ADWAITA BRAHMA SIDDHI

M. D. MEHTA

26/25

With kind regards

from

Dahyabhai P. Devasani

THE

Sujna Gokulji Zalâ Vedânt Prize.

1899

—:O:—

ADWAITA BRAHMA SIDHDHI:
OF
Sadânanda Kâshmîraka (Pages 1–176. Bibliotheca Indica Series).

TRANSLATED BY
NARMADÂSHANKAR DEVASHANKAR MEHTA, B. A.,

Bhâu Dâji Prizeman, 1894; Some time a Senior Dakshinâ Fellow Gujarât College; Sujna Gokulji Zâlâ Vedânta Prizeman 1894.

Ahmedabad:

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY
MOTILAL SHAMALDAS PATEL, MANAGER.
The "UNION PRINTING" Press Company Ld.
1910

SUJNA GOKULJI ZÂLA VEDÂNTA PRIZE FOR 1899.

MOTTO.

यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं नाल्पेसुखमस्ति
भूमैवसुखम् भूमात्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यः ।

(छान्दोग्य-VII.-23.)

"All philosophy aims at a knowledge of the Absolute under different phases."

(Fleming).

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

Adwaita Brahma Siddhi is one of the standard works of Vedânta of the post-S'ankara school. The followers of S'ankara have taken a fancy, as it were, to designate the standard doctrinal works of their school as "Siddhi". or establishment. The translator is aware of such six "Siddhis" or doctrinal works namely (1) नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि (2) इष्टसिद्धि (3) ब्रह्मसिद्धि (4) अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि (5) अद्वैतसिद्धि (6) स्वाराज्यसिद्धि. Numbers 2 and 3 have not been published, but their existence is inferred from unambiguous references thereto by Sadânanda Kâshmîraka in his अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि (vide pages 202, 193 of the book); by Madhusûdana in his अद्वैतसिद्धि in his last stanza:—

सिद्धीनामिष्टनैष्कर्म्य ब्रह्मगानामियंचिरात्
अद्वैतसिद्धिरधुना चतुर्थी समजायत ॥

and by Appaya Dîkshita in his Siddhântalesha (vide page 197. Siddhantalesha Vizyanagram Series). Chronlogically नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि is the oldest the author Sureshwara being one of the four prominent disciples of Sánkara ; while स्वाराज्यसिद्धि is the latest standard work.

The arrangement of अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि materially differs from that of अद्वैतसिद्धि of मधुसूदन. The latter is written with the sole view of refuting the hostile doctrines and presupposes in the reader a knowledge of the opposite doctrines. The former, however, gives in the beginning a succinct acc-

ount, with all fairness and lucidity, of the hostile school and then proceeds to refute it. For a student of Vedânta who has not independently studied the opposite systems through original texts or through a compendium like सर्वदर्शनसंग्रह, the present work is, therefore, more useful than the sister "Siddhis"

The style of अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि is more lucid and less pedantic than that of अद्वैतसिद्धि which is a hard nut to crack. In simplicity of exposition and fairness to the opponent it deserves to be placed with विवरणप्रमेयसंग्रह of Vidyâraṇya.

With regard to the date of Sadânanda Kâshmîraka who is not to be confounded with our modern Sadânanda, the author of वेदान्तसार, शैवसुधाकर, सहस्राक्ष and सुधासिद्धान्त, there are two hypotheses one putting him between 1660 to 1760, while the other between 1400 and 1479 A. D. In favour of the first view it may be observed that apparently he must have succeeded मधुसूदन, for the latter declares in the last stanza that his is the fourth "Siddhi", the three preceding "Siddhis" being इष्ट, नैष्कर्म्य, and ब्रह्म. We have already seen that ब्रह्मसिद्धि and अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि are two distinct works, for the latter alludes to the former by name. Thus we may assume that either अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि must have succeeded अद्वैतसिद्धि of मधुसूदन or the latter author while writing his अद्वैतासिद्धि must have been unaware of the composition of अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि already extant. There is one circumstance, however, to

note in favour of the view that मधुसूदन preceded सदानंदकाश्मीरक. The philosophical teacher of सदानंद was ब्रह्मानंदसरस्वती. Now मधुसूदन had a disciple of the name of ब्रह्मानंदसरस्वती who wrote a commentary popularly called ब्रह्मानन्दीयम् on his teacher's अद्वैतसिद्धि. If it be presumed that this ब्रह्मानंदसरस्वती was the teacher of सदानंद (for which there is no valid basis except the similarity of name which is more deceptive) our author must be placed at least one generation after मधुसूदन. Now मधुसूदन flourished in the first part of the 17th century, for in the first place he was a contemporary of Gadâdhara Bhatta whose active career lay in the last part of the 16th century, and in the second place he refers to Appaya Dikshita by name who was born in 1587* and died in 1660 A. D. (Vide English introduction to अद्वैतसिद्धि. Adwaita Mañjari Series). This hypothesis of Sadânanda's date (somewhere between 1660-1760) is indirectly supported by the Mss of अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि. The oldest Ms. is dated 1761 Samvat or 1705 A. D., and Pandit Wâman S'âstri who has collated the Mss states that the Ms. of 1705 A. D. appears to have been

* Gangâdhar S'astri of Benares College puts this date to be 1550. A. D. Vide his introduction to सिद्धान्तलेश. But this makes no material difference in ascertaining the date of मधुसूदन who refers to Appaya and we may fairly presume that मधुसूदन's active career lay in the middle of the 17th Century.

written by the author himself because there are certain corrections, additions and footnotes which a mere manuscript writer would not hazard to make.

But the above hypothesis is shaken by the absolute omission of Vallabhâchârya and his शुद्धाद्वैत theory of Vedânta by our author. We have the mention of रामानुज the propounder of विशिष्टाद्वैत school (p. 174) of मध्व the propounder of द्वैत school (p. 159), of Bhatt Bhâskara, the propounder of भेदाभेद school, (p. 159) and of विज्ञानभिक्षु the propounder of अविभागाद्वैत school (p. 31) of Vedânta. The pages noted are of the original text. The omission of Vallabha and his शुद्धाद्वैत school therefore in a comprehensive review of Sadânanda cannot reasonably be regarded as merely accidental. Vallabha was born in Samvat 1535 or 1479 A. D. This is then our *terminus ad quem* for our Sadânanda. Let us now determine the *terminus ad quo*,. The study of the book shows that Sadânada refers *interalia* to grammarian कैयट and philosopher विद्यारण्य. According to Dr. Buhler कैयट is not older than 13th Century. Vidyârañya before he became an ascetic was called माधव and it is well-known that he wrote out the commentaries of the Vedas under instructions from King Vîrbukka of Konkan under the conjoint name of सायणमाधव the former being his brother. Vidyàrañya made a gift of a village to certain Brahmins in S'aka 1313 (A.D. 1391) as is gathered from a copper plate (vide

Jaiminîya Nyâya Mâlà Vistara. Anandâ S'rama series pages 4–5 Also विवरणप्रेमयसंग्रह p. 3 Vizyanagram series) From these dates we infer that Sadânanda could not have flourished prior to 1400 A. D. Nor could he have flourished after 1479 A. D. His approximate date is then the first part of the 15th Century.

The grounds stated in favour of the previous hypothesis pointing to Sadananda's date falling somewhere between 1660–1760 are not such as cannot be harmonized with the above deduction. In the first place there is nothing substantial in the plea that Sadânada was the grand disciple of Madhusûdana. The stock of names of Sannyasins is limited as in the Pársi community and therefore there is no wonder that Sadânanda might have a teacher of the name of Brahmânanda Saraswati who mignt be different from the disciple of Madhusûdana of the same name. It may here be noted that if मधुसूदन was really the grand teacher of सदानंद the latter would not have omitted his name in his work. He would naturally have drawn arguments from अद्वैतसिद्धि. Madhusûdana although does not directly refer to Sadânanda Kashmiraka by name he quotes passages in his work which are found in the same words in Adwaita Brahma Siddhi (Vide मधुसूदन's सिद्धान्तबिन्दु or commentary on S'ankarâchârya's Das'as'loki page 169–Adwaita Mañjari series–where the very words of सदानंद on page 244 of his work (अस्मन्मते &c.) are quoted. Vide also मधुसूदन's commentary

on the Gita II. 16 which is a quotation from अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि pp. 24-25 with verbal variations here and there.

It is quite possible on the contrary that these quotations may not have been from अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि but from any anterior work from where सदानंद himself might have taken the passages. The translator is of opinion that looking to the style of अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि as well as the significant omission of the religious and philosophical movement of Vallabha, सदानंद is an author anterior to मधुसूदन. His work has not apparently reached the learned circle of India as is clear from the collection of Mss which come from Kâshmira, Bharatpura and Kotâ only.

Thus although his work might be extant in मधुसूदन's time the latter might not be aware of its existence and thereby he might be considering इष्ट, नैष्कर्म्य and ब्रह्म to be the only Siddhis preceding his अद्वैतसिद्धि.

Our author has written another work called स्वरूपप्रकाश for he makes mention thereof in the present work (Vide page 247 of the Sanskrit text), but the book has not seen the light of the day.

The present translation is of the text comprised in pages 1–176 of अद्वैतब्रह्मसिद्धि published in the Bibliotheca Indica series as per University

Notification No. 820 of 1903–1904. Wherever the translator has differed from the editor, the grounds of the translator for adopting a different reading have been stated in the notes appended to the translation.

BORSAD.
24th June 1904.

N. D. MEHTA.

Translation of the Advaita Brahma Siddhi.

OF

Sadânanda Kâshmiraka (Pages 1–176 Bibliotheca Indica Series).

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3	17	,,	duad	,,	dyad
,,	20	,,	,,	,,	,,
,,	23	,,	,,	,,	,,
4	10	,,	wonld	,,	would
,,	30	,,	staed	,,	stated
5	20	,,	not merely	,,	no
,,	25	,,	duads	,,	dyads
7	10	,,	decause	,,	because
,,	11	*after*	is	*add*	seen
8	25	*for*	industructible	*read*	indestructible
,,	26	*after*	destroyed	*add*	either
,,	31	*for*	neıther	*read*	neither
,,	32	,,	therefor	,,	therefore
9	22	,,	dyal	,,	dyad
10	1	,,	Vedântic	,,	Vedântin
12	17	,,	avoidiug	,,	avoiding
,,	19	,,	ffor	,,	for
13	5	*after*	*e. g.*	*add*	a
,,	14	*for*	in toto	*read*	*in toto*
,,	16	,,	instance	,,	instances
,,	21	,,	otherwards	,,	otherwords
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„	27	*for*	aud	*read*	and
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„	16	„	establisbed	„	established
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41	29	*for*	namc	*read*	name
42	7	„	Visesha	„	Vis´esha
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46	18	„	Rahu	„	Râhu
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„	24	„	shoul	„	should
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73	4	„	independece	„	independence
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„	30	„	woald	„	word
74	9	„	Smiti	„	Smṛiti
„	„	*omit*	of		
„	31	*after*	meditation	*add*	as
78	8	*for*	frm	*read*	form
„	15	„	Vedict	„	Vedic
80	25	„	by	„	my
„	27	„	beings	„	being
84	26	„	heteredox	„	heterodox
85	13	„	abhorisms	„	aphorisms
„	26	„	Bhâshyakara	„	Bhâshyakâra
87	1	„	mimâñsâ	„	Mimâñsâ

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„	14	„	commentory	„	commentary
„	15	„	Bhamati	„	Bhâmati
89	13	„	veda	„	Veda
„	25	„	veda	„	Veda
90	9	„	Srigalagîtâ	„	S'ṛigâlagîtâ
„	19	„	Sankhyas	„	Sânkhyas
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„	5	„	not	„	nor
„	21	„	smriti	„	Smṛiti
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„	28	*after*	incomparable	*add*	” .
93	30	*omit*	by		
95	21	*for*	Kârika	*read*	Kârikâ
96	7	„	wit	„	with
„	11	„	trik	„	trick
„	12	„	relatiou	„	relation
„	17	„	and	„	an
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97	13	„	diads	„	dyads
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99	12	„	relation	„	Relation
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105	6	„	substainable	„	sustainable
„	34	„	dilemmna	„	dilemma
106	12	„	manifestion	„	manifestation
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112	6	„	Sylogism	„	sylogism
113	17	„	heteredox	„	heterodox
116	28	„	constitutents	„	constituents
117	31	„	secoud	„	second
118	9	„	Buddistic	„	Buddhistic
119	1	*omit*	of		
121	9	*after*	that	*add*	the
„	12	„	refutation	„	Vide B.S. II. ii. 18
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„	„	„	produceso	„	produces
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131	5	*for*	harmoneous	*read*	harmonious
137	9	„	Other wise	„	Otherwise
138	12	„	characterestic	„	characteristic
143	25	„	more	„	mere
151	17	*for*	thus	*read*	that
154	10	„	terms	„	term
156	23	„	individualiry	„	individuality
„	26	„	in as much	„	inasmuch
„	27	„	conized	„	cognized
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„	27	„	there	„	tl.e'r
192	27	„	self-mortifictation	„	self mortification
196	19	*omit*	, ;		
199	10	*for*	indenifitiness	*read*	indefiniteness
„	21	„	its	„	it
„	„	„	it sentirety	„	its entirety
202	11	„	Vaises'hikas	„	Vais'eshikas
203	9	„	Maya	„	Mâyâ
204	3	„	efficaciousc	„	efficacious
206	18	„	emiprically	„	empirically
207	13	„	n t	„	not
„	20	„	inexpressibillity	„	inexpressibility
209	16	„	elephaut	„	elephant
214	24	*for*	his	*read*	His
219	2	„	bnt	„	but
220	21	*omit*	the		
„	25	*for*	arbitary	*read*	arbitrary
„	28	„	leading	„	leads
224	25	„	intelllgence	„	intelligence
232	2	„	ज्ञानेऽर्थाकारस्तस्माद्	„	ज्ञानेऽर्थाकारास्तस्माद्
„	13	„	Brahman Sutra	„	Brahma Sutras
233	21	„	knowledgo	„	knowledge
234	17	„	Yudhishtira	„	Yudhiṣṭhira
235	2	„	intellegence	„	intelligence
„	10	„	consttsting	„	consisting
„	„	„	intellegence	„	intelligence
237	9	„	heterdox	„	heterodox

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239	11	„	omniscent	„	omniscient
242	11	„	their	„	there
244	16	„	Upâdhyaya	„	Upâdyâya
246	10	„	fact the	„	fact that
248	12	„	disintersted	„	disinterested
251	9	„	Shrikrishṇa	„	S'ri Krishṇa
„	21	*omit*	a		
253	13	*for*	*viz*, con-	*read*	*viz.*, coun-
260	9	„	Brahaman	„	Brahman
268	13	„	epually	„	equally
270	10	*after*	difference	*add*	of
272	3	*for*	trumphet	*read*	trumpet
„	5	„	S'rikri-	„	S'ri Kri-
276	21	„	Mahabharata	„	Mahâbhârata
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278	11	„	meditiation	„	miditation
280	19	„	Vedantin	„	Vedântin
„	30	„	Vaiseshikas	„	Vais'eshikas
„	„	„	Naiyay-	„	Naiyây-
281	6	„	Nadhvas	„	Mâdhavas
281	20–21	*omit*	( )		
„	25	*for*	Vaiseshika	*read*	Vais'eshika
282	1	„	1	„	I
283	19	„	infered	„	inferred
„	20	*omit*	)		
„	22	*for*	characterisitic	*read*	characteristic
585	2	„	differentation	„	differentiation
„	4	*after*	to	*add*	,
287	5	*for*	Vedantin	*read*	Vedântin
„	10	„	differance	„	difference
288	28	„	essence	„	essence
290	7	*before*	rise	*omit*	the
„	28	*for*	humam	*read*	human

Page.	Line.				
291	15	*for*	there	*read*	their
„	18	*omit*	is		
292	2	*for*	linguistic	*read*	linguistic
„	3	„	Do	„	Do
„	29	„	non-confuction	„	non-confusion
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297	24	„	when	„	where
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298	19	„	posibilty	„	possibility
299	5	„	The	„	To
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309	22	„	Khadya	„	Khâdya
„	23	„	instablity	„	instability
311	1	„	hold	„	held
314	14	*omit*	this		
„	24	*for*	submits	*read*	subsists
„	26	„	Ramânuja	„	Râmânuja
315	5	„	preception	„	perception
„	8	„	absoute	„	absolute
320	10	*after*	sometimes	*add*	we
321	5	*for*	inappropritate	*read*	inappropriate
„	17	*after*	that	*add*	if
323	34	*for*	Naiyayika	*read*	Naiyâyika
324	14	„	Do.	„	Do.
„	21	„	ज्ञानोत्पतिः	„	ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः
325	32	„	know	„	known
326	5	*omit*	no		
327	6	*after*	Section	*add*	VI.

ADVAITA BRAHMA SIDDHI.

OR

The Doctrine of Secondless Brahman.

CHAPTER I.

SECTION 1.

1. I bow down to my philosophical teacher, Bhahmànada, the quiet lord of sages, through whose moderate grace even, good arguments reveal themselves in my mind.

2. My homage by means of body, mind and speech, is due perpetually to His Holiness Nàràyanàchárya, who is none else than eternal God S'iva, with a view to the cessation of darkness consisting of duality.

3. That secondless Brahman, consisting of Thought, Being, and Bliss, which is established in the Veda, is being thought of in this work with arguments for the purpose of removing the mental impurity.

4. It is a well known fact that in this world some persons of limited intelligence, unacquainted with the essence of the Veda, in spite of the Secondless nature of Brahman having been established by all the prolixity of language in the Vedas, Smṛitis, Itihàsas, Purâṇas &c, give forth, in consequence of their tenacious belief in the reality of dualism resulting from the abundant sins committed in previous births, a number of

fallacious arguments leading to hell *e. g.* are the teacher and the S'astra false or real (in the Vedànta doctrine which establishes the falsity of all except Brahman). By such arguments, people, the stage of whose knowledge of Brahman has not attained ripe stability, have their minds troubled with the faults such as the improbability of Brahman &c. In order therefore to bring out the fallacious nature of the above arguments as well as to remove faults like improbability of Brahman &c from the minds of the aspirers for absolution, and to stop the mouth of incorrigible controversialists the following good arguments which are designated as blows of a hammer are considered in the main:

5. The opponent who raises the query:–are the teacher and S'astra real or false-should be asked the following question:—

What are we to understand by the word "teacher"? Does it mean his body or his soul, or the Secondless Brahman consisting of Being Thought, and Bliss? If we take the first meaning, is that body created by means of atoms in accordance with the theory of the creation of an effect which is non-existent before its birth; or does it evolve from the five great * elements coming into being in the order of evolution commencing with Pradhân (nature) Mahat (the great element of intelligence &c), on the the theory of the produc-

* These are:—Ether, air, light water, and earth.

tion of an effect which is already existent; or is that body a mere phenomenal appearance of Secondless Brahman on the theory of the apparent transformation of the real cause into an unreal effect? No hypothesis other than these three is known to explain causation in any of the twelve schools of philosophy, orthodox as well as heterodox.

6. Now the first stand-point which explains causation as the actual production of an effect on the theory of a new creation is untenable for it is neither supported by reason nor by scripture.

7. Let us examine the theory of the foolish arguer on which he explains the production of an effect totally non-existent before its birth. If the point is that duad &c. non-existent before their birth, come into being from two real or existent atoms, it is untenable as under:—Two atoms are an intimate cause of a duad. The latter is totally non-existent like the horn of a hare, and consequently there being no distinction between the non-existences of a duad and a horn of a hare, the two atoms would equally be the cause of the horn of a hare, which is absurd. There can be no intimate relation between an existent and non-existent object.

8. It is a false line of argument to say that by non-existent effect is meant a counter-

entity of anterior non-existence, and not eternal non-existence like that of colour in air because what are we to understand by the phrase:- a non-existent effect is the counter-entity of the anterior non-existence? Does it mean that the non existent nature of the effect follows from its being the counter entity of anterior non-existence, or vice versa? The first view is wrong. All effects being thus equally non-existent, the sham things like the flower in the sky would be designated as existent, for the fact that a thing is counter-entity of an anterior non-existence is determined by the nature of effect. In other words an effect only becomes the counter-entity of its anterior non-existence, and if such an effect is to be styled "a non-existent effect," sham things like the flower in the sky will have to be designated as "existent" they being non-effects. The opponent cannot consider this logical consequence to be agreeable to him, because it would lead to the annihilation of the genus of property, &c. residing in an effect, which is admitted to be non-existent. As a matter of fact the Naiyâyika does not regard the genus of property &c. to be non-existent but as positive entities.

9. Again the opponent cannot argue that he admits a kind of distinction between the horn of a hare, the hair of a crab on the one hand and a non-existent effect like a pot on the other. For as stated above there being no common characteristic or genus in the latter, there is

no distinguishing attribute by which the latter can be differentiated from the former sham objects.

10. The second alternative by which the possibility of being a counter-entity of anterior non-existence follows from the non-existent nature does not hold water. Because according to that view sham things like horn of a man would be counter-entities of anterior non-existence. Again a contrary result would also ensue, for every anterior non-existence invariably terminates in the production of its counter-entity a positive thing; the sham thing like the horn of a man being on the above line of argument a counter-entity would be regarded as a positive thing. Such a consequence cannot be acquiesced in by the Naiyâyika, for it would be like a final oblation of the difference of existence and non-existence.

