AKṢARA

A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER

in the

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

P. M. MODI.

મુરબ્બીશ્રી બ.ક.ઠાકોર સાહેબને
સપ્રેમ અર્પણ.
તા.૧૦.૨/૩૪ પ્ર.મો.માદી

R

AKṢARA

A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER

IN THE

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Inaugural—Dissertation

zur

ERLANGUNG DER DOCTORWÜRDE

der

HOHEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN FAKULTÄT

der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

Vorgelegt von

P. M. MODI, M. A.
AUS BHAVNAGAR (BRIT. INDIEN).

Printed at
THE BARODA STATE PRESS
BARODA
1932

Referent: Prof. Dr. F. Otto Schrader
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. E. Fraenkel.

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 14. Februar 1931.

Zum Druck genehmigt

Kiel,
den 14. Februar 1931. Der Dekan: Prof. Dr. Rosenberg.

MOTTO:

Pañcaviṃśaṃ yad etat te proktaṃ Brāhmaṇasattama |
tathā tan na tathā c eti tad bhavān vaktum arhati ||

" This Twentyfifth [of the Aupaniṣadas] *(i.e. akṣara)* which has been described by you, O best of Brahmins, pray tell me whether it is so or whether it is not so. "

MBh. XII. 318. 58.

ERRATA.

Page.	Line.				
5,	2:	read	*maitra*	for	*matira.*
11,	6:	read	*vadanti*	„	*vadnti.*
11,	27:	insert	a comma after (*amṛta*).		
24,	28:	read	*karman* or *yoga* instead of *karma* or *yogan.*		
25,	32:	„	Sāṃkhya	for	Sāṃkhy.
42,	40:	„	*avyakta*	„	*āvyakta.*
43,	1:	„	*budhyamāna*	„	*budhydmāna.*
44,	21:	„	*a–vidyā*	„	*a–vidya.*
44,	23:	insert a comma after *Viṣṇu.*			
55,	14:	read	"itself"	for	"itsvlf".
55,	14:	read	"there"	„	"rhere".
55,	36:	„	"that"	„	"what".
56,	16:	delete semicolon.			
59,	34:	read	"L. Mahābhārata"	„	"Mahābhārata".
62,	2:	read	*viddhi yogān*	„	*vīddhi yogan.*
63,	24:	„	"invulnerable"	„	"invulnarale".
63,	26:	„	"believed"	„	"belived".
66,	24:	„	*buddhaka*	„	*buddhak.*
68,	23:	„	*eli*	„	*eli.*
71,	7:	„	"not"	„	"note".
71,	42:	„	*tallvasaṃjñitaḥ*	„	*tattvsaaṃjñitaḥ.*
76,	10:	delete	"and" after indentity.		
78,	19:	read	"from"	for	"for".

Page.	Line.				
78,	39:	read	"(reference)"	for	"(refence)".
80,	8:	"	"differentiated"	"	"differentisted".
80,	11:	"	"twentyfive"	"	"Twentyfive".
80,	20:	"	"Twentyfifth"	"	"Twentifitth".
80,	11:	"	*tālmabhāvana*	"	*tāmabhāvana.*
94,	19:	delete	"the" before "more".		
96,	17:	"	"this".		
97,	7:	read	"throughout"	for	"throught".
99,	27:	"	*eṣa*	"	*esa.*
100,	15:	substitute	"The views of both"	for	"Both".
114,	23:	read	"offered"	for	"done".
123,	27:	"	"beings"	"	"begins".
138,	5:	delete	"the" before		"Knowledge"and "not-Knowledge."
138,	36:	"	"the" before		"Bh. Gî."
141,	6:	insert	"second" before		"Imperishable."
143,	27:	read	"(8)"	for	"(6)"
144,	15:	"	*adhibhūta*	"	*adhibhuūta.*
145,	5:	"	"would"	"	"will".
146,	6:	"	"penetrated"	"	"penitrated".
152,	5:	"	"their authors had"	"	"they have."
152,	7:	"	"to have found"	"	"that we have."
154,	27:	"	"need"	"	"would"
166,	29:	"	*Upalabdhi*	"	*Upalabahi.*
170,	31:	"	"moon, sun"	"	"Moon, Sun."
175,	7:	"	*akṣare*	"	*akṣara.*
177,	4:	"	"studied at"	"	"visited"

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

The Problem.

Translations of the Bhagavadgîtā abound, and their number is constantly increasing, but not so the help for interpreting that famous text, such as Colonel Jacob's "Concordance to the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgîtā." It is curious, indeed, that even now, more than a century after the first translations and A. W. von Schlegel's critical edition of the Bhagavadgîtā, the one work which ought to precede any translation, viz., the book on the terminology of the Gîtā, has yet to be written. There exists so far but a single contribution to it, viz., Franklin Edgerton's Paper "The meaning of Sāṃkhya and Yoga," which appeared in 1924 in Vol. XLV of the American Journal of Philology.

The term *akṣara*.

Accepting Prof. Schrader's suggestion I, therefore, proposed to supply this want and began by examining what seemed to us the most puzzling of the metaphysical terms of the Gîtā, viz., *akṣara*; and the inquiry on it grew to such an extent that it has become the sole subject of this Thesis.

Its meaning.

The following table will give an idea of the present condition of our problem. There are altogether fourteen passages in the Gîtā in which the word *akṣara* occurs. Three of these (viz., VIII. 13, X. 25, and X. 33) may be dismissed at once, because in them the meaning "letter" or "syllable" is incontestable. In the remaining eleven places (Bh. Gî. III. 15 b; VIII. 3a, 11a, 21a; XI. 18a, 37d; XII. 1c; 3a; XV. 16b and d, 18b), where it may be supposed to mean a metaphysical principle or an adjective qualifying the same, it is understood as follows by the two best known Indian commentators and four European translators :—

Bh. Gî.	Śaṅkara.	Rāmānuja.	Garbe.
III. 15b	The Supreme Soul (m.).	The individual soul.	The Imperishable (cause of *prakṛti*).
VIII. 3a	Brahman (n.).	The One of the form of the aggregate of individual souls (*kṣetrajñāsamaṣṭirūpa*).	Imperishable (adj.).
11a	,,	The Immutable posessing the attributes "not-gross" etc.	,,
21a	(Not explained.)	A liberated soul.	,, in VIII. 19 (adj. to *avyakta bhāva* i.e. *puruṣa* in VIII. 22).
XI. 18a	Brahman (n.).	The Immutable.	Imperishable (adj.).
37d	(Not explained.)	The principle (called) the individual soul (*jīvātmatattva*).	The Imperishable.
XII. 1c	Brahman, the Supreme Atman.	The nature of the inner self (*pratyagātmasvarūpam*).	,, (=the impersonal Brahman).
3a	The One presiding over the power of Illusion.	,,	Imperishable (adj.).
XV. 16b,d	The Lord's power of Illusion.	The liberated person.	The Imperishable (the individual soul).
18b	The seed of the world-tree (i.e. the power of Illusion).	The liberated soul.	,,

Deussen.	Barnett.	Hill.	Bh. Gî.
The Imperishable (cause of Veda–Word).	The Imperishable (cause of "Word-Brahman").	The Imperishable (cause of *prakṛati*).	III. 15b
The Imperishable.	The Imperishable (Vāsudeva).	The Imperishable (Vāsudeva).	VIII. 3a
The Imperishable (also the Syllable Om).	The Imperishable (the Abode).	The Imperishable (the Praṇava).	11a
"*Akṣara* (imperishable)" (identical with *avyakta bhāva* in VIII. 19; adj. to *puruṣa* in VIII 22).	The Imperishable (identical with *puruṣa* in VIII 22).	The Imperishable (identical with *puruṣa* in VIII 22).	21a
The Imperishable.	The Imperishable.	The Imperishable	XI. 18a
,,	,,	,,	37d
,,	,, (the Absolute).	,, (Vāsudeva).	XII. 1c
,,	The Imperishable.	,, (Do.)	3a
Imperishable (adj. to *puruṣa*).	,, (the World–Soul).	,, (the soul, individual and universal).	XV. 16b, d
The Imperishable.	The Imperishable.	The Imperishable.	18b

It will be seen from the above that, while the Indians feel at liberty to understand, in each case, the word in the sense in which it fits best into their own philosophical Systems, the Europeans show a certain tendency towards giving the word so far as possible one consistent meaning. But it is clear that none of them, Indian or European, has endeavoured to study the word in the light of previous and later texts, not even Deussen who, having translated sixty Upaniṣads and most of the philosophical texts of the Mahābhārata, was best equipped for that study. The reason for this neglect is, of course, the supposed irreparable vagueness of the terminology of the Gîtā.

The Present Situation.

The terminology of the Gîtā is, however, not so vague as it is generally believed to be. There are certain words which are known to the Gîtā as *saṃjñās* " technical terms," while there are others which are yet in the making. To the former class belong words like *karman* (VIII. 3), *avyakta* (VIII. 18), *adhyātma* (XI. 1), *kṣetra*, *kṣetrajña* (XIII. 2), *guṇātīta* (XIV. 25), *aśvattha* XV. 1), *dvandva* (XV. 5), *puruṣottama* (XV. 18), *sad* (XVII. 26–27), *a–sad* (XVII. 28), *sannyāsa*, *tyāga* (XVIII. 2,11; VI. 2), *sthita–prajña* (II. 55,56), *adhidaiva*, *adhiyajña* (VII. 29–30; VIII. 1–4) and many others. There are some terms which the Gîtā uses in two or more technical meanings, e. g., *yoga* (V. 4; VI. 23; II. 48), *sāṃkhya* (V. 4; XVIII. 13–14), etc. Moreover, *pravadanti* " they declare," *prāhuḥ* " they say ", *ucyate* " it is called, " *abhidhiyate* " it is named ", *saṃjñitam* " called ", *smṛtam* " known (in tradition)", *udāhṛtam* " illustrated (by people)", *prathitaḥ* " well–known ", *proktam* " said to be "—all such expressions which often occur in the Gîtā indicate the existence of a fixed terminology to which the author had recourse. But there are also a number of words which are used in two or more meanings without there being an indication of their having had at that time any technical sense. Such terms are *prakṛti*, *guṇa*, *māyā*, *mahad brahman*, *svabhāva*,

The Gîtā Terminology not very vague.

nirvāṇa, *buddhi*, *param*, *ajñāna*, *adhiṣṭhāna*, *mad–bhāva*, *mat-sādharmyam*, *aṃśa*, *matira*, *karuṇa*, *sāmya*, *siddhi*, *etc.* It is to be noted that while expressions such as *saṃjñitam*, *proktam*, *prāhuḥ*, etc. frequently accompany the words of the former class, they are not to be found in the passages where the words of the latter group occur. This shows that the Gîtā had certain fixed terms at its disposal.

Was *akṣara* a technical term in the days of the Gîtā? In III. 15, *akṣara* is introduced as if it were very well–known to the reader. In VIII. 3, *akṣara* is given as the explanation of Brahman; this shows that its meaning was considered to be less ambiguous and better fixed than that of the term Brahman. In VIII. 11. *akṣara* is that one "which the Veda–knowers declare ". In VIII. 21, *akṣara* is the designation of the higher *avyakta* othervise "called" *paramā gati*. The Lord is said to be *akṣara* which is "the highest to be known" (XI. 18) and "*akṣara*, *sad*, *asad*, and whatever is beyond these" (XI. 37). In XII. 1, the contrast between the meditators on *akṣara* and on *Kṛṣṇa* (i. e. *puruṣa*) is introduced as if the distinction between the two were quite well–known; the question is not whether both are objects of meditation, but it is, which of the two is better. The description of *akṣara* (in XII. 3) is given not because it is unknown, but because thereby the author wants to point out the difficulties that surround the *akṣara*-mediator (XII. 5). In XV. 16, *kṣara* and *akṣara* are contrasted (almost in the same way as in Śve. Up. I. 8) and *kūṭastha* is said to be the "designation" of *akṣara* (*kūṭastho ऽkṣara ucyate*). So, it is quite clear that the author of the Gîtā uses the term *akṣara* in the unambiguous sense of a technical expression. He has inherited it from very old traditions, viz., from the traditions of the Oldest Prose and the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads.

Akṣara, a technical term.

In addition to the internal evidence that the Gîtā itself supplies to us, we have ample material to recover the meaning or meanings of the metaphysical terms of this work. First of all, we have the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, to which the Gîtā itself refers (XIII. 4). These are the

Aids to interpret it.

immediate predecessors of the Gītā. A glance at Colonel Jacob's "Concordance of the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā" will show that the terms *prakṛti*, *māyā* etc., which are not known to the Gītā as technical terms, occur not at all or rarely in these Upaniṣads, while the terms like *sāṃkhya*, *yoga* etc., which the Gītā knows as used in more than one technical sense are known to these Upaniṣads but not as technical. For the term *akṣara*, these Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads supply a good deal of information, as can be seen by referring to passages like Śve. Up. I. 8,10, Śve. Up. V. 1, and Mu. Up. II. 1. 2. The relation of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* in the Gītā is based upon the same in these Upaniṣads. The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad in particular has rendered an important service in this respect.

The Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads.

The Mahābhārata philosophical texts, especially the chapters of the Mokṣadharma Section of Book XII, show the stage immediately following that of the Gītā teaching, just as the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads record the preceding one. The terms like *sāṃkhya* and *yoga*, which have in the Gītā two or more technical meanings, have here only one, and the terms like *prakṛti* etc., for the exact sense of which in each verse of its occurrence in the Gītā we have to depend mainly on the context, are in the Mahābhārata fixed technical terms. The *akṣara*–doctrine of the Gītā has undergone a great development and in place of the one System of the Gītā, we have in the Mahābhārata at least four Schools, each of which has its own conception of *akṣara*. This latter deserves to be fully examined in order to make out the sense of the term *akṣara* in its later historical relations. In the course of my investigation it was found that the *akṣara–puruṣa* doctrine as embodied in these (four) Mahābhārata Schools which are the descendants of the Gītā doctrine had been misunderstood, in consequence of the Gītā doctrine itself having been previously misunderstood. So the laborious task devolved on me of reconstructing as best I could the several systems of those Schools, and thus the Chapter on "*Akṣara* in the Mahābhārata" in this Thesis has

The Mokṣadharma Section in MBh. XII.

come to be the largest one (though it is only the summary of a much bigger work to be published on a later occasion, if that should be desired). The Mahābhārata philosophical portions have proved to be specially useful, as they have preserved for us the history of the *akṣara*-doctrine of the Gītā in its development prior to Śaṅkara, the earliest commentator on the Gītā whose commentary is available to us.

The Brahmasūtras, though not a regular commentary on the Gītā, were intended to explain not only the Upaniṣads but also the Gītā in so far as it agrees or seemed to agree with them. They, thus, have a right to be examined for the present inquiry. It is well-known that "*api ca smaryate*" and similar expressions in the Sūtras refer always to the Gītā. Though the verses of the Gītā are referred to in the Sūtras only as a witness for the view of the Sūtrakāra about the Upaniṣads, and though unlike the latter, they rarely form the *viṣayavākya* of an entire *adhikaraṇa*, the Sūtras' attempt to fix the meaning of the Upniṣads which had greatly influenced the Gītā doctrine is really useful to us for our present purpose. The Sūtrakāra had to consider, among many others, the same terms with which we are confronted in the Gītā; *avyakta* (I.4.1–7, in Ka.Up.I.3.11), *akṣara* (I.2.21–23, in Mu.Up.I.1.5–6; and I.3.10–11, in BṛUp.III.8.7–8), *dhṛti* (I.3. 16, in Bh.Gī XIII.6), *prakṛti* (I.4.23), *yoni* (I.4.27, in Bh.Gī. VII. 6, XIV.3–4), *samādhi* (II.3.39, in Bh.Gī.II.44.53), *para puruṣa* (I.2.26)—these and many other terms have been either discussed or are used during discussion by the Sūtrakāra. Among the many useful remarks that the Sūtrakāra makes regarding the terminology concerning *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, I may here point out Br. Sū.III.3.52 where he says that "*Akṣara* and *puruṣa* have the same designations in common, but the application of terms in each case to either of them is to be determined by the frequency of their occurrence." (Appendix IV). But what is more important is the *akṣara*-doctrine of the Sūtras in its relation to the *puruṣa*–doctrine. As one would expect from an author who lived some centuries after the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the Mahābhārata, (and

The Brahmasūtras.

the Buddistic philosophy), we have in the Sūtras an independent view based upon these texts, revealing an age of criticism, that yet remembered the Gîtā doctrine and was thus much earlier than that of Saṅkara. When I discovered that the Sūtrakāra's *akṣara*-or-*puruṣa* doctrine was directly based upon the still unforgotten traditions of the *akṣara*-and-*puruṣa* doctrine of the Gîtā (though the Sūtrakāra understands them in his own way), the difference between the Sūtrakāra's own teaching and that of his commentators appeared so great that I had to undertake an independent interpretation of the Sūtras concerned, leaving aside the question of critcising the other interpretations. Thus, the Sūtras have given an unexpected help in settling the sense of the term *akṣara* in the Gîtā.

In this way it will be seen that for fixing the terminology of the Gîtā we have an amount of useful materials coming to our aid.

Synonyms of *akṣara*.

I must here note that the Gîtā uses a number of expressions in place of *akṣara*, such as *prakṛti*, *parā prakṛti*, *mahad brahman*, *kṣetra*, *yoni*, *avyakta*, *brahman*, *ātman*. A systematic account of these had to be postponed owing to the bulk that this dissertation reached already during the investigation of the term "*akṣara*", though almost all of these and also some of the terms for the lower Nature had to be indirectly dealt with in course of the study, not only in the light of the evidence of the Gîtā but also in that of the other literature connected with the subject.

Result of the Author's Investigation.

Regarding the results of my investigation I feel tempted to say with Kālidasa: "*Balavad api śikṣitānām ātmany apratyayaṃ cetaḥ*" (Śākuntala I. 2). I confess, I really have such a feeling as regards some of the details of the interpretations I have given to the various texts. I think however, that my dissertation will show that till now we have either missed or not properly realised the significance of one very important Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy. The history of the *akṣara-puruṣa* conception covers a very long period of metaphysical thought definitely beginning with the

age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. The view of these was confirmed and amplified by the Gîtā. This led to the origin and development of the four great philosophical Schools of the Mahābhārata, including the Mahābhārata Sāṃkhya School. These, in their turn, were responsible for the establishment of the Vedanta as a system in opposition to other Systems, the earliest account of which can be said to have come down to us in the Brahmasūtras, which, henceforth, became the philosophical Text Book of all the various Branches of the Veda. If my interpretations of these texts, taken in their entirety, are not wrong, that will prove not only the importance of the *akṣara-puruṣa* doctrine in Indian Metaphysics, but it will also explain the as yet unsolved question of the origin of the Classical Sāṃkhya, which should be ultimately traced to the Gîtā theory of two Natures. Moreover, it has been here discovered that the idea of a transcendent God, as we have it in the Classical Yoga School, originated in the rejection of the Upaniṣadic identity of Jîva and Paramātman. Regarding the texts here dealt with, it is hoped, that the new interpretation given to many verses of the Gîtā and the reconstruction of the Schools of the later Mahābhārata made in this work will show that this "Great Epic of India" is a much more consistent and much more useful account of the philosophical movements of those days than it has been hitherto believed to be. Lastly, it is left to the reader how far the pioneer effort made here to present an independent explanation of parts of the Brahmasūtras is successful in its aim of discovering the original meaning of that aphoristic work.

Editions and Translations used.

In conclusion, it remains to be stated that I have as a rule used the Bombay edition of the Mahābhārata; wherever the Kumbhakoṇam edition was used, it has been so stated. Similarly in case of numbering the Sūtras I have followed Śaṅkara's *pāṭha*; otherwise, I have made a note. A list of translations and interpretations of the various texts used by me is given overleaf. I am indebted to most of these for supplying me with a stimulating *pūrvapakṣa* on a fairly good number of passages.

2

17 4/44

Works and Articles consulted: their Abbreviations.

P. Deussen: Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda, second ed. Leipzig 1905.

P. Deussen and O. Strauss: Vier philosophische Texte des Mahābhārata, Leipzig, 1906 (VPTM).

F. Edgerton: " The Meaning of Sānkhya and Yoga, " in The American Journal of Philology, Vol. XLV, 1924 (AJP).

E. Frauwallner: " Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma, " viz., " Die sāṃkhyistischen Texte " (in W. Z. K. M., Vol. 32), and " Die nicht-sāṃkhyistischen Texte " (in J. A. O S., Vol. 45).

R. Garbe: Die Bhagavadgîtā, Leipzig 1905.

R. Garbe: Introduction to the Bhagavadgîtā, Bombay, 1918. (IBG).

E. W. Hopkins: The Great Epic of India, New York, 1902 (GEI).

F. O. Schrader: Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, Adyar 1916.

The Bhagavadgîtā (Bh. Gî.).

The Brahmasūtras (Br. Sū.).

The Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads (EMU).

The Later Mahābhārata i.e. the Mahābhārata excluding the Bhagavadgîtā (L. MBh.).

The Mahābhārata (MBh.).

The Oldest Prose Upaniṣads (OPU).

CHAPTER I.

AKṢARA IN THE UPANIṢADS.

The Impersonal and the Personal in the Vedas.

The conception of the impersonal Absolute goes back to the Ṛgveda: " That which is one the wise speak of in various ways " (*ekaṃ sad viprā bahudhā vadnti* ṚV. I. 164.47) and " That one (n.) breathed by its own power in absence of air" (*ānīd avātaṃ svadhayā tad ekam*–ṚV. X. 129. 2.). The idea of the personal is also to be traced to the same source: " *Puruṣa* alone is all this " (*puruṣa ev edaṃ sarvam*–ṚV. X. 90. 2).

In the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads.

Again, the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads know both these conceptions: " Across what then, pray, is the Ether woven, warp and woof ? (Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 7); He said: 'That, O Gārgî, the Brahman-philosophers call the Immutable (*akṣara*). It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long, ...(Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 8). Verily, O Gārgî, at the command of that Immutable, the sun and the moon stand separately sustained (Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 9).....Verily, O Gārgî, that Immutable is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the ununderstood understander. Other than it there is naught that sees; other than it there is naught that hears; other than it there is naught that thinks; other than it there is naught that understands' " (Bṛ. Up. III. 3. 11). The personal *ātman* also is described in the same terms in Bṛ. Up. III. 7. 23. About *puruṣa* we read: " So much is his greatness, yet *puruṣa* is greater than this; all beings are one-fourth of him; three-fourths of him, the Immortal (*amṛta*) is in heaven " (Chā. Up. III. 12. 6, ṚV. X. 90. 3). The *puruṣa* in the eye and in the sun are mentioned in Chā. Up. I. 7. 5 and I. 6. 6. The " Golden *puruṣa* " is found in Bṛ. Up. IV. 3. 11. Bṛ. Up. also states " I am Brahman " (I. 4. 10.) and " He who is yonder, yonder *puruṣa*—I myself am he " (V. 15. 1).

Neither the Ṛgveda nor these oldest Upaniṣads feel it necessary to consider whether the final reality is personal or impersonal. The Bṛ. Up. even ascribes personal attributes like that of 'commanding' (*praśāsana*) to the impersonal *akṣara*. Both the ideas of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are mentioned here independently of each other. *Akṣara* is neither identified with *puruṣa*, nor is it lower than *puruṣa*. Each by itself is the highest object of human life. The direct effect of *akṣara* is the first element called Ether; and between *akṣara* and the Ether, there is no other principle.

The two Conceptions not yet connected.

But when we come to the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, we find as if their authors were engaged in the problem: " Are *akṣara* and *puruṣa* two or one? In what relation do they stand?"

The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad in one place preserves an earliest effort aimed as if at solving this problem. It thinks it best to identify the two and thus to speak of *akṣara–puruṣa* "the Immutable [or] the Puruṣa" (Mu. Up. I.2. 13; Appendix I). The author of this passage was confronted only with the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads; he did not know the "Spiritual Dualism" contained in the "Pluralistic Dualism" of the Mahābhārata Aupaniṣadas, of which we shall have to speak hereafter. He tried to answer the problem of his age: " Is the final reality personal or impersonal?" He acquiesced in simply putting the two conceptions side by side. He may have been encouraged in doing so by those who held that " This shining, immortal *puruṣa* who is in this earth .....is just this *ātman*, this Immortal *(amṛta)*, this *Brahman*, this All " (Bṛ. Up. II. 5. 1).

Earliest Solution of their Relation.

But this identification did not satisfy the philosophers of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, who seem to have gone on reasoning " How could the personal and the impersonal be identified ? Were they not both of them mentioned separately in the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads ? If they should be kept separate, what could be their relation ? Can the impersonal be

Further Development: The Impersonal lower than the Personal.

the master of the personal ? No. The personal must be higher than the impersonal." This seem to have been the view prevalent during the age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. All of them agree in placing *puruṣa* above *akṣara* (Mu.Up. II. 1. 1–2, III. 2. 8; Appendix I; Pr. Up. V. 5. 7; App. I; Śve. Up. I. 7–12, V. I; App. I). The Kaṭha Up. says "*Puruṣa* is higher than *avyakta*" (Ka. Up. III. 11), and in Tai. Up. II. 5, we read: "Brahman is the tail (of the blissful *ātman* of the form of *puruṣa*)." Such a tendency is already found in Bṛ. Up. where *ātman* (who is identical with *akṣara* in Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 8–11) and *puruṣa* called " Aupaniṣada Puruṣa " are separately described in the same terms (Bṛ. Up. III. 9. 26) and yet *puruṣa* is said to be the last resort (*parāyaṇa*) of *ātman* the All (Bṛ. Up. III. 9. 10–17); and where *amṛta* (a synoym of *akṣara* as in Śve. Up. I. 10) is distinguished from *puruṣa* because it is his *devatā* (Bṛ. Up. III. 9. 10).

Avyakta, a synonym of *akṣara*.

But though the impersonal is thus definitely said to be lower than the personal, both of them are the goals (*gati*, the *summum bonum*) for those who desire to be free from the world (Mu. Up. III. 2. 8, I. 1. 5, III 1. 1; App. I). The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (II and III) aims at teaching that both *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are objects to be independently pursued by men, though those who meditate on *puruṣa* go beyond "the bright one" i. e. *akṣara* (Mu. Up. III. 2. 1, App. I). The Pr. Up. says that " *jivaghana brahmaloka* " i.e. *akṣara* is the lower *brahman* and *puruṣa* is the higher *brahman* (Pr. Up. V. 2, 5–7 App. I). *Akṣara* and *puruṣa* are said to be the goals respectively in Śve. Up. IV. 18, I. 11. Again, the teaching of *akṣara* as well as that of *puruṣa* is *vidyā* "the Lore" (Mu. Up. I. 1. 5, I. 2. 13, II. 1. 10, III. 2. 10). Moreover, both *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are eternal and unborn (Mu. Up. I 1. 6, II. 1. 2, Śve. Up. I. 9). To this conception of the impersonal and the personal is to be traced ultimately the earliest germ of the Mahābhārata and the Classical Sāṃkhya as we shall see later on.

Both eternal: both goals: both *vidyās*.

But, if *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are both of them "goals," both of them "Lores," and both of them eternal, why should the former be lower than the latter? The reason was more a cosmogonical one than either theological or ontological. Brahman or *akṣara* or *avyakta* which is lower than the *puruṣa* (Mu. Up. II. 1. 2; Śve. Up. I. 1. 8; Ka. Up. III. 11) is a living principle (*jīvaghana*–Pr. Up. V. 5, App. I; *prajñāna-ghana*-Bṛ. Up. IV. 5. 13; *jīva ātman* Chā. Up. VI. 3. 2, VI. 11. 1.); and both *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are jointly to produce the world (Mu. Up. II. 1. 5 c–d).

Akṣara, a Conscious Cosmic Principle also.

How can these animate and conscious principles produce the inanimate, the unconscious? Here the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads contemplate on the nature of the relation between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. The Śve. Up. has gone further in solving this problem than either Muṇḍaka or Praśna Upaniṣad. The Mu. Up. said that *akṣara* is the matrix, *yoni*, in respect to *puruṣa* (Mu. Up. III. 1. 3b), and that "the male pours seed into the female" (Mu. Up. II. 1. 5). The Śve. Up. confirms this idea of the relation (Śve. Up. I. 2; VI. 16a, V. 6), but explains it further: *akṣara* is a power of the Lord (Śve. Up. III. 3), an unborn female (I. 9); *akṣara* is the *māyā* or *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* is 'the *māyin*' the possessor of *māyā* (IV. 10); and in this respect, not in so far as it is a "goal", *akṣara* is "the ruled" and *puruṣa* is "the ruler" (while the Jîva is a "not–ruler", Śve. Up. I. 8). The Śve. Up. is the first to use these terms for explaining *akṣara*. To put it in the terms of Vedanta philosophy, *akṣara* is *dharma*, *puruṣa* is *dharmin*. This seems to be the sense of the higher—ness (*paratva*) of the *puruṣa*, and it is quite consistent with the statement that both *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are eternal, that the knowledge of both is Brahmavidyā, and that both are goals. The *paratva* has to do with creation, not with absolution. There is a "Spiritual Dualistic Monism"; together with the Jîva, *akṣara* and *puruṣa* form a Triad, but not three principles (Śve. Up. I. 9, 12).

Akṣara, the Matrix (*yoni*).

Akṣara, the Power (*śakti*).

Akṣara, a *dharma* of *puruṣa*.

The Doctrine of 'Dualistic Monism.'

With the above relation, *akṣara* and *puruṣa* set out to create the world. At this stage, a new conception enters the field of Indian Philosophy. The authors of the EMU thought that the unconscious world (*jada jagat*) could only be produced out of an unconscious principle. They could not think that "the Ether" (*ākāśa*) was directly the effect of *akṣara*, as Yājñavalkya had really believed (Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 11; see P. 12 above). They said, the unconscious Nature is an effect born of *akṣara* when this falls into pregnancy through *puruṣa* (p. 14 above). This Nature is called *brahman* in Mu. Up. I. 1. 8–9. The Śve. Up. says that *pradhāna* is the Mutable (I. 10). The Ka. Up. meant the same when it placed *mahān ātmā* between *buddhi* and *avyakta* (III. 10–11, VI. 7). The Ka. Up. is the first to enumerate the principles making the world, in the form of an evolutional series such as becomes common in later philosophy. This Nature from which the world is directly produced is inanimate, while *akṣara* is the animate Nature. As we shall see later on, this distinction between the two Natures continues to be maintained in the Aupaniṣada School during the period of the Gîtā and the Mahābhārat.

Two Natures in the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads.

There are many synonyms of *akṣara*, which rise up during this period of the EMU. The most important of these for the history of Indian Philosophy are *avyakta* (Śve. Up. I. 8; Ka. Up. III. 11) and *vidyā* (Śve. Up. V. 1, App. I); "*prakṛti*" may also be noted here (Śve.Up.IV. 10).

Terms for the Higher Nature.

The unconscious Nature was called the *brahman* which is born (Mu. Up. I. 1. 8–9), *avidyā* (Śve. Up. V. 1); *kṣara* (Śve. Up. I. 8, 10), and *pradhāna* (Śve.Up. I. 10). *Pradhāna* was so called because it was thought to be the first of the produced things. It had not become a technical term even in the days of the Mahābhārata and the Brahmasūtras where we find the word used by different schools in different meanings as it suited them. (See Ch. IV.)

Terms for the Lower Nature.

The conception of the paths to reach *akṣara* or *puruṣa* has also advanced during this period. This is clear when we contrast the simple mention of "*jñāna*" and "*devayāna*" in the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads with the statements on the same topic in Mu. Up. III. and Sve. Up. VI. 13. This shall be considered along with the teaching of the Gītā on the same subject.

Paths leading to *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

If we compare the idea of *akṣara* in the EMU with that in the OPU, we find that, unlike the Bṛ. Up. (III. 8. 9) which makes *akṣara*, the impersonal principle, "a ruler" or "a commander" sustaining by its command the world, the Śve. Up. definitely separates the functions of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, and makes only the latter the ruler and sustainer. Śve. Up. I. 8 says that the Lord, *akṣara* and the Jîva are the ruler, the ruled and not-ruler respectively. Śve. Up. I. 9 a-b and IV. 5 state that all these three are "unborn". Śve. Up. I. 12 explains the same three as "the inciter", *preṇitṛ*, "the object of enjoyment", *bhogya*, and "the enjoyer", *bhoktṛ*. The lower Nature is *kṣara* or *pradhāna* (Śve. Up. I. 10) or *vyakta* (Śve. Up. I. 8); it is called *vyakta* because the Śve. Up. which mentions *akṣara* as the only *avyakta*, does not yet know the theory of two *avyaktas* of the Gîtā (Bh. Gî. VIII. 19-21, App. I and II); but this lower Nature is not "unborn" and is not to be included in the Triad. The term "*brahmam*" seems to have been used here for the Triad specially to distinguish it as a whole from *akṣara* or *īśa* either of which could be called Brahman (n.). Though the word "*brahmam*" may mean a Brahman-song elsewhere, such a sense cannot be reasonably attributed to the term here. "*Brahmam*" (Śve. Up. I. 9,12) is equivalent to "*paramaṃ brahma*" in Śve. Up. I. 7. The three are *traya* or three (Śve. Up. I. 7,9), but they form a three-fold reality called "*trividhaṃ brahmam*" (Śve. Up. I. 12). We shall see later on how the authors of the Mahābhārata (XII. 217) used this passage of the Śve. Up. to express their own idea of a Tetrad.

Progress during the EMU Period.

Idea of Trinity in the Śve. Up.

CHAPTER II.

AKṢARA IN THE BHAGAVADGÎTA.

The Gîtā accepts the distinction between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, taught originally in the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. *Akṣara* is not to be identified with *puruṣa* (Bh. Gî. VIII. 3-4, 10-11, 21-22; XII. 1-4; XV. 16-18; App. II.); *puruṣa* is beyond (*para*) *akṣara* (VIII. 21-22; XV. 18; App. II); as an object of meditation and as a "goal" *akṣara* is not dependent on *puruṣa* (VIII. 11; XII. 1). The *akṣara*-meditators may even be said to reach the *puruṣa* (Bh. Gî. XII. 4); or else those who have reached *akṣara* or Brahman, make a further progress and reach the *puruṣa* (Bh. Gî. XVIII. 53-55; App. II). In this last point the Gîtā seems to develop the earlier *akṣara*-doctrine. The Gîtā prefers the meditation on *puruṣa* to that on *akṣara*, because the former is easier than the latter (Bh. Gî. XII. 5). *Puruṣa* is the "presiding deity", *adhidaivata* (VIII. 4, 22; App. II), and presides over *akṣara* which is his "abode" *dhāman* (Bh. Gî. VIII. 21, 3, 11). This idea of *dhaman* appears originally in the Mu. Up. (III. 2. 1-4; App. I) and the Gîtā develops it. The word "*pada*" is used for "*dhāman*" in Bh. Gî. XV. 4 (as probably in Ka. Up. III. 11.)

Akṣara and *puruṣa* two "goals" as in EMU.

Puruṣa the Presiding Deity.

Akṣara, the abode.

One older word for *akṣara*, used in the Gîtā is Brahman. It should be here pointed out that the Gîtā is always careful not to identify *puruṣa* with Brahman, because the latter stands for *akṣara* which is different from and lower than *puruṣa*. Kṛṣṇa is identified with *puruṣa*, and

Brahman, a Synonym of *akṣara*.

not with Brahman. Even Garbe finds that in reply to Arjuna's question: "What is that Brahman?" (Bh. Gî. VIII. 1), Kṛṣṇa does not say "I am that Brahman", but says that Brahman is *akṣara* (Bh. Gî. VIII. 3; App. II). It would have been better if Garbe had accepted as genuine this position of the Gîtā as regards the relations of Brahman or *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, as he actually found it in the Gîtā itself. In Bh. Gî. XIV. 26–27, *puruṣa* or Kṛṣṇa who is identified with *puruṣa* is stated to be the foundation, *pratiṣṭhā*, of Brahman or *akṣara*. If we accept this statement of the Gîtā that Kṛṣṇa or *puruṣa* is different from *akṣara* or Brahman, we can clearly understand the teaching of the Gîtā. Bh. Gî. VI. 27–29 explains the method of *dhyāna* as applied to Brahman (the word "*ātman*" was also used in those days for *akṣara* or Brahman, as in Mu. Up. II. 2. 3–5, see App. I), and the same is said also of Kṛṣṇa i.e. *puruṣa* in VI. 30–32. Bh. Gî. VI. 27–32 is no interpolation, because it does not say that "Kṛṣṇa is Brahman"; it distinguishes the two and only teaches the same method as to the attainment of both. In Bh. Gî. VIII. 1–4 Brahman is explained as *akṣara*, and *puruṣa* or Kṛṣṇa as the *adhidaivata;* the *adhiyajña* (VIII. 4c–d) is not "an answer by Kṛṣṇa regarding himself"; it refers to the Yajña-philosophy of the Gîtā according to which every act of a man is a *yajña* and every man is the *puruṣa*. That the *puruṣa* mentioned in VIII. 4b is "the answer by Kṛṣṇa regarding himself" can be easily seen by a glance at VIII. 5–14 which verses speak of Kṛṣṇa as if he were identified with *puruṣa*. Kṛṣṇa's being *pratiṣṭhā* "the foundation" of Brahman (XIV. 26–27) means that *puruṣa* is the *adhidaivata* of *akṣara*. (VIII. 3–4); Kṛṣṇa is identified with *puruṣa*, not with "the God", or "a demi-god", or "the Impersonal". In XVIII. 50–53, 54–55, Kṛṣṇa is not identified with Brahman; but it is said that after reaching Brahman one can by further development reach *puruṣa* who is higher than *akṣara*.

Brahman, not identified with Kṛṣṇa or *puruṣa*.

Brahman in Gîtā VIII.

In Gîtā XIV.

In Gîtā VI.

In Gîtā XVIII.

Vāsudevaḥ sarvam (Bh. Gî. VIII. 19, XI. 40) is not different from *puruṣa ev edaṃ sarvam* (ṚV. X. 90. 2). Similarly, the other verses of the seventh Adhyāya of the Gîtā will be explained without any difficulty, if we accept the Gîtā's own words that *puruṣa* is higher than *akṣara*, and if we remember that this *puruṣa* is the Aupaniṣada *puruṣa*, and that according to the Gîtā both of them are "goals" to be reached by the same methods. In Bh. Gî. X. 12; XI. 18, 17; VII. 19; XI. 40 it is not that the re-editor has not "shrinked from asserting out and out the identity of Kṛṣṇa with Brahman" (Garbe, IBG, p. 7) as he had done in Bh. Gî. VIII. 1-4; but Kṛṣṇa is here said to be both Brahman or *akṣara* and *puruṣa* (X. 12; XI. 18; XI. 37–38); similarly he is also Vāyu, Yama, etc. etc. (XI. 39). When in the famous Ṛg-verse the one Being is identified with Agni, Varuṇa, Indra, etc., or when in Nārada's prayer in MBh. XII. 338, Nārāyaṇa is said to be Puruṣa (8), Pradhāna (12), Sacrifice (67), Pāñcarātrika (67), Sāṃkhya, Yoga (78) etc., we should suppose that each of these passages was composed at different periods part by part as the different identifications arose, if we accept Prof. Garbe's explanation of Bh. Gî. X. 12 etc. A comparison of Bh. Gî. V. 14–17 with V. 18–26 will show that they teach the attainment of *puruṣa* and Brahman respectively through the same means viz., the path of Yoga; in V. 19 Brahman is said to be free from faults and impartial, while the same is said of *prabhu*, the Lord, in V. 14; as distinguished from the Yogas following the path of *puruṣa*, who dedicate their intellect and mind, and devote themselves to *puruṣa* or *prabhu* (17), the Yogas following the path of *akṣara* are here taught to turn their mind inward and find pleasure and peace and light within themselves (24 a–b, 21 lb). One can dedicate all his actions to Brahman (IV. 24, V. 10) or to *puruṣa* (IX. 16). Bh. Gî. IV. 35 and VI. 30 say that one can see all beings in Kṛṣṇa or *puruṣa* and *vice versa;* the same is said of

Meaning of "*Vāsudevaḥ sarvam*" in Gîtā VII.

Brahman in Gîtā X and XI.

In Gîtā V.

In Gîtā IV.

akṣara or *ātman* in VI. 28–29 where the word *ātman* is used for Brahman. In fact there are two "goals": *akṣara* or Brahman and *puruṣa* or Kṛṣṇa; and there are many paths to attain either of the two. If the Gîtā offers any teaching regarding these two, it is that the two are never to be identified. Both can be reached by the same means, as said in XII. 1 and therefore the Gîtā is against their identification. All the so-called Vedantic interpolations assumed by Prof. Garbe can be understood as genuine parts of the Gîtā if we accept the Gîtā's own view regarding the relation of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. Kṛṣṇa is *puruṣa*, not *akṣara*. This can be easily seen if we contrast the Gîtā with the Pāñcarātra texts of the Mahābhārata (see Ch. III) or with the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

In Gîtā VI.

Prof. Garbe's View untenable.

Though, as a goal *akṣara* is independent of *puruṣa*, in the process of creation this is not the case. The Gîtā's doctrine of *akṣara* as one of the two goals is the same as that of the EMU. What the Gîtā particularly seems to contribute to the philosophy of those days is its teaching about *akṣara* as a partner of the *puruṣa* in the act of creation, and this was done by distinguishing *akṣara* from the unconscious Nature or *brahman* of Mu. Up. I. 1. 9. Let us therefore briefly notice the Gîtā's contrast of the higher Nature with the lower one. *Akṣara* is here also a conscious living Nature (VII. 5; *cetanā* in XIII. 6) as in Pr. Up. V. 5 (see p. 13) and the upholding (*dhṛti*) of the world is here also one of its functions (Bh. Gî. XIII. 6; VII. 5; Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 9; Br. Sū. I. 3. 10, 16). For this reason it would not be accepted as the direct cause of the world. So *akṣara* is in the Gîtā the cause of *brahman* "the lower Nature", as in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (Bh. Gî. III. 15; Mu. Up. 1. 1. 9); and this lower Nature becomes (through activity or *karman*) the

Gîtā's Distinction between the two Natures.

Akṣara, the Higher Nature, a Living, Spiritual Principle.

