf. above 1103 b, 21 *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται.* The words *περὶ ἕκαστα* are explained 1103 b, 6 sqq.

§ 12. **ἀναισθήτου.** The word is here used in its common meaning of 'dull,' 'stupid,' cf. 1104 a, 24 n., in which sense it is almost a synonym of *ἀνάλγητος* (1100 b, 32 n.). It is a very strong term, and is applied to the Thebans in Dem. de Cor. § 240.

13 ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ
τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράτ-
14 τει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε
βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής, καίτοι εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς 15
βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ
μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ'
αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ [βαλεῖν
καὶ] ῥῖψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ
καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, 20
διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι. οὐ
μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ
αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ
φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς 25
γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης
16 ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κα-
κιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ
δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν 30
17 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ

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§ 13. **ἔτι δ' ἄλογον κ.τ.λ.** It is unjustifiable (*οὐκ ἔχει λόγον*) for a man who acts dishonestly to say he does not wish to be dishonest. He is making himself so to the best of his power, and that voluntarily. The reference is to the paradox of Sokrates, cf. MM. 1187 a, 8 *εἰ γάρ τις, φησὶν (ὁ Σωκράτης), ἐρωτήσειεν ὁντιναοῦν πότερον ἂν βούλοιτο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἄδικος, οὐθεὶς ἂν ἕλοιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν.* Cf. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 4; iv, 6, 6 sqq.

§ 14. **καίτοι.** Rassow's emendation of MS. *καί.* See Bywater, Contr. p. 34.

προεμένῳ, sc. *τὴν ὑγίειαν.*

τὸ [βαλεῖν καὶ] ῥῖψαι. See Bywater, Contr. p. 34. I prefer to bracket the more common *βαλεῖν* rather than the more striking *ῥῖψαι.* No one would require a note on *βαλεῖν.* **ἀρχή,** sc. *ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις.*

§ 15. **οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ.** We have once more two common *τόποι*: (1) the analogy of bodily states, (2) praise and blame as a *τεκμήριον* of *τὸ ἑκούσιον.* Cf. Plato, Protag. 323 c sqq.

§ 17. **εἰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ.** The argument is as follows. "If any one were to say that we are not responsible for our *φαντασία*, we answer (1) that if a man is responsible in a sense for his *ἕξις*, he is responsible in the same sense for his *φαντασία*, (2) that if a man is not responsible for his *ἕξις*, he is not responsible for any of his bad acts at all. It is all a mere question of natural endowment."

φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός
1114 b ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ
μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς
φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ
αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα
5 πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ
δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγα-
θὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν·
τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν
10 τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ
τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ
ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ 18
ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἑκούσιον ἔσται; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ
ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαί-
15 νεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες
πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ 19
φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε
τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως
τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ
20 κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει
τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ 20

τῆς φαντασίας. In this passage ἡ φαντασία is simply equivalent to τὸ φαίνεσθαι. Bonitz rightly paraphrases the clause by οὐκ εἰσὶ κύριοι τοῦ φαίνεσθαί τι ἀγαθόν.

εὐφυής. In fact we should in that case have to go back to the doctrine that goodness comes to us φύσει. Of course Aristotle admits the importance of εὐφυΐα both in practical and theoretical matters. Cf. Top. 163 b, 15 τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εὐφυΐα, τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἐλέσθαι τἀληθὲς καὶ φυγεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος. But he will not allow that we have no responsibility for the formation of ἕξεις.

εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. If it is all a matter of εὐφυΐα, and we are not responsible for our character, then goodness is as involuntary as badness. Plato cannot mean this.

§ 19. εἴτε δὴ κ.τ.λ. We may try to maintain that goodness is voluntary by holding either (1) that the φαντασία of the end is not given to a man by nature, but is partly due to himself (**παρ' αὐτόν**), or (2) that the end is given by nature, but the means are voluntary. But both these views will make badness voluntary to the same extent as goodness.

τὸ δι' αὐτόν. Mr Bywater's proposal to read τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ is attractive.

§ 20. εἰ οὖν κ.τ.λ. The argument may be summed up thus. (1) Our πράξεις are in our power and we have

οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν
ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι
τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν·
ὁμοίως γάρ. 25

21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε
γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ <καὶ> καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ὅτι
ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἑκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος
22 προστάξῃ. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ 30
ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους
κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς
ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ 1115 a
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω
χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.

23 Ἀναλαβόντες δὲ περὶ ἑκάστης εἴπωμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ
περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσίν. 5
καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. VI. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ

1114 b, 26. EE. 1228 a, 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότητές εἰσί τε ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς, καὶ αὗται προαιρετικαί, καὶ αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν αὗται, καθόλου εἴρηται· καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ λαμβάνοντες λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς, καὶ πρῶτον εἴπωμεν περὶ ἀνδρείας.

1115 a, 4. EE. 1228 a, 26 σχεδὸν δὴ δοκεῖ πᾶσιν ὅ τ' ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι περὶ φόβους καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία μία τῶν ἀρετῶν. διείλομεν δ' ἐν τῇ διαγραφῇ πρότερον καὶ θράσος καὶ φόβον ἐναντία· καὶ γάρ ἐστί πως ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις ταύτας λεγόμενοι ὁμοίως ἀντικείσονται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς

full responsibility for them. (2) Our ἕξεις proceed from our πράξεις and are so far in our power. We have partial responsibility for them, that is we are responsible at the start (ἐν ἀρχῇ). (3) Our φαντασία of the τέλος depends on our ἕξις, so we are just as responsible for that.

§ 21. Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The summary as usual destroys the connexion. The words οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ (b, 30) should be taken closely with what precedes.

<καὶ> καθ' αὑτάς, not κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The καί comes from Aspasios and the Vetus Versio.

ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, 'the right rule' 1103 b, 32 n.

§ 23. περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς, sc. μεσότητές εἰσιν. Aristotle discusses all the ἀρεταί under these two heads.

VI. **§ 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** This chapter deals with the question περὶ ποῖα μεσότης ἡ ἀνδρεία.

περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα 2
δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν
κακά, διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.
φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν 3
νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀν-
δρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ
δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπι-
εικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέ-
γεται δ' ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ
τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

(οὗτος γὰρ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ θαρρεῖν ἧττον ἢ δεῖ) καὶ ὁ θρασύς· καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἧττον ἢ δεῖ, θαρρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ παρωνυμάζεται· ὁ γὰρ θρασὺς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, δεῖ δὲ μήθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ θρασεῖς (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι) μήθ' οὕτως ὡς οἱ δειλοί (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ταὐτὸ ποιοῦσι, πλὴν οὐ περὶ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· τῷ μὲν γὰρ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπουσι, τῷ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλουσι), δῆλον ὡς ἡ μέση διάθεσις θρασύτητος καὶ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· αὕτη γὰρ βελτίστη.

1115 a, 10. EE. 1229 a, 32 περὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν νῦν μὲν ἁπλῶς εἰρήκαμεν, βέλτιον δὲ διορίσασθαι μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερὰ λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβου. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς· τοῖς γὰρ ἄλλην τινὰ προσδεχομένοις λύπην ἑτέρα μὲν ἄν τις ἴσως λύπη γένοιτο καὶ πάθος ἕτερον, φόβος δ'

ἤδη, 1107 a, 33.

§ 2. **προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.** Plato, Protag. 358 d προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Laches 198 b ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ.

§ 3. **οὐ περὶ πάντα κ.τ.λ.** In EE. 1229 a, 34 sqq. this restriction is made clearer by the amended definition of τὰ φοβερά as ὅσα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς, i.e. those λῦπαι ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. But this is not an 'Eudemian development' for we read in Rhet. 1382 a, 21 ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται ἄδικος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅσα λύπας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δυνάται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν.

οἷον ἀδοξίαν. Cf. the Platonic definition of αἰδὼς as φόβος ἀδοξίας below 1128 b, 11 and see note there.

κατὰ μεταφοράν i.q. καθ' ὁμοιότητα. This alludes to Plato, see § 7 n.

πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα 4
μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα
ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα·
ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευ- 20
θέριοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχου-
σιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖ- 5
ται ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ
μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν 6
ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος 25
τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ
οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι.
δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος 7

οὐκ ἔσται, οἷον εἴ τις προορῷτο ὅτι λυπήσεται λύπην ἣν οἱ φθονοῦντες λυποῦνται, ἢ τοιαύτην οἵαν οἱ ζηλοῦντες ἢ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι. ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιαύταις φαινομέναις ἔσεσθαι λύπαις φόβος γίνεται ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν. διὸ καὶ σφόδρα τινὲς ὄντες μαλακοὶ περὶ ἔνια ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔνιοι σκληροὶ καὶ καρτερικοὶ [καὶ] δειλοί. καὶ δὴ καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἴδιον τῆς ἀνδρείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν περὶ τούτου λύπην ἔχειν πώς. εἰ γάρ τις εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος πρὸς ἀλέας καὶ ψύχη καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας λύπας ὑπομενετικὸς ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀκινδύνους οὔσας, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ μαλακὸς καὶ περίφοβος, μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι πάθος ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὴν τὴν φθοράν, ἄλλος δὲ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνας μαλακός, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἀπαθής, ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξειε δειλός, οὗτος δ' ἀνδρεῖος. καὶ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλησίον ᾖ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, περὶ ὅσα φαμὲν εἶναι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἴρηται δὴ ὅτι τὰ φαινόμενα ποιητικὰ λύπης τῆς φθαρτικῆς· ταῦτα μέντοι πλησίον τε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω, καὶ τοσαῦτα τῷ μεγέθει ὄντα ἢ φαινόμενα ὥστ' εἶναι σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. ἔνια γὰρ ἀνάγκη παντὶ φαίνεσθαι ἀνθρώπῳ φοβερὰ καὶ διαταράττειν. οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, ὥσπερ θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων ἐνίας ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος ἕξεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν παθημάτων.

§ 5. **φθόνον.** We might be tempted to think that φόνον is the true reading. It goes well with ὕβρις ('ὕβρις or murder of children and wife'), and the corruption is common. This is a case, however, where the text is guaranteed by Eudemos. See above.

εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν 8
30 τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ
καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ 9
τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως 10
δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής,
καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μά-
35 λιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ 11
1115 b καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάτ-
τιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνα-
τον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ
τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ἀλκὴ 12
5 ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέ-
τερον ὑπάρχει.

VII. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι
καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε

1115 b, 7. EE. 1228 b, 4 δοκεῖ δ' ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἄφοβος εἶναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς φοβητικός, καὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ταχύ, ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ἠρέμα καὶ μόλις καὶ ὀλιγάκις καὶ μεγάλα, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένει τὰ φοβερὰ σφόδρα, ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ τὰ ἠρέμα. ποῖα οὖν ὑπομένει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; πρῶτον πότερον τὰ ἑαυτῷ φοβερὰ ἢ τὰ ἑτέρῳ; εἰ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἑτέρῳ φοβερά, οὐθὲν σεμνὸν φαίη ἄν τις εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τὰ αὑτῷ,

§ 7. ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. This is directed against the doctrine of Plato in Laches 191 d—e that Courage is not displayed only in war. Sokrates asks for *τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους κ.τ.λ.* Plato was deepening the significance of *ἀνδρεία*, Aristotle has to do only with *τὰ δοκοῦντα*, the moral consciousness of the average Hellene, and he proves his point as usual by referring to the practice of free states and monarchs.

§ 10. ὑπόγυια. Tr. 'close at hand.' Cf. EE. 1229 b, 15 *πλησίον γε φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ πόρρω*. MM. 1191 a, 33 *εἰ γάρ τις τὸν εἰς δέκατον ἔτος κίνδυνον μὴ φοβεῖται, οὔπω ἀνδρεῖος. ἔνιοι γὰρ θαρροῦσι διὰ τὸ μακρὰν ἀπέχειν, ἂν δὲ πλησίον γένωνται, ἀποθνήσκουσι τῷ δέει.* Cf. also Rhet. 1382 a, 21 sqq. quoted above *ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται.*

§ 11. οἱ μέν, *οἱ μὴ θαλάττιοι.* There is surely a touch of humour in this contrast between the cheerful sailors and the brave Hellene who has given up all hope, and laments that drowning is a nasty death, not fit for a gentleman and soldier.

§ 12. ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ἀλκή, 'where there is a possibility of a brave defence.'

VII. **§ 1. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν κ.τ.λ.** The *μεσότης* described and contrasted with the *ὑπερβολή* and *ἔλλειψις*.

νοῦν ἔχοντι· τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ
2 μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀν- 10
δρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δέ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ
3 ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἧττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα
4 φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι <ὃ> οὐ δεῖ, ἡ 15
δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως

εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ φοβερά. <φοβερὰ δὲ τὰ> φόβου ποιητικὰ ἑκάστῳ ᾧ φοβερά, οἷον εἰ μὲν σφόδρα φοβερά, εἴη ἂν ἰσχυρὸς ὁ φόβος, εἰ δ' ἠρέμα, ἀσθενής. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον μεγάλους φόβους καὶ πολλοὺς ποιεῖσθαι. ἐδόκει δὲ τοὐναντίον ἡ ἀνδρεία ἄφοβον παρασκευάζειν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἢ μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἠρέμα καὶ μόλις. ἀλλ' ἴσως τὸ φοβερὸν λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, διχῶς. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δὲ τινὶ μὲν καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον φαῦλα καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ὅσα τοῖς πονηροῖς ὠφέλιμα καὶ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς παιδίοις ἢ παιδία. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστι, τὰ δὲ τινί. ἃ μὲν δὴ δειλὸς φοβεῖται ἢ δειλός, τὰ μὲν οὐδενί ἐστι φοβερά, τὰ δ' ἠρέμα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις φοβερά, καὶ ὅσα τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, ταῦθ' ἁπλῶς φοβερὰ λέγομεν. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς ταῦτ' ἔχει ἀφόβως, καὶ ὑπομένει τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερά, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ὡς φοβερὰ αὐτῷ, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ᾗ μὲν ἄνθρωπος, φοβερά, ᾗ δ' ἀνδρεῖος, οὐ φοβερὰ ἀλλ' ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ οὐδαμῶς. ἔστι μέντοι φοβερὰ ταῦτα· τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις φοβερά. διὸ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται ἡ ἕξις· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὑγιεινὸς ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι οὐ τῷ ὑπὸ μηθενὸς ὁ μὲν πόνου τρίβεσθαι, ὁ δ' ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ὑπερβολῆς, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἠρέμα, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλὴν θᾶττόν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, * * καὶ ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ πάσχουσιν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπαθεῖς ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἠρέμα.

ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ οὐθέν ἐστι φοβερόν, οὐδ' ἂν φοβηθείη. ἢ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον; ἡ γὰρ ἀνδρεία ἀκολούθησις τῷ

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§ 2. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, sc. *τὰ κατ' ἄνθρωπον.*

ὡς ὁ λόγος (sc. *λέγει, κελεύει, προστάττει*), not 'reason,' but the 'rule' which guides him. Cf. 1114 b, 29. 1115 b, 19. 1117 a, 8. 1119 a, 20. 1125 b, 35. 1138 b, 20, 29.

ὑπομενεῖ, sc. *ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.*

δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα 5
ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος· κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος,
πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας 6
ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.
τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει.

λόγῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ καλὸν αἱρεῖσθαι κελεύει. διὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ὑπομένων αὐτά, οὗτος ἤτοι ἐξέστηκεν ἢ θρασύς· ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ καλὸν ἄφοβος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος. ὁ μὲν οὖν δειλὸς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ φοβεῖται, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς καὶ ἃ μὴ δεῖ θαρρεῖ· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἄμφω ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ταύτῃ μέσος ἐστίν. ἃ γὰρ ἂν ὁ λόγος κελεύῃ, ταῦτα καὶ θαρρεῖ καὶ φοβεῖται. ὁ δὲ λόγος τὰ μεγάλα λυπηρὰ καὶ φθαρτικὰ οὐ κελεύει ὑπομένειν, ἂν μὴ καλὰ ᾖ. ὁ μὲν οὖν θρασύς, καὶ εἰ μὴ κελεύει, ταῦτα θαρρεῖ, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς οὐδ' ἂν κελεύῃ· ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος μόνος, ἐὰν κελεύῃ.

1115 b, 17. EE. 1230 a, 21 καὶ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία αὕτη. ἡ δ' ἀληθὴς οὔτε αὕτη οὔτ' ἐκείνων οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ ὁμοία μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τῶν θηρίων, ἃ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὁμόσε τῇ πληγῇ φέρεται. οὔτε γὰρ ὅτι ἀδοξήσει, δεῖ μένειν φοβουμένους, οὔτε δι' ὀργήν, οὔτε διὰ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ἢ διὰ τὸ δυνάμεις ἔχειν φυλακτικάς· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰήσεται οὕτω γε φοβερὸν εἶναι οὐθέν. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ

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§ 5. **κατ' ἀξίαν.** Not very different from *κατὰ τὸ δέον*.

§ 6. **τέλος δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The text here is not quite certain, but the argument is plain. The rule says that an act to be really brave must be done from the right motive (*οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ*). It is to be shown that this means *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*. This is proved as follows. The end of every activity which proceeds from a *ἕξις* must be the end which corresponds to the *ἕξις* from which it proceeds. To the brave man, that is the man who embodies the *ἕξις* (*τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*), bravery appears as *τὸ καλόν*, and therefore *τὸ καλόν* is its end. From this it follows that every act, if it is to be called brave, must have *τὸ καλόν* as its end, that is, it must be performed *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*.

τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. We might paraphrase this by saying that the end of every activity is conformity to a certain type of character or, in more Aristotelian language, the reproduction of a form (*εἶδος, λόγος τῆς οὐσίας*). So the Paraphrast says the end of every activity according to goodness is *τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς ἕξεως γίνεσθαι*. The good man's end is the reproduction of the form of goodness in all his acts. Now a final cause appearing as a formal cause appears as *τὸ καλόν*, cf. Part. An. 645 a, 25 *οὗ δ' ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἴληφεν*.

καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. Rassow here reads *καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δέ. ἡ <δ'> ἀνδρεία καλόν*.

τοιοῦτον, sc. *καλόν*.

ὁρίζεται...τῷ τέλει, i.e. the end determines the form. Cf. Meteor. 390 a, 10 *ἅπαντα δ' ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα τῷ ἔργῳ*.

καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ
7 τὴν ἀνδρείαν, τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ
ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν
ἀνώνυμα), εἴη δ' ἄν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος εἰ μη-
δὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ
τοὺς Κελτούς· ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ
8 φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ
προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας· ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ
ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι. ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται,
9 μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι· ἐν
10 τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ
δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ
καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.

προαιρετική (τοῦτο δὲ πῶς λέγομεν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι ἕνεκά τινος πάντα αἱρεῖσθαι ποιεῖ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τὸ καλόν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ἀρετή τις οὖσα ἕνεκά τινος ποιήσει τὰ φοβερὰ ὑπομένειν, ὥστ' οὔτε δι' ἄγνοιαν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ μᾶλλον ποιεῖ κρίνειν) οὔτε δι' ἡδονήν, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν, ἐπεί, ἄν γε μὴ καλὸν ᾖ ἀλλὰ μανικόν, οὐχ ὑπομένει· αἰσχρὸν γάρ.

b, 24. EE. 1229 b, 22 οἱ μὲν <οὖν> δειλοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς ἐπιψεύδονται διὰ τὰς ἕξεις· τῷ μὲν γὰρ δειλῷ τά τε μὴ φοβερὰ δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἠρέμα σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ θρασεῖ τὸ ἐναντίον τά τε φοβερὰ θαρραλέα καὶ τὰ σφόδρα ἠρέμα, τῷ δ' ἀνδρείῳ ταληθῆ μάλιστα. διόπερ οὔτ' εἴ τις ὑπομένοι τὰ φοβερὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἀνδρεῖος, οἷον εἴ τις τοὺς κεραυνοὺς ὑπομένοι φερομένους διὰ μανίαν, οὔτ' εἰ γιγνώσκων ὅσος ὁ κίνδυνος, διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὅλως ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστιν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δι' ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ὑπομένουσιν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινά· μετ' ἐλπίδος γάρ ἐστι τιμωρίας. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὔτ' εἰ διὰ ταύτην οὔτ' εἰ δι' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν ὑπομένει τις τὸν θάνατον ἢ φυγὴν

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§ 7. **ἀνάλγητος**, cf. 1100 b, 32 n.

τοὺς Κελτούς. EE. 1229 b, 28 *οἷον οἱ Κελτοὶ πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅπλα ἀπαντῶσι λαβόντες*. Aristotle seems to have taken this from Ephoros; for Strabo (vii, p. 293) says upon his authority *ὅπλα αἴρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πλημμυρίδας τοὺς Κίμβρους, καὶ ὅτι ἀφοβίαν οἱ Κελτοὶ ἀσκοῦντες κατακλύζεσθαι τὰς οἰκίας ὑπομένουσιν*.

§ 9. **θρασύδειλοι.** This compound is not found elsewhere, but may belong to the language of comedy.

ἐν τούτοις, sc. *ἐν οἷς δύνανται μιμεῖσθαι*.

1116 a ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστιν. δύσελπις δή τις ὁ δει- 11
λός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. περὶ ταὐτὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὅ τε δειλὸς 12
καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.

Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ 13
θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερὰ ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἱρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. τὸ δ' ἀποθνῄσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἤ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν. VIII. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι, λέγονται δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους. πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ

μειζόνων λυπῶν, οὐδεὶς δικαίως <ἂν> ἀνδρεῖος λέγοιτο τούτων. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡδὺ τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν, πολλάκις ἂν δι' ἀκρασίαν ἀπέθνῃσκον οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ ἀποθνῄσκειν οὐκ ὄντος ἡδέος, τῶν ποιητικῶν δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλοὶ δι' ἀκρασίαν περιπίπτουσιν εἰδότες, ὧν οὐθεὶς <ἂν> ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ καὶ πάνυ ἑτοίμως ἀποθνῄσκειν. οὔτ' εἰ φεύγοντες τὸ πονεῖν, ὅπερ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεὶς ἀνδρεῖος, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

"φαῦλοι βροτῶν γὰρ τοῦ πονεῖν ἡσσώμενοι,
θανεῖν ἐρῶσιν."

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν Χείρωνα μυθολογοῦσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕλκους ὀδύνην εὔξασθαι ἀποθανεῖν ἀθάνατον ὄντα.

1116 a, 15. EE. 1229 a, 12 ἔστι δ' εἴδη ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ' ὁμοιότητα· <τὰ> αὐτὰ γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ

§ 12. **ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται.** For δέ connecting a finite verb with a participle, cf. 1135 b, 31. 1152 a, 4.

§ 13. **ἐν οἷς εἴρηται,** sc. *ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις*, i.e. *ἐν πολέμῳ*.

VIII. § 1. **Ἔστι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** We pass now to the five forms of *ἀνδρεία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*.

ἡ πολιτική. This is the courage of the citizen army, the courage that won Marathon.

ἔοικεν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρειότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ 20
2 ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διομήδην καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα·

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

καὶ [Διομήδης]

Ἕκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων 25
"Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο."

3 ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς
4 γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταὐτό· 30 χείρους δ', ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι,

αὐτά. μία μὲν πολιτική· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ δι' αἰδῶ οὖσα. δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὐχ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. τρίτη δ' ἡ δι' ἀπειρίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν, δι' ἣν τὰ παιδία καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι οἱ μὲν ὑπομένουσι τὰ φερόμενα, οἱ δὲ λαμβάνουσι τοὺς ὄφεις. ἄλλη δ' ἡ κατ' ἐλπίδα, καθ' ἣν οἵ τε κατευτυχηκότες πολλάκις ὑπομένουσι τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ οἱ μεθύοντες· εὐέλπιδας γὰρ ποιεῖ ὁ οἶνος. ἄλλη δὲ διὰ πάθος ἀλόγιστον, οἷον δι' ἔρωτα καὶ θυμόν. ἄν τε γὰρ ἐρᾷ, θρασὺς μᾶλλον ἢ δειλός, καὶ ὑπομένει πολλοὺς κινδύνους, ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν Μεταποντίῳ τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείνας καὶ ὁ ἐν Κρήτῃ μυθολογούμενος· καὶ δι' ὀργὴν καὶ θυμὸν ὡσαύτως. ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ὁ θυμός. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι σύες ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντες· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνώμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασεῖς. ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ· ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμός, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἄριστα μάχονται. διὰ νόμον δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία. κατ'

§ 2. **Πουλυδάμας κ.τ.λ.** Il. xxii, 100.

[**Διομήδης**]. This seems to be an adscript. Bywater, Contr. p. 35.

Ἕκτωρ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Il. viii, 148.

§ 3. **δι' αἰδῶ.** For *αἰδώς* cf. 1128 b, 10 sqq. Fritzsche quotes Il. v, 529

ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε, καὶ ἄλκιμον ἦτορ ἔλεσθε,
ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας·
αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἠὲ πέφανται.

καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ "μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥῖνας μένος" καὶ "ἔζεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἕλει] ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. [οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.] φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσ-

20 καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἱρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος. καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν φέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν
25 ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος "σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ" καὶ "μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε" καὶ "δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥῖνας μένος" καὶ "ἔζεσεν αἷμα·" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαί-
30 νειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὁρμήν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι 11
διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ [ἢ ἐν ἕλει] ᾖ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνος καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα
35 πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὁρμᾶν οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ
1117 a οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. [οὐ δή ἐστιν ἀνδρεῖα τὰ 12
δι' ἀλγηδόνος ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον.] φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσ-

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πεδινὸς ἐν αὐτῇ, τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωμάλων ὄντων, ἐν ᾧ παρατεταγμένοι ποτὲ Κορωνεῖς σὺν τοῖς βοηθήσουσιν αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχοίου μετὰ τῶν βοιωταρχῶν, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν κατέλαβε καὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν εἶχεν ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ Ὀνόμαρχος ὁ Φωκεὺς προδοθεῖσαν αὐτῷ (B.C. 354–3), αὐτοὶ μὲν μείναντες ἀπέθανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ὀνόμαρχον, ἀποκλείσαντες τὰς πύλας, ἵνα αὐτοῖς μηδὲ βουλομένοις εἴη φυγεῖν καὶ καταλιπεῖν τὴν πατρίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιῶται ἐκ τοῦ Μεταχοίου ἔφυγον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς μάχης, αἰσθόμενοι ἕνα τεθνάναι τῶν βοιωταρχῶν Χάρωνα. ἱστοροῦσι περὶ τῆς μάχης ταύτης Κηφισόδωρος ἐν τῇ ιβ' <τῶν> Περὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ πολέμου καὶ Ἀναξιμένης ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ τῶν Περὶ Φίλιππον καὶ Ἔφορος ἐν τῇ τριακοστῇ (FHG. I, 274, 153).

§ 10. **Ὅμηρος.** These are inexact reminiscences of Il. xvi, 529 and Od. xxiv, 18. The phrase **ἔζεσεν αἷμα** 'his blood boiled' occurs nowhere in Homer, but *ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος* was a current definition of Anger (De An. 403 a, 31). In poetry it occurs first in Theokritos, Id. xx, 15 *ἐμοὶ δ' ἄφαρ ἔζεσεν αἷμα.*

§ 11. **ἢ ἐν ἕλει** was bracketed by Victorius. It seems to be a mere variant of *ἐν ὕλῃ.*

οἱ ὄνοι. Cf. Homer's comparison of Aias to a stubborn ass which goes on eating the corn though the boys keep on beating it. Il. xi, 558 sqq.

λαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ 5
ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἥδονται· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μέν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ
13 διὰ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι. οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλ- 10
πιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις· παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν
14 <ἂν> ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκόμενοι· 15
εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ
15 φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ 20
ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι ἧττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προ-
φανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο,
16 τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. ἀνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα

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§ 12. **προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα,** 'will and motive,' i.e. if the man acts *προαιρούμενος* and *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.* As in Plato, *θυμός* is recognised as the natural basis of courage.

τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἥδονται. Cf. EE. 1229 b, 31 (l. c. p. 145), Rhet. 1378 b, 1 *καὶ πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἕπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν (ἀνάγκη) τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι.*

§ 13. **οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι... οἱ δὲ...** Bywater points out (Contr. p. 56) that this "twofold use of the article," the first being an ordinary article, the second meaning 'others,' is "a favourite construction with Aristotle." Cf. 1149 a, 16. 1149 b, 2. 1158 a, 31. **διὰ τὰ πρότερον εἰρημένα** sc. *ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή.*

§ 14. **εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται.** Probl. 955 a, 2 *διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύμως, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ γῆρας δύσελπίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ νεότης ἐλπίδος πλήρης.*

§ 15. **ἀπὸ ἕξεως κ.τ.λ.** We know that a man may perform a brave act without being already brave; for it is only so that he becomes brave. But it is only the formed *ἕξις* that can be trusted in an emergency.

ἦν. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 35 and, for the idiomatic imperfect, 1113 a, 19 n.

§ 16. **ἀξίωμα,** not 'dignity' but 'self-reliance.' It is the same thing as *τὸ οἴεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι.*

μένουσι sc. *οἱ εὐέλπιδες.*

χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν, ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἵ τε δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι εἴρηνται 17
ποιοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρεῖοι.

IX. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὖσα οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρεῖος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπο- 2
μένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ 3
1117 b δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κἀν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδύ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν.

οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, i.e. *οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες*.

ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, 'or (even) suspect that it is.' L^b has *ὑποπτεύσουσι*, K^b *ὑποπτεύουσιν*. The corruption is due to the scribes having taken *ἕτερον ἢ* together.

ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κ.τ.λ. The story is told in Xen. Hell. iv, 4, 10. The Spartan cavalry had taken Sikyonian shields with a *sigma* upon them. This was in the battle at the Long Walls of Corinth B.C. 392.

IX. § 1. **Περὶ θάρρη δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We now approach the question *πῶς μεσότης ἡ ἀνδρεία*, and we find that it has more to do with pains than pleasures, whereas we shall see that *σωφροσύνη* has more to do with pleasures than pains (1117 b, 26). This is really the same question as *πῶς ἀντίκεινται ἀλλήλαις καὶ τῇ μεσότητι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις;* The fact that the *θρασύς* is like the *ἀνδρεῖος* while the *δειλός* is not (1108 b, 30 sqq.) is due to the fact that *ἀνδρεία* is *μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἢ τὰ θαρραλέα*. It has already been pointed out how important these questions of *ἀντίθεσις* are. Cf. above 1108 b, 11 n.

§ 2. **διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** The merit of *ἀνδρεία* does not lie in not facing the wrong things, but in facing the right things; for it has to do with *τὰ φοβερά* rather than *τὰ θαρραλέα*. That is why it is harder to be *ἀνδρεῖος* than to be *σώφρων*. *Ἀνδρεία* implies the presence of positive pain, *σωφροσύνη* only the negation of certain pleasures. For the merit of *σωφροσύνη* lies in abstaining from the wrong pleasures, not in enduring the right pains.

§ 3. **τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος**, 'the end of an act which conforms to the definition of *ἀνδρεία*.' Cf. 1115 b, 21 *τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*. Being an *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν*, it must be *ἡδὺ καθ' αὑτό*.

ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ, 'by the attendant circumstances,' cf. Rhet. 1367 b, 29. 1407 a, 35. 1415 b, 24.

εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομενεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μή. καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστε- 10
ρος ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς, λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀνδρεῖος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν ἀντ' 15
ἐκείνων αἱρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται.
στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἧττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἕτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν
βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν, 20
ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· 25
ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διῃρήσθωσαν δὴ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ

1117 b, 20. EE. 1230 a, 34 *περὶ ποῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης καὶ τίνων καὶ διὰ τί, καὶ τὰ φοβερὰ τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει, σχεδὸν εἴρηται κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ἔφοδον ἱκανῶς· περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀκολασίας μετὰ ταῦτα διελέσθαι πειρατέον. λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς.*

b, 28. EE. 1230 b, 21 *ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ σώφρων ἐστὶ περὶ*

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§ 5. **ἐφάπτεται** sc. *τις*. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

§ 6. **στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ.** A practical remark for the benefit of the statesman. The *ἀνδρεία* we have been describing is not necessarily the best for professional soldiers.

X. § 1. **τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν**, sc. *θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας*. Aristotle starts as usual from *τὰ δοκοῦντα*, in this case the Platonic view. Aristotle did not himself believe in 'parts of the soul.'

ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The question *περὶ ποῖα μεσότης ἡ σωφοσύνη;* is discussed after a brief indication of *πῶς μεσότης*, i.e. *ἧττον...περὶ τὰς λύπας*. Cf. above 1115 a, 5 n.

αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομάθεια· ἑκάτερος γὰρ
30 τούτων χαίρει οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων
35 κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ
1118 a λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. περὶ 3
δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκό-
5 λαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως 4
δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ

ἡδονάς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας τινὰς αὐτὸν εἶναι. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν περὶ τίνας. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πάσας οὐδὲ περὶ ἅπαντα τὰ ἡδέα ὁ σώφρων σώφρων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν δόξῃ περὶ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν, περί τε τὸ γευστὸν καὶ τὸ ἁπτόν, τῇ δ' ἀληθείᾳ περὶ τὸ ἁπτόν· περὶ γὰρ τὴν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονὴν τῶν καλῶν ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας ἀφροδισίων, ἢ λύπην τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ περὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς τῶν εὐαρμόστων ἢ ἀναρμόστων, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δι' ὀσφρήσεως, τάς τε ἀπὸ εὐωδίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ δυσωδίας, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ σώφρων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκόλαστος οὐδεὶς λέγεται τῷ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ πάσχειν. εἰ γοῦν τις ἢ καλὸν ἀνδριάντα θεώμενος ἢ ἵππον ἢ ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἀκροώμενος ᾄδοντος, μὴ βούλοιτο μήτε ἐσθίειν μήτε πίνειν μήτε ἀφροδισιάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καλὰ θεωρεῖν τῶν δ' ᾀδόντων ἀκούειν, οὐκ ἂν δόξειεν ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' οἱ κηλούμενοι παρὰ ταῖς Σειρῆσιν.

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§ 2. **οἷον** refers to *ψυχικαί*, which is the emphatic word, as it is really the pleasures of the soul that are being divided from the more obvious pleasures of the body.

ἑκάτερος. For similar constructions *ad sensum* cf. 1118 b, 20. 1161 a, 16.

οὗ, i.e. *τούτῳ* or *τῷ οὗ*. The ellipse of the demonstrative or article before the relative is common. Cf. 1132 b, 1. 1156 a, 22. 1168 a, 11. 1174 a, 10. Bywater, Contr. p. 45.

§ 3. **οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες κ.τ.λ.** This distinctive character was already given to the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell by Plato. Cf. Phileb. 51 b *ἀληθεῖς ἡδονὰς ὀρθῶς τις ὑπολάβοι ἂν τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων.*

5 τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ
συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμια- 10
μάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι
6 διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμημάτων. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅταν πεινῶσι χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου· 15
7 τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμήματα ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοὸς ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι 20
δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ᾔσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν "ἢ [εὑρὼν] ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον

1118 a, 9. EE. 1230 b, 36 *ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ δύο τῶν αἰσθητῶν ταῦτα, περὶ ἅπερ καὶ τἆλλα θηρία μόνον τυγχάνει αἰσθητικῶς ἔχοντα, καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπούμενα, περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἁπτά. περὶ δὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ἡδέα σχεδὸν ὁμοίως ἅπαντα φαίνεται ἀναισθήτως διακείμενα, οἷον περὶ εὐαρμοστίαν ἢ κάλλος. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅτι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῶν καλῶν ἢ τῇ ἀκροάσει τῶν εὐαρμόστων, εἰ μή τί που συμβέβηκε τειρατῶδες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ εὐώδη ἢ δυσώδη· καίτοι τάς γε αἰσθήσεις ὀξυτέρας ἔχουσι πάσας. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς*

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§ 5. **πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.** There is no *ἀκολασία* in the pleasures of smell *per se* (*καθ' αὑτάς*), it only comes in so far as they incidentally suggest the hope or memory of pleasures of another class. Plato (loc. cit.) had said *τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας*. Aristotle shows with great skill how it happens that to take pleasure in certain smells may be *ἀκόλαστον*. It is only in so far as they suggest pleasures of taste and touch.

§ 6. **καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους**, sc. *τοὺς μὴ ἀκολάστους.*

ἀκολάστου. In Probl. 950 a, 12 sqq. the example of the smell of salt fish is given, which is unpleasant when we are not hungry, *ἡ τοῦ ταρίχου ὀδμή, ὅταν ἄδην ἔχωμεν τοῦ φαγεῖν. …ἡ δὲ τοῦ ῥόδου ἀεὶ ἡδεῖα.*

§ 7. **ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις.** The peculiarly human character of the pleasures of sight, hearing and smell is evidence of their 'pure' character.

τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν…ἐποίησεν, 'it is the smell that makes them aware of the presence of hares.'

[εὑρών]. This word comes from Aspasios, who meant to correct what seemed a misquotation of Il. iii, 24 *εὑρὼν ἢ ἔλαφον κεραὸν ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα.* But *εὑρών* is pointless, for it does not

αἶγα," ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς 8
ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται·
αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύ- 9
σει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ
κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες
καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ
οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι'
ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις

εὐφραίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθ' αὑτάς. λέγω δὲ <μὴ> καθ' αὑτάς, αἷς ἢ ἐλπίζοντες χαίρομεν ἢ μεμνημένοι, οἷον ὄψων καὶ ποτῶν (δι' ἑτέραν γὰρ ἡδονὴν ταύταις χαίρομεν, τὴν τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν), καθ' αὑτὰς δὲ οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν εἰσιν. διὸ ἐμμελῶς ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν τὰς δὲ ἡδύ. ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ γευστὸν οὐ περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἐπτόηται τὰ θηρία, οὐδ' ὅσων τῷ ἄκρῳ τῆς γλώττης ἡ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' ὅσων τῷ φάρυγγι, καὶ ἔοικεν ἁφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ γεύσει τὸ πάθος. διὸ οἱ ὀψοφάγοι οὐκ εὔχονται τὴν γλῶτταν ἔχειν μακρὰν ἀλλὰ τὸν φάρυγγα γεράνου, ὥσπερ Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιδος. ὥστε περὶ τὰ ἁπτόμενα, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, θετέον τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐστίν. οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστριμαργία καὶ λαγνεία καὶ

express a definite *αἴσθησις* like sight (see Bywater, Contr. p. 36). We have had *ὀσμή* and *ἀκοή*, so we must now have *ὄψις*.

§ 8. **ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κ.τ.λ.** Probl. 949 b, 6 *διὰ τί κατὰ μόνας δύο αἰσθήσεις ἀκρατεῖς λέγομεν, οἷον ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν; ἢ διὰ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινομένας ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις. ἅτε οὖν κοιναὶ οὖσαι ἀτιμότατοί εἰσι. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ μόναι ἐπονείδιστοί εἰσιν.*

§ 9. **φαίνονται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** Even taste, so far as it affords an opening to *ἀκολασία*, may be reduced to touch. So far as it is strictly speaking the sense of taste, i.e. a *δύναμις κριτική* which distinguishes the various savours which lie between sweet and bitter, it does not appeal to the *ἀκόλαστος*. The real *ἀκόλαστος* would certainly refuse to be appointed wine-taster and pass his life in distinguishing vintages. That is rather on the level of artistic pleasure.

τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. 422 a, 8 sqq. for Aristotle's theory of taste.

οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις. It is not the distinction of tastes that gives pleasure to the glutton, but the contact of food with the gullet. Would he be willing to spit it out after tasting it? Cf. Part. An. 690 b, 29 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα τῶν χυμῶν ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν· τῶν δὲ ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καθόδῳ ἡ ἡδονή...καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν πλείστων ὄψων καὶ ἐδεστῶν ἐν τῇ καταπόσει τῇ τάσει* ('tension' v. l. *θλίξει* 'contact') *τοῦ οἰσοφάγου γίνεται ἡ χάρις.*

10 λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φά-
ρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ
ἁφῇ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· 1118 b
καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἄνθρω-
11 ποί ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ᾗ ζῷα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν
καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώτα-
ται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφῄρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς 5
γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ
γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἡ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἁφή, ἀλλὰ περί
τινα μέρη. XI. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική·

ὀψοφαγία καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἅπερ μόρια ἡ ἀκολασία διαιρεῖται. περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ὄψεως ἢ ἀκοῆς ἡ ὀσφρήσεως ἡδονὰς οὐθεὶς λέγεται ἀκόλαστος εἰὰν ὑπερβάλῃ, ἀλλ' ἄνευ ὀνείδους τὰς ἁμαρτίας ψέγομεν ταύτας, καὶ ὅλως περὶ ὅσα μὴ λέγονται ἐγκρατεῖς· οἱ δ' ἀκρατεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀκόλαστοι οὐδὲ σώφρονες.

§ 10. **ὀψοφάγος ὤν.** Eudemos names him. He was Philoxenos son of Eryxis. A certain pudding was called after him (Φιλοξένειοι πλακοῦντες). As he was a favourite butt of the comic poets, Athenaeus is full of information about him. In a comedy of Krobylos he was called *κάμινος, οὐκ ἄνθρωπος* because he liked to burn his throat with hot slices of fish. When he went out to dine his servant used to take his own wine, oil, vinegar and sauce, with which he corrected the crudity of his host's cookery. Theophilos (FHG. IV, 516) says of him *ηὔξατό ποτε γεράνου τὴν φάρυγγα σχεῖν*, and Machon has put his prayer in verse:

Φιλόξενός ποθ', ὡς λέγουσ', ὁ Κυθήριος
ηὔξατο τριῶν ἔχειν λάρυγγα πηχέων,
ὅπως καταπίνω, φησίν, ὅτι πλεῖστον χρόνον
καὶ πάνθ' ἅμα μοι τὰ βρώματ' ἡδονὴν ποῇ.

τὸν φάρυγγα. This is incorrect, of course, from the anatomical point of view. Aristotle himself restricts the name *φάρυγξ* to the *trachea* or windpipe. But it was popularly used for *οἰσοφάγος*. Cf. Eur. Cycl. 215 *ὁ φάρυγξ εὐτρεπὴς ἔστω* (for dinner), Ar. Frogs, 571 *ὦ μιαρὰ φάρυγξ*. We cannot expect correct anatomy from an *ὀψοφάγος*, a Satyr and a *πανδοκεύτρια*. Machon says *λάρυγγα*, which is equally wrong.

κοινοτάτη, i.e. *πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις*. Cf. Probl. 950 a, 9 sqq. *οὐσῶν δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πέντε, τά τε ἄλλα ζῷα ἀπὸ δύο μόνων τῶν προειρημένων ἥδεται.*

§ 11. **καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** A further restriction to certain pleasures of touch.

XI. § 1. **κοιναί** implies *φυσικαί*. Certain desires are common to all as opposed to *ἴδιαι*, and therefore *φυσικαί* as opposed to *ἐπίθετοι* 'adventitious.'

10 πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τῆς δὲ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ 2
φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα, καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω
15 τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι 3
ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἕν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία. διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὡς
20 παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδώδεις. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ 4
πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερ-
25 βάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ

1118 b, 16. EE. 1221 b, 15 ὀψοφάγοι δὲ καὶ γαστρίμαργοι καὶ οἰνόφλυγες τῷ πρὸς ὁποτέρας τροφῆς ἀπόλαυσιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν παθητικὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον.

φησὶν Ὅμηρος. Il. xxiv, 129.

τῆς δὲ τοιᾶσδε, sc. *ἐπιθυμεῖ*. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 36. Keeping the MS. *τὸ δὲ τοιᾶσδε*, Ramsauer reads *παντός* for *πᾶς*.

§ 2. **φαίνεται**, sc. *τὸ τοιᾶσδε ἢ τοιᾶσδε ἐπιθυμεῖν*.

ἡμέτερον, i.e. *ἴδιον* as opposed to *κοινόν*. Still some things are naturally more pleasant than others to certain classes of people, and even to all.

§ 3. **αὐτήν**, sc. *τὴν γαστέρα* implied in *γαστρίμαργοι*. Cf. 1117 b, 29 n.

§ 4. **τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων κ.τ.λ.** On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 36, and for *φιλοτοιοῦτος* see 1099 a, 9 n. Aristotle speaks here as if '*φιλο*-so-and-so' was always used in a bad sense, but in discussing *φιλοτιμία* later on, he calls attention to the fact that *τὸ φιλοτοιοῦτον πλεοναχῶς λέγεται* (1125 b, 14), i.e. that compounds with *φιλο-* are ambiguous and sometimes have a good sense, sometimes a bad one.

τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. For this test cf. 1125 b, 16. 1150 a, 12. b, 1. 1151 a, 5. What *οἱ πολλοί* do would be the average or *ἀριθμητικὴ μεσότης*, not the *μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς*. But any wide divergence from the average raises the presumption of excess or defect.

κατὰ πάντα δὲ κ.τ.λ. For *δὲ* connecting a finite verb with a participle, cf. 1116 b, 8 n. The *ἀκόλαστος* goes wrong in all three ways.

5 καὶ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σώφρων οὐδ' ἀκόλαστος τῷ μή, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ 30
λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.

6 Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ 1119 a
τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν—μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία—ἀτόπῳ
7 δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς 5
ἡδονὰς καὶ ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὔ· εἰ δέ τῳ μηδέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω
ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος 10

1119 a, 5. EE. 1231 a, 26 ἀναίσθητος μὲν οὖν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, ὁ οὕτως ἔχων ὥστε καὶ ἐλλείπειν ὅσων ἀνάγκη κοινωνεῖν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πάντας καὶ χαίρειν· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἀκόλαστος. πάντες γὰρ τούτοις φύσει τε χαίρουσι, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας λαμβάνουσι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐδὲ λέγονται ἀκόλαστοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ χαίρειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ τυγχάνοντες καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ μὴ τυγχάνοντες), οὐδ' ἀνάλγητοι (οὐ γὰρ ἐλλείπουσι τῷ χαίρειν ἢ λυπεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλουσιν).

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§ 5. **περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας κ.τ.λ.** The question of *πῶς μεσότης* is here briefly touched, and the relation of *σωφροσύνη* to pleasure and pain is contrasted with that of *ἀνδρεία*. To perform a brave act we must endure positive pain, to act in a temperate way we have only to abstain from pleasure. If we are *σώφρονες* this will give us positive pleasure and not pain; if we feel pain in abstaining, we are *ἀκόλαστοι*, but the pain is not positive; **τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή.**

§ 6. **μετὰ λύπης...ἡ ἐπιθυμία.** Cf. 1105 b, 21.

§ 7. **οὐ πάνυ γίνονται**, 'hardly occur.' For the use of *οὐ πάνυ*, cf. Ind. s. v.

οὐ τέτευχε δ'...ὀνόματος. Cf. 1107 b, 6 where he adds *ἔστωσαν δ' ἀναίσθητοι*. Eudemos (loc. cit.) compares the New Comedy type of the *ἀγροῖκος*. There were comedies of this name by Antiphanes, Anaxandrides, Anaxilas, Philemon and Menander.

διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως μὲν περὶ ταῦτ' 8
ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὐδ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὐδὲ σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

XII. Ἑκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν· καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν 2
τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ. μᾶλλον δὴ ἑκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον· καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾷον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. δόξειε 3
δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἑκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον·

ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις περὶ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μεσότης, καὶ βελτίστη αὕτη ἡ ἕξις, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐναντία. ὥστ' εἰ σωφροσύνη ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις, περὶ ἃ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἡδέα τὰ εἰρημένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν μεσότης σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, μεσότης οὖσα ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀναισθησίας· ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ἀκολασία· ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἤτοι ἀνώνυμος ἢ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὀνόμασι προσαγορευομένη. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας.

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§ 8. **ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος**, sc. λέγει, κελεύει, προστάττει. Cf. 1115 b, 12 n.

XII. § 1. **Ἑκουσίῳ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This discussion of the voluntariness of ἀκολασία and δειλία is due to the need of showing how far the respective ἀρεταί are really ἐφ' ἡμῖν, and therefore how far it is true that our deliberation is really complete with regard to them.

ὧν τὸ μὲν αἱρετὸν κ.τ.λ. The point is that it is more in our power not to pursue a good thing than to avoid a bad one.

§ 2. **ἐξίστησι**, explained by **φθείρει τὴν φύσιν**, φύσις here being used in the Academic sense of normal state or condition. Cf. below 1149 b, 35.

§ 3. **δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.** There is no pain in being a coward, for the coward keeps out of the way of pain; but particular acts of cowardice imply

αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ῥίπτειν καὶ τἆλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ 30
4 βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἑκούσια—ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ—τὸ δ' ὅλον ἧττον·
5 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἁμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν 1119 b
πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προ-
6 τέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦ-

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1119 a, 33. EE. 1230 a, 38 λέγεται δ' ὁ ἀκόλαστος πολλαχῶς· ὅ τε γὰρ μὴ κεκολασμένος πως μηδ' ἰατρευμένος, ὥσπερ ἄτμητος ὁ μὴ τετμημένος, καὶ τούτων ὁ μὲν δυνατός, ὁ δ' ἀδύνατος· ἄτμητον γὰρ τό τε μὴ δυνάμενον τμηθῆναι καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν μὲν μὴ τετμημένον δέ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἀκόλαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι κόλασιν, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν μὴ κεκολασμένον δὲ περὶ ἁμαρτίας περὶ ἃς ὀρθοπραγεῖ ὁ σώφρων, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται τὴν ἀκολασίαν. ἔτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον οἱ δυσίατοι καὶ οἱ ἀνίατοι πάμπαν διὰ κολάσεως. πλεοναχῶς δὲ λεγομένης τῆς ἀκολασίας, ὅτι μὲν περὶ ἡδονάς τινας καὶ λύπας εἰσί, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῷ περὶ ταύτας διακεῖσθαί πως καὶ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· διεγράψαμεν δὲ πρότερον πῶς τὴν ἀκολασίαν ὀνομάζοντες μεταφέρομεν. τοὺς δὲ ἀκινήτως ἔχοντας δι'

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actual pain. On the other hand, there is no pain—quite the contrary—in committing a particular act of intemperance; but to be an intemperate man is always painful (τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή).

δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. Really they are μικταὶ πράξεις.

§ 5. **τὸ δ' ὄνομα κ.τ.λ.** A note on etymology. The word ἀκόλαστος was used of children like the English 'spoiled.' It conveys the idea of the proverb "Spare the rod," etc.

φέρομεν. The verb φέρειν is used of 'applying' a name to a thing. See Met. 1062 a, 13 δεῖ τοίνυν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι γνώριμον καὶ δηλοῦν τι, καὶ μὴ πολλά, μόνον δ' ἕν· ἂν δὲ πλείω σημαίνῃ (i. q. πλεοναχῶς λέγηται), φανερὸν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ὃ **φέρει τοὔνομα** τούτων. Rhet. 1412 b, 10 ἐὰν προσηκόντως τὸ **ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ**. Cf. below 1125 b, 15. b, 28.

§ 6. **οὐ κακῶς...μετενηνέχθαι**, 'not to be a bad metaphor' (μεταφορά). The word μεταφέρειν is to be explained from the use of φέρειν given in the last note. We 'transfer' a name from its proper application in virtue of some ὁμοιότης or, more strictly, in virtue of some ἀναλογία. Cf. Poet. 1457 b, 6 sqq.

τον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ 7
ἥξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές,
κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὦσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μη- 8
θὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκο-
λασμένον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν
λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν 9
τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης. 10

ἀναισθησίαν πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ἡδονὰς οἱ μὲν καλοῦσιν ἀναισθήτους, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι τοιούτους προσαγορεύουσιν. ἔστι δ' οὐ πάνυ γνώριμον τὸ πάθος οὐδ' ἐπιπόλαιον διὰ τὸ πάντας ἐπὶ θάτερον ἁμαρτάνειν μᾶλλον καὶ πᾶσιν εἶναι σύμφυτον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδέων ἧττάν καὶ αἴσθησιν. μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι, οἵους οἱ κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἳ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν.

καὶ ὁ παῖς. Cf. above 1103 a, 3 ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.

§ 7. τὸ συγγενές. Here apparently in the sense of τὸ σύμφυτον as in 1149 b, 11 and often.

ἐκκρούουσιν. Cf. 1154 a, 27.

BOOK IV.

GOODNESS IN SOCIAL LIFE.

Introductory Note.

The Fourth Book shows how the principles we have discovered apply not only to the great virtues of Fortitude and Temperance, but also to those "minor morals" which make up nine-tenths of life. If our principles are worth anything at all, they must be capable of explaining these also, and in fact it is the best possible test we can apply to them. The importance of this book is entirely missed if we imagine that Aristotle is setting before us types of character for our admiration and imitation. His aim is not edification, but the application of the test of fact to a general law. From this point of view the criticism that he has strayed from moral philosophy into matters more fitting for a handbook of etiquette will be seen to be wide of the mark. Our principles must be shown to explain what the average Athenian understood by *καλοκἀγαθία*, or they stand condemned. The lesser men who came after Aristotle did not rise to this point of view. They apologise for discussing such things, or even deny to them the name of "virtues." But Aristotle's greatness is seen in this, that he felt bound to show that the Mean was exemplified not only in the regulation of such passions as Fear and Desire, but just as much in the ordinary acts of everyday social life.

Δ

Λέγωμεν δ' ἑξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος. δοκεῖ δὴ εἶναι
περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν
τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρί-
25 σεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μᾶλλον δὲ
ἐν τῇ δόσει. χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νο- 2

1119 b, 22. EE. 1231 b, 27 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία καὶ ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης μεσότητες. ἡ μὲν ἐλευθεριότης περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν καὶ ἀποβολήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτήσει μὲν πάσῃ μᾶλλον χαίρων ἢ δεῖ, ἀποβολῇ δὲ πάσῃ λυπούμενος μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἀνελεύθερος, ὁ δ' ἀμφότερα ἧττον ἢ δεῖ ἄσωτος, ὁ δ' ἄμφω ὡς δεῖ

I. § 1. **περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος.** The restriction of the word ἐλευθέριος to Liberality in money matters was Attic. Cf. Plato, Rep. 402 c, Theait. 144 d ἡ τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότης, Xen. Symp. 4, 15 ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα, passages which show that the limitation did not even in Attic always 'go without saying.' Many points in Aristotle's sketch are suggested by Plato's picture of Kephalos in the Republic.

περὶ χρήματα. The first question is περὶ ποῖα μεσότης. Cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, sc. ἐν οἷς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. **ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων,** sc. ἐν ἡδοναῖς τισιν. **ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν,** Par. ὥσπερ ὁ δίκαιος. Aristotle speaks as if δικαιοσύνη had already been treated in its natural place along with ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, though it had really been postponed, on the ground, as we are told above (1108 b, 7), that οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται.

περὶ δόσιν...ἐν τῇ δόσει, a good example of the equivalence of these two prepositional phrases to express the material (ὕλη) of goodness, which is here a πρᾶξις not, as hitherto, a πάθος. Cf. also ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κ.τ.λ. above.

μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν τῇ δόσει. Cf. above 1117 b, 26 ἧττον...περὶ τὰς λύπας.

§ 2. **χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.,** 'all that has a money value,' not merely money itself. The money value is the *continuum* in which we have to find the μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Aristotle's theory of money is discussed later on in Book V.

3 μίσματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία
περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνε-
λευθερίαν προσάπτομεν ἀεὶ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρή-
ματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμ- 30
πλέκοντες. τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανη-
4 ροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν, διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι·
πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγο-
5 ρεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων,
τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὑτὸν ἀπολλύμε- 1120 a
νος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὑτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὴ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχό-
μεθα.

ἐλευθέριος. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω τὸ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθός. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκεῖνοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει, ὅπου δὲ ἔσχατά εἰσι, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἓν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον τῷ εἴδει τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα μεσότητα εἶναι ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν καὶ

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§ 3. **ἀσωτία,** 'prodigality.' Antiphanes and Euthykles wrote comedies called Ἄσωτοι, and Timostratos one called Ἄσωτος. Ennius and Caecilius each wrote an *Asotus*. We shall see that all through this book Aristotle draws more on Comedy than on life. The 'Middle' and New Comedy had provided a *hortus siccus* of types of character, which furnished him with the material he wanted. There could be no better evidence of τὰ δοκοῦντα.

ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις. The plural is used because each may be either ὑπερβολή or ἔλλειψις according as we refer it to λῆψις or δόσις.

ἐπιφέρομεν, 'we apply.' For φέρειν, ἐπιφέρειν ὄνομα cf. 1119 a, 34 n.

συμπλέκοντες. Of this word Bonitz says "logice saepe usurpatur de coniungendis in eandem notionem plurimis notis" (Ind. Ar. 718 a, 55). We may render 'in a complex sense,' 'with a wider connotation.' 'Prodigality' often connotes Incontinence and Intemperance.

§ 4. **οὐ δὴ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται,** i.e. ἀλλοτρίως προσαγορεύονται. We have ἀλλοτρίως ἀποδιδόναι in Cat. 2 b, 35 of those who answer the question τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος in any other category than the τί ἐστιν (genus and species). So Top. 108 b, 28 οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὁρίζεσθαι. From Phys. 195 b, 3 we see that οἰκείως is also opposed to κατὰ συμβεβηκός, and that term could be substituted for ἀλλοτρίως in the passages above. The meaning here, then, is κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγονται.

§ 5. **βούλεται...εἶναι.** 'By ἄσωτος we mean ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων.' The phrase βούλεται εἶναι is often used in the same sense as βούλεται λέγεσθαι (for which see 1110 b, 30 n.). So below 1125 b, 33. The usage explained 1132 a, 21 n. is a little different.

Ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία τις, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κα- 6
κῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετήν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετήν· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. χρῆσις δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ 7
δόσις· ἡ δὲ λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτῆσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλ-
λόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν 8
δόσει ἕπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λή-
ψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾷον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἧττον 9
προΐενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευ- 10
θέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ

ἀποβολήν. διχῶς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ χρῆσις τοῦ κτήματός ἐστιν, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ ἱματίου, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μέν, οὐ μέντοι οὕτως ὡς ἂν εἴ τις σταθμῷ χρήσαιτο τῷ ὑποδήματι, ἀλλ' οἷον ἡ πώλησις καὶ ἡ μίσθωσις· χρῆται γὰρ ὑποδήματι. ὁ δὲ φιλάργυρος ὁ περὶ τὸ νόμισμά ἐστιν ἐσπουδακώς, τὸ δὲ νόμισμα τῆς κτήσεως ἀντὶ τῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς χρήσεώς ἐστιν· ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἄσωτος περὶ τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τρόπον τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν χρηματισμοῦ τὴν αὔξησιν διώκει· ὁ δ' ἄσωτος ἐλλείπει τῶν ἀναγκαίων· ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος τὴν περιουσίαν δίδωσιν.

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§ 6. **Ὧν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία κ.τ.λ.** The middle term of the first syllogism is *τὰ χρήσιμα = ὧν χρεία ἐστίν*, that of the next is *ὁ ἔχων...τὴν ἀρετήν*.

§ 7. **χρῆσις...κτῆσις.** Cf. 1098 b, 32 n. The point is that the *ἀρετή* derives its character from its *ἐνέργειαι*.

§ 8. **καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος.** We are looking for an *ἐπαινετὴ ἕξις*, and that will have to do with *τὸ χαλεπώτερον* and not *τὸ ῥᾷον*.

§ 9. **ἧττον προΐενται**, sc. *τοῦ δέοντος*. 'Men are apter to give away too little of their own than to take their neighbours' goods.' It is not the *μᾶλλον* which is redundant, as editors say, but the *οὐ*. For **μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ** after a negative (explicit or virtual) see Liddell and Scott *s. v. μάλα* II, 6, Kühner, § 516, 6. So in French, "on donne trop peu du sien, plus souvent qu'on ne prend le bien d'autrui."

εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· 20
οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχε- 11
δὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ, 12
τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα 25
ἕπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ 13
κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡδὺ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς 14
οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διά τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυ- 30
πηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς
πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ 15
δεῖ· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἡ τοιαύτη 16
λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦν- 17
τος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ
τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, 1120 b
ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων, βουλόμενός γε
διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ
διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ 18

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§ 10. **εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα.** Cf. Rhet. 1376 a, 28 *ἀμφισβητεῖν περὶ τοῦ ἤθους εἰς φαυλότητα*.

οὐχ ἧττον, i.e. *μᾶλλον*. We call them 'honest' rather than 'liberal.'

οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες, sc. *ὡς δεῖ*.

§ 11. **τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς**, sc. *λεγομένων*. Cf. 1152 b, 7 *τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν*.

§ 12. **καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.** For the proof of this see 1115 b, 20.

τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει, i.e. *τῇ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον δόσει*.

§ 13. **καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως.** Cf. above 1104 b, 5 sqq.

§ 16. **εὐχερῶς**, 'without caring how,' *μὴ δυσχεραίνων*. The *εὐχερής* is not 'nice' or 'fastidious.'

§ 17. **οἷον ἀπὸ κ.τ.λ.**, e.g. the produce of his own lands or live stock, not from the public property (*ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν*), as some politicians do. Cf. below 1163 b, 8.

καλόν...ἀναγκαῖον. This is the literary form of the opposition between the end and the *conditio sine qua non*, the final and the material cause. The *ἀναγκαῖον* here referred to is not *τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν*, but *τὸ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ εὖ* (Met. 1072 b, 12), *τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον* (Part. An. 642 a, 9), the conditionally necessary, that which must be if something else is to be.

οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν οἰκείων. I prefer *οἰκείων*, the reading of L^b, to *ἰδίων* (K^b) which all the editors follow. Above *ἰδίων* (opp. *κοινῶν, δημοσίων*) is in place, but here we want an opposite to *ἀλλοτρίων*.

§ 18. **ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.** This is added to show the need of the caution given in the preceding section.

σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ βλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ 19
πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν [δίδωσιν]. οὐθὲν δὴ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῷ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι 21
ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελόμενον ὅπως ἔχῃ, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ 22
δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθέριός ἐστιν ὁ 23
κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος 24
οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν

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§ 19. **αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν**, sc. *ἐστί*. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 37. It is the *προαίρεσις* which makes the man liberal.

§ 20. **εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.** Cf. infra 1167 b, 34. 1168 a, 21. This *ἔνδοξον* comes from Plato, Rep. 330 b *οὔ τοι ἕνεκα ἠρόμην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν, ταύτῃ τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν ἧπερ οἱ ἄλλοι.*

§ 21. **διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται κ.τ.λ.** Cf. the *σκολιόν* of Timokreon *ὤφελέν σ', ὦ τυφλὲ Πλοῦτε κ.τ.λ.* (Bergk-Crusius p. 269), and the Ploutos of Aristophanes.

δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφότερα ὡς δεῖ· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικεῖ δόσει ἡ τοιαύτη λῆψις, ἡ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἑπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆ-
25 λον ὡς οὔ. ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμ- 1121 a
βαίνῃ αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ
26 ὡς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
27 δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ 5
μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσεν, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδου οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.
28 ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἥδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ προϊοῦσι φανερώ-
29 τερον. εἴρηται δὴ ἡμῖν ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ 10
ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς. 15
30 τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον

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§ 24. **ἕπεται.** By this word Aristotle "denotat praedicari aliquam notionem de altera, ita ut hac posita, illa etiam ponenda sit" (Bonitz).

§ 26. **εὐκοινώνητος**, 'easy to do business with.' For the sentiment cf. Menander fr. 95 Kock—

οὗτος κράτιστός ἐστ' ἀνήρ, ὦ Γοργία,
ὅστις ἀδικεῖσθαι πλεῖστ' ἐπίσταθ' ἐγκρατῶς.

§ 27. **τῷ Σιμωνίδου.** I have adopted Bywater's conjecture for MS. *τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ*. See Contr. p. 37. Simonides had a reputation for avarice. Aspasios says *φιλαργυρίας αὐτοῦ μέμνηνται ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ πλούτου.* The saying here referred to is probably that given in Rhet. 1391 a, 8 *ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα τὴν Ἱέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γενέσθαι κρεῖττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν· Πλούσιον εἰπεῖν· τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὁρᾶν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις διατρίβοντας.*

§ 29. **πλὴν ἐν μικροῖς.** If it were *ἐν μεγάλοις* he would be *ἄδικος*, cf. 1122 a, 7.

τὰ...τῆς ἀσωτίας, excess in giving, defect in taking.

οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται, i.e. *οὐχ ἕπεται ἀλλήλοις*. There is no necessary connexion between the two attributes of *ἀσωτία* and so 'they do not go much together.' For *οὐ πάνυ*, see Ind. s. v. It does not mean 'not at all,' except in the sense that *οὐχ ἥκιστα* may mean *μάλιστα*.

μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι—ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι—ἐπεὶ ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι 31
20 τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐίατός τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ' εὖ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθείη ἤ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι, εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ,
25 καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἠλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν 32 τρόπον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διά τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα,
30 ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὑτόν. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ 33 εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀνα- 34 λίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν
1121 b πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευ- 35
θέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου
5 ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἤθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἤ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς
10 τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσω- 36

§ 30. **οἵπερ καί**, 'and it is just these,' i.e. private persons as opposed to tyrants.

§ 31. **ἐπεί**, *quamquam*. **ὅ γε τοιοῦτος**, i.e. ὁ *μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνων καὶ πᾶσι διδούς*. This is the prodigal young man of the New Comedy, who is usually a sympathetic character.

§ 34. **εὐχερῶς** here is simply 'conveniently,' 'easily,' opp. to *δυσχερῶς*. In this sentence the meaning expressed by *εὐχερῶς* above (1120 a, 34) is given by *ὀλιγώρως*.

§ 35. **τούτου ἕνεκα**, sc. *τοῦ καλοῦ*, cf. 1120 a, 24.

εὐχερῶς once more with the same meaning as 1120 a, 34.

πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν. Rhet. 1389 b, 37 (*οἱ πρεσβῦται*) *πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν*. 1390 a, 34 *οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἅμφω*.

§ 37. **τὸ γῆρας**. The New Comedy usually represented old men as *ἀνελεύθεροι*. Cf. Rhet. 1389 b, 28 *ἀνελεύθεροι (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι)· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ οὐσία· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν*.

§ 38. **χωρίζεται** opp. to *συνδυάζεται* above 1121 a, 16.

τος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν
37 δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ εἰς τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός τ' ἐστίν—δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν—καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον 15
38 ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολύ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλόκληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χω- 20
ρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δό-
39 σει ἐλλείπουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδωλοὶ γλίσχροι κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἱ μὲν διά τινα ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχρῶν· (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή 25
ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι· τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος· ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς

1121 b, 21. EE. 1232 a, 10 *αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων εἴδη λέγονται διαφέροντα τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον περὶ μόρια, οἷον ἀνελεύθερος φειδωλὸς καὶ κίμβιξ καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, φειδωλὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ μὴ προΐεσθαι, αἰσχροκερδὴς δ' ἐν τῷ ὁτιοῦν προσίεσθαι, κίμβιξ δὲ ὁ σφόδρα περὶ μικρὰ διατεινόμενος, παραλογιστὴς δὲ καὶ ἀποστερητὴς ὁ ἄδικος κατ' ἀνελευθερίαν. καὶ τοῦ ἀσώτου ὡσαύτως λαφύκτης μὲν ὁ ἐν τῷ ἀτάκτως ἀναλίσκειν, ἀλόγιστος δὲ ὁ ἐν τῷ μὴ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ λύπην.*

§ 38. **κυμινοπρίστης**, 'cummin-sawer.' Cf. our 'skin-flint,' 'cheese-parer.'

§ 39. **οἷον κ.τ.λ.** Cf. EE. 1232 a, 12 above. We are here in the midst of the New Comedy vocabulary.

κίμβικες. According to Coraes, quoted by Stewart, the word *κίμβιξ* properly meant 'flea' (Modern Greek *τζιβίκι* = *κιμβίκιον*). The name seems to have been applied to Simonides (by Xenophanes, according to schol. Ar. Peace 697), cf. Athenaeus 656 d *ὄντως δὲ ἦν ἀληθῶς κίμβιξ ὁ Σιμωνίδης καὶ αἰσχροκερδής, ὡς ὁ Χαμαιλέων φησί.*

ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι)· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς οὐ ῥᾴδιον αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους μή· ἀρέσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε διδόναι. οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὁπόσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἃ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτὴς καὶ λωποδύτης [καὶ ὁ λῃστὴς] τῶν ἀνελευθέρων· αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκα ἀμφότεροι πραγματεύονται καὶ ὀνείδη ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς· καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὴ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μεῖζόν τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

Aristophanes, Wasps 1357, has the expressive compound *κυμινοπριστοκαρδαμογλύφος*. The word is found in Alexis (fr. 251) and Poseidippos (fr. 26), while *κυμινοκίμβιξ* is quoted from an anonymous comic writer.

ἀρέσκειν. I prefer this, the reading of both K^b and L^b, to the more colourless *ἀρέσκει* of inferior sources. The sudden transition to indirect speech brings vividly before us some comic old man's tirade.

§ 40. **πορνοβοσκοί**, the *lenones* of the New Comedy. Cf. Theophr. Char. 6 *δεινὸς δὲ καὶ πανδοκεῦσαι καὶ πορνοβοσκῆσαι καὶ τελωνῆσαι καὶ μηδεμίαν αἰσχρὰν ἐργασίαν ἀποδοκιμάσαι, ἀλλὰ κηρύττειν μαγειρεύειν κυβεύειν.*

κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ, 'in small sums and at high interest.'

§ 43. **καὶ ὁ λῃστής** is omitted by Aspasios and is inconsistent with *ἀμφότεροι* below. Bywater, Contr. p. 38.

οἱ μέν, the robbers (*λωποδύται*); **οἱ δέ**, the sharpers.

§ 44. **μεῖζόν τε γάρ κ.τ.λ.** For the question *πῶς ἀντίκεινται* see notes on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

II. Δόξαι δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι· οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει. καθάπερ γὰρ τοὔνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρός τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ," ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπής. τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια καλεῖται,

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1122 a, 18. EE. 1233 a, 31 *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐ περὶ τὴν τυχοῦσαν πρᾶξιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν δαπάνην, εἰ μή που κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν· ἄνευ δὲ δαπάνης μεγαλοπρέπεια οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κόσμος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων ἀναλωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπερβολῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. ὁ δὴ ἐν μεγάλῃ δαπάνῃ τοῦ πρέποντος μεγέθους προαιρετικός, καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης μεσότητος καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡδονῇ ὀρεκτικός, μεγαλοπρεπής. ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ παρὰ μέλος, ἀνώνυμος· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔχει τινὰ*

II. §1. **περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας**, 'munificence.' This was a form of goodness regularly expected of the Athenian upper classes, and showed itself chiefly in *λῃτουργίαι* and *ἐπιδόσεις*.

ὑποσημαίνει, cf. 1112 a, 16.

ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα. Of course in the compound *μεγαλοπρεπής*, *πρέπειν* has its original sense of 'to be conspicuous,' but Aristotle treats it as if it meant 'to be fitting.'

§ 2. **πρός τι**, 'relative.'

τριηράρχῳ...ἀρχιθεωρῷ. The trierarchy was an *ἐγκύκλιος λῃτουργία* (Dict. Ant. s. v.), the *ἀρχιθεωρία* was an extraordinary one. The *ἀρχιθεωρός* had to equip the sacred pilgrimages to Delos, Olympia and elsewhere. See *Aθ. πολ.* 56, 3 *καθίστησι δὲ καὶ* (ὁ *ἄρχων*) *εἰς Δῆλον χορηγούς, καὶ ἀρχιθεωρὸν τῷ τριακοντορίῳ τῷ τοὺς ἠθέους ἄγοντι.* These are the *δὶς ἑπτά ἠθέους* of Plato, Phaid. 58 a and Bakchylides.

ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ, synonymous, 'the object.' Cf. above 1119 b, 25 n. The expression is condensed for *πρὸς τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ ὅ*. For the omission of the antecedent, cf. below 1122 b, 2.

§ 3. **πολλάκι κ.τ.λ.** Od. xvii, 420–1

Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ ποτε οἶκον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔναιον
ὄλβιος ἀφνειόν, καὶ πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτῃ.

§ 4. **μικροπρέπεια.** The word does not seem to occur before Aristotle.

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦταί, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ πρέπον γὰρ 5
35 δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ 6
1122 b γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὁρίζεται καὶ ὧν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δα-
5 πάνης ἄξιον δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ 7
ἕνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ 8
προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλ- 9

γειτνίασιν, οὓς καλοῦσί τινες ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας. οἷον εἰ εἰς γάμον δαπανῶν τις τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, πλούσιος ὤν, δοκεῖ πρέπειν ἑαυτῷ τοιαύτην κατασκευὴν οἷον ἀγαθοδαιμονιστὰς ἑστιῶντι, οὗτος μὲν μικροπρεπής, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους δεχόμενος ἐκείνως μὴ δόξης χάριν μηδὲ δι' ἐξουσίαν ὅμοιος τῷ σαλάκωνι, ὁ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπής· τὸ γὰρ πρέπον κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι [καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος (l. πράττοντος) κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον (περὶ ὃν Jackson)] καὶ περὶ ὅ (οἷον περὶ οἰκέτου γάμον ἕτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου) καὶ αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἐπὶ

ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κ.τ.λ. EE. 1233 a, 38. Isokr. Dem. 7 d *ἔστι φιλοκάλου μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές, καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ περίεργον.*

βαναυσία. The origin of the word is unknown, but its primitive application was clearly to mechanical arts unworthy of a free citizen. In the Politics we find it in this sense without any moral implication, e.g. 1277 b, 35 *ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον.*

ἀπειροκαλία, 'want of taste,' coupled with *ἀμουσία* in Plato, Rep. 403 c.

§ 5. **ἐπιστήμονι**, 'an artist,' 'a connoisseur.'

§ 6. **ἐν ἀρχῇ.** No such statement has yet been made, but that will not justify us in bracketing the sentence with Ramsauer. It has been implied throughout in the discussion of *ἕξεις* under the two heads *περὶ ποῖα* (=*ὧν ἐστιν*) and *πῶς* (=*ταῖς ἐνεργείαις*). The point here is that we must have *πρέπον μέγεθος* not only in the *ἐνέργεια*, i.e. the *δαπάνη*, but also in the *ἔργον*, the object of the *δαπάνη*. I therefore read **αἱ δὲ** for the MS. **αἱ δή**.

§ 8. **προετικῶς**, 'profusely,' already in Xen. Mem. iii, 1, 6.

ἀκριβολογία, 'nice counting of the cost.' This use of the word for the habit of *ἀκριβὴς λογισμός* instead of *ἀκριβὴς λόγος* (cf. *ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι* 1139 b, 19) is rare. The usual term for this is *μικρολογία* (Theophr. Char. 10). A similar idea, however, under-

λιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ
10 πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλο- 10
πρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος, περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον 15
τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν (τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυ-

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(*ἐστὶ* Jackson) *τοσοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ᾤετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προϋπάρξασαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ἔχων πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν [ὃ] οὐθεὶς τούτων. καὶ ἐπ' ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως· ἔστι γάρ τις οὔτ' ἐλεύθεριος οὔτ' ἀνελεύθερος.*

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lies the use of *ἀκριβής* in Andok. 33 § 19 *ἀκριβῶς διαιτᾶσθαι* and Menander fr. 235 Kock *ἀκριβὴς τοὺς τρόπους.* Cf. also Plato, Laws 844 b *ἐὰν δὲ δι' ἀκριβείας ᾖ* (*τὸ ὕδωρ*), i.e. so scarce that they have to count every bucketful.

§ 9. **πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου**, 'how much it will cost and how it can be done cheapest.'

§ 10. **ἐν τούτοις δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, sc. *ἐν τῷ ᾧ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.* 'It is here that the *μέγα* (i.e. the *μέγεθος*) of the *μεγαλοπρεπής* shows itself, and this is what liberality has to do with. He will produce a more magnificent result (than the *μικροπρεπής* or the *βάναυσος*) at the same expense.' The whole sentence is intended to show the likeness of the *ἐλευθέριος* and the *μεγαλοπρεπής*. It is not the actual amount that he spends which makes him munificent, but the way he spends it. The clause *ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης κ.τ.λ.* does not, I think, contrast Munificence with Liberality, but with its own excess and defect. Suppose the *μικροπρεπής* and the *βάναυσος* to spend the same sum as the *μεγαλοπρεπής* on a public object, the result will be neither *μέγα* nor *πρέπον*. In the one case it will be spoiled by a desire to do more for the money than can properly be done, in the other by the desire to make the *ἔργον* look expensive at the cost of higher qualities. Cf. 1122 a, 32.

οἷον μέγεθος, *quasi dicas μέγεθος.* Aristotle uses *οἷον* to introduce explanations of an etymology. Cf. 1128 a, 10.

κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Public munificence is not to be gauged by its money value like property, but by its impressive character. The word *θεωρία* is a characteristic Greek touch. The munificent man is the man who provides fine 'sights,' processions, tragedies, public buildings and the like. The Athenians were born *φιλοθεάμονες.* The munificent man produces something 'grand,' not merely something costly.

μαστόν)· καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ [μεγαλοπρέπεια] ἐν μεγέθει. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ 11
περὶ θεούς, ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. ἐν ἅπασι δ' 12
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι πρέπειν—διὸ 13
πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἠλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς—πρέ- 14
πει δὲ [καὶ] οἷς τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. 'The goodness of an *ἔργον* lies in its grandeur,' not in its cost. I bracket *μεγαλοπρέπεια* with Muretus. Its shifting place in the MSS. indicates that it is an adscript.

§ 11. **τίμια.** Cf. 1101 b, 11 n.

κατασκευαί. The word is used absolutely for 'buildings.' Here temples etc. are clearly meant.

πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητα. This is said to mean 'objects of patriotic ambition.' But *εὐφιλοτίμητα* is a very strange word, and ought to mean 'easy objects of ambition.' I believe that we should read *οὐκ εὐφιλοτίμητα* or *ἀφιλοτίμητα* (the confusion of *εὐ-* and *ἀ-* is constant in MSS.). The greatest *λῃτουργίαι* were far from being objects of public ambition, as we know; but just for that reason they attract the *μεγαλοπρεπής*. Cf. what is said of the *μεγαλόψυχος* 1124 b, 23. Dion. Hal. has the phrase *εἰς τὰ κοινὰ ἀφιλοτιμία*.

λαμπρῶς is a word of constant occurrence in connexion with the *λῃτουργίαι*.

ἑστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. The *λῃτουργία* of the *ἑστιάτορες* was simply *ἑστιᾶν τὴν φύλην*, and this might conceivably be *πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν φιλοτίμητον*. Here we have something 'grander,' appealing only to a *μεγαλοπρεπής* like Konon who *τῇ περὶ Κνίδον ναυμαχίᾳ νικήσας Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τειχίσας τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἑκατόμβην τῷ ὄντι θύσας καὶ οὐ ψευδωνύμως πάντας Ἀθηναίους εἱστίασεν.* (Athenaeus i, 3 d.)

§ 12. **τίνων ὑπαρχόντων,** 'what are his antecedents?' The reference is not merely to property, though it includes that.

πρέπειν. The sentence continues after the parenthesis with *πρέπει δὲ* (b, 29). Bywater, Contr. p. 38. For the example given in EE. 1233 b, 11 (p. 175), cf. Plutarch, Them. 5 *εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν ἐλθὼν Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ διαμιλλώμενος τῷ Κίμωνι περὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σκηνὰς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην λαμπρότητα καὶ παρασκευήν, οὐκ ἤρεσκε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὄντι νέῳ καὶ ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγάλης ᾤοντο δεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχωρεῖν· ὁ δὲ μήπω γνώριμος γεγονώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δοκῶν ἐξ οὐχ ὑπαρχόντων παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαίρεσθαι, προσωφλίσκανεν ἀλαζονείαν.*

προγόνων ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει
15 καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα· τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα 35
εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ περί 1123 a
τι ἡ πᾶσα πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ δωρεὰς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. 5
16 μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ (κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος), καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων (κάλλιστα
17 γὰρ ταῦτα), καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἁρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ. καὶ ἐπεὶ 10
τῶν δαπανημάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον <ἁπλῶς> μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ
18 ἐν τούτοις μέγα, καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι—σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ ἡ καλλίστη ἢ λήκυθος μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἔχει παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἡ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ 15
19 ἀνελεύθερον—διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν (τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέρβλη-
20 τον) καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ βάναυσος τῷ

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§ 14. **ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν,** 'those they have to do with' by relationship (*τῶν γένει προσηκόντων*) or otherwise.

§ 15. **τῶν δὲ ἰδίων,** 'private' as opposed to *τὰ περὶ θεούς* and *τὰ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν*.

ξένων...ἀποστολάς. Specially used in connexion with gifts given to the parting guest.

§ 17. **ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.** A long compound protasis which goes down to a, 14 *δαπανήματι*, followed by a parenthesis (a, 14 *σφαῖρα*...a, 16 *ἀνελεύθερον*). The apodosis begins at a, 16 *διὰ τοῦτο*.

ἁπλῶς, inserted by Bywater (Contr. p. 38), seems necessary to make an antithesis to *ἐνταῦθα*. 'Expenditure is munificent *ἁπλῶς* when it is great expenditure on a great object, in a given kind of expenditure, it is what is great in that kind.' The words *ἐνταῦθα* and *ἐν τούτοις* are equivalent to *ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει*.

§ 20. **βάναυσος.** Cf. above 1107 b, 19. 1122 a, 31, where *βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία* are coupled. Eudemos (loc. cit. p. 174) speaks of *ἀπειροκάλους καὶ σαλάκωνας*, and Theophrastos (ap. Stob. II, 140 Wachsm.) called the *ὑπερβολή* by the name

παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἑστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅτι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνείδη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες. 20 21 22

III. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνό-

1123 a, 34. EE. 1232 a, 19 *περὶ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας ἐκ τῶν τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις ἀποδιδομένων δεῖ διορίσαι τὸ ἴδιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ*

of *σαλακωνία*. Cf. also Hesych. s.v. *σαλακωνεῦσαι*. *Ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος σαλάκωνά φησιν εἶναι τὸν δαπανῶντα ὅπου μὴ δεῖ*. Cf. Rhet. 1391 a, 3 (of the *ἤθη* which go with wealth) *καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες· τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας εἰωθέναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἐρώμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῷ οἴεσθαι ζηλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἃ καὶ αὐτοί*.

παρὰ μέλος, i.q. *πλημμελῶς*, *absone*, opposed to *ἐμμελῶς* (1122 a, 35) for which Plato has *ἐν μέλει* Soph. 427 d. Cf. also *παρὰ μέλος φθέγξασθαι*, *εἰπεῖν* Phileb. 28 b, Kritias 106 b, Laws 696 d and EE. 1233 a, 39 (p. 173).

ἐρανιστάς, "Ἔρανος being a club where each member entertained in turn, or an entertainment where each guest contributed, it was of course bad taste to eclipse the rest in splendour." Grant. Eudemos refers to *ἀγαθοδαιμονισταί*.

κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν. For the cost of a comic *χορηγία* Zell refers to Lys. p. 699 *κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν Κηφισοδότῳ ἐνίκων καὶ ἀνήλωσα σὺν τῇ τῆς σκευῆς ἀναθέσει ἑκκαίδεκα μνᾶς*. A tragic *χορηγία* might cost 30 minae.

ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ, sc. *τοῦ χοροῦ*.

ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαροῖ. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38. Megarian comedy was thought *φορτικόν* at Athens.

§ **21. ἐν μικρῷ...ἀπολεῖ** are to be taken together. He will spoil the beauty of his work 'for a trifle' (Welldon). This use of *ἐν* resembles its use in the phrase *κινδυνεύειν ἐν* c. dat. for which see Kühner § 431, 1.

III. § **1. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία**, best rendered 'Pride.'

ματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν· διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμ- 1123 b 35 2 3 5

ἄλλα <ἃ> κατὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν καὶ ὁμοιότητα μέχρι του λανθάνει πόρρω προϊόντα, καὶ περὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ταὐτὸ συμβέβηκεν. διὸ ἐνίοτε οἱ ἐναντίοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιποιοῦνται, οἷον ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ αὐθάδης τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοροι μέχρι τινός, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομενετικὸς κινδύνων καὶ ὁ θρασύς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὧδε ὁ δ' ὧδε· ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει πλεῖστον. λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν μεγέθει τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. ὥστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ ὅμοιος εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅτε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται.

περὶ ποῖα...πρῶτον. Cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

λάβωμεν. For the dialectical phrase *λαβεῖν περί* with an interrogative cf. 1130 b, 7. 1139 a, 15. 1168 b, 13.

§ **2. τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν**, 'the man who corresponds to the *ἕξις*,' who embodies the type. Cf. 1126 b, 20. For the *τόπος* of *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*, cf. Top. 147 a, 12.

§ **3. δοκεῖ δή...εἶναι.** These words are enough to show that Aristotle is not depicting an ethical ideal of his own, as has been supposed, but is still analysing *ἔνδοξα*. His own ideal we learn from Book X; this is the ideal of the average Hellene, and the character described reminds one of Περικλέης οὐλύμπιος. The description itself has much quiet humour and is surely half-ironical. In An. Post. 97 b, 15 Aristotle takes the search for the definition of the *μεγαλόψυχος* as an illustration of method—*οἷον λέγω εἴ τί ἐστι μεγαλοψυχία ζητοῦμεν, σκεπτέον ἐπί τινων μεγαλοψύχων οὗς ἴσμεν (σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν) τί ἔχουσιν ἐν πάντες ᾗ τοιοῦτοι. οἷον εἰ Ἀλκιβιάδης μεγαλόψυχος ἦ Ἀχιλλεὺς καὶ ὁ Αἴας, τί ἓν ἅπαντες; τὸ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι ὑβριζόμενοι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπολέμησεν, ὁ δ' ἐμήνισεν, ὁ δ' ἀπέκτεινεν ἑαυτόν. πάλιν ἐφ' ἑτέρων, οἷον Λυσάνδρου ἢ Σωκράτους, εἰ δὴ τὸ ἀδιάφοροι εἶναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχοῦντες, ταῦτα δύο λαβὼν σκοπῶ τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἔχουσιν ἥ τε ἀπάθεια ἡ περὶ τὰς τύχας καὶ ἡ μὴ ὑπομονὴ ἀτιμαζομένων* (the definition here fulfils this condition). *εἰ δὲ μηδέν, δύο εἴδη ἂν εἴη τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας.*

§ **4. σώφρων**, here in its popular sense, equivalent to *κόσμιος*, 'modest.'

§ **5. τὸ κάλλος κ.τ.λ.** Cf. Poet. 1450 b, 34 *ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἔκ τινων οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν*. Pol. 1326 a, 33 *ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι*. Probl. 915 b, 37. 920 b, 29.

μετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν 6
χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων 7
ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάντε μεγάλων ἐάντε μετρίων, ἐάντε
καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ
μάλιστ' ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει εἰ
μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν με- 8
γέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸν
ἀξιοῖ, οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὴ μεγά- 9
λων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ
ἓν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη. ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· 10
μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ
μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς 11
ἀγαθῶν· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν
ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθῶς κρῖναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπαινετόν. δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ' εἶναι μεγάλα ἃ διώκει ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχων ἕξιν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα [εἶναι ἡδέα]. ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία κρατίστη· κρίνει δ' ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρετὴ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ὀρθῶς, ἅπερ ὁ φρόνιμος ἂν κελεύσειε καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὥστε ἕπεσθαι αὐτῇ πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἢ αὐτὴν ἕπεσθαι πάσαις.

1123 b, 13. EE. 1232 b, 14 οὕτω μὲν οὖν δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίως ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ εἶναί τε μάλιστα περὶ τιμὴν καὶ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν [καὶ] δόξης οὐχ ὁμολογεῖσθαι. δεῖ δὴ τοῦτο διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ τιμὴ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλη διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ πολλῶν τῶν τυχόντων ἢ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀξίων λόγου, καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐπὶ τίνι ἡ τιμὴ διαφέρει. μεγάλη γὰρ οὐ τῷ πλήθει τῶν τιμώντων οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τιμίαν εἶναι· τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τἆλλα ἀγαθὰ τίμια καὶ ἄξια σπουδῆς ταῦτα ὅσα μεγάλα ἀληθῶς ἐστιν,

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§ 6. **χαῦνος.** The literal sense of this word is 'gaping.' It is then applied to anything porous, spongy or loose (Liddell and Scott) as for instance snow. It is from this that the meaning 'flimsy,' 'frothy,' 'inane' is derived.

§ 8. **τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1107 a, 6 *διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.*

§ 11. **ἄνευ λόγου,** 'we need not prove,' i.e. it is evident on the face of it even apart from the explanation or ground. Cf. 1131 a, 13. 1142 b, 2.

τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα [οἱ μεγάλοι] ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,
κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς
ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν γε μεγαλόψυχον. ὁ
δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. καὶ
δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα.
οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι,
οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα;
καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ
μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος
φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ ἀπονέμεται

ὥστε καὶ ἀρετὴ οὐδεμία ἄνευ μεγέθους· διὸ δοκοῦσι μεγαλοψύχους ποιεῖν ἑκάστη, περὶ ὅ ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστί τις παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς μία μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἰδίᾳ μεγαλόψυχον τοῦτον λεκτέον τὸν ἔχοντα ταύτην. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἕνια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν τίμια τὰ δ' ὡς διωρίσθη πρότερον, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὰ δὲ μικρά, καὶ τούτων ἔνιοι ἄξιοι καὶ ἀξιοῦσιν αὑτούς, ἐν τούτοις ζητητέος ὁ μεγαλόψυχος. τετραχῶς δ' ἀνάγκη διαφέρειν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἄξιον εἶναι μεγάλων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δὲ μικρὰ καὶ ἄξιόν τινα τηλικούτων καὶ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τούτων, ἔστι δ' ἀνάπαλιν πρὸς ἑκάτερα αὐτῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτος οἷος ἄξιος ὢν μικρῶν μεγάλων ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ ἄξιος ὢν μεγάλων ἀξιοίη ἂν μικρῶν ἑαυτόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄξιος μικρῶν, μεγάλων δ' ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν ψεκτός (ἀνόητον γὰρ καὶ οὐ καλὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τυγχάνειν), ψεκτὸς δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἄξιος ὢν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ τῶν τοιούτων μετέχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν· λείπεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἐναντίος τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις, ὅστις ὢν

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§ 12. **οἱ μεγάλοι.** For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 38.

§ 14. **τὸ...μέγα,** 'the grand.' Everything is 'on the grand scale' with the *μεγαλόψυχος.*

§ 15. **φεύγειν παρασείσαντι.** The meaning is made quite clear by De Motu Animalium 705 a, 17 *καὶ οἱ θέοντες θᾶττον θέουσι παρασείοντες τὰς χεῖρας,* Probl. 881 b, 6 *ὁ δὲ θᾶττον θεῖ παρασείων ἢ μὴ παρασείων.* The attitude is familiar from vase-paintings and is certainly beneath the dignity of our hero. Is it possible not to see that this is a humorous touch?

1124 a τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος 16
τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκἀγαθίας. μάλιστα 17
5 μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν.
10 τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ 18
εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν
15 μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται· ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τἆλλα.
20 διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα 19
συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπό τινων·
25 κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητός· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω 20
ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ

ἄξιος μεγάλων ἀξιοῖ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τούτων, καὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν οἷος ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὗτος ἐπαινετὸς καὶ μέσος τούτων. ἐπεὶ οὖν περὶ τιμῆς αἵρεσιν καὶ χρῆσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐντίμων ἀρίστη ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποδίδομεν, καὶ οὐ περὶ τὰ χρήσιμα, τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης αὕτη ἐπαινετωτάτη, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία μεσότης ἂν εἴη.

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§ 16. **κόσμος...τῶν ἀρετῶν.** Simply 'an adornment of goodness.' Grant rightly translates 'the crown of the virtues.'

§ 19. **τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον.** For this *τόπος*, cf. Top. 117 a, 16.

τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς
21 παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ 30
ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν κατα- 1124 b
φρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὁμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρο-
22 νοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως κατα- 5
23 φρονεῖ—δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς—οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς
24 οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. 10

1124 b, 1. EE. 1232 a, 38 ἔτι δοκεῖ μεγαλοψύχου εἶναι τὸ καταφρονητικὸν εἶναι. ἑκάστη δ' ἀρετὴ καταφρονητικοὺς ποιεῖ τῶν παρὰ τὸν λόγον μεγάλων, οἷον ἀνδρεία κινδύνων (μέγα γὰρ οἴεται εἶναι (ὑπομεῖναί τι Fritzsche) τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ πλῆθος (πάθος Fritzsche) οὐ πᾶν φοβερόν), καὶ σώφρων ἡδονῶν μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐλευθέριος χρημάτων. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἑτέρῳ τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος τί δοκεῖ ἑνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν ἀπολογίαν ἐπαινέσαντα. καὶ τὸ ὀλίγωρον τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστ' εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον. πάλιν περὶ τιμῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν καὶ πλούτου, περὶ ὧν σπουδάζειν δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐθὲν φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πλὴν περὶ τιμῆς. καὶ λυπήσεται ἀτιμαζόμενος καὶ ἀρχόμενος ὑπὸ ἀναξίου. καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα τυγχάνων.

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§ 21. **καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ.** Those who have wealth and power (without goodness) become haughty *too*. We have seen already (a, 20) that the *μεγαλόψυχος* is considered supercilious. As Aristotle goes on to say, haughtiness is the one point in which they can successfully imitate the *μεγαλόψυχος*.

ἐν οἷς δύνανται. Cf. 1115 b, 31.

§ 23. **μικροκίνδυνος.** L^b and Aspasios have *πυκνοκίνδυνος*.

ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν κ.τ.λ. 'Life at any price is not worth having.' The adverb *πάντως* corresponds in meaning to the verbal phrase *πᾶν ποιεῖν*.

καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γάρ οἱ προσοφλήσει
ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημο- 25
νεύειν οὗ ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ (ἐλάττων
γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν), καὶ
15 τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούειν, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ
λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί, οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ 26
μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόλις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς
μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ
20 τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ
σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ
ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθε-

§ 24. **ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων**, 'he is apt to return it by a greater benefit.' For the reading in the next clause, see Bywater, Contr. p. 39. By **ὁ ὑπάρξας** is meant the man who *starts* the interchange of benefits, 'the original benefactor.' Cf. 1136 b, 13. 1163 b, 21. In the same way ὁ *ὑπάρχων* is the aggressor in war as opposed to ὁ *ἀμυνόμενος*.

§ 25. **δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle enjoys noting the *travers* of this character. The *μεγαλόψυχος* was an object of raillery from the days of the Old Comedy downwards, — Perikles got his share,—but all the same he was the type that all true Hellenes inwardly admired.

οὗ ἄν, neuter, 'any benefit they have conferred.' This is Bywater's correction of MS. *οὕς* (Asp. *ὧν*). See Contr. p. 39. If we keep *οὕς*, we shall have to insert *ὑφ'* before *ὧν* with Münscher.

ἀκούειν, sc. *δοκοῦσι*, 'to be told of.' Bywater's correction of MS. *ἀκούει* (Contr. p. 39).

διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν κ.τ.λ. This seems to be referred to as if it were a well-known difficulty. Achilles had told Thetis to remind Zeus of certain definite services she had done him (Il. i, 394 sqq.), but she contents herself with saying *εἴποτε δή σε μετ' ἀθανάτοισιν ὄνησα | ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργῳ* (ib. 503). The question why she did not take her son's advice is just the sort of *πρόβλημα* that ancient critics propounded, and Aristotle here gives the *λύσις*. Cf. Poet. c. 25.

οἱ Λάκωνες. The schol. quotes Kallisthenes *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν* who related *ὅτι Θηβαίων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν εἰσβαλλόντων, ἔπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμμαχίας δεόμενοι, λέγοντες ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅσα μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεποιήκασιν εὖ τούτων ἐπελάθοντο ἑκόντες, ἃ δ' αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων ἐπεπόνθεσαν τούτων ἐμέμνηντο, ὡς διὰ τούτων αὐτοὺς ἐπαξόμενοι πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον*. If this refers to 369 B.C., the speeches in Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 33 do not bear it out.

§ 26. **ἐπ' ἐκείνοις...ἐν δὲ τοῖς.** Both expressions are admissible. For *ἐπί* cf. *χαίρειν ἐπί*, and for *ἐν* cf. *γέλωτ' ἐν σοὶ γελῶ*. Aristotle likes to vary his prepositions. So we have immediately after **εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς.**

27 νεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι· καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὗ πρω-
τεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου
τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων 25
28 δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῆ εἶναι καὶ
φανερόφιλον (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου, καὶ ἀμελεῖν
τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν
φανερῶς (παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι,
καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ] 30
29 πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν
ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ· διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κό- 1125 a
30 λακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·
οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστιν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ
μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ
31 μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑ- 5
τοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει
αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός
ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι'
32 ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς
καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. 10
33 καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν
34 καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κί-
νησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ
βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα

§ 27. **εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα κ.τ.λ.**, i.e., if I am right, he reserves himself for *τὰ ἀφιλοτίμητα*. Cf. above 1122 b, 22 n.

§ 28. **ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** On the reading and interpretation of this passage see Bywater, Contr. p. 39. The MS. tradition is more confused than anywhere in the Ethics.

ἀληθευτικός, 'frank.' Cf. below 1127 a, 13 sqq.

δι' εἰρωνείαν. For the meaning of this word see below 1127 a, 21 n. The proud man affects a certain mock-humility in order to evade those who would trouble him with small matters. "I fear that is not quite in my line."

§ 29. **πρὸς ἄλλον...ζῆν**, 'to take his rule of life from another.' The preposition *πρός* is used of the standard. So *πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν*, *πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν ζῆν* etc.

§ 31. **ἀνθρωπολόγος**, apparently here only. The proud man does not care for personal conversation.

εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. The proud man will not indulge in weak abuse, though, when he wants to insult and humiliate people, he will speak his mind freely enough.

§ 34. **καὶ κίνησις δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle knows in his heart that the *μεγαλόψυχος* is something of a *poseur*.

σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων.

Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι (οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοί εἰσιν), ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἠλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἠλίθιοι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

IV. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἡ δόξειεν ἂν παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἄμφω γὰρ αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ· ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον ψέγομεν ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δ' ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴπομεν. δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φέρομεν ἀεὶ τὸ φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες

σύντονος, 'shrill,' as is shown by Gen. An. 786 b, 35 *δοκεῖ γενναιοτέρας εἶναι φύσεως ἡ βαρυφωνία καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ βέλτιον ἐν ὑπεροχῇ, ἡ δὲ βαρύτης ὑπεροχή τις.* This seems better than making it a mere synonym of *σπευστικός*. We want a word for the voice as well as one for the gait. So *ὀξυφωνία* immediately afterwards.

§ 35. **οὐδ' οὗτοι**, any more than the *μικροπρεπής* and the *βάναυσος*. Cf. 1123 a, 31.

ὀκνηροί, 'backward,' 'shy,' 'retiring.' They are not *ἠλίθιοι* like the others. Cf. 1123 b, 3.

1125 a, 17. EE. 1233 a, 9 *τῶν δ' ἐναντίων, ὥσπερ διεγράψαμεν, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἀγαθῶν μεγάλων ἀνάξιον ὄντα χαυνότης (τοὺς τοιούτους γὰρ χαύνους λέγομεν, ὅσοι μεγάλων οἴονται ἄξιοι εἶναι οὐκ ὄντες), ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἄξιον ὄντα μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν μεγάλων μικροψυχία (μικροψύχου γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὅστις ὑπαρχόντων δι' ἃ δικαίως ἂν ἠξιοῦτο, μὴ ἀξιοῖ μηθενὸς μεγάλου ἑαυτόν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν εἶναι μεσότητα χαυνότητος καὶ μικροψυχίας. ὁ δὲ τέταρτος τῶν διορισθέντων οὔτε πάμπαν ψεκτὸς οὔτε μεγαλόψυχος, περὶ οὐδὲν ἔχ<ον> ὧν μέγεθος· οὔτε γὰρ ἄξιος οὔτε ἀξιοῖ μεγάλων, διὸ οὐκ ἐναντίος. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλων ἀξίῳ ὄντι μεγάλων τὸ μικρῶν ὄντα ἄξιον <μικρῶν> ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτόν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἐναντίος οὔτε τῷ μὴ μεμπτὸς εἶναι (ὡς γὰρ ὁ λόγος κελεύει, ἔχει)· καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τῇ φύσει τῷ μεγαλοψύχῳ (ὧν γὰρ ἄξιοι, τούτων ἀξιοῦσιν αὑτοὺς ἄμφω)· καὶ ὃ μὲν γένοιτ' ἂν μεγαλόψυχος (ἀξιώσει γὰρ ὧν ἐστιν ἄξιος), ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, ὃς ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ μεγάλων κατὰ τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἀξιοῖ, τί ἂν ἐποίει εἰ μικρῶν ἄξιος ἦν; εἰ γὰρ [ἂν] μεγάλων ἀξιῶν χαῦνος ἦν, * * ἢ ἐλαττόνων ἔτι. διὸ καὶ οὐθεὶς ἂν εἴποι μικρόψυχον, εἴ τις μέτοικος ὢν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ ἑαυτόν, ἀλλ' ὑπείκει· ἀλλ' εἴ τις εὐγενὴς ὢν καὶ ἡγούμενος μέγα εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν.*

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§ 36. **σχήματι**, 'manner.'

§ 37. **ἀντιτίθεται**. We expect *ἀντίκειται*, but cf. 1145 a, 25 n.

καὶ γὰρ γίνεται κ.τ.λ. See notes on 1109 a, 6 and a, 12.

IV. § 1. **ταύτην**, sc. *τὴν τιμήν*. **ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις** 1107 b, 24.

§ 4. **πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτου λεγομένου**, 'as *φιλο*-so-and-so is ambiguous, it is clear that we do not always apply the name *φιλότιμον* (on the reading, Bywater, Contr. p. 40) to the same thing.' In other words, compounds with *φιλο*- sometimes have a good sense, sometimes a bad one. Mr Stewart instances *φιλομαθής* and *φίλοινος*. On **φιλοτοιούτου** cf. 1099 a, 9 n., 1118 b, 22 n., and for **φέρειν ὄνομα ἐπί τι** 'to *apply* a name to a thing,' see 1119 a, 34 n.

μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωνύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον· ὀρέγονται δὲ τῆς τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον· ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· ἐπαινεῖται δ' οὖν ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

V. Πρᾳότης δ' ἐστὶ μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς· ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τὴν πρᾳότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης τις λέγοιτ' ἄν.

1125 b, 26. EE. 1231 b, 5 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ληπτέον καὶ περὶ πρᾳότητος καὶ χαλεπότητος· καὶ γὰρ τὸν πρᾷον περὶ λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ θυμοῦ γιγνομένην ὁρῶμεν ὄντα, τῷ πρὸς ταύτην ἔχειν πώς. διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ καὶ χαλεπῷ καὶ ἀγρίῳ

τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. On this test see 1118 b, 23 n. It is put here to vary the expression. The more accurate μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ follows in the next clause.

ὡς ἐρήμης...ἀμφισβητεῖν. In the sense of 'lay claim to' ἀμφισβητεῖν takes the genitive like ἀντιποιεῖσθαι (e.g. Pol. 1283 a, 11 ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, Isaios 3, § 1 οὐδεὶς προσεποιήσατο οὐδ' ἠμφεσβήτησε τῆς κληρονομίας). The best commentary is the parallel passage 1107 b, 31 ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας. We are not to understand δίκης with ἐρήμης, for the allusion is to the κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἐπιδικασίαι, and in that connexion ἔρημος means 'unclaimed.' Cf. Ἀθ. πολ. c. 43, 4 καὶ τὰς λήξεις τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ὅπως μηδένα λάθῃ μηδὲν ἔρημον γενόμενον, Isokr. Aigin. § 3 τὸν οἶκον ἔρημον ποιῆσαι, and especially Isaios 3 § 61 ὡς ἐρήμων τῶν κλήρων ἐπιδικάζεσθαι.

§ 6. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Cf. 1108 b, 19—25.

ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. If ὁ μέσος had a name, one or other of the ἄκροι would have been thought μᾶλλον ἀντικεῖσθαι τῷ μέσῳ. As it is, they are only opposed to one another.

V. **§ 1. Πρᾳότης,** 'good temper,' 'patience.'

φέρομεν, 'we apply the name Patience to the mean.' See 1119 a, 34 n.

ἀνώνυμον οὖσαν. But see EE. 1231 b, 8 διεγράψαμεν δὲ καὶ ἀντεθήκαμεν τῷ ὀργίλῳ (EN. 1126 a, 13) καὶ χαλεπῷ (EN. 1126 a, 26) καὶ ἀγρίῳ...τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη (EN. 1126 a, 8) καὶ τὸν ἀνόητον (cf. ἠλίθιοι EN. 1126 a, 5).

τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾷος δὴ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πρᾳότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾷος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. ἁμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾷος ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς ἐστιν εἴθ' ὁτιδήποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός, τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες. ἡ δ'

(πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι διαθέσεως) τὸν ἀνδραποδώδη καὶ τὸν ἀνόητον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῦτα μάλιστα καλοῦσι τοὺς μηδ' ἐφ' ὅσοις δεῖ κινουμένους τὸν θυμόν, ἀλλὰ προπηλακιζομένους εὐχερῶς καὶ ταπεινοὺς πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγωρίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἀντικείμενον τῷ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ μόλις, τῷ δ' ἠρέμα τὸ σφόδρα, τῷ δὲ πολὺν χρόνον τὸ ὀλίγον λυπεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν λύπην ἣν καλοῦμεν θυμόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴπομεν, καὶ ἐνταῦθ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις (ὁ μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸς τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, ὁ καὶ θᾶττον καὶ μᾶλλον πάσχων καὶ πλείω χρόνον καὶ ὅτ' οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὁποίοις οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλοῖς, ὁ δ' ἀνδραποδώδης τοὐναντίον), δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ὁ μέσος τῆς ἀνισότητος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡμαρτημέναι ἀμφότεραι αἱ ἕξεις ἐκεῖναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐπιεικὴς ἡ μέση τούτων ἕξις· οὔτε γὰρ προτερεῖ οὔθ' ὑστερίζει οὔτε οἷς οὐ δεῖ ὀργίζεται οὔτε οἷς δεῖ οὐκ ὀργίζεται. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ πρᾳότης ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη ἐστίν, εἴη καὶ ἡ πρᾳότης μεσότης τις, καὶ ὁ πρᾷος μέσος τοῦ χαλεποῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους.

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§ 3. **ἐφ' οἷς** neut., **οἷς** masc.

βούλεται ... εἶναι, 'we mean by patient one who is imperturbable and not led on by feeling.'

ἐπὶ τούτοις neut., cf. above **ἐφ' οἷς.**

§ 5. **εἴτ' ἀοργησία.** Eudemos and MM. call it ἀναλγησία, on which see 1100 b, 32 n. Probably the usage by which ἀνάλγητος meant rather 'coarse' or 'stupid' prevented Aristotle from giving it this more restricted sense. Cf. 1115 b, 26 n.

ἐφ' οἷς, neuter. Cf. 1125 b, 31 n.

§ 6. **αἰσθάνεσθαι,** like *sentire,* 'to have a sense of one's position,' to realise what is going on whether pleasant or otherwise. Hence ἀναίσθητος, cf. 1104 a, 24 n.

ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται—καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θᾶττον, καὶ πλείω
χρόνον,—οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
δύναιτ' εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν ὁλό-
κληρον ᾖ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν 8
ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ
δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμ-
βαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ'
ἀνταποδιδόασιν ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἶτ' ἀπο-
παύονται. ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκράχολοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς 9
πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροὶ 10
δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ
τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῷ· ἡ γὰρ
τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα.
τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπι-
φανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὑτῷ δὲ πέψαι
τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖται. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότα-
τοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' 11
οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω
χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.
τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ 12
γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται—ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι—
καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους. ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 13

1126 a, 13. EE. 1221 b, 10 αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων εἴδη κατονομάζεται τῷ διαφέρειν κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ χρόνου ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ πρός τι τῶν ποιούντων τὰ πάθη. λέγω δ' οἷον ὀξύθυμος μὲν τῷ θᾶττον πάσχειν ἢ δεῖ, χαλεπὸς δὲ καὶ θυμώδης τῷ μᾶλλον, πικρὸς δὲ τῷ φυλακτικὸς εἶναι τῆς ὀργῆς, πλήκτης δὲ καὶ λοιδορητικὸς ταῖς κολάσεσι ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.

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§ 8. **ᾗ φανεροί εἰσι**, sc. *ἀνταποδιδόντες*, 'in an open way.'

§ 10. **ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1117 a, 6 n.

τὸ βάρος. "The *πικρός* has as it were a load of indigestible anger in him." Stewart.

δεῖται. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 41. The metaphor of digesting anger is at least as old as Homer. Cf. Il. i, 81.

§ 12. **μᾶλλον γίνεται κ.τ.λ.** See notes on 1109 a, 6 and 12.

ἀνθρωπικώτερον. Cf. 1111 b, 1 n.

συμβιοῦν. We have the more correct *συζῆν* below 1126 b, 11.

πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον
χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ ἁμαρ-
τάνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ 35
τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας
ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀν- 1126 b
δρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκ-
βαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον 14
δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργι- 5
ζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα,
αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν
γινόμεναι ἠρέμα, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ 15
τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν. 10

VI. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα
πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι
δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις
πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φρον- 15
τίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ

1126 b, 11. EE. 1233 b, 29 φιλία δὲ μεσότης ἔχθρας καὶ κολα-

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§ 13. **οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον...ἀνθεκτέον.** This passage is repeated almost verbally from 1109 b, 14 sqq.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, sc. *τὰ τοιαῦτα* (1109 b, 23). **κἀν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις**, sc. *τῶν τοιούτων*. See the note on 1109 b, 23. The reading *κἀν* for MS. *καὶ* is due to Professor Bywater. The parallel passage has *καὶ ἐν*.

VI. § 1. **Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις κ.τ.λ.** Eudemos says (1234 a, 24) that these are not *ἀρεταί· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ.* They are mere *παθητικαὶ μεσότητες*. The author of the Magna Moralia says (1193 a, 35) *εἰ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἢ μὴ ἀρεταί, ἄλλος ἂν εἴη λόγος.* We see how the notion of *ἀρετή* had been narrowed and starved. The principle of the Mean must apply here too if it is any good at all. Cf. below 1127 a, 14—17.

ἄρεσκοι. The *ἄρεσκος* is beautifully described by Theophrastos. The 'Good-natured Man' has always been a type in Comedy. The Schol. here says *ὥσπερ ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν κωμῳδιοποιῶν προαγόμενος Ὅμοιος.*

§ 2. **δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες.** There were comedies entitled *Δύσκολος* by Mnesimachos and Menander. For *δύσεριs* cf. Isokr. Demon. 8 d, *ὁμιλητικὸς δ' ἔσει, μὴ δύσεριs ὢν μηδὲ δυσάρεστος.*

εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν ἀποδέξεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ· ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ 4
20 τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλίᾳ. τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ 5
πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος
25 εἶναι. ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις ὡς ἁρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, 6
ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάσεται
30 τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ 7
λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις γινομένας· τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστι μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν· κἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικράν, ἢ βλάβην, ἡ δ' ἐναντίωσις
35 μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφόρως 8
δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον
1127 a ἢ ἧττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς,

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κείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐχερῶς ἅπαντα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμιλῶν κόλαξ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἁπάσας ἀντικρούων ἀπεχθητικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ [τε] πρὸς ἅπασαν ἡδονὴν μήτ' ἀκολουθῶν μήτ' ἀντιτείνων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον βέλτιστον, φίλος.

1126 b, 36. EE. 1233 b, 34 σεμνότης δὲ μεσότης αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδὲν πρὸς ἕτερον ζῶν καταφρονητικὸς αὐθάδης,

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§ 4. **φιλίᾳ.** The Greeks had no word for 'amiability.' Aristotle is careful to note the difference between *φιλία* in that sense and the *ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον* discussed in Books VIII and IX. With the addition of affection (*τὸ στέργειν προσλαβών*) the amiable man becomes the friend. Without it he is not so, for his amiability does not depend on feeling for another, but on his own character (*τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι*).

§ 8. **διαφόρως.** The usual reading is *διαφερόντως*. It is true that Aristotle often uses this word incorrectly in the sense of 'differently'; but here K^b has *διαφερόντως διαφόρως δ'*, which may perhaps justify us in substituting the more Attic adverb.

ἑκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἱρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ᾖ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαῦθις μεγάλης μικρὰ 5
9 λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ· τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ διά τι ἄλλο ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχε- ραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ 10
φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

VII. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδόν ἐστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς 15
τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλόν τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητας εἶναι τὰς ἀρε- τὰς πιστεύσαιμεν ἄν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες. ἐν δὴ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν 20
2 ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ

ὁ δὲ πάντα πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ καὶ πάντων ἐλάττων ἄρεσκος, ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους οὕτως ἔχων σεμνός.

1127 a, 12. EE. 1233 b, 38 ὁ δὲ ἀληθὴς καὶ ἁπλοῦς, ὃν

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§ 9. **τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν... ὁ δὲ...** For the construction cf. 1110 b, 22.

κόλαξ. The *κόλαξ* is the Parasite of the New Comedy. Athenaeus vi, 235 c sqq. has a learned dissertation on the words. The word *παράσιτος* was originally *σεμνὸν καὶ ἱερόν*, being the name of certain persons associated with the priests in the sacrificial meal. Accordingly *οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ποιηταὶ τοὺς παρασίτους κόλακας ἐκάλουν*. Eupolis wrote a comedy entitled *Κόλακες*, satirising Kallias the son of Hipponikos and his train of parasites. The first to use the word *παράσιτος* in its later sense was *Ἀραρὼς ἐν Ὑμεναίῳ* (Kock II, 218).

ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1125 b, 24.

VII. § 1. **Περὶ τὰ αὐτά**, sc. *περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας καὶ τὸ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν* (1126 b, 11).

ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης, 'the mean between *ἀλαζονεία* and its opposite.' It is unnecessary to insert *καὶ (τῆς) εἰρωνείας* with Imelmann and recent editors. It is idiomatic Greek to omit one of the extremes with *μέσος* and *μεταξύ*; cf. Aristophanes, Birds, 187 *ἐν μέσῳ δήπουθεν ἀήρ ἐστι γῆς (καὶ οὐρανοῦ)*.

οὐ χεῖρον κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1126 b, 11 n.

§ 2. **ἐλάττων.** The original meaning of *ἀλαζών* was 'vagrant'

ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν 3
ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέ- 4
καστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς κἀν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ
ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε
ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ 5
μηδενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει
καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἐὰν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττῃ. καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ 6
μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ
ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος ὢν ἐπαινε-
τός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφότεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ
ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀλη-
θευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος 7
λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης
1127 b γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου δια-
φέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν
τοιοῦτος εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ 8
φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει

καλοῦσιν αὐθέκαστον, μέσος τοῦ εἴρωνος καὶ ἀλαζόνος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω καθ' αὑτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ βελτίω ἀλαζών, ὁ δ' ὡς ἔχει, ἀληθὴς καὶ καθ' Ὅμηρον πεπνυμένος· καὶ ὅλως ὁ μὲν φιλαλήθης, ὁ δὲ φιλοψευδής.

(ἀλᾶσθαι), cf. πλάνος. Hence the meaning 'charlatan,' 'quack' (Italian *ciarlatano*, 'a mountebank doctor'). In Plato and Aristophanes the word still means 'impostor' quite generally and is associated with γόης. Sokrates is an ἀλαζών as well as an εἴρων. For the specialised sense here given to the word cf. Xen. Kyr. ii, 2, 12 quoted below b, 15 n. In the New Comedy the ἀλαζών is the Miles Gloriosus. The original adapted by Plautus had this title.

§ 3. **ὁ εἴρων.** The εἴρων is properly the 'sly' man. Cf. Philemon, fr. 89 Kock:

Οὐκ ἔστ' ἀλώπηξ ἡ μὲν **εἴρων** τῇ φύσει,
ἡ δ' **αὐθέκαστος.**

The word occurs first in Aristophanes, Clouds, 449.

§ 4. **αὐθέκαστος**, not 'the man who is always himself,' but ὁ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον **λέγων**, 'the man who calls each thing itself,' i.e. 'by its proper name.' So ὁ τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγων, 'the man who calls a spade a spade.' The opposite is given in Antiphanes fr. 52 Kock, αὐτὸ μὲν μηδέν. See last note.

κἀν. Cf. 1127 b, 2 καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ. The reading κἀν is suggested by Professor Bywater. The MSS. have **καί.**

§ 7. **τῷ...τοιοῦτος εἶναι.** Cf. 1126 b, 24. We are not discussing truthfulness as an ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον.

καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦ- 5
δος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ ἠὐλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοι-
9 οῦτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
ἀποκλινεῖ· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς
10 ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιού- 10
μενος μηδενὸς ἕνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν—οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε
11 τῷ ψεύδει—μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός· εἰ δ'
ἕνεκά τινος [ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών], ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν
ψεκτός, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος.
12 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει·
κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν· ὥσπερ 15
καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης

From that point of view it comes under the head of δικαιοσύνη.

§ 9. **ἀποκλινεῖ.** So Coraes for MS. ἀποκλίνει. The Paraphrast has νεύσει.

ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολάς. The adjectives ἐπαχθές and φορτικόν are constantly found together in the orators. The sentiment is thoroughly Attic, and accounts for the use of ἐπιεικής, μέτριος and σπουδαῖος in the sense of ἀγαθός. Cf. 1137 a, 34 n.

§ 11. **ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών.** This seems to be an adscript; for in the MSS. it comes after οὐ λίαν ψεκτός where it does not make sense. I take it that the μάταιος who μηδενὸς ἕνεκα προσποιεῖται is not classed as an ἀλαζών at all, and that the object of the awkward sentence οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. is to reiterate this. But there may be some further dislocation; for Aspasios read οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ. after εἰρημένα 1127 b, 22. Bywater, Contr. p. 41.

§ 12. **οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ.** The μάταιος who μηδενὸς ἕνεκα προσποιεῖται has only the 'potency' of an ἀλαζών in him; he only becomes one when he of deliberate purpose uses προσποίησις as means to an end. For the expression, cf. Top. 126 a, 30 ὁρᾶν δὲ καὶ εἴ τι τῶν ψεκτῶν ἢ φευκτῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἢ τὸ δυνατὸν ἔθηκεν, οἷον τὸν σοφιστὴν ἢ διάβολον, ἢ κλέπτην τὸν **δυνάμενον** λάθρα τὰ ἀλλότρια κλέπτειν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τῷ δυνατὸς εἶναί τι τούτων τοιοῦτος λέγεται· **δύναται** μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ φαῦλα δρᾶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι· πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι **κατὰ προαίρεσιν** λέγονται. This is just the difference between the διαλεκτικός and the σοφιστής. Cf. Met. 1004 b, 22 περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ **τῆς δυνάμεως**, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου **τῇ προαιρέσει.** Rhet. 1355 b, 17 ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ **ἐν τῇ δυνάμει** ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ **προαιρέσει.**

κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, opp. κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν.

ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης κ.τ.λ. We may best understand the point by asking whether we call the man who 'spins yarns' a liar. In the same way 'innocent vanity' is not ἀλαζονεία. Cf. Xen. Cyrop. ii, 2, 12 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζὼν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις καὶ πλουσιωτέροις εἶναι ἢ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέροις καὶ ποιήσειν ἃ μὴ ἱκανοί εἰσιν ὑπισχνουμένοις, καὶ ταῦτα φανεροῖς γιγνομένοις ὅτι τοῦ

ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι 13
τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός,
οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσίς ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ δια-
λαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο
οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιοῦνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται·
ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλατ- 14
τον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ
κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν·
μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκρά-
της ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] 15
βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ
ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ
γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν· οἱ δὲ 16

λαβεῖν τι ἕνεκα καὶ κερδᾶναι ποιοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ μηχανώμενοι γέλωτα τοῖς συνοῦσι μήτε ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῶν κέρδει μήτ' ἐπὶ ζημίᾳ τῶν ἀκουόντων μήτ' ἐπὶ βλάβῃ μηδεμιᾷ, πῶς οὐχ οὗτοι ἀστεῖοι ἂν καὶ εὐχάριτες δικαιότερον μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλαζόνες;

§ 13. **οἱ δὲ κέρδους**, sc. *τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιοῦνται*, 'they pretend to things from which their neighbours derive benefit.' Then **καὶ διαλαθεῖν ἔστι μὴ ὄντα** is added as if *προσποιοῦνται τοιοῦτοι εἶναι* had preceded; for *ὄντα* must be masculine singular if **μάντιν σοφὸν ἰατρόν** is to have any construction. 'They assume characters the unreality of which may escape detection.'

§ 14. **οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης.** This passage seems to be the origin of the current phrase 'Socratic irony,' a thing which is almost as mythical as 'tragic irony.' We know from Plato that Sokrates was often called 'sly' by his opponents, and no wonder. But neither here nor anywhere else is the word used in a good sense.

§ 15. **προσποιούμενοι**, bracketed by Vahlen, is exactly the opposite of what is meant. The verb to be supplied is *ἀπαρνούμενοι*. It seems to have come from the correct *προσποιούμενοι μὴ ἔχειν* of Aspasios. Bywater, Contr. p. 41.

βαυκοπανοῦργοι. A word from the language of comedy. Schol. Anon. *β. φησὶν ὡς ἓν ἀνθ' ἑνὸς εἰπεῖν τοὺς σεμνοπανούργους.* **βαυκὸς** γὰρ ὁ τρυφερός, ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς Ἀραρὼς ἐν Καμπυλίωνι (Kock, Com. Frag. II, 217)

βαυκὰ μαλακὰ τερπνὰ τρυφερά.
μετενήνεκται δὲ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τῶν **βαυκίδων**, *ἅ ἐστιν εἶδος ὑποδημάτων Ἰωνικῶν, οἷς αἱ Ἰάδες χρῶνται, οὗ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἐν Θεσμοφοριαζούσαις* (sc. *β* Kock I, 482) *μέμνηται.* Κλείταρχος *μέντοι ὁ γλωσσογράφος τὸ σεμνὸν ἀποδέδωκεν.*

ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής. Schol. Anon. *εὐτελὴς ἄγαν ἱστορεῖται Ξενοφῶντι* (Λακ. πολ. 2 § 1). *διὰ ταῦτα καὶ σκώπτουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ κωμῳδοί, ὡς* Πλάτων *ἐν Πρέσβεσι* (Kock I, 634)—

Χαίρεις οἶμαι μεταπεττεύσας αὐτὸν δια-
κλιμακίσας τε,
τὸν ὑπηνόβιον σπαρτιοχαίτην ῥυπακόν-
δυλον ἑλκετρίβωνα.

I do not know why the editors think this refers to Laconising Athenians, not to the Spartans themselves.

μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν 30
17 καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντικεῖσθαι
δ' ὁ ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.

VIII. Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ
διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὁμιλία τις
ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. 1128ª
διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.
2 δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις
3 τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, 5
καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν
εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ'
αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μηδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραί-
νοντες ἄγροικοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς

1127 b, 33. EE. 1234 a, 4 *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εὐτραπελία μεσότης, καὶ ὁ εὐτράπελος μέσος τοῦ ἀγροίκου καὶ δυστραπέλου καὶ τοῦ βωμολόχου. ὥσπερ γὰρ περὶ τροφὴν ὁ σικχὸς τοῦ παμφάγου διαφέρει τῷ ὁ μὲν μηθὲν ἢ ὀλίγα καὶ χαλεπῶς προσίεσθαι, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄγροικος ἔχει πρὸς τὸν φορτικὸν καὶ βωμολόχον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐθὲν γελοῖον ἀλλὰ χαλεπῶς προσίεται, ὁ δὲ πάντα εὐχερῶς καὶ ἡδέως.*

§ 17. **χείρων γάρ**, sc. *τοῦ εἴρωνος*. For this test see 1109 a, 6 n.

VIII. § 1. **ἀναπαύσεως.** For Aristotle's theory of Rest, see below 1176 b, 34. It is *ἄνεσις τῆς ψυχῆς* (Pol. 1337 b, 42), 'relaxation of the soul,' and is necessary for the worker (*ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως* ib. 38). It must be carefully distinguished from *σχολή* (*διαγωγή*) which is an end in itself, not a means to further exertion.

καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ κ.τ.λ. Besides Play, Aristotle recognises Sleep and Drink (*μέθη*) as forms of *ἀνάπαυσις* (Pol. 1339 a, 17). For the importance of *μέθη* cf. the Second Book of Plato's Laws.

διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς. The word *διαγωγή* is here used in its wide popular sense of passing time, not in the narrow sense (equivalent to *σχολή*) which it often has, and in which it is contrasted with *ἀνάπαυσις*.

λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν. This distinction is elaborated in the Eudemian Ethics (1234 a, 14 sqq. p. 198). The man who can *make* a joke (the *μέσος* between the *φορτικός* and the *ψυχρός*), and the man who can *take* a joke even at his own expense are both described.

ἐν τοιούτοις...τοιούτων, 'whether those in whose company he speaks are like himself, and whether those by whom he is spoken to are like himself.'

§ 3. **πάντως**, 'at any cost.' Cf. 1124 b, 9 n.

ἄγροικοι. All MSS. but K^b have *ἄγριοι*, which, however, means 'savage' and is out of place here. In

παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὔτροποι· τοῦ γὰρ ἤθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἤθη. ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαρίεντες· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἔξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἁρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾶς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαι-

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δεῖ δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μή, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· οὗτος δ' εὐτράπελος. ἡ δ' ἀπόδειξις ἡ αὐτή· ἥ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ μὴ ἧν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἕξις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετή, τὰ δ' ἄκρα ψεκτά. οὔσης δὲ διττῆς τῆς εὐτραπελίας (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶ τῷ γελοίῳ καὶ τῷ εἰς αὐτόν, ἐὰν ᾖ τοιονδί, ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σκῶμμά ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ δύνασθαι τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι), ἕτεραι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλων, ἀμφότεραι μέντοι μεσότητες. καὶ γὰρ τὸν δυνάμενον τοιαῦτα πορίζεσθαι ἐφ' ὅσοις ἡσθήσεται <ὁ> εὖ κρίνων, κἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ᾖ τὸ γελοῖον, μέσος ἔσται τοῦ φορτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ. ὁ δ' ὅρος οὗτος βελτίων ἢ τὸ <μὴ> λυπηρὸν εἶναι τὸ λεχθὲν τῷ σκωπτομένῳ ὄντι ὁποιῳοῦν· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τῷ ἐν μεσότητι ὄντι ἀρέσκειν· οὗτος γὰρ κρίνει εὖ.

1108 a, 26 we have ἄγροικος, and so in Eth. Eud. 1234 a, 5 and Magna Moralia 1193 a, 11. Bywater, Contr. p. 42. The ἄγροικος was a well known type in Comedy, cf. Eth. Eud. 1230 b, 18 μάλιστα δ' εἰσὶ τοιοῦτοι (sc. ἀναίσθητοι) οἵους οἱ κωμῳδοδιδάσκαλοι παράγουσιν ἀγροίκους, οἳ οὐδὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ ἀναγκαῖα πλησιάζουσι τοῖς ἡδέσιν. There were comedies entitled Ἄγροικος by Antiphanes, Anaxandrides, Anaxilas, Philemon and Menander.

οἷον εὔτροποι, *quasi dicas* εὔτροποι. Cf. 1122 b, 12 n. The word which is applied to the movements of the body is used to explain the metaphor in the word applied to the movements of the mind.

§ 4. **οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται.** EE. 1234 a, 12 ἥ τε γὰρ εὐτραπελία ἡ τοιαύτη, καὶ μὴ ἧν μεταφέροντες λέγομεν, ἐπιεικεστάτη ἕξις. The word εὐτράπελος has already a bad sense in Pindar (Pyth. i, 92).

§ 5. **ἐπιδεξιότης.** Cf. Rhet. 1381 a, 34 οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι τωθάσαι καὶ ὑπομεῖναι... δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι καὶ ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες.

δεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἡ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὁριστέον τῷ λέγειν μὴ ἀπρεπῆ ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται—ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα κἂν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ· οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει—τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τί ἐστιν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει, οἷον νόμος ὢν ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιος εἴτ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγροικος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀληθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν

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§ 6. **ἐκ τῶν κωμῳδιῶν κ.τ.λ.** This is not the technical distinction between the Old and the New Comedy, which the grammarians called ἡ ἀρχαία and ἡ νέα κωμῳδία. Aristotle is simply noting a distinction between the comedies of the 5th century (τὰ παλαιά) and those of his own day (τὰ καινά). The Middle Comedy (ἡ μέση) is a grammarian's figment of still later date. See Fielitz, De Atticorum Comœdia bipartita (Bonn, 1886).

αἰσχρολογία, 'indecency.' Cf. Plato, Rep. 395 e κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας. Aristotle felt very strongly on this point. Cf. Pol. 1336 b, 3 ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ (l. εἴπερ) τι ἄλλο, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν. This marks the change in manners. Xenokrates was just as strong on the subject, cf. Plutarch, Πῶς δεῖ ἀκούειν, 38 b τοῖς παισὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἐκέλευε περιάπτειν ἀμφωτίδας, ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ ὦτα ταῖς πληγαῖς, τούτων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ἤθη διαστρεφομένων.

ἡ ὑπόνοια, 'innuendo.'

§ 8. **κἂν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ.** I have written κἂν for the MS. καί. Translate 'What he listens to patiently, we think he would not stop at himself. Now he will draw the line somewhere' (**οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει**). The sentence is usually taken as if ποιεῖν σκῶμμα could mean 'to *make* a joke.' The phrase πᾶν ποιεῖν means 'to stop at nothing,' and we must start from that in translating.

§ 9. **καὶ σκώπτειν**, sc. ἔνια.

§ 10. **ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου**, 'cannot resist a joke.' He is γέλωτος ἀκρατής, cf. 1145 b, 19 n.

ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.

IX. Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἕξει. ὁρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, καὶ ἀποτελεῖται τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχριῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαίνεταί πως εἶναι ἀμφότερα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἕξεως εἶναι. οὐ

1128 b, 10. EE. 1233 b, 16 σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐπαινετῶν καὶ ψεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπερβολαί τὰ δ' ἐλλείψεις τὰ δὲ μεσότητές εἰσι παθητικαί. οἷον ὁ φθονερὸς καὶ ἐπιχαιρέκακος. καθ' ἃς γὰρ ἕξεις λέγονται, ὁ μὲν φθόνος τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς κατ' ἀξίαν εὖ πράττουσίν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου πάθος ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀνώνυμον, ἀλλ' ὁ ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις. μέσος δὲ τούτων ὁ νεμεσητικός, καὶ ὃ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις· διὸ καὶ θεὸν οἴονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν. αἰδὼς δὲ μεσότης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ

IX. § 1. **Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς κ.τ.λ.** In 1108 a, 30 sqq. we were told of two *μεσότητες* which were *ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη*, viz. *αἰδώς* and *νέμεσις*. Here we are told that *αἰδώς* is not an *ἀρετή*, because it is the feeling itself, not a *ἕξις* or habitual attitude towards the feeling. Nothing is said of *νέμεσις* at all. The two seem to be *μεσότητες* in the feelings of fear and anger which come by nature.

ὁρίζεται. Plato, Laws 646 e *φοβούμεθα δέ γε πολλάκις δόξαν, ἡγούμενοι δοξάζεσθαι κακοὶ πράττοντες ἢ λέγοντές τι τῶν μὴ καλῶν· ὃν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ πάντες, αἰσχύνην.* (Aristotle does not distinguish *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη* at all in this discussion, see next note.) In Top. 126 a, 6 he criticises this definition of shame. Shame, he says, is *ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ*, fear *ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ*. So in the Rhetoric (1383 b, 13) we have an amended definition which leaves out fear, *ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων*, or more shortly *περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία* (1384 a, 23).

§ 2. **ἐρυθραίνονται...αἰσχυνόμενοι.** We see here that Aristotle ignores the thoroughly Hellenic distinction between *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*. The sign of the former is not blushing, but the downcast eye. Cf. Rhet. 1384 a, 36 where Aristotle himself quotes the proverbial *ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰδώς*. The tendency was to use *αἰσχύνη* for *αἰδώς*; Aristotle, at least in the Ethics, uses *αἰδώς* for *αἰσχύνη*. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen 1, 168, sqq.

σωματικὰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. De An. 403 a, 16 *ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα.*

πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἁρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ. οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἁμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι· καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστιν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστιν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις (οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον)· φαύλου δὲ καὶ τῷ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξαι τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἑκὼν δ' ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδὼς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξει, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ πράττειν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλά τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

πάσης ὁμοίως καταπλήξ, ὁ δὲ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιεικῶν αἰδήμων.

EE. 1234 a, 24 πᾶσαι δ' αὗται αἱ μεσότητες ἐπαινεταὶ μέν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δ' ἀρεταί, οὐδ' αἱ ἐναντίαι κακίαι· ἄνευ προαιρέσεως γάρ. ταῦτα δὲ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τῶν παθημάτων διαιρέσεσιν· ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν πάθος τί ἐστιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ φυσικὰ εἶναι εἰς τὰς φυσικὰς συμβάλλεται ἀρετάς· ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ λεχθήσεται ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον, ἑκάστη πως ἀρετὴ καὶ φύσει καὶ ἄλλως μετὰ φρονήσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται (πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ) καὶ ἡ νέμεσις εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ἡ αἰδὼς εἰς σωφροσύνην, διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται ἐν τῷ γένει τούτῳ τὴν σωφροσύνην· ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ὁ μὲν ἔμφρων, ὁ δ' ἄφρων.

§ 3. **αἰδήμονας.** The regular Attic word for this was *αἰσχυντηλός*, which is used in exactly the same sense below. Cf. Plato, Charm. 158 c *καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυντηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν.* (Cf. also 160 e.) So Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1389 a, 29 that the young are *αἰσχυντηλοί* but not the old. It is characteristic of Xenophon's diction that *αἰδήμων* is a favourite word with him.

§ 6. **καὶ τῷ εἶναι.** For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 42, and for the construction cf. 1107 a, 3. 1127 b, 15.

§ 7. **ἐξ ὑποθέσεως,** 'conditionally good,' and the hypothesis is that we have done something bad.

§ 8. **ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον,** in Book VII.

BOOK V.

JUSTICE.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Justice receives a much more elaborate treatment than any other form of goodness. This is not only because of its great importance, but also because of the greater complexity of the problems to which it gives rise. The object of the whole discussion is, of course, to show that the principle of the Mean applies to Justice as well as to other forms of goodness; but justice differs from the forms of goodness we have studied hitherto in being essentially relative (*πρὸς ἕτερον*). It thus involves four terms and not three only; for there are at least two persons and at least two things which are just for those persons. The mean which Justice aims at is at first an unknown x which has to be found by some application of the Rule of Three.

Aristotle begins at once by limiting the sense of the word justice. In Greek *ἀδικεῖν* meant not merely "to be unjust," but also "to be guilty" of any offence whatsoever against the law, and the word *δικαιοσύνη* could therefore be used as equivalent to "righteousness," that is to say, the whole of goodness regarded as relative to others. In the Republic, Plato had given it a wider meaning still, and had made it include the relations between the different "parts" of the individual soul, a view which Aristotle discusses later on (1138 b, 5 sqq.). It was therefore necessary at the outset to distinguish "particular" from "universal" justice; but the distinction is of little interest to us, seeing that the English word "justice" is never used naturally in the wider sense which Aristotle is anxious to distinguish and set aside. We have only to consider justice in the special sense in which it refers to the fair apportionment of "external goods."

§ 2. The first form of justice in this sense which Aristotle treats of is Distributive Justice. He has to show that the principle of the Mean applies to this, and he does so by showing that the formula of justice may be expressed as a proportion of the form $A : B :: C : D$ or $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$. This is what the Greeks called a "geometrical" proportion. The name of the second kind is usually mistranslated "Corrective Justice," and this mistranslation has led to much confusion in the interpretation of the argument. Really this form of justice regulates *obligationes ex contractu* quite as much as *obligationes ex delicto*. The true meaning of *διορθοῦν* is to "adjust" whether by correction (*ἐπανόρθωσις*) or otherwise, and the scholastic term *iustitia directiva* is really far more accurate. There would be no harm in calling the form of justice which adjusts the damages and penalties imposed by a court of law *iustitia correctiva*, and that which regulates the exchange of commodities and the like might then be called by S. Thomas's name *iustitia commutativa*. But this would obscure the fact that the two are applications of the same principle, that, namely, of "arithmetical proportion."

We are not in the habit of calling an equation of the form $A - B = C - D$ a proportion at all, but it was one of the recognised Pythagorean *μεσότητες*, and in Aristotle's day it was commonly called an *ἀναλογία*, though that word was properly confined to the *γεωμετρικὴ μεσότης*. It will be convenient for us to speak of "arithmetical proportion" too.

1129 a

E

Περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, περὶ ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν 2
ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ 3
πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἕξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας, ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ 4
τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων

I. § 1. **περὶ ποίας...πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης.** The two regular questions *περὶ ποῖα μεσότης* and *πῶς μεσότης;* cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

§ 2. **κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον,** i.e. that of starting with *τὰ ἔνδοξα* and arguing dialectically from them. For *μέθοδος*, see 1094 a, 1 n.

§ 3. **ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ κ.τ.λ.** This *ἔνδοξον* comes from Plato, Gorgias 460 b (referred to by Fritzsche). *Τί οὖν, ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικὸς ἢ οὔ;—Ναί.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;—Ναί.—Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἰατρικὰ ἰατρικός κ.τ.λ.;—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;—Πάντως δήπου.—Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά που πράττει;—Ναί.—Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν;—Φαίνεταί γε.*

ὡς ἐν τύπῳ. Schol. Anon. *καὶ ταύτας αὐτῶν ἀποδοὺς ὑπογραφάς τινας· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὁρισμοὺς εἶπεν αὐτά· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἕνα λόγον ἀποδοθῆναι οὔτε τῆς δικαιοσύνης οὔτε τῆς ἀδικίας, ἐπεὶ προϊὼν δείξει ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγονται.*

§ 4. **οὐδὲ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** I understand the connexion of this section with the preceding exactly as Professor Stewart does; and, if we suppose that there is a direct reference to Plato's Gorgias, it comes out still better. Plato was right in adding *ἀνάγκη τὸν δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν*, for the case is really different from that of the *ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ δυνάμεις* (*τεκτονική, μουσική* and *ἰατρική*) from which he starts. If *δικαιοσύνη* were a *δύναμις*, then the just man would also be the clever thief (Plato, Rep. 334 a). It is, however, an *ἕξις*, and we know that the

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι, ἕξις δ' ἡ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ 15
τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν
5 βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἐναντία ἕξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ εὐεξία ᾖ φανερά, καὶ ἡ καχεξία φανερὰ γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἡ εὐεξία 20
καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς
6 καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολου-

ἕξις determines *βούλησις* (and therefore *προαίρεσις*) by determining *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*. So in Top. 145 b, 34, the definition of *δικαιοσύνη* as *δύναμις τοῦ ἴσου διανεμητική* is criticised; *δίκαιος γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ προαιρούμενος τὸ ἴσον διανεῖμαι τοῦ δυναμένου*. For *δύναμις* and *προαίρεσις* cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

δύναμις μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is true, of course, only of *αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις* (cf. 1103 a, 26 n.). Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard justice as an art, it will be the art of doing unjust things as well as just, exactly as *νόσον ὅστις δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαθεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας* (Rep. 333 e).

ἡ ἐναντία. It is needless to read *ἡ αὐτή*, though it would be more logical. The double *ἐναντία* is idiomatic, cf. below a, 18.

ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας, the typical *ἕξις*.

ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, here in the sense of *τὸ σημαντικὸν ὑγιείας, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*, cf. Top. 106 b, 36 *τὸ ὑγιεινῶς ἢ ποιητικῶς ἢ φυλακτικῶς* (i.e. *πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν*) *ἢ σημαντικῶς* (i.e. *ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*) *ῥηθήσεται*.

§ 5. **πολλάκις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** For *σκέψις ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου* as applied to *ἕξεις*, cf. Top. 147 a, 17.

ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων. I cannot believe that this means anything else than the things in which the *ἕξεις* are found. As a *ποιότης, δικαιοσύνη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ λέγεται τῷ δικαίῳ* (Bonitz; Ind. 260 b, 41). If this is so, the *ὑποκείμενα* will be *σύστοιχα*, and *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν συστοίχων* is a recognised dialectical method. Further, this is in accordance with the actual procedure which Aristotle follows; for what he actually does is to consider the *ἄδικος*, i.e. the *ὑποκείμενον* of the *ἐναντία ἕξις*. If I am right, **τῶν εὐεκτικῶν** must = *τῶν εὖ ἐχόντων* as below 1176 a, 15 and often.

τὸ ποιητικόν. The ambiguity of the word *εὐεκτικός* seems to have caused a transition to another class of *σύστοιχα*, for *τὰ ποιητικά* are not properly *ὑποκείμενα*. But it matters little; for *τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν* are identical with *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως* and these are such as *τὰ ἔχοντα* perform. The mention of them here will not seem irrelevant if we remember that our aim is not merely to know justice but to produce it.

§ 6. **ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Top. 106 a, 9 *πότερον δὲ πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς τῷ εἴδει λέγεται, ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου σκοπεῖν εἰ πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἐάντε τῷ εἴδει ἐάντε τῷ ὀνόματι διαφωνῇ.*

θεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐὰν θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται,
καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ
ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιο- 7
σύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν
αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον,
(ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν) οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται
κλεὶς ὁμωνύμως ἥ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῴων καὶ ᾗ τὰς
θύρας κλείουσιν. εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. 8
δοκεῖ δὴ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ
ἄνισος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ [ὁ] δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος
καὶ ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ
1129 b δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεο- 9

ἐὰν θάτερα κ.τ.λ. On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 42 and Stewart's note in loc. I have followed Stewart in keeping the *θάτερα* of K^b L^b. Bywater reads *θάτερον* from the Vetus Versio and omits *καὶ ἡ ἀδικία*. But (1) the idiomatic *θάτερα* is more likely to have been lost in the Versio than invented by the scribes, and (2) we really want the two pairs, the *ἕξεις* and the *ὑποκείμενα*. 'If one pair of terms is ambiguous, the other pair will be so too.' I do not think it necessary to insert *καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη* after *τὸ δίκαιον* with Stewart. Aristotle does not care for minute symmetry in such clauses. Cf. 1108 a, 16 *οὔτ' ἐπαινετὰ οὔτ' ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά*, quoted by Bywater, Contr. p. 29.

§ 7. **τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν.** The word is here used in the widest sense, in which any two things which share the same name are called *ὁμώνυμα*, not in the restricted sense explained in 1096 b, 27 n. As a matter of fact they are *συνώνυμα* (cf. 1130 a, 33).

λανθάνει, sc. *ἡ ὁμωνυμία*. Cf. Phys. 249 a, 23 *εἰσί τε τῶν ὁμωνυμιῶν αἱ μὲν πολὺ ἀπέχουσαι, αἱ δὲ ἔχουσαί τινα ὁμοιότητα, αἱ δ' ἐγγὺς ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, διὸ οὐ δοκοῦσιν ὁμωνυμίαι εἶναι οὖσαι*. So Top. 139 b, 28 *λανθανούσης τῆς ὁμωνυμίας*, An. Post. 97 b, 30 *αἱ ὁμωνυμίαι λανθάνουσι*. In the present case the *ὁμωνυμία* is *σύνεγγυς γένει* and therefore properly a *συνωνυμία*.

ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ κ.τ.λ. The *γάρ* introduces the reason for the choice of the instance which follows. Cf. 1104 a, 13. **κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν**, 'in outward appearance.'

§ 8. **καὶ ἄνισος**, 'unfair, i.e. unequal.' This is added because the popular word *πλεονέκτης* does not bring out the fact that the *ἄδικος* not only takes more than his share of good things, but less than his share of bad things. Cf. 1129 b, 10. (Bywater, Contr. p. 43).

τὸ παράνομον. Of course the English word 'unjust' has not this wider sense, but it was quite familiar to Athenian ears. 'To be guilty' of any offence whatsoever was in the language of the courts *ἀδικεῖν*. The *ὁμωνυμία* is, therefore, a mere accident of the Greek language, and we should not erect the distinction between "universal and particular injustice" into a part of Aristotle's system. He is only clearing the ground as usual by narrowing the application of the word.

νέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τἀγαθὰ ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ
ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστι μὲν ἁπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά,
τινὶ δ' οὐκ ἀεί. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὔχονται καὶ διώκουσιν·
δεῖ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εὔχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς 5
10 ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἱρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθά. ὁ δ' ἄδικος
οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν
ἁπλῶς κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μεῖον κακὸν ἀγαθόν
πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστιν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ
11 πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστω δ' ἄνισος· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ 10
12 κοινόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος,
δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ
ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τού-
13 των δίκαιον εἶναί φαμεν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάν-
των, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς 15
ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρό-
πον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιη-
τικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ

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§ 9. **περὶ ὅσα κ.τ.λ.**, sc. *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά*. Cf. 1099 b, 8 n. For **ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά**, cf. Top. 115 b, 33 **ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου** *δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων*, **ἁπλῶς** *ῥηθήσεται*. See too Pol. 1332 a, 21 *καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ᾧ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀγαθά ἐστι τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*.

§ 11. **ἔστω**, Vermehren's conjecture for MS. *ἔστι*.

περιέχει καὶ κοινόν. The word *ἄνισος* includes the man who *τὸ πλέον αἱρεῖται τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν* and also the man who *τὸ ἔλαττον αἱρεῖται τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν*. It is 'common' to both.

§ 12. **ἦν.** Cf. 1113 b, 13 n.

πως δίκαια, i.e. in the wide sense in which *τὸ δίκαιον* includes the practice of all goodness so far as it is enjoined by law.

§ 13. **ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων.** This need not be taken too literally. Aristotle only means that the laws deal with all departments of life, but we are looking for the particular department to which Justice belongs. The verb **ἀγορεύειν** belongs to Attic legal style, and is never used in Aristotle except of *οἱ νόμοι*.

στοχαζόμενοι κ.τ.λ. This refers to the distinction between *ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι* and *παρεκβάσεις*, for which see below 1160 a, 31 sqq. I think Rassow is right in his view that the *ὀρθὴ πολιτεία* **στοχάζεται τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις**, while the *παρέκβασις στοχάζεται τοῦ συμφέροντος* **τοῖς κυρίοις**, whether one (tyranny), few (oligarchy), or many (democracy). I therefore retain **κατ' ἀρετήν**, though omitted by K^b, and I understand it of *ἀριστοκρατία*, while **κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον** refers to *τιμοκρατία* and the like.

ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, i.e. in the wide sense. The **μέν** is answered by **δέ γε** in 1130 a, 14.

πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀν- 14
20 δρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πρᾴου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς
25 μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη 15
μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστι τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ "οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔθ' ἑῷος" οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν "ἐν δὲ δικαιο-
30 σύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι." καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὑτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνα-

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§ 14. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος κ.τ.λ. The argument is intended to show that δικαιοσύνη as a separate form of goodness must have some other meaning than legality. That is shown to extend to all forms of goodness so far as they are πρὸς ἕτερον.

§ 15. οὔθ' ἕσπερος κ.τ.λ. Schol. Anon. (p. 210, 9 Heylbut) τοῦτο ἐξ Εὐριπίδου σοφῶς (Σοφῆς Usener, or is it a marginal exclamation?) Μελανίππης· λέγει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ (fr. 486 Nauck)—

δικαιοσύνας τὸ χρύσεον πρόσωπον.

This is explained and confirmed by Plotinos Enn. i, 6 ὡς καλὸν τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἕσπερος οὔτε ἑῷος οὕτω καλά, ib. vi, 6 δικαιοσύνη...ἧς ὡς ἀληθῶς καλὸν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ οὔτε ἕσπερος κ.τ.λ. Bywater, Hermes v, 356.

παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν κ. τ. λ. Schol. Anon. (loc. cit.) τοῦτο Θεόγνιδος· εἴρηται δὲ οὕτως (v. 145–6)—

Βούλεο δ' εὐσεβέων ὀλίγοις σὺν χρήμασιν οἰκεῖν
ἢ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως χρήματα πασάμενος.

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετή (sic) χώραν μέντοι παροιμίας ἐπέχει καὶ μέμνηται αὐτῆς ὡς παροιμίας Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ἠθῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ἠθικῶν ὡς <Φωκυλίδου αὐτοῦ μέμνηται. καὶ ἴσως καὶ> Φωκυλίδης αὐτῷ ἐχρήσατο.

καὶ τελεία κ.τ.λ. We shall not feel any difficulty about this passage if we remember that it is purely literary, and that we must not look for technical precision in it. Justice (=Righteousness) is 'complete' because it is all goodness, 'complete' goodness. It is 'complete' because it is the use (not merely the possession) of goodness. It is 'complete' because it is πρὸς ἕτερον.

χρῆσις. The implied antithesis is κτῆσις. Cf. 1098 b, 34 n. In Pol. 1328 a, 38 εὐδαιμονία is defined ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ **χρῆσίς τις τέλειος.**

16 τοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος ὅτι ἀρχὴ 1130 a
ἄνδρα δείξει· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων.
17 διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ
δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ
18 γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. κάκι- 5
στος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος
τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ
19 πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ
δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐν-
20 αντία ἀδικία μέρος κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει 10
ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·
ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν
πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ᾗ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.

II. Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι

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§ 16. τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος. In L^b the reading is ἀρχά, but why should Bias of Priene speak Doric? This is one of those γνῶμαι which Sophokles has made into poetry. Cf. Antig. v. 175 sqq.

ἤδη, *ex vi termini*. We may bring out this force of ἤδη by paraphrasing 'when we come to the ruler, a relation to others is at once implied.' Cf. 1142 b, 14. 1177 a, 6. This is correlative to the idiomatic use of οὔπω and οὐκέτι. See Ind. s. vv.

§ 17. ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν. This is one of the definitions given by Thrasymachos in the First Book of the Republic. Cf. 343 c, 'Righteousness and right are really ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, what is good for the stronger and the ruler, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη.'

ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. The first will be the case in a παρέκβασις, the second in an ὀρθὴ πολιτεία. Jackson.

§ 18. καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν κ.τ.λ. Since the worst man is he who acts badly, not only πρὸς αὑτόν, but also πρὸς ἕτερον, the best man is he who acts well not only with regard to himself, but also with regard to others.

§ 20. τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cf. 1141 b, 24. The full expression would be οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι ἀρετῇ καὶ τὸ εἶναι δικαιοσύνῃ, cf. Top. 133 b, 23 ἄλλο λέγεται τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὸ εἶναι· οὐ ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τε τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ λευκῷ. Simplicius in Phys. (p. 735, 12 Diels) speaks of τὸ εἶναι συνήθως ὑπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ εἶδος σημαῖνον. Cf. Phys. 202 a, 18, ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἓν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἄναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες· ταῦτα γὰρ ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἷς, with Met. 1066 a, 32 where we have the same examples but the last clause runs ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ἕν. (Ramsauer.)

ἁπλῶς, closely with τοιάδε ἕξις, 'without qualification.' Translate 'regarded simply as a state of this kind, it is the same as goodness.'

II. **§ 1. Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε,** 'Yes, but we are looking for—.' This answers ἕνα μὲν τρόπον 1129 b, 17. The

γάρ τις, ὥς φαμεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας 2
μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γέ τινα (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος 3
τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ 4
προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὔ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. ἔτι περὶ μὲν τἆλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται 5
ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοχθηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ δ' ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία 6

particles δέ γε are used with their idiomatic force.

τὴν ἐν μέρει δικ., 'particular justice,' i.e. that justice which is a part of goodness and not ὅλη ἀρετή. The phrases ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος below are equivalent. The force of the preposition here is modal (Ind. Ar. 245 b, 27 sqq.) and may be best brought out by 'as,' 'justice as a part of goodness.' So we have ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης below a, 22.

§ 2. **κατὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** The argument is as follows. In the case of particular vices we say that a man ἀδικεῖ even although he gains no unfair advantage for himself, and in this use of the word ἀδικία = ὅλη κακία πρὸς ἕτερον. But, on the other hand, there are cases where a man gains an unfair advantage and therefore ἀδικεῖ, but where his ἀδικία is neither identical with any particular vice nor yet with ὅλη κακία. Yet it is κακία (for we blame it), and it is ἀδικία (for in one sense of the word, ἄδικος = πλεονέκτης, cf. above 1129 a, 32).

οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας. We have the same argument about ἀκρασία below 1146 b, 4.

§ 3. **ἔστιν ἄρ' ἄλλη.** For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 43.

ὡς μέρος, equivalent to ἐν μέρει and κατὰ μέρος above.

§ 4. **προσλαμβάνων...προστιθείς**, 'making money,' 'spending money.' Cf. Plato, Euthyphro, 3 d λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως εἴ τίς μου ἐθέλει ἀκούειν.

διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν, sc. ἄδικος λέγεται.

§ 5. **ἀδικήματα**, in the wider sense = παράνομα.

ἐμοίχευσεν. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν 1130 b
δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἡ δὲ περὶ πάντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος. 5

7 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετήν, δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ποία
8 τις, ληπτέον. διώρισται δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ
9 μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἡ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ 10
δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἕτερον καὶ ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐχ ἅπαν ἄνισον), καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιο- 15
σύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου
10 καὶ ἀδίκου ὡσαύτως. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὖσα χρῆσις πρὸς ἄλλον ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ἀφείσθω. καὶ 20
τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας φανερὸν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενά ἐστιν· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν

§ 6. **συνώνυμος.** This is more technical than the ὁμωνυμίαν of 1129 a, 27, and for the reason given. The definition is in the same genus, and συνώνυμον τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ εἶδος (Top. 123 a, 28).

τὴν δύναμιν, i.q. τὸ εἶναι above 1130 a, 12.

ταῦτα πάντα. They are, of course, περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία (1129 b, 3), i.e. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά.

§ 7. **Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** A striking example of the cumbrous transitions and recapitulations which disfigure the Ethics. We may attribute these to Nikomachos if we please. Introd. § 5.

§ 9. **τὸ παράνομον.** For the reading see Stewart's note.

§ 10. **τὰ...πραττόμενα.** I agree with Professor Stewart in preferring the πραττόμενα of L^b to the προσταττόμενα of K^b. See, however, Bywater, Contr. p. 44. The νόμιμα are called δίκαια τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι and τῷ ποιητικὰ εἶναι (b, 25), i.e. τῷ πρὸς ἓν εἶναι, cf. 1096 b, 27 n. They are related to justice exactly as τὰ εὐεκ-

προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος.
25 τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστι τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενο- 11
μοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς
καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἁπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι,
πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστιν ἢ ἑτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ
γὰρ ἴσως ταὐτὸν ἀνδρί τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί.
30 τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου 12
ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν
τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν

τικά to εὐεξία (1129 a, 20), or τὰ ὑγιεινά to ὑγίεια. This does not mean, however, that general and special justice are related in that way.

§ 11. **τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν**, 'the education which is to make a good citizen.' For the expression cf. Pol. 1310 a, 14 τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας...εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημοτικῶς, εἰ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοί, ὀλιγαρχικῶς.

ἁπλῶς, i.e. without any such qualification as 'a citizen of a democracy or an oligarchy.'

οὐ γὰρ ἴσως κ.τ.λ., 'it is not perhaps the same thing for a man to be a good man and to be a good citizen of any state' (lit. 'any citizen'). For the question here raised see Newman's Politics, Introd. pp. 234 sqq. The main point is that the goodness in virtue of which a man is a good citizen is relative to the constitution (πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν) and cannot therefore in all cases be identical with the goodness of a good man. Pol. 1276 b, 34 ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ. This is because the state is not the κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτεία, the true ἀριστοκρατία. In it the good man and the good citizen coincide. Cf. Pol. 1293 b, 5 ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ (ἀριστοκρατίᾳ) ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν. Yet even here the good man in the fullest sense and the good citizen are completely identified only in the ruler; for he alone has occasion to exercise φρόνησις.

ἀνδρὶ...ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. This use of εἶναι with a predicative dative is a favourite way of expressing the category of οὐσία or, in other words, the definition of a thing (λόγος). Cf. the account given of the similar phrase τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό 1130 a, 12. As a ποιότης, ἀγαθός has always the same meaning; but, since it is a relative term also (πρός τι), it will have different definitions when it is predicated in the category of οὐσία.

παντί. Jackson illustrates this use from Pol. 1277 a, 13 ἀλλ' ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς (in any state) ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου;

§ 12. **τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος κ.τ.λ.** We now come to the two divisions of Justice in the particular sense, the only sense which the word has in English.

ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς. Citizenship meant to a Greek the right to share in the goods of the state, and only in the second place the corresponding duty of contributing to them. The citizen was a shareholder, not a taxpayer.

13 δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη 1131 a
δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστι τὰ δ'
ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις ὠνὴ δανεισμὸς
ἐγγύη χρῆσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις (ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται,
ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος), τῶν δ' 5
ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία δεσμὸς θάνατος ἁρπαγὴ πήρωσις κακηγορία προπηλακισμός.

III. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, 10
2 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τι ἔστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον·
ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἔστι τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἔστι καὶ τὸ
3 ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ
λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι.
4 ἂν εἴη. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ 15

ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι. A wide word which includes all business transactions and is not at all confined to 'contracts' (συνθῆκαι). The ἑκούσια are contracts, but the ἀκούσια are *obligationes ex delicto*.

διορθωτικόν. Much confusion has been caused by the current translation 'Corrective Justice.' The *iustitia directiva* of the schoolmen is really more accurate; for διορθοῦν is a word of far wider meaning than ἐπανορθοῦν and signifies 'to adjust,' whether before or after the transaction. Cf. Lobeck on Phrynichus p. 250 "Ὀρθοῦν et erigere et dirigere notat; signate dicitur illud ἀνορθοῦν hoc διορθοῦν. Utrique affine est ἐπανορθοῦν quod locum habet in iis quae ad pristinum statum, unde luxata erant, reducuntur; omnibus autem subest notio mutationis in melius; quamobrem usum promiscuum habent."

§ 13. **ἑκούσια.** Jackson maintains that the form of justice applicable to these is only the "*rectification* of wrong arising out of such transactions." But this will not do; for, if a wrong has arisen, the συνάλλαγμα at once becomes ἀκούσιον. And we shall see that all the examples given refer to the preliminary adjustment of terms, and not to the rectification of wrong.

πρᾶσις ὠνή *emptio venditio*, **δανεισμός** *mutuum*, **ἐγγύη** *pignus*, **χρῆσις** *commodatum* (loan for use as distinct from loan for consumption), **παρακαταθήκη** *depositum*, **μίσθωσις** *locatio conductio*.

τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων κ.τ.λ. These correspond roughly to the *obligationes ex delicto*. The distinction between λαθραῖα and βίαια is like that between *furtum* (κλοπή) and *rapina* (ἁρπαγή). Cf. also Plato, Laws 864 c.

III. § 1. **Ἐπεὶ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος κ.τ.λ.** We now begin the discussion of Distributive Justice.

§ 3. **ἄνευ λόγου.** Cf. 1142 b, 2 n. The view is universally held apart from any ground. Cf. Pol. 1282 b, 18 δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ᾗ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ᾗ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον 5
ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει
ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ 6
ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ μὴ ἴσα ἴσοι ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν 7
τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες [ὑπάρχειν], ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ'

§ 4. **καὶ πρός τι.** This follows from the fact that all δικαιοσύνη is πρὸς ἕτερον. **καὶ τισίν.** This is explanatory of καὶ πρός τι. Translate 'the just is necessarily...relative, i.e. just *to* certain individuals.' Pol. 1282 b, 20 τί γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον.

§ 5. **ἐν οἷς** explained by **τὰ πράγματα** (which may be an adscript), 'the objects' which are to be divided. For the use of ἐν cf. 1111 a, 1 n.

§ 6. **ἡ αὐτὴ...ἰσότης,** 'there will be the same equality in the persons and in the objects,' i.e. if the persons are equal, the objects will be equal; if the persons are unequal, the objects will be unequal.

ὡς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'there is the same ratio between the one pair, the objects, as there is between the other pair.' It is not necessary to follow K^b in omitting τὰ ἐν οἷς, nor is there any difficulty in the double ἐκεῖνα.

ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1301 b, 28 ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. Eur. Hec. 306—

Ἐν τῷδε γὰρ κάμνουσιν αἱ πολλαὶ πόλεις,
ὅταν τις ἐσθλὸς καὶ πρόθυμος ὢν ἀνὴρ
μηδὲν φέρηται τῶν κακιόνων πλέον.

§ 7. **ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν,** 'from the principle of *according to merit*.' Cf. Isokr. Nik. § 12 δικαιότατον μὴ τοὺς ἀνομοίους τῶν ὁμοίων τυγχάνειν ἀλλὰ καὶ πράττειν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστους. Areop. § 21 δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοιν νομιζομέναιν εἶναι καὶ τῆς μὲν ταὐτὸν ἅπασιν ἀπονεμούσης, τῆς δὲ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστοις...τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν καὶ κολάζουσαν προηροῦντο.

[**ὑπάρχειν**]. See Bywater, Contr. p. 44.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1280 a, 22 οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατά τι ἄνισοι ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἄνισοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατά τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως ἴσοι. ib. 1317 a, 40 ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία. ib. 1290 b, 1 δῆμος μέν ἐστιν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι. ib. 1301 b, 1 εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἴσων αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. ib. 1293 b, 40 ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν. ib. 1293 b, 9 καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι...ὅπου γε μὴ μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς.

8 ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι—
τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' 30
ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ—ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν
9 τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἡ μὲν οὖν διῃρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι,
δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται
καὶ δὶς λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἡ τοῦ Α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Β, οὕτως ἡ 1131 b
τοῦ Β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Γ. δὶς οὖν ἡ τοῦ Β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν
10 ἡ τοῦ Β τεθῇ δίς, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ
τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός·

§ 8. **μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ,** 'abstract number,' which is not a number of anything particular but a number of units. Cf. Met. 1092 b, 19 αἰεὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὃς ἂν ᾖ τινῶν ἐστιν ('is always a number *of* something'), ἢ πύρινος ἢ γήϊνος (e.g. the proportion of fire and earth in flesh and bone) ἢ μοναδικός. As this last is the object of ἀριθμητική, it is also called ἀριθμητικός. So already Plato, Phileb. 56 d οἱ μὲν (οἱ πολλοὶ) γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο...οἱ δ' (οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες) οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει. Cf. Rep. 525 b sqq.

ἡ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This gives the reason of the statement made in a, 29. I have therefore marked τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον...ἀριθμοῦ as a parenthesis.

ἰσότης λόγων, 'equality of ratios.' Euclid, Book V, def. 3 defines *ratio* thus: λόγος ἐστὶ δύο μεγεθῶν ὁμογενῶν ἡ κατὰ πηλικότητα πρὸς ἄλληλα ποιὰ σχέσις, and in def. 8 we have ἀναλογία δέ ἐστιν ἡ τῶν λόγων ταὐτότης. There is a various reading ἡ τῶν λόγων ὁμοιότης. On the question whether Proportion is identity or similarity of ratios, see Stewart's interesting note.

§ 9. **διῃρημένη...συνεχής,** 'continuous...discrete.' Cf. Theon of Smyrna p. 82, 10 (Hiller) λέγεται δὲ ἡ μὲν **συνεχὴς** ἀναλογία, ἡ δὲ **διῃρημένη,** συνεχὴς μὲν ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις τρισὶν ὅροις, διῃρημένη δὲ ἡ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις τέσσαρσιν. For instance the ἀναλογία 8, 4, 2 is 'continuous,' while 6, 3, 4, 2 is 'discrete.' Theon points out, just as Aristotle does, that a continuous proportion may be regarded as discrete, ἔστι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχὴς ἐν τέτταρσιν ὅροις, δὶς λαμβανομένου τοῦ μέσου. Other terms were in use for 'continuous' and 'discrete,' e.g. συνημμένη and διεζευγμένη.

ἡ τοῦ Α, sc. γραμμή, 'the line A.' The ellipse of γραμμή is regular, but the usual phrase is ἡ Α or ἡ ἐφ' ἧς (ᾗ) Α (cf. 1132 b, 6 sqq.). I suspect that τοῦ has crept in from the reading ἡ τοῦ πρώτου etc. found in K^b, and this, as we can see from Michael of Ephesus, originated in the absurd idea that ἡ τοῦ πρώτου σχέσις was intended. In the absence of a system of numeration based on the zero, arithmetical questions must be treated geometrically. Jackson's defence of ἡ τοῦ πρώτου (sc. ὅρου) γραμμή in the sense of 'the line which we take for our first term' is not quite convincing, but the sense would be the same.

διῄρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἅ. ἔσται ἄρα ὡς ὁ πρῶτος 11
ὅρος πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον, οὕτως ὁ τρίτος πρὸς τὸν τέταρτον, καὶ
ἐναλλὰξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ πρῶτος πρὸς τὸν τρίτον, ὁ δεύτερος πρὸς
τὸν τέταρτον. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἅπερ ἡ νομὴ
συνδυάζει, κἂν οὕτω συντεθῇ, δικαίως συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ
πρώτου ὅρου τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου τῷ τετάρτῳ σύζευξις 12
τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστί,
<τὸ δ' ἄδικον> τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον,
τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον—(καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν 13
γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμ-

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§ 10. **διῄρηται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** This is quoted in Pol. 1280 a, 17 *διῄρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς*. The *πράγματα* are here expressed by *ἅ* instead of *ἐν οἷς* as the verb lends itself to this. 'There is a similar division into persons and things,' i.e. the line which represents A+C is 'similarly divided' to that which represents B+D.

§ 11. **ὡς ὁ πρῶτος ὅρος κ.τ.λ.** In Mathematics *ὅρος* is the 'term' of a proportion, and the word was transferred by Aristotle from Mathematics to Logic. It is evident from 1133 a, 6 that it was customary to arrange the 'terms' in a square, a fact which may explain the word *ὅρος* and the symbol ::. I have read *α, β, γ, δ* as ordinals here with Jackson, since we are now dealing with *ὅροι*, not *γραμμαί*.

ἐναλλάξ, *alternando*, i.e. A:Γ::B:Δ. Cf. An. Post. 74 a, 18 *τὸ ἀνάλογον ὅτι ἐναλλάξ*. Euclid, v, def. 13 *ἐναλλὰξ λόγος ἐστὶ λῆψις τοῦ ἡγουμένου πρὸς τὸ ἡγούμενον, καὶ τοῦ ἑπομένου πρὸς τὸ ἑπόμενον*.

τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, sc. *ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκάτερον* (b, 14), i.e. *componendo*, A+Γ : B+Δ :: A : B. Euclid calls this *σύνθεσις* (cf. *συντεθῇ* here). Cf. v, def. 15 *σύνθεσις λόγου ἐστὶ λῆψις τοῦ ἡγουμένου μετὰ τοῦ ἑπομένου ὡς ἑνὸς πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἑπόμενον*.

ἅπερ, i.e. the two terms in each *ὅλον*, the person and the thing. I have adopted Bywater's correction of MS. *ὅπερ*. See Contr. p. 44.

§ 12. **σύζευξις**. The 'conjunction' of the terms. The word refers merely to the drawing of lines in the graphic formula, thus—

A B
| |
Γ Δ

Cf. the note on *ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις* below (1133 a, 6).

<τὸ δ' ἄδικον>. For the reading, see Bywater, Contr. p. 11.

§ 13. **καλοῦσι ... ἑκάτερον**. This would be a footnote in a modern work. It breaks the connexion, for it seems to make the next sentence say that geometrical proportion cannot be continuous, which is absurd.

γεωμετρικήν. Cf. Theon of Smyrna p. 85, 8 (Hiller) *ἀναλογίας δὲ ὁ μὲν Θρασυλλός φησιν εἶναι προηγουμένας τρεῖς (1) ἀριθμητικήν, (2) γεωμετρικήν, (3) ἁρμονικήν*. In the first each mean exceeds and is exceeded by the same *number*; in the second by the same *ratio*, e.g. 2, 4, 6, 8 form an *ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία* while 2, 4, 8, 16 form a *γεωμετρικὴ ἀναλογία*. The 'harmonic proportion' does not concern us here. Properly speaking, the name *ἀναλογία* should be confined to geometrical proportion, and so it was originally. But

βαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἑκάτερον πρὸς ἑκά-
14 τερον)—ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται 15
εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-
λογον· τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ
μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμ-
βαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλέον ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος
15 ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ 20
γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον κακόν·
16 ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἱρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος, τὸ
17 δ' αἱρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μεῖζον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν
εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

IV. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς 25
2 συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ
τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ πρότερον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανε-
μητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ
τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίνηται
ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι 30

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we see that by Aristotle's time it was already extended to series in arithmetical progression (cf. 1106 a, 35 n.), and later it was used for all manner of series. See Gow, Greek Mathematics, p. 93, n. 1.

§ 14. **αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία**, sc. *ἡ τοῦ διανεμητικοῦ δικαίου*, not *ἡ γεωμετρική*. We cannot have the continuous proportion—

A : B :: B : Γ

for the person (*ᾧ*) and the thing (*ὅ*) cannot be an identical term, which is necessary for continuous proportion. Cf. 1131 a, 33 and Phys. 262 a, 19 *τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων, ἀρχῆς μέσου τελευτῆς, τὸ μέσον πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἄμφω ἐστί, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ ἓν τῷ λόγῳ δὲ δύο*. The phrase **ἀριθμῷ ἕν** expresses the complete identity of a particular thing with itself (cf. Met. 999 b, 33 *τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἢ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει*), as opposed to unity of species, unity of genus and analogical unity.

τὸ μὲν ... τὸ δὲ ... i.e. the one *ὅλον*—the other *ὅλον*. In unjust distribution of good things, if A is *ὁ ἀδικῶν* and B *ὁ ἀδικούμενος*, $\frac{A+\Gamma}{B+\Delta}$ becomes more than $\frac{A}{B}$.

§ 15. **ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ**, cf. 1129 b, 8.

IV. § 1. **Τὸ ... λοιπὸν ἕν**. These and the following words imply that there is but one other kind of justice, viz. *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον*, and that it is applicable, not only to *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* (which are treated first), but also to *ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα* (for which see 1132 b, 30 sqq.). The notes will show how I avoid making a third *εἶδος* ('Catallactic or Commutative Justice') with Professor Ritchie (Classical Review, vol. viii. pp. 185 sqq.).

§ 2. **τὴν εἰρημένην**, sc. *τὴν γεωμετρικήν*.

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. τὸ δ' ἐν 3
τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιόν ἐστι μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδι-
1132 a κον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον
ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ
φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέ-

τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. This word is properly used of the *εἰσφορά* or property-tax raised from the wealthier citizens in time of war. But here it cannot be intended as anything more than an illustration; for it implies that the principle of *κατ' ἀξίαν* is understood of wealth. In Pol. 1280 a, 28 the argument *οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὸν μνῶν τὸν εἰσενεγκόντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ ὀδόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν* is dismissed as *ὁ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν λόγος.*

§ 3. **κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν,** sc. *ἀναλογίαν.* Cf. 1106 a, 35 n. An arithmetical proportion—we do not usually call it a proportion—is one in which the first term exceeds the second by the same number (or length) that the third exceeds the fourth. Its formula is $a-b=c-d$, not $\frac{a}{b}=\frac{c}{d}$. The *ἴσον τι* involved in such a proportion arises from the fact that, if four quantities are in 'arithmetical proportion,' the sum of the means is equal to the sum of the extremes, $a+d=b+c$, whereas in geometrical proportion the equation is $\frac{a}{b}=\frac{a+c}{b+d}$.

οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. The *persons* (*οἷς*) are regarded as equal, but the *things* (*ἐν οἷς, τὰ πράγματα*) are usually unequal. So Demosthenes, Meid. § 46, speaking of the extension of the *γραφὴ ὕβρεως* to slaves, says *οὐ γὰρ ὅστις ὁ πάσχων ᾤετο δεῖν σκοπεῖν (ὁ νομοθέτης) ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ὁποῖόν τι τὸ γιγνόμενον.* It is the business of *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* to make the same difference between the persons as exists between the things, either (1) before they enter into a *συνάλλαγμα* at all (*ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις*), or (2) before the *συνάλλαγμα* is dissolved by process of law (*ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις*). The *διόρθωσις* consists in the process of adding to A or subtracting from B till an *ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία* is established.

ἐπιεικής...φαῦλος. This is a different illustration of the principle of *τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον* from that implied by *τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα* above. It is taken from *ἀριστοκρατία*, not from *ὀλιγαρχία*, and *κατ' ἀξίαν* this time means *κατ' ἀρετήν.*

τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφοράν. This is usually supposed to mean simply 'the amount of the damage' or 'the difference produced by the hurt'; but surely Aristotle is not to be credited with the childish doctrine that a court of law simply awards compensation. The Athenians were too well accustomed to discussing the question *ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι* by their elaborate process of *τίμησις* and *ἀντιτίμησις*, not to be aware that the wrong done by the one party may be much greater or much less than the damage suffered by the other, and Plato has preserved in the Laws such formulae as *διπλάσιον τοῦ βλάβους... ἐκτεισάτω* (843 d), *τὸ βλάβος ἀποτινέτω* (843 c) and *τοῦ βλάβους τὸ ἥμισυ τίνειν* (767 e, 915 a) to be applied in different circumstances. The *διαφορά*

πει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδι- 5
4 κεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον
τοῦτο ἄνισον ὂν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν
ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διῄ-
ρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ
5 ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς 10

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to which the judge really looks in assessing the penalty is that between the *ἀδικία* (*iniuria*) and the *βλάβος* (*damnum*), and Aristotle is only following Greek idiom in omitting one of the terms (cf. 1127 a, 13 n.). Cf. Plato, Laws 862 b *πρὸς δύο δὴ ταῦτα βλεπτέον, πρός τε ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβην.* Justice is not done either by transferring the gain of the wrong-doer to the injured party, or by making the wrong-doer compensate the injured party for his loss. We must assess the penalty *κατ'* (*ἀριθμητικὴν*) *ἀναλογίαν*, not *κατ' ἰσότητα* (1132 b, 33).

ἀδικεῖται and **βέβλαπται** are both perfect in sense.

εἰ ἔβλαψεν. For the idiomatic omission of *ὁ μέν*, cf. below *ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ*, and Vahlen on Poet. 1447 b, 14.

§ 4. **πληγῇ...πατάξῃ,** 'has been wounded,' 'has wounded,' not 'has been beaten,' 'has beaten,' which would be *πληγὰς ἐμβάλῃ...πληγὰς λάβῃ.*

κτείνῃ. The archaic *κτείνω* (Attic prose has only *ἀποκτείνω*) is regularly used as a legal term, and so occurs in Plato, Euthyphron 4 b *εἴτε ἐν δίκῃ ἔκτεινε ὁ κτείνας κ.τ.λ.* and often in the Laws. **ἀποθάνῃ** is of course its passive.

τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, lit. 'the being done to and the doing.' If the verbs had been used, we should have had *ποιεῖν*, not *πράττειν*, but *πρᾶξις* has to do duty as the noun of *ποιεῖν*, since *ποίησις* has been specialised in meaning. It has not, I think, been observed that this sentence is a highly compressed reference to a passage in Plato's Laws, 876 d sqq., which leaves no doubt as to the meaning. The question there is how far we are to leave it to the judges *προσάπτειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ πράξεως*, and this is illustrated by the various degrees of wounding and killing as here, and a law is given for the *γραφὴ τραύματος.* We have first the case of the man who wounds intending to kill, a case where the wrong done (*ἀδικία*) far exceeds the wrong suffered (*βλάβος*). The guilty man is not to be punished for murder, but he is not to be let off with the penalty of wounding. He is sentenced *τὸ βλάβος ἐκτίνειν τῷ βλαφθέντι*, and also to be banished. Then come cases such as that of a child wounding his parents, where the *ἀδικία* includes *ἀσέβεια* and the penalty is death. The whole passage will repay study.

εἰς ἄνισα. The *πάθος* and the *πρᾶξις* are of course just the same thing looked at from different points of view, and yet they are represented by a line divided into *unequal* segments. The common view of the passage can afford no explanation of this; it would require an undivided line simply transferred from one side to the other, and thus making the two sides unequal. But nothing is said of this.

τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, sc. *τὸ πάθος καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν*, 'to equate the wrong suffered and the wrong done by the penalty he imposes.' I think Michael

εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη,
τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι·
ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία 6
τὸ δὲ κέρδος. ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον
μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλατ-
τον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον
κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέ-
γομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη
τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, 7
ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι
ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον

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was right in taking τῇ ζημίᾳ here as instrumental dative, though the accepted interpretation seems to be that of Münscher and Jackson, πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν τὸ κέρδος ἀφαιρῶν αὐτοῦ, 'to equalise the unjustly augmented advantages of the one (τὸ κέρδος) and the unjustly impaired advantages of the other (τὴν ζημίαν) by taking from the former and giving to the latter.' In any case the meaning will be the same, and it will not be that the judge forces A to make good the loss of B. What the judge has to do is τιμᾶν ὅτι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, and that means that, if the wrong done by A is greater than the damage suffered by B, A will have a severer penalty than merely τίνειν τὸ βλάβος. How much severer, we shall see presently.

§ 5. **ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις**, sc. τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. We find κατηγορεῖν, λέγειν ἐπί τινι in the same sense as ἐπί τινος. The words ζημία and κέρδος, 'loss' and 'profit' are properly used of ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα. They are therefore not appropriate (**οἰκεῖον**) to all kinds of ἀκούσια, though they are to some (**τισίν**), e.g. theft and fraud.

§ 6. **ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ**. The words ζημία and κέρδος *can* be applied as soon as the damage and the wrong have been assessed.

ὥστε κ.τ.λ. We have now got a more and a less, namely the profit of the wrong-doer and the loss of his victim. We know that the just is the equal, and the equal is the mean between the more and the less. Therefore the just sentence will be that which imposes upon the wrong-doer, not the exact equivalent of the damage he has inflicted, but the arithmetical mean between the damage he has inflicted and the wrong he has committed. Cf. Plato's case of the man who wounds intending to kill.

ἐπανορθωτικόν. The narrower term is correct when we are speaking of ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα. We now see how corrective justice in ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα is a μέσον, and that is the object of the discussion.

§ 7. **διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** An argument from popular language for the benefit of those who are not impressed by mathematical formulae. A good judge is μέσος—(this really meant 'impartial,' but it will serve as a λογικὴ πρότασις) —but a good judge is living justice, therefore justice is a μέσον. Q.E.D.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1133 b, 14. 1160 b, 18. 1161 a, 28. 1171 a, 12. This is a Platonic way of expressing the ideal which anything aims at. Cf. Phd. 74 d.

δίκαιον ἔμψυχον· καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν
ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς ἐὰν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξό-
8 μενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστής. ὁ δὲ
δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμη- 25
μένης, ᾧ τὸ μεῖζον τμῆμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ'
ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ
δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὸ αὑτοῦ ὅταν
9 λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ
ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ 30
ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι
10 δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστής. ἐπὰν γὰρ δύο ἴσων
ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ, δυσὶ τού-
τοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφῃρέθη μέν, μὴ προσετέθη
δέ, ἑνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἑνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, 1132 b

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ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον. For the predicative object after ζητεῖν, cf. 1144 b, 7. 1158 a, 31. For the phrase Thuc. IV. 83 μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐπιτρέπειν.

ἔνιοι, 'some peoples.' The word is constantly used to introduce terms belonging to some dialect (γλῶσσαι).

μεσιδίους. Pol. 1306 a, 26 ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρίζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν (αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι) στρατιώταις καὶ ἄρχοντι μεσιδίῳ. The context does not enable us to decide whether this was at Larisa or Abydos.

§ 8. **ἐπανισοῖ,** '*restores* equality.'

ὥσπερ γραμμῆς. Cf. 1131 b, 8 n. The διαφορὰ τοῦ βλάβους is ᾧ...ὑπερέχει ἡ πρᾶξις τοῦ πάθους or *vice versa*. Observe that it is the excess of the larger segment over the half, and not its excess over the lesser segment, which is subtracted from the one and added to the other.

δίχα, i.e. εἰς ἴσα. So in Phys. 239 b, 18 we read that Zeno's second argument (the Achilles) differs from his first ἐν τῷ διαιρεῖν μὴ δίχα (=μὴ διχοτομεῖν) τὸ προσλαμβανόμενον μέγεθος.

§ 9. **τῆς μείζονος**, sc. γραμμῆς.

ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν. This is a Pythagorean fancy if we can trust Alexander. But it sounds more like Kratylos.

§ 10. **ἐπὰν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** We now get the mathematical proof of the formula, which may best be stated as follows. It is to be shown that, however the wrong and the damage may be apportioned, the just sentence will be that A shall pay and B shall receive the arithmetical mean of the difference between them. Let the whole πάθος καὶ πρᾶξις (C+D)=10, of which C (ἀδικία estimated as κέρδος)=7, while D (βλάβος estimated as ζημία)=3. The parties come before the judge as A+7 and B−3. The problem is to restore equality by equating ζημία and κέρδος. This implies the formula

(A+7)−(B−3)=(C+5)−(D−5).

Therefore 5 is the μέσον (=δίκαιον) required. However the 10 may be divided, A will always have as his ὑπεροχή twice the arithmetical mean.


τοῦ μέσου ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Fully expressed this would be **τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἑνὶ** ὑπερέχει θάτερον, **καὶ τὸ μέσον** τοῦ

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριοῦμεν τί τε ἀφελεῖν 11
δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον
ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι
δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ
μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ ΒΒ ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις· ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ 12
ἀφῃρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ,
ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ· τῆς
ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ. [ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·
ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον,
καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.] ἐλή- 13
λυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἥ τε ζημία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ
τῆς ἑκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν ἢ τὰ αὑτοῦ
κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιοῦσθαι,

ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη ἑνὶ *ὑπερέχει.* For the ellipse of *τοῦ* (which Zell would insert) before *ἀφ' οὗ*, cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 45 and 1117 a, 30 n.

§ 11. **τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει,** sc. *τοῦ ἀφ' οὗ ἀφῃρέθη.* **ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται** sc. *τὸ μέσον.*

§ 12. **αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ κ.τ.λ.** sc. *γραμμαί.* **τὸ ΑΕ, τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ ΓΔ,** sc. *τμῆμα.* The figure is



Now, in whatever proportions the *πάθος καὶ πρᾶξις* AA is divided, the line BB will always be the arithmetical mean between AE and ΔΓΓ, and will therefore represent *τὸ δίκαιον*. Mr Jackson says "In the following figure ΓΔ = ΓΖ = ΑΕ. It is strange that this is not expressly mentioned in the text." But Aristotle had doubtless a *διαγραφή* to refer to, and in that case it might seem superfluous to write down that ΑΕ = ΓΖ. And it is wrong to say that ΓΔ = ΑΕ, for the whole argument implies that ΔΓ = ΕΑ, a very different thing. Aristotle is not putting in an elaborate way the obvious fact that, if the gain and the loss are equal, the judge must take the gain from the one party and give it back to the other. He is discussing the more interesting case where the gain and the loss are unequal, and showing that however we split up, say the number 10, the same principle will apply. For instance we may get such equations as 17 − 10 = 10 − 3, or 16 − 10 = 10 − 4, or 15 − 10 = 10 − 5, or 14 − 10 = 10 − 6 etc. In all these cases 10 represents justice.

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. This seems to have been interpolated here from 1133 a, 13—16. But it is a very valuable interpolation; for it shows that whoever noted the sentence as a parallel passage here took the right view of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* in its relation to *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον*. See the notes on 1132 b, 21 sqq.

§ 13. **ἐλήλυθε.** Cf. 1133 a, 20. 1142 a, 8. 1143 a, 16. 1166 a, 2. Note in passing that, if the words *ζημία* and *κέρδος* have been transferred in this way from *ἑκούσια* to *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*, we have a strong presumption that these two fall under the same kind of justice.

οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν 15
14 δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος· ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλέον μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ'
αὐτὰ <τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασιν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε
ζημιοῦσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας
μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν
καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. 20

V. Δοκεῖ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς εἶναι ἁπλῶς δίκαιον,
ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὡρίζοντο γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δί-
2 καιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρ-
μόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτι-

ἄδειαν δέδωκεν. The judge does not restore equality in *ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα*, they must be adjusted beforehand. Even if the purchaser makes a bad bargain, the law says *caveat emptor*. Of course if the vendor is fraudulent, it is an *ἀκούσιον συνάλλαγμα* and not a contract at all.

§ 14. **ὅταν...γένηται,** sc. *αὐτοῖς*, 'when the parties have got exactly what they gave,' **<τὰ> δι' αὐτῶν** sc. *γενόμενα*. Rassow's insertion of *τά* is much simpler than any of the interpretations which have been proposed. Nothing is commoner than the omission of *τά* after *αὐτά* by haplography.

τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, i.e. *τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν, in obligationibus ex delicto*. We are coming to the *ἑκούσια* in the next chapter, and we shall see that the same holds good of them.

V. § 1. **τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός,** 'the inverse' or 'reciprocal.' It is confusing to start from Euclid's definition of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθέναι*, for that refers solely to geometrical proportion. If we can speak of an arithmetical proportion at all, we can surely have an 'inverse' or 'reciprocal' arithmetical proportion of the form

$$a - b = d - c.$$

There seems to be an instance of this usage in Theon of Smyrna p. 87, 11 (Hiller) *τὸ δὲ ἀντιπεπονθότως ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον· ὅσον ἂν τοῦ μεγέθους ἀφέλῃς τῆς ὅλης ἐν τῷ κανόνι χορδῆς, τοσοῦτον τῷ τόνῳ προστίθεται, καὶ ὅσον ἂν τῷ μεγέθει τῆς χορδῆς προσθῇς, τοσοῦτον τοῦ τόνου ὑφαιρεῖται*, which certainly appears to refer to addition and subtraction only. The phrase **τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ** would mean literally 'that which has had done to it the opposite of something else,' and would very well apply to a quantity from which the same sum was subtracted as had been added to another.

ἁπλῶς is the emphatic word and is repeated. Aristotle, as we shall see, has no objection to *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*, if we add *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*. To omit this qualification is to neglect the *διαφορὰ τοῦ βλάβους*, i.e. to assume that the *κέρδος* and the *ζημία* are equal.

οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι. According to Alexander's commentary on Met. 985 b, 26 the Pythagoreans regarded *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* and *τὸ ἰσάκις ἴσον* (quadrature) as the proprium of Justice, whence some gave the number of Justice as 4 (the first *even* square), some as 9 (the first *odd* square).

§ 2. **οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ νεμητικόν.** This is obvious; for distributive justice is *κατ' ἀξίαν* and is therefore determined by a (geometrical) proportion.

οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν, for the

κόν—καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδαμάνθυος 3
δίκαιον·

εἴ κε πάθοι τά τ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο

—πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ· οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ 4
δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι
μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ 5
ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ. ἀλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς 6
ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ

ζημία and κέρδος have to be measured by the judge in each case. We must not assume that they are equal; for **πολλαχοῦ διαφωνεῖ**. The βλάβος is seldom exactly equal to the ἀδικία.