11. The opponent again retorts that just as there is not merely *anterior* non-existence of colour in air, there being *eternal* non-existence of the colour in it, admitted on the strength of perception that there is no colour in air, so the horn of a hare has no anterior non-existence in atoms, (but duads &c have such an anterior non-existence in atoms). To this it may be replied that the opponent should wait till we reach the section relating to the refutation of the theory of intimate relation in which we are going to include the refutation of non-existence in general. Besides

in the third chapter we are going to refute the anterior and posterior non-existence in particular.

12. Now turning to the production of a dyad from atoms let us see if this production is existent or real or non-existent or unreal. If it be admitted to be existent, the operation of the cause would be meaningless for the production of the dyad is already accomplished. If it be non-existent, it means that the non-existent production of a dyad comes into being, and consequently the coming into being of the production would require another beginning and so on a palpable confusion *ad inifinitum*.

13. To escape from this dilemma if it be said that production of a piece of cloth, for instance, is not a different entity from that piece, the difficulty cannot be said to have been solved. Because if such were the case, we can not say that cloth is produced. A mere mention of cloth should suffice lest there might be tautology in adding the words "is produced.."

14. Another view is therefore proposed by which production of a dyad &c means either the intimate connection with existence of the cause or with the cause itself. Neither of this is true. Because the collection of atoms being permanently existent the intimate connection with it is an ever existent entity and thus there would be no necessity for the operation of the cause for the production of a dyad &c. Besides the theory of

intimate connection is to be refuted in detail further on.

15. The opponent might retort that the production of a dyad &c is not inconsistent, for the atomists' (Vais'eshika's) argument on which the existence of atoms is proved is as under:— All substance in the form of effect should be produced by a number of substances of like nature, accompanied by conjunction, and having a measure finer than that of the effect, decause it (effect) has parts. Whatever has parts is produced by a number of substances of like nature possessed of conjunction and measure finer than that of the object produced. e. g a piece of cloth produced from threads. On the same line of argument whatever is possessed of parts, that is, all the effects commencing with a dyad, should have been produced by such a number of finer substances. It follows, therefore, that there are numerous, and permanent atoms, of the same class with the effect viz. earth, possessed of finest measure, and of no parts and helped by conjunction in the production of substances having parts.

16. It should not be argued that there is no necessity for admitting the cause of the world much less for admitting atoms the world having neither beginning nor end on the principle that the world is at no time different from what it is; in fact it is of the same nature at all times. Because the premiss on which the argument is based is wrong: the world, the subject matter of

argument, *has* a beginning and an end, because it is possessed of parts like a piece of cloth... this deduction proves the beginning and end of the world. Again if it be objected that there is no necessity for the cause, the world having been produced by its very nature, it may be replied that the existence of its cause is inferred from the syllogysm.....The world has a cause, because it is an effect *e. g.* a piece of cloth admitted by both the sides. Again Brahman cannot be put forth as the cause of the universe admitting it to be an effect, because Brahman being devoid of property and parts cannot have the requisite conjunction for the production of the effect. The eternity of atoms cannot be questioned on the ground of their having a finite measure like a pot. Because atoms are indivisible by something else, they having reached the maximum stage of fineness of measure as will be seen from the following inferencc:—The grades of *atomic* measure stop at a certain stage, because they are grades of a kind of measure *e. g.* the grades of cubic measure (which stop at a certain stage). Besides this indivisibility, there is another reason why atoms are industructible. An effect in our theory is destroyed by the division or the destruction of the cause ; atoms have no cause, and hence they cannot be destroyed. To admit that they have a cause would lead to confusion ad infinitum which would prove neither creation nor destruction of the universe. It follows therefor that the division of the pro-

ducts forming the world upto the atomic stage is called destruction. It should not be objected that there can be no destruction of the world when there are a number of substances like a variety of atoms. Because the atomist considers that to be *subsidiary* destruction in which there is a miscellaneous destruction of all *substances* in the form of effects; while that to be the *universal* destruction in which there is the destruction of all effects (whether they be substances, properties or actions). In the subsidiary destruction a positive product, consisting of the motion of four kinds of atoms, continues, for it is admitted that in the subsidiary destruction atoms are moving to and fro.

17. The order of creation is as under:— After the world is destroyed (in the Universal Destruction) the first motion is generated in motionless atoms by the desire of God to create the world consequent upon the merit or demerit of beings. By that first impetus one atom is joined with another and a dyad is produced. By three dyads a triad is produced and in this order the big universe with air &c. is produced. The properties such as colour &c residing in atoms give rise to similar properties in dyads &c on the principle of the production of a piece of cloth from threads. The opponent thus sums up his atomic theory and challenges the Vedàntin to show in-consistency, if there be any.

18. The Vedântic replies* that the theory is unsubstantial, and enquires of the atomist whether there is any cause for the first or the last action in atoms. If it is said that there is no such cause the world would arise haphazard. If the cause of the first or last action in atoms is admitted it is further enquired if the cause is visible or invisible. If visible, is it (*a*) effort as in the movement of a body; or (*b*) hitting or (*c*) a conjunction of a moving substance with a motionless object *e. g.* the conjunction of a raised pestle with a mortar; of wind with trees; or (*d*) a conjunction in the form of a propelling force in the object already united *e. g.* the conjunction of the hand with an arrow requiring an effort for propelling; or (*e*) an impression or effect consisting of velocity or elasticity, depending on the original propelling force; for its existence and continuity, or (*f*) gravitation.

19. The first cause is not appropriate, for it is impossible to determine the connection between mind and soul requisite for the production of an effort. It can not be said that in consequence of the eternity of mind and soul there is the possibility of effort which consists in the union of the mind with the soul. Because effort which is the property of the soul is admitted as coming into existence when there is a conjunction between mind and soul located in a body.

*Vide B. S. II ii-12.

At the time of Universal Destruction there is no organism, for on the contrary assumption it would be impossible to avoid mundane existence even in the state of absolution (which resembles universal destruction) on account of the production of special attributes of the soul such as intellect &c resulting from the admitted presence of the organism. The series of possible causes commencing from hitting referred to above is not possible, for all the causes require an effort on the part of an intelligent being which, as shown just now, is an impossibility in the state of Universal Destruction.

20. Now it may be argued that let the cause of the primeval motion in atoms be invisible. But this assumption also does uot explain the theory. It is enquired :—Is this invisible* cause in intimate relation with (*a*) soul or with (*b*) atoms.

21. In the first place merit or demerit by itself cannot be the cause of the primeval motion in atom, because it is insentient. It is futile to argue that merit or demerit can become the the cause of primeval motion in spite of its being insentient just as a load-stone attracts iron. Because on that assumption merit or demerit independent of a sentient being would be in perpetual proximity with atoms and there would thus be no Universal Destruction. If it be ad-

*By "invisible cause" is meant merit or demerit of beings.

mitted that there is no such proximity, there would be the ever absence of creation.

22. If it now be admitted that merit or demerit controlled by a sentient being becomes the cause of the primeval motion it should be stated whether it is controlled by an individual soul, or God. It can not be the first, for in Universal Destruction the opponent's theory does not admit of the existence of intelligence in individual souls. Nor can it be the second, because God being ever present the merit or demerit governed by Him cannot be the cause of occasional activity in atoms. Besides in the opponent's doctrine there can be no activity in God. Activity is either for the attainment of happiness, or for the avoiding of pain or for attaining or avoiding means of pleasure or pain. God is a being whose desires are always fulfilled, and hence it follows that He cannot be active for the purpose of attaining pleasure or its means or avoiding pain or its means, such a desire being totally absent in Providence. According to the Vedic text[4] :—" How can there be desire in a being whose desires are always fulfilled. "

23. Again is this God, the controller of atoms and the instrumental cause of their motion proved by perception or by inference? The first alternative is not possible, for God is admitted to be indirectly knowable and not directly. The second alternative is equally untenable, for there is no middle term on which the inference can be based.

24. It should not be argued that there is the possibility of a middle term *viz.* " being an effect " on which the following syllogism is based :—The primeval motion has a creator, because it is an effect *e. g* pot. Because that inference is vitiated by a rival syllogism :—The primeval motion is a result of a plurality of authors because it is an effect *e.g.* a palace.

25. If we try to prove existence of God on the argument :—Earth has an author, (because it is an effect), and not on the argument relating to primeval motion, the following faults creep in. In the first place the middle term (viz being an effect) is not proved in toto with respect to atoms of earth. In the second place pot &c. which are put forth as instance to prove the argument, have their existence already proved in a different way, for an earthen pot being an accomplished effect following the conjunction of two halves, the potter is no more a necessary cause than his father. In otherwards the conjunction of two halves is sufficient to explain the existence of an effect like a pot, and hence there is no necessity to admit a maker or potter in the category of cause he having no immediate connection with the production of the effect. An earthen pot therefore is not a proper instance to prove the above argument. The vedic text therefore rightly tells us : —

" A wise man is freed from mundane existence by knowing the Infinite both in beginning

and end, which is devoid of all distinction which has neither a middle term nor an instance to prove its existence by inference, and which is unknowable" (in the ordinary sense of the term). Nor should it be said that God may become the subject matter of inference although proved by the Veda, for it would amount to proving a thing already proved. If it be argued that although the use of syllogism proving the existence of God may be of no practical use to an orthodox opponent or a believer in the Veda, it serves its purpose with respect to sceptic or non-believer in the Veda. The Vedântic replies that he concurs with the Naiyâyika in this respect. In this third view (viz that of proving the existence of God neither by perception nor inference but by scripture only), however, what is proved is the existence of the cause of the Universe which is both intimate and instrumental and not a mere instrumental cause like the God of the Naiyâyikas. Such a cause combining the elements of intimate and instrumental causes is found in Vedântic conception of God through the admission of Mâyâ, and hence there is no necessity for admitting the existence of atoms. The following vedic text declares the same view.

"The substantial cause (Prakṛiti) should be known to be Mâyâ, and the great Lord, the Possessor of Mâyâ, is the creator of the Universe." (श्वे. श्व. IV 9-10).

26. Besides, does that merit or demerit

(the invisible cause) which becomes the instrument in the production of the primeval motion in atoms, require its own fructification or not? If we take the second view there would be the absence of Universal Destruction, for such a merit or demerit in an unripe state would give rise to the motion in atoms even before the creation. If we adopt the first alternative in which merit or demerit is admitted to be in need of ripeness before, it can produce primeval motion in atoms, it can not explain the motion in atoms at a *particular* time. Because fructification or ripeness of merit or demerit is not a new property arising in it, but it means the approaching of time for the production of the fruit, prescribed in the Law of Karma, for a particular good or bad action. Again ripeness of actions the time of whose fructification is indeterminate, sometimes means absence of impediment in the production of their fruits by other powerful actions. Actions good or bad, are by nature capable of yielding fruits at various times because they are fructified in accordance with the degree or force of their original performance. Hence it is impossible that there can be a uniform fructification at one time of all actions performed by a variety of souls with a view to their yielding fruits at a variety of times.

27. In like manner the merit or demerit is not in intimate relation with atoms, for its intimate connection is admitted with the soul,

It is futile[5] to argue that although there is no *direct* intimate relation between atoms and the invisible factor, called merit or demerit, the latter has got an *indirect* intimate relation with atoms inasmuch as it bears intimate relation with the soul which is joined with atoms. Because the soul intimately connected with merit or demerit being all pervading his contact with the atoms is ever present, and consequently there would never be a cessation of the activity in atoms. Even if we assume the contact of the soul with atoms as resulting from the action of atoms, (and not following as a consequence of the all-pervading nature of the soul) the production of dyad &c. cannot be explained, for there would, on that assumption, ensue a series of contacts which would lead to an ever flowing activity and not to a stage of the production of new effects. To avoid this difficulty it cannot be argued that the *indirect* intimate relation between atoms and merit or demerit, based upon the contact of the former with the soul with whom the merit or demerit has *direct* intimate relation, is not an ever present condition leading to perpetual activity in atoms, but an adventitious or occasional stage explaining the production of dyad &c. Because such an assumption[6] would lead to a logical fault of inter-dependence as under :—Merit or demerit should be the factor explaining the occasional character of that *indirect* intimate relation; and such an

occasional indirect intimate relation compels us to assume the existence of merit or demerit.[7]

28. Besides not only in consequence of the absence of a cause, atoms cannot combine, but even the very nature of atoms precludes the possibility of the essential nature of conjunction in them as under :—Does the mutual conjunction of atoms spread in and out their bodies or has it a limited sphere of contact ? In the first view, there can be no increase in volume, because when the atom combines with another in and out, the result would be a mere atom. Besides conjunction is seen between two objects having parts. If the instance of the contact of the concha or external ear with ether in which the former has parts while the latter has none, be put forth to vitiate the above generalisation, it may be said that in case the contact is all pervading, sounds of different places should be comprehended, but such is not the case, for we hear sounds of a limited area.

29. The second view is also untenable, because such a form of conjunction, which is technically[8] defined as a contact which resides in the same place as is the abode of its total absence, cannot be assumed to exist, on the strength of visible instances, in invisible atoms which are admitted to have no parts. If such a conjunction were admitted to exist in atoms we shall have to admit that atoms have parts and consequently they have a beginning.

30. Again has an atom any limitation by time or space? If it has, then the assumption that an atom has no parts will have to be abandoned. If it has such limitation, an atom and ether would be of the same measure, for both of them are assumed to have no limitation by space. It would, therefore, follow that either ether is atomic or atom is all pervading.

31. The above refutation of the partless or indivisible nature of an atom implies the refutation of the doctrine that atoms, ether &c have no beginning because they being devoid of parts have neither intimate nor non-intimate causes for their production.

32. It should not be argued that the division of the world should end in triads or molecules and not in atoms or monads because such a theory is not admitted by Gautama or Kaṇâda. Even admitting that theory, a triad cannot have a great or perceptible measure, because a limited object does not attain perceptible measure without a material cause. Again such a great or perceptible measure which is called a "middle size" is necessarily possessed of an end. The triads would thus be destructible and not permanent elements constituting the universe. By this line of argument we have by the by refuted the gabble of Siromaṇi in his Padartha Khandana:-"The triad is the terminus of the division of the world because there is no proof of the existence of

monads. It should not be said that perception resulting from occult powers is the proof of their existence, for in that case the point should be settled by asking such Yogins possessed of such powers &c." Such a theory admitting triads to be the termini of the world is nothing but deviation from the fundamental doctrine of the atomist.

33. Another* point to be enquired into is:- Are atoms by nature active or inactive, or both, or neither active nor inactive, ? If they are essentially active there would be no destruction there being perpetual activity. If they are essentially inactive, there would be an absence of creation, there being perpetual want of activity. They can not be both active and inactive, because such a position is absurd. If they are essentially neither active nor inactive it follows that their occasional activity or inactivity must be due to some instrumental cause. But such a cause has already been refuted by us.

34. Further there is another tenet of the atomist viz:—"An atom has got the finest measure, has no parts, is permanent, and has got a touch." If the above tenet is accepted the very fact that an atom is tactile would lead to its grossness, partibility, aud impermanency, for the assumption of one property of touch necessarily leads to the other. Earthen pot &c, which are tangible are

*Vide B. S. II. ii. 14.

actually seen to be gross, partible, and destructible. It will not do to say that atoms are permanent, they having no cause in spite of their being positive entities. Because the presence of their cause is implied by their being tactual. Again it is futile to base the permanency of atoms on the syllogism:—"The negation of permanency of effects is preceded by a counter entity (*i. e.* a permanent entity), because it is a negation *e. g.* the negation of an earthern pot." Because the syllogism at the most proves the existence of a permanent entity which should not necessarily be an atom. Such an entity is found in the permanent Self which explains the propriety of negation of permanency of effects.

35. The opponent argues :—" Conjunction is a necessary factor in the creation of an effect, for without it the production of an effect cannot be accounted for. Such a conjunction entering into the category of cause may either be determined by the creation of the universe or not *so* determined (*i. e.* determined by the production of ordinary effects after the great creation of the universe. In point of fact at the time of universal creation atoms should have combined). "

36. To this it is replied that there is no such necessity to assume conjunction, for the production can be otherwise explained as follows :—

Is your conjunction a necessary cause because of its generic character as conjunction or be-

cause of a particular form of it? In other words, does conjunction *perse* become a cause or is a *particular* form of conjunction needed? It cannot be the first, because as one uniform generic conjunction would bring about only an earthen jar from the part forming its substantial cause, it would be impossible to produce other effects like a tray &c, by the help of other conjunction determined by various parts of the clay[10]. It cannot be the second, because although in the production of a jar &c, a particular form of conjunction of parts is a necessary cause, in effects like the transformation of milk, water &c, into curdle, ice &c, the motion &c, of the very parts of milk and water are admitted to be the causes (and not the conjunction). To admit in such places that the products (curdle, ice &c) are brought into existence by the gradual development of the form of parts depending upon a series of conjunctions is nothing but a lack of scientific economy. In point of fact, such a gradual development of the body from parts is not experienced in such products. Nobody experiences the production of the light of a lamp spreading in a limited area as a gradual development of parts. This is the point which S'ankara has touched in his Bhâshya on (B. S. II. ii. 17) as under:—

" The production of an effect is not necessarilly brought about by a mere conjunction of parts, because even without such a conjunction

water milk, &c, turn into ice curdle &c.". Ânandagiri's comment on this passage runs as under :—

"By 'etcetera' is meant salt and such other things. By 'without such a conjuction' is meant that ice, curdle &c., are produced without the help of a conjunction of parts which is agreeable to their appearance and which is different from that conjunction which is agreeable to the appearance of water milk &c. Although curdle &c. are products, their production from the combination of various parts is not proved, and consequently the position of the atomist that *all* products are brought about by the development or new combination of parts is vitiated by uncertainty".

37. The refutation of the position of actual creation by various combination of parts includes the refutation of another argument :—All substances in the form of products are produced by substances having a finer measure than their own because they are effects.

38. The opponent retorts :—"The fine molecule or triad of dust seen in the solar ray coming through an aperture should be a product because it is possessed of parts–This argument proves the existence of dyads, the causes of triads. On the same line of argument a dyad should have parts, it being the first product. The constituents of a dyad are atoms or monads. If the latter are again recognized to be products there would be infinity of parts which assumption would lead to the equality of measure between

the mount Meru and a rapeseed. To avoid such a logical consequence we stop at atoms which are thus proved to be devoid of parts. Now their conjunction also is proved by the very difficulty of explaining the rise of products on any other hypothesis. There is no scope for raising such alternatives as :—Is conjunction a property pervading all the parts of the bodies brought into contact or is it a mere partial contact ? Because the principle is that nothing which can be perceived to be of a particular nature can be held improper on *apriori* reasoning."

39. To this the Vedântin replies that the argument is fallacious, because a triad can be proved to exist on another hypothesis. In the first place the great element of earth is produced from Nescience, in the order of creation commencing with ether according to the theory of fivefold combination, which will be described hereafter. Then a jar, for instance, is produced from Nescience forming the material cause of earth. In Nescience forming the material cause of the pot are produced pieces by the action of hitting with a stick &c. In the Nescience forming the substantial cause of the pieces are exhibited particles of dust by the process of pounding. Again the same Nescience forming the material cause of these particles gives rise to the primeval molecule which the opponent calls a triad. it may be observed that the material cause of even the action of hitting is recognized to be Nescience, for in the Vedântic doctrine

no other means are assumed for explaining the creation of the universe. This point has been noted in the Vishṇu Purâṇa in the following verse:—

"Tell me what essence dost thou find in the objects of the world? People whose inner perception of Self is closed by their own action find a jar, for instance, in earth; pieces in the jar; particles of dust in those pieces; and the fine molecule in those particles of dust".

40. In this verse by the fine molecule is meant a triad. If it is contended that beyond this triad there is a finer element called an atom, we have nothing to say against such assumption. But what we press for is that such an atom is not eternal but destructible, it being of the same class as earth, like your dyad.

41. The admission of the mere existence of elements like atoms does not mean that they are eternal particles producing the universe, for such a theory is opposed to Vedic texts and to arguments already mentioned. The Vedic text:— "From that self ether is produced, from ether air, from air light, from light water and from water earth"-read with another text.-"Brahman thought-let me be many":—declares that the first thought of God which is the particular form of primeval modification of Mâyâ is the cause of ether, and that ether, &c become the causes of air &c. To

sum up then, the theory that conjunction of parts is a cause towards the production of an effect does not stand the test of examination.

42. The opponent again retorts by saying that although atoms are essentially devoid of parts, the latter are assumed for the purpose of conjunction. The Vedântin replies that this is not a happy assumption, for when parts are assumed, the conjunction of atoms and the resulting products like dyads &c, would also be mere assumed entities. And as assumed entities have no reality, the conjunction between such assumed entities would not be a real non-intimate cause. It will not do to say that even without a real non-intimate cause, the relation of cause, and effect can be established by a mere assumed conjunction. Because if such a position is admitted, materials like bricks &c, seen in a dream would bring about a real house. Besides the position would be contrary to the opponent's doctrine that a positive product cannot come into being without a non-intimate cause.

43. Finally there are a number of syllogisms like the following which favour the opposite view (*i. e.* conjunction between atoms is not possible):—

(*a*) Atoms have no help-mate in conjunction because they are devoid of action, the cause of conjunction, in spite of their being independent *e. g*, ether.

(*b*) Atoms are devoid of action, because there is the absence of causes bringng about action such as effort, striking &c. *e. g.* ether.

(*c*) Atoms are not the producers of substances, because there can be no increase in volume, consequent upon conjunction, they having no parts *e. g.* self, ether &c.

Section II.

Refutation of Intimate Relation.