The Lower Nature, an Effect of *akṣara*.

cause of the creation (III. 15; App. II). This relation of *akṣara* and this *brahman* is the same as that in Mu. Up. I. 1. 9 i. e. the latter is "born" of the former. *Akṣara* may be called *parā prakṛti*, and the *brahman aparā prakṛti* (VII. 4–5); in contrast with the latter which is called *brahman* (III. 15) *akṣara* may be called *mahad brahman* (XIV. 3). The higher Nature may be called the *sanātana avyakta* or *akṣara* (VIII. 20–21); the lower Nature is *avyakta* technically so called (VIII. 18; XIII. 5; App. II). The union of the higher Nature and the *puruṣa* leads to the birth of "all beings" (VII. 6; XIV. 3; XIII. 26). *Akṣara* is called also *kṣetra* (XIII. 6, 26) or simply *prakṛti* (XIII. 19) and is eternal (*anādi* or *sanātana*, as in VIII. 20) like *puruṣa* (XIII 19). The Gîtā associates the three *guṇas* only with the lower Nature (III. 27, etc.), and "*karman*" activity is the latter's special attribute (III. 15). *Māyā* in here the lower Nature (Cf. III. 27 with VII. 14–15). But though the Gîtā thus makes a minute distinction between the lower Nature, the higher Nature and the *puruṣa*, it should be noticed that these three are not enumerated in the Gîtā as three principles; the lower Nature is twice said to be the effect of *akṣara* (III. 15 ; IX. 7–10), but the higher Nature is eternal like *puruṣa* as we saw above, and the relation of these last two may not have been considered by the Gîtā to be really more than that of *dharmadharmibhāva*. This is clear from the statement that even the *akṣara*-worshippers, in a sense, reach the *puruṣa*.

Synonyms of *akṣara*.

Gîtā's Theory of two *avyaktas* or two *prakṛtis*.

The Higher Nature, eternal.

The Lower Nature, a Material Principle.

Difference between the Gîtā and the L. MBh.

Unlike the Śve. Up. (I. 8) and Ka. Up. (III. 11) the Gîtā knows two *avyaktas* (VIII. 18–20, XIII. 5), and while the Śve. Up. understood *kṣara* to mean *pradhāna* and explained *kṣara* as *vyakta*; the Gîtā says that *kṣara* consists of "all beings" (Bh. Gî. VIII. 18–19;

Progress durings the Gîtā Period.

VIII. 4; III. 14–15; XV. 16) and that "all manifestations" *vyaktis* arise from the lower Unmanifest which is lower than the higher or "eternal" *avyakta* called *akṣara* (VIII. 18–21). Equally important with the mention of these two *avyaktas* is that of two *prakṛtis* in the Gîtā, while the Śve. Up. (IV. 10) knew only one principle called *prakṛti* which is the higher one of the Gîtā. These two *avyaktas* and two *prakṛtis* were the chief points round which, as we shall see in the next Chapter, the Mahābhārata philosophers centred their discussions.

Of greater historical worth than its contribution to the metaphysics of the day, was the Gîtā's ethical and religious teaching. This was its doctrine about the three great paths of absolution: the *sāṃkhya*, the *yoga*, and the *upāsanā* or the *bhakti* paths. The Gîtā says that *akṣara* or *puruṣa* can be reached by any one of the many paths (Bh. Gî. IV. 11, 25–30; IX. 15). Bh. Gî. XIII. 24-25 gives the names of these as *dhyānayoga*, *sāṃkhyayoga*, *karmayoga*, and the path of pure *upāsanā* i.e. *upāsanā* not accompanied by knowledge. The first three are also mentioned under the names of *dhyāna*, *jñāna* and *karmaphalatyāga* in Bh. Gî. XII. 12. The three paths of *bhakti*, *jñāna* and *karman* are also to be found in Bh. Gî. IX. 13-14, 15 and 16 respectively. The path of devotion is preached throughout the Gîtā (XIII. 25; IV. 10; VII. 16; IX. 13–14, 32–33; XII. 1–2; XVIII. 55). The path of complete self-surrender and divine grace may have been meant in XVIII. 62, 64–66 and XI. 47–48, though the Gîtā does not seem to distinguish it from the path of devotion, in the way it distinguishes between *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* or *jñāna* and *karman*. Each of these is not exclusive of the rest, but one particular idea is prominent in each. *Dhyāna* may have been helpful to all those who aspired after liberation.

The Three Great Paths of the Gîtā.

Here we are concerned chiefly with *sāṃkhya* and *yoga*. These terms occur only once in Śve. Up. viz., VI. 13, where the context shows that they are names of paths to reach the goal; there is no word to indicate that they stand there for philosophical schools of those names; on the contrary it seems that in the Śve. Up. they are less sharply contrasted with each

other than in the Gîtā. That the Gîtā knows these terms only as paths can be proved from the fact that Arjuna is asked to follow either of the two paths *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* (II. 39; III. 3; V. 1–5; VI. 1–2; XIII. 24; XVIII. 1, 49–55, 56). If *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* had been two schools of those names at that time, the author of the Gîtā who belonged to neither of these but to the Aupaniṣada School, would not have asked Arjuna to follow either of these. *Sāṃkhya* is a synonym for *sannyāsa* (V. 1–5; VI. 2; XVIII.1; XVIII. 50–55) or *jñāna* (III.3; IX. 15; XII. 12, XVIII. 50–55); and *yoga* means the path of action, the more complete name being *karmayoga* (III. 3; V. 1–2, 4–5; XIII 24d; XIII. 1e; XVIII. 56). If these terms had any other signification at that time, who could have profited by these explanations assigned to them in the Gîtā?

Sāṃkhya and *yoga* in the Gîtā, only two Paths, not two Schools.

I should here draw attention to the necessity of rendering "*sāṃkhya*" in the Gîtā by "renunciation" rather than by "knowledge". The origin of the *sāṃkhya* path is to be traced to the belief in *jñāna* or *vidyā* as a means for absolution; and this word "*jñāna*" was originally used to imply renunciation of actions though the latter may have meant only sacrificial actions. "*Avidyā*" meant sacrificial rites (Ka. Up. II. 4–5; Cf. Mu.Up. I. 2. 8), and *vidyā* the Aupaniṣadic knowledge in contrast to these; when the term *parā vidyā* was used for the latter, *aparā vidyā* was used for the former, as in Mu. Up. I. 1. 4. where *vidyā* is contrasted with the Vedic rites. But the contrast between these two careers for life (*niṣṭhā*) is brought out most clearly in Mu. Up. 1. 2. *Avidyā* (in Mu. Up. 1. 2. 9a) is explained as *karman* in "*Yat karmiṇah.....*" (Mu. Up. I. 2. 9c); and so the life of begging, *bhaikṣacaryā* (Mu. Up. I. 2. 11.), stands for *vidyā*. This passage of Mu. Up. is a record of the later form of a conflict between the followers of the Vedic path of actions and those of "renuncia-

Sāṃkhya, *sannyāsa* rather than *jñāna*.

Jñāna, the reverse of *karman* i.e. *sannyāsa* in the EMU.

tion of those actions" called *jñāna*, such as we read of in Chā. Up. V. 10 which uses the term "*pathas*" for the two paths (Chā. Up. V. 10. 8.), characterises them as "light" and "smoke" (Chā. Up. V. 10. 1 and 3) and calls them "*devayāna*" and "*pitṛyāṇa*" (Chā. Up. V. 10. 2, 4). The same two paths are described in Ka. Up. 1. 3. The words "in the forest" (*araṇye*–Chā. Up. V. 1. 1) and "the life of begging" (*bhaikṣacaryā*–Mu. Up. I. 2. 11) are indicative of "renunciation" *sannyāsa*, a word not known to these earlier Upaniṣads and therefore not to be expected therein. This latter term came into vogue for the first time in the days of the Gîtā, which uses both the terms *jñāna* and *sannyāsa* as synonyms (Bh. Gî. III. 4, V. 1–2). In the Gîtā, *karman* or *karmayoga* or *yoga*, as it is often called, is not unaccompanied by knowledge, as it was the case with the path of "*karman*" in the earlier Upaniṣads. Bh. Gî. II. 53 says that the *sthitaprajña* described in II. 54–72 is a follower of the *yoga* and a glance at his picture will show that he lacks no knowledge. Bh. Gî. III. 3–4 will show that *sāṃkhya* is primarily concerned with *sannyāsa*, and *yoga* with action, while neither is particularly a path of knowledge. Whenever Arjuna is asked to perform the actions of his life, he is advised to do so after having attained knowledge (IV. 15). The illustration of Janaka as follower of the path of *karman* proves the same (III. 20). *Karman* or *yoga* by itself attains the same fruit as *sāṃkhya* or *sannyāsa* (V. 4–5). Instead of *jñāna*, *sannyāsa* is opposed to *karma* or *yogan* in V. 1–2 and other places. It is well known that the predecessor of Śaṅkara had explained *jñānakarmasamuccaya* to be the teaching of the Gîtā. If the Gîtā opposed pure action (i.e. action without knowledge) to knowledge or renunciation and said that either of the two leads to the same goal, one fails to understand how it could teach such a doctrine. When the Gîtā sometimes uses the term *jñāna* in place of the clearer term *sannyāsa*, it does so because it retains the older usage of the term while it admits or probably employs for the first time

Yoga in the Gîtā, inclusive of *jñāna* i. e. the Knowledge of Atman.

Yoga, jñana plus *karman.*

the new expression. All these points show, that in the Gîtā *sāmkhya* is an equivalent of *sannyāsa*, i. e. *jñānasamuccitasannyāsa*, just as *yoga* is one of *karman* i. e. *jñānasamuccitakarman*. Lastly, if we look to the L.MBh. we find that the Sāṃkhya is specially associated with asceticism, and, as I shall show later on, the L.MBh. Yoga has its own metaphysical theories (Ch. III), which could not have developed if *yoga* in the Gîtā had meant actions without knowledge. For these reasons, I believe, it would be more accurate to explain the term *sāṃkhya* in the Gîtā as renunciation than as knowledge (Bh. Gî. III. 4; V. 1–2). In the Gîtā "knowledge" does not imply renunciation (Prof. Edgerton, AJP. XLV, 1924), but it is renunciation itself. In the Gîtā *sāmkhya* differs from the *yoga* only so far as this renunciation of actions is concerned. There is hardly any other point of difference between the two paths, so far as the Gîtā is concerned. The association of *sāmkhya* with renunciation is not incidental but inherent (Edgerton, AJP. p. 32). To say otherwise is to deprive the Gîtā of its special contribution to the Indian religion and ethics.

Sāmkhya, jñāna plus *sannyāsa.*

Prof. Edgerton's View untenable.

The above discussion as regards the meanings of *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* shows that when the Gîtā says: "*Sāṃkhya* and *yoga* are one" (V. 5c–d), it means that both are independent paths to either of the two "goals" of the Gîtā, *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. A confusion has arisen regarding the meaning of this and similar statements in the Gîtā, because such statements are also made with regard to the Sāṃkhy and Yoga Schools of the L. MBh. and the Classical ones. It seems that at each of these three periods in Indian Philosophy, the saying about the unity or identity of the two had quite different meanings and therefore we must interpret it always with reference to the context. The Gîtā explains it in the words: "The same place (i.e. *akṣara* or *puruṣa*) as is reached by the *sāṃkhya*–followers is also reached by the *yoga*–followers" (V. 5 a–b), and "One who has

Meaning of "*Sāmkhya* and *yoga* are one" in the Gîtā.

Identity of Goals, not of Paths.

properly resorted to either of the two, gains the fruit of both" (V. 4 c–d). They are two independent paths, not two steps on the same path as Śaṅkara believes, nor does it mean that " the same system is both Sāṃkhya and Yoga, the system being double but the teaching being identical, " as Prof. Hopkins holds. As we have seen, the path of *sannyāsa* accompanied by knowledge was already known before the Gîtā was written, though under the names of *bhaikṣcaryā* etc., and the path of actions not accompanied by knowledge was also well known (Mu. Up. I. 2. 9–11). The Gîtā was the first to put forth systematically a third path viz., the path of actions accompanied by knowledge and in doing so said that the first and the last are the only paths, the middle one being considered fit to be condemned (Bh. Gî. II. 41–45 and Mu. Up. I. 2. 1–9); and that out of the remaining two the latter was preferable (II. 40; III. 4; V. 2; VI. 1–2).

Prof. Hopkin's View untenable.

Yoga Path, the Gîtā's special contribution.

But the Gîtā as we have it before us betrays more than the knowledge of *sāṃkhya* as a mere path. Though the expression "*guṇa–saṃkhyāna*" cannot in itself suggest any reference to *sāṃkhya* as a school, because " the discrimination of the three constituents " seems to have originated in the Aupaniṣada School (of the Gîtā) and to have been adopted later on by all the philosophical schools that followed it; yet "*sāṃkhye kṛtānte*" (Bh. Gî. XVIII. 13) is the one undoubted reference in the Gîtā to a philosophical school of the name of *sāmkhya* which could not be directly described as a *darśana* or *śāstra* but only as the "*sāṃkhya* in which the teaching is settled" (*kṛtānta–siddhānta*). This expression, though not implying a complete system of philosophy, as is shown by its contents, goes against Prof. Edgerton's view that nowhere in the Gîtā, the *sāṃkhya* has to do with the discussion of philosophical truth (AJP. Vol. XLV. 1924). The followers of the path of *sāṃkhya* believed that " all action " belonged to *prakṛti*, the

Gîtā XVIII. 13, a Reference to Sāṃkhya as a School.

Prof. Edgerton's View untenable.

lower Nature, as did also the followers of *yoga* and *bhakti*. But a few of the former who seem to have differed on the point, held that the individual soul is one of the five agents (XVIII. 13). While the Gîtā as a whole objected to attributing any agency, *kartṛtva*, to the individual soul, these *sāmkhya*–separatists, as we may aptly call them, objected to attributing the whole agency to the individual soul. Both the followers of *sāṃkhya* and the *sāṃkhya*–separatists must have accepted *akṣara* and *puruṣa* as the "goals"–the then prevailing conceptions of *summum bonum*. The belief that the individual soul is an agent must have been originally the reason why the Sāṃkhya-followers insisted upon *sannyāsa*. Bh. Gî. XVIII. 12–16 only shows that some of the followers of the *sāṃkhya*–path of the Gîtā had begun to take interest in philosophical discussions, especially in that on the origin of *kartṛtva*, the most burning question of the time when the Gîtā was written. These *sāṃkhya*–separatists seem to have survived in the form of the later Mahābhārata Sāṃkhyas, who also held that the Atman is an agent (MBh. XII. 315. 7–9; see Ch. III). But the *sāṃkhya*–followers of the Gîtā seem to have merged into the Aupaniṣada School of the Mahābhārata, the question of *sannyāsa* having probably come to rest by the doctrine of the four *āśramas* or stages of life of which the Gîtā knows little. Thus, as regards the Gîtā, not only is the *sāṃkhya* to be understood as *brahmavidyā* (Dahlmann, Nirvāṇa, P. 165), but even *yoga* and *bhakti* or *upāsanā* are also *brahmavidya* or rather we should say, all the three are paths to *brahmavidyā*, because in the Gîtā as in the EMU, the *brahmavidyā* deals with *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, and *sāṃkhya*, *yoga*, and *bhakti* are means to it.

The Individual Soul, an Agent.

Survival of that View in L. MBh.

Dr. Dahlmann's View, amplified.

Regarding *yoga*, the reader may be reminded that the Gîtā knows two technical meanings of the term, viz., "*karmayoga*" and "*dhyana-yoga*", both of which had no special metaphysical doctrines of their own (except that the "goal" was *akṣara* or *puruṣa*). In the days of

Two Technical Meanings of "yoga", in the Gîtā.

the later Mahābhārata, they reach the status of philosophical Schools, as also do the *sāṃkhya*-followers.

The Path of Devotion and Meditation.

The Gītā's path of *bhakti*, *upāsanā*, grace or complete self-surrender (Bh. Gī. XI. 47–48; XVIII. 65–66; IX. 26; X. 9) arose from an earlier movement (Śve. Up. VI. 18, 23; Mu. Up. III. 2. 3–4). In the Gītā, *bhakti* leads to *akṣara* or to *puruṣa* (see " *bhaktāḥ* " in Bh. Gī. XII. 1) because *upāsanā* is not yet completely separated from *bhakti*. But this *upāsanā* or *bhakti* is according to the Gītā "one-minded" (VIII. 22; IX. 22; XI. 54; IX. 30), and that of the personal *puruṣa* is preferable because it is easier than that of the impersonal *akṣara* (XII. 5).

One Aupaniṣada School with three Paths.

The point to be noticed most of all is that the Aupaniṣadas of the Gītā admit the alternative of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, so that the Gītā has only one Aupaniṣada School, and not two. Moreover the *sāṃkhya*– *yoga*– and *bhakti*–paths of the Gītā do not discuss what are the final principles, what is their number, and how they are mutually related These and other problems are attempted for the first time in the later Mahābhārata. Thus, the Gītā has only one philosophical school with three paths.

The Possible Re-edition of the Gītā.

Lastly, if it be asked, whether there was a re–edition of the "original" Gītā, I would venture to suggest that at first the Gītā taught the *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* paths to reach *akṣara* or *puruṣa*, and afterwards the path of *bhakti* was added to these. We have already seen that the path of pure *karman* and that of pure *jñāna* which must have arisen from the Vedas–and–Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads respectively, were supplanted by the Gītā's teaching about *yoga* i. e. *jñānakarmasamuccaya*. This latter may have been in course supplemented by the path of *bhakti*, which also admitted the possibility of a compromise between pure action or *karman* and pure knowledge or *sannyāsa* (see Bh. Gī. V. 29; IX. 24, 27; cf. also the performance of sacrifices in the L.MBh.

Pāñcarātra School). And this was incorporated into the Gītā as a third alternative career (*niṣṭhā*) in addition to the two it had already, viz., *sāṃkhya* and *yoga*. During all these stages the philosophical theory inherited from the time of the EMU continued unaltered, and the *śāṃkhya* and *yoga* continued to be mere paths, and not schools. Thus, when the *bhaktiyoga*

No Doctrinal Change in the Re-edition.

was recognised as a path, it was a path to *akṣara* or *puruṣa* (Bh. Gī. XII. 1). *Puruṣottama* was substituted for *puruṣa*, but then *akṣara* and *kṣara* came to be described as *puruṣas* (Bh. Gī. XV. 16-18; App. II). This shows that the re–edition must have taken place long before the formation of the Mahābhārata Pāñcarātra School which identified *akṣara* and *puruṣa* (see Ch. III).

CHAPTER III.

AKṢARA IN THE LATER MAHĀBHĀRATA.

When one speaks of the later Mahābhārata philosophy, he must distinguish not only between four different Schools but also between the Chapters describing them. MBh. XII. 182–253, 302–317, 308, and 334–352 respectively deal with the MBh. Aupaniṣada, Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pāñcarātra Schools. The words Sāṃkhya and Yoga are almost entirely wanting in 182–253 and if they occur they invariably show that the author is referring to those Schools by way of explaining his own (i.e. Aupaniṣada) School. Thus, 234. 28--30 is found to be a cursory reference to the Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools, if we look to what precedes and follows these verses. Similarly, 210. 9–10 and 14 refer to the Pāñcarātra School by such words as "*viduḥ*" and "*vadanti*"; the doctrine contained in these verses is that which we find in the Nārāyaṇîya Section (MBh. XII. 334–352). On the contrary 302–307 and 309–317 give the principles which are common to both Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and also those which are peculiar to Sāṃkhya only, and even Prof. Hopkins says that 308 records the teaching of the Yoga School only. Prof. Edgerton's contention that the principles described in 308 belong to both the Sāṃkhya and Yoga (Schools) is based upon the grave misunderstanding that the terms "*sāṃkhya*" and "*yoga*", even in the later Mahābhārata, denote only two paths of these names and in no way two Schools of philosophy. Prof. Deussen and Prof. Hopkins have not admitted this four-fold division of the Chapters of MBh. XII; they have not distinguished the Aupaniṣada School (182–253) from the Sāṃkhya and Yoga

Distinction between the Chapters of the Four Schools in L. MBh. necessary.

Prof. Edgerton.

Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen.

Schools (301–317); and this mistake has led them to a great confusion as regards the teaching of these Schools, as is evident from Prof. Hopkins' constant complaint that the author or authors of the Mahābhārata have tried to Vedanticise the Sāṃkhya doctrine, and also from the wrong interpretations of the MBh. philosophical texts given by Prof. Deussen in his Translation, which shall be pointed out in the following pages.

Even Dr. Frauwallner who deals with some of the Chapters (182–253) as "non-Sāṃkhyist texts" seems to understand these as containing a pre-Classical Sāṃkhya doctrine, but not an Aupaniṣada one (JAOS. Vol. 45, p. 201, p. 203, p. 204), though, as he himself points out in most of the cases, the verses (in Ch. 194, 219, 201–206) are closely connected with the Upaniṣads. Prof. Jacobi's belief that the basis of the Epic Sāṃkhya was the Classical Sāṃkhya is founded upon what he understands to be contradictory statements in the Mahābhārata, viz., that "the Sāṃkhya teaches only twentyfive principles" (MBh. XII. 307.47; 308.14; 318.35), and, again, that, "Brahman is the Twentysixth" (e. g. MBh. XII. 308). (See Prof. Jacobi, Ueber das urspruengliche Yogasystem, p. 4.) He thinks that the series of twentyfive principles was the original one and then Brahman was added as the Twentysixth. His chief reason is that Brahman stands as the Twentysixth. But if we look to the Earliest Metrical Upaniṣads and the Gîtā, we learn that the series of twentysix principles was already known though the principles were then not counted and consequently the numerical designations Twentyfourth, Twentyfifth, and Twentysixth not given to the highest three principles. Thus, five (subtle) elements, five (gross elements or) "objects" (*viṣayas* or *arthas*), ten organs of sense and action, the Mind, the Self-consciousness, the Intellect, the lower Nature, the higher Nature, and *puruṣa* make up a series of twentysix principles; and such a series, at least that including

Dr. Frauwallner

Prof. Jacobi.

The Series of 26 Principles older than their Enumeration and Numerical Designations.

the last six of these is already mentioned in Ka. Up.III. 10–11, Bh. Gî. VII.4–6; and the two Natures and *puruṣa* are also to be found in the numerous passages from the Gîtā and the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads quoted in Ch. I. This shows that the series of evolution was known long before the number and numerical designations of the principles came into vogue. Neither the Ka. Up. nor the Gîtā knows any thing about these latter. In this sense the series of the twentysix principles was the original one and that of the twentyfive was arrived at by rejecting one (viz., the higher Nature) of the twentysix, as we shall see. The Mahābhārata Sāṃkhyas were the first philosophers to count the principles and at the same time to reject the higher Nature; but, then, at the same time the Mahābhārata Aupaniṣadas accepted the fashion of the day by counting their own principles including the higher Nature. It is always said in the Mahābhārata, as Prof. Jacobi himself notes, that the Sāṃkhyas have twentyfive and only twentyfive principles; and I must add that when a twentysixth principle is mentioned, it is never said to belong to the Sāṃkhya School (see below). Thus, Prof. Jacobi's contention that the series of twentyfive was the original one is only partly right; it is right in so far as the counting is concerned, but not from the standpoint of the series itself. Therefore, I believe, my proposal to divide the Chapters of MBh. XII in the manner I have done above, will prove acceptable.

I have already said above that immediately after the Sāṃkhyas started the mode of counting and numbering the metaphysical principles, the Aupaniṣadas adopted the fashion. It should be mentioned further that this was the case also with the Yogas and the Pāñcarātras of the days of the MBh. All the four Schools gave numerical designations to their more important principles. The Sāṃkhyas had only twentyfive principles (MBh. XIII. 307. 47; 308. 14; 318. 35); they held that

Numerical Designations adopted by all the Four L. MBh. Schools.

the Nature, which for them is only one, is the Twentyfourth and that the Lord or Viṣṇu who is identical with the Jîva is the Twentyfifth (302. 38, 39; 305. 37–39; 306. 36; 306. 39, 40, 42, 43–44; 307. 2, 8, 9, 40). The Yogas called the Nature the Twentyfourth, the Jîva the Twentyfifth, and Brahman or the Lord the Twentysixth. This difference between the L.MBh. Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools has been till now overlooked. The Yoga Chapter in the MBh. (XII. 308) is emphatic in asserting that the Sāṃkhyas have only twentyfive principles (XII. 308. 14, 25; see also 307. 47) and the same chapter is equally emphatic in stating that from the Yoga–standpoint the Jîva is the Twentyfifth and Brahman the Twentysixth (308. 6, 7). MBh. XII. 308. 17 clearly says that " The *budhyamāna* (i. e. the Twentyfifth) is ' devoid of intellect (*buddhi*) ' (as compared) with the *prabuddha* the Twentysixth; this is said to be the difference (*nānātva*) of the Yoga School from the teaching of the Sāṃkhya Sruti". This very idea is given in verses 6–7 of the same Chapter where we read that " The Twentyfifth knows the Unmanifest (i. e. the Nature) but even he does not know the Twentysixth who eternally knows the Twntyfifth and the Twentyfourth (i. e. the Nature)". In my opinion this should leave no doubt that the Brahman which is described as the Twentysixth in this Chapter (308) is neither a Sāṃkhya nor an Aupaniṣada Twentysixth, but only a Yoga Twentysixth. The non–admission of this evidently clear statement of the L. MBh. is one of the causes that have led my predecessors in the field to various curious theories such as those pointed out above. As we shall see later on, there was another Yoga School in the days of L. MBh., which regarded *puruṣa* as the Twentysixth. Another fact which we have to admit is that the Aupaniṣadas of the L. MBh. had also a Twentysixth principle; and this was naturally the *puruṣa*; they did not distinguish the Jîva from this *puruṣa*, and consequently they held the higher Nature to be the Twntyfifth but called it the unfallen

Sāṃkhya, a School of only 25 Principles.

Yoga, a School of 26 Principles.

Aupaniṣada, a School of 26 Principles.

Twentyfifth (*acyuta pañcaviṃśaka*–318. 57ff.) in order to distinguish it from the Twentyfifth of other Schools, specially the Sāṃkhya. According to these Aupaniṣadas, the lower Nature was the Twentyfourth. This nomenclature of the L.MBh. Aupaniṣadas has been preserved for us in MBh. 318. 55–82. The Chapter (318) as a whole states the Aupaniṣada doctrine and clearly says that the Twentyfifth (i.e. the higher Nature) of the Aupaniṣadas was rejected by the Sāṃkhya and the Yogas. Prof. Hopkins' explanation of "*acyuta pañcaviṃśa*" as denoting an attempt of the Aupaniṣadas to foist their own view that " the Jîva is destructible in Paramātman " on the Sāṃkhyas who rejected it, is quite unacceptable (Prof. Hopkins, GEI p. 137). This is so because no Indian School of philosophy has ever said that the Jîva is destroyed in Paramātman and also because the context (*śāśvata avyakta*–318. 56) clearly shows that the " *acyuta pañcaviṃśa* " is the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas. The same has got to be said with regard to Prof. Deussen's translation of the verses in question (VPTM pp. 665 ff.). His interpretation of verses 318. 56 etc. seems to suggest that he himself had a doubt as regards what he was writing. Lastly I have to note that even the Pāñcarātras did not withhold themselves from following the usual custom of the philosophical Schools of the day. They named their highest principle (i. e. *puruṣa* identified with the higher Nature, as we shall see later on) the Twentyfifth (MBh. XII. 339. 24), and therefore their Twentyfourth would be the Nature which they regarded as "born" of the Twentyfifth (see Ch. III). If we do not lose sight of this fact of the nomenclature of those days, the number of the so-called inconsistent statements in the L. MBh. will be reduced a great deal.

Mistakes of Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen.

Pāñcarātra, a School of 25 Principles.

1. The Aupaniṣada School.

It is noteworthy that MBh. XII. 182–253 which gives the chief Aupaniṣada doctrine exhibits a complete unity of teaching if we examine it in the light of the EMU and the Gītā. This becomes evident if we try to understand the "*para*–ladders" so called by Prof. Hopkins. These are found in L. MBh. XII. 204. 10–11; 204. 19–20: 210. 14, 23, 26–28; 210. 35–39; 213. 12; 247. 3–4, 7. Most of these give a complete list of all the steps in the ladder. The main difficulty that has till now been experienced by the various interpretors of these passages seems to center in the term " *jñāna* " (204. 10c–d, 11 a, 19c–d; 213. 12c.). Prof. Hopkins seems to confound this technical term of the Mahābhārata age with the word "*jñāna*" in the sense of knowledge leading to absolution (GEI. p. 136 and p. 131). Dr. Frauwallner ventures the conjecture that *jñānam* in these passages comes from or is an abbreviation of *jñānātmā* (see the footnote to p. 193, Band XXXII. " Wiener Zeitschrift fuer die Kunde des Morgenlandes "). Prof. Deussen translates *jñānam* as conciousness (VPTM p. 225) and does not explain why the intellect is here the effect of that consciousness (*jñānam*, as he understands it), in contradiction to the usual description according to which the latter is the effect of the former. As a matter of fact, all these conjectures are not necessary, if we do not lose sight of the text of the L.MBh. itself which describes the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and says that " The Sāṃkhyas called the *jñāna* (of the Aupaniṣadas) *avyakta* (MBh. XII. 306. 40 and 307. 9) and *prakṛti* " (MBh. XII. 318. 40). These verses leave no doubt that the *jñānam* in 204. 10c–d, etc., is the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, which the Sāṃkhyas adopted as their own Nature (*avyakta* or *prakṛti*). This meaning of the technical term *jñānam* together with the fact that the theory of two Natures given in these ladders (e.g. in 247. 3–4, 7) was already mentioned in the EMU and the Gītā, is a sufficient help for reconstructing the evolutional series con-

Impressive Consistency of the "*para*–ladder" Accounts of the Aupaniṣada School.

Jñāna, the Lower Nature.

tained in them, the last three numbers of which are the same as those in the earlier Aupaniṣada Schools viz., the lower Nature, the higher Nature and the *puruṣa*. The *para*–ladder passages are too numerous to be abandoned as "a loose exploiting of the Sāṃkhya in terms of Brahmaism" (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 131).

The *akṣara*–and–*puruṣa* Doctrine as in EMU and Bh.Gî.

These Aupaniṣadas, like those of the Gitā, accepted the *akṣara*–and–*puruṣa* doctrine of the EMU. Both *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are "goals" for them. In XII. 211.15 *akṣara* is called *sattva*, and *puruṣa kṣetrajña*. 210. 23 mentions "*paraṃ brahma*" and "*dhātā prabhuḥ*". In 213.2 Viṣṇu and *avyakta* or *akṣara*, His residence, are mentioned. 217.6–12 is an adaptation of Ka. Up. III. 11. According to 237.31–33 *sattva* or *akṣara* and *kṣetrajña* are two Atmans. The higher Nature and the Lord are found stated in 240. 16–23,28; 240. 31–32, 34; 241. 22, 36;243. 3,15, 18,19,20; 247. 3–4; 248.20–24; 249.1–2, 10–11; 285. 36–37; 301. 21–23. *Puruṣa* is said to be higher than *akṣara* in these passages and also in 210. 23, 36, 8. We have already seen that the lower Nature called *jñāna* etc., is also mentioned in these texts. In all these respects the EMU, the Gîtā and L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas can be said to have the same teaching.

The lower Nature as in EMU and Bh. Gî.

But what is of particular interest to us, is the emphasis that this Aupaniṣada School of the L. MBh. lays on the non–identity of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* on the one hand and on that of *akṣara* and the lower Nature on the other. The latter point is more vigorously put forth than the former. This was done in two ways, viz., by showing that *akṣara* is a conscious principle while the lower Nature is not so, and by explaining that it is eternal as distinguished from the non–eternal lower Nature.

Non–identity of the two Natures emphasised.

The following statements emphasise the living nature of *akṣara* :—

(1) "The Subtle (*sūkṣma*, i.e. the higher Nature) is able to see the lower Nature, *buddhi*, etc." (MBh. XII. 204. 20).

Akṣara the Higher Living Nature.

(2) "*Sattva* (i.e. *akṣara*) and *kṣetrajña* are both of them Atmans" (MBh. XII. 237. 31–33). Prof. Deussen does not explain why *sattva* which he understands as *prakṛti* is called Atman (VPTM. p. 353). The same statement is found also in MBh. XII. 285. 36; 248, 20–24; 249. 1–2, 10–11.

(3) "*Puruṣa* has himself become *akṣara* and *kṣara*" (MBh. XII. 240. 31–32).

(4) MBh. XII. 213. 12–13, 242. 18–20 and 252. 10c–d say that *akṣara* is the Life–principle (Cf. *jīva–bhūtā* in Bh. Gî. VII. 5). It acts and animates the All (XII. 242. 20b); its designation is *jīva*, and in company of Time and Action it revolves the world (XII. 213. 13); it is *jīva* and yet it is called *kṣetra* (XII. 249. 11 ff); it is the seed of all individual souls (XII. 213. 13).

Akṣara designated *jīva* and *kṣetra*

(5) The fact that *akṣara* is "living" and is called "*kṣetra*" (XII. 249. 10. 11f; 252. 11 ff.; 307. 14; 318. 111) agrees well with Bh. Gî. XIII. :6 which states that *kṣetra* includes *cetanā* "consciousness" and *dhṛti* "the sustenance of the world." (Cf. also *jīvabhūtā* and *dhāryate* in Bh. Gî. VII. 5.) All these passages metioning *kṣetra*, which stands for *akṣara* as possessed of "life" *jīva* were not considered by Prof. Hopkins; and Prof. Deussen who translated the term "*jīva*" in this connection as "the seed of the embodied" and "the individual soul" (VPTM p. 256, 368, 398) did not notice the inconsistency involved in calling that "individual soul" *sattva* or *kṣetra*, and in saying that the "individual soul" is "the seed of the embodied".

Mistakes of Prof. Deussen and Prof. Hopkins.

(6) The lower Nature is "not–seeing", *a–paśya*, the higher Nature is "seeing", *paśya*, and *puruṣa* is "always seeing" *sadā–paśya* (XII. 318. 72, 73, 82).

NOTE.—As the terms *paśya* and *a–paśya* forming the compound *paśyāpaśya* occur in 318. 82 and also elsewhere in the MBh., I propose to read "*Paśyaṃ tathaiva c āpaśyam paśyaty anyaḥ sadāऽnagha*"—in XII. 318. 72a–b. The meaning of the proposed reading given by me here will also testify to the correctness of my suggestion. For the same reasons I read "*paśyam*" in place of "*paśyan*" in 73 a of the same Chapter.

(7) To point out the consciousness of *akṣara,* it was called "the awakening Twentyfifth" *budhyamāna pañcaviṃśaka* (MBh. Kumb. ed. 323. 70) in contrast to the *abudhyamāna* "lower Nature"; and also

Other Synonyms of *akṣara* in L.MBh.

(8) "the awakening Unmanifest" *budhyamāna avyakta* (MBh. XII. 305. 34) as distinct from the "*apratibuddha avyakta*" the lower Nature.

(9) For the same purpose of distinguishing *akṣara* from the lower Nature, the former was celled *śāśvata avyakta* "the eternal Unmanifest" (Cf. Bh. Gî. VIII. 20: *sanātana avyakta*), implying that the lower Nature (or the Nature of the Sāṃkhyas) was not eternal in so far as it did not eternally remain in the same condition (MBh. XII. 318.56);

(10) "*acyuta pañcaviṃśaka*", "the unfallen Twentyfifth", as distinguished from the Twentyfourth which was "fallen" (XII. 318.57);

(11) "the first deity" *ādya daivata* (XII. 318.83, not "the origin of gods," as Prof. Deussen says); and

(12) "the primeval Twentyfifth" *ādya pañcaviṃśa* (XII. 318.82).

(13) The same aim was desired to be served by giving numerical designations to these three important principles. Though the higher Nature was eternal and differed from the lower because the latter was not eternal and as such logically they could not have been counted

The Numerical Designations.

as t w o, yet they were said to be two. *Akṣara* and *puruṣa* were also numerically t w o, firstly because " He (i. e. a meditator) who sees the Twentysixth does not see "the seeing" (*paśyam*–see notes above), the Twentyfifth i. e. *akṣara*" (XII. 318.73a–b), and secondly because " The Twentyfifth (i. e. *akṣara*) can t h i n k that ' There is none higher than I, " (XII. 318.73 c–d). *Kṣetra* which is a term for the living conscious Nature as we have already seen is said to be the Twentyfifth (MBh. XII. 307.14c–d, 15).

NOTE.—According to the reading in 72 a–b proposed above, the verse means, "The other (i.e. the Supreme Being) sees eternally *paśya* (i.e. *akṣara*) as well as *a–paśya* (i. e. the Twentyfourth). The Twentysixth sees (both) the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth". Thus the latter half of the verse expresses in numerical terms what the former half does in the terms of the attribute of consciousness or "seeing". Verse 73a–b says that the meditators of *akṣara* (*paśya*) and those of *puruṣa* (the Twentysixth of 72c referred to by "*enam*" in 73b) realise only the object of their meditation and not both the objects of meditation. 73 c–d asserts the self–consciousness of *akṣara* or the Twentyfifth and the fact that as a goal it is independent of *puruṣa*. The interpretations of Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen, which are not discussed here, are based upon an incorrect reading and hence fail to present any consistent meaning.

The above–mentioned sharp distinction between *prakṛti* (above which "stands" *akṣara*–XII. 314. 10–11), *akṣara* and *puruṣa* was necessitated by the opposition of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools with which the Aupaniṣadas found themselves confronted, as can be seen from the passages which mention that distinction given above. The latter thus made each of these three principles an individual entity; they accepted *vyaktibheda* between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, though *puruṣa* was above *akṣara* and in that sense the latter was yet subordinate to the former. The EMU and the Gîtā had also distinguished

Progress in the Aupaniṣada School during L. MBh. Period.

between these three but the mutual difference between them had never before been considered sufficient to justify their being enumerated as three principles, as we have seen in Chapters I and II. The EMU and the Gītā had maintained dualistic monism of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

The Doctrine of "Pluralistic Dualism".

The MBh. Aupaniṣadas admitted a dualism of these, while, on the other hand, their doctrine was a non–pluralism in so far as the lower Nature which was counted as an entity was not eternal like the other two, but was born of the higher Nature. Thus it is not possible to describe this system as a pluralism. It is very difficult to find out an accurate expression from Western Philosophy which would convey the exact sense of the metaphysical position of these Aupaniṣadas. Under the circumstances it would not be wrong to speak of it as "Pluralistic Dualism" of the L.MBh. Aupaniṣadas.

It should be specially noted that, just as in Sve. Up., so with the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas the *dehin*, though counted separately, is not actually considered a different principle from the *puruṣa* (but somehow as an aspect of the latter). It is only the L. MBh. Yogas, as we shall see, who achieved the separation. The "tetrad" of the Aupaniṣadas is merely the "triad" or Śve. Up. with *vyakta* added to it (Cf. Retrospect, foot–note) and with a less theistic conception of the highest principle which is here not so much the " ruler " as in Śve. Up.

The " Tetrad " of the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas.

On account of the above–mentioned position of the chief L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas, it is but natural that we find, in the same text a second Aupaniṣada School which seceded from the former. These separatists were called "saints" *sādhavaḥ* (MBh. XII. 318. 56, 78). They held that the two (eternal and non–eternal) forms of the Unmanifest, *avyakta*, should be looked upon as one and the same end of the evolutional series, or that the

The Rise of another Aupaniṣada School in L. MBh.

eternal Unmanifest should be looked upon as the one end in so far as it stands above the (lower) *prakṛti*, which is non–eternal and an effect of the former (MBh. XII. 318. 56; see also the v. l. in the Kumb. ed.). Regarding the relation of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* these "saints" said that "One should look upon them as only one on account of their (mutual) position" (MBh. XII. 318. 79), or that " One should look upon them as one and the same because the Twenty-sixth resides in the Twentyfifth " (according to the v. l. in the Kumb. ed.). Thus the second Aupaniṣada School also believes that *akṣara* is the residence "*sthāna*" of the *puruṣa*, and thus accepts "*sthānabheda*" but it rejects "*vyaktibheda*" in *akṣara* and *puruṣa* and also in *akṣara* and *prakṛti*. Prof. Hopkins is not right in identifying these "saints" with either the Sāṃkhyas or the Yogas who only quoted the " saints " in support of their own views. (His interpretations of verses 56, 78 are also misguided.)

Numerical Unity of the Lower and the Higher Natures.

Numerical Unity of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

The Doctrine of " *sthānabheda* " in *akṣara*–and–*puruṣa*.

The position of these Aupaniṣadas thus supported in a way the Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools in their doctrines, and gave rise to such an Aupaniṣada School as the author of the Brahmasūtras belonged to. In Brahmasūtras III. 2.11–21 and 32–38 both of these L. MBh. Aupaniṣada Schools are criticised by the Sūtrakūra (see Ch. IV; App. IV).

Further Proof of the Existence of the School of these "saints".

2. The Sāṃkhya School.

The doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas of the later Mahābhārata Age has been preserved to us in MBh. XII. 300–307 and 309–317. We can briefly summarise it under three headings: (a) What the Sāṃkhyas are here said to have rejected, (b) What they are said to have accepted, and (c) How they differ from the Classical Sāṃkhyas.

Sāṃkhya Chapters in L. MBh.

(a) What these Sāṃkhyas are said to have rejected :—

(1) The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas rejected "*budhyamāna avyakta*", (MBh. XII. 305. 32–35). This passage mentions two *avyaktas* and two *budhyamānas* and ironically says that if the enlightened Sāṃkhyas and Yogas understood the *budhyamāna avyakta*, they will equate [their doctrine to the Aupaniṣada one] (305. 34), and mentions three principles *avyakta*, *budhyamāna avyakta*, and *budhyamāna* (305. 32–35). The middle of these, which the enlightened did not know (i. e. did not accept as a principle) is *akṣara* or the higher conscious Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, who invented this designation to distinguish the latter from *avyakta* the lower unconscious Nature and from *budhyamāna*, the Lord, both of which were accepted by their fellow–philosophers. Prof. Hopkins finds the plurality of souls in this passage ! (See GEI. p. 124–125.) He and Prof. Deussen show utter ignorance of the L. MBh. terminology according to which all these terms are technical (see MBh. XII. 306–308; and also Ch. III.)

Sāṃkhyas' Rejection of "*avyakta budhyamāna*" i. e. the Higher Nature.

Mistakes of Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen.

NOTE.—Prof. Hopkins, in finding in the passage in question (MBh. XII. 305. 32–35) a reference to the doctrine of plurality of souls, ignores that *aprabuddha* "the non-awakened" is in the MBh. a name for the Nature (305. 32, see Deussen, VPTM. p. 623), His interpretation of *aprabuddha* as "the conditioned soul" is based upon an ignorance of the L. MBh. terminology. In contrast to this *aprabuddha*, the soul was called *budhyamāna* (305. 31; 307–308). Again, Prof. Hopkins is not quite just to the text because he drops verse 34 and connects 33 with 35. As a matter of fact verse 34 is the most important of the whole group; it mentions *budhyamāna avyakta* and says that "If the enlightened (Sāṃkhyas and Yogas) know the *budhyamāna avakta*, then they will equate their doctrine [to that of Aupaniṣadas]". This *budhyamāna avyakta* was rejected by the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas, as will be seen from the fact that the passage ironically asserts the ignorance of the "enlightened". This "*budhyamāna avyakta*" is different from the *āvyakta* which is *aprabuddha*

(verse 32) and from the "*budhydmāna*" which is not *avyakta* (verse 31); i. e. in brief we have here three principles, *avyakta* (the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas and) the Nature of the Sāṃkhyas, *budhyamāna avyakta* or *akṣara* which the "enlightened" Sāṃkhyas and Yogas did not know, and *budhyamāna*, the Supreme Soul not distinguished from the individual one; all these three are meant by the plural number of the compound "*budhyamānāprabudahānām*" (gen. plu., verse 35c). Prof. Deussen takes the verse (34) to mean: "When the enlightened know Prakṛti (i. e. the lower Nature), they will teach Brahman". Is not this interpretation a strange one ? Even Prof. Deussen shows complete ignorance of the L. MBh. terminology when he translates *budhyamāna* as the awakened ones and *aprabuddhas* as the unawakened ones, in verse 35 (VPTM. 623;); this was the way he adopted to explain the plural number of the compound just noticed.