§ 3. **καίτοι βούλονταί γε**, i.e. people generally, not the Pythagoreans. For this formulation of the *lex talionis*, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,' cf. Hesiod fr. 212 Mark. The case is well stated in MM. 1194 a, 37 *οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, εἴ τις τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐξέκοψέν τινος, ἀντεκκοπῆναι μόνον ἀλλὰ πλείονα παθεῖν ἀκολουθήσαντα τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ἦρξε πρότερος καὶ ἠδίκησεν, ἀδικεῖ δὲ κατ' ἀμφότερα, ὥστε ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα, καὶ τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν πλείω ὧν ἐποίησεν δίκαιόν ἐστιν.*

οἷον εἰ κ.τ.λ. There is no inconsistency between this and 1132 a, 5 *χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις*. The inequality does not lie between the officer and the private, but between the blow given and the blow received. If an officer strikes a private, that is not merely a blow, but may also be an act of discipline; if a private strikes an officer, that is not merely a blow, but also an act of mutiny. Cf. Probl. 952 b, 28 *ἐὰν μέν τις ἄρχοντα κακῶς εἴπῃ, μεγάλα τὰ ἐπιτίμια, ἐὰν δέ τις ἰδιώτην, οὐθέν. καὶ καλῶς· οἴεται γὰρ τότε οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν τὸν κακηγοροῦντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὑβρίζειν.* The case of Demosthenes v. Meidias is in point here. The judge must therefore 'measure' the *πάθος καὶ πρᾶξις* before he can treat the parties as equal, and strike the balance of debit and credit between them. The amount of *damnum* (βλάβος) being the same, the amount of *iniuria* (ἀδικία) is quite different. Accordingly we do not apply the principle of the arithmetical mean 'simply' (ἁπλῶς), but 'proportionally.'

§ 5. **ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον κ.τ.λ.** In *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* the *ἀδικούμενος ἀδικεῖται ἄκων*, but the *ἀδικῶν ἀδικεῖ* either *ἑκών* or *ἄκων*. Here we see a clear case where the damage suffered may remain the same, while the wrong committed is quite different. Cf. Dem. Meid. § 43 *οἱ νόμοι... ἂν μὲν ἑκὼν βλάψῃ, διπλοῦν, ἂν δ' ἄκων, ἁπλοῦν τὸ βλάβος κελεύουσιν ἐκτίνειν.*

§ 6. **ἐν...ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς.** These are precisely the same as *τὰ ἑκούσια συναλλάγματα* described above (1131 a, 2 sqq.) and they therefore belong to *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον* in the widest sense (1131 a, 1 n.). We shall therefore find that they are regulated by the *arithmetical* mean, and this must therefore work out as a case of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*, not ἁπλῶς indeed, but *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*.

κατ' ἀναλογίαν κ.τ.λ. In the case of *τὰ ἀκούσια*, we must not assume that ἀδικία and βλάβος are equal, and

ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν—εἰ
δὲ μή, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει—ἢ τὸ εὖ—εἰ 1133 a
δὲ μή, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν.
διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις 7
ᾖ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ τῷ
χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. ποιεῖ 8
δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύ-
ζευξις. οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Β, οἰκία
ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκο-
δόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν
ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αὑτοῦ. ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον ᾖ τὸ κατὰ τὴν

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in the case of *ἑκούσια* we must not assume that the things to be exchanged are of equal value.


συμμένει κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pol. 1261 a, 30 *διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σῴζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον.*

τὸ κακῶς sc. *ἀντιποιεῖν*. I am not sure that Muretus was right in bracketing *εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει*. It is redundant, of course; but the future indicative clause, *δουλεία ἐστὶν εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσω*, 'if I am not to retaliate,' is rather too idiomatic for an interpolator. For the omission of the subject of *ἀντιποιήσει*, cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

§ 7. **ἐμποδὼν ποιοῦνται.** Zell notes that according to Pausanias there were temples of the Charites in the *ἀγορά* at Sparta, Orchomenos and Olympia.

ἄρξαι, 'to take the initiative.' Cf. 1135 b, 26.

§ 8. **ἡ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις**, 'diagonal conjunction.' If we arrange our *ὅροι* in the same way as above (1131 b, 9 n.), and we wish to effect a *μετάδοσις*, it is clear that we must 'conjoin,' not A with Γ and B with Δ as we did in the case of *διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον* (this might have been called *ἡ κατὰ πλευρὰν σύζευξις*), but A with Δ and B with Γ. Thus



Now the condition of such a *σύζευξις* being just ('equal') is that the terms should form an *ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία*, for it is only in that case that the sum of the extremes will be equal to the sum of the means. The meaning of 'diagonal conjunction' is well illustrated by Jackson from EE 1242 b, 15, where we are told that in unequal friendships (*φιλίαι καθ' ὑπεροχήν*) the *ὑπερέχων* is apt to expect to get more services from his friend than he gives in proportion to his own superiority (on the principle of *τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον*), whereas the *ὑπερεχόμενος τοὐναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν*, i.e. he says the rule is not $\frac{A}{B}=\frac{A+\Gamma}{B+\Delta}$

but $A+\Delta=B+\Gamma$.

Cf. below 1163 b, 33.

ἐφ' ᾧ, sc. *ὅρῳ*. Mr Jackson says "*ἐφ' ᾧ* Α κ.τ.λ. are lines, not...points." But the *line* Α is *ἐφ' ᾗ* Α (Stewart). The *ὅροι* are neither lines nor points, but dots.

δεῖ οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the problem is.'

τοῦ...ἔργου, τοῦ αὑτοῦ. This is the reading both of K^b and L^b, and

ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου· δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνῃροῦντο 9
15 γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ <ὃ> ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ,

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I do not think it impossible. Professor Bywater (Contr. p. 45) reads *τὸ...ἔργον* (so M^b), *τὸ αὐτοῦ* on the authority of the Vetus Versio. This is certainly neater, but the authority of the Versio is not high upon a point of this kind.

ἐὰν οὖν πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. Before we can say that A+Δ=B+Γ we must make a *διόρθωσις* of the terms. In this *διόρθωσις* there are two stages. First (**πρῶτον**), we must equate Γ and Δ. Say 1Γ=xΔ. This is **τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον**, the stage which the Pythagorean formula ignores. Secondly (**εἶτα**), we must bring the terms A and B into inverse arithmetical ratio of 1 and x. This will give us A + (x − 1) − B = Γ − Δ (**τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός**). After this *διόρθωσις* 'diagonal conjunction' becomes possible (**ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον**) thus;

A + (x − 1) + Δ = B + Γ.

οὐδὲ συμμένει, sc. *τὸ συνάλλαγμα*. The parties enter into a *συνάλλαγμα* or 'business relation' (*συναλλάττονται*) as soon as the one offers a house for shoes and the other shoes for a house. If, however, it is found impossible to effect the *διόρθωσις* or adjustment of terms, *οὐκ ἐμμένουσι τῷ συναλλάγματι*. Having failed to come to terms, they break off negotiations (*διαλύονται τὸ συνάλλαγμα*). It is not correct to say, as Mr Jackson does, that "one of the two parties will be obliged to have recourse to corrective justice in order to obtain his rights"; for this is a case in which *ἄδειαν δέδωκεν ὁ νόμος* (1132 b, 15). Surely an action will not lie against a man with whom one has made a bad bargain unless force or fraud were used, in which case the *συνάλλαγμα*, being *βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν*, would be by definition *ἀκούσιον* (*βίαιον* or *λαθραῖον*).

§ 9. **καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.** The case of a builder and a shoemaker is comparatively simple; for we may say roughly that a house is worth, say 125 pairs of shoes, and then

x − 1 = 124.

But the same principle applies to more complicated cases, like that of a doctor and a farmer, whose *ἔργα* are not definite units, but things like *ὑγίεια* and *τροφή*. What meaning can we assign to 1Γ=xΔ in that case? It seems as if Γ and Δ were incommensurable.

ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ. There can, I think, be no doubt that, in this context, **τὸ ποιοῦν** and **τὸ πάσχον** must refer to the two terms A and B which are *ἀντιπεπονθότα* to 1 and x. The use of *τὸ ποιοῦν* in this sense will not seem very strange if we remember that the case primarily in view is that of the doctor who produces health and his 'patient.' In the language of modern economics *τὸ ποιοῦν* is Supply and *τὸ πάσχον* is Demand. What Aristotle really means, then, is that there would be an end of all commerce unless Supply and Demand can be made identical in every respect. The insertion of *δ* is due to Rassow.

καὶ ὅλως ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι.
10 διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστιν ἀλλαγή. ἐφ' ὃ τὸ νόμισμ' ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεταί πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ 20
μετρεῖ, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκίᾳ ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία.
11 τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα ἑνί τινι πάντα 25
μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἡ χρεία, ἢ πάντα συνέχει—εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέοιντο ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή—οἷον δ'

τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι, sc. *κατ' (ἀριθμητικὴν) ἀναλογίαν*, not *κατ' ἰσότητα*. We must equate the producers (*τούτους*) as well as the products (*ταῦτα δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι* 1133 a, 13) to get the *ἀναλογία* required for purposes of exchange.

§ 10. **συμβλητά**, 'comparable,' i.e. commensurable (*σύμμετρα*). The formula we have been working with assumes that the value of the one product can always be expressed as a multiple of the other. But, since the products are dissimilar, there must be some "common measure" of both if this is to prove true. The principle is clearly laid down in Gen. Corr. 333 a, 20 *εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν (συμβλητὰ) ἀνάγκη ταὐτό τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον πᾶσι τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ᾧ μετροῦνται*. The "common measure" is *money*, which forms as it were 'a middle term' (**γίνεταί πως μέσον**) under which both the *ἔργα* may be brought.

ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1132 b, 12 n.

πως μέσον. This is the important point. The existence of money tends to disguise the fact that justice *ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν* is an arithmetical mean like the other forms.

τὴν ὑπεροχήν...τὴν ἔλλειψιν. These words show we are dealing with *difference*, not *ratio*.

πόσα ἄττα δὴ κ.τ.λ. If the value of shoes is fixed in money, it becomes comparable, not only with the value of a house, but also with that of *τροφή*.

δεῖ τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., what is wanted, then, is that the proportion

A + (x − 1) − B = Γ − Δ

should be generalised in such a way that it will represent not one equation only, but a whole series. We know already that 'x shoes' (**τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα**) = 1 house. But, unless this can be extended, so that we can also equate shoes with *τροφή* etc., commerce is impossible.

ὅπερ, sc. *διαφέρει*. Identity of difference, not of ratio, as above 1131 b, 14.

§ 11. **ἡ χρεία**. Aristotle derives this idea from Plato (Rep. 369). A modern economist would say rather that Normal Value is determined by Cost of Production (which some editors import into the argument here); but Aristotle is thinking of the more ultimate fact that, but for *χρεία*, the thing would have no value at all, whatever the cost of production might be, and infers from this that 'x shoes' = 1 house because the shoemaker's 'need' of the builder exceeds the builder's 'need' of the shoemaker by x − 1.

ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, e.g. if the need of

ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην·
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ
ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται **12**
δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς
σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ.
1133 b εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ ἄγειν ὅταν ἀλλάξωνται (εἰ
δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας ἕξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον), ἀλλ'
ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὑτῶν. οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι αὕτη ἡ

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the builder for the services of the shoemaker were not so great, the rate of exchange would not be the same. Aristotle does not seem to see that Cost of Production narrows this variation to a comparatively slight fluctuation.

ὑπάλλαγμα, 'a pledge, security.' This is one of the non-Attic terms which Aristotle may have brought from Stageira. Phrynichos even says **ὑπάλλαγμα** *ἁμαθῶς τινες ἀντὶ τοῦ* **ἐνέχυρον**. The meaning is precisely the same as in 1133 b, 11 *τὸ νόμισμα οἷον ἐγγυητής* κ.τ.λ.

κατὰ συνθήκην...οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ. In Pol. 1257 b, 10 Aristotle quotes this view in an extreme form, probably derived from the Cynics, *λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασιν, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων* ('adopting a new currency') *οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλοῦτον οὗ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν*. It is true that there is an element of *συνθήκη* or *νόμος* in currency—we may have a gold or a silver standard—but it has an intrinsic (*φύσει*) value also determined by its Cost of Production.

§ 12. ἔσται δὴ κ.τ.λ. After the digression on currency, we are reminded of the two stages of the *διόρθωσις*. The inverse arithmetical ratio will only be applicable (**ἔσται**) after the equation has been made in money value (**ὅταν ἰσασθῇ**). We can then work out the new problem of exchanging shoes and *τροφή*, as easily as that of exchanging them with a definite *ἔργον* like a house.

ὅπερ, sc. *διαφέρει*. Cf. 1133 a, 22. The *διαφορά* is *ὑπεροχή* or *ἔλλειψις* of *χρεία*.

εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας κ.τ.λ. The translation certainly is 'We must not bring them into the figure of proportion after they have exchanged, but when they still have their own products, otherwise one of the extremes will have both excesses.' This can only have any real meaning if we understand it of the generalisation of the equation to other cases than that first stated. The *ἔργον* of the *σκυτοτόμος* must not be equated with that of the *γεωργός* in the form it received from its exchange with that of the *οἰκοδόμος*, otherwise the *γεωργός* will have not only his excess over the cobbler, but the excess of the builder over the cobbler as well. The *σχῆμα ἀναλογίας* then is

οἰκία *ὑποδήματα* *τροφή*

It is only such a figure that can give any meaning to **τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον**.

ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργὸς Α, τροφὴ Γ,
σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω 5
13 μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία
συνέχει ὥσπερ ἕν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρείᾳ ὦσιν
ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφότεροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν
οὗ <οὐκ> ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξα-
14 γωγήν. δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης 10
ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἂν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμι-
σμα οἷον ἐγγυητής ἐσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι
λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον
δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα
τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινω- 15
νία. τὸ δὴ νόμισμα ὥσπερ μέτρον σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσά-

γεωργὸς Α κ.τ.λ. Having equated *τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα* to *τροφή*, we can now apply *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός* by 'diagonal conjunction' in the same way as we did before.

§ 13. ὅτι δ' ἡ χρεία κ.τ.λ. These constant equations would be very troublesome, and we therefore look for some common *nexus*, which will enable us to measure each commodity once for all.

ὥσπερ ὅταν κ.τ.λ. This must surely be an instance of failure to effect an exchange (**οὐκ ἀλλάττονται**), and it must lead up to the view of money as **ἐγγυητὴς τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς**. The meaning must therefore be 'no exchange takes place when the producer (**τις**) wants something which the consumer (**αὐτός**) has not got.' I have therefore written **οὗ <οὐκ> ἔχει** for **οὗ ἔχει** (L^b), or *οὐχί* (K^b).

διδόντες...ἐξαγωγήν, 'offering the privilege of exporting corn.' The phrase *διδόναι ἐξαγωγήν* is technical in the sense of to permit exportation of a home product. Cf. Isokr. Trapez. § 57 where we read that Satyros, King of Bosporos, and his father treated the Athenians as 'the most favoured nation' and, *πολλάκις ἤδη διὰ σπάνιν σίτου τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐμπόρων ναῦς κενὰς ἐκπέμποντες, ὑμῖν ἐξαγωγὴν ἔδοσαν*, Theophr. Char. xxiii *καὶ διδομένης αὐτῷ ἐξαγωγῆς ξύλων ἀτελοῦς* ('duty-free'). Bywater (Contr., p. 46) also compares CIG 3523 (= Cauer 126) and Dittenberger, Sylloge 60 *b* 1 and 354, 6. The plural participle referring to the same subject as a singular indefinite pronoun is quite a common construction. Cf. 1135 b, 31.

§ 14. οἷον ἐγγυητής, cf. *ὑπάλλαγμα* above 1133 a, 29.

πάσχει...τὸ αὐτό, 'the same thing, indeed, happens to money,' i.e. there is not always the same demand for it. I think that the context sufficiently justifies this interpretation; for in 1133 a, 28 the two cases have been already distinguished, *ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγή* (failure to exchange, when wine is wanted and corn offered), *ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή* (unfavourable exchange). See, however, Bywater, Contr., p. 46.

τετιμῆσθαι, 'to have a price put on them,' not, we may be sure, by the 'higgling of the market.' Aristotle no doubt is thinking of a tariff prescribed by the magistrates.


ζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς. ἓν δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκία α, μναῖ δέκα β, κλίνη γ. τὸ α τοῦ β ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἡ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἡ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος, τὸ γ τοῦ β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκίᾳ, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἡ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἱ πέντε κλῖναι.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, εἴρηται. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττόν ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης τίς ἐστιν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέσου ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ

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§ 15. **ἐξ ὑποθέσεως**, i.q. *κατὰ συνθήκην*.

οἰκία α κ.τ.λ. The sum of 10 minae is taken as the common measure of houses and beds, which are not directly commensurable. We know, however, that a house is worth five minae and a bed worth one, so we can say that $\alpha=\frac{\beta}{2}$ and $\gamma=\frac{\beta}{10}$ from which it follows that $\alpha=5\gamma$. The diagram is given thus by the Par.—



The 10 minae take the place of 'x shoes' in the earlier diagram.

ἢ ἴσον, 'worth five minas or $=5$ minas.' For the use of *ἴσον* in the sense of the sign $=$, cf. 1133 a, 22.

οὕτως, i.e. five beds for a house.

§ 17. **Τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** We now come to the question *πῶς μεσότης ἡ δικαιοσύνη;* That *δικαιοπραγία*, the *ἐνέργεια*, is a *μέσον*, we have sufficiently shown; but what are we to say of the *ἕξις*?

οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. The difference arises from the fact that *δικαιοσύνη* is an *ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἕτερον*. We have no longer to find simply a *μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, but an unknown x which involves a proportion, whether geometrical or arithmetical. Justice is *τοῦ μέσου* because, whether in distribution or in adjusting penalties and prices, it seeks to find this x, while Injustice seeks to secure for oneself $x+n$ of good things and $x-n$ of bad, and to secure for others either $x+n$ or $x-n$ of good things or bad, as the case may be.

καθ' ἣν, sc. *ἕξιν*.

δίκαιος λέγεται πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανεμητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἱρετοῦ πλέον αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἡ δ' ἀδικία τοὐναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἡ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεώς ἐστιν, ἐφ' αὑτοῦ μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἁπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον ἀδικεῖσθαί ἐστι, τὸ δὲ μεῖζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἑκατέρας ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἑκάστην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτης ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ λῃστής; ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ᾧ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οἷον οὐ κλέπτης, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ·

πρακτικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν. A more accurate expression than the *βούλονται* with which we started 1129 a, 9.

διανεμητικός. There is no reason to suppose that this word is intended to include *διορθωτικός* here. Aristotle touches upon *τὸ διορθωτικόν* below a, 12.

§ 18. **ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων**, i.e. in the case referred to above as *ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον* (a, 3). In that case the total result is the same, i.e. that one gets too much and the other too little, but the violation of proportion is not necessarily in the same direction, as it always is in the case of *αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον*. It may be one way or the other (**ὁποτέρως ἔτυχεν**).

τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος κ.τ.λ. This refers to *τὸ διορθωτικόν*. The *ἀδίκημα* (the *πάθος καὶ πρᾶξις* of 1132 a, 9) is divided into unequal segments, the *κέρδος* and *ζημία* of 1132 a, 12.

VI. § 1. **Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.** A note on the importance of *προαίρεσις* intended to remind us of what we have learnt before. Such reminders are characteristic of lectures.

ἢ οὕτω μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'or does the quality of the *ἀδίκημα* make no difference?' Of course *διοίσει* is personal, and we must explain *οὕτω* as *τῷ τοιόνδε ἢ τοιόνδε ἀδίκημα ἀδικεῖν*.

εἰδώς. Cf. 1105 a, 31 *πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς*.

διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχήν, 'from the efficient cause of Will.' For *προαίρεσις* as the *ἀρχὴ πράξεως* cf. 1113 a, 6 n.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπε- 3
πονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ δὲ μὴ λαν- 4
θάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ
εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ
κατ' ἀριθμόν· ὥστε ὅσοις μή ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις
πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλά τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ'
ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς·
νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ
τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις (ἐν οἷς
δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία), τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὑτῷ
νέμειν τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἁπλῶς κακῶν.
διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ 5

§ 3. **εἴρηται πρότερον**, 1132 b, 21 sqq. The allusion to τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς is not irrelevant; *τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πόλις* (*ib.* 33).

§ 4. **καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ.**, 'not only justice, but justice *in the state*.' We are learning to be lawgivers. Hitherto we have been discussing the subject καθόλου (1134 a, 16); we must now look at its particular application to our subject.

πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν. On 'self-sufficiency,' see Bradley in Hellenica pp. 197—199. The state must be all-sufficient in itself for the good life.

ὅσοις μὴ κ.τ.λ. It is quite clear from the reference below (b, 14) that this refers to the κοινωνίαι of husband and wife, father and children, master and slaves. Among them there cannot be τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον in the strict sense, but only something which may be called justice metaphorically or by analogy (*τι δίκαιον καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, cf. 1115 a, 19 n.).

ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν κ.τ.λ., 'either proportionally or arithmetically equal,' e.g. the citizens of an aristocracy are 'proportionally equal,' those of a democracy 'arithmetically equal.' We find *ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἀριθμῷ, κατὰ ποσόν*, opposed to *κατ' ἀναλογίαν, λόγῳ, κατ' ἀξίαν*. Cf. 1158 b, 30.

ἐν οἷς ἀδικία, 'among whom there is a possibility of injustice.' We shall see that injustice is, strictly speaking, impossible towards wife, children or slaves (infra b, 13).

καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις. The possibility of the ἐνέργεια follows from the possibility of the ἕξις, but not *vice versa*.

τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν. See 1129 b, 2 n.

§ 5. **διὸ οὐκ ἐῶμεν κ.τ.λ.** Cf. Pol. 1281 a, 34 *ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον, φαῦλον*. The objection is that a human being has feelings of his own, cf. 1286 a, 17 *κρεῖττον δὲ ᾧ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ τὸ συμφυές, τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' ἔχειν πᾶσαν*.

ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον. This is the reading of M^b only, and is therefore probably due to conjecture. Both K^b and L^b have ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, which is supposed

τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων φύλαξ 1134 b
τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν 6
αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ δίκαιος—(οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὑτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ
ἑτέρῳ πονεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναί φασιν ἀγαθὸν 5
τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον)—μισθὸς ἄρα 7
τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ
τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον 8
καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταὐτὸν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, 10
ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν 9
δ' οὐδεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς
αὐτά. οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· κατὰ
νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος, οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν
οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον 15
πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο
γάρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πο-

to mean 'contrary to the general principle' embodied in the law, *τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου* of Pol. 1286 a, 17. But surely this would not be sprung upon us without anything in the context to suggest it. For the confusion of *νόμος* and *λόγος* in the MSS., see 1138 a, 10 n. In later times *λόγος* was supposed to mean 'reason.'

§ 7. **μισθὸς...δοτέος.** All this comes from Plato, Rep. 345 e sqq.

§ 8. **τὸ δεσποτικόν...τὸ πατρικόν.** Justice between master and slaves or between father and children resembles the *δίκαιον* of the state. But it is not the same; for these κοινωνίαι do not fall under the head of ἐν οἷς ἀδικία. There cannot be ἀδικία ἁπλῶς to parts of oneself, but only ἀδικία καθ' ὁμοιότητα. The word *πατρικός* properly means 'hereditary,' but Aristotle gives it a new application.

ἕως ἂν ᾖ πηλίκον κ.τ.λ., 'till it attains a certain age and has been separated.' L^b inserts μὴ before χωρισθῇ, the scribe supposing ἕως ἄν to mean 'as long as.'

ὥσπερ μέρος. Cf. Pol. 1254 a, 9 *τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον*.

§ 9. **πρὸς αὑτά**, Ramsauer's reading for MS. *πρὸς αὐτόν*, seems clearly right.

ἦν, ἦσαν, as we saw above a, 24 sqq.

ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. This is not quite how the equality was formulated above, but it comes to the same thing; for, in the Third Book of the Politics, Aristotle shows that the citizen is necessarily ὁ *μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι* (1283 b, 42).

μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκα. Cf. Pol. 1259 a, 39 *γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς*.

τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον. In Pol. 1253 b, 8 the *τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς* are thus given. *ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ δεσ-*

λιτικοῦ. VII. τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μή, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει, τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς· καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς, παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἔστι μέν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκῃ, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἁρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται πάντας ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὁμοιά ἐστι τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ

1 2 3 4 5

1135 a

ποτικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρὸς σύζευξις), καὶ τρίτον πατρική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ ὠνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). The word γαμικός properly means not 'conjugal,' but 'pertaining to a wedding,' while πατρικός is properly 'hereditary.'

VII. §1. **φυσικόν...νομικόν.** See 1094 b, 16 n.

ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, 'when they have adopted it.'

μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι. In Herodotos, vi, 79 we are told ἄποινα δέ ἐστι Πελοποννησίοισι δύο μνέαι τεταγμέναι κατ' ἄνδρα αἰχμάλωτον ἐκτίνειν. But Asia in the 4th century is not Peloponnesos in the 5th.

τὸ αἶγα θύειν κ.τ.λ. We do not know what this refers to.

τὸ θύειν Βρασίδᾳ, at Amphipolis. Cf. Thuc. v, 11.

τὰ ψηφισματώδη. On the distinction between ψηφίσματα and νόμοι see below 1141 b, 27.

§ 3. **τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.** It is true that τὰ δίκαια are κινητά, but it is not true that τὸ φύσει is ἀκίνητον. On the contrary, τὰ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως (Phys. 192 b, 13).

καίτοι παρά γε κ.τ.λ. In heaven there is 'immutable justice,' so the argument would not be true at all of the gods. There is nothing remarkable in the fact that Aristotle attributes justice to the gods in a dialectical argument like this. It is true that he shows below (1178 b, 10) that it is absurd to talk of the gods being just, but ordinary speech does so, and that is enough to make an ἔνδοξον.

§ 4. **ποῖον κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle means τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. Cf. Introd. § 26.

οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὗ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταὐτὰ πανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη. τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά, ἑκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἕν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἢ τάξει· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῇ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὔπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα· καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποιά τε εἴδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. VIII. ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ ὅταν ἑκών τις αὐτὰ πράττῃ· ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὔτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκοις, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ· ὅταν γὰρ ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα τότ' ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δ' οὔπω, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ. λέγω δ' ἑκούσιον μέν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἄν τις τῶν ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττῃ μήτε ὃν μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ <ἕνεκα>, οἷον τίνα τύπτει καὶ τίνι καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, κἀκείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μηδὲ βίᾳ (ὥσπερ εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτοι ἕτερον, οὐχ ἑκών· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ)· ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις

1 2 3 5 10 15 20 25

§ 5. **οὗ μὲν ὠνοῦνται κ.τ.λ.**, i.e. wholesale and retail measures differ.

§ 7. **τὸ κοινόν**, sc. τῷ διανεμητικῷ καὶ τῷ διορθωτικῷ. Aristotle had used δικαίωμα above to get a neat antithesis to ἀδίκημα. But he admits that this is stretching the meaning of the word considerably.

VIII. **οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.**, 'they perform acts of which justice or injustice are accidents,' the regular way of explaining the term κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

§ 3. **καὶ πρότερον**, 1111 a, 1 sqq.

μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός represents μὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν. He strikes some one ᾧ συμβέβηκε πατρὶ εἶναι, but not καθ' αὑτόν.

γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἀγνοεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὴ ἀγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βίᾳ, ἀκούσιον. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθὲν οὔθ' ἑκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν. ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. τῶν δὲ ἑκουσίων τὰ μὲν προελόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προελόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσ' ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα ᾠήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὅν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως

μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν. This is the same class of things as is referred to at 1113 b, 26. It is explained in the next sentence, πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.

οὔτ' ἀκούσιον. This has been suspected, but it seems to me quite correct. We cannot rightly call τὰ φύσει ὑπάρχοντα involuntary any more than voluntary. They are altogether outside that classification, for they happen φύσει and not βίᾳ. It would be absurd to say that we grow old intentionally.

§ 4. καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, as well as τὸ καθ' αὑτό.

§ 5. τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι. For τὸ ἑκούσιον is a wider term than τὸ προαιρετόν. See above 1112 a, 14 ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται (τὸ προαιρετόν), τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον;

§ 6. μετ' ἀγνοίας, sc. τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα.

ἁμαρτήματα is here used in its widest sense including ἀτυχήματα. In legal terminology, ἀτύχημα is *casus*, ἁμάρτημα implies *culpa*, ἀδίκημα implies *dolus*. Cf. Menander fr. 426 Kock—

ἀτύχημα κἀδίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει·
τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δ' αἱρέσει.

The distinction was a commonplace of the δικαστήρια.

§ 7. παραλόγως. Cf. Rhet. 1374 b, 6 ἔστιν ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἁμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παράλογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τέ ἐστιν. The παράλογον is what is contrary to reasonable expectation. For instance it is not παράλογον if you unintentionally kill a man when shooting in the street, but it is παράλογον if you shoot in an uninhabited place and a man suddenly appears and is killed.

ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς αἰτίας. Mr Jackson would read ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀγνοίας. But surely αἰτία here means simply 'the charge,' 'the offence,' as often in the orators.

§ 8. μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ. It does not require προαίρεσις to make an *act* unjust, though we do not call a *man* unjust unless the act comes from a ἕξις προαιρετική.

ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά. The ἀναγκαῖα πάθη have to do with τὰ σωματικά, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν (1147 b, 26); the φυσικά include more than that, ὅσα κοινὰ πᾶσι καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοινά (1149 b, 5). They are ἀνθρώπινα, though not ἀναγκαῖα, e.g. anger etc.

§ 9. ἐκ προνοίας, the legal phrase. We do not presume 'malice.'

ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα (ἁμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ 8 ἐν αὐτῷ ᾖ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἔξωθεν)· ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικὰ συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη· 9 ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμφισβη-

οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει, sc. τῆς αἰτίας, 'is not the aggressor.'

§ 10. οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. The issue of fact is not raised, but only that of justification.

ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is the φαντασία of wrong suffered that is the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως of that form of ὄρεξις called θυμός. The process is explained below 1149 a, 32.

ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν. Cf. Rhet. 1417 b, 27 μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ (sc. ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι) τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τινες περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν (the present case).

ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην κ.τ.λ., 'unless in cases where the wrong has been done from forgetfulness.' For instance a man may forget to pay a bill, and in that case is not μοχθηρός. There is no difficulty about the plural, cf. 1133 b, 9 n.

περὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For δέ connecting a

τοῦσιν (ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ), ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἴεται ἀδι-
1136 a κεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὔ· ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψῃ, ἀδικεῖ· καὶ 11
κατὰ ταὐτ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ
τὸ ἀνάλογον ᾖ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν
προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ· δικαιοπραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἑκὼν
5 πράττῃ. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μέν ἐστι συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ' 12
οὐ συγγνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλὰ
καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἁμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά, ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι'
ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν
μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ συγγνωμονικά.

10 IX. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις εἰ ἱκανῶς διώρισται περὶ τοῦ
ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἔστιν ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης
εἴρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

Μητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος.
—Ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν, ἢ <οὐχ> ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών;

15 πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ'
ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον; καὶ ἆρα

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finite verb with a participle, see 1116 a, 8 n.

ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ. Clearly ὁ *ἐπιβουλεύσας* is contrasted with ὁ *μὴ προβουλεύσας* above (b, 20). He is the man who has received no provocation and is the aggressor (*ἄρχει*). He cannot plead *ἄγνοια*, and the *ἀμφισβήτησις*, if there is one, will be *περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι*, not *περὶ τοῦ δικαίου*. The word *ἐπιβουλεύειν* implies an unprovoked act, not a retaliation of any kind.

§ 11. **ἐὰν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως κ.τ.λ.** The presence of *προαίρεσις*, i.e. of *βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις*, not mere *ὄρεξις* like *θυμός*, at once makes the man *ἄδικος*, though his act may be an *ἀδίκημα* even without *προαίρεσις*.

παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον, according as the citizens are equal *κατ' ἀναλογίαν* or *κατ' ἀριθμόν* (1134 a, 27). The reference is not to Distributive and Corrective Justice.

ἂν μόνον ἑκών, i.e. even without *προαίρεσις*.

§ 12. **διὰ πάθος δὲ κ.τ.λ.** An act of this kind would not be an *ἀδίκημα*, but something worse. In the Seventh Book these 'bestial' *πάθη* are discussed.

IX. § 1. **Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.** In the light of the distinctions just made certain old difficulties may be solved. The first is 'Can a man be wronged with his own consent?'

Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκε. Cf. 1110 a, 28 n. The two lines seem to have formed part of a *στιχομυθία*. The MSS. have *ἢ θέλουσαν*, but the sense seems to require an antithesis to *ἑκοῦσαν*. Grotius restored *οὐ θέλουσαν*, Jackson and Bywater read *οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν*, comparing Hippol. 319 *φίλος μ' ἀπόλλυσ' οὐχ ἑκοῦσαν οὐχ ἑκών*. The speakers are probably Alkmeon and Phegeus.

καὶ ἆρα πᾶν κ.τ.λ. On the dittographia see Bywater, Contr. p. 47.

πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως, [ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον,] ἢ
2 *τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαι-*
οῦσθαι· τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ὥστ' εὔλογον
ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ δι- 20
καιοῦσθαι ἢ ἑκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε
καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἑκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται
3 *οὐχ ἑκόντες. ἔπειτα καὶ τόδε διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ὁ*
τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς ἀδικεῖται πᾶς, ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράτ-
τειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐν- 25
δέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων· ὁμοίως
δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ τἄδικα
πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι· ἀδύνα-
τον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικοῦντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιο- 30
4 *πραγοῦντος. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα*
τινά, τὸ δ' ἑκόντα εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς, ὁ δ' ἀκρα-
τὴς ἑκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὑτόν, ἑκών τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο κἂν ἐν-
δέχοιτο αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τῶν ἀπο-
5 *ρουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἑκὼν ἄν τις* 1136 b
δι' ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἑκόντος, ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἑκόντ'
ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ
βλάπτειν εἰδότα καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου

The alternative is whether (1) *τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι* is in every case necessarily one or the other, or whether (2) it is sometimes the one and sometimes the other.

§ 2. **δικαιοῦσθαι,** 'having justice done to one.' Aristotle requires an opposite to *ἀδικεῖσθαι* and uses *δικαιοῦσθαι* in a sense of his own. So above (1135 a, 12) he used *δικαίωμα* as the opposite of *ἀδίκημα*.

εὔλογον, opp. **ἄτοπον** (a, 21), marks a dialectical argument.

§ 3. **ἔπειτα** answering to **πρῶτον μέν** a, 11. The reading is Bywater's correction of MS. *ἐπεί*. See Contr. p. 47. The second *ἀπορία* is 'Can we say that every man who suffers a wrong is wronged?'

ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων, sc. *ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν*. We have seen already that *ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν* it is possible to commit an *ἀδίκημα* **κατὰ συμβεβηκός,** e.g. when we act *δι' ἄγνοιαν*. Is it also possible *κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀδικεῖσθαι*?

§ 4. **ἁπλῶς,** opp. to **ἢ προσθετέον** below (b, 3). If we say that a wrong is 'simply' *damnum* knowingly inflicted, we shall have to say that the *ἀκρατής*, who knowingly suffers *damnum* at the hands of another or his own, *ἀδικεῖται*. We must, however, regard *iniuria* as well as *damnum*, and *volenti non fit iniuria*.

§ 5. **προσθετέον,** i.q. *προσδιοριστέον*.

βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἑκὼν καὶ τἄδικα πάσχει, 6
ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών· οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατής,
ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει· οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐδεὶς
ὃ μὴ οἴεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν
πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι 7
δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει "χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκα-
τόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ δι-
δόναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα
δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, 8
δῆλον.

Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δύ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότερόν ποτ'
ἀδικεῖ ὁ νείμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλέον ἢ ὁ ἔχων, καὶ
εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον 9
λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ἔχων τὸ πλέον,
εἴ τις πλέον αὑτοῦ ἑτέρῳ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἑκών, οὗτος αὐτὸς
αὑτὸν ἀδικεῖ· ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιει-
κὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν; ἑτέρου γὰρ
ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, πλεονεκτεῖ, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καλοῦ.
ἔτι λύεται κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ παρὰ
τὴν αὑτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διά γε τοῦτο,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ διανέ- 10
μων ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλέον ἔχων ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ
ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ᾧ τὸ ἑκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν·
τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἥ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν 11
λέγεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ
οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μέν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα.
ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δί- 12

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§ 6. **βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** We may consent to *damnum*; but, if it is essential to *iniuria* that it should be *παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν*, we cannot consent to that. For no one 'wishes' anything but *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*.

§ 7. **Ὅμηρος.** Il. vi, 236.

§ 8. **ὧν προειλόμεθα.** This has no reference. Aristotle forgets that he has not enumerated the *ἀπορίαι*. He now mentions the third and fourth.

§ 9. **ἐλαττωτικός**, opp. *πλεονεκτικός*.

§ 11. **κτείνει**, the legal word.

§ 12. **ἀγνοῶν**, sc. *τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*. The case supposed is one in which material facts were not before the court.

καιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον
γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρι-
νεν ἀδίκως, πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. 1137 a
ὥσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις μερίσαιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ 13
ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ τὸν
ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. οἱ δ' 14
ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ καὶ τὸ 5
δίκαιον εἶναι ῥᾴδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ
τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ
τὸ ἀργύριον ῥᾴδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ ἔχοντας
ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε ῥᾴδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ 15
γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, 10
ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιέναι (ἀλλ' οὐ
ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· ἀλλὰ πῶς
πραττόμενα καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια, τοῦτο δὴ πλέον ἔρ-
γον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ
ἑλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομὴν εἰδέναι ῥᾴδιον, ἀλλὰ πῶς 15
δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον
ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται 16
εἶναι οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐχ ἧττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ
καὶ μᾶλλον δύναιτ' ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων· καὶ γὰρ
συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν 20

πλεονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτός. The unjust judge *ἀδικεῖ*, for he takes more than his share of the *ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*. It is not essential that he should literally share the spoils of the *ἀδίκημα*. Even if he were to decide the case on those terms (**ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ**), it is not the land in dispute but a money equivalent that he would receive. So the equivalent need not be more than the gratitude of the one party (**χάρις**) or the pleasure of punishing the other (**τιμωρία**). These are enough to constitute *πλεονεξία*.

§ 14. **ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡδὶ κ.τ.λ.** It is not easy to be *ἄδικος*, though it is easy to commit an *ἄδικον*.

§ 15. **ἀλλ' οὐ κ.τ.λ.**, 'though these things are not just except accidentally.' For a parenthesis introduced by *ἀλλά* = 'though,' followed by a main clause introduced by *ἀλλά* = 'but,' Bywater (Contr. p. 48) compares 1139 b, 2. 1150 b, 6 sqq.

τοῦτο δή, sc. *τὸ γνῶναι πῶς πραττόμενα κ.τ.λ.* The MSS. have *τοῦτο δέ*, but see Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

§ 16. **δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο**, i.e. because they ignore the fact that it is easy to do an unjust act, but not to be unjust. Plato had already shown in the First Book of the Republic that, if we regard Justice as a mere external accomplishment or *τέχνη*, the just man will be the best thief (Rep. 334 a).

ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεὶς ἐφ' ὁποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἁπλῶς 17 ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον, τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, τοῖς δὲ μέχρι του· τοῦτο δ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

X. Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις· καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ 1137 b ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς [οὐ δίκαιον] εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν 2 οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον

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§ 17. **τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν**, i.e. *τῶν ἐκτός*, things which are good in themselves, though they may be bad in relation to something else. Cf. 1129 b, 3.

ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ., 'but admit of excess or defect in them.' Of course *ἔχουσι* is the dative of the participle, which is connected with the finite verb by *δέ*. Cf. 1116 a, 8.

τοῦτο δ'. This is the reading implied by the Vetus Versio, and I have followed Stewart in preferring it. The MSS. have *διὰ τοῦτ'*, which leaves *ἐστίν* without a subject. Others read *διό* for *διά*.

X. § 1. **Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας κ.τ.λ.** The questions of legal casuistry we have been discussing lead up naturally to the question of "equity."

ὥστε καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'so much so that in praising things we even transfer the word *ἐπιεικές* to other things than *δίκαια*, and use it as equivalent to *ἀγαθόν*.' Attic avoids the strong terms *ἀγαθός* and *κακός* and prefers the milder terms *ἐπιεικής*, *μέτριος* and *φαῦλος* or *ὁ τυχών*. Aristotle often uses *ἐπιεικής* in this sense. Cf. 1102 b, 10.

[οὐ δίκαιον]. These words are not translated in the Vetus Versio and seem better away, as Giphanius saw.

ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄν- 10
3 τοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρ-
4 θωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ 15 τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὀρθός· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός
5 ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ 20 τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ᾗ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἂν εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ᾔδει, ἐνο-
6 μοθέτησεν. διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. 25 καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι
7 νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀορίστου ἀόριστος καὶ

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§ 2. **δικαίου τινός**, 'better than a species of justice.' It is itself a species of *τὸ δίκαιον*, not another *γένος*.

§ 4. **ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς κ.τ.λ.** Cf. Plato, Polit. 294 a *νόμος οὐκ ἄν ποτε δύναιτο τό τε ἄριστον καὶ τὸ δικαιότατον ἀκριβῶς πᾶσιν ἅμα περιλαβὼν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτάττειν*.

εὐθύς, 'from its very nature.' This use of *εὐθύς* is derived from such phrases as *εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς*, *εὐθὺς φύσει ὑπάρχει*. Cf. 1140 b, 17.

ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη, sc. *τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*, for *ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἡ πρᾶξις*.

§ 5. **ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.** Cf. Rhet. 1374 b, 11 (*ἐπιεικὲς*) *τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον* ('the letter') *ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου*. We see from the word *παρών* that Aristotle is thinking of the lawgiver's *ἀποδημία* in Plato, Polit. 294 a sqq., and that in turn is suggested by the story of Solon.

§ 6. **ψηφίσματος δεῖ**. A *ψήφισμα* is an executive, not a legislative, act. The *ἐκκλησία* was an executive, not a legislative, body. Allowing for differences, we may think of an Order in Council.

ὁ κανών ἐστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας ὁ μολίβδινος κανών· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανών, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον καὶ τινὸς βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικός, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικής ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἕξις.

XI. Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῶν δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτιννύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος, ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. ἔτι ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάπτῃ μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων ἑκών, ἀδικεῖ, ἑκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὃν καὶ ᾧ· ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων ἑκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον, ὃ οὐκ ἐᾷ

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§ 7. **τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομίας.** This is said to refer to the 'Cyclopean' building, e.g. at Tiryns, where polygonal stones were used and a *μολίβδινος κανών* would doubtless be of service. But why should it be called 'Lesbian'? Stewart asks whether the reference is not to the Lesbian *κῦμα* or 'moulding' (Dict. Ant. s. v. *Cyma*). The Lesbian *κῦμα* was undulating, not a simple hollow like the Dorian. Surely this must be right. Cf. Aeschylus fr. 72, Dindorf—

ἀλλ' ὁ μέν τις Λέσβιον φατνώματι
κῦμ' ἐν τριγώνοις ἐκπεραινέτω ῥυθμοῖς.

XI. § 1. **Πότερον δ' ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ.** All the other *ἀπορίαι* lead up to this one, and it derives its importance from its bearing on Plato's account of *δικαιοσύνη*.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Even in the wide Platonic sense of Justice it is impossible.

ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει. It is now common to say after Victorius, that *οὐ κελεύει* = *ἀπαγορεύει* just as *οὐκ ἐᾷ* = *κωλύει*, and that the remark here is merely an explanation of this. But then it would be mere tautology, and if *οὐ κελεύει* is idiomatically equivalent to *ἀπαγορεύει*, no explanation would be needed. If we had to do here with an explanation of an idiomatic *οὐ κελεύει* = *ἀπαγορεύει*, we should most certainly have *ἃ δὲ οὐ κελεύει*, not *ἃ δὲ μὴ κελεύει*. Further, there is really no authority for *οὐ κελεύειν* = *ἀπαγορεύειν*. The simple interpretation, and the right one, is to supply *ἀποκτιννύναι* after *μὴ κελεύει*.

The law forbids us to kill anything which it does not expressly enjoin us to kill. We must not kill except where the law gives us *ἄδεια*. The argument is that as suicide is not expressly exempted from the penalties of *φόνος*, it must come under them.

§ 2. **παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον**, 'in violation of the same law' as the *μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων* who *βλάπτει παρὰ τὸν*

ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα. ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὔ; ἑκὼν γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐδεὶς ἑκών. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ, καί τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι. ἔτι καθ' ὃ ἄδικος μόνον ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλως φαῦλος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου· ἔστι γάρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὅλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ—ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη ἀφῃρῆσθαι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἑκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον· ὁ γὰρ διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' αὑτόν, ταὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἴη ἂν ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐδεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ αὑτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ λύεται τὸ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ

νόμον above. The L^b reading *παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* seems to me meaningless in this context. K^b has *παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον* and the Vetus Versio implies *νόμον*, whence we may infer that the reading of M^b, though doubtless a conjecture, is right. For the confusion of *λόγος* and *νόμος* in MSS., see above 1134 a, 35.

§ 3. **ἡ πόλις ζημιοῖ.** Cf. Aischines against Ktesiphon § 244 *ἐάν τις αὐτὸν διαχρήσηται, τὴν χεῖρα τὴν τοῦτο πράξασαν χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος θάπτομεν.* It is clear from this that the *ἀδικία* consisted in bringing blood-guiltiness (*μίασμα*) on the state, not in depriving the state of a citizen. Hence *ἀτιμία* is the appropriate punishment, not damages.

§ 4. **ἔτι καθ' ὃ κ.τ.λ.**, in the special sense to which we have limited *ἀδικία*, i.e. so far as it has to do with *πλεονεξία* of *τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά*. Here *ὁ ἀδικῶν* is **ἄδικος μόνον** (there is no *ἐπαναφορά* to any other kind of badness 1130 a, 28), but not **ὅλως φαῦλος** (i.e. his *κακία* is not *ὅλη κακία πρὸς ἕτερον*, but the *ἐν μέρει κακία*).

οὕτω πονηρός, 'bad in the same sense,' i.e. as having a particular form of badness.

ἅμα γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ. If A and B are *ἀριθμῷ ἕν*, there can be no *ἀδικία*, for Γ and Δ (*τὰ πράγματα*) cannot be added to A = B and subtracted from it at the same time.

§ 5. **ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Not only is an act of injustice voluntary and deliberate, but doing wrong is prior to having wrong done to one—if wrong has first been done to one, there is no *ἀδικία*—but, if a man could wrong himself, the agent and patient being simultaneous with the wrong suffered;

30 δὲ πλέον ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου * * * καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν
ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ)· ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ
ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ
κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν
τὸ ἑκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ
35 ἀδικίας. καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἧττον φαῦλον, 8
1138 b κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐδὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν.
ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ, ἀλλὰ πλευρῖτιν λέγει μείζω
νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίη ὑπὸ
5 τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι ἢ ἀποθανεῖν.

Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς 9
αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ
τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις
διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον· εἰς
10 ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν
τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν
ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ
τούτοις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [τῶν ἠθικῶν 10
15 ἀρετῶν] διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

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§ 7. **καὶ ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ.** These words seem to have no grammatical connexion as they stand. Some phrase like *τὸ δὲ δικαιοπραγεῖν μέσον* (Rassow) may have been lost by homoeoteleuton.

ἢ ἐγγύς, for the *ἀδίκημα* may be *ἄνευ προαιρέσεως*, in which case the agent is not *ἄδικος*.

§ 8. **τῇ τέχνῃ**, as usual *τῇ πολιτικῇ*, but illustrated by *ἰατρική*. No art as such takes account of *συμβεβηκότα*.

§ 9. **Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We can now dispose finally of the account of *δικαιοσύνη* in Plato's Republic. It is based on a metaphor, and (1) it only refers to the relation between 'parts of the soul,' (2) it is not true *πολιτικὸν δίκαιον*, which implies equality.

τῶν αὐτοῦ τισιν. For this Platonic phrase, cf. e.g. Crito 47 c *ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;* 47 e *ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων.*

ἐν τούτοις...τοῖς λόγοις, i.e. in the writings of Plato and his followers.

BOOK VI.

GOODNESS OF INTELLECT.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. Our account of goodness cannot be complete until we have described Goodness of Intellect as well as Goodness of Character. We know that Happiness is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it may be that this will prove to be some kind of intellectual goodness. But there is a still more pressing need for such a discussion, since the nature of goodness of character cannot be made perfectly clear without it. We have assumed all along that the mean state in which goodness is to be found was determined by the "right rule" (*ὀρθὸς λόγος*), and we said also that this meant it was determined "by what the wise man would determine it by." Now Wisdom is certainly a form of intellectual goodness, and we must therefore discuss that if we are to make our previous inquiries thoroughly intelligible. The case is just like that of health. We may define that roughly as a mean, and we may say truly enough that we can feel when we are healthy and when we are not (*ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις*). This will even enable us to look after our own health to some extent; for we can always warm ourselves by exercise if we find we are too cold. But such an account of health will not be enough for us if we intend to become doctors. In that case we must have the form of health in our souls. Now the object of the present course is not to give empirical rules for action, but to train lawgivers; for we know that the fairest and grandest aim of practical science is to produce Happiness for a state. The lawgiver, then, must have the "right rule," the form of goodness, in his soul; and we cannot fulfil the task we set before us at the

beginning of the course if we do not address ourselves to the solution of this problem.

§ 2. We may convince ourselves by a process of dialectical reasoning that the forms of intellectual goodness are two in number, namely Practical and Theoretical Wisdom (*φρόνησις* and *σοφία*). This might have been deduced at once from the doctrine that all thought is either theoretical or practical (Introd. § 11); but it is more in accordance with our method to work it out from current philosophical views, and especially those of the Academy. In any case we find that there are these two forms of intellectual goodness; and if we compare them and ask how they are related to each other, we shall come very near the final answer to the question with which we started.

§ 3. All forms of thought, practical and theoretical alike, perform their functions through syllogism; but there is a fundamental difference between the syllogism of action and that of knowledge. This is due to the fact that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is always an action, and an action is necessarily particular, it is this action and not another. Now we know that there can be no demonstration of the particular, and therefore the thought which enters into the practical syllogism must be of a different character altogether from that which is operative in demonstration. Practical Wisdom, the virtue of that form of thought, must be capable, not only of apprehending the things that are good for man, the "right rule" (*ὀρθὸς λόγος*) to apply in each department of life; it must also enable us to see that the particular act under consideration is in the circumstances a case of that general rule. In theoretical science, it is to sense we must go for the particulars; but we can hardly call our perception of the character of a particular act by the name of sense. It is not unlike the intuition by which we apprehend mathematical relations; but even that is not the same. It is better to call it "practical thought," and to leave the explanation of its true nature to the physicist or the "first Philosopher.". We all know quite well what is meant by it. And we now see how it is that the Mean is determined. The wise man, the lawgiver, has the form of goodness, the "right rule" in his soul, and he has also the power of seeing how that form is to be embodied in a particular act. And he has the form of goodness in his soul just because he knows the end of human life; for the form is

always determined by the end. The test, then, of whether a certain state of the soul is goodness or not is just the degree in which it is subservient to the supreme end of all human activity.

What, then, is that supreme end? We know that it is an activity according to the best form of goodness, and it looks as if we had already stated what that is. For it is clear that Theoretical Wisdom is something far higher than Practical. Practical Wisdom has to do with what is good for Man; but Man is far from being the highest thing in the world. We shall come back to this in Book X; meanwhile it is enough to point out that Practical Wisdom is, as it were, the handmaid of Theoretical Wisdom, and that all its commands are subservient to the realisation of the highest kind of activity by the highest thing in man.

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Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἱρεῖσθαι, μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν.

Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων,

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I. § 1. **ὡς ὁ λόγος...λέγει**, 'as the rule says.' Cf. 1115 b, 12 n.

διέλωμεν. This sense of διαιρεῖν (διαιρεῖσθαί) τι or περί τινος is often found in Herodotos (Stein on vii, 16, γ) and seems to be derived from such phrases as διαιρεῖν διαφοράς, *dirimere controversias*. The oldest example is probably Herakleitos fr. 2 διαιρέων κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. It cannot therefore come from διαιρεῖν in its special Platonic or Aristotelian sense, as Bonitz seems to suggest (Ind. 180 a, 23).

ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, sc. ταῖς ἠθικαῖς ἀρεταῖς.

τῶν ἄλλων, e.g. health and strength, cf. 1104 a, 11.

σκοπός. Cf. 1094 a, 24 n. Here the metaphor changes at once from 'hitting the mark' to 'tuning a lyre,' from which we may infer that the literal meaning of σκοπός was already lost sight of. This is only natural, since the correlative verb τυγχάνειν was constantly used without any feeling for the metaphor. There is no justification for Grant's view that the non-metaphorical use is a mark of Eudemian authorship (see Stewart's note); for it is found already in Plato, e.g. Gorg. 507 d οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν.

ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων, i.e. the man who has in his soul the λόγος (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, εἶδος, formal cause) of goodness, as the doctor has the λόγος of health. Cf. 1138 b, 31 and note. The definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή has already suggested that this is the φρόνιμος.

ἐπιτείνει...ἀνίησιν. The true pitch (ἁρμονία) is a μεσότης between τὸ ὀξύ and τὸ βαρύ, and the μουσικός has its λόγος in his soul. The process of ἐπίτασις and ἄνεσις is that described 1109 a, 24 sqq.

ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων. This is also supposed to be a 'Eudemian' touch on the ground (1) that the word ὅρος in the sense of 'standard,' 'determining principle,' is not found in the undisputed books of EN, and (2) that it is found in EE 1222 b, 7 (quoted on p. 105) and 1249 a, 21 (quoted on p. 251). But (1) though the word

ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, 2 οὔσας κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν,

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1138 b, 23. EE. 1249 a, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστί τις ὅρος καὶ τῷ ἰατρῷ, πρὸς ὃν ἀναφέρων κρίνει τὸ ὑγιεινὸν σώματι καὶ μή, καὶ πρὸς ὃν μέχρι ποσοῦ ποιητέον ἕκαστον καὶ εὖ (l. εἶναι) ὑγιαῖνον, εἰ δὲ ἔλαττον ἢ πλέον, οὐκέτι· οὕτω καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ αἱρέσεις τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐπαινετῶν δὲ δεῖ τινα εἶναι ὅρον καὶ τῆς ἕξεως

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is not found in EN, it is distinctly implied in the definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή as ἐν μεσότητι...ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν, and (2) the passages from EE can be most naturally explained as reproductions of the present passage. Indeed it seems incredible that Eudemos should have written 1249 a, 21 sqq. if he also wrote the passage before us as part of the same work. Further, there is no difficulty in supposing that Aristotle should have used the word ὅρος in the sense here given to it. It meant originally 'land-mark,' and its metaphorical use is as old as Bakchylides, fr. 10 εἷς ὅρος, μία βροτοῖσίν ἐστιν εὐτυχίας ὁδός, | θυμὸν εἴ τις ἔχων ἀπενθῆ διατελεῖν δύναται βίον. So Demosthenes says (De Cor. § 296) τὴν δ' ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδέν' ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτοῦ, ἃ τοῖς πρότερον Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετροφότες. In the more precise sense of 'standard,' 'regulative principle,' it is used by Plato (Rep. 551 a ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων) and Aristotle (Pol. 1294 a, 10 ἀριστοκρατίας ὅρος ἀρετή, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, *et passim*). Note that the ὅρος and the σκοπός are the same thing and identical with whatever we may ultimately find to be man's chief end.

§ 2. **ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές.** This has been supposed to be a criticism of Aristotle by Eudemos; but, as Eudemos repeats the remark on the last page of his own Ethics 1249 b, 5 (quoted p. 252), it would seem as if he had applied the same criticism to himself. In this case too, it appears incredible that one writer should have written both passages as part of the same work. It is true that Eudemos is fond of the phrase, cf. 1216 b, 32 (p. 40), 1217 a, 19 (p. 14), 1220 a, 17, and that it occurs nowhere else in EN. But (1) it is a thoroughly Aristotelian way of speaking, cf. de An. 413 a, 11 ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ γίγνεται τὸ σαφὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώτερον. And (2) there is no occasion for the alleged criticism, since the theory of the Mean is avowedly given as a provisional sketch or τύπος (EN 1104 a, 1 sqq., 1114 b, 27), and in Book X Aristotle explains what the ὅρος or σκοπός is much more fully than Eudemos ever does. We there learn that it is the θεωρητικὸς βίος on which the φρόνιμος keeps his eye, and the meaning of this is thoroughly worked out, while Eudemos dismisses in half a page his corresponding doctrine that the ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας (i.e. τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς) is τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν.

ἐπιμελείαις. The word is used both of Medicine and Politics.

ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ
τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἄν
30 τις οὐδὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἷον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς
τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς
ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ 3
μόνον ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμένον
τίς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὅρος.

35 Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν εἶναι 4
1139 a τοῦ ἤθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν

καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πλήθους καὶ ὀλιγότητος καὶ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρότερον ἐλέχθη τὸ "ὡς ὁ λόγος." τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν εἴπειεν "ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτης." τοῦτο δ' ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ σαφὲς δέ.

πονεῖν...ῥᾳθυμεῖν. These words are taken from the *ἐπιμέλεια* of the *γυμναστής* or *παιδοτρίβης*. Cf. e.g. Plato, Rep. 410 b *τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τοὺς πόνους*. Isokr. Dem. § 12 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις... αὔξεσθαι πέφυκε*. Galen says on Hippokrates, Epid. 6, 5, 9 *τὸ πόνος ὄνομα πολλάκις μὲν εἴωθεν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἀντὶ τοῦ γυμνασίου λέγειν, ἐνίοτε ἀντὶ τῆς ὀδύνης* (cf. 1154 b, 7). So ib. 6, 6, 5 *πόνοι, σιτία, ποτά, ὕπνοι, ἀφροδίσια, πάντα μέτρια, εἰ passim*. The usual opposite of *πόνος* in this sense is *ἀνάπαυσις* (cf. 1127 b, 33 n.), but cf. Rhet. 1370 a, 14 (*ἡδέα*) *αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαι*. We see that the use of *ῥᾳθυμία* in a bad sense is secondary from e.g. Isokr. Evag. § 42 *τὰς ἀληθινὰς τῶν ῥᾳθυμιῶν οὐκ ἐν ταῖς ἀργίαις...ἐνούσας*.

οὐδὲν...πλέον, 'would be none the wiser.' Cf. the idiomatic *οὐδὲν πλέον ποιεῖν*, the negative of *πλέον τι ποιεῖν*.

ἡ ἰατρικὴ...ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. Observe that these take the place of *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος* and *ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων* and thus show how we are to understand those expressions.

§ 3. **καὶ περὶ κ.τ.λ.**, i.e. with regard to *ἕξεις* of the soul as well as those of the body.

τούτου τίς ὅρος. The *ὅρος* is indifferently the *ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων* and the *ὅρος τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου*. This is quite correct; for the *λόγος is* the *εἶδος* of goodness, i.e. the Mean, existing in the soul of the *φρόνιμος*, just as the art of medicine *is* the form of health existing in the soul of the doctor. Cf. Met. 1070 a, 29 *ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ὁ λόγος τῆς ὑγιείας ἐστίν*, 1070 b, 32 *ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική*. (Introductory Note, § 1.)

§ 4. **Τὰς δὴ κ.τ.λ.** There is nothing in Rassow's view that an independent introduction to Book VI begins here (see Stewart's note on 1138 b, 18). The connexion of thought is this. We know from the definition that the *φρόνιμος* has the *ὅρος* we are looking for, and we know that *φρόνησις* is a *διανοητικὴ ἀρετή* (1103 a, 6), so we must go on to discuss *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί*.

ἔφαμεν, 1103 a, 3 sqq.

ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς
5 *πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν οὕτως. πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη*
δύ' εἶναι μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλο-
γον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαι- 5
ρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἓν μὲν ᾧ
θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέ-
χονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἓν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ
τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ
γένει τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα 10
6 *καὶ οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. λεγέσθω δὲ τού-*
των τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλεύε-
σθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ

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§ 5. **πρότερον**, 1102 a, 27 sqq.

τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Aristotle did not himself admit 'parts of the soul' in the proper sense (cf. 1102 a, 31 n.), but he is still content for the purpose in hand to take his psychology from *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* (1102 a, 26 n.).

ὑποκείσθω, cf. 1103 b, 32 n.

ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Introd. § 10.

τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, sc. *καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν*. It makes no difference whether we say the things themselves or their *ἀρχαί* are necessary or contingent. Cf. 1140 a, 34 n.

ἕτερον...τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός. This is a clear reference to the argument of Plato, Rep. 476 e, sqq. Cf. especially 477 b *ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε*. The principle is laid down 477 d *δυνάμεως δ' εἰς ἐκεῖνο μόνον βλέπω ἐφ' ᾧ τε ἔστι* (=*πρὸς ὃ πέφυκε*) *καὶ ὃ ἀπεργάζεται,...καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταγμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἑτέρῳ καὶ ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην*. The distinction, then, is that between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα*.

εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle himself did not hold the *similia similibus* theory of knowledge in this naked form; the argument still proceeds on Platonic lines.

§ 6. **λεγέσθω.** The imperative marks the dialectical character of the argument. Cf. *ὑποκείσθω* above.

λογιστικόν. We expect *δοξαστικόν*, and so this 'part' is called below 1140 b, 26. In Plato the name *λογιστικόν* is given to the highest of the three parts of the soul, and includes *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν* instead of being opposed to it. Aristotle never uses the word elsewhere except in discussing Platonic psychology, and then he always uses it in the Platonic sense, as opposed to *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* and *τὸ θυμοειδές*. He does, however, speak of *λογιστικὴ φαντασία* (cf. App. A), and this has led to the use of the word here.

τὸ γὰρ...λογίζεσθαι κ.τ.λ. As usual Aristotle appeals to the language of common life to justify him in giving a narrower sense to the word than Plato had done. The phrases *λογίζεσθαι τὰ συμφέροντα*, *λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος* were of everyday occurrence.

οὐδεὶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1112 a, 21. This completes the proof that *τὸ λογιστικόν* has to do with *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα*.

τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστιν
15 ἔν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. ληπτέον ἄρ' ἑκατέρου τού- 7
των τίς ἡ βελτίστη ἕξις· αὕτη γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρου, ἡ δ'
ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον.

II. Τρία δή ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀλη-
θείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις, τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ 2
20 πράξεως· δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν πράξεως
δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ

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§ 7. **βελτίστη ἕξις...ἀρετὴ...πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.** Cf. 1097 b, 24 sqq.

II. § 1. **Τρία δὴ κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle approaches the question of the *οἰκεῖα ἔργα* of the two 'parts' from the other side, that of the distinction between theoretical and practical (Introd. § 11), and bases it now upon his own psychology. There are two specifically human ends, namely *πρᾶξις* and *γνῶσις*, or, as he here says, *πρᾶξις* and *ἀλήθεια*. If we wish to find the *οἰκεῖον ἔργον* of any 'part' of the human soul, we must find what it contributes to either of these. That this must be the connexion of thought is made clear, I think, by the difficulties into which we get if we take **πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας** as equivalent to *πρακτικῆς ἀληθείας* (see Stewart's note). It seems much more likely that Aristotle should here oppose *πρᾶξις* to *ἀλήθεια*. Though, as we shall see, *πρᾶξις* also implies *ἀλήθεια*, *ἀλήθεια* is not the *τέλος* in practical matters (*τὸ τέλος οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις*). If Aristotle had written here *πράξεως καὶ γνώσεως* there would have been less misunderstanding.

κύρια. The adjective *κύριος* corresponds to the substantive *ἀρχή*, especially in the sense of efficient cause. Cf. 1147 a, 26.

αἴσθησις. There can be no *γνῶσις* without *αἴσθησις* (de An. 432 a, 7 *μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι*) nor without *νοῦς* (An. Post. 87 b, 28 sqq. *δι' αἰσθήσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπίστασθαι*). Therefore *νοῦς* and *αἴσθησις* are *κύρια τῆς* (*θεωρητικῆς*) *ἀληθείας*, *κύρια τῆς γνώσεως*. The position of the word **νοῦς** between **αἴσθησις** and **ὄρεξις** indicates that it is to be taken with both.

§ 2. **τούτων δ' ἡ αἴσθησις κ.τ.λ.** We turn now to consider our more immediate object, the *κύρια πράξεως*, i.e. *νοῦς* and *ὄρεξις*. Cf. de An. 433 a, 9 *φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἡ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς*. de Mot. An. 700 b, 18 *ταῦτα δὲ πάντα* (sc. *τὰ κινοῦντα*) *ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν*.

οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως. This is not fully explained here and must be supplemented from the de Anima and the de Motu Animalium, for which see App. A and B. The lower animals have *τὴν κατὰ τόπον κίνησιν*, but this can be explained by *αἴσθησις* and *ὄρεξις* alone. There can be no *ὄρεξις* without a *φαντασία*, but *φαντασία* may be either *αἰσθητική* or *λογιστική* (*βουλευτική*). It is only the latter of these that implies *νοῦς*, and we do not call a *κίνησις* by the name of *πρᾶξις* unless it arises from an *ὄρεξις* moved by *νοῦς*, i.e. by a *λογιστικὴ φαντασία*.

ἔστι δ' ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. To find the *οἰκεῖον ἔργον* of *τὸ λογιστικόν* (i.e. *νοῦς* so far as it is a *κύριον πράξεως*), we now analyse the contributions of *νοῦς* and *ὄρεξις* to *πρᾶξις*. Now the characteristic activities of *νοῦς* are affirmation and negation, while those of *ὄρεξις* are pursuit and avoidance, and these are evidently 'analogous'

ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ
ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευ-
τική, δεῖ διὰ ταῦτα μὲν τόν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν
ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν 25
μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ
3 ἀλήθεια πρακτική· τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακ-
τικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς τἀληθές ἐστι καὶ
ψεῦδος—τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι παντὸς διανοητικοῦ ἔργον—τοῦ δὲ
πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ ἀλήθεια ὁμολόγως ἔχουσα τῇ 30
4 ὀρέξει τῇ ὀρθῇ. πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ
κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος

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activities. Hence their relation is stated as a proportion.

ἐν διανοίᾳ. There is no distinction here between *διάνοια* and *νοῦς*.

ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ κ.τ.λ. As Ramsauer says, the middle term of this argument is *σπουδαία προαίρεσις*. We know that *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* is *ἕξις προαιρετική* (1106 b, 36), and that *προαίρεσις* is *ὄρεξις βουλευτική* (1113 a, 10). It follows that a good *προαίρεσις* (and therefore a good *πρᾶξις*) implies (1) an *ὀρθὴ ὄρεξις*, i.e. *βούλησις τἀγαθοῦ*, and (2) an *ἀληθὴς λόγος*, or true judgment that for a certain class of persons a certain class of acts is good. The function of *νοῦς* here is strictly analogous to its function in creating theoretical truth. In the latter case it makes explicit the universal latent in *αἴσθησις*, and thus produces a *λόγος*, which in turn becomes an *ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως*: in the former it makes explicit the universal latent in *ὄρεξις*, and thus produces a rule of conduct (*ὀρθὸς λόγος*), which in turn becomes an *ἀρχὴ βουλεύσεως*, the major premiss of a practical syllogism.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Practical *διάνοια* has for its function the conversion of *ὄρεξις* into a *λόγος* or general rule of conduct. This is practical truth and the *οἰκεῖον ἔργον* of *τὸ λογιστικόν* which we are seeking.

§ 3. **τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς κ.τ.λ.** Introd. § 11. In both its aspects the *οἰκεῖον ἔργον* of *διάνοια* is truth.

§ 4. **πράξεως...ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις,** 1113 a, 6 n.

ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα. The final cause of *πρᾶξις* is *τὸ ὀρεκτόν*, i.e. *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*.

προαιρέσεως δὲ κ.τ.λ. The *ἀρχὴ προαιρέσεως* is *ὄρεξις* (as *κινούμενον* *κινοῦν*) and a *λόγος ἕνεκά του* (as *κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*). For the different way in which these 'move,' cf. App. A.

λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. This is a general rule of conduct, such as *παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά* (1147 a, 5), the *λόγος* which tells us what sort of thing we must do if we are to attain the object of *ὄρεξις*, and which therefore forms the major premiss of the practical syllogism. It is the fact of its being *ἕνεκά του* that brings such words as *δεῖ*, *συμφέρει* into it (cf. 1140 b, 18 *δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα πράττειν*). The prime mover of *πρᾶξις*, then, is always something distinctly formulated by thought; for the *ὀρεκτόν* can only become an efficient cause *τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι* (De An. 433 b, 12), and if it is only in *φαντασία* we have no *πρᾶξις*. We must not infer from this, however, that thought constitutes the

ὁ ἕνεκά τινος. διὸ οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὔτ' ἄνευ
ἠθικῆς ἐστιν ἕξεως ἡ προαίρεσις· εὐπραξία γὰρ καὶ τὸ
35 ἐναντίον ἐν πράξει ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἤθους οὐκ ἔστιν. διά- 5
νοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική·
1139 b αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἕνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ
πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς—ἀλλὰ πρός τι καί
τινος—τὸ ποιητόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος,
ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ
5 ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος.

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end. Thought simply universalises and formulates the material furnished by ὄρεξις in the same way as it universalises and formulates the material furnished by αἴσθησις. In itself it is indifferent to right or wrong, and we shall see that it can universalise wrong ὀρέξεις as well as right, and formulate false λόγοι as well as true.

οὔτ' ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. Two words for the same thing.

οὔτ' ἄνευ ἠθικῆς...ἕξεως. This secures that the ὀρέξεις which thought has to universalise into rules of conduct are right, and thus that τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν shall be the same as the true good, i.e. τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.

§ 5. **διάνοια δ' αὐτή,** 'thought by itself,' 'thought alone,' i.e. without ὄρεξις.

ἡ ἕνεκά του, cf. λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος above.

αὕτη, sc. ἡ ἕνεκά του διάνοια. This completes the proof that διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ. We have seen that this is true of πρακτικὴ διάνοια, and it is also true of ποιητικὴ διάνοια. There too the ἀρχή is ἡ ἕνεκά του διάνοια, and that implies ὄρεξις as well as νοῦς. The end of the builder or the doctor is the realisation of the form, whether of a house or of health, existing in his soul. The formal becomes the final cause, and that can be effected by ὄρεξις alone. It is not necessary to prove that the third kind of thought, θεωρητικὴ διάνοια, οὐθὲν κινεῖ by itself; for its objects are either ἀκίνητα or have their ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in themselves. Cf. Introd. § 10.

οὐ τέλος ἁπλῶς. The process of production (**τὸ ποιητόν**) is not an end in the unqualified sense in which πρᾶξις is so. It is relative (**πρός τι**) and it is the production of something (**τινός**). By **τὸ ποιητόν** here we must not understand the thing produced (τὸ ἔργον). It is used in the same way as τὸ πρακτόν and means the thing *done*, not the thing *made*, the building and not the house. We may say either ποιεῖν ποίησιν or ποιεῖν ποίημα (ἔργον). Here τὸ ποιητόν corresponds to the internal accusative.

ἀλλὰ πρός τι κ.τ.λ. Tr. 'though it is etc.' For the structure cf. 1137 a, 11 n.

ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν, sc. τέλος ἁπλῶς. The end of the πρᾶξις is the ἐνέργεια itself, not an external ἔργον.

ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. 'This sort of efficient cause is Man.' For the others see 1112 a, 31. Aristotle sometimes calls this efficient cause νοῦς or διάνοια (see the note referred to). In those cases we must understand the qualification ἕνεκά του. The language here brings out well the absolute interdependence of νοῦς and ὄρεξις in προαίρεσις.

6 Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐδὲν γεγονός, οἷον οὐδεὶς προαι-
ρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ
γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γε-
γονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται, 10
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα.

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ'
ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

III. Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν λέγωμεν.
ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι 15
πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις
σοφία νοῦς· ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.
2 Ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάν-

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§ 6. **Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This seems to be a detached fragment loosely appended as usual to the end of a section. It appears to be part of a proof that Practical Thought deals with τὸ ἐσόμενον, for which doctrine cf. Introd. § 12.

Ἀγαθών, fr. 5. The quotation merely embodies a favourite γνώμη, for which see also Pindar, Ol. ii, 17; Simonides fr. 52; Soph. Aias 378, Trach. 740; Plato, Protag. 324 b, Laws 943 a.

τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων, sc. τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ καὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. As νοῦς is equivalent to διάνοια, so is νοητικός to διανοητικός.

καθ' ἃς οὖν κ.τ.λ., for ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ οἰκεῖον 1139 a, 17.

III. § 1. **ἄνωθεν,** cf. 1155 b, 2 n.

ἔστω δή, the regular formula in introducing a dialectical πρότασις, in the present case a λογικὴ πρότασις (cf. Top. 105 b, 20) used also in An. Post. 88 b, 30—89 b, 9. We must regard this as a mere preliminary enumeration of states with a *prima facie* claim to be regarded as διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί, and not as Aristotle's own list. We shall find that he reduces them to two, φρόνησις and σοφία (so Prantl). For a similar preliminary list afterwards reduced to two, cf. Mot. An. 700 b, 17 (App. B).

ὑπολήψει...δόξῃ. Here these are introduced as coordinate, quite in accordance with the tentative character of the present discussion. Later we shall see that ὑπόληψις is the genus of which ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and φρόνησις are species.

§ 2. **Ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ.** It is natural to start with the familiar pair ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη, which look as if they might be the two ἀρεταί we are seeking for.

εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι. We are now going to fix the precise meaning of these vague popular terms. The name of ἐπιστήμη is given to many things καθ' ὁμοιότητα (1115 a, 19 n.) which are not ἐπιστήμη at all τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, e.g. it is given to πολιτικὴ itself. This passage is referred to in Met. 981 b, 25 εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν. This, so far as it goes, is evidence of the Aristotelian character of Book VI.

τες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. ἀίδιον ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀίδια, τὰ δ' ἀίδια ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἔτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν 3
μαθητόν. ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν—ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ· ἡ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχὴ ἐστι

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As usual in discussing a ἕξις, the first question is περὶ ποῖα; cf. 1115 a, 5 n.

ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν, 'when removed from actual observation.' The verb θεωρεῖν expresses the ἐνέργεια of knowledge (cf. 1146 b, 31 n.). A triangle has its angles equal to two right angles whether any one actually knows Eucl. I, 32 or not. We cannot say the same of τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, the facts of nature and of human life.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν οὗ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἁπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην.

ἀίδιον ἄρα. On the ἀίδια see 1112 a, 21 n.

ἐξ ἀνάγκης...ἁπλῶς, 'necessary in an unqualified sense' as opposed to ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα, cf. An. Post. 73 a, 21 quoted above. That the angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles is necessary ἁπλῶς, that a saw should be of iron if it is to cut is necessary ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (Phys. 200 a, 12). The results of πολιτική are only ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα, but πολιτική is not τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ an ἐπιστήμη. Note that the ὑπόθεσις in this phrase is the Q.E.F., the problem to be solved.

ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα, not subject to γένεσις and φθορά, 'coming into being' and 'ceasing to be.' Cf. Part. An. 639 b, 23 ὑπάρχει δὲ τὸ μὲν (sc. ἀναγκαῖον) ἁπλῶς τοῖς ἀιδίοις, τὸ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τοῖς ἐν γενέσει πᾶσιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχναστοῖς, οἷον οἰκίᾳ κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. **διδακτή**. Met. 981 b, 7 ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δ' οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν. This introduces us to the second question, πῶς;

ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς. An. Post. 71 a, 1 πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ, sc. διδασκαλία, not ἐπιστήμη. Aristotle never admits that ἐπιστήμη can be got δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, for it is always apodeictic. For the present statement cf. An. Post. 71 a, 6 ἀμφότεροι γὰρ (sc. οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ οἱ διὰ συλλογισμῶν λόγοι) διὰ προγιγνωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν, οἱ μὲν λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ συνιέντων, οἱ δὲ δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον.

ἀρχὴ ἐστι κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. 1393 a, 26 ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή. This must be a proof that ἡ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς διδασκαλία is ἐκ προγινωσκομένων just as much as ἡ συλλογισμῷ, so the reading of L^b, ἀρχῆς ἐστι, cannot be right. To say that ἐπαγωγή 'is of the ἀρχή and the universal' is true, but not to the point here. The ἀρχή must be identical with the προϋπάρχουσα γνῶσις, and there is no difficulty in taking it so. For ἀρχή simply means 'starting-point' (Introd. § 22), and it is just as proper to call τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα the 'starting-point' of our knowledge of τὸ καθόλου as to call τὸ καθόλου the 'starting-point' of demonstration. In both kinds of διδασκαλία there is an ἀρχή. The meaning of **καὶ τοῦ καθόλου** now becomes clear. The universal has an ἀρχή (principium cognoscendi) *just as much as* syllogism or demonstration has, and that ἀρχή is ἐπαγωγή. The reading of L^b must be due to a corrector who thought that ἀρχή could be used only in the special sense of ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως.

καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τῶν καθόλου—εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογι- 30
4 σμός· ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα. ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀποδεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γάρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῷ ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. 35

IV. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ ποιητὸν 1140 a
2 καὶ πρακτόν· ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις—πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις—ὥστε καὶ ἡ

καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, sc. γνώριμοι.

κατὰ συμβεβηκός. He will have something which as a matter of fact *is* knowledge (ᾧ συμβαίνει ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναι), but he will not have it *as* knowledge (καθ' αὑτό). Cf. An. Post. 71 b, 28 τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ὧν ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξίν ἐστι, ib. 99 b, 20 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους.

IV. § 1. **Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης κ.τ.λ.** The positive result of this discussion is that, though (1) ἐπιστήμη is περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν and so far fulfils the requirements of the ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, yet (2) it always implies a προϋπάρχουσα γνῶσις upon which all its necessity depends, and therefore cannot be the ἀρετή itself.

τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου κ.τ.λ. We might suppose that τέχνη was the ἀρετή of the λογιστικόν, but we are met by the distinction between ποίησις and πρᾶξις. A little dialectic will show that τέχνη has to do only with the former, and therefore will not cover the whole ground of τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. Observe that the distinction is taken from ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι. Cf. Introd. § 11.

πῶς, 'in a certain way,' i.e. in the way explained by the quotation from the Analytics above, especially ἐκ γνωριμωτέρων, as we see from the next sentence. Not every kind of πίστις is ἐπιστήμη.

μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιη-
5 τικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχεται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε γὰρ
ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις οὔτε ἡ ποίησις πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ 3
οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι καὶ ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου
ποιητική, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λό-
γου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἣ οὐ τέχνη, ταὐτὸν
10 ἂν εἴη τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική. ἔστι 4
δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεω-

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§ 2. μετὰ λόγου ἕξις. This is the correct Aristotelian designation for what popular philosophy calls *ἕξις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος*. As we are coming to a dialectical *κατασκευή* of the definition in due form, it is necessary to substitute the true genus. It was not necessary to define *ἐπιστήμη*, as we could refer to the Analytics for a sufficient *ἔνδοξον*, but it is necessary to define *τέχνη*. On the distinction between *μετὰ λόγου* and *κατὰ λόγον* see 1144 b, 26.

ἕτερόν ἐστι. The *τόπος* here is *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν πτώσεων καὶ συστοίχων*, which is applied to the *πρόβλημα* of *ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον* in Top. 151 b, 30. Assuming, on the basis of *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, that *πρᾶξις* and *ποίησις* are *γένει ἕτερα* (cf. 1140 b, 3), it follows that *ἕξις πρακτική* and *ἕξις ποιητική* are *γένει ἕτερα*, for the *ἐνέργεια* and the *ἕξις* are *σύστοιχα*.

διὸ οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Therefore neither is contained in the other.' This follows from the fact that they have *ἀντιδιῃρημέναι διαφοραί*. They are co-ordinate *γένη* falling under the higher genus from which they are differentiated. For the phraseology, see next note.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ κ.τ.λ. Building is an *εἶδος* both of *τέχνη* and of *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική*. The same *εἶδος* cannot be in two *γένη* neither of which is contained in the other (see last note). Therefore *τέχνη* and *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική* are the same *γένος*. For the principle here applied cf. Top. 144 a, 12 *οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸν ἐν δύο γένεσιν εἶναι μὴ περιέχουσιν ἄλληλα*. So 140 a, 1. 144 b, 14. 152 a, 16.

ὅπερ...τις. The pronoun *ὅπερ* is used to mark predication *ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν*, and when *τις* is added as here, it marks that the *γένος* is predicated of the species or of the individual (cf. 1153 b, 6 and Bonitz, Ind. 533 b, 36 sqq.). It is necessary to mark that the *γένος* and the *διαφορά* are predicated *ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι*, for otherwise we should have no definition. Cf. An. Post. 97 a, 23 *εἰς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν ὅρον διὰ τῶν διαιρέσεων τριῶν δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, (1) τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγορούμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, (2) καὶ ταῦτα τάξαι τί πρῶτον ἢ δεύτερον, καὶ (3) ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα.* Here we see that (1) *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική* is predicated of *οἰκοδομική ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν*, and that (2) it is first, for *ἐπὶ πλέον λέγεται τῆς οἰκοδομικῆς*.

καὶ οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is added to secure the third requirement for the *κατασκευή* of a definition, viz. *ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα*. Cf. Top. 154 a, 37 *δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ παντὸς οὗ τοὔνομα* (i.e. *τέχνη*) *κατηγορεῖσθαι τὸν ὅρον, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἀντιστρέφειν, εἰ μέλλει ἴδιος εἶναι ὁ ἀποδοθεὶς ὅρος*.

μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς. The qualification *ἀληθοῦς* may be added because *ἀλήθεια* is the *ἔργον* of *διάνοια*, whether theoretical or practical (1139a, 29).

§ 4. περὶ γένεσιν. An. Post. 100 a, 6 *τὸ καθόλου...τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπι-*

ρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ
μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ
ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἡ
τέχνη ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι 15
5 ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον,
ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πράξεως εἶναι. καὶ
τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ
καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ

τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην. 20

6 ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς
ποιητική ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἀτεχνία τοὐναντίον μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς
ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

V. Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν θεωρήσαντες
τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ 25

στήμης· ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν. Most editors bracket *καὶ* with Muretus, making *τὸ τεχνάζειν* a new subject. See, however, Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. This is added to distinguish the sphere of *τέχνη* from that of *φύσις*, which is also *περὶ γένεσιν*. Introd. § 10.

§ 5. τρόπον τινά. Cf. Part. An. 640 a, 28 *ἕνια γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεται ταὐτὰ τοῖς ἀπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ὑγίεια.* Phys. 197 a, 5 *ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του. διὸ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ διάνοια καὶ τύχη· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις οὐκ ἄνευ διανοίας.* Rhet. 1362 a, 2 *αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι.* Both have to do with *τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι*. The limits of the operation of *τύχη* in the sphere of *προαίρεσις* are discussed in Met. 1034 a, 9 sqq.

Ἀγάθων, fr. 6.

V. **§ 1. Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως κ.τ.λ.** We shall see that *φρόνησις* is the *ἀρετή* of the 'calculative part'; but we must first discover its precise meaning. In Plato the word *φρόνησις* is exactly equivalent to *σοφία*, but Xenokrates had already marked a difference between the two. Cf. Clem. Strom. p. 441, 20 Pott. *ἐπεὶ καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐν τῷ περὶ φρονήσεως τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῶν πρώτων αἰτιῶν καὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας εἶναί φησιν, τὴν φρόνησιν ἡγούμενος διττήν· τὴν μὲν πρακτικήν, τὴν δὲ θεωρητικήν· ἣν δὴ σοφίαν ὑπάρχειν ἀνθρωπίνην· διόπερ ἡ μὲν σοφία φρόνησις· οὐ μὴν πᾶσα φρόνησις σοφία.* We see here that *φρόνησις*, though still regarded as both theoretical and practical, is made something specifically human. Aristotle also makes *φρόνησις* something human, but he confines it to the practical, a restriction which he justifies as usual by an appeal to the use of the word in current language.

οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, 'the way to get a definition of *φρόνησις* is——.' For the use of *λαβεῖν* in the dialectical sense (opp. *ἀποδοῦναι*) with *περί*, cf. 1142 a, 32 n. The method is *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν*, cf. 1123 a, 35 n.

δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ
συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς
ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ 2
τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπου-
δαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν
εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός. βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν 3
ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ
πρᾶξαι. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ'
αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μή ἐστιν ἀπό-
δειξις—πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν—καὶ οὐκ
1140 b ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη
ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέ-
χεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ
γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως. λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι 4
ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ

καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι, cf. the definition in Rhet. 1366 b, 20 *φρόνησις δ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.*

ὅλως, opp. *κατὰ μέρος.*

§ 2. **σημεῖον δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ.** This is the argument from *πρόσθεσις* and *ἀφαίρεσις* (cf. 1094 b, 28 n.). If the various *φρόνιμοι περί τι* are all *βουλευτικοὶ περί τι*, we may generalise this and say that *βουλευτικός* (*ἁπλῶς*) will be *φρόνιμος* (*ἁπλῶς*). The words **ὥστε καὶ ὅλως** mark the argument as an *ἐπαγωγή.*

ὧν μὴ ἐστι τέχνη, i.e. where *πρᾶξις* and not *ποίησις* is concerned.

§ 3. **βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς κ.τ.λ.** We pass to the first question asked with regard to every *ἕξις*, viz. *περὶ ποῖα;*

ὥστ' εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. The argument is that *φρόνησις* is deliberative (i.e. not *τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης*), *ἐπιστήμη* is demonstrative (i.e. *τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης*), therefore *φρόνησις* is not *ἐπιστήμη.*

πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If the *ἀρχή* is contingent, so is everything that follows from it. This is added to anticipate the objection that, though the *ἀρχή* may be contingent, yet, when once it is determined, what follows may be necessary, and therefore capable of demonstration. This, however, is not what Aristotle means by necessary. It only gives us *τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον*, while the object of knowledge must be *ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁπλῶς*. Cf. 1139 b, 23 n.

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι. As this is a new protasis dependent on *εἴπερ*, we might expect *μή* instead of *οὐκ*. But the use of *οὐ* after *εἰ* (*εἴπερ*) in a causal sense is well attested in classical Attic (Kühner § 513, 5), and in post-classical Greek becomes the rule (Jannaris Hist. Gr. Gr. § 1807 sqq.). There is therefore no need to continue the parenthesis down to *ὄντων* with Ramsauer and Stewart.

§ 4. **ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου.** There is no difficulty in the substitution of this phrase for *ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς* above. The *ἕξις* in which the soul *ἀληθεύει* (1139 b, 12) may be called *ἀληθής* just as well as the *λόγος*.

καὶ κακά. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ
5 πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. διὰ
τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι,
ὅτι τὰ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεω-
ρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς 10
6 πολιτικούς. ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύο-
μεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν, σῴζει δὲ τὴν
τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει
οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγω-
νον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακ- 15
τόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ
πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς
οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ'
αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ
ἀρχῆς. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου 20
7 ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν

περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ κ.τ.λ. These words are necessary to complete the definition; for all *ἕξεις* are relative, and the *διαφορά* must be relative when the *γένος* is relative. Cf. Top. 145 a, 14 *τῶν γὰρ πρός τι καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ πρός τι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης* (in the loose sense)· *θεωρητικὴ γὰρ καὶ πρακτικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ λέγεται, ἕκαστον δὲ τούτων πρός τι σημαίνει· θεωρητικὴ γάρ τινος καὶ ποιητικὴ τινος καὶ πρακτική.*

τῆς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to justify the way in which the differentia of *φρόνησις* has been made relative. As the end of *πρᾶξις* is the good for Man, this is the proper qualification. We cannot determine the differentia of *τέχνη* in so simple a manner.

§ 5. **διὰ τοῦτο**, since *φρόνησις* is relative to human good.

Περικλέα, as opposed to *σοφοί* like Thales and Anaxagoras. Cf. 1141 b, 4.

οἰκονομικούς...πολιτικούς. These are instances of *φρόνιμοι κατὰ μέρος.*

§ 6. **ἔνθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ.** From Plato, Krat. 411 e *σωφροσύνη δὲ σωτηρία οὖν νυνδὴ ἐσκέμμεθα, φρονήσεως.*

δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 49.

ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν. Introd. § 22.

οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, sc. *τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.* His *φαντασία* is warped (*διέστραπται*) by pleasure, so that his *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* is not the true good.

φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. Cf. 1151 a, 15 *σῴζει τὴν ἀρχήν.*

ὥστ' ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. We now get the complete definition by genus (*ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθής*) and differentia (*περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτική*).

§ 7. **ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** This is the first of the *ἕξεις* we are considering to which we are able to give the name of *ἀρετή*. Incidentally this section gives the reason for refusing that name to *τέχνη*. It is really the addition of the words *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθά* that shows *φρόνησις* to be an *ἀρετή*, for all *ἀρετή* is relative to the *οἰκεῖον ἔργον*, and it is clear that

τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη. δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς 8 τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

VI. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὑπό-

τέχνη is not in the same way relative to the οἰκεῖον ἔργον of Man.

τέχνης...ἀρετή. We learn from 1141 a, 12 sqq. that σοφία in its original sense is the ἀρετὴ τέχνης, and that it connotes ἀκρίβεια. In other words, we may say that τέχνη admits of τελείωσις just as ἐπιστήμη does, and therefore neither is an ἀρετή in the full sense (see p. 69 sqq.). On the other hand, φρόνησις requires no such τελείωσις, for it implies its own ἀρχαί as we have just seen. It is therefore a complete ἀρετή.

ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος. This is a Socratic paradox (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 20) which was used in various forms by Plato, but most explicitly in the 'Hippias Major,' to show that goodness was no mere art or external accomplishment. The reason why the ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων is αἱρετώτερος is that he has the δύναμις, while the ἄκων ἁμαρτάνων has not, and πᾶσα δύναμις τῶν αἱρετῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῶν φαύλων δυνάμεις αἱρεταί, διὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἔχειν φαμὲν αὐτάς· δυνατοὺς γὰρ εἶναι τὰ φαῦλα πράσσειν (Top. 126 a, 36). Now the φρόνιμος necessarily has a good προαίρεσις, and so he cannot go wrong intentionally, but this is not so with the οἰκοδόμος. He may have a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθὴς ποιητικὴ οἰκίας, and yet deliberately build a bad house.

On the relation of δύναμις to προαίρεσις, cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 8. **τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ.** The substitution of the name δοξαστικόν for λογιστικόν makes a more Platonic antithesis to τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. The term itself is not, however, Platonic, nor does Aristotle ever refer to it elsewhere. We have to pass lightly over the fact that the Platonic distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα does not correspond to the Aristotelian distinction between θεωρητική and πρακτικὴ διάνοια. We are able to ignore the difference only because τὰ φύσει γινόμενα do not at present enter into the inquiry.

λήθη...ἔστι. Cf. 1100 b, 17 τοῦτο γὰρ (sc. τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους) ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰς (sc. τὰς τιμιωτάτας τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν) λήθην. From this it seems to follow that here too the point is that the ἐνέργεια of φρόνησις is more continuous than that of other ἕξεις μετὰ λόγου (ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη), just because it is πρακτική. We shall see later (cf. 1175 a, 4 sqq.) that a continuous ἐνέργεια is impossible to man, and τέχνη depends upon external conditions.

VI. § 1. **Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη κ.τ.λ.** We have seen that ἐπιστήμη always implies a προϋπάρχουσα γνῶσις

ληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ οὔτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ δὲ τυγχά- 35 νουσιν οὖσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ 1141 a σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπό- 2 δειξίν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησίς ἐστι καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς, τού- 5 των δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω δὲ τρία φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

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and cannot therefore be the complete ἀρετή of τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν. We have now to consider what is lacking to ἐπιστήμη in this respect. We shall then be able to discover the ἀρετή which is coordinate with φρόνησις.

περὶ τῶν καθόλου...ὑπόληψις. This point was not specially mentioned in the account of ἐπιστήμη given above, and it is no doubt brought in now because it is of importance in the contrast between φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη. Cf. 1141 b, 14 sqq. For the doctrine cf. Met. 1059 b, 25 πᾶς γὰρ λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐσχάτων, 1060 b, 20 τὸ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῶν καθόλου καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦδε. An ὑπόληψις that *this* triangle has its angles equal to two right angles is not ἐπιστήμη, we only have that when we know it of *the* triangle as a whole. Knowledge does not descend to particulars, there is no knowledge of 'a this' (τόδε τι), but only of 'a such' (τοιόνδε τι).

μετὰ λόγου γάρ. This puts shortly the proof given above 1139 b, 25 sqq. All ἐπιστήμη implies a ground (λόγος) and therefore an ultimate ground; for otherwise we should have a process *ad infinitum* (Introd. § 22). Now the ultimate ground cannot have a ground, and therefore (ἐπιστήμη being μετὰ λόγου) it cannot be the object of ἐπιστήμη. It must be the 'starting-point' (ἀρχή) of ἐπιστήμη or ἀπόδειξις.

§ 2. **εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ.** Note that τέχνη is tacitly dropped from the ἔνδοξον which we are using as a major premiss. This may be accidental, or it may be due to the fact that σοφία is the ἀρετὴ τέχνης.

νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν. In An. Post. 100 b, 5 the same result is reached by a similar dialectical process. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ' ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης. To understand the meaning of the doctrine νοῦς ἐστι τῶν ἀρχῶν, we must remem-

VII. Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ 2

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ber that νοῦς and αἴσθησις are both 'immediate' (ἄνευ λόγου). We cannot give a ground for the 'principle of contradiction' any more than we can give a ground for our perception of this triangle. This immediate cognition Aristotle described in a metaphor taken from sense as a 'contact' (θιγεῖν). No error (ψεῦδος) is possible about the ἀρχαί, we either apprehend them or we do not, in which case we have, not ψεῦδος or ἀπάτη, but ἄγνοια. Cf. Met. 1051 b, 24 with Bonitz's note, Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. trans. vol. I, p. 197.

VII. § 1. **Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν κ.τ.λ.** A consideration of the use of the word σοφία in current language will show that it connotes ἀκρίβεια or 'finish,' and that therefore it will be a better name for the complete ἀρετή we are seeking.

ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις, followed, after the parenthesis ἐνταῦθα μὲν κ.τ.λ., per anacoluthiam by εἶναι δέ instead of καὶ εἶναι. The first use of the word σοφός in current language is of the skill of the cunning workman. This is a correct observation. The word σοφία occurs only once in Homer, and then it is used of a carpenter (Il. xv, 412). The method here is just like that by which we discovered the meaning of φρόνησις, cf. 1140 a, 24 n. We ask to whom we give the name σοφός, and we find in the first place that we give it to δημιουργοί and τεχνῖται in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια.