Just as conjunction is not proved, so it is difficult to prove the tenet of intimate relation* on which the proof of conjunction is based. To take up the enquiry, has that intimate relation which is quite distinct from co-related objects, any connection with those objects or not? If it has no connection whatsoever, it would as well unite the Himâlayas with the Vindhya mountains[1]. Nor can it be said that it has a kind of connection with the objects between which it subsists. Because that second connection, joining intimate relation with the two objects, will require a third connection and so on, a position leading to confusion *adinfinitum*. It cannot be said that intimate relation, being in itself a kind of connection, is not in need of any other connection to unite it with the two objects. Because[2] the essential nature of intimate relation is found to be inexplicable:—Does that intimate

* Vide B. S. II. ii. 13.

relation in essence consist of the substratum, or is it a kind of entity appearing in substratum; or is it essentially a period of time of appearance; or appearance itself; or is it a determining space. There is no other alternative. The theory is inexplicable even assuming any of the five alternatives on the principle:—Let the fool be pleased[3]) Because is this essential form of connection with itself (स्वरूपसंबन्ध) identical with intimate relation or different therefrom? If it is identical, it is a misnomer to say that intimate relation has an essention connection (*i. e.* connection with itself). It is a position of self-dependence (which is as inconsistent as rising on one's own shoulders). Besides the position is vitiated by oure xperience that a thing cannot be called as belonging to itself. If it be said that connection with itself (essential connection) is different from Intimate Relation the confusion *adinfinitum* as stated above is palpable.

The opponent retorts:—Is the propriety of Intimate Relation questioned on the ground that it cannot be proved or because of its leading to confusion *adinfinitum*? It can not be due to the first cause. Because relation in the world is of two kinds:—(*a*) Conjunction and (*b*) Intimate connection. The former subsists between object which can exist separately, and is directly perceived, as for instance, the conjunction between a pot and a rope. The latter kind of relation subsists between objects which cannot exist independently. Such co-related objects are (*a*) a thing and its

parts (*b*) action and the thing in which it inheres (*c*) class and its species, (*d*) a distinguishing attribute and an eternal substance.[4] The followers of Kaṇâda (Vais'eshikas) maintain that the intimate relation is inferable by means of the middle term consisting of the conception of locality (literally-"herein") in the proposition:—The piece of cloth inheres in these threads. The followers of Gautama, however, hold that the intimate relation is directly cognizable.[5] Leaving aside this minor doctrinal difference one thing is certain that both of them admit intimate relation. Now the existence of intimate relation is thus proved:—"The cognition:-the cloth is in these threads-must be preceded by a relation between the two objects, because the cognition of 'here' indicated by the words "in these threads" is not sublated. When such a cognition is not sublated there is an anterior relation *e. g.* the cognition 'berries are in a fountain'—implies that there is already a relation of abode and abiding (आधाराधेय भाव संबन्ध) between fountain and berries.

The other view that intimate relation is untenable on account of confusion *adinfinitum* is also not correct for the same reasons. When intimate relation is proved to exist on the grouud that effects (*e. g.* cloth) can not be explained without the logical assumption of such a relation between cause and effect, there is no scope for raising objections like confusion *adinfinitum* based on fallacious reasoning.

To the above the Vedântin replies that the Naiyâyika is labouring under delusion, as will be seen from the following:—

In the first place the perception does not take the form " cloth appears in these threads " but takes the form of identical relation as "these threads appear as cloth " " this clay appears as a pot, " and so forth every where. No body perceives " a tree in branches " but "branches in the tree. " In the same way threads are experienced in cloth (and not the reverse). The principle on which the existence of intimate relation was based-*viz* unsublated idea of location of effect in cause-remains unproved, being thus falsified by other means of right knowledge. Again is this Intimate Relation different from the two related objects or one with them ? If it is different is it independent or dependent ? If it is both different and independent it should appear as a distinct entity like soul, ether &c. If it is different and yet dependent, it should be stated what relation it bears with the object on which it is dependent. In dependent objects like property &c. we actually find a relation subsisting between them and the substances on which they depend. It should not be proclaimed that Intimate relation being in itself a relation does not require any other relation to connect it with objects on which it depends. Because such a principle does not hold good in the Naiyayika conception of conjunction (which is recognized

to be a kind of relation and yet in need of Intimate Relation to connect it with conjoined objects). If it be argued that although conjunction is a relation it requires another relation (Intimate Relation) to connect it with conjoined objects, because it is a property; that categories like common characteristic &c. being dependent and not in the form of relations are in need of a relation to connect them with the objects on which they depend; that Intimate Relation is a relation but not a property, and thus differs from conjunction, then the reply is that the Intimate Relation being in itself a kind of relation should be regarded as property like conjunction and not a separate category as in the Nyâya system. If it be contended that property resides in substance, while Intimate Relation is found to inhere even in properties, and hence it cannot be regarded as property, the Vedântin replies let the foolish opponent be pleased by our assumption that Intimate Relation inheres in properties &c, but we must infer that the Intimate Relation subsisting between cause and effect should at least be property, because it is a relation subsisting between substances *e. g.* conjunction. Again if the opponent draws distinction between conjunction and Intimate Relation by saying that conjunction is a property on account of its being relation between objects which can exist separately as well as on account of its inherence in substances only, while Intimate Relation, being neither a relation

between objects which can exist separately nor an entity inhering in substances only, is not a property, the Vedântin enquires into the nature of those objects which cannot exist separately. What are we to understand by that close affinity or want of separate existence between two objects ? Does it mean (*a*) that the two objects have the same substratum or (*b*) that they exist in one and the same time or (*c*) that they have no essential difference in their nature ? If the first view is adopted it is further questioned:— is the identity of substratum confined to both the Correlated objects or to one of them ? If the first alternative is adopted, there can be no Intimate Relation between a piece of cloth and its property say whiteness, (which relation is, however, admitted by the Naiyâyikas) because the piece of cloth inheres in threads with which it is supposed to be in Intimate Relation, while its whiteness inheres in the cloth with which it is supposed to be in Intimate Relation. In other words the piece of cloth has for its substratum threads, while its whiteness has for its substratum the cloth and not the threads. Thus the difference in the substratum is admitted by the Naiyâyika himself and consequently it would not do to hold that " close affinity " means that the two corelated objects should have the same object as substratum. Again the matter will not be improved by saying that one of the corelated objects should have the same abode, for as

will be described hereafter. a pot and ether will have to be regarded as objects that cannot exist separately. To put it, in other words, when a pot is connected (संयुक्त) or is in mere contact with ether, the pot has, for its substratum earth but ether being a permanent substance and having Intimate Relation with nothing else has in fact the same abode that is to say ether being eternal and all pervading has the same abode for ever, while pot &c may have fluctuating substratum. Now if it be said that out of two correlated objects one should not change its abode or substratum to justify what the Naiyâyikas call " close affinity " (अयुतसिद्धि), a pot and ether which have come in contect (सयुक्त) and are thus correlated would be regarded as bearing "close affinity" by the unchanging substratum of one of them *viz.* ether. It would then follow that pot and ether are in Intimate Relation which is contrary to the Naiyâyika doctrine.

To turn to the second view of " close affinity " *viz.* objects synchronous bear close affinity the result would be that the right and left horns of a bull would be regarded as having "close affinity."

The third view is also untenable, because to assume the absence of essential difference in nature between correlated objects would make the difference between substance and property, nul and void in the Naiyâyika system. It is

futile to say that by the assumption of Intimate Relation between substance and property, their essential difference is not annihilated. Because the very Intimate Relation is not yet proved.[6] Property being thus viewed as identical with substance the " close affinity " on which Intimate Relation is based is not proved. (In fact there would be identity and not a kind of Relation subsisting between two distinct objects.)

Again etymologically " the root (यु) according to Paṇini has two senses :—(1) to unite and (2) to separate. In the word (अयुतसिद्धि) or "close affinity" the root यु bears the second sense *i. e.* the term with a negative particle means " accomplishment of objects in an inseparate condition " Now such an inseparate creation or accomplishment is not possible in the Naiyâyika system between substance and property, it being a postulate that substance is first produced and property is produced at a later stage (*i e.* in the second moment of the creation of the substance).

If by " close affinity " or " accomplishment in an inseparate condition " is meant the manifestation of the being of an effect in cause in a related form, it is enquired:—(*a*) does the effect form an intimate relation with the cause, having first attained its being or (*b*) is it first intimately connected with the cause and then attains its being or existence or (*c*) is it simultaneously brought into existence and put in intimate relation with the cause? According to the first

view, an effect is already an accomplished or existent fact and hence it is misnomer to say that there is an accomplishment in an *inseparate* condition. (In other words the effect has already attained an existence independent of, or separate from, that of the cause). The second view is also untenable, for how can the effect being non-existent before its birth bear an Intimate Relation with the cause ? If it, however, be contended that although the effect is non-existent (prior to its creation) its Intimate Relation with the cause is assumed, The Vedântin enquires does that assumed Intimate Relation subsisting between the cause and the effect imply that the cause has an accomplished effect or an unaccomplished effect ? If it be said that the cause with which the effect is supposed to have intimate relation, has not an accomplished effect, it means that the effect is both existent and non-existent simultaneously (*i. e.* the fact that the effect is not accomplished in the cause means that it *has not attained existence.* Again the assumption that even such an effect has an intimate relation with the cause implies that the effect has some kind of existence prior to its birth). But this is contradictory, as such a position is falsified by actual experience.

Now to say that the cause has an accomplished effect with which it is intimately united means that accomplishment is viewed as one with intimate relation, and consequently it can

not be said that an accomplished effect has an intimate relation with the cause. (that is to say, the effect being ever accomplished or existent in the cause the intimate relation is nothing else but an ever present identical appearance.)

To turn to the third view *i. e.* Intimate Relation and the attainment of being occurs simultaneously in the effect, it is inquired :—Is that effect in an accomplished form existent or non-existent or other than existent or non-existent ? According to the first alternative the relation is of an already accomplished object, and hence there is no " inseparate accomplishment " meaning thereby the *simultaneous* occurence of being and relation. According to the second alternative there can be no intimate relation the effect being still non-existent or unaccomplished. The adoption of the third alternative would lead the Naiyâyika to the theory of the indescribable appearance of the effect in cause, and thus the Naiyyâika would per force join hands with the Vedântin as an ultimate consequence of the argument.

This refutation of Intimate Relation between the cause and effect includes the refutation of that relation beween property and such other groups.

Another point to be discussed in this connection is that if Intimate Relation is different from the two correlated objects, another relation

should be pointed out to justify the connection between Intimate Relation and correlated objects.

To point out that there is another relation namely the relation between an object and its attribute, will not improve the position, because such a relation is difficult to establish. In the first place the proposed relation which subsists, for instace, between Devdatta and his staff, requires another relation called conjunction to justify its being, and hence, truly speaking, is not a relation.[7] Even assuming that the proposed relation is really a relation, the confusion adinfinitum cannot be avoided. To escape from this if it be argued " that confusion in argument or want of finality when it is supported by actual experience only, uudermines the ordinary principles of action, and not when it relates to the sphere of being; that the present confusion is of the latter type and hence there is no harm.[8] "—The Vedântin replies that this absence of finality in argument is supported by actual experience. Thus intimate relation being in it self an attribute (according to the amended position) would require another relation to prove its being, and so forth. The want of finality is therefore evident. Intimate Relation is therefore not different from correlated objects.

Nor can it be said that it is identical with them. Because such a position would not prove intimate relation as an independent entity. The

The Naiyâyika contends that if no such intimate relation is admitted how can we account for the concordance of subject and predicate. The Vedântin replies that the concordance between subject and predicate (*e. g.* in the causal relation indicated in the proposition:—"Effect appears in the cause ") is justifiable on another grouud namely the phenomenal and fictitious relation, to be described hereafter, between cause and effect. If it be retorted by the Naiyâyika that the concordance cannot be regarded as depending upon fictitious relation there being no sublation (as in the proposition "that which appeared as a pillar is a man "), the Vedântin replies that just as the perception " I am a man " persists until the philosophical nature of " I " or " ego " as devoid of all attributes like humanity &c, is realized, so the concordance that effect is the source of the appearance of a piece of cloth, for instance, in threads, is justifiable by fictitious relation subsisting until the higher stand-point in knowledge is reached. The concordance is again actually sublated by the Vedic knowledge imparted in texts like the following :—

"Effect (*e. g.* pot) is simply a name originating from speech while the truth is the cause *e. g.* earth. "

Finally Intimate Relation cannot be permanent because it depends for its existence on correlated objects. When one or both of the correlated objects perish, the relation necessarily

perishes. It is impossible, for instance to suppose that property, or substance and the property both vanish and yet the relation subsisting between them persists. Intimate relation, therefore, is an effect dependent for its appearance solely on the operation of an instrumental cause just like conjunction. This is the line of argument which we do not wish to prolong in the case of Intimate Relation for it would be like killing an animal already killed.[9]

Section III.

Refutation of the theory of the non-existence of the effect prior to its birth.

It follows from the above section that the effect is not different from the cause on the strength of argument and experience, but that the effect is simply an indescribable transformation of the cause. The effect being thus non-existent apart from the cause, how can there be a relation between the two ? As conjunction has no existence independent of the conjoined objects, there can be no conjunction between the cause and effect (which are essentially identical). Nor should it be said that relation is an object separate from the related objects simply because apart from the conception and term of " correlated objects " we have the notion and nomenclature of Intimate Relation. Because variety of notions and nomenclature is possible with respect

Vide B. S. II. ii. 17

to one and the same object viewed from its numerous indescribable aspects *e. g.* one and the same individual called Devdatta is styled a man, a Brahmin, and a person of fair complexion from the variety of his bodily stand-point ; is called a child, a youth or an old man from the stand point of his physical condition; is called a Brahmin well versed in the Vedas, or a cook from the variety of his actions; is known as a father, son, grandson, brother, son-in-law in his relation with different persons. In the same way a stroke or a line reprensenting " one " when placed in different positions gives rise to a variety of numerical terms and notions such as one, hundred, thousand &c. On the same line of argument correlated objects give rise to the terms and notions of " conjunction and Intimate Relation " apart from those of " Correlated objects " and thus there is no independently existing thing like " relation. " To conclude* then the terms " conjunction and Intimate Relation " connote those states of a thing in which there are respectively an intervening space or absence of such a space as distinguished from its entirety or homogeniety. Two fingers for instance can be said to have a relation of juxta-position; curdled milk and the round vessel in which it is placed are said to have a relation of being up and down. The same principle is to be applied to other kinds of relation. It is thus esta-

*Vide A'nandgiri on S'ankara Bhàshya on B. S. II. ii. 17.

blished that property, motion, common characteristic and intimate relation are identical with the category called substance.[1]

Again though property &c, are proved to be one with substance the adoption of the terminology of "Substance" is also useless as shown below. Is the establishment of earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind, as substances, necessary for popular dealings in speech or does that knowledge lead to absolution? The object of the terminology cannot be the first, for people do not say "bring substance" or "Dravya," the popular notion of 'Dravya' "being gold &c." It cannot be the second, because even after knowing earth &c, to be so many kinds of substances, the annihilation of false knowledge, which is the means of absolution consisting of the cessation of pain, is not brought about by such a knowledge. On the contrary in spite of the popular terms as earth &c, serving the practical purposes, the introduction of the purposeless scientific terminology as "earth &c, are so many substances" expands the sphere of false knowlodge. There is therefore no such thing as "substance" But as in every object like earth we see the inherence of "name" there is only one category called "name" which includes all the Nayiyâyika substances.

There is again no independent category named "property" Because people do not say in their ordinary dealings—"A pot has for its

property blackness." But the ordinary usage is:—"A pot is black"-a phrase giving rise to the notion of the category of "name" of the pot characterised by blackness &c. So blackness &c, fall under the category of "form" or characteristic. What the Naiyâyikas call the category of "action" is nothing but what the Vedântins call "motion." It is not proper to sub-divide "action" into five classes such as tossing up" [2] &c, for every-where we see "motion" and nothing else. Thus all products of Nescience to be described hereafter fall under the class of "object" (as opposed to subject) comprising three minor classes of "name," "form" and "motion" seen everywhere. The "subject" is the Self. Thus there are two categories of "subject" and "object" so far as the empirical world is concerned. From the transcendental stand-point, Nescience and its products being annihilated there is only one category namely "Self". This point will be cleared in the fourth Chapter of the book.

As substance, property and action have no existence, the lower subdivision or classification of substance &c., is also not proved. Because the general principle, Brahman, underlying everything and which will he described hereafter, would comprise such classifications. The classification going under the name of the Highest genus is also not possible (for the same reason[3]).

As permanent substances are in themselves

capable of excluding one another, the category called "Special Characteristic" is not proved even on the opponent's hypothesis.

In our doctrine there is no eternal object other than self, and we therefore do not require an excluding, or distinguishing attribute like the opponents "Visesha" or "Special characteristic"[4].

The refutation of Samavâya or Intimate Relation has already been given.

The category of "non-existence" cannot be established in the absence of its counter-entities (*e. g.* substance &c., which have been disproved[5]).

To sum up then, all the phenomenal world is super-imposed upon that eternally existing Brahman as is shown in the following Vedic text:—

"Oh quiet-minded S'vetaketu, (his father Uddâlaka proceeds to teach the doctrine of the eternally existing Brahman which underlies all phenomena) by this sprout (*i. e.* the body) arising out of food, infer the existence of "water" as its root; again through the sprout consisting of "water" infer the existence of light as its root; again through the sprout of "light" infer the principle of Being as the root. Oh good boy, all these creatures originate from that Principle of Being, reside in the same, and ultimately absorb themselves into the same" (Chhândogya VIII. 6).

The above text teaches that all the products are phenomenally super-imposed upon Brahman. The[6] principle of Being referred to is not to be confounded with the Naiyâyika category called Sâmânya or common characteristic running through all, because that category has already been refuted. Besides there is no proof for its existence. It should not be said that the appearance of being a characteristic running through all the individuals is capable of proving the existence of the category called Sâmânya. Because such an appearance is not specially applicable to to Sâmânya, but is common to all the categories. Otherwise (*i. e.* if Being and Sâmânya are identical) how can we reconcile notions of "Existence" or "being" in the highest genus, lower genus, and destruction when the highest genus or Sâmânya is admitted to exist in substance property and action only? As existence is predicated of *all* the objects, the Vedântin does not admit the principle of Being inhering only in substance, property and action, it being incapable of establishing its own nature. Again the contrary view is possible *i. e.* the predication of being with respect to objects other than the three catagories of substance property and action is possible to express. To argue—"there is no impropriety in the production of knowledge of 'being' with respect to the last three positive categories (*viz.* Common Characteristic, Special attribute and Intimate Relation), there being a connection between them and the category of

substance ; likewise highest genus comprising substance property and action is essentially existent ; and destruction (posterior non-existence of a thing) is said to exist on account of its temporal connection "—is futile because one uniform appearance of being is explicable on the assumption of one uniform object, and cannot justify the assumption of a variety of relation and at the same time essential being. If the unbroken appearance of being is admitted without the uniform presence of an object, all classification would come to an end. It is therefore admitted by the Vedântin that the origin of being is one homogeneous and real Brahman which is essentially self-shining and illumining all objects in their known as well as unknown conditions, and which justifies the predication of existence every where.

The cognition that " a jar exists " has for its object the identity of the jar with the principle of Being. It does not mean that the jar is intimately connected with the highest genus of existence (comprising substance property and action), because the cognition of identity cannot be borne out by a relation depending upon duality or difference. Thus the cognition. *e. g.* substance *exists*, property *exists*, action *exists*, common characteristic, special attribute, Intimate relation and negation *exist*-proves that the Principle of Being is one with everything. As substance, property &c., have no essential difference existence or being is not a property residing in

these objects. But on the contrary existence means that substance &c., are one with the Principle of Being namely Brahman. But as this identity cannot be real, its ideal character will be described hereafter. Vârtikakâra therefore rightly says :—

" There can be no difference between the classes of substance &c., from the stand-point of existence ; much less can there be the difference on another stand-point. Because there is a uniform cognition *e. g.* substance exists, property exists."

The cognition that a piece of cloth is different from a jar is also unable to prove difference or dualism, because a jar, a piece of cloth and their difference are one they being identical with the Principle of Being.

In order to support his view the eminent commentator of MahâBhâshya of Patanjali named Kayyata of Kâsmîra quotes the couplets of Bhartrihari :—

" The Principle of Being which is essentially indivisible divides itself into a variety of classes such as cow &c., in consequence of the difference of related objects, and is called a genus or class (by the Naiyâyikas). All parts of speech have their being in that Principle of existence. They are designated as crude forms of substantives and roots (by grammarians). The same Princi-

ple of being is eternal and is known as the Great Soul (by philosopers like Kapila). It is the same principle which the cosmologists describe as so many worlds as Atala, Sutala &c. In all the sciences it is only the Nescience which is described in a variety of ways, the real origin of all objects being the beginningless Brahman".