(2) The Saṃkhyas and the Yogas also rejected what the Aupaniṣadas called *acyuta pañcavīṃśaka* "the unfallen Twentyfifth" (MBh. XII. 318. 56–57, 79; see p. 34 above where Prof. Hopkins' interpretation has been criticised). The Twentyfourth of the Aupaniṣadas, the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas was a "fallen" (*cyuta*) Twentyfourth.

Sāṃkhyas' Rejection of "*acyuta pañcaviṃśa*".

(3) The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas refused to admit *śāśvata avyakta* which corresponds to *sanātana avyakta* of the Gîtā (VIII. 20) and which was a designation given by the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas (see p. 38 above).

Sāṃkhyas' Rejection of "*śāśvata avyakta*".

NOTE.—It should be noted that Prof. Deussen takes *acyuta* and *śāśvata* as independent designations of *pañcavimśaka* and *avyakta* and explains the *pañcavimśaka* (thus separated from *acyuta*) as the individual Soul, as if the topic of the discussion (in XII. 318) were the latter. Nowhere in the Indian Philosophy is *śāśvata* an independent designation, and never in the L. MBh. is *acyuta* used in that sense. Both Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen have lost sight of the great problem that busied the philosophers of the Mahābhārata, who followed the Age of the Gîtā.

All the passages reffered to above show that the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas rejected the *akṣara* of the Aupaniṣadas in so far as it was a higher Nature different from their conception of the Nature.

(b). What the Sāṃkhya are said to have accepted:—

(1) The terminology of the L. MBh. Saṃkhyas betrays their descent and at the same time dissent from those who had the traditions of the EMU and the Gītā. If we study the Sāṃkhya terms in MBh. XII 302–307 and 309–317, we find that the Twentyfourth or the Nature of these Sāṃkhyas bears the names which belonged originally to the lower Nature and to *akṣara* (in its capacity as the higher Nature) of the Aupaniṣadas and that their Twentyfifth has such designations as had mainly belonged to the Aupaniṣada *puruṣa* and *akṣara* (in its capacity as a "goal"). The former shows that the Sāṃkhyas have identified the two Natures, and the latter that they have identified the two "goals" of the Aupaniṣadas. To the former class of terms are to be traced such words as *a–vidya, kṣetra, avyakta, jñāna* and to the latter *vidyā, nirguṇa, īśvara, Viṣṇu avyakta* (306. 34, 38). These occur too often in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga Chapters (XII. 302–317) to be specially pointed out here. A detailed list of them is given in the L. MBh. itself (XII. 318 37–47). As an illustration of my standpoint I would draw the attention of the readers to two of the terms just mentioned, viz., *a–vidyā* and *vidyā* which the Sāṃkhyas used for their Nature and *puruṣa* respectively (XII. 307.2–3). Prof. Hopkins has expressed great surprise at this usage of the terms in question (GEI. p. 136). The presence of these terms cannot be explained by referring them to the Knowledge and Ignorance taught in Sānkara's theory of Illusion; because, as Prof. Hopkins correctly points out, the Māyāvāda is not known to the Mahābhārata; and though Prof. Deussen adds no explanatory notes to his translation of these terms, I believe he would not have

Connection of the Sāmkhya Terms witb those of the Aupaniṣadas.

The Terms *a–vidyā* and *vidyā*.

Confusion of Prof. Hopkins.

Prof. Deussen.

differed from Prof. Hopkins on this point. The fact seems to be that these Sāṃkhyas had got to explain the terms which the Aupaniṣadas used. In the terminology of the latter *a–vidyā* and *vidyā* stood for the lower Nature and the higher Nature respectively. They were used in that sense in Śve. Up. V. 1 (see App. I). The Sāṃkhyas having used "*a–vidyā*" for their own Nature, had no other course but that of applying "*vidyā*" to their *puruṣa* the Twentyfifth. In doing so they tried to give a new sense to these terms (307. 3–8). This was an effort similar to their effort to explain the Twentyfifth as both *kṣara* and *akṣara* (see below).

(2) The Sāṃkhyas accepted "*kṣara*" and "*akṣara*" of the Aupaniṣadas, but explained these terms in their own way. They said that the same Nature is *akṣara* when it withdraws the manifestations within itself, and it is *kṣara* when it puts forth these manifestations (307. 10–17); in other words, *akṣara* is Nature as one, *kṣara* is Nature as many (305. 36–39). This explanation of *kṣara* and *akṣara* was necessitated by the fact that the Sāṃkhyas identified the two Natures of the Aupaniṣadas, who held that *kṣara* or *pradhāna* was the lower Nature and *akṣara* was the higher Nature (Cf. Sve. Up. 1. 7–11; App. 1). In extending the *kṣara–akṣara* standpoint to the *puruṣa* (MBh. XII. 307. 18–19), the Sāṃkhyas sought a justification for their position regarding the Nature.

The terms *kṣara* and *akṣara*.

NOTE.—Regarding MBh. XII. 305. 36 it should be noticed here that *ekatva* and *nānātva* in "*ekatvam akṣaram prāhur nānātvam kṣaram ucyate*" (36c–d) are explained as what the soul sees and what it does not see when it proceeds on the right path having placed its belief in (the doctrine of) the twentyfive (37); and the same topic is continued in the following chapter where *ekatva* and *bahutva* are both said to belong to the Prakṛti only (306. 33) and it is said that *ekatva* comes into existence during the dissolution and *bahutva* when the

Nature creates the creation (306.33). Prof. Hopkins who says that a real plurality of souls is mentioned in these passages (GEI. p. 124) and Prof. Edgerton who would like to find here an emperical plurality (AJP) have no justification for their incorrect conjecture except that the words *ekatva* and *nānātva* or *bahutva* occur here (though they do not refer at all to the plurality of souls). How can the "many" souls be called *kṣara* "perishable" ? These interpretors have not considered the context at all. Prof. Deussen translates the terms, but suggests no explanation (VPTM. p. 623, p. 627).

The term *jñāna.*

(3) The Sāṃkhyas accepted *jñāna* "the lower Nature" of the Aupaniṣadas and also the *avyakta* of the latter; but they called these Prakṛti, and this was for them the one and only Prakṛti (XII. 318.40, 39).

The term *kṣetra.*

(4) The Sāṃkhyas accepted *kṣetra*, the conscious Nature or the Twentyfifth of the Aupaniṣadas (see p. 37 above); but identified it with their own Nature. MBh. 307.14c–d, 15 says, that "They (i. e. the Aupaniṣadas) call (the *akṣara* mentioned in verse 13a–b) *kṣetra* because it is *adhiṣṭhāna*, the resi-dence (of the *puruṣa*); this is that Twentyfifth (of the Aupaniṣadas). But when it withdraws the net of constituents within its unmanifest self, then along with those constituents the Twentyfifth dissolves". Prof. Deussen does not note that the *kṣetra* is here said to be the Twentyfifth and that the dissolution of the Twentyfifth within itself is taught here (VPTM. p. 630).

Sāṃkhyas' Nature, a Combination of the two *prakṛtis* of the Aupaniṣadas.

(5) The Sāṃkhyas taught that Prakṛti is both "moving" and "unmoving", "changing" and "unchanging"; it is also "imperishable", "unborn" etc. They herewith intended to show that there is no necessity of accepting two *prakṛtis*. They combined the two *prakṛtis* of the Aupaniṣadas into one and naturally rejected the view that the(lower) Nature is " born " as a distinct entity–the view of the EMU and the Gītā (MBh. XII. 318. 37–47).

The Sāṃkhyas first to emphasise (but not to originate) the Theory of Evolution.

(6) Sāṃkhyas took the term *prakṛti* from the Aupaniṣadas but made it a teachnical term in their School. " The Sāṃkhyas hold the view of Evolution (lit. the Sāṃkhyas evolve) and speak of the Evolving Matter, Prakṛti ". This idea is expressed in a very terse sentence: " *Sāṃkhyāḥ prakurvate prakṛtiṃ ca pracakṣate* (MBh. XII. 306.42). Although the Aupaniṣadas of the Gītā knew the Evolution and used the term *prakṛti*, the first philosophers in India to be called "Evolutionists" are these L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas. They are *prakṛtivādinaḥ* (306. 27). These Sāṃkhyas henceforth restricted in the above sense the application of the tern " *prakṛti* " (318. 39–40).

Sāṃkhyas' Acceptance of the Aupaniṣada *puruṣa.*

(7) The Sāṃkhyas accepted the *puruṣa* of the Aupaniṣadas (318. 39, 42) and said that *puruṣa* alone is conscious (and not *akṣara* also). Their acceptance of the term *jñāna* for their Nature was only a technical matter; it did not mean that the Nature was a conscious principle.

(8) They accepted the *īśvara* of the Aupaniṣadas but called him "*nirguṇa*", a name of *akṣara* in the MBh. Aupaniṣada School.

Theistic Character of the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas.

(9) If any positive proof is needed for the conclusion that the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas were not atheists, it will be found in MBh. XII. 318. 79e–f, where it is said that the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas accepted the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas. It would be unscientific to start with a presupposition that the Sāṃkhya School in the L. MBh. was atheistic, and then to argue that MBh. XII. 318 is an interpolation or is influenced by Classical Sāṃkhyas. It should be also remembered that though the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas admitted the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas they called it the Twentyfifth, because they rejected the Aupaniṣada Twentyfifth. This is the sense of MBh. XII. 318. 79e–f, which has been noticed above. Prof. Hopkins' and Prof.

Jacobi's views about this verse have been mentioned and refuted in the beginning of this Chapter. So these Sāṃkhyas were theists, though not in the Western sense : they believed (as the Aupaniṣadas did) in one Supreme Being which somehow appears as an individual soul striving for liberation (i. e. self–realisation).

In MBh XII. 302. 138, it is clearly said that the Twenty-fifth of the Sāṃkhyas was Viṣṇu. But as said just above, the Sāṃkhyas did not distinguish it from the Jîva, and this accounts for the objection in MBh. XII 300. 3 " How can 'one without the Lord' (*anīśvara*) be freed ? " This refers to one who does not believe in God as distinct from the Jîva. This sense of XII. 300. 3 is clear from the fact that this objection (in MBh. XII. 300.) comes from the Yoga School; while the statement that the Sāṃkhyas accept the Twenty-sixth (of the Aupaniṣadas) is from the Aupaniṣada School. In order to understand this one has to go a little deeper into the study of the L. MBh. Schools. In 308 where the Yoga doctrine is mentioned, it is explained that the L. MBh. Yogas for the first time separated Jîva and Îśvara, unlike the Sāṃkhyas who identified the two (see MBh. XII. 308 below). This will be fully dealt with in the next Section about the Yoga School. But it should be only stated here that MBh. XII. 300. 2–7 where the disputed words "*anīśvara*" and "*mokṣa*" occur, is explained nowhere except in MBh. XII. 308. 10–35, particularly 25–26 which undoubtedly refers to 300. 2–7, as the topic in both the passages shows. A comparison of these two passages will prove that *anīśvara* only means " one without a Lord separate from himself ". The Jîva who is the not–Lord (Śve. Up. I. 8) as compared with Paramātman who is the Lord, has never had the term *anīśvara* applied to it as a designation; there is no passage where *anīśvara* is used as a synonym for Jîva the individual soul; and there is no text in the EMU, the Gîtā or the L. MBh. where Jîva is said to be *anīśvara* in the sense "because there is no Îśvara above him" (Prof. Edgerton, AJP. 1924), though the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas regarded the Jîva as ultimately one with the Supreme Soul. Even when the Gîtā uses the term *īśvara* with reference to the Jîva it does so only in an etymological sense, viz., with regard to the Jîva's " ownership " of his subtle body (Bh. Gî. XV. 7–8). And as Prof. Schrader points out to me there are other words used with reference to the Jîva in the same sense as " *īśvara*"; thus the Sāṃkhyas used the term "*svāmin*", according to Garbe (Sāṃkhya–Philosophie, p. 305, 287, etc.), for the soul in its connection with the Upādhis, i. e. as a Jîva; and in a similar use the term is also met with in MBh. XII. 311. 20; "*Indriyāṇaṃ tu sarveṣām īśvaraṃ mana ucyate*", as compared with Bh. Gî. X. 22: " *Indriyāṇam manaś c āsmi;* " also see Ahirbudhnya–Saṃhitā XII. 22 where *svāmin* is given as a Sāṃkhya term for *manas* (see Prof. Schrader in Z. D. M. G. for 1914). Moreover, MBh. XII. 300. 3 and Gîtā XV. 7–8 describe the " bound " soul, and it would be to no purpose if the authors were using *anīśvara* or *īśvara* in the sense that the Jîva is identical with the Lord; on the contrary, such a statement would only lead to confusion. MBh. XII. 306. 41 refers to *īśvara* as a term for the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, and therefore an equivalent of *kṣetra* and *sattva*, and says that the Sāṃkhyas regarded it to be *anīśvara*. Thus, this passage refers to neither theism nor atheism in Sāṃkhya. For these reasons, I cannot accept the interpretation of *anīśvara* in MBh. XII. 300 as "having no–lord, supreme", given by Prof. Edgerton, though, of course, I do not deny that *anīśvara* elsewhere can mean *anuttara* "supreme" (Prof. Edgerton AJP, pp. 8–12).

Explanation of "*anīśvara*" in MBh. XII. 300.

Prof. Edgerton's View untenable.

Thus, the terminology of the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas clearly shows that they accepted the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, but identified with it the *akṣara* or the higher Nature of the latter and thus admitted only one Nature. It also indicates that these Sāṃkhyas approved of the *puruṣa* or *īśvara* of the Aupaniṣadas but to him they attributed all such characteristics and designations of the Aupaniṣada *akṣara*, as could not be consistently assigned to their own Nature.

Terminology of the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas, a sure Witness of their Descent from the Aupaniṣadas.

(c) How the later Mahābhārata Sāṃkhyas differ from the Classical Sāṃkhyas :—

Difference between the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and the Classical Sāṃkhya Schools.

The mere difference between these two Schools bearing the same name cannot in itself show that one is later than the other, though Prof. Hopkins would say the reverse. It should be examined carefully which of the two Schools has a more primitive form. If one of them is more primitive than the other and if the texts concerned have not the appearance of a dishonest report, then the possibility of the system described in them being the older form of the two cannot well be denied.

There may be many other points of difference between the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and the Classical School of that name than those given below, and these may be found out by a more detailed enquiry into the Mahābhārata, than it was possible for the present writer to undertake; he simply collects here those points which seemed to him to be very striking during his enquiry for *akṣara* into the chapters concerned.

Ignorance of the term "*prakṛti-vikṛti*.

(1) This Sāṃkhya does not know the terms of the Classical Sāṃkhya, like *vikṛti*, *prakṛtivikṛti*, etc. It mentions "eight *prakṛtis*"; and the Prakṛti is then called paṛā *prakṛti* (MBh. XII. 310. 10) a term which though used by the Aupaniṣadas for their *akṣara* (Bh. Gî. VII. 5) these Sāṃkhyas could apply only to their Nature.

Primitive Conception of the Mind.

(2) The Mind, not the *ahaṃkāra* as in the Classical Sāṃkhya, is here the cause of the five elements (XII. 306. 27–28).

Prakṛti described as Male, not as Female.

(3) Instead of the more advanced view of regarding Prakṛti as the female and Puruṣa as the male, the L. MBh. Smākhya has got the cumbrous classification (based on an agnostic scheme much in vogue at the Buddha's time) of "the male", "the non-male", "the male-and-non-male" and "the neither-male-nor-non-male". "The male" is the Prakṛti and "the neither-male-nor-non-male" is the Puruṣa (of these Sāṃkhyas) (MBh. XII. 305. 25–29).

Terms, unknown to Classical Sāṃkhya.

(4) This Sāṃkhya uses the terms *abuddha* for its *prakṛti* and *budhyamāna* for its *puruṣa* who is Jîva and becomes *buddha*, the Lord, in the state of absolution (MBh. XII. 305.31). These form a part of the L. MBh. terminology; it would be wrong to explain them as having only the etymological sense, to the exclusion of the technical one as will be shown later on.

Identity of Jîva of and Îśvara. Theism.

(5) The Twentyfifth of these Sāṃkhyas is " the Lord ", Îśvara of the Aupaniṣadas, and not only the Jîva as in the Classical Sāṃkhya School (MBh. XII. 305.32–33a–b; see p. 48 above). Thus the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya is theistic, like the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas.

Primitive Conception of the Grounds for Puruṣa's Existenee.

(6) Not only is the conception of the grounds on which the existence of Puruṣa the Twentyfifth is supported in this Sāṃkhya,quite primitive when compared with the one given in Sāṃkhya Kārikā 17; but it is also noteworthy that L. MBh. Sāṃkhya has four instead of the five grounds of the Classical Sāṃkhya (MBh. XII. 315.9c–d, 10).

Puruṣa, an Agent.

(7) One of the grounds for the existence of the Twentyfifth is that the Twentyfifth is "an agent" *kartṛ* (MBh. XII. 315.7–9a–b). L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas did not say that he is *bhoktṛ*, because they did not yet distinguish *kartṛtva* from *bhoktṛtva* as did the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (17). Thus these Sāṃkhyas seem to be the descendants of the "*sāṃkhya*-separatists" of Bh. Gî. XVIII. 13–16 (see Ch. II. p. 27).

Absence of the Classical Sāṃkhya Idea of "*viveka*".

(8) The Classical Sāṃkhya idea of emphasising the non—identity of the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti is not found in the Mahābhārata, though all the Mahābhārata Schools taught that the Twentyfourth should be given up ("*heya*"). This is so because the Mahābhārata does

not know anything about the identity of these two, which the Classical Sāṃkhya treats of as the *a–viveka* "want of discrimination", though the former knows that the Prakṛti is of the nature of attachment (*sāsaṅgā*) and the Puruṣa is by nature devoid of attachment (*niḥsaṅga*) as is said in MBh. XII. 315. 13–16.

No Plurality of Souls.

(9) The most important fact to be noticed in this connection is that the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya did not know the doctrine of the plurality of individual souls. I have examined and interpreted all the passages that Prof. Hopkins, Prof. Edgerton and Prof. Deussen have put forth in support of their views in this respect (see Appendix III, where even XII. 350.2 is discussed). They either refer to the doctrine of two Natures of the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas, which the Sāṃkhyas criticised or they discuss the unity and diversity of the Twentyfourth and do not at all refer to a real (as Prof. Hopkins thinks) or an empirical (as Prof. Edgerton holds) plurality of individual souls. Even the L. MBh. Yogas who separated the Jîva and Paramātman did not know of this plurality (MBh. XII. 308).

Prof. Hopkins' and Prof. Edgerton's Views, untenable.

These points of difference between the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and the Classical Sāṃkhya seem to me to bear witness to the historical priority of the former. Dr. Frauwallner (Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 45, and Wiener Zeitschrift fuer die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Band XXXII) has shown the same on the ground of other similar points. But I must say that some of the passages used by him belong definitely to the L. MBh. Aupaniṣada School (see p. 31 above), while some others quoted by him would lose their strength if the author or authors of the Mahābhārata really attempted "a loose exploiting of Classical Sāṃkhya in terms of Brahmaism" (Prof. Hopkins, the Great Epic of India, p. 131). I have examined all such passages that have been pointed out by Prof Hopkins, and I must confess

Dr. Frauwallner's View amplified.

that to me they appear to be only an honest attempt on the part of the Mahābhārata authors to preserve for us the then existing philosophical doctrines. The difference on most of the vital points like *karḥṭva* of the Jîva and the plurality of individual souls, and the child–like ingenuousness with which these views are placed before us in addition to the evidence of the terminology and to that of the fact that these Sāṃkhyas rejected the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣdas, should be regarded as a sufficient proof of the great antiquity of the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya School.

The L. MBh. Sāṃkhya much prior to the Classical Sāṃkhya.

The special contribution of the Mahābhārata Sāṃkhyas to the history of the Indian Philosophy lies in the fact that they are the first to separate Matter and Spirit as the Unconscious and the Conscious. The contrast between the (lower) Unmanifest and *puruṣa* is put forth in the Sāṃkhya chapters of the Mahābhārata as emphatically as the distinction between *akṣara* (the higher or living Nature) and *puruṣa* was in the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Gîtā (MBh. XII. 318. 37–44). The one was *saguṇa*, the other was *nirguṇa*; the one was *ajña*, the other was *jña*; the one was *avedya*, the other was *vedya*; the one *jñāna*, the other *jñeya*; the one *avidyā*, the other *vidyā* (MBh. XII. 307. 2); the one a *tattva*, the other *nistattva*; the one *sāsaṅga*, the other *niḥsaṅga*; the one *abuddha*, the other *budhyaṃāna*. Such is the distinction between Matter and Spirit that one finds in the Mahābhārata Sāṃkhya for the first time in the history of the Indian Philosophy, and at a period much prior indeed to that of the Classical Sāṃkhya School. The Aupaniṣadas of the EMU and the Gîtā and even those of the L. MBh. had not realised this most striking phenomenon in the every–day world, because they had believed in the higher Nature intervening between the pure Matter (i. e. the lower Nature) and *puruṣa*. The L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas could accept the inherited view

Progress made by the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas.

Complete Separation of Spirit and Matter.

that Matter is an effect of Spirit and for this reason they accepted also the spiritual *akṣara* which connected the two viz., the lower Nature and the *puruṣa*. The great contrast itself between Spirit and Matter may have been the ground on which the Sāṃkhyas based their view and parted company with their fellow-thinkers. That this disentanglement of Spirit and Matter from the causal relation which the Aupaniṣadas always believed in, was achieved through the rejection of *akṣara* "the higher Nature" is a fact which the Mahābhārata most emphatically teaches. This point cannot be insisted upon strongly enough. The *śāśvata avyakta* or *acyuta pañcaviṃśa* was flatly refused by the Sāṃkhyas. Most of the philosophers of the days of Mahābhārata were engaged in the discussion of this problem. The Mahābhārata credits Āsuri and Pañcaśikha and also Kapila with having expressed their views on this problem. From the context in which their names occur in the Mahābhārata, they seem to have been the pioneers in rejecting the distinction between the two Natures of the Aupaniṣadas (MBh. XII. 318. 59 ff). The origin of the Mahābhārata Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools should be traced to what they are expressly said in the Mahābhārata to have refused to accept (see pp. 42–43 above). Compare the "motto" at the beginning of this Thesis. To the followers of the EMU and the Gītā who accepted a Dualistic Monism of two Spirits, and to the Aupaniṣadas of the Mahābhārata who believed in a Pluralistic Dualism of three principles (apart from the Jîva), one material and two spiritual, this purely dualistic attitude of the Sāṃkhya could not have come as a great surprise, because these latter did any how accept the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas, the *puruṣa* of the EMU, one of the two "goals". It is for this reason that the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas sympathised with the Sāṃkhyas and often praised them (MBh. XII. 318. 57, 79).

Contents of the Works of Āsuri and Pañcaśikha: Rejection of the Higher Nature.

Finally, we have already seen that some followers of the *sāṃkhya*-path of the Gîtā had begun taking interest

in doctrinal questions (see pp. 26–27 above). These *sāṃkhya*-separatists believed the Atman to be an agent (Bh. Gî. XVIII. 13–16), while the *sāṃkhya*-followers as a whole believed in two Natures the higher of which was not at all "active" while the lower possessed "all the activities", as did the followers of *yoga* and *bhakti* paths. From the fact that the Sāṃkhya philosophers of the L. MBh. hold Atman to be an agent, I have already suggested that it were the *sāṃkhya*-separatists of the Gîtā who are responsible for the Sāṃkhya School of the L. MBh. (p. 27). The latter's rejection of the higher Nature seems to have been due to their belief in the Atman's *kartṛtva*. When the Atman was itsvlf an agent, rhere was no necessity of beliving in two Natures, neither of which would be in this case an agent. Though a verbal statement expressive of this argument is wanting in the (later) Mahābhārata which starts with the very idea that the Sāṃkhya is an independent School, the period intervening between the Gîtā and the L MBh. must have seen the *sāṃkhya*-separatists reasoning as above. These latter, like other followers of the *sāṃkhya-niṣṭhā* were ascetics; the follower of the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya School were also ascetics as already emphasised by Prof. Hopkins. For these reasons the *sāṃkhya-niṣṭhā* of the Gîtā is the ultinate origin of the Saṃkhya School of the L. MBh.

Rise of L. MBh. Sāṃkhya School from the *sāṃkhya* Path of the Gîtā.

But even then the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya did not entirely cease to be a path or *niṣṭhā* like the *sāṃkhya*-path of the Gîtā, because both of these accept the *puruṣa* (and the latter, the *akṣara* also) as their "goal". The same is true also of the L. MBh. Yogas, who like the Rudrite Yogas, accepted the *puruṣa*, or like the Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas, the *akṣara* of the Aupaniṣadas as the "goal", as we shall see in the next Section. From this standpoint one can say what the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools do share the Nature of being "paths" for the same goal as the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas. The statements in the L. MBh. that "the Sāṃkhya and the Yogas see the *puruṣa* or

Resemblance between the *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* Paths of the Gîtā and the L. MBh. Schools of those names.

the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas" (XII. 318, 79) or that all these Schools are equally good for the attainment of liberation from this world, are expressive of what was then a real fact.

3. The Yoga School.

It is more necessary to point out that the Yoga in the L. MBh. forms a metaphysical system of its own than it was to do the same with regard to the Sāṃkhya. The problem is exceedingly important because, while Prof. Edgerton, so far as I know, is the only one to hold that in the (later) Mahābhārata, "Sāṃkhya" does not stand for a School but only for a path of salvation, the view that in Mahābhārata at least the Twentysixth is a principle either foisted upon the Sāṃkhya or said any how to belong to them, and therefore in that sense the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas of the L. MBh. have the same metaphysical principles; is held by almost all scholars who have worked in this field and is generally believed in all over India also. My study has led me to think that the metaphysical principles in both these Schools were idntical neither in their number nor in their nature; on the contrary, there is evidence to believe that unlike the Classical Schools of these names, the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools agreed mostly as regards the non-philosophical matters.

Yoga an independent School of Thought in L.MBh.

There are striking statements in the L. MBh. itself on this point. Just as the Sāṃkhya is a Śāstra, so is Yoga a Darśana (XII. 307.44, 48d). Again, "Both the Systems have the same career of life" (*ekacaryāu tāv ubhau*–XII. 316 2c). "Purity, accompanied by penance and compassion for all beings are equally taught in both. The observance of vows also is the same in both; but the doctrinal teaching is not the same in the two Schools", (*darśanaṃ na samaṃ tayoḥ*–XII. 300. 8–9). Moreover, "The Yogas and Sāṃkhyas who have made the definition

Statements regarding the Difference of Doctrines and Identity of Practice between L. MBh. Sāṃkhya and Yoga School.

of the metaphysical principles according to their own individual Scriptures see that this (visible world) is the action of the Unmanifest and the Manifest" (MBh. XII. 310. 100c–d, 101 a–b). Whenever the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga are mentioned together in the Gītā, it was intended to show that they were concerned with "renunciation" and "action" respectively, but in the L. MBh. this is not the case at all; it aims at pointing out some philosophical differences and sometimes resemblances also between the two Schools (MBh. XII. 307. 47–48; 308. 1). In the Gītā an aspirant is advised to accept either of the two paths, *sāṃkhya* or *yoga*; the Mahābhārata, on the contrary, complains that the Sāṃkhyas and Yogas do not accept some philosophical principles of the Aupaniṣadas (MBh. XII. 318. 56–57, 79; 305. 32–35), and therefore no Aupaniṣada would be asked to follow either Sāṃkhya or Yoga. These statement go against the view that "This system is both Yoga and Sāṃkhya, the systems being double but the teaching being identical" (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. pp. 133-134) and also against the other view that "Nowhere is there any suggestion that the Sāṃkhya–or Yoga either–means any particular system of metaphysical truth" (Prof. Edgerton, AJP. p. 5 and p. 7). They had their own doctrines and these were recorded in writings not available to us now (XII. 307. 46a–b).

Prof. Hopkins' and Prof. Edgerton's Views untenable.

But while I emphasise the importance of the hitherto neglected statements regarding the doctrinal differences between the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas, I should not ignore another type of sentences which say that "Whatever is the Scripture of the Sāṃkhyas is also the teaching of the Yogas" (MBh. XII. 307. 44) or that "The two Schools are one" (MBh. XII. 305. 19; 316. 4; 305. 31; 310. 8, 26; 318. 71, 100–101). These passages are not in conflict with those noted in the above paragraph. For their meaning we have to depend upon the context, as we have done in the case of similar

Meaning of "Sāṃkhya and Yoga are one" in L. MBh.

statements in the Gītā (see. pp. 25–26). They generally refer to the theory of the Nature which was common to both the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas (XII. 307. 44; 310. 8, 26, 71, 100–101; and also 311, 312, 313). It was this part of the doctrine which the Sāṃkhyas were the first to make their own and which the Yogas accepted exactly as the Sāṃkhyas taught (XII. 308. 1d.). Otherwise, such statements refer to the sameness of the "goal" in the two systems (XII. 300. 8–9). They never intend to say that the conception of the individual soul was the same in the two Schools; rather, as we shall see later on, this and as a corollary to it, the nature of absolution were the very points on which they differed. It is where the interpretors of the L. MBh, have extended the application of the statements concerning the unity or identity of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga to such doctrinal matters as are not meant by the context, that they have actually gone beyond the text of the Mahābhārata.

In this connection it would not be wrong once again to refer to the statements in the L. MBh. which always say that the Sāṃkhyas have only twentyfive principles (XII 302. 38; 306. 43–44; 305. 38; 307. 2, 47; 308. 14). The other statements which mention the Twentysixth always refer either to the two Yoga Schools or to the Aupaniṣada School of the later Mahābhārata. There is no verse in the L. MBh. where it is said that the Sāṃkhyas had a Twentysixth principle. " The Sāṃkhyas see the Twentysixth " (XII. 318. 79) means that they believe in the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas, which they call the Twentyfifth in their own System. Even XII. 308. 14–17 which refers to the Twentysixth of the Yoga is wonderfully accurate when it says that the Sāṃkhyas mention "twentyfive principles" (XII. 308. 14). The Sāṃkhyas believed that the *budhyamāna* becomes the *buddha*, but they never said that the Twentyfifth becomes the Twentysixth, because in their School the *budhyamāna* is always numerically identical with *buddha*.

The Twentysixth never said to be a Principle of the Sāṃkhya School.

Thus we have seen that, so far as the statements about the number and nature of the principles in the two Schools of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga are concerned, they do admit of doctrinal difference between them, though they also refer to the identity of some points of the teaching. Let us now see how far these statements are corroborated by the actual teaching itself.

Comparison of the Statements with the actual Teaching.

The Yogas had rejected the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas, just as the Sāṃkhyas had done. Whenever the Sāṃkhyas are described as not having accepted the *budhyamāna avyakta*, *śāśvata avyakta* or *acyuta pañcaviṃsa*, the Yogas are always mentioned as their companions (see p. 42–43).

Rejection of the Higher Nature.

The second point of similarity between these two Schools is that they have the same view about Prakṛti or the Nature; and this follows as a natural consequence of their joint rejection of the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas just noticed above. The statement, " The same is the doctrinal teaching of both these Schools " (MBh. XII. 307. 44), is immediately followed by other statements : " I have narrated to you the highest principle of the Sāṃkhyas " (307. 47), and " The teaching of the Yoga is said to consist of *budhyamāna* and *buddha* " (307. 48). These sentences restrict the sense of 307. 44 and show that only the doctrine of the Nature, which has been given in the verses that precede 307. 44, is the same in the two Schools; thus we are not allowed to say that " The Systems are two but the teaching is the same," as Prof. Hopkins holds, or that the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga have no part in the discussion of philosophical teaching but are only two paths even in the Mahābhārata, as Prof. Edgerton believes. My interpretation of 307. 44 is proved by 308. 1, where we read :

The Conception of Prakṛti.

Prof. Hopkins' and Prof. Edgerton's Views untenable.

"[The followers of the Yoga] making the Atman multiple (i. e. twofold, as we shall see below), relate the same (twentyfour) principles (*ātmānaṃ bahudhā kṛtvā tāny eva pravicakṣate*)."

This is followed by: "The *budhyamāna* transforming this (*etad* i.e. the *avyakta*) in this way (i. e., in the way taught by the Sāṃkhyas in the preceding chapter) does not know (ceases to be a knower)" (*etad evaṃ vikurvāṇo budhyamāno na budhyate* — 308. 2a–b). These two verses (308. 1–2) are to be taken with 307. 46 and 48, and 308. 1a–b which clearly say that the author describes the Yoga School in 308 with which we are concerned here. "*Tāny eva pravicakṣate*" and "*etad evaṃ vikurvāṇaḥ*" show that only the doctrine of the Nature is common to the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, while "*ātmānaṃ bahudhā kṛtvā*" establishes beyond any possibility of doubt my thesis that the Yogas differed from the Sāṃkhyas in so far as they (i.e. the Yogas) believed in the Jîva to be different from the Brahman or *puruṣa* (as we shall see below). Without giving here other passages (enumerated above) or explaining further the meanings of the above verses, I refer my reader to the following note which will convince him that Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen have failed to understand even the fundamentals of this Yoga School. It is sufficient to say here that the Yogas accepted the twentyfour principles, but unlike the Sāṃkhyas, said that the Jîva is the modifying agent of the Twentyfourth as distinct from the Supreme Soul.

Prof. Deussen's Interpretation also incorrect.

NOTE.—As the whole of Chapter 308 is misunderstood by my predecessors, I must here say something to justify my interpretations. (1) "*Ātmānaṃ bahudhā kṛtvā*" is explained by Prof. Hopkins as: "The Lord–Spirit divides himself into many" (GEI. p. 134, 136). This is quite wrong; *kṛtvā* can refer only to the subject of *pravicakṣate*, which must be in the plural number: it were the Yogas who "made the Atman multiple (i.e. two–fold)." It is indeed surprising to find that even Prof. Deussen has committed the same mistake (VPTM, p. 633). (2) It should also be pointed out that none of these scholars seems to have understood "*tāni eva*" in "*tāny eva pravicakṣate*:" the expression undoubtedly refers to the "twenty-four principles," and explains 307. 44. (3) Prof. Hopkins explains *vikurvāṇa* (308. 2) as *vikṛti* and *budhyamāna* as Brahman! I see no reason for not explaining *vikurvāṇaḥ* as nom. sing. of the present participle of *vi* + *kṛ*. According to

the Yoga School *budhyamāna* was the individual soul (see below) and is quite different from the Supreme Soul whom they called *buddha*; and therefore Prof. Hopkins' interpretation is due to a grave misunderstanding regarding the fundamental doctrines of this Yoga School. Prof. Deussen shares the same blunder (VPTM. p. 633).

The Conception of *summum bonum*.

The third point of similarity to be noticed here is the conception of the *summum bonum* in the two Schools, which they had in common with the Aupaniṣadas and in a certain sense with the Pāñcarātras. To explain the situation of those days, *akṣara* and *puruṣa* were both of them regardad as the goals of life. This idea was inherited from the EMU and the Gîtā. As a result, all philosophers who accepted either of these two singly (like the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas) and also those who identified the two into one (like the Pāñcarātras, see Sec. 4 below) could be, in that sense, said to have recognised the same *summum bonum*. While describing the numerical designations in all the four Schools of the days of the later Mahābhārata (pp. 32–34), and also the doctrines which the Sāṃkhyas accepted from the Aupaniṣadas (pp. 44–47), while showing that the idea of God was the same in the Sāṃkhya as in the Aupaniṣada School and therefore the former was not atheistic (pp. 47–48), and lastly while pointing out that the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya is in a way like the *sāṃkhya*–path of the Gîtā (p. 52), I had occasions to refer to the fact that the *puruṣa* (not to be distinguished from *akṣara* in its capacity as the "goal" and not yet to be identified with it) was the "goal" of the Saṃkhyas. Now, I shall show that the "goal" of the Yogas was also not different from that of the Aupaniṣadas.

Two Yoga Schools in L.MBh.

But before we can properly understand the "goal" in the L.MBh. Yoga, it is here necessary to point out that the L.MBh. mentions two Yoga Schools. One was taught originally by Hiraṇyagarbha (XII. 308. 45), while the head of the other was Rudra (316. 5; 318. 52). "O you, controller of your enemies, know the

Yogas with Rudra at their head to be other Yogas" (*rudrapradhānān aparān viddhi yogan arindama*–316. 5a–b), and, "They move about in all the ten quarters with the self–same body till the dissolution of the world" (316. 6). "*Aparān yogān*" (316.5) refers to the distinction between these Rudrite Yogas and the Yogas described in the Chapter and the verses that precede 316.5.

The Germ of both present in the Gîtā.

The origin of these two Schools of Yoga is undoubtedly to be trace to the Bh. Gî. which knows the term *yoga* to have two technical meanings (Bh. Gî. II. 48, 50 and VI. 23; see Introduction, p. 4). While the Gîtā did not enumerate the Yoga Schools as two because they were then in their infancy, the definite statement in the later Mahābhārata noticed above is indicative of the progress of thought during the period intervening between the composition of the two works. It also shows that the L.MBh., as we have it, is prior to the Classical period of Indian Philosophy which knows only one Yoga School viz., the *dhyānayoga* which the Gîtā explains as *duḥkhasaṃyogaviyoga* (Bh. Gî. VI. 23) and the L. MBh. as *rudrapradhānayoga*. The Gîtā uses the terms *yoga* and *karmayoga* for the other Yoga; the later Mahābhārata seems to refer to a later development of this Yoga when it mentions the Hiraṇyagarbha Yoga School (308. 45). In interpreting the Gîtā and the L.MBh. we must not lose sight of these two meanings of the word (in the former) and two Schools having the same name (in the latter). When these texts themselves explain the term *yoga* to have two independent technical meanings recognised as such in the days of their composition, it is not reasonable to identify "*karmayoga*" with "*dhyānayoga*" (through the word *yogakṛtya* "practices or exercises of Yoga" used for "*dhyānayoga*" in the L. MBh.), and to say that "there was only 'one method' called Yoga but the word had two interpretations", as Prof. Edgerton has done (AJP, pp. 40–46). Again Prof. Hopkins and others who argue that the Mahābhārata (the Gîtā included) is an

Their Priority to the Classical Yoga.

Prof. Edgerton's and prof. Hopkins' Views untenable.

effort to render the Classical Sāṃkhya theistic on the analogy of the Classical Yoga, seem to have been led to such a conclusion, partly at least, on account of having overlooked the distinction between the two Yoga Schools of L. MBh. and therefore the notice I have here taken of this fact will not be deemed unnecessery.

Now, we shall not be surprised to find that these two Yoga Schools have two different conceptions of the final goal, both of which were recognised as equally good, at that time. Hiraṇyagarbha (308.45) is mentioned as the teacher of the Yogas described in 308, and verses 31–51 of that Chapter described *akṣara* to be their goal or highest principle which (*akṣara*) they called the Twentysixth (308.7–8). These Yogas rejected *akṣara* as the higher Nature but accepted it as the goal; and as the Gîtā had already made this twofold distinction in the conception of *akṣara* it is quite natural that the same discrimination is made by these Yogas. Unlike these Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas, the Rudrite Yogas contemplated on *puruṣa*. "Having thus enumerated (their principles upto Prakṛti, as stated in the preceding verse), they meditate on the absolute eternal, infinite, pure, the woundless (*avraṇa*), constant *puruṣa*, the invulnarale, ageless, deathless, eternal, unchanging Lord and the unchanging Brahman (316.16, 17, 25)". Thus, the two Yoga Schools respectively belived in *akṣara* and *puruṣa* as the goal.

The Conception of the *summum bonum* different in the two Yoga Schools.

Besides the two passages (308.31–52, 7–8 and 316.16–17, 25) we have to consider one more passage on this subject, viz., 318.79e–f. It says that "The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas accept the Twentysixth". I have already explained how it describes the Sāṃkhya doctrine of those days (see p. 47 above). As regards its application to the two Yoga Systems I do not think we have any difficulty in understanding it. Chapter 318 mainly deals with the Aupaniṣada doctrine (see p. 34 above), and therefore the verse in question means "The Yogas see the Twentysixth of the Aupa-

The Yogas' Acceptance of the Twentysixth.

niṣadas", and this applies easily to the Rudrite Yogas whose Twentysixth was the *puruṣa*. But the verse can also mean "The Yogas see their own Twentysixth", and this would be correct with reference to both the Schools of the Yoga, because according to both the Twentyfifth was the individual soul, and so the Twentysixth was *akṣara* (as the goal) with the Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas and *puruṣa* with the Rudra Yogas. Thus, according to the verse (318.79 e–f) the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas, viz., the *puruṣa*, was accepted by the Sāṃkhyas (but as the Twentyfifth in their System) and also by the Rudra Yogas (with whom the *puruṣa* was the Twentysixth). As Rudra is mentioned in the list of the teachers in that Chapter (318.52) and as Hiraṇyagarbha is wanting in the same, I am inclined to believe that the author had in his mind the Rudrite Yogas (in 79e–f), though the verse applies also to the Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas if we construe the text in a way not uncommon to the Sanskrit literature. (The views of Professors Hopkins and Jacobi on "the Twentysixth" in 318. 79, and elsewhere in MBh. have been already discussed on p. 30 ff. above).

There is one more point in which the Yogas seem to have resembled the Sāṃkhyas. It is said that "The practice or observance (i. e. the career of life) followed by the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas is the same" (*tāv ubhāv ekacaryau*--MBh. XII. 316. 2c, quoted above on p.56). In the L.MBh. though the Sāṃkhyas are said to be Yatis (ascetics), the Yogas are not said to be *karmayogins* which they are actually and most emphatically declared to be in the Gītā. Moreover, instead of contrasting Sāṃkhya and Yoga on the basis of renunciation and action, the L. MBh. mentions three *niṣṭhās* "careers of life" independently of any special reference to any philosophical Schools though, of course, they can be traced to have been particularly favoured by one or other of these latter. They are called *kevala jñāna* (traceable in the Sāṃkhya School), *kevala karman* (most probably referring to the Pāñcarātras who were

The Conception of the Career of Life.

The L. MBh. Conception of Three *niṣṭhās*, without Reference to Schools.