§ 2. **εἶναι δέ τινας κ.τ.λ.** Just as we found that current language recognises φρόνιμοι ἁπλῶς as well as φρόνιμοι περί τι, so we find that it recognises σοφοὶ ἁπλῶς as well as σοφοὶ λιθουργοί and ἀνδριαντοποιοί. Here as there we are entitled to use the τόπος of πρόσθεσις and ἀφαίρεσις, and we may infer that they are called σοφοί in virtue of their ἀκρίβεια also. Much light is thrown upon this passage by the discussion of ἔνδοξα concerning the σοφός in Met. 982 a, 4 sqq. These are (1) ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφόν, (2) τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γνῶναι δυνάμενον...τοῦτον σοφόν, (3) ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ διδασκαλικώτερον σοφώτερον εἶναι, (4) οὐ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν. From the examination of these which follows (982 b, 25) we learn that ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν· αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λαμβανομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας (cf. 1078 a, 9 καὶ ὅσῳ δὴ ἂν περὶ προτέρων τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἁπλουστέρων, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει τἀκριβές· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστίν). The conclusion is (982 b, 8) ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν. We may, then, from the fact that when σοφία is predicated of τεχνῖται it connotes ἀκρίβεια, infer that when it is predicated ἁπλῶς it connotes the same thing, and that means that it is (1) knowledge of the most primary and simple things, (2) dependent on the immediate first principles of all knowledge; for such knowledge alone can have perfect ἀκρίβεια. It alone can be free from irrelevant ὕλη.

τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα 15
οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σο-
3 φία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέ-
ναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ
σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη
τῶν τιμιωτάτων· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν 20
φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἴεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν
4 ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγα-
θὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ
ταὐτὸν ἀεί, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταὐτὸν πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρό-
νιμον δὲ ἕτερον—τὸ γὰρ περὶ [αὐτὸ] ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν 25

ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος. That the Homeric authorship of the 'Margites' was taken quite seriously by Aristotle is clear from Poet. 1448 b, 28 sqq. The end of the second verse, πάσης δ' ἡμάρτανε τέχνης, is preserved by Clem. Strom. i, 281 a. The quotation is humorously made for the sound rather than the sense. Aristotle seems to have been suddenly reminded of it by his own words **οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς,** and he did not shrink from enlivening his lecture by a joke at the expense of his own favourite pursuits. Of course the quotation also illustrates the primitive meaning of σοφός.

§ 3. **δεῖ ἄρα κ.τ.λ.** The argument is that the σοφός must be in a true state as to the ἀρχαί, for otherwise his knowledge would not be ἀκριβής, and there would be nothing in common between the σοφὸς περί τι and the σοφὸς ἁπλῶς.

κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα. Cf. Rhet. 1415 b, 8 ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλήν (sc. ὁ λόγος). This comes from Plato, Gorg. 505 d ἐπιθέντας κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς περιίῃ (sc. ὁ λόγος). Phileb. 66 d ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Tim. 69 a τελευτὴν ἤδη κεφαλήν τε...ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν.

τῶν τιμιωτάτων. This is added because the διαφορά of σοφία must be made relative as well as its genus ἕξις (cf. 1140 b, 5 n.). The section beginning at **ἄτοπον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** justifies our making it relative in this particular way. By τὰ τιμιώτατα Aristotle means as usual God, the πρῶτος οὐρανός and the like. Cf. Met. 1026 a, 21 τὴν τιμιωτάτην (sc. ἐπιστήμην) δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. For the meaning of τίμιος, cf. 1101 b, 11 n.

§ 4. **εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ.** I follow Zell in taking this as a long protasis going down to **προνοητικήν.** The argument is that, while the φρόνησις we have been studying is relative to Man, there are other φρονήσεις relative to each species of living beings. Now we have no right to assume that Man is the highest thing in the world.

τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα κ.τ.λ. 'For that which sees the good (τὸ εὖ) of (περί) a given class of beings (ἕκαστα),

φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν <ἂν> αὐτά, διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἔνια φρόνιμά φασιν εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὑτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν—φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὑτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν, πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἁπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

6 Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι, βουλεύεται δ' οὐδεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἁπλῶς εὔβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν.

7 Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν· πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἑτέρων εἰδότων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα

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they would call "wise" (e.g. *φρόνιμος περὶ ἵππους, πρόβατα*) and would entrust that class (**αὐτά**) to him' (as groom or shepherd). I still think (see Classical Review vol. III, p. 373) that **περὶ αὐτό** and **περὶ ἕκαστα** are alternative readings, of which the latter deserves the preference. The words **περὶ ἕκαστα τὸ εὖ** will then be equivalent to *τὸ ἑκάστων ἀγαθόν* in accordance with the regular periphrasis of the genitive by *περί* c. acc. Bywater, however, reads **τά** for **τό** at the beginning of the sentence and construes *τὸ εὖ θεωροῦν τὰ περὶ αὑτὸ ἕκαστα*, 'particulars concerning itself' (Contr. p. 50). He also reads with K^b *φησίν* and *ἐπιτρέψει* which may well be right. It is worth while noting that this is simply the old Socratic problem of the *ἐπιστάτης*, for which cf. e.g. Plato, Apol. 20 b *εἰ μέν σου τὼ υἷε πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι...νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν;*

τῶν θηρίων ἔνια. Not only the *ἐπιστάται*, but even the beasts themselves are called *φρόνιμα* if they have the capacity of foresight, e.g. ants, bees etc. Cf. Gen. An. iii, 2 (quoted in the Introductory Note to Book VIII), Hist. An. 488 b, 15 *τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ δεῖλα, οἷον ἔλαφος, δασύπους*, and often in the biological works. So too in Met. 980 b, 21 we read that animals which have memory are *φρονιμώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν*. Cf. Plato, Pol. 263 d *εἴ που φρόνιμόν ἐστί τι ζῷον ἕτερον*.

οἷον φανερώτατά γε, 'as, to take the most visible things only, the bodies of which the heavens are composed.' That the stars are meant is clear from Met. 1026 a, 18, where they are called *τὰ φανερὰ τῶν θείων*, and Phys. 196 a, 33 *τὰ θειότατα τῶν φανερῶν*. The First Mover is *ἀφανές*, but the stars are visible. In them we already see *τὸ θεῖον*. Cf. also de Caelo 290 a, 32, Zeller (Eng. Trans.) I, p. 504.

§ 5. **δῆλον.** This shows that the purpose of the preceding section is to justify the addition of *τῶν τιμιωτάτων* to the differentia of *σοφία*.

Ἀναξαγόραν...Θαλῆν. This seems to be suggested by Plato, Hipp. Maj. 281 c *οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐκεῖνοι, ὧν ὀνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ,...τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Μιλήσιον Θαλῆν καὶ ἔτι τῶν ὑστέρων μέχρι Ἀναξαγόρου...φαίνονται ἀπεχόμενοι τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων*. For the anecdotes told to show the 'uselessness' of *σοφία*, cf. my "Early Greek Philosophy" pp. 41 n. 29, 273 n. 8. Thales and Anaxagoras are contrasted with Perikles (1140 b, 8).

§ 6. **καὶ περὶ ὧν κ.τ.λ.** This limits *τὰ ἀνθρώπινα* by excluding everything which is not *δι' αὐτοῦ πρακτόν*. Cf. 1112 a, 28—31.

ἁπλῶς, as opposed to *κατὰ μέρος*, explained above 1140 a, 27.

στοχαστικός, 1106 b, 15 n.

κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν, equivalent here to *κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν*, cf. 1139 a, 12 *τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν*.

§ 7. **Οὐδ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.** A second point of difference between *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*.

τῶν καθόλου μόνον. This of course implies that *φρόνησις* is also *τῶν καθόλου*, and hitherto that is the aspect of it we have been discussing. We have only spoken of *φρόνησις* as *περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθά*, and both *ἄνθρωπος* and *ἀγαθά* are universals. We must not suppose, however, that it is *φρόνησις* which makes us aim at the *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* (that is the sphere of *ὄρεξις*), nor that it makes our *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* the true good (that is the function of *ἦθος*). What *ἡ καθόλου φρόνησις* does is, given the true good as an *ὀρεκτόν*, to frame general rules for its attainment. This is the aspect in which it resembles science; for *πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου* (Met. 1059 b, 26 et passim).

περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Cf. 1110 b, 6 *αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα*. The sphere (*περί*) or matter (*ἐν*) of *πρᾶξις* is always the particular; for we cannot perform any act that is not a particular act. Hence our deliberative analysis cannot be complete till we have carried it as far as the particular. In science this is impossible; for particulars are the objects of *αἴσθησις* alone.

διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ. For the opposition of *ἐμπειρία* and *τέχνη* see p. 67.

εἰδείη, 1110 a, 14 n.

ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική.

VIII. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ 2 πόλιν ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετική, ἡ δὲ ὡς [τὰ] καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, πολιτική. αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική· τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν

κοῦφα καὶ. It does not seem necessary to bracket these words with Trendelenburg. The case given is the analysis of *τὰ ὑγιεινά* in the sense of *τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ ὑγιείας*, and its terms are (1) digestible, (2) light, (3) poultry. The empirical practitioner may be supposed to know steps 2 and 3, and his treatment will therefore be more successful than that of the theorist who knows only steps 1, 2, but stops short of the particular 3. What the *ἔμπειρος* does not know is the middle term connecting *κοῦφα* and *ὑγιεινά*.

ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον, sc. *τὴν περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*.

καὶ ἐνταῦθα, 'in this case' as well as in that of diet, there is a master art (i.e. *πολιτική*) which it will be better to know, for it will teach us the *αἰτία*. Aristotle returns to this point at 1180 b, 13 sqq. On **ἀρχιτεκτονική** (sc. *τέχνη*) see Introd. § 13.

VIII. § 1. **τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτόν.** Cf. 1130 a, 12 n. Here the meaning is that *ἡ περὶ πόλιν φρόνησις* or *πολιτική* is a special application of *φρόνησις* generally. There is also *φρόνησις* concerned with the family (*οἰκονομία*) and the individual.

§ 2. **ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονική**, corresponding to the master-science of physiology in the case of medicine.

ὡς καθ' ἕκαστα. The words *καθ' ἕκαστα* are treated as a single indeclinable adjective. Cf. 1097 a, 13 n. I have followed Mr Stewart's suggestion in bracketing *τά*. Cf. 1110 b, 3 *ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα ἄγνοια*.

τὸ κοινὸν...ὄνομα. In Aristotle's terminology *πολιτική* includes *νομοθετική*, but he is here speaking of ordinary language. The cheirotechnic art has usurped the name which belongs equally to the architectonic.

πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτική, while *νομοθετική* is concerned with *τὸ καθόλου* and therefore not *πρακτική*.

τὸ γὰρ ψήφισμα κ.τ.λ. The *νόμος* corresponds to the major premiss of the political syllogism and the *ψήφισμα* to the minor. We must always remember that the Athenian *ἐκκλησία* was not a legislature, and that its *ψηφίσματα* were executive acts applicable to particular cases. Cf. 1137 b, 29. 1152 a, 20. Now the restriction of the name *πολιτικός* to the 'practical politician,' the *ῥήτωρ* or *σύμβουλος* in the *ἐκκλησία*, is only one effect of the general tendency of the Athenian democracy to put *ψηφίσματα* in the place of the *νόμοι*. Demosthenes complains of this in his speech against Leptines § 91 *καὶ γάρ τοι τότε μὲν τέως τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐνομοθέτουν, τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι νόμοις ἐχρῶντο, καινοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐτίθεσαν*, whereas now *ψηφισμάτων οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν διαφέρουσιν οἱ νόμοι, ἀλλὰ νεώτεροι οἱ νόμοι, καθ' οὓς τὰ ψηφίσματα δεῖ γράφεσθαι, τῶν ψηφισμάτων αὐτῶν ὑμῖν εἰσιν.* In Pol. 1292 a, 15 sqq. Aristotle speaks strongly on the same subject. He says that the corruption of democracy into a tyranny of the people (*κύριον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον*) comes about *ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος*. The *δῆμος* then becomes a *μόναρχος, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν*. Its *ψηφίσματα* are analogous to the arbitrary behests (*ἐπιτάγματα*) of a tyrant, and the *δημαγωγοί* to his flatterers. Diogenes Laertios (v, 17) attributes to Aristotle the remark that, of the two great inventions of Athens, wheat and laws, wheat is used while the laws are not.

ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν· 3 μόνοι γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα· καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, φρόνησις· ἐκείνων δὲ ἡ μὲν οἰκονομία ἡ δὲ νομοθεσία ἡ δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἡ 4 μὲν βουλευτικὴ ἡ δὲ δικαστική. εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως τὸ αὑτῷ εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν, καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὸ περὶ αὑτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων φρόνιμος 1142 a εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες· διὸ Εὐριπίδης—

ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον, sc. *ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει*, the 'ultimate,' the last step of the analysis. Cf. 1112 b, 23 *καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει*, De An. 433 a, 15 *οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ* (the efficient cause which sets *βούλευσις* at work), *τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως*. The first thing we come to in our analysis that is *ἐφ' ἡμῖν* is the last step of the analysis and the first step in action. The *πολιτικός* embodies this in a *ψήφισμα*.

§ 3. **δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** 'There is a belief that—.' Of course this is not Aristotle's view, but a popular use of language like the restriction of the name *πολιτική* to 'practical politics.' In both cases one branch has usurped *τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα*.

ἐκείνων, 'the other species.' The pronoun refers vaguely to all forms of *φρόνησις* which have to do with more than the individual, whether the family (*οἰκονομία*), or the state (*νομοθεσία* and *πολιτική*).

βουλευτική...δικαστική. Cf. Pol. 1297 b, 40. We should say 'executive and judicial,' the functions of the *ἐκκλησία* and the *δικαστήρια*. The 'legislative function' was not exercised by the *δῆμος*, but by the *νομοθέτης*.

§ 4. **εἶδος μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** To know one's own good is a species of *φρόνησις* just as *οἰκονομία* and *πολιτική* are, but it is so differentiated from the other species that it is taken for a different genus and incorrectly called by the *κοινὸν ὄνομα*. There is no difficulty in **γνώσεως**, which is simply the noun of *εἰδέναι*. The variant **φρονήσεως** is probably a conjecture.

ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν. There are degrees in the differentiation of *εἴδη* within a *γένος*. The greatest *διαφορά* in a given *γένος* makes the *εἴδη* into *ἐναντία*.

τὸ περὶ αὑτόν, i.e. *τὸ αὑτοῦ*. I read *τό* with K^b; the reading *τά* doubtless originated from a misunderstanding of the periphrasis *περί c. acc.* = *gen.*

Εὐριπίδης. The quotation as given by Aristotle is as usual defective, indeed in the present case it is unintelligible. The whole passage can be restored from Plutarch and Stobaeus with the help of Dion Chry-

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν...
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον....

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὑτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον καὶ σκεπτέον.

Σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, νέος δ' ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ'

sostom (Or. 59), from whom we learn that the words are spoken by Odysseus in the Prologue to the 'Philoktetes.' It ran thus—

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοίην, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως
ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένον στρατοῦ
ἴσον μετασχεῖν τῷ σοφωτάτῳ τύχης;
* * * * *
οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτω γαῦρον ὡς ἀνὴρ ἕφυ·
τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καί τι πράσσοντας πλέον
τιμῶμεν, ἄνδρας τ' ἐν πόλει νομίζομεν.

The quotation is made solely to illustrate the sense popularly given to φρονεῖν. 'How can I be wise, seeing I have preferred πράγματα to minding my own business?'

ζητοῦσι, sc. οἱ ἄνθρωποι implied in δοκεῖ 1142 a, 1. It is the practice and belief of the many that gives rise to the popular abuse of the term φρόνιμος.

ἐλήλυθε. Cf. 1132 b, 12 n.

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. The reason is that man is φύσει συνδυαστικόν and φύσει πολιτικόν (1162 a, 17).

καὶ σκεπτέον. This seems to refer to the discussion at the end of the Ethics on the functions of the family and the state in producing goodness.

§ 5. **τοῦ εἰρημένου**, sc. τοῦ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα εἶναι. This is plainly the meaning, though the reference is a little obscure. That does not justify us, however, in bracketing the highly characteristic passage 1141 b, 23—a, 11. This is a lecture, not a treatise.

διότι, only here in the Ethics = ὅτι, though common enough elsewhere in Aristotle, especially after σημεῖον.

δοκεῖ. For the change of number cf. 1141 b, 18.

καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, as well as τῶν καθόλου. Young men may know the general principles of conduct, but they do not know the facts of life, and cannot therefore complete the deliberative analysis. They may know that men should not drink too much; they do not see that 'This is too much for me.'

§ 6. **ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** We may widen the question and ask not only why a boy may be a mathematician though he cannot be φρόνιμος, but also why he cannot be a σοφός (philosopher) or even a φυσικός.

ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν
7 οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἄδηλον; ἔτι
ἡ ἁμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλεύσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα
8 φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται·

ἢ φυσικός. Cf. Met. 1005 b, 1 ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη. The object of φυσική is Nature, which has its ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in itself, that of the πρώτη φιλοσοφία is τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, 'Reality as such.'

δι' ἀφαιρέσεως 'abstract.' Cf. Met. 1061 a, 28 ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται· περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ, οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότητα κ.τ.λ....μόνον δὲ καταλείπει τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές. The mathematician strips τὰ αἰσθητά of all their sensible ἐναντιώσεις and treats them as mere *quanta*. It is this 'taking away' which is called ἀφαιρεσις, *abstractio*. The opposite of ἀφαίρεσις is πρόσθεσις, cf. De Caelo 299 a, 15 τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λέγεσθαι τὰ μαθηματικά, τὰ δὲ φυσικὰ ἐκ προσθέσεως (motion is 'added to' extension). Aristotle means here that in mathematics so much is 'taken away' that a minimum of experience is enough; he does not mean to say that the ἀρχαί of mathematics are independent of experience, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν (An. Post. 81 b, 2).

τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. The undemonstrable first principles of Physics, being ἐκ προσθέσεως as compared with Mathematics, require a long ἐπαγωγή before they can be apprehended by νοῦς.

οὐ πιστεύουσιν, 'have no conviction of them.' Cf. 1147 a, 18 τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον...καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μανθάνοντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὔπω.

τὸ τί ἐστιν, 'the definition' (ὁ ὁρισμὸς δηλοῖ τὸ τί ἐστι), e.g. the definitions of the point, line etc. which are the ἀρχαί of mathematics.

§ 7. **ἔτι ἡ ἁμαρτία κ.τ.λ.** There are two opportunities for going wrong in deliberative analysis, (1) with regard to the general rule, (2) with regard to its particular application. In mathematics the second does not exist. We must know the definition of a line, but the question 'Is this a line?' is irrelevant.

ἢ γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Note the brachylogy. The full sense is ἢ γὰρ ἡ ἁμαρτία περὶ τὸ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

τὰ βαρύσταθμα. Theophrastos ap. Athen. 42 c χείρω δ' ἐστὶ τὰ βαρυσταθμότερα (ὕδατα)...δυσκατεργαστότερα γάρ ἐστι...τῷ πολὺ τὸ γεῶδες ἔχειν.

§ 8. **τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου.** Cf. De An. 433 a, 15. App. A. Like ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις implies both the universal and the particular; but, while ἐπιστήμη only uses τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον in order to arrive at τὸ καθόλου (there being no ἐπιστήμη of τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον), φρόνησις is emphatically τοῦ καθ' ἑκάστου. Its analysis is not complete till it reaches τὸ ἔσχατον, the ultimate individual which can be analysed no further, for an act is always a particular act and φρόνησις is practical. Then what is ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει becomes πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

25 τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν 9
γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου,
οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων,
ἀλλ' οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον
τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις
30 ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

IX. Τὸ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι διαφέρει· τὸ γὰρ
βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβου-

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§ 9. **τῷ νῷ**, in the special sense in which *νοῦς ἐστι τῶν ἀρχῶν*.

τῶν ὅρων, i. q. *τῶν ἀμέσων ἀρχῶν*. Cf. 1143 a, 36 *τῶν πρώτων ὅρων...νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὐ λόγος*. These are the definitions (*ὅρος* = *ὁρισμός*) which are the starting-point of every science.

λόγος, i. q. *συλλογισμός, ἀπόδειξις*. It is impossible *λόγον ἀποδοῦναι τῶν ἀρχῶν*.

οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, sc. *αἰσθητῶν*. An *ἴδιον αἰσθητόν* is one *ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι*, e.g. colour, sound, taste; *τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητά* are *κίνησις, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος*. These are *αἰσθητά*, but are not perceived by one special *αἰσθητήριον*. On *propria* and *communia sensibilia* see De An. 418 a, 7 sqq., and on the 'intuitional' element in *φρόνησις* Introd. § 23.

οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα κ.τ.λ., i.e. like the perception of the fact that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle. Introd. §§ 22, 23. Bywater brackets **ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς** because the words seem to imply that there is no mathematical *ἔσχατον* except a triangle. See Contr. p. 51. We must bear in mind the *ἀναλύειν ὥσπερ διάγραμμα* of 1112 b, 20. The case supposed is that of the geometer who breaks up his figure till he comes to something—say a triangle—which enables him to start the construction or proof at which he aims. It is in this way, for instance, that the properties of parallelograms are discovered.

στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ, 'for on that side too there will be a stop.' We reach the limit of analysis just as much when we descend to particulars as when we ascend to the *ἀρχαί* or *πρῶτοι ὅροι*. It is as impossible to give a reason why a triangle cannot be divided any further as it is to give a reason for the axioms. For the impersonal use of **στήσεται** (opp. *εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν* 1094 a, 20 n.), cf. e.g. Phys. 242 a, 19 *οὐ δὴ εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν ἀλλὰ στήσεταί που*.

ἀλλ' αὕτη κ.τ.λ. Mathematical intuition (**αὕτη**) is more properly called *αἴσθησις* than *φρόνησις* can be. It really is *αἴσθησις*, though not *ἡ τῶν ἰδίων*, while *φρόνησις* is of course intellectual, not sensuous. I have no hesitation in preferring the reading of K^b, *ἤ*, to that of L^b, *ἡ*. Still better, I think, would be *ἤ ἡ*.

ἐκείνης, sc. *τῆς φρονήσεως*. Mathematical and practical intuition belong to the same genus, but they are specifically different, their differentiae being *αἰσθητική* and *διανοητική*.

IX. **§ 1. ζητεῖν τι**, a species of *τὸ ζητεῖν*. It is necessary to put *βούλευσις* into its genus, in order that we may have the needful *πρ*ᷝ*τάσεις* for the following piece of dialectic. We shall see that the qualities now to be discussed are the natural basis of *φρόνησις*. They are *δυνάμεις* and come by nature.

λαβεῖν ... περί. Cf. 1140 a, 24. Here the sense is made more explicit by the addition of *τί ἐστι*, cf. 1123 a,

λίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ
2 ἄλλο τι γένος. ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι
περὶ ὧν ἴσασιν, ἡ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμε- 1142 b
νος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εὐστοχία· ἄνευ
τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἡ εὐστοχία, βουλεύονται δὲ πο-
λὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βου-
3 λευθέντα, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἡ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον 5
καὶ ἡ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ
δόξα ἡ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευό-
μενος ἁμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δῆλον ὅτι ὀρ-
θότης τις ἡ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης·
ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἁμαρτία— 10
δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὥρισται ἤδη πᾶν οὗ

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35 n. We shall see from the sequel that Aristotle's reason for discussing *εὐβουλία* is that Plato, and doubtless his followers, had made certain statements about it which must be discussed if they are not to confuse the account we have given of *φρόνησις*. The argument is therefore on strictly Academic lines.

πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις. Plato had said so. Cf. Rep. 428 b *ἡ εὐβουλία δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστιν*. Alc. I., 125 e *Πολιτείας κοινωνούντων τίνα καλεῖς ἐπιστήμην;—Εὐβουλίαν ἔγωγε*.

ἡ δόξα. The most obvious Platonic alternative.

ἡ εὐστοχία. We may perhaps infer that some such definition was current in the Academy from [Plato] Def. 412 e *ἀγχίνοια εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων στοχαστικός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ τοῦ δέοντος*. On *ἀγχίνοια* as a species of *εὐστοχία* cf. 1142 b, 6.

§ 2. ἄνευ...λόγου. The *εὔστοχος* can give no account of his success, he has no conscious ground for what he does. It is not quite correct to say that *ἄνευ λόγου* = *ἄνευ λογισμοῦ*, though it comes to much the same thing. Rather, it is the opposite of *μετὰ λόγου*. See Ind. s.v. *λόγος*.

καὶ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. A favourite *γνώμη*. Cf. Isokr. Demon. § 34 *βουλεύου μὲν βραδέως, ἐπιτέλει δὲ ταχέως τὰ δόξαντα*.

§ 3. εὐστοχία τις ἡ ἀγχίνοια. Cf. 1142 a, 33 n. So too An. Post. 89 b, 10 *ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοιά ἐστιν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῳ χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου* (the middle term), *οἷον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἐνενόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου· ἢ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῳ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται· ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*.

δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Since *εὐ-* in *εὐβουλία* means *ὀρθῶς*, *εὐβουλία* must be an *ὀρθότης*.

ὀρθότης τις. The mention of *δόξα* seems to have suggested the Platonic *ὀρθὴ δόξα*. It is an *ὀρθότης*, though not an *ὀρθότης* of *δόξα*. The word *ὀρθότης* in this sense, as opposed to *ἁμαρτία*, is not Aristotelian but Platonic.

ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. There can be no rightness of knowledge any more than a wrongness, for knowledge is always right; there is a rightness of belief, but it is truth and not *εὐβουλία*.

ὥρισται ἤδη. Everything which is an object of belief is already deter-

δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἡ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὔπω φάσις. καὶ γὰρ ἡ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ἐάντε εὖ ἐάντε καὶ κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστιν ἡ εὐβουλία βουλῆς· διὸ ἡ βουλὴ ζη- 4
τητέα πρῶτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὃ προτίθεται δεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται

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mined one way or the other, but the object of *βουλή* is still *ἀόριστον*, for *ὁ βουλευόμενος* has not yet determined which course to adopt.

οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου, even though it is not the rightness of either knowledge or belief, it is *μετὰ λόγου*, i.e. it proceeds upon grounds and can give a reason for what it does.

διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται, sc. *αὐτὴν ὀρθότητα εἶναι*. This implies an exhaustive division of *ἕξεις μετὰ λόγου* into *ἐπιστήμη*, *δόξα*, and *διάνοια*. Such a division is to be found only in Plato, and we have seen that we are here criticising him. For the definition of *διάνοια* in this sense cf. Theait. 189 e (*τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καλῶ*) *λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ*. Soph. 263 e *ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια*. All the difficulties of this section disappear if the reference to Plato is borne in mind. The older commentators took the sentence to mean 'it falls short of thought,' while modern editors suppose Aristotle to be using *διάνοια* here in the unparalleled sense of the 'discursive faculty.' In Aristotle *διάνοια* includes *all* intellect, theoretical and practical, intuitive and discursive, but here the terminology is not his own. See next note for the relation of *διάνοια* to *δόξα* in Plato.

φάσις τις ἤδη. This is also from Plato. Cf. Soph. 263 e *Καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις γε αὖ ἴσμεν ἐνόν*—*Τὸ ποῖον;*—*Φάσιν τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.*—*Ἴσμεν.*—*Ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὅτι προσείπῃς αὐτό;* Hence *δόξα* is called *διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις* ib. 264 b. Note the idiomatic **οὔπω** and **ἤδη**. Ind. s.vv.

ζητεῖ τι. Here again we make use of the premiss *τὸ βουλεύεσθαι ζητεῖν τι* (1142 a, 31).

§ 4. **ὀρθότης...βουλῆς**. There is no contradiction; for the Platonic *διάνοια* includes the Aristotelian *βουλή*.

ζητητέα. Aristotle may have trusted his memory to fill in at lecture the usual statements that no one deliberates about what is necessary or due to chance, etc. At any rate, he goes on to discuss *ὀρθότης* and not *βουλή*.

πλεοναχῶς, sc. *λέγεται*. Cf. 1125 b, 14 n.

ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς κ.τ.λ. The *first* requirement is that the end should be right. We do not call the bad man *εὔβουλος*, though he gains his end by deliberation (**φαῦλος** here is equivalent to *ἀκόλαστος*). Nor do we call the morally weak man (the **ἀκρατής**) by that name. As we shall see, the *ἀκρατής*, though against his better knowledge, aims at the pleasure of the moment, and the *ἀκόλαστος* does so on principle.

ὃ προτίθεται δεῖν. This reading is implied by the Vetus Versio, while the MSS. have the meaningless *ἰδεῖν*.

βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν 20
τι τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς
5 εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ
συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι'
οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ'
αὕτη πω εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέν- 25
6 τοι δι' οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον τυχεῖν,
τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθό-
7 της ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι
ἔστι καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν
δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ 30
ἡ πρός τι τέλος. εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦ-
σθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς
τὸ τέλος οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.

It is true, as Bywater points out (Contr. p. 51), that *δεῖν* strictly speaking implies *ὑποτίθεται*, but (1) we can hardly credit the author of the Versio with the emendation *δεῖν* for *ἰδεῖν*, and (2) the pleonasm of *δεῖν* is extremely common with *verba imperandi*, and is still easier with *verba proponendi*. Jackson quotes Plato, Soph. 221 a *ὅπερ ἄρτι προυθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν*. The absence of *τούτου* is idiomatic, cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

§ 5. **ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ κ.τ.λ.** The *second* requirement is that the means shall be right as well as the end.

ὃ...τυχεῖν. For the ellipse of *τούτου* cf. b, 19 above.

ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον. Strictly speaking the *ὅρος* can neither be true nor false; the meaning is that the wrong middle term altogether may be taken, so that one or both of the *προτάσεις* of the practical syllogism are false, though the *συμπέρασμα* is a true statement of the particular act that must be done to reach the end. Aristotle even speaks of *πράγματα* as *ψευδῆ* when they are not what we take them to be (Met. 1024 b, 25).

§ 6. **ἔτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ.** The *third* requirement is that the time should be right.

ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον κ.τ.λ. This sums up the three requirements of *ὀρθότης*, (1) end (**οὗ**), (2) means (**ὡς**), (3) time (**ὅτε**).

§ 7. **ἔτι ἔστι κ.τ.λ.** A *fourth* requirement is that it must be directed to *the* end, not merely to *an* end, to *εὐδαιμονία*, not merely to e.g. health or strength. Cf. 1140 a, 27.

κατορθοῦσα, 1098 b, 29 n.

οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις, sc. *τοῦ συμφέροντος πρὸς τὸ τέλος*. This avoids the contradiction of making *φρόνησις* a true conception of the *end* of Man. Others read *πρός τι τέλος*. It is not *φρόνησις* but *ὄρεξις* which makes us aim at the good, and it is not *φρόνησις* but *ἦθος* which makes our good the true good. But, on the other hand, *τὸ ὀρεκτόν* can only become an efficient cause *τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι* (App. A), and neither *ὄρεξις* nor

X. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ εὐσυνεσία, καθ' ἃς λέ-
1143 a γομεν συνετοὺς καὶ εὐσυνέτους, οὔθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμῃ
ἢ δόξῃ—πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί—οὔτε τις μία τῶν
κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἢ γεω-
μετρία περὶ μεγέθη· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ
5 ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσίς ἐστιν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὁτουοῦν,
ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις καὶ βουλεύσαιτο. διὸ περὶ
τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸν σύνεσις 2
καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἐστιν, τί γὰρ
δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις
10 κριτικὴ μόνον. ταὐτὸν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συν-
ετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν 3
οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν
λέγεται συνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν τῷ
χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ
15 φρόνησίς ἐστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ

ἦθος could give us an ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις of τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος such as the rule παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά. That is the function of the πρακτικὸς νοῦς, and φρόνησις is the ἀρετή which enables it to discharge it. In Mot. An. 700 b, 25 τὸ τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος is distinctly called an object of thought (διανοητόν).

X. §1. **σύνεσις.** This term was also somewhat loosely used by Plato. Cf. Phileb. 19 d νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ, and Aristotle himself had enumerated it provisionally along with σοφία and τέχνη as a διανοητικὴ ἀρετή (1103 a, 5). It is therefore important to show how it is really related to ἐπιστήμη and φρόνησις. The word was very popular in the 4th century, as may be seen from Demosthenes and Aischines.

πάντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This must surely refer to **δόξῃ** alone. Everyone has at least δόξα.

οὔτε περὶ...ὁτουοῦν, 'not any or every γιγνόμενον.' It has nothing to do with τὰ φύσει or κατὰ τύχην γιγνόμενα, nor even with such human affairs as are beyond our reach.

§ 2. **ἐπιτακτική...κριτική.** Aristotle here uses the Platonic διαίρεσις. Cf. Pol. 260 b ἆρ' οὖν συμπάσης τῆς γνωστικῆς εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικὸν διαιρούμενοι προσείποιμεν, ἐμμελῶς ἂν φαῖμεν διῃρῆσθαι; The fact of its being a κριτικὴ δύναμις shows that it belongs to νοῦς. Cf. Mot. An. 700 b, 20 (App. B).

§ 3. **ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν κ.τ.λ.** The point is the distinction of the two meanings of μανθάνειν, (1) 'to understand,' (2) 'to learn.' Cf. Top. 165 b, 32 τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, (1) τὸ συνιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, (2) τὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

ἄλλου λέγοντος. This is the main point and marks σύνεσις as subordinate to φρόνησις. The πολιτικός need only be συνετός, the νομοθέτης must be

4 εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταὐτόν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοὔνομα ἡ
σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν
γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

XI. Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν συγγνώμονας καὶ
ἔχειν φαμὲν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστι κρίσις ὀρθή. 20
σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστά φαμεν εἶναι συγ-
γνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικὲς τὸ ἔχειν περὶ ἔνια συγγνώμην.
ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή·
ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

2 Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι· 25
λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν
ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη
καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὗται

φρόνιμος. As Stewart well says, σύνεσις is the distinctive ἀρετή of the ἐκκλησία.

XI. § 1. **γνώμη.** Plato had used this word too in a way which suggested that it was equivalent to ἐπιστήμη. Cf. Rep. 476 d οὐκοῦν τούτου μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γιγνώσκοντος γνώμην ἂν ὀρθῶς φαῖμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν ὡς δοξάζοντος; Aristotle as usual wishes to limit it to the sense it had in actual speech. In that sense it corresponds to our 'feeling,' when we call anyone 'a man of fine feeling' or say some one 'wants feeling.' Cf. the use of the adjectives εὐγνώμων and ἀγνώμων 'unfeeling,' 'harsh.' The συγγνώμων is he who συγγιγνώσκει, 'gives his γνώμη on our side.' It is probable that this meaning of the word is connected with its use in the heliastic oath γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν in cases not provided for by law. "If σύνεσις is especially the κρίσις in the ἐκκλησία, γνώμη is especially that in the δικαστήριον." Stewart.

τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, neuter not masculine, as is shown by the last words of the section.

κριτική. This, therefore, is also a δύναμις of νοῦς. Cf. 1143 a, 10 n.

ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, i.e. τοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικοῦς. There is no difficulty in the fact that the definitions given of γνώμη and συγγνώμη are the same; they are related just in the same way as σύνεσις and εὐσυνεσία. Cf. the opening words of cc. 10, 11 and 1143 a, 10. On ἐπιείκεια cf. 1137 a, 31 sqq.

§ 2. **πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις.** We see from what follows that this means νοῦς, γνώμη, σύνεσις, i.e. all the practical ἕξεις which apprehend their object immediately. Εὐβουλία is not included; for that is μετὰ λόγου.

εὐλόγως, 1096 a, 2 n.

εἰς ταὐτὸ τείνουσαι. Cf. 1096 b, 27 πρὸς ἓν συντελεῖν and the note there. All these ἕξεις are πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα, sc. πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν.

λέγομεν ... ἐπιφέροντες. The construction is a little mixed; for some of the objects are governed by λέγομεν and some by ἐπιφέροντες. For ἐπιφέρειν cf. φέρειν 1119 a, 34 n. The phrase **νοῦν ἤδη** is explained by ἤδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει (1143 b, 8).

δυνάμεις. They were called ἕξεις above, but δυνάμεις is the more correct term; for φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα (1143 b, 6) and no ἀρετὴ φύσει παρα-

τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ
30 κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς καὶ [εὐγνώμων
ἢ] συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάν-
των ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ 3
τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον
δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ
35 πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' 4
ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὅρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων
1143 b νοῦς ἐστι καὶ οὐ λόγος, καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις
τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς
τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως·

γίγνεται. They are πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα as all εὐφυΐα is to its formed ἕξις (cf. 1144 b, 4). As a διανοητικὴ ἀρετή, φρόνησις is gained mainly by teaching (1103 a, 15 n.)—such teaching as we find in the 'Ethics'—but the teaching requires as a foundation (1) ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and (2) εὐφυΐα.

[εὐγνώμων ἢ]. Bywater, Contr. p. 52.

τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the sphere of γνώμη is really as wide as that of φρόνησις.

§ 3. καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ. Here we see another difference between these δυνάμεις and φρόνησις. They are restricted to the particular, φρόνησις has to do with the universal besides.

§ 4. καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The difficulties which have been raised about this passage are mainly imaginary. The chief point to remember is that νοῦς in its restricted sense (not when it is equivalent to διάνοια) is a δύναμις which apprehends its object immediately (τῷ θιγεῖν) like αἴσθησις, not mediately like ἀπόδειξις or βούλευσις. Now, both in theory and in practice we must assume such a faculty. We have seen that in theory it is called νοῦς, and everyone knows that a man who can see the right thing to do is said νοῦν ἔχειν. We need not discuss now whether this is strictly speaking the same νοῦς. It is in any case an element in φρόνησις and bears the same name as the other.

τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, for τὰ πρῶτα are ἔσχατα viewed from beneath, they are the ultimates of demonstrative analysis.

ὁ κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις, that described 1140 b, 31 sqq.

ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς. Cf. 1147 a, 28 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. These two phrases must surely have the same explanation, and there can be little doubt that in the latter the word προτάσεσι is to be 'understood.' As this whole passage really deals with προτάσεις also, it does not seem impossible to suppose such an ellipse, especially in so condensed a piece of writing. We can hardly suppose even Aristotle to have meant such a *contradictio in adjecto* as πρακτικαὶ ἀποδείξεις would involve.

τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως, 'the minor premiss,' usually called ἡ δευτέρα πρότασις. Its formula in the Practical Syllogism is ἐγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε καὶ τόδε τοιόνδε, and this is just what the νοῦν ἔχων sees.

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα αὗται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ
5 τὰ καθόλου· τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. 5
διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν
6 οὐδείς, γνώμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ'
ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἰόμεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἥδε ἡ ἡλικία
νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. [διὸ
καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις 10
καὶ περὶ τούτων.] ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ
πρεσβυτέρων [ἢ φρονίμων] ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ
δόξαις οὐχ ἧττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ
7 τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα ὁρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ
φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει 15
οὖσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρα,
εἴρηται.

XII. Διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί χρήσιμοί

ἀρχαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1139 b, 28 ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή ἐστι καὶ τοῦ καθόλου. The universal rules of conduct and the definition of εὐδαιμονία can only be found by a dialectical process which starts from particular moral judgments. We generalise 'I ought to do this' into 'οἱ τοιοῦτοι must do τὰ τοιαῦτα.'

§ 5. ἔχειν αἴσθησιν, used in the wide sense, like αἰσθάνεσθαι, and including νοῦς. So we say 'I see,' when we mean an intellectual not a sensuous perception. The sense in which αἴσθησις is used here has been explained above, 1142 a, 25 sqq. We were told there that this αἴσθησις ἀντίκειται τῷ νῷ, here that it is νοῦς. But Aristotle is only examining the subject dialectically from every side, and we are left with a very clear and definite idea of a certain aspect of φρόνησις, however vague the terminology may be. And the vagueness is not in Aristotle's own mind, but in the popular language from which he feels bound to start.

§ 6. ταῖς ἡλικίαις ... ἀκολουθεῖν. This puts the acquisition of σύνεσις, γνώμη and νοῦς (not φρόνησις) on the same level as τὸ πολιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον, which is the example given of τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γιγνόμενα in the sphere of φύσις (An. Post. 32 b, 6).

διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. These words break the argument here, nor do they come in very well after **αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς** above, where Rassow and Bywater would place them. In that position they would commit us to the strange doctrine that ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ ἀποδείξεις.

ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν κ.τ.λ. This goes closely with **ταῖς ἡλικίαις ... ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ.**

ἢ φρονίμων. These words are suspicious. The φρόνιμος can always put his advice in syllogistic form, and no one can become φρόνιμος merely by getting old. Perhaps, however, the word is used in its popular sense.

§ 7. τί μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This recapitulation strongly favours the view that there are only two διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί, σοφία and φρόνησις.

XII. **§ 1. Διαπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.** The ἀπορίαι concerning σοφία

εἰσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων
ἄνθρωπος—οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστι γενέσεως—ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο
μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρό-
νησίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀν-
θρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστιν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν,
οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις
αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά,
ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται·
οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμνα-
στικήν ἐσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ 2
τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος·
ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν
ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἱκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ
καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὅμως οὐ
μανθάνομεν ἰατρικήν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δό- 3
ξειεν εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται·
ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὴ

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and *φρόνησις* are (1) What is the use of *σοφία* since it can produce nothing, and of *φρόνησις* regarded as the power of apprehending *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς*? (2) What is the use of *φρόνησις* even if we regard it as the power of apprehending *τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν*? (3) How are we to reconcile the imperative character of *φρόνησις* with its inferiority to *σοφία*?

εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί. The whole *ἀπορία* turns on this; for *ἕξεις* inevitably give rise to *τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*. If we have the *ἕξις*, intellectual knowledge of the *ἐνέργειαι* which will follow from it is superfluous. They will follow whether we know them or not.

ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. This is added to make it clear that *τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά* are to be taken in a sense analogous to that of *τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά*, so called *τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας* (*τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι* 1096 b, 27 n.), as when we speak of a 'healthy complexion,' or a 'healthy tread' (*ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν*). We do not take them in the sense of *τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά* till the next *ἀπορία*.

§ 2. **τούτων χάριν**, sc. *τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*.

τοῦ γίνεσθαι, equivalent to *τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ φυλακτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικῶν*, the sense in which *ὑγιεινὰ καὶ εὐεκτικά* are used of wholesome diet and exercise.

τοῖς οὖσι σπουδαίοις ... τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν. Argyropoulos read **τοῖς μὴ οὖσι**, which gives a clear sense. The healthy man does not need to know what produces health, the unhealthy man consults his doctor.

§ 3. **χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὖσα**, as was shown above 1141 a, 20 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ ποιοῦσα, i.e. *ἡ περὶ γένεσιν*. Of course *σοφία* can have no imperative character; for its objects are

τούτων λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.
4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς 1144 a
αὑτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου,
5 καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι
μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως
ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5
6 τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. ἔτι τὸ ἔργον
ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ
μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ
πρὸς τοῦτον. τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράτ- 10
7 τειν ἢ μὴ πράττειν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακτικωτέ-
ρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνω-
θεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ
δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὔπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον

ἀκίνητα. The *τόπος* here is *εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοιόνδε ἢ ᾧ ἂν ὑπάρχῃ, μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο* (sc. *αἱρετόν*) *ὅ ποτε ποιεῖ ἢ ὃ μὴ ποιεῖ*. (Top. iii, 5.)

§ 4. **πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The first *λύσις*. The *τόπος* is *τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν*.

§ 5. **ἔπειτα καὶ.** The second *λύσις*. *Σοφία* is not the efficient but the formal cause of *εὐδαιμονία*. The *λόγος* of health as it exists in the soul of the doctor is *ἰατρική* and an efficient cause, when realised in the body of his patient it is a formal cause.

ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, sc. *τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ποιεῖ*.

τῷ ἔχεσθαι, 'by being possessed.' I think we may understand **τῷ ἐνεργεῖν** as *τῷ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα*.

§ 6. **ἔτι.** The third *λύσις*. The function of Man (which we know to be *πρακτική τις ζωὴ τοῦ λόγον ἐχόντος*) cannot be discharged by *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* alone. Note the positive result which is emerging from these three *λύσεις*. We begin to see (1) that the *διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί* are necessary to the *τελείωσις* of Man, (2) that *σοφία* is the *ἀρίστη ἀρετή*, and therefore that *εὐδαιμονία* will be above all *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*, and (3) that *φρόνησις* is ancillary to *σοφία*. All this will be worked out later.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. While *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* can ensure the rightness of the end (for the *βούλησις* of the good man is *τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλητόν*), yet this is not enough. Goodness cannot do without Wisdom, which ensures the rightness of *τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν*.

τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου κ.τ.λ. The four *μόρια* (we are using popular language) are *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν* (goodness *σοφία*), *τὸ λογιστικόν* (goodness *φρόνησις*), *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν* (goodness *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*), and *τὸ θρεπτικόν*. The point of its being mentioned here is that, as it is not an *ἴδιον* of Man, its function is not the *ἔργον* of Man. Cf. 1097 b, 34.

§ 7. **περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν κ.τ.λ.** The fourth and most complete *λύσις*, involving the other three.

μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον. Cf. 1139 b, 14.

λέγομεν. 1134 a, 17 sqq.

τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετή, 8 τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἕνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δει- 9 νότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ᾖ καλός, ἐπαινετή ἐστιν, ἐὰν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαμὲν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύ- 10 ναμις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)·

δι' ἕτερόν τι, i.e. *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, e.g. *τιμῆς καὶ δόξης χάριν*.

οἷον, 'that is' (not 'for instance').

§ 8. **ἐπιστήσασι**, sc. *τὴν διάνοιαν* (Met. 987 b, 2), *τὴν σκέψιν* (Met. 1090 a, 2), *τὸν λόγον*. The object is often omitted as here, cf. H. A. 487 a, 12 *περὶ ὧν τύπῳ μὲν εἴπωμεν πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἐπιστήσαντες ἐροῦμεν*.

§ 9. **δύναμις** in the strict sense as opposed to *ἕξις*. Being a *μετὰ λόγου δύναμις* it is *τῶν ἐναντίων*. See above 1103 a, 20 sqq. and notes.

ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα, sc. the members of the Academy, cf. [Plato] Def. 413 a *δεινότης διάθεσις καθ' ἣν ὁ ἔχων στοχαστικὸς ἐστι τοῦ ἰδίου τέλους*. This was doubtless suggested by the famous discussion in the Theaitetos.

πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπόν. All *πρακτά* are only *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα*.

αὐτῶν. Bywater reads *αὐτοῦ*, sc. *τοῦ σκοποῦ*.

δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους. Cf. Plato, Theait. 177 a *δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι*, Dem. Olynth. 1 § 3 *πανοῦργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς πράγμασιν χρῆσθαι*. Aristotle is referring to the rhetorical device of qualifying people by the *δύναμις* without reference to the *προαίρεσις*.

§ 10. **ἡ δ' ἕξις**, sc. *φρόνησις*.

τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ, sc. *τῷ νῷ*. Cf. 1096 b, 29. In the face of the constant description of *νοῦς* as *ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς*, we can hardly understand this otherwise. Nor is there any inconsistency; for *δεινότης* is a *δύναμις* of *νοῦς*.

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ κ.τ.λ. On the practical syllogism see Introd. § 22.

ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες. The two words have coalesced into one. The ultimate *ἀρχή* of all practical reasoning is the definition of *εὐδαιμονία*.

τοῦτο δ' εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρ- 35 χάς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρόνιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν. XIII. σκέπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ 1144 b γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα—οὐ ταὐτὸν μέν, ὅμοιον δέ—οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ 5 ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἆλλα ἤδη ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ 10 ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ 2 τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετή. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν

XIII. § 1. **σκεπτέον δὴ κ.τ.λ.** We now see the purpose of the discussion of *δεινότης*. Just as the *δύναμις* of *δεινότης* cannot become the *ἕξις* of *φρόνησις* without *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, so—and this is the main point for our present purpose, the *λύσις* of the *ἀπορία*,—the *δύναμις* of *φυσικὴ ἀρετή* cannot become the *ἕξις* of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* without *φρόνησις*. Observe that, with characteristic carelessness, the terms of the *ἀναλογία* are given in the wrong order.

ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετή. The *locus classicus* on this subject is H. A. 588 a, 18 sqq. *ἔνεστι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἴχνη τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τρόπων, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔχει φανερωτέρας τὰς διαφοράς· καὶ γὰρ ἡμερότης καὶ ἀγριότης, καὶ πραότης καὶ χαλεπότης, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δειλία, καὶ φόβοι καὶ θάρρη, καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ πανουργίαι, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν συνέσεως ἔνεισιν ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητες, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐλέγομεν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ζῴων (ἔνια γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἔνια δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις μᾶλλον), τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει, ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ τέχνη καὶ σοφία καὶ σύνεσις οὕτως ἐνίοις τῶν ζῴων ἐστί τις ἑτέρα τοιαύτη φυσικὴ δύναμις· φανερώτατον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν παίδων ἡλικίαν βλέψασιν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τῶν μὲν ὕστερον ἕξεων ἐσομένων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν οἷον ἴχνη καὶ σπέρματα, διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν θηρίων ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἄλογον εἰ τὰ μὲν ταὐτὰ τὰ δὲ παραπλήσια τὰ δ' ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις.

σωφρονικοί. The termination conveniently marks the *φυσικὴ δύναμις*.

ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι. For the predicative object after *ζητεῖν*, cf. 1132 a, 22 n.

§ 2. **ὁμοία οὖσα**, i.e. *τῷ ὄψιν ἢ νοῦν λαβόντι*.

εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. διόπερ τινές φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι, τὴν ἕξιν εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν, ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή [ἐστιν]· ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων

3 4 5 6

οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. Above (1144 a, 29) we found that *φρόνησις οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἀρετῆς*. We may express the relation of the two by saying that *ἀρετή* without *φρόνησις* is blind, *φρόνησις* without *ἀρετή* is empty. Our naturally good tendencies cannot become goodness unless *φρόνησις* is present to show us both the general rules of conduct which must be obeyed if we are to attain the good, and also what particular acts come under these rules. It was this fact which made Sokrates identify goodness and knowledge.

§ 4. **καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες.** In Met. 992 a, 33 and 1069 a, 26 we read that *γέγονε τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία*, and that *οἱ νῦν τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον οὐσίας τιθέασιν*. These passages show that *οἱ νῦν* are certainly not the Peripatetics, but the contemporary Academy. We have been told already (1103 b, 32) that the doctrine of *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* is *κοινόν* (note *ad loc.*) and we may infer that it belonged to the Academy.

προστιθέασι, 'after naming the *ἕξις* and that to which it is relative, add the qualification *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον*.'

§ 5. **δεῖ...μεταβῆναι**, 'we must take a little step in advance' (cf. 1097 a, 24 n.). The Platonist *κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον* implies a merely external standard; *we* say that the *ἀρεταί* are *μετὰ λόγου*, and that goodness is inseparably bound up with wisdom.

ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος...ἡ φρόνησις. It is true that the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* is not an *ἀρετή* nor identical with *φρόνησις*, but yet this way of speaking is quite Aristotelian. The *ὀρθὸς λόγος* of health is *ἰατρική*, and so the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* of action may be regarded as the form of goodness existing in the soul of the *φρόνιμος*, and identical with the *φρόνησις* of the man who 'has the *λόγος*.' Cf. 1138 b, 31 n.

ἡμεῖς δὲ, opp. to *οἱ νῦν* above.

ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἄν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφυέστατος πρὸς ἁπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἁπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, κἂν εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῃ. ἔτι ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

1145 a 7 8 10

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§ 6. **ὁ λόγος...ᾧ διαλεχθείη τις ἄν**, 'the dialectical argument that might be used to show—.'

ὅτι χωρίζονται...αἱ ἀρεταί. The doctrine here indicated is that of the *ἀντακολουθία τῶν ἀρετῶν*, as it was called later in the school. Alexander of Aphrodisias wrote a special treatise upon it (Scripta minora, ed. Bruns pp. 153 sqq.), in which he quotes from Theophrastos *οὐδὲ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον τῶν ἀρετῶν τὰς διαφορὰς οὕτω λαβεῖν ὡς μὴ κατά τι κοινωνεῖν αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις, γίνονται δ' αὐταῖς αἱ προσηγορίαι κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον* (Heylbut in Arch. 1, p. 195). The doctrine of the *ἀντακολουθία τῶν ἀρετῶν* was fully worked out by Plato, though the term is post-Aristotelian.

οὔσῃ. Bywater reads *ὑπαρχούσῃ* with K^b.

§ 7. **δῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ.**, a resumption of the first *λύσις*.

§ 8. **ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** The *λύσις* of the *ἀπορία* stated 1143 b, 33. The ministering function of *φρόνησις* is well brought out in a fragment of Theophrastos preserved by the scholiast on cod. Vindob. gr. phil. 315 (Heylbut loc. cit.) *ὁ δέ γε Θεόφραστος λέγει τὴν φρόνησιν <ἔχειν> πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν ὡς ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐπιτροπεύοντες δοῦλοι τῶν δεσποτῶν πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας· ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πάντα πράσσουσιν ἃ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἵνα οἱ δεσπόται σχολὴν ἄγωσι πρὸς τὰ ἐλευθέρια ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἥ τε φρόνησις τὰ πρακτέα τάπτει ἵν' ἡ σοφία σχολὴν ἄγῃ πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν τιμιωτάτων.* It is significant that this illustration has been embodied in MM. 1198 b, 9 sqq.

BOOK VII.

WEAKNESS AND BADNESS OF WILL.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We have seen that the efficient cause of human action is Will (*προαίρεσις*) and that Will is the union of an intellectual and an appetitive element. We have seen further that Practical Truth, which gives the standard and measure of all goodness, is the harmony of a true judgment with a right appetition. We know that our task as lawgivers, who aim at creating happiness for the state, will be to produce in the citizens a good will which shall be in harmony with the principles embodied in our laws. But our task will not be complete until we have studied the obstacles in the way of this, and the *ἐκστάσεις* (Phys. 246 a, 17; cf. pp. 70, 71) which thus arise. And this is not quite so simple a matter as might be supposed. We have to deal not only or mainly with the fact of practical falsehood in harmony with a wrong appetition, though that must be considered too. We have a much more serious difficulty to face, namely the fact that the action may be bad, though the will is good. It is the case that the Good Will may be overmastered by Desire, and this fact, to which we give the name of "Weakness" (*ἀκρασία*) or want of self-control, will require careful consideration as well as the more simple case of actual badness (*κακία, ἀκολασία*). We must also take into account the possibility of "portents" (*τέρατα*) of goodness or badness. The occurrence of a superhumanly good person in our state would alter all its arrangements, as he and he alone would be its ideal ruler. Further, the statesman must know something of the failures of nature, her incomplete (*ἀτελεῖς*) or mutilated products (*πηρώσεις*) which are more brutes than men, just as the others are rather divine than human.

The result of our inquiry will be that desire for pleasure is the cause of moral weakness. Are we to say, then, that all pleasure is bad? This *θέσις* has actually been maintained, so the refutation of it, though a digression, will not be misplaced.

H

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἁρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετήν, ἡρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἕκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός

οὐδὲ ἐῴκει
ἀνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάις ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῇ θηριώδει

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1. § 1. **ἄλλην...ἀρχήν.** Aristotle often speaks of 'making a fresh start' (*ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἄρχεσθαι, ποιεῖσθαι, λαβεῖν* Bon. Ind. 111 b, 35) to mark clearly that a new division of the subject is being approached.

περὶ τὰ ἤθη, i.q. *τῶν ἠθῶν*. Cf. Ind. s. v. *περί*.

ἡρωικήν...καὶ θείαν. The idea of superhuman goodness and wisdom originated among the mystics of the 6th century B.C. (Early Greek Philosophy, § 33). Plato in his later works, especially the Statesman, had speculated on the possibility of a divine ruler, and Aristotle held (Pol. 1332 b, 16) that *εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν τοσοῦτον διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν...δῆλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι.* This would be the Rule of the Saints; and if there were one such transcendent man, we should have the *παμβασιλεία*.

Ὅμηρος. Il. xxiv, 258.

περὶ Ἕκτορος. Bywater writes *περὶ <τοῦ> Ἕκτορος* "in accordance with Fitzgerald's principle," to which this is the only apparent exception (Contr. p. 52).

§ 2. **ἐξ ἀνθρώπων...θεοί.** This idea was quite foreign to the primitive and popular religion of the Hellenes, and also had its origin in the 6th century mysticism. Rohde's 'Psyche' contains the best account of these beliefs.

ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον 3 ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του—"σεῖος ἀνήρ" φασιν—οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς διαθέσεως 4

ἀντιτιθεμένη. The use of this present participle (omitted in Bon. Ind.) where we should look for *ἀντικειμένη* can be paralleled from Plato Soph. 257 b *τῷ καλῷ ἀντιτιθέμενον*. It may be explained on the same principle as *ὁ καλούμενος* (=*κεκλημένος*) and the like.

ὥσπερ οὐδὲ...οὕτως οὐδὲ... For the repetition of *οὐδέ* in both clauses of the comparison, cf. the note on *καί* below. The idea that Man is intermediate between Beast and God is another survival of 6th century mysticism which strongly influenced both Plato and Aristotle. Cf. the well known passage Pol. 1253 a, 27 *ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.*

τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς. The best commentary is 1101 b, 18 sqq.

ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας, 'a different genus from badness.' Note the hyperbaton; *κακίας* is governed by *ἕτερον*, not by *γένος*.

§ 3. ἐπεὶ...καὶ...οὕτω καὶ... The repetition of *καί* in both clauses of a comparison is frequent in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 357 b, 24). For *οὕτως* after *ἐπεί* cf. Bon. Ind. 546 b, 22.

καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες. This is from Plato, Meno 99 d *καὶ αἵ γε γυναῖκες δήπου, ὦ Μένων, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας θείους καλοῦσι· καὶ οἱ Λάκωνες ὅταν τινὰ ἐγκωμιάζωσιν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, θεῖος (σεῖος* Casaubon) *ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος.* Bywater inserts *οἵ* before *ὅταν* and Susemihl (after Coraes) adds *οὗτος* from Plato after *φασίν*. Both corrections are of the probable kind, but Aristotle is very abrupt in his way of quoting. It is characteristic that the old Homeric way of speaking should survive on the lips of women and in aristocratic Sparta. In democratic Athens *θεῖος* was ironical. Cf. Blass in Müller's Handbuch 1, p. 184.

διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις. For the meaning of *πήρωσις* ('stunted growth' or 'arrested development') in Aristotle's biology cf. 1099 b, 18 n. Bestiality is found in human beings who are either 'morbid' (*διὰ νόσους*) or *mangués* (*ἀτελεῖς*), Nature's failures.

καὶ τοὺς...δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is merely an illustrative remark; it does not give another species of bestiality.

ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. This seems to be a *ἅπαξ εἰρημένον*. The verb *δυσφημεῖν* means 'to give a bad name to,' to use the opposite of a 'euphemism' (*εὐφημία* has this sense already in Dem. F. L. §§ 48, 50), and the *ἐπι-* has the same force as in *ἐπικαλεῖν*. The meaning is that we sometimes call the extreme (*ὑπερβολή*) of human badness by a worse name than is really appropriate to it, the opposite exaggeration to the use of *θεῖος* for *σφόδρα ἀγαθός* (cf. *δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν*).

τῆς τοιαύτης ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μνείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἑκα- 1145 b
τέραν αὐτῶν ὑπολητέον, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηταί τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἱκανῶς.

6 Δοκεῖ δὴ ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς

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§ 4. εἴρηται πρότερον, i.e. in the discussion of *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*.

περὶ...ἕξεων...ἕτερον γένος. When *ὑπολαμβάνειν* is qualified by an adverb, it takes *περί c. gen.*, otherwise it takes a double accusative (Bon. Ind. 799 b, 50 sqq.). We may say either *ἕτερον γένος ὑπολητέον* or *ὡς περὶ ἑτέρου γένους ὑπολητέον*. Here we have a mixture of the two constructions. There is no difficulty in the singular **ἑκατέραν,** for *μαλακία καὶ τρυφή* are subordinate to *ἀκρασία*, *καρτερία* to *ἐγκράτεια*. The point is that *ἀκρασία* and *κακία* (*μοχθηρία*), *ἐγκράτεια* and *ἀρετή*, which are all specifically human, differ *εἴδει* only; not *γένει*, as divine goodness and bestiality differ from them (1145 a, 27).

§ 5. δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. A brief sketch of the dialectical method follows, cf. Introd. § 25. Here **τὰ φαινόμενα** are equivalent to **τὰ ἔνδοξα** below (cf. An. Pr. 24 b, 11 *λῆψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου*), though properly speaking the term has a wider sense. Not all *φαινόμενα* are *ἔνδοξα*, but only *τὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς* and *τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς φαινόμενα*.

ταῦτα τὰ πάθη. The word *πάθος* is loosely used here of all states of soul as in De An. i, 1. Really they are *ἕξεις*.

τὰ δυσχερῆ are identical with *αἱ ἀπορίαι*, cf. Phys. 225 a, 30 *ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει δυσχερῆ*. Elsewhere they are called *δυσκολίαι* as in Phys. 211 a, 7 *δεῖ δὲ πειρᾶσθαι τὴν σκέψιν οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι,...ὥστε τά τε ἀπορούμενα λύεσθαι καὶ (ὅπως) τὰ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν...ὑπάρχοντα ἔσται, καὶ ἔτι τὸ τῆς δυσκολίας αἴτιον* (cf. 1154 a, 23 *τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους*) *καὶ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἔσται φανερόν.*

§ 6. Δοκεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ. A string of *δοκοῦντα* follows.

ἥ τε ἐγκράτεια...τῶν σπουδαίων κ.τ.λ. This needs no illustration. Though obvious, it is not, however, stated for nothing. We shall see that several of the *ἀπορίαι* arise from an apparent contradiction between this and other *δοκοῦντα*.

ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ. [Plato], Def. 567 b *ἐγκράτεια...ἀκολούθησις τῷ ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ· δύναμις ἀνυπέρβλητος τοῦ ὑπολειφθέντος ὀρθῷ λογισμῷ.* ib. 415 d *ἐγκρατὴς ὁ κρατῶν ἀντιτεινόντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων τῷ ὀρθῷ*

τῷ λογισμῷ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. καὶ τὸν σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἑτέρους εἶναί φασιν. τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον ὁτὲ μὲν οὔ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὁτὲ δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν. 7

II. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεταί τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὔ φασί τινες οἷόν τε εἶναι· δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ 2 τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας— ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἴεταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει 3 γενέσθαι, φανερόν. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ' οὔ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης μηθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμο-

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λογισμῷ, 416 a ἀκρασία ἕξις βιαστικὴ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λογισμὸν πρὸς τὰ δοκοῦντα ἡδέα εἶναι. We are here, then, on Academic ground. Cf. also Isokr. περὶ ἀντιδ. § 221 ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὰς ἀκρασίας οὐκ ἐμμένουσι τοῖς λογισμοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσαντες τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὁρμῶσιν.

ἐκστατικός in this sense comes from ἐξίστασθαι used as we find it in Thuc. ii, 61 ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι (sc. τῇ γνώμῃ) καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι. So Rhet. ad Alex. 1429 a, 16 τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάθη, δι' ὧν ἐξιστάμεθα τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα. This is really implied in the phrases αὐτοῦ κρατεῖν, κρείττων εἶναι (ἡττᾶσθαι, ἥττων εἶναι); for they imply a struggle in which our 'better knowledge' is victorious or vanquished. It is then the proper etymological sense of the word.

καὶ τὸν σώφρονα κ.τ.λ. In the σώφρων and the ἀκόλαστος there is properly speaking no struggle; the one is bad as the other is good, without an effort. But common language often used the word promiscuously **(συγκεχυμένως)**. Even Plato does so, cf. e.g. Rep. 430 e κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡδονῶν τινων καὶ λυπῶν ἐγκράτεια.

πάντα σώφρονα, 'in all respects σώφρων,' 'in full possession of σωφροσύνη,' for ἐγκράτεια might be regarded as partial σωφροσύνη.

§ 7. **τὸν δὲ φρόνιμον κ.τ.λ.** We get a hint of the λύσις from the addition of the words **καὶ δεινούς** (cf. 1144 a, 27).

ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς κ.τ.λ. We find ἀκρατεῖς θυμοῦ in Plato, Laws 869 a, and Isokrates, Demon. § 21, speaks of ἐγκράτεια...κέρδους, ὀργῆς. In fact, ἀκρατής may be used wherever ἥττων εἶναι, *c. gen.*, 'to have a weakness for,' 'to be incapable of resisting' may be used. Cf. e.g. ἥττων τοῦ γελοίου 1128 a, 34.

II. § 1. **Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.** This ἀπορία relates to the ἔνδοξον that ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει.

ὑπολαμβάνων. This word is substituted for εἰδώς because it will cover φρόνησις, ἐπιστήμη and δόξα, all of which are discussed in the present passage.

ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first form of ὑπόληψις, ἐπιστήμη.

ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης. This is from Plato Protag. 352 b δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι· οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης, οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου περιελκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. This passage compared with 1147 b, 16 sufficiently justifies the K^b reading **αὐτήν** (αὐτόν vulg.) in the next line.

Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 4 προσερωτώμενος δὲ εἰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους μὲν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, ποιοῦντας δὲ τἀναντία, σοφούς τε καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς εἶναι νομίζοι, Οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἢ ἀσόφους τε καὶ ἀκρατεῖς· πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἃ ἂν οἴωνται συμφορώτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν.

ὑπολαμβάνοντα, sc. πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, a characteristic brachylogy.

§ 2. ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις. It thus becomes a θέσις (cf. 1096 a, 2 n.), but the celebrity of Sokrates still makes it necessary for us to discuss the πρόβλημα it involves. But for this we might let it alone; τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φροντίζειν εὔηθες (Top. 104 b, 23). For the phraseology cf. Phys. 253 b, 29 τὸ φάναι συνεχῶς ἀλλοιοῦσθαι λίαν ἐστὶ τοῖς φανεροῖς ἀμφισβητεῖν. 254 a, 8 μάχεται τοῖς φανεροῖς ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, Met. 1091 a, 6 μάχεται...τοῖς εὐλόγοις.

δέον can hardly stand for δέον ἐστί, cf. 1107 a, 32 n. Bonitz, therefore, deletes **καί**, taking δέον as accusative absolute, while Bywater suggests the transposition of **γίνεται** from the next clause where it is not really wanted. I suspect, however, that Aristotle really meant to say δέον ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ., λίαν ἁπλῶς ἔλεγεν, or something of the sort, but that the sentence was never finished owing to the parenthesis ὅτι...φανερόν.

τίς ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ., equivalent to πῶς ἀγνοῶν ἀκρατεύεταί τις. Cf. Gen. An. 740 b, 22 τὸν δὲ τρόπον λέγω τὸ ὡς καὶ ὅτε. Sokrates went wrong, then, because he spoke λίαν ἁπλῶς (cf. Bon. Ind. 77 b, 5).

οὐκ οἴεταί γε, sc. δεῖν πράττειν ἃ πράττει, cf. 1136 b, 8 ὅ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἃ οἴεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. The logic of the sentence requires οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ, but the phrase οἴεται δεῖν was so common in the discussion of this subject that it easily slips in, even in an elliptical form. Cf. also 1152 a, 5.

§ 3. **εἰσὶ δέ τινες κ.τ.λ.** The notes will show that these are Plato's followers rather than Plato himself.

λογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μηθένα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασιν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴγε δόξα καὶ μὴ ἐπιστήμη, μηδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα ἀλλ' ἠρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι, συγγνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. φρονήσεως ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης; αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἷς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἑκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις

παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον. The aorist participle has its full temporal force. It would not be admitted that a man could act *παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν βέλτιον*.

§ 4. **ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις...ἠρεμαία.** It is certainly not an adequate account of Plato's distinction between *ἐπιστήμη* and *δόξα* to say that the one is 'strong' and the other 'mild.' The present discussion will therefore be unintelligible unless we suppose that the Academy had already come to make this purely psychological distinction between them. But there is, fortunately, sufficient evidence to justify us in saying that the Academy did now regard *ἐπιστήμη* as differing from *δόξα* mainly in the strength of the *πίστις* which it implies, and its consequent power of resistance. Cf. [Plato] Def. 414 b *ἐπιστήμη ὑπόληψις ψυχῆς ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου*,—*δόξα ὑπόληψις μετάπειστος ὑπὸ λόγου*, definitions of which the authenticity is guaranteed by Ar. Top. 139 b, 32 *οἷον εἰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀμετάπτωτον εἴρηκεν*, 130 b, 16 (*et passim*) *ὁ θεὶς ἐπιστήμης ἴδιον ὑπόληψιν ἀμετάπειστον ὑπὸ λόγου*. Now in Top. 126 b, 15 Aristotle criticises a definition of *πίστις* as *σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως* and, since *ἠρέμα* is the opposite of *σφόδρα*, a *ὑπόληψις εὐμετάπειστος* (i.e. deficient in *πίστις*) will be an *ἠρεμαία ὑπόληψις*.

ἡ ἀντιτείνουσα, a Platonic word, cf. 1102 b, 18 n. and the Academic definition of the *ἐγκρατής* given above 1145 b, 10 n.

ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσι. This confirms the view that the Academy distinguished *δόξα* from *ἐπιστήμη* by the absence of *πίστις*, which is defined as [Plat.] Def. 412 a *ὑπόληψις ὀρθὴ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς αὐτῷ φαίνεται*.

ἐν αὐταῖς, sc. *τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει*.

τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ. This word usually means *ἀκολασία* as opposed to *ἀκρασία*, hence the addition of the words **οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ.**

§ 5. **φρονήσεως ἄρα κ.τ.λ.** This must depend on the *διαίρεσις* which is given in De An. 427 b, 24 *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων*. We have seen *φρόνησις* called a *ὑπόληψις* above, 1142 b, 33. This leads us to the *ἀπορία* raised by the contradictory *δοκοῦντα* that the *φρόνιμος* cannot be *ἀκρατής* and that some *φρόνιμοι* are *ἀκρατεῖς*.

ἰσχυρότατον. Cf. EE. 1246 b, 34 *ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως*.

δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος (τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις) καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς.

6 Ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατὴς σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρησταὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἡ κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαῖον· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι, οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐδὲν μέγα.

7 Ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ πάσης δόξης ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτόλεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπείσθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.

8 Ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος [ψευδόμενος] ἀπορία—διὰ γὰρ

δέδεικται πρότερον, 1141 b, 14 sqq. 1142 a, 23 sqq. 1144 b, 30 sqq.

§ 6. **Ἔτι εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ.** The *ἀπορίαι* raised by the contradiction between the *ἔνδοξα* that *ἐγκράτεια* is good, and that the *ἐγκρατής* is the *σώφρων*.

ἐν τῷ...ἔχειν. Cf. Pol. 1255 b, 31 *ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους*, 'what makes a master a master is not owning slaves.'

τὸ ἄγαν, sc. *ἐπιθυμεῖν*. This is substituted for *τὸ ἰσχυρὰς ἔχειν*, probably from a reminiscence of *τὸ Χιλώνειον, μηδὲν ἄγαν*.

ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε, sc. *ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν φαύλας καὶ ἰσχυρὰς τὸν ἐγκρατῆ*. Otherwise *ἐγκράτεια* would not be *τῶν σπουδαίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν* (1145 b, 8).

οὐ πᾶσα. This is all that is required for the *ἀνασκευή* of a universal affirmative *πρότασις*.

§ 7. **Ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ κ.τ.λ.** This *ἀπορία* arises from the contradiction between *ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῶν σπουδαίων* and *ὁ ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ* and of their respective *ἀντιθέσεις*.

ἐκστατικόν, sc. *ποιεῖ*.

ἔσται τις. This is all that is required for the *ἀνασκευή* of the universal affirmative *πρότασις*, *ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν*.

ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ. "But Odysseus knew that Philoctetes would not listen to him, and would be too proud to return after such treatment. Therefore he had recourse to guile, and persuaded Neoptolemus to second him by false pretences. The interest of the drama lies in the gradual effect produced upon the heart of the boy by the sufferings of Philoctetes, by his frank belief in the fictitious tale, by his open-hearted friendship, and by his unbounded trust in one who is deceiving him; until at length, in spite of the strongest motives, it becomes a moral impossibility for Neoptolemus to persevere in his attempt." L. Campbell.

§ 8. **Ἔτι κ.τ.λ.** This *ἀπορία* results from an artificial contradiction between the views that the *ἀκρατής* acts *εἰδὼς* (or *ὑπολαμβάνων*) *ὅτι φαῦλα* and the view that *ἡ ἀκρασία τῶν φαύλων καὶ ψεκτῶν*.

τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ὦσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπεranθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον—συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκρασίας ἀρετή· τἀναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τἀγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τἀγαθὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ πράξει. 9

Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν· εὐιατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἄν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ᾗ φαμεν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ 10

ψευδόμενος was rightly bracketed by Coraes as a mere dittography of *ψευδόμενος* above. There can be no reference to the *Mentiens* of Eubulides (Ritter and Preller § 233). "What follows this is a digression suggested by the word *ἀπορία*." Bywater, Contr. p. 53.

παράδοξα ... ἐλέγχειν. We must take *παράδοξα* as internal accusative. They desire to frame *σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι* of a paradoxical kind, i.e. opposed to *τὰ ἔνδοξα*. An *ἔλεγχος* is a *συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως*, i.e. a syllogistic proof of the contradictory, in the present case the contradictory of our *ἔνδοξα*. Note the word **βούλεσθαι**, it is the *προαίρεσις* and not the *δύναμις* that makes the sophist. Cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν, 'when they succeed,' does not seem very pointed. Should we not read *ἐντύχωσιν*? The proper word for a dialectical 'encounter' is *ἔντευξις*, cf. Top. 101 a, 27 *(ἡ διαλεκτικὴ χρήσιμος) πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις*.

δέδεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 995 a, 31 *ᾗ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ (ἡ διάνοια), ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν*. This is still a note explaining the meaning of *ἀπορία* and *λύσις*.

§ 9. **ἀφροσύνη μετ' ἀκρασίας ἀρετή**. In the Topics (150 b, 27 sqq.) Aristotle discusses at length this type of definition, which he calls *τόδε μετὰ τοῦδε*. The example there given is that of *ἀνδρεία* as *τόλμα μετὰ διανοίας ὀρθῆς*. It is worth noting that there are two or three definitions of this type in the Platonic *Ὅροι*. So 411, e *χρηστότης ἤθους ἁπλαστία μετ' εὐλογιστίας*, ib. *φιλανθρωπία...μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας*.

ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., sc. *διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην*.

§ 10. **Ἔτι κ.τ.λ.** This *ἀπορία* arises from the contradiction between the identification of the *ἀκρατής* with the *ἀκόλαστος* and the view that the *ἀκρατής* acts *διὰ πάθος, παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν*.

τῷ πεπεῖσθαι, 'from conviction' (*πίστις*).

τῇ παροιμίᾳ. This proverb does not seem to be found elsewhere, but its application is obvious. You cannot cure the *ἀκρατής* by giving him

πυίγῃ, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἃ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ [πεπεισμένος] οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄλλα πράττει. 1146 b

Ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἁπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φαμὲν δ' εἶναί τινας ἁπλῶς. 5

Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν.

III. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες· εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περί τινας ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ 10

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right conviction, for he has it already.

ἐπέπειστο, sc. *δεῖν πραττεῖν*. Bekker reads *μὴ ἐπέπειστο* with L^b, but see next note.

πεπεισμένος ..ἄλλα πράττει. Ramsauer adds *ἄλλα* before *πεπεισμένος*, a conjecture adopted by Bywater, who brackets *ἄλλα* before *πράττει*, thus making the corruption, if there is one, a simple transposition. The Versio has *non suasus, οὐ πεπεισμένος*. I think it simpler to bracket *πεπεισμένος*. The meaning is sufficiently given by *νῦν δέ*, 'as it is.'

§ 11. **Ἔτι εἰ κ.τ.λ.** The *ἀπορία* raised by the use of expressions like *ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ, τιμῆς, κέρδους*.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We do, as a matter of fact, speak of *ἀκρατεῖς* without any qualifying restriction (*ἁπλῶς*). As we cannot mean by this *ἀκρατεῖς πάντων*, there must be a proper application of the word to a special class of objects.

§ 12. **τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν κ.τ.λ.** The meaning is more fully expressed above 1145 b, 6. The *λύσις* of the *ἀπορίαι* will leave us with the *ἔνδοξα* stripped of their difficulties.

III. § 1. **Πρῶτον μὲν...εἶτα....** This section gives the two divisions of the following discussion. The *first* is the discussion of the question **πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες** (cf. 1145 b, 29 *τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀγνοίας*). This extends from 1146 b, 24 to 1147 b, 19. The *second* is the discussion **περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ...θετέον κ.τ.λ.** with a number of kindred questions (**ὅσα συγγενῆ**). This extends from 1147 b, 20 to 1152 a, 36. It is important to observe that the twofold character of this division is clearly marked by the language, see next note.

§ 2. **ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ.** This has been regarded as a duplicate of the preceding section, and it has been said that it outlines a discussion which does not exist. This view overlooks the fact of the twofold division made in the last section and the natural reference of this section to

τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφοράν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατὴς ὁ ἀκρατής, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὥς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὔ. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ ἅπαντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἁπλῶς ἀκρατής, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἁπλῶς ἔχειν (ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὠδὶ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων ἀεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἡδὺ διώκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἴεται μέν, διώκει δέ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι 3
παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον 4

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the second part of it only (**εἶτα περὶ ποῖα κ.τ.λ.**). We have first to deal with the great *ἀπορία*, *πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ;* and then we can take all the rest together. As, however, they seem at first somewhat miscellaneous, it is important to find a 'starting-point for the discussion' (**ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως**), a point of vantage (*τόπος*) from which we can attack them all. This Aristotle finds in the fact that the states now under discussion are *ἕξεις* and must be discussed as such (see next note).

πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατὴς κ.τ.λ. We are already familiar from the discussion of the *ἀρεταί* with this division of the discussion into (1) *περὶ ποῖα;* and (2) *πῶς;* Cf. 1115 a, 5 n. We know that it is the proper way to discuss any *ἕξις*. I have retained the MS. reading **τῷ πῶς** (Bywater writes *τῷ ὥς*) because I hold that the word to be supplied is *ἔχειν*, and that *τῷ ὡς* (sc. *εἶναι*) below is different. The ellipse of *ἔχειν* with *πῶς* is common.

εἰσι...ἔχοντες. Cf. 1144 a, 32 *ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν.*

ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. If we find that the *διαφορά* of *ἀκρασία* is *τὸ πῶς ἔχειν* and not *τὸ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι*, we must still go on to ask the question *περὶ ποῖα*, since *ἀκρασία* has to be differentiated, not only from *ἀκολασία*, but from other *ψεκτά*. The answer to the question is indicated at once. It differs from *ἀκολασία τῷ πῶς*, i.e. by the absence of *προαίρεσις*, and from other bad *ἕξεις* by being limited to the same objects as *ἀκολασία*.

§ 3. **Περὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** We now begin the discussion of the first main point, *πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὔ*. But first we must clear the ground by finding the *λύσις* of the *ἀπορία* about *δόξα* given 1145 b, 36. It is not true to say that *δόξα* is an *ἠρεμαία ὑπόληψις*, and so the substitution of *δόξα* for *ἐπιστήμη* makes no difference. Observe that Aristotle himself would not call it *ἐπιστήμη*, but he is here adopting the Academic standpoint for the sake of argument.

οὐ διστάζουσιν, cf. 1146 a, 1 *καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διστάζουσιν.*

§ 4. **εἰ οὖν...πράξουσιν.** Note the future, 'If we are going to say

τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἧττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται· δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. 30
5 Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν [τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα]· τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. 35
6 Ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφο- 1147 a

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that it is from the mildness of their conviction that they act etc.'

οὐθὲν διοίσει κ.τ.λ. 'we shall find (by appealing to experience) that *ἐπιστήμη* is no better than *δόξα* in respect of *πίστις* (*σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως*).' It is important to notice that *διοίσει* here means 'will surpass.'

δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. One negative instance is enough for the *ἀνασκευή* of the definition *ἡ δόξα ἠρεμαία ὑπόληψις*. The Academy will not say that Herakleitos had *ἐπιστήμη*, and yet he had 'conviction' (*πίστις σφοδρότης ὑπολήψεως*) in the highest degree. For the oracular style of Herakleitos, see my Early Greek Philosophy p. 131.

§ 5. **Ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.** These words introduce the first of four distinct *λύσεις* joined to each other by *ἔτι* as usual. The first three are dialectical and based upon the theory of 'potential knowledge' which was first worked out by Plato in the Theaitetos. The fourth is the real *λύσις* and is of a strictly psychological character. We need not expect to find the three first quite consistent with each other or with the fourth. Aristotle is only concerned in the first instance to show the Academy how they may keep to *ἐπιστήμη* and yet account for *ἀκρασία* on their own principles. If we compare the successive *λύσεις* with the successive definitions of Knowledge in the Theaitetos, we shall see how fundamental and essential a thing *τὸ διαλέγεσθαι* is in Greek philosophy.

ἔχων...χρώμενος. The distinction between knowledge potential and actual originates in the Theaitetos, 197 b sqq., where, however, *ἔχειν* is equivalent to *χρῆσθαι* here, and what is here called *ἔχειν* is called *κτᾶσθαι*. For the opposition of *χρῆσις* (=*ἐνέργεια*) to *ἕξις*, cf. 1098 b, 33 n. We very commonly find *τὸ θεωρεῖν* described as the *ἐνέργεια* of *ἐπιστήμη*, as in the present passage. Cf. Phys. 255 b, 2 *ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων*. Met. 1048 a, 32 *λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει...ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἐὰν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρεῖν*. de An. 412 a, 22 *λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δὲ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν*.

τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 6. **Ἔτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.** The second *λύσις* goes a little deeper. A man may know the major premiss actually and the minor premiss only potentially. For the two kinds of *προτάσεις* see 1143 b, 3 n. It is no valid objection to Aristotle's argument here to say that in the case supposed the act would be *ἀκούσιον*. We are only considering whether it is *possible* to act *παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην*, not whether we are *responsible* for it if we do.

τέρας οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατά τε δὴ τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μηδὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ θαυμαστόν.

7 Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν

πρακτὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The particular makes its first appearance in the minor premiss; acts are necessarily particular, and therefore there can be no act unless the minor premiss is actual.

διαφέρει...τὸ καθόλου. By *τὸ καθόλου* (not *ἡ καθόλου*) is meant the universal which forms the middle term. The general rule *παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά* contains two universals and therefore requires two minor premisses to connect it with a particular agent and a particular act. The first of these takes as middle term the universal which is predicated of the agent (*ἐφ' αὑτοῦ*). This minor premiss is obvious and does not detain us, cf. de Mot. An. 701 a, 25 *ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δήλην οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει.* But the other universal (*τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος*) is of a different character. Ἐπιστήμη takes us no further than *ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε*, and this can yield only the conclusion *ἐμοὶ συμφέρει τὸ τοιόνδε*, not an act. We are in that case left in the position of the doctor who only knows that light food is digestible without knowing what food is light (1141 b, 19 n.). This is a case, then, when a man acts wrongly, though he has *ἐπιστήμη* of what is right. Of course Aristotle himself would say such an act was *ἀκούσιον* and not *ἀκρασία*, but that is not the question at present. We are only showing how it is possible to act *παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην*, and *ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε* is *ἐπιστήμη* while *τόδε τοιόνδε* is not. Even if the man does 'use' the minor premiss, that will not be enough to make him act rightly.

ἢ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'or (the universal may be predicated of the thing, e.g.) *ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε*.' This is, of course, a *minor* premiss. The conjunction *ἢ* introduces the other species of *καθόλου*.

εἰδέναι, sc. *τὸν ἀκρατῆ*.

§ 7. **Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.** The *third* λύσις, which goes a little deeper by recognising two kinds of potential knowledge. When we say a man has knowledge potentially we may mean either that he 'has' it but does not 'use' it, or merely that he is capable of having it (as *δεκτικὸν ἐπιστήμης*) but does not actually 'have' it at the time. This distinction is best brought out in Gen. An. 735 a, 9 *ἐγγυτέρω δὲ καὶ πορρωτέρω (τῆς ἐνεργείας) αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι δυνάμει, ὥσπερ ὁ καθεύδων γεωμέτρης ἐγρηγορότος πορρωτέρω, καὶ οὗτος τοῦ θεωροῦντος.* The case considered in this section is parallel to that of 'the sleeping geometer' (cf. *οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα*), that considered in the two preceding sections was that of

ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι δὲ διαφέρουσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἕξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινόμενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἵ γε ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν 8 λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μανθάνοντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὔπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τοῦτο δὲ χρόνου δεῖται· ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑπολεπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους.

9 Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἄν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. ἡ

the geometer *ἐγρηγορὼς μὲν μὴ θεωρῶν δέ*. Cf. also above 1098 b, 33.

καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν. Cf. Mot. An. 701 b, 29 *ὅταν γένηται ἀλλοίωσις περὶ τὴν καρδίαν,...πολλὴν ποιεῖ τοῦ σώματος διαφορὰν ἐρυθήμασι καὶ ὠχρότησι καὶ φρίκαις καὶ τρόμοις καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἐναντίοις.* This brings us to the verge of Aristotle's own physiological λύσις. See the whole passage in App. B.

§ 8. **οὐδὲν σημεῖον**, sc. *τοῦ ἔχειν* (in the sense previously given to the word). Τὰ *ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως* are generally speaking *σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεως*, but the *ἕξις* may be a *mere δύναμις*. The geometer may be talking in his sleep. The **ἀποδείξεις** here mentioned are probably to be understood as geometrical; for Aristotle cannot mean us to take the word with Ἐμπεδοκλέους. The **ἔπη Ἐμπεδοκλέους** are just about the last thing Aristotle would call *ἀποδείξεις*.

καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μανθάνοντες κ.τ.λ. This is another way in which Aristotle more than once describes *merely* potential knowledge. Cf. Phys. 255 a, 33 *ἔστι δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως ὁ μανθάνων ἐπιστήμων καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ θεωρῶν ...ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων πως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν*, de An. 429 b, 8 *δυνάμει πως* (sc. *ἐπιστήμων*), *οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν*. Thurot's conjecture *μανθάνοντες* for *μαθόντες* seems to me certain. We can hardly identify *οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες* with *οἱ μανθάνοντες πρὶν μαθεῖν*.

τοῦτο...δεῖται. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 55.

§ 9. **Ἔτι καὶ ὧδε κ.τ.λ.** The *fourth* and real λύσις. We now drop 'potential knowledge' altogether, and the explanation is in perfect harmony with that given in the de Mot. An. (cf. App. B). It should be observed, however, that the three previous λύσεις, though provisional, have gradually prepared us for this one.

φυσικῶς. This word alone implies that the preceding λύσεις are διαλεκτικώτεραι. To consider a thing *φυσικῶς* is to consider it in the light of its *οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί*, i.e. of *φυσικαὶ προτάσεις* (Top. 105 b, 21), in the

25 μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία· ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν ἔνθα μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχήν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἷον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος

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present case, of course, from a psychological point of view. Hence φυσικῶς is regularly opposed to λογικῶς (= διαλεκτικῶς). Cf. Phys. 204 b, 4 λογικῶς μὲν οὖν σκοπουμένοις ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε δόξειεν ἂν οὐκ εἶναι (τὸ ἄπειρον)...b, 10 φυσικῶς δὲ μᾶλλον θεωροῦσιν ἐκ τῶνδε. Gen. Corr. 316 a, 10 ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες.

ἡ...καθόλου, sc. πρότασις. The major premiss is not ἐπιστήμη, but the other form of ὑπόληψις called δόξα, which is περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, and may be true or false. We have seen already, however, that this does not imply that it is a mere ἠρεμαία ὑπόληψις.

ἡ δ' ἑτέρα, sc. πρότασις, cf. 1143 b, 3 n. In a real practical syllogism, the minor premiss cannot be of the form ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε, which is all that ἐπιστήμη could give us. It must be of the form ξηρὸν τόδε, and that is a matter for αἴσθησις.

ἔνθα μέν, i.e. ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς προτάσεσιν.

ἐν ταῖς ποιητικαῖς. The simplest way of taking this is to supply προτάσεσι as above (προτάσεις are the subject of the sentence) and to translate 'in the case of practical premisses,' cf. de Mot. An. 701 a, 23 αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαί κ.τ.λ. There might, of course, be θεωρητικαὶ προτάσεις, the major a δόξα such as 'The east wind brings rain,' and the minor an αἴσθησις, 'The wind is in the east.' The conclusion is 'It will rain.' Or we may have 'It is bad for a man to get wet,' 'It is raining,' the conclusion of which is that I put on my cloak.

εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος κ.τ.λ. This is an illustration of a case where there is no impediment or conflict. We have a practical major premiss **παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ**. As a δόξα, this may be true or false, but it is a universal imperative, just as much as παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά. We have to ask, then, (1) whence it derives its universality, (2) whence it derives its epitactic form. Its universality must be due, as universality always is, to the action of νοῦς. It is νοῦς that generalises particular desires for sweet wine into the universal proposition (καθόλου δόξα, λόγος) **πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ**. It makes explicit the universal implicit in particular ὀρέξεις exactly in the same way as it makes explicit the universal implicit in particular αἰσθήσεις. But this is not all. The verb **δεῖ** means ἀγαθόν ἐστι, and the epitactic character of the proposition can only be due to its presentation by νοῦς (or φαντασία) to βούλησις as its ὀρεκτόν. This further implies that the person who has such a major premiss is one whose φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν is **τὸ ἡδύ**. In other words, this is the major premiss of ἀκολασία. If this καθόλου δόξα is in the soul, and a minor premiss **τουτὶ δὲ ἡδύ** is supplied by αἴσθησις, the act of tasting necessarily follows as a conclusion. We see, then, that a bad act may be produced by a practical syllogism as well as a good one. The problem of ἀκρασία therefore assumes this form: 'Is it possible for a syllogism the conclusion of which is a bad act to exist side by side with the knowledge of the major premiss or

γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἕν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, 30
ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ
10 πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῇ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι,
ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ),
τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ'
ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· 35
ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ **1147** b

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practical principle which that act violates?'

§ **10. ὅταν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The answer to the problem proposed at the end of the last note is that it is impossible if the major premiss of the bad act and the major premiss which it violates are contradictory. No one can have in his soul at one and the same time the propositions παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ and οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα. If, then, the latter is present, the possibility of the bad act will depend upon whether it can result from some other major premiss. Now the premiss **πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ** is not *per se* contradictory to οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα, so they may quite well coexist. The only question, then, is whether the bad act can follow from πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ as well as from παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ.

αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ, in the sense explained by the *third* λύσις. The ἐνέργεια is really that of ἐπιθυμία, as we shall see.

τύχῃ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, 'and when desire (for pleasure) is present at the time,' not βούλησις or ὄρεξις τἀγαθοῦ. It all depends, then, on the state of ὄρεξις at the moment.

ἡ μὲν...λέγει φεύγειν. The syllogism οὐ συμφέρει τὰ γλυκέα, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ, οὐ συμφέρει τουτί may even be completed; but, in the absence of any ὄρεξις to which it can present itself, nothing happens. For διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ.

ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει. The presence of ἐπιθυμία is enough to replace the absence of the epitactic element in πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ. The way in which this happens is explained in de Mot. An. 701 a, 31 (App. B) ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἡ τῆς ὀρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. In itself (**καθ' αὑτό**) πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ, τουτὶ ἡδύ is quite compatible with the other syllogism; but for ἐπιθυμία it has a different meaning. The object of ἐπιθυμία is just τὸ ἡδύ and so it moves it at once. As it is put in the de Mot. An. (loc. cit.), "Ποτέον μοι, says desire. Τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, says αἴσθησις or φαντασία or νοῦς. Εὐθὺς πίνει."

κινεῖν γὰρ δύναται. As an ὄρεξις (which is κινούμενον καὶ κινοῦν) it can set in motion the body (which is κινούμενον and not κινοῦν). This does not mean, of course, that ἐπιθυμία has this power more than any other form of ὄρεξις. The point is that νοῦς cannot move the body except through ὄρεξις. A judgment that something is good cannot move the body unless βούλησις τἀγαθοῦ is present, but the case supposed is one where ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος occupies the soul.

ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης. This is really Aristotle's great contribution to moral psychology. There is an intellectual element in badness as well as in goodness. The bad man and the morally weak man have major premisses as well as the good. The bad man has only one major premiss which is the contradictory of the good man's. The morally weak man has

ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὑτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός—ἡ γὰρ 11
ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα—τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου
ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.

Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ 12
ἀκρατής, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδον-
τος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιο-
λόγων ἀκούειν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ 13

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two. These cannot be contradictory in themselves (**καθ' αὑτό**), but only **κατὰ συμβεβηκός**, i.e. *ᾗ συμβαίνει τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐπιθυμητῷ εἶναι.*

§ 11. **καὶ διὰ τοῦτο.** We have seen already that the lower animals are incapable of goodness or badness just because they have not *νοῦς* (1139 a, 20). They cannot get beyond an image in the soul of something once felt as sweet (*φαντασία*) or an association of something now perceived with such an image (*μνήμη*). Memory is not an intellectual act, but belongs to the same 'part' of the soul as Imagination (*φαντασία*), i.e. the *πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων* (sc. *ὅσα χρόνου αἰσθάνεται*), *καὶ οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ φρόνησιν* (de Mem. 449 b, 1—450 a, 22). The *ὀρεκτόν* can only move the lower animals *τῷ φαντασθῆναι*, not *τῷ νοηθῆναι.*

§ 12. **Πῶς δὲ λύεται κ.τ.λ.** This is put in the popular form as the word **ἄγνοια** shows. The meaning must be 'How does *ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος* give place to *βούλησις τἀγαθοῦ*?' For an explanation we are referred to 'the physiologists' and their account of drunkenness and sleep. The drunken man who recites Empedokles gets sober; the sleeping geometer wakes. This is how Aristotle dismisses a question which is *φυσικώτερον* and goes beyond *πολιτική*. To us, of course, it is just the fundamental question; for the answer to it must explain why the ordinary man who is neither good nor bad sometimes does right and sometimes wrong. Now, if we take Aristotle's hint and go to the de Somno for an explanation, we find that the alternation of sleeping and waking is due to the fact that no animal is able *συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν*. Physiologically speaking, what happens is that the warm *ἀναθυμίασις* from food rises into the head, which it therefore makes heavy. It is then cooled in the brain, whence it returns to the heart. The consequent cooling of the heart produces unconsciousness; for the heart is the *πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν*. So too *μέθη* arises *τῶν ἄνω θερμανθέντων* (Probl. 843 a, 1). The analysis of pleasure will show us that *ἐπιθυμία* too has a physiological basis. It is caused by the pain produced by *ἔνδεια* and it ceases with the pleasure produced by *ἀναπλήρωσις*, both these being *σωματικά*. Cf. also Phys. 247 b, 13 sqq.