The fact that Brahman is comprehended by all the senses follows from its essential character of underlying all phenomena. The opponent retorts:—How can Brahman be the object of sensuous knowledge such as visual preception, when it is devoid of form &c ? It is a futile argument to say that although Brahman is essentially incapable of being preceived it attains a kind of fitness for becoming an object of sensuous knowledge when limited by objects like a jar. just as Rahu (the shadow of the earth–to put the idea in the modern scientific expression) becomes visible when limited by the moon at the time of eclipse. Because if limitation were to impart a kind of fitness for sensuous knowledge, ether &c., would be preceptible when limited or determined by property like sound &e., The instance of Râhu is not to the point, because it being black is essentially a fit object of perception; it is apparently unfit to be perceived on account of the defect of remoteness which is removed when it comes in contact with the pure white moon, which renders it perceptible to our eyes. Again the opponent continues:—It is improper to argue that Brahman shines in all cognitions like time which, according to the Mîmânsaka's theory, is invariably associated with every kind of cognition, it being said that there is no cognition where the element of time is absent. Such an argument is not valid, because, the opponent continues his refutation, the invariable association of time with all cognitions is not admitted. It cannot be said that the want of such an admission is opposed to experience (which proves temporal connection in all mental thoughts), because the experience is explicable on the extended application of inferential knowledge *e. g.* this place has got atoms (*i. e.* although atoms are imperceptible, we say, "the place is full of atoms." This experience is supported not by actual perception but by inferential knowledge about the existence of atoms. In the same way the element of time in all cognitions although not directly perceptible is experienced on account of the inferential belief in its existence everywhere).

The Vedântin replies to the above by a categorical "No" and proceeds to explain his position that Brahman is cognizable by all the senses as under:—

According to the opponent's theory the universal experience.–"Now the jar exists"–which is determined by time standing as the substratum of the jar, will have to be abandoned. The defect pointed out that Brahman cannot be ex-

perienced because it is devoid of all characteristics such as form &c., which render an object amenable to experience, is untenable. Because form &c., are essential for experience with respect to those objects only which are capable of being cognized by means of a *special* sense *e. g.* sight, hearing &c. Brahman and time are not such objects but are cognizible by *all* the senses in general. Thus although they are devoid of form &c, they can be cognized by sight &c. As a matter of fact, form &c., are essential conditions of perception with respect to a substance and nothing else. Now time and Brahman are recognised to be substances in the Vedânta doctrine, the former being one with Nescience, and the latter being independent category consisting of self-shining thought, being and bliss. They are therefore fit objects of perception. This is the line of argumeut on which the opposite view is to be refuted.

The opponent again turns round and says;- All this is reasonable when there is the existence of great *eternal* time. We see no proof of its existence. It should not be said that the proof has already been pointed out in the experience.-" Now there is a jar " which is determined by time relation. Because that experience is explicable on the assumptions of the division of time which has a beginning.

To this it is replied that even in that experience-" now there is a jar "-the eternal time

is needed as a uniting factor which determines the cognition of " present time." To explain this point further, it is enquired :—

What is the corresponding substratum or object of mental notion expressed by the word " Now " in the proposition-now there is a jar? Is it the jar itself, or ground &c., or the motion of the sun &c. It cannot be the first, for a thing cannot become its own substratum. It cannot be the second, because the ground is an element which varies. Again when a thing residing in one place is carried to another, the notion-" this exists now "-persists. (So ground which varies cannot be the substratum of the temporal notion expressed by " Now " which is uniform). It cannot be the third, because the jar has no direct relation with the solar movement. If it be admitted that there is a relation of the solar movement with the jar inasmuch as the diurnal motion of the sun is connected with the earth with which the jar is in contact, it follows that an underlying factor which unites all is an essential element to be admitted which must be different from all products. Such an element which unites all *relative* relations: should be regarded as the substratum of the notion "now &c" and is called eternal time. That absolute element of time is different from the universal soul. It is also not included in Nescience, because Mâyâ or Nescience having no existence apart from the merit and demerit of individual soul and their

impressions is not admitted–such is the view of the old school of Naiyâyikas with regard to the time. The followers of the modern school of Naiyâyikas such as Shiromaṇi Bhattâ Châryа, maintain that time, which consists of the substratum of the whole universe, is essential even with respect to God or supreme soul. The Vedântins regard time as a mode of Mâyâ or Nescience wich is different from the merit and demerit of individual souls and their impressions, as proved by the Vedas, and Smṛitis. A minor school of the Vedantins holds that time is a kind of relation between intelligence and Nescience. Such in brief are the views of different thinkers with regard to time.

To conclude, then, the theory of the non-existence of the effect before its birth is vitiated by the testimony of the Veda and Smṛitis. The object expressed by the word "Philosophic teacher" referred to at the commencement of the work, cannot be established on the Naiyâyika theory. It is useless to push the refutation further which will be like killing an animal already killed.

Section IV.

Refutation of the theory of evolution.

Let then the word "philosophical teacher" mean the organism as the evolved product of the five great elements appearing in the order

of manifestation commencing with nature, intellect, egoism &c., and let us thereby resort to the theory of the effect as existent before its production. The latter hypothesis is admitted by the Sânkhyas, the followers of the Yoga school of Patañjali, of the S'aiva school of Pâs'upatas, and of the Vaishṇava sect. That element of nature is proved by inference. All objects are by nature pleasant, painful, and deceptive, for one and the same object gives pleasure to one individual, pain to another and deludes a third. It follows, therefore, that the series of causes should be of triple nature. Vâchhaspati Mis'ra expresses the the same thought when he says that all objects are explained by Padmâvati[1]. Thus let us assume that the element of nature consisting of the three elements of Sattva (goodness), Rajas (badness) and Tamas (indifference) with their essential characteristics of pleasure, pain and delusion, be the material cause of the world. Neither Brahman nor atoms are the cause of the universe, because both of them are devoid of properties and parts.

To this the Vedântin replies that the argument is fallacious as will be presently shown. The Sânkhya philosopher holding the thesis that the five elements produced in the order of nature, great element of intellect, egoism &c., evolve themselves into an organism should be asked the following question:—What is to be understood by the term "evolution"? If it means

the real transformation of the cause into effect *e. g.* milk turning into curdle, gold into ear-ornament, the further point to be considered is:– Whether this transformation is produced or not? If it be replied that it is produced, the opponent relies upon the theory of the effect non-existent before its birth, which is engulfed by faults already noted. If the reply be in the negative, the opponent cannot explain the propriety of expression such as " a thing is produced and destroyed ". The opponent retorts:—that such is not the case. The Vedântin does not understand the theory of the existent effect. The advocate of that theory does not admit production or destruction of objects. He understands by the words " production " and " destruction " merely the manifestation and disappearance of an object in the causal substance, But this position also requires elucidation. The Vedântin asks:—Is this manifestation existent or non-existent before the operation of the cause? If the first alternative is admitted the operation of the cause is meaningless, for nothing more is to be attained by that operation (the manifestation of the effect being already existent). If the second alternative is adopted the position reverts to that of the advocate of the theory of the non-existent effect. If the opponent explains that the operation of the cause is needed for the manifestation of the effect the position is not in the least improved, because the dilemma:—Is the manifestation

existent or non-existent–remains still in full force. Again the opponent explains away the difficulty by saying that the operation of the cause is essential in asmuch as it imparts present existence to the effect by removing the element of non-being therefrom just as the element of real gold mixed up with metallic ore of copper &c., is revealed in its pure form by the removal of blackness &c., by means of heat. In reply it is stated that the being and non-being taken in the sense of the present and past existences cannot inhere in one and the same object at the same time they being contradictory. Nor can the contradiction be set aside by saying that being and non–being are separate properties existing in one and the same substance, because even properties which lead to the inherence of contradictory substances cannot co-exist in one and the same object. To say that these properties of being and non-being do not flow from contradictory substances but follow from other properties there would be palpable confusion adinfinitum[2].

The opponent again retorts:—Manifestation means developed Sattva while disappearance means developed Tamas. Thus at the time of the operation of the cause although Tamas or the element of darkness exists in the substance. the revealing of the effect is not prevented by it, like a stone which bars the spreading of heat when put in fron of fire. The operation of

the cause is thus only an accelerating circumstance in the manifestation of the effect and not a productive factor. There is thus not the slightest fault in the Sânkhya theory of existent effect.

To this the Vedântin replies by a categorical "No" and proceeds to describe how the doctrine of evolution is opposed to the teaching of the Veda and argument.

The Vedic text describing creation runs thus:—

'From that self ether was produced from ether air, from air light, from light water and from water earth were generated (Taittirîya Up. VI. II. 1). Now if we hold that the text teaches evolution, how can ether, which had different characteristic from self, be the evolute of nature? In the same way how can the subsequent elements which have different characteristics from the elements just preceding them be the evolutes of the preceding ones *i. e.* how can air be evolved from ether differently constituted; light evolved from air of different constitution; water from light and so forth? Pot, jar &c are not seen essentially different in kind from earth from which they are evolved. Now if we admit that the evolutes should be of the same class as the causal substance, there would be confusion of classes and the division of elements would not be possible and the result might be that

fire might turn out to be neither hot nor cold, earth might turn out to be cold. The abandoning of milk might lead to the abandoning of curdle (there being no essential difference on the assumed hypothesis between the cause and effect), and the effect of such a hypothesis would be the reversal of the science of ethics (which is based on essential difference of objects and their properties). Thus the doctrine of existent effect cannot stand the test of examination. Let us then have the doctrine of creation[3].—(based upon the theory of production of a non-existent effect) which stands to reason as shown below:—

Self,* ether &c are incapable of transformation. But the fact is that a substance, the minute particles of which remaining together and nourished by it (*i. e.* the substance) produce an effect, is said to be the substantial cause which is a kind of efficient cause. The material causes are the respective minute particles only and not the whole causal substance[4]. Thus there is no confusion in elements, there being variety of classes. The theory of evolution does not stand to reason, but the sister theory of creation is sustainable.

To this the Vedântin replies that the arguer is under delusion. The theory of creation has already been refuted. It follows that neither an existent nor non-existent effect is generated.,

* Vide Vijñânabhikshu on Brahma Sûtra page 33, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series.

but the universe including ether &c being indescribable has a phenomenal existence. The argument would stand thus:—The world is phenomenal, because it has a beginning, although its beginning is not explicable on the doctrines of evolution and creation, respectively admitted by the Sânkhyas, and Vais'eshikas *e. g.* the silver appearing in a mother o',-pearl. This is just what is summarized by the author of the VedântaMuktâvali in the following couplets. "Just as an existent object is not produced, so a non-existent object is not generated and yet the very appearance or beginning of a thing, which goes by the name of effect, proves its phenomenal character."

By this line of argument we show that the prattling by way of justifying the Sânkha theory of evolution made by Vijnanabhikshu, the commentator of the Sânkhya aphorisms, is irrelevant. The position of Vijnanabhikshu is briefly as under:—

"Now those who are keen in refuting the doctrine of existent effect should be asked:—whether the manifestation of the effect is understood as the cognition of effect or something else? The first alternatve is vitiated by the fact that the refuter does not properly understand the Sânkhya theory. His holiness Kapila does not say that the cognition is a determining factor of an effect like stick wheel &c. To say so would show that the man is deluded, because

the position is vitiated by the anomaly that even in the absence of stick &c the effect is cognised by the senses. Then remains the second alternative The manifestation according to the other alternative is thus described by the Sânkhya. All objects have two conditions:—One is its prospective condition and the other its present condition. The prospective condition is prior to the operation of the cause, while the present condition is posterior to that operation. The causal operation brings about the present condition of an object or effect. It is futile to question the propriety of that condition by raising the dilemma as to whether it is existent or non-existent, because that condition is admitted to be both existent and non-existent. One should not point out contradiction in this position because from different stand-points existence and non-existence are predicated of an object. It is non existent from the prospective stand-point; it is existent from the present manifested stand-point. Existence is simply a relation of time. The absence of such a temporal relation is called non-existence."[5]

The above justification of the Sânkhya theory by Vijnânabhikshu originating from his imagination is thus fully refuted by us. Just as the simultaneous being and non-being of an *object* is justified from two different standpoints of its prospective and present conditions, so the existence and non-existence of different *properties* also will have to be based on the assumption of other

properties the latter properties will also require some other properties to justify their existence and non-existence, and thus there would be palpable instability of argument. Again the existence of a property flowing from its very nature is difficult to describe, because it is absurd to suppose relationship of a thing with itself. Consequently the existence of a property based upon relation originates from the being of another property based upon another relation and thus there is confusion adinfinitum of relation also. It follows from this line of argument that it is difficult to describe existence and non-existence of different properties and a *fortiori* it is much more difficult to describe the existence and non-existence of the conditions based upon a variety of properties. It is enough for the present to argue with an opponent unfit to argue with. The matter will be discussed at length in the third chapter while refuting the doctrine of a thinker who holds simultaneous difference and non-difference of objects, and we therefore close the argument here.[6]

Again assuming the Sânkhya theory of evolution as based upon Existent effect, the opponent's doctrine is unsustainable. To proceed with the examination:—Is Pradhâna (*i. e.* primeval matter from which the world is evolved usually rendered as nature) devoid of parts like ether &c or is it possessed of parts like air &c? It cannot be the first, for there would be impossibility of evolution. The opponent should

not retort by saying:—how is the transformation of the Vedântic impartite Brahman into the world possible? Because the Vedântin admits the world (not as actual transformation of Brahman but) as a mere appearance of Brahman according to the method to be described hereafter. The other alternative is not possible. Because the Pradhâna would be destructible on account of its possessing parts. Again the assumption of such a destructible primeval matter is opposed to the Vedic text which declares that Nature to be *unborn*, one, and red, white and black in in its essence (श्वे. श्व. उ. iv. 5). Again is the whole of the Pradhâna evolved into the world or is only a part thereof turns into the world? On the first alternative, the Pradhâna will have have to be regarded as impermanent; on the other, there will be the absurdity of a part in a substance which is impartite.

Moreover does the Pradhâna transform itself into the great element of intellect and the subsequent evolutes, under the guidance of an intelligent principle or does it do so independently? On the second alternative, the Pradhâna being non-sentient cannot properly bring about an orderly creation of the world. The argument on this point is embodied in the aphorism:—"Pradhâna cannot be the cause of the world, because the Veda declares the cause to be sentient while Pradhâna is not such" (B. S. l. i. 5). On the first alternative it is further enquired:—

Does that intelligent principle (*a*) alone undergo change, or (*b*) does the dead element of Pradhâna alone evolve into the world or (*c*) does the Pradhâna in its association with the intelligent principle transform itself into the world? It cannot be the first (*a*) because that assumption would contradict the teaching of the Veda and Smṛitis as also reason, the intelligent principle being changeless and permanent. It cannot be the second (*b*) for that view has already been shown as defective. It cannot be the third (*c*) (as will be presently shown). Does that association of Pradhâna with a sentient principle refer to its connection with the individual soul or with God? The first view is untenable, because the creation &c of the world cannot be explained by association of Pardhâna with a sentient principle of limited knowledge. The second view is likewise unsatisfactory for the opponent does not admit the existence of God. If it be argued that (although Kapila does not admit the existence of God) the view that Pradhâna in its association with God evolves itself into the world beginning with the great element of intellect, is tenable on the Sânkhya theory of Patañjali which admits of God, it is replied that the difficulty is not solved. It is enquired:—What is to be understood by the Prakṛiti or Pradhâna; Does it mean Mâyâ or something else than Mâyâ and God? The last alternative is not possible for such a third element is not known. The first alternative would make the follower of Sânkhya theory join hands

with the Vadântin, as that is the desired theory of the latter, the Vedic text declaring that Prakṛiti is the Mâyâ and God is the possessor of Mâyâ. (श्वे. श्व. उ. iv. 10.)

Again is this Prakṛiti identified with Mâyâ existent like God, or is it non-existent like the horn of a man, or is it indescribable. It cannot be the first, for such an assumption would oppose the Veda which teaches non-dualism as will be shown hereafter. It cannot be the second, because a non-existent principle cannot be the subject-matter of proof. To say that it is both existent and non-existent is a contradiction in terms. It cannot be the third, because by admitting it to be such as cannot be described either as existent or as non-existent, the opponent unconsciously enters into the theory of non-dualism (advocated by the Vedântin).

It is further questioned:—Is God's association with nature based upon (*a*) conjunction or (*b*) on intimate relation or (*c*) on identity or (*d*) on a fictitious relationship? It cannot be the first (*a*) because conjunction requiries intimate relation and the latter has already been refuted while upsetting the theory of diads. The same refutation precludes us from assuming the second alternative (*b*). The third view (*c*) is also untenable, for a further question is put to the opponent:—Does that identity admit of difference in itself or is it the same as non-dualism? The first kind of identity has been refuted by

the same argument as refutes intimate relation. The second kind of identity implies that there is no Prakriti apart from God. The assumption of the fourth alternative (*d*) would lead the opponent to adopt the non-dualistic theory of the Vedântin. Again It is enquired :—Does the series of transformations in the reverse order exist at the time of universal destruction or not? It cannot be the first, for such an assumption would contradict the definition of universal destruction *viz* the state of equilibrium of the primeval matter with its three-fold constituents is called the state of Universal Destruction. The second alternative is not possible because there would be no rule as to when the primeval matter would evolve itself into other elements and when not. The opponent contends :—just as grass &c of their own accord turn into milk on one occasion (*e. g.* when eaten by a cow) and do not assume that form on another, so the primeval matter may occasionly evolve into the world, and may at sometimes relapse to its original form. The Vedântin replies in the negative, for even in the instance referred to the grass necessarily requires its connection with the stomach of a cow &c before it turns into milk. grass eaten by the bullock &c does not turn into milk. The opponent again retorts :—just as a lame man directs a blind man, or just as a loadstone attracts iron, so the intelligent soul although devoid of causal activity, propels nature devoid of intelligence. The reply is in the negative, for

even a lame man requires the power of speech to direct the blind, and the loadstone needs proximity before it attracts iron.

The soul, however, has no means like speech &c. If it be argued that by his mere presence he moves the nature, he would be an eternal source of activity, his presence being ever existent[7]. Nature cannot be said to undergo the change of its own accord, because there is no object for its doing so. The experience of pleasure and pain by soul cannot be put forth as the object of Nature's activity, for according to the opponent's theory, soul is regarded to be as stainless as a leaf of lotus (which does not retain the trace of water even if the latter touches it). Nor can the super-imposition of experience on soul be possible, the opponent not accepting either of the two theories of knowledge *viz.*, the theory of perverse knowledge and the theory of indescribable appearance[8].

The opponent retorts :—Although soul is incapable of retaining any trace of sensuous experience, he can be regarded as an experiencer in consequence of his not being discriminated from intellect-the abode of the notions of doer &c. When this discrimination is achieved, there is possibility of absolution on account of the annihilation of the notion of doer and enjoyer. The Vedântin replies that the explanation is not satisfactory, the term indiscrimination having no definite meaning in the opponent's doctrine,

To take up the subject:—Does that indiscrimination mean (*a*) absence of discrimination or (*b*) something other than discrimination or (*c*) something opposed to discrimination. It cannot be the first (*a*) because the negation is not admitted as capable of producing a possitive effect[9]. It cannot be the second (*b*) because a pot, for instance, which is other than discrimination is not the cause of sensuous attachment consisting of the notion of doer and enjoyer. According to the third view indiscrimination is the same as the positive nescience. The opponent then enters the Vedântin's field by admitting the theory of Mâyâ. It has been rightly said that if the sensuous attachment is due necessarily to indiscrimination, the foolish follower of Sânkhya theory has per force to admit the doctrine of Mâyâ.

Again we do not see any proof for taking the discrimination of nature from soul (according to the Sânkhyas) or the differentiation of objects into six or sixteeen categories (according to the Vais'eshikas and Naiyâyikas) as a means of absolution. Because it is only the Veda which enlightens us as to the proper means for achieving a supernatural end. It should not be argued that the words of Kaṇâda Kapila &c are the requisite proofs in this connection like the words of Manu. Because the works of Kaṇâda and Kapila are based upon reason, and as such cannot have as much evidential value as the Veda. If those works have the same value, any principle may be proved by mere nomenclature and

there will be no trouble for defining and examining the tenets of these sages. The Veda on the contrary maintains that the knowledge of Brahman alone and not the discrimination or differentiation referred to is the means of absolution *e. g.*, "those who know that Brahman become immortal; those who do not know it are involved in misery (Brihadâraṇyaka Upanishad IV. 4. 14.) He who sees difference dies again and again (after taking various births) (Brihadâraṇyaka Upanishad IV. 4. 19.)"

It is again enquired:—What kind of knowledge is the means of absolution? Is it in the general form or is it the knowledge of speciality of every object? If the first alternative is adopted, then all have got that knowledge in the generic form of knowability of objects. On the second alternative even God Brahmâ cannot attain the knowledge of Universal objects each with its special form, such objects being infinite. If it be argued that the cause of absolution is the knowledge of objects in the form of this classification as substance &c., it is replied that such a knowledge is possible to attain by that text declaring that classification; and thus the further description of substance as earth &c., would be purposeless. The same objection applies to the discrimination of nature from soul advocated by the Sânkhyas. Because such a generic knowledge of the difference between matter and spirit is easy to attain, and the dif-

ficulty of attaining knowledge of each object in its special characteristic is so clear that the position would be equally improper as that of the Vais'eshikas just alluded to. The opponent cannot meet the argument by saying that the knowledge of the real nature of soul is the cause of absolution. Because according to the doctrine of the Naiyâyikas the knowledge:—I am, because I know myself (cogito ergo sum) is possessed by every body. This knowledge cannot be regarded as indirect or a delusion. (Thus there would be no necessity for propounding a knowledge of soul by the Naiyâyikas for achieving absolution). If it be argued :—"although this ordinary knowledge of the soul is direct and true piece of knowledge, it does not repel the false knowledge on account of its being subject to the latent impressions of false knowledge. But that other knowledge of the soul produced by the ripeness of hearing the Vedic text &c following the differentiation of the various categories is capable of removing false knowledge along with its impressions". To this it is replied that the argument is unsustainable. Because this knowledge of the soul also, which is as true and direct as the ordinary knowledge referred to, cannot escape the incapacity of removing impressions attached to the former one. There is no proof to show that the latter knowledge has a different character from the former. We stop here because we intend to discuss the matter in detail in the third chapter where we are going to refute the Naiyâyika's conception of absolution.