Yatis devoting themselves to big sacrifices offered to Nārāyaṇa), and *jñānakarmasamuccaya* followed by Janaka. These are described in MBh. XII. 320. 39–40 and 345. 92. It is most striking that, though Janaka himself refers to the Schools under the names of "*sāṃkhyajñāna*", "*yoga*", and "*mahīpālavidhi*" (i. e. the Path of Devotion, cf. *rājavidyā* and *rajaguhya* in Bh. Gī. IX. 2) in 320. 25 and again to the three *niṣṭhās*, mentioned above, in 320. 39–40, still he does not connect them with each other; on the contrary, he says that Pañcaśikha taught the *jñānakarmasamuccaya niṣṭhā*, though he was himself a Sāṃkhya philosopher. Thus, in the days of the L.MBh. the careers of life were independent of the metaphysical doctrine. This, again, is in consistency with the progress of thought during the priod intervening between the Gītā and the L.MBh, during which the *sāṃkhya* and the *yoga* paths became Schools of these names.

Before we begin to examine the points of difference between the L.MBh. Yogas and Sāṃkhyas, it is necessary to make a few remarks regarding the terminology of the Yogas. The Yogas seem to have specially favoured the designations *a–pratibuddha* or *a–prabuddha*, *budhyamāna*, and *buddha* (rather than the Twentyfourth, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth–which they also used in pursuance of the fashion of the day. It is probable that these expressions referring to the presence or absence of " consciousness " in the philosophical principles were originated by the Yogas and accepted by the Sāṃkhyas and the Aupaniṣadas with such additions and alterations as would suit their own Systems. This fact should be carefully noted because as yet these terms have not been definitely recognised as technical terms by those who have interpreted the Mahābhārata. There is ample evidence that these (terms) are used in the L.MBh. in a conventional and not in the etymological sense, though the latter must have been the basis of the former. In 307. 47 the author brings to a close his description of the Sāṃkhya doctrine (*sāṃkhyānāṃ*

Terminology of L. MBh. Yoga Schools.

tu paraṃ tattvaṃ yathāvad anuvaṇitam—307.47c–d) and then thus begins the Yoga teaching: "*Buddha* and *budhyamāna*, because he (the latter, i. e. the soul) is not in reality the *pratibuddha*, *budhyamāna* and *buddha*, they declared to be the Yoga doctrine " (307. 48). (The Kumbhakoṇam ed. reads "*buddham apratibuddhaṃ ca budhyamānaṃ ca tattvataḥ*" in place of 307.48a–b of Bombay ed., which is intended to show that three principles of these three names are taught by the Yogas.) Now, hear the following *guṇavidhi* (classification of the principles ?) [concerning] *buddha* and *abuddha*. [The Yogas] (see above 307.48) making the Atman multiple (*bahudhā*, i.e. twofold; see below) assert the same (*tāny eva*, i. e., the twentyfour principles of the Sāṃkhyas, described in 307) (308.1). The *budhyamāna* modifying this [Unmanifest or *abuddha* mentioned in verse 1] in this way does not know (i. e. ceases to be a knower of the Twentysixth?). He upholds the constituents, he creates and withdraws them. He does so continuously for the sake of mere sport (308.2,3a–b). And they call the *budhyamāna* [so] because he knows the Unmanifest (308.3c–d). But the Unmanifest being itself possessed of the constituents never (*na kadācit*) knows [the *budhyamāna* who is] the Constituentless; [therefore] they call it (n.) *aprati-buddhak* (308. 4). But when this Twentyfifth (n., sc. *tattvam*) knows the Unmanifest, the *budhyamāna* certainly becomes attached to the world; so says the Śruti (of the Yogas). For this reasson [the Yogas] call the unfallen Unmanifest (*acyuta avyakta*) "*apratibuddha*" (308.5). And they call the Twentyfifth "*budhyamāna*" because he knows the Unmanifest; but even he does not know the Great Atman (*mahātman*) (308.6). The Twentysixth (n.), the *buddha*, which is pure, incomprehensible, eternal, knows eternally (*satataṃ.....budhyate*) the Twenty-fifth and the Twentyfourth (308. 7). Here, the Unmanifest (i. e. the Twentysixth), the absolute Brahman, which is by its very nature permeating the visible and the invisible, is, O friend of great lustre, the [sole] Knower in this world. The Twentyfourth does not see the Absolute (*kevala*) and the Twentyfifth" (308. 9a–b).

Evidence for the same.

From this quotation it would appear that verse 307.48 associates *budhyamāna* and *buddha* and (according to the Kumbhakoṇam ed.) *apratibuddha* (also mentioned in 308.4) specially with the Yoga School. Secondly it is clear from the verbal forms *vadanti* (308.3d, 6b) and *āhuḥ* (4d) that these are *saṃjñās* "technical names". If we look to what follows, we also find that *apratibuddha*, *budhyamāna* and *buddha* are the names of the principles (308.21c–d, 22a–b). It is also clear from the above that these Yogas called them respectively the Twentyfourth, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth. It is further evident that the three are defined here in such a way that the possibility of their being reduced to two at any stage of development is precluded. *Apratibuddha* is "never a knower" (4a, c), i. e. one which can never become *budhyamāna* or *buddha*. *Buddha* is "eternally a knower" (7c–d); so the *budhyamāna* can never become the *buddha*. The three must eternally remain three; and we shall see later on that this position is maintained throughout by the author of this Chapter. They are also numbered as t h r e e. The remarks concerning these terms made already (on pp. 42–43 and p. 51) and the following note will convince the reader that Professors Hopkins, Deussen and Edgerton have committed grave blunders in not interpreting these terms as technical.

NOTE.—The fact that the interpretors of the L. MBh. School have not till now recognised these three as three principles of these names becomes clear if we look to their interpretations. Prof. Edgerton translates 307.48 as follows: " 'The (soul) becoming–enlightened and that–is–enlightened is declared to be (also) the substance of Yoga teaching ' (so that there is, as stated, no difference in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga views of truth)". Besides other objections to be raised against this translation later on, I would here point out that Prof. Edgerton has failed to understand that *budhyamāna* and *buddha* are two principles of those names and not two conditions of the same soul. This is evident from the fact that he has done away with the repeated " *ca* " in 308.44c–d. While 307.48 clearly says that the *budhyamāna* is *budhyamāna* "because in reality it is not *pratibuddha* (or, to use the usual form, *buddha*) and while 308.3–7 distinguishes *budhyamāna* as a knower (of the Nature) and *buddha* as an eternal knower (of the other

two), Prof. Hopkins sees the identity of the individual spirit and the Lord–Spirit in verse 307.48. In doing so, he neglects the context. If the *budhyamāna* became the *buddha* (or, in other words, if the Twentyfifth became identical with the Twentysixth), how could the Twentysixth be said to be "eternally knowing the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth"? This shows that *budhyamāna* and *buddha* are here two principles and not conditions. (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 134). I have alreaday mentioned Prof. Hopkins' and Prof. Deussen's explanations of 308.1 above. Prof. Hopkins explains *apratibuddha* in 308.4, not as a name for the Unmanifest, but as that of the individual soul (GEI. p. 135). Prof. Deussen interprets "*etad* (n.) *evam vikurvāṇaḥ*" (308.2) as "As he changes himself in this way....," and "*budhyamāna*" (in 308.5c) as "knowing" (i. e. as an adj.) though in 307.48 he interprets the same word as "the Awakening" (i.e. as a noun): this proves that even Prof. Deussen did not decide for himself whether these are technical terms or adjectives (VPTM. 633). 308.6a–b means according to Deussen: "Through him, the Prakṛti has not yet been [fully] known (*apratibuddha*— Prof. Deussen does not understand that according to the context *apratibuddh eli* stands for "*apratibuddha* — not *apratibuddhā*–+*iti*" i.e. for *aprabuddham iti*), so they say with reference to the Unmanifest, Imperturbable". No more examples will be necessary for proving that the terminology of the L MBh. Yogas (and, in a sense, that of other L. MBh. Schools who also used the same terms with modifications) has been till now not correctly understood. Henceforth I shall restrict myself to giving a consistent interpretation of 308 as I believe it to be, and request the reader to compare it with those of Professors Deussen and Hopkins wherever these be available. (*Abuddha* in 308.1 is a short form of *apratibuddha* in 4 and 5 and also in 21, used metri causa).

Points of Doctrinal Difference between L. MBh. Yogas and Sāṃkhyas.

Now, we shall be able to understand how the L. MBh. Yogas differed from the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas. The most prominent point of difference was the distinction of the Jîva from the Paramātman, which these Yogas made for the first time in the history of Indian Philosophy, just as the Sāṃkhyas separated the Nature from the Puruṣa for the first time by the rejection of the higher Nature.

As we have seen (in 308. 1) the Yogas made the Atman "multiple" *bahudhā*. The meaning of *bahudhā* must depend upon the context which, as we can learn from the verses that follow 308. 1, shows that unlike the Sāṃkhyas, the Yogas have two Atmans, the *budhyamāna* and the *buddha*, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth. It will have been also noticed that the *budhyamāna* is here the creator and destroyer (308. 2–3) while the *buddha* is permeating the visible and the invisible world without taking any part in the creation. The *buddha* is (at first) not known even to the *budhyamāna* (308. 6c–d) and has apparently nothing to do with creation and destruction on account of its seeing the other two eternally. Thus, *bahudhā* is used for *dvidhā* partly because of meterical reasons and partly because, as in those days when only one Atman was known to the Sāṃkhyas there was no possibility of its being confounded if the Yoga doctrine was contrasted with their view. Thus, there is no support to the interpretation of *bahudhā* as implying plurality of souls. (Moreover, as already said, it is not the "Lord–Spirit who makes himself many", as was interpreted by Prof. Hopkins; see p. 60 above.) The following verses (308. 9c–d, 17) bring out this fundamental difference between the two Schools quite distinctly:—

Distinction between Jîva and Paramātman.

"When the *budhyamāna* thinks of himself that he is of a different nature [from the Twentysixth], then he is 'Unmanifest–eyed' *avyaktalocana* because he is possessed of Prakṛti (9c–d, 10a–b)[1]. But when he knows the supreme knowledge pure and unimpure, he attains to 'the state of the *buddha*' (*buddhatva*) like the Twentysixth[2] (10c–d, 11a–b). Then, he gives up the Unmanifest which is of the nature of creation and dissolution (11c–d). Then, he who is devoid of the attributes knows the Nature (*prakṛti*) as possessed of attributes and as devoid of consciousness. Then, he comes to possess the attributes [*buddhatva* etc.] of the Absolute[3] (i. e. the Twentysixth—

Evidence for the same.

308. 8), because of his having seen the Unmanifest (i.e. Brahman, as said in 308. 8) (12). Having come into contact with the Absolute, the liberated soul will reach the Atman[4] " (13a–b). "This non–principle, ageless and deathless, they (i. e. the Sāṃkhyas) call ' principle ' (*tattvam*)[5] (13c–d). But it is not [to be dealt with] as a principle (*tattvavat na*) ' because it resorts to the principles ' (*tattvasaṃśrayaṇāt*). Learned people (i. e., the Sāṃkhyas) speak of twentyfive 'principles' (*tattvas*)[6] (14). But he is not ' possessed of principles ' (*tattvavān*)[7]; rather this intelligent one is a ' non–principle ' (*nistattva*)[8]. He leaves far behind (i. e. is entirely different from) the (Sāṃkhya) principle of which *buddhatva* is predicated (by the Sāṃkhyas)[9]. The highly conscious one (*prājña*), the ageless and deathless, the Twentysixth, when being conceived of [by the Twentyfifth or the Jiva] with the notion of 'I' (i. e. I am the *prājña*) becomes identical [with the meditator] undoubtedly only through force (*kevalena balen eva*) [but not in reality][10] (16). By [the side of] the Twentysixth i. e. the *prabuddha*, even the *budhyamāna* (i. e. the Twentyfifth) is ignorant[11]. This is said to be the distinction[12] [of the Yoga School] from the teaching of the Sāṃkhya Scripture (17).

The Sāṃkhyas criticised by the Yogas.

NOTES.—**1.** These two verses (9c–d and 10a–b should be construed together (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 135, differs). " Of a different nature " stands for *anyaḥ*, because, as said in verse 26ff, the liberation of the soul from the world lies in the Twentyfifth becoming like the Twentysixth. Prof. Hopkins' translation : ' thinks that I am the other ', is based upon a complete misunderstanding of the Yoga doctrine in this Chapter. ' *Avyakta–locana* ' is confirmed by Kumbh. ed.; the reading proposed by Prof. Hopkins, viz., ' *vyakta–locana* ' is not necessary; so also his proposed reading *aprakṛtimān* in place of *prakṛtimān*. " *Avykta–locana* " means " one who sees through the influence of the Unmanifest, the Nature" and also "one whose eyes are not annointed with collyrium (and therefore cannot see clearly)". **2.** *Yathā ṣaḍvimśaḥ* gives the standard of comparison for *buddhatva*, the *sādharaṇa dharma* which would then belong to both the *budhymāna* and the *buddha*. Prof. Edgerton's interpretation, "the *budhyamāna*,

as the Twentysixth (*ṣaḍvimśaḥ yathā*) will attain to *budhatva*", is, besides being in itself meaningless, in disharmony with the context, which shows that the *badhyamāna* never becomes the *buddha* (see also Prof. Deussen VPTM. p. 634). **3.** '*Kevala-dharmā* and '*kevalena samāgamya*' in verse 13 shows that "*ṣaḍ-viṃśaḥ yathā*" is the *upamāna* here, and that the Twentyfifth does note become the Twentysixth in the state of absolution. Prof. Deussen's translation of "*kevaladharmā bhavati*" as "and becomes the Absolute" is inaccurate; so, also his translation of *kevalena samāgamya* as "having become one with the Absolute". **4.** *Atmānam āpnuyāt* is an expression for the state of liberation; it cannot mean "reaches his real self" if such an expression implies any theory of Illusion (Prof. Deussen, VPTM. p. 634). " *Āhuḥ* " in 13 shows that a School other than that in 308 is probably referred to here and verse 14 shows that this other School is the Sāṃkhya School (see 307. 40, 47; 306. 43 etc. where the Sāṃkhya is said to have only twentyfive principles). *Etad nistattvam* in 13c–d refers to *kevala* in 13a. *Ajarāmaram* 13d–the Yogas would never allow that the Supreme Being becomes subject to old age and death, unlike the Sāṃkhyas who held that the Supreme Being itself is bound and again liberated. This postion of the Yogas is quite consistent with their view that the *budhyamāna* (and not the *buddha*) is the creator and destroyer and that the Twentysixth knows the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth eternally (308. 2, 7). The *buddha* serves for the *budhyamāna* as an ideal as it were (308. 11). The *budhyamāna* becomes *kevaladharmā*, not *kevala* itself (12–13); he can come into contact with the *kevala* and hope to be thereby liberated only if the latter is eternally a b o v e bondage and liberation (13). **5.** In my opinion we have here a protest of the Yogas against the custom of the Sāṃkhyas who called the Supreme Being (the Twentysixth of the Yogas) "a *tattva*" on the ground that it resorts to the *tattvas*. According to the Yogas, the Supreme One never resorts to the *tattvas* as we have seen in 308. 6–8, and therefore it can never be called a *tattva* even in the secondary sense. In other words, the Yogas do not admit that the *budhyamāna* becomes the *buddha* in liberation; the *buddha* never resorts to the principles at all during its eternal existence. The position of the Sāṃkhyas, "*tattvasaṃśrayaṇāt tattvam*", is often met with in the L. MBh. e. g. in 302. 38:

" *Pañcaviṃśatitamo Viṣṇur nistattvas tattvasaaṃjñitaḥ |*
tattvasaṃśrayaṇād etat tattvam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ ||

See also 306. 41; 307. 47; 306. 43; 302. 38; **6**. "But he is not possessed of principles" amounts to "he never resorts to the principles". **7–8**. Here the followers of the Yoga emphatically assert their view that the Supreme Being is in no sense a *tattva*; he is a *nistattva*. **9**. i. e., He is not a 'principle with the characteristic *buddhatva*,' but is no principle at all, though he should be called the Twetysixth, as these Yogas do. The followers of the Yoga object to the term *tattva* being applied to the Supreme Being and, for this reason, are bound to reject the Supreme Being of the Sāṃkhyas whom they called "*buddha*" and also "*tattva*". Again, "*buddhatvalakṣaṇaṃ tattvam* ", "a principle (and again) called *buddha*", is to be found only in the Sāṃkhya School, not in the Yoga; the latter would accept *buddhatvalakṣaṇaṃ nistattvam*. This seems to be the sense of verse 15. As regards the position of the Sāṃkhyas, 306. 44 when considered along with 307. 37 would mean that the Twentyfifth who, when influenced by *prakṛti*, is called *budhyamāna*, becomes *kevala* (306. 44d) and *buddha* ("now I am *buddha*" 307. 37c) when he knows himself (306. 44c). The Yogas refused to accept the identity of the two. **10**. The repetition of *ajarāmara* (in 13, 16) shows that it forms an important argument of the Yogas; the Jîva is subject to death and old age, the Supreme Being is according to Yoga eternally free from these; there is no possibility of there being complete identity between the two even after the former's absolution. *Aham iti gṛhyamaṇaḥ* refers to the method of meditation, in which the object of meditation is thought of as identical with the self of the meditator. "*Kevalena balena eva* " is a simple expression and means "only per force" i. e. "never in reality"; the reason is, as explained above, that the *ṣaḍviṃśa* is not like the *pañcaviṃśa*; there can be no real identity between the two; the identity achieved during the meditation is an unreal conjectural one, as it is based upon mere force and on no reasonable grounds. Prof. Hopkins has failed to notice the emphasis underlying the expression " *kevalena balen eva*" and then he comes to the conclusion quite contrary to the one given above (see GEI. p. 135). Prof. Edgerton interprets it as, "by the mere abstract power" and adds, by way of explanation, "the power of this knowledge"; I do not think "*balena*" should be here interpreted as "the power of knowledge"; the context shows that all identity of the individual soul with the Supreme One is denied here (Prof. Edgerton, AJP, Vol. XLV, 1924). Prof. Edgerton, seems to have followed Prof. Deussen (VPTM p. 635). All the three interpretors believe that in the present verse the

identity is taught by the Yogas. But the next verse solves the problem. **11**. This seems to mean: The Twentyfifth never becomes identical with the Twentysixth because though the former is *budhymāna*, the latter is *prabuddha*. This was already said in verse 6: "Even he (i e. the *budhyamāna*) does not know the Great Atman". "*Prabuddha*" shows that the *buddha* eternally knows the *budhyamāna* who knows the former only during liberation. **12**. "*Nānātva*" in verse 17 refers to the difference between the Yogas and the Sāṃkhya Schools. In 13 and 14 the Sāṃkhya doctrine has been introduced as the view of an opponent; and the word "*tu*" in 13c shows the same. Again, the remarks, "it is not like *tattva*" (14b) and "That intelligent one is *nistattva*, and has no *tattva*" (15a–b) indicate that here the Sāṃkhya view has been rejected; because elsewhere in the Sāṃkhya text (302–307) it is always said that though the Twentyfifth (of the Sāṃkhyas, of course) is a non–principle, it is yet a principle because it resorts to principles. Moreover we are given here the facts that the *buddha* or the Twentysixth of the Yogas is "no principle characterised as *buddha*"; that the identity of the Jîva and the Supreme Soul is a forced one; and that the *budhyamāna*, as compared with the *buddha* is ignorant. All these arguments show that the difference between the Yoga and the Sāṃkhya Schools is meant here by the word "*nānātva*". In 308. 1.c–d we are told that "the Yogas having made the Atman multiple (i. e. twofold, as already shown above) describe the same (n. plu.) (principles)"; and it is exactly in agreement with this statement that these verses (308. 9c–d—17) explain the difference between the two Schools on the problem of the Yoga view of Atman. The Yogas actually taught two Atmans, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth. Verse 14 has clearly said that the Sāṃkhyas accept only twentyfive *tattvas* including the Twentyfifth as *tattva* because it resorts to the *tattvas*; there is no indication here that the Sāṃkhyas accepted the Twentysixth. Prof. Deussen translates verse 17 as follows: " But when he has become awakened through the awake Twentysixth, he [still] continues being ignorant (so ist er weiter erkenntnislos, 17a–b which, however, has nothing like "weiter"), because this [opposition of the subject and the object in the act of knowing] is explained to be still a plurality according to the view of the Sāṃkhyas and the Scripture (17c–d)". And Prof. Hopkins (10c. cit. p. 135) explains the same in the following manner, "That separateness of spirits (*nānātva*, M.) which is part of the exposition of Sāṃkhya is really (explained by) the conditioned spirit (*budhyamāna*? M.) when not fully (? M.

enlightened (*abuddhimān*, M.) by the (fully) (? M.) enlightened Twentysixth ".* Prof. Edgerton takes "*etan nānātvam ity uktam*" (17c) to mean "This (consciousness) implies plurality" (Prof. Edgerton, AJP. Vol. XLV, 1924). It will be seen that all these interpretors have not realised the importance of the terms *budhyamāna* and *buddha* as names of metaphysical principles. It is difficult to understand what meaning Prof. Deussen makes out of 17a–b. Though the term *nānātva* can mean "plurality", it can also mean "difference", as in the present case. Moreover, I do not think that in 308 we have anywhere "the opposition of the subject and the object". As regards Prof. Hopkins' translation, I have shown that the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya knows nothing of the plurality of individual souls implied in his words " separateness of spirits ". (There is a separateness of spirits here, viz., that of the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth; but this is far from Prof. Hopkins' meaning.) Moreover, his translation is too free to be of any value in understanding the text. There are other minor differences between my interpretation and those of others; these have not been noticed here. It will be seen that the second point of difference between the two Schools of L. MBh, to be presently noticed, will also prove the correctness of the interpretation proposed by me above.

The above translation of 308. 9c–d—17 and the notes added to it, which fully refute the incorrect interpretations of Prof. Hopkins and Prof. Deussen, prove that the L. MBh. Yoga differed from the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya as regards the Atman. The Yoga believed in two Atmans, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth, while the Sāṃkhyas believed in only one viz., the Twentififth. The Twentififth of the Yoga is the creator and destroyer, and their Twentysixth has nothing to do with the world. The Yogas objected to calling the latter a *tattva* and rejected the Sāṃkhya view on that point.

As a natural consequence of the separation of the Jîva from the Supreme Being, which this Yoga School taught for

* Bracketed additions marked M. (Modi) are my own.

the first time in the history of the Indian Philosophy, they were led to reject the then existing view about the nature of liberation or release from worldly existence. But as this Yoga School found itself confronted specially by the Sāṃkhyas, the explanation of their teaching on this point, like that on the question of the separateness of the Jîva from the Lord, has assumed the form of a criticism of the Sāṃkhya view on the same topic. This has been already suggested in the verses translated above. The " bondage " was said to consist in the *budhyamāna* becoming attached to the world (308. 5). It was said that the *budhyamāna* does not know the Great Atman [during his bondage] (308. 6), and that when he thinks himself to be other [than the Twentysixth] he comes into possession of Prakṛti (308. 9c–d, 10a–b), and that when he "knows (i. e. acquires) the pure knowledge" he attains the *buddha*–state like (that of) the Twentysixth. The fact that he does not himself become the Twentysixth was made clear by stating that in absolution he becomes (not *kevala* but) *kevaladharmā* (308. 12c). This last one is the point emphatically stated in verses 18-30 to be now examined.

The Conception of the *summum bonum*: the Jîva becomes like Paramātman, not Paramātman Himself.

" The identity (*ekalva*) of this Twentyfifth united with the Conscious One (*cetanena sametasya*)[1], takes place, when he (i. e. the Twentyfifth) does not cognise [any longer] by means of the intellect[2] [and not when he merges himself into the Supreme Being, the Twentysixth, as Prof. Hopkins implies] (18). When the *budhyamāna* attains equality (*samatāṃ yāti*) with the *prabuddha*, he 'whose nature was attachment' (*saṃgadharmā*) becomes unattached[3] (19). Having reached the unattached, the Twentysixth, the unborn and omnipresent, the omnipresent [Jîva] abandons the Unmanifest, the Twentyfourth, when he knows it to be worthless, through the knowledge of the Twentysixth (20-21a-b)[4]. Here the *apratibuddha*, the *budhyamāna* and the *buddha* have been to-day described to you in their proper way according

Evidence for the same.

to the teaching in the [Yoga] Sruti (21c–d, 22a–b). The similarity and the dissimilarity (*ekatva* and *nānātva*)[5] [of the *budhyamāna* and the *buddha*[6]] should be seen from the teaching in the [Yoga] Scripture as follows (*etāvad*) (22c–d): The dissimilarity (*anyatva*) between these two [the *budhyamāna* and the *buddha*] is like that between the fruit of the tree of Ficus Glomerata and the worm [residing in it]; the distinction (*anyatva*) between the two can be perceived also as that between the fish and the water[7] (23). Only thus[8] (*evam eva*) should be understood the non–identity and identity and of these two. This [knowledge of the identity and the non–identity] together with the knowledge of the Unmanifest (i. e. the Nature, the *apratibuddhaka*, the Twentyfourth) is called [in the Yoga School] the liberation (24)[9]. They [i. e. the Sāṃkhyas] say that this one here, viz., the Twenty fifth who lives in the [various] bodies [by turn] is to be made free from the sphere (or power) of the Unmanifest (25)[10]. It is the decision [of the Yogas] that he [i. e. " the Twentyfifth in the body "][11] might be released only in this way and not otherwise[12]. Having associated[13] with the Highest[14] he comes to possess the attributes of the Highest (26). Having come into association ("*sametya*," occuring four times in 27–30) with the pure (*śuddha*), the Awakened (*buddha*), the [ever–] liberated (*mukta*) the one whose nature is [eternal] separation [from *prakṛti*], who possesses absolution, whose nature is pure, who is absolute and independent,– the Twentyfifth comes to possess as his attributes purity, awakening (*buddhi*), liberation, separation (Kumbh. ed.), purity..... and becomes independent " (308. 27–30)[15].

The Sāṃkhyas criticised by the Yogas.

NOTES.—**1.** Compare this with " *kevalena samāgamya* " in 13 above. **2.** i. e., ceases to be " Unmanifest–eyed " (10b). "*Yadā buddhyā na budhyate*" cannot here mean "has no longer any consciousness (of self)" (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 135). **3.** The liberation consists in the *saṃgātmaka* (5d) becoming *niḥsaṃgatmā* (19d). **4.** Verses 21c–d and 22a–b have been

already explained. They mention three independent principles and thus indirectly show that the preceding verses (18–21a–b) are not intended to mean that the *budhyamāna* becomes identical with the *buddha* even in liberation. **5.** *Nānātva* and *ekatva* 22c–d cannot be other than those mentioned in 24b (see below). *Nānātva* is explained as *anyatva* in 23. **6.** That the similarity and dissimilarity intended in 22c–d is that between the two viz., the *budhyamāna* and the *buddha*, is proved not only by my interpretation of 13–17a–b and by the fact that there can be no question of *apratibuddha* being compared with any of these two, but also from *etayoḥ* in 23b, d and 25b. **7.** The Yoga Twentysixth (*buddha*) is here compared with the fruit itself and the Jîva (the *budhyamāna*, the Yoga Twentyfifth) with the worm within it. The Ficus Glomorata is never known to be without a worm or worms within it. The idea underlying these similes as given here seems to be that just as the fruit and the water are greater than the worm and the fish, so the *buddha* is greater than the *budhyamāna* and therefore the two are "never identical". The repetition of *anyatva* shows that here the non–identity of the two is emphasised as in 13–17 also. **8.** "Only thus", *evam eva*, implies a protest against the Sāṃkhyas. It means that the *buddha* is like the *budhyamāna*, but is also greater than the latter. Both are knowing principles, but the *buddha's* knowing is eternal, the *budhyamāna* knows the *buddha* only when he is liberated. **9.** It should be noted that verse 24 gives the Yoga view of liberation. This view maintains the non–identity (though likeness also) of the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth even during absolution. **10.** After having stated their own view (24), it is just proper for the Yogas to mention the Sāṃkhya standpoint, which they wanted to refute. *Prāhuḥ* (25c) shows that the hostile view is mentioned here and the statements about the *pañcaviṃśatika* leave no doubt that the Sāṃkhya is meant here. **11.** This expression, though used by the Sāṃkhyas, applies well to the Twentyfifth of the Yogas also and therefore they welcome it. **12.** The emphatic expressions: *evam.....nānyathā* (23), *iti viniścayaḥ* (26) and *evam eva* (24) are not meaningless, only if we suppose that the Sāṃkhya view is criticised here from the Yoga standpoint. So, the Yogas do not accept the Sāṃkhya view, that the *budhyamāna* becomes *buddha* in liberation or that the Twentyfifth is both the individual and the universal soul. **13.** Note the Yogas' emphatic use of "*sametya*" (26). Cf. *sametasya* in 18 and *āsādya* in 20. **14.** I follow the v. l. in the Kumbh. ed. which runs as follows:–"*pareṇa paradharmā*

ca bhavty eṣa sametya vai". The reading in he Bombay ed., *paraśca paradharmā ca bhavaty eṣa sametya vai*", is inconsistent with the word "*sametya*" in it and seems to have been introduced by some one who believed the Yoga to teach the identity of Jîva and Paramātman. **15**. After reading all the verses (18–30) it would appear clear that Prof. Deussen and Prof. Hopkins are not right in understanding *nānātva* (in 22,24) to refer to the doctrine of the plurality of individual souls (VPTM. p. 635; GEI. p. 135). It is evident that *nānātva* here (as invariably in all other places where Prof. Hopkins takes it to mean plurality of souls–see App. III) is explained by the text itself as *anyatva* (308.23) and both *nānātva* and *ekatva* of 22 refer to only two (and not to many) in 308.24. We have here (22–24) not "the two theories of separateness [of many souls] and unity [of two, the Jîva and the Lord], but only one theory of the identity and non–identity (*bhedābheda* in a sense) of the Jîva and Îśvara.

The above interpretation of 308.18–30 and the notes on the same will have shown that the Yogas differed for the Sāṃkhyas on the point of the nature of liberation. Verses 13–17 show that the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth of the Yogas (or, in other words the individual soul and the Supreme Being) are different in their very nature; thus they mean indirectly that the two are not identical during bondage (*saṃsāra*); and verses 18–30 aim at emphasing their non–identity even after the liberation of the Jîva. According to the Yogas, the Jîva never realises himself as the Supreme Being which is never involved into bondage. So also their identity conceived of during meditation is a forced one (16). The liberated soul (the Twentyfitth in liberation) and the Supreme Being (the Twentysixth) are quantitatively two though, as regards their attributes they may be said to be qualitatively one.

No Identity of Jîva and Paramātman, in L. MBh. Yoga.

That the Sāṃkhya is criticised here is proved not only by the Yogas' persistence on the method of salvation described here (24, 26) and by the reference to the Sāṃkhya method of the same (25) which (refence)

finds its parallel in 14, but also by another passage viz., XII. 300. 3–4 which unequivocally says that the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas differed in their method and idea of absolution.

Further evidence.

The Yogas had said : "*Anīśvaraḥ kathaṃ mucyet*" How could the soul be released if he had no God (apart from himself) ? The answer of the Sāṃkhyas, which did not admit of God as distinct from the Jîva, is given in 300. 4–5. It was the *mokṣadarśana* (300. 5) on which the two Schools differed. "*Pratyakṣahetavo Yogāḥ Sāṃkhyāḥ śāstraviniścayāḥ*" (300. 7) should therefore refer to the fact that the Yogas for the first time went against the Scriptures in separating the Jîva from Îśvara. They argued from direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). To them, the idea that God has become bound or that the bound soul becomes God would have appeared most inconsistant. Yet both the Schools had a good number of followers (300. 8). To sum up : The L. MBh. Yogas had made the Atman "multiple" *bahudhā* i. e. twofold : the Jîve and the Îśvara, while they accepted the same twentyfour principles as the Sāṃkhyas (308. 1).

The above explanation of 308. 1–30 contains no indication that the Yogas knew the theory of the plurality of souls. The expression *bahudhā* (308. 1) means *dvidhā* according to the context, as explained above. *Nānātva* in 308. 17 or in 308. 22 and 24 has no reference to that theory, as is evident from my translation and notes. I have also shown that even the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya did not believe that the souls were many (except in 350. 2 for which see App. III). For all these reasons, both Prof. Deussen (VPTM, p. 635) and Prof. Hopkins (GEI, p. 135) must be said to have failed in their efforts to explain *nānātva* (in 308. 17, 22 and 24) as plurality of souls. The latter's interpretation, according to which *nānātva* (22, 24) refers to the plurality or separateness of individual spirits and *ekatva* mentioned in the same breath

No Plurality of Souls in the Yoga Schools.

Mistaken Interpretation of L. MBh. XII. 308 by Prof. Deussen and Prof. Hopkins.

refers to the unity of the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth looks absurd, even independently of the context which restricts both *nānātva* and *ekatva* to "the two" in 308. 24 (and not to "the many" of Prof. Hopkins).

It will have been noticed that throughout this Chapter (308) the Twentysixth is distinguished from the Twentyfifth (or, that the Jîva aspect of the Twentyfifth of the Sāṃkhyas has been fundamentally differentisted from the Īśvara and Mukta aspect of the same so as to make them numerically two). Again, the Sāṃkhyas are twice said to have only Twentyfive principles (308. 14, 25); these statements are exceedingly important because they occur in the midst of other statements mentioning the Twentysixth (308. 7 11, 16, 17, 20, 21). So, the Twentysixth mentioned here is that of the Yoga School, not that of the Sāṃkya. Moreover, I have already shown that the Twentysixth in XII. 318. 79e–f is that of the Aupaniṣadas and does not belong to the Sāṃkhyas as their Twentisixth, though the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas is not different from the Twentifilth of the Sāṃkhyas. Finally, as yet nobody has shown any passage in the entire Mahābhārata stating that the Twentyfifth becomes the Twentysixth in the state of liberation. This was, indeed, impossible (a) in the Aupaniṣada School because their Twentifilth and Twentysixth were respectively *akṣara* and *puruṣa*; (b) in the Yoga Schools because they denied that the Twentysixth, *akṣara* (with the Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas) or *puruṣa* (with the Rudra Yogas) and the Twentifilth were numerically one; and lastly (c–d) in the Sāṃkhya and the Pāñcarātra Schools because they believed only in twentyfive principles. The effort of Prof. Hopkins to find the Twentysixth (of the Sāṃkhya School!) in 307 which nowhere mentions the name " Twentysixth " but on the contrary says that the Sāṃkhyas have no principle higher than the Twentyfifth (307. 47) is not a well guided one. The " friend " (*bandhu*) mentioned in 307. 27, who is neither

The Twentifilth never becomes the Twentysixth in the L.MBh. Schools.

explicitly nor implicitly said to be the Twentysixth, should be construed like the two " friends " in Śve. Up. IV. 6, which knows nothing about the separation of the Jîva and Īśvara (see Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 133).

Just as the origin of the Classical Sāṃkhya is to be traced to the rejection of the higher Nature, so we find, according to the above interpretation of the L.MBh., that the origin of the Classical Yoga lies in the rejection of the traditional identity of the Jîva and Īśvara inherited from the days of the Earliest Prose Upaniṣads. The idea of God in the Yoga System was not arrived at by superimposing it on an atheistic Sāṃkhya System with twentyfive principles, but by distinguishing the Jîva from God on practical grounds, viz., (1) on the argument that the actual experience (*pratyakṣa*) shows that they should be always numerically two, though not qualitatively, and thererefore the Scripture (*śāstra*) may be set aside on this point (300. 4–5); (2) on the belief that God is eternally beyond old age and death, while the Jîva undergoes bondage (*saṃsāra*) (308. 16c.); (3) by making the Jîva (who is separate from God from the beginning) the creator and destroyer of the world (308. 2); and finally (4) by keeping him distinct from God both during bondage and liberation :—in short by the rejection of the identity of Jîva and God (i. e. *akṣara* or *puruṣa*, as the case may be) taught in the Oldest Prose and Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and in the Gītā and inherited by the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas. Not only is this origin of the Yoga conception of a transcendent and supercosmic God supported by the text (308), but also there is nothing unreasonable in the process of its being obtained by the rejection of *jīveśvarayor abheda* instead of its being attributed, rather superficially, to a *nirīśvara* Sāṃkhya. It is probable that originally the word *nirīśvara* may have meant what the word *anīśvara* means in the L.MBh. (" one not having any God separate from the Jîva–

Discovery of the Origin of the Classical Yoga Doctrine of Transcendent God : Abandonment of the Upaniṣadic Identity of Jîva and Brahman.

300. 3). Thus the Chapter (XII. 308) clearly shows that the idea of a supercosmic God who serves, as it were, only as an ideal for the Jîva, had been reached long before the theory of the plurality of souls was known.*

Historical Importance of MBh. XII. 308.

The importance of Chapter 308 of MBh. XII is as great as that of the passages which show that the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas rejected the higher Nature of the Aupaniṣadas. This Chapter (308) clearly proves that the Yoga was one definite philosophical School in the days of the L. MBh.; that it differed from the Sāṃkhya on the nature of the Jîva and Îśvara; that the Yogas had a Twentysixth principle but the Sāṃkhyas had only twentyfive; and lastly that the origin of the idea of God in the Classical Yoga is to be traced not to a superficial ascription of God to an atheistic Sāṃkhya System, but to the rejection of the Upaniṣadic oneness of God and the soul. If the importance of this Chapter (308) and the passages which refer to the rejection of the higer Nature had been realised, the four Schools of the later Mahābhārata would have been clearly distinguished from each other.

Adoption of the L. MBh. Yoga terminology by other contemporary Schools.

I have already suggested that the new teminology of *aprati-buddha, budhyamāna* and *buddha*, which probably originated in the L. MBh. Yoga School (307. 48), was also adopted by the other Schools. It would be therefore interesting here to note the different conceptions of the principle called *budhyamāna* in the three different Schools with which we are here concerned. The Aupaniṣadas called

* The one soul of this L.MBh. Yoga was omnipresent (308. 20), and this must be the reason that when, in the later history of Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools, the doctrine of the plurality of souls arose, the many souls were also taught to be omnipresent.

their higher Nature *budhyamāna avyakta* " the knowing Unmanifest" because their *akṣara* is a living conscious principle (MBh. XII. 305. 31–35, see pp. 38, 42 above). The Sāṃkhyas gave the name of *budhyamāna* to the bound soul which became *buddha* in the liberated state (MBh. XII. 306. 44, 307. 37). This was their highest principle, the Twentyfifth (MBh. XII. 306. 43; 304. 9; 302. 32; 307. 47; 308. 14). The Yogas said hat the *budhyamāna* obtains the state of the *buddha* (*buddhatva*) i.e. becomes like the *buddha*, but the two are eternally two, as we have seen above. (This was perhaps the origin of the term *buddha* which later on in the days of Buddhism became the property of the Buddhistic School with a definite sense.)

The Conception of " *budhyamāna* " in all the Schools.

Origin of the term " *buddha* " older than Buddhism.

Thus, the Yoga is a System of what may be appropriately termed a Double Dualism, viz., one dualism of Matter and Spirit, as that of the Sāṃkhya; and another of two Spirits, i.e., the Jîva and the impersonal Brahman or the personal *puruṣa*. The special contribution of this L. MBh. School of Yoga lies, as already stated, in the fact that it consciously separated the individual from the Supreme Soul for the first time in the history of the Indian Philosophy. This Spiritual Dualism should be distinguished from the Spiritual Dualistic Monism of the EMU and the Gîtā which consisted of the higher Nature and the *puruṣa* both of which are called Atmans. The L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas had a Pluralistic Dualism because they enumerated *akṣara, puruṣa* and the lower Nature as three principles, but the last was not considered to be eternal while these Yogas who regard the Jîva as an independent principle like the Twentyfourth and the Twentysixth have really three eternal principles which, however, as explained above, stand to each other in the relation of a Double Dualism. The Oldest Prose Upniṣads knew nothing about any dualism

Progress made by the L. MBh. Yogas.

The Doctrine of "Double Dualism of Spirit and Matter."

or Dualistic Monism. They had said: "Brahman is one only, without a second". That was not yet the age of synthesis and antithesis but that of mere thesis. The Age of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads, the Gītā, and the later Mahābhārata, although it started with the intention of providing a synthesis for the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads (Remember–Mu. Up. 1. 2 does nothing except placing *akṣara* and *puruṣa* side by side) is really an age of antithesis, when we compare it with that of the Brahmasūtras. But this latter had its forerunner in the L. MBh. Pāñcarātra School, which we shall examine in the next Section.

4. The Pāñcarātra School.

The text of the L. MBh. Pāñcarātras is the Nārāyanaṇīya Section (MBh. XII. 334–351). Whenever their views are quoted elsewhere in the Mahābhārata, the text refers to these as belonging to another School i.e. the School of the Pāñcarātra. An example of the latter is found in MBh. XII. 210. 10–11 and 14 (see p. 30 above). The accuracy with which the views of the Pāñcarātra School are mentioned in the L. MBh. is a sufficient guide to distinguish its doctrines from those of other Schools.

Pāñcarātra Chapters in the L. MBh.

The most striking phenomenon that we find in the Pāñcarātra School is its complete identification of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. "This (Nārāyaṇa) is the one auspicious form of that which is the Immutable (*akṣara*), the Unmanifest (*avyakta*), the Lord, the cause of the world, the Unchanging (*kūṭastha*), the Agent (*kartṛ*), devoid of "the pairs" (*dvandvas*), whom they knew as the non–Agent (*akartṛ*)....." (XII. 342. 125–126). In another passage Nārāyaṇa is "the unborn ancient *puruṣa*", "the Lord", and also the source of the world, the abode of the Immortal, "the Subte" (*sukṣma*) ..... (XII. 346. 21–22). There are many other passages of the same type, which identify the impersonal with the personal (XII. 334. 29–31a–b, 339.

Identification of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

29; 340. 44; 351. 17–18). The terms for *akṣara* in the EMU and the Gītā are thus included here in those of the *puruṣa*; as a result Nārāyaṇa could be described as he who is not to be seen with the eye, not to be touched with the sense of touch etc., i.e. exactly in the fashion of the description of *akṣara* in Bṛ. Up. IV. 5. 15. Especially noteworthy is the term *vidyā* which the Śve. Up. (V. 1) used for *akṣara*, and the L. MBh. Sāṃkhya for *puruṣa* or the Twentyfifth (307. 1–2; see pp. 44–45 above) and which these Pāñcarātras could only use for an innate power of the *puruṣa*, always in his "company" though he is "alone" (MBh. XII. 339. 68, 72; 342. 95; 344. 12 c–d; 347, 19). If the historical development in the meaning of *vidyā* and *avidyā* is lost sight of, a great confusion is inevitable (Prof. Hopkins, GEI. p. 104 and p. 136). Its position in the L. MBh. Pāñcarātra School shows that the latter identified *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. Even the later development of the Pāñcarātra Sect also confirms this view (see Prof. Schrader, Introduction to the Pāñcarātra, pp. 62–64 and p. 78).