§ 13. **Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ κ.τ.λ.** This section is intended to bring out the truth underlying the paradox of Sokrates. I read *ταύτην <δ'>* with Ramsauer and make the apodosis go down to *ἔσχατον ὅρον*.

δόξα αἰσθητοῦ, 'a belief as to an object of perception.' The formula of the minor premiss (*τελευταία πρότασις*)

κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην <δ'> ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐν τῷ πάθει ὤν, 10
ἢ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ λέγειν
ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου
μηδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν
ἔσχατον ὅρον καὶ ἔοικεν ὃ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν· οὐ 14
γὰρ τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρούσης γίνεται 15
τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὕτη περιέλκεται διὰ τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς
αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα
ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

IV. Πότερον δ' ἐστί τις ἁπλῶς ἀκρατὴς ἢ πάντες κατὰ 20
μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποιά ἐστι, λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἰσὶν οἵ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρ-
τερικοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ 2

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is e.g. *τουτὶ γλυκύ* (1147 a, 29), and this differentiates it from the minor premiss of a scientific syllogism such as *ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε* (1147 a, 6).

ὡς οὐκ ἦν. For the imperfect cf. Ind. s.v. *ἦν*.

τὸν ἔσχατον ὅρον, i.e. the *τόδε* or *τουτί* which is *ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ὧν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία*. This is not *καθόλου* and therefore not *ἐπιστημονικόν*, for there can be no *ἐπιστήμη* of *τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*.

§ 14. **τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης**, '*ἐπιστήμη* in the proper sense,' all the terms of which are necessarily *καθόλου*.

παρούσης. The text is sufficiently guaranteed by *ἐνούσης* 1145 b, 23, which also settles the meaning here. Stewart's very ingenious *περιγίνεται τὸ πάθος* is quite unnecessary if the interpretation given above is correct. There can be no *κυρίως ἐπιστήμη* where the major premiss is given by *δόξα* and the minor by *αἴσθησις*.

ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, sc. *ἐπιστήμης*. This is a new name for the *αἴσθησις τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα* by which we apprehend the minor premiss *ἐγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε καὶ τόδε τοιόνδε*. The phrase is probably used with some reference to the *ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις* of Speusippos (cf. Ritter and Preller § 286). That was a doctrine intended to bridge over the gulf between the particular and the universal, much of the same nature as Aristotle's own doctrine that, though we only perceive a particular, yet it is only the universal element in it, the form, that really enters into perception.

IV. § 1. **Πότερον δ' ἐστί κ.τ.λ.** We now come to the second division **περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ θετέον** (1146 b, 9).

§ 2. **ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.**, 'whereas—.' The apodosis is not reached till 1147 b, 31 **τοὺς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** This is not meant to be a complete classification of the objects of desire, as we can see at once from the omission of pleasures intrinsically bad. It is only a preliminary statement as to two classes of pleasures, which is sufficient for the purpose immediately in hand, namely the ascertainment of the proper objects of *ἀκρασία* in its literal sense.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ' αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀναγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά—λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τά τε περὶ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ ἃ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην—τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐχί, αἱρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὑτά—λέγω δ' οἷον νίκην τιμὴν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων—τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἁπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστιθέντες δὲ [τὸ] χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, ὡς ἑτέρους καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ Ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ Ὀλύμπια νικῶν·

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα κ.τ.λ. The use of this name for the bodily pleasures arises from such phrases as *ἀναγκαία τροφή*. Plato, Rep. 558 a sqq., speaks in this sense of *ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιθυμίαι*, and in Phileb. 62 e *ἀναγκαῖαι ἡδοναί* are mentioned as a recognised class. The present classification is not, however, to be found in Plato.

αἱρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά. These will be the 'higher pleasures,' since *τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν* is always the best.

ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, 'but admitting of excess.' For this sense of *ἔχειν* cf. Ind. s.v. The excess of these pleasures will be *φευκτόν*, but only *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.

ἔθεμεν, 1117 b, 27 sqq.

τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς. It is necessary to add this; for, unless they had the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* 'in themselves,' there would be no *ὁμοιότης* or analogy between the *κατά τι ἀκρατεῖς* and the *ἁπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς*. The *ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ* etc. must have a true *δόξα* with regard to the object of *θυμός*, as well as a false one.

προστιθέντες...ἁπλῶς. For the opposition of *ἁπλῶς* to *κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*, cf. 1095 a, 2 n., and for the omission of *τό*, Bywater, Contr. p. 55. It enables us to take *προστιθέντες* as 'absolutely.'

καθ' ὁμοιότητα, cf. Ind. s.v. *ὁμοιότης*.

ὥσπερ Ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ. The imperfects **διέφερεν** and **ἦν** show that this refers to some previous *ἀκρόασις* or discussion (cf. Ind. s.v. *ἦν*). All the Greek commentators except Heliodoros tell us that there was an Olympic victor called *Ἄνθρωπος*, and this view goes back to no less an authority than Alexander, who says in his exegesis of the Topics (p. 114, 8 Wallies) *ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἴδιον ὄνομα τοῦτο τοῦ Ὀλυμπιονίκου πύκτου οὗ ἐν τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς μνημονεύει*. This statement is repeated by Alexander on other occasions (see the Index in Wallies) and has just received most remarkable confirmation from a statement made in an Oxyrhynchus papyrus communicated to the Classical Review for July 1899 by Messrs Grenfell and Hunt, "This is a fragment of a list of Olympian victors, written in the third century A.D., and referring, with some lacunae, to a period of about thirty years in the first half of the fifth century B.C. According to this list, the general trustworthiness of which is proved by its agreement with Pausanias and other authorities, the name of the winner of the boxing-match at Olympia in the year 456 B.C. was *Ἄνθρωπος*. It was doubtless on the evidence of a similar list that Alexander Aphrodisiensis made his statement that *Ἄνθρωπος* was a *πύκτης*." The meaning, then, is 'just as we saw that the Olympic victor was both *Ἄνθρωπος* and *an ἄνθρωπος*.' The **νικῶν** of K^b is much more idiomatic than the vulgate **νενικηκώς**.

ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τοῦ ἰδίου μικρὸν διέφερεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις ἢ ἁπλῶς οὖσα ἢ κατά τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐδείς. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σώφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν 1148 a

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ὁ κοινὸς λόγος. The definition of *ὁμώνυμα* is *ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον. τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἂν γάρ τις ἀποδιδῷ τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει.* In the present case if we give the *λόγος* corresponding to the *κοινὸν ὄνομα ἄνθρωπος*, namely *τί ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι*, it will not be quite the same as the *λόγος* corresponding to the *ἴδιον ὄνομα*, namely *τί ἐστιν αὐτῷ Ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι*. In the former case, if we adopt the Platonic method of definition, the *λόγος* will be *ζῷον θνητὸν ὑπόπουν δίπουν ἄπτερον*, in the latter we shall have to make a *πρόθεσις* such as *Ὀλυμπιονίκης πύκτης*. Note that all this is strictly Academic. It is really impossible to define the individual *Ἄνθρωπος*.

σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. The *σημεῖον* amounts to this, that *ἀκρασία*, whether it has to do with bodily pleasures *simpliciter* or with some particular bodily pleasures, belongs to the same *γένος* as *κακία* (cf. *οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος* 1145 b, 2), while *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* etc. belong to a different genus altogether, which is only called *κακία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, as we speak of a 'bad doctor' (1148 b, 7).

§ 3. περὶ ἃς λέγομεν κ.τ.λ. 1117 b, 28 sqq.

μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι. This gives us the differentia. It is quite consistent with the preceding account; for *προαίρεσις* implies *ὄρεξις τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ* (*βούλησις*) as well as *βούλευσις*, while *ἀκρασία* is caused by *ἐπιθυμία*, i.e. *ὄρεξις τοῦ φαινομένου ἡδέος*, and excludes *βούλευσις*.

καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, sc. *τὰς ὑπερβολάς*. It is only the *ὑπερβολή* of warmth (for instance) that causes pain, i.e. *τὸ μᾶλλον αἴσθησιν ἐμποιοῦν ἐν τῷ θιγγάνειν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐὰν μετὰ λύπης* (Part. An. 648 b, 15).

ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους. It has been argued that this is inconsistent with the doctrine of Book III that the pains shunned by the *ἀκόλαστος* (and therefore the *ἀκρατής*) are always those of unsatisfied pleasure, so that *τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή* (1118 b, 32). But, as a matter of fact, the pleasures of warmth and coolness are to Aristotle

περὶ ἁφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ μαλακοὶ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' εἰς ταὐτὸν τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σώφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκό-

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pleasures belonging to the sense of touch, and stand exactly on the same footing as the pleasures of nutrition and reproduction. To look at the matter *φυσικώτερον*, this is because *ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὕλη τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν* (Part. An. 646 a, 16). We find also that *τὸ θερμόν* has the most intimate connexion with *τροφή*, since digestion depends upon it. The pains of hunger, thirst, warmth and cold are therefore exactly the four we should expect to find mentioned. Another sure sign that *ἁλέαι* and *ψύχη* are pleasures of this class is that they are of those *ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ*. Even oysters and molluscs live at the mouths of rivers; for they seek *ἅμα τήν τ' ἁλέαν καὶ τὴν τροφήν* (Gen. An. 761 b, 7), and fish change about from the deep sea to the shore *φεύγοντες τὰς ὑπερβολὰς* (observe the phrase) *τοῦ ψύχους καὶ τῆς ἁλέας*. Lastly, it is only if we suppose that some warmth may be the object of *ἀκολασία*, that we can see any point in the exception of *θερμασία* produced by gymnastics (1118 b, 6). We may remember, too, that Philoxenos was *κάμινος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος*.

παρὰ...τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. contrary to the *λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά του* which *διάνοια* has affirmed in harmony with *βούλησις*.

κατὰ πρόσθεσιν...ἁπλῶς. Cf. Ind. s.vv.

καθάπερ ὀργῆς. Cf. Thuc. iii, 84, 2 *ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις...ἀσμένη ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὖσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου*.

§ 4. **σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We cannot say that this is inconsistent with the account of *μαλακία* given later, as it merely states a fact of language which Aristotle regarded as significant. And it surely is a fact that the word *μαλακία* is not used of the *ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ* etc. See Stewart's note.

εἰς ταὐτὸν...τίθεμεν. The phrase *εἰς γένος* (*ἐν γένει*) *τιθέναι* is frequent, especially in the Topics.

οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται. The question has been raised how the *ἀκόλαστος* can have *προαίρεσις* since his aim is the pleasure of the moment. The answer is that *προαίρεσις* is not necessarily a *σπουδαία προαίρεσις*, and the object of *βούλησις* is *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, which is only the true good to the good man. The difference between the *ἀκρατής* and the *ἀκόλαστος* is just this, that to the former pleasure appears in its true character, simply as the object of *ἐπιθυμία*, while to the latter the pursuit of pleasure presents itself as *τὸ ἀγαθόν*, the object of *βούλησις*. The major premiss *παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ*, which is that of the *ἀκόλαστος*, is equivalent to *πᾶν*

λαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι <τῶν> τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων—τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἱρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον—οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμή, πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν (διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ

γλυκὺ ἀγαθόν, not to *πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ*.

διὸ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Stewart is plainly right in taking *μᾶλλον* with *ἂν εἴποιμεν* and not with *ἀκόλαστον*. There is no question of degrees of *ἀκολασία*. Tr. 'we should rather give the name of *ἀκόλαστος* to the man who etc.' By **τοῦτον ὅστις κ.τ.λ.** is meant some one of whom we are in doubt whether he is *ἀκρατὴς* or *ἀκόλαστος*, and whom we decide to be only *ἀκρατής*. It is surely impossible to mistake the profound psychology of making the *ἀκόλαστος* a man of mild desires. With him pleasure has become the object of *βούλησις*, the *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, and he pursues it as a 'cool sensualist.'

καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας. The *ἀκρατὴς* only shunned *τῶν λυπηρῶν τὰς ὑπερβολάς* (1148 a, 7); for they alone are strong enough to produce a violent desire for the opposite pleasures. The *ἀκόλαστος* shuns all *λῦπαι* on principle.

λύπη ἰσχυρά, i.e. a *ὑπερβολή* such as upsets the *ἀκρατής*.

§ 5. **ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This section is no mere duplicate of 1147 b, 23 (where see note), but the necessary introduction to the discussion of the *θηριώδης*, incidentally recapitulating and putting in a clearer light what has been said already. We now have for the first time a complete classification of desires into (1) those of things **τῷ γένει καλά, φύσει αἱρετά**, (2) of **τὰ ἐναντία τούτων**, i.e. those of things *τῷ γένει αἰσχρά, φύσει φευκτά*, not previously mentioned, (3) of **τὰ μεταξύ**, i.e. *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα* (*τὰ σωματικά*). These last are properly described as 'intermediate' between *τὰ καλὰ* and *τὰ αἰσχρά*, for they are *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα*, the pleasures of *τὸ ζῆν*, not of *τὸ εὖ ζῆν*. They are therefore indifferent in themselves, but become good when sought *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*. For the punctuation see Stewart's note. The apodosis to the long protasis is not reached till 1148 b, 2 **μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.**, being delayed by the enormous parenthesis 1148 a, 28 **διὸ ὅσοι...**b, 2 **μωραίνειν**.

οἷον χρήματα κ.τ.λ. These are *φύσει αἱρετά, ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν*.

τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν, 'for doing so in a certain way, i.e. in excess.'

διὸ ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. There is no verb for this nominative, the construction being forgotten owing to the parenthesis within a parenthesis **καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα... σπουδάζοντες**. The thought requires us to supply *μοχθηροὶ οὐκ εἰσίν*, the place of which is taken by the re-

τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν
καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες
ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ
ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες—ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔστι
τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μά-
χοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ φιλο-
1148 b πάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει
μωραίνειν)—μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ
τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἱρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὑτό,
φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσιν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. ὁμοίως 6
δ' οὐδ' ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστιν· δι' ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσ-
επιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρασίαν περὶ ἕκαστον λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν
ἰατρὸν καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἁπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν

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sumptive apodosis **μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.**

ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη, an instance of *ὑπερβολὴ περὶ τέκνα*.

ὥσπερ Σάτυρος, an instance of *ὑπερβολὴ περὶ γονεῖς*, Aspasios (158, 16 Heylbut) says *Σάτυρος...ὃς οὐδὲ ζῆν εἵλετο ἀποθανόντος τοῦ πατρός*. The Anonymus (p. 426, 23) says *οὗτος γὰρ ἐρῶν τινος κόρης καὶ πρὸς τὴν μοιχείαν εὑρὼν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα Σώστρατον συνεργοῦντα, τοσοῦτον ἔκτοτε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα ἐφίλησεν, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τελευτήσαντος ἑαυτὸν κατεκρήμνισε καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀπεστέρησε.* (This sounds like a reminiscence from the New Comedy.) Heliodoros on the other hand has *ὁ Σάτυρος ὡς θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενος τὸν πατέρα*, as if his text did not contain **περί**. It seems just possible that this may be right. As Stewart reminds us, the kings of Bosporos during the 4th century were called Satyros. I would add that *Σάτυρος ὁ φιλοπάτωρ* looks very like a royal title, and if the reference were to the deification of a dead king by his son, the parallel to the case of a Niobe would be striking. For *ἐπικαλεῖσθαι*, *invocare*, cf. EE. 1245 b, 33 *ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους*.

μοχθηρία, i.e. *ἀκολασία, κακία*.

φαῦλαι δὲ κ.τ.λ., cf. 1147 b, 25 *ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν*.

§ 6. **τῶν ψεκτῶν**. There seems to be a slight inconsistency between this and 1148 a, 28 *ψέγονται...τῷ πῶς καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν*. The explanation is to be found above 1148 a, 3. We may say that *τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς* in such matters *ψέγεται ὡς ἁμαρτία* but not *ὡς κακία*. It is thus not really *τῶν ψεκτῶν*.

προσεπιτιθέντες κ.τ.λ., 'they call it *ἀκρασία* with the additional qualification *περὶ ἕκαστον*, *in a given thing*.' Here again *περὶ ἕκαστον* is virtually = *ἑκάστου*.

οἷον κακὸν ἰατρὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. El. 177 b, 13 *ἆρ' ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; εἴη δ' ἄν τις ἀγαθὸς ὢν σκυτεὺς μοχθηρός· ὥστ' ἔσται ἀγαθὸς σκυτεὺς μοχθηρός.*

κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν εἶναι
ἑκάστην αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν, οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι 10
κἀκεῖ ὑπολεπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι
ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ταὐτὰ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ
θυμοῦ καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες ἀκρατῆ
θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τούτων τὰ 15
μὲν ἁπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῴων καὶ ἀνθρώπων,
τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθη
γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων
2 ἕκαστα παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἕξεις· λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις,
οἷον τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἣν λέγουσι τὰς κυούσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ 20
παιδία κατεσθίειν, ἢ οἷοις χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπη-
γριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὠμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώ-
πων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐω-
3 χίαν, ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις,
αἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους γίνονται (καὶ διὰ μανίαν ἐνίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ 25

ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ'...οὕτω κἀκεῖ. Cf. 1145 a, 25 n.

ἑκάστην, sc. *τὴν τοῦ ἰατροῦ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὑποκριτοῦ κακίαν*.

τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν. The *ἀναλογία* is e.g. as the *ἀκρατής* is to the *ἀκόλαστος* so is the *ἀκρατὴς θυμοῦ* to the *ὀργίλος*, the *ἀκρατὴς τιμῆς* to the *φιλότιμος* (in the bad sense), the *ἀκρατὴς κέρδους* to the *ἀνελεύθερος*.

V. § 1. **ἡδέα φύσει**, the *φύσει αἱρετά* of 1148 a, 24.

τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, i.e. the *ἐναντία τούτων* of 1148 a, 24. We now see why these were added to the list.

τὰ μὲν διὰ πηρώσεις κ.τ.λ. The division is not very clear; but the chief distinction is clearly between 'bestial' people, who have unnatural desires 'by nature,' or 'habit,' and 'morbid' people who have unnatural desires from disease, mental or bodily.

παραπλησίας, sc. unnatural.

§ 2. **τὴν ἄνθρωπον**, 'the female.' It seems very doubtful, as Fritzsche says, whether this can be the Lamia of folk-lore.

τῶν...περὶ τὸν Πόντον. Cf. Pol. 1338 b, 19 *πολλὰ δ' ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον Ἀχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι κ.τ.λ.* Herod. iv, 18, 106 *ἀνδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι ἤθεα, οὔτε δίκην νομίζοντες οὔτε νόμῳ οὐδενὶ χρεόμενοι.*

τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν. This must surely refer to the bull. See 1149 a, 14 n.

§ 3. **αὗται μὲν...αἱ δὲ...** We pass here from the strictly 'bestial' to the 'morbid.' The instances given seem to be familiar. They probably come from the collections made by the school.

τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγών, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὲ ἥπαρ) αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπύουσιν ἀλλ' ὀπύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσοι νοσηματώδως ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν
1149 a ὅρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης· τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ ἡ ἁπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον· καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ ἔνια

αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους. This seems to be a third class which may arise either from disease, or habit, which is a second nature.

τριχῶν τίλσεις. Victorius says 'huic vitio virgines non paucae affines sunt, quae inde nullo pacto absterreri possunt.' Aristotle is possibly alluding to the morbid appetites connected with puberty and pregnancy.

§ 4. **ὅσοις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** These are cases of *πήρωσις*. What follows is quite in accordance with Aristotle's view of the distinction between the sexes. Cf. Gen. An. 737 a, 27 *τὸ θῆλυ ὥσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον*, 775 a, 15 *δεῖ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὥσπερ ἀναπηρίαν εἶναι τὴν θηλύτητα φυσικήν*.

§ 5. **ἀκρασία.** We expect *καὶ ἐγκράτεια* to correspond with *κρατεῖν*, but Aristotle does not care for formal symmetry.

τοῦ πάθους, i.e. *θυμοῦ*, sc. *ἀκρατῆ λεκτέον*, **ἀκρατῆ δ' ἁπλῶς οὐ λεκτέον**, 'We must call him *ἀκρατής of the feeling*, not *ἀκρατής simpliciter*.'

πᾶσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is the case where we apply the word *θηριότης* to excess of badness (*ἐπιδυσφημοῦντες*). Cf. 1145 a, 33.

§ 6. **κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς.** Cf. Pol. 1323 a, 29 *δεδιότα τὰς παραπετομένας μυίας*. The *ψοφοδεής* has the kind of fear we find in certain beasts. Soph. fr. 58 *ἅπαντα γάρ τοι τῷ φοβουμένῳ ψοφεῖ*.

ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν κ.τ.λ. This is 'morbid,' not 'natural' like the fear of the *ψοφοδεής*. The reference is to morbid 'antipathies' to certain animals. Stewart quotes a fragment of Plutarch, *εἰ ἔνιοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι ὄντες ὅμως φοβοῦνται φαῦλα ἄττα, οἷον γαλῆν ἢ ἀλεκτρυόνα ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς φανερᾶς αἰτίας*.

γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, οἷον τὰς ἐπι-
7 ληπτικάς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις. τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μὲν μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ [Φάλαρις] κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον
8 ἔχειν· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρίας ἡ μὲν κατ' ἄνθρωπον ἁπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἡ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν θηριώδης ἡ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἁπλῶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.

9 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, δῆλον. VI. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἧττον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μέν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἳ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἁμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες,

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τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, e.g. the Kelts. Cf. 1115 b, 28.

§ 7. **τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν κ.τ.λ.** We are still discussing *περὶ ποῖα ὁ ἀκρατής;*

εἰ [Φάλαρις] κατεῖχεν. I have bracketed Φάλαρις on the ground that we know no such stories about him. I assume that a copyist did not understand the use of *κατεῖχεν* without an expressed subject and took the nearest name from 1148 b, 24.

§ 8. **ὥσπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ.** For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 56. The conclusion is that the *ἀκρατὴς ἁπλῶς* is (1) *περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ μοχθηρῷ* (i.e. *ἀκολάστῳ*), and therefore (2) only *περὶ τὰ κατ' ἄνθρωπον*. This gives us another form of *ἀκρασία κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*, viz. *ἡ θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης*. It also is only *ἀκρασία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*.

ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία...ἡ δὲ... For the 'twofold use of the article' cf. 1117 a, 12 n. The predicate of the second clause is **κατὰ πρόσθεσιν** *μοχθηρία λέγεται*. For the partitive genitive in the singular cf. 1141 b, 24 n.

§ 9. **περὶ τὰ ἄλλα**, sc. (1) *περὶ τὰ φύσει αἱρετά*, (2) *περὶ τὰ θηριώδη καὶ νοσηματώδη*.

VI. § 1. **ὅτι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** This section contrasts *ἀκρασία* in the strict sense (**ἡ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν**) with **ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ**. The latter requires special consideration; for, while it is only called *ἀκρασία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, yet *θυμός* is a form of *ὄρεξις* coordinate with *ἐπιθυμία*, and therefore we must note the points of likeness and unlikeness. Four reasons are given to show that *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* is the less disgraceful.

παρακούειν. This word (omitted in Bon. Ind.) is explained in de Somno 458 b, 31 *τὸ γὰρ παρορᾶν ἢ παρακούειν ὁρῶντος ἀληθές τι καὶ ἀκούοντος, οὐ μέντοι τοῦτο ὃ οἴεται*.

πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μέν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὁρμᾷ πρὸς τὴν
1149 b ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ λόγῳ πως, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. αἰσχίων οὖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ λόγου πως ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, 'if there is only a knock at the door,' *si fores crepuerint*. It seems plain that *ψοφεῖν* is here used impersonally and that it is used in the sense which properly belongs to *κόπτω*.

οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας. We see, then, that its *παρακούειν* consists in its hearing something real, namely a judgment that so-and-so is an insult, but not what it thinks it hears, namely an order.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος...ἐδήλωσεν. Cf. Probl. 949 b, 13 *διὰ τί ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μόνον, οὔσης τῆς ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργήν; ἢ ὅτι ἀκρατὴς μέν ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τι πράττων, καὶ ἀκρασία ἡ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἀγωγή, εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐπιθυμίαι ὡς ἐπίπαν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὸν λόγον, αἱ δ' ὀργαὶ μετὰ λόγου, οὐχ ὡς κελεύσαντος τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὡς δηλώσαντος τὸν προπηλακισμὸν ἢ τὴν αἰτίαν.*

ἢ ἡ φαντασία. Cf. Rhet. 1378 a, 31 *ἔστω δὴ ὀργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν*. Like all other *ὀρεκτά*, *τιμωρία* can only move *τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι*. The difference between it and *τὸ ἡδύ* is that it implies also a *φαντασία* of the *αἰτία* which must be some form of *ὀλιγωρία* (*καταφρόνησις, ἐπηρεασμός, ὕβρις* all described Rhet. 1378 b, 14 sqq.). Now it is just here that the dependence of *θυμός* on *τὸ λογιστικόν* comes in. *Ὀλιγωρία* is defined as *ἐνέργεια δόξης περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον*, and that is *μηδενὸς ἄξιον* which is not good and contributes little or nothing to what is good (Rhet. 1378 b, 12). All this *θυμός* must get from *νοῦς*. The premiss *πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ* is merely a generalisation of particular desires for sweet things; the premiss 'such conduct is *ὕβρις*' is no mere generalisation from particular feelings of resentment, but the result of deliberation. But such a premiss is not enough to justify anger. It may be that the man is beneath contempt, or that for some other reason the *ὀρθὸς λόγος* would prescribe the exercise of *πραότης*, and this is a matter for further deliberation. What we may call *ἀκρασία θυμοῦ* consists in not waiting for this; for the *φαντασία* of *ὀλιγωρία* is sufficient to move *θυμός*, and *θυμός* can move the body. Still the *φαντασία* which moves *θυμός* is the result of deliberation, though incomplete.

ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις. There is no contradiction in saying that a *λόγος* may furnish the motive of *ἐπιθυμία*. The example already given, *πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ*, shows this. But it is not *ἴδιος λόγος*, i.e. *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, which is the sense in which the word is used elsewhere in this passage.

2 ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις μᾶλλον ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἡ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κἀκεῖνος τὸν ἄνωθεν," καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ" ἔφη "ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν·" καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλκύ-
3 σαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμός, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασίν· "δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς·" καὶ τὸν "κεστὸν ἱμάντα" Ὅμηρος· "πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος." ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχίων ἡ ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν ἐστι, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ

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§ 2. **ἔτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς κ.τ.λ.** The *second* reason.

ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Even among desires the most universal are the most excusable. For the distinction between **κοιναὶ** *ἐπιθυμίαι* and *ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι*, cf. 1118 b, 8 sqq.

τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς, sc. *τῶν ἀναγκαίων*. The words **καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων** merely explain this. I do not think that they refer to *τὰ φύσει αἱρετά*.

ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος κ.τ.λ. The writer of MM. seems to have taken this illustration seriously; for he adds that the plea 'It runs in the family' was admitted, *καὶ ἀποφυγεῖν δή· δοκεῖν γὰρ τοῖς δικασταῖς φυσικὴν εἶναι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν.*

καὶ ὁ ἑλκόμενος κ.τ.λ. Zell says that the same story occurs in a German Volkslied and refers to 'Des Knaben Wunderhorn' vol. ii, p. 269. Clearly, then, Aristotle is drawing on folk-lore for his illustrations, the stuff of which Mährchen and Fabliaux are made.

§ 3. **ἔτι ἀδικώτεροι κ.τ.λ.** The *third* reason.

δολοπλόκου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The author of this lyrical fragment is unknown. Zell compares Sappho's *Ποικιλόθρον' ἀθάνατ' Ἀφρόδιτα | παῖ Δίος δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε*. The quotations are given in the usual scrappy and abrupt way.

κεστὸν ἱμάντα. Il. xiv, 214—

ἦ, καὶ ἀπὸ στήθεσφιν ἐλύσατο κεστὸν ἱμάντα,
ποικίλον, ἔνθα δέ οἱ θελκτήρια πάντα τέτυκτο·
ἔνθ' ἔνι μὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ' ἵμερος, ἐν δ' ὀαριστὺς
πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων.

περὶ τὸν θυμόν, i.e. *τοῦ θυμοῦ*. Cf. Ind. s.v. *περί*.

καὶ κακία πως. This is the point to which the whole discussion is meant to lead up. It is not *κακία ἁπλῶς* because it is *ἄνευ προαιρέσεως*.

κακία πως. ἔτι οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν 4
πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς
ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρα-
σία ἡ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν 5
τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἡ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυ-
μόν, καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυ-
μίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικάς, δῆλον· αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς 6
διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ
μὲν ἀνθρώπιναί εἰσι καὶ φυσικαὶ καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ
μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσή-
ματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολα-
σία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκό-
λαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τι ὅλως
ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρει καὶ σι-

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§ 4. ἔτι οὐδεὶς κ.τ.λ. The *fourth* reason. The argument requires that ὕβρις should be an instance of ἀκρασία δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, but it is absurd to suppose that ὑβρίζει here means μοιχεύει, as the old commentators do. The explanation is to be found in Rhet. 1380 a, 34 καὶ τοῖς δι' ὀργὴν ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἧττον ὀργίζονται· οὐ γὰρ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, ἡ δ' ὀργὴ μετὰ λύπης. Now ὕβρις, 'unprovoked insult,' is a species of ὀλιγωρία, the others being καταφρόνησις and ἐπηρεασμός, and, if we substitute ὕβρις for ὀλιγωρία in the above sentence, we get the same statement as that in the text. That ὕβρις arises from ἐπιθυμία appears from another passage (Rhet. 1378 b, 23) ἔστι γὰρ ὕβρις τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἡσθῇ. The ὀρεκτόν, then, is the *pleasure* of humiliating another, and therefore the ὄρεξις is ἐπιθυμία. It is true, of course, as Aristotle says (Rhet. 1378 b, 1) that all anger is accompanied by the pleasure of hope; but men do not get angry for the sake of that.

εἰ οὖν οἷς κ.τ.λ. For the argument cf. 1119 a, 21 sqq.

§ 6. κατ' ἀρχάς, 1145 a, 15 sqq.

καὶ τῷ μεγέθει. This is added because we call men 'brutal' (ἐπιδυσφημοῦντες 1149 a, 4) though their desires are not generically (**γένει**) different from those of normal human beings, but only different in scale (**μεγέθει**), i.e. τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν.

τὰς πρώτας, sc. τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας καὶ φυσικάς.

εἴ τι is Bywater's certain correction of MS. εἴ τινι. Aristotle means that we speak of certain kinds of animals as ἀκόλαστα by analogy, i.e. if their desires are related to normal animal desires as those of the ἀκόλαστος are to normal human desires. This is sufficiently illustrated by the opening chapters of the de Gen. An., where we read of the physiological characteristics of animals ἃ δεῖ σωφρονέστερα εἶναι (717 b, 27).

ὕβρει. Aristotle is doubtless thinking of asses. The phrase τῶν ὄνων ὑβριστότερον was proverbial.

ναμωρίᾳ καὶ τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι—οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν
οὐδὲ λογισμόν—ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαι- 35
7 νόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβε- 1150 a

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συναμωρίᾳ. The verb συναμωρέειν means 'to lay waste' in Herodotos. Aristotle is probably thinking of the boar, which is described as ἐκστατικὸς καὶ θυμώδης in Part. An. 651 a, 4.

τῷ παμφάγον εἶναι, especially the pig, which is εὐχερεστάτη πρὸς πᾶσαν τροφὴν τῶν ζῴων. Hist. An. 596 a, 18.

οὐ γὰρ ἔχει...λογισμόν. This abrupt parenthesis adds, as by an afterthought, a reason for the statement that we do not call the brutes σώφρονα or ἀκόλαστα. It breaks the sentence in an extraordinary way, but it is characteristic of the lecture-style. Aristotle cannot mean to speak only of the exceptional brutes under discussion.

ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε κ.τ.λ. This goes closely with εἴ τι ὅλως διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. The negative sense of διαφέρει justifies ἀλλά. The meaning is that exceptionally lascivious, destructive and omnivorous γένη are παρὰ φύσιν or τέρατα. For the phrase ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως in this sense, cf. Hist. An. 488 b, 19 γενναῖον τὸ μὴ ἐξιστάμενον ἐκ τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως, Rhet. 1390 b, 28 ἐξίσταται τὰ εὐφυᾶ γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἤθη. Aristotle is thinking, then, of animals that have 'run wild' or degenerated. He cannot mean to say that all brutes ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, as Stewart says.

§ 7. ἔλαττον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This sentence is little more than a series of jottings, and we must supply the missing links as best we may. In the first place, **ἔλαττον** seems to mean ἔλαττον κακόν as the old commentators say. 'Brutality is a less evil than badness,' though in a man it is more terrible than in a beast; for in a beast (the words **ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ** imply that τὸ θηρίον is the subject of ἔχει) the 'better part,' i.e. νοῦς, is not depraved but wholly absent. It is the presence of a depraved νοῦς that makes the brutality of man so much more terrible and destructive than that of animals, just as a living thing, which has its ἀρχὴ κινήσεως in itself, is more hurtful than an inanimate thing. It only remains to explain the obscure remark **παραπλήσιον οὖν...ἑκάτερον κάκιον.** The key to this is to be found in Top. 116 a, 23 ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ ὅπερ τόδε τι (cf. 1140 a, 7 n.) τοῦ μὴ ἐν γένει (sc. αἱρετώτερον) οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν γένει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τὸ δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' οὔ· οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεται ὅπερ τὸ γένος ὃ μὴ τυγχάνει ἐν τῷ γένει ὄν, οἷον ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ χρῶμα. Therefore, *per contra*, ἀδικία will be worse than ὁ ἄδικος ἄνθρωπος, for ἀδικία is ὅπερ κακόν τι, while the man is only ἄδικος κατὰ συμβεβηκός. In the same way θηριότης (which is ἕτερόν τι γένος κακίας 1145 a, 27) is less bad than κακία which is ὅπερ κακόν τι. But we may look at the thing from the standpoint of another τόπος also; for the ποιητικὸν ἀγαθοῦ is better than τὸ μὴ ποιητικόν, and therefore τὸ ποιητικὸν κακοῦ is worse than τὸ μὴ ποιητικόν. Looked at in this way ὁ ἄδικος is worse than ἀδικία, for that which has its ἀρχή in itself is ποιητικώτερον. In the same sense θηριότης is 'worse' than κακία, for a beast can do much harm and a brutal man infinitely more. There are in fact two senses of 'worse.' The first is 'worse *per se*' and in this sense badness is worse than brutality; the second is 'worse *per accidens*' and in this sense brutality is worse than

ρώτερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἡ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή— παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἄδικον· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἑκάτερον κάκιον—μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

VII. Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγάς, περὶ ἃς ἥ τε ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ ἥττους· τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς ἀκρατὴς ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς ὁ δὲ καρτερικός. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις, κἂν εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χείρους. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαι 2 εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὔ, καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὔ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας, ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὰς

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badness. But in this sense 'worse' means *ποιητικώτερον κακοῦ*, and as the *ποιητικὸν κακοῦ* is *τὸ φοβερόν*, it is correctly said to be **φοβερώτερον**.

VII. § 1. **Περὶ δὲ τὰς κ.τ.λ.** We are still dealing with the question *περὶ ποῖα;* but now we turn from the *ἡδοναί* to the *λῦπαι*. It must be borne in mind that the *λῦπαι* in question are the pains of certain unsatisfied bodily desires.

διωρίσθη, sc. *εἶναι*.

ὧν οἱ πολλοί. For this criterion cf. 1118 b, 23 n.

ὁ μὲν...ὁ δὲ... For the twofold use of the article, cf. 1117 a, 12 n.

§ 2. **ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιαι κ.τ.λ.** 'Necessary' pleasures, being *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖα*, are only necessary **μέχρι τινός**. The *ἐπιθυμίαι* which are *ὀρέξεις* of these pleasures, and the *λῦπαι* which arise from these desires not being satisfied, will be characterised accordingly.

ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ. The meaning must be the same as that expressed in 1118 b, 25 *καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν (οἱ ἀκόλαστοι) ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί*. In that case **αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν ἡδέων** must be the *μισητά, οἷς οὐ δεῖ χαίρειν*, referred to above as *οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα* (**αἱ δ' οὔ**), while **ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολάς** must be equivalent to *μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ*. We may paraphrase, then, *ὁ διώκων τῶν ἡδέων τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἢ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καθ' ὑπερβολήν*. It is to be noted that the reading **καθ' ὑπερβολάς** is supported as against the more natural *καθ' ὑπερβολήν* by Alexander, Eth. Probl. (p. 127, 24 Bruns) *αἱ μὲν γὰρ μέσαι αἱρεταί, αἱ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς φαῦλαι*.

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σώφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἧτταν ἀλλὰ διὰ προ- 3 αίρεσιν.—(τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρουμένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χείρων εἶναι εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἠρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὤν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς.)—τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν 4 μαλακίας εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος. ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ

καὶ διὰ προαίρεσιν. I read **καὶ** for **ἢ** with Aspasios. For the meaning cf. 1105 a, 31 *ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά*.

ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This justifies the name *ἀκόλαστος* (lit. 'incorrigible'). It is the presence of *προαιρεσις* which makes him so (*ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει* 1150 b, 30).

§ 3. **τῶν δὲ μὴ...τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς**. This passage breaks the continuity of the argument, but that is no reason for its excision. It is a reminder of what we have been told of the distinction between the *ἀκόλαστος* and the *ἀκρατής*, such a reminder as often occurs in lectures. It is suggested here by the remark **ὥστ' ἀνίατος**, which has called to mind the *ἀπορία* 1146 a, 31 which is now solved.

διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, sc. *οἱ προαιρούμενοι καὶ οἱ μή*. The difference is explained in **παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε κ.τ.λ.**

εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν. Cf. above, 1148 a, 17 sqq.

εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος. This suggests a sort of *ἀκολασία θυμοῦ* (*καθ' ὁμοιότητα* of course) leading to *ὕβρις*.

τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων, above 1150 a, 19. **τὸ μὲν**, i.e. *τὸ φεύγειν τὰς (μετρίας) λύπας διὰ προαίρεσιν*, **ὁ δὲ**, i.e. *ὁ διώκων τὰς (ὑπερβάλλουσας) ἡδονὰς διὰ προαίρεσιν*.

μαλακίας εἶδος. It is not *μαλακία ἁπλῶς*, for that is not *διὰ προαίρεσιν*, as we shall see. Strictly it is *μαλακία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*.

§ 4. **ἀντίκειται δὲ κ.τ.λ.** To understand this section we must bear in mind that the *ἐγκρατής* and *ἀκρατής* are *περὶ ἡδονάς* while the *καρτερικός* and the *μαλακός* are *περὶ λύπας*. It has been said that there is no value in the distinction drawn here between the *καρτερικός* and the *μαλακός*, since to conquer pleasure (**κρατεῖν, νικᾶν**) is the same thing as to bear up against pain (**ἀντέχειν, μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι**). But this criticism assumes that the pain which the *καρτερικός* bears up against is identical with the pain of *ἐπιθυμία* felt by the *ἐγκρατής*, and there is nothing to justify any such assumption. It is true that the pain felt by the *ἀκόλαστος* and the *ἀκρατής* is simply caused by the absence of the pleasure which they desire (*τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή* 1118 b, 32), and we could not draw any valid distinction between the victory over pleasure and the resistance

μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἡ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἱρετώτερον ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τίς ἐστιν· ὃς ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἴρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα οὐκ οἴεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ὤν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν—ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικὸν εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἕχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ

1150 b

to pain on the part of the *ἀκρατής*. But surely pains due to the desire for excessive pleasures are not the only pains. There is a pain of hunger as well as a pain which arises from the unfulfilled desire of eating to excess. It is with this pain, accordingly, that *καρτερία* and *μαλακία* have to do. The *ἐγκρατής* is the man who gets the better of a desire for a positive excess of pleasure, the *καρτερικός* resists the desire for the absence of a positive pain when it is right to do so. It is strong desire for the excess of a particular pleasant drink (*πᾶν γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκύ*) that overcomes the *ἀκρατής*, while it is *ἡ τυχοῦσα δίψα*, as Aspasios rightly says, that proves too much for the *μαλακός*.

§ 5. **ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων κ.τ.λ.** The object of this section is to show that *τρυφή* is a form of *μαλακία*, contrary to the general opinion which represents it as something grand (*νεανικόν*).

ἕλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, 'lets his cloak trail,' a recognised sign of *τρυφή*. Cf. Plato Alc. I 122 b, *εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλεις εἰς πλούτους ἀποβλέψαι καὶ τρυφὰς καὶ ἐσθῆτας ἱματίων θ' ἕλξεις κ.τ.λ.* Dem. F. L. § 361 *διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς πορεύεται θοἱμάτιον καθεἰς ἄχρι τῶν σφυρῶν*. Academic gowns are sometimes worn so now for similar reasons.

§ 6. **ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει**, i.e. the standard here too is that of *οἱ πολλοί*.

οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. The apodosis does not begin till 1150 b, 12 *ἀλλ' εἴ τις κ.τ.λ.*

ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν. For *ἀλλά* introducing a parenthesis followed by *ἀλλά* introducing the main statement, cf. 1137 a, 11 n. The examples which follow are not examples of *μαλακία*, for the pains are such that *οἱ πολλοί* would not resist them.

εἰ ἀντιτείνων, sc. *ἡττᾶται*.

ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης. Theodektes of Phaselis, rhetor and tragedian, belonged to Aristotle's own circle, and is often referred to. Like other tragedians of his time, he came from the school of Isokrates, and his chief characteristic was the introduction of rhetorical methods into tragedy. Cf. Haigh, Tragic Drama pp. 424–6. The Aldine scholiast tells us that the breakdown of Philoktetes was marked by the words *Κόψατε τὴν ἐμὴν χεῖρα*. Cf. Nauck FTG. p. 803[2].

Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ—ἀλλ' εἴ τις πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων ἡττᾶται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσίς ἐστιν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν. ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια. οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προεγείραντες, ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἡττῶνται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ'

ὁ Καρκίνου...Κερκύων. Ald. schol. *ὁ Καρκῖνος τραγικὸς ἦν· ὁ δὲ Κερκύων εἶχε θυγατέρα τὴν Ἀλόπην, μαθὼν δὲ ὅτι ἐμοιχεύθη ἡ αὐτοῦ θυγάτηρ Ἀλόπη, ἠρώτησεν αὐτὴν τίς ἦν ὁ μοιχεύσας, λέγων· Εἴ μοι τοῦτο ἂν εἶποις, οὐδ' ὅλως ἂν λυπηθῶ· εἶτα εἰπούσης τῆς Ἀλόπης τὸν αὐτὴν μοιχεύσαντα, οὐκ ἔτι ὁ Κερκύων ὑπὸ τῆς λύπης ἔφερε ζῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἀπελέγετο.* Cf. Haigh, Tragic Drama, p. 431 sq.

ἀθρόον ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, 'pent up laughter breaks out in one great guffaw.' The word *ἀθρόος* properly expresses the sudden taking effect of what has been slowly accumulated. Cf. Pol. 1307 b, 34 *λανθάνει δὲ ἡ μετάβασις διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίνεσθαι*, 'political change is unobserved because it is not of a sweeping character.' In Hist. An. 582 b, 7 *κάθαρσις ἀθρόα* is a purge of everything that has accumulated in the body as opposed to *ἡ κατ' ὀλίγον κάθαρσις*.

Ξενοφάντῳ. Seneca de Ira ii, 2 'Alexandrum aiunt, Xenophanto canente, manum ad arma misisse.' If Xenophantos was Alexander's musician, this will be a reminiscence of court life at Pella.

ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασιλεῦσιν. See Hippokrates *περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων* c. 106, with Coray's notes. The story told by Herodotos (i, 105) was doubtless invented to account for this.

§ 7. **δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** This brings out very well the difference between shunning (positive) pain and pursuing (positive) pleasure. The **παιδιώδης** does not, as is supposed, seek pleasure; for **παιδιά** is **ἄνεσις** (cf. 1127 b, 33 sqq.), rest or relaxation from labour. The man who is too fond of amusement is not a pleasure-seeker, but merely one who cannot bear up against the pain of work.

§ 8. **ἀκρασίας...τὸ μὲν...τὸ δὲ...** Cf. 1110 b, 22 n. In the case of the **ἀσθενεῖς** (**οἱ μέν**), *βούλευσις* is present, though not *βούλησις*, in the case of the *προπετεῖς* both are absent.

ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες. As Stewart says, the reference must be to "a tickling-match in which the aggressor has the advantage." Cf.

ἂν ἡδὺ ᾖ οὔτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

VIII. Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐ μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος ὁ δ' ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοσημάτων οἷον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὴς ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει.

1151 a αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι· ὅμοιος γὰρ

Probl. 965 a, 11 *διὰ τί αὐτὸς αὑτὸν οὐθεὶς γαργαλίζει; ἢ ὅτι καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἧττον ἐὰν προαισθηται, μᾶλλον δ' ἂν μὴ ὁρᾷ; ὥσθ' ἥκιστα γαργαλισθήσεται ὅταν μὴ λανθάνῃ τοῦτο πάσχων.* The *προπετεῖς* are like those who are tickled unawares; if they had known the *πάθος* was coming it would not have affected them.

μελαγχολικοί, 'excitable,' 'hot-headed.' According to early medical theory excitability of this kind was produced by the heating of the 'black bile.' The word *μελαγχολᾶν* was quite common in the sense of 'to be crazy' (cf. Aristophanes, Birds 14, Ploutos 12, 366, 903). Aristotle uses it in the popular sense. The theory of the 'four temperaments,' which makes its appearance first in Galen, in time gave the word a different meaning. Here it corresponds to the 'choleric' and 'sanguine' as opposed to the 'bilious' and 'phlegmatic.' We may gather the explanation of the *προπέτεια* of *μελαγχολικοί* from de Memor. 453 a, 19 *τούτους γὰρ φαντάσματα κινεῖ μάλιστα.* Now-a-days we say 'nervous,' but Aristotle had never heard of nerves.

VIII. § 1. **Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ.** We now pass from the first question *περὶ ποῖα ὁ ἀκρατής;* to the second question *πῶς ἔχων* (1115 a, 5 n.). If we take this as the subject of the present chapter, it will be found that the connexion of thought is sufficiently clear.

ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, 1150 a, 21.

ὥσπερ ἠπορήσαμεν, 1146 a, 31 sqq.

λανθάνει, sc. *τὸν ἔχοντα.*

§ 2. **αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων**, sc. *τῶν ἀκρατῶν*, to be supplied from *ἀκρασία*. The connexion is quite straightforward; for the subject of the chapter is *πῶς ἔχων ἀκρατεύεταί τις.*

οἱ ἐκστατικοί, i.e. *οἱ προπετεῖς, οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοί.* Cf. 1145 b, 11 n.

οἱ...μὴ ἐμμένοντες, i.e. *οἱ ἀσθενεῖς.*

ἡττῶνται, sc. *οἱ ἀσθενεῖς.*

ὅμοιος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The *ἀσθενής*, then, possesses the characteristics of the *ἀκρατής* in the most distinct form and is the typical *ἀκρατής*. The *προπετής* is not the *ἀκρατής* we are studying just now.

ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου
3 οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἡ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἔστι, φανερόν (ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως)· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσίν ἐστιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους "Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσιν δ' οἷάπερ ἀξύνετοι," καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικοῦσι δέ.
4 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὗτος δὲ οὔ·

1151 a, 11. Cf. EE. 1227 b, 12. *τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων, λέγωμεν πότερον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀναμάρτητον ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρθόν, οὕτως ὥστε οὗ ἕνεκα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τισι, τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἐγκράτεια· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ διαφθείρει τὸν λόγον. ἔστι δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια ἕτερον. λεκτέον δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅσοις γε δοκεῖ τὸν λόγον ὀρθὸν παρέχειν ἡ ἀρετή, τοῦτο αἴτιον. ἡ μὲν <γὰρ> ἐγκράτεια τοιοῦτον, τῶν ἐπαινετῶν δ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια. λέγομεν δὲ προαπορήσαντες. ἔστι γὰρ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν διαμαρτάνειν· ἔστι δὲ τὸν μὲν σκοπὸν ἡμαρτῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον περαίνοντα ὀρθῶς ἔχειν, καὶ μηδέτερον. πότερον δ' ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ τὸν σκοπὸν ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν σκοπόν; τιθέμεθα δὴ ὅτι τὸν σκοπόν, διότι τούτου οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς οὐδὲ λόγος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ τοῦτο ὑποκείσθω. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς σκοπεῖ εἰ δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ περιπατεῖν ἢ μή, οὔτε ὁ γυμναστικὸς εἰ δεῖ εὖ ἔχειν ἢ μή, ἀλλ' εἰ παλαῖσαι ἢ μή. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἄλλη οὐδεμία περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ὥσπερ γὰρ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις. ἐπειδὴ δεῖ τόδε ὑγιαίνειν, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ ὑπάρξαι εἰ ἔσται ἐκεῖνο, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι. τῆς μὲν οὖν*

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§ 3. **ἀλλὰ πῇ ἴσως**, cf. *κακία πως* 1149 b, 20. By *πῇ* we must understand *ᾗ πρακτικὴ τῶν κακῶν.*

ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου. Bergk-Crusius p. 47,—

Καὶ τόδε Δημοδόκου· Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν
οὐκ εἰσίν· δρῶσιν δ' οἷαπερ ἀξύνετοι.

§ 4. **ὁ μέν**, sc. *ὁ ἀκρατής.*

διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. It is his *ἦθος* that makes them his *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.*

ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν, 'it is, on the contrary, the former that—.' The corrective particles *μὲν οὖν* mark this as the direct answer to the *ἀπορία.*

ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ μὲν φθείρει ἡ δὲ σῴζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ

νοήσεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως ἡ τῆς νοήσεως τελευτή. εἰ οὖν πάσης ὀρθότητος ἢ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία, εἰ μὴ ὁ λόγος, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἂν ὀρθὸν εἴη τὸ τέλος ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινός. οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνειν τούτων ἄλλης δυνάμεως, ὅσα ἕνεκα τοῦ τέλους δεῖ πράττειν· τοῦ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὀρθὸν εἶναι τῆς προαιρέσεως [οὗ] ἡ ἀρετὴ αἰτία. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποιός τις· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει ἀλλ' οὐ τί πράττει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία τῶν ἐναντίων ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. εἰ δή τις, ἐφ' αὑτῷ ὂν πράττειν μὲν τὰ καλὰ ἀπρακτεῖν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρά, τοὐναντίον ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ σπουδαῖός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τήν τε κακίαν ἑκούσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὰ μοχθηρὰ πράττειν. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ψεκτὸν ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπαινετόν· τὰ γὰρ ἀκούσια αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ οὐ ψέγεται οὐδὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐπαινεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἑκούσια.

1151 a, 17. EE. 1227 a, 8 περὶ μὲν τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑποθέσεις.

We have only to change the acts of the *ἀκρατής* and not his character. Therefore he can be cured.

ὥσπερ...αἱ ὑποθέσεις, sc. *ἀρχαί*. The second interpretation suggested by Professor Stewart, though with some doubt, seems to be certainly right. An *ὑπόθεσις* in mathematics is certainly the assumption of the thing to be proved or the thing to be done from which an analytical proof starts. Cf. 1112 b, 20 *ἀναλύειν... ὥσπερ διάγραμμα* and the note there. It should be added that Eudemos (loc. cit.) certainly took the words in this sense; for he gives as an example *εἰ ἔστι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαί, ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι*. We have seen already that in the phrase *τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπόν* (1144 a, 24) and *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον* (1139 b, 23 n.) the *ὑπόθεσις* is the Q. E. F. of the problem, which has to be analysed till we come to a construction which is in our power. Similarly in a theorem the *ὑπόθεσις* is the Q. E. D. assumed as true and analysed till we come either to something already demonstrated or to an axiom, or to something contradictory of these ("absurd"), in

ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων <ὢν> τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διά γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπουδαία ἕξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

IX. Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν ὁ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ καὶ ὁποιᾳοῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῇ ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατὴς δὲ ὁ ὁποιᾳοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει καὶ ὁποιῳοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὁποιᾳοῦν,

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which case the contradictory of the hypothesis is proved. This method was first formulated by Plato (Cantor, Vorlesungen I p. 189 sq.).

οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Professor Stewart thinks this sentence "may be thought to point the other way," i.e. to favour the interpretation of *ὑπόθεσις* as equivalent to definitions and axioms. But the word *ἀρχή*, 'starting point,' is wide enough to cover the hypothesis of an analytical proof (cf. last note), and such an hypothesis is not based upon any 'ground' (*λόγος*). The figures into which the *διάγραμμα* has to be analysed are given by mathematical intuition (cf. 1142 a, 28 n.).

ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστή, grammar requires us to supply *διδασκαλική ἐστι*, but nothing more is really meant than *κυρία ἐστίν*. There is nothing unusual in a zeugma like this, and the sentence does not force us to believe that *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή* is able *διδάσκειν*. As to **φυσικὴ ἀρετή** cf. 1144 b, 1 sqq. People are born with a tendency to aim at the right end, the right *ἀρχή* naturally presents itself to them, but *ἐθισμός* is required to fix *ὄρεξις* in a certain *ἦθος*.

§ 5. **ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι...δεῖν.** This sums up admirably Aristotle's teaching as to the relation between *ἦθος* and *διάνοια*. It is *ἦθος* (*τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι*) that makes pleasure the *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν* of the *ἀκόλαστος*. Then *διάνοια* formulates this as a *λόγος ἕνεκά τινος, δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττειν* (cf. 1140 b, 18).

IX. § 1. **Πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The *λύσις* of the *ἀπορία* raised 1146 a, 16 sqq.

τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ κ.τ.λ. I have followed Bywater in adopting the reading of L^b. For another view, see Stewart's note.

κατὰ...συμβεβηκός. The *ἐγκρατής* may abide by a *λόγος* which as a matter of fact is false (*ᾧ συμβαίνει ψευδεῖ εἶναι*), but only because he thinks it true. He abides by something which happens to be untrue, but only because he thinks it leads to something which he is seeking **καθ' αὑτό.**

καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαιρέσει
35 ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γάρ τις τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ
1151 b αἱρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἱρεῖται,
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ πρότερον. ἁπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ
καθ' αὑτό. ὥστε ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὁποιαοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει
ὁ δ' ἐξίσταται, ἁπλῶς δὲ [ὁ] τῇ ἀληθεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ 2
5 ἐμμενετικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ εἰσίν, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας, οἷον
δύσπειστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπειστοι· οἳ ὅμοιον μέν τι ἔχουσι
τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασὺς
τῷ θαρραλέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει [ὁ ἐγκρατής], ἐπεὶ
10 εὔπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· οἱ δὲ οὐχ ὑπὸ
λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες 3
καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι'
ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες ἐὰν μὴ μετα-
15 πείθωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται ἐὰν ἄκυρα τὰ αὑτῶν ᾖ ὥσπερ
ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ ἐοίκασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγ-
κρατεῖ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ τοῖς δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' 4

εἰ γάρ τις κ.τ.λ. Suppose, for instance, that a man thinks he ought to work a certain number of hours every day, which is really too much for him, are we to call him *ἐγκρατής* for sticking to his resolution though the *λόγος* is false? The answer is in the affirmative; for the number of hours he works is merely a means to an end, and it is really the true *λόγος* of the end that he abides by *καθ' αὑτό*.

§ 2. **ἰσχυρογνώμονας.** The word does not occur in earlier literature.

ἐπεὶ εὔπειστος κ.τ.λ. You may change the views of the *ἐγκρατής*, on occasion, by argument; it is desire that he cannot be changed by. On the contrary, it is just argument that has no effect on the obstinate; to desires and pleasures they are much more susceptible.

§ 3. **ἰδιογνώνονες.** Cf. Phrynichos (com.) *Μονότροπος* fr. 1, *Ζῶ δὲ Τίμωνος βίον | ἀγέλαστον, ἀδιάλεκτον, ἰδιογνώμονα.*

οἱ ἄγροικοι. Cf. Rhet. 1395 a, 6 *οἱ γὰρ ἄγροικοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται.*

ἄκυρα...ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα. Cf. e.g. Dem. c. Aristocr. § 92 *ἄκυρόν ἐστι τὸ ψήφισμα· προβούλευμα γάρ ἐστιν, ὁ νόμος δ' ἐπέτεια κελεύει τὰ τῆς βουλῆς εἶναι ψηφίσματα.* In Attic law *ἄκυρος* means "null and void."

ὥστε μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Obstinacy is rather a form of *ἀκρασία* than of *ἐγκράτεια*, for the obstinate are those who cannot resist the desire for the pleasure of victory.

§ 4. **εἰσὶ δέ τινες κ.τ.λ.** We have seen that there are cases of *τὸ ἐμμένειν* which are not *ἐγκράτεια*, we now see that there are cases of *τὸ μὴ ἐμμένειν* which are not *ἀκρασία*.

ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεο-
πτόλεμος· καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν· τὸ
γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπείσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσ- 20
σέως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονήν τι πράττων οὕτ'
ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὔτ' ἀκρατής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχράν.
5 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις καὶ τοιούτος οἷος ἧττον ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σω-
ματικοῖς χαίρειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ [τοιοῦτος]
τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρα- 25
τὴς οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ
τὸ ἧττόν τι· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατὴς ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον με-
ταβάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέ-
ρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνον-
ται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι 30
φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον
6 εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. ἐπεὶ δὲ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἡ τοῦ
σώφρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς
οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς 35
ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων 1152 a
φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι
παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ' οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες,
ἀμφότεροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν καὶ 5
οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος. X. οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ

καίτοι δι' ἡδονήν. We know already that to the good man *αἱ καλαὶ πράξεις* are *ἡδεῖαι καθ' αὑτάς* (1099 a, 7 sqq.); we shall see presently in what sense the good man may be said to act *δι' ἡδονήν*.

§ 5. **ὁ [τοιοῦτος] τούτου.** On the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 57. The discussion of the question *πῶς ἔχων;* ends as usual with an examination of the relation between the mean and the extremes (*πῶς ἀντίκεινται;*) Cf. 1108 b, 11 n.

διὰ τὸ μᾶλλόν τι...διὰ τὸ ἧττόν τι, sc. *τοῦ δέοντος τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρειν.* This new type of character is the man who knows that he ought to take more bodily pleasures, but whose desires are not strong enough. Of course **οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον** is the regular Attic idiom for *δι' οὐδέτερον*.

διὰ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν κ.τ.λ. For this *αἰτία*, cf. 1109 a, 10 n.

§ 6. **ἠκολούθηκεν,** 'it is a natural consequence that we speak of the *ἐγκράτεια* of the *σώφρων*.' This is the *λύσις* of the *ἀπορία* raised by the fact that some use the terms *συγκεχυμένως* (1145 b, 16).

X. § 1. **οὐδ' ἅμα κ.τ.λ.** The

ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ ἦθος δέδεικται ὤν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον 2 φρόνιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός —τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν—οὐδὲ δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεω- 3 ρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἑκὼν μέν (τρόπον γάρ τινα εἰδὼς καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὔ· ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικὸς οἷς ἂν βουλεύσηται, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικὸς οὐδὲ βουλευτικὸς ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ᾗ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένῃ μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένῃ. 4 ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν

λύσις of the ἀπορία caused by some people using the word φρόνιμος of the ἀκρατής (1145 a, 17).

δέδεικται, 1144 b, 30.

§ 2. **τῷ πρακτικὸς**, sc. εἶναι.

τὸν δὲ δεινὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 a, 23 sqq. This is one of Aristotle's long parentheses. And yet the parenthesis contains the λύσις.

κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον, 'in definition.' The difference is that the one is a mere δύναμις, while the other implies προαίρεσις. If we define the φρόνιμος in the same way as the δεινός, we lay ourselves open to the ἔνστασις, εἴ τι τῶν δι' αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν εἰς δύναμιν ἔθηκεν (Top. 126 b, 4). For δύναμις and προαίρεσις cf. 1127 b, 14 n.

§ 3. **οὐδὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ.**, closely with ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς οὐ πρακτικός above.

ἑκὼν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has already refused to allow that τὰ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν are ἀκούσια.

ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικής. Difficulties have been made about this, but really there is none; for προαίρεσις does not mean only an isolated act of choice, but is often used in the sense of ἕξις προαιρετική. Now, in this sense, the προαίρεσις of the ἀκρατής is good; but it is prevented from becoming an efficient cause of action by the fact that ἐπιθυμία is for the time stronger than βούλησις.

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος. Cf. 1135 b, 20.

ὁ μὲν γάρ, sc. ὁ ἀσθενής, **ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός**, i.e. ὁ προπετής.

χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν. This is a standing complaint in the comic poets and Demosthenes. Cf. 1141 b, 27 n.

Ἀναξανδρίδης, fr. incert. 16.

§ 4. **τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως**, cf. 1118 b, 23 n.

πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἧττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. εὐιατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν ἡν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾷον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος 30 χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὔηνος λέγει

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ
ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

5 τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται πρὸς ἀλ- 35 λήλας, εἴρηται.

XI. Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν πολι- 1152 b τικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους ἀρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς 2 λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τήν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ 5 λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ πλεῖστοι

τῶν φυσικῶν, i.e. τῶν φύσει, which Ramsauer reads.

τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, cf. de Mem. 452 a, 27 ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος ('habit is a second nature').

Εὔηνος. Cf. Bergk-Crusius p. 134.

XI. § 1. **Περὶ δὲ ἡδονῆς κ.τ.λ.** That Eudemos regarded a discussion of pleasure as a necessary supplement to the discussion of ἀκρασία is proved by EE. 1231 b, 2 ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ γένους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔσται διαιρετέον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὕστερον περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας. From this it has been inferred that the present book is 'Eudemian,' but it may also be inferred that Eudemos followed Aristotle's order of treatment. And the latter inference is far more probable; for, as we shall see, the views criticised are distinctly those of Speusippos, which must have lost some of their 'actuality' by the time of Eudemos. The connexion of thought I take to be this: We have found that ἀκρασία and ἀκολασία are bad, and that they are due to desire for pleasure. Are we to say, then, that pleasure is bad?

τοῦ...φιλοσοφοῦντος. The discussion opens, however, with a general statement that the political philosopher must consider pleasure and pain. This is quite in Aristotle's way. He is always anxious to show that he is keeping in view the practical end of this ἀκρόασις, and discussions which are necessary for other reasons are introduced by a series of remarks as to their practical bearing on statesmanship. A notable instance is the beginning of Book III (where see notes).

ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς. If we say a thing is 'good' *simpliciter*, we mean good in relation to the chief end. If we mean 'good' for anything else, we must 'add' what it is good for. It is then ἀγαθὸν κατὰ πρόσθεσιν.

§ 2. **ἔθεμεν**, 1104 b, 8 sqq.

μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ τὸν μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι 3
ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι
10 ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν 4
οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή,

ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, οἷον ὡς ἂν εἴποις μάλα χαίροντα (Asp. 142, 7). It is quite possible that Aristotle had this etymology in his mind; for it is quite in his style (cf. 1132 a, 32, 1140 b, 11, Bon. Ind. s.v. Etymologica).

§ 3. **τοῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** This is not the Cynic view, as is commonly said. In spite of his catchword μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθείην (RP. 217 A), Antisthenes said ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους διωκτέον ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων, and τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον (Athen. 513). He would therefore admit that ἡδονή might be incidentally good. It was Speusippos who first held pleasure and pain to be two evils opposed to each other and to the good (1108 b, 13 n.). Aulus Gellius ix, 5 'Speusippus vetusque omnis academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese.'

τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι κ.τ.λ. This second ἔνδοξον seems to be meant for that of Plato in the Philebos, where 'pure' or 'unmixed' pleasures (i.e. pleasures not implying pain) are distinguished from 'mixed' or 'impure' pleasures.

εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι κ.τ.λ. This is the conclusion to which Aristotle himself comes in Book X, and is in agreement with the conclusion of the Philebos. Cf. 1172 b, 28 sqq.

§ 4. **ὅλως μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Six arguments (each introduced as usual by ἔτι) for the *first* view, that no pleasure is good. The arguments cannot be those of Antisthenes; for they are Platonic in character and presuppose the Philebos. On the other hand they are not the arguments of the Philebos itself. Therefore they must be the arguments of a follower of Plato.

γένεσις...εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή, 'a felt process to a normal state.' Fritzsche's conjecture ('rationem habet alius philosophi, Platonis asseclae cuiusdam (Speusippi?), qui erat hostis voluptatum et non solum res, sed verba etiam multa a Platonis Philebo in sua scripta transtulerat') evidently hits the mark. So too Grant: "In all probability the school, and perhaps the actual writings, of Speusippus are here referred to." Plato did not regard all pleasures as γενέσεις, but only the 'impure' or 'mixed.' On the other hand the definition is evidently based on the πληρώσεις αἰσθηταί of Phileb. 51 b. We find the definition given as sufficient for rhetorical purposes in Rhet. 1369 b, 33 ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἁθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν. So too Probl. 878 b, 11 ἡ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδύ ἐστιν, ἐὰν ᾖ αἰσθητή.

εἰς φύσιν. The use of φύσις in the sense of 'normal state' also points to Speusippos. Cf. Clem. Strom. ii, 21 (RP. 288 A) Σπεύσιππος...τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἕξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν...ἧς δὴ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους ὄρεξιν ἔχειν.

οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκίᾳ. ἔτι ὁ σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος 15
τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. ἔτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον. ἔτι παιδία
5 καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, 20
ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραί·

οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενὴς κ.τ.λ. This argument is taken from Plato with just such modifications of terminology as we should expect from Speusippos. Cf. Phileb. 53 c ἆρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς ἀεὶ γένεσίς ἐστιν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς;...54 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνοιτ' ἄν....τό γε μὴν οὗ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ (i.e. γένει) ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὦ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

οἷον κ.τ.λ. Cf. the illustration in Phileb. 54 b πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας;

ἔτι ὁ σώφρων κ.τ.λ. That Speusippos used this argument has already been shown to be highly probable (1104 b, 24 n.), and, if he did, the necessity for discussing his view of pleasure at the present stage becomes apparent.

ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος κ.τ.λ. Cf. Clem. Strom. (loc. cit.) Σπεύσιππός φησι...στοχάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας, [Plat.] Def. 412 c ἀλυπία ἕξις καθ' ἣν ἀνέμπτωτοί ἐσμεν εἰς λύπας.

ἔτι ἐμπόδιον κ.τ.λ. This really comes from Plato, Phd. 65 a τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ; κ.τ.λ. 66 c (just after ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν.) ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. The similarity of language is too striking to be accidental, and yet in the Phaedo it is not specially pleasure that is ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν, but the body. The natural inference is that a follower of Plato made use of the Phaedo in drawing an indictment against pleasure.

ἔτι τέχνη οὐδεμία κ.τ.λ. This is just as clearly based on the Gorgias 462 b sqq., where rhetoric and other arts which aim at τὸ ἡδύ instead of τὸ βέλτιστον are declared not to be arts, but merely ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή...χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας. Here again a Platonic argument, which has a different purpose in Plato, is used as part of an indictment against pleasure.

ἔτι παιδία κ.τ.λ. Here again we may compare Gorgias 464 d ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἰατρὸν...πότερος ἐπαΐει περὶ τῶν χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἰατρόν. The general impression, then, which we get from these six arguments is that they are Platonic materials worked up into an indictment against pleasure, and some of the arguments seem safely attributable to Speusippos.

§ 5. **τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας κ.τ.λ.** An argument for the *second* ἔνδοξον.

νοσώδη γὰρ ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

XII. Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μέν, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς φαῦλαι τινὶ δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἱρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνιαι δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον αἱρεταί, <ἁπλῶς> δ' οὔ· αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. ἔτι ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἕξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί

ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον κ.τ.λ. An argument for the *third* ἔνδοξον. These two are dismissed shortly; for they do not immediately concern us at present. Our task now is to examine the thesis that all pleasure is bad *per se*.

XII. § 1. **Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ.** We have now three ἐνστάσεις to the *first* argument, οὐδεμία γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσι. As usual, the first two are mainly dialectical, but lead up to the third, which is the real λύσις.

μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον. This is added for dialectical purposes. If the argument fails even to disprove that pleasure is the best, it fails *a potiori* to disprove that it is good. This point is taken up 1153 b, 7 sqq., and is the real reason why the *third* ἔνδοξον is mentioned at all.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. The position that no pleasure is good because it is a γένεσις and not a τέλος is first attacked by the τόπος of τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον. The word 'good' is ambiguous and therefore, even if we are justified in saying 'no pleasure is good' in one sense of the word, we may be wrong if we take the other sense of it. It may be true that no pleasure is ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, but it does not follow that no pleasure is ἀγαθόν τινι, and even pleasures which are not ἀγαθόν τινι may possibly be ἀγαθόν ποτε.

ἀκολουθήσουσιν, 'it will follow that they also are called good in an ambiguous sense.' If a term is ambiguous, it will be predicated ambiguously of every subject. 'Good' is ambiguous, so therefore will 'good ἕξις' and 'good γένεσις' be.

αἱ δ' οὐδ' ἡδοναὶ κ.τ.λ. This is a different point. Certain γενέσεις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθηταί which are obviously not good are not pleasures at all, though τῷδε (τῷ κάμνοντι) and ποτέ (ἐν ταῖς νόσοις) they appear to be so.

§ 2. **ἔτι ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.** This argument is not so dialectical as the last. It depends upon the view of the good as an ἐνέργεια as opposed to the definition of it by the Academy as a ἕξις (cf. 1098 a, 6 n.). Besides the form of κίνησις which is merely γένεσις (κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν), there is another, namely ἐνέργεια, which implies that the ἕξις is complete.

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κ.τ.λ. The pleasures which Speusippos takes as typical are only pleasant *per accidens*.

εἰσιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν [ἐνέργεια], τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεούσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡδεῖ χαίρουσιν ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθ' ἁπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλλα διέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ

αἱ καθιστᾶσαι. This term was used by Speusippos (Clem. Strom. loc. cit. ἧς δὴ καταστάσεως...ὄρεξιν ἔχειν) and he took it from Plato, cf. Phileb. 42 d εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἡδονὴν ἀποδεξόμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἕξεως καὶ φύσεως (i.e. φυσικῆς ἕξεως), 'the normal state which remains unimpaired.' The best commentary is the phrase τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς 1154 b, 18. The desires which are gratified by the pleasure of restoration to a normal state are the desires of so much of us as has remained normal.

ἐπεὶ καί, 'for that matter,' 'for the matter of that.' We shall see that there are pleasures which are independent of desire and do not therefore imply pain or a disturbance of the normal state.

ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν, sc. ἡδονή. K^b has ἡ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργεια and L^b αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι. But Aspasios says οἷον αἱ θεωρητικαί (sc. ἡδοναί).

§ 3. **ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ.** The *third* and decisive ἔνστασις. We must substitute ἐνέργεια for κίνησις. We need not discuss whether this is or is not 'inconsistent' with Book X, where the ἡδονή is distinguished from the ἐνέργεια which it accompanies. Aristotle is dealing here with the argument of Speusippos, and he only modifies his statement so far as is necessary for his immediate purpose.

ἕτερόν τι...βέλτιον, sc. τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν φυσικὴν ἕξιν.

τὸ τέλος, sc. βέλτιον εἶναι.

οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, e.g. αἱ θεωρητικαί. Aristotle does not deny that some pleasures are accompanied by a γένεσις, though he does deny that any pleasure is a γένεσις.

χρωμένων, sc. ἡμῶν. We have seen that χρῆσις (opp. ἕξις) is equivalent to ἐνέργεια (cf. 1098 b, 32 n.), and that it was an Academic term.

τῶν...ἀγομένων, i.e. τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν ἀγομένων, 'the pleasures of those who are being led etc.'

τὴν τελέωσιν...τῆς φύσεως. Here again we have the terminology of Speusippos. Cf. Clem. Strom. (loc. cit.) ἕξις τελεία ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι.

οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως,
ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσίς τισιν
εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται
εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον. τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια 4
ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν.
ταύτῃ οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατά γε τοῦτο,
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν. ἐμποδίζει 5
δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδονή, ἀλλ'

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον. The reasons for altering the genus in the definition of Speusippos have been given in full. We expect, of course, that this will involve a change in the differentia; for there is no reason to suppose that the differentiae of the genus *ἐνέργεια* will be the same as those of the genus *γένεσις*. No reason, however, is given for the choice of the particular differentia **ἀνεμπόδιστος**. The word only occurs elsewhere in Pol. 1295 a, 35 *εἰ γὰρ καλῶς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον*. Now, as Stewart points out, *ἀνεμπόδιστον* there is equivalent to *τέλειον*, and *τελεία* and *ἀτελής* are often used as differentiae of *ἐνέργεια*. This must have been in Aristotle's mind, but the full meaning of the *τελείωσις* of an *ἐνέργεια* is not worked out till Book X.

δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is added to show what a very ambiguous thing the *γένεσις* argument is. Some, and (if Grant is right in thinking the Cyrenaics are meant) just the very thinkers from whom Plato took the view that *ἡδονή* is a *γένεσις*, had asserted it to be a *γένεσις* just because it was good. The reference of this to the Cyrenaics seems to me certain (cf. also Zeller, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 1, 176). It is in Plato's ironical way to take his argument against pleasure from the hedonist Aristippos, and it is characteristic of Aristotle to insist on the equivocal nature of the argument. According to the Cyrenaics the good was to be found only in the feeling of the moment, and feeling is motion rising into consciousness (*κίνησις εἰς αἴσθησιν ἀναδιδομένη*). Since, then, pleasure is the good it must be a *κίνησις*. But pain is also a *κίνησις*, so pleasure must be what the Cyrenaics called the *λεία κίνησις* and compared *τῷ λείῳ κύματι, τῷ οὐρίῳ ἀνέμῳ*. This Plato interprets as *κίνησις εἰς φύσιν* or *κίνησις εἰς οὐσίαν*, by the help of the (Megarian) distinction between *γένεσις* and *οὐσία*. It is therefore quite correct to say that the Cyrenaics held pleasure to be a *γένεσις* just because it was the good. Aristotle points out that what they were trying to express was that it is an *ἐνέργεια*. It is worth noting that Speusippos had written against Aristippos. Cf. D. L. iv, 4 *καταλέλοιπε δὲ πάμπλειστα ὑπομνήματα καὶ διαλόγους πλείονας, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀρίστιππον τὸν Κυρηναῖον*.

§ 4. **τὸ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.** The answer to the *fourth* argument, preceded by a remark of even wider application.

τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'is the same as (to say that wholesome things are bad) because (*ὅτι*) some wholesome things stand in the way of making money.'

κατά γε τοῦτο, '*this* does not prove them bad in themselves.'

§ 5. **φρονήσει...ἕξει.** These words are of course used in the sense given

αἱ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον
6 ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. τὸ δέ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι
ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλ-
λης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· 25
καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδο-
7 νῆς εἶναι. τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον
διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώ-
κειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ
ἁπλῶς καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας 30
καὶ τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν
ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης, καὶ τὰς σωμα-
τικάς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται), καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ'
ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας,
ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρονος. XIII. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ 1153 b
ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς
κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον

to them by the Academy. Writing in his own person Aristotle would have substituted *σοφίᾳ...ἐνεργείᾳ*.

§ 6. **τὸ δὲ τέχνης κ.τ.λ.** The *ἔνστασις* to the *fifth* argument. No art produces an *ἐνέργεια* but only a *δύναμις*. The art of medicine makes a man able to heal, but it does not produce the act of healing. For that *προαίρεσις* also is required. Cf. MM. 1208 b, 1 *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλη ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τὴν χρῆσιν παραδίδωσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἕξιν*. For the relation of *δύναμις* to *προαίρεσις* in art, cf. 1127 b, 14 n. It is a favourite *τόπος* in dialectical arguments, which this is shown to be by the words **εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν** (cf. 1099 b, 12 n.).

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle too remembers the passage in the Gorgias. Cf. 1152 b, 18 n.

§ 7. **τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα κ.τ.λ.** The *ἀπορίαι* raised by the *second*, *third* and *sixth* arguments are all solved by the same *λύσις*, namely our distinction between pleasures good in themselves and pleasures which are not so. It is the excess of the latter alone to which the statements in question really apply.

εἴρηται, above 1148 a, 22 sq.

XIII. § 1. **ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ.** The main position of Speusippos is now attacked from the *τόπος* of *τὸ ἐναντίον*. The position is thus stated in Aulus Gellius ix, 5 'Speusippus...voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse...opposita inter sese, bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret.' It is admitted, then, that pain is an evil.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ. All pain is *ἁπλῶς κακόν*, though some pain may be *ἀγαθόν τινι*, e.g. the pain of a surgical operation. Even that, however, though incidentally good, is bad **τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική** (sc. *εἶναι*), i.e. *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.

τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ κ.τ.λ. The argument is based on the rule given in Top. 123 b, 5 *ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει, ἅπερ ᾗ ἐναντίον τι τῷ γένει*. Now *κακόν* is a genus,

ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν
5 ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ
λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ
γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι 2
φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων

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and it has a genus opposite to it, namely *ἀγαθόν* (see next note), therefore the opposite of every *κακόν τι* will be *ἀγαθόν τι*.

ἢ φευκτόν τι κ.τ.λ. It is necessary to add this; for of course both pleasure and pain are opposite to *ἀλυπία* as *στέρησις* and *ἕξις* (see next note), but that means merely that *ἢ πάθη* they are opposed to *ἀπάθεια*.

ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν κ.τ.λ. This *λύσις*, though without the name of Speusippos, is more fully stated in Book X (1173 a, 6 sqq.).

ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον κ.τ.λ. This illustration is inapplicable because *τὸ μεῖζον*, *τὸ ἴσον* and *τὸ ἔλαττον* are not instances of *ἐναντία* in the strict sense. They are not contraries, but 'relative opposites' (*ἀντικείμενα ὡς τὰ πρός τι*), i.e. *αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται* (Cat. 6 a, 36). Thus *τὸ μεῖζον* is *μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος* and *τὸ ἔλαττον* is *ἔλαττον τοῦ μείζονος*, and it is only in that sense that they are opposites. The opposition of the greater or less to the equal is of another kind still. Together they make up *τὸ ἄνισον* and are opposed as *ἕξις* and *στέρησις* (on the whole subject, see Met. x, 5). It is in this way that badness is opposed to badness and also to goodness (cf. 1108 b, 11 n.); but pointing to cases like this does not get us out of the difficulty; for they do not show that the same thing can have more than one opposite *κατὰ ταὐτόν*, i.e. *ἢ φευκτόν τι ἢ κακόν* as in the present case.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη κ.τ.λ. To make his *λύσις* complete, he would have to say that *τὸ κακόν* was predicated of pleasure *ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι* (on **ὅπερ...τι** cf. 1140 a, 7 n.), i.e. that it was its genus. For pleasure cannot be in contrary opposition to the good unless it is either (1) *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει*, (2) *ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ γένει*, (3) *αὐτὸ γένος*. The second possibility is alone in question here, and so unless pleasure is a species of *τὸ κακόν* it cannot be the opposite of *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. But Speusippos will not say this; for he would then have to say also that pain is *ὅπερ ἀγαθόν τι*. Further Speusippos himself gives *γένεσις* as the genus of pleasure, and the same species cannot be in two genera neither of which contains or is contained in the other (cf. 1140 a, 5 n.). To make *κακόν* the genus either of pleasure or pain would be to take the *διαφορά* for the *γένος*.

§ 2. **Τἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κ.τ.λ.** For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 58. This is an argument *a fortiori* and is strictly *ad hominem*. So far from the definition of *ἡδονή* as a *γένεσις* proving that it is not good, it fails even to prove that it is not the highest good. Indeed if we substitute, as we must, *ἐνέργεια* for *γένεσις*, it will be hard to resist the inference that pleasure is the highest good. We shall find Aristotle's own teaching about this in Book X. At present we are only getting rid of the idea, which the account given of *ἀκρασία* might suggest, that all pleasure is bad.

ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'just as there is nothing to prevent some form of knowledge being the highest good.' The Platonists say that the highest

οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν 10
ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαι-
μονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἢ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην
εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ
ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν,
ἁπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον 15
εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως·
οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία
τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι
ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται
3 ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις 20

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good is a kind of knowledge, though they admit that some kinds of *ἐπιστήμη* are bad. This is distinctly *ad hominem*; for Aristotle would not admit that any *ἐπιστήμη* as such is bad. As a *δύναμις*, it is of course *τῶν ἐναντίων*, but the *προαίρεσις* must be taken into account. In itself (*καθ' αὐτό*), *ἐπιστήμη* is always of the good (1094 a, 1 n.), and only of the bad *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*.

ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. The *first* argument. *Εὐδαιμονία* is some form of unimpeded activity, all pleasure is unimpeded activity, therefore *εὐδαιμονία* is some form of pleasure. The purpose of this argument is to show that, if we substitute *ἐνέργεια* for *ἕξις* in the Academic definition of *εὐδαιμονία*, as we must (cf. 1098 a, 5 sqq.), and also substitute *ἐνέργεια* for *γένεσις* in the definition of pleasure (cf. 1152 b, 13 sqq.), we shall be driven to the conclusion that *εὐδαιμονία* is *ἡδονή τις*. The clause **εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν...εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν** is added to show that the conclusion is necessary even if we define *εὐδαιμονία* as the *ἐνέργεια* of only one *ἕξις*, i.e. as *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀρετήν* (1098 a, 17).

εἰ ἔτυχεν, 'if you like.' Cf. 1113 a, 19.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. The *second* argument. *Εὐδαιμονία* is a *τέλειος ἐνέργεια*, *τέλειος ἐνέργεια* is *ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια*, therefore *εὐδαιμονία* is *ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια*, i.e. *ἡδονή*. It is just for this reason that external goods are necessary to happiness; for they insure that the activity will be 'unimpeded.'

πάντες...οἴονται. Cf. 1099 a, 7 sqq.

ἐμπλέκουσι. This word is only used here in Aristotle, though *συμπλέκειν* is common (1119 b, 30 n.).

εὐλόγως, cf. Ind. s. v.

τῶν τελείων. Cf. 1097 a, 28 sqq.

προσδεῖται, cf. 1099 a, 15 n.

ταῦτα, accusative, 'that he may not be impeded in these ways.' Cf. for the internal accusative Ar. 'Wasps' 333 *τίς γάρ ἐσθ' ὁ ταῦτά σ' εἴργων;*

§ 3. **οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον κ.τ.λ.** We do not know who proposed this *θέσις*. Cicero (Tusc. v, 9) tells us that Theophrastos in his work *de vita beata* (i.e. *περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*) 'multa disputat quamobrem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non potest. in eo etiam putatur dicere *in rotam beatam vitam non escendere;* non usquam id dicit omnino, sed quae dicit idem valent.' This probably went with the story of Perikles quoted on 1100 b, 29 n. We may reasonably assume that it was a Cynic paradox.

περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς 4
τύχης δοκεῖ τισι ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως
οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώ- 5
πους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν·

φήμη δ' οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα λαοὶ
πολλοὶ . . .

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν 6
οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ' ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι
1154 a ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ 7

The *τροχός* is often mentioned in Aristophanes and the Orators (*ἐπὶ τὸν τροχὸν ἀναβῆναι, ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ στρεβλοῦσθαι*.

§ 4. **διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.** Cf. note on *ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται κ.τ.λ* (1099 b, 9).

ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. On the meaning of *ὅρος* cf. above 1138 b, 23 n. The standard by which we determine whether *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά* really constitute *εὐτυχία* is their relation to *εὐδαιμονία*.

§ 5. **καὶ τὸ διώκειν κ.τ.λ.** This is the argument of Eudoxos, as we shall see in Book X.

πως. Aristotle himself might allow that pleasure was *τὸ ἄριστόν πως*. Exactly how, we shall see in Book X.

φήμη δ' οὔτις κ.τ.λ. Hesiod, Works and Days 763. The end of the second line is *φημίζουσι· θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή*. The verse expresses one of Aristotle's deepest convictions. Cf. 1098 b, 28.

§ 6. **φύσις...ἕξις ἀρίστη.** Observe that these are treated as equivalents, as they are in Academic terminology.

ἔχει τι θεῖον. This is a Platonic idea. Cf. Laws 950 b *θεῖον δέ τι καὶ εὔστοχον ἔνεστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς*. Cf. also below 1173 a, 4.

τὴν...κληρονομίαν. On the metaphor here implied, cf. 1125 b, 17 n.

παραβάλλειν. This verb was originally a nautical metaphor, *παραβάλλειν* (sc. *τὴν ναῦν*) 'to heave to,' 'come alongside.' Bodily pleasures are the port for which most men steer.

§ 7. **φανερὸν δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** The main point of this argument is as follows. It is admitted that the *εὐδαίμων βίος* is pleasant; but, if pleasure is not good, it is not a necessary part of *εὐδαιμονία*. It is also admitted that the wise man seeks *ἀλυπία*, i.e. that he shuns pain. But if pleasure is not good, pain is not bad, so why should he shun it?

ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα— τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν;—ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν. οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μηδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ 5
ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

XIV. Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπτέον τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταὶ σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ
2 καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος, διὰ τί 10
οὖν αἱ ἐναντίαι λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν; ἢ μέχρι του ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἔστι τοῦ βελτίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων δ' ἔστι, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. ἔστιν δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν 15
ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν τὴν ὑπερβολήν ἐστιν,

καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, sc. *ἡ ἀνεμπόδιστος*. The words are explanatory of *ἡδονή*.

τίνος γὰρ...ἀγαθόν; I take these words as parenthetical. If pleasure is not good, what good will it be to the happy man? Then with **ἐνδέχεται ζῆν** we must supply *τὸν εὐδαίμονα*.

XIV. § 1. **Περὶ δὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ.** We come now to the view that, though some pleasures are good (the 'unmixed' pleasures), yet most (i.e. the 'mixed' or 'necessary' pleasures) are bad (1152 b, 10).

διὰ τί οὖν κ.τ.λ., closely with *ἐπισκεπτέον* (see Stewart's note). Those who say that bodily pleasures are bad *simpliciter* must explain the fact that their opposite pains are bad. If the pleasure of eating is bad as such, how can we account for hunger being bad too?

κακῷ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. Cf. 1153 a, 1 sqq.

ἢ οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ κ.τ.λ. Two *λύσεις* are suggested, (1) that the opposition between bodily pains and bodily pleasures may be merely that of *ἀπόφασις* and *κατάφασις*, in which case we may call bodily pleasures 'good' in the sense of 'not bad,' and (2) that bodily pleasures are *positively* good up to a certain point, and only become bad beyond that point. The second alternative is as usual the one that Aristotle adopts; but the first contributes an important element to the solution.

τῶν...ἕξεων καὶ κινήσεων. The terminology is Academic, but Aristotle's meaning is clear. No *ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα* can admit of excess; for it is something *τέλειον*. There cannot be excess, mean and defect in the mean itself (1107 a, 20 sqq.). From this it follows that no *κινήσεις* which belong to such a *ἕξις*, i.e. the *ἐνέργειαι* which are *ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως*, can admit of excess either. We cannot exceed what is good in performing e.g. just acts, and therefore the pleasure of performing just acts cannot be excessive. We can eat too much, and therefore the pleasure of eating may be excessive.

ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκειν...ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. 'It is not the pursuit of necessary

ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφροδισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον 3
τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν— ὅταν γὰρ εὔλογον φανῇ τὸ διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὂν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον—ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ αἱρετώτεραι. πρῶτον 4

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pleasures that makes a bad man, but the pursuit of them in excess.'

ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς λύπης κ.τ.λ. This important doctrine is stated very briefly here, but its real meaning comes out more and more in the sequel. The opposite of excessive bodily pleasure is not positive pain, but merely the negative pain of the absence of that excess (*τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ ἡ ἡδονή* 1118 b, 32), which is not pain at all to any one else. We can now solve the difficulty about the opposition between bodily pleasure and bodily pain stated above (1154 a, 10) by the help of the two *λύσεις* there given. In the case of the normal man the pain which is opposite to the right amount of bodily pleasure is positively bad, and the pleasure is positively good. In the case of the bad man, the excess of positive pleasure which he seeks is positively bad, and the opposite pain which he shuns is only the negation of that pleasure and therefore not positively bad.

§ 3. **Ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.** There is a slight anacolouthon in this sentence. The long parenthesis (**τοῦτο γὰρ...μᾶλλον**) breaks the construction, which is resumed by **ὥστε λεκτέον κ.τ.λ.** as if *ἐπεὶ* had not preceded.

οὐ μόνον δεῖ κ.τ.λ. The necessity of showing the cause of error is especially cogent for Aristotle in view of the conviction which he has just expressed as to the value of popular opinion (so EE. 1216 b, 30 *ἔχει ἕκαστος οἰκεῖόν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν*). Cf. Eucken, Methode der Ar. Forschung p. 10.

ὥστε λεκτέον κ.τ.λ. I take it that the *ψεῦδος* of which we have to discover the *αἴτιον* must be the view that *all* pleasure is bad, and I think that this is borne out by the sequel. We have done for the present with the view that some pleasures are good while others are bad, and return to the main subject of discussion, namely the *θέσις* of Speusippos that *all* pleasure is bad. Now we have seen already that this view is only made plausible by restricting the inquiry to bodily pleasures (1152 b, 33 sqq.), and that again is only possible because most people know no other (1153 b, 33 sqq.). Therefore, in order to explain the origin of the error, we must first show what makes most people give this preeminence to bodily pleasures. Two reasons are given for this, (1) that they are *ἰατρεῖαι* of pain and therefore appear strong by contrast, (2) that, if the pain is excessive, the *ἰατρεία* has to be excessive too.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The *first* reason is simply that they remove pain, which the 'unmixed pleasures'

μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικήν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις (ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων), αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελεουμένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 1154 b
οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὑτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς

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do not, seeing they do not imply a previous pain. The mere contrast with the opposite pain makes them appear stronger than they really are; for we estimate their strength by their distance from the opposite pain and not by their distance from the neutral state.

ἐκκρούει, cf. 1119 b, 10 n.

καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς κ.τ.λ. This is the *second* reason. The first merely explains why bodily pleasures seem stronger than others; this is the reason why the excess of bodily pleasures seems good. It is because they are regarded as *ἰατρεῖαι*, and it is the practice of some doctors to cure one excess by its opposite. Cf. Probl. 358 a, 2 *ὅταν πολὺ ἐκστῇ τις...ἐνίων ἰατρῶν τοιαύτη ἡ τέχνη· ὑπερβολαῖς γὰρ ἰῶνται οἴνου ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἅλμης ἢ σίτου ἢ λιμοῦ*. This is fallacious, as we know, but it accounts for the popular error.

ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, sc. *τῆς ἡδονῆς*.

διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον κ.τ.λ., 'from being seen in contrast with the opposite.'

καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ κ.τ.λ. We see here that the real question is how all pleasure has come to be thought bad. It is because bodily pleasures, and bodily pleasures in excess, are commonly supposed to be the only pleasures. Now (1) *ὑπερβολαί* show a *φαύλη φύσις* and are therefore bad altogether, while (2) *ἰατρεῖαι* show an *ἐνδεὴς φύσις* and are therefore bad in themselves, even though they may be regarded as good *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*. They are *ἀγαθά τινι, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ*. On the reading and interpretation see Bywater, Contr. p. 56.

ἐκ γενετῆς, the case of *θηριότης*. The 'morbid' nature is here omitted.

δι' ἔθος, the case of *ἀκολασία*.

αἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Bywater loc. cit.

§ 5. **ἔτι διώκονται κ.τ.λ.** Another reason why bodily pleasures are supposed to be the only ones, and all pleasure is therefore supposed to be bad.

δίψας. I see no reason for taking this metaphorically. As Aspasios suggests, a thirst acquired by eating salt fish is **βλαβερά**, while one acquired by bodily exercise is **ἀβλαβής**. For 'innocuous pleasures,' cf. Plato, Rep. 357 b *αἱ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς*. Pol. 1339 b, 25 *ὅσα ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων*.

χαίρουσιν, τό τε μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. ἀεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιολόγοι μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὁρᾶν, τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὥς φασιν. ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ 6
νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἡ νεότης. οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν δέονται ἀεὶ ἰατρείας· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσιν. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται. αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν 7
οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· αὗται δὲ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδέα τὰ ἰατρεύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιᾶσδε φύσεως. οὐκ 8

τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον κ.τ.λ. The neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain, though merely negative, appears to many as positive pain. Cf. 1150a, 32n.

ἀεὶ...πονεῖ τὸ ζῷον. Aspasios says ὁ γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρας ἔλεγεν ἀεὶ πονεῖν τὸ ζῷον διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, and the reference to Anaxagoras is confirmed by Theophrastos, de Sensibus § 29 (Diels, Dox. p. 507, 21) ἅπασαν δ' αἴσθησιν μετὰ λύπης (Ἀναξαγόρας φησίν). This is a very interesting anticipation of modern views as to the sub-conscious. All vital processes involve πόνος, but in a well-regulated organism this does not rise above the 'threshold of consciousness' as λύπη.

§ 6. ὁμοίως...ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι. We have seen already that μέθη arises τῶν ἄνω θερμανθέντων (cf. 1147 b, 8 n.), and the 'sanguine temperament' of youth is also due to its 'hot-headedness.' Cf. Probl. 954 b, 39 τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὸ περὶ τὸν τόπον ᾧ φρονοῦμεν καὶ ἐλπίζομεν ποιεῖ εὐθύμους καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύμως, ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τοὺς παῖδας.

ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι,—opposed to οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ...ἀεί.

οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοί. Cf. 1150 b, 25 n.

ἐξελαύνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aspasios quotes from the Ἠθικά of Theophrastos ἐξελαύνει ἡδονὴ λύπην ἥ γε (surely τε) ἐναντία, οἷον ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πίνειν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ διψῆν, καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα, τουτέστιν ἡτισοῦν ἂν εἴη ἰσχυρά, ὥστε ἐνίοτε πεῖναν ἐξελαύνει καὶ ἀκοῆς ἡδονή, ὅταν ᾄσμασιν ἢ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀκούσμασι διαφερόντως χαίρωμεν. This shows that Aristotle either wrote this passage or something uncommonly like it. Cf. Introd. § 4, n. 5.

§ 7. τοῦ ὑπομένοντος ὑγιοῦς. Cf. above 1152 b, 35 τῆς ὑπολοίπου φύσεως καὶ ἕξεως. It is the unimpaired part that πράττει and therefore feels the pleasure; but, as the ἰατρεία is going on at the same time, we think that it is pleasant.

ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν κ.τ.λ. Things which stimulate the activity of a given ἕξις (or φύσις) are pleasant by nature, e.g. music is naturally pleasant to a musical nature.

ἀεὶ δ' οὐθὲν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῆν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτοί, ὥστε ἄν τι θάτερον πράττῃ, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἁπλῆ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. 25
διὸ ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ μίαν καὶ ἁπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινησίας, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύ, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη 30
μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.

9 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἴρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακά· λοιπὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, 'when the two elements are equally balanced.'

διὸ ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Met. 1072 b, 15 διαγωγὴ δέ ἐστιν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν.

μεταβολὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eur. Or. 234.

BOOKS VIII—IX.

FRIENDSHIP.

Introductory Note.

As usual, several good reasons are given why a discussion of *φιλία* should form part of a course on *πολιτική*, but we are left to guess why it should come between the discussion of Will and Desire and the final account of the Good for Man. That this is characteristic of the method we have seen already (cf. Book III. Introductory Note p. 108, 1152 b, 1 n.); otherwise we might be tempted to think that the proper place for the treatment of *φιλία* was just after that of *δικαιοσύνη*, with which it has so many points of contact, and it might be urged that a transposition of VI—VII and VIII—IX would have the further advantage of bringing the two discussions of Pleasure together. The hypothesis, however, is excluded by the fact that *φιλία* was taken up at the same point of the course by Eudemos. This shows that the present arrangement is not due to any accident of editing, so there must be some connexion of thought, other than that given in the text, which made this the right place for the discussion. Following a hint of Teichmüller's (Neue Studien III, p. 129), we may, I think, give the following account of the matter. According to Aristotle, the growth of *φιλία* keeps pace with the growth of *φρόνησις*. The lowest animals care for their young at least at the time of birth, and the higher we rise in the scale of animal *φρόνησις* (cf. 1140 a, 27 n.) the wider and more permanent does *φιλία* become, till at last in man it appears as the feeling of union with his kind upon which the family, the state, and all other human associations rest. Cf. Gen. An. 753 a, 7 *ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἴσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ* (1) *τοῖς μὲν χείροσιν*

τοῦτ' ἐμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκεῖν μόνον, (2) *τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελείωσιν*, (3) *ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφήν*, (4) *τοῖς δὲ δὴ μάλιστα κοινωνοῦσι φρονήσεως καὶ πρὸς τελεωθέντα γίνεται συνήθεια καὶ φιλία, καθάπερ τοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων ἐνίοις, τοῖς δ' ὄρνισι μέχρι τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ ἐκθρέψαι· διόπερ καὶ μὴ ἐπῳάζουσαι αἱ θηλεῖαι ὅταν τέκωσι, διατίθενται χεῖρον ὥσπερ ἑνός τινος στερισκόμεναι τῶν συμφύτων.* Here we have the different stages of *φιλία* clearly traced, and these stages are made to depend upon the degree of *φρόνησις*, or knowledge of the good for one's own kind, which is present at each. In fact *φιλία* is, we may say, the altruistic use of *φρόνησις*, a use which is its 'natural' use in spite of public opinion to the contrary (cf. 1141 b, 29 sqq.). We can see, then, how the treatment of *φιλία* is quite in its right place here, and we shall see later how it leads us naturally through the stages of love for the good as such, and love for our own 'best self,' to its highest manifestation, the *amor dei intellectualis*. It is, in fact, *φιλία* and *φιλία* alone that can bridge the gulf between *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*, the practical and the theoretic life.

1155 a

Θ

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιότατον εἰς τὸν βίον. ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἕλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας

1155 a, 3. EE. 1234 b, 18 Περὶ φιλίας, τί ἐστι καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ τίς ὁ φίλος, καὶ πότερον ἡ φιλία μοναχῶς λέγεται ἢ πλεοναχῶς, καὶ

I. **§ 1. ἔστι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** The reasons given for discussing *φιλία* are (1) that it is *καλόν*, (2) that it is *ἀναγκαῖον*. This is the literary form of the distinction between *τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετόν*, *τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα* and the *conditio sine qua non*, *οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ*. The distinction between *καλαί* and *ἀναγκαῖαι πράξεις* plays a great part in the Politics, and is derived from Plato, cf. Rep. 493 c *τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἐωρακὼς εἴη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι*. To say *φιλία* is an *ἀρετή* is equivalent to saying it is *καλόν*. The two points are then taken in the reverse order: (1) *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον* §§ 1—4, (2) *τὸ καλόν* § 5.

ἀρετή τις. There is an *ἀρετή* which, for want of a better name, we called *φιλία*, but that is not what we are going to speak of now. It was not based on feeling (*πάθος*) or affection (*τὸ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ*), and we are now going to discuss *φιλία* as a feeling (cf. 1126 b, 19 sqq.). In this sense it may or may not be strictly an *ἀρετή* itself; it is certainly **μετ' ἀρετῆς**, for in its truest form it can exist, we shall see, only between the good.

ἀναγκαιότατον. The proofs that *φιλία* is (*ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*) *ἀναγκαῖον* to the good life may be reduced to three: (1) it is necessary as supplying its *ὕλη* and also its *ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά*, (2) it is necessary because it is natural, and 'nature makes nothing in vain,' (3) it rather than justice is the bond of the state, and the good life is possible only in the state.

ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων κ.τ.λ. It supplies the *ὕλη* (the *ἐν οἷς*) for good activities.

καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι κ.τ.λ. These are taken as examples because they can choose freely (cf. 1095 b, 21 n.). If we find, then, that they would not choose to live without friends to benefit, we get a strong *ἔνδοξον*.

κεκτημένοις δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεία· τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας, ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους; ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθείη καὶ σῴζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτῳ ἐπισφα- 10
2 λεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθείας, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· "σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω·" καὶ γὰρ 15
3 νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι. φύσει τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι

εἰ πλεοναχῶς, πόσα ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πῶς χρηστέον τῷ φίλῳ καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ φιλικόν, ἐπισκεπτέον οὐθενὸς ἧττον τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη καλῶν καὶ αἱρετῶν. τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργον εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ποιῆσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τοῦτό φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμον· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι φίλους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικουμένους ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. ἔτι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία ἠθική τις εἶναι ἕξις. καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ποιῆσαι ὥστε μὴ ἀδικεῖν, †ἀλλ' εἰς (ἄλις Jackson) φίλους ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ ἀληθινοὶ φίλοι οὐκ ἀδικοῦσιν.

εὐετηρίας. Cf. 1098 b, 26 n.

ἢ πῶς ἂν κ.τ.λ. We pass from the *ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ* as *ἐν οἷς*, to the *ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ* as *ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά*.

§ 2. πρὸς θεράπειαν κ.τ.λ. This clause is obscure owing to the fact that **πρὸς** has to do duty twice over by a sort of brachylogy. The full construction would be *πρὸς θεραπείαν καὶ πρὸς βοηθείας πρὸς τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως*. For the plural *βοήθειαι* and for *βοήθεια πρός τι* see Bon. Ind. 139 a, 2 sqq. The old editors took *βοηθείας* as gen. sing. (*ob infirmitatem auxilii* Zell), Bekker reads *βοηθεῖ* on inferior authority, Susemihl and Bywater both restore the reading of the best MSS. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii, 4, 6 *ὁ ἀγαθὸς φίλος ἑαυτὸν τάττει πρὸς πᾶν τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῷ φίλῳ*.

σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω. The first words of the famous passage, Il. x, 224—

σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ ὃ τοῦ ἐνόησεν,
ὅππως κέρδος ἔῃ· μοῦνος δ' εἴπερ τε νοήσῃ,
ἀλλά τέ οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις.

Plato also refers to this passage by its first words only (Symp. 174 d, etc.), so it was already proverbial.

§ 3. φύσει κ.τ.λ. If a thing exists *φύσει*, it must be *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον*, for nature aims at the good and *οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ*. The fact that the

καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι πρὸς ἄλ-
ληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους
ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς οἰκεῖον
ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πό- 4
λεις συνέχειν ἡ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν
σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἡ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοιόν τι τῇ
φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στά-
σιν ἔχθραν οὖσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν· καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων
οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, 5
καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον
δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐὰν δίκαιοι ὦσιν, οὐκ ἀδικήσουσιν· ἢ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἢ ἐγγύς τι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν τὸν φίλον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνομεν, τὴν δὲ ἀφιλίαν καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν δεινότατον, ὅτι ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ ἡ ἑκούσιος ὁμιλία μετὰ τούτων· μετ' οἰκείων γὰρ ἢ μετὰ συγγενῶν ἢ μεθ' ἑταίρων συνδιημερεύομεν, ἢ τέκνων ἢ γονέων ἢ γυναικός. καὶ τὰ ἴδια δίκαια τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν μόνον, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους νενομοθέτηται, καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

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hen-bird is uneasy if not allowed to sit (cf. Gen. An. quoted on p. 345) is already a sign that *φιλία* is a necessary condition of the good life.

τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι, 'animals of the same race.' Eudemos says *ὁμογενέσι* (p. 380). Cf. Rhet. 1371 b, 12 *ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ καὶ νέος νέῳ.* Fritzsche quotes Theokr. ix, 31 *τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, | ἴρηκες δ' ἴρηξιν· ἐμὶν δ' ἀ Μῶσα καὶ ᾠδά.*

ἐν ταῖς πλάναις. This is one of the few places in Aristotle where we see a sign of the coming cosmopolitanism. He was himself an *ἄπολις*.

οἰκεῖον, opp. *ἀλλότριον*. Cf. below 1171 a, 16 *οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνειν.*

§ 4. **ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The good life is impossible without the *πόλις*, *φιλία* is the bond of the *πόλις*, therefore *φιλία* is *ἀναγκαῖον*.

οἱ νομοθέται, cf. 1103 a, 3 n.

ὁμόνοια. Cf. below 1167 a, 22 sqq. Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 16 *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμόνοιά γε μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναι.*

τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα, sc. *δίκαιον*, 'justice in the fullest sense.' I do not think there is any reference to special forms of justice, either *τὸ ἐπιεικές* (Zwinger) or *τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* (Aspasios), but simply to the general principle *αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον* (1160 a, 7).

§ 5. **ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν.** For the opposition between *τὸ (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) ἀναγκαῖον* and *τὸ καλόν*, cf. 1120 b, 1 n. Friendship is not only a means but an end.

τοὺς φιλοφίλους. Cf. Rhet. 1381 b, 26 *φιλοῦσι τοὺς σφόδρα φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας.*

ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἥ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἔν τι εἶναι· 30
καὶ ἔτι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.

6 Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους,
ὅθεν 'τὸν ὅμοιόν' φασιν 'ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον,' καὶ 'κολοιὸν ποτὶ
κολοιόν,' καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας 'κεραμεῖς' πάντας 35

1155 a, 32. EE. 1235 a, 4 *ἀπορεῖται δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῆς φιλίας, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οἱ ἔξωθεν περιλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον λέγοντες· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι φίλον, ὅθεν εἴρηται*

ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον·
καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν·
ἔγνω δὲ φώρ τε φῶρα, καὶ λύκος λύκον.

οἱ δὲ φυσιολόγοι καὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν διακοσμοῦσιν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὸ

οἴονται. The reference is probably to the provisional result reached in Plato's Lysis 214 e,—a passage which, as we shall see, Aristotle had before him in composing this part of his lecture—*Ἔχομεν ἄρα ἤδη τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ φίλοι· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει ὅτι οἳ ἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί.*

§ 6. **Διαμφισβητεῖται κ.τ.λ.** The first two *ἔνδοξα* are taken from Plato's Lysis 214 a sqq. and together form a dialectical *πρόβλημα*. The first is that *φιλία* is of the like, cf. Lysis l.c. *λέγουσι δὲ (οἱ ποιηταί)...'' αἰεί τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον'' καὶ ποιεῖ γνώριμον. ἢ οὐκ ἐντετύχηκας τούτοις τοῖς ἔπεσιν; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτα αὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκῃ ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶ δέ που οὗτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες.* The second *ἔνδοξον* is that *φιλία* is of the unlike, cf. Lysis 215 c, *ἤδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος...ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμιώτατοι εἶεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς ἄρα ''καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ, | καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ κ.τ.λ.*

τὸν ὅμοιόν φασιν κ.τ.λ. Od. xvii, 218 *ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον*, quoted by Plato l.c. with a slight verbal difference. Theophr. Char. xxix, *καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς παροιμίας τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸν ὅμοιον πορεύεσθαι.*

κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν. MM. 1208 b, 9 *κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιὸν ἰζάνει.* Rhet. 1371 b, 15 *ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, ὡς ''ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει'' (cf. 1161 b, 34) καὶ ''ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον,'' καὶ ''ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα'' καὶ ''ἀεὶ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιόν,'' καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.* Here Aristotle seems to be quoting from Doric source (Epicharmos?).

κεραμεῖς. From Hesiod, Works and Days, 25

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ.

also quoted in the Lysis l.c. with verbal differences.

1155 b τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι. καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων "ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν" ξηρανθεῖσαν, "ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν," καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ "ἀντίξουν" συμφέρον καὶ "ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην

τὸ ὅμοιον ἰέναι πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον, διὸ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ τὴν κύν' ἔφη καθῆσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς κεραμίδος διὰ τὸ ἔχειν πλεῖστον ὅμοιον. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω τὸ φίλον λέγουσιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φασὶν εἶναι φίλον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐρώμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν πᾶσιν εἶναι φίλον, ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ οὐ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ξηροῦ, ἀλλ' ὑγροῦ, ὅθεν εἴρηται

ἐρᾷ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖα

καὶ τὸ

μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκύ.

ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ εἰς τοὐναντίον. τὸ δ' ὅμοιον ἐχθρὸν τῷ ὁμοίῳ· καὶ γὰρ

κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει,

καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρεφόμενα πολέμια ἀλλήλοις ζῷα. αὗται μὲν οὖν αἱ ὑπολήψεις τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον πολέμιον,

τῷ πλέονι δ' αἰεὶ πολέμιον καθίσταται
τοὔλασσον, ἐχθρὰς θ' ἡμέρας κατάρχεται,

ἀνώτερον, sc. 'in serie causarum' (Bon. Ind. 68 b, 47); for *φυσική* is *ἡ ἄνω ἐπιστήμη* with regard to *πολιτική*, just as *ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία* is with regard to *φυσική* (Met. 1005 a, 33 *ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω*). They take *φυσικαί* instead of *ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις* (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.). This explains the use of *ἄνωθεν* above 1144 a, 12.

Εὐριπίδης μὲν κ.τ.λ., fr. 898 Nauck, beginning *Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅση θεός;* The lines more immediately referred to here are—

ἐρᾷ μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖ', ὅτε ξηρὸν πέδον
ἄκαρπον αὐχμῷ νοτίδος ἐνδεὼς ἔχῃ·
ἐρᾷ δ' ὁ σεμνὸς οὐρανὸς πληρούμενος
ὄμβρου πεσεῖν εἰς γαῖαν Ἀφροδίτης ὕπο.

καὶ Ἡράκλειτος κ.τ.λ. Cf. 'Early Greek Philosophy' pp. 158 sqq. In the Lysis 215 e Plato quotes some sayings which are clearly of Heraklitean origin (Kratylos?) *ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου (τοῦ ἐναντίου) ἕκαστον ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκέος, τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλῆρες δὲ κενώσεως...τροφὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολαῦσαι.*

τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον κ.τ.λ., fr. 46 Bywater. It seems to be fairly well made out (Zeller 1, p. 657 n. 1 ed. 5) that the primary reference of this fragment was to pieces of wood used in building and supporting each other by leaning in opposite directions. The stability of the building is due to opposite strains or, as Chrysippos puts it (ap. Aul. Gell. vii, 1, 2) 'opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quaeque fulta nixu consistere.' But in any case the point lies in the pun 'The hostile is good for us,' 'what disagrees with us agrees with us.'

ἁρμονίαν" καὶ "πάντα κατ' ἔριν" γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου
7 *ἐφίεσθαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημάτων ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, οἷον* 10 *πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἷόν τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον ἓν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν*

ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τόποι κεχωρισμένοι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ δὲ φιλία δοκεῖ συνάγειν· οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι

ὡς ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἶναι ἁρμονίαν μὴ ὄντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα ἄνευ θήλεως καὶ ἄρρενος ἐναντίων ὄντων.

1155 b, 8. EE. 1235 a, 29 *δύο μὲν αὗται δόξαι περὶ φιλίας εἰσί, λίαν τε καθόλου <καὶ> κεχωρισμέναι τοσοῦτον· ἄλλαι δὲ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω καὶ οἰκεῖαι τῶν φαινομένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ τοὺς φαύλους εἶναι φίλους, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοὺς ἀγαθούς· τοῖς δ' ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ φιλοῦσιν αἱ μητέρες τὰ τέκνα (φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἐνοῦσα φιλία· προαποθνήσκειν γοῦν αἱροῦνται τῶν τέκνων)· τοῖς δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον δοκεῖ φίλον εἶναι μόνον. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ διώκουσι ταῦτα πάντες, τὰ δὲ ἄχρηστα καὶ αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν ἀποβάλλουσιν· ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ὁ γέρων ἔλεγε τὸν πτύελον καὶ τὰς τρίχας καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας παραβάλλων, καὶ τὰ μόρια ὅτι ῥιπτοῦμεν τὰ ἄχρηστα, καὶ τέλος*

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. For the meaning of his doctrine of "like to like," cf. Early Greek Philosophy, p. 245 sqq.

§ **7. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** These *φυσικαὶ προτάσεις* are not relevant to the present enquiry; we shall confine ourselves to *ἀπορίαι* raised by *ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις*.

οἷον πότερον κ.τ.λ. This also comes from Lysis 214 d *τοῦτο τοίνυν αἰνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτ' ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται.*

πότερον ἓν εἶδος κ.τ.λ. We shall

ἢ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἓν οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, οὐχ ἱκανῷ πεπιστεύκασι σημείῳ· δέχεται γὰρ

τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν ἀποθάνῃ· ἄχρηστος γὰρ ὁ νεκρός. οἷς δὲ χρήσιμον, φυλάττουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. ταῦτα δὴ πάντα δοκεῖ μὲν ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλοις εἶναι. τό τε γὰρ <ὅμοιον> ἄχρηστον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, καὶ ἐναντιότης ὁμοιότητος ἀπέχει πλεῖστον, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀχρηστότατον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· φθαρτικὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον. ἔτι δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ κτήσασθαι φίλον· τοῖς δὲ σπανιώτατον γνῶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄνευ ἀτυχίας (τοῖς γὰρ εὖ πράττουσι βούλονται πάντες

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find that the answer to this *πρόβλημα* will furnish the *λύσις* of all the *ἀπορίαι*.

ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται κ.τ.λ. The question at issue here is whether difference in degree excludes specific difference. According to Plato, Phileb. 24 e *ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένους ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι.* This doctrine Aristotle fully accepts, and it follows from it that difference in degree can never constitute specific difference, *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* is not *εἰδοποιόν*, cf. Pol. 1259 b, 36 *οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν*...38 *τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδὲν* (sc. *εἶδει διαφέρει*). But it does not follow from this that difference in degree will exclude specific difference, though it may exclude generic, cf. Part. An. 644 a, 18 *ὅσα διαφέρει...κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ταῦτα ὑπέζευκται ἑνὶ γένει.* If anything can be 'more or less' something, it must be that thing, but there is nothing to prevent the 'more' being a different species from the 'less' under certain conditions.

δέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* cannot be *εἰδοποιόν*, this can only be in cases where, as Plato would say, *τὸ πέρας* is 'mixed' with *τὸ ἄπειρον*, i.e. where there is some *λόγος* or determinate ratio constituting a 'form' (*εἶδος*). The most instructive example of this is furnished by musical 'intervals.' It is true that the genus *φθόγγος* admits of *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*, and we might conclude from this that it can have no specific differences. But this is to leave out of account the fact that *αἴσθησις*, the *δύναμις κριτική*, cannot distinguish any interval less than the *δίεσις*. The *μεσότης* of *ὀξύ* and *βαρύ* may be a little 'more' or 'less,' the note may be slightly 'flat' or 'sharp'; but it remains specifically the same note. So too with colours. They are all generically one, and their genus has the *ἐναντίωσις* white and black corresponding to *ὀξύ* and *βαρύ* in the musical scale. But *αἴσθησις* cannot distinguish an infinite number of colours between white and black. There are a certain definite number of *λόγοι* or proportions of white and black which sight can distinguish, and mixtures a little more or a little less are referred to these *λόγοι*, which therefore constitute the *εἴδη χρώματος*. Red is specifically different from green, in spite of the fact that it is whiter. In de Sens. 446 a, 1 Aristotle illustrates this by the old puzzle of the grain of millet. We do not hear the fall of one grain, nor does it make the sound louder if we add one grain to a bushel.

τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. εἴρηται δ' 15
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν.

II. Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον· δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ 20
2 ἂν εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν

δοκεῖν φίλοι εἶναι)· οἱ δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς συνδιαμένουσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις ἀξιοῦσι πιστεύειν, ὡς ἐξαπατῶντας καὶ προσποιουμένους, ἵνα κτήσωνται διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτυχούντων ὁμιλίας πάλιν εὐτυχούντων φιλίαν.

1155 b, 17. EE. 1235 b, 13 *ληπτέος δὴ τρόπος ὅστις ἡμῖν ἅμα τά τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει, καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν εὐλόγως φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα· μάλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντιώσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι <μὲν> ὡς ἀληθὲς ᾗ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ πότερον τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ φιλούμενον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦμεν οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, καὶ μάλιστα ὁ ἔρως τοιοῦτον—οὐθεὶς γὰρ*

ἐραστὴς ὅστις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ—

ἡ δὲ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος, ταύτῃ μὲν τὸ φιλούμενον τὸ ἡδύ, εἰ δὲ ὃ βουλόμεθα, τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἔστι δ' ἕτερον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

τῷ εἴδει. Things *γένει ἕτερα* do not.

ἔμπροσθεν. It is vain to ask where.

II. **§ 1. περὶ αὐτῶν**, quite general. 'The subject may be cleared up.'

γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ. So *προαίρεσις* was defined after an enquiry into *τὸ προαιρετόν*, *βούλευσις* and *βούλησις* after an enquiry into *τὸ βουλευτόν* and *τὸ βουλητόν*. This dialectical method is *σκέψις ἐπὶ τῶν πτώσεων*, and is here applied to the *πρόβλημα*, *πότερον πολλαχῶς ἢ μοναχῶς τῷ εἴδει λέγεται;* (Top. 106 a, 9), the rule being *ὅταν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ ἡ πτῶσις ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἡ πτῶσις, καὶ αὐτό* (ib. b, 38). It is more obvious that *τὸ φιλητόν* has different species than that *φιλία* has; for *τὰ φιλητά* have actually different names (*τοῖς ὀνόμασι διαφωνεῖ*), and this makes it clear that *φιλία* is not specifically one.

ἀγαθόν ... ἡδύ ... χρήσιμον. Cf. 1104 b, 30 *τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος.*

δόξειε δ' ἄν κ.τ.λ., for *τὸ χρήσιμον* is always *ἄλλου χάριν* (1096 a, 7).

§ 2. πότερον οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. the precisely similar question about *βούλησις* above 1113 a, 15 sqq. There we saw that the object of *βούλησις* was always *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, but that in the case of the good man this coincides with *τὸ φύσει* or *κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν*. The solution in the present case would be the same: we always love *τὸ φαι-*

φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ
25 τὸ ἑκάστῳ· φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον. τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύ- 3
χων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ—γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλε-

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περὶ δὴ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συγγενῶν τούτοις πειρατέον διορίσαι, λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν τήνδε. τὸ γὰρ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ βουλητὸν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὀρεκτόν· φαινόμενον γάρ τι ἀγαθόν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κἂν μὴ δοκῇ. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταὐτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. ὅτι μέντοι φίλον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, δῆλον.

τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου ληπτέον ὑπόθεσιν ἑτέραν. τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τινί, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὔ. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδέα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντί φαμεν σώματι συμφέροντα ἁπλῶς εἶναι σώματι ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι οὔ, οἷον φαρμακείας καὶ τομάς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδέα ἁπλῶς σώματι τὰ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι καὶ ὁλοκλήρῳ, οἷον τὸ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐν τῷ σκότει· καίτοι τῷ ὀφθαλμιῶντι ἐναντίως. καὶ οἶνος ἡδίων οὐχ ὁ τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ τὴν γλῶτταν ὑπὸ οἰνοφλυγίας, ἐπεὶ οὔτε ὄξος παρεγχέουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀδιαφθόρῳ αἰσθήσει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐχ ἃ τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀλλ' ἃ τοῖς καθεστῶσιν. ἀμφοτέρων γοῦν μεμνημένοι

νόμενον φιλητόν, but this does not affect our inference from different species of φιλητά to different species of φιλία. For, if we say φαινόμενον φιλητόν instead of φιλητόν, to allow for all cases where τὸ ἀγαθόν or τὸ ἡδύ is not the really good or pleasant, we still keep the πτῶσις required for the argument. Eudemos works this out with reference to health as a normal state, cf. above 1113 a, 22 sqq. with the notes.

§ 3. **ἐπὶ μὲν κ.τ.λ.** Three characteristics of φιλία are inferred from the use of the word in current language. Though we use the verb φιλεῖν of our feeling towards inanimate objects (it is a **φίλησις**), yet we do not call that feeling φιλία. This is because φιλία is (1) βούλησις ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθοῦ, (2) ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, to which we must add, (3) μὴ λανθάνουσα.

ἀντιφίλησις, cf. ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι below.

ἐκείνῳ. For the reading cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 59.

τῷ οἴνῳ. The illustration is suggested by the word φίλοινος in Plato, Lys. 212 d οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ' αὖ φιλόκυνές γε καὶ φίλοινοι. The problem here is not so obvious to us because we have the verb 'to like' for this sort of φίλησις. Cf. French *aimer le vin*, but not *une amitié pour le vin*.

εἴπερ, 'if at all.'

ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. This is merely a popular belief the mention of which is suggested by the problem of the φίλοινος. We must not press it or make it part of the definition; for, as we shall see, it does not strictly hold of all or indeed any species of φιλία. The truth which underlies this ἔνδοξον is otherwise expressed by Aristotle.

εὔνους. On εὔνοια see below 1166 b, 30. Here it is defined as βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, but something more is required to differentiate φιλία from it.

ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι, i.e. ἐν ἀντιφιλοῦσι. Here, as in commercial exchange, supply and demand, action and reaction (τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον, cf. 1133 a, 15 n.) must be equal.

§ 4. **μὴ λανθάνουσαν.** This is added to meet the possibility even of reciprocal and disinterested well-wishing which is unknown to *both* parties. If A may entertain such a feeling towards B without B's knowledge, it is equally possible that B may be entertaining it towards A without A's knowledge. This may be common enough, for instance, between writers of different nationalities.

δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων, sc. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον. Cf. the definition in Rhet. 1380 b, 35

σθαι τἀγαθά, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σῴζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς 30
ἔχῃ—τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἂν μὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι
4 φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὔνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς 35
εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι 1156 a
πρὸς τοῦτον. εὔνοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων. 5

ταῦθ' αἱρούμεθα. ὡς δ' ἔχει παιδίον καὶ θηρίον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καθεστῶτα, οὕτως ἔχει ὁ φαῦλος καὶ ἄφρων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ φρόνιμον. τούτοις δὲ ἡδέα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλά.

1155 b, 27. EE. 1236 a, 7 sqq. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ πλεοναχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τοιόνδ' εἶναι λέγομεν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὠφέλιμον καὶ χρήσιμον), ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινὶ καὶ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων δι' ἕκαστον τούτων ἐνδέχεται ἡμᾶς αἱρεῖσθαί τι καὶ φιλεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπον. τὸν μὲν γὰρ <τῷ> τοιόνδε καὶ δι' ἀρετήν, τὸν δ' ὅτι ὠφέλιμος καὶ χρήσιμος, τὸν δ' ὅτι ἡδὺς καὶ δι' ἡδονήν. φίλος δὴ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφιλῇ, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτούς.

III. Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς

1156 a, 6. Cf. EE. 1236 a, 16 sqq. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἴδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἓν ἁπάσας μηδ' ὡς εἴδη ἑνὸς γένους, μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὥσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν. καὶ <γὰρ> ψυχὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ' οὗ λόγος ἐν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει. οἷον ὄργανον ἰατρικόν, ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσαιτο· ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὀργάνου. ζητεῖται μὲν οὖν πανταχοῦ τὸ πρῶτον· διὰ δὲ τὸ καθόλου εἶναι [τὸ] πρῶτον λαμβάνουσιν καὶ πρῶτον καθόλου, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς φιλίας οὐ δύνανται πάντ' ἀποδιδόναι τὰ φαινόμενα. οὐ γὰρ ἐφαρμόττοντος ἑνὸς λόγου οὐκ

ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαί τινι ἃ οἴεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος. οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

III. § 1. **ταῦτα**, sc. τὰ φιλητά, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ χρήσιμον. The inference from the πτῶσις is marked by the particles **ἄρα, δή**.

οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the different species of φιλητά furnish us with a διαφορά of the genus βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι μὴ λανθάνουσα. There cannot be three εἴδη φιλίας unless they are differentiated by διαφοραί which are διαφοραί of this γένος. So Aristotle proceeds to show that each species of φιλία is **βούλησίς τις** ἀγαθοῦ etc.

ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν, i.e. the φιλία which has τὸ ἡδύ for its object is, if we may coin the phrase, βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀγαθῶν. On the other hand, if the φιλητόν is τὸ ἀγαθόν, it will be βούλησις τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀγαθῶν.

οὐ καθ' αὑτούς is explained by **κατὰ συμβεβηκός** below. We wish such a friend to be rich, for instance, not because we believe such riches to be a necessary χορηγία for the full development of his nature, but for what we hope to get out of him.

οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι κ.τ.λ. We must supply οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες as subject to **ἀγαπῶσι**, for it would be quite possible to love witty people διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Wit is an ἀρετή, a part of καλοκἀγαθία, and might therefore be *pro tanto* φιλητὸν ᾗ ἀγαθόν. In that case we should love the wit τῷ ποιόν τινα εἶναι.

αὐτοῖς. οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ᾗ πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ὦσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ

οἴονται <τὰς> ἄλλας φιλίας εἶναι· αἱ δ' εἰσὶ μέν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσίν· οἱ δ' ὅταν ἡ πρώτη μὴ ἐφαρμόττῃ, ὡς οὖσαν καθόλου ἄν, εἴπερ ἦν πρώτη, οὐδ' εἶναι φιλίας τὰς ἄλλας φασίν· ἔστι δὲ πολλὰ εἴδη φιλίας. τῶν γὰρ ῥηθέντων ἦν ἤδη, ἐπειδὴ διώρισται τριχῶς λέγεσθαι τὴν φιλίαν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ διώρισται δι' ἀρετήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ.

τούτων ἡ μὲν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἐστιν ἡ [διὰ] τῶν πλείστων φιλία —διὰ γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμοι εἶναι φιλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ μέχρι τούτου, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία

Γλαῦκ', ἐπίκουρος ἀνὴρ τόσσον φίλος ἔσκε μάχηται,

καὶ

οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας—

ἡ δὲ δι' ἡδονὴν τῶν νέων—τούτου γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν· διὸ εὐμετάβολος φιλία ἡ τῶν νέων· μεταβαλλόντων γὰρ τὰ ἤθη κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ—ἡ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶν βελτίστων.

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§ 2. **ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστιν.** Bywater (Contr. p. 59) thinks the article, which is omitted in K^b "would be better away" and refers to EE 1237 a, 40 (p. 363). But that passage simply states that τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν (not specially τὸ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν) τὸ φιλούμενόν ἐστι χρῆσθαι ᾗ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον τῷ φίλῳ ᾗ φίλος, which is another point. The reading ᾗ φιλούμενός ἐστι would surely be equivalent to ᾗ φιλεῖται, and we have just been told that *all* friends βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. The meaning must be the same as that of ᾗ ἐστιν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος just below, that is, practically equivalent to τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι above. But there is no need to read ἐστὶν <ὅσπερ ἐστίν> here with Bonitz; for **ᾗ...ἔστιν** can very well mean "on the ground of what he is," in accordance with the principle of abbreviating subordinate relative clauses illustrated in Kühner § 557. When φιλία is διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, we love our friend "for what he is," not for his usefulness or agreeableness to ourselves.

§ 3. **δι' ὃ**, i.e. τοῦ δι' ὅ, cf. 1117 b, 30 n. This abbreviation is really similar in principle to that of ᾗ explained in the last note.

φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δο- 4
κεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ὦσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γάρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' 5
ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα

φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία—μόνον γὰρ αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως—αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ μικρόν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸν τροχίλον φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὡς οἱ μάντεις τὰς συνεδρείας καὶ διεδρείας λέγουσιν. καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἂν εἶεν φίλοι ἀλλήλοις καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. οἱ δ' ὅτι ἡ πρώτη οὐχ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς, οὓς φασι φίλους εἶναι· ἀδικήσει γὰρ ὅ γε φαῦλος τὸν φαῦλον, οἱ δ' ἀδικούμενοι οὐ φιλοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ φιλοῦσι μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν πρώτην φιλίαν, ἐπεὶ τάς γε ἑτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει. δι'

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§ 4. **ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις**, cf. Rhet. 1389 b, 36 *πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς.* The *ἠθοποιΐα* here reminds us once more of the New Comedy with its typical old men and young men.

οὐ πάνυ...συζῶσι, 'are not much given to *συμβίωσις*.' Cf. Ind. s. v. *οὐ πάνυ*.

τὴν ξενικήν. A merchant will not necessarily introduce his 'correspondent' from a foreign country to his family or his club. A Hellene called his *ξένοι* by the name of *φίλοι*, but clearly this is *διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον*.

§ 5. **τῶν νέων.** For the *ἦθος* cf. Rhet. 1389 a, 2 *οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοὶ καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πεῖναι...καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ...καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους.*

διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὑτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπί- 35
πτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρω- 1156 b
τικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν 5
φιλίαν οὕτως.

6 Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ᾗ

ἡδονὴν γὰρ ὑπομένουσιν ἀλλήλους βλαπτόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὦσιν ἀκρατεῖς· οὐ δοκοῦσι δ' οὐδ' οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους φίλοι εἶναι, ὅταν κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ζητῶσιν, ὅτι οὐχ ἡ πρώτη. ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ βέβαιος, αὕτη δὲ ἀβέβαιος. ἡ δ' ἐστὶ μέν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, φιλία, οὐκ ἐκείνη δέ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστι, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθ' ἕνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀδύνατον. λείπεται τοίνυν οὕτως, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μόνη <ἡ> πρώτη φιλία, ἔστι δὲ ὡς πᾶσαι, οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχον ἔχουσαι πρὸς ἑαυτάς, οὔτε καθ' ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἕν.

1156 b, 7. EE. 1236 b, 27 *ἐπεὶ δ' ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἅμα, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ, ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ πρῶτός ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ δι' αὑτὸν αὐτὸς αἱρετός (ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον· ὡς γὰρ βούλεταί τις δι' αὑτὸν εἶναι τἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη καὶ*

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§ 6. **Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.** The friendship of the good is distinguished from the other two by being *τέλειόν τι*. We have seen that *φιλία* exists *φύσει* (1155 a, 16 n.) and is therefore capable of growth or evolution. By calling the friendship of the good *τελεία*, Aristotle means to say, in accordance with the strict use of the word, that the growth is complete and that the 'form' (*εἶδος*) of *φιλία* is realised in it so that none of it is left out (*τὸ τέλειον = οὗ μηδὲν ἔξω*). It is, in fact, 'full-grown' *φιλία*, as a *τέλειος ἀνήρ* is a 'full-grown' man. We can now see why the *ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι* were shown at length to be characteristic of youth and age; the one is undeveloped, the other is past its prime. Eudemos has worked out this point more fully. Cf. 1236 a, 16 sqq., quoted on p. 356.

καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. As *φιλία* is *ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι* (1155 b, 33), it is necessary to make it clear that the *τελεία φιλία* implies the goodness of both parties. It is only then that the *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ᾗ ἀγαθοί* can be reciprocal.

ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ
10 τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὐτοὺς γὰρ
οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων
φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν
ἑκάτερος ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ
ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

αὐτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι εἶναι), ὁ δ' ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδύς ἐστιν ἁπλῶς· διὸ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ ὁπωσοῦν φίλος ἡδύς. ἔτι δὲ διοριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον· ἔχει γὰρ ἐπίστασιν πότερον τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν φίλον, καὶ πότερον τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, ὥστε καὶ τὸ φιλητὸν ἡδύ, ἢ οὔ. ἄμφω γὰρ εἰς ταὐτὸ συνακτέον· τά τε γὰρ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ἁπλῶς <ἂν> τύχῃ φευκτά· καὶ τὸ μὴ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν οὐθὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὃ ζητεῖται, τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὰ οὕτως εἶναι ἀγαθά. ἔστι γὰρ αἱρετὸν μὲν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν· ἃ δεῖ συμφωνῆσαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιεῖ· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅπως οἷς μήπω ἐστὶ γένηται. * * εὐθέτως δὲ καὶ πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἄνθρωπος ὤν (φύσει γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθά), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀντὶ γυναικὸς καὶ εὐφυὴς ἀφυοῦς, διὰ τοῦ ἡδέος δὲ ἡ ὁδός· ἀνάγκη

καθ' αὑτούς, 'essentially,' not merely *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* or in so far as they may be 'some good' to one another. The disinterested character (*ἐκείνου ἕνεκα* 1155 b, 31) of true *φιλία* depends upon the *φιλητόν* being something which belongs to the *φιλούμενος*, not in relation to the *φιλῶν* (*τῷ φιλοῦντι*), but *καθ' αὑτόν*, for *βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν* (1156 a, 9).

δι' αὑτούς, here as often a *reciprocal* reflexive pronoun, more emphatic than *δι' ἀλλήλους*. They love (**οὕτως ἔχουσι** i.e. *φιλοῦσι*) 'for each others' own selves,' in other words each loves *ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενος ἔστι*, 'for what the object of his love is' (1156 a, 16).

διαμένει οὖν κ.τ.λ. A thing cannot be 'complete' unless it has sufficient time to develope fully (cf. *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ* 1098 a, 18 n.); for all *κίνησις* is in time. We now see why it was shown above that the *ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι* are *εὐδιάλυτοι* (1156 a, 19). That which is really *τέλειον* must be *τέλειον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον* (1156 b, 33).

ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. Cf. 1100 b, 11 sqq., and contrast 1156 a, 21 *τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται*, a, 34 *τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα*.

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This continues the proof that such *φιλία* is 'complete.' Since *τὸ τέλειον* is *οὗ μηδὲν ἔξω*, 'complete' *φιλία* must include the incomplete or undeveloped forms of *φιλία*. The good, therefore, must be (1) good, (2) good for one another, (3) pleasant, (4) pleasant to one another.

καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι, i.e. (2) good for one another. This *φιλία* therefore includes the advantages of *φιλία διὰ τὸ συμφέρον*.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, i.e. both (3) *ἁπλῶς* and (4) *τῷ φίλῳ*.

ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ 15
γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται,
7 τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία
μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα
τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστιν
ἢ δι' ἡδονήν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά 20

εἶναι τὰ καλὰ ἡδέα. ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο διαφωνῇ, οὔπω σπουδαῖον τελέως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐγγενέσθαι ἀκρασίαν· τῷ γὰρ διαφωνεῖν τἀγαθὸν τῷ ἡδεῖ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκρασία ἐστίν.

1156 b, 17. EE. 1237 a, 10 ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ πρώτη φιλία κατ' ἀρετήν, ἔσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοί. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ὅτι χρήσιμοι, ἀλλ' ἄλλον τρόπον· διχῶς γὰρ ἔχει τὸ τῳδὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν. καὶ ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὠφελίμου, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἕξεων. ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ ἁπλῶς ὠφέλιμον καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοιοῦτον <οἷον τὸ> γυμνάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ φαρμακεύεσθαι. ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἡ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετή <ἐστιν>. ἔστω γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν φύσει σπουδαίων· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ φύσει σπουδαίου ἀρετὴ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ὁμοίως δὴ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἡδύ. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιστατέον καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν ἐστιν ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φιλία, καὶ

καθ' ἡδονήν, equivalent to *ἡδεῖαι*, more often *πρὸς ἡδονήν*.

αἱ οἰκεῖαι...καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, 'his own acts, and (therefore) acts like them.' If a colour is pleasant, it will be pleasant when reflected in a mirror.

αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. The acts of one good man are 'the same as or similar to' those of another, and therefore pleasant to him. This friendship, then, includes the advantages of *φιλία διὰ τὸ ἡδύ*.

§ **7. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ κ.τ.λ.** If I am right in my interpretation of this section, it is not a duplicate of the last. It puts the whole matter in a more scientific form and shows that all four advantages of friendship not only belong to the friendship of the good, but belong to it *καθ' αὑτήν*, and that this is the reason of its permanence.

συνάπτει, intrans. 'join,' 'meet,' cf. 1157 a, 34.

πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία κ.τ.λ. It is not necessary to mention *τὸ χρήσιμον*, for it is not *φιλητὸν ὡς τέλος*. It is sufficiently provided for by the qualification *τῷ φιλοῦντι*.

ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα, 'either for pleasure simply or for pleasure to the lover, i.e. pleasure depending on a similarity.' I delete the comma after *φιλοῦντι* with Grant, though I do not adopt with him the interpretation of Aspasios. The meaning, I think, is that friendship is either *δι' ἡδονὴν ἁπλῶς*, as for instance the friendship of kings for *εὐτράπελοι* (cf. 1156 a, 13 n.), or it may be *δι' ἡδονήν τινι*, i.e. it may be based on the fact that activities 'the same as or similar to' our own are pleasant, for instance the friendship of bad men who 'rejoice in each other's badness' (cf. 1159 b, 10). The first kind is based upon pleasure as such, and may exist between the most unlike persons; the

τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὑτούς· ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοιοι, καὶ τὰ λοιπά—τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς—ἔστιν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δ' 8

τί διαφέρει, καὶ ἐν ποτέρῳ ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ φιλεῖν, [καὶ] πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθός, κἂν εἰ μὴ ἡδύς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο, διχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ φιλεῖν, πότερον ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς φαίνεται. δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἱ πρόσφατοι θεωρίαι καὶ μαθήσεις αἰσθηταὶ μάλιστα τῷ ἡδεῖ, οὕτω καὶ αἱ τῶν συνήθων ἀναγνωρίσεις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν. φύσει γοῦν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς, καὶ οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ. διὸ εὐθὺς τὰ ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις χαίρει, καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἥδιστον ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀτελεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθέντι· ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος. εἰ δὲ τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν φιλεῖν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῆς ἀλλήλων γνωρίσεως, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὅλως

second is based on a pleasure which can only be felt by a like person on recognising acts like his own. Aspasios, followed by Grant, takes *καθ' ὁμοιότητα* in the sense of 'metaphorically,' 'by analogy' (cf. Ind. s.v. *ὁμοιότης*), but this would imply the doctrine that friendship *δι' ἡδονὴν ἁπλῶς* was true friendship, whereas from 1158 b, 6 we see that *all* friendship based on pleasure is only *φιλία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*. On the other hand, to put a comma after *φιλοῦντι* with the other editors would make Aristotle say that *all* friendship is based on similarity, which would be to prejudge the *λύσις* of the *ἀπορία* stated 1155 a, 32 sqq., and that in a manner inconsistent with the *λύσις* actually given below.

ταύτῃ...καθ' αὑτούς. Strict grammar would require either *ταύτῃ...καθ' αὑτήν* or *τούτοις...καθ' αὑτούς*, but the change from the abstract to the personal is in complete accordance with Greek idiom, being in principle the same as the use of *αὐτοί* in reference to the name of a town. All the four advantages belong to this *φιλία*, and that too essentially and therefore permanently.

ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοιοι, sc. *ᾗ ἀγαθοί*. Both being good they will be *ἀγαθοὶ ἀλλήλοις*, as shown above. The reading I have adopted has far the highest authority (K^b Γ Asp.), and makes excellent sense if we only put a comma after it. The other reading **ταύτῃ δὲ ὅμοια** *καὶ τὰ λοιπά* ('and the remaining *εἴδη φιλίας* are like it') is mentioned by Aspasios and is plainly accommodated to his erroneous interpretation of *καθ' ὁμοιότητα* above. For the sense given to *ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι*, cf. 1157 b, 2 where it can hardly mean anything else.

καὶ τὰ λοιπά, 'the remaining two' of the four advantages enumerated above, explained by *τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς*. Hitherto *καὶ τὰ λοιπά* has been taken either as an accusative limiting *ὅμοιοι*, or as the subject of *ὅμοια*.

ἔστιν. My interpretation of course makes it necessary to give *ἔστιν* the full force of *ἔνεστιν* or *ὑπάρχει*. This is quite in accordance with Greek idiom, which repeats a compound verb by the corresponding simple one.

εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ 25 προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, 9 πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν 30 φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὔ.

IV. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταὐτὰ γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια

ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἀντιπροαίρεσις τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων, ὅτι ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα. ἔστι δ' αὕτη ἡ φιλία ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἡ τοιαύτη προαίρεσις. τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια, αὕτη δ' οὐκ ἔξω ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ φιλοῦντι, δυνάμεως δὲ πάσης ἔξω· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ <ᾗ> ἕτερον. διὸ τὸ φιλεῖν χαίρειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι φιλητοῦ ἐνέργεια, τὸ δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἐμψύχῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀψύχῳ· φιλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὸ φιλούμενον [ὅ] ἐστι χρῆσθαι ᾗ φιλούμενον, ὁ δὲ φίλος φιλούμενον τῷ φίλῳ ᾗ φίλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ ᾗ μουσικὸς ἢ ᾗ ἰατρικός· ἡδονὴ τοίνυν ἡ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ᾗ αὐτός, αὕτη φιλική. αὐτὸν γὰρ φιλεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλος. ὥστ' ἂν μὴ χαίρῃ ᾗ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡ πρώτη φιλία. οὐδὲ δεῖ ἐμποδίζειν οὐθὲν τῶν συμβεβηκότων μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὐφραίνειν. εἰ γὰρ σφόδρα δυσώδης, λείπεται· ἀγαπᾶται γὰρ τῷ εὐνοεῖν, συζῇ δὲ μή.

Cf. Plato, Phd. 59 b, where *παρῆν* is repeated by *ἦν*.

§ 8. **ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Another reason for the rarity of such *φιλία*. The verb *προσδεῖται* is properly used of the *conditio sine qua non* which is not itself a part of the thing. Cf. 1099 a, 31 n.

τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας, EE 1238 a, 2 *διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθε ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἁλῶν*. In this precise form the proverb does not seem to occur earlier; but the phrase *ἅλες καὶ τράπεζα* was commonly used of 'eating one's salt and sharing one's board.'

ἀποδέξασθαι, *probare*, cf. 1157 b, 18. 1165 b, 13. 1169 a, 8.

§ 9. **βούλησις...φιλίας**, i.e. *εὔνοια*, cf. 1155 b, 33.

IV. § 1. **Αὕτη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** A comparison between the *ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι* and *τελεία φιλία* gives the answer to the question whether there are more *εἴδη φιλίας* than one. Strictly speaking there is only one; the rest are only *φιλία καθ' ὁμοιότητα*. But, as current language calls these *φιλία* also, it will be best for us to do so too. There are then three *εἴδη φιλίας* in the popular sense of the word.

καὶ κατὰ τὰ λοιπά, the remaining *ὑπάρχοντα*, viz. good and pleasure both *simpliciter* and *τῷ φιλοῦντι*.

35 ἑκατέρῳ παρ' ἑκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν. ἡ δὲ
1157 a διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι μένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον
5 ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἥδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίοτε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει (τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ
10 ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία)· πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ 2
χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἧττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμ-

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καὶ κατὰ πάντα κ.τ.λ., 'and in respect of them all each gets from each the same and similar things.'

ὁμοίωμα...ἔχει, but only in the sense of having *ταὐτόν τι*, the sense in which *παιδιά* is said in Pol. 1339 b, 35 *ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν τῷ τέλει*, because both imply pleasure. It is not even a *ὁμοίωμα* like that between things which are *εἴδει ἕν*, but admit of *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* (cf. 1155 b, 14 n.), they are not 'like' in the sense that white lead is 'like' snow. For we must not infer from Aristotle's mention of *εἴδη* which admit of *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* that he meant to apply this to *φιλία*. They were only adduced to show that the argument adduced (by Speusippos?) was insufficient.

καὶ ἐν τούτοις, sc. *ἐν τοῖς καθ' ὁμοιότητα φίλοις*.

μένουσι. L^b has *διαμένουσι*, but the compound is referred to by the simple verb, cf. 1156 b, 23 n.

ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίνηται κ.τ.λ. The forms of *φιλία* in which the two parties do not get the same thing from one another are discussed in Book IX and there for the first time get the name of *ἀνομοειδεῖς φιλίαι* (1163 b, 32). All the *φιλίαι* discussed in this book are *ὁμοειδεῖς* and are further subdivided into *φιλίαι* (1) *ἐν ἰσότητι*, (2) *καθ' ὑπεροχήν*.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The *ὁμοίωμα* to true *φιλία* is most complete when there is reciprocity not only of pleasure but of the same pleasure.

ληγούσης δὲ κ.τ.λ., suggested by Plato, Symp. 183 e *πονηρὸς δ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐραστὴς ὁ πάνδημος, ὁ τοῦ σώματος μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐρῶν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ μόνιμός ἐστιν ἅτε οὐδὲ μονίμου ἐρῶν πράγματος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι, οὗπερ ἤρα, οἴχεται ἀποπτόμενος, πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ὑποσχέσεις καταισχύνας. ὁ δὲ τοῦ ἤθους χρηστοῦ ὄντος ἐραστὴς διὰ βίου μένει ἅτε μονίμῳ συντακείς.*

§ 2. **ἧττον φίλοι**, less even than those who exchange different pleasures. Of course *ἧττον* goes with *διαμένουσι* as well as **φίλοι**.

φέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ 15
τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθούς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ
3 *μή τις ὠφέλεια γίνοιτο. καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φι-* 20
λία ἀδιάβλητός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ δεδοκιμασμένου· καὶ τὸ "πιστεύειν" ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ "μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι," καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλίᾳ ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἑτέραις
4 *οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι* 25

1157 a, 16. EE. 1237 b, 8 *αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἣν πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι δι' αὐτὴν καὶ δοκοῦσι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦνται. βέβαιον γάρ τι δοκεῖ ἡ φιλία· μόνη δ' αὕτη βέβαιος. τὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ γινόμενα μηδὲ ῥᾳδίως [οὐ] ποιεῖ τὴν*

μηδέτερον ὁποιῳοῦν, 'one who is neither good nor bad to a person of any character you please.'

ἑαυτοῖς, the reciprocal reflexive, an emphatic *ἀλλήλοις*. Cf. 1156 b, 10 n.

ἀδιάβλητος. The proper meaning of *διαβάλλειν* is 'to set at variance,' 'to estrange.' The meaning 'to misrepresent,' 'slander' is secondary.

τὸ πιστεύειν κ.τ.λ., 'the sayings *πιστεύω* ("I trust him") and *οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικήσειε* ("He would never do me wrong").'

ἐν τούτοις, sc. *ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*.

§ 4. **ἐπεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** 'I say *ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις* (sc. *φιλίαις*); for, since people call them *φιλίαι*, we may do so too,' though strictly speaking only the friendship of the good, as *τελεία φιλία*, deserves the name. But, if we use the word in this comprehensive way, we must allow more *εἴδη φιλίας* than one. Eudemos is at pains to point out exactly where the unity of these different *φιλίαι* lies. They are not *καθ' ἓν λεγόμενα* or *συνώνυμα* as the *εἴδη* of one *γένος*, since the *γένος* is only predicated of one of them *καθ' αὑτό*. Nor are they mere chance *ὁμώνυμα* (cf. 1096 b, 27 n.); for they are all called *φιλία* in virtue of a common element. They are *πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενα*, just as the *ἀρετή* of a *παῖς* is so called *πρὸς τὸ τέλος* (Pol. 1260 a, 32), i.e. in the light of what it will be when fully developed. Now this relation between the *ἀτελές* and the *τέλειον* is just *τὸ ἀνάλογον*. For instance the less highly developed animals have not blood but something 'analogous,' Hist. An. 489 a, 21 *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν αἷμα καὶ φλέψ, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον τούτων· ἔστι δ' ἀτελῆ ταῦτα, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἶς τὸ δὲ ἴχωρ* (for the biological theory see Zeller, Aristotle, Eng. Trans. ii, 24 sqq.). The different *φιλίαι* are therefore *τῷ ἀνάλογον ἕν* or *καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, for this is the only kind of unity that can exist between the undeveloped and the developed, just as it is the only kind that can exist

λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἴδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ᾗ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιόν τι, ταύτῃ φίλοι·

κρίσιν ὀρθήν. οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος· ἡ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. δεῖ γὰρ πεῖραν λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ λέγει καὶ Θέογνις·

οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης ἀνδρὸς νόον οὐδὲ γυναικός,
πρὶν πειραθείης ὥσπερ ὑποζυγίου.

οὐδ' ἄνευ χρόνου φίλος, ἀλλὰ βούλονται φίλοι, καὶ μάλιστα λανθάνει ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ὡς φιλία. ὅταν γὰρ προθύμως ἔχωσι φίλοι εἶναι, διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὑπηρετεῖν τὰ φιλικὰ ἀλλήλοις, οἴονται οὐ βούλεσθαι φίλοι, ἀλλ' εἶναι φίλοι. τὸ δ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας·

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between different *γένη*. We see then that Aristotle does not adopt the suggestion he made that the difference is one of *μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*, for that difference is expressly contrasted with *τὸ ἀνάλογον*. Cf. Hist. An. 588 a, 25 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ* (sc. *ζῷα*) *τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον...τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀνάλογον διαφέρει*. The true doctrine is that the other *φιλίαι* are so called because they show in a rudimentary and undeveloped way the characteristics of true *φιλία*, and it is only to avoid unnecessary conflict with current language that we speak of them as *εἴδη φιλίας* at all.

ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις...ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες. People talk of 'friendly states' and of children 'playing with their friends,' and we must respect the *usus loquendi* if possible. Strict grammar would require *ὥσπερ τὰς πόλεις...ὥσπερ τοὺς παῖδας* (it is quite wrong to supply *λέγουσι* or *ὀνομάζουσι*); but Greek idiom can use the nominative after *ὥσπερ* without regard to the structure of the sentence.

πρώτως καὶ κυρίως, opp. *δευτέρως καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μεταφοράν*. Cf. Bonitz on Met. 1015 b, 11.

ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι, sc. *φιλοῦσι*, to be supplied from *φίλοι*. Τὸ *ἡδύ* is their *φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, and therefore holds an 'analogous' position in their *φιλία* to that of *τὸ ἀγαθόν* in true *φιλία*.

καὶ ὅμοιόν τι, sc. *φιλοῦσι*. This is another point of 'analogy.' Their *φιλία* is based, like that of the good, on the fact that *ἑκάστῳ καθ' ἡδονὴν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται*. The acts of (e.g.) the *εὐτράπελος* are pleasant to the *εὐτράπελος*, just as the acts of the good man are pleasant to the good man. Again, however, we have a variety of interpretations due, as above 1156 b, 20, to the two senses in which *τὸ ὅμοιον* and *ὁμοιότης* are used throughout this passage. In L^b *τι* after *ὅμοιον* is omitted, and this shows that the passage was understood to mean 'in so far as it is something good and *like the good*.' But this loses sight of one point in the analogy.

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιληδέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὗται συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

6 Εἰς ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἴδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι' αὑτούς φίλοι· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι τούτοις. V. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται, οὕτω 1157 b

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οὐ γὰρ εἰ βούλονται ὑγιαίνειν, ὑγιαίνουσιν, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἰ φίλοι βούλονται, ἤδη καὶ φίλοι εἰσίν. σημεῖον δέ· εὐδιάβλητοι γὰρ οἱ διακείμενοι ἄνευ πείρας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πεῖραν δεδώκασιν ἀλλήλοις, οὐκ εὐδιάβλητοι, περὶ ὧν δὲ μή, πεισθεῖεν ἂν ὅταν σύμβολα λέγωσιν οἱ διαβάλλοντες. ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις αὕτη ἡ φιλία· ἄπιστος γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ κακοήθης πρὸς πάντας· αὐτῷ γὰρ μετρεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους. διὸ εὐεξαπατητότεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ἂν μὴ διὰ πεῖραν ἀπιστῶσιν. οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι αἱροῦνται τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἀντὶ τοῦ φίλου, καὶ οὐθεὶς φιλεῖ μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ πράγματα. ὥστ' οὐ φίλοι. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται οὕτω κοινὰ τὰ φίλων· προσνέμεται γὰρ ὁ φίλος τοῖς

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§ 5. **οὐ πάνυ...συνάπτουσι**, 'are not very apt to coincide.' It is a mistake to suppose that *οὐ πάνυ* means 'not at all' in classical Greek, in spite of Cobet's contention to that effect. Where it seems to mean 'not at all,' it is only by a litotes; just as *οὐχ ἥκιστα* may seem to mean *μάλιστα*. The friendship of the good is necessarily both pleasant and useful (1156 b, 18), but a friendship for pleasure is not very likely to be useful, nor a friendship for use very likely to be pleasant.

οὐ...πάνυ συνδυάζεται, cf. 1121 a, 16. Pleasure and profit belong to the friendship of the good essentially, but there is nothing to bind pleasure to profit nor profit to pleasure. As 'accidents' they are 'not much found in combination.' Cf. Met. 1027 a, 11 *οἷον οὔτ' αἰεὶ οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁ λευκὸς μουσικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεταί ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται*. The phrase, then, excludes the *συνδυασμός* of pleasure and profit from *τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*.

§ 6. **ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες**, cf. 1156 b, 22 n., and 1157 a, 32 *ᾗ...ὅμοιόν τι*, sc. *φιλοῦσι*.

δι' αὑτούς, i.e. *δι' ἀλλήλους*, cf. 1156 b, 10 n.

τῷ ὡμοιῶσθαι, i.e. *καθ' ὁμοιότητα*.

V. § 1. **ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1098 b, 33 *τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηργηκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ εὖ πράξει*.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μέν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἡ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται "πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν." οὐ φαίνονται 2 δ' οὔθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται οὔθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ 3

πράγμασιν, οὐ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς φίλοις. οὐ γίνεται ἄρ' ἡ φιλία ἡ πρώτη ἐν πολλοῖς, ὅτι χαλεπὸν πολλῶν πεῖραν λαβεῖν· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ ἂν ἔδει συζῆσαι. οὐδὲ δὴ αἱρετέον ὁμοίως περὶ ἱματίου καὶ φίλου· καίτοι ἐν πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος δυοῖν τὸ βέλτιον αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ μὲν τῷ χείρονι πάλαι ἐχρῆτο, τῷ βελτίονι δὲ μηδέπω, τοῦθ' αἱρετέον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ πάλαι φίλου τὸν ἀγνῶτα εἰ βελτίων· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄνευ πείρας οὐδὲ μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁ φίλος, ἀλλὰ χρόνου δεῖ. διὸ εἰς παροιμίαν ἐλήλυθεν ὁ μέδιμνος τῶν ἁλῶν· ἅμα δὲ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοί, εἰ δὴ φίλος ἔσται σοὶ φίλος. ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἐστι τῷ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθός, ἁπλῶς <δ'> ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταὐτ' ἄμφω, ὥστε ὃ ἐστιν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ τούτου ἄλλῳ, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλῳ δ' ἀγαθός, ὅτι χρήσιμος. τὸ δὲ πολλοῖς ἅμα εἶναι φίλον καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν κωλύει· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἅμα πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐνεργεῖν.

ὥστ' ἐνεργεῖν. It is not necessary to insert *ἄν* with Ramsauer and Susemihl. Their *ἕξις* is such as to become active at once when brought into contact with the object.

τὴν φιλίαν ἁπλῶς, sc. *τὴν ἕξιν*.

πολλὰς δὴ κ.τ.λ. We do not know the author of this version of "out of sight, out of mind." The word *ἀπροσηγορία* occurs nowhere else in classical literature. We expect it to mean want of 'affability'; but Aristotle seems to take it as simply "lack of converse" (Peters).

§ 2. **οἱ στρυφνοί**, 'sour.' The *εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν* are given in de An. 422 b, 11. They form a series between the opposites sweet and bitter, differing *τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* like sounds and colours (cf. 1155 b, 15 n.). In this series *τὸ στρυφνόν* comes between *τὸ αὐστηρόν*, 'dry' (as we say 'dry sherry') and *τὸ ὀξύ*, 'acid.' It is the taste of unripe fruit. In its metaphorical use as applied to *ἦθος* we have it in Ar. Wasps 877.

δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὔνοις ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν —ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέγονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει— συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

4 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ

1157 b, 25. EE. 1238 a, 11 ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι ὀρθῶς λέγεται ὅτι ἡ φιλία τῶν βεβαίων, ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν αὐτάρκων. καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται

ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιον, οὐ τὰ χρήματα.

πολὺ δὲ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅτι χρόνος λέγεται δεικνύναι τὸν φιλούμενον, καὶ αἱ ἀτυχίαι μᾶλλον τῶν εὐτυχιῶν. τότε γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων (οὗτοι γὰρ μόνοι ἀντὶ τῶν φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ φύσει κακῶν, περὶ ἃ αἱ εὐτυχίαι καὶ αἱ δυστυχίαι, αἱροῦνται μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἢ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι)· ἡ δὴ ἀτυχία δηλοῖ τοὺς μὴ ὄντως ὄντας φίλους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τυχόντας. ὁ δὲ χρόνος δηλοῖ ἀμφοτέρους· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ χρήσιμος ταχὺ δῆλος, ἀλλ' ὁ ἡδὺς μᾶλλον. πλὴν οὐδ' ὁ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺς ταχύ. ὅμοιοι γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῖς οἴνοις καὶ ἐδέσμασιν· ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ ταχὺ δηλοῖ, πλείω δὲ χρόνον γινόμενον ἀηδὲς καὶ οὐ γλυκύ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμοίως. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ τῷ τέλει ὁριστέον καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ. ὁμολογήσαιεν δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων μόνον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόματος καλοῦσι γλύκιον· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀποβαῖνον οὐχ ἡδύ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνεχές, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐξαπατᾷ.

§ 3. **ἀποδεχόμενοι**, *probantes*, cf. above 1156 b, 28.

οἱ μακάριοι, *beati*, as opposed to *οἱ ἐνδεεῖς*, those who are in need of nothing. It is not necessary, however, to limit the meaning so far as to make it merely equivalent to *οἱ πλούσιοι*.

μονώταις, cf. 1097 b, 9 n.

ἡ ἑταιρική, sc. *φιλία*.

§ 4. **Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The connexion of thought here seems to be this. The distinction just drawn between the *ἕξις* and the *ἐνέργεια* of *φιλία* suggests another important distinction which still further brings out the nature of the *τελεία φιλία*. Although it is true that something more than the *ἕξις* is necessary for it, we must distinguish the *ἐνέργεια* which comes from the formed *ἕξις* and the mere *πάθος* of *φίλησις* which is the material out of which the *ἕξις* is formed. The *ἐνέργεια* of true *φιλία* is not a *πάθος*, but an *ἐνέργεια* which is *ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως* and implies *προαίρεσις*. The distinction is just like that between the *κινήσεις* which make up

πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, ἡ δὲ φιλία ἕξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἧττον πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἕξεως· καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕξιν. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος. ἕκάτερος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ εἴδει· λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἰσότης, μά-

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ἐθισμός and the good activities which arise when the *ἐθισμός* is complete.

τὸ αὑτῷ τοιοῦτον, sc. *ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ*.

δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα, (1) *διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς*, (2) *διὰ τὸ αὑτῷ*.

§ 5. **ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Three *σημεῖα* are given which show that true *φιλία* is a *ἕξις*, (1) *ἀντιφίλησις* implies *προαίρεσις*, (2) the *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ* is *ἐκείνων ἕνεκα*, (3) the *φιλητὸν* is *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. Ultimately this means that *φιλία* is not an *ἀλλοίωσις* but a *τελείωσις* of the soul. Cf. 1103 a, 25 n.

ἡ γὰρ φίλησις κ.τ.λ. We can now explain why the word *φιλία* has a more restricted application than *φίλησις* (i.e. the verb *φιλεῖν*, cf. above 1155 b, 29 n.). It is just because *ἀντιφίλησις* implies *προαίρεσις* and *προαίρεσις* implies a *ἕξις*. For the presence of *προαίρεσις* as a means of distinguishing *ἕξεις* from *πάθη* cf. 1106 a, 3, where it is given as one of the arguments to show that *ἀρετή* is not a *πάθος* but a *ἕξις*, that the *ἀρεταί* are *προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως*. Now it is clear that the reciprocation of *φίλησις* must be 'deliberate' or *μετὰ λόγου*—no mere *ἀλλοίωσις* of *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν* could amount to reciprocation—and it therefore implies the union of the intellectual with the appetitive, i.e. *προαίρεσις*, and that implies a *ἕξις*.

καὶ τἀγαθὰ βούλονται κ.τ.λ. The fact that the *βούλησις* is disinterested (**ἐκείνων ἕνεκα**) also shows that it can be no mere *πάθος*.

καὶ φιλοῦντες κ.τ.λ. The fact that the *βούλησις*, so far as it is self-regarding, is of the true *ἀγαθόν* also shows it is no mere *πάθος*. It always requires a determinate *ἕξις* to make *τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν*, the object of all *βούλησις*, coincide with *τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν*.

τῇ βουλήσει, the *βούλησις ἀγαθῶν* is reciprocal (*ἀνταποδίδωσι*, cf. *ἀντιφίλησις*, *ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι* above).

καὶ τῷ εἴδει. This *φιλία* is (1) *ἐν ἰσότητι*, cf. *τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι*, and also (2) *ὁμοειδής* as explained below 1158 b, 1 *τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν* (cf. 1157 a, 4 n.) *καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις* as contrasted with the *ἀνομοειδεῖς φιλίαι* in which *ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας* (1158 b, 2). This point is as important as the other and could hardly be omitted here. The K^b reading **καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ** seems to me to spoil the argument, though it is no doubt true that they give each other equal pleasure.

φιλότης ἰσότης. This is said to be a Pythagorean formula.

λιστα δὲ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταὐθ' ὑπάρχει. VI. ἐν δὲ τοῖς 1158 a
στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἧττον γίνεται ἡ φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἧττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὔ· οὐ γὰρ γί- 5
νονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὔνοι μέν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ τἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις,
2 ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον 10
κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα (ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)· πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν
3 σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμ- 15
πειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπη-
4 ρεσίαι. τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλίᾳ ἡ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν

1158 a, 1. EE. 1238 a, 30 *ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη φιλία, καὶ δι' ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι λέγονται, ἡ κατ' ἀρετήν ἐστι, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετῆς, ὥσπερ*

VI. § 1. **ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς κ.τ.λ.** This is not a duplicate of 1157 b, 13 sqq. It is true that the same facts are referred to, but it is for a different purpose. In the first passage it is stated that the "sour and elderly" do not produce the *ἐνέργεια* of *φιλία*, which is one sign among others that true *φιλία* is a *τελείωσις* and therefore, though it cannot suffer *ἀλλοίωσις*, it may be lost *ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν* (cf. 1103 a, 25 n.). Here we are speaking of the *κινήσεις* (*ἀλλοιώσεις*, *πάθη*) called *φιλήσεις* which are the *ποιητικὰ φιλίας*, and it is pointed out that they too are absent from natures past their prime.

§ 2. **ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ.** This is really another *σημεῖον* that true *φιλία* is *τελεία*. Like love, it cannot have many objects, and the reason is that, like it, it is an *ὑπερβολή*. Now one of the definitions of *τὸ τέλειον* is *τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς τὸ γένος* (Met. 1021 b, 15).

οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, sc. *πολλοὺς ῥᾴδιον*.

§ 3. **πολλοὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** The two things which make *τελεία φιλία* rare are (1) the small number of the good, (2) the time it takes to form.

§ 4. **τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The two *ἀτελεῖς φιλίαι* are now contrasted with each other.

ὅταν ταὐτὰ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1157 a, 4 sqq.

ταὐτὰ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν γίνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς
20 αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν
ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων.
καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δέ·
συζῆν μὲν γὰρ βούλονταί τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν
χρόνον φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ' αὐτὸ
25 τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς φίλους ἡδεῖς ζη-
τοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς·
οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς 5
ἐξουσίαις διῃρημένοις φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ἄλλοι
γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσι χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ

εἴρηται πρότερον· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ἐγγίνονται φιλίαι καὶ ἐν παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις καὶ τοῖς φαύλοις. ὅθεν λέγεται, "ἥλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει" καὶ

κακὸς κακῷ <δὲ> συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις εἶναι τοὺς φαύλους, οὐχ ᾗ φαῦλοι ἢ μηδέτεροι, ἀλλ' οἷον ᾠδικοὶ ἄμφω, ἢ ὁ μὲν φιλῳδὸς ὁ δ' ᾠδικός ἐστιν, καὶ ᾗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ταύτῃ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις· ἔτι χρήσιμοι ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλοις καὶ ὠφέλιμοι, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἢ <ᾗ> οὐδέτεροι. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐπιεικῆ φαύλῳ εἶναι φίλον. καὶ γὰρ χρήσιμος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁ μὲν φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῷ σπουδαίῳ, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν· καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθά, ἁπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἁπλῶς, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ᾗ πενία

ἐλευθέριον...ἀγοραίων. These words are properly contrasted, cf. below 1162 b, 26.

καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δέ, opp. *οἱ ἐνδεεῖς* 1157 b, 20.

οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν. I do not know why Grant should doubt that Aristotle was capable of meaning this as a joke. It may be true that he jokes with difficulty, but he was certainly not above a little banter of the Academy.

τοιούτους ὄντας, sc. *ἡδεῖς*, **καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς**, sc. *ἀγαθοὺς καὶ ἡδεῖς*. This gives all four *ὑπάρχοντα*.

§ 5. **οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις.** Asp. *λέγει...τοὺς τυράννους*, cf. 1095 b, 21 n. The obvious fact that princes and potentates have two sets of friends confirms our doctrine. They wish to have all the advantages that can be derived from friendship; but, as *οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός* (1159 a, 35 n.), they cannot as a rule find pleasant friends who are also useful. So they have both 'agreeable people' (poets, philosophers, musicians, wits) and also 'able henchmen' (men, for instance, who can poison a troublesome brother) at their courts. Aristotle knew all about this from personal experience in Macedonia. We may see the same thing in the case of Frederick the Great.

οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους 30
εἰς τὰ καλά, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι,
τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν, ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται
6 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπου-
δαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἐὰν μὴ
καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον 35
ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

συμφέρει ἢ νόσος, <καὶ> ταῦτα τῶν ἁπλῶς ἀγαθῶν ἕνεκα, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φάρμακον πιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ βούλεται * *, ἀλλὰ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα βούλεται. ἔτι καθ' οὓς τρόπους καὶ ἀλλήλοις οἱ μὴ σπουδαῖοι εἶεν ἂν φίλοι. εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἡδὺς οὐχ ᾗ φαῦλος, ἀλλ' ᾗ τῶν κοινῶν τινος μετέχει, οἷον εἰ μουσικός. ἔτι ᾗ ἔνι τι πᾶσιν ἐπιεικές· διὸ ἔνιοι ὁμιλητικοὶ εἶεν ἂν καὶ σπουδαίῳ. ἢ ᾗ προσαρμόττουσιν ἑκάστῳ· ἔχουσι γάρ τι πάντες τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους...τοὺς δὲ... For the "twofold use of the article" cf. 1117 a, 12 n. We must take **δεινούς** as a secondary predicative object after *ζητοῦσι*. 'They seek others who shall be skilful at executing orders.' For the predicative object after *ζητεῖν* cf. 1132 a, 22 n.

§ 6. **ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** This section answers the question 'why do tyrants not avoid the necessity of having two sets of friends by taking good men as their friends?'

ἀλλ' ὑπερέχοντι κ.τ.λ. 'But such a man (**τοιοῦτος** = *ὁ σπουδαῖος*) does not become a friend to one who exceeds him (in power, i.e. *τῷ τυράννῳ*), unless he (the good man) is exceeded (by the tyrant) in goodness as well as (**καὶ**) in power. Unless this is so, the good man is not equalised to the tyrant by being exceeded in power (only) in proportion to the amount by which he is exceeded in goodness. Such tyrants are not found every day' (on **οὐ πάνυ** see Ind. s.v.). This is how recent editors (Grant, Stewart) take the passage. The old view, according to which *ὁ ὑπερέχων* and not *ὁ σπουδαῖος* is the subject of *ὑπερέχηται* is grammatically improbable and morally absurd. It would make Aristotle say that the good man would find it easier to be the friend of a tyrant the worse the tyrant was! This sentence is really the close of a long debate. Plato had suggested in the 'Laws' that, even if philosophers could not be kings, a philosopher might do something as the friend of a young tyrant. Aristotle, who knew what court life was, renounces the idea. It is better to lecture on *πολιτική* with the hopes of training a *νομοθέτης*.

οὐκ ἰσάζει. For *ἰσάζειν* intransitive cf. 1154 b, 24. 1162 b, 2. Aristotle has not yet explained what he means by **ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος**, and he has only been led into mentioning it here by the case of the tyrant. We shall see from the next section that the principle is the same as that of Distributive Justice. If the tyrant is

1158 b Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ γὰρ 7
αὐτὰ γίνεται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον
ἀνθ' ἑτέρου καταλλάττονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας·
ὅτι δ' ἧττόν εἰσιν αὗται φιλίαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται.
5 δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταὐτοῦ
εἶναί τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλίαι· καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς
κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλίαι (ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει
ἡ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κἀκείνῃ), τῷ δὲ τὴν
μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως

1158 b, 1. EE. 1238 b, 15 *τρία μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα φιλίας· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις κατ' ἰσότητά πως λέγεται ἡ φιλία. καὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ἐν ἰσότητί πώς εἰσιν ἀρετῆς φίλοι ἀλλήλοις. ἄλλη δὲ διαφορὰ τούτων ἡ καθ' ὑπερβολήν, ὥσπερ θεοῦ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον εἶδος φιλίας, καὶ ὅλως ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον· κατ' ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀριθμὸν δ' οὐκ ἴσον. ἐν τούτῳ τῷ γένει πατὴρ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὁ εὐεργέτης πρὸς τὸν εὐεργετηθέντα. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων διαφοραί εἰσιν· ἄλλη πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς γυναῖκα, αὕτη μὲν ὡς ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου, ἡ δὲ εὐεργέτου πρὸς εὐεργετηθέντα. ἐν ταύταις δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι. γελοῖον γὰρ εἴ τις ἐγκαλοίη τῷ θεῷ ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλεῖται, ἢ τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ. φιλεῖσθαι γάρ, οὐ φιλεῖν, τοῦ ἄρχοντος, ἢ φιλεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. καὶ ἡδονὴ διαφέρει οὐδὲν ἤ τε τοῦ αὐτάρκους ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κτήματι ἢ παιδί, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἐπὶ τῷ γινομένῳ. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν φίλων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δι' ἡδονὴν οἱ μὲν κατ' ἰσότητά εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν. διὸ καὶ οἱ ἐκείνως οἰόμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ὁμοίως χρήσιμοι καὶ εὖ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς. δῆλον δ' ἐν τοῖς*

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as much better than the philosopher as he is more powerful, there will be a proportionate equality between them, and therefore the possibility of *φιλία*, though not *φιλία* of the kind we have been discussing hitherto, but a *φιλότης κατ' ἀξίαν* in which *γίγνεται* **πως** *ἰσότης* (1158 b, 27).

§ 7. **Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.** We now pass from *φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι*, which is *ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι* and resembles *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον*, to *φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχήν*, which is *κατ' ἀξίαν* and resembles *τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον*. It is of great help in the interpretation of this Book to keep this analogy in view.

τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνεται, sc. *ἐν ταῖς ὁμοειδέσι*, **ἢ...καταλλάττονται**, sc. *ἐν ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσιν*.

αὗται, 'the latter,' sc. *αἱ ἀνομοειδεῖς*.

μεταπίπτειν ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φι- 10
λίαι, δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης. VII. *ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας*
εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ ὅλως πρεσ-
βυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρί τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρ-
χοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται καὶ ἀλλήλων·
οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρ- 15
χομένους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα,
οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. ἑτέρα
γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι'
ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι.
2 *ταὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνεται ἑκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ* 20
ζητεῖν· ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς
γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος
ἡ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικὴς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν

ἐρωτικοῖς· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μάχεσθαι ἀλλήλοις πολλάκις. ἀγνοεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶν ὅτι οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν προθυμίαν. διὸ εὑρηκέναι νεῖκος ὁ (εἴρηκεν Εὔνικος Jackson) *"ἐρώμενος τοιαῦτ' ἂν οὐκ ἐρῶν λέγοι." οἱ δὲ νομίζουσι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον.*

b, 20. EE. 1239 a, 1 *ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται, τριῶν ὄντων εἰδῶν φιλίας, κατ' ἀρετὴν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, αὗται πάλιν διῄρηνται εἰς δύο· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἴσον αἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν εἰσιν. φιλίαι μὲν οὖν ἀμφότεραι, φίλοι δ' οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ἄτοπον γὰρ ἂν εἴη εἰ ἀνὴρ παιδίῳ φίλος, φιλεῖ δέ γε καὶ φιλεῖται. ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι μὲν δεῖ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ φιλῇ, ὀνειδίζεται ὡς ἀνάξιον φιλῶν. τῇ γὰρ ἀξίᾳ τῶν φίλων μετρεῖται καί τινι ἴσῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν δι' ἡλικίας ἔλλειψιν ἀνάξια ὁμοίως φιλεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ γένος ἢ κατὰ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ὑπεροχήν. δεῖ δὲ τὸν ὑπερέχοντα ἢ ἧττον ἢ μὴ φιλεῖν ἀξιοῦν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησίμῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ κατ' ἀρετήν. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς μικραῖς ὑπεροχαῖς εἰκότως γίνονται ἀμφισβητήσεις (τὸ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐνιαχοῦ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλου σταθμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐν χρυσίῳ· ἀλλὰ*

VII. § 1. **καθ' ὑπεροχήν**, in the mathematical sense of the word, cf. Ind. s.v.

καὶ ἀλλήλων, as well as from the *φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι*.

§ 2. **ταὐτὰ μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ.** Friendship *ἐν ἰσότητι* may or may not be *ὁμοειδής*, friendship *καθ' ὑπεροχήν* is always *ἀνομοειδής*.

ἀνάλογον...καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι. I do not think we should press the meaning of **καί**, as if there were anything other than the *φίλησις* which is 'in proportion.' Rather

πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φίλησιν
δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν,
καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως·
ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἡ φίλησις γίνηται, τότε γίνεταί πως
ἰσότης, ὃ δὴ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ 3
φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον
πρώτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ
τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν
δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς 4
ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἤ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν·
πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ
1159 a καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι
οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ
μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν 5

τὸ μικρὸν κακῶς κρίνουσιν· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς μέγα, τὸ δ' ἀλλότριον διὰ τὸ πόρρω μικρόν)· ὅταν δὲ ὑπερβολὴ ᾖ, οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐπιζητοῦσιν ὡς δεῖ ἢ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοίως ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἷον εἴ τις ἀξιοῖ τὸν θεόν. φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι φίλοι μέν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἴσῳ, τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖν δ' ἔστιν ἄνευ τοῦ φίλους εἶναι.

Aristotle has in his mind two forms of statement (1) *καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι*, (2) *ἀνάλογον τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι*. Even an English writer might say loosely "if there is excess on either side, the affection must be in proportion *as well*."

τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, e.g. *τὸν ἡδίω*.

κατ' ἀξίαν, cf. 1131 a, 24 n.

πως ἰσότης, for *τὸ ἀνάλογον* is *ἰσότης λόγων*, cf. 1131 a, 31 n.

§ 3. **Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.** In spite of the parallelism between *ἡ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλία* and *τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον*, there is really a great difference. In the latter the *proportion* is everything and it does not matter how great the excess may be; in the former *equality* in the strict arithmetical sense is the norm, and if the excess goes beyond a certain limit *φιλία* ceases altogether. The *δίκαιον* of a democratic state is only one form of justice among others, the friendship of equals is the typical friendship from which all others are variations. Eudemos (l.c.) goes so far as to say that, though they are *φιλίαι*, you cannot call the parties *φίλοι*.

§ 4. **ἤ τινος ἄλλου**, e.g. *τοῦ ἡδέος*.

§ 5. **ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι**, sc. *φίλοι*, 'up to what point friends are still friends.' This is a 'brachylogy' of the type illustrated in Kühner § 597 f. Cf. especially Plato, Meno 89 a *οὐκ*

ὁρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι
μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι. ὅθεν καὶ 5
ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ
μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι
ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθά· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθά. εἰ
δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ
ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος· ἀνθρώπῳ 10
δὴ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα·
αὑτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τἀγαθά. VIII. οἱ πολ-
λοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ
φιλεῖν· διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ
φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος καὶ μᾶλλον 15
φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ

1159 a, 12. EE. 1239 a, 21 *δῆλον δὲ καὶ διὰ τί ζητοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὴν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαν τῆς κατ' ἰσότητα· ἅμα γὰρ ὑπάρχει οὕτως αὐτοῖς τό τε φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπεροχή. διὸ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἐνίοις ἐντιμότερος τοῦ φίλου· ἄμφω γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῷ κολακευομένῳ. μάλιστα δ' οἱ φιλότιμοι τοιοῦτοι· τὸ γὰρ θαυμάζεσθαι*

ἂν εἶεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί, sc. *ἀγαθοί*. I do not therefore think it necessary to read *ἡ φιλία* as Bywater proposes (Contr. p. 60). Nor is there any difficulty in the singular *μένει* which follows.

ἀφαιρουμένων, 'subtracted' from the one party. Aristotle might equally well have said *προστιθεμένων*, 'added' to the other; for *ὑπεροχή* arises from *ἀφαίρεσις* and *πρόσθεσις*.

§ 6. **ἀπορεῖται μή ποτ' οὐ**, 'there is a difficulty as to whether perhaps...'

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ. The point is that in wishing a friend to become a god, you are wishing to deprive him of something good, namely your own friendship.

αὑτῷ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We shall come to the question of *φιλαυτία* presently.

VIII. § 1. **οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We have said that *φιλία* in the primary sense is *ἐν ἰσότητι*, but we have to account for the fact that the mass of men prefer *φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχήν*. It is because they prefer to be loved rather than to love, and this is due to their love of esteem. It is easy to account for the love of flattery; the common run of men like to feel their superiority. It may seem more strange to say that men seek friendships in which the other party exceeds them, but this also is true. They love the friendship of the great because of the expectation of favours to come, and the friendship of the wise and good as a testimony to their own worth. In all these cases, however, the *φιλία* is only *αἱρετὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός* and not *καθ' αὑτό*, whereas the friendship of equals is *αἱρετὸν καθ' αὑτό* and therefore better.

προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος. Cf. Dem. de Cor. § 125 *ὅρα μὴ τούτων μὲν ἐχθρὸς ᾖς, ἐμὸς δὲ προσποιῇ*.

τιμᾶσθαι, οὗ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δι' αὐτὸ δ' ἐοίκασιν 2
αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι
γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι
διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα (οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν ἄν του
δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείῳ τῆς εὐπαθείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ)·
οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν καὶ εἰδότων ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βε-
βαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὑτῶν· χαίρουσι
δή, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει.
τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ χαίρουσιν· διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖτ-
τον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ ἡ φιλία καθ' αὑτὴν αἱρετὴ
εἶναι. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι 3
εἶναι. σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· ἔνιαι
γὰρ διδόασι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι,
ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν ἀμφότερα μὴ ἐνδέχηται,
ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν εἶναι ἐὰν ὁρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας,
καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὦν μητρὶ προσ-

ἐν ὑπεροχῇ. φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοὶ οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι. φιλητικὸς δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ὑπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῇ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ἡδονῇ ὁ φιλητικός. ἔνεστι γὰρ † ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός· ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλούμενον, φιλοῦντα δ' οὔ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν. σημεῖον δέ· ἕλοιτ' ἂν ὁ φίλος μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἄμφω, γιγνώσκειν ἢ γιγνώσκεσθαι, οἷον ἐν ταῖς ὑποβολαῖς αἱ γυναῖκες ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη ἡ Ἀντιφῶντος. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ἐθέλειν γινώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν τι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ φιλεῖν ἕνεκα. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τῷ φιλεῖν πρὸς τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐπαινοῦμεν· γινώσκουσι γάρ, ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκονται.

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§ 2. **ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις.** Cf. 1095 b, 21 n.

βεβαιῶσαι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1095 b, 18 sqq.

§ 3. **δοκεῖ δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ.** Another reason why *φιλία καθ' ὑπεροχήν* is not *φιλία* in the true sense. Whether we regard the *ὑπερέχων* or the *ὑπερεχόμενος*, such *φιλία* is always *διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι*, cf. 1159 a, 12 n.

σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες κ.τ.λ. This *σημεῖον* derives its force from the fact that *φιλία* is *φύσει*. We shall expect to find the characteristics of true *φιλία* in a rudimentary form (*ἴχνη*) even in purely instinctive feelings.

ἥκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας 4
οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων
ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, 35
οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ 5 1159 b
ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζοιντο γὰρ ἄν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης
καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἡ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὑτοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
μένουσι, καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, 5
ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ διακωλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ'
αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μο-
χθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὑτοῖς διαμέ-
νουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι,
χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς 10 6

1159 a, 33. EE. 1239 b, 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πλείονες τρόποι φιλίας, καὶ πόσοι τρόποι, ὅτι τρεῖς, καὶ ὅτι τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι καὶ οἱ φίλοι διαφέρουσιν, οἵ τε κατ' ἰσότητα καὶ οἱ καθ' ὑπεροχήν, εἴρηται· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ φίλον λέγεται καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐλέχθη, ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν συμπεριλαμβανόντων (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιόν φασιν εἶναι φίλον, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον), λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τούτων πῶς εἰσι πρὸς τὰς εἰρημένας φιλίας. ἀνάγεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τό τε γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλοῦν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν πολύμορφον· καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μὲν ὅμοιος ἀεὶ καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται τὸ ἦθος, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ ἄφρων οὐθὲν ἔοικεν ἔωθεν καὶ ἑσπέρας. διὸ ἐὰν μὴ συμβάλλωσιν οἱ φαῦλοι, οὐ φίλοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ διίστανται· ἡ δ' οὐ βέβαιος φιλία οὐ φιλία. ὥστε οὕτως μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον, ὅτι <τὸ> ἀγαθὸν ὅμοιον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις ταὔθ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἕκαστον δὲ

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§ 4. **τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων.** Cf. above 1155 a, 29. This is another *σημεῖον*. No one is praised for being loved.

§ 5. **οὕτω δ' ἄν**, sc. *τῷ φιλεῖν* (not merely *τῷ φιλεῖσθαι*) *κατ' ἀξίαν* or *ἀνάλογον*. The *ὑπερεχόμενος* may make up for his inferiority by the strength of his affection.

τῶν κατ' ἀρετήν, sc. *ὁμοίων*.

μόνιμοι...καθ' αὑτούς, virtually *διαμένουσιν ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καθ' αὑτούς*, from which it follows that they are permanently *ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, their activities being 'the same or similar' 1156 b, 17.

οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς, much less *ἀλλήλοις*. We cannot be sure that the activities of one bad man will be the same or similar to those of another, as we can in the case of the good. See the fuller account in EE. loc. cit. above.

ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθὴς εἰδότι· οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὤν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἄν τις ἕλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

φύσει αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἡδύ. διὸ καὶ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ συνημερεύσεις τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν ἥδισται ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις· καὶ ταύτῃ ἐνδέχεται καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀλλήλους φιλεῖν.

κακὸς κακῷ δὲ συντέτηκεν ἡδονῇ.

τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ φίλον ὡς τὸ χρήσιμον· αὐτὸ γὰρ αὑτῷ τὸ ὅμοιον ἄχρηστον. διὸ δεσπότης δούλου δεῖται καὶ δοῦλος δεσπότου, καὶ γυνὴ καὶ ἀνὴρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡδὺ καὶ ἐπιθυμητὸν τὸ ἐναντίον ὡς χρήσιμον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τέλει ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ τύχῃ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἐν τῷ τέλει μέν ἐστιν, οὐκ ὀρέγεται δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν τοῦ ὑγροῦ. ἔστι δέ πως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μέσον· ὡς σύμβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἓν μέσον. ἔτι κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστι τοῦ ἐναντίου, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος. ὀρέγονται γὰρ οὐκ ἀλλήλων τἀναντία, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέσου. ὑπερψυχθέντες γάρ, ἐὰν θερμανθῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστανται, καὶ ὑπερθερμανθέντες, ἐὰν ψυχθῶσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀεὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέσοις. ἀλλὰ χαίρει ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμίας τοῖς φύσει ἡδέσιν, οἱ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξιστᾶσι τῆς φύσει ἕξεως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστίν· τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ᾖ ἐπὶ τῶν

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§ 6. **οἷον πένης**, cf. 1157 b, 21 n.

§ 7. **οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ κ.τ.λ.** Cf. the quotation from Euripides 1155 b, 3.

ἀλλοτριώτερα, i. e. *φυσικώτερα* 1155 b, 2.

IX. Ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἥ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἁπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνίᾳ δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ' ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων," ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοι- 2 νωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἧττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἑταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 3 φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἑκάστους τούτων, καὶ αὔξησιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερῆσαι ἑταῖρον δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ

ἐμψύχων. διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥᾳθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

1159 b, 25. EE. 1241 b, 11 δοκεῖ δὲ τό τε δίκαιον εἶναι ἴσον τι καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν ἰσότητι, εἰ μὴ μάτην λέγεται ἰσότης [ἡ] φιλότης. αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι δικαίου τι εἶδος· κοινωνία γάρ, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πᾶν διὰ τοῦ δικαίου συνέστηκεν, ὥστε ὅσα εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ δικαίου καὶ κοινωνίας, καὶ πάντα ταῦτα σύνορα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ ἐγγὺς ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς.

IX. § 1. **Ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We pass now to the discussion of *φιλία ἐν κοινωνίᾳ*, especially in the state. It is here that the parallelism of *φιλία* and *δικαιοσύνη* comes out most clearly.

ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1155 a, 22 sqq.

περὶ ταὐτά, the things which are its matter, **ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς**, the persons who are its object. Cf. 1111 a, 1 n.

τι δίκαιον. Cf. Plato Rep. 351 b, sqq.

προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν κ.τ.λ. The usual confirmation from current language necessary to set up an *ἔνδοξος πρότασις*. So in English, 'My learned friend,' 'My Right Hon. friend.'

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, often quoted by Plato. It is said to be a Pythagorean maxim. Cf. especially Gorg. 507 e *ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἔνι κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη*.

§ 2. **ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς κ.τ.λ.** This is an implied criticism of Plato's Republic.

§ 3. **αὔξησιν λαμβάνει**, virtual passive of *αὔξεται*. Fritzsche compares *ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει* Soph. El. 183 b, 21.

βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ ὀθνείῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὀντινοῦν ἄλλον. αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα. αἱ 4
δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις ἐοίκασι τῆς πολιτικῆς· συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπί τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ ποριζόμενοί τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι κατὰ μέρη 5
τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλωτῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται. ἔνιαι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι γίνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ ἐρανιστῶν· αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα καὶ συνουσίας [πᾶσαι δ' αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς

1160 a, 14. EE. 1241 b, 24 *αἱ δ' ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι εἰσὶν [ἢ] μόριον τῶν τῆς πόλεως κοινωνιῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν φρατέρων ἢ τῶν ὀργίων, ἢ αἱ χρηματιστικαὶ ἔτι πολιτεῖαι.*

ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, masc. of the persons, **ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα** = *περὶ ταὐτά* 1159 b, 25.

§ 4. **τῆς πολιτικῆς**, sc. *κοινωνίας*.

συμπορεύονται, sc. *οἱ κοινωνοί*, cf. below a, 25, especially *οἱ σύμπλοι* and the like.

ἐπί τινι συμφέροντι, 'the condition upon which they make a journey in common is profit of some kind.' For the sense of *ἐπί* cf. 1110 a, 23.

τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν. Pol. 1278 b, 23 sq. *τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς.* We see from this that *τὸ συμφέρον* includes *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* as well as *τὸ ζῆν*.

φασιν. For the *ἔνδοξον* cf. Plato, Rep. 369 c. Ar. Pol. 1279 a, 17. 1282 b, 17.

§ 5. **ἢ πόλεως**, Ramsauer understands this as referring either to exiles trying to recover their city or colonists seeking for a new one. But surely it is more natural to think of a *πολιορκία*. For **εἴτε...εἴτε...ἢ...** cf. 1112 a, 24.

ἔνιαι δὲ...συνουσίας. It is clear that Bywater is right in holding that **b, 23 θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες κ.τ.λ.** is continuous with this. I think it safer, however, to assume an interpolation than a dislocation, and **b, 21 πᾶσαι... b, 23 βίον** is not wanted here. It is repeated in substance at the end of the chapter.