With regard to the followers of Prabhâkara who do not admit the existence of delusion as they assume that it is not a species of knowledge, the propriety of correct knowledge has no scope. If it be argued by the followers of Prabhâkara that in accordance with the Vedic text–the works of the knower of Brahman are destroyed–knowledge results in the destruction of actions, it is replied that on the opponent's hypothesis the true knowledge of the soul being ever present the actions should be destroyed without any special effort. There is a greater meaning in this reply to the followers of Prabhâkara, because he is precluded from saying that there is even the slightest difference in the knowledges of the soul (as was assumed by his Naiyâyika brother whose view has been refuted in the previous paragraph), inasmuch as he does not admit the existence of common characteristic in properties. It should not be argued that the knowledge which has been nourished by continence, control of the external and internal senses &c, which results in the absense of retrogressive births in the world, and which is enjoined by the Veda, is capable of annihilating actions. Because knowledge cannot be the subject–matter of injunction, it being not possible to do, undo or to turn it otherwise (according to the knower's will). Again assuming that it

can be enjoined, it should be stated what kind of knowledge is enjoined. Is it the knowledge relating to the soul possessed of intellect &c or to the soul in its absolute character? On the first alternative, this knowledge does not differ from the ordinary knowledge of the soul in his migrating condition; besides we are going to show that the tenets of the Indian logician *viz*, that the soul and intellect are related as substance and property and that there are numerous souls,—are opposed to the teaching of the the Veda, reason and experience. On the other alternative, the true knowledge of the soul, which is the cause of absolution, has reference to the pure Self. It follows therefore that such knowledge implies the absence of innate difference as also of the difference based upon the same and different classes, and thus the opponent unconsciously enters the field of the Vedântin[10]. We shall show further on how perception &c are not opposed to the Vedânta theory. The Vedic text quoted in support of the opponent's theory that knowledge destroys actions means that actions are destroyed in consequence of the sublation by right knowledge of false knowledge which is the cause of action. It does not mean that knowledge and action are directly opposed. We stop here so far as the theory of Prabhâkara is concerned.

With regard to the doctrines of Kapila and Patañjali it may be noted that both these phi-

losophers regard soul as ever inferable. It cannot therefore become the object of direct knowledge. Indirect knowledge cannot be put forth as a means of absolution, for such a knowledge already exists according to the opposite theory. It should not be argued that although soul is in essence indirectly cognizable, its direct knowledge is possible by the efficacy of merit derived from the practice of meditation. Because the merit derived from the meditation enhances the efficacy of the senses in accordance with the power of the object, (but not in contravention of it). Bhatta has rightly said:—"Where an enhanced degree of perception of remote and minute objects is found the same does not go beyond the essence of the object; the excess of power derived cannot turn an object of visual perception into an object of auditory perception".

The knowledge of the difference between nature and spirit being thus difficult to establish, the absolution based upon it is not proved. Again the object of the activity of nature is not established. Nature therefore cannot be said as turning into great element of intellect &c.

The above refutation includes the refutation of the other position of the Sânkhya, to wit, the soul although essentially pure or absolute, achieves absolution when there is absolute and permanent sublation of three kinds of pain following from the cessation of Nature's activity for the enjoyment of its corresponding soul, in

asmuch as Nature's activity becomes purposeless with regard to that soul when the indiscrimination which has no beginning is annihilated by the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Spirit. The position is again opposed to the teaching of the great Upanishad text—"That art thou"—which will be propounded in the fourth chapter.

Now let us turn to the general refutation of the Sânkhya theory. If the Sânkhya argues:—just as water which is non-sentient flows towards a low level of its own accord so nature will evolve itself into the world without the assistance of an intelligent help-mate. It is replied that the opponent is deluded. In water &c the presence of an immanent deity is proved by the Veda, for a Vedic text declares:—

"Oh Gârgî, the sun and the moon are held in control by that Indestructible principle; the same is the case with heaven and earth; Oh Gârgî, a man, who leaves this world after knowing that Indestructible principle, is the real Brâhmin; he who leaves the world without knowing it is a miser, or a worthless creature". Again the text of the Antaryâmi Brâhmaṇa (a chapter of the Brihadâraṇyka Upanishad treating of immanent deity) proceeds to say:—

"That is the immanent and immortal soul "who resides in earth, water, light, air, ether, "vital air, speech, eyes, ears, mind, skin, intellect,

"and semen, who is inside the egos of earth &c "and who is not known by presiding deities of "earth &c. He is a seer although himself un-"seen. He is the hearer although unheard; the "thinker although unthought of; and the knower "although unknown. He is such because there "is no seer apart from him, no hearer apart "from him; and no thinker and knower apart "from him. Anything else is worthless."

Again what the opponent has previously stated-that all objects are of three-fold character, namely pleasant, painful and indifferent, on the principle of Padmâvati* is fallacious. Because if all objects were essentially pleasant &c they should appear to be so to all individuals alike (but it is not so). Again even in the presence of an object we experience that pleasure is destroyed or created anew, (which experience cannot be justified on the opponent's hypothesis of essential threefold character of every object).

The opponent retorts:—Even in the theory of Vedânta if Mâyâ were admitted as evolving into the world under the intelligent guidance of the Thought of Brahman, one should point out another thought as the producer of the primeval thought of Brahman which in itself is a modification of Mâyâ and thus there would be confusion *adinfinitum;* if the mere presence of Brahman is to be construed as a guide of Mâyâ,

* Vide note No. 1 on this Section.

there should be perpetual evolution. It is replied that the objection is inapplicable. Because the modification in the form of Brahman's thought and the absence of any necessity for the gnidance of another thought for propelling the former thought are both declared by the Veda in the texts :—(*a*) "Oh good Sir, the principle of Being existed prior to creation in its unique and secondless character". and (*b*) "He thought that he should be multiform and should generate". The gist of the texts is that the thought of Brahman referred to is a peculiar modification; and that the fact that Brahman thought that it should be many at a certain point of time implies that God is independent of Mâyâ. The objections have therefore no scope. There is another reason why the Vedântic Theory is faultless and it is that the power of God or Brahman has a limited scope for its operation *i. e.* the whole region of Brahman is not transformed into the world, but only a part thereof-so to say manifests itself as the world. As a matter of fact, however, reason has no scope in the Vedic doctrine of creation as an indescribable manifestation of Brahman, it being not the proper subject of argument, but a fact revealed by the scripture. A Vedic text declares that this knowledge is not attained by reason (Kathopanishad 1. ii. 9). Nature or dead principle of the Sânkhyas cannot be excluded from the critical examinition by reason. If the Sânkhya holds that the Vedântic Mâyâ, the Thought operating on it

and Hiraṇyagarbha or Demiurgus, are what the Sânkhya calls Pradhâna or nature, Mahat or the great element of intellect, and Ahankâra or the element of egoism respectively, the independece of Pradhâna cannot be established for the opponent does not admit the essential spiritual link of an intelligent being in the so called thought moving nature as in the sister theory of Vedânta. Again the Sânkhya theory that the creation of objective elements of earth &c is subsequent to the creation of subjective elements of egoism is opposed to the Vedic cosmogony to be described hereafter. The doctrine of non-duality to which the Sânkhya theory is opposed is based upon the Veda as well as Smṛiti as shewn below and therefore holds its own. The Veda declares :—

"There is only one God immanent in all "beings, all pervading, and the inner soul of all "individuals" (S'vestâs'vatara VI ii). Manu also declares in his Smṛiti :—

"The worshipper of Self equally seeing his "soul in all beings and all beings in his sou. "obtains sovereignty (Manu XII 21)".

Again the opponent should not argue the superiority of Kapila (the author of Sânkhya system) on the strength of the following Vedic text declaring the greatness of that sage :—

"One should see God who created the sage Kapila at the commencement of the world and who filled him with knowledge". (S. S. V. 2)

Because another text declares that what Manu has taught is the real medicine. It follows that the Smṛiti of Manu &c are reliable. Although the teaching of Kapila Smṛiti is opposed to the teaching of express Vedic texts described hereafter and hence there is no necessity to refute Kapila's doctrine, yet when the opponent turns round on the strength of Smṛiti we have attempted to refute the point by a like Sm iti of of Manu of superior origin.

The opponent now retorts:—Let the Smṛiti of Kapila be unreliable. The Smṛiti of Patañjali called Yoga system cannot be thrown aside because the Vedic texts of the following nature declare the necessity of Yoga or meditation with its eight stages:—"That is the highest end of life in which the five senses coupled with mind become stable and the intellect does not move to and fro. This firm fixity of the senses is called meditation" (Kâthaka VI. 10-11).

"One should contemplate the god-head by keeping his body straight, the head, spine and hips coming in one line" (श्वे. श्व. II. 8.)

It is stated in reply that the Vedântin admits that the Veda teaches Yoga. But the point is that sages like Kapila and Patañjali have recapitulated the theory of the evolution of nature or Pradhâna based upon the fallacious reasoning of the opposite view which is held by people from times immemorial, with a view to establish Yoga or meditation necessary for the

realisation of Brahman which is the object to be attained. Their aim is not to *prove* the theory of Nature's evolution. (The theory, in other words, is resorted to by these sages to base the doctrine of Yoga which has sanction in the Veda). In the same way the systems of Nyâya, Mîmânsa &c are intended by the respective sages for basing the ground-work for those tenets of the opposite doctrine which are acceptable by the non-dualistic system of Vedânta; and not for establishing real opposite doctrines.

It is now argued by the opponent:—Let the discrimination between nature and spirit be not valid it being difficult to establish it. But the same kind of invalidity attaches to the power of Mâyâ residing in the second-less Brahman because Mâyâ is regarded as indescribable. To discuss the point at length, is your Mâyâ (*a*) identical with the noumenon or substratum; (*b*) is it a phenomenon or an effect; (*c*) is it different from both noumenon and phenomenon? It cannot be (*a*) because there is not instance to prove it. The burning power of fire is not the same as fire, because when an impediment is put the burning power is sublated although fire persists. It cannot be (*b*) because an effect being non-existent before its birth, Mâyâ would turn out to be non-existent. On the third alternative (*c*) is that Mâyâ existent or non existent? If existent, the non-dualistic doctrine

falls to the ground, if non-existent we shall not be able to establish the cause of the universe, Mâyâ, the proposed cause, being nil.

Again, the opponent proceeds, is their any proof of Mâyâ? If there is a proof is it (*a*) perception, (*b*) inference, (*c*) comparison, (*d*) scripture (*e*) implication or (*f*) non-appearance? It cannot be perception, because Mâyâ being beyond the operation of senses cannot be the object of direct knowledge, just as the group of senses themselves admitted by all is not amenable to perception. Mâyâ cannot be inferred, because it being indescribable the knowledge of concomitance between the middle and major terms requisite for deduction cannot arise. Mâyâ cannot be proved by word or scripture, for there is no class characteristic, property, action or relation in Mâyâ by which we can ascertain its existence by the force of word. Implication also cannot establish Mâyâ, because there is no object in the world which cannot be explained even in the absence of Mâyâ. Non-appearance finally cannot prove Mâyâ because Mâyâ is not a mere negation according to Vedânta. It cannot be said that Mâyâ requires no proof for its establishment. Because an object which is beyond the operation of all proofs is necessarily an unreal or absurd object.

It is replied to the above argument that just as the burning power of fire is distinct from its effect such as scalding as well as from the cause *viz.*, fire and yet indescribable and just as the power of clay to turn into a pot is distinct from the effect *viz.*, a pot in the form of a pitcher, as also from the cause *viz.*, clay, and yet indescribable. So the power of Mâyâ inferred by the inexplicability of effects on any other assumption is distinct from cause and effect and yet indescribable as existent or non-existent. Thus there is no scope for the above objections.

It has been said in this connection :—

"This power of manifestation or production "is different both from the substratum and the "product. The burn (effect) and an ember "(cause) for instance are *visible*, while the power "of burning is *inferred*. Again a jar with a "broad bottom and bulging form in the middle "is a product; clay possessed of five-fold pro- "perties such as sound &c is the cause; while "the power is different in nature from both the "pot and clay. As in that power we neither "see the inherent clay as in the jar, nor the pro- "perties of sound &c as in the clay, it is said to "be unthinkable and such as cannot be difinitely "described".

Again His Holiness S'rikrishna has stated the existence of Mâyâ in the fourth chapter of the Bhagvadgîtâ :—

"Although I am unborn, and not subject to decay and although I am the Lord of beings I control my nature and become born by my own Mâyâ (Gita IV 6)".

The following are the comments on the passage :—

The Mâyâ with no beginning is the condition of the Lord. It is capable of satisfying the conditions of a cause of the eternal world, because it is present at all time. It operates under the Will of the Lord. It is said to be the form of the Lord because it is made up of exceedingly pure Sattva (*i. e.*, the pure element of threefold nature) Brahman in company of this Mâyâ is rightly called unborn, indestructible and omnipotent Lord. By this eternal body consisting of Mâyâ the Lord taught the doctrine of Yoga both to Vivasvat and to Arjuna. This point is described by the Vedict text which says that Brahman has Âkâs'â for its body. The word Âkâs'â in this text means the unevolved Mâyâ because this meaning is conveyed in texts like this :—

"Every thing is interwoven in Âkâs'â (*i.e.* the ultimate material cause of the universe). In Brahma-Sûtras also we find that "Âkâs'â" is taken not in the sense of material ether but as Brahman as qualified by Mâyâ. Vide aphorism:- "Âkâs'â is Brahman for we find attributes or signs which support that view" (B. S. 1. i. 22).

It might be argued that when God has no physical body (*i. e.* when Mâyâ alone is taken to be the body) how can there appear human forms &c in God, these forms being the aspects

of physical organism? To this the text of Gita *viz.*, "I become born by my own Mâyâ"—is a reply. It means that by this Mâyâ I *appear* as a human being &c for the welfare of the world, and not that I really assume a human body &c. In the chapter of the Mahâbhârata called Moksha Dharma this meaning is conveyed:-

"Oh Nârada", S'rikṛishṇa says, "what you see is this indescribable form or body generated by me; you are not able to see me accompanied with the properties of all elements".

The last words of the above text mean that Nârada cannot see the Lord in his aspect of primeval cause with his physical eye.

The interpretation we have put on the text of the Gîtâ referred to is supported by the opinion of S'ankara (in the introduction of the Gîtâ):—

"That Lord ever possessed of six divine "attributes consisting of knowledge, indepen- "dence, powers essential as well as auxiliary, "valour, and undaunted spirit with reference to "all objects, controls his all-prevading Mâyâ "with its three-fold character, the origin of all "beings, and appears doing good to the people "by assuming a body, as it were, through his Mâyâ "although essentially he is the unborn, indes- "tructible, ever-pure, ever conscious, and ever "free Lord of the Universe. He assumes this "apparent form of human body &c not for ac- "hieving his own end, but for favouring the "people".

Commentators on the Gîtâ say that God takes a phenomenal divine form created of his free Will, and that the opinion of Bhâs'yakâra S'aṅkara is that the eternal primeval causal condition possessed of infinite powers and called Mâyâ is the body of the Lord.

Others, however, do not regard the presence of body and its governing spirit with respect to God. They hold that the eternal all-pervading, perfect and unqualified homogeneous element of thought being and bliss namely the Supreme Being is body if you like to call it so; there is no other physical or phenomenal body of God.

If this view is to be adopted the text of the Gîtâ should be thus rendered:—

The Vedic texts:—"God is all prevading like ether and is eternal; this soul is indestructible, for decay is not his property"—show that God is essentially devoid of birth and death and illumines everything (Note:—This explains the words "unborn" and "not subject to decay" in the text of the Gîtâ referred to). Besides God is the Lord of everything, he being the substratum of Mâyâ the cause of the universe. Then the text says:—"I control by own nature" which means that he controls the essential nature of homogeneous thought beings and bliss The word "own" conveys that he controls his own self and not Mâyâ, because a vedic text says:—"Where does that Lord reside? It is replied "in his own greatness" (*i. e.*, the Vedic

text negatives the idea of Mâyâ as an associate of Brahman). The text of the Gîtâ thus means that God controlling his own self *i. e.*, remaining in his essential greatness, is born *i. e.*, acts like a being having a body even without the notions of body and soul. How can there appear in an element without body and consisting of homogeneous thought being and bliss, the presence of body as in S'rikṛishṇa? The text proceeds to say "by my own Mâyâ" *i. e.*, although I am devoid of all properties, pure and full of thought being and bliss, the appearance of body and spirit in the form of S'rikṛishṇa is purely phenomenal." It has been said:—"Know this Kṛishṇa to be the soul of all beings. He here appears possessed of body through his Mâyâ for the good of the world".

In the seventh chapter of the Gîtâ it is said:—This my divine Mâyâ possessed of threefold characters is, verily, difficult to ford. Those who resign themselves in me go beyond that Mâyâ" (Gita VII. 14).

In this text[12] "divine" means phenomenally superimposed both subjectively and objectively on the deity who is self-shining, intelligent, blissful, and homogeneous described in the Vedic text:—"There is one God concealed in all beings, all pervading and the inner soul of all" By the word "this" in the text of the Gîtâ just quoted is meant that the 'Mâyâ being cognized by the witnessing soul cannot be con-

troverted. The term " verily " in the text implies that the Mâyâ is proved by implication inasmuch as it becomes the material cause of the phenomena of the world.[15] The phrase " possessed of three-fold characters or properties " conveys the idea that Mâyâ consists of three elements of Sattva (fine matter exhibiting the phenomenon of knowledge), Rajas (Mediocre matter exhibiting the phenomenon of activity) and Tamas (base matter exhibiting the phenomenon of dullness). The Mâyâ being made up of these three properties ('गुण' in Sanscrit means both " property " and " thread ") is the cause of bondage as if it were a strong cord of these threads. The term "my" in the text implies that the Mâyâ belongs to God, represented by the speaker namely Srikṛishṇa, and that it being subject to his control gives rise to the creation &c of the world in consonance with His Will. The term " Mâyâ " in the text means ignorance which is the origin of the whole world and which is possessed of two powers namely (1) that of enveloping exhibited by its preventing the true nature of Brahman from being cognized and (2) that of projecting exhibited by its giving rise to the appearance of non-Brahman. This meaning of Mâyâ as the material cause of the world is conveyed in the Vedic text :—" Mâyâ should be known as nature or the material cause of the world; while Mâyin (possessor of Mâyâ) should be known as the great Lord. "

The clause " those who resign themselves in me " in the text of the Gîtâ means :—those who resort to the Lord, devoid of all conditions, in his character as the homogeneous element of Thought, Being and Bliss ; in other words it means those who contemplate or touch that element with that modification of mind which arises out of hearing the Vedic text declaring the identity of the individual with the Supreme Being, which assumes the form of intuitive consciousness devoid of all difference, and which essentially contradicts Ignorance and its products. The demonstrative pronoun " those " in the above clause shows that such persons who possess the qualification of devoted contemplation of the Deity whatever may be the class or creed to which they belong, are competent to transgress the power of Mâyâ. By the term "that" in the concluding portion of the text is meant that Mâyâ the origin of all evil is ordinarily difficult to transgress. The phrase " go beyond " means " transgress. " Such in brief is the exposition of the text of the Gîtâ.

As regards the Vedic texts it may be noted that we shall quote them while establishing that Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the world. To conclude then there is no scope for raising a doubt with regard to the proof of Mâyâ inasmuch as it is proved by the Veda, Smṛiti, inference and other means of right knowledge.

Section V.

Eclectic view of the orthodox systems.

It is argued by the opponent:—According to your line of argument all the systems of philosophy which propound the doctrine of duality have no scope. Such a conclusion is not admissible, because the authors of these systems were great seers of truths of all time.

To this it is replied that the objection is raised because the opponent does not understand the real intentions of the various sages. The doctrines of all these sages propounding various systems have their ultimate purport in the doctrine of appearances and consequently in the secondless God-head taught by the Upanishads. It cannot be said that those sages were deluded because we admit that they were omniscient. To assume that they were deluded will not leave any alternative but to admit that all sages were deluded which is absurd. The truth is that these sages knowing that people with outward mental propensities would not be easily able to grasp the doctrine of non-duality wherein the highest end of life is centred, propounded different schools of philosophy for the refutationof heteredox systems which discard the Vedic testimony, and not for laying down their various doctrines as final truths. This view is suggested by the eminent Sânkhya sage of antiquity namely Vyâsa in the fourth chapter of his Bhâshya on the Yoga sûtras of Patañjali.

"The final form of the three elements constituting nature is not amenable to perception. Whatever is perceived is verily phenomenal and hence unreal." (Yoga sûtra IV. 13)[1]

Again it has been said:—"the world is first "put forth as a possible entity by the doctrines "of creation and evolution by Kaṇâda and "Kapila, and then it is proved to be unreal by "argument."

Even revered sage Gautama in his Nyâya system takes this consistent view of the various systems culminating in the Vedântic doctrine of Mâyâ. His abhorisms are:—

"This consciousness of proofs and objects "of proofs is explicable like the consciousness of "objects in a dream (N. S. iv. 31).

or

"it may be possible even without the exis-"tence of real objects like a phantom, an "appearance of a city in heavens at the time of "sunset, and the phenomenon of mirage." (N. S. IV. ii. 32).

This system of Nyâya has a protective value like a hedge of thorns; the truth lies in the system of Bâdarâyaṇa.[2]

The Bhâshyakara on Sânkhya Sûtras, namely Vijñânabhikshu, also, quotes the following verses:—

"People who have full faith in the Veda "alone should discard those elements of the

" Nyâya, Vais'eshika, Sânkhya and Yoga systems " propounded by Gautama, Kaṇâda, Kapila and " Patañjali respectively, which are opposed to " the teaching of the Veda. In the systems of " Jaimini and Vyâsa there is no element going " against the teaching of the Veda, because these " sages have resorted to the Veda itself for " studying its teaching and have gone over the " whole of the Vedic literature."[3]—; and adds that these texts from the Parâs'ara Upapurâṇa &c show that the system of Vedânta is paramount in establishing the existence of the Supreme Being; and that the system of Sânkhya although subject to criticism in so far as it denies the existence of God, is not to be regarded as an unreliable piece of evidence, because it has full scope in proving its main object *viz* the achievment of the chief end of life (*i. e.* absolution) and its means namely the discrimination between nature and spirit. The principle of reasoning is that a text is to be taken in the sense wherein its purport lies :—The phenomenality of the world is declared in the ninety sixth verse of first chapter of the Nârada Pâncharâtra where the identity of the individual with the Supreme Being is established :—

" This world is verily illusory; and I am " the real secondless Brahman. The texts of " the Upanishad, the word of the teacher, and " one's own experience are the proofs of the " above principles."

Even Bhatta in his Mimâñsa Vârtika in the chapter relating to argument tells us :—

" Thus the author of the Mimâñsa Bhâshya desirous of refuting the athæst has argumentatively declared the existence of soul. The establishment of that truth and the realisation of it are achieved by the study of the Upanishads."

The soul referred to in the above text is the absolute Brahman and none else. Although the final truth is that every thing is Brahman its teaching to a man unduly attached to action, is undesirable, for S'rikrishṇa says :—" The mental equilibrium of person attached to action should not be disturbed. "

His Holiness Vasishtha likewise advises :—

" Whoever teaches that every thing is Brahman to a totally dull as also to a half intelligent person takes the risk of throwing that person into the meshes of great evil. "

Again the sages like Gautama &c, are declared by the Veda to be the revealers of their respective systems of philosophy and not as the actual and deliberate authors. It has been said:—" All the teachers from Brahmâ to sages downwards are the revealers of the truths and not their creators.[4] This point is touched in the Nyâya Bhâshya where it is said :—" The system of logic which was revealed to the sage Gautama the best of teachers is here commented on by

Vâtsâyana." The Veda itself declares:—"The Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Sâmaveda, the Atharva Veda, Itihâsa or stories of past incidents narrated in the Veda; Purâṇa or mythological stories in the Veda; variety of lores; verses embodying epigrammatic truths; aphorisms; commentories of texts; and gloss thereon all these are, as it were, the breath of that great being Brahman."

As the sages are the persons to whom the truths of the veda are revealed and not that they invented the truths, Vâchaspatimis'ra who is not an advocate of a particular system but an independent thinker quotes in his commentory on the Bhâshya on Brahma Sûtras called Bhamatî the following couplet embodying the pith of the Bhâshya on the aphorism:—(If it be said that in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there would result non release" (B. S. II. i. 11):—

"A principle carefully declared by clever thinkers is reversed by more clever arguers."

The author of the Vârtikas has also said:—

"Things which are unthinkable should not be subjected to the test of reasoning, because a deep truth is not apprehended by ill founded reasoning."

What falls within the realm of the unthinkable is described in the Vâyu Purâṇa as under:—

"Every thing beyond the cosmic matter should be regarded as unthinkable."

The opponent argues;—Is every kind of reasoning ill founded? If so, the reasoning which establishes the ill-foundedness of deduction being in itself ill founded cannot prove the truth. To this objection it is replied that such is not the case. That reasoning which is not opposed to the teaching of the Veda and smṛiti is acceptable as a means of arriving at a right conclusion Yajñavalkya has accordingly stated:—

"There are fourteen stays on which Duty rests viz (1) Purâṇas, (2) Logic, (3) Mîmânsa or consideration of the vedic texts, (4) Smṛitis, (5–10) six subsidiary sciences of the veda (grammar, prosody, etymology, astronomy, liturgy and phonetics), (11–14) and the four Vedas." (Yajñavalkya Smṛiti I. 3)

If such a qualified use of reasoning is not enforced, the reasonings embodied in the materialistic school of philosophy taught by a venerable sage like Brihaspati would turn out to be acceptable. Manu discriminates between acceptable form of reasoning from the unacceptable when he says on the one hand.

"He knows the true nature of duty who establishes by reasoning unopposed to the veda the validity of the teaching of righteousness by sages; and none else." (Manu Smṛiti. XII. 156) and on the other:—

"One should not worship even by a word of mouth those who are hypocrites, who follow pursuits not assigned to them, who are rogues fol-

lowing the vow of cats (*i. e.* who perform, outward ceremonies and are inwardly imupre just as cats close their eyes as if sleeping and at once catch the rats when they are near them). who depend upon reasoning alone disregarding revelation ; and who pretend to be ascetics like cranes." Again in the Mahâbhárata a chapter known as Srigalagîtâ (so called because Indra taught the truth in the form of a jackal) occurs in which the unacceptability of mere reasoning is thus described:—

"As I was too much attached to the system of logic which is based upon deduction from experienced premisses and by which no end of life is achieved, the result is that I am born a jackal in this forest."

This subject is discussed at length in big works on Vedânta. To conclude, then, the doctrine of evolution cannot be established by the Sankhyas of both the thæstic and athæstic schools although they admit the existence of the effect prior to its appearance.

Section VI.

Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the world.

God is not merely an instrumental cause, but is both the material and instrumental cause, as is proved by the veda. The dual causality of God is proved by the intermediate element of Mâyâ, and consequently there is no necessity for

assuming Pradhâna (Material cause of the Sankhyas), or atoms (material cause of the Vais'eshikas). The vedic texts in support of the presence of the intervening element of Mâyâa are:—

God has neither hands not legs and yet, he catches everything and moves ; He has no eyes and yet sees ; He hears without ears ; He knows all the knowable and there is none who can know Him. Such a being is the ancient and primeval lord. He has neither effect nor instrument to bring about effects. His highest power is heard to be multiform. It is innate and presents itself in three forms of knowledge, prowess and activity." Again there are other texts:— (*a*) He appears to be multiform on account of Mâyâ which has a variety of forms". (*b*) "Know Mâyâ to be the material cause and God to be the possessor of Mâyâ." (*c*) " That possessor of Mâyâ creates the world." *(d)* " God becomes of various forms through his Mâyâ."

Apart from the above vedic texts the smriti also declares:—

" That Mâyâ capable of turning the impossible into possible presents the world, God, individual soul and their differences", in me who am pure undivided consciousness, devoid of all kinds of conditions and attributes and who am incomparable.

The texts in favour of the dual capacity of Brahman as material and efficient cause of the

world are numerous of which the following are typical :—

" Everything which is cognizable is verily Brahman. One should quietly contemplate the Deity from whom the world proceeds, in whom it stays and vanishes. Know that to be Brahman from which all these elements came forth ; by which they are sustained ; and in which they enter and disappear".

In the above texts although the terminations representing the ablative and instrumental cases[1]—have a general sense of causality, it follows by way of implication from the expression—" that Brahman is the substratum in which all the products disappear"-that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. Thus it is proved that Brahman is both the material cause and instrumental cause of the world.

By this line of argument the doctrine of Vaishṇava sect based upon the theory of difference and non-difference of cause and effect propounded by Bhatta Bhâskara, as also the doctrine of the Nyâya, Vais'eshika, Sânkhya, Patanjali (Yoga), and Pâs'upata (S'aiva) schools of philosophy admitting God to be the instrumental cause only is refuted. The gist of the latter view is briefly as under:—

A sentient element which governs the production of an effect, *e. g.* a potter in the production of a pot, is invariably seen to be the instrumental cause of that effect, and not the material cause, because one and the same element cannot be the governor and the governed. The syllogism would stand thus:—

" God is not the material cause of matter, because He is sentient *e. g.* a potter".

The word " matter " is used in the major term (*viz* " not the material cause of matter ") in order to avoid the fact of non-pervasion of the major term because a potter, an intelligent being, *is* actually the material cause of pleasure pain &c [2] The material or substantial cause is either the Pradhâna (the primeval matter of the Sânkhyas) or atoms.

The sense of the word " teacher " with the discussion of which the book commences cannot thus be ascertained on the Sânkhya theory of existent effect. If it be argued that by the word " teacher " we mean a phenomenal appearance of Brahman in an organized form, either physical or illusory assumed through affection towards the devoted on the theory of existent effect, it is replied that just as a man, who wishing to avoid the payment of toll-tax at night time takes a round about way and missing the road ultimately comes to the same tollbar at day break has to pay the toll so the above assumption is equivalent to the dilatory admission of the Vedantic position because everything appearing as distinct from Brahman is admitted by to be an illusion the nature of which will be described hereafter.

NOTES.

Chapter I Section I.

1. Lit:—

Through the smallest particle of whose grace.

2. What is meant in this technical phraseology is this:— The opponent who is a Naiyayika argues that a pot, for instance, was non-existent before its production. The non-existence of the pot preceding its production is called anterior non-existence or प्रागभाव and the pot itself is called counter—entity or प्रतियोगि. It is argued that by non-existence, pot is meant that the would-be pot is the counter-entity of the anterior non-existence, and not the totally non-existent thing like colour in air &c. In fact the anterior non-existence of a pot has a terminus while colour of air has neither beginning nor end, hence it would be a misnomer to say that the anterior non-existence of the colour of air has a counter-entity in that colour for the latter is never to come into being.

3. By invisible cause is meant merit or demerit of a being.

4. This is not a Vedic text but a hemistich of a Kârika of Gaudapâda on Mândukya Upanishad.

5. There is direct intimate relation (समवाय) between the soul and the merit or demerit. There is *indirect* intimate relation depending upon conjunction (संयुक्तसमवाय) between atoms and merit or demerit, for there is the soul intervening who has direct intimate relation with merit or demerit on the one hand, and a mere contract (संयोग) with attoms on the other. This direction should be borne in mind by the reader while reading the passage that follows.

6. *Viz* the intimate relation of the merit or demerit with the soul which has contact with atoms is not a permanent condition but an occasional stage.

7. The pith of the argument is as under:—

It is an admitted tenet of the Naiyâyikas that merit or demerit (अदृष्ट) has intimate relation (समवाय) with the soul. Such a merit or demerit could not explain the primeval motion in atoms giving rise to the universe. It was therefore proposed that merit or demerit as intimately connected wit atoms would explain the the primeval motion of nebulous matter. But here the original tenet came in the way which said that the intimate relation subsists between soul and merit or demerit. The Naiyâyika then resorted to the trik of *indirect* intimate relation by which merit or demerit bore intimate relatiou with atoms through the soul having a contact (संयुक्त) with atoms. It would thus be seen that the amended relation between the atoms and merit or demerit depended upon the conjunction between soul and atoms. Now soul is all-prevading. His conjunction with atoms is therefore and ever present factor. The indirect intimate relation between atoms and merit or demerit is thus a permanent factor which would lead to perpetual activity. If it be assumed that the contact (संयोग) of atoms with the soul is the result of the action in atoms and not of the all--parvadiug nature of the soul, the position is nothing but a begging of the question, for the every primeval motion in atoms is to be explained. Even supposing that such a contact would do, the result would be perpetual activity in atoms but no production of dyad &c which requires the cessation of the activity of monads for some time at least. The Naiyâyika then turns round and says that the indirect intimate relation is an occasional stage which would explain the production of dyad &c. The Vedântin replies that there would be logical interdependence. For it is only the अदृष्ट or merit or demerit which explains the occasional character of that relation, and we are led to assume that अदृष्ट on account of the occasional character itself. Thus अदृष्ट or merit or demerit either in direct intimate relation with atoms cannot explain the primeval motion in debulous matter.

8. The stock instance of such a partial conjunction is the connection between a monkey and a tree (वृक्षकपिसंयोग) Now if the monkey is on a branch, it cannot at the same time be in touch with the root. It follows therefore that in saying that a tree is in contact with a monkey we presume that in one part of the tree *e. g.*, root, the contact is totally absent. This is what is meant by the technical definition of partial conjunction (अव्याप्यवृत्तिसंयोग).

9. A triad or त्रुटि is a molecule resembling in size a particle of dust which is perceived only through the solar ray coming through an aperture. If the division of the world is not supposed to stop at triads each triad is said to be made of three diads each of which contains two monads. Each triad is therefore composed of six monads. The measure of a monad is called atomic (अणु or परिमण्डल); that of a dyad is called short or ह्रस्व ; that of triad is called great or महत् ; and that of a molecule consisting of four triads, and of higher combinations is called cubic or दीर्घ.

10. (*a*) The point is that if one generic conjunction becomes the cause of a particular effect like a jar, other forms of conjunctions inhering in the same material cause like clay cannot bring about other forms of earthen ware like a tray &c.

NOTES.

Chapter I, Section II.

1. The point is that if Intimate relation itself has no connection whatsoever with the related objects, there is no reason why it should join, for instance, cause and effect and not objects like the Himâlayas and the Vindhya mountains. Because the absence of connection of Intimate Relation with cause and effect on the one hand and the two mountains on the other is the same.

2. In my opinion the portion included within brackets

is an interpolation although Pandit Wâman Shastri includes it in the text. The passage is not found in the Ms. found in Bharatpura Kota respectively designated as ख and ग by the editor except the first sentence in the Kota Ms. It appears in the Kâshmîra Ms. (styled क) and hence seems to be an old one. But from its position in the text it appears that it is an explanatory note showing the possible alternative views about the essential nature of Intimate Relation. The text becomes clearer by the omission of this passage rather than by its retention. The subsequent portion commences with तथाहि, which words usually introduce the refutation of the objection which just precedes and which is parenthetically inserted between the words न and वाच्यम्. As the portion following " तथाहि " explains the fallacious nature of the objection preceding the bracketed portion and not the latter, it is evident that the latter is only an explanatory or marginal note erroneously incorporated in the body of the text by the writer of the MS.

3. The principle—" let the fool be pleased " is similar to what we call in English—" Let us assume it for argument's sake "—When an opponent persists in his position which is untenable, the position is admitted in order to please the foolish opponent and its weakness brought out by examination.

4 In the system of Kanâda the category of substance is divided into nine classes :-(1) Earth, (2) water, (3) light, (4) air, (5) ether, (6) time, (7) space, (8) self, and (9) mind. Out of these nine the first four are made up of atoms ; the four following are all-pervading ; while the last is atomic in size. Those substances are eternal which are either infinite or atomic. It follows therefore that the atoms of the first four and the last five substances are eternal in their nature. In order that each of these eternal substances may not be confounded with another, Kanâda admits

a category called विशेष which means an attribute peculiar to each eternal substance by which it is distinguished from the rest. Such an attribute and the substance in which it inheres are said to be intimately connected.

5. According to the doctrine of Vaiśeshikas a relation cannot be perceived until the whole of the objects between which it subsists is perceptible. Accordingly the contact between two pots, for instance, is perceptible because both the pots are wholly cognizable by sight. The conjunction, on the contrary, between a pot and ether is not perceptible because ether is not amenable to sight. As Samavâya or Intimate relation is a connection inhering in all the parts of the body upto atoms, and not a partial connection (अव्याप्यवृत्ति) like Saṁyoga or conjunction, the objects in which it inheres are not perceptible in *toto* and hence its existence is inferred but not directly cognized. The inference is based on the proposition :—Here (*i. e*, in these threads) the piece of cloth exists. The conception of " here " makes us infer the intimate relation between threads and cloth. The Naiyâyikas, however, hold that we perceive Samavâya or intimate relation by the same process by which we perceive the objects viz threads and cloth. In other words it is directly cognizable.

6. I have taken the text to be समवायस्याद्याप्यनिरूपणत्वात् and not समवायस्याव्याप्यनिरूपणत्वात् which is meaningless in the context.

7. The point is this :—In the proposition-Devdatta is in possession of a staff-it is said that Dedvatta is the object qualified and the staff is the qualifying attribute. This relation of qualification and qualified assumes another relation namely conjuntion between Devdatta and his staff for until they are in contact with each other the so-called relation of qualification and qualified cannot exist. So by assuming that relation between Samavâya or intimate re-

relation on the one hand and the correlated objects on the other, the confusion does not stop at that stage, for we shall have to admit a relation like conjunction which in its turn will require another and so forth.

8. This principle is otherwise expressed as under:— प्रमाणमूला अनवस्था न दोषावहा *i. e.*, when for instance seed becomes the cause of a tree, and vice versa, it should not be alleged that the theory of causation is bad for there is no finality of reasoning. Because although by *a priori* reasoning there may not be finality, the practical purpose is served by the apparent cause and effect. To put the same thought in the words of the text the alleged want of finality in the example of seed and tree has no support from actual experience but originates from *a priori* method of reasoning with regard to being or existence, and hence is not a fault in argument.

9 The point is that when the very existence of Intimate Relation is refuted, it is needless to refute its other characteristics like permanence &c.

NOTES ON.

Section III.

Chapter I.

1. Compare S'ânkara Bhâshya and the commentary of Ânandagiri thereon. B. S. II. ii–17.

2. In भाषापरिच्छेद they are enumerated as under :—

उत्क्षेपणं ततोऽवक्षेपणमाकुंचनं तथा ।
प्रसारण च गमनं कर्माण्येतानि पंच च ॥

i. e., Action is five fold *viz.*, (1) tossing up (2) throwing down (3) contraction (4) expansion and (5) ordinary motion.

3. It may be noted here that the Vaiśeshikas whose doctrine is being refuted admit a category called Sâmânya

or common characteristic running through all the individuals of a class. This category is of two kinds called highest Genus or class and Lower Genus or species. The former comprises the first three categories of substance, property and action together; while the latter includes each of the three separately. The sub-divisions of substance into earth &c., are species–so to say.

The Vedântin's point of refutation is that Brahman which underlies all phenomena is such as would include all such classifications as Lower and Higher genera and there is therefore no necessity to admit a separate category like Sâmânya.

4. This para contains a refutation of the Vaiśeshika's category called Viśesha or special characteristic. According to the opponent's theory eternal substances are the atoms of the first four elements, and ether, time, space, self and mind. Now each atom of earth has, for example, the same properties as its brother atom. The difficulty then arises:– How can one atom be distinguished from the other when both of them have the same number of properties ? The opponent with a view to avoiding this difficulty admits a category called Viśesha residing in each eternal substance, the object of which is to distinguish one from the other. Each eternal substance is supposed to have its own Viśesha or special attribute by which it is distinguished from the rest. The Vedântin replies that even in the opponent's theory there is no need to admit a category like Viśesha which has purely a mental existence, for the very fact that each eternal substance has a separate being is sufficient to distinguish an eternal substance from the other. There is no need for such a distinguishing attribute in the Vedântic doctrine, for there are not so many eternal substances as in the Naiyâyika doctrine, Self being admitted to be the only eternal substance and thus there is no likelihood of confusion.

5. The "negation" implies the existence of a "positive" counter-entity. When there is no such entity, negation is meaningless. To put it more clear:—There can be non-existence of a pot because pot-a counterentity-is capable of existing. But the non-existence of a lotus in the sky "or a son of a barren woman" is simply a non-sense.

6. This passage is somewhat abstruse and requires a brief comment. The author has established the Principle of Being as the noumenon underlying all phenomena on the strength of the Vedic text quoted from the Chhândogya Upanishad. The opponent, who is a Naiyâyika, says that the Principle of Being referred to is not Brahman, but the highest classification called Sattâ comprising the categories of substance, property and action. In other words Existence and Sattâ Sâmânya (highest genus) are identical. Now Sattâ or highest genus of existence is proved by the continuous cognition of Being in all propositions. The reply of the Vedântin is that the continuous cognition of being is found not only with respect to substance, property and action which make up the highest genus called Sattâ but with respect to other categories also. We predicate, for instance, existence of the highest genus (Sattâ) itself which is a kind of Samânya (4th category of Naiyâyikas meaning common characteristic running through all the individuals) also of Lower genus called *Jâti* and also of the remaining categories. It follows therefore that Being has a wider area than the Naiyâyika Sattâ or the highest genus comprising the first three categories. The Naiyâyika then explains that the predication of being with respect to the last three positive categories (common characteristic, Special attribute, and Intimate Relation) as also with regard to the negative category of destruction is due to the connection of the former three with the category of substance which is connected with the highest genus of existence (Sattâ) and to the connection of time, which is a kind of substance

comprised in Sattâ with the latter *i. e.*, the destruction of of a thing. In other words Sattâ by itself is sufficient to explain the predication of being everywhere, and there is no necessity to admit an independent Principle of Being called Brahman underlying all phenomena. The Vedantin replies that the cognition of being inhering in all and expressed by phrases like—"this is, that is, and so forth" must have reference to one object only. An idea or a cognition proves one thing at a time. It cannot prove the existence of a corresponding object and at the same time its various relations as suggested by the Naiyâyika. If it be said that there is no underlying Principle of Being corresponding to the the terms expressing existence in all proposition, there will be an end to all classification which depends upon the inherence of a common characteristic running through all. We see, for instance, the inherence of humanity or the common characteristic of mankind in all human beings. Now if the corresponding group of common human characteristics were negatived there can be no classification. In the same way if the Principle of Being were negatived there can be no copula, and the predication would be a nullity. This Principle of Being underlies all and is self-shining. It is called Brahman-a datum without which no science can stand. Vide Bhartṛihari's Kârikâs quoted in the text following this passage.

NOTES.

Chapter I. Section IV.

1. Padmâvati is the stock instance of a woman in the Sânkhya philosophy representing the three-fold character of objects, just as Socrates is the stock instance of the western logic to prove the mortality of human beings. The point to be explained by Padmâvati is that just as the same woman produces different feelings of filial love, jealousy and lust in her father, husband and paramour respec-

tively so every object has three-fold character of goodness, badness and indifference.

2. The point is that the Sâṅkhya theory of manifestation and disappearance of an object in the causal substance which implies the ever existence of the effect in the cause cannot be proved by the analogy of gold mixed up with metallic ore. It is shown by the analogy that although gold exists in the ore even before and after its appearance its actual manifestation is brought about by the operation of heat which has the effect of removing blackness and revealing golden hue. The opponent explains that on the same analogy the effect although inhering for ever, in the cause is manifested by the operation of the cause which has the effect of hiding the element of non-being and of revealing the element of being. The Vedântin replies that the inherence of being and non-being in the same substance is not possible. To say that these are separate properties and hence can inhere in one and the same object just as colour and fragrance are found to inhere in one and the same flower, is to purposely neglect the contradictory nature of these properties. Fire cannot be cold and hot at the same time for these properties imply the inherence of their respective substances of water and light in the burning charcoal which is not possible. It is confusion of thought to say that cold and heat flow from other properties and are not due to their respective substances. In the same way being and non-being cannot co-exist in one and the same substance eventhough they may be assumed as independent properties ; because they are essentially contradictory and imply that the object is possessed of the two contradictory substances as in the instance of burning charcoal, supposed for argument's sake to be cold and hot.

3. I have taken the reading "आरंभवाद" of ख Ms. which is better than "परिणामवाद" of the text. Upto now

the impropriety of परिणामवाद (doctrine of evolution) is described on the strength of the Veda and argument. This doctrine has for its basis the theory of existent effect (सत्कार्यवाद) *i. e.* a theory in which effect is supposed to exist prior to its appearance). Now the author finding that परिणामवाद of the Sâṅkhyas is not substainable turns to examine the आरंभवाद (doctrine of creation based on the असत्कार्यवाद *i. e.* theory of the effect non-existent before its birth) of the Naiyâyikas. The passage which follows describes how the doctrine of creation is better than the doctrine of evolution. The next para contains summary refutation of the doctrine of creation.

4. The main distinction between the theory of evolution and the theory of creation is that in the former the causal substance is said to undergo a change and the transformation is said to be the effect which was in another form already existent ; while in the latter minute atoms constituting the causal substance combine themselves in a variety of forms and give rise to products not only different in degree but in kind from the causal substance. The whole of the causal substance does not undergo change, but remain as the nourisher of the portion which gives rise to variety of products. The causal substance in this aspect is said to be the substantial cause (अधिष्ठानकारण) inasmuch as the products have their being in the big substance. The minute particles which actually constitute the product are said to be the material cause (उपादानकारण). Thus the element of earth is the substantial cause of a jar while the atoms which go to form the jar are said to be the material cause. Thus the five elements are not confounded as in the other theory, for they are different in kinds.

5. The point of Vijñânabhikshu is this :—

The opponent of Sâṅkhya challenged the accuracy of सत्कार्यवाद by turning the dilemmna of existence or non-exis-

tence to manifestation (आविर्भाव) which in the Sânkhya theory is equivalent to creation (उत्पत्ति or आरंभ). It has been pointed out in the text that if the manifestation is existent prior to the operation of the causal substance the latter operation is meaningless, the effect being already accomplished ; and that if the manifestation is non-existent the Sânkhya theory of सत्कार्य is abandoned and the opponent gains his ground. Vijñânabhikshu says that the refutation is based on an assumed premiss that manifestation of an effect is the same as its cognition. The follower of Kapila's doctrine does not take manifestation and cognition as one and the same thing. By manifestion of the effect he simply means that the product is revealed in the causal substance and whoever has the requisite means of knowledge can cognize it if the senses are directed towards it. Thus manifestation is objective while cognition is purely subjective. The anomaly is then described in the text. If the cognition be a determining factor of an effect like a jar, cognition and effect would be co-extensive terms just as the definition and the term defined are *e. g.*, गोत्व सास्नादिमत्व. Now although implements like the potter's stick and wheel are necessary for the being of an effect, they are not needed for the rise of cognition which arises even in the absence of those implements. This means that cognition and effect (*i. e.*, manifestation) are not identical.

6. The gist of the refutation of Vijñânabhikshu's position is briefly as under :—

A pot for instance is both existent and non-existent on the Sânkhya theory of latent effect (सत्कार्यवाद). It is said to be non-existent from the standpoint of its prospective being in the world. It is existent from the standpoint of its actual present manifestation. Thus both being and non-being of an object are based upon its different aspects. The author proceeds to say that just as a substance like a pot is said to be existent and non-existent

from its two aspects shown above, so the being and non-being of properties must depend upon variety of other properties which would lead to confusion *ad-infinitum*. Now the two aspects of an object referred to flow from a variety of properties because the properties of an object in its prospective condition are not the same as the properties of the same object in its present manifested condition. In other words the latent and revealed forms of an object are distinguished on account of the difference of properties. These properties should, according to the theory of Vijñânabhikshu, have other properties behind them on which their existence and non-existence can be based as in the case of a substance. Now the existence means according to the opposite theory, temporal relation. A property is existent not on account of its very nature, but on account of its relation with present time. Thus the existence and non-existence of properties depend upon an infinite series of properties and relations. The properties on which the aspects of a substance are based being thus not established, it cannot be said that an object like a pot is existent and non-existent according to its present and prospective conditions.

7. (Sc.) But this is not desirable as such a state of things will not bring about destruction.

8. Indian Metaphysics include a variety of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) as also the the theory of being (ontology). The world is phenomenal, and yet it appears as if it were real. The burden of explaining the world as it appears is on all the thinkers of various philosophical schools. Knowledge is of two kinds: (1) real. (प्रमिति) and (2) ideal (स्मृति). A third species is admitted by certain philosophers inclusive of the Vedântins which is called false knowledge (मिथ्याज्ञान). In ontology also the Vedânta admits of the existence of a third thing called phenomenal or मायिक over and above the absolute being (सत्) and absolute non-being (असत्). Now the question

is :—How is false knowledge which in Sanskrit is called अध्यास or मिथ्याज्ञान possible? Thinkers of India are divided on this point. The typical instance of such a knowledge is the cognition of silver in a mother o'pearl. Now this cognition has no corresponding object like *real* (सत्) silver nor does it arise without a substratum of any sort (*i. e.*, from असत् or non-being). Nor again does it originate from an object both existent and non-existent at the same time, for such an assumption is opposed to reason. The Vedântin per force admits a phenomenal being like the fictitious silver in the shell to justify the subjective cognition. His position is called the theory of indescribable knowledge (अनिर्वचनीयख्यातिवाद).

Philosophers of other schools hold a variety of views on this point. One school holds that knowledge is necessarily two-fold *i. e.*, it is either real (प्रमिति) or ideal or what is called memory (स्मृति). The cognition of silver in the mother o'pearl is simply an ideal memory of real silver. This means that no new cognition of an external corresponding silver arises on seeing the shell. This position is called अख्यातिवाद *i. e.*, the theory which does not admit of a third form of knowledge.

The second view is that real silver, existing elsewhere, appears, as if it were, in front in consequence of some defect in vision. This is called अन्यथाख्याति or the theory of knowledge in which a perverse view is presented.

The third view of idealists is that the silver which appears is simply an idea and there is no external silver whatsoever. This ideal silver appears, as if it were, objective. This position is called आत्मख्याति or the theory of knowledge in which a form of intellect appears as an object. It differs from अख्यातिवाद inasmuch as the latter admits of the existence of an external world although it disapproves of a third kind of knowledge as the idealists do.

The fourth view is that of Nihilists who deny both the external and internal silver. This is called शून्यताख्याति.

It would be foreign to our subject to discuss the relative merits of these theories. Suffice it to say that the Vedânta lays stress on the अनिर्वचनीयख्याति described above.

It is clear that the super-imposition of a property or object on something else is possible in the true sense of the term in the अन्यथाख्याति and अनिर्वचनीयख्याति for in other theories there is no corresponding external object. To turn to the text, the Sânkhya cannot hold that Nature works for the experience of soul because the latter is admitted to be devoid of all kinds of sensuous contact. The opponent then argues that although the real experience refers to mind and not to the soul, the former is superimposed upon the latter. The Vedântin replies that the argument will appear reasonable in the mouth of one who holds either the theory of perversion or the theory of indescribable appearance. The Sânkhya does not admit either of the two and thus super-imposition is not possible in his doctrine.

9. According to the opponent's theory indiscrimination (*i. e*, want of discrimination) leads to the mundane existence of the soul which means that a positive effect is produced by a negative thing.

10. A tamarind tree is different from a neem tree. This difference is said to be in the same class of trees. Again a tree is different from a stone. The difference is said to be based upon different class. Thirdly a branch of a tree is different from its root. This is the innate difference of parts. When the knowledge of pure or Absolute Self is the cause of absolution, it means that the soul has no like of its kind, also has no unlike (non-soul) and it being impartite has no innate difference.

11. To take the stock instance of implication, "Devdatta, who is fat, does no eat at day time"—This proposition leads to the implication that Devdatta eats at night, else his fatness cannot be explained. In the same way if Mâyâ is to be implied, it must be shown that the world or a particular phenomenon in it cannot be explained in its absence. But the fact is otherwise. The world is fully explained by the causes such as Nature or Atoms. The assumption of Mâyâ is thus gratuitous.

12. This passage is the exposition of the preceding text of the Gîtâ.

13. The point is that if the world is regarded to be phenomenal or apparent, there should be some material cause like the element of Illusion (Mâyâ) which gives rise to the various appearances in an unchanging substratum like Brahman. In the absence of such an element the world cannot be said to be phenomenal. Hence it is said that Mâyâ is *verily* difficult to ford; *i. e.*, it is not absolute zero but a relative reality confronting us in our affairs of the world.

NOTES ON

Section V. Chapter I.

1. Sadânanda reads this text as :—

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यत्तुदृष्टिपथंप्राप्तं तन्मायैवसुतुच्छकम्

Whereas in the Yoga Bhâshya the text is

\+ + + + + +

तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम्

The difference in meaning is obvious by the use of एव and इव. By taking एव the interpretation would be that the objects of the world (the products) are verily a big fiction or Mâyâ and hence unreal. By taking इव the text would mean that the products are unreal like a phantom.

Thus the doctrine of Mâyâ would be supported by taking एव, and hence Sadânand takes that reading in support of his position. It seems that इव is the older text for both Vâchaspatimiśra and Vijñânabhikshu, who preceded Sadânada while commenting on this Yogabhâshya take इव as the text and not एव.

2. The editor Pandit Wâman Sastri adds a note showing that even Udayanâchârya, a staunch Naiyâyika, while refuting the doctrine of Buddhist idealist expresses his reverence to the Vedânta system.

Udayanâchârya makes the Buddhist idealist in his argument to accept the position of the Vedântin and then when the opponent argues that such an acceptance would not mean the success of the Nyâya system, Udayanâchârya proceeds to say that a Naiyâyika who is like a dealer in wet ginger need not be anxious about the wealth of another big merchant *i. e.*, the system of Vedânta stands on a more solid foundation than that of the Nyâya which aims at the refutation of the hostile system of Buddhist &c.

It may be noted that even Vijñânabhikshu who does not admit the doctrine of Mâyâ, takes this eclectic view of the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy (vide his Brahma Sûtra Bhâshya pages 89–101 Chowkhamba Sanskrit series).

3. This passage is taken from the introduction of Vijñânabhikshu on Sânkhya Sûtras (pages 4–5. Edition of Jivânanda Vidyâsâgara.)

4. The text should be कारकाः and not तारकाः as is clear from the context.

NOTES ON.

Section VI Chapter I.

1. यतः (from whom) and येन (by whom) in the above

text imply that Brahman is the cause of the world and probably instrumental cause for ablative and instrumental causes are used. But the text gives a deeper sense when it says that in Brahman everything vanishes, this conveys the sense that Brahman is the material cause as well.

2. The point in the argument is this. In the Syllogism quoted in the text:—"God" is the minor term, "is not the material cause of matter" is the major term, "because he is sentient" is the middle term. The author then shows the propriety of the phrase "matter" in the major term. In the absence of "matter" the major term would be "is not the material cause". This is predicated of God because he is sentient. But the generalisation "that no sentient creature is the material cause" on which the conclusion that God is not the material cause is based is not true, for a potter for instance is the material cause of his pleasure and pain although he is sentient. Thus the major term is qualified by the insertion of the word "matter" and then the generalisation that no sentient creature is the material or substantial cause of matter—will be correct because pleasure and pain are not matter but properties.

CHAPTER II.

Section I.

Refutation of the Buddhistic Realists.

In the first chapter the nature of body was discussed. Now we undertake the discussion of the nature of soul by valid arguments.

The opponent argues:—"It is not proper to say that you gave a blow of a hammer on our head in accordance with the maxim of the dawning of a man near the toll-bar described at the close of the preceding chapter, because by the term "teacher" is meant (not the physical organism nor the phenomenal modification of Brahman but) the individual soul, independent of the organism consisting of body and senses, whose existence is admitted by all the orthodox and heteredox systems of philosophy; and who is the experiencer of the fruits of actions connected with this world or the after-death regions". The Vedântin enquires in a happy mood of mind:—Who is that individual soul you refer to? Is he (*a*) the transitory consciousness admitted on the principle—whatever exists is momentary like a cloud—by the disciples of Buddha named, Vaibhâshika, Sautrântika, Yogâchâra and Mâdyamika who do not wear the lower band of Dhotar; or (*b*) an element other than body senses &c., possessed of parts and of the same size as the body, admitted by the followers of Jainism who are naked ascetics or gymnosophists; or (*c*) an element

eternal and atomic admitted to be so by a sect of the followers of Jainism who feared the impermanency of the soul on the assumption of the middle-sizedness of it in accordance with the size of the body admitted by their brother thinkers of the same school; or (*d*) the organism itself perceptible to the senses admitted for the sake of economy of thought by the materialistic philosophers like Châryâka; or (*e*) an element which is the substratum of the eight properties namely knowledge, pleasure, pain, volition, hatred effort, merit and demerit; which is other than the body and senses; is the doer and enjoyer; and is all-pervading and different in each organism admitted by the followers of Kaṇâda, Gautama and Prabhâkara; or (*f*) a principle of both intelligent and non-intelligent character admitted by the Mîmânsakas; or (*g*) a principle of eternal consciousness which experiences the fruits of action although not a real doer-admitted by the followers of Kapila and Patañjali; or (*h*) Brahman which is essentially thought, being and bliss and secondless in character and the subject-matter of all the Upanishads when appearing as individual soul in consequence of Mâyâ having no beginning? None of the views commencing from the transitory consciousness to the pure experiencer (*i.e.*, from (*a*) to (*g*)) can satisfactorily prove the import of the term "teacher". Because those views are opposed to reason and experience. Besides those thinkers who are believers in the Veda will find their views opposed-to the Vedic and Smârta texts to be quoted hereafter.

We shall first take the doctrine of the four disciples of Buddha namely Vaibhâshika, Sautrântika, Yogâchâra, and Mâdhyamika. The first disciple holds that all the external group of objects to be described later on is perceptible as well as inferable on the principle:—

"Whatever exists, *i e.*, appears to the senses as existent, is momentary like a sheet of clouds; the external world exists; therefore it is momentary". Sautrântika maintains that although the external world is a momentary flux in consequence of the variety in cognition, its existence is only inferable and not perceptible. His argument on which the inferability of the external world is based is that we are conscious of ideas only which reflect in them the images of external objects like pot &c. These reflections of the external world into the subjective region of ideas must have corresponding objects which cast the reflections *e. g.*, the reflection of the face has a corresponding object like the face. Yogâchâra holds that everything consists of ideas which are momentary, and that the objective world does not exist. Mâdhyamika goes one step further and denies the essential existence of ideas also and advocates absolute nihilism. The diversity of opinion among disciples of the same teacher is explained on the diversity of intellect of the disciples who are classified-as low, mediocre and excellent in mental equipment. Those who are of low intellect are carried to the final doctrine of nihilism by the hypothesis of the existence of internal and external

world, but of a transitory nature which culminates gradually to the desired goal. Those who are of moderate intelligence are brought to the doctrine of nihilism by the teaching of the existence of the subjective world of ideas only. Finally those who are of superior intellect are taught the doctrine of nihilism direct.

We shall first enunciate and refute the doctrine of Vaibhâshika and Sautrântika :—

These thinkers who admit the existence of all the external world assume two groups of objects. The first is called the external aggregate; the other the internal aggregate. The elements and their products constitute the first aggregate. In elements are included earth, water, light, air, ether and season. The products of elements comprise objects possessing colour &c., and senses cognizing them like sight &c. The atoms of earth are hard in their nature; those of water are sticky; those of light are hot; those of air are mobile. At the time of creation the heaps of the atoms of these four elements make up the great earth and volumes of water &c. There is no new whole as distinct from the parts or constituents, because there is no proof for its independent existence. Besides the admission of the independent whole as apart from the constitutents would lead to the apprehension of double weight &c., in the whole or constituted independent object.

The internal aggregate consists of mind and

mental operations. The cause of the internal aggregate is five-fold. The causal groups of the internal aggregates are:—(1) group of sensations (2) group of knowledge (3) group of feelings; (4) group of verbal knowledge and (5) group of impressions. Etymologically the group of sensation (रूप्यतेएभिरिति रूपम् *i. e.*, that by which a thing is determined) comprises senses with their respective objects. Although objects cognized like earth &c, are external, they appear at the time of cognition to be within the organism and are mingled up with the senses. They are therefore included in the group of sensation. The second group namely that of knowledge is of two kinds. The first kind comprises the series of cognitions of the ego known as the subjective consciousness which goes by the name of soul or self. The other comprises the series of cognitions referring to the external or non-ego, which are generated by the senses, and which assume the form of the external objects. This series is called the objective consciousness, and is of six kinds on account of the six-fold division of the senses (*i. e.*, 5 external senses and the inner sensory). Both these sub-divisions of the group of knowledge namely subjective and objective cognitions are devoid of attributes or conditions and are momentary because they are existent. By momentariness it is meant that the object becomes the counter-entity of the posterior non-existence having reference to the secoud moment after its birth.[1] Thus each subjective cognition generates

the next cognition and in this way a series of subjective consciousness having neither beginning nor end is established. It should not be argued, the Buddhist says, that the momentary soul cannot legitimately be expected to work for the enjoyment of the fruit realizable after a lapse of time. Because, the Buddhist questions the opponent:—Does this absence of activity in the soul on the Buddistic theory of momentary nature of the subjective consciousness which is urged as an objection against it, refer to the time preceding the realization of the true knowledge or following it? It cannot have reference to the time preceding gnosis because activity will proceed until the stronghold of the impressions relating to the permanence of the universe is annihilated and this annihilation is not possible without the ripeness of the thought that the world is a momentary flux and nothing more. The thought embracing momentariness is fourfold:—(1) the thought that a thing is defined by its very nature (2) the thought that everything is momentary; (3) the thought that everything is painful; and (4) the thought that everything is reducible to zero or has no substantial basis. The thought of the thing-in-itself is the first mode of meditation. By this method of thought, are dispelled the conceptions relating to objects and their properties (inasmuch as nothing is like another so that anything can be predicated of it). The second method of thought will dispel the illusion of permanence in the universe.

The second objection that the absence of of activity in the soul has reference to the time after the realization of truth is wide of mark, for such a state of things is admitted by the Buddhist. When the meditation of the momentary nature of the universe in its fourfold aspects becomes ripe, the series of subjective consciousness with its conditions either subsides or attains absolution by absorption into the series of the conditionless and omniscient consciousness of God. In both the cases activity ceases. Bondage and freedom are virtually described by this line of discussion.

The third group of feelings consists of the ideas of pleasure pain &c resulting from the objective series of consciousness referred to above.

The fourth group of verbal knowledge is based upon ideas generated by words like cow, horse &c., and possessed of corresponding forms.

The fifth group consists of impressions resulting from the preceding groups such as (*a*) attachment, hatred, egoism, nescience, and fear of death which are the five-fold feelings absorbed in anxiety; (*b*) the auxiliary feelings of anxiety *e. g.*, arrogance, pride &c; and (*c*) merit and demerit.

The group of knowledge is called mind; while the remaining groups are said to be subjective or depending upon mind inasmuch as the bundles of ideas &c., although falling within the stream of mind attain sometimes a mental colour

or tinge when the objects of the senses are reflected in the mind; and at other time they lose their mental or subjective condition when the mind is deflected from the objects.

The aggregate of the five groups already described is the Internal causal aggregate. The two aggregates *viz* subjective or internal, and objective or external, are proved to be momentary by perception and inference. Perception which determines the present condition of a thing proves the exclusion of that thing from non-present condition. (*i. e.*, it proves only the momentary existence and nothing more) just as the perception of blue colour proves the exclusion of that colour from non-blue. Inference likewise proves the momentary nature or object. The syllogism would be :—

" All objects are momentary; because they have got practical efficiency, and are existent. Those which are not momentary are also unable to supply practical needs and are non-existent *e. g.*, the horn of a hare" Again—"the series of existences of an object like a pot, connected with the moments preceding the last moment of that object, disappears in each moment following the moment of its own existence because they are existences of the object namely a pot *e. g.*, the existence of a pot connected with its last moment."

Thus although the series is a momentary flux, the activity of the world is explained on the basis of ignorance which is fourfold. *Viz* :—The

belief of permanence in non-permanent objects; the belief of eternity in things which are products; the belief of pleasure in that which is really painful; and the belief of substantiality in that which is unsubstantial or zero. Thus, the Buddhist sums up, that when everything is explainable on the hypothesis of the two aggregates, why should an eternal and intelligent soul and God be admitted.

To this it is replied that Buddhist is labouring under delusion, his theory being opposed to experience and reason.

To commence the refutation, it is impossible that aggregates can be formed of objective atoms and subjective groups of ideas in the absence of a permanent and intelligent framer of aggregates. Mind can not be put forth as the framer of the aggregates because it being transitory according to Buddhistic theory can have no desired goal and consequently cannot operate in the creation of aggregates. Besides atoms which have no parts cannot form into groups. This objection is summarized in the couplet:—

"Neither aggregate of the subjective groups of ideas nor of objective atoms of elements is possible on the Buddhistic hypothesis, there being no permanent intelligent principle and the ideas and atoms being themselves non-intelligent".

Again even mere extra-cosmic God cannot be the cause of the subjective and objective worlds unless there is some proximity between the world

and such creator. No proximity or connection can be established in an impartite principle.

The opponent retorts that according to his doctrine the formation of both the aggregates is rationally explicable even without the assumption of an intelligent principle. To express the opponent's view, the production of effects is based on two grounds (*a*) dependence on a single cause and (*b*) dependence on a variety of causes working towards the production of an effect. The production of effects is of two kinds:— (1) External or objective (2) Internal or subjective. The production of an effect (प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः) etymologically means that the cause assumes a new form by reaching the new stage. By "dependence on a single cause" is meant that each cause separately leads to the production of the effect. By the term "variety of causes" (प्रत्ययाः) is meant that a number of causes combine and give birth to a single effect. The relation of such variety of causes is styled "dependence on such causes".

We now describe the production of the external world consisting of the globe and its accompaniments like rivers &c, on the first mode of causality. To take for instance the production of a plant in which a sprout is generated by a seed; a leaflet by the sprout; a stem by the leaflet; a stalk by the stem; a calyx by the stalk; a corolla by the calyx; a flower or blossom by the corolla; and a fruit by the blossom. In this series of causes and effects, the sprout cannot arise in the absence of the seed; and the fruit in the

absence of the blossom. In the production of effects the seed has not the consciousness that it produces the sprout. In the same way the series of causes from the sprout to the blossom has not the knowledge that each respectively gives birth to respective effects. Again the effects (e. g. fruit) have not the consciousness that they are produced by the respective causes (e. g. blossom). It follows therefore that even without sentient character of seeds or even without the intervention of an extra-sentient agency, the law of causation is found working (in the realm of nature). Having thus established the first mode of causality depending on separate causes we shall turn to describe the other mode depending on plurality of causes.

To take the instance of the production of the sprout from the seed (the immediate material cause हेतूपनिबन्ध) we find that the sprout, which is the direct effect of the seed, is generated by the combination of six elements The element of earth helps the seed in gathering together particles and thus the sprout becomes hard. In the same way the element of water moistens the seed ; the element of light ripens the seed by imparting the requisite temperature ; the element of air brings out the particles of the seed and thus shews forth the appearance of the sprout from the seed ; the element of ether gives scope to the evolution of the seed ; and finally the element of season helps the complete manifestation of the seed in the form of the sprout. Thus

when all the six elements in an unblemished condition combine at the time of the growing of the seed, the sprout comes forth and not otherwise. Here also the element of earth has not consciousness that it gathers together the particles for the growing seed, and so on in the subsequent series terminating in the element of season which also does not know that it helps the complete evolution of the seed into the sprout. Likewise the sprout does not know that the six elements have brought about its birth.

Let us now describe the first mode of causality working in the realm of the internal subjective sphere. The series of subjective phenomena consits of ignorance; impression; fœtal consciousness; material cause of the body (technically called 'name" नाम); the embryonic form (रूप); the group of senses originating from the six elements; the formation of the organism which combines the three elements just preceding; the sensibility of pleasure and pain; desire or happiness; activity for achieving that end; merit and demerit leading to birth in particular environments; old age; death; consequential pain among friends and relatives of the deceased; their weeping; the experience of the world as a source of misery; and finally the mental pessimism. Now in this series commencing from ignoraunce and ending in pessimism impressions would not have arisen had there not been ignorance. In the same way had there not been the series

ending in birth, the subsequent phenomena of old age, death &c., would not have ensued. In this series "ignorance" does not know that it brings forth impressions; nor do the impressions know that they are brought forth by ignorance. In the same way the series ending in birth does not know that it generates old age, death &c; nor do old age &c., know that they are produced by birth &c. Thus on the assumption of ignorance &c., non-sentient in themselves and uncontrolled by an extra-sentient agency, impressions &c., are produced, just as seed &c., which are non-sentient and are not controlled by an extra sentient agency give forth sprout &c. The only observed fact on which the generalization is made is that one link of the chain of phenomena touches the other, and the latter link appears, the intervention of a sentient principle being unobserved. Thus having described the first mode of causality we shall describe the other mode with respect to the subjective realm.

The organism is produced by the combination of the six subjective elements of earth, water, light, air, ether, and consciousness.[2] Now the elements of earth produces the hardness of the body; that of water keeps the moisture in the body; that of light helps in the digestion of food and drink; that of air produces respiration; and that of ether produces the cavity inside the body; The element which gives rise to the sprout of

"name" and "form"[3] and to the mind accompanied with its five-fold sensations *e. g*, sensation of sound &c., and intellect, is called the principle of consciousness. When these internal elements of earth &c., are unimpaired, the body is produced by this combination. Now in this production of the body the elements of earth &c., have not the knowledge that they bring out the hardness &c., of the organism as stated in the preceding para. Thus the production of the body takes place on the same lines on which the sprout of a plant is generated. This theory of production cannot be shaken by thousands of arguments to the contrary. The ignorance consisting of the false idea of regarding these six elements, which are essentially transitory products and painful, as eternally permanent and pleasant objects, gives rise to the nomenclature of organism, physique, body, man, mother, daughter, egoism, self-interest &c. This ignorance is the primeval cause of all evil. It leads to impressions of attachment hatred and delusion with respect to the object of senses. These in their turn give rise to the first consciousness in a being in embryo. This subjective consciousness gives rise to the phenomenon of "name" which means the four elements constituting the material cause of the body, and which is so called because all the naming of objects is based upon those material elements. Taking the element of "name" as its basis a physical form with white, black or other kind of complexion is produced. The manifestation of a physical body

in the form of fœtal nucleus or bubble is designated by the terms "Name" and "form". Then follows in the order of manifestation the group of the six senses combined with "name" and "form". It is technically called "the abode of the six" because the six elements of earth &c., are the props on which the group of senses is based. The (external) senses are five only (*e.g.*, eye &c); are identical with the physical organs, and produce the respective sensations without leaving their situation. The senses according to Buddhistic theory are not substances distinct from the physical organs producing cognitions by touching the respective objects as in the atomic theory of the Vais'eshikas. The senses are regarded as the "dominant "causal factor" in the production of subjective phenomena.[4] The combination of "name", "form" and "senses" is called the tangible or developed organism which reveals the objective consciousness *i. e.*, the knowledge resulting from the contact of the objects with the senses located in a developed body. Then follows the sensation of pleasure &c., which gives rise to desire or resolution :— "I must have this or that form of happiness" This desire leads to the activity of speech and body. The activity leads to merit aud demerit which are technically called "birth" because they are the causes leading to a new life. Then follows actual birth or the production of a new dody. The degeneration of the body generated is called

"old age" which is followed by "death" or destruction of body. The dying man who has attachment towards the world brings forth internal agony in son &c. Then follows weeping in the form of "Dear son" &c. The experience of all unpleasant sensations originating from the five senses is "the misery of life" which results in the mental depression or pessimism. Over and above these there are minor painful sensations *e. g.*, arrogance, pride &c. All these phenomena commencing from birth are the causes of ignorance &c., and vice versa-thus establishing a perpetual circle like a water-wheel.

The Buddhist sums up his theory and says that the existence of the "aggregate" is implied in the series of ignorance &c. Every existent object is transitory, has a beginning, is painful and unsubstantial. By the contemplation of this four-fold character of the world absolution is accomplished. Where is the draw-back, the Buddhist enquires, in this theory which dispenses with the principle of intelligence?

To the adove the Vedântin replies that the Buddhist is prattling as if in an intoxicated condition.

*To commence the refutation, the Buddhistic term for cause (प्रत्यय) etymologically means that which approaches the effect. Now the tenet that birth &c., are the results of Ignorance &c.,

* Vide B. S. II. ii. 19.

is objectionable, for assuming the mutual causality in the series of phenomena enumerated above. ignorance &c., would explain the production of of each succeeding phenomenon only. But there will be no cause for the aggregate. The point of refutation is this:—Those products which depend for their manifestation on separate immediate causes are not in need of any other thing. We have nothing to say against such phenomena. Let them be produced by their respective immediate causes on which they solely depend. But the aggrogate of the five groups is dependent for its manifestation on a plurality of co-operating causes and not on the separate immediate cause. In other words, the aggregate is the result of the attention on the working of many causes. There is no principle other than a sentient being which can put these causes into harmoneous working.

The Buddhist retorts:—Earth &c., produce a sprout even without the help of others, when they (earth &c.) attain the last moment of their existence. These elements in their last moments have mutual eye on each other on account of the attention resulting from their approach towards the effect. The Vedântin should not object that when the effect can be accomplished by a single cause, the assumption of other causes is gratuitous. Because, the Buddhist replies, our experience shews that an effect is produced after a number of causes has worked towards its manifestation. It should not be urged that when

one of the causes is able to produce the effect, the rest will remain idle. Because although all the causes are operating in the production of one effect, they are capable of producing subsidiary effects of a variety of nature, wherein their efficiency lies. Again it should not be objected that in consequence of a variety of causes there would necessarily be a variety of effects. Because the combination of these causes is one.

To the above the Vedântin replies that the position is objectionable. If causes in the last moment of their existence are capable of producing their respective effects without the help of anything else, then on the same line of argument all preceding elements will be capable of producing their respective succeeding effects without the help of anything else. It follows then that when seeds are stored in a granary, that moment of a seed which has to produce a moment in itself capable of generating the sprout in the order of succession of moments standing as its effects, will be able to produce unaided the desired effect (*i. e.* sprout) in the very granary. In the same way all the moments succeeding the moment generating the sprout will be able to produce their respective effects (say upto the production of corn) without the help of anything else and thus a cultivator will have his object attained by the storing of seeds in his granary without taking the multifareous trouble of agriculture.*

* Vide B. S. II. ii. 27.

As this conclusion is absurd the Buddhist must admit that either the last, middle or first moments of seeds depending upon one another are capable of producing the desired effect Now this harmoneous working of causes cannot arise without the intervention of an intelligent principle, for such working is invariably observed as attended by an intelligent being knowing the variety of arrangement of causes and their respective purposes. If the opponent argues:—"the aggregate is implied by the series of phenomena commencing with Ignorance":—the Vedântin's reply is that implication is absurd as will be presently shewn. The Vedântin enquires:—What are we to understand by this implication? Does it mean that the series of Ignorance &c., creates the aggregate or indicates the existence of the aggregate? It cannot be the first because a cause cannot bring forth a product which is unfit for production therefrom.[5] Thus the Buddhist should resort to the other view. In that case the world of aggregates which is indicated by the series of ignorance &c., must be shewn to have some cause. Now this causal factor other than a governing intelligent principle is not possible even in the Vais'heshika's theory which admits the eternal character of atoms and the existence of an enjoying soul; much less can it be found in the Buddhistic theory which admits the momentary flux of all objects.

Again-many causes co-operating with one

another produce the desired effect-this tenet cannot be established on the Buddhistic theory of momentary flux. Because an object having a moment's existence cannot be the object of help inasmuch as a moment being indivisible cannot admit of help from another, being itself incapable of rendering help to another. If however, the principle of co-operation or interdependence of causes be established by admitting the difference of moments of receiving and giving help, the theory of momentary flux falls to the ground

The opponent retorts :—Well, when the production of the world of aggregate is regarded as dependent on a variety of causes co-operating with one another, the presence of a governing intelligent principle is needed. But when we admit the creation as dependent on the working of separate immediate causes, the help of another cause or of an intelligent principle is not needed for the immediate separate cause will bring forth the effect consisting of the aggregate by its very nature. Now where is the impropriety in this theory?

The Vedântin replies that the position is not supported by experience inasmuch as an effect is not produced, as will be shewn hereafter, by a single cause unaided by anything else. Besides there is the fallacy of arguing in a circle or reciprocal relation of cause and effect in the theory which explains that the world of aggregates originates from the series of ignorance &c., and vice versa,

It is objected by the opponent:—All objects although momentary manifest themselves in the mundane existence having no beginning, in the form of aggregates. It is not that atoms lying here and there are formed into aggregates by something else. The series of ignorance &c., depends upon such series of aggregates flowing in this mundane existence. Thus the production of effects dependent on the variety of causes co-operating with one another is possible even without the assumption of an intelligent principle.

To this it is replied that the argument is fallacious. Does the series of impressions called by Buddhists to be the flow of ("merit" or "demerit"), and falling within the main river of aggregates forming the world, produce pleasure and pain, of which it is the admitted cause according to its potentiality without the help of any extra thing; or does that series produce pleasure and pain with some help from an extra agency? In the first alternative the series of impressions should perpetually produce pleasure and pain, because an efficient cause cannot stop in producing its legitimate effect. In the other alternative, an intelligent being will have to be admitted as the helping causal factor; and in that case the Buddhist will have to abandon the theory of production by co-operating natural causes only.

Again does an aggregate produce a like or unlike aggregate? It cannot be the first, be-

cause a human being[6] cannot then be born as a god or a lower animal. It cannot be the other, because in that case a human body can turn into that of an elephant in one moment and then into a god or a man in another. Again aggregates cannot be proved by a variety of causes accompanied by the impressions of past good or bad actions called the invisible factor. Because the Invisible factor of virtue or vice cannot be established on the Buddhistic theory as shewn below :—

It is a well known fact that every being who is anxious to get a kind of enjoyment which he has not obtained, seeks that enjoyment and exerts himself for the achievement thereof. This activity is explicable on the assumption of a permanent enjoyer different from enjoyment itself and having a simultaneous touch with enjoyment and its means and not on the assumption of a transitory being. Nor can it be explained on the mere assumption of a being identical with enjoyment; because experience shows that it is absurd to suppose enjoyment seeking its own enjoyment. Nor can one enjoyment exert itself for another enjoyment. The same absurdity occurs in absolution when a permanent being or soul is not admitted.

Now if the seekers of enjoyment and absolution be regarded by the Buddhist as permanent beings, there will be the fault of abandoning

one's position. On the other hypothesis of their transitory nature there would result want of activity on the part of beings. To sum up the argument, the absence of a permanent enjoyer leads to the impropriety of want of activity, this in its own turn leads to the absence of a doer; the latter leads to the absence of latent impressions of virtue and vice called the Invisible factor; and finally the absence of such a factor disproves the existence of aggregates.

Again an aggregate cannot be caused by nescience or false knowledge also. The false knowledge, for instance, of regarding a pearl oyster as a piece of silver &c., does not create the effects of silver from the real object consisting of a pearl oyster &c.

Nescience &c., again cannot have mutual causal relation among themselves, and consequently the production of effects by immediate separate causes cannot be established inasmuch as the Buddhist holds that the anterior cause vanishes at the time of the production of the subsequent effect. In the theory of momentary flux, the inferential knowledge of fire &c., flowing from the knowledge of middle terms like smoke &c., which is based on universal experience, is a palpable contradiction; likewise there is the impropriety of the combination of many causes for that production of one effect (because both the inferential knowledge and combination of cause would imply the operation lasting for more than

one moment). The point of the argument is this:

* The Buddhists of this school do not admit the state of being destroyed as a result of the proximity of a destructive cause as is held by the Vais'eshika or atomist, it being held by the Buddhists that destruction has no cause. The presence of a destructive cause is therefore not desired by the Buddhist to account for destruction. It follows therefore that when a thing is said to be undergoing destruction, it means that it has recently been involved in the process of natural (*i. e.*, not resulting from an extra destructive cause) decay. Again when a thing is said to be destroyed it means that the thing has long since been involved in decay. Thus the moment of the cause preceding the production of the effect being either under the process of destruction or destroyed altogether cannot legitimately stand as the cause of the subsequent moment it being involved in non-existence.

The opponent argues:—The temporal relation or existence of the cause is needed before the production of the effect, but not at the time of the existence of the effect. Because at that time the effect being accomplished the temporal relation or continuance of the cause, which is admitted for proving the creation of the effect, becomes purposeless. It follows then that an anterior moment in an established condition and

* Vide B. S. II. ii. 20.

positive form becomes the cause of the subsequent moment.

To this it is replied that the argument is fallacious Objects, as a rule, produce their respective effects after coming into being and after operating themselves towards the production of the effects. Such a state of things cannot be explained without the stability of those objects or causes. Other wise the popular experience will be contradicted by the theory.

The Buddhist retorts:—The being of the cause and its operation are one and the same as is held by us in the tenet:—"The being of causes is the activity necessary for the production of effects; and the very being is said to be the causal or creative factor".

To this it is replied:—Let the operation of the cause be explained by its very being. A momentary thing, however, cannot stand as a cause. Earthen pots &c, and ear ornaments &c., produced respectively from earth and gold are experienced as indentical with earth and gold. If the cause is not existent at the time of the effect, how can the effect be cognized as one with the cause? It should not be said that the effect is like the cause and not identical with it, because similarity cannot be explained on the assumption that no form of the cause inheres in the effect. If, however, the inherence of the cause is admitted, the cognition that this is the same

cause proves the identity of the effect with the cause, and thus the theory of momentary existence of the cause falls to the ground. If the cause and effect be regarded as devoid of all similarity the objects like threads and a piece of cloth will be regarded as having no causal relation with each other. It will not do to hold that the relation of cause and effect is a determining factor (and not similarity or dissimilarity), because that relation cannot be comprehended when the substance is regarded as existing for one moment only. Nor can the common characterestic of earth &c., stand as the cause of pot &c., for in that case the theory of momentary flux will have to be abandoned (the common characteristic being based upon a kind of stability in objects) and the Vedântic theory will be established.

Again the production and destruction may mean (*a*) the essential nature of the substance or (*b*) the properties thereof or (*c*) different entities altogether. They cannot be the first. Because in that case substance, production and destruction would be mere other words, and the substance would consequently turn to be momentary (and the production and destruction will not explain the states of the substance). The second alternative (*b*) is not satisfactory. It would mean that the condition of the substance in the first moment would be its production, that the middle moment would be its regular existence, while the third moment would

be its decay. Thus the connection of the substance with the first second and third moments will disprove the position of momentary flux.

The third alternative (*c*) is equally bad. When the substance is distinct from, or altogether untouched by, production and decay, the eternity of it is a logical consequence. Assuming that there is a touch the substance so long as it has not attained a being cannot be regarded as having a touch with production and destruction which are admitted as altogether different entities in this third hypothesis. The existence of a witnessing soul, if admitted to be momentary, cannot explain the touch of a substance with the two states of production and decay because perception or non-perception of the substance would be the properties of the seer, and thus the objective production and decay cannot be established. The assumption of a permanent witnessing soul will prove again the doctrine of stability rather than the theory of momentary flux.

A thing, again, cannot be regarded as the cause of a particular effect by its mere existence in the anterior moment. Because numerous effects will have to be regarded as flowing from that causal substance (inasmuch as the latter will precede them in point of time). If to avoid this difficulty the existence of other causes be admitted, it would be impossible to determine on the theory of momentary flux what particular

substance is necessarily required to be existent for the production of a particular effect or to express it negatively the absence of *which* substance leads to the absence of production of *which* effect will be difficult to establish.

* The anterior moment being itself engrossed in destruction cannot be the cause of the subsequent moment:—this is not the only fault in the Buddhistic theory. There are other drawbacks. The Buddhist is asked :—

Is the effect produced in the absence of its cause or during the period of the existence of the causal element ? The first view would lead to an assumption contrary to the Buddhistic tenet that four kinds of causes bring about the subjective phenomena. The tenet is that mind and the bundle of ideas together with pleasure and pain are produced when they come in contact with four kinds of co-operative causes namely (1) the substantial factor. (2) the temporal factor of succession of moments (3) the dominant factor and (4) auxiliary factor. To illustrate the tenet the subjective notion of blue colour has for its substantial factor the external blue substance; the antecedent knowledge of the blue is the temporal factor bringing about the cognition of the current blue colour; the sense of sight is the dominant factor determining the comprehension of the colour; and finally the auxiliary

* Vide B. S. II. ii, 21.

factor of light brings the blue object within the clear visual perception. In the above tenet even if the precedence and succession of cause and effect are not intended to be conveyed, the contact between the two is a necessary ingredient. The four kinds of co-operative causes cannot be regarded as combining in only one moment. To assume that cause and effect existing in different moments come into contact with each other is to vitiate the theory of momentary flux (because it implies the existence of a third moment when the cause and effect meet each other). If production again be regarded as depending upon no cause, any object may turn out any where there being no restrictive factor of causation.

The second view namely the effect is produced during the period of existence of the causal element is also not favourable to the Buddhistic theory. The presence of the cause at the moment of the creation of effect would mean that cause and effect exist simultaneously. But such a conclusion is not desirable by the Buddhist, because one of their tenets is that all objects are momentary, the very term for an object (संस्कार) in the Buddhistic literature etymologically meaning "positive product which has a beginning and an end. " The simultaneous existence of cause and effect at the moment of the creation of the effect means that the anterior moment of