Revival of the Oldest Description of *akṣara*.

The term *vidyā*.

This combination of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* under the name of Nārāyaṇa was called by the Pāñcarātras "the Twentyfifth" (XII. 339. 43).

Nārāyaṇa, named the Twentyfifth.

NOTE.—The three passages mentioning *vidyā* as conceived of in the three Schools may be quoted here for facilitating their comparison :—

(1) *Dve akṣare brahmapare tv anante vidyāvidye nihite yatra gūḍhe |*

kṣaram tv avidyā hy amṛtaṃ tu vidyā vidyāvidye īśate yas tu soऽnyaḥ ||

(Śve. Up. V. 1)

(2) *Avidyām āhur avyaktaṃ sargapralayadharmi vai |*
sargapralayanirmuktāṃ vidyām vai pañcaviṃśakaḥ ||

(MBh. 307. 2). Cf. also MBh. 307. 11a–b where we read about the same two : *Ubhāv ev ākṣarāv uktāv ubhāv etāv anakṣarau.*"

(3) *Ekākī vidyayā sārdhaṃ viharişye jagat punaḥ |*
tato bhūyo jagat sarvaṃ kariṣyāmīha vidyayā || (339. 72)

Or

vidyāsahāyo yatrāste bhagavān havyakavyabhuk |

(344. 12c–d).

If we remember that in its original conception this *vidyā* is a living, conscious principle (see p. 15 above), we can also understand the great religious movement of the Śākta Sect and also Sakti– or Devî–worship prevalent even now in some form or other all over India. It could not have originated from a personification of the dead, inanimate, unconscious Nature or *prakṛti* of the Classical or L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas. The first root of it is in the " *śakti* " of Śve. Up. I. 3 and the *jîvabhūtā parā prakṛti* of the Gîtā (VII. 5).

Another point in the doctrinal teaching of this School is that the Nature or *prakṛti* which should be regarded as the Twentyfourth of this School is said to be "born of Nārāyaṇa". This is undoubtedly the natural result of the Pāñcarātras' conception of Nārāyaṇa who is *puruṣa* identified completely with *akṣara* (as the goal) and yet having as his "*sahāya*" *vidyā*, as said above. This Nature which is thus the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas (born of *akṣara* the higher Nature—Bh. Gî. III. 15, Mu. Up. I. 1. 9) is often described in the Nārāyaṇîya Section: 'From Him (i. e. *puruṣa* in 334. 30) is born the Unmanifest possessed of three *guṇas*" (334. 31); "The Unmanifest dissolves into the actionless *puruṣa*" (339. 29–31); "He whom the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas call Paramātman.....From Him is born the Unmanifest which the wise know as *pradhāna* (340. 28c–d, 29c–d; see also 347. 16a–c).

The Nature, the Twentyfourth, "born" of Nārāyaṇa.

Like Nature, the Jîva or individual soul is also described as emerging from and returning unto the *puruṣa*. A reference to App. III. which discusses among others the two chapters of the Nārāyaṇîya Section on the plurality of souls would show that the *puruṣa* of the Pāñcarātras is called the *yoni* (i. e. "source", or "matrix") of the souls, and this agrees with other passages, such as 334. 42 and 335. 2 where an individual soul is said to have "come forth" (*prasṛta*) from the Atman (*ātma-prabhava*). But though in one passage (343. 14) Nārāyaṇa is called the "creator of the self" (*saṃvabhūtāmabhāvana*), we may justly doubt that this means an abandoning of the general Indian belief that transmigration, i. e. the individual soul, has no beginning. For, in another passage (350.23) even the God Brahman is said to have created and go on creating "many souls". And there can be but little doubt that here, as throughout in the later Pāñcarātra, the liberated are thought of as persons different from, though united with and similar to Nārāyaṇa. Such seemingly advaitic phrases like *māṃ praviśya* (339. 43) or *paramātmā bhaviṣyati* (349. 48) should not mislead us (Cf. Schrader, Introduction to the Pāñcarātra, p. 91 fll.). For, the inhabitants of Śvetadvîpa are all of them "awakened", i. e., liberated (*prati-buddhāś ca te sarve*), and God is "pleased in their company" (*taiḥ sārdhaṃ ramate*) (343. 53–64). Indeed, Śvetadvîpa is nothing else than the place of the liberated (and, according to Prof. Schrader, identical *mutatis mutandis* with the umbrella-shaped "rock of the liberated" of the Jainas). And though a further progress from Śvetadvîpa to the "Thousand–rayed God is indicated (339.129–130; cf. 339. 19–20), which presumably takes place when *pralaya* comes (cf. the *kramamukti* in Śaṅkara's Vedanta), we may safely assume that, as in the later Pāñcarātra, the difference between the liberated and the non–liberated continues even during the cosmic Night, and that, when the latter ends, it is the non–liberated who are "created", i. e., sent out again into the world. There would, indeed, be no sense in teaching liberation at all, if in *pralaya*

The Individual Souls and their Relation to Nārāyaṇa.

both the liberated and the non-liberated would get rid of individual existence.*

Progress made by the Pāñcarātra School.

Thus, what the history of Indian Philosophy owes to these Pāñcarātras is the identification of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* into one goal. This identification is not to be found in the whole of the Gîtā, except in Bh. Gî. XIII. 12–17. What Garbe has said about the conception of the Supreme Being in the Gîtā applies to this passage only out of the entire Gîtā and to the entire Nārāyaṇîya Section of ths Mahābhārata. In the Pāncarātra Doctrine we have no dualism of any kind whatsoever; because *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are not to be distinguished; and *prākṛti* is "born" of Nārāyaṇa.

No Dualism.

Comparison of the Pāñcarātra with other Schools.

Though both the Pāñcarātra and the Sāṃkhya are Systems recognising only twentyfive principles, the former has only one eternal principle (the individual souls, though eternal, not being counted as different from the Universal Spirit, but admitted as existing within that Spirit itself), while the Sāṃkhyas teach two eternal entities viz., Spirit and Matter. The Yoga Schools and the Aupaniṣada System differ from the Pāñcarātra in so far as each of them accepts twentysix principles while the latter has only twentyfive. The Pāñcarātra however is nearer to the Aupaniṣada than to the Yoga because the Pāñcarātra like the Aupaniṣada does not distinguish the Jîva as an independent and numerically one principle, and believes that the Nature is not eternal. Moreover, in so far as the Pāñcarātra identifies the *akṣara* with the *puruṣa*, it may be looked upon as more Upaniṣadic than the Yogas who gave up the *akṣara* as the higher Nature and also as the goal (as did the Rudra Yogas) or gave up the *puruṣa* (as was the case with the Hiraṇyagarbha Yagas).

* I am indebted to Professor Schrader for this information about the conception of the Jîva in the Pāncarātra.

The Doctrine of *coincidentia oppositorum*.

One result of this Pāñcarātra doctrine of the identity of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* is that the Supreme Reality is now conceived to be possessed of contradictory attributes. It is both *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*, *kartṛ* and *akartṛ*, etc.; that is to say: it is *saguṇa*, *kartṛ*, etc. like *puruṣa*, and *nirguṇa*, *akartṛ*, etc., like *akṣara*. We may say that the Supreme Being is both *satyakāma*, *satyasaṃkalpa* (Chā. Up. VIII. 1. 5) and *anaṇu*, *ahrasva*, *adîrgha* (Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 8). As the Gîtā puts it, it is possessed of feet etc. (like the *viśvarūpa puruṣa* in Bh. Gî. XI) and it is also devoid of all senses (Bh. Gî. XII. 13–14).

Its Original Meaning.

It is important to notice this nature of the *akṣara=puruṣa* doctrine here, because the explanation of this conception has become one of the chief problems in the later Indian Philosophy. Śaṅkara, who said that the positive attributes of Brahman are unreal and the negative ones are real, went against the historically correct view which regarded both of them as real, (and by " positive attributes " Śaṅkara, understands all attributes i. e., both those given in the Śrutis which refer to *puruṣa* and those that are denied of *akṣara*). Rāmānuja who held that Brahman has all auspicious (*kalyāṇa*) and no objectionable (*heya*) attributes, or, in other words, that Brahman is full of compassion etc., and devoid of cruelty, etc., did not understand the originl sense of passages like Bh. Gî. XIII. 13–16. Vallabha who explained the texts in question as implying that Brahman is possessed of all divine (*alaukika*) and devoid of all worldly (*laukika*) attributes seems to have come to that conclusion after examining exactly what is actually denied and asserted of the Supreme Being in the positive and negative texts of the Scriptures.

Its Meaning according to the Ācāryas.

Is the Pāñcarātra a development of the Gîta doctrine like the later Mahābhārata Sāṃkhya and Yoga, or is it

the protest riased by those who possessed the traditions of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads? To me it appears that predominantly neither of these was the case. The Pañcarātra was in reality a revival of, or a reconciliation of Asceticism with, the Ritualism of the Brāhmaṇas. This is clear from the importance of rites and ceremonies preached in the Nārāyaṇîya Section; but these were to be performed in the way in which the Gîtā had asked man to perform his worldly duties, i.e., as a dedication to the Supreme Being. The Gîtā taught that acts can be dedicated to the impersonal as well to the personal (Bh. Gî. IV. 24 and IX. 16); and under the influence of this allegorical Yajña philosophy of the Gîtā the Pāñcarātras revived the old Vedic cult. The traces of such a revival of or probably reconciliation with the Vedic religion are found in the Gîtā itself (see p. 28 above). Also the same devotional spirit (*bhakti*) of the Gîtā, which pervades throughout the Nārāyaṇîya Section) led them to the mystic identification of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. Their "one-mindedness" (*ananyatā* of Bh. Gî. VIII. 14, 22; IX. 30, 13, 22; XI. 54; XII. 6) was more intensive than that of the Gîtā because in the latter it was either for *akṣara* or for *puruṣa* (Bh. Gî. XII. 1), while the former could not think that there was the possibility of an option being given to a devotee as regards the choice of the object of his meditation or devotion, and therefore identified the two then known objects of reverence.

Origin of the Pāñcarātra School: Reconciliation or Revival of Vedic Religion under the Bhakti-teaching of the Gîtā.

A similar rejection of the idea of "two goals" resulting in a similar admission of only one goal was achieved by the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas on a quite rationalistic basis, as is clear from their rejection of the higher Nature. There is no wonder, therefore, that the text of the L. MBh. represents all these three and also the Aupaniṣada School as having been on friendly terms with one another. In a sense all of them felt to be on an equal level (MBh. XII. 348. 82-83; 249. 1 etc.).

That they had all of them the same goal is a fact repeatedly mentioned in the Nārāyaṇîya Section (XII. 349. 68c-d—70, 73). As we have seen, the goal in all of them was *akṣara*, or *puruṣa*, or both (see p. 55 above); and coming undoubtedly after the much revered Gîtā which consistently taught either of these to be the goal, none of these four Schools was likely to quarrel with the others for the doctrine concerning the Supreme Being. In the light of the teaching of the Gîtā they all felt that each of them and therefore all of them were in a way —and only in a way because they had their own doctrinal differences also—different paths to the same *summum bonum*. Though in the days of the Ācāryas and in our own days this form of tolerance and sympathy may seem incomprehensible, it was not so in the Mahābhārata Age because the catholic spirit and teaching of the Gîtā were not yet forgotten.

Pāñcarātra School also, a Path to the same Goal.

Under the influence of the Gîtā, though much later than the Mahābhārata, a further philosophical movement also took place, which explained and in so doing modified the Pāñcarātra doctrine of the identity of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. The result of this movement was recorded in the Brahmasūtras. The Pāñcarātras never discussed with their fellow-philosophers their doctrinal differences which we have noticed above. The Nārāyaṇîya Section unlike the other Sections of MBh. XII, avoids all arguments and reasonings. There is a kind of mysticism about the union of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. (The "Aniruddha-theology" is not any reasoned-out doctrine against any other School.) It is the author of the Brahmasūtras who gives reasons for the equality of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, and in doing so he acts like the "saints" mentioned in MBh. XII. 318. 56, 78 (see p. 40 above). This further development of the doctrine which came into existence with the Earlier Metrical Upniṣads we shall examine in the next Chapter.

Further Development, the Brahmasūtras.

CHAPTER IV.

AKṢARA IN THE BRAHMASŪTRAS.

The aphoristic language of the Brahmasūtras is a real obstacle to the right interpretation of the Sūtras and does not assure as much success as one may expect in the case of the Mahābhārata. Yet, if once the key of their proper explanation is found out, this very obstacle becomes a help because though aphoristic the Sūtras are arranged into certain groups of aphorisms which are connected with each other in a logical train of ideas. The writer of this Thesis believes to have discovered this key and though he may not have—and he does feel that he has not—been able to understand correctly every one and every word of the aphorisms he has attempted to interpret, he thinks, the general sense of the Sūtras cannot, originally, have been very different from what he has suggested it to be. And thus it is that he has ventured to include their discussion in this work.

Claim for the Discovery of the Original Meaning of the Sūtras.

First of all it should be noticed that even Śaṅkara had not always the original readings or divisions (*adhikaraṇas*) of the Sūtras before him, and in most of such cases all the later Bhāṣyakāras too will be found to have shared the same fate. This will be seen from the suggestions made in Appendix IV, regarding Sūtras III. 3. 26, 38–39, 42, 43, 45–46, 50–51. One more example of this loss of the old tradition may be given here. Br. Sū. II. 3. 18 is "*jnoSta eva*" which means "the Atman is possessed of consciousness (lit. is conscious), on account of the same reason (i. e. "because of the Śrutis", as said in Br. Sū. II. 3. 17)". Now, it is quite probable that the next two apohrisms formed only one and

Mutilation of the Original Sūtras.

meant, "And because out of [the three possible movements that he makes during his worldly life, viz.,] departure from the body, going to the other world, and coming back, the last two are to be made by himself alone" (Br. Sū. II. 3. 19–20). It is a well-known fact that at the time of the departure from the gross body, the God of death or his messengers are supposed to come and take away the Jîva from the body, according to the Scriptures. This leaves no room for the use of the soul's consciousness then. But in the other two cases, the soul exercises its power of knowing and itself directs its way to and from the other world. Thus, the Sūtrakāra supports his argument for *jñatva* "knowerness" of the Jîva. But the fact that Śaṅkara and his successors divide the originally one Sūtra into two and explain them as embodying a *pūrvapaksa* on the topic of the size of the individual soul shows how far the meaning of the Sūtras had been already forgotten even at the time of the Bhāṣyakāras remembered by Śaṅkara. This is confirmed by some interpretations preserved by Śaṅkara of these predecessors of his. See particularly Br. Sū. I. 4. 1–3 (explained later on in this Chapter). So we see that a new interpretation need not be wrong because it differs widely from that of the commentators.

If we study the Sūtras, the most conspicuous point that immediately attracts our attention is a discrimination which the Sūtrakāra makes and which amounts to a dualism which he is not ready to call a dualism of metaphysical principles, but which he would have us understand as *saṃjñābheda* "a Non-identity of Names" (Br. Sū. III. 3. 8) in contrast to "*arthābheda*" "Identity of Goal" (Br. Sū. III. 3. 5). For the sake of convenience we may call this a dual method of meditation on the Highest One (*para*). This Duality of Names is the sole teaching of Br. Sū. III. 3. 1–55 (App. IV). An enumeration of some of the points on the strength of which this duality is put forth by the author of the Sūtras will bring home to the reader the first and foremost problem that the Sūtrakāra has discussed in his work :—

The Sūtrakāra's Discrimination between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

(1) First of all, as said above, the goal in all the Vedanta texts is one and the same, but a distinction in its names is admissible, and on this distinction the Sūtrakāra will base his teaching of two types of the method of meditation, the means to reach the goal (Br. Sū. III. 3. 8, 10, 16, 33). These two names are *pradhāna* (III. 3. 11) and *akṣara* (III. 3.33). (For the terminology of the Sūtrakāra see (9) below.) By *pradhāna* is meant *puruṣa*. In Br. Sū. III. 2. 23 the Sūtrakāra says that the Highest One (*para*– Br. Sū. III. 2. 11) is the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) and in the same connection he says that "Because it has both the designations (i.e. *puruṣa* and *akṣara*), the case is like that of the words "*ahi*" (the name of a serpent without any reference to its posture) and "*kuṇḍala*" (the name of a serpent with special reference to its posture of coil).

Their Designations.

(2) Another discrimination between the two is that *pradhāna* has a form, *akṣara* is formless; and because the latter is the more important than the former (Br. Sū. III. 3. 44), the Supreme Being itself is formless (Br. Sū. III. 2. 14). The fact that *pradhāna* or *puruṣa* has a form is used as an argument for deciding the topic of Mu. Up. II. 1 in Br. Sū. I. 2. 23.

Their Forms.

(3) A third point of discrimination is that in the case of the meditation on *puruṣa* "the collection of thoughts" (*upasaṃhāra*) is obligatory, while in that on *akṣara* it is voluntary and is to be observed only in the case of those attributes of *akṣara* which are mentioned in the text of the particular School ("Branch") to which the meditator belongs (Br. Sū. III. 3. 11, 33, 39, 40, 41).

"Collection" of their Thoughts.

(4) The Sūtrakāra differentiates between the functions (*kārya*) of *pradhāna* and *akṣara*. They are respectively "maintenance" or "sustenance of the world" *saṃbhṛti* and "heaven-pervasion" *dyuvyāpti* (Br. Sū. III. 3. 18, 23).

Their Functions.

(5) The author of the Sūtras distinguishes between three kinds of thoughts or attributes: (a) those of the *puruṣa* (b) those of the *akṣara* and (c) some of both of these which are interchangeable, i.e., which primarily belong to *puruṣa* but which are mentioned by the Śrutis with referance to *akṣara* also. The Sūtrakāra illustrates the last by quoting Tai. Up. II. 1 (*satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*) where, he says, *satya* and those that follow it, though really the attributes of *puruṣa*, are however mentioned as those belonging to *akṣara*. The utility of all these attributes is mentioned above in (3). (See Br. Sū. III. 3. 37–43; App. IV.) Even in Br. Sū. I, where the author has given his explanations of the Śruti–texts, he has kept in mind this "Scriptural Interchange". It appears that in Br. Sū. I. 1–2 the Sūtrakāra has dealt with those texts which according to him refer to *puruṣa* and in Br. Sū. I. 3–4 those which primarily deal with *akṣara* but ascribe to it such attributes as properly belong to *puruṣa*. This original scheme of the Sūtras is suggested by the word "*āyatana*" in Br. Sū. III. 3. 39, which undoubtedly refers to *dyubhvādyāyatanam* in Br. Sū. I. 3.1 (see App. IV).

Interchange of their Thoughts.

(6) The dual method of meditation or, as the Sūtrakāra himself puts it, the option of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* for the purpose of meditation is vigorously upheld by him. Liberation is achieved in either way. If this option of choice is not admitted, then the Scriptures would be violated (Br. Sū. III. 3. 28–30). Both *akṣara*– and *puruṣa*–meditations are Vidyās "Lores leading to Salvation", as in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad which is referred to by the Sūtrakāra on this point (Br. Sū. III. 3. 47). The attainment of *puruṣa* which results in the eternal enjoyment of all objects of desire by the liberated in the company of *puruṣa* is not to be understood as the attainment of a world (*loka*, like the world of the moon etc.), though there is a common feature between the two (Br. Sū. III. 3. 51; App. IV).

Option of Choice between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*

(7) The sūtrakāra finds it necessary to give his opinion regarding the question: which of the two, *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, is more important? He says that the former is "the stronger" (*baliyaḥ*) because it is mentioned in more texts than *puruṣa* is. But at the same time the option of choice from either of the two, given to the meditator, is strongly maintained by him, as already said above (Br. Sū. III. 3. 44–45).

Comparative Importance of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

(8) I may here draw attention to Br. Sū. III. 2. 35 (*sthānaviśeṣāt prakāśādivat*) which answers a *pūrvapakṣa* argument basing the distinction of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* (with their individual attributes) as two principles on the fact that *akṣara* is connected on the one hand with *mahat* and on the other with *puruṣa* (as in Ka. Up. III. 11). The Sūtra (III. 2. 35) replies this by saying that this "connection" (of the two) refers to the "distinction of place" in the Supreme Being. The light is called the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars in connection with its presence in various places; the same is the case with the Supreme Being which is also like the Light as said in Br. Sū. III. 2. 26 (Br. Sū. III 2. 32, 35; App. IV).

Discrimination of " Place " in the Supreme Being.

(9) The distinction that we have seen above is also visible in the Sūtrakāra's terminology. In this connection I wish to point out particularly three terms *para*, *pradhāna* and *akṣara*, which are used by him respectively in the sense of the Supreme Being (irrespective of the personal or the impersonal aspect), the personal, and the impersonal. In using " *para* " for the Highest One, the Sūtrakāra's intention seems to be to avoid a term which would suggest solely *akaṣra* or solely *puruṣa*. This word occurs in Br. Sū. II. 3. 41 ("The Jîva derives his power of action from *para* 'the Highest One' "), II. 3. 46 ("The Jîva's being 'a part', *aṃśa*, [of the Supreme One] is like the case of the Light etc. 'The Highest One' *para* is not such "), III. 2. 11 (" The twofold

The Sūtrakāra's Terminology.

The term "*para*".

statements [containing the *coincidentia oppositorum*] cannot belong to ' the Highest One ', *para*, even from the standpoint of place....."), III. 2. 5 ("[The real nature of the Jîva] is concealed on account of the desire of the ' Highest One ' (*para*) [that it should be so]....."), and IV. 3. 12 ("Jaimini says that the liberated soul goes to the ' Highest One ' *para*....."). All these passages show that throught the Sūtras " *para* " is used consistently for the " Highest One ", as said above. It is so used in Br. Sū III. 3. 54 (Appendix IV). The term *pradhāna* occurs in Br. Sū III. 3. 11 and (as I have suggested in Appendix IV) in III. 3. 43. In both these places where the term is used as a metaphysical principle, the context shows that it is contrasted (in III. 3. 11, III. 3. 33) or compared (III. 3. 43) with *akṣara* (see App. IV for the interpretation of the Sūtras). This fact shows that the word *pradhāna* is consistently used for *puruṣa*. In using this term in this sense, the Sūtrakāra seems to have adopted the terminology of his own days, as he does in the case of many terms like *sūkṣma* and others (Br. Sū. I. 4. 3; see below). "*Pradhāna*" was used in the days of the Mahābhārata exactly for the personal aspect of the Supreme Being as understood by the Sūtrakāra. "He, who is always thus ready and whose mind is pleased, reaches, without delay, t h a t B r a h m a n b y s e e i n g w h i c h o n e c o m e s t o k n o w *p r a d h ā n a*. He is not to be seen with the eye, nor even with all the senses. The Great Atman is seen only by the lamp of the mind. H e h a s t h e e n d s o f h i s h a n d s a n d f e e t o n a l l s i d e s, the eyes and faces in all directions; he possesses ears in all places in the world, and [thus] he stands pervading all" (MBh. XIV 19. 47–49 also see. 18.32). There can be no doubt as to the meaning of the term *pradhāna* in this passage. It is so used probably also in MBh. XII. 340. 39. The Sūtrakāra does not avoid using the older term for the personal aspect of the Supreme Being, I mean, the word *puruṣa* (Br. Sū. III. 3.24; I. 2. 26, see below). This, by the way, is an instructive example for the totally different meanings which the same word as a technical term may have in different Schools (*pradhāna* =*prakṛti* esp. as *avyakta*, in the Classical Sāṃ-

The term " *pradhāna* ".

khya; =the lower Nature in Sve. Up. I. 10). As regards "*akṣara*", Sūtra III. 3. 33 clearly shows that the Sūtrakāra restricts its usage only to the impersonal aspect. So, there can be no doubt that even the terminology of the aphorisms reveals the differentiation between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

The term '*akṣara*'.

(10) The last noteworthy point in the Sūtras in this respect is that in the first Adhyāya of the work certain Śrutis are explained as not referring not only to (the Sāṃkhya) Prakṛti and the Jîva but also to *akṣara*. Śaṅkara and other commentators could not understand that *akṣara* could have been the *pūrvapakṣa* in the interpretation of certain Vedanta texts. In some cases, if we cast a glance at the original *viṣayavākya* it would at once appear that the *pūrvapakṣa* views stated by the commentators had never had the least possibility of having represented any hostile School. Such *pūrvapakṣas* look ridiculous; and the wonder is that they have not yet been questioned by any scholar and that they had escaped the critical eyes even of Dr. Thibaut and Prof. Deussen who were, so far as I know, the only persons to make a thorough study of the Brahmasūtras and commentaries on them.

"*Akṣara*" as a *pūrvapakṣa* in Br. Sū. I.

Dr. Thibaut and Prof. Deussen.

Thus, Br. Sū. I. 2. 24 discusses the topic of the *vaiśvānara* Section of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (Chā. Up. V. 11ff.) The Section begins with the words: "*Ko nu ātmā kiṃ brahma*" (Chā. Up. V. 11. 1) and the text is meant to teach the meditation on the *vaiśvānara* Atman. Śaṅkara's *pūrvapakṣas* are expressed in "*Kim vaiśvānaraśabdena* (1) *jāṭharognir upadiṣyata uta* (2) *bhūtāgnir atha* (3) *tadabhimāninī devatā athavā* (4) *śārīra āhosvit* (5) *parameśvaraḥ*" (Śā Bhā. Br. Sū. I. 2. 24). It would at once appear that out of these the second and the third are the *pūrvapakṣas* discussed in Br. Sū. I. 2. 27, but not in I. 2. 24. The fourth seems to have been refuted in 26, not in 24–25.

Vaiśvānara in Chā. Up.V., *puruṣa*, not *akṣara*.

There was not the least possibility of the "abdominal fire" having been one of the antagonistic views. The only *pūrvapakṣa* refuted in 24–25 seems to have been one about *akṣara* being the topic of Chā. Up. V. 11ff. This is clear from the fact that the Sūtrakāra refers to a text which mentions "*vaiṣvānara* even as *puruṣa*" (Br. Sū. I. 2. 26). Śaṅkara has hit upon the exact Śruti referred to in this Sūtra; but he did not understand why a text mentioning *puruṣa* was specially referred to by the Sūtrakāra. The Jîva is called *puruṣa*, but, as the Sūtra (26) shows, the Jîva is to be refuted; so the Śruti with the word *puruṣa* is used to refute *akṣara*. ("*Tathādṛṣṭyupadeśāt*" and "*asaṃbhavāt*" refute the Jîva view.) In the Gîtā (Bh. Gî. XV. 14) *vaiśvānara* is identified with Kṛṣṇa who stands for *puruṣa* and not for *akṣara*; so the Sūtrakāra is also right in referring to the Bhagavadgîtā.

Let us take another example. Br. Sū. I. 2. 18–20 discusses the topic of the famons *antaryāmibrāhmaṇa* (Bṛ. Up. III. 7. 3ff). Śaṅkara presents the various posssible views in the words: "*Sa* (i.e. *antaryāmī*) (1) *kim adhidaivādyabhimānidevatātmā kaścit* (2) *kiṃvā prāptāṇimādyaiśvaryaḥ kaścid yogī* (3) *kiṃvā paramātmā* (4) *kiṃvārthāntaraṃ kiṃcit.....*" (Śā Bhā. Br. Sū. I. 2. 18.). The last supposition shows that even Śaṅkara felt doubtful if (1) and (2) could have been the *pūrvapakṣas* though he himself proposed them as such. A glance at the Śruti which repeats "*esa ta ātmāऽntaryāmy amṛtaḥ*" with every setence will show that the possibility of Śaṅkara's *pūrvapakṣas* stands precluded even by the original Vedanta text. As is clear from the Sūtras and Śaṅkara's commentary on them, it is Śaṅkara who himself raises these objections and himself gives their refutations. As the "*śārīra*" is refuted in 20, he could not be the *pūrvapakṣa* in 18 and 19. Moreover, the Nature [of the Sāṃkhyas] is refuted in 19 and not in 18; and "*ca*" in *na ca smārtam.....* " (19) shows that one view has been already refuted in 18. So, *akṣara* only (which is not the Nature of the Sāṃkhyas and not the *śārīra* also) is the *pūrvapakṣa* in 18. This is also suggested by the

Antaryāmin in Bṛ. Up. III, *puruṣa*, not *akṣara*.

word "*smārtam*" (19). The Sūtrakāra has in his mind *śrauta avyakta* and *smārta avyakta*: the Gītā mentions these two *avyaktas* and the word *smārta* may as well suggest the lower Nature of the Gītā which is called a Smṛti. The Sūtrakāra does not believe in this lower Nature. So, "*ca*" and "*smārtam*" (in 19) distinctly show that the "*śrauta avyakta*" i. e. *akṣara* is refuted in 18. The attribute (*dharma*) referred to in 18 seems to be the one implied in "*yamayati*" i.e., the act of controlling; according to the Sūtrakāra the governing over the creation (*praśāsana*–Br. Sū. I. 3. 10–11; *saṃbhṛti*–Br. Sū. III. 3. 23) is a function of *puruṣa*, not of *akṣara*.

Br. Sū. III. 3. 18–24 discusses whether Tai. Up. II. 8 mentions *akṣara* or *puruṣa* (see App. IV).

The above examples will be, I believe, sufficient to prove that even in Br. Sū. I the Sūtrakāra distinguishes between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. It is quite probable that even the Aupaniṣadas differed as to whether the topic of certain Śrutis was *akṣara* or *puruṣa*, because in those days both of these were accepted as the objects of meditation.

The foregoing points will show that the discrimination between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, which the Sūtrakāra exhibits throughout his work is so explicit and is so unambiguously expressed that one cannot fail to observe it after the first three Chapters of this Dissertation have been written or read. This differentiation is always present in the mind of the author of the aphorisms and serves him as the guiding principle whether he discusses (1) the names of the "goal", (2) its form or formlessness, (3) collection of its attributes, (4) its functions, (5) the "thoughts" about it (or attributes belonging to it), (6) the option of choice regarding the object of meditation, (7) the comparative importance of the two "names", (8) the doctrines of other Aupaniṣada Schools, (9) the question of the terminology or (10) the textual interpretation. This differentiation of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* appears to me to be the most arresting point in the Sūtras and therefore it has been mentioned first and that too with some details.

Thorough Distinction between *akṣara* and *puruṣa* in the Sūtras.

We have seen above that the distinction between *akṣara* and *puruṣa* is known to the Sūtrakāra. Before trying to ascertain the exact nature of this differentiation, I wish to point out what seems to me to be an indication to the Sūtrakāra's knowledge of the distinction between the two Natures of the EMU and the Gītā, though the Sūtrakāra himself does not accept it. This problem is discussed in Br. Sū. I. 4. 23–28. Having described *avyakta* or *akṣara* (in I. 4. 1–23), the Sūtrakāra says that "It is also *prakṛti* [the word used for the lower Nature by the Aupaniṣadas of his time, and for the Nature by the Sāṃkhyas] because the Proposition and the Illustrations [given in Chā. Up. VI. I. 3, VI. 1. 4–6] are not to be obstructed [in their sense]" (23). "*Ca*" (also) in the Sūtra shows that the author identifies *akṣara* understood in the previous Sūtras with *prakṛti*, so that according to him there is only one Nature viz., the higher Nature or, to speak more accurately, the Supreme Being, which may be called *akṣara* or *puruṣa*, is also the Nature of the creation. The Sruti referred to by him does not mention the lower Nature of the EMU and the Gītā, but describes the creation as directly taking place from "that by (hearing) which the unheard becomes heard....." (Chā. Up. VI. 1. 3). "And [*akṣara* is also *prakṛti*] because 'thought' (*abhidhyā*) is predicated [of the Essential Cause of the Universe in the Scriptures)" (24). Here the author refers to a text like "*soऽkāmayata bahu syām* ....." (Tai. Up. II. 6. 1), which shows that the Nature of the world is a thinking one and therefore goes against *prakṛti* or the lower Nature which is devoid of consciousness according to the EMU and the Gītā. "And [*akṣara* is also *prakṛti*] because both [the evolution and the dissolution of the world] are, in the Scriptures, stated as directly taking place [from

Identification of the two Natures: *akṣara* or *puruṣa* is also the (only) Nature (*prakṛti*).

Akṣara, the Conscious *prakṛti*.

and into it]" (25). "Directly" (*sākṣāt*) is a clear proof that the Sūtrakāra rejects the lower Nature. For that purpose he refers to texts like " *Sarvāṇi ha va imāni bhūtāny ākāśād eva samutpadyante | ākāśaṃ praty astaṃ yānti* "—Chā. Up. I. 9. 1. The fact that "*ubhaya*" in the Sūtra (25) refers to the evolution and the dissolution of the world and that " *sākṣāt* " refers to "*eva*" in the Śruti, goes against Śaṅkara who holds that this Adhikaraṇa is intended to describe *akṣara* as the " *nimitta* " and at the same time the " *upādāna* " cause of the world. "[*Akṣara* is also *prakṛti*] because [the world is] a modification, *pariṇāma*, of *ātmakṛti* i.e. of Brahman or *akṣara* itself creating itself as the creation" (26). The *viṣayavākya* is "*Tad ātmānaṃ svayam akuruta*"—Tai.Up. II. 7. This Śruti says that the creation or what the creator has made is itself the self of the creator (*akṣara*). This is in agreement with Br. Sū. II. 1. 14 and 20 The modification (*pariṇāma*) cannot be the Atman of *akṣara* if it were to take place from the lower Nature. " And [*akṣara* is also *prakṛti*] because it is said to be the source, *yoni*, of the world in the metrical compositions, " (27). In this Adhikaraṇa this is the only Sūtra where the author refers to the EMU and the Gītā, and in doing so he has hit upon a very important statement in these works which always describe *akṣara* as the *yoni* wherein the *puruṣa* lays the seed and from which " all beings " are born. Such passages are Kau. Br. Up. I. 6; Śve. Up. I. 2, VI. 16, V. 6; Mu. Up. I. 3; Bh. Gī. XIV. 3–4, VII. 6. In these, *ākāśa* (meaning Atman), *ātman, Brahman, mahad brahman*, or *jīvabhūtā parā prakṛti* is " the source" *yoni*. So, the lower Nature cannot be the *yoni* described in these words. And because *akṣara* is the *yoni*, it is also *prakṛti* (the lower Nature of the Aupaniṣadas or the Nature of the Sāṃkhyas). In Br. Sū. II. 1. 23, the author says that in the Śruti " *anena jīvena ātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi* " (Chā. Up. VI. 3. 2), "*jīva ātman*" refers to the l i v i n g s e l f of Brahman because the cause of the world is not devoid of consciousness and cannot be explained to be like inanimate objects e.g. a stone etc. All these Sūtras prove

Evidence of the *yoni* passages.

Evidence of "*jīvena ātmanā*" in Chā. Up. VI.

that the Sūtrakāra knows the theory of the two Natures and rejects the lower Nature in so far as he identifies it with the higher one, which is for him the Supreme Being.*

The Sūtrakāra's rejection of the lower Nature was not a novel feature in the history of Indian philosophy. The "saints" (*sādhavaḥ*) in MBh. XII. 318. 56 are said to have held that " One should look upon the two forms of the eternal Unmanifest as one and the same end [of the series of evolution]. " The doctrine of these saints on this particular point seems to have been the same as that of the Sūtrakāra. Moreover, in identifying the lower Nature with the higher one, the author has gone exactly in the opposite direction of what the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas are found to have done (see above pp. 42–44). Both of them are the results of a movement of the same character, but their conclusions are quite different from each other. The Sūtrakāra says that the created world is a living, conscious modification (*pariṇāma*) of the Atman; the Sāṃkhyas said that the world is devoid of consciousness.

Various forms of the Identification of the two Natures.

In this connection we may examine the exact meaning of *akṣara* as the Nature, as taught in the Sūtras. *Avyakta* in the evolutional series of Ka. Up. III. 10–11 is discussed in Br. Sū. I. 4. 1ff. The Sūtrakāra says that it is not "the principle established by inference by the Sāṃkhyas" (*ānumānika*) because " its comprehension (*grahīti*, interpretation) is presented in the allegory of the body [and the chariot] " and that "the Śruti shows it." The "allegory" says that the end of the journey is the Highest Abode of Viṣṇu (Ka. Up. III. 9); so according to the Sūtrakāra "*avyakta*" is "*Viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ pad-*

The Sūtrakāra's Theory of *akṣara* as the Nature: Br. Sū. I. 4. 1–7.

* Though the Sūtrakāra's doctrine of the identity of the lower Nature with the higher one is not entirely different from Śaṅkara's doctrine of " *abhinnanimittopādana* " according to which he explains Br. Sū. I. 4. 23–28, the standpoint from which each of these two discusses the problem, reveals a contrast rather than a resemblance between the two views.

am" mentioned as the terminus of the journey in the allegory. "*Darśayati ca*" in the Sūtra refers to Ka. Up. III. 15 which describes what is said to be "beyond *mahat*" and *avyakta* is also "beyond *mahat*" in Ka. Up. III 11a which is the *viṣaya-vākya*. In the second Sūtra (I. 4. 2.), the same *avyakta* is said to be the *sūkṣma* because it can be properly so called. In the days of the Sūtrakāra "*sūkṣma*" was a synonym for *akṣara* ("The *sūkṣma* sees all these, the lower Nature "*jñāna*", the Intellect, etc. etc.—MBh. XII. 204. 20). So, he uses a current word to explain the Śrauta term. * Among his other arguments, he says that in the same passage "*mahat*" is stated to be lower than *avyakta* and higher than *buddhi*; and as according to the Sāṃkhyas *buddhi* is the direct effect of their *avyakta*, this *mahat* (in Ka. Up. III. 11) cannot be a Sāṃkhya principle; so also *avyakta* (Br. Sū. I. 4. 7).

Now, the fact to be noticed here is the Sūtrakāra's view of *avyakta* or *akṣara* as the Nature, and this is given in the Adhikaraṇa discussed above. He says, *avyakta* is lower than *puruṣa* because the former is dependent on the latter, just as the objects of sense (*arthāḥ* in Ka. Up. III. 10.) are said to be lower than the mind because they are dependent on the latter for being perceived. The Sūtrakāra seems to reject a *pūrvapakṣa* view which regarded *avyakta* in the capacity of the higher Nature (in Ka. Up. III. 10–11) to be lower than *puruṣa* from "the standpoint of the place" (*sthāna*–Br. Sū. III. 2. 11) of the two.§ Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra, *avyakta* as the subtle principle (*sūkṣma*) i. e. as the

Meaning of "*Puruṣa* is higher than *avyakta*" (Ka. Up. III. 11).

* Śaṅkara's explanation of *sūkṣma* and *avyakta* as the subtle body as distinguished from the gross one is a proof that he had not an uninterrupted tradition. He depends upon his predecessor who, taking *avyakta* to refer to the gross body also, was in no better position than Saṅkara himself.

§Those who believed that *avyakta* is spatially lower than *puruṣa*, also believed that the *nirguṇa* texts refer to *avyakta* and *saguṇa* to *puruṣa*. The Sūtrakāra rejects their view (Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21; see App. IV. 2).

(higher and only) Nature depends upon *puruṣa*. In other words, in the Highest Being, the personal aspect governs the impersonal one as far as the act of creation is concerned (Br. Sū. I. 4. 3). This would be the Sūtrakāra's explanation of *avyakta* or *akṣara* in such texts as Ka. Up. III. 10–11.

As regards the evolution from *akṣara*, we have seen already (pp. 101–102 above) that the Sūtrakāra does not distinguish the lower Nature from the *akṣara*. This means that he does not accept the lower Nature. In the same way he rejects the creation of *buddhi* and *manas* (Br. Sū. II. 3. 15) and begins the evolution from *akṣara* with the direct creation of the Ether (*viyat*—Br. Sū. II. 3. 1) from it. He says that the world is identical with its cause (i. e. Atman) and gives as a proof of it the example of the vital breath (Br. Sū. II. 1. 14, 20). In dropping the three links, the lower Nature, the Intellect, and the Mind (—the problem of *ahaṃkara* does not arise for him, as also for the authors of the Mahābhārata in many places—), the Sūtrakāra has directly set aside the teaching of the EMU, the Gītā and the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas.

Rejection of the lower Nature, the Intellect and the Mind, as links in the Series of Evolution.

Before we summarise the Sūtrakāra's view about the nature of the Highest Being (*para*), it would be both interesting and instructive to note the doctrines of some Aupaniṣada (Vedanta ?) Schools, which the Sūtrakāra has refuted. The adversaries of the Sūtrakāra were those who held that the Vedanta texts mention more "goals" than one (i. e. two) (Br. Sū. III. 3. 1–4) and that the (two) goals are not identical (Br. Sū III. 3. 5–9). The former he confronted with such texts as Bh. Gī. VIII. 11 and Ka. Up. II. 15 which the Sūtrakāra could interpret as teaching unity of the goal of the Vedantas (III. 3. 4). With the latter he argued that non-identity of the goals was inconsistant with the omnipresence of each of them taught in the Śruti (III. 3. 9). He held that there was only one goal but it had two names, *pradhāna* and *akṣara*. The former of these

Two Aupaniṣada Schools criticised by the Sūtrakāra.

two hostile Schools seems to have regarded *puruṣa* and *akṣara* as two independent goals; the latter who said that the two were not identical may have thereby meant that *akṣara* is the Abode and *puruṣa* lives in it and therefore they are in that sense one, but they are not identical. The exact views of these opponents are not given in Br. Sū. III. 3. 1–9; yet they could be inferred to have held some such doctrines as we have described above. There are, however, two other groups of aphorisms, which come to our aid here. The first group is Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21 (App. IV. 2. a). It records a hostile view which admitted a difference of place in the Highest Being, and went further by saying that the negative texts belong to one "place" and the positive ones to another "place" in the Supreme Being. This seems to mean that *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are two places in the Supreme One and the negative and the positive texts respectively describe these two places (*sthāna*—Br. Sū. III. 2. 11). The other School is implied in "*api*" in Br. Sū. III. 2. 11 and is refuted in Br. Sū. III. 2. 32–37 (App. IV. 2. b). It believed that there was a goal beyond (or other than) the Unmanifest or *akṣara* (Br. Sū III. 2. 23 and 32), because the Unmanifest was described as connected with the Supreme One (or *puruṣa*) beyond it and because the Śrutis asserted the difference (*bheda*) between the two (Br. Sū. III. 2. 32). According to this School *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are numerically two.

The "*sthāna-bheda*" (?) View.

The "*svarūpa-bheda*" (?) View.

Although neither the commentators nor the modern interpretors like Dr. Thibaut and Prof. Deussen have even exhibited any curiosity as to who these opponents of the Sūtrakāra could have been, it is not difficult to identify them with some predecessors of the author of the Sūtras. The view which believes in a difference of place (*sthāna*) in the Supreme Being which is numerically one seems to be that of the L. MBh. "saints" (*tatsthānāc c ānupaśyanti eka ev eti sādhavaḥ*—MBh. XII. 318. 78; see Ch. III p. 41 above),

Identification of these two Aupaniṣada Schools with those of the L.MBh.

who held that *akṣara* is the "place" of the Best One and therefore in that sense the two are one. The other doctrine according to which *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are different from each other (and therefore two in number) was the view of the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas who enumerated *akṣara* as the Twentyfifth and *puruṣa* as the Twentysixth (MBh. XII. 318. 47–83). According to the Sūtrakāra both these Schools are dualistic. The latter asserted the difference between *akṣara* and *puruṣa* and was therefore undoubtedly dualistic. The unity of goal propounded by the former was superficial, because though they stated that the Supreme Being was one, yet not only did they say that in that one Being *akṣara* was spatially lower than *puruṣa*, but they also said that the negative sentences described only the lower place (*akṣara*) and the positive only the upper one (*puruṣa*) in the Supreme Being; so that all the attributes of the Highest Being did not belong to it wherever it was present (Br. Sū. III. 2. 11—note the word "*sarvatra*" in this Sūtra; App. IV. 2. a). The Sūtrakāra regarded such a distinction between the twofold attributes as an admission of duality, and therefore he opposed it, as will be clear from his view of the nature of the Supreme Being.

The Sūtrakāra's Criticism of these Views.

The most striking feature in the Sūtrakāra's view of the Highest Being (*para*), is the systematic and rational interpretation which he gives for the first time in the history of Indian Philosophy, to the twofold contradictory statements regarding the attributes of the Supreme One, the *coincidentia oppositorum*.

Problem of *coincidentia oppositorum*.

The historical position of the problem before the Sūtrakāra may be summed up in the following words: the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads which had thought of the impersonal (*akṣara*) and the personal (*puruṣa*) independently of each other, had regarded each of them as the Highest Being in itself. Therefore, the attributes of *akṣara* contained not only

History of its Beginning.

the negative ones, but also some positive ones, such as the act of ruling (*praśāsana*–Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 9). Similarly there was the custom of describing the personal principle negatively as was done in the case of the impersonal. The personal is described negatively in Bṛ. Up. III. 9. 26 and III. 7. 23 (cf. the impersonal in Bṛ Up. III. 8. 11), Bṛ Up. IV. 4. 25 and Chā. Up. VIII. 7. 1 (cf. Pra. Up. V. 7); and the Gītā remembers this fact in II. 24. But a second stage was reached when the impersonal was placed below the personal (as the latter's Nature). Then the *akṣara* was no longer associated with such attributes as properly belong to the *puruṣa*. This is the case in Ka. Up. III. 15; Mu. Up. I. 1. 6; Pra. Up. V. 7; and Bh. Gī. XII. 3. In the third stage which is evident in the later Mahābhārata (and in Br. Sū. III. 2. 32–37), the distinction between *akṣara* and *puruṣa* and between the attributes of the two became very sharp, and, as we have seen, they have developed into numerically two metaphysical principles. In the fourth case, we find that the distinction between the attributes of these two is allowed to remain as it was, but the two were to be regarded as numerically one (MBh. XII. 318. 78; Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21). On the fifth occasion, the tendency already visible in Śve. Up. III. 19–20, Ka. Up. II. 10, Īśa. Up. 5, Ka. Up. II. 20 and Bh. Gī. XII. 13–14 assumes a definite shape and the Pāñcarātra conception of o n e mystic principle springs up by the fusion of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. This (principle) had both the negative and the positive attributes without any reference to the lower or the higher "place" in it. But at this stage no explanation for this mystic combination of the two hitherto distinct principles with distinct qualities is offered, nor it is realised that this conception is inconsistent with those already in vogue (see p. 91 above).

The author of the Sūtras who comes after all these stages definitely rejects the earlier views (2—4) except the first one, which he emphasises as an argument for his own view, and the last one which he adopts and systematises. According to him *akṣara* is not spatially lower than puruṣa; and again they are not two, but one. Whatever attributes, negative or positive, the one is said to have, also belong to the

other, because the Śruti itself makes such an interchange; their distinction is useful only for meditation (see p. 94 above). The Highest Being in its entirity is called *akṣara* or *puruṣa* and the negative and the positive statements are applicable to every part of it, to every place in it (*sarvatra*). The Śruti says that *akṣara* is the goal. It also says that *puruṣa* is the goal. Each of the the two are also individually said to be omnipresent. It is irrational to hold that there are two goals and that each of them is omnipresent. The Sūtrakāra makes use of this argument twice (Br. Sū. III. 2. 38; III. 3. 9). Wherever *akṣara* is mentioned, it is said that there is none else than it; wherever *ātman* or *puruṣa* is mentioned, it is also said that there exists none else but him (Br. Sū. III. 2. 37). The Sūtras refer to Bṛ. Up. IV. 5. 13, " It is—as is a mass of salt, without inside, without outside, e n t i r e l y a mass of taste (*kṛtsno rasaghana eva*), even so, verily, is this Atman, without inside, without outside, entirely a mass of knowledge (*kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghana eva*) ", and especially to Bh. Gī. XIII. 12–16. " This has e v e r y w h e r e its hands and feet, e v e r y w h e r e its eyes, heads, and mouths, e v e r y w h e r e it is possessed of ears in the world, and remains having enveloped every [existing] thing " (Bh. Gī. XIII. 13). " *Sarvataḥ* " in the Gītā corresponds to "*sarvatra*" in Br. Su. III. 2–11. and therefore the Sūtrakāra refers to it. According to the Sūtrakāra, when any text says that the Supreme Being (*akṣara* or *puruṣa*) is devoid of hand and feet, it denies them of it in its entirity. This will be the sense of Śve. Up. III. 19 and Mu. Up. I. 1. 6. This is how he solves the problem of the *coincidentia oppositorum*. The same is perhaps meant also in Br. Sū. II. 1. 30 and 37 (*sarvopetā ca taddarśanāt* and *sarvadharmopapatteśca* respectively). The Supreme Being as a whole (" *sarvatra* ") is possessed of all, and therefore contradictory, attributes. The great teachers of Vedanta, that followed the Sūtrakāra busied themselves with interpreting this verdict of the author of the aphorisms (see p. 89 above).

The Sūtrakāra's Rational Explanation of the Problem.

The standpoint which the Sūtrakāra has taken up is guided by a historical insight into the development of the *akṣara–puruṣa* doctrine in those days. The Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads never taught that the *akṣara* was spatially lower than the *puruṣa*, nor did they think that the personal aspect was in confiict with the impersonal. The Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads did not mean that *akṣara* was a principle with so much share of individuality as to be counted as a second principle by the side of the *puruṣa*. What they implied by putting the *akṣara* below the *puruṣa* in the discussion of the evolution of the world (as in Ka. Up. III. 10–11) was perhaps that in the entire Brahman the personal aspect governs the impersonal during the act of creating the world, and we find that the Sūtrakāra does accept this meaning of the *paratva* of the *puruṣa* (Br. Sū. I. 4. 3; see p. 104 above). When the EMU and the Gītā said that the meditator on *puruṣa* when liberated " went beyond *akṣara* (Mu. Up. III. 2. 1; Pra. Up. V. 5, 7; Bh. Gī. VIII. 21–22, XV. 16–18, XVIII. 53–55), they did not mean that the meditators on *akṣara* reached the Twentyfifth and those on *puruṣa* the Twentysixth (see Bh. Gī. XII. 4). The Sūtrakāra feels himself bound to understand those statements as referring to different places in the entire Brahman which is like an omnipresent mass of light wherein one may differentiate between its parts as occupying different places, though each part has the same attributes. In brief, let not the historian of the Indian Philosophy forget that the Aupaniṣada or rather the Vedanta School owes its "monistic monotheism" (how else shall we name the union of the personal and the impersonal with the control of the former over the latter as regards the latter's creative activity !) and therewith all the later monistic or monotheistic phases of the various Vedanta Schools, to the author of the Brahmasūtras. Henceforth the dualism and the pluralism to which the EMU, the Gītā and, more than either of these, the later Mahābhārata Aupaniṣadas had fallen a victim, is driven out of the Vedanta School once for all.

The Sūtrakāra, the Restorer of Advaitism in the Aupaniṣada School.

Most of the other notable features of the "*akṣara* or *puruṣa*" doctrine of the Sūtrakāra have been noticed in the beginning of this Chapter; but one point in which the author has checked and corrected the turn of thought, into which the Pāñcarātras had already let themselves enter, requires to be mentioned here, so that the Sūtrakāra may not be mistaken for being more of the Pāñcarātras than he really is. The latter (as we find them in the L. MBh.) did not at all distinguish between *akṣara* and *purusa* and could think that the personal is at the same time the impersonal (see p. 84 above). But, for the Sūtrakāra these two are two for the practical purpose of meditation. They are two distinct names of the one object of meditation and indicate two distinct methods of meditation, though leading to one and the same goal. This difference between the Pāñcarātras and the Sūtrakāra, and the way in which the latter succeeded in purging the Aupaniṣada speculation of its dualistic character, and thereby establishing an option of choice as regards the object of meditation, lead us to consider what we may call the compromising nature of the aphorisms.

Distinction between the Sūtrakāra and the L. MBh. Pāñcarātras.

Although the Gītā never aimed at reconciling the various Schools of Indian Philosophy, the Brahmasūtras bear clear marks of the great sacrifices that the various Śakhās of the Śruti have made in the cause of maintaining the original monism or monotheism of their ancestors. First of all, each of the Vedic Schools agreed to honour the Revealed Texts of all others (Br. Sū. III 3. 44, 49). Secondly, if any one of the four requirements, *codanā*, *ākhyā*, etc. was the same in these texts, the same Brahman was to be understood as the topic in all of them (Br. Sū. III 3. 1, 6). But this did not mean that every School was henceforth to study all the texts; the rule of *svādhyāya* was taught in all the Śākhās and was not to be disturbed in the least by this union of the Schools. Thirdly,

Compromising Character of the Sūtras.

since all the texts did not mention b o t h *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, henceforth *akṣara* or *puruṣa* was the goal. We have already noticed the nature of this new teaching. The followers of the Chāndogya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka could join the union only on this condition; while those whose texts taught b o t h as the goals (i. e. the EMU and the Gītā) were in practice pursuing only o n e of the two because they were both of them not meant for one and the same man. Moreover, great appeal for unity was effected by such other arguments as the fact that every Revealed Text whether teaching the personal or the impersonal principle had taught it as omnipresent and there can be no two omnipresent principles. The followers of the EMU and the Gītā found that the idea of *akṣara* as the Nature of the *puruṣa* was inconsistent with their conception of it as an eternal goal; so, *akṣara* was allowed to remain as Prakṛti (Br. Sū. I. 4. 23) but not as a *prakṛti* belonging to *puruṣa*. The fact that the Chāndogya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Schools had already at various times taught the personal and the inpersonal principles without reference to their mutual relations led them to accept the new standpoint. Henceforth those who believed in *akṣara* were to note that *puruṣa* was also a name of the same principle; and those who meditated on *puruṣa* were to accept that the *puruṣa* could also be designated *akṣara* (Br. Sū. III. 3. 8). "*Akṣara*" was only "a different thought " (*pṛthag dhī*–Br. Sū III 3 42; *prajñāntara*–Br. Sū III 3. 50; *upadeśantara*–Br. Sū III. 3. 37). *Akṣara* is "more powerful" (*balīyas*) than *puruṣa* because a majority of the combining parties believed in it; but, then, *puruṣa* is also sanctioned by the Sruti (Br. Sū. III. 3. 44–45) and both are equally good as the Vidyā (Br. Sū III. 3- 47) The followers of the oldest Schools were not to think that the attainment of *puruṣa* was that of a world (*loka*–Br. Sū. III. 3. 51). The fourth important condition to which all had to agree was that about " *upasaṃhāra* " or " the Rule of Collection of Thoughts" (Br.Sū. III. 3. 5). This was the most important and practical feature of this Syncretism. Till now, each School had meditated on God as He was described in its own individual text. But now a list of the thoughts on God was to be

The Oldest Upaniṣadic Schools.

prepared from the Revealed Texts of all the Schools. Each School was to accept what was common to all and to give to others what was peculiar to itself and consistent with the new doctrine of "*akṣara* o r *puruṣa*." This syncretic "Rule of Collection" was obligatory for the meditation on the personal aspect, but not for that on the impersonal, because in this latter case the meditator was to deny all attributes of *akṣara* and the existing lists were found to contain a sufficiently exhaustive enumeration of these (Br. Sū. III. 3. 33). But if they found some attributes of *puruṣa* in the list of those of *akṣara*, they were not to reject them out of respect for the Sruti which (respect) was the background of their union (III. 3. 40), and if they wished to collect the attributes of *akṣara* from the various texts, there was no objection (III. 3. 39). Even in the case of the meditation on *puruṣa*, it was not possible that a meditator could meditate on Him as possessed of all the attributes in all the Revealed Texts; therefore the number of such attributes to be used in practical contemplation was not to be fixed (III. 3. 31). The younger Schools were to make a greater sacrifice and we find that they did it without any opposition. They were asked to give up such attributes of *puruṣa* as would show that *puruṣa* was different from *akṣara* (Br. Sū. III. 3. 12). The Sūtrakāra says that *priyaśirastva*, *brahmapucchalva* etc. are not to be accepted as attributes of *puruṣa*, even though they are mentioned as such in the Sruti; and the wonder is that he finds none to oppose him. There is no *pūrvapakṣa* on this significant step he takes. The followers of the EMU and the Gītā also agreed to give up the lower Nature, the Intellect and the Mind as the created principles in the evolutional series (1. 4. 23–28; II. 3. 15). This was done perhaps because all of them vigorously opposed the purely rational Sāṃkhyas or perhaps because it was necessary to appease the Vājasaneyins and the Bahvṛcs who were yet highly honoured by the philosophical thinkers. (Even the L. MBh. contains some descriptions of creation beginning with the Ether as in the Chā. and Bṛ. Upaniṣads.)

The Younger Upaniṣadic Schools.

Thus, we find that all the Upaniṣadic Schools agreed in giving up minor though important differences for the purpose of forming a union of all the followers of the Revealed Texts. A new book was to be prepared. The general points of agreement were to be recorded in a document for the future guidance of all the Śākhās who were to keep on studying their own *svādhyāya* but in the light of this agreement. The most important requirement was a list of the thoughts on the highest Being and a systematic account of the exact nature of the "*sādhana*" and "*phala*" agreeable to all the combining Schools. The task seems to have been handed over to Bādarāyaṇa and to some other renowned teachers who represented all these Schools. They composed a book and therein noted their views on the points where they differed (Br. Sū. I. 4. 21–23; IV. 3. 7–16; IV. 4. 5–7; IV. 4. 10–12; III. 2. 41–42). Henceforth this new work (on the teaching of Brahman as distinguished from Karman) became the chief text for this united body of the Vedic Śākhās, to be known now as the Vedanta School.

Formation of the Vedanta School: Its First Text Book and its First Acārya.

The great sacrifices, described above, which the uniting parties have done, sets one to think whether the purpose that made them sink their differences was only a theoretical one or whether this syncretism had a practical goal. Would anybody have advised the followers of the EMU and the Gītā, under normal circumstances, to give up the subordination of *akṣara* to *puruṣa* by abandoning some of the attributes of each of these about the meaning of which they had not the least doubt? And would such an advice have been accepted by them if it had been actually given? Do the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads and the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads show any signs of this union? Is not the theory of the two Natures a formidable hinderance in the way of such a proposal? It is not at all difficult to imagine the motive force of this union. We have

Practical purpose of the Union: The Desire to oppose jointly the Sāṃkhya and other hostile Schools.

seen how the Gītā distinguished between the two Natures and how the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas differed from the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas and Yogas, though all of them (as they are found in the later Mahābhārata) agreed, in a way, as regards the nature of the final goal. But the seed of their disunion and enmity is also present in the Mahābhārata. The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas refused to accept *akṣara* either as the higher Nature or as a goal by the side of the *puruṣa* (i. e. optionally to be accepted in place of *puruṣa*). When later on these two Schools became more and more rationalistic and introduced philosophical changes of grave significance, which caused them to be ranked with atheists, the orthodox Aupaniṣadas of all Śākhās found it necessary to offer a combined opposition to these now entirely hostile Schools. Perhaps some more adversaries had freshly entered the field. It was under these circumstances that the descendants of the L. MBh. Aupaniṣadas who never before found it necessary to form themselves into a combined School, who speculated in a variety of ways on all points except the *akṣara-puruṣa* doctrine, and who understood by the word Vedanta any text or passage of the Upaniṣads, formed themselves into a School of their own distinguished from the hostile Schools, Sāṃkhya, Yoga and others. No wonder that from the beginning of the very first chapter, the Brahmasūtras criticise the Sāṃkhya and lose no opportunity of doing the same whenever possible.

But this achievement itself would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, and the considerations, by which we find it to have been guided, would have been entirely defferent from what they really are, if the teaching of the Bhagavadgītā had been already forgotten at the time of the composition of the work which is intended to record it. It is impossible to think that the third point described above (p. 94) regarding the admission of the option of choice of one out of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* would have suggested itself or would have been accepted by the parties involved if they had not before them the correct

Invaluable Contribution of the Gītā Doctrine in the Formation of the First Vedanta School.

interpretation of the EMU, the Gîtā and the L. MBh. Aupaniṣada doctrines, the last of which are criticised and rejected by the Sūtrakāra. On the contrary, the fact, as I have found it, is that the remembrance of the *akṣara*-and-*puruṣa* doctrine of the Gîtā (Bh. Gî. XII. 1–5) had exceedingly facilitated the task of the author of the Sūtras who only transformed it into into an *akṣara*-or-*puruṣa* doctrine. The boldness which the Sūtrakāra shows in rejecting those attributes of *puruṣa* which conveyed its distinction from *akṣara* (see p. 113 above) is unparalleled in the works of any of the Ācāryas whose only recourse was an hair-splitting method of interpretation* whenever they had to meet a passage contrary to what they taught. The Sūtrakāra could do what he has done, because he was sure of the support of those for whom he did it. (In this respect the Sūtrakāra is more reliable than the Ācāryas in the matter of the interpretation of the texts with which we are concerned.) In brief, the interpretation of the Sūtras offered in this Thesis will, it is hoped, show that the unique success which they achieved in their aim of combining all Aupaniṣadas against the purely rational Schools and giving the Vedanta texts a System called Vedanta Darśana, was greatly due to the teaching of the Bhagavadgîtā.‡ Therefore, the inclusion of the Brahmasūtras in the present Dissertation as an evidence for the meaning of the term *akṣara* will not be considered out of place.

---

* Śaṅkara actually said that *priyaśirastva*, *brahmapucchatva*, etc. refer to the "*ānandaḥ ātmā*" who is the *ānandamaya kośa* (Śā. Bhā. Br. Sū. I. 1. 19).

‡ Does not Bh. Gî. XIII. 4 which may be a later interpolation in the Gîtā, refer to the diversity (*bahudhā*) of the *akṣara-puruṣa* doctrine in the EMU, in the Gîtā and, in the Brahmasūtras ? This Thesis has also produced ample evidence to show that *kṣetra* (Bh. Gî. XIII) was a term for *akṣara* and therefore *kṣetrajña* a term for *puruṣa*.

RETROSPECT.

In the Ṛgveda, the oldest literary monument of Aryan culture, we read already in those few hymns which herald the dawn of philosophy, that it is in reality but one being (*ekaṃ sat*) named differently which is addressed in the hymns to the various deities (I. 164. 46); and that, before the world was created, "without air that one breathed by its own power; for there was not beyond it anything whatever" (X. 129. 2).

Later, the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads taught as their highest metaphysical principle either *akṣara* only, i. e., the (impersonal) Immutable or only *puruṣa* the "Person" : it, or he, respectively, was declared to be " one only without a second " (*ekam eva a-dvitīyam*-Chā. Up. VI. 2. 1).

After that, we find in Chapter I of Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad a first attempt at reconciling the impersonal and the personal (*yen ākṣaraṃ puruṣaṃ veda satyam* I. 2. 13); but the prevailing view in the Age of these Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads is the one expressed in Mu. Up. II and III, placing *puruṣa* above *akṣara* (Mu. Up. II. 1. 2; Pra. Up. V. 5, 7; Ka. Up. III. 11). In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad this is summarized as follows : Brahma (not Brahman) is the one threefold being (*trividhaṃ brahmam*), viz., a triad (not three !) consisting of the individual soul, the Immutable, and the Person, called here (I. 12), respectively, the Enjoyer, the Enjoyable, and the Inciter (or Lord in I. 8); the Immutable (i.e., the "Highest Immutable"; Śve. Up. IV. 8) being again twofold (V. 1) in so far as it has the unconscious Matter (the Manifest, Mutable, *pradhāna*, *avidyā*) as its periodical manifestation and is yet persisting as the Unmanifest, Immortal, Immutable, Light, Self, Knowledge

(*avyakta, amṛta, akṣara, haras, ātman, vidyā*) (I. 8, 10; V. 1). The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, then, taught a triad foreshadowing a future tetrad.*

The Bhagavadgîtā taught the very same doctrine, only with some new names, speaking of two Unmanifest ones or Natures (VIII. 20; VII. 5), viz., a higher one (*akṣara, mahad brahman*) and a lower one (*kṣara, brahman*) (XV. 16; XIV. 3; VIII. 3–4; III. 15; V 10) of which the latter periodically emerges from the former (IX.7; III. 15); and we may suppose that its teaching the lower Unmanifest to produce the manifest universe (VIII. 18–19) is also in agreement with Śve. Up., as is undoubtedly its regarding the personal (*puruṣa*) as higher than the impersonal (*akṣara*) and yet not a distinct entity from it : they are not two, though they are not one either; i. e., they are so to speak, an internal difference only (*svagata bheda*) of one and the same being.

This doctrine we find again practically unchanged with the Mahābhārata Aupaniṣadas: they called the lower Nature (1), *akṣara* (2), and *puruṣa* (3), the Twenty-fourth, the Twentyfifth and the Twentysixth respectively and said(MBh. XII. 217. 1): "He who does not know the tetrad does not know the Supreme Brahman" (*na sa veda paraṃ brahma yo na veda catuṣṭayam;* XII. 217. 1), where the four are : (1) *vyakta;* (2) *avyakta* or *amṛta pada* (XII. 217. 2), (3) *puruṣa* (XII. 217. 6), and (4) *dehin,* the embodied soul (XII. 217. 12). But we see also another and, evidently, later School of the Mahābhārata Aupaniṣadas preparing already the ground for future developments by finding it necessary to explain—which was not really different, apart from its being expressly stated, from the view of both Sve. Up. and Bh. Gî.—that the two Natures are one and *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are one in that in either case the one is the "place" of the other (*tatsthatvāt;* XII. 318. 56. 78).

---

* This becomes quite clear, if we restore, as Prof. Schrader suggests, the strange reading *supratiṣṭhākṣaraṃ ca* in Śv. Up. I. 7 to *supratiṣṭhaṃ kṣaraṃ ca.*

The Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas of the Mahābhārata then actually did away with the theory of the two Natures, but in a different manner.

(1) The Sāṃkhyas abolished the *akṣara* or the higher Nature by simply distributing its attributes among the lower, i. e., their only Nature, and the Twentysixth of the Aupaniṣadas whom they accepted as their Twentyfifth. [This was the origin of the dualism of Spirit and Matter which we find as an accomplished fact in the Classical Sāṃkhya.]

(2) The Rudrite Yogas, while accepting the Sāṃkhya Twentyfourth (and rejecting the higher Nature), could not admit the Sāṃkhya *puruṣa* who was both Jîva and Îśvara, for they (i. e. these Yogas) wanted a highest principle which was absolutely beyond bondage and liberation, i. e., had not even the semblance of being somehow (temporarily), viz., by creation etc., contaminated by the Prakṛti. Thus, they believed in two principles instead of the one *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas, viz., the Twentyfifth, who was for them only a kind of world-soul, and the Twentysixth, the Parmātman, who was placed above the Twentyfifth and the Twentyfourth (Prakṛti) and who was the absolutely transcendent, yet personal, highest being. [Thus, and not on the basis of an atheistic Sāṃkhya, has evolved the idea of a personal highest God in the Yoga System.] This School, then, may be looked upon as having evolved from the (likewise Rudrite) Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. For, its two Atmans are the two "friends" in Śve. Up. IV. 6–7. But in Śve. Up. the boundary between the two is still constantly obliterated; it has still a conscious *prakṛti* and its "Lord" is still, though not *bhoktṛ*, yet *kartṛ* as regards creation etc., (V. 3; VI. 3–4).

(3) The Hiraṇyagarbha Yogas were at one with the Rudrite Yogas as regards their Twentyfourth and Twentyfifth, but went beyond them by positing an impersonal Twentysixth which they called *akṣara.* This *akṣara,* then, was like that of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads deprived of both its personality (cf. Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 9) and materiality, the former being reserved for their Twentyfifth,

and the latter for their Twentyfourth. This is the acme of metaphysical abstraction reached in the Mahābhārata.

In all of these three Schools the Twentyfifth engaged (either really or apparently) in creation, etc., and transmigration etc., had so far been only one, who either had (as in the case of the Yogas) or had not (as with the Sāṃkhyas) a higher principle above him, and the empirical plurality of individuals must have been for them but a phenomenon of Nature, if they cared at all to explain it. We can understand this attitude if we realise that it was a Herculean task for Indian thinkers to free themselves from the grip of the ancient Aupaniṣada tradition with its one and only Ātman. It is a great pity, therefore, that the Mahābhārata has not preserved for us one or two documents showing the rise of the theory of plurality of souls. We are merely confronted, in one of the latest chapters of the Śāntiparvan (350. 1 fll.) with the fact that both the Sāṃkhyas and the Yogas had meanwhile taken to it, i. e., to the doctrine of one real highest soul and many empirical individual ones. [For the Sāṃkhyas now only one more step remained to be taken, viz., that of abolishing the *puruṣa*, just as formerly they had abolished the higher Nature, and establishing a real plurality of souls, but that is not heard of yet in the Mahābhārata; it came later, when Buddhism spread and atheism became fashionable.]

Some time after the origin of these three Schools, came the Mahābhārata Pāñcarātras who rather developed the religion (*dharma*) of the Bhagavadgîtā, their most venerable authority: they emphasised the oneness of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* and did not allow either Matter or soul to be a distinct entity from it, but looked upon the former as periodically created and withdrawn and upon the latter also as emerging from and returning into their "source" the Puruṣa. In spite of this they did not renounce the *svagatabheda* standpoint of the Gîtā, but spoke of an innate power of the Puruṣa which they called his *Vidyā* (and which was later identified with Viṣṇu's wife Lakṣmî) and also of the souls as somehow

being parts of God and continuing as such even during the period of cosmic rest. This, then, is the strictest monism taught in the Mahābhārata.

And, finally, Bādarāyaṇa, the author (or reviser ?) of the Brahmasūtras, substituted the Mahābhārata Pāñcarātra view of the oneness of *akṣara* and *puruṣa* by his teaching that the same Supreme Being called *para* "the Highest" is to be meditated upon as *akṣara* or *puruṣa*.

But, while in Bādrāyaṇa's Sūtras (and also in the systems of the Vaiṣṇavite Ācāryas) the abandoned ancient position (of *puruṣa* being higher than *akṣara*) is still to some extent recognizable, even the traces of the latter will be found to have disappeared when we turn to the works of his most renowned successor, Śaṅkarācārya.

Thus it has happened that the history of *akṣara* has become what it has been called by us: a forgotten chapter. It undoubtedly covers a very long period when again and over again those very questions were asked which are echoed in the motto of this Thesis. The history of Indian Philosophy must, indeed, have essentially been for many centuries the history of *akṣara*.

APPENDIX I.

Interpretation of the Upaniṣads.

Scholars may want a more detailed demonstration of the right claimed by the author of this Thesis to use the Upaniṣads in the way he has done. He, therefore, submits to them the following translation of, and notes on, those passages of the Upaniṣads which testify most unambiguously to the correctness of his view of *akṣara* and at the same time can be shown to be in full agreement, in this respect, with his second source on *akṣara*, the Bhagavadgîtā.

A.—Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.

1. Mu. Up. II. 1. 1–2.

(1) The following is the truth: Just as from a well-kindled fire sparks rise in thousands all alike, so, O gentle one, are the various things born of the Immutable and return into the same.

(2) That divine, formless *puruṣa* is both outside and inside, unborn, without breath, without a mind, shining, higher than the highest Immutable (*akṣarāt paratalaḥ paraḥ*).

Notes :—

1. These verses make it quite clear that the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad distinguishes between *akṣara* and *puruṣa* and places the latter above the former, as does the Gîtā (e. g. in XV. 16–18).

2 It should, however, be noticed that this passage of the Upaniṣad (II. 1. 1)describes all things as originating from the Immutable. We know that in the Gîtā also, the higher Nature is said to be either the origin of all beings (e. g. Bh. Gî. VII. 6, XIV. 4), or the origin of the lower Nature which is the direct origin of all begins (Bh. Gî. VIII 20–21, III. 14–15).

2. Mu. Up. III. 2. 8.

Just as the flowing rivers disappear into the ocean, having abandoned name and form, so the knower totally freed from name and form reaches the divine *puruṣa* higher than the Highest (*parāt paraṃ puruṣam*).

NOTES :—

1. *Puruṣa* in this verse can be no other than *puruṣa* above the highest Immutable in Mu. Up. II. 1. 2.

3. Mu. Up. I. 1. 7–9.

(7) Just as the spider creates and takes [back], just as herbs rise up on the earth, just as the hairs on the head and the hairs on the body (appear) from the living man, so does every thing here rise from 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*).

(8) The [lower] *brahman* develops on account of *tapas*; from that is the food born; from food, breath, mind, truth (*satya*), words, and, in the rites, 'the Immortal' (*amṛtam.*)

(9) From that [*ātman*] who is omniscient, who knows all, whose *tapas* consists of knowledge, is born this [lower] *brahman*, name, form, and food.

NOTES :—

1. The use of the masculine forms in I. 1. 9 should not lead us to suppose that the last verse is a later interpolation, because *akṣara ātmā* (Pr. Up. IV. 9) or *akṣaraḥ puruṣaḥ* (Mu. Up. I. 2. 13), or rather simply *ātmā* (see *ātmā* in Mu. Up. II. 2. 5, and notes on Śve. Up. I. 7–12) could have been understood by the author of the Upaniṣad as the subject possessed of omniscience and other attributes mentioned in this Śruti. The occurrence of these masculine expressions in the sense of the impersonal Immutable shows nothing else than that though the idea in the mind of these writers was an impersonal one, they believed themselves to be entitled to make use of words that were of the masculine gender. Even in the oldest Upaniṣads like the Bṛ. Up. *ātmā* is the word used for what is described only negatively, e.g. Bṛ. Up. III. 9. 26. In the present instance, *brahman* is said to be the effect of the Immutable according to the interpretation we have proposed,

and this conclusion is justified by Bh. Gī. III. 15 (*brahm ākṣara-rasamudbhavam*). So *brahman* in Mu. Up. I. 1. 9 means the lower Nature. Moreover the expression '*yaḥ sarvaṃ jñaḥ sarvavid*' (in I. 1. 9) is the same as in II. 2. 7 where undoubtedly it refers to *akṣara* (see notes on *ātman* under Śve. Up. 1. 7–12). The author of the Brahmsūtras clearly says that *ātman*, Brahman, etc. are words used both for *akṣara* and *puruṣa* (Br. Sū. III. 3. 52; see App. IV).

2. As already said, *brahman* in I. 1. 9 is the lower Nature, because it is the effect of the Immutable. This follows also from the fact that it is said to be 'growing' 'gathering' or 'developing' (*cīyate*) through *tapas* (I. 1. 8).

3. That *akṣara* in this passage is of the same nature as that of the Bhagavadgītā is proved by the similarity of the attributes mentioned in Mu. Up. I. 1. 6 and those in Gītā XII. 2–3.

4. That the Immutable is said to be the goal in Mu. Up. II. 2. 3, while elsewhere in the same Upaniṣad, e. g. in III. 2. 8 *puruṣa* is said to be the goal, is no obstacle to our interpretation, because in the days of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad both *akṣara* and *puruṣa* were regarded as goals, as we find in the case of the Bhagavadgītā.

4. Mu. Up. I. 2. 13.

To him who had properly approached [him], whose mind was tranquil and who possessed control (of the senses), that knower (of Brahman) proclaimed in truth that Lore of Brahman so that he could know the real 'Immutable–puruṣa' (*akṣara puruṣa*).

NOTE :—

'*Akṣara puruṣa*', mentioned here, seems to be a crude attempt to explain the relation of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*. The oldest Upaniṣads use both these terms separately, e. g. *akṣara* in Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 8–11, and *puruṣa* in Chā. Up. III. 12. 6, and Bṛ. Up. III. 9. 26. Each word denotes the highest reality known to the Upaniṣad. Both these words are placed together in the present passage; this seems to have been done consciously in order to reconcile the impersonal and the personal conceptions about the highest truth referred to above. The authors of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣadas found that in the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads, sometimes, *akṣara* was taught, and at other

times *puruṣa* was taught, as is the case in the passages just mentioned. They were not confronted with an Aupaniṣada School teaching *akṣara* and *puruṣa* as two philosophical principles, as was actually the case with the author of the Brahmasūtras who had before him the Mahābhārata Aupaniṣada School. So, the EMU try to reconcile the conception of the impersonal with that of the personal in Bṛ. Up. and Chā. Up., but were not concerned with that spiritual dualism which was itself the result of the EMU and the Gītā. Thus, the first section of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad seems to be earlier than the other two sections, because this effort to reconcile *akṣara* and *puruṣa* (in Mu. Up. I) is less successful than the same in II and III where the impersonal *akṣara* (e. g. in II. 1. 2, III. 1. 3 and III. 2. 1, 8) is clearly placed below the personal *puruṣa*. The expression '*akṣara puruṣa*' betrays the author's intention to convey the idea of the impersonal Immutable only, because he uses the simple term *akṣara* in Mu. Up. I. 1. and refers to *tapas* and *śraddhā* in I. 2. 11 which is evidently based upon Chā. Up. V. 10. 1–2. Both these Upaniṣadic passages describe the paths of gods and Pitṛs. Chā. Up. V. 10. 1–2 mentions the impersonal Brahman as the goal of *devayāna*, so it is quite probable that the Mu. Up. passage which draws upon that older text has the same goal in view. The words like *brahmaloka* (Mu. Up. I. 2. 6) and *amṛta puruṣa* in Mu. Up. I. 2. 11 also point to the same. The expression *akṣara puruṣa* is like the expression *akṣara ātman* in Pr. Up. IV. 9, which though masculine refers to the impersonal reality described in Pr. Up. IV. 10. The Immutable is designated as *akṣara puruṣa* also in Bh. Gî. XV. 16: "There are these two *puruṣas* in the world, viz., the Mutable and the Immutable"; but the Gîtā does so, because it calls the *puruṣa* (of Mu. Up.) "*puruṣottama*" (Bh. Gî. XV. 18).

CONCLUSION :—

1. The Immutable in the Mu. Up. is the Impersonal One (I. 1. 6) as in Bh. Gî. XII. 3–4.

2. It is below *puruṣa*, e. g. in II. 1. 2, III. 1. 2, III. 2. 8, as in Bh. Gî. XV. 16–18.

3. It is an independent goal just like the *puruṣa* (1. 1. 5), as in Bh. Gî. XII. 1, VIII. 10.

4. It can be called *akṣara* (I. 1. 5, 7; II. 1. 2; II. 2. 2), *ātman* (possibly in I. 1. 9, II. 2. 5), *akṣara puruṣa* (I. 2. 13), *amṛta puruṣa* (I. 2. 11), Brahman (III. 1. 3), *yoni* (with reference to *puruṣa*) (III. 1. 3), *yoni* of all beings (I. 1. 6), *śukra* (III. 2. 1), *brahmadhāma* (III. 2. 2, 4).

5. From it, *brahman* or the lower Nature is "born" (I. 1. 8–9).

6. Specially noteworthy is the fact that in Mu. Up. 1. 2. we have an earlier effort to reconcile the impersonal and personal principles of Bṛ. Up. and Chā. Up. than the one in Mu. Up. II. 1. 1–2.

B.—Praśna Upaniṣad.

Sections IV and V of the Praśna Upaniṣad mention the Immutable (*akṣara*) and *puruṣa* respectively, and, as we shall see presently, distinguish between the two, placing *puruṣa* above *akṣara*.

1. Pr. Up. IV. 9–11.

(9) For he, who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, fancies, knows, and acts, he is the person of the nature of knowledge (*vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ*), [and] he has his stand in the highest Immutable Self (*pare ɔkṣare ātmani*).

(10) He, indeed, who knows the Immutable (*akṣara*) which is without shadow, without a body, without blood, and radiant, O gentle one, he, who knows this Immutable, reaches none else than the highest Immutable. He becomes omniscient and all-[embracing]. For that the following verse [is the authority].

(11) He who knows that Immutable in which the knowledge-self (*vijñānātmā*), along with all the gods (i. e. senses), and all the vital airs and elements find rest—such a one having become omniscient, O gentle one, has certainly entered everything.

NOTES :—

1. The person of the nature of knowledge (*vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ*) is the Jîva (individual soul) in whom all senses and all objects of sense rest during the dreamless sleep (Pr. Up. IV. 6–7).

2. The expression *para akṣara ātman* (in verse IV. 9) for the highest Immutable, which is more complex than the usual word *akṣara* (e.g. in Mu. Up. I. 1. 5) may be compared with the similar expression *akṣara puruṣa*, 'the Immutable *puruṣa*', for the same, used in Mu. Up. I. 2. 13. see pp. 125–126).

3. The description of the Immutable in verse 10 makes it quite clear that *para akṣara ātman* in the previous verse is to be identified with the *akṣara* of the Bhagavadgîtā (see e. g. XII. 2–5).

4. Verse 11 makes the sense of *vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ* in verse 9 quite clear. He is accompanied by the senses, the vital airs and the elements. He can be none else but the Jîva.

2. Pr. Up. V. 2, 5, 7.

(2) Indeed, O Satyakāma, that which is the Syllable 'Om' is the Higher and the Lower Brahman (*paraṃ c āparaṃ ca brahma*). Therefore the knower obtains either of the two (*ekataram*) by this same resort (viz., the Syllable Om).

x x x

(5) But he who meditates on the Supreme *puruṣa* (*parama puruṣa*) by means of this very Syllable, viz., 'Om' consisting of three parts, joins the Light, viz., the Sun. He being free from sin, just as the serpent is freed from slough, is carried by the Sāma-hymns to the world of Brahman (i. e. to the Immutable). From this [world] replete with Life (or from this solid Mass of Life–*Jīvaghana*), he sees *puruṣa*, higher than the Highest, residing in the City (*parāt paraṃ puriśayaṃ puruṣam*). Regarding this, the following two verses are [the authority].

x x x

(7) He obtains this [human] world by means of the Ṛg-verses, the world of the atmosphere through the Yajus-verses, and through Sāmans he obtains that [Immutable] which the Wise proclaim. He, who knows what is quiet, without old age, immortal, without fear, and the Highest (*para*) obtains Him even by the same resort viz., the Syllable 'Om' [meditated upon as an entire Syllable].

NOTES :—

1. The conception of the Higher and Lower Brahman of this Upaniṣad is very important. Sentences 3 and 4 of this section describe how the meditator on one and two parts (*ekamātra* and *dvimātra*) of the Syllable 'Om', obtains the human world and the world of the moon. (Apparently these worlds are not to be counted as Brahman.) The world of the moon is the world from which the soul returns, according to V. 4. The sentence (V. 5), therefore, describes the world from which there is no return. This world is said to be the Brahman-world (*brahmaloka*). And the man who meditates on all the three parts of the Syllable (i. e. who meditates on the Syllable 'Om' as consisting of three parts, but not as a single Syllable, see note 9 below), goes to it after having joined [the rays of] the Light viz., the Sun. The description (*vinirmuktam* etc. in V. 5) shows that this man is the liberated soul. Therefore, this must be the Lower Brahman (*aparaṃ brahma*) mentioned in verse V. 2. This is "one of the two (goals)" stated in this Śruti (V. 2). The phrase *parāt param* (V. 5) is an epithet of the *puruṣa* "who is higher than this Mass of Life which is the Highest (*etasmāj jīvaghanāt parāt paraṃ*)." This interpretation is supported by the description of the *puruṣa* in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad. There we read: the Brahman-knower being freed from 'name and form' reaches the divine *puruṣa* higher than the Highest (Mu. Up. III. 2. 8).

2. *Brahmaloka* in this passage is 'the Immutable *akṣara*', because (a) as pointed out in the note to the previous verse, according to this Upaniṣad there is no return from this Brahman-world, return being possible only if the meditator goes to the world of the moon as said in sentence 3 of this section; (b) it is said here that the liberated soul "sees" the *puruṣa* from this Brahman-world; no text tells us that one can "see" the *puruṣa* from the world of Brahmā otherwise called Prajāpati; (c) even some of the Upaniṣads distinguish between the Brahman-world, i. e. the Immutable, and the world of Prajāpati, e. g. Kau. Up. I. 3, in which *brahmaloka* can only mean the Immutable; as the question of return and non-return is here (in Pra. Up. V) discussed according as the soul reaches the Moon or the Sun, we can associate this passage with Kau. Up. I. 3 where the same topic is met with; and (d) lastly this Brahman-world is said to be *jīvaghana*, a solid Mass of Life; the soul that is "bound" including even Brahmā could not have been so called. The idea of '*jīvasamaṣṭi*' as the inter-

pretation of *jīvaghana* is not acceptable because that idea is not known to the EMU and because "*jīvaghana*" is not difficult to be explained, if we look to the literature of the Age of the EMU. This term "*jīvaghana*" means the same as is called *prajñānaghana* "Mass of Consciousness" in Bṛ. Up. IV. 5. 13 and in Māṇḍukya Up. 5, and "*jīvabhūtā prakṛti*" the Life-element in Bh. Gî. VII. 5, and "*jīva ātman*" in Chā. Up. VI. 3. 2. (see Ch. IV. p. 102). In Chā. Up. VIII. 3. 2. (*brahmaloka* means *akṣara* the "Immutable"; so also in Chā. Up. VIII. 4. 1–3, VIII. 5. 3–4 and in Bṛ Up. IV. 3. 32.

3. It should also be emphasised that the liberated soul is here said to s e e *puruṣa* from the world of the Immutable, so that it is not meant here that the soul reaches the *puruṣa* by meditation on Him through the syllable 'Om' c o n c e i v e d o f a s c o n s i s t i n g o f t h r e e p a r t s.

4. The world described as 'what the Wise (*kavayaḥ* – cf. Ka. Up. III. 14) proclaim,' is the Brahman-world of V. 5 or "the Lower Brahman" of V. 2, because both of these are said to be reached through the Sāman-hymns. And this description of the Brahman-world also justifies my interpretation of the term *brahmaloka* in V. 5. So, the expression "the Lower Brahman" has got quite a different meaning from what Śaṅkara would explain it to be.

5. Now, there should be no doubt regarding the explanation of "Him" (V. 7c), because this word stands for *puruṣa* who is mentioned in V. 5. Verse 7 is a quotation intended to explain sentence 5 (see note 8 below).

6. As it is said that even by the syllable 'Om' the Brahman-knower reaches *puruṣa*; it follows that 'Om' in this case is n o t conceived of as a syllable consisting of three parts, but as a s e l f - c o m p l e t e s i n g l e m y s t i c s y m b o l. This idea seems to be similar to that in the Bh. Gî. VIII. 13. 'Even' (*eva* in V.7c–d) is significant in this connection.

7. 'The quiet one' and the other epithets refer undoubtedly to *akṣara*. It is not unusual to describe the Immutable in these terms (see *śāntātman* in Ka Up. III. 13). Moreover, *param* 'the Highest' mentioned here is to be distinguished from *parāt param* 'the higher than the Highest', the attribute of *puruṣa* in one of the sentences here (V. 5).

8. 'Him' (in V. 7c) must refer to *puruṣa* as distinguished from the impersonal *akṣara* conveyed here by the neuter pronouns '*yat*' and '*tat*'. This *puruṣa* is the one whom the liberated soul "sees" from the Brahman-world (V. 5).

9. The exact literal sense of this last verse must be noted. It states that one who knows *akṣara* attains to *puruṣa* by means of the syllable "Om". This idea follows also from two verses in Bh Gî. viz., VIII. 12, where it is said that 'he, who, repeating the Brahman consisting of the o n e syllable viz., 'Om' and remembering me, departs leaving off his body reaches the highest goal', and XII. 4 which says: 'Those who meditate on *akṣara* being attached to the good of all creatures, reach none but me'. This also agrees with Tai. Up. II. 1, which says 'The knower of Brahman obtains what is beyond [it]' (see also Bh. Gî. XVIII. 53–55 and XII. 4–5).

CONCLUSION :—

1. So, according to Praśna Upaniṣad IV and V, the Immutable (*akṣara*) is impersonal and can be described negatively (Pr. Up. IV. 10, V. 7d), as is also the case in Bh. Gî. XII. 3–4.

2. It is also called (a) *para akṣara ātman* 'the Highest Immutable Atman' (Pr. Up. IV. 9–11, the term *ātman* being used here without a reference to the self), (b) '*apara brahman*' the Lower Brahman, in contrast with the *puruṣa* who is called '*para brahman*' the Higher Brahman (Pr. Up. V. 2), (c) '*brahmaloka*' the Brahman-world, (d) 'jîvaghana' a solid Mass of Life (Pr. Up. V. 5), meaning the same as *jīvabhūtā parā prakṛti* in Bh. Gî. VII. 5, and (e) 'that which the Wise proclaim" (*yat tat kavayo vedayante*–Pr. Up. V. 7).

3. The *puruṣa* is higher than it (*parāt paraṃ puriśayaṃ puruṣam īkṣate*–V. 5).

C.—Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.

From the standpoint of terminology, this Upaniṣad is later than the two already examined. Two passages in it are specially important for our inquiry and will, therefore, be discussed here in extenso, viz., I. 7–9 and V. 1.

1. Śve. Up. I. 7–12.

(7) This is the Supreme Brahman (*paramaṃ brahma*) celebrated in song. The three therein are well established and imperishable (*akṣara*). The Brahman-knowers having known the distinction between these are merged into Brahman, being devoted to it and freed from [all] forms of existence.

(8) The Lord (*īśa*) maintains (*bharate*) this all, the combined Mutable (*kṣara*) and Immutable (*akṣaṛa*), the Manifest and the Unmanifest (*vyaktāvyaktam*). And the Atman, the not-Lord (*anīśa*), is "bound" because of his being the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), and is released from all bonds after having known the divine One.

(9) The knower (*jña*) and the not-knower (*ajña*), the Lord and the not-Lord, are both "unborn". The one "female unborn" is associated with the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment. And the infinite Atman is " of the form of the all " (*viśvarūpa*) and, indeed, no Agent. It is [the attainment of] Brahma, when one attains these three.

(10) The Mutable (*kṣara*) is the First Evolver (*pradhāna*); and the Immortal, the Immutable (*amṛtākṣaraṃ*) is the Light (*haras*). Over the Mutable and the [Immutable] *ātman*, the One God rules. Through meditation on him, through applying oneself to him and [thus] becoming completely of his nature (*tattvabhāvāt, bhūyaḥ*) at the end [there results] the cessation of all deceit (*viśvamāyā*).

(11) For him who has known God [there follows] the relinquishment of all fetters, the cessation of birth and death because of the troubles being removed. Through meditation on him, [he gains] the third [of the triad] on the loss of the body [and thus] all-Lordliness (*viśvaiśvarya*). He is then absolute (*kevala*) and has achieved all desires.

(12) This [triad] should be known as contained eternally in the Atman, since nothing higher remains to be known for him who has known the Enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*), the Enjoyable (*bhogya*) and the Prompter (*preṛitṛ*); this is the entire Threefold Brahma which has been proclaimed.

NOTES :—

1. The technical use of '*akṣara*' in the sense of the Immutable should be distinguished from the ordinary sense of the word, viz., imperishable.

2. Verse 8 gives the explanation of the 'three' mentioned in the previous verse. They are (1) the Mutable and the Immutable combined together (*samyukta*) and thus forming one of the three, (2) the Lord (*īśa*) and (3) the not-Lord (*anīśa*) i.e. the Jîva.

3. If Śve. Up. I. 7b be interpreted to mean " The three are well established and are imperishable therein ", then the three should be necessarily understood as (1) the Mutable, (2) the Immutable and (3) the not-Lord, the Supreme Brahman being the Lord (*īśa*) himself. In that case, verse 7 would regard also the Mutable (*kṣara*) as an imperishable (*akṣara*) principle, along with the Immutable and the Jîva. An explanation of this is found in Śve. Up. V. I (see note 2 on Śve. Up. V. I).

4. It should be noted here that the Mutable is called the Manifest and the Immutable the Unmanifest (*avyakta*). These terms are also used in the Gîtā e.g. in VIII. 18–21 (see App. II). This use of the term *avyakta* for *akṣara* is a later one. The older Upaniṣads, e.g. the Muṇḍaka and the Praśna, do not use it. They use the word '*akṣara*' which is met with in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, e.g. in III. 8.8 (see note 13 below). The explanation of the Immutable as the Unmanifest in contrast with that of *kṣara* as the Manifest shows that *akṣara* cannot be here interpreted as the Jîva. This, also, follows from the fact that the not-Lord is one of the imperishable three, along with the Immutable also (see notes 2–3 above).

5. The distinction between the Immutable and the Lord is here definitely stated as that between the ruled and the ruler or the sustained and the sustainer (*bharate* in verse 8).

6. The first half of verse 8 finds an exact parallel in Bh. Gî. XV.16–18. The Upaniṣadic words *bharate* and *īśa* should be compared with *bibharti* and *īśvara* in the Gîtā. The author of the Brahmasūtras makes 'sustenance' *sambhṛti* a distinct attribute of *puruṣa* (Br. Sū. III. 3. 23; App. IV).

7. As distinct from 'the ruled' i.e. the Immutable and the Mutable, and 'the ruler' the Lord, the Jîva is called 'the

not–ruler'. It should be noticed that he is here not counted as one of the ruled. The statement that the not–ruler Atman is "bound" through his characteristic as an enjoyer may be compared with Bh. Gî. XIII. 20–22 (see also Śve. U. IV. 5–7).

8. The one "unborn female" is the higher Nature or the Immutable because only the Immutable can be said to be united, on the one hand, with 'the enjoyer' the Jîva and, on the other, with 'the objects of enjoyment' which would constitute the Mutable, and because the Mutable is here 'the First Evolver' *pradhāna* and 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*) is said to be 'the Immortal' *amṛta* which ultimately means the same as *ajā* 'unborn' (see verse 10).

9. Thus, the three in verse 9 are the three unborn, viz., the Jîva, the higher Nature and the infinite Atman or the Lord. Verse 8 includes the Mutable along with the Immutable, but the triad is essentially the same in both the verses.

10. Verse 9 describing the infinite Atman or the Lord as 'of the form of the all' (*viśvarūpa*) means that the Mutable and the Immutable which constitute 'the all', are contained in the Lord (see verse 8).

11. The word *amṛta* in verse I. 10 a is the one which is used as a synonym of *akṣara*, the Immutable. It is so used in the oldest Upaniṣads as well as in those which can be historically assigned to the same period as the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, e. g. "This is the Immutable, this is the Immortal, the Fearless (Chā. Up. I. 4. 4); " It alone is the Bright (*śukram*), it is Brahman, it alone is designated the Immortal" (Kaṭha Up. V. 8.,VI. 1); see also Muṇḍaka .Up. II. 2. 2, 11 and Kaṭha Up. VI. 17 (see note 1 on Śve. Up. V. 1).

12. The word *haras* (as Prof. Schrader points out to me) has been identified with Greek *theros* "heat [of the summer]" and traced back, together with *ghṛṇa*, *gharma*, etc., to the root *ghṛ*. Besides in the Ṛgveda it also occurs in Yajurveda (Taitt. Saṃh. and Brāhm.) to which the Śve. Up. is said to belong. It is used especially for "energy" as of the eye or of a horse (cf. *harasvin* "fiery", "energetic"), and thus may be looked upon as a synonym of *tejas* and a precursor of the later term *śakti*. For *tejas* in the sense of a higher *prakṛti* compare e. g. Chā. Up. VI. 2. 3, 8. 4–6, 15. 2; Pra. Up. IV. 6.

13. The explanation of the Mutable as *pradhāna* 'the First Evolver' is very important. *Pradhāna* is here said to be *kṣara* (the Mutable) because in the days of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads (e. g. Mu. Up. I. 1. 9) and even later in Bh. Gî. (III. 15) and MBh. (see Ch. 1. Section 1) the Aupaniṣada School thought the Nature (i. e. their lower Nature) to be an effect of the higher Nature viz., *akṣara*. The Mutable is not the Intellect and the other elements produced from the Intellect, but *prakṛti* 'the lower Nature' itself including all its effects (and capable of becoming manifest and therefore) called the Manifest (*vyakta*) in contrast with the Unmanifest (*avyakta*), the designation of the Immutable (Śve. I. 8). The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad seems to be the earliest to use the term" *avyakta*". It is absent in the Chā., Bṛ., Mu., Pr. Upaniṣads. It occurs only once in Śve. Up. while thrice in Kaṭha Up., though both of these are of equal length. As we shall see later on, the history of *avyakta* is the history of some centuries of Indian philosophy. Here it should be noted that, the Śve. Up. which explains both *pradhāna* and *vyakta* as *kṣara*, has got a more primitive conception of *avyakta* than the Gîtā which speaks of all manifestations (*vyaktayaḥ*) as born of *avyakta* (which stands there for *pradhāna*) and of the latter as ' lower than' another *avyakta* (which is '*akṣara avyakta*' of the Śve. Up.) (Bh. Gî. VIII. 18–21). The Śve. Up. understands *vyakta* to be *pradhāna*. Thus, the Śve. Up. uses these terms (*vyakta* and *avyakta*) in a very primitive way, and the Kaṭha Up. avoids *vyakta* but shows a special fondness for *avyakta* while the Gîtā goes still further and puts forth the doctrine of *vyaktis* and two *ayaktas*, the lower and the higher, the first of which is *pradhāna* (Śve. Up.) or *mahat* (Kaṭha Up.) "the lower Nature" and the second of which is the *akṣara* of Śve. Up. and the *avyakta* of Śve. and Kaṭha Upaniṣads.

14. The term *ātman* in verse 10b evidently stands here for the Immutable mentioned along with the Mutable in 10a and 8a–b. In both these verses the Lord is the ruler over the Mutable and the Immutable, as is said also in this verse. As remarked already, the Jiva is here conceived as the not–ruler but not as one who is ruled over. The Sve. Up. uses the term *ātman* in the sense of the Immutable. Thus, in I. 3d *ātman* in *kālātmayuktāni* stands for the term "*yoni*" in 2 b, the term *kāla* being the first in the list of the causes mentioned in 2 a–b just as *puruṣa*, to be here identified with *deva* in 3b, is the

last. *Ātman* (in 3d) cannot be the Jîva because he (i. e. the Jîva) is positively denied to be a cause in 2 c–d. In Śve. Up. VI. 16, *puruṣa* is actually said to be *ātmayoni*, having *ātman* (the Immutable) as the womb (at his disposal for fructification). '*Atmayoni*' is to be compared with *brahmayoni* in Sve Up.V 6. He who 'presides' (*adhitiṣṭhati*–I. 3) is the same as he who 'rules' (I. 10). It is highly probable that the word *ātman* in Śve. Up. I. 6 c–d means the Immutable. "The Jîva having known *ātman* (the Immutable) and the Prompter as distinct [from each other and also from himself] and then having become gratified with that [knowledge or with that Immutable, compare *juṣamāṇa* and *juṣṭa* in Śve. Up. IV. 5 and 7] attains to immortality" (Sve. Up. I. 6). Thus, this verse gives us the same idea of the 'Triad' as is given also in the verses that follow it.

The Śve. Up. is not the only one which uses the term *ātman* for the Immutable. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad II. 1 gives us the description of *puruṣa*, who is above the Immutable (II. 1. 2). In contrast with Mu. Up. II. 1, Mu. Up. II. 2 aims at teaching the Lore of the Immutable (II. 2. 2–3). The term Brahman in II. 2. 4b and the term *ātman* in II.2. 5c are used for the Immutable, *akṣara*, of II. 2. 2–3. 'That *ātman* in which the sky, the earth, the atmosphere, the mind are sewn crosswise and lengthwise, along with all the vital airs' is the Immutable (*akṣara*) according to Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 7–8, 11. The words *amṛta* (7) and Brahman (9, 11) make it quite clear that *ātman* (in 5, 6, 7) is used for *akṣara*.

So also Mu. Up. III. 1 is intended to explain the Lore of the Immutable and uses the term *ātman* (e. g. in verses 5, 10) for the Immutable, while III. 2 is intended to teach the doctrine of the *puruṣa*. The first verse of III. 2 is very important. 'He [the knower of *ātman*–III. 1. 10] knows this Highest Abode in the form of Brahman (*paramam brahmadhāma*). Those wise men who without a desire [for the fruit] worship *puruṣa* (described in III. 3) go beyond this bright one (*śukram etat*) (III. 2. 1). Here the terms *brahmadhāma* and *śukra* make it clear that *ātman* in III. 1 is used for Brahman which is the womb for *puruṣa* (III. 1. 3). The term *śukra* 'the bright one' is so used in Kaṭha Up. V. 8, VI. 1, VI. 17, also in Śve. Up. IV. 2. 'This' (*etad*) in 'this bright one' (*śukram etat*) in verse 1 refers to *brahmadhāma* which is an explanation of *ātman* in III. 1. 10. But the term *ātman* in

III. 2. 3–4 is used for *puruṣa* mentioned in III. 2. 1. In III. 2. 3–4 it is said that *puruṣa* or *ātman* can be obtained by no other means than 'selection' (*varaṇa*), and the latter half of verse 4 says that "But this self of that knower who tries to obtain him by these means (Vedic study etc. mentioned in III. 3) enters the Brahman–abode (*brahmadhāma*) [but not *puruṣa*]". That III. 2 is intended to teach *puruṣa-vidyā* is proved by the mention of *puruṣa* higher than the Highest in III. 2. 8.

So, in the history of the term *ātman* we have to admit a period when it meant in some texts the Immutable and in others the *puruṣa*, especially, at the time when these two were actually distinguished from each other as in the Mu., Pr., and Śve. Upaniṣads. This is quite natural because even when the term *ātman* was used with reference to the " self ", as in the Chā. and Bṛ. Upaniṣads, it was thought of as possessing those attributes and functions which are later on divided between *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

In Chā. Up. IV. 15. 1. *puruṣa*, *ātman*, *amṛta* and Brahman are all identified, and *ātman* is not different from the impersonal Immortal. So also in Bṛ. Up. IV. 4. 25 where *puruṣa* is absent.

In the Kaṭha Up. which seems to be later than the Śvetāśvatara in as much as the latter does not know the evolutional series which the former mentions twice, an effort is made to distinguish the various meanings of *ātman* by qualifying the term by such words as *jñāna*, *mahān*, *śānta* (II. 13) and *madhvada*, *jiva* (IV. 5). So also *akṣara ātman* in Pr. Up. IV. 9.

Thus *ātman* in Śve. Up. I. 10b means the Immutable (*akṣara*.)

15. The word *māyā* "deceit" in verse 10 is explained in verse 11 as the fetters. It does not seem to mean the Illusion of the existence of the world, but it means the cause of the bondage and the bondage itself. In absolution the 'all' (*viśva*) does not cease to exist but the liberated gets the lordship over the all (I. 10–11).

16. The three mentioned in verse 12 are the same as those in verse 9. In 12 the names of these three are given from the standpoint of 'enjoyment'. So, the Enjoyable is the Immutable from which the Mutable or the First Evolver and the whole creation proceed.

2. Sve. Up. V. 1.*

There are, with Brahman above them (*brahmapare*) two infinite Imperishables, wherein Knowledge (*vidyā*) and not–Knowledge (*avidyā*) are placed concealed. Not–Knowledge is the Mutable (*kṣara*), Knowledge is the Immortal. He who rules over the Knowledge and the not–Knowledge is other than these two.

NOTES :—

1. In this verse the Supreme Brahman is said to be above 'two Imperishables'. One of these is the hiding place of 'Knowledge', *vidyā*, which is identified with ' the Immortal '. As said in note 11 on Sve. Up. I. 7–12 the Immortal means the Immutable. This conclusion will follow also from the fact that 'the not–Knowledge', the opposite of Knowledge, is identified with the Mutable (*kṣara*). These terms (*vidyā* and *avidyā*) with these meanings have played a great part in the Mahābhārata philosophical Schools.

2. The identification of ' Knowledge ' with *amṛta* i. e. the Immutable, seems to be the identification of the means and the aim. In Kena Up. 12 we are told that 'one attains the Immortal through Knowledge'. So also in Īśa Up. 11. In the Pāñcarātra system, *vidyā* 'Knowledge' is a synonym for the higher Nature (i. e. the Immutable). See Prof. Schrader's Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā, P. 62).

3. The idea of 'two Imperishables' (*akṣaras*) one of which is (the place of) the Immutable and the other (that of) the Mutable is like that of two Unmanifests (*avyaktas*) in Bh. Gī. VIII. 20. According to the Gītā, all beings (called the Mutable in Bh. Gī. VIII. 4, XV. 16) rise from the lower Unmanifest, just as the Mutable in the form of "not–Knowledge" is to be traced to the Imperishable according to this verse of the Śve. Up.

The higher Unmanifest of the Gītā (VIII. 20–21) is, according to the terminology of the Gītā, *akṣara* " the Immutable" properly so called. Thus, the two Imperishables are also the same as the two *prakṛtis* in the Bh. Gī. VII. 4–6.

---

*See Additional Note.

The Mutable in the form of *pradhāna* is the second Imperishable (I. 10). The kind of vagueness in the sense of *kṣara* ' the Mutable ' (used for *pradhāna* or the second Imperishable in I. 8, 10 and for " not–Knowledge" the effect of that Imperishable in V. 1.) is due to the fact that the Sve. Up. is the first Up. to use the term *kṣara* in contrast to *akṣara*. The Ruler of Knowledge and not–Knowledge or the two Imperishables is the same as the Ruler mentioned in Sve. Up. I. 8, and 10 and also in Bh. Gī. XV. 18.

CONCLUSION :—

This Upaniṣad is important from various standpoints, especially from that of the idea of Trinity. But here we are concerned only with its terminology the fixation of which will be facilitated by the following considerations :—

1. The Immutable is according to this Upaniṣad lower than Brahma (V. 1).

2. The higherness or superiority of *puruṣa* to the Immutable is here interpreted as the Immutable's being ruled by *puruṣa* the Ruler (I. 8, 10 ; V. 1).

3. It is impersonal (I. 10.), but again it is described as a femle (I. 9, IV. 5 – a female unborn). This idea seems to have arisen out of the conception of *akṣara* as the "matrix" (*yoni*) for *puruṣa* (e. g. in Mu. Up. I. 3, Śve Up. V. 6). In this connection it may be noted that the Sve. Up. is the first Upaniṣad to use the terms *prakṛti*, *māyā* (IV. 10), and *śakti* (I. 3.) for the Immutable. When *puruṣa* was placed above the Immutable, the idea suggested itself naturally that the Immutable was the power of, or the "matrix" for, *puruṣa*, and this idea further developed into a number of words of the feminine gender invented for the Immutable (e. g. *vidyā*, *māyā*, *prakṛti*). The term *māyin* (Śve. Up. IV. 9–10) also shows that *māyā* was supposed to be a power belonging to *puruṣa*. The term *ajā* " the female unborn " was suggested by the term *aja* "unborn" for *puruṣa* and the Jīva and by the fact that the Immutable called either *akṣara* or Brahman or *ātman* was considered to be the female generative organ (*yoni*) for *puruṣa* (VI. 16, I. 2, V. 6). This term *ajā* was also responsible for the invention of the term *prakṛti*.

4. This Immutable is unborn, just as in the Gîtā (VIII. 20, XIII. 10).

5. The Immutable and the Mutable are joined together, i. e. as the cause and the effect ; so *pradhāna* is the effect of the Immutable.

The terminology of Śve. Up. may, then, be summarised as follows :—

1. The Reality is threefold or a Triad and it is called *paramaṃ brahma* (I. 7), *brahmam*, (I. 9) or *trividhaṃ brahmam* (I. 12).

2. *Puruṣa* is called *puruṣa* (I. 2), *īśa* – (I. 8, 9, 10 ; V. 1), *deva* (I. 8, 11), *jña* (I. 9), *ātman* (I. 9), *preritṛ* (I. 12, 16), Brahman (V. I).

3. The Immutable is called *akṣara* (I. 1, 10 ; V. 1), Brahman (I. 7, V. 6), *avyakta* (I. 8), *ajā* (I. 9), *ātman* (I. 3, 6, 10 ; VI. 16), *bhogya* (I. 12), *haras* (I. 10), *amṛta* (I. 10 ; V. 1), (the abode of) *vidyā* (V. 1), (and also *māyā* and *prakṛti* in IV. 10).

4. The lower Nature is meant by the Imperishable (V. 1), (the abode of) *avidyā* (V. 1), *kṣara* (I. 8, 10), *vyakta* 'the Manifest' (I. 8).

5. The effects also of the lower Nature are called *kṣara* (V. 1) or *avidyā* (V. 1).

6. The individual soul is designated as *anīśa* (I. 8, 9), *bhoktṛ* (I. 8, 9, 12), *ajña* (I–9).

Let us, finally, see how the Trinity of the Sve. Up. is found in the Gîtā :—

We should here compare the various forms of the Lord in Bh. Gî. VII. 29–30 and VIII. 1–4 with the members of the triad in Sve Up. I. 6–12. In the Gîtā we are told that one should know the Lord with his Adhibhūta, Adhidaiva, Adhiyajña and Adhyātma forms, while in Śve. Up. we read : "It is [the attainment of] Brahma, when one attains the three" (I. 9). *Puruṣa* or the Adhidaiva of Bh. Gî. VIII. 4 is called

puruṣa in Sve. Up. I. 2, *īśa* and *deva* in Śve. Up. I. 8. The Immutable is called *akṣara* in both the texts (Bh. Gî. VIII. 3, and Śve. Up. I. 8, 10). The second Imperishable or *pradhāna* (Śve. Up. I. 10) which is the same as *kṣara* and *vyakta* is to be identified with *svabhāva* or Adhyātma in Bh. Gî. VIII. 3. *Kṣara* 'the effect of the Imperishable' (Śve. Up. V. 1) is the Adhibhūta (Bh. Gî. VIII. 4a). The *bhoktṛ* (Sve. Up. I. 9) is the Adhiyajña in Bh. Gî. VIII. 4. Besides these identifications, the Bh. Gî. speaks of the Immutable, the Jîva and *puruṣa* as 'eternal', *sanātana*, in IV. 31, VIII. 20, in II. 24, XV. 7 and in XI. 18, VII. 10 respectively. The higher Nature or the Immutable and *puruṣa* are called 'beginningless' *anādi* in XIII. 19 and X 3; and the attribute *aja*, 'unborn', is applied to the Jîva in Bh. Gî. II. 21 and to the Lord in IV. 6, VII. 25, X. 3, 12. Thus, the Bhagavadgîtā is also inclined to regard the three members of the Trinity of the Śve. Up. as eternal (see App. II).

APPENDIX II.

Interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā.

It is intended here to explain from my standpoint the *akṣara*–passages of the Gītā. The meanings assigned by various ancient and modern authorities to the term *akṣara* in the verses concerned have been stated in a tabular form in the Introduction.

1. Bh. Gî. III. 14d–15.

Sacrifice is born of Activity (*karman*). Know Activity to be born of *brahman* [the lower Nature] and *brahman* as born of ' the Immutable ' (*akṣara*); therefore [this *akṣara* which may be called] the omnipresent [and] eternal Brahman is to be found in Sacrifice (i. e., it is the final source to which Sacrifice can be traced).

Notes :—

1. The term 'Brahman' when used for 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*) is qualified by the two epithets ' omnipresent ' and ' eternal ' in order to distinguish it from *brahman* which is born of ' the Immutable ' and is not therefore eternal.

2. The lower Nature is here said to be "born" of the Immutable. This passage of the Gîtā is very important on account of this clear and doubtless statement regarding the lower Nature. See notes, below, on Gîtā XIII. 19. *'Brahman'*, the lower Nature, is said to be ' born ' also in Mu. Up. I. 1. 9. " *Brahman* " seems to have been used for the lower Nature in contrast with the higher Nature which is called *mahad brahman* in Bh. Gî. XIV. 3–4.

2. Bh. Gî. VII. 29–30, VIII. 1–5, 8.

(VII. 29) Those who, having resorted to me, endeavour for freedom from old age and death, know that Brahman, the whole spiritual form (*adhyātma*) and the whole Activity (*karman*).

(30) Those who know me with my material and divine forms (*adhibhūta* and *adhidaiva*), and with my form as the sacrificial agent (*adhiyajña*), will also, with their mind disciplined through Yoga, know me at the time of [their] departure [from this world].

Arjuna said :—

(VIII. 1–2) What is that Brahman ? What is the spiritual form ? What, Oh Puruṣottama, is Activity ? What is said to be the material form ? How is the divine form [to be understood] ? And who in this body here is the sacrificial agent, O slayer of Madhu ? And how are you known [even] at the time of departure [from this world] by those who are self–disciplined ?

The Lord said :—

(3) The Immutable (*akṣara*) is the Supreme Brahman (*prama brahman*); the [lower] Nature (*svabhāva*) is the spiritual form (*adhyātma*). The act of creating (*visarga*) causing the birth and existence of beings is [technically] named Activity (*karman*).

(4) The material form (*adhibhūta*) is the mutable existence (*kṣara bhāva*), and the divine form (*adhidaiva*) is *puruṣa*. O best of the embodied beings, I myself am the sacrificial agent (*adhiyajña*) in this body.

(5) And he who, while leaving the physical frame at the time of death, departs remembering me alone, attains to my state; there is no doubt as to this.

x x x

(6) He reaches the divine supreme *puruṣa*, meditating [on him] with a concentrated mind disciplined by the path of constant application (*abhyāsa–yoga*).

Notes :—

1. This passage must be considered in connection with III. 14 c–d, 15. "The whole Activity" (VII. 29) shows that the topic of *karman* is here further discussed. *Brahman*,

karman, *yajña* (in *adhiyajña*) and *akṣara* are dealt with in both the places. VIII. 5 also reminds one of II. 72.

2. Brahman in VII. 29 and VIII. 1 is the omnipresent and eternal Brahman mentioned in III. 15.

3. As the term *adhyātma* seems to have been used in the Gītā always in the sense of 'spiritual' (vide Bh. Gī. XI. 1), we can distinguish between *adhibhūta* and *adhyātma* by translating them as 'material' and 'spiritual' forms. *Adhidaiva* may therefore be fitly translated as the 'divine form', so that it may be distinguished from *adhyātma*. As verse VII. 30 states that *adhibūta*, *adhidaiva* and *adhiyajña* are the forms belonging to Kṛṣṇa, we should not hesitate in taking *adhyātma* (VII. 29) also as one of his forms. These three forms may also be called Kṛṣṇa's supernatural (*adhidaiva*), super-sensual (*adhyātma*), and sensual (*adhibuūta*) forms, thus implying the 'higher-ness', *paratva*, of each, which, as we shall see later on, is distinctly mentioned in the Gītā.

4. They may be regarded as the purely transcendent, the transcendent-and-immanent and the purely immanent forms. *Puruṣa* is only transcendent; therefore he is called 'divine', *adhidaiva* or *divya* (VIII. 8, 10), or 'the highest', *para* (VIII. 10) or *parama* (VIII. 8). For the same reason he is also called *puruṣottama* (VIII. 1), because he 'is beyond the Mutable and higher than the Immutable' (XV. 18). The purely immanent or material form of Kṛṣṇa is 'the mutable existence' (VIII. 4). When the Gītā explains the immanence of the Lord e. g. in VII. 7–12, X. 20–42, XI, XV. 12–15, it is always with reference to this form of the Lord. Whatever is neither purely immanent nor purely transcendent, may be classified as constituting the transcendent-and-immanent or *adhyātma* form. Now, let us see what existences (*bhāvāḥ*) constitute '*adhyātma* in its entirety', *kṛtsnam adhyātmam* (VII. 29). The Gītā clearly states that *svabhāva* 'the lower Nature', is *adhyātma* (VIII. 3). The Gītā also says that *karman* is born of *svabhāva* (e. g. in V. 14); and in III. 14 *karman* is said to be born of *brahman*. So *svabhāva* being identical with *brahman*, the immediate cause of *karman*, is born of the Immutable (III. 15b).

The fact that the Gītā understands the lower Nature (*svabhāva*, *brahman*, *prakṛti*, etc) to be *adhyātma* and explains the *adhibhūta* form as 'all beings' is noteworthy. The Gītā distinguishes between the two Natures, but does not make the

lower Nature *adhibhūta*. The Mahābhārata always understands *adhyātma* with reference only to *akṣara* and *puruṣa*, while the author of the Brahmasūtras identifies both the Natures (Br. Sū. I. 4. 23–28, see Chap. IV. p. 101) and according to him the Nature will be *adhyātma*.

'The Immutable' by its very nature stands above 'the Mutable' or *adhibhūta*. 'The Immutable' is quite distinct from, and lower than, *puruṣa* who is the highest; so *akṣara* seems to be one of the constituents of the 'entire *adhyātma*' mentioned in VII. 29. The Activity or *karman* (VIII. 3) as the effect of *brahman*, *svabhāva* or the lower *prakṛti* (III. 15, V. 14, III. 27) is also a constituent of the same, because 'the material form' consists only of "the beings".

So, on the data of III. 14–15 and VII. 29–30 and VIII. 1–8 we arrive at the following table :—

parama divya puruṣa (VIII. 8)
= the supreme divine *puruṣa*
= *adhidaiva*
= the supernatural or the transcendent form.

|

akṣara "the Immutable" + *brahman* (III. 15a) or *svabhāva* (VIII. 3, V. 14) or the lower *prakṛti* (e. g. III. 27), + *karman* the "Activity" (III. 14, VIII 3 c–d, III. 27)
= *adhyātma*
= the supersensual or the transcendent–and–immanent form.

|

kṣara = the Mutable (VIII. 4), = " all beings ", *bhūtāni*, mentioned in III. 14 and VIII. 4
= the sensual or purely immanent form.

We find that this sequence of gradation arrived at from these two passages, is confirmed by XV. 16–18, which may therefore be next taken up for consideration.

3. Bh. Gî. XV. 16–18.

(16) There are these two *puruṣas* in the world: 'the Mutable' (*kṣara*) and 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*). 'The Mutable' consists of all beings; the Unchanging is called 'the Immutable'.

(17) The Highest *puruṣa*, however, is (yet) another; he is called 'the Highest Spirit' (*paramātman*), the imperishable Lord who sustains the three worlds, having penitrated them.

(18) As I am beyond the Mutable and as I am higher even than the Immutable; hence am I well-known in the world and in the Veda as 'the Highest *puruṣa*' (*puruṣottama*).

NOTES:—

1. We have seen in the passages already examined that *puruṣa*, the Immutable and the Mutable are the three forms of Kṛṣṇa. The same is the idea of this passage. In VIII. 1 Kṛṣṇa was addressed by Arjuna as *puruṣottama*; here he calls himself "*puruṣottama* well-known in the world and in the Veda". The reason why the *puruṣa* of the other passages in the Gîtā (e. g. VIII 4, 8, 10,22; XI. 38; X. 12) is called here *puruṣottama* seems to be that his own other two forms have been here described as *puruṣas* which term is here used in a secondary sense ("principle"), the purpose being that of pointing out the inferiority of *kṣara* and *akṣara* to *puruṣa* mentioned also in VIII 3–4. *Puruṣottama* is a special term of the MBh. Pāñcarātras.

2. 'The Mutable' is lower than 'the Immutable'; this is the force of *api* 'even' in *akṣarād api c ottamaḥ*–XV. 18. It consists of all beings (XV. 16 c–d); so it is the same Mutable as is explained in VIII. 4a.

3. 'The Immutable' is naturally not different from the same mentioned in VIII. 1. It is above 'the Mutable' and is said to be in the world (XV. 16) because *puruṣa* or *puruṣottama* is higher even than 'the Immutable'. 'The Immutable' is described to be the Unchanging, *kūṭastha*, both here and in XII 3, where undoubtedly *akṣara* means the impersonal form of the Lord.

4. *Akṣara* cannot mean the individual soul (as the term is often understood) in the Gîtā because in the Gîtā the Jîva is never said to be lower than the Lord but is always regarded

as identical with him (being his own 'part'). Again, there is no passage in the Gîtā, where the Jîva is given the designation '*akṣara*'. Moreover, 'the Immutable' is according to the Gîtā an object of meditation (XII. 3–4) and the goal of ascetics (VIII.11); while the Jîva is never such an object nor such a goal. The term *akṣara*, is here used in contrast with the term *kṣara*, as in VIII 3–4, and therefore must have the same meaning here as in that verse (see notes 6–7 on Śve. Up. I. 7–12).

4. Bh. Gî. XII. 1–4.

ARJUN SAID:—

(1) Which of those devotees who thus worship you with constant devotion and those, on the other hand, who [worship] 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*), 'the Unmanifest' (*avyakta*), are the better learned in the [science of the various] paths?

THE LORD SAID :—

(2) Those who having fixed their mind on me, being always devoted [to me], and possessed of the highest belief [in me], worship me, are considered by me to be the best possessed of the [right] path.

(3–4) Those, however, who worship 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*) the ineffable, the unmanifest, the omnipresent, the unthinkable, the unchanging, the unmoving, and the firm, having controlled the group of the organs (of sense and action), having the same feeling towards everything, and rejoicing in the welfare of all beings, obtain none but me.

NOTES :—

1. The Gîtā here, mentions the 'Immutable' and *puruṣa* as the goals reached by the released; so there are two kinds of worship or meditation and two independent paths. '*Yoga*' in XIII. 1 means a path for salvation.

2. The worshippers of the Immutable are here contrasted with those of *puruṣa*. This contrast was already a burning question in the days of the Muṇḍaka, Praśna, and Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads (Vide App. I). Though the Immutable is not here

stated to be lower than *puruṣa*, it is 'lower' according to XV. 16–18 (and VIII. 21–22, as we shall just see). The worshippers of *puruṣa* are said to be better possessed of the right path than those of the Immutable because these latter choose a path more troublesome than that of the former (XII. 5).

3. The worshippers of 'the Immutable' are not generally said in the Gītā to reach *puruṣa*. As a rule they "enter the Immutable" (VIII. 11). So also in VIII. 21; II. 72; V. 6, 24; VI. 28. Similarly the worshippers of *puruṣa* usually attain *puruṣa* (VIII. 10; VIII. 22: VI. 31; VII. 18, 19; VIII. 5,16). In XVIII. 53–55, we are told that one who is devoid of the idea of 'mine' *mama* 'becomes Brahman' and then, having secured devotion to Kṛṣṇa, enters Kṛṣṇa. So, on the strength of these passages (XII. 4, VIII. 11, XV. 53–55), we may, without assigning a secondary or metaphorical sense, to any word or sentence in these verses, conclude that generally the meditators on 'the Immutable' reach 'the Immutable' and that some of them reach also Kṛṣṇa after having obtained devotion to him.

4. The verse under consideration (XII. 4) is important from the standpoint of the relation of the Immutable to *puruṣa*. As (some at least of) the *akṣara*–meditators are said to reach *puruṣa* just like the *puruṣa*–worshippers; the Immutable is not to be understood as a second independent entity by the side of *puruṣa*, though undoubtedly according to the Gītā the Immutable is to be distinguished from *puruṣa* and is in a way lower than *puruṣa*, as said above in note 2. The next passage which we have to examine throws further light on the present question.

5. Bh. Gī. VIII. 18–22.

(18) All manifestations arise at the advent of the Day of Brahmā from the [lower] Unmanifest (*avyakta*); they are absorbed at the advent of the Night into that same called [technically] the Unmanifest.

(19)—This same group of beings having repeatedly become [manifest] is dissolved [into its original source] at the advent of the Night, without a will of their own; O son of Pṛthā, it arises [also similarly] at the advent of the Day—

(20) However, beyond that Unmanifest [technically so called], there is another 'eternal Unmanifest Existence' (*sanātana avyakta bhāva*) which does not perish when all beings perish.

(21) This [latter] Unmanifest Existence is [technically] called the Immutable (*akṣara*); [the sages] call it the Highest Goal. That [Existence] [from which the liberated], after having reached it, do not return, is my Supreme Abode (*parama dhāman*).

(22) Higher (than the Immutable) is that *puruṣa* obtainable through undivided devotion, in the interior of whom [all] beings rest and by whom all this [visible world] is permeated.

NOTES :—

1. Verse 19 is a parenthetical one. The lower Unmanifest in 18 is the source of all beings mentioned in verse 10. Verse 20 mentions two Unmanifest Existences. One of them is withdrawn when all beings perish. The other, the higher one, is eternal. This is called 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*) in verse 21. It is the hi ghest goal [of the worshippers of the Immutable].

2. I have followed the reading according to Śaṅkara's commentary. If we had to read *vyaktāt* in place of *a–vyaktāt* in 20 b, we lose the force of the contrast intended in the verse. Moreover, there is no difficulty in understanding the doctrine of the two Unmanifest Existences, as we have seen above. The lower Unmanifest is again mentioned in Bh.Gī. XIII. 5 where *avyakta* is the source of *buddhi* and therefore is the same as the lower *prakṛti* (Bh. Gī. VII. 4). This doctrine of two *avyaktas* became most important in the days of the LMBh., as will be seen from Ch. III.

3. That the word *dhāman* in verse 21 d means 'abode' can be shown on the strength of the passages in the Gītā in which the same or a similar word like *pada* or *sthāna* or a verb showing motion from one place to another (with reference to the movement of the released) is used. In this verse also the expressions, 'having reached' and 'do not return,' point to the correctness of the interpretation. So, *akṣara* is the 'abode' wherein Kṛṣṇa (or *puruṣa*) dwells, and perhaps we are to understand the *puruṣa* "being higher" than the Immutable in this sense also.

4. Verse 22 should be studied along with IX. 4. In the former that *puruṣa* in the interior of whom the beings rest and by whom "all this" is penetrated is mentioned, in the latter the same is said of Kṛṣṇa. So *puruṣa* of verse 22 is the *puruṣottama* of XV. 18, and *paraḥ* in the first quarter of verse 22 distinctly

means that *puruṣa* is higher (*para*) than the Immutable. *Puruṣa* is never identified with *akṣara* in the Gītā. In Bh. Gī. VIII. 3–4 both of them are clearly distinguished from each other.

6. Bh. Gī. XI. 18, 37 c–d.

(18) You are the Immutable (*akaṣra*) the highest worth knowing, you are the highest resting place of all this [world]. You are the imperishable eternal protector of Dharma. I believe you to be the eternal *puruṣa*.

(37 c–d) O Infinite One, Lord of the gods, abode of the world, you are 'the Immutable' (*akṣara*), the Being (i. e. the Manifest), the not–Being (i. e. the Unmanifest), and whatever is beyond that.

NOTES :—

1. First, it should be noted that these are the words of Arjuna who out of his homage to Kṛṣṇa identifies him by turn with all the various gods and yet places him above all of them. Secondly, in verse 18, Kṛṣṇa is identified with the Immutable and also with *puruṣa*. The same is also the sense of verse 37, where Kṛṣṇa is said to be the Immutable and what is beyond it. This last expression 'what is beyond the Immutable', refers to *puruṣa*. So, according to these verses also *puruṣa* is above *akṣara*.

CONCLUSION :—

On the strength of the above passages in which *akṣara* is mentioned expressly the conception of the Immutable in the Gītā may be summarised as follows:–

(1) The Immutable in the Gītā is described (e. g. in XII. 3) in the same negative terms in which the Upaniṣads describe *akṣara* (e. g. Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 8; Mu. Up. I. 1. 6) or *avyakta* (e. g. Kaṭha Up. III. 15). The Gītā says that it describes the same *akṣara* as is described by the knowers of the Veda (VIII. 11).

2. It is distinct from *puruṣa* or *puruṣottama* (VIII. 3–4, 10–11, 21–22; XII 1–4; XV. 16–18).

3. It is lower than *puruṣa* or *puruṣottama* (VIII. 21–22, XV. 18).

4. It is other than the lower Nature called *svabhāva* (VIII. 3), or the lower *avyakta* (VIII. 18–20), or *brahman* " the immediate cause of Activity " (III. 15).

5. It is above this lower Nature (VIII. 20–21), or in other words the lower Nature is "born" of the Immutable (III. 15).

6. It is above the Mutable (XV. 18.) or all beings (VIII. 18–19; VIII. 4; III. 14–15).

7. In relation to *puruṣa*, the Immutable may be described as ' the supreme abode ' of the *puruṣa* (*dhāma paramaṃ mama*–VIII. 21–22; and *pada*–VIII. 11).

8. It is the ultimate source of all ' Activity ' (*karman*) (III. 14–15) and all beings (III. 14–15, VIII. 18–19).

9. It is like *puruṣa* an independent object of meditation and a goal (XII. 1–4, VIII. 21). Particularly it is the goal of ascetics (VIII. 11).

10. Some meditators of the Immutable reach *puruṣa* (XII. 4, XVIII. 53–55).

11. It may be called *parama akṣara* (VIII. 3), *paramā gati* (VIII. 21), *parama dhāman* (VIII. 21), *avyakta* (VIII. 20–21, XII 1, 3), *kūṭastha* (XII. 3, XV. 17).

12. Though both the Immutable and the *puruṣa* are independently objects and goals of meditation, the author of the Gītā thinks the latter to be the better of the two because it can be understood and reached with less trouble (XII. 5).

13. The Immutable is one of the three eternal (*sanātana*) principles in the Gītā (VIII. 20) and it does not perish even when all beings including the lower Unmanifest perish. So, *akṣara* is unborn, unlike the lower *avyakta*, its effect (VIII. 18, III. 15). It is also *kūṭastha* ' unchanging '.

APPENDIX III.

No Plurality of Souls in the Mahābhārata.

Most of the passages in the Mahābhārata which Prof. Hopkins, Prof. Deussen and Prof. Edgerton have explained as referring to the doctrine of the plurality of souls have been already discussed in Chapter III of the Thesis and it has been shown that they have not the least knowledge of this doctrine (see Ch. III. Sec. 2). Only two passages where Prof. Hopkins believes that we have the mention of the plurality of souls remain to be considered here, viz., MBh. XII. 315. 10e–f, 11ff, and MBh. XII. 350. 1–3, 7.

1. MBh. XII. 315. 10e–f, 11ff.

These verses can be easily translated as follows :—

(10e–f) The Unmanifest is eternal; the Manifest, non-eternal. This we have learnt.

(11) Men, who have compassion for all beings and who have resorted to *kevala jñāna* ('the knowledge of the Absolute'), say that the Unmanifest is one and also many.

(12) Different [from the Unmanifest] is the Puruṣa; but the Unmanifest called the Unchangeable * is [in reality] not unchangeable. Just as stalks [issue] in the rush, so is this [Unmanifest] born [as the Manifest].

* Cf. Cūlikā Upaniṣad: "*aṣṭarūpām ajām dhruvām*" and Bh. Gī. "*kūṭastho'kṣara ucyate*" (Bh. Gī. XV. 16). This verse of the MBh. (XII. 315. 12. a–b) also proves my point that the L. MBh. Sāṃkhyas have identified the two Natures of the Aupaniṣadas. (I am thankful to Prof. Schrader for the above interpretation of MBh. XII. 315. 12 and for drawing my attention to the passages from Cū. Up. and Bh. Gī.).

It should be noted that these verses use the terms *vyakta* and *avyakta* for the two metaphysical principles of the Sāṃkhya of those names. This is apparent from the context. Prof. Hopkins' translation of 10 a–b must appear queer to any reader: "Puruṣa is eternal and non-eternal, manifest and unmanifest". (GEI. p. 123). Such an interpretation requires no refutation. Then, in the case of verse 11, Prof. Hopkins removes *puruṣāḥ* from its grammatical connection as subject of *āhuḥ* in "*avyaktaikatvam ity āhur nānātvaṃ puruṣās tathā*" (11 a–b). He wants to show that this sentence teaches the doctrine of the plurality of souls and therefore makes an independent sentence of "*nānātvaṃ puruṣās tathā*" (GEI. p. 123). In fact *ekatva* and *nānātva* in 11 refer to the eternal Unmanifest and to the non-eternal Manifest in 10 e–f. In this sense they have been used very often in L. MBh, e. g. in XII. 305. 36 (see pp. 45, 74, 76). *Avyakta* means the Sāṃkhya Nature, and therefore Prof. Edgerton is also wrong when he explains *avyakta-ekatva* as 'the esoteric unity of souls' and '*nānātva*' as 'the empirical plurality' and quotes examples where '*avyakta*' is used of Brahman or the Lord, but does not trouble himself about what it could have meant throughout in these Sāṃkhya chapters of the L. MBh. (AJP. Vol XLV, 1924, p. 26). Prof. Deussen is quite right here when he explains *puruṣāḥ* in 11 b as human beings and as the subject to *āhuḥ* in 11a (VPTM p. 653).

2. MBh. XII. 350. 1–3, 7.

The second and last passage which remains to be examined in this connection is found in chapter 350 of MBh. XII, which teaches indeed a plurality of souls, but without reference to the Classical Sāṃkhya and in a different sense. The first fact to be borne in mind in interpreting the verses in question is that they are, like the whole of the Nārāyaṇīya,* much later than the chapters describing the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga Schools of the Mahābhārata (XII. 302–317), and that the two chapters (350–351) dealing with the problem, never before raised, of *puruṣa-bahutva* form the very last section of

* This is evident from its general character, but also e. g. from the statement (343, 11 fll.) that "the nectar of the story about Nārāyaṇa" has been won by churning the ocean of the "Bhārata of one hundred thousand (verses)".

the Nārāyaṇîya. Secondly, the verses state that the philosophers of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga Schools believed in many souls "in the world" (*bahavaḥ puruṣā loke**–MBh. XII. 350. 7). Thus the passage mentions an empirical plurality of souls, and not a real one which came to be believed in perhaps only when the Sāṃkhya became atheistic. Moreover, in verse 350. 7, the interpolator of these chapters (350–351) himself admits that "Vyāsa" did not teach plurality of souls, but only "unity of *puruṣa*" (*puruṣaikatva*). This is a frank admission that in the Mahābhārata we have always "unity of soul", since "Vyāsa" can refer only to the "author" of the Mahābhārata. And lastly, as regards the explanation of the problem given here, it is not the desire of the interpolator to misrepresent the (Classical) Sāṃkhya view, as Prof. Hopkins charges him with having done, but the interpolator admitting that the Sāṃkhyas teach an empirical plurality of souls, tries to explain it from his own standpoint (350 7) which is that of a Pāñcarātra, as Prof. Schrader rightly points out to me. The doctrine of one Puruṣa as the "Source" (*yoni*) of many souls (*bahūnāṃ puruṣāṇāṃ yath aikā yoniḥ*–XII. 350. 3) represents the position of the Pāñcarātras who admitted a real internal difference (*svagatabheda*) in one sole Being.

Thus, even this last passage goes directly against Prof. Hopkins' conclusions, and on the contrary, admits positively that in the Mahābhārata "Vyāsa" has taught "unity of *puruṣa*" (350. 7).

I would not repeat here the other passages discussed already in the text (see Ch. III. pp. 42, 45, 74, 78) where I have shown that Professors Hopkins, Deussen and Edgerton were wrong in referring them to plurality of souls. Thus, in the Mahābhārata we have no plurality of souls and the only passage where an empirical plurality of souls is mentioned without expressly excluding a real world–soul and a Supreme Lord is also a witness for the "unity of *puruṣa*" in the Mahābhārata.

---

*"*loke*" means "in the world", as opposed to '*Vede*" "in the Scripture;" compare "*loke Vede ca prathitaḥ Puruṣottamaḥ*" (Bh. Gî. XV. 18), and also "*lokavat*" in Br. Sū. II. 1. 13, 33, etc. and "*loke*" in Br. Sū. II. 1. 25, where also "*loke*" is contrasted with what is stated "in the Śruti".

APPENDIX IV.

Interpretation of the Brahmasūtras.

This appendix has been prompted by two considerations: firstly, I felt it to be my duty to the reader of Chapter IV to justify in a more extensive way the unusual method applied there in the interpretation of the Sūtras; and, secondly, I wish to invite criticism of my method with a view to undertaking if encouraged to do so, an independent interpretation of the whole of the Brahmasūtras. The contrast between my interpretation and those of the Ācāryas is the necessary result of my conviction that these, including even Śaṅkara, were not in possession of an unbroken tradition. How the latter got lost, I am at present unable to explain; but the fact of its having been broken long before Śaṅkara will, I believe, become evident from the consistency of my interpretation in the following pages as against the farfetchedness and often palpable impossibility of those of the Ācāryas.

1. Br. Sū. III.3.1–53.

Section* 1.

Oneness of Goal.

(1) [Brahman] is such that the [very same] idea thereof is [to be had] from all the Vedanta texts, because of the absence of any difference in the scriptural injunction, etc.

(2) If it be argued: "No. [All the Vedanta texts do not teach the same Brahman] because of the difference [in scriptural injunction, etc]", we reply: "No. [If the Vedanta texts are similar] even in o n e [out of the scriptural injunction, name, etc.] [we would say that a l l of them teach the same Brahman].

---

* The division of the Sections (*adhikaraṇas*) followed here is my own.

(3) [Although the same Brahman is taught in all the Vedanta texts, one learns only one of these and not all] because [the rule of studying] the text of one's own Vedic Branch is indeed such, and one is religiously qualified for [the study of] the customary text (only). And that rule is like that of [taking] the water [from one particular well, although one can take it from any other watering place as well][1]

(4) And [there is a text which] also shows it[2].

NOTES :—

1. The reading "*savavacca*" in place of *salilavacca* will give the following interpretation : " And that rule is like that of the *sava*–sacrifices [where complete option is given]."

2. e. g. Bh. Gī. VIII. 11, as Śaṅkara rightly says. Note that the problem in this Section is whether all the Vedanta texts teach one and the same Brahman, or two, or many.

SECTION 2.

*Collection of Thoughts**

(5) A Collection [of all the attributes of the object of meditation, mentioned in all the Vedanta texts] [should be made], because of the non–difference (i.e. identity) of the goal, as [is done] in the case of [the rites] which are subordinate to *vidhi* (the Vedic precept), and [the collection should be made only] in so far as the context is similar[1] [in the Vedantas concerned].

(6) If it be said : " The difference [of goals][2] does exist because [of the authority] of the Word," we reply : " No, because of non–distinction [in the Word]".

(7) " Nor [can the view of the difference of goals be maintained] on the strength of a difference of ' the context ' (*prakaraṇa*) as in the case of *parovarīyastva* " etc.

(8) If it be said : " [There is a difference of goals] because of ' the designations ' (*saṃjñā*) [like *akṣara* and *puruṣa*]," we reply : " It has been already explained, and that is even admitted here (by us)."

---

* *thīs*, as in Br. Sū. III.3.33

(9) And [the difference of goals] is inconsistent[3] because of the omnipresence (of both the so–called goals).

NOTES :—

1. i. e., the Sūtrakāra allows the " collection " of the attributes of *puruṣa* only from the *puruṣa*–texts and not from the *akṣara*–texts also, when one meditates on *puruṣa*.

2. Note that the opponent seems to have in his mind the two goals : *akṣara* and *puruṣa*.

3. Śaṅkara reads '*samañjasam*,' but I follow the reading accepted by most of the other Ācāryas.

SECTION 3.

Two Names of the Goal.

(10) Because there is no difference in all (other points), these two (designations) are (to be understood) otherwise[1].

Note :—

The Sūtrakāra agrees to a difference of two *saṃjñās*, not to that of goals, the goal being in all Upaniṣads (and the Gītā) the same because all other points, *codanā* etc. are the same everywhere.

SECTION 4.

Attributes of puruṣa.

(11) The attributes, beginning with " bliss " (*ānanda*) belong to *pradhāna*[2] [and should be collected for the meditation on the same, as said in Sūtra 5 above].

(12) The attributes, such as' having *priya* for the head' (*priyaśirastva*) do not come up for consideration because [these attributes show] an accumulation and a diminution which are [possible only] in case of there being a difference [in the "goals" to be achieved][3].

(13) But the other [attributes] [should be collected] because of the sameness of the object [of meditation].

(14) [The attributes such as 'having *priya* for the head' are not to be collected] because of their non-utility in meditation,

(15) And because of the word *ātman*[4] [used as predicate of *ānanda* in the Śruti].

NOTES:—

1. This is probably a reference to Br. Sū. I. 1. 12, because no Sruti gives a list beginning with bliss, as is required by the Sūtra, not even Tai. Up. II. 1 which is referred to in Br. Sū I. 1. 12 and indirectly in the present Sūtra.

2. '*Pradhāna*' is a word used for *puruṣa* even according to Śaṅkara (Śā. Bhā. Br. Sū. III. 3. 33). In the days of the Sūtrakāra *pradhāna* was used for the personal *puruṣa* e. g. in MBh. XIV. 19. 47–48, XIV. 18. 32 (see Chapter IV).

3. Note that the Sūtrakāra rejects such attributes of *puruṣa* (in Tai. Up. II. 5) as do not agree with his standpoint that *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are only two names for the same goal (Br. Sū. III. 3.8). He would reject also *brahma-puccha*tva of *puruṣa* in " *brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā* " (Tai. Up. II. 5).

4. " *Ānanda ātmā* " (Tai. Up. II. 5) may have meant : " *Ānanda* is the Atman of the *puruṣa* [just as *jīva* is the Atman of *akṣara* or Brahman, Chā. Up. VI. 3. 3) " ; but the Sūtrakāra understands it to mean " *Ananda* is the Atman " i. e. " *Ānanda* is the Paramātman or *pradhāna*".

SECTION 5.

Method of puruṣa-meditation.

(16) *Pradhāna* should be grasped [in the meditation] as [identical with] the Self (*ātman*) [of the meditator], as is the case in [the meditation of] the other [i. e. *akṣara*], because of what follows.

(17) If it be said; "[*Pradhāna* should be so comprehended] because of the 'invariable concomitance' (*anvaya*)" we reply: "[Still] it may be because of the ' affirmation' *avadhāraṇa*)[2] ".

NOTES :—

1. *Anvaya* is 'the invariable co-existence' (opp. of *vyatireka*) ; here, that of the Jîva and *puruṣa* in the human heart (?)

2. *Avadhāraṇa* is " *eva* " in " *atm ety ev opasīta* " Bṛ. Up. I. 4. 7.

SECTION 6.

The Functions of akṣara and puruṣa.

(18) [The topic (*prakaraṇa*) in Tai. Up. II. 8] is not the same as that which has preceded, because of the description of the function [of *akṣara* in this passage].

(19–20) "(The functions of 'delighting' and 'awing') are the same; and this is so because of the non-difference (of the topic in these sections of the Vedanta). Even in other places it is so because of the connection (between the two functions)[1] ".

(21) Not, indeed, because of the difference [between the two functions of 'delighting'[2] and 'awing'].

(22) And [the Śruti] shows it.

(23) Moreover on this ground [we distinguish between] 'maintenance' (or sustenance) (*saṃbhṛti*)[3] and 'heaven-pervasion' *dyuvyāpti*[4] [as the functions of *puruṣa* and *akṣara* respectively].

(24) And [the topic in Tai. Up. II. 8. is not the same as in the preceding sections i.e. Tai. Up. II. 1–7] because the other attributes are not herein mentioned as they are in the sections of *puruṣa*-lore[5].

(25) "['No, aksara is not mentioned in Tai. Up. II. 8', or 'No, the topic of Tai. Up. II. 8 is not different from that in the preceding sections'] because the objects, viz., penetration and others [mentioned here] are different [from those usually mentioned with respect to *akṣara*, e. g. those in Mu. Up. II. 2. 3–4][6] ".

(26) [No], but in case of any one of these objects missing (*hāni*) one should take it over (*upāyanam*)[7] [from any other text where it is not missing], because of the subordination [of such objects] to the [express] Word, as is done in the case [of the non-mention of one or more] of *kuśa* grass, a piece of cloth (*ācchandas* – a seat ?), a hymn and a by-song ; this has been already explained.

27. (One must take in the objects not mentioned in his text from other texts where they are mentioned,) because there remains nothing to be accomplished hereafter (by the liberated), for so say the followers of a certain Branch.

NOTES :—

1. As '*vā*' in Sūtra 21 shows, these two Sūtras (19–20) are *pūrvapakṣa* Sūtras.

2. According to the Sūtrakāra, "delighting," *anandana* (in Tai. Up. II. 7) and "awing" (in *bhīṣā asmāt vātaḥ pavate* Tai. Up. II. 8) are respectively the functions of *puruṣa* and *akṣara*.

3. Cf. *bibharti* in Bh. Gī.XV.17, *bharate* in Śve. Up. I. 8.

4. Cf. *divi* in *tripād asy āmṛtaṃ divi*—Chā. Up. III. 12.6 also Chā. Up. III. 13.7.

5. This shows that *pradhāna* is, according to the Sūtrakāra, *puruṣa*, and that the Sūtrakāra makes a distinction between *puruṣa–vidyā* and *akṣara–vidyā*.

6. Note that the Ācāryas do not know the Śruti to which this Sūtra must refer.

7. Instead of *upāyanaśabdaseśatvāt* I propose to read *upāyanam śabdaṣeśatvāt*. I believe this was the original reading as is suggested by the context, by the presence of the word 'hānau', and by the fact that the Acāryas could not give any satisfactory meaning to the Sutra as they found it.

SECTION 7.

Option of the Name for Meditation.

(28) [One may meditate on either of the two, *puruṣa* and *akṣara*] in accordance with his own wish, because both of them are not in disagreement [with the Scriptures].

(29) The goal (*gati*) is fulfilled in either way, because otherwise [there would be] an inconsistency [in the Scriptures].

(30) [Such a statement that one may meditate on either of the two according to his own wish] is quite proper because we find an object of such a nature [in the Scripture] as we find such a one in the world.

SECTION 8.

Number of Thoughts to be collected for Meditation on puruṣa.

(31) There is no obligation (*niyama*) that all the thoughts on *pradhāna* should be collected for meditation on it; [but] there is no opposition [to such a collection] because of the Word[1] and of Inference.

NOTE :—

The collection of the thoughts was taught for the first time by the Sūtrakāra; the Śrutis, whenever they described the meditation on *puruṣa*, enumerated a few of these attributes and said that the meditator on *puruṣa* so far described would thereby reach his goal.

SECTION 9.

No Collection of the Thoughts during adhikāra.

(32) [The thoughts[1]] which belong to the religious qualification (*adhikāra*) should [be allowed to] remain [in the meditation] only so long as the qualification lasts.

[Or, the collection of *ādhikārika* thoughts should be restricted to as many of them as are in accordance with the meditator's qualification].

NOTE :—

" *Ādhikārikāṇām* " in the Sūtra suggests that *dhiyām* is understood; and this is further confirmed by *dhiyām* in the next Sūtra.

SECTION 10.

Meditation on 'akṣara'.

(33) But [to collect] the thoughts on *akṣara* for the purpose of meditation on it is discountenanced (*avarodhaḥ*) because of [their] common [negative] character[1] and because of [the meditator's] becoming that (i. e. *akṣara*); the case is similar to that of the *aupasada* rite; this has been already said[2].

(34) Because of the Scripture stating (that) " so many[3] " are the attributes of *akṣara*.

NOTES :—

1. The word "*sāmānya*", which is variously interpreted by the commentators seems to have in fact only the simple sense of "common character" and this common character of the *akṣara*p-assages is their negative nature, which renders the collection of the thoughts on *akṣara* unnecessary.

2. A reference to Br. Sū. III. 3. 8 and 10, or to Br. Sū. III. 3. 11.

3. The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to the fact that the *akṣara* texts mention the attributes of *akṣara* in such a way as if they intended to exhaust all the attributes in that single list. See e. g. Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 3–11.

SECTION 11.

Method of Meditation on akṣara (see Sec. 13).

(35) The meditator on *akṣara* is to think of *akṣara* as [present] within his own self, as in the case of [meditation on] the group of *bhūtas*[1].

(36) If it be said: "[*Akṣara* is to be thought of as within the meditator's self because] otherwise the difference [between *akṣara* and *pradhāna*] will remain unexplained", we reply: "No. The case is like that of a second precept[2].

NOTES :—

1. The five elements of the body and their deities.

2. According to the Sūtrakāra, *puruṣa* and *akṣara* form the basis of two precepts for the same goal.

SECTION 12.

Interchange of Thoughts on puruṣa and akṣara.

(37) [In the texts about *akṣara* and *puruṣa* we find] an interchange [of (some of) the attributes or thoughts of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*], because [the Śrutis] distinguish (*akṣara*) as they do the other (*puruṣa*).

(38) [For example, we may point out that] that same [Śruti which describes *puruṣa* as *ānanda*[1] etc. distinguishes *akṣara* with such distinctions as properly belong to *puruṣa*][2].

(39) The attributes *satya*[3] and others[4] may be, at the wish of the meditator, taken in the meditation on the other [than that with reference to which they are mentioned in Tai. Up. II. 1] (i. e. in the meditation on *puruṣa*), and in that [with reference to which *satya* and others are mentioned] (i. e. in the meditation on *akṣara*) [the meditator, may, at his will, collect attributes] from "*āyatana*" and those that follow[5].

(40) [The attributes of *puruṣa* when mentioned by the Sruti with reference to *akṣara*[6] should, out of respect [for the Śruti] not be dropped [in the meditation on *akṣara*].

(41) [This rule of non-dropping or "interchange" applies to an attribute of *puruṣa*] when it is present [in an *akṣara*-text]. [This is done] out of this [respect for the Śruti] because it is the word of the Śruti[7].

(42) There is no rule for deciding [which are] those [interchangeable attributes]; the fruit of such a standpoint is that there is no objection [from the side of the Scripture] to (*akṣara* and *puruṣa*) being thought of separately (*pṛthag dhī*)[8].

NOTES :—

1. Tai. Up. II. describes *puruṣa* in II. 7 and *akṣara* or Brahman in II. 1.

2. The Sūtrakāra has in his mind "*Satyaṃ jñānam anantam brahma*"—Tai. Up. II. 1, as is evident from the word *satyādayaḥ* in the next Sūtra (according to my suggestion). He thinks that *satya, jñāna, ananta* are properly speaking the attributes of *puruṣa*, but by way of "interchange of attributes", the Śruti assigns them to *akṣara*.

3. I have divided the words in Sūtras 38–39 in a different way from that in which they are found in all existing *pāṭhas*; and in place of '*kāmādītaratra*' (in 41) I have substituted '*kāmād itaratra*' which is the reading according to Madhva; thus, Sūtra 38 is '*saiva hi*' and Sūtra 39 reads "*satyādayaḥ kāmād itaratra tatra c āyatanādibhyaḥ.*"

4. No commentator has been able to quote as *viṣaya-vākya* a Śruti which gives a list of attribntes beginning with *satya*, as is required by the Sūtra. All the conjectures of Śaṅkara and others seem to me unnecessary; they are a proof of the loss of tradition.

5. *Āyatanādibhyaḥ* is explained by no interpretor in a satisfactory way. I believe, the Sūtrakāra refers to the attributes that he has enumerated in Br. Sū. I. 3–4 which begins with *dyubhvādyāyatanam svaśabdāt* (Br. Sū. I. 3 1). This also shows that in Br. Sū. I. 3–4 the Sūtrakāra has discussed such texts as primarily refer to *akṣara*.

6. " *Praśāsana* " in Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 9 (Br. Sū. I. 3. 11) is an example.

7. This sounds rather tautological and tautology was strictly avoided in the Sūtra literature. A better explanation if suggested by any scholar will be welcomed.

8. Śaṅkara reads " *pṛthag hi* ", but others have the reading which I have followed. Sūtra 50 (*prajñāntara*) confirms the correctness of the latter.

Section 13.

Method of Meditation on akṣara (contd.).

(43) [During meditation, *akṣara* is to be conceived of] in that very way in which *pradhāna*[1] is comprehended for the same purpose; this has been already said.[2]

Notes:—

1. Here, again, all the available recensions read *pradānavat* the meaning of which none has been able to explain satisfactorily; I have taken " *pradhānavat* " to have been the original reading. (See the notes below.)

2. This refers to ' *itaravad* ' in Br. Sū. III. 3. 16, and it also proves the correctness of the change in reading I have proposed above.

Section 14.

Superiority of akṣara to puruṣa.

(44) Because of the majority of the texts [describing *akṣara*], that (i.e. *akṣara*) is more important [as an object of meditation] (than *pradhāna*).

(45) Even then[1], the option already stated [holds good] because of the context of the texts [describing it]; so it may be as is the case with (optional) rites and with the mind of man.

(46) And [the former option holds good also] because of the transference [of the attributes of the one to the other in case of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*].

(47) But, [the meditation on *puruṣa* is] nothing else but *vidyā* (the doctrine of liberation), because of the affirmation [in the Sruti][2].

(48) And because we see a text [to the effect].

(49) And there is no objection [to *puruṣa-upāsanā*] because of the superiority of the evidence of the Śruti text and other proofs [to that of pure reason].

(50) And this ('option' *pūrvavikalpaḥ*) is seen from [the evidence of] the theme (or 'introductory remarks') etc. to have the difference (*pṛthaktvavat*) of another (way of) understanding ; this has been already said[3].

(51) Though there is an analogy [between the *puruṣa*-attainment and a world[4] like the worlds of Indra, Āditya, etc. mentioned e. g. in Br. Sū. IV. 3], there arises no " fault of *puruṣa* being regarded as a world " (*lokāpatti*), because [the idea of *puruṣa* as the goal in absolution in the form in which we have to understand it] is found [in the Scripture, and the Scripture is the highest authority], nor indeed [is there any possibility of *puruṣa* being looked upon as 'a world' *loka*] just as there is no possibility of Death [in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad being looked upon as the death known in the human world].

(52) And [the former option holds good because both *akṣara* and *puruṣa* have] a similarity of words[5] with *para* (the Highest), but the application [of a term particularly to either of the two] is based upon the frequency (of usage).

Notes :—

1. " *Tad api* " should be transferred to this Sūtra from the preceding one where it stands according to all the commentators.

2. This is a reference to Mu. Up. I. 2. 13.

3. This is a reference to Br. Sū. III. 3. 42 (*pṛthag dhī*).

4. Tai. Up. II. 1 says that the liberated soul enjoys all objects of desire in company of the intelligent Brahman; this sounds as if the liberated soul were to reside in a world (*loka*) like the worlds of Indra, Prajāpati, etc., where also similar enjoyment of desires is described as taking place.

5. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that words like *ātman, jyotiḥ*, Brahman, etc. which are used for the Highest Being (*para*) can be used for either of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*; he means also that even the words *akṣara, puruṣa* etc. may have been used interchangeably, but the frequency of usage helps us in deciding the sense of any particular passage.

Section 15.

Choice of One only out of the Two.

(53) One [of the two options should be accepted for meditation, because that one which is accepted is to be meditated upon as identical with the self of the meditator, and] because the self [of the meditator] exists [already] in the body [and the meditation involves the identity of two only, not that of three].

Section 16.

No Invariable Co-existence of the Object of Meditation and the Meditator.

(54) There is a logical non-co-existence [of *akṣara* or *puruṣa* and the Jîva], because [the first two] do not [necessarily] exist where the [last] one exists; but the case is different from what we find[1] [in Śruti and Smṛti][2].

Notes:—

1. *Upalabahi*, in the Sūtras, means "the finding of a statement in the Sruti" e. g. in Br. Sū. II. 1. 36. Bh. Gî. XVIII 61 says that Îśvara (not "Jîva" who does, of necessity, reside in the human body) resides in the heart of all beings. The Sūtrakāra says that it is not so in meditation. He seems to think that *akṣara* or *puruṣa* does not reside in the heart by nature, but one of the two may manifest itself therein after the meditation is carried out.

2. The Sūtras (54 ff) refer to *aṅgopāsanā* and therefore are not discussed here.

2. Br. Sū. III. 2 (partly).

Two Aupaniṣada views are here criticised by the Sūtrakāra.

(a) Br. Sū. III. 2. 11–21.

These Sūtras embody a refutation of the view that in the Highest there is a "distinction of place" (*sthānabheda*):

(11) [It can] not [be said that] [the two sets of characteristics mentioned in] the two-fold taxts[1] are those of the Highest One[2] even[3] with regard to [different] places (*sthānataḥ*) [within the Highest One], for, [they belong to it] everywhere.

(12) If it be said: "No [i. e. the two-fold attributes do not belong to *para* 'in every part of it' *sarvatra*], because there is a difference [in *para* itself, viz., the difference of space or place–*sthāna*[4]]"; we reply: "Not so, because a statement about that (i. e. about the difference of space) is not found in each text[5]" or "In each text there is a reverse statement[6]".

(13) Moreover, the followers of one Branch of the Vedas [really say] so[7].

(14) For, it (the Highest) is certainly, formless, that [formlessness] being its chief [aspect][8].

(15) And it is like the Light[9], because [its description] cannot be futile.

(16) And the Śruti does describe it (i. e. *para*) as "only that" (*tanmātra*)[10].

(17) And the Śruti[11] shows [that the "whole" of *para* has all the attributes that belong to it], and the Smṛti does the same.

(18) And for this very reason, [we have in the Śruti[12] *para brahman's*] comparison like that of the Sun and water (*kam*)[13] and others.

(19) But, in so far as (*para brahman*) cannot be reflected as [the Sun] in the water, (Brahman) is not like that (i. e. the Sun) [in becoming "many"][14].

(20) [*Para brahman's*] participating in increase and decrease is explicable on the ground of that characteristic being included [in the *coincidentia oppositorum*]; it is so because both the [mutually contrary] attributes are reconciliable [in *para brahman*].

(21) And because the Scriptures show it[15].

NOTES:—

1. The texts giving separately the *coincidentia oppositorum.*

2. Note that *para* is used by the Sūtrakāra when he speaks of the Supreme Being, without any particular reference to it as *pradhāna* or *akṣara*. *Para* was so used in III. 3. 52.

3. 'Even' *api* implies the Sūtrakāra's rejection of the view that the two-fold texts can be explained as describing two forms (*rūpas*) of the Highest or as describing *akṣara* and *puruṣa* as two separate entities instead of two places (*sthāna*) in the Highest.

4. This *pūrvapakṣa* seems to state that *akṣara* and *puruṣa* are numerically one, but *akṣara* is the lower place and *puruṣa* is the higher place in the Highest One which has got this spatial distinction within itself; so that the negative sentences (*anaṇu, ahrasva* etc.) and the positive ones (*satyakāma, satyasamkalpa*) should respectively be applied to these two. The opponent seems to have referred to such texts as Mu. Up. II. 1. 2 which says that *puruṣa* is above *akṣara.*

5. The Sūtrakāra means two texts which describe only *puruṣa* or only *akṣara.*

6. Here the Sūtrakāra may refer to the attributes of *puruṣa* (*praśāsana* etc.) mentioned with reference to *akṣara* (e. g. in Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 9) or *vice versa.*

7. Probably the Sūtrakāra refers to Mu. Up. I. 2. 13 where "*akṣara puruṣa*" is mentioned so that there is no difference of place in the two as is mentioned in Mu. Up. II. 1. 3 where *puruṣa* is said to be above *akṣara.*

8. According to the Sūtrakāra, *puruṣa* and *akṣara* are, as it were, two aspects for meditation. The former has a form (Br. Sū. I. 2. 23); the latter has none. *Akṣara* is more important than *puruṣa* (Br. Sū. III. 3. 44).

9. The *pūrvapakṣin* seems to have pointed to such texts as Mu. Up. II. 1. 4. The Sūtrakāra says that the description in II. 1. 4 is not futile because the *para* is itself like the Light.

10. "He is like a solid mass of salt, which is without an inward and without an outward, a mass of juice, the whole of it (*kṛtsna rasaghana eva*) ....." Bṛ. Up. III. 2. 16.

11. The Sūtrakāra refers to such texts as describe *para brahman* to be possessed of contrary attributes e. g. Sve. Up. III. 19, 20; Kaṭha Up. II. 10, 20; Īśa Up. 5; and Bh. Gī. XIII. 12–13.

12. The reference is to the Brahmabindu Upaniṣad as quoted by Śaṅkara and other commentators.

13. *Kam*, is used in the sense of water in the Maitrāyaṇīya Saṃhitā, Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and even in the Yājñavlkya Smṛti. The word *ambu* in the next Sūtra also shows that *kam* in this Sūtra stands for 'water'.

14. i. e. the manner in which *para* becomes many is not that in which the Sun, the Moon etc. become many. This restricts the comparison of *para* with the Sun etc.

(15) See e. g. Śve. Up. III. 20., Bh. Gī. XIII. 16.

(b) Br. Sū. III. 2. 32–38.

These Sūtras embody a refutation of the view that there are two goals :—

(31) "[The Supreme One[1] is] higher than this [*avyakta*, as described in Br. Sū. III. 2. 23], because of the designations of a bridge[2], measure[3], connection[4], and difference[5] [which are applied to *avyakta*]".

(32) But [it is not so] because [the designation "bridge" is] due to the common characteristic[6].

(33) [Because the designation of measure is] for the ease of understanding, like [the designation of] its [four] feet [which cannot mean that the *para* is a quadruped].

(34) [The designation of the connection of the Unmanifest with *puruṣa*] is due to the mention of a particular place in the Supreme One[7]; [otherwise everything is *para* and those with

which *avyakta* is connected are different places in *para*]; it is similar to the case of the Light[8] etc.

(35) And because [in the case of the difference of *akṣara* and *puruṣa*] there is the possibility of an explanation[9].

(36) And, because the Śruti negatives the existence of any other principle [besides *akṣara*[10].]

(37) Hence the omnipresence[11] [of *avyakta*] which is established in the texts which mention the extent (of Brahman) and in others.

NOTES:—

1. As *tu* in the next Sūtra shows, this is a *pūrvapakṣa* Sūtra.

2. Chā. Up. VIII. 4. 1–*avyakta* or *ātman* is a bridge.

3. Chā. Up. III. 18. 2–Brahman has four feet; therefore it is limited; the unlimited must be beyond it.

4. *Avyakta* is connected with *puruṣa* on the one side and *mahad* or the lower Nature on the other e. g. in Kaṭha Up. III. 11.

5. *Akṣara* is different from *puruṣa* e. g. in Mu. Up. II. 2, Bh. Gī. XV. 18, Sve. Up. 1. 6.

6. The Sūtrakāra does not admit that *puruṣa* is higher or other than *akṣara*, and that therefore there are two goals. *Atman* is called a bridge because like a bridge which helps in crossing a river, *ātman* helps in crossing the sea of worldly existence.

7. The Sūtrakāra does not believe that the twofold contradictory attributes belong to different parts or places in the *para*; they belong to every place in the Supreme Being; but he admits the distinction of place as such in *para* without reference to its attributes. So there is no inconsistency in the Sūtrakāra's position in III. 2. 11 and in this Sūtra.

8. The Light is called star, Moon, Sun, fire, flame, with reference to its presence in different places, so the *para* is called *puruṣa*, *akṣara* etc. with reference to its presence in various places.

9. In Br. Sū. I. 4. 3. *avyakta* (in Kaṭha Up. III. 11) is explained to be lower than *puruṣa*, because as the Nature it is dependent on the latter. This seems to be the *upapatti* in the Sūtra.

10. The Sūtrakāra, naturally, refers to such texts as deny the existence of any principle other than *akṣara* e. g. Bṛ. Up. III. 8. 11.

11. There cannot be two omnipresent goals like *akṣara* and *puruṣa* both of which are omnipresent according to the texts; so they are the names of one and the same goal. Cf. Br. Sū. III. 3. 9.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

Other and perhaps better explanations of Śve. Up. I. 7a–b and V. 1 (than those given in App. I. C) can be given as follows:—

(I.7a–b) This is the Supreme Brahman (*paramaṃ brahma*) celebrated in song. The three and the Mutable are well established in it.

(V.1) There are, with Brahma above them (*brahmapare*) two infinite Immutable Ones, wherein Knowledge (*vidyā*) and not–Knowledge (*avidyā*) are placed concealed. Not–Knowledge is the Mutable (*kṣara*), Knowledge is the Immortal. He who rules over the Knowledge and not–Knowledge is other than these two.

NOTE:—

1. I accept Prof. Schrader's suggestion to read *supratiṣṭhākṣaraṃ ca* as *supratiṣṭhaṃ kṣaraṃ ca* instead of dividing the compound as *supratiṣṭham akṣaraṃ ca* as I have done in App. I. C. The advantages of accepting this suggestion are obvious. Firstly, *trayam* (the three) in I. 7b are, in this case, the same as the three in I. 9 and 12, viz., the Lord, the Immutable, and the Jîva, since *kṣara* is, according to this suggested reading, to be counted separately (see note 3 in App. I. C. 1). Secondly, *supratiṣṭham akṣaram ca*, the division of the compound, that I had proposed, required " *akṣaram* " to be applied to *kṣaram* and in a secondary sense, viz., "imperishable" instead of the usual sense, viz., "the Immutable". Thirdly, the construction of "*ca*" (and) at the end of I. 7b had to be left out of account in my rendering of the verse, since, the compound *supratiṣṭhākṣaraṃ* could itself be explained as *supratiṣṭham akṣaraṃ ca*, according to the rules of *samāsa*. As a matter of fact, the *ca* at the end of I. 7b requires the splitting up of *supratiṣṭhākṣaraṃ* into " *supratiṣṭham kṣaraṃ* " and this confirms Prof. Schrader's suggestion. And lastly, *etat* in Śve. Up. I. 8a requires *kṣara* and *akṣara* to have been mentioned in I. 7

and this requirement can be best fulfilled according to the suggested correction of the text.

2. *Paramaṃ brahma* (Śve. Up. I. 7a) is, in this case, the Triad as a whole as distinguished from the *traya* or the three taken singly. Thus, *paramaṃ brahma* is equivalent to *brahmam* in I. 9 and 12.

3. *Brahma* in *brahmapare* (in Śve. Up. V. 1a) seems to be *brahmam* mentioned in Śve. Up. I. 9 and 12 (see 1. on p. 140). *Brahmam* is the Triad (Śve. Up. I. 9, 12) which is certainly higher than, or above, the two Immutable Ones, to be explained in the next note.

4. The two Immutable Ones (*dve akṣare*) seem to be the two *ajas*, viz., Īśa and the Immutable (*akṣara*) mentioned in Śve. Up. I. 8a–b, the *jña* and the *ajā* in Sve. Up. I. 9a–b, the *deva* and the *akṣara* or *ātman* in Sve. Up. I. 10a–b, and the *preṭṛ* and *bhogya* in Sve. Up. I. 12c–d. Only these two can be properly said to be *akṣaras* or the Immutable Ones among the principles mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Moreover, V. 1b can be consistently explained only with this interpretation of *dve akṣare* (see note 5 below). And again if *brahma* in *brahmapare* is *brahmam* or the Triad, *dve akṣare* must mean the Lord and the *akṣara* or the Immutable. So, Śve. Up. V. 1. is to be noted because it calls the Īśa (or *puruṣa*) *akṣara*, besides designating the usual *akṣara* as such.

5. Śve. Up. V. 1b states that in the two *akṣaras vidyā* and *avidyā* are placed concealed. Thus, the two *akṣaras* are the hiding places of *vidyā* and *avidyā* and as such cannot be identical with *vidyā* and *avidyā*. *Vidyā* is explained as *amṛta* or *akṣara* (see note 11 on Śve. Up. I. 7–12 in App. I) in Śve. Up. V. 1c, and *vidyā* is said to be placed concealed in one of the two *akṣaras* in V. 1. a–b. This can only mean that the *akṣara* called both *amṛta* and *vidyā* is lower than, or to be traced to, another *akṣara*, which *akṣara*, again, can be none else but the *puruṣa* or *īśa* as the Śve. Up. likes to call him (Śve. Up. I. 8–9). This meaning of V. 1 justifies the explanation of *dve akṣare* in V. 1a as the Lord and the Immutable.

6. *Avidyā* is placed in one of the two *akṣaras* (V. 1b); it is also explained as *kṣara* (V. 1c); so the *akṣara* in which *avidyā* is concealed is the Immutable or *akṣara* properly so called.

7. Thus, the order of the principles mentioned in V. 1 is as follows: (1) *brahmam* or the Triad, (2) *akṣara*, the hiding place of *vidyā* otherwise called *akṣara* also, i. e. *puruṣa* or *īśa*, (3) *akṣara* the hiding place of *avidyā*, (4) *avidyā* or *kṣara*. So, this is a preparatory stage towards the evolutional series of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Ka. Up. III. 11).

8. *Dve* in *dve akṣara* (V. 1a) should be noticed. It is the first definite departure from the " *ekam eva advitiyam* " of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads (e. g. Chā. Up. VI. 2. 1); as is also the expression *trividham brahmam*. Such a statement about the dualism (in this case, the spiritual dualism) of *puruṣa* and *akṣara* is quite consistent with the sharp distinction between these two principles met with in the Gītā, and the yet sharper one found in the later Mahābhārata.

9. As the Knowledge (along with the not–Knowledge) is said to be ruled over by the Īśa (Śve. Up. V. 1. c–d), it cannot be the Jīva who is declared to be the not–ruler (anīśa) in Sve. Up. I. 9.

CONCLUSION :—

It must be admitted that the explanation of Śve; Up. V.1 proposed above is more in harmony with that of Śve. Up. I. 7–12, than the one given in App. I; because thereby the same principles as are mentioned in Śve. Up. I, are to be found in Śve. Up. V. Moreover, to understand the two *akṣaras* in V. 1 as referring to *puruṣa* or *īśa* and *akṣara* is besides being consistent with the teaching of the verse (V. 1) itself, far better than taking the term *akṣara* to mean "imperishable" and referring one *akṣara* to what is called *kṣara*.

The above interpretation further supports the reconstruction of the meaning of the term *akṣara* proposed in this Thesis as a whole.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

I, Prataprai M. Modi, was born on the 9th February 1898 in Bhavnagar (Br. India). I am a Hindu by religion and a Bania by caste. My first lessons I had for two years from a private teacher in Bhavnagar. Then I visited the Sanâtana Dharma High School at Bhavnagar for seven years and passed the Matriculation Examination of the Bombay University in 1916. After having studied for four years in the Samaldas College (Bhavnagar), the Bahauddin College (Junagadh), and the Gujarat College (Ahmedabad) I passed the B.A. Examination of the Bombay University from the last mentioned College, with Honours in Sanskrit in 1920. During 1920-21 I worked as the Dakṣiṇā Fellow in Sanskrit in the Gujarat College. Then for further two years I studied at the Central Hindu College and at the College of Oriental Learning of the Benares Hindu University and passed the M.A. Examination in the Second Division with Sanskrit as my subject and Vedanta as my Special Group in July 1923. In September of the same year I was appointed Assistant Professor of Sanskrit at the Samaldas College, Bhavnagar and was made the Senior Professor after two years. In 1926 I won the Zala Vedanta Prize of the Bombay University in an All-India competition for a work on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Siddhāntabindu (a philosophical Sanskrit work) which has been published in 1929. Being enabled by the Council of Administration, Bhavnagar State, Bhavnagar to prosecute my studies in Oriental Research in Germany, I left India in June 1929 and after four months' study of the German language in Goettingen I joined the Kiel University, where since

then I have studied Sanskrit, English, and History of Religion. I have attended the lectures of Prof. Dr. F. O. Schrader, Prof. Dr. K. Wildhagen, and Prof. Dr. H. Mandel. I heartily thank all my teachers of this place. I am particularly indebted to Prof. Dr. F. O. Schrader whose never failing help and invaluable advice in the important questions of technical and philosophical nature I urgently needed and readily secured for the interpretation of the various texts I had to deal with during the preparation of this Work. Above all, what I shall always value most is the great joy and inspiration which I derived when I had the privilege of discussing with him various crucial points of Indian Philosophy. It often reminded me of the cordial relations which existed between the disciple and the teacher in the happy days of Ancient India. My bow to him.

Published by Dr. P. M. Modi, Samaldas College, BHAVNAGAR.