ἅπαντα τὸν βίον] θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς <τε> ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ 25
σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον
6 τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὴ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίαι ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίαις. 30

X. Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ παρεκβάσεις, οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι βασι-

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ποιοῦντες, agreeing with *κοινωνοί* implied in *κοινωνίαι*. Cardwell compares Thuc. iii. 79. Eur. Or. 38. Hdt. i, 151, γ. Cf. also above a, 9.

τιμάς τε κ.τ.λ. They combine the honour of the gods (the *θυσίαι*) with their own relaxation (the *σύνοδοι*).

ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες. This is the important point, for it shows how these *κοινωνίαι* are not merely for the sake of pleasure but for the sake of the good life. That they are for the sake of *ἀνάπαυσις* is proved by the fact that the original festivals were during the time of *σχολή* after the hard work of the harvest. On *ἀνάπαυσις* see 1127 b, 33 n. Lambinus compares Hor. Epp. ii. 1, 139.

φαίνονται γίνεσθαι, i.e. in Aristotle's own time. Cf. the argument in *Ἀθ. πολ.* c. 3 where the relative antiquity of the *ἄρχοντες* is proved from the nature of the festivals they managed. The *ἄρχων* must be more recent than the *βασιλεύς* and the *πολέμαρχος* because he only manages *τὰ ἐπίθετα*. Of course **ἀρχαῖαι** does not mean '*in* ancient times' (*παλαιαί*), but 'coming down *from* ancient times,' 'original' as opposed to *ἐπίθετα*.

§ 6. **ἀκολουθήσουσι**, cf. above 1152 b, 28 n.

X. § 1. **Πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.** For classifications of constitutions, cf. Plato Rep. 301 a, sqq. 544 c, sqq. Ar. Pol. 1279 a, 22 sqq. Rhet. 1365 b, 29.

παρεκβάσεις, 'deflections.' The name is taken from music where certain scales were called 'deflected.' Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 386. The fullest explanation of the meaning is given in Pol. 1290 a, 13 sqq., where we are told that oligarchy and democracy are commonly regarded as the typical constitutions, *καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις.* People make aristocracy a kind of oligarchy and the *πολιτεία* a kind of democracy just as they make the west wind a deflection of the north and the east wind of the south. He goes on *ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας, ὥς φασί τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τίθενται εἴδη δύο, τὴν δωριστὶ καὶ τὴν φρυγιστί, τὰ δ' ἄλλα συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δώρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν.* But the true doctrine is *δυοῖν ἢ μιᾶς οὔσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας* (the well tempered scale) *τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ' ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημοτικάς.* We shall therefore best realise Aristotle's meaning if we think of the *παρεκβάσεις* as 'out of tune,' remembering at the same time that

λεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν
35 εἰώθασιν οἱ πλεῖστοι καλεῖν. τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ 2
βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασι-
1160 b λείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλεῖστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ
5 τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὑτῷ μὲν οὐκ

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vulgar people at Athens preferred scales which were not natural, cf. Pol. 1342 a, 22 *εἰσὶ δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσί, καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα* (see Susemihl and Hicks p. 636). The *ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι* are based on the natural notes of the scale.

βασιλεία ... ἀριστοκρατία. Pol. 1279 a, 32 *καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μέν, πλειόνων δ' ἑνός, ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς.*

ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. Plato calls this *ὀλιγαρχία*. Rep. 550 c *Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν;—Τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἦ δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν.* Isokrates, who only allows three constitutions, speaks (Panath. § 131) of *δημοκρατίαν...ἀριστοκρατίᾳ χρωμένην, ἣν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ χρησιμωτάτην οὖσαν ὥσπερ τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀριθμοῦσιν.*

τιμοκρατικήν. Plato uses the word in a very different sense (see Rep. 545 b, sqq.). He dissociates it from its natural connexion with *τιμήματα* and uses it of states like Sparta whose ruling principle is honour.

πολιτείαν. This refers to the *πάτριος πολιτεία* which the moderate party tried to restore after the Peloponnesian War. Its ideal was that political power should be confined to *οἱ τὰ ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι*, and that is why it is here called *τιμοκρατική*. In the Politics Aristotle calls it *πολιτεία* simply and says (1279 a, 37) *ὅταν τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία.* But he means exactly the same thing as he does here. That he is not thinking of a 'timocratic' state, in which there are several classes based upon a property qualification, is shown by b, 18 *ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι.*

§ 2. **βελτίστη...βασιλεία.** This is only to be understood, however, of the ideal ruler in the *παμβασιλεία*, the man of *ἡρωϊκὴ καὶ θεία ἀρετή*. The whole question is thoroughly discussed in the Third Book of the Politics.

χειρίστη...τιμοκρατία. The reason is given Pol. 1279 a, 39 *ἕνα μὲν διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν.*

ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος κ.τ.λ. Pol. 1279 b, 6 *ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος.* 1311 a, 2 *ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς μὲν τυραννικὸς τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν.*

ἂν σκοποίη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἄν τις εἴη βασιλεύς. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ.
3 μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γάρ 10
ἐστι μοναρχίας ἡ τυραννίς, ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἳ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν· ὀλίγοι 15
δὴ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. ἐκ δὲ τιμοκρατίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γάρ εἰσιν αὗται·

1160 b, 12. EE. 1241 b, 33 *ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἴδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας. κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡ <δημοκρατικὴ> κοινωνία καὶ ἡ ἑταιρικὴ φιλία, τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὅρῳ μετρεῖται· κατ' ἀναλογίαν δὲ ἡ ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἀρίστη καὶ βασιλική. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δίκαιον τῷ ὑπερέχοντι καὶ ὑπερεχομένῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. καὶ ἡ φιλία δὲ ὁμοίως πατρὸς καὶ παιδός, καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος.*

κληρωτὸς...βασιλεύς. Ramsauer refers to Plato, Polit. 290 e sqq. *καὶ δὴ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν...τῷ λαχόντι βασιλεῖ φασι τῇδε τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ μάλιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσιῶν ἀποδεδόσθαι.* 291 a *τούτους τε τοίνυν τοὺς κληρωτοὺς βασιλέας ἅμα καὶ ἱερέας.* The reference, then, is primarily to the *βασιλεύς* at Athens and, as Mr. J. Solomon has shown (Cl. Rev. iii, 294), the meaning is practically 'a merely titular king.' Mr Solomon quotes two further passages in illustration (1) Ar. Pol. 1318 a, 2 *περιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς ποιεῖν* (as a means of reducing a magistracy to insignificance) and (2) Plato, Laws 692 a *οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ* (i.e. the *ἀρχή* of the Spartan kings) *τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως*, which, as he rightly says, must practically mean 'reducing it to an almost nominal kingship.'

φανερώτερον, sc. *ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς τιμοκρατίας* (a, 36).

κάκιστον δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the *τόπος* see Top. 117 b, 2. Cf. Pol. 1289 a, 39 *ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης πολιτείας παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρίστην.*

§ 3. **μεταβαίνει**, impersonal, 'the transition is from—.'

εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. Pol. 1306 b, 25 *ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταὐτὸν ὀλίγοι.* 1290 b, 19 *ὀλιγαρχία δ' (ἐστὶν) ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι (κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν), ὀλίγοι ὄντες.* 1279 b, 7 *ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων (συμφέρον ἐστίν)* (Fritzsche).

εἰς δημοκρατίαν. Pol. 1290 b, 17

πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾷστα μεταβαίνουσιν. ὁμοιώματα δ' αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς τυραννική· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱέσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περσικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει, καὶ

1160 b, 32. EE. 1241 b, 27 αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι ἐν οἰκίαις συνυπάρχουσι, καὶ αἱ ὀρθαὶ καὶ αἱ παρεκβάσεις (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὥσπερ ἔστι δημοκρατία ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι, πλείους ὄντες, κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὦσιν. 1279 b, 8 ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία (ἐστὶ) πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων.

σύνοροι, 'conterminous.'

πλήθους ... βούλεται ... εἶναι. Cf. 1132 a, 21 n. 'The ideal of timocracy too is to be the rule of the majority.' If the *τίμημα* were so high as to exclude the majority, we should have an oligarchy.

οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι, e.g. the 5000 at Athens, *οἱ τὰ τιμήματα παρεχόμενοι.*

ἥκιστα μοχθηρόν. Cf. Pol. 1289 b, 2 *ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν..., μετριωτάτην δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν.*

τῆς πολιτείας, sc. *τῆς τιμοκρατικῆς.*

§ 4. **τῷ πατρὶ μέλει**, so that his ὄρος is *τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων συμφέρον.* Cf. Pol. 1259 b, 10 *ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική.* Here too Homer's *Ζεὺς πατήρ* is referred to.

βούλεται εἶναι. Cf. 1132 a, 21 n.

ἐν Πέρσαις κ.τ.λ. This is in striking contrast to Xenophon's ideal picture.

αὕτη μὲν οὖν, i.e. the 'tyrannical' relation between master and slave, as opposed to that between son and father.

τῶν διαφερόντων. How they differ we learn from Pol. 1260 a, 9 *ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός· καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχοντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν ἀλλ' ἀτελές.*

§ 5. **ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικός**, sc. *κοινωνία.* In Pol. 1259 b, 1 we have *γυναικὸς μὲν* (sc. *ἄρχειν*) *πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς.*

περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ ἁρμόζει, ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδωσιν. ἁπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι· οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικῇ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν· διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκήσεων (ἐνταῦθα

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις)· βασιλικὴ μὲν ἡ τοῦ γεννήσαντος, ἀριστοκρατικὴ δ' ἡ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, πολιτεία δ' ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· παρέκβασις δὲ τούτων τυραννὶς ὀλιγαρχία δῆμος. καὶ τὰ δίκαια δὴ τοσαῦτα.

EE. 1242 a, 1 λέγονται δὲ φιλίαι συγγενικὴ ἑταιρικὴ κοινωνικὴ ἡ λεγομένη πολιτική. ἔστι μὲν συγγενικὴ πολλὰ ἔχουσα εἴδη, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀδελφῶν, ἡ δ' ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱῶν (καὶ γὰρ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, οἷον ἡ πατρική, καὶ κατ' ἀριθμόν, οἷον ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἐγγὺς γὰρ αὕτη τῆς ἑταιρικῆς· ἐπιλαμβάνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα πρέσβειον)· ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ συνέστηκε μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ μάλιστα. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐταρκεῖν δοκοῦσι συνελθεῖν, ἐπεὶ συνῆλθόν γ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ συζῆν χάριν. μόνη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ παρ' αὐτὴν παρέκβασις οὐ μόνον φιλίαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καθ' ὑπεροχήν. μάλιστα δὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἐν τῇ τῶν χρησίμων φιλίᾳ, διὰ τὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον συνῆλθον πρίων καὶ τέχνη, οὐχ ἕνεκα κοινοῦ τινος (οἷον γὰρ ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή) ἀλλὰ τοῦ χρωμένου ἕνεκεν. συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὄργανον ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνειν, ἧς δίκαιον πρὸς τὸ ἔργον· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ τρυπάνῳ εἶναι διττόν, ὧν τὸ κυριώτερον ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ τρύπησις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ εἴδει σῶμα καὶ δοῦλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον.

μεθίστησιν, sc. *τὴν κοινωνίαν*, i.e. *εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν.*

ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι. Cf. the well-known lines of Menander—

Ὅστις γυναῖκ' ἐπίκληρον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν
πλουτοῦσαν, ἤτοι μῆνιν ἐκτίνει θεῶν,
ἢ βούλετ' ἀτυχεῖν, μακάριος καλούμενος.

§ 6. **τῶν οἰκήσεων**, 'habitations.' As Stewart points out, the word is often used of the habitations of wild beasts: "Dicuntur autem haud male *οἰκήσεις* quae non sunt *οἰκίαι*, nedum *οἶκοι*," Ramsauer. The word *οἰκία* implies an organised family, *οἴκησις* is a mere place to live in.

γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενὴς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἑκάστῳ ἐξουσία.

XI. Καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική, 2 διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευομένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται 3 οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς 4 γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἁρμόζον ἑκάστῳ· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιῶται, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἔοικε δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικήν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία. ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δί- 6 καιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν

1161 a, 30. EE. 1241 b, 17 ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἔχει ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων μὲν οὐκ

XI. § 1. **Καθ' ἑκάστην κ.τ.λ.** We may compare the modern ideas of (1) Loyalty, (2) *Noblesse oblige*, (3) Fraternity.

ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. How far that is is explained above, 1134 a, 26 sqq.

ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων. Here again Aristotle is thinking of Plato's Politikos.

§ 2. **ἡ πατρική**, sc. *φιλία*.

διαφέρει, sc. *ὁ πατήρ*.

§ 3. **οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία.** The son or the subject *ἰσάζει ἀνάλογον ὑπερεχόμενος*.

§ 5. **βούλονται...εἶναι.** 'The ideal of the *πολιτεία* is that the citizens should be equal and good.' Here *ἐπιεικεῖς* = *ἀγαθοί*, cf. 1136 a, 35 n.

τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· οἷον τεχνίτῃ πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς δοῦλον· ὠφελεῖται 35 μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ 1161 b ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦ- 7 λος. ᾗ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ' 5 ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ 8 φιλία δή, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν. 10

XII. Ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις τήν τε συγγενικὴν καὶ τὴν ἑταιρικήν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ καὶ συμπλοϊκαί, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς ἐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἷον γὰρ

ἔστι κοινωνία. οὐ γὰρ δύ' ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἕν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνός [οὐδέν]. οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἑνὸς οὗ ἕνεκά ἐστιν. τό τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν ὄργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἄψυχος.

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§ 6. **δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον.** Cf. Pol. 1253 b, 27 *τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἴαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῳρεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανόν πρὸς ζωήν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον.*

§ 7. **ᾗ δ' ἄνθρωπος.** Cf. Ulpian 'Quod attinet ad ius civile servi pro nullis habentur, non tamen iure naturali; quia, quod ad ius naturale pertinet, omnes homines sunt aequales.' Pol. 1255 b, 12 *διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστί τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς φύσει τούτων ἠξιωμένοις.*

XII. § 1. **ἀφορίσειε δ' ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.** 'We might make *συγγενική* and *ἑταιρικὴ φιλία* into separate species' from *κοινωνικὴ φιλία* in the strict sense. Eudemos (loc. cit. p. 387) actually does so.

πολιτικαί, 1161 a, 10 sqq. **φυλετικαί** 1160 a, 18.

συμπλοϊκαί, 1159 b, 28. 1160 a, 15.

καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, e.g. *ἡ τῶν συσστρατιωτῶν.*

καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἄν τις καὶ τὴν ξενικήν. καὶ ἡ συγγενικὴ δὲ φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἠρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ μᾶλλον συνῳκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκεῖον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὀδοὺς θριξ ὁτιοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐδὲν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἧττον. καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντος χρόνου τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἴσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν 3
τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυτούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῷ κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι· ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταὐτοποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασὶ ταὐτὸν αἷμα καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὴ ταὐτό πως καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν 4
καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἥλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα,

τὴν ξενικήν. 1156 a, 31.

§ 2. **μᾶλλον συνῳκείωται κ.τ.λ.**, i.e. *οἰκειότερον ἔχει*, 'feels it more its own.'

φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μητέρες. Muretus quotes Eurip. frag. incert.—

μήτηρ φιλότεκνος μᾶλλόν ἐστι τοῦ πατρός·
ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς οἶδεν ὄνθ', ὁ δ' οἴεται.

Menander Καρχ. 2—

αὐτὸν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οἶδε τοῦ ποτ' ἐγένετο,
ἀλλ' ὑπονοοῦμεν πάντες, ἢ πιστεύομεν.

Homer, Od. i, 215—

μήτηρ μέν τ' ἐμέ φησι τοῦ ἔμμεναι, αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε
οὐκ οἶδ'· οὐ γάρ πώ τις ἐὸν γόνον αὐτὸς ἀνέγνω.

§ 3. **τῷ κεχωρίσθαι**, i.e. they are ἕτεροι in virtue of their separation, just as they are *οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ αὐτῶν τι εἶναι*.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. The following **ἐκεῖνα** shows that this is neuter.

ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα κ.τ.λ., 'their identity with their parents identifies them with one another.' Cf. Met. 1018 a, 7 *ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ ταὐτότης ἑνότης τίς ἐστιν ἢ πλειόνων τοῦ εἶναι, ἢ ὅταν χρῆται ὡς πλείοσιν, οἷον ὅταν λέγῃ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ταὐτόν· ὡς δυσὶ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῷ.*

ταὐτὸν αἷμα. This idea is expressed by the word *ὅμαιμος*. Cf. Aisch. Eum. 89 *αὐτάδελφον αἷμα.*

ῥίζαν, sc. *τὴν αὐτήν*. Cf. Eur. Ion 1576 *παῖδες γενόμενοι τέσσαρες ῥίζης μιᾶς.*

καὶ ἐν διῃρημένοις, i.q. *κεχωρισμένοις*. Cf. EE. 1245 a, 35 *βούλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος.*

§ 4. **τὸ σύντροφον**, 'being brought up together,' **τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν**, sc. *εἶναι*, their 'being of an age.'

ἥλιξ γὰρ ἥλικα. Cf. EE. 1238 a, 33, Rhet. 1371 b, 15. The proverb is quoted by Plato, Phdr. 240 c *ἥλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἥλικα.*

ἐκ τούτων, sc. *ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν.*

§ 6. **τῶν ὀθνείων**, i.e. *τῆς τῶν ὀθνείων.*

§ 7. **ἀνάλογον**, 'in proportion' (to the closeness of their relationship).

τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικόν. Cf. Pol. 1252 a, 26 *ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν, (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι οἷον αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον).*

πρότερον (sc. *χρόνῳ*) **καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον** (sc. *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*). But in another sense the state is *πρότερον καὶ κάλλιον*. Cf. Pol. 1253 a, 19. The addition of **καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον** shows what kind of priority is meant.

κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις, a sure sign that a thing is *φυσικόν*, in the sense of *ἀναγκαῖον*. Cf. Introductory Note.

ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, i.e. *ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τεκνοποιία*. Cf. Gen. An. 753 a, 7 quoted in the Introductory Note. See also Oecon. 1343 b, 13 *ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ἀλόγως τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον μετέχουσι τῆς φύσεως* (surely *φρονήσεως*), *ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τεκνοποιίας μόνον χάριν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ φρονιμωτέροις διήρθρωται μᾶλλον*

καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ 35
ὁμοιοῦται. ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων 1162 a
συνῳκείωνται· τῷ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω
5 τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, 5
καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεούς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆ-
6 ναι αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι· ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων, ὅσῳ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀδελφικῇ ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς 10
ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσῳ οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσῳ ὁμοηθέστεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ
7 βεβαιοτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν συγγε- 15
νῶν τὰ φιλικά. ἀνδρὶ δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι οὐ μόνον 20

τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθὺς γὰρ διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετήν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ χαίροιεν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς βιωτέον ἀνδρὶ 8 πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται

1162 a, 29. EE. 1242 a, 19 τὸ δὴ ζητεῖν πῶς δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ ὁμιλεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν δίκαιόν τί ἐστιν. καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἅπαν πρὸς φίλον. τό τε γὰρ δίκαιόν τισι καὶ κοινωνοῖς, καὶ ὁ φίλος κοινωνός, ὁ μὲν γένους, ὁ δὲ βίου. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῷον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τἆλλά ποτε συνδυάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι [καὶ] θήλει καὶ ἄρρενι † ἀλλ' αἱ διὰ δύμον αὐλικόν † (ἄλλο δὲ δὴ μοναυλικόν?), ἀλλὰ κοινωνικὸν ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πρὸς οὓς φύσει συγγένεια ἐστίν· καὶ κοινωνία τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιόν τι, καὶ εἰ μὴ πόλις εἴη· οἰκία δ' ἐστί τις φιλία. δεσπότου μὲν οὖν καὶ δούλου ἥπερ καὶ τέχνης καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται οὔτε φιλίαι οὔτε δικαιοσύναι, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἀνάλογον· γυναικὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὸς φιλία ὡς χρήσιμον καὶ κοινωνία· πατρὸς δὲ καὶ υἱοῦ ἡ αὐτὴ ἥπερ θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος πρὸς τὸν παθόντα καὶ ὅλως τοῦ φύσει ἄρχοντος πρὸς τὸν φύσει ἀρχόμενον· ἥ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑταιρικὴ μάλιστα ἡ κατ' ἰσότητα.

οὐ γάρ τι νόθος τῷδ' ἀπεδείχθην·
ἀμφοῖν δὲ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ἐκλήθη
Ζεὺς ἐμὸς ἄρχων.

ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς τὸ ἴσον ζητούντων λέγεται. διὸ ἐν οἰκίᾳ πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ φιλίας καὶ πολιτείας καὶ δικαίου.

(φαίνονται γὰρ μᾶλλον βοήθειαι γινόμεναι καὶ εὔνοιαι καὶ συνεργίαι ἀλλήλοις), ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ μάλιστα, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι συνεργὰ ἀλλήλοις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστί.

διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα. Fritzsche quotes Oecon. 1343 b, 26 οὕτω προφκονόμηται ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου ἑκατέρου ἡ φύσις, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς γυναικός, πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν, κ.τ.λ.

§ 8. **οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν φαίνεται,** sc. τὸ δίκαιον.

τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἑταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

XIII. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχήν (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χείρονι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. 2 γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα, εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας), πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι· τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἂν ᾖ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὗ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοίη τῷ φίλῳ· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται. 3 οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονήν· ἅμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν· γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ 4 συνημερεύειν. ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματική· ἐπ'

συμφοιτητήν, 'schoolfellow.' Plato, Euthyd. 272 c οἱ συμφοιτηταί μου, Phdr. 255 a.

XIII. § 1. **Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν κ.τ.λ.** We come now to certain practical rules about φιλία. We always make a point of drawing practical conclusions from our theories, even if they interrupt the main argument. They serve also, however, to bring out the true nature of Friendship.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, κ.τ.λ., i.e. they may be equally pleasant or useful, or one more pleasant or useful than the other (**ἰσάζοντες...ἢ διαφέροντες**).

κατ' ἰσότητα closely with **ἰσάζειν.**

καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς, sc. τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῷ ἡδεῖ or τῷ χρησίμῳ.

τῷ...ἀποδιδόναι sc. δεῖ ἰσάζειν. The reading τῷ is probably a conjecture by the corrector of cod. Par. 1417 (τό K^b L^b), but it seems necessary to make a proper antithesis to κατ' ἰσότητα.

§ 2. **ἀμύνεται,** Spengel quotes Rhet. 1398 a, 24 διὸ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβρει γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὁμοίως εὖ παθόντα. Cardwell refers to Isokr. 86 d χαριέντως αὐτοὺς ἡμυνάμην, Thuc. iv, 63 τὸν εὖ καὶ κακῶς δρῶντα ἐξ ἴσου ἀρετῇ ἀμυνούμεθα.

§ 3. **οὐ πάνυ δέ,** sc. ἐγκλήματα γίνεται. Ind. s. v. οὐ πάνυ.

ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοi ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται. ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ νομικὴ μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἡ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἡ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοὐκ ἀμφίλογον,

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1162 b, 21. EE. 1242 b, 22 ἡ δὲ κατ' ἴσα φιλία ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτική. ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐστι μὲν κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀλλήλαις φίλαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πολῖται, καὶ ὁμοίως

οὐκέτι γιγνώσκουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι Μεγαρῆας,

καὶ οἱ πολῖται, ὅταν μὴ χρήσιμοι ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα ἡ φιλία· ἔστι δὲ ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον οὔτε τὸ φυσικὸν οὔτε τὸ βασιλικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ μέρει, οὐδὲ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅπως εὖ ποιῇ ὁ θεός, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἴσον ᾖ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς λειτουργίας. κατ' ἰσότητα δὴ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρησίμου φιλίας εἴδη δύο, ἡ μὲν νομικὴ ἡ δ' ἠθική. βλέπει δ' ἡ μὲν πολιτικὴ εἰς τὸ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥσπερ οἱ πωλοῦντες καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι. διὸ εἴρηται

μισθὸς ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ.

ὅταν μὲν οὖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν <ᾖ> ἡ πολιτικὴ αὕτη φιλία, [καὶ] νομική·

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§ 5. **κατὰ νόμον.** The opposition is not quite correctly stated, for a *νομικὸν δίκαιον* may quite well be unwritten, nor is an *ἄγραφον δίκαιον* necessarily *φύσει δίκαιον*. But the expression is natural, for *τὰ γεγραμμένα δίκαια* are *περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν* (Rhet. 1374 a, 19).

φιλίας. So K^b and Asp. This reading is guaranteed by Eudemos (loc. cit.), otherwise we might be tempted to adopt the reading of L^b **ὠφελείας.**

ἠθική. We still speak of a 'moral' as distinct from a 'legal' obligation, though the associations are different.

ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν, sc. *φιλίαν*, **συναλλάξωσι ... διαλύωνται,** 'when they contract and dissolve the friendship.'

§ 6. **ἡ μὲν...ἡ δὲ...** A further subdivision of *ἡ νομική*.

φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖταί ἢ ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο· κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλέον, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας· οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὠφέλιμα· καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὠφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. δυναμένῳ

ὅταν δ' ἐπιτρέπωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἠθικὴ βούλεται εἶναι φιλία καὶ ἑταιρική. διὸ μάλιστα ἔγκλημα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ· αἴτιον δ' ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν. ἕτεραι γὰρ φιλίαι ἡ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν· οἱ δ' ἀμφότερα βούλονται ἅμα ἔχειν, καὶ ὁμιλοῦσι μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου ἕνεκα, ἠθικὴν δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἐπιεικεῖς, διὸ ὡς πιστεύοντες οὐ νομικὴν ποιοῦσιν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ τῶν τριῶν πλεῖστα ἐγκλήματα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ ἀνέγκλητον, οἱ δ' ἡδεῖς ἔχοντες καὶ δόντες ἀπαλλάττονται· οἱ δὲ χρήσιμοι οὐκ εὐθὺς διαλύονται, ἂν μὴ νομικῶς καὶ ἑταιρικῶς προσφέρωνται)· ὅμως δὲ τῆς χρησίμου ἡ νομικὴ ἀνέγκλητος. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν νομικὴ διάλυσις πρὸς νόμισμα (μετρεῖται γὰρ τούτῳ τὸ ἴσον), ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἑκούσιος. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ νόμος ἐστὶ τοῖς οὕτως ὁμιλοῦσι φιλικῶς μὴ εἶναι δίκας τῶν ἑκουσίων συναλλαγμάτων, ὀρθῶς· τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ πέφυκε δίκαιον εἶναι, οἱ δ' ὡς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ συναλλάττουσιν. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἀμφιβάλλοντα αὐτοῖς ἀμφότερα, πῶς ἑκάτερος ἐγκαλεῖ, ὅταν ἠθικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ νομικῶς πιστεύσωσιν.

φιλικὸν...ἔχει, 'the postponement is the friendly element in it.'

διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις κ.τ.λ. Stewart quotes Theophrastos *Περὶ συμβολαίων* from Stobaeus *Χαρώνδας καὶ Πλάτων ...παραχρῆμα κελεύουσι διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ἐὰν δέ τις πιστεύσῃ, μὴ εἶναι δίκην, αὐτὸν γὰρ αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς ἀδικίας.*

§ 7. **ὁτιδήποτε ἄλλο,** sc. *ὠφελεῖ*. This seems the only verb we can supply.

§ 8. **οὐχ ὁμοίως,** 'not so well.' 'If he does not come out of the business on as good terms as he went in.' The phrase cannot be equivalent to *μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν* above; for it refers exclusively to *ἠθικὴ φιλία*.

βούλεσθαι ... προαιρεῖσθαι. The appetitive element is sound, but the intellectual and deliberative is not.

§ 9. **δυναμένῳ δὴ κ.τ.λ.** The words *καὶ ἑκόντι* can hardly be translated 'willingly (i.e. without waiting to be asked)' (Stewart), for *ἑκών* means 'voluntarily' (i.e. without being forced). Nor can *ἑκόντι ἀνταποδοτέον* naturally mean anything else than 'one must give back to the man who is willing to take it.' I

δὴ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν [καὶ ἑκόντι] (ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον· ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει—οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος—καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον)· καὶ ὃ ὡμολόγησεν ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ διδοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν. ὥστ' εἰ δυνατόν, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένῃ ἢ μή. ἀμφισβήτησιν
10 δ' ἔχει πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελείᾳ μετρεῖν καὶ

καὶ ἔχει δὴ ἀπορίαν ποτέρως δεῖ κρίνειν τὸ δίκαιον, πότερα πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα βλέποντα τὸ ὑπηρετηθέν, πόσον, ἢ ποῖον ἦν τῷ πεπονθότι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ὅπερ λέγει Θέογνις·

σοὶ μὲν τοῦτο, θεά, σμικρόν, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγα.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, σοὶ μὲν παιδιὰν τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ θάνατον. ἐντεῦθεν δ' εἴρηται τὰ ἐγκλήματα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὡς μέγα ὑπηρετήσας, ὅτι δεομένῳ ἐποίησεν, ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτο, λέγων πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου ὠφέλειαν πόσον ἠδύνατο, ἀλλ' οὐ τί ἦν αὐτῷ· ὁ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὅσον ἐκείνῳ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσον αὐτῷ. ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ μεταλαμβάνων καὶ ἀμφιβάλλει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὅσον αὐτῷ μικρὸν ἀπέβη, ὁ δ' ὅσον αὐτῷ μέγα ἐδύνατο, οἷον εἰ κινδυνεύσας δραχμῆς ἄξιον ὠφέλησεν, ὁ μὲν τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος ὁ δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀργυρίου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τῶν νομισμάτων ἀποδόσει. καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα

suspect the interpolator meant it so, not seeing the drift of the next clause. Aspasios, as well as K^b, omits the words.

ἄκοντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A long 'digressive parenthesis' (Bywater). We must not assume that our benefactor meant to be a friend to us.

ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα κ.τ.λ. There is an anacolouthon here caused by the parenthesis within a parenthesis *οὐ γὰρ...δρῶντος*. We expect *ἀποδοτέον*, but the sentence is resumed by *καθάπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ.*

καὶ ὃ ὡμολόγησεν ἄν, sc. *ἀνταποδοτέον*. I have adopted Bywater's conjecture here. We must join closely *τὴν ἀξίαν ὧν ἔπαθεν καὶ ὃ ὡμολόγησεν ἄν*. 'He must repay the equivalent of the benefit received and what he would have agreed to repay if he could' (but for the misunderstanding).

οὐδ'...ἠξίωσεν ἄν. He is entitled to assume that it is not a mere commercial transaction and that the giver is so much his friend that he would not have asked him to pay if he were unable.

ἐπὶ τίνι, 'on what terms.' **ὑπομένῃ,** sc. *εὐεργετούμενος*.

§ **10. ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει,** 'there is room for difference of opinion,' and therefore *ἐγκλήματα* may arise. Ind. s.v. *ἔχειν*.

πρὸς ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἑτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὑτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν 15
11 κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις. ἆρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἡ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην· τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρετο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· 20 κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τοῦ δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

περὶ τούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀξιοῖ πῶς τότ' ἦν, ὁ δὲ πῶς νῦν, ἂν μὴ διείπωνται. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν. ὥστε καὶ δίκαιον τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἐστί, καὶ δικαιοσύνη φιλική. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μάχεσθαι, διότι καλλίων μὲν ἡ ἠθικὴ φιλία, ἀναγκαιοτέρα δὲ ἡ χρησίμη. οἱ δ' ἄρχονται μὲν ὡς οἱ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν ὄντες· ὅταν δ' ἄντικρυς ᾖ τι τῶν ἰδίων, δῆλοι γίνονται ὅτι ἕτεροι ἦσαν. ἐκ περιουσίας γὰρ διώκουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ καλόν· διὸ καὶ τὴν καλλίω φιλίαν. ὥστε φανερὸν πῶς διαιρετέον περὶ τούτων. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικοὶ φίλοι, εἰς τὴν προαίρεσιν βλεπτέον εἰ ἴση, καὶ οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀξιωτέον θατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου· εἰ δ' ὡς χρήσιμοι καὶ πολιτικοί, ὡς ἂν ἐλυσιτέλει ὁμολογοῦσιν· ἂν δ' ὁ μὲν φῇ ὧδε ὁ δὲ ἐκείνως, οὐ καλὸν μὲν ἀντιποιῆσαι, δέον τοὺς καλοὺς λέγειν λόγους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θατέρου, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐ διείποντο ὡς ἠθικῶς, δεῖ κρίνειν τίνα, μηδ' ὑποκρινόμενον μηδέτερον αὐτῶν ἐξαπατᾶν. ὥστε δεῖ στέργειν αὐτὸν τὴν τύχην. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, δῆλον, ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ μεγάλα παθὼν μὴ ἀποδῷη δι' ἀδυναμίαν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἠδύνατο, καλῶς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἀνέχεται κατὰ δύναμιν λαμβάνων τὰς θυσίας. ἀλλὰ τῷ πωλοῦντι οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔξει, ἂν μὴ φήσῃ δύνασθαι πλέον δοῦναι, οὐδὲ τῷ δανείσαντι.

οὐκ ἦν, sc. *λαβεῖν*.

§ **11. ἆρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The regular formula in a tentative answer.

ἐπαρκεῖ, sc. *ὁ εὖ ποιῶν*.

ἢ καὶ πλέον. Fritzsche quotes Hes. *Ἔργ.* 349 *Εὖ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρὰ γείτονος, εὖ δ' ἀποδοῦναι, | αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ, καὶ λώϊον, αἴ κε δύνηαι.* This is the rule of the *ἐπίμετρον*.

XIV. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαις· ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἴεται γὰρ ὅ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλέον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ὠφελιμώτερος· ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα οὔ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴονται γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλεῖον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλεῖον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστῃ φίλον εἶναι, μηδέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; 1163 b ἔοικε δ' οὖν ἑκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιοῦν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλέον 2 νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς τῷ δ' ἐνδεεῖ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς

1163 a, 24. EE. 1242 b, 2 ἐπεὶ δὲ φιλίαι τρεῖς, κατ' ἀρετήν, κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, κατὰ τὸ ἡδύ, τούτων δὲ ἑκάστης δύο διαφοραί (ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἡ δὲ κατ' ἰσότητά ἐστιν ἑκάστη αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τὸ περὶ αὐτὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀμφισβητησάντων δῆλον), ἐν μὲν τῇ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦται τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερέχων ἀνεστραμμένως τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν ἐλάττω, οὕτω τὸ παρὰ τοῦ ἐλάττονος γινόμενον πρὸς τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ, διακείμενος ὥσπερ ἄρχων πρὸς ἀρχόμενον· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἴσον κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνιῶν οὕτω συμβαίνει. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ τοῦ ἴσου μετέχουσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ λόγῳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσον ἀριθμῷ εἰσήνεγκον ἀργύριον, ἴσον καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ διαλαμβάνουσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσον, ἀνάλογον. ὁ δ' ὑπερεχόμενος τοὐναντίον στρέφει τὸ ἀνάλογον, καὶ κατὰ διάμετρον συζεύγνυσιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὕτως ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὁ ὑπερέχων καὶ λειτουργία ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ κοινωνία. δεῖ ἄρα τινὶ ἑτέρῳ

XIV. § 1. **Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.**, i.q. *ἐγκαλοῦνται ἀλλήλοις*.

ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχήν, and therefore in the Family and the State.

νέμεσθαι, sc. *προσήκειν*.

οἴονται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The *ὑπερέχων* wishes to regulate the friendship on the principles of Distributive Justice, while the *ὑπερεχόμενος* regards it as falling under the head of an exchange of services for honour, and therefore, as Eudemos puts it, *συζεύγνυσι τὴν διάμετρον*. Cf. above 1133 a, 6 n.

§ 2. **ἔοικε δ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle solves the difficulty by applying *τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον*. We must find *τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον* and apply the rule of *τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*. Then only will 'diagonal conjunction' be fair.

καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία 3 τὸ κέρδος. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει· τῷ δὴ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττουμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρήματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ὠφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀποδιδόντα τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα. 4 τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κἂν δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν· ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέδρακεν, ὥστ' ἀεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δή. ἅμα δ' ἴσως οὐδείς ποτ' ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίᾳ· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελές. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

ἀνισάσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀνάλογον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τιμή, ὅπερ καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι φύσει καὶ θεῷ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχόμενον. δεῖ δὲ ἰσασθῆναι τὸ κέρδος πρὸς τὴν τιμήν.

§ 4. τὸ δυνατὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In this *φιλία* differs from *δικαιοσύνη*.

ἔστιν, sc. *τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν*.

εἰς δύναμιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. for the *ἔνδοξον* Xen. Mem. i, 3, 3 *ἐπαινέτης ἦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπους τοῦδε* (Hes. *Ἔργ.* 336) *Κὰδ δύναμιν δ' ἔρδειν ἱέρ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν*.

ἀπείπασθαι. Cf. Plato Laws 928 e for the *ἀποκήρυξις* of a son. Dem. Boiot. § 39 *ὁ νόμος τοὺς γονέας ποιεῖ κυρίους οὐ μόνον θέσθαι τοὔνομα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλιν ἐξαλεῖψαι ἐὰν βούλωνται καὶ ἀποκηρῦξαι*.

τῶν ὑπηργμένων, sc. *τῷ υἱεῖ παρὰ τοῦ πατρός*.

τὴν ἐπικουρίαν, sc. *τὴν γηροτροφίαν*.

I

Ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ

1163 b, 32. EE. 1243 b, 15 πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις ταῖς μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον. χαλεπὸν γὰρ μετρῆσαι ἑνὶ τῷδε τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὡς [τὸν] ἡδὺν ἐπὶ τὸ συζῆν, ὁ δ' ἐκεῖνον ἐνίοτε ὡς χρήσιμον· ὅταν δὲ παύσηται τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ἄλλου γινομένου ἄλλος γίνεται, καὶ τότε λογίζονται παντί τινος, καὶ ὡς Πύθων καὶ Παμμένης

I. § 1. **Ἐν...ταῖς ἀνομοειδέσι φιλίαις**, i.e. *ὧν μὴ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος*. The reading of L^b *ἀνομοειδέσι* deserves the preference over the *ἀνομοιειδέσι* of K^b (cf. Bon. Ind. s.v. *ὁμοειδής*); for what is meant is friendships in which the *φιλητόν* of the one party (*ἀγαθόν, ἡδύ* or *χρήσιμον*) is *τῷ εἴδει ἕτερον*, not merely *ἀνόμοιον*, from that of the other. In other words, they are friendships in which *ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἀντικατάλλονται οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας*. They must not be confused with *αἱ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν φιλίαι*. Eudemos (loc. cit.) describes friendships of this kind as *μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν*, by which he means apparently friendships in which the *φιλητά* differ not merely by attaining a higher or lower degree *along the same line*, but in which they are wholly disparate. So in Met. 994 a, 2 the *αἴτια τῶν ὄντων* are said to be *ἄπειρα* neither *κατ' εὐθυωρίαν* (as an infinite series) nor *κατ' εἶδος*.

εἴρηται. The reference, if genuine, must be to 1132 b, 31 sqq., the account of justice *ἐν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις συναλλάγμασιν*.

καθάπερ εἴρηται. It has not been said, though it has been implied in 1163 b, 1 sqq.

ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ, sc. *κοινωνίᾳ*, as we see from Eudemos loc. cit. The point of the illustration is that here too the parties are *ἀνομοειδεῖς*.

§ 2. **ἐνταῦθα**, sc. *ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ*. Cf. 1133 a, 19 sqq.

πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῇ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχῃ. διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὰν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα, διὸ τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φι-

διεφέροντο καὶ ὅλως διλάσκαλος καὶ μαθητής (ἐπιστήμη γὰρ καὶ χρήματα οὐχ ἑνὶ μετρεῖται), καὶ ὡς Πρόδικος (Ἡρόδικος Spengel) ὁ ἰατρὸς πρὸς τὸν ἀποδιδόντα μικρὸν τὸν μισθόν, καὶ ὡς ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς καὶ ὁ βασιλεύς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδεῖ, ὁ δ' ὡς χρησίμῳ ὡμίλει· ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ ἔδει ἀποδιδόναι, αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἔφη, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον ᾄσαντα εὐφρᾶναι, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποσχόμενος ἐκείνῳ. ὅμως δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ἐνταῦθα πῶς γνωριστέον· ἐνὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρητέον καὶ ἐνταῦθ', ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅρῳ ἀλλὰ λόγῳ· τῷ ἀνάλογον γὰρ μετρητέον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ μετρεῖται κοινωνία. πῶς γὰρ κοινωνήσει γεωργῷ σκυτοτόμος, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνάλογον ἰσασθήσεται τὰ ἔργα; τοῖς δὲ μὴ κατ' εὐθυωρίαν τὸ ἀνάλογον μέτρον, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν σοφίαν δοῦναι ἐγκαλεῖ, ὁ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἀργύριον, τῇ σοφίᾳ πρὸς τὸ πλούσιον, εἶτα τί δοθὲν πρὸς ἑκάτερον. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἥμισυ ἔδωκεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ μείζονος μὴ πολλοστὸν μέρος, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος ἀδικεῖ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀμφισβήτησις, ἂν φῇ ὁ μὲν ὡς χρησίμους συνελθεῖν αὐτούς, ὁ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ φιλίαν.

ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ, sc. *κοινωνίᾳ*, where *ἡδεῖα ὄψις* is exchanged for *θεραπεία*. Cf. 1157 a, 7 sqq.

ἐνίοτε μὲν κ.τ.λ. 1159 b, 16 sqq.

εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν. Cf. 1113 a, 19, 22. 1114 a, 15. 1153 b, 13.

§ 3. **Ταῦτα δὲ μὴ...ὑπάρχῃ**, 'and they have not both these attributes.' So a, 11 *τὰ ὑπάρχοντα*, 'their attributes.' The case supposed is that described above (*ληγούσης τῆς ὥρας*, when the *θεραπεία* ceases).

αὐτούς, i.e. *ἀλλήλους καθ' αὐτούς*, cf. above 1156 b, 10 n. Contrast the good, who *δι' αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός* (1156 b, 10). The MSS., however, have *αὐτούς*.

ἡ...τῶν ἠθῶν. Victorius seems clearly right in referring to 1157 a, 10 *πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοήθεις ὄντες*. It is not necessary to suppose with most editors that *ἡ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλία* is meant. Affection founded on character is **καθ' αὑτήν**, even if the character is not an ideally good one; for the friend is loved *καθ' αὑτόν*, not merely for his *ὑπάρχοντα*.

λίαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἠθῶν καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν οὗ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνῃ, οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ᾄσειεν, τοσούτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἑκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἱκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει ὁ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κἀκείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προϊεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προϊέμενος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν· ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." οἱ δὲ

καθ' αὑτήν, i.e. in it *καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν*. This is a striking example of the way in which *καθ' αὑτόν* has come to be treated as a simple adjective without regard to its literal meaning.

§ 4. **ἐφίεται**. Cf. 1110 a, 14 n.

οἷον καὶ τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ κ.τ.λ. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 401 (where *αὑτὸν ὡς ἡδὺν ἐποίησεν* means 'adopted the rôle of a friend *διὰ τὸ ἡδύ*'), and Plutarch, *Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης* 333 f. *Διονύσιος γοῦν ὁ τύραννος, ὥς φασι, κιθαρῳδοῦ τινὸς εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἀκούων ἐπηγγείλατο δωρεὰν αὐτῷ τάλαντον. τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν ἀπαιτοῦντος, Χθές, εἶπεν, εὐφραινόμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ παρ' ὃν ᾔδες χρόνον, εὔφρανα κἀγὼ σὲ ταῖς ἐλπίσιν, ὥστε τὸν μισθὸν ὧν ἕτερπες ἀπελάμβανες εὐθὺς ἀντιτερπόμενος.* Note the loose, conversational way in which Aristotle alludes to the story.

κἀκείνου γε χάριν, sc. *οὗ δεόμενος τυγχάνει*. **ταῦτα**, sc. *ἃ ἔχει*. Muretus conjectured *τὰ αὑτοῦ*.

§ 5. **τοῦ προλαβόντος**, not merely *τοῦ πρότερον λαβόντος*, as the editors say, but (as often) 'the one who has got the start,' 'the advantage.' He is called *ὁ προέχων* below 1164 b, 9. This rendering makes the aorist tense (suspected by Bywater) natural and right. The second alternative introduced by ἤ is preferred, as shown by the following clause with **γάρ**. Cf. 1156 b, 34.

ὅπερ φασὶ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plato, Prot. 328 b *ἐπειδὰν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον, ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερὸν ὀμόσας, ὅσου ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.*

ποιεῖν, imperf. inf. 'used to do.'

τὸ "μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί." Hesiod, Ἔργ. 368—

μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω,
καί τε κασιγνήτῳ γελάσας ἐπὶ μάρτυρα θέσθαι·
πίστεις δ' ἆρα ὅμως καὶ ἀπιστίαι ὤλεσαν ἄνδρας.

προλαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μηδὲν ποιοῦντες ὧν ἔφασαν διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγ-
7 κλήμασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἃ ὡμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθὸν μὴ ποιοῦντες εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασίν εἰσιν. ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προϊέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι—τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία—τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαί- 1164 b
ρεσιν—αὕτη γὰρ τοῦ φίλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ' ἡ ἀξία μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ
8 ἐνδεχόμενον. μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπί τινι, μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέχοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἵλετ' ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἕξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμε-

Even among friends things should be done on a business footing.

§ 7. **τοῦτο**, i.e. to have a fixed charge payable in advance.

δι' αὐτούς, 'for the sake of their friends themselves,' not for what they hope to get out of them. **εἴρηται**, 1162 b, 6 sqq.

κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. It is not a case for 'payment by results.' It is the will (*προαίρεσις*) rather than the power (*δύναμις*) that is essential.

καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1164 b, 5.

§ 8. **ἐπί τινι**, 'for some return,' 'on the understanding that a return has to be made.' The context shows that we are still dealing with 'understandings,' not with 'agreements.' So *ἐπί τινι* is not equivalent to *ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς*.

τὸν προέχοντα, 'the one who has the start.' Cf. the note on *τοῦ προλαβόντος* 1164 a, 23. The editors appear to think that *ὁ προέχων* can mean *ὁ πρότερον σχών*. Even Zell says "is qui prior habet, id est, qui prior accepit."

οὗτος, sc. *ὁ προέχων*.

ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου κ.τ.λ. The pleasure has to be calculated in terms of *τὸ ὠφέλιμον*.

ἕξει, sc. *ὁ προέμενος*. **τὴν παρὰ τούτου**, sc. *τοῦ προέχοντος*.

ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις, 'in the case of things offered for sale.' The seller will take as much as he can get, but the just price is the value of the article to the buyer. Aristotle is still thinking of *χρεία* as the only standard of value. He forgets that there is a Normal Value determined by Cost of Pro-

νον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων δίκας 9
μὴ εἶναι, ὡς δέον ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον
καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἴεται δι-
καιότερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ
τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ
γὰρ οἰκεῖα καὶ ἃ διδόασιν ἑκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἄξια·
ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάτ-
τωσιν οἱ λαμβάνοντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσούτου τιμᾶν ὅσου
ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

II. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷον πότερον δεῖ
πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ κάμνοντα
μὲν ἰατρῷ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειροτονητέον τὸν πολε-
μικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον,
καὶ εὐεργέτῃ ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ προετέον,
ἐὰν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχηται. ἆρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκρι- 2
βῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥᾴδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας

1164 b, 22. EE. 1244 a, 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλου σκεπτέον πότερον δεῖ ἐκείνῳ τὰ χρήσιμα ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ βοηθεῖν ἢ τῷ ἀντιποιοῦντι καὶ δυναμένῳ. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρόβλημά ἐστι, πότερον τὸν φίλον ἢ τὸν σπουδαῖον εὖ ποιητέον μᾶλλον. ἂν μὲν γὰρ <ὁ> φίλος καὶ σπουδαῖος, ἴσως οὐ λίαν χαλεπόν, ἂν μή τις τὸ μὲν αὐξήσῃ τὸ δὲ ταπεινώσῃ, φίλον μὲν σφόδρα ποιῶν, ἐπιεικῆ δὲ ἠρέμα· εἰ δὲ μή, πολλὰ προβλήματα γίνεται, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν ἦν, οὐκ ἔσται δέ, ὁ δὲ ἔσται, οὔπω δέ, ἢ ὁ μὲν ἐγένετο, ἔστι δ' οὔ, ὁ δὲ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ

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duction. If the seller does not get this, he will withdraw his wares from the market, unless indeed they are perishable.

§ 9. **ἐνιαχοῦ τε κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1162 b, 29.

τῶν ἑκουσίων συμβολαίων. Cf. above 1131 a, 2 sqq. and the notes.

οἴεται. There is no difficulty in the third person singular which Aristotle uses very freely without a definite subject (cf. 1110 a, 14 n.). Here we may supply *ὁ νομοθέτης* from *οἱ νόμοι* if we like.

ἀλλ' ὅμως κ.τ.λ. However high the seller's estimate may be, it is the buyer's estimate that is decisive.

δεῖ δ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. A reservation in favour of the seller. When the article has been bought its apparent value to the purchaser is lowered, for he is no longer conscious how much he wanted it. Of course, if he wishes to sell it again, its apparent value to him rises again.

II. § 1. **Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ.** These *ἀπορίαι* form a sort of casuistry of Friendship. For *ἔχει* cf. Ind. s. v.

ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ
3 ἀναγκαίῳ. ὅτι δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδη- 30
λον· καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἑταίροις, ὥσπερ καὶ δάνειον ᾧ ὀφεί-
4 λει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἑταίρῳ δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ'
ἀεί, οἷον τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ λῃστῶν πότερα τὸν λυσά- 35
μενον ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὁστισοῦν ᾖ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἑαλωκότι 1165 a
ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρωτέον; δόξειε
5 γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα. ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται,
καθόλου μὲν τὸ ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἡ
δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον·
ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προϋπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι, 5
ἐπειδὰν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἡ ἀντ-

οὐδὲ ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἐργωδέστερον. μὴ γάρ τι λέγει Εὐριπίδης, ποιήσας

λόγων δίκαιον μισθὸν ἂν λόγους φέροις,
ἔργον δ' ἐκεῖνος ἔργον <ὃς> παρέσχετο.

καὶ οὐ πάντα δεῖ τῷ πατρί, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἃ δεῖ τῇ μητρί· καίτοι βελτίων ὁ πατήρ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ Διὶ πάντα θύεται, οὐδ' ἔχει πάσας τὰς τιμὰς ἀλλὰ τινάς· ἴσως οὖν ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ τῷ χρησίμῳ, ἄλλα δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. οἷον οὐκ εἰ σῖτον δίδωσι καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ συζῆν τούτῳ δεῖ· οὐδ' ᾧ τοίνυν τὸ συζῆν, τούτῳ ἃ μὴ οὗτος δίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμος. ἀλλ' οἳ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες τούτῳ πάντα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ διδόασιν οὐ δέον, οὐδενός εἰσιν ἄξιοι.

καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅροι τῆς φιλίας πάντες μέν πως εἰσι φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς αὐτῆς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ χρησίμῳ τὸ βούλεσθαι τὰ κείνῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τῷ εὖ ποιήσαντι καὶ τῷ ὁποῖος δεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἐπισημαίνει οὗτος ὁ ὁρισμὸς τῆς φιλίας), ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ συζῆν, τῷ δὲ καθ' ἡδονὴν τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν· πάντες δ' οὗτοι οἱ ὅροι κατὰ

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§ 4. **μᾶλλον τὸν πατέρα,** sc. *δεῖν λύεσθαι.* The point is that, as it is right to ransom your father rather than yourself, it will be right to ransom him rather than the man who has ransomed you, and still more if the man who ransomed you is not himself a captive but is merely claiming repayment of the money he spent.

§ 5. **τὴν προϋπαρχήν,** 'the original benefit.' The word comes from *ὑπάρχειν* as opposed to *ἀμύνεσθαι.* Cf. 1124 b, 12 n.

ἀπόδοσις γίνηται ὃν οἴεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίοτε ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰόμενος κομιεῖσθαι ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομιεῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ 6 πάθη καὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῖς περὶ ἃ εἰσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἑταίροις 7 καὶ εὐεργέταις, ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταὐτό. δόξειε δ' 8 ἂν τροφῆς μὲν γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὂν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταὐτ' ἐπαρκεῖν· καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ

φιλίαν μὲν λέγονται τινά, οὐ πρὸς μίαν δ' οὐδείς. διὸ πολλοί εἰσι, καὶ ἕκαστος μιᾶς εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλίας, οὐκ ὤν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ εἶναι προαίρεσις. καὶ γὰρ ὁ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ ποιήσας εὖ * * βούλεται τῷ ἔργῳ τῷ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ τῷ δόντι τὸ εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἀλλὰ συζῆν οὐ τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἡδεῖ.

ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ φίλοι ἀλλήλους ἔνιοι· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλοῦσι τὸν ἔχοντα· διὸ φιλεῖ κἀκείνους οἷον διότι ἡδὺς τὸν οἶνον εἵλετο, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος τὸν πλοῦτον εἵλετο· χρησιμώτερος γάρ. διὸ <οὐ> δεῖ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μᾶλλον εἵλετο ἀντὶ ἥττονος. οἱ δ' ἐγκαλοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνον γὰρ νῦν ζητοῦσι τὸν ἀγαθόν, πρότερον ζητήσαντες τὸν ἡδὺν ἢ τὸν χρήσιμον.

τὸ ἀξίωμα, 'the claim.'

οἴονται δέ, 'but they think (or rather 'he thinks') it is so.' The number changes, but it is still the good man who does not wish to lend his money. It is quite natural that he should not lend to a man who he thinks (rightly or wrongly) will not pay back.

§ 6. **εἴρηται**. Cf. 1104 a, 1 etc.

θύεται, sc. *πάντα*.

§ 7. **κήδη**, funerals.

§ 8. **τροφῆς**, partitive genitive. The allusion is to the Hellenic duty of *γηροτροφία*.

πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί, οὐδ' αὖ 25 τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικήν, 9 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικήν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις· πρὸς ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς παρρησίαν καὶ ἁπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενέσι δὲ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ 30 πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπονέμειν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἑκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' 10 οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥᾴων ἡ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διά γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχηται, οὕτω διοριστέον. 35

III. Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ 1165 b τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων εὔλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἄν τις, 5 εἰ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὃ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως οἴωνται καὶ ὦσι 2 φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῶτ' ἄν· ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, 10 δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσῳ περὶ τιμιώτερον ἡ κακουργία.

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§ 9. **ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει**, 'rising and giving them a seat.' Cf. Plato, Rep. 425 a *σιγάς τε τῶν νεωτέρων παρὰ πρεσβυτέροις, ὡς πρέπει, καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ ὑπαναστάσεις.*

καὶ συγκρίνειν κ.τ.λ., 'and compare the claims of each in respect of closeness, goodness and usefulness.' I cannot feel convinced of Professor Bywater's view (Contr. p. 62) that *συγκρίνειν* is here used in the sense of *συνδυάζειν* (or *συνάγειν*) and that the reference is to "combining the persons and their respective dues." These, I take it, would be *προσήκοντα*, not *ὑπάρχοντα*.

§ 10. **ἡ κρίσις**, i.e. *ἡ σύγκρισις* according to the usual practice of repeating a compound by the simple word (1156 b, 23 n.). Ruelle's *σύγκρισις* is therefore unnecessary.

III. §1. **ἐν ἀρχῇ**, probably 1162 b, 23.

§ 2. **ἢ τοῖς...κιβδηλεύουσιν.** Zwinger quotes Theognis, v. 200—

Χρυσοῦ κιβδήλοιο καὶ ἀργύρου ἄνσχετος ἄτῃ,
Κύρνε, καὶ ἐξευρεῖν ῥᾴδιον ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ·

ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχηται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ 3
δοκῇ, ἆρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλη-
τὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ † φιλητέον † πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ·
φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρη-
ται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἆρ' οὖν εὐθὺς διαλυ-
τέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν;
ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν
οὐσίαν, ὅσῳ βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ'
ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ
φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται.
εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένοι ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γίνοιτο καὶ πολὺ 4
διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἆρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται;
ἐν μεγάλῃ δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν
ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διά-
νοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι
μήτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπού-
μενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ
δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν
τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἆρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς 5
αὐτὸν ἑκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ
μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις
μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς

εἰ δὲ φίλου νόος ἀνδρὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι λέληθε
ψυδρὸς ἐών, δόλιον δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ ἔχει,
τοῦτο θεὸς κιβδηλότατον ποίησε βροτοῖσι,
καὶ γνῶναι πάντων τοῦτ' ἀνιηρότατον.

Camerarius adds Dem. Lept. § 167—*θαυμάζω δ' ἔγωγε εἰ τοῖς μὲν τὸ νόμισμα διαφθείρουσι θάνατος παρ' ὑμῖν ἐστὶν ἡ ζημία, τοῖς δ' ὅλην τὴν πόλιν κίβδηλον καὶ ἄπιστον ποιοῦσι λόγον δώσετε.*

§ 3. **οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον κ.τ.λ.** There is clearly something wrong. Stahr reads *οὔτε δὲ φιλητὸν <τὸ> πονηρόν*, and so Bywater. Stewart supposes the original text to have been *ἢ οὐ δυνατόν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ δεῖ. φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, the words *οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρόν* being due to a dittography of *οὐδὲ δεῖ φιλοπόνηρον*.

φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We have perhaps an echo of this in Theophrastos, Char. 14 (*Περὶ φιλοπονηρίας*) *καὶ τὸ ὅλον φιλοπονηρία ἀδελφή ἐστι τῆς πονηρίας καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ -ῆς παροιμίας τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον πορεύεσθαι.*

ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι, 'capable of reform.' For *ἔχειν* cf. Ind. s. v.

§ 4. **ἦν.** For the imperfect cf. Ind. s. v. *ἦν*.

συμβιοῦν. Cf. 1126 a, 31 n.

γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγενομένην φιλίαν, 35
ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας διάλυσις γένηται.

IV. *Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι* 1166 a
ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. τι-
θέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ
ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ
ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκ- 5
να πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ
τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα

1166 a, 1. EE. 1240 a, 5 *πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς λέγονται οἵ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν· κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δ' ὅμοια φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γάρ πως κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη ἡ φιλία, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διῃρημένοις τὸ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν· δι' ἃ μᾶλλον οὕτως αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, <ὡς> ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται πῶς ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὑτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ ταῦτα καὶ διῃρημένοις· ᾗ δὴ*

IV. § 1. **Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We now come to what is really the important part of the discussion of *φιλία* so far as regards the main argument. It is *φιλία* alone, in the sense of the higher self-love, that can lead us from the practical to the theoretic life. Cf. Introductory Note p. 345.

πρὸς τοὺς πέλας (so K^b for vulg. *πρὸς τοὺς φίλους*). Friendship as a feeling *πρὸς ἕτερον* is, in its highest form, an externalisation and transference to others of the good man's relation to himself.

ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν. We must not supply *φιλικῶν*, for Aristotle does not intend to assume yet that there is such a thing as self-love. That question is raised only to be dismissed below (a, 33). There is no definite ellipse. Eudemos says more clearly *ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἕξεως* (loc. cit. p. 410).

τιθέασι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Five *φιλικά* are enumerated and shown to be characteristic of self-love, viz. (1) *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα*, (2) *βούλησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν*, (3) *τὸ συνδιάγειν* (=*τὸ συζῆν*), (4) *τὸ ταὐτὰ αἱρεῖσθαι* (*τὸ ὁμογνωμονεῖν*), (5) *τὸ συναλγεῖν καὶ συγχαίρειν*.

οἱ προσκεκρουκότες, 'who have quarrelled' (perhaps about a trifle) and 'never see each other now,' so that their friendship is clearly dis-

καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρ- 2
χει—τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι (ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι)—οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν 3
αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν· καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει—τοῦ

δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα, ἢ δ' οὐ διῃρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει.

ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕξεως [ὡς] οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν διωρισμένοι, καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τἀγαθὰ ἢ οἷα οἴεται ἀγαθά, μὴ δι' αὐτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτόν, κἂν εἰ μὴ διανέμων τἀγαθά, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα φιλεῖν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἱρεῖται δι' αὐτὴν τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς, οἱ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἱ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται φιλεῖσθαι. ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι [ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν], οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες,

interested (**αὐτοῦ χάριν**). Cf. Pol. 1263 a, 18 *οἱ πλεῖστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσκρούοντες ἀλλήλοις.*

ὁρίζονται. They are not, of course, scientific *ὁρισμοί*, but only dialectical *ὁρικά* (Top. 102 a, 9 sqq.) *τῆς φιλίας.*

§ 2. **τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ**, i. q. *τῷ ἀγαθῷ*, and **ὁ σπουδαῖος** below i. q. *ὁ ἀγαθός.*

ᾗ...ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, 'in so far as they fancy themselves good.' The point is more fully explained below 1166 b, 2. Here the remark is quite parenthetical.

καθάπερ εἴρηται. Cf. 1113 a, 22 sqq.

§ 3. **οὗτος γάρ**, sc. *ὁ ἐπιεικής* (a, 10). The *fourth φιλικόν* shown to be true of the good man's relation to himself. Cf. 1167 b, 4.

κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν, i.e. there is no variance between his *ὀρέξεις*, his *ἐπιθυμία* and *θυμός* have the same objects as his *βούλησις*. It is not true of him that *τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται* (1099 a, 12); *πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ* (1102 b, 28). We must avoid the Paraphrast's error of saying *τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατά τε λογικὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλογον.* The *λόγον ἔχον* has no *ὄρεξις.*

καὶ βούλεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. The *first φιλικόν*, viz. *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα.*

καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα. Of course to the good man these are identical with *τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθά*, but Aristotle inserts the words lest we should forget that *ὄρεξις* is *οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας.*

γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν—καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα—τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ·—καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ 4
φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι, ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐ- 20
δεὶς πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον—ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ

ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστά γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, ὅτι [μὴ] ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν· <τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν> μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκεῖνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν. ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ [μὴ] μίαν ψυχὴν εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρεται πρὸς τὸν ἕνα. καὶ γὰρ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. οὐθεὶς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν εὖ ποιεῖ διά τι ἕτερον, οὐδὲ χάριτος. οὐ δὲ λέγει ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ εἰς· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι βούλεσθαι ὁ δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι φιλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλεῖν.

1166 a, 20. EE. 1240 b, 8 *καὶ τὸ εἶναι μάλιστα καὶ τὸ συζῆν*

ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ, 'which each of us is believed to be.' We need not seek far for the author of this *ἔνδοξον*. Plato in Rep. IX. had already represented *τὸ φιλόσοφον* in the likeness of a man, while *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* are in the image of a lion and a many-headed monster. We need not yet consider whether, or in what sense, Aristotle himself could accept the formula. Cf. 1168 b, 30 sqq. 1178 a, 2 sqq.

καὶ ζῆν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The *second φιλικόν.*

τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ, in the Platonist sense of the word *φρόνησις*. Cf. above 1140 a, 24 n.

§ 4. **γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος κ.τ.λ.** Stewart is evidently right in trying to explain this sentence by the light of the *ἀπορία* about *βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ* raised above (1159 a, 5 sqq.). There we saw that a man will not wish his friend to be a god, here we see that he will not wish to be a god himself. We are coming closer to the idea of Self.

γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος, 'by becoming another.' The sentence "No one chooses by becoming another that the thing he has become should have all good things" is not logical; but the thought does not lend itself to clear expression. If we bracket *ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον* with Vermehren, the sentence is smoother; but I am inclined to think the confusion of two inconsistent thoughts is intentional.

καὶ νῦν, 'as it is,' so he would be wishing for something which already exists. Cf. Leibniz's "A quoy vous serviroit-il de devenir Roy de la Chine à condition d'oublier ce que vous avez esté? Ne seroit-ce pas la même chose que si Dieu en même temps qu'il vous détruisoit, créoit un Roy dans la Chine?"

θεὸς τἀγαθόν—ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν· δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν
ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ 5
βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμέ-
25 νων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνεῖαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες
ἀγαθαί, αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ
τῇ διανοίᾳ. συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ·
πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ
ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὴ πρὸς
30 αὑτὸν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ
τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς αὑτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος
ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ
φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ πότερον ἔστιν ἢ 6
οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν

καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν, καὶ μία δὴ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μηδὲ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ συναποθνήσκειν. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ὁ εἷς, καὶ ἴσως ὁμιλεῖ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὑτόν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πονηρῷ διαφωνεῖ, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ καὶ ἐχθρὸν ἐνδέχεσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι· ἡ δ' εἷς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος, ὀρεκτὸς αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ. τοιοῦτος ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀρετὴν φίλος, ἐπεὶ ὅ γε μοχθηρὸς οὐχ εἷς ἀλλὰ πολλοί, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας ἕτερος καὶ ἔμπληκτος. ὥστε καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλία ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅτι γάρ πῃ ὁμοιοῖ καὶ εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός,

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ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν, 'remaining just what he is,' sc. *αἱρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν*. A will not accept bliss on condition of becoming B. It is nothing to A that B is blessed.

§ 5. **συνδιάγειν τε κ.τ.λ.** The *third φιλικόν*.

μνεῖαι. I prefer this, the reading of K^b, to the more commonplace *μνῆμαι*. The *poeticus color* is quite in place here. Cf. 1165 b, 33.

συναλγεῖ τε κ.τ.λ. The *fifth φιλικόν*.

ἀμεταμέλητος. Zwinger compares Epicharmos (fr. 280 Kaibel), *οὐ μετανοεῖν ἀλλὰ προνοεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφόν*.

τῷ δὴ...ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. Men's views of the characteristics of *φιλία* are entirely derived from the good man's relation to himself. His relation to himself is transferred to his relation to his friend; for the friend is "another self," and that is why men regard the points enumerated as *φιλικά*.

§ 6. **πρὸς αὑτὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This is introduced as an entirely fresh point. We have seen that our view of what friendship is is based upon the good man's relation to himself; can we put it the other way and say that the good man loves himself? This is precisely parallel to the question in Book V. whether a man can wrong himself.

ταύτῃ εἶναι φιλία, ᾗ ἐστι δύο ἢ πλείω [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ- 35
νων] καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμοιοῦ- 1166 b
7 ται. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν,
καίπερ οὖσι φαύλοις. ἆρ' οὖν ᾗ τ' ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ
ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτῃ μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν;
ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῇ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὐδενὶ ταῦθ' 5
8 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύ-
λοις· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦ-
σιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἱροῦνται γὰρ
ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλα-
βερὰ ὄντα· οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται 10

ταύτῃ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος καὶ ὀρεκτός· φύσει δὲ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὁ πονηρὸς παρὰ φύσιν. ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς οὐθ' ἅμα λοιδορεῖται ἑαυτῷ, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀκρατής, οὔτε ὁ ὕστερος τῷ πρότερον, ὥσπερ ὁ μεταμελητικός, οὔτε ὁ ἔμπροσθεν τῷ ὕστερον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψεύστης. ὅλως τε εἰ δεῖ ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταὶ διορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος σπουδαῖος. δῆλον γὰρ

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man loves himself? This is precisely parallel to the question in Book V. whether a man can wrong himself.

ᾗ ἐστι δύο ἢ πλείω. This has been taken in two ways, (1) 'in so far as he is two or more,' (2) 'in so far as two or more of the characteristics mentioned are present.' With regard to (2) I would ask why 'two or more' are mentioned. Surely the good man has them all and the bad man fancies he has. EE. 1240 a, 17 sqq. (loc. cit. p. 409) seems to me decisive in favour of (1). We have there *τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς*, and below a, 20 *ᾗ δὲ δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα*. This is an authoritative explanation. Eudemos also (loc. cit.) refers to the parallel question *πότερον ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὔ*. If we follow this hint and turn to 1138 b, 5, we find *κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ ὁμοιότητα ἔστιν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὑτοῦ τισιν*. Here as there we have a reference to the Platonic view. This Aristotle regards as a metaphor, so we may be sure that the argument here is still purely dialectical.

ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. Bywater (Contr. p. 63) puts a comma before *ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων* to show that it goes closely with *δόξειε δ' ἄν*. I do not see how it follows from what has been said, and prefer to believe the words have crept in from the paraphrase. We see from the next sentence that *τὰ εἰρημένα* most naturally means the *φιλικά* which have been enumerated, and it is therefore likely that they are introduced here to support the interpretation we have rejected.

§ 8. **ἑτέρων μὲν κ.τ.λ.** Observe that the *διαφορά* is entirely in the *ὀρεκτικόν*, not between *ὄρεξις* and *διάνοια*.

τοῦ πραττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται καὶ διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν μισοῦνται, καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ 9
μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιημερεύσουσιν, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμιμνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐδέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες οὐδὲν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλγοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς· στασιάζει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεῖ ἀπεχόμενόν τινων, τὸ δ' ἥδεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκεῖσε ἕλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἥδεσθαι, 10
ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἥσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν. οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητόν. εἰ δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἑτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πόσον σπουδαῖον αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἐγκαλέσωσιν αὐτοῖς, ἀποκτιννύασιν αὑτούς· ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ πᾶς αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀγαθός. ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἁπλῶς ὢν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι δύ' ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ ἃ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων <οὔ>, οἷον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ * *, οὐκ ἄρα φίλος. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἤδη ἔχῃ προαίρεσιν· ἤδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἔοικε δ' ἡ φιλία ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ κατὰ συγγένειαν· οὐθέτερον γὰρ ἐφ' αὑτοῖς λῦσαι, ἀλλὰ κἂν διαφέρωνται, ὅμως οὗτοι μὲν ἔτι συγγενεῖς, ὁ δὲ ἔτι εἷς, ἕως ἂν ζῇ.

καὶ ... μισοῦνται, 'and who are hated' (the relative cannot be repeated in Greek), **καὶ φεύγουσι**, 'actually shun.'

φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν, opp. *ζῆν βούλεται ἑαυτόν* (1166 a, 17).

§ 9. **ἑαυτοὺς δὲ φεύγουσιν**, opp. *συνδιάγειν ἑαυτῷ βούλεται* κ.τ.λ. (1166 a, 23).

οὐδὲ δὴ συγχαίρουσιν κ.τ.λ. opp. *συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται ἑαυτῷ* (ib. 27).

V. Ἡ δ' εὔνοια φιλίᾳ μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἔστι γε φιλία· 30
γίνεται γὰρ εὔνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνῶτας καὶ λανθάνουσα, φιλία δ' οὔ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησίς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει
2 δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ δ' εὔνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς 35
συμβαίνει· εὔνοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμ- 1167 a
πράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν· ὅπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, προσπαίως εὔνοι
3 γίνονται καὶ ἐπιπολαίως στέργουσιν. ἔοικε δὴ ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονή· μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ἰδέᾳ οὐδεὶς ἐρᾷ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐδὲν 5
μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῇ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῇ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὔνους γενομένους, οἱ δ' εὖνοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται γὰρ μόνον τἀγαθὰ οἷς εἰσιν εὖνοι, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθεῖεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη 10

1166 b, 30. EE. 1240 b, 38 *ποσαχῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ φιλεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσαι αἱ φιλίαι ἀνάγονται πρὸς τὴν πρώτην, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· οἰκεῖον δὲ τῇ σκέψει θεωρῆσαι καὶ περὶ ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας. δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων. ἔστι δ' ἡ εὔνοια τῆς φιλίας οὔτε πάμπαν ἕτερον οὔτε ταὐτόν. διῃρημένης γὰρ τῆς φιλίας κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὔτ' ἐν τῇ χρησίμῃ οὔτ' ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡδονὴν ἐστίν. εἴτε γὰρ ὅτι χρήσιμον, βούλεται αὐτῷ τἀγαθά, οὐ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀλλὰ δι' αὑτὸν βούλοιτ' ἄν, δοκεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ <ἡ φιλία> καὶ*

V. § 1. **καὶ πρότερον**, 1155 b, 32. We here begin an examination of cognate *ἕξεις* and *δυνάμεις* like that in Book VI., 1142 a, 31 sqq.

διάτασιν, *animi intentionem*. The word is originally a medical term. Cf. Plato, Rep. 407 c *κεφαλῆς τινες... διατάσεις, migraines.*

ἀκολουθεῖ. Cf. Ind. s. v.

§ 2. **περὶ τοὺς ἀγωνιστάς**. Cf. Lat. *favor*.

§ 3. **ἀρχὴ φιλίας**. Cf. EE. (loc. cit.), which proves that *ἀρχή* here means simply 'beginning.'

τῇ ἰδέᾳ...τῷ εἴδει. There is no difference of meaning.

οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾷ, 'is not in love for all that.'

ἀπόντα ποθῇ, *absentem desiderat*; for *πόθος* (*desiderium*) is always *τοῦ ἀπόντος*, Plato, Krat. 420 a.

μεταφέρων, 'in a metaphor.' Cf. Ind. s. v.

τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὔνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὔνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὔνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διά τινα χρῆσιν. ὅλως δ' ἡ εὔ- 4
νοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῳ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρεῖος ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴπομεν.

VI. Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται. διόπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν· οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασιν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταὐτὰ προαι-

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ἡ εὔνοια οὐκ αὐτοῦ εὔνοια τοῦ εὐνοϊζομένου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ᾧ εὐνοεῖ· εἰ δὴ ἦν ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἡδέος φιλίᾳ, κἂν τοῖς ἀψύχοις εὐνόουν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι περὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν φιλίαν ἡ εὔνοια ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν εὐνοοῦντος βούλεσθαι μόνον ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ φίλου καὶ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εὔνοια ἀρχὴ φιλίας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος πᾶς εὔνους, ὁ δ' εὔνους οὐ πᾶς φίλος. ἀρχομένῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ὁ εὐνοῶν μόνον, διὸ ἀρχὴ φιλίας, ἀλλ' οὐ φιλία.

1167 a, 22. EE. 1241 a, 15 δοκοῦσι γὰρ οἵ τε φίλοι ὁμονοεῖν καὶ οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες φίλοι εἶναι. ἔστι δ' οὐ περὶ πάντα ἡ ὁμόνοια ἡ φιλική, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ τοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ὅσα εἰς τὸ συζῆν συντείνει, οὔτε μόνον κατὰ διάνοιαν ἢ κατὰ ὄρεξιν (ἔστι γὰρ τἀναντία τὸ κινοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀκρατεῖ διαφωνεῖ τοῦτο), οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁμονοεῖν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.

ἀργήν. The metaphor is probably from fields that lie fallow or mines that are unworked. Contrast *ἐνέργεια*.

τὰ δίκαια δρῶν. He is *δίκαιος* rather than *εὔνους*, in the proper sense.

VI. § 1. **ὁμόνοια**, *concordia*, a political term.

περὶ ὁτουοῦν. As the writer of MM says (1212 a, 15) we do not call it *ὁμόνοια* to agree with Empedokles about the elements. As Eudemos put it, it is neither *κατὰ διάνοιαν* nor yet *κατ' ὄρεξιν* solely. Hence its relation to *προαίρεσις*.

ρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα. περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν 30
πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακὸν ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν δ' ἑκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος 35
καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γί- 1167 b
νεται οὗ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γάρ ἐστι
3 καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ὁμόνοια· οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι ταῦτα προαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες βλάπτουσιν ἀλλήλους. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ φιλία· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πρώτη καὶ φύσει σπουδαία, διὸ οὐκ ἔστι τοὺς φαύλους ὁμονοεῖν, ἑτέρα δὲ καθ' ἣν καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ὁμονοοῦσιν, ὅταν τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχωσιν. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεσθαι, ὥστε ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχειν οὗ ὀρέγονται. ἂν γὰρ τοιούτου ὀρέγωνται ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀμφοῖν, μαχοῦνται· οἱ ὁμονοοῦντες δ' οὐ μαχοῦνται. ἔστι δ' ἡ ὁμόνοια, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ αὐτὴ προαίρεσις ᾖ, μὴ τοῦ ἑκάτερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία πολιτική.

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§ 2. **περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ κ.τ.λ.** There are three things to note in answering the question *περὶ ποῖα;* (1) it has to do with *πρακτά*, (2) on a large scale, (3) in which it is possible for the desires of all parties to be satisfied. Cf. Eudemos loc. cit.

ἢ ἄρχειν Πιττακόν. The illustration is to the point, for (1) Pittakos was an *elected* tyrant (Pol. 1285 a, 35), and (2) he resigned against the wishes of the citizens. Accordingly *ὁμόνοια* prevailed only during the period when he consented to rule (**ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν**).

οἱ ἐν ταῖς Φοινίσσαις. Eteokles and Polyneikes in Euripides. Cf. "Was mein Bruder Karl will, dass will ich auch."

ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, 'in the same person.'

οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς. These are the same as *οἱ ἄριστοι*.

πολιτικὴ δὴ κ.τ.λ. The conclusion of the argument. If it has to do (1) with *πρακτά* on a large scale and (2) with things as to which the desires of all may be satisfied, it will be political.

καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται. Ὁμόνοια is used technically by Thucydides of agreement as to the constitution. So in viii. 93 *ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.*

ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν (τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ εὔριπος), βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας· ἑαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

VII. Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν

1167 b, 17. EE. 1241 a, 34 περὶ μὲν οὖν ὁμονοίας καὶ εὐνοίας εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· ἀπορεῖται δὲ διὰ τί μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν οἱ ποιήσαντες εὖ τοὺς παθόντας ἢ οἱ παθόντες εὖ τοὺς ποιήσαντας. δοκεῖ δὲ δίκαιον εἶναι τοὐναντίον. τοῦτο δ' ὑπολάβοι μὲν ἄν τις διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ὠφέλιμον συμβαίνειν· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ὀφείλεται, τὸν δ' ἀποδοῦναι

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§ 3. **ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν**, sc. ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, opp. ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις, without the political significance which the word has above (b, 1).

ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, 'being of one mind.' The phrase ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, μένειν is common in Demosthenes, and can be replaced by ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, μένειν in the same sense (see Rehdanz Ind. s.v.). There is no reference whatever to the proverb ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ὁρμεῖν.

ὥσπερ εὔριπος. "Significantur hoc nomine omnia maris loca angustiora in quibus contrarii sunt fluctuum motus," Zell. For the simile cf. Aischines p. 66. 27 πλείους τραπόμενος τροπὰς τοῦ Εὐρίπου παρ' ὃ ᾤκει.

§ 4. **τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει.** Cf. the complaints of Demosthenes in the Philippics.

VII. § 1. **Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται κ.τ.λ.** This ἀπορία too serves to bring out some important points about φιλία.

παρὰ λόγον, i. q. ἄλογον, opp. κατὰ λόγον, εὔλογον.

τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις. Fritzsche compares Thuc. ii, 40 βεβαιότερος ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν ὥστε ὀφειλομένην δι' εὐνοίας ᾧ δέδωκε σῴζειν· ὁ δ' ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν ἀλλ' ἐς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων.

ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιουμένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοὺς "ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους," ἔοικε δ' ἀνθρωπικῷ· ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον, καὶ οὐδ' ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ γάρ ἐστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σῴζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας κἂν μηδὲν ὦσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἄν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου·

δεῖ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυσικόν. ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αἱρετώτερον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὁ δ' εὖ παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἡ περὶ τὰ τέκνα σπουδή ἐστι, καὶ τοῦ γεννῆσαι καὶ <τὰ> γεννώμενα σῴζειν. καὶ φιλοῦσι δὴ μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες τὰ τέκνα [καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων] ἢ φιλοῦνται· καὶ οὗτοι πάλιν τὰ αὑτῶν ἢ τοὺς γεννήσαντας, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον· καὶ αἱ μητέρες τῶν πατέρων, ὅτι μᾶλλον οἴονται αὑτῶν εἶναι ἔργον τὰ τέκνα· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τῷ χαλεπῷ διορίζουσι, πλείω δὲ λυπεῖται περὶ τὴν γένεσιν μήτηρ.

ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένους. Epicharmos fr. 146 Kaibel, where θαμένους is restored. I do not think the interpretation given by Koraes "as if from a bad seat in the theatre" is adequate. It seems more likely that ἐκ πονηροῦ should be understood on the analogy of ἐκ δεξιᾶς, ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς, ἐξ ἐναντίας, so that the meaning will be 'looking at the thing on the bad side' or, as we say, 'the seamy side' (metaphor from tapestry). Cf. the Latin *in malam partem*.

ἀνθρωπικῷ. Cf. 1111 b, 1 n.

§ 2. **φυσικώτερον.** Cf. 1147 a, 24 n. In 1155 b, 8, 9 φυσικὰ ἀπορήματα are opposed to ἀνθρωπικά.

οὐδ' ὅμοιον, 'is not even analogous.' Cf. 1105 a, 26. Bywater (Contr. p. 64) reads **τὸ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας**, a decided improvement.

περὶ ἐκείνους, sc. τοὺς δανείσαντας, 'there is no φίλησις in them' (for their debtors).

τοῦ σῴζεσθαι βούλησις κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1155 b, 30.

κομιδῆς. Cf. κομίζεσθαι 1162 b, 32.

1168 a μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὴ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ 4
πεπονθὸς ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ
5 τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ εἶναι πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργείᾳ—τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν—ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστί πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὃ γάρ ἐστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει. ἅμα δὲ καὶ 5
10 τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι οὐδὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἧττον ἡδὺ καὶ φιλητόν. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἡ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος 6

§ 3. **περὶ τοὺς ποιητάς.** Cf. 1120 b, 13 n.

§ 4. **ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ ὁ ποιήσας κ.τ.λ.** The conclusion of the syllogism is that *τὸ ἔργον* is *φιλητόν*, and this is reached through the middle term *τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι* (*τὸν ποιήσαντα*). Thus

τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ is *φιλητόν*
τὸ ἔργον is *τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι*
∴ *τὸ ἔργον* is *φιλητόν*.

From this it follows that *τὸ ἔργον* must be the subject (or predicate) of the sentence which contains the minor premiss, the article being added to both subject and predicate because the terms are convertible (cf. 1097 b, 22 n.). 'The product is (in a sense) its producer in activity.' If we write *ἔστι* for *ἐστί* and translate 'the producer of the product (*ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον*) is (in a sense) actively,' we could only conclude that he loves production, not that he loves the product, and the word *πως* becomes meaningless. It is clear, then, that here Aristotle is really trying to show that the love of an *ἔργον* is a form of self-love, and this helps the main argument considerably. Further, the doctrine that the *ἐνέργεια* of the *ποιῶν* is embodied in the *πάσχον* is thoroughly Aristotelian, cf. De An. 426 a, 4 *ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἐγγίνεται*, and especially Phys. 202 a, 13 sqq. where the whole problem suggested by the fact that *ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ* is discussed. Cf. EE. loc. cit. p. 419.

ἐστί πως. The meaning of this reservation is clear from De An. 424 a, 25 (of the *αἰσθητικόν* and the *αἰσθητόν*) *ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι ἕτερον* (1130 a, 12 n.), compared with 418 a, 3 *τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ*. We may say, then, that *τὸ ποιοῦντι εἶναι* is not the same as *τὸ ἔργῳ εἶναι*, but the producer is potentially the product and the product is the producer actualised. Therefore the producer loves the product; for he loves *τὸ εἶναι*, and *τὸ εἶναι* in the primary sense is *τὸ εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ*.

ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, i.e. *τῷ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο*, 'the object of the act.' Cf. 1117 b, 30 n. The *τόπος* of *τὸ καλόν* is now applied.

§ 6. **ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.** We now look at the question from the *τόπος* of *τὸ πολυχρόνιον*, which is applied to the *πρόβλημα* of *πότερον αἱρετώτερον* in Top. 116 a, 13.

ἡ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἡ μνήμη· ἥδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι 15
μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἥ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἢ ἧττον· ἡ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις ποιήσει ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῷ πάσχειν· τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν 20
7 ἕπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐπιπόνως γενόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἡ γέν- 25
νησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκεῖον εἶναι.

VIII. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' 30
ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον—ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει—ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα,
2 τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν. τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα δια- 35
φωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν 1168 b
μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται· ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ 5

καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις κ.τ.λ. For the *τόπος* cf. De An. 430 a, 18.

§ 7. **οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα κ.τ.λ.** Cf. above 1168 a, 1 and Plato Rep. 330 b.

VIII. § 1. **Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** We now approach the question of *φιλαυτία* more directly. It is to this that the whole discussion has been tending.

οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'that he does nothing of himself.' I do not see how the phrase can mean 'he does nothing without an eye to his own interest.' But the self-lover is emphatically the man who does nothing 'unless he has to.' Cf. Dem. Chers. § 5 *τά γ' ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἕτοιμ' ὑπάρχοντα ὁρῶ*, Eur. Tro. 74 *ἕτοιμ' ἃ βούλει τἄπ' ἐμοῦ*.

§ 2. **ἐκείνου ἕνεκα.** Cf. 1155 b, 31.

φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ "μία ψυχή" καὶ "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων" καὶ "ἰσότης φιλότης" καὶ "γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον·" πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ· καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν 3
καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο
δῆλον. οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι 4
τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται
ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος· δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὑτοῖς 5
ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 6
μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώ-

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μία ψυχή. Eur. Or. 1045 *ἔχων... ψυχὴν μίαν.*

κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. 1159 b, 31.

ἰσότης φιλότης. 1157 b, 36.

γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον. Theokr. xvi, 18 *ἀπωτέρω ἢ γόνυ κνήμα.*

ποτέροις, 'which set of *ἔνδοξα*.' This is a regular dialectical *πρόβλημα*.

§ 3. **λάβοιμεν,** cf. 1123 a, 35 n. For the *τόπος* of *τὸ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενον*, cf. Top. 110 a, 23 sqq. It is specially applicable to the case of *φιλοτοιοῦτοι*. Cf. 1125 b, 14 n.

§ 4. **οἱ πολλοί.** For the restriction of a word's application by the behaviour of *οἱ πολλοί*, cf. 1153 b, 33.

§ 6. **ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.,** 'Just as the sovereign is held to *be* the state in the fullest sense, and in any composite whole the ruling part is taken to *be* the whole, so the ruling part of a man *is* the man.'

τατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πε- 35
πραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. 1169 a
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέ- 5
7 γεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἁμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν 10
ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν
8 ἑπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν 15
καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικής, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς

τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή. For the construction cf. 1118 b, 23. This is not, of course, Aristotle's own theory. We are dealing with *ἔνδοξα*.

τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος (cf. 1178 a, 2. 7), 'implying that mind *is* each one of us.' The *ἐγκρατής* is *κρείττων τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν*, a phrase which implies that he himself is *νοῦς* and not *ἐπιθυμία*. We are not yet entitled to say that this is Aristotle's own view, but it certainly was Plato's. Here it is only inferred from an *ἔνδοξον*.

τὰ μετὰ λόγου, i.e. *τὰ προβεβουλευμένα* (1112 a, 16). The intellectual element is essential to *προαίρεσις*.

ἢ μάλιστα. Now that the doctrine *νοῦς ἐστιν ἕκαστος* is more positively stated, a reservation is added.

κατὰ λόγον...κατὰ πάθος. Cf. 1095 a, 10 n.

καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι closely with *τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν*. There is no difficulty in saying that the good man *κατὰ λόγον ὀρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν*. Some MSS., however, omit *ἢ* before *τοῦ καλοῦ* from a desire to avoid this. The meaning will then be 'as much as *τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ* differs from *τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν*.' But it is not true that *ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν ὀρέγεται τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν*, his *ὄρεξις* is surely *τοῦ παρόντος ἡδέος*.

§ 7. **ἀποδέχονται,** cf. 1156 b, 28 n.

τοιοῦτον, sc. *ἀγαθόν*.

§ 8. **πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.** Ramsauer quotes Rhet. 1362 a, 24 (*ἀγαθὰ*

πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν 9
φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέῃ
ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς
καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ
καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἕλοιτ' 10
ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἠρέμα, καὶ βιῶσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη
τυχόντως, καὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς
καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνῄσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει·
αἱροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ'
ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ
μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μεῖζον
ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ 10
αὐτὸς τρόπος· πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· κα-
λὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπου-
δαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἱρούμενος τὸ καλόν. ἐνδέχεται
δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προΐεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ
αὐτὸν πρᾶξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς 11
ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον
1169 b νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἴρηται·
ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

IX. Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα εἰ δεήσε-
ται φίλων ἢ μή. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακα-
ρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρ-
κεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον
αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν "ὅταν ὁ

1169 b, 3. EE. 1244 b, 1 σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας καὶ φιλίας, πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀλλήλων δυνάμεις. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πότερον, εἴ τις εἴη κατὰ πάντα αὐτάρκης, ἔσται τούτῳ * * φίλος. εἰ κατ' ἔνδειαν ζητεῖται φίλος καὶ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς αὐταρκέστατος, εἰ ὁ μετ'

ὅ' ἐστι) ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἂν ἑκάστῳ ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς (i.e. ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς) ἀποδίδωσιν ἑκάστῳ.

IX. § 1. **Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** This πρόβλημα brings us still closer to the question how φιλία is related to the Self.

ἕτερον αὐτόν, cf. above 1161 b, 29, 1166 a, 32.

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων κ.τ.λ. Euripides, Orestes, 665—

τοὺς φίλους
ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς χρὴ τοῖς φίλοισιν ὠφελεῖν·
ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

2 δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;" ἔοικε δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ'
ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ
δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν 10
ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς
ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ἀθνείων,
τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται
πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις,
ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων καὶ τῶν 15
3 εὐτυχούντων οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μο-
νώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὑτὸν
τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συ-
ζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ
τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει, δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιει- 20
κῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν.
4 δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ
πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησί-
μους εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος,
ἐπειδὴ τἀγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ· οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, 25
ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν (ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὢν οὐδὲν δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου
ἡδονῆς)· οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι

ἀρετῆς εὐδαίμων, τί ἂν δέοι φίλου; οὔτε γὰρ τῶν χρησίμων δεῖσθαι αὐτάρκους οὔτε τῶν εὐφρανούντων οὔτε τοῦ συζῆν· αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἱκανὸς συνεῖναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο φανερὸν ἐπὶ θεοῦ· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐδενὸς προσδεόμενος οὐδὲ φίλου δεήσεται, οὐδ' ἔσται αὐτῷ οὔτε μηθὲν †δεσπότου. ὥστε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος ἥκιστα δεήσεται φίλου, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὅσον ἀδύνατον εἶναι αὐτάρκη. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐλαχίστους εἶναι φίλους τῷ ἄριστα ζῶντι, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλάττους γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ σπουδάζειν ὅπως ὦσι φίλοι, ἀλλ' ὀλιγωρεῖν μὴ μόνον τῶν χρησίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ συζῆν αἱρετῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τότε φανερὸν ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν ὡς οὐ χρήσεως ἕνεκα ὁ φίλος οὐδ' ὠφελείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνος. ὅταν γὰρ μηθενὸς ἐνδεεῖς ὦμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπολαυσομένους ζητοῦσι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς

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§ 3. **μονώτην.** Cf. above 1097 b, 9. **καθ' αὑτόν**, here in its ordinary sense 'by himself,' 'alone.'

§ 4. **οἱ πολλοί.** Cf. 1168 b, 17 n.

φίλων. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὑτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκείας, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα)· ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας, τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος. οἴονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα. μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον καθ' αὑτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾷον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὖσα καθ' αὑτήν, ὃ δεῖ

ποιήσοντας. ἀμείνω δ' ἔχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκεις ὄντες ἢ μετ' ἐνδείας, ὅτε μάλιστα τῶν συζῆν ἀξίων δεόμεθα φίλων.

περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον, μή ποτε τὸ μέν τι λέγεται καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανθάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν. δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ συζῆν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτατον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ ὄρεξις· τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γνῶσίν τινα. εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέμοι καὶ ποιήσειε τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ * * (ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν λανθάνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γέγραπται, τῷ μέντοι πράγματι ἔστι μὴ λανθάνειν), οὐθὲν ἂν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἀνθ' αὑτοῦ· τὸ δ' ὅμοιον τοῦ ζῆν ἀνθ' αὑτοῦ ἄλλον. εὐλόγως δὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτερον. δεῖ γὰρ ἅμα συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ ζῆν [καὶ] αἱρετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ

§ 5. **ἐν ἀρχῇ**, 1098 a, 16.

ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. Cf. the antithesis of *χρῆσις* and *κτῆσις*.

ἐν ἀρχῇ, 1099 a, 21.

τὸ οἰκεῖον, 'what is his own.' Cf. 1156 b, 15 *καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι.*

ἄμφω, sc. *τὸ σπουδαῖον* and *τὸ οἰκεῖον*.

περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ᾗ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἥδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν. φυσικώτερον δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἱρετὸς εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' αὑτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως,

†τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. εἰ οὖν ἐστιν ἀεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἡ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἱρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως· ὥστε τὸ αὐτοῦ βούλεσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι τοιονδὶ βούλεσθαί ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ' αὐτούς ἐσμεν ἕκαστον τούτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δύναμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸς γίνεται ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, καθὰ πρότερον αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ᾗ καὶ οὗ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)· ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν ἀεὶ βούλεται, ὅτι βούλεται ἀεὶ γνωρίζειν, τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι αὐτὸς εἶναι τὸ γνωστόν. τὸ δὴ συζῆν αἱρεῖσθαι δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκοπουμένοις πως εὔηθες (ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῶν πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις, οἷον τοῦ συνεσθίειν ἢ τοῦ συμπίνειν· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον οὖσι ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἢ χωρίς, ἂν ἀφέλῃς τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον· ἅμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐταρκέσι φίλοις οἷόν τε· μανθάνων μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δ' ὁ φίλος, ἡ δ' ὁμοιότης φιλία)· ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεταί γε, καὶ πάντες ἥδιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καθ' ὅσον

§ 7. **Θέογνις**, v. 35,

Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεαι,
ἢν δὲ κακοῖσι
συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.

φυσικώτερον κ.τ.λ. If we consider this *πρόβλημα* in the light of *φυσικαὶ προτάσεις* (cf. 1147 a, 24 n.), we are landed once more in the psychology of the Self, and this is in fact the real motive of the inquiry. The argument is intricately stated; but it may, I think, be worked out as a series of syllogisms, the first of which is supported by two prosyllogisms. If these are disentangled, the repetitions and parentheses can easily be referred to their proper place in the argument.

τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. 413 b, 1 *τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην* (sc. *τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικήν*) *ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως.* 414 b, 18 *ἑτέροις δὲ* (*ὑπάρχει*) *καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις.*

ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἡ νοήσεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων· ὡρισμένον γάρ, τὸ δ' ὡρισμένον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ

ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὗ δύναται ἀρίστου, ἀλλὰ τούτων τῷ μὲν ἡδονῆς σωματικῆς, τῷ δὲ θεωρίας μουσικῆς, τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφίας. καὶ τὸ ἅμα δεῖ εἶναι τῷ φίλῳ. διό φησι "μόχθος οἱ τηλοῦ φίλοι," ὥστ' οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τούτου γινομένου. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλίᾳ ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν.

1170 a, 19. EE. 1245 a, 26 ὁ μὲν τοίνυν λόγος ἐκεῖνά φησι διαπορῶν, τὸ δ' ἔργον οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παρακρούεταί πως ἡμᾶς ὁ διαπορῶν. σκεπτέον ἔνθεν ταληθές. ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησίν, ἄλλος Ἡρακλῆς, ἄλλος αὐτός. διέσπασται δὲ καὶ χαλεπὸν τὰ ἐφ' ἑνὸς γενέσθαι· ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὴν φύσιν τὸ συγγενέστατον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ὅμοιος ἕτερος, ἄλλος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ τούτων κατὰ μόριον ἕτερος ἕτερον. ἀλλ' οὐθέν

εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται. For ἀνάγειν see 1113 a, 6. 'The capacity is reduced to (or 'traced up to') the activity' as its ἀρχή. For the ἐνέργεια as the ἀρχή (οὗ ἕνεκα) of the δύναμις cf. Met. 1050 a, 8 sqq., and especially 1051 a, 29 τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀναγόμενα εὑρίσκεται. As a capacity is always a capacity of some activity, if a capacity is the differentia of a thing, that thing will be the corresponding activity.

τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, 'the primary ἀρχή,' 'that which makes the δύναμις what it is lies in the ἐνέργεια which is its final cause.' When applied to ἀρχαί, τὸ κύριον is practically the same as τὸ πρῶτον (cf. Bonitz on Met. 1015 b, 11). We now have

Prosyllogism A.

The differentia of human life is the capacity of Sensation and Thought.

Every capacity is referred to its activity as primary.

∴ Human life is primarily the activity of Sensation and Thought.

ὡρισμένον γάρ. This gives us the middle term of—

Prosyllogism B.

The determinate is good by nature.

Life is determinate.

∴ Life is good by nature.

For the view that the 'determinate' or 'limited' is good, cf. 1106 b, 30. As we shall see later, this means that life is τέλειόν τι, that its form is completely realised.

τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. This gives us—

Syllogism I.

Life is Sensation and Thought. (Prosyll. A.)

Life is good by nature and therefore pleasant in itself to the good man. (Prosyll. B.)

∴ Sensation and Thought are good by nature and pleasant in themselves to the good man.

8 τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζωὴν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν
9 τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἱρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζωή), ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῖμεν ἂν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν), τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῇ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὑτό (φύ- 1170 b
σει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζωή, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ), αἱρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγα-

τε ἧττον βούλεται ὥσπερ αὐτὸς διαιρετὸς εἶναι ὁ φίλος. τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὑτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ τὸ <τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ> αὐτόν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήδεσθαι καὶ συζῆν τῷ φίλῳ ἡδὺ εὐλόγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἐκείνου ἅμα αἴσθησις ἀεί), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειοτέρας ἡδονάς. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἀεὶ ἥδιον ἑαυτὸν θεωρεῖν ἐν τῷ βελτίονι ἀγαθῷ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁτὲ μὲν

§ 8. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις. In the first part of Book X we shall see that such lives do not fulfil the requirements of τὸ ὡρισμένον. They are ἀτελεῖς, 'incomplete.'

§ 9. εἰ δ' αὐτὸ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has compressed the whole argument into one of his enormous protases, the apodosis of which does not come till b, 8 **οὕτω.** We can disentangle first

Syllogism II.

Sensation and thought are good and pleasant in themselves to the good.

Self-consciousness is consciousness of Sensation and Thought.

∴ The Self-consciousness of the good is consciousness of something good and pleasant in itself.

ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὁρᾷ αἰσθάνεται κ.τ.λ. For this way of expressing what we call 'self-consciousness,' cf. De An. 425 b, 12 ἐπεὶ δ' αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει ὅτι ὁρᾷ ἢ ἑτέρᾳ. De Somno 455 a, 15 ἔστι δέ τις καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ᾗ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθάνεται· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ. This consciousness of sensation as distinct from sensation is called by Eudemos συναίσθησις. We are not told here what it is that αἰσθάνεται ὅτι νοεῖ. We shall see that it is νοῦς itself in its highest function, νόησις νοήσεως.

θοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ—συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἥδονται—ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἱρετόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἱρετὸν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος, ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἔστιν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἱρε-

πάθος, ὁτὲ δὲ πρᾶξις, ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι. εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν συνεργεῖν, ἡ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστά γε. διὸ <δεῖ> συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευωχεῖσθαι, οὐ τὰ διὰ τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· αἱ τοιαῦται * * ὁμιλίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολαύσεις. ἀλλ' ἕκαστος οὗ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ βούλεται συζῆν· εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων αἱροῦνται μάλιστα.

συναισθανόμενοι...τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθοῦ κ.τ.λ. The verb *συναισθάνομαι* is very appropriate for the consciousness of sensation or thought as distinct from either. Just as from *σύνοιδά σοι* we get *σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ*, we might get *συναισθάνομαι ἐμαυτῷ* from *συναισθάνομαί σοι* to express the meaning *αἰσθάνομαι ἐμαυτοῦ αἰσθανομένου ἢ νοοῦντος*. Eudemos already has the word *συναίσθησις* in the primary sense, and in the secondary it is technically used by Alexander.

§ 10. ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κ.τ.λ. This has been proved above 1166 a, 1 (note how these apparently unconnected discussions fit in with one another) and gives us the major premiss of

Syllogism III.

The good man is related to his friend as to himself.

The good man's consciousness of himself is good and pleasant.

∴ The good man's consciousness of his friend's self is good and pleasant in itself. Q. E. D.

The doctrine is, then, in modern phrase, that the possibility of sympathy depends upon the presence of self-consciousness, that is, of a self which distinguishes itself from its sensations and thoughts and can therefore relate itself to the sensations and thoughts of a friend in the same way as to our own. It is thus that *φιλία* widens the self.

ἐν τῷ συζῆν. The *συναίσθησις τοῦ φίλου* can be fully realised only in intellectual communion. This follows from all that has been said, and is gradually leading us up to the ideal of the *θεωρητικὸς βίος*.

εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle feels the need of a clearer and more succinct statement of the argument.

τόν ἐστι καθ' αὑτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὂν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, κἂν ὁ φίλος τῶν αἱρετῶν εἴη. ὃ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτῃ ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.

X. Ἆρ' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ "μήτε πολύξεινος μήτ' ἄξεινος," καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει μήτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτ' αὖ πολύφιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἁρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ [τοῦτο] πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ

1170 b, 13. EE. 1245 b, 9 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν καὶ δεῖ συζῆν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὅτι ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μάλιστα τοιοῦτος, φανερόν· ὅτι δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῦτ' εὐλόγως συνέβαινε λέγοντος ἀληθῆ. κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβολῆς ἀληθοῦς οὔσης ἡ λύσις <οὐκ> ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ τοιοῦτος οἷος δεῖσθαι φίλου, καὶ τὸν ὅμοιον ἀξιοῦμεν. καίτοι κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲ νοήσει ὁ σπουδαῖος· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ὁ θεὸς εὖ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ βέλτιον ἢ ὥστε ἄλλο τι νοεῖν παρ' αὐτὸς αὑτόν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἕτερον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἐστιν.

1170 b, 20. EE. 1245 b, 20 καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ εὔχεσθαι πολλοὺς φίλους, ἅμα δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐθεὶς φίλος ᾧ πολλοὶ φίλοι, ἄμφω λέγεται ὀρθῶς. ἐνδεχομένου γὰρ πολλοῖς συζῆν ἅμα καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι ὡς πλείστοις αἱρετώτατον· ἐπεὶ δὲ χαλεπώτατον, ἐν ἐλάττοσιν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς συναισθήσεως εἶναι, ὥστ' οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ πολλοὺς κτήσασθαι (πείρας γὰρ δεῖ), ἀλλὰ καὶ οὖσι χρήσασθαι.

X. § 1. **Ἆρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.** This problem as to the number of friends prepares us for the view that the highest life can be led only by a chosen few.

ἐμμελῶς. Cf. 1123 a, 22 n.

μήτε πολύξεινος κ.τ.λ. Hesiod Ἔργ. 660.

§ 3. **ὥσπερ πόλεως.** Pol. 1326 a, 35 *ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον*

πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων. καὶ φίλων
1171 a δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι—ὅτι 4
δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι
5 πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν 5
καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ
10 συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρα- 6
γμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν
15 φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν

ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῴων, φυτῶν, ὀργάνων. καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως, ὁτὲ δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται πλοῖον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοιν, εἰς δὲ τί μέγεθος ἐλθὸν ὁτὲ μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὁτὲ δὲ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν. The principle is that the πόλις has an ἔργον, τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ὥστε τὴν δυναμένην τοῦτο μάλιστ' ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην. If it passes this limit it ceases to be a πόλις and becomes an ἔθνος like Babylon (1276 a, 28), which is αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ ζῆν but not πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

τὸ δὲ ποσὸν κ.τ.λ. This is a principle which applies to all μεσότητες (cf. above 1155 b, 14 n.), and it is this which makes an ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων necessary. Here the ὅρος is συμβίωσις.

§ 5. **βούλεται εἶναι.** Cf. 1119 b, 34 n.

καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ κ.τ.λ. The argument is that as the ὑπερβολή of it is limited to one, it will be limited to fewer as it approaches the ὑπερβολή.

§ 6. **αἱ ὑμνούμεναι.** Fritzsche quotes Plutarch, Περὶ πολυφιλίας 93 e τὸν μακρὸν καὶ παλαιὸν αἰῶνα μάρτυρα ἅμα τοῦ λόγου καὶ σύμβουλον λάβωμεν, ἐν ᾧ κατὰ ζεῦγος φιλίαι λέγονται, Θησεὺς καὶ Πειρίθοος, Ἀχιλλεὺς καὶ Πάτροκλος, Ὀρέστης καὶ Πυλάδης, Φιντίας καὶ Δάμων, Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Πελοπίδας.

πλὴν πολιτικῶς. For πολιτικὴ φιλία cf. 1161 b, 13 sqq.

οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους. 20

XI. Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἵ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἵ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν· βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, κάλλιον 25
δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ζητοῦσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἱρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία αὐτὴ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον 30
ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὔ, ἡ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται,

1171 a, 21. EE. 1245 b, 26 καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπεῖναι εὖ πράττοντα τὸν φιλούμενον βουλόμεθα, ὁτὲ δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἅμα βούλεσθαι εἶναι φιλικόν. ἐνδεχομένου μὲν γὰρ ἅμα καὶ εὖ, τοῦτο πάντες αἱροῦνται· μὴ ἐνδεχομένου δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸν Ἡρακλῆ ἴσως ἂν ἡ μήτηρ εἵλετο θεὸν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα τῷ Εὐρυσθεῖ θητεύειν. ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν εἴπειεν καὶ ὃν ὁ Λάκων ἔσκωψεν, ἐπεί τις ἐκέλευσεν αὐτὸν χειμαζόμενον ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Διοσκόρους. δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φιλοῦντος τὸ ἀπείργειν εἶναι τῆς συμμεθέξεως τῶν χαλεπῶν, τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα τοῦ δὲ φιλουμένου τὸ βούλεσθαι συμμετέχειν, καὶ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα συμβαίνει εὐλόγως. δεῖ γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ μηθὲν εἶναι οὕτω λυπηρὸν ὡς <μὴ> ἰδεῖν τὸν φίλον· δοκεῖ δὲ δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι μὴ τὸ αὑτοῦ. διὸ κωλύουσι συμμετέχειν· ἱκανοὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ κακοπαθοῦντες, ἵνα μὴ φαίνωνται τὰ αὑτῶν σκοποῦντες καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι τὸ χαίρειν λυπουμένου τοῦ φίλου. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κουφότεροι εἶναι μὴ μόνοι φέροντες τὰ κακά.

ἀγαπητόν. Cf. 1094 b, 9.

XI. § 1. **Πότερον δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις κ.τ.λ.** This πρόβλημα also bears on the relation of φιλία to the ideal life.

ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν...κάλλιον δὲ... Cf. 1155 a, 3 n.

§ 2. **ὥσπερ βάρους.** Victorius quotes Xen. Mem. ii, 7, 1 Σωκράτης Ἀρίσταρχόν ποτε ὁρῶν σκυθρωπῶς ἔχοντα· Ἔοικας, ἔφη, βαρέως φέρειν τι· χρὴ δὲ τοῦ βαρέος μεταδιδόναι τοῖς φίλοις· ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τί σε ἡμεῖς κουφίσαιμεν.

ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. ἔοικε δ' 3
ἡ παρουσία μικτή τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν
1171 b τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεταί τις
ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι—παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος
καὶ τῇ ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ᾖ ἐπιδέξιος· οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἥδεται καὶ λυπεῖται—τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθά- 4
νεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὑτοῦ ἀτυχίαις λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει
λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν
φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὑτοῖς, κἂν μὴ
ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπο-
μένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς
εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συ-
στένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας.
μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. ἡ δ' ἐν 5
ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τήν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν
ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἥδονται ἐπὶ τοῖς αὑτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.
διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους
προθύμως—εὐεργετικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν—εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυ-
χίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν,
ὅθεν τὸ "ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν." μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον

ἐπεὶ δ' αἱρετὸν τό τ' εὖ καὶ τὸ ἅμα, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ἅμα εἶναι μετ' ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερόν πως ἢ χωρὶς μετὰ μείζονος. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄδηλον τὸ πόσον δύναται τὸ ἅμα, ἥδη διαφέρονται καὶ οἴονται τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα πάντων φιλικόν, [καὶ] ὥσπερ συνδειπνεῖν ἅμα φασὶν ἥδιον ταὐτὰ ἔχοντας· οἱ δ' ἂν μέντοι οὐ βούλονται. ἐπεὶ δ' εἴ γέ τις ὑπερβολὰς ποιήσει, * * ὁμολογῶσιν ἅμα κακῶς πράττοντας σφόδρα ἢ εὖ σφόδρα χωρίς. * * παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀτυχίας. ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ βουλόμεθα τοὺς φίλους ἀπεῖναι οὐδὲ λυπεῖν, ὅταν μηθὲν μέλλωσι ποιήσειν πλέον· ὁτὲ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἥδιστον παρεῖναι. τὸ δὲ τῆς ὑπεναντιώσεως ταύτης καὶ μάλ' εὔλογον. διὰ γὰρ τὰ προειρημένα τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ ἐν φαύλῃ ὄντα ἕξει τὸν φίλον θεωρεῖν φεύγομεν ἁπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δ' ὁρᾶν τὸν φίλον

§ 4. **κἂν μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπίᾳ.** Tr. 'even if he is not exceptionally insensible to pain.'

§ 5. **διαγωγήν.** Cf. 1127 b, 34 n.

τὸ "ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν." We do not know where this comes from.

ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν.
6 ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἁρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας 20
ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως—φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα
τοὺς ἐν χρείᾳ καὶ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον
καὶ ἥδιον—εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως
—καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεία φίλων—πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχο-
λαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν 25
δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ
συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἱρετὴ
φαίνεται.

XII. Ἆρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀγαπητότατόν
ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπάς, 30
ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου,
οὕτω καὶ τοῖς φίλοις αἱρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία
γὰρ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν
φίλον· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν αἱρετή, καὶ περὶ
τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, 35
2 ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἑκάστοις τὸ 1172 a
εἶναι ἢ οὗ χάριν αἱροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ τῶν φί-
λων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ
συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν

ἡδύ, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἡδίστων, διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, καὶ μὴ κάμνοντα, εἰ αὐτός· ὥστε ὁπότερον ἂν τούτων ᾖ μᾶλλον ἡδύ, ποιεῖ τὴν ῥοπὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι παρεῖναι ἢ μή. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν χειρόνων συμβαίνει καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι· μάλιστα γὰρ φιλοτιμοῦνται τοὺς φίλους μὴ πράττειν εὖ μηδ' εἶναι ἀνάγκαι * * αὐτοῖς κακῶς. διὸ ἐνίοτε τοὺς ἐρωμένους συναποκτιννύασι. μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ οἰκείου αἰσθάνεσθαι κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ποτὲ εὖ ἔπραττε μᾶλλον, ἢ εἰ ᾤετο ἀεὶ κακῶς πράττειν.

§ 6. **μὴ ἀξιώσαντας.** For the reading see Bywater, Contr. p. 66.

XII. § 1. **Ἆρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.** The discussion is concluded by some remarks upon *τὸ συζῆν* which is the *ἐνέργεια τῆς φιλίας* and therefore the *ὅρος* of all *φιλικά*. This is really a summary of the whole argument.

περὶ αὐτόν = *αὐτοῦ*. Cf. Ind. s.v. *περί*.

αὐτῆς, sc. *τῆς συναισθήσεως* (the phrase is used in EE. loc. cit. p. 431). Aretinus reads **αὐτοῖς**.

ἢ συμφιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὅτι περ μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοi μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν ὡς οἷόν τε [συζῆν]. γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία 3 μοχθηρά—κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις—ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιεικής, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλλήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν "ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά." περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 4 εἰρήσθω· ἑπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

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§ 2. **ὡς οἷόν τε.** I think this reading (that of K^b) is established by EE. 1245 a, 20 *καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει ἕκαστον καὶ οὗ δύναται ἀρίστου.* When *οἷόν τε* became *οἷονται*, *συζῆν* would be added as the most obvious verb.

§ 3. **ἀπομάττονται.** 'They take the impress of those things in one another they are pleased with.' The verb is properly used of wax taking the impress of a seal.

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Theognis 35

Ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν
συμμίσγῃς, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον.
ταῦτα μαθὼν ἀγαθοῖσιν ὁμίλεε· καί ποτε φήσεις
εὖ συμβουλεύειν τοῖσι φίλοισιν ἐμέ.

BOOK X.

THE GOOD FOR MAN.

Introductory Note.

§ 1. We are now in a position to answer the question with which we started, but first we must clear up a point which we have left unsettled. In our discussion of the view that pleasure was bad we left it quite an open question whether it might not even be the highest good. This view has often been held, and its most recent and authoritative exponent is Eudoxos who substituted Pleasure for the Platonic Form of the Good. The arguments directed against his position by Speusippos and other members of the Academy are altogether inadequate, and we must therefore come to some understanding on the point before we go any further.

What, then, is pleasure? Contrary to the view received in the Academy it is certainly not a motion. All motions are incomplete and pleasure is something complete in any given moment, just like vision. We can use the present and the perfect tense at once of it. There is not less pleasure in any moment of its presence than there is in its whole duration. It is completely present or not at all, and this shows that it is no motion; for every motion is incomplete till it reaches its end and then it ceases to exist as motion altogether. Pleasure then must be an activity or rather the completion of an activity. Pleasure is the completion of the activity of a subject at its best acting upon an object at its best.

§ 2. It is clear, then, that we can hardly distinguish the pleasure of the highest life from the highest life itself, and in this sense it is true that pleasure is the highest good. But this is not hedonism. Just because the pleasure and the activity which it

completes are so closely bound up together that they can only be distinguished by an effort of thought, it follows that pleasures must differ specifically just as the activities do which they complete. There is therefore no sense in saying that pleasure in the abstract is the end. There is no such thing as pleasure in the abstract; but only pleasures that are inseparably bound up with certain activities. We must therefore continue to look for human good in some form of activity, which will of course, as we saw long ago, be essentially pleasant. And we must decline to separate the activity from its pleasure and discuss which of them is really the end of life.

§ 3. What activity, then, is it that constitutes human good? We know that it must be one which is sought for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, and therefore it cannot be the life of action, the life of the man who possesses goodness of character without anything higher. Of the "three lives" with which we started it can clearly be none other than the life of the onlooker, the disinterested spectator. Now there are at first sight two lives which seem to fulfil this character. There is the life of amusement and there is the life of the philosopher, the life of artistic, scientific or religious "contemplation." But though some people may make amusement their end, this is not its proper function. Amusement is properly speaking a form of rest or relaxation and is a means to an end. We rest in order that we may be the better able to act. There remains, then, the "contemplative life," the life of the thinker. And this is in complete accordance with the results we have reached already: for we saw that, if there were more forms of goodness than one, the good life would be an activity in accordance with the highest and most complete of these. We have seen too that the highest and most complete form of goodness is *σοφία*, and from this it follows that human happiness consists in an *ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν*.

§ 4. Such happiness is possible, however, for man only to a small extent, and is indeed not strictly speaking human but divine. The greater part of man's life belongs to the province of goodness of character. Our study of self-love has shown us, however, how these two are related. Self-love, in the sense of the love of that which is highest in us, is necessary and right, and so we see that the more properly human life which we live for the

most part, our everyday life, must be ordered with a view to making possible so far as may be the life of Thought which is in some sense the life of our true selves. Now we see what is the true "standard of the means" (*ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων*), or, as Eudemos calls it, the *ὅρος τῆς καλοκἀγαθίας* (i.e. *τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς*). It is the theoretic life which the *φρόνιμος* keeps in view when he determines the mean; for he knows that his own practical wisdom is only ancillary to the theoretical wisdom of the philosopher. Eudemos expresses exactly the same thought in a definitely religious form when he says that the standard which regulates goodness is *τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν*, "to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever."

§ 5. We now know what the good for man is, and we know also how it is to be produced. If we wish to attain to the blessedness of the contemplative life, we must first of all be good in the everyday sense of the word. And we become good by performing good acts. But our aim at present is not merely to secure this blessed life for ourselves even if that were possible. The object of our science is to secure the good for the citizens of a state so far as they are capable of it. How, then, are we to produce in our citizens the character from which good acts arise? Education is of course the only way to produce character, but the education of the family has too little authority to be sufficient. It is true that in the present state of things the state does not discharge this its most important function, and all that the father of a family can do is to become in some sort a domestic lawgiver, but this is clearly only a makeshift. What we have to do is to learn what constitution will really secure the performance of its function by the state, and to train ourselves to be lawgivers who can legislate with this end in view. The details of this constitutional legislation form the subject of the Politics.

K

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν. μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ

I. § 1. **ἴσως ἔπεται διελθεῖν.** This formula of transition, for which cf. 1155 a, 3, is repeated at the beginning of Book X, though Book IX ends with the words **ἐπόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.** So far as it goes, this fact favours the view that these transitions are a trace of editorial work.

μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. The usual enumeration of more or less irrelevant reasons for the discussion.

συνῳκειῶσθαι, 'to be most closely bound up with.' For the word cf. 1161 b, 21 and for the thought 1105 a, 1 *ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται* (sc. *ἡ ἡδονή*).

διὸ παιδεύουσι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b, 11 n. This seems to be the earliest instance of the metaphorical use of **οἰακίζοντες** (=*κυβερνῶντες*), though *οἴαξ* for the 'helm of government' occurs from Aischylos onwards. The same idea is expressed in Plato's image (Laws 644 d sqq.) of man as a "puppet of the gods" (*θαῦμα τῶν θεῶν*) whose movements are controlled by the two strings (*σμήρινθοι*) of pleasure and pain pulling opposite ways.

πρός. For *μέγα πρός* cf. 1161 b, 33.

ῥοπὴν ἔχοντα, cf. 1094 a, 23.

προαιροῦνται. Strictly speaking this is true only of *οἱ ἀκόλαστοι*, but the word is doubtless used in a popular sense as equivalent to *διώκουσιν*.

§ 2. **ὑπέρ.** Cf. 1096 a, 4 n. Here, by a characteristic brachylogy, **ἥκιστα παρετέον** takes the construction of **λεκτέον** which it implies.

ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν, cf. Ind. s.v. *ἔχειν*.

οἱ μὲν...οἱ δὲ... The two parties are represented in the Ethics by Eudoxos and Speusippos.

τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν 30
φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοὐναντίον
3 *ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἧττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων· ὅταν οὖν* 35
διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τἀληθὲς προσαναιροῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονήν, ὀφθείς 1172 b
ποτ' ἐφιέμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην
4 *οὖσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. ἐοίκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συνῳδοὶ γὰρ* 5
ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς συνιέντας ζῆν κατ' αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἅλις· τὰ δ' εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

II. *Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾠήθη εἶναι διὰ τὸ*

διὸ δεῖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1109 b, 4 sqq.

§ 3. **μή ποτε.** 'It may be that...' Goodwin MT. § 269. From signifying 'it is to be feared that' *μήποτε* came to mean 'perhaps.'

περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι κ.τ.λ., i.q. *περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν*, cf. 1105 b, 16. The **ἐν** as usual (Ind. s.v.) indicates the *ὕλη*.

τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, i.e. *τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς*. Met. 1063 b, 2 *οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται τὰ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις*.

ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν, sc. *ἀγαθήν* implied in *ἐφιέμενον*.

II. § 1. **Εὔδοξος.** Eudoxos of Knidos, mathematician and astronomer, had belonged to the Academy. He was, it would seem, one of the most original of its members, and developed Plato's theories on lines of his own. The scholiast of L^b tells us that he held *τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν*, which amounts to saying that he identified it with the Form of the Good. Cf. Rep. 509 b *ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ...ὑπερέχοντος*. In his sketch of Aristotle's life, von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff says "The geographer and astronomer Eudoxos is probably the only one of his associates who had a real influence on Aristotle. That he should take notice of his ethical doctrines, which after all are not of any great significance, can hardly be explained apart from some personal relation to him. Now Eudoxos was just the right man to introduce the natural science of the Ionians to Aristotle; and we certainly require some such intermediary when we look at Aristotle's life as a whole" (Ar. und Ath. i, p. 333).

διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. This implies the definition of the Good as *οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται* (1094 a, 3).

πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἱρετὸν τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον ὄν—ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν—τὸ δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὑτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὐχ ἧττον δ' ὤρετ' εἶναι φανερὸν ἐκ τοῦ 2 ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τοὐναντίον αἱρετόν· μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἱρετὸν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἱρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἥδεται, ὡς καθ' αὑτὴν οὖσαν αἱρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. προστιθεμένην τε ὁτῳοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ

ἔλλογα. Aristotle himself never uses this word for λόγον ἔχοντα, nor is it found in Attic writers. This makes it probable that Grant is right in his view that this is a quotation from Eudoxos. If so, the definition of τὸ ἀγαθόν at the beginning of the Ethics will be his. Cf. also Top. 116 a, 19.

τὸ ἐπιεικές, i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν.

φέρεσθαι, an unusual word in this connexion, but natural in the mouth of an astronomer.

τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. The argument is thus given by Alexander (Top. p. 6 Wallies) ἂν λάβωμεν ὅτι ὃ πάντα τὰ ζῷα αἱρεῖται ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, τοῦτο μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα κατὰ φύσιν τελικώτατον, καὶ συλλογισάμενοι ὅτι ὃ πάντα τὰ ζῷα ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἱρεῖται, τοῦτό ἐστι τελικώτατον, εἶτα προσλάβωμεν ὅτι τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν πάντα ὁμοίως, λογικά τε καὶ ἄλογα, αἱρεῖται...(ὅτι ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν) ἐσόμεθα συλλελογισμένοι.

§ 2. ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου. For the τόπος cf. Top. 117 b, 3 ἔτι ἐκ τῶν φθορῶν καὶ τῶν ἀποβολῶν καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν λήψεων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων...οὗ γὰρ ἡ ἀποβολὴ ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον φευκτότερον, αὐτὸ αἱρετώτερον.

ὁμοίως δή, sc. καθ' αὑτὸ πᾶσιν.

μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἱρετὸν κ.τ.λ. For this τόπος cf. Top. 116 a, 29 καὶ τὸ δι' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον αἱρετοῦ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι.

οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν. This certainly sounds like direct quotation.

προστιθεμένην τε κ.τ.λ. This is from the τόπος of πρόσθεσις, for which cf. Top. 115 a, 26 ἔτι δ' ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως. ἐὰν ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον προστεθὲν ποιῇ ἀγαθὸν ἢ λευκόν, μὴ ὂν πρότερον λευκὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, τὸ προστεθὲν ἔσται λευκὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν οἱόνπερ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχον (sc. ἀγαθὸν ἢ λευκόν) προστεθέν τι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον ὑπῆρχε, καὶ αὐτὸ ἔσται τοιοῦτον. The present case is of course the second. As Aristotle goes on to observe, it only proves that pleasure is *a* good, not that it is *the* good.

δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν, αὔξεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ. 3 ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ αἱρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιούτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τἀγαθόν· αἱρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρίς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ τἀγαθὸν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετά τινος τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ 4 ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστι τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, ταῦτ' εἶναί φαμεν· ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν 1173 a

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§ 3. πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου κ.τ.λ. Top. 117 a, 16 ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων.

Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ. Phileb. 60 d λεγέτω...εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν, ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινός.—Οὐκ ἔστιν...—Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη; That is, the πρόσθεσις of wisdom also makes pleasure better, and therefore neither is *the* good.

τὸ μικτόν. The phrase is Plato's. Phileb. 22 d ἐν τῷ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ. 27 d νικῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

οὐδενὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'There is nothing the addition of which can make *the* good more worth having.' I prefer the **αὐτῷ** of L^b to the **αὐτὸ** of K^b. *The* good does not admit of πρόσθεσις, for all other good things are desired for the sake of it. This is given in the Topics as an ἔνστασις (objection) to the τόπος ἐκ προσθέσεως. Cf. 117 a, 16 ἔνστασις εἰ που θάτερον θατέρου χάριν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἄμφω τοῦ ἑνός, οἷον τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ὑγιείας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι τῆς ὑγιείας ἕνεκεν αἱρούμεθα.

τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν. Cf. 1096 b, 16 καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; Even these we desire τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, and therefore εὐδαιμονία + pleasure is not more worth having than εὐδαιμονία alone.

§ 4. τοιοῦτον, sc. οἷον μὴ μετά τινος τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἱρετώτερον γίνεσθαι, or, in other words, μὴ συναριθμούμενον (1097 b, 17 n.).

οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν. As Rodier says, this is added to show that Aristotle does not mean to approve of Plato's theory of the good, except in so far as the above argument goes.

ἐνιστάμενοι, An. Pr. 69 a, 37 ἔνστασις δ' ἐστὶ πρότασις προτάσει ἐναντία.

μὴ οὐθὲν λέγωσιν. See Kühner § 394, 6.

ἃ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, sc. ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. There is no sense in saying a thing is not good if it is thought good by all.

πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ. ᾗ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὀρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἦν ἄν τι λεγόμενον, ᾗ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἔστι τι [φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν] κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὑτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. οὐκ ἔοικε 5 δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γάρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακόν ἐστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδέτερα—λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπί γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τὸ μηδέτερον δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακόν, τὴν δ' αἱρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται. III. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία. λέγουσι 2 δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι

ᾗ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. So Bywater for MS. *εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, cf. Contr. p. 66. The emendation had been anticipated by Michelet.

ἔστι τι κ.τ.λ. Thurot deleted *ἀγαθόν*, which Michael does not seem to have had, and Bywater would delete *φυσικόν* too. We cannot speak of a *φυσικὸν ἀγαθόν* aiming at an *οἰκεῖον ἀγαθόν*. For the thought cf. 1153 b, 31. This is the *θεῖόν τι* of 1153 b, 32. Introd. § 25.

§ 5. οὐ γάρ φασιν κ.τ.λ. The argument is that of Speusippos and has been discussed in Book VII (1153 b, 1 sqq. and the notes).

τῷ μηδέτερα. Stewart points out that this, the MS. reading, can be defended by Plato, Rep. 583 e *ἦ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι;*

ὄντων κακῶν. For another reading (*ὄντοιν <τῶν> κακῶν*) cf. Bywater, Contr. p. 66.

τὸ μηδέτερον δέ. This correction of MS. *τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ* is due to Professor Butcher. 'That which is neutral ought to be (*ἔδει*) neither shunned nor sought or both alike.'

οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται, 'so the antithesis is of this kind.'

III. **§ 1. οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιοτήτων κ.τ.λ.** From this it appears that the Platonists (Speusippos) regarded all good things as qualities. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι*, 'is predicated in all the categories' (1096 a, 23). 'Activities according to goodness' are *κινήσεις*, and so therefore is *εὐδαιμονία* itself. But Speusippos, who defined *εὐδαιμονία* as *ἕξις τελεία*, of course regarded it as a *ποιότης*.

§ 2. τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον. Cf. 1170 a, 20 and the argument of Plato's Philebos 24 e *ὁπόσ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λιαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι...* 31 a *ἡδονὴ δὲ ἄπειρός τε αὐτὴ καὶ τοῦ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδὲ ἔξοντος γένους.* The word *ἀόριστος*, however, is never used by Plato in the sense of *ἄπειρος*, and this makes it likely that Aristotle is criticising a contemporary form of the Platonic doctrine. With Xenokrates *ἀόριστος* was the technical term.

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι κ.τ.λ. It does not follow from the fact that *τὸ ἥδεσθαι* admits of *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον* that *ἡ ἡδονή* does so too. If it did, we should have to say that goodness also is *ἀόριστον*, for people may be more or less good.

εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, sc. *τοῦτο κρίνουσι*. We have seen above (1152 b, 13) that Speusippos, in making all pleasure a *γένεσις*, ignored Plato's distinction between 'mixed' and 'unmixed' pleasures. In the same way he here ignores Plato's view that *ἀμετρία* was to be found in the mixed pleasures only, while the pure pleasures possessed *ἐμμετρία*. Cf. Phileb. 52 c *οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τάς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον, ἐμμετρίαν.*

δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἥδεσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν καὶ <πράττειν> κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται ταὐτό· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. εἰ δὲ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή ποτ' οὐ 3 λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὦσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγεῖς αἱ δὲ μικταί. καὶ τί κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὡρισμένη οὖσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. 4 τέλειόν τε τἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνειν

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§ 3. καὶ τί κωλύει. A fresh point. The reading *τί γὰρ κωλύει* has inferior authority and does not make the argument clearer.

καθάπερ ὑγίεια. For *ὑγίεια* as a *συμμετρία* cf. Top. 139 b, 21, where *συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν* is quoted as a definition obscure from its ambiguity. The illustration here is taken from Plato, Phileb. 25 e.

ἐν πᾶσιν...ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Masculine. The proportion of health varies in different persons and in the same person at different times.

ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός. Cf. 1170 b, 32 n. There is always some latitude in a *μεσότης*. We cannot distinguish (*κρίνειν*) very minute intervals, and so a note may be flat or sharp and still be the same note. Aristotle is never tired of arguing against the abstract use of the formula of *τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον*.

§ 4. τέλειόν τε κ.τ.λ. This is all from Plato's Philebos. Cf. especially 54 d *ἆρ' οὖν ἡδονή γε εἴπερ γένεσίς ἐστιν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν;*

πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἐοίκασι λέγειν οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν. πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὑτήν, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως ὥσπερ
1173 b ὀργισθῆναι, ἥδεσθαι δ' οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὔξεσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἥδεσθαι. γένεσίς τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; 5
5 δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι· καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἡ ἡδονή, τούτου ἡ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν 6

οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν, 'not even a motion,' and therefore *a fortiori* not a *γένεσις*, which is a species of *κίνησις*.

οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου. Here *κόσμος* = *οὐρανός*. Cf. De Caelo, 288 a, 13 *περὶ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτοῦ ὅτι ὁμαλής ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀνώμαλος...λέγω δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πρώτου οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς πρώτης φορᾶς.* The *κύκλῳ φορά* of the *πρῶτος οὐρανός* is an absolutely uniform motion. It has no *ἐπίτασις* or *ἄνεσις*, acceleration or retardation. We cannot therefore call it slow or quick in itself (**καθ' αὑτήν**), for we have no slower or quicker motion of itself with which to compare it. But if we compare it with the derivative motions like that of the planets, we can call it rapid **πρὸς ἄλλο**.

οὐδέτερον, sc. *οὔτε τὸ καθ' αὑτὴν οὔτε τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο*.

ἡσθῆναι. The ingressive aorist expresses the *κίνησις* or *γένεσις* which ends in feeling pleasure, **ἥδεσθαι**. So we may 'get angry' quickly, but we cannot 'be angry' quickly.

οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕτερον, 'not even relatively.'

βαδίζειν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Walking and growing are *εἴδη κινήσεως*, in all of which there is acceleration and retardation, quick and slow. For the *εἴδη κινήσεως* cf. below 1174 a, 30.

μεταβάλλειν...εἰς τὴν ἡδονήν, i.e. *ἡσθῆναι*.

§ 5. **γένεσίς τε κ.τ.λ.** If it is not a *κίνησις*, it cannot be a *γένεσις*, but there are some special reasons against this as well.

οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος. Cf. Phys. 204 b, 33 *ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ οὗ ἐστι, καὶ διαλύεται εἰς τοῦτο.* The reason is that *γένεσις* is the process to *ἐνέργεια* of the form contained *δυνάμει* in a thing, and the *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια* are strictly correlative. A thing can only become actually what it is potentially. The reverse process (*φθορά*) is determined in the same way. What is the thing of which pleasure is the *γένεσις*, while its *φθορά* is pain?

§ 6. **καὶ λέγουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This seems to be an attempt to meet the last argument. The form of which pleasure is a *γένεσις* and pain a *φθορά* is *τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἕξις.* This doctrine the Platonists derived from the Philebos. Cf. 42 c *εἴρηταί που πολλάκις ὅτι τῆς φύσεως ἑκάστων διαφθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι καὶ πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι καὶ τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνες καὶ ὀδύναι καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει συμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.* We must remember that Plato himself did not explain all pleasure

τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο· τὸ 10
σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἥδοιτ' ἄν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποῖτο. ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφὴν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γενο-
7 μένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἥδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' 15
οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν αἵ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς
8 γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. πρὸς δὲ 20
τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγοι τις ἂν

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in this way. Aristotle meets the argument by pointing out that if *ἡδονή* is *ἀναπλήρωσις*, it must be in the body, not in the soul.

τεμνόμενος. Aristotle is probably referring to some passage in which surgical operations (*τέμνειν καὶ κάειν*) were referred to as examples of violent alterations of the normal state. Grant refers to Tim. 65 b, where *αἱ καύσεις καὶ τομαὶ τοῦ σώματος* are given as examples of things which *ἀπαλλοτριοῦται ἀθρόα* and therefore cause great pain, while the recovery causes little pleasure because *κατὰ σμικρὰ μόγις τε εἰς ταὐτὸν πάλιν ἑαυτοῖς καθίσταται.* The opposite class is represented by the pleasures of smell (*εὐωδίαι*), the satisfaction of which is *ἀθρόα*, while the *κένωσις* is not perceived. There is therefore no reason to conjecture *κενούμενος* (Spengel), *δεόμενος* (Zeller) or *ἐνδεὴς γενόμενος* (Bywater).

§ 7. **ἄλυποι γάρ εἰσιν κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1152 b, 36 *ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί.* Plato, however, also explained these as *πληρώσεις*, though the *κένωσις* preceding them was gradual (*κατὰ μικρὰ*) and imperceptible (*ἀναίσθητος*), while the *κατάστασις* to the normal state was *ἀθρόα*. Cf. the passage quoted in the last note as to *εὐωδίαι*. See also Rep. 584 b *εἰ 'θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδονάς· αὗται γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος γίγνονται παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλείπουσι.* Phileb. 51 b (*ἡδονὰς*) *τὰς περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.*

§ 8. **πρὸς δὲ τοὺς κ.τ.λ.** Aristotle now turns to the argument given above 1152 b, 20 *τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι.*

λέγοι τις ἄν. The first answer is simply the old one that culpable pleasures are not (*φύσει*) *ἡδέα* at all. For **ὑγιεινά, γλυκέα, πικρά**, cf. above 1113 a, 28—29, and for **τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν**, see ib. 26 n.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἰητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά, οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν. ἢ οὕτω λέγοι τις ἄν, 9 ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἱρεταί εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπό γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὔ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὁτιοῦν φαγόντι. ἢ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί· ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ 11 δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος ἕτερος ὢν τοῦ κόλακος οὐκ οὖσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διαφόρους εἴδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν δ' 1174 a ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο ζῆν 12 παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπιφέροι ἡδονήν, οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἑλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε 13 τἀγαθὸν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἱρετή, δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ

§ 9. **ἢ οὕτω κ.τ.λ.** A second tentative answer. The pleasures are good in themselves, but not from these sources. For **λέγοι τις ἄν** see Bywater, Contr. p. 67.

§ 10. **ἢ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν.** The third answer. Here this is only shown dialectically; below (1175 a, 21 sqq.) it is discussed *φυσικώτερον*.

§ 11. **ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ.** The point seems to be this. The friend is said *πρὸς τἀγαθὸν ὁμιλεῖν*, the flatterer *πρὸς ἡδονήν*. This suggests *prima facie* that *ἡδονή* is not *ἀγαθόν*, or, if we insist that the friend after all gives pleasure too, we must say that it is a different species of pleasure. If pleasure were *μονοειδής*, we could not draw any distinction at all.

§ 12. **οὐδείς τ' ἂν ἕλοιτο κ.τ.λ.** EE. 1215 b, 22 (p. 20). This again indicates that there is some difference in species. Simply as pleasure, a child's pleasure may be greater than a man's, and yet no one would wish to have it over again. So, again, no one would wish to have the pleasures of shameful conduct, though, if pleasure were *ὁμοειδής*, they would be just as much worth having as any others.

περὶ πολλά τε κ.τ.λ. This is the other side of the argument. We are coming to see that it is the character of the activities, and not the pleasures as such, that decides our choice.

ὅτι εἰσί τινες αἱρεταὶ καθ' αὑτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφ' 10 ὧν. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

IV. Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ποιόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον 15 γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ 2 εἶδος· διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομία, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ 20 οὗ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς

ἢ ἀφ' ὧν, i.e. *ἢ τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν*. Cf. 1117 b, 30 n.

IV. § 1. **Τί...ἢ ποιόν τι.** For this formula cf. 1106 a, 15 n.

ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, almost equivalent to *ἄνωθεν* in the sense explained 1155 b, 2 n. The phrase means practically *φυσικώτερον ἐπισκοποῦσιν*.

ἡ μὲν ὅρασις κ.τ.λ. Seeing is taken as the type of an *ἐνέργεια* which is complete in every instant as opposed to a *κίνησις* or 'process' which is *ἀτελής*. Aristotle's favourite way of expressing the completeness of an activity in any instant of it is by saying that the present and the perfect tense can be simultaneously used of it. If I look at a thing for some time, I can say both *ὁρῶ* and *ἑώρακα* at any moment; but if I am building a house, I cannot say *ᾠκοδόμηκα* till the process (*κίνησις*) is finished. Cf. Top. 178 a, 9 *ἆρ' ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ποιεῖν τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι; οὔ, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁρᾶν γέ τι ἅμα καὶ ἑωρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται.* Met. 1048 b, 29 *πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία, μάθησις, βάδισις, οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν, ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται... ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.* 1066 b, 20 *ἢ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τις, ἀτελὴς δέ.* If we see a thing at all, we see it just as much one moment as the next; there is no process. So even if we feel the same pleasure for a time, it is no more a pleasure in one moment than another; it is complete in every *νῦν*. The essence of a process (*κίνησις*) is that it is completed in time; a complete *ἐνέργεια* is independent of time.

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. and *τὸ τέλειον* is *οὗ μηδὲν ἔξω* (Introd. § 27).

§ 2. **οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομία.** I agree with Professor Stewart's suggestion that the MS. reading *οἰκοδομική* is due to the following *καὶ* which has disappeared from all MSS. but K^b. We do not want the art here, but the process.

ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ κ.τ.λ. 'A process, then, is complete either in the whole of the time it takes or in the instant that it attains its end.' L^b omits *ἢ* before *τούτῳ*, but this makes the connexion awkward. Of course, strictly speaking, the process ceases to exist as a process in the same instant as it is completed.

μέρεσι [τοῦ χρόνου] πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς. καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία—οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον—ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ 3 γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κἀκείνην·

τοῦ χρόνου. This is awkward, as the sequel shows Aristotle is speaking of the parts of the construction, not of the time. The reading of K^b is *καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ*, from which Bywater infers that the original reading was *καὶ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς*. The vulgate reading looks decidedly conjectural.

ῥαβδώσεως, 'fluting.'

τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως, 'the construction of the temple as a whole.' Cf. above *τῆς ὅλης* (sc. *κινήσεως*) *καὶ ἀλλήλων*. With the *ποίησις τοῦ ναοῦ* the *κίνησις* becomes *τελεία* and therefore ceases. If we can say *τὸν ναὸν πεποίηκεν*, we can no longer say *τὸν ναὸν ποιεῖ*. But we can still say *ὁρᾷ* even when we can also say *ἑώρακεν*.

τὸ προκείμενον, *propositum*, 'the task in hand.' Cf. *ὃ προτιθέμεθα*.

κρηπῖδος, 'the base.'

§ 3. **ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** The case of locomotion is just like that of building. It has its specifically different parts just as building has, and each is incomplete in itself. The process of locomotion is only complete when the body in motion has reached its destination and then the process is over. If you can say *βεβάδικεν*, you cannot still say *βαδίζει*.

ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ, Phys. 243 a, 6. There are three species of *κίνησις*, (1) locomotion or *φορά* (*ἡ κατὰ τόπον*), (2) qualitative motion (*ἀλλοίωσις*, alteration), and (3) quantitative (*αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις*, growth and diminution). Here *πόθεν ποῖ* is substituted for *κατὰ τόπον* as the emphasis is on the *ποῖ*, the goal of the locomotion.

καὶ ταύτης διαφοραί. These correspond to the *λίθων σύνθεσις, κίονος ῥάβδωσις* etc. For the *εἴδη τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως* cf. Part. An. 639 b, 1 *οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται μία τῷ εἴδει (ἡ τῶν ζῴων πορεία)· διαφέρει γὰρ πτῆσις καὶ νεῦσις καὶ βάδισις καὶ ἕρψις.* Mot. An. 698 a, 5 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ πτήσει κινεῖται τὰ δὲ νεύσει τὰ δὲ πορείᾳ τῶν ζῴων, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλους τρόπους τοιούτους.*

οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως κ.τ.λ. Not only are there different *εἴδη κινήσεως*, but if we take any one *εἶδος*, e.g. walking, every step is *ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει* from every other.

ἐν τῷ μέρει, sc. *τοῦ σταδίου*.

τὴν γραμμήν. The *γραμμή* in the race-course is 'the scratch.' But the meaning seems to be more general here. You may draw a line across

οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ 1174 b οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ 4 εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτῳοῦν 5 χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς. οὐ 10

any part of the race-course, and the crossing of each successive line brings the process of running nearer its completion. The crossing of each line is specifically different; for the differentia of *φορά* is *κατὰ τόπον* (*πόθεν ποῖ*), and the lines differ *κατὰ τόπον*.

ἐν ἄλλοις, i.e. in the Physics.

ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ, 'in any given time.' There can be no difficulty in taking this as equivalent to *ἐν ὁτῳοῦν* above. The equivalence of *πᾶς* (*ἅπας*) and *ὁστισοῦν* is normal, e.g. *ὁτιοῦν φαγόντι* (1173 b, 28) is the same as *παμφάγῳ ὄντι* (cf. 1149 b, 34), and *πᾶν ποιεῖν* is the regular phrase for *ὁτιοῦν ποιεῖν* (1128 a, 29 n.). Cf. also *πάντως* = *ὁπωσοῦν* (1124 b, 9). I only mention this because some editors wish to read *οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι χρόνῳ*, adopting the interpretation of Michael, for which see next note.

αἱ πολλαί. This must surely mean 'the many motions' into which it may be cut up, *τὰ μέρη*. I do not think we can translate 'most motions,' i.e. all but the *κύκλῳ φορά* of the *πρῶτος οὐρανός*, as Michael supposes. It is true, no doubt, that Aristotle regarded this as complete and *ἐν ἀδιαφόρῳ κατ' εἶδος*, but it seems irrelevant.

εἴπερ...εἰδοποιόν. If the specific difference of *φορά* is *κατὰ τόπον* (*πόθεν ποῖ*), then each part of it will be in a specifically different *τόπος*, and from a different *πόθεν* to a different *ποῖ*.

§ 4. **ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.** Phys. 234 a, 34 *ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐθὲν πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι.* This is demonstrated from the indivisibility of *τὸ νῦν*. The conclusion is *ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἠρεμεῖν τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.*

ἐν τῷ νῦν, Phys. 220 a, 18 *φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν μόριον τὸ νῦν τοῦ χρόνου... ὥσπερ οὐδ' αἱ στιγμαὶ τῆς γραμμῆς.* 233 b, 33 *ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν... ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι.*

δῆλον καί. A fresh point. Not only is pleasure not a process, but we cannot even say there is a *κίνησις* or *γένεσις* of pleasure. I think the context requires Ramsauer's *τῆς ἡδονῆς* (the MSS. have *τὴν ἡδονήν*). He compares for the phraseology Phys. 246 b, 11 *τὰ πρός τι οὔτ' αὐτά ἐστιν ἀλλοιώσεις, οὔτε αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἀλλοίωσις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐδὲ ὅλως μεταβολή.*

οὐ γὰρ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Met. 1044 b, 21 *ἔνια ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, οἷον αἱ στιγμαί, εἴπερ εἰσί, καὶ ὅλως τὰ εἴδη καὶ αἱ μορφαί.* Nothing indivisible can strictly speaking be said to come into being or pass away. A process implies that one part of the thing has changed while the rest remains in its original state. Now pleasure, as we have seen, is an indivisible whole, complete at every

γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, 5
15 τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν—τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, μηθὲν διαφερέτω—καθ' ἑκάστην δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. αὕτη δ' ἂν
20 τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. οὐ 6
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε

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moment. It can no more go through a process of becoming than a point. If it is not complete, it is not there at all. In the same way we may say *τὸ ξύλον λευκὸν γίγνεται*, but we cannot say *τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεται*. Whiteness is or is not there, it cannot 'become' (Met. 1044 b, 21). What we call the *γένεσις* of pleasure is not pleasure, but a certain process in us which leads up to it. The pleasure is not there at all till the process is complete. Then it is all there, and no more in one moment than another. Wherever you make a section it is complete.

ταῦτα, sc. *κίνησις καὶ γένεσις*.

§ 5. **αἰσθήσεως δὲ κ.τ.λ.** We are now in a position to see the real relation between *ἐνέργεια* and *ἡδονή*. The *ἡδονή* simply *is* the *τελείωσις* of the *ἐνέργεια*, not something wholly different from the *ἐνέργεια*.

πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν, for *αἴσθησις* is essentially relative (*πρός τι*).

ἐν ᾧ ἐστι. The *δεκτικὸν τῆς αἰσθήσεως* is the *αἰσθητήριον*. It is ultimately the *ψυχή* that *ἐνεργεῖ*.

§ 6. **οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ.** We have seen that the activity of the best sensation in relation to the best object is the most perfect and the most complete. But the completeness consisting in the relation between the sensation and its object must be distinguished from the further completeness of the pleasure. To understand this passage, we must bear in mind that *τὸ αἰσθητόν* is the efficient and *ἡ αἴσθησις* the formal cause of the *ἐνέργεια*. According to Aristotle, sensation consists in a sentient being taking into itself the form without the matter of its object. It must, therefore, itself be that form potentially (De An. 431 b, 21 *ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα*). Hence it is that *ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς* (1130 a, 12 n.), the *ἐνέργεια* is one, though it can be analysed into *αἴσθησις* and *αἰσθητόν*. Further it is complete, and the pleasure which supervenes is something different from its efficient or formal cause.

καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ 25
7 ἰατρὸς [ὁμοίως αἴτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν].—καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαμὲν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα)· δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ᾖ τε αἴσθησις ᾗ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ 30
8 ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου.—τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή· ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ 1175 a

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ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρός, sc. *τελειοῖ*. Health is the formal cause and the doctor the efficient cause of being healthy. The two are therefore illustrations of the difference between *αἴσθησις* and *αἰσθητόν*, not of the difference between these and pleasure. The parallelism is exact; for, just as it is the form of the object that makes actual the potentiality of it in the soul, so it is the form of health in the doctor's soul that is the efficient cause of health in his patient. Cf. Met. 1070 b, 30 *τὸ κινοῦν...ἐν τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος...ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας εἶδος ἡ οἰκοδομική*. Neither *ὑγίεια* nor *ἰατρός* illustrates the way in which pleasure completes the activity; the illustration of that is deferred by the characteristically awkward parenthetical recapitulation **καθ' ἑκάστην...τοῦ πεισομένου**. We must, I think, bracket **ὁμοίως αἴτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν**, which confuses the argument.

§ 7. **καθ' ἑκάστην κ.τ.λ.** This parenthesis gives the proof of what was said 1174 b, 20 sqq.

πρὸς τοιοῦτον, sc. *πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον*.

ποιήσοντος...πεισομένου. The *αἰσθητὸν ποιεῖ*, the *αἴσθησις πάσχει*. The *ἐνέργεια* may be analysed into action and reaction, but it is really one and complete. Cf. Phys. 255 a 34 *ἀεὶ δ' ὅταν ἅμα τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ὦσι, γίνεται ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ δυνατόν*.

§ 8. **τελειοῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Note the awkward resumption.

οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, 'not like its immanent formal cause.' The *ἕξις* here must correspond to *ὑγίεια*, and it is parallel to the form which is made actual in the soul by *αἴσθησις*.

ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, 'as a superadded completion' or 'perfection.' It is not like health, but like the bloom of youth, something which supervenes upon the activity when the action and reaction are both at their best. The illustration is now complete, and the parallelism may be exhibited thus—

Formal Cause	*ὑγίεια*	*αἴσθησις*.
Efficient Cause	*ἰατρός*	*αἰσθητόν*.
Supervenient Perfection	*ὥρα*	*ἡδονή*.

τὸ κρῖνον ἢ θεωροῦν, i.e. *τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἢ νοοῦν*. In An. Post. 99 b, 35 *αἴσθησις* is called *δύναμις σύμφυτος κριτική*. Hitherto we have been speaking of *αἴσθησις*, but of course all that has been said applies equally to *νοῦς*. We shall see that the *ἐνέργεια* of *νοῦς* is the highest.

ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ. The agent and patient, the action and reaction, are similar and similarly related in

πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταὐτὸ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς 9
συνεχῶς ἥδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυ-
5 νατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἕπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ
10 παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ 10
τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ
15 θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος· ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὗ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἱρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἱρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν 11
ἡδονήν, ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεζεῦχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα

νόησις and αἴσθησις, so the same result will follow.

§ 9. **πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** Grant quotes Met. 1050 b, 22 διὸ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἥλιος καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μή ποτε στῇ, ὃ φοβοῦνται οἱ περὶ φύσεως. οὐδὲ κάμνει τοῦτο ὁρῶντα· οὐ γὰρ περὶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀντιφάσεως αὐτοῖς, οἷον τοῖς φθαρτοῖς, ἡ κίνησις, ὥστε ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις οὖσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία τούτου.

οὐ γίνεται, sc. συνεχῶς, which can easily be supplied from what precedes.

παρακέκληται, 'the mind is stirred up.' Cf. Plato, Rep. 523 a τὰ...οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν. Isokrates regularly uses παρακαλεῖν and προτρέπεσθαι as synonyms.

οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, 'as when people *look* and do not merely *see*,' is, I suppose, the meaning.

τοιαύτη, sc. διατεταμένη.

ἀμαυροῦται, 'is dimmed.' At Athens this word was only poetical, but it is frequent in the κοινή. It may have been in common use at Stageira.

§ 10. **ὀρέγεσθαι δὲ κ.τ.λ.** The fact on which Eudoxos relied, namely that all aim at pleasure, is now explained. It is really life, i.e. activity, they aim at, and the pleasure is its τελείωσις.

καὶ τούτοις, 'and with these faculties' as shown by the examples τῇ ἀκοῇ and τῇ διανοίᾳ. The pleasure each man pursues is not any pleasure, but that which is the natural completion of the activity which is best in his eyes.

§ 11. **πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ.** This question has now become almost meaningless. Cf. Introductory Note.

συνεζεῦχθαι. Cf. 1178 a, 16.

φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ 20
γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή. V. ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι—οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῷα καὶ δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἄγαλμα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος—ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς δια- 25
2 φερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ 30
οἰκεία ἡδονή· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ· 35

χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι. Cf. 1175 b, 35 διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι. Cf. 1102 a, 30 ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα and the note there.

V. § 1. **ὅθεν δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ.** We now see what is meant by saying that pleasures differ specifically. Aristotle has to deal with the view that pleasure *qua* pleasure is the same though from different sources, for which cf. Plato, Phileb. 12 d εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι.

τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα κ.τ.λ. As Alexander puts it (Ἠθ. προβλ. 120, 4 sqq. Bruns) αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνδιαιροῦνται ταῖς ἐνεργείαις.

φαίνεται, sc. τελειούμενα. Natural products like animals or trees are τέλεια when they have reached their full development of size and structure; the products of art are τέλεια when they have been finished so far as to serve the end for which they are made.

§ 2. **αὐταί**, 'these in turn,' i.e. the pleasures of thought and the pleasures of sense differ specifically among themselves as well as from one another. Cf. below 1176 a, 3 καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι, 'from their adaptation.' Cf. 1161 b, 21. Not only do the pleasures differ specifically τῷ ἐπὶ διαφερούσαις γίνεσθαι ἐνεργείαις, but also in their own nature as being οἰκεῖαι ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἐφ' αἷς γίνονται (Alexander loc. cit.).

συναύξει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1177 b, 21. That the specific difference between pleasures is intrinsic and not due solely to their association with certain ἐνέργειαι, is shown by the fact that the ἐνέργεια is increased by its οἰκεῖα ἡδονή. The latter must, then, have some specific character of its own. All this depends upon Aristotle's theory of growth, cf. Gen. Corr. 322 a, 26 ᾗ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ προσιὸν δυνάμει ποσὴ σάρξ, ταύτῃ μὲν αὐξητικὸν σαρκὸς κ.τ.λ.

συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα· τοῖς
1175 b ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει. ἔτι δὲ 3
μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίους ταῖς ἐνεργείαις εἶναι. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαί-
5 ροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἡ κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνέργειαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως 4
δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἡ γὰρ ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μηδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ
10 τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὁτῳοῦν σφόδρα οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ὦσι, τότε μάλιστ' αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 5
οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ
15 βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν. σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκεῖαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς
20 ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας τοὐναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκεῖαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὑτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γάρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως. διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικείᾳ 6
25 καὶ φαυλότητι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἱρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ φευκτῶν

§ 3. **ἐκ τοῦ...ἐμποδίους...εἶναι.** Alexander (loc. cit.) ἔτι εἰ αἱ ἐπ' ἄλλαις ἐνεργείαις ἡδοναὶ ἐμποδίζουσι τὰς ἐπ' ἄλλαις γινομέναις...εἶεν ἂν ἡδοναὶ ἡδονῶν φθαρτικαί. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ ἡδονῶν φθαρτικαί, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν ὁμοειδεῖς, ἔχουσαί γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἀλλήλας ὃ ἔχει τἀναντία πρὸς ἄλληλα.

§ 4. **ἐνεργῇ**, 1110 a, 14 n.

ἐκκρούει. Cf. 1119 b, 10. 1154 a, 27.

§ 5. **πολὺ διεστᾶσιν.** They are like *ἐναντία*, as Alexander says, and *a fortiori* they must be *εἴδει ἕτερα*, for *ἐναντία* are the *εἴδη* that are furthest apart in any *γένος*.

καθ' αὑτήν. This brings out the meaning of *οἰκεῖαι*. The pleasures are not attached to the activities in an accidental way; they are essentially the pleasures *of* the activity. They therefore differ *καθ' αὑτάς*, not merely *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* or *ᾗ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ γίνεσθαι*.

τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία ἡδονή ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ' αἰσχρῶν ψεκταί. οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέ- 30
ξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ.
7 οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις—ἄτοπον γάρ—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεταί τισι ταὐτόν. 35
ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί. διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἁφῆς καθαρειότητι, καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως· 1176 a
ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν
8 διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ

§ 6. **τῶν ὀρέξεων**, 'than the appetitions, from which they arise.' Alexander (loc. cit.) καὶ γὰρ εἰ πλέον ἀφέστηκεν τὸ ἐφιέμενον καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν τινος καὶ μηδέπω ἔχον αὐτὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ συνόντος αὐτῷ, εἴη ἂν καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία πλέον ἀφεστῶσα τῆς ἡδονῆς τῆς ἐνεργείας, ἐφ' ᾗ ἡ ἡδονή. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔφεσίς ἐστιν ἡδονῆς, τῇ δ' ἐνεργείᾳ σύνεστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ παρακολουθεῖ· ὥστ' εἰ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις συνδιαιροῦνται αἱ ἡδοναί, πολὺ ἂν μᾶλλον ταῖς ἐνεργείαις συνδιαιροῖντο.

αἱ μὲν γάρ, sc. *αἱ ὀρέξεις*. Desire is both antecedent in time and different in its nature from the activities. It is the efficient cause (Mot. An. 700 b, 35 *ἡ δ' ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν κινούμενον κινεῖ*), while pleasure is the superadded perfection of the activity itself.

§ 7. **διάνοια...αἴσθησις.** The typical *ἐνέργειαι*. It is said that this is inconsistent with Book VII where pleasure is defined as *ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια*. But that is purely dialectical. The *γένεσις αἰσθητή* of Speusippos is there developed dialectically into *ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια*, and it is not necessary to go further for the purpose of the argument there. Here we have a further step but no inconsistency.

καθαρειότητι. This appears to be because sight, hearing and smell are independent of contact, while taste is a form of touch. Cf. De An. 434 b, 14 *αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι' ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή.* 435 a, 14 *τὰ δὲ ἄλλα...πάντα...τῷ δι' ἑτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ διὰ τῶν μεταξύ, ἡ δ' ἁφὴ τῷ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν.* Further (ib. 435 b, 17) *ἄνευ γὰρ ἁφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον,...τὰς δ' ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει...οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ.* In other words, touch (and taste) are *ἀναγκαῖα*, the rest are *καλά*. We have learnt already that *ἀκρασία* and *ἀκολασία* in the proper sense have to do only with *ἁφή* and *γεῦσις*.

αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, i.e. *αἱ τῆς διανοίας* (Ind. s. v. *περί*) *ἡδοναί*.

καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. Cf. 1175 a, 27 *καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων*. The pleasures of each class (pleasures of sense and of intellect) differ among themselves. This has already been shown of the

καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνους σύρματ' ἂν ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἥδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφὴ ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν εἴδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὔλογον εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ σμικρὸν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ 9
αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητά ἐστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων συμβαίνει. δοκεῖ 10
δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἧ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμο- 11
λογουμένως αἰσχρὰς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι; ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἕπονται αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἐστὶν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι ἡδο-

pleasures of sense, and it is equally true that the pleasures of *σοφία* are higher than other pleasures of intellect.

§ 8. **ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον.** Cf. 1097 b, 24 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, sc. *ἡδονὴ οἰκεία ἑκάστῳ*. It is the *ἔργον* which determines what is the *οἰκεία ἐνέργεια* of each, cf. Pol. 1253 a, 23 *πάντα τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται*.

καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν. Fr. 51 Bywater. *σύρματα τὸν χόρτον Ἡράκλειτος λέγει* Michael.

ἀδιαφόρους, sc. *κατὰ τὸ εἶδος*. The technical term for things identical in species.

§ 9. **διαλλάττουσι,** i.q. *διαφέρουσι*, cf. 1161 a, 5. Among the lower animals we do find that each kind has its own pleasures; among men alone do we see that pleasures specifically different are pursued by different individuals.

ἐπὶ γλυκέων κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1113 a, 28 n.

§ 10. **δοκεῖ δ' κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1113 a, 25 sqq.

μέτρον...ὁ ἀγαθός. Cf. 1166 a, 12.

ναὶ κυρίως λέγοιντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

VI. Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προει- 2
ρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἴπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθά- 1176 b
περ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὑτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρ- 5
κης. καθ' αὑτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται 3
παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον 10
ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν

§ 11. **δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς,** 'in a secondary and even a far lower degree.' Cf. Plato, Phileb. 44 e *οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπτέον*.

VI. § 1. **περὶ εὐδαιμονίας.** We are at last in a position to explain the real meaning of our *ἀρχή*, the definition of Happiness.

§ 2. **ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις.** The doctrine of Speusippos dismissed 1098 b, 31 sqq.

καθεύδοντι...φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον. Cf. 1095 b, 31 sqq., 1098 b, 31 sqq. EE. 1216 a, 3.

τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα, e.g. *τῷ Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπεσόντι* 1101 a, 6. Cf. 1100 a, 8. 1100 b, 28.

ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, 1098 a, 5.

αἱ μὲν...ἀναγκαῖαι, sc. *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, i.e. those which have some *ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν* (cf. 1094 a, 3), which are the *conditio sine qua non* of something higher.

τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς...τῶν δι' ἄλλο. Of course there are some things *αἱρετὰ καθ' αὑτά* and also *δι' ἄλλο* (1096 b, 17), but *εὐδαιμονία* belongs to the class of things which are *οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο*.

οὐδενὸς...ἐνδεής, i.q. *τελεία*. Cf. 1097 a, 30 sqq.

§ 3. **καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ.** It is necessary to discuss the claims of amusement to be the end of life for the reason given in Book I.

παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις. Cf. 1095 b, 17. 1158 a, 27.

οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται,
ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς, δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν 4
δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δ' ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες
ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὑτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. εὔλογον δή, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν 5
πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἑκάστῳ δ' ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἱρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. οὐκ 6
ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἑτέρου ἕνεκα αἱρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνα-
τοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος
1177 a ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν 7
γελοίων καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ

ἐφίενται, sc. *οἱ τύραννοι*.

§ 4. **τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις**, 1095 b, 21 n.

§ 5. **πολλάκις εἴρηται**, 1063 a, 1 sqq., 1113 a, 25 sqq., 1254 a, 36, etc.

§ 6. **ἡ ἀνάπαυσις**. On the theory of *ἀνάπαυσις ἄνεσις τῆς ψυχῆς*) see above 1127 b, 33. 1150 b, 17.

It will not seem strange to us that Aristotle insists so strongly on the truth that amusement is not the end of life if we bear in mind that *θεωρία* is a form of *διαγωγή* and is therefore liable to be confused with *ἀνάπαυσις*. Cf. Pol. 1337 b, 33.

ἧττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

VII. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ'
ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν
γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζη-
τούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται

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§ 7. **εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου**. The slave, being an *ἔμψυχον ὄργανον* (1161 b, 4), has no *βίος* of his own. He is the instrument of another's life. Cf. Pol. 1280 a, 32 *δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων...οὐκ ἔστι* (sc. *ἡ πόλις*) *διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τὸ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν*.

καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται. Cf. 1098 a, 5.

VII. § 1. **εἴρηται**. Strictly speaking it has not been said, though it is perhaps implied in 1095 b, 14 sqq. where all other lives than the *θεωρητικὸς βίος* are shown to be inadequate while its consideration is reserved (1096 a, 4). In any case it follows at once from the proof given in Book VI that *σοφία* is the highest form of goodness.

§ 2. **τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν**. Cf. 1138 b, 7 n.

θεωρεῖν...δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς. The reason is that *θεωρία* is the *ἐνέργεια* of a *δύναμις* which is so high as to be almost an *ἐνέργεια*. The only reason why it is not continuous is that it is still a *δύναμις*, not the *actus purus* of *νόησις*. Met. 1074 b, 28 *εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως*.

§ 4. **κεχορηγημένων**, cf. 1101 a, 15.

πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως
1177 b αὐταρκέστατος. δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶ- 5
σθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχο- 6
5 λούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια, αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἄσχολοι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ
10 παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνοιντο. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἄσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τήν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν
15 οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. εἰ δὴ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ 7
πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὑτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν,

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συνεργοὺς ἔχων. Cf. 1170 a, 5. From the beginning Greek science was organised on cooperative principles (Early Greek Philosophy, Introd. *ad fin.*), and the Peripatos itself was so in a high degree. The Greek thinks of scientific inquiry as the give and take of independent minds (*διαλεκτική*). But of course it is possible for the wise man's soul to commune with itself.

§ 5. **οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.** At the beginning of the Metaphysics it is shown that science arises after everything necessary to life has been secured. Its origin is in Wonder and it serves no end but the satisfaction of our natural desire to know. Cf. 982 b, 24 *δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη, μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις.*

§ 6. **δοκεῖ τε κ.τ.λ.** This is the truth which underlies the perverted view that amusement is the end of life. *Εὐδαιμονία* is *ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή*, though it is not mere *ἀνάπαυσις* ('rest') or *ἄνεσις* ('relaxation').

§ 7. **εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ.** The apodosis begins at b, 24 **ἡ τελεία δή.**

ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν 20
οἰκείαν—αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν—καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, τὰ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα· ἡ τελεία δὴ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι 25
8 τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος 30
θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον 1178 a
9 πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ

σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν, sc. *τῶν ἐν σχολῇ*, e.g. *τῶν παιδιῶν*.

συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Cf. 1175 a, 30.

μῆκος βίου τέλειον, 1098 a, 15 n.

§ 8. **τοῦ συνθέτου**, 'man as a composite being.'

ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν. Cf. Nauck FTG. p. 690 where we have the verse—

ἄνθρωπον ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπινα.

In Rhet. 1394 b, 24 Aristotle quotes—

θνατὰ χρὴ τὸν θνατόν, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θνατὸν φρονεῖν.

So Pindar, Isthm. v, 20 *θνατὰ θνατοῖσι πρέπει*, Sophokles, Tereus fr. 515 *θνητὰ φρονεῖν χρὴ θνητὴν φύσιν*, Antiphanes ap. Stob. Flor. i, 316 *εἰ θνητὸς εἶ βέλτιστε θνητὰ καὶ φρόνει.*

ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν. Aristotle did not believe in individual immortality. *Νοῦς* alone is immortal and it is not individual. But by identifying ourselves so far as may be with it we escape to a certain extent from mortality. The thought was originated by Plato in the Phaedo, and remained in one form or another to the end. Cf. Tim. 90 b *τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι...πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθ' ὅσον δ' αὖ μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν.* Cf. also the *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν* of Theait. 176 b.

τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. Cf. 1138 b, 7 n.

τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν. Giphanius compares Soph. El. 183 b, 22 *μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχή...ὅσῳ γὰρ κράτιστον τῇ δυνάμει, τοσούτῳ μικρότατον ὂν τῷ μεγέθει χαλεπώτατόν ἐστιν ὀφθῆναι.* Of course the expression is figurative.

§ 9. **εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο.** Cf. 1169 a, 2.

εἴπερ τὸ κύριον. Cf. 1168 b, 31.

τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

VIII. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί. δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν ἀπὸ 2 τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνῳκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἡ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετή. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ 3 ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικάς εἰσιν ἀρετάς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρτημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί· καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατὰ ταύτας καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μεῖζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον 4 δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ

τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Here we see the real sequence of the whole argument. For *φιλία* in its highest form is the love of the higher self, and it is good, as proved above 1170 a, 13 sqq., for it is just the self-consciousness of the activity of thought (*νόησις νοήσεως*).

VIII. § 1. **Δευτέρως δὲ κ.τ.λ.** As the *κύριον* in man is *νοῦς*, the best human life will be *κυρίως καὶ πρώτως ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν* (cf. 1157 a, 31 n.). But we must also take the *σύνθετον* into account.

§ 2. **ἔνια δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1144 b, 3 sqq.

§ 3. **συνέζευκται.** Cf. 1175 a, 19.

εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1144 a, 22 sqq.

τὸ ὀρθόν, i.e. the *ὀρθότης* of the *ὀρθὸς λόγος*.

αὗται, sc. *αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί*.

περὶ τὸ σύνθετον, i.q. *τοῦ συνθέτου*, cf. Ind. s.v. *περί*.

διακριβῶσαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Neither is a note on the Ethics the proper place to discuss the *χωρισμός* of *νοῦς*.

§ 4. **δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.** It is true that this section contains repetitions, but that is no reason for suspecting it.

πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα—μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι—πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης· τὸ δὴ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη· πρὸς δὲ 1178 b τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ 6 καλλίους, πλειόνων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρός γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρός γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἧ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ, αἱρεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιού- 7 των πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους** ὑπομένοντες τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντες ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ

ἐξουσίας, sc. *τοῦ ἀκολασταίνειν* (Koraes).

§ 5. **ἀμφισβητεῖταί τε κ.τ.λ.** EE. 1288 a, 15.

§ 7. **ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους**; sc. *πράξεις*. I read *ὑπομένοντες* with K^b and *κινδυνεύοντες*. The accusatives of our other authorities seem due to assimilation to *ἀνδρείους*. Some such words as *ἀλλ' ἄτοποι* seem to have fallen out before *ὑπομένοντες*.

οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν. Met. 1074 b, 17 *εἴτε γὰρ μηθὲν νοεῖ* (*ὁ νοῦς*), *τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων.*

μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, 8
25 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλ-
30 λον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ 9
αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα
35 ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.
1179 a οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὔταρκες οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν 10
5 τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἧττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἱκανὸν δὲ τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. καὶ Σόλων 11
10 δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια

§ 8. **τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις κ.τ.λ.** Cf. Met. 1072 b, 14 *διαγωγὴ δ' οἷον ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν.*

§ 9. **εὐημερίας.** Cf. 1099 b, 3 n.

§ 10. **τοσαῦτα ὑπάρχειν,** sc. *μέτρια.*

§ 11. **καὶ Σόλων δὲ κ.τ.λ.** From Herod. i, 30. Cf. especially *Τέλλῳ τοῦτο μὲν τῆς πόλεως εὖ ἠκούσης παῖδες ἦσαν καλοί τε κἀγαθοί, καί σφι εἶδε ἅπασι τέκνα γενόμενα καὶ πάντα παραμείναντα· τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ βίου εὖ ἥκοντι, ὡς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν, τελευτὴ τοῦ βίου λαμπροτάτη ἐπεγένετο· γενομένης γὰρ Ἀθηναίοισι μάχης πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι βοηθήσας καὶ τροπὴν ποιήσας τῶν πολεμίων ἀπέθανε κάλλιστα, καί μιν Ἀθηναῖοι δημοσίῃ τε ἔθαψαν αὐτοῦ τῇ περ ἔπεσε καὶ ἐτίμησαν μεγάλως.*

κεκτημένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. ἔοικεν δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι 15
12 γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις ἐοίκασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα 20 καὶ τὸν βίον φέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις
13 ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν. εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλο- 25
γον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγενεστάτῳ—τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς—καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. 30
τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

IX. Ἆρ' οὖν εἰ περί τε τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος

Ἀναξαγόρας. Cf. EE. 1215 b, 6 (p. 19) and D L. ii, 7 *πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα 'Οὐδέν σοι μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' 'Εὐφήμει,' ἔφη, 'ἐμοὶ γὰρ καὶ σφόδρα μέλει τῆς πατρίδος,' δείξας τὸν οὐρανόν.*

§ 12. **συμφωνεῖν δὴ κ.τ.λ.** Cf. 1098 b, 9 sqq. and Introd. § 25. The *λόγοι* here are the dialectical arguments derived from *λογικαὶ προτάσεις*, and these are said to be in harmony with *τὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς δοκοῦντα*, which form *ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις*. They must further be tested by the facts of life (*ἔργα*), and if they do not stand this test, they are to be regarded as *mere* *λόγοι*.

§ 13. **ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν κ.τ.λ.** It has been objected to this passage (1) that it breaks the connexion of ideas, (2) that it is inconsistent with Aristotle's view of the relation between God and Man. Both objections are true, but neither is a sign of spuriousness. The words **δοκεῖ** and **εὔλογον** show that this is merely a new *ἔνδοξον*.

IX. § 1. **Ἆρ' οὖν κ.τ.λ.** We have now discovered what *εὐδαιμονία* is, and we have also seen how a man may attain it for himself; but our task is not complete. We have still to ask how the *νομοθέτης* is to produce it in the state.

τοῖς τύποις. Cf. Introd. § 26.

ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν
1179 b ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γνῶναι, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά· οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ 2
εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως
ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς 3
τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δι-
καίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσα-
σθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι
τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἤθός τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς
ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς,
τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι·
οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέ- 4
χεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας·
πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν
αὗται ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ
δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευ-
στοι ὄντες. τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι; οὐ 5
γὰρ οἷόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι κατειλημ-

τὴν προαίρεσιν. Here *προαίρεσις* is practically equivalent to *πραγματεία* or *μέθοδος*, cf. 1094 a, 2 n.

καθάπερ λέγεται, 1103 b, 26.

§ 2. **οὐδὲ...ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι.** Cf. 1105 b, 2. 1152 a, 8.

ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι, i.e. to have the *ἕξις* and produce the *ἐνέργεια*. Cf. 1098 b, 32 n.

§ 3. **κατὰ τὸν Θέογνιν,** v. 432—434

εἰ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδαις τοῦτό γ' ἔδωκε θεός,
ἰᾶσθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀτηρὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν,
πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον.

The quotation is suggested by Plato, Meno 95 e, where, after quoting *ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλά* (1172 a, 13), he goes on *οἶσθ' ὅτε ἐν τούτοις ὡς διδακτοῦ οὔσης τῆς ἀρετῆς λέγει;*—*Φαίνεταί γε.*—*Ἐν ἄλλοις δέ γε ὀλίγον μεταβάς,* "*εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν,*" *φησι,* "*καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,*" *λέγει πως ὅτι* "*πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἔφερον.*"

νῦν δὲ φαίνονται...ἰσχύειν go together.

προτρέψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι, an Isokratean touch.

κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ready to be 'possessed' or 'inspired' (*κατέχεσθαι*) by goodness. So in Plato's Ion *passim* *ἐξ Ὁμήρου κατέχεσθαι.*

§ 4. **αἰδοῖ...φόβῳ.** For the opposition cf. 1116 a, 31.

οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. This chiastic repetition and amplification is exactly in the style of Isokrates.

§ 5. **μεταρρυθμίσαι,** an Ionic word, also used by Xenophon. The Attic equivalent is *μετασχηματίσαι.*

κατειλημμένα, 'shut up in,' 'locked up in.' The term is probably a medical one; for in Probl. 870 b, 10 (Why do we sweat more in summer than winter though the body is drier?) we read that *τοῦ χειμῶνος πεπυκνωμένων ἐκτὸς τῶν σωμάτων, πολὺ κατειλημμένον τὸ τῆς φύσεως θερμὸν εἰς πνεῦμα οὐ διαλύει τὰ ὑγρά.*

μένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι· ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων
ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοι-
μεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει 20
οἱ δ' ἔθει οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον ὡς
οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διά τινας θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς
ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή
ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς
ἤθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ 25
μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσαν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
ἀκούσειεν λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος
ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἷόν τε μεταπεῖσαι; ὅλως τε
οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος
προϋπάρχειν πως οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ 30
δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν
πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ
γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς,
ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφὴν
καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γενό- 35
μενα. οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας 118
τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν

γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς κ.τ.λ. Cf. above 1099 b, 9 sqq.

τὸ...τῆς φύσεως, cf. 1103 a, 20 n.

ἐφ' ἡμῖν. The words show that this is a formal *βούλευσις.*

δεῖ προδιειργάσθαι...ὥσπερ γῆν. Koraes compares Hippokr. (*Νόμ.* § 2) *ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἡμέων ὁκοῖον ἡ χώρη· τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων ὁκοῖον τὰ σπέρματα· ἡ δὲ παιδομαθίη τὸ κατ' ὥρην αὐτὰ πεσεῖν ἐς τὴν ἄρουραν.* The doctrine is the same as 1095 b, 4 sqq. where too K^b has **ἔθεσιν** for **ἤθεσιν** (L^b).

§ 7. **ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν.** Cf. 1095 a, 8.

§ 8. **δεῖ δὴ κ.τ.λ.,** the Platonic view. Cf. 1104 b, 12 n.

ὑπὸ τοιούτοις...νόμοις, sc. **ὀρθοῖς.** After *τρέφεσθαι* and *παιδεύεσθαι,* *ὑπό* c. dat. is regular. The steps in the deliberative analysis are *ἀρετή, ἐθισμός, νόμος.*

συνήθη γενόμενα. Cf. Rhet. 1369 b, 16 *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν.*

αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἴονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ἐπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυεστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καί φασι δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἳ μάλιστ' ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς. εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἑκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατά τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν· ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἡ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἤ τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὁρμαῖς, κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ

αὐτά. Susemihl suggests **ἄττα**, while Rodier points out that Michael seems to have read **ἄλλα**.

§ **10. οἴονταί τινες.** The reference seems to be to Plato's requirement in the Laws 722 d sqq. that all laws should begin with a *προοίμιον* of a persuasive and protreptic character.

τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους...ἐξορίζειν. Plato, Protag. 325 a *ὃς δ' ἂν μὴ ὑπακούῃ κολαζόμενος καὶ διδασκόμενος, ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα τοῦτον ἐκβάλλειν ἢ ἀποκτείνειν.*

διὸ καί φασι κ.τ.λ. Cf. 1104 b, 16 n.

§ **11. μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἑκόντα.** We must not press this. It is purely phraseological like *οἵ τ' ὄντες οἵ τ' ἀπόντες* in Soph. Ant. 1109.

βιουμένοις. Aristotle means *ζῶσι*, but he has slipped into a rare Ionism. This is quite on a different level from the common, though incorrect, *βιοῦν, βιῶσαι*. The study of Isokrates has not effaced the early associations of Stageira (Wilamowitz-Möllendorf Aristoteles und Athen vol. i, p. 331).

§ **12. λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ...νοῦ.** Pol. 1287 a, 28 *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.*

νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθὴς τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει <ἢ> μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχου. κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν [καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι]· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἑκάστῳ δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, **ἢ προαιρεῖσθαί γε. μᾶλλον δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων· γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν, οὐδὲ δι' ὧν εἷς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ μουσικῆς ἢ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἤθη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ' ἴσως οὔ, ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην

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§ **13. ἐν μόνῃ δὲ κ.τ.λ.** Cf. Pol. 1337 a, 31 *ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην.* Cf. also 1102 a, 10.

ἢ μετ' ὀλίγων. The addition of ἢ is due to Professor Bywater. Aristotle means the Cretans and the Carthaginians. Cf. Pol. 1272 b, 24.

κυκλωπικῶς, Od. ix, 114 (of the Kyklopes)...*θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος | παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.* Elsewhere Aristotle uses this quotation to describe the patriarchal stage of society. Cf. Pol. 1252 b, 20 *πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου...καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ λέγει Ὅμηρος* κ.τ.λ.

§ **14. καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι.** Professor Bywater's suggestion that these words should come after *συμβάλλεσθαι* would certainly improve the sentence.

γεγραμμένων...ἀγράφων. This famous antithesis is only mentioned here because the laws of the domestic legislator will as a rule be unwritten.

§ **15. ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς.** Cf. 1097 a, 11.

μάχην περιτίθησιν is a strange phrase. Stahr conjectures *μειλίχην* for *μάχην* and Stewart *παρατίθησιν* for *περιτίθησιν*.

περιτίθησιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν <ἂν> ἄριστα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς,
15 τί πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοισδί—τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν—οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἑνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς 16 ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἑτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι
20 ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἧττον ἴσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἄν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας 17 βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῷ πειρα-
25 τέον γενέσθαι, εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἄν. ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἆρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπι- 18
30 σκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει

ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς. Cf. 1141 b, 22 εἴη δ' ἄν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική. Cf. also Met. 981 a, 10 πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ' εἴδος ἓν ἀφορισθεῖσι.

§ 16. δι' ἐμπειρίαν. Cf. Met. 981 a, 12 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων, πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτη ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων, ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ μὲν καθόλου γνωρίζῃ, τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσιν· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν, οἱ δ' οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

§ 17. καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα, 'any given subject submitted for treatment.'

§ 18. μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον. We have found that *νόμος* is the means to *ἐθισμός* and that therefore we must become *νομοθετικοί*. The next step in the *βούλευσις* is the means of becoming *νομοθετικοί*.

μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει...εἶναι, sc. *ἡ νομοθετική*. Cf. 1141 b, 23 sqq.

τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, 35
πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἳ δόξαιεν 1181 a
ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται—καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε
καὶ δημηγορικούς—οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικοὺς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφε- 5
19 τέρους υἱεῖς ἤ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὔλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἄν, οὔθ' αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ' ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς 10
πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πο-
20 λιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας. τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι. ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποιόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾠοντο 15

ἢ οὐχ ὅμοιον κ.τ.λ. This whole passage is an echo of the well-known complaints of Plato in the Meno (91 a – 100 c) and Protagoras (319 d – 320 b) that the statesmen of Athens have not taught any one their art, not even their sons.

ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων. Cf. 1094 a, 10. b, 4.

§ 20. τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ. The history of the Greek word *ῥήτωρ* and its everyday use at Athens led to this identification, the criticism of which forms the first subject of Plato's Gorgias. But, as Spengel saw, Isokrates is more immediately aimed at. Cf. e.g. Antid. § 80 *νόμους μὲν θεῖναι μυρίοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ἱκανοὶ γεγόνασιν, εἰπεῖν δὲ περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἀξίως τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν πολλοὶ δυνηθεῖεν. ὧν ἕνεκα τοὺς ἔργον ποιουμένους τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους εὑρίσκειν τοσούτῳ χρὴ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τῶν τοὺς νόμους ποιούντων, ὅσῳπέρ εἰσι σπανιώτεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι καὶ ψυχῆς φρονιμωτέρας δεόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ νῦν.*

οὐδ' ἂν ᾠοντο κ.τ.λ. Here the reference is quite plain. Cf. Antid. § 82 *ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐνταῦθα προεληλύθαμεν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς κειμένους ἀναριθμήτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν νόμων ἐπαινεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχαιοτάτους, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς καινοτάτους, οὐκέτι τῆς αὐτῆς διανοίας ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι προαιρουμένοις προῦργου γέγονε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν κειμένων, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ζητεῖν δεῖ ἑτέρους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς*

ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας
τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον,
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικήν. οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα
20 κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συν-
ιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν
τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποίηται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσ-
περ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν·
1181 b πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους
κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμά- 21
των γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνταί γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θερα-
πεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν
5 ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις
ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως
οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς
μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς ἢ τοὐναντίον
καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἁρμόττει εὔχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ
10 ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιοῦσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν

παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας πειραθῆναι συναγαγεῖν, ὃ ῥᾳδίως ὅστις ἂν οὖν βουληθεὶς ποιήσειε κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's words are a direct quotation from this.

ἔργοις ἐοίκασιν. The point is that the laws are τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης, not ἡ τέχνη. Cf. the criticism of the rhetorical teaching of Gorgias and the rest, which consisted in giving their pupils speeches to learn by heart. Soph. El. 184 a, 2 οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐπιστήμην φάσκων παραδώσειν ἐπὶ τὸ μηδὲν πονεῖν τοὺς πόδας, εἶτα σκυτοτομικὴν μὲν μὴ διδάσκοι, μηδ' ὅθεν δυνήσεται πορίζεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δοίη δὲ πολλὰ γένη παντοδαπῶν ὑποδημάτων, οὗτος γὰρ βεβοήθηκε μὲν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, τέχνην δ' οὐ παρέδωκεν.

§ 21. ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων. We see from the context that this is an argument *a fortiori*. Medical books are more scientific than collections of laws, and yet the doctor must use his own judgment.

ἴσως οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. 1360 a, 30 χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαΐειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἁρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστιν τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς τὰς τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίας· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα πολιτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν.

ἄνευ ἕξεως. This is the MS. reading, and is supposed to mean either (1) without the habit produced by experience and practice, or (2) without knowledge as a ἕξις ἀποδεικτική. Neither of which seems satisfactory. We might read ἄνευ ἐξετάσεως. The words are confused in MSS., e.g. in Plato Apol. 22 e.

ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα
22 τάχ' ἂν γένοιντο. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύ-
νητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον
βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύνα-
23 μιν ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν 15
οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων
πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν
θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σῴζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ
ποῖα ἑκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν
καλῶς αἱ δὲ τοὐναντίον πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τού- 20
των τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη,
καὶ πῶς ἑκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη.
λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

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§ 23. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The fact that the sketch here given does not agree with the order followed in the Politics as we have it, or, as Newman says, with "any conceivable order," seems to me decisive in favour of its genuineness. Surely an interpolator would have given a more recognisable synopsis. On the whole question, see Newman's Politics vol. II, App. A.

ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν. We have at last one of these in the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, of which few will now suspect the Aristotelian origin.

APPENDIX A

De Anima 433 *a*, 9 *sqq.*

Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἡ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα· πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός, διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική· τὸ ὀρεκτὸν γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστι τὸ ὀρεκτόν. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν. εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινόν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως—ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις—ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δ' ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς τίς ἐστιν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός· ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν. τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐὰν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἔτι ὀρεκτικόν· ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσι—ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἥδη· φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἥδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον—εἴδει μὲν ἓν ἂν εἴη τὸ

κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ᾗ ὀρεκτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν—τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι—ἀριθμῷ δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, ἓν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον δ' ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔτι τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν—κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ᾗ ἐνέργεια—τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον· ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἤδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ' ἀρχή· διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει δ' ἀχώριστα· πάντα γὰρ ὅσει καὶ ἕλξει κινεῖται. διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ ἑαυτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.

Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν τί τὸ κινοῦν ἐστιν, οἷς ἁφὴ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις, πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐνοῦσα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη. φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται ἀορίστως, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔνεστι μέν, ἀορίστως δ' ἔνεστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς· πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν. καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην. διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις· νικᾷ δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ κινεῖ τὴν βούλησιν· ὁτὲ δ' ἐκείνη ταύτην, <ὁτὲ δ',> ὥσπερ σφαῖρα ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία γένηται· φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ κινεῖ· ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι. τὸ δ' ἐπιστημονικὸν οὐ κινεῖται ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα—ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τοίνυν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε—ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου· ἢ ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον, ἡ δ' οὔ.

APPENDIX B

De motu animalium 701 *a*, 7 *sqq.*

Πῶς δὲ νοῶν ὁτὲ μὲν πράττει, ὁτὲ δ' οὐ πράττει, καὶ κινεῖται, ὁτὲ δ' οὐ κινεῖται; ἔοικε παραπλησίως συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκινήτων διανοουμένοις καὶ συλλογιζομένοις. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ μὲν θεώρημα τὸ τέλος—ὅταν γὰρ τὲς δύο προτάσεις νοήσῃ, τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνόησε καὶ συνέθηκεν—ἐνταῦθα δ' ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται ἡ πρᾶξις, οἷον ὅταν νοήσῃ ὅτι παντὶ βαδιστέον ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, βαδίζει εὐθέως, ἂν δ' ὅτι οὐδενὶ βαδιστέον νῦν ἀνθρώπῳ, αὐτὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς ἠρεμεῖ· καὶ ταῦτα ἄμφω πράττει, ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ ἢ ἀναγκάζῃ. ποιητέον μοι ἀγαθόν, οἰκία ἀγαθόν, ποιεῖ οἰκίαν εὐθύς. σκεπάσματος δέομαι, ἱμάτιον δὲ σκέπασμα, ἱματίου δέομαι. οὗ δέομαι ποιητέον, ἱματίου δέομαι, ἱμάτιον ποιητέον. καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἱμάτιον ποιητέον, πρᾶξίς ἐστιν. πράττει δ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. εἰ ἱμάτιον ἔσται, ἀνάγκη τόδε πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τόδε, τόδε· καὶ τοῦτο πράττει εὐθύς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δὲ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ δύο εἰδῶν γίνονται, διά τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ. ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἐρωτώντων ἔνιοι, οὕτω τὴν ἑτέραν πρότασιν τὴν δήλην οὐδ' ἡ διάνοια ἐφιστᾶσα σκοπεῖ οὐδέν· οἷον εἰ τὸ βαδίζειν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐνδιατρίβει. διὸ καὶ ὅσα μὴ λογισάμενοι πράττομεν, ταχὺ πράττομεν. ὅταν γὰρ ἐνεργήσῃ ἢ τῇ αἰσθήσει πρὸς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἢ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ τῷ νῷ, οὗ ὀρέγεται εὐθὺς ποιεῖ· ἀντ' ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἢ νοήσεως ἡ τῆς ὀρέξεως γίνεται ἐνέργεια. ποτέον μοι, ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει, τοδὶ δὲ ποτόν, ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἢ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ νοῦς, εὐθὺς πίνει. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῷα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὀρέξεως οὔσης, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἢ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως.

INDEX

TO THE INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

NOTE.—*I have not thought it necessary to give an Index to the Text, as those of Grant, Susemihl, and Bywater are amply sufficient. The references are to the pages of this volume.*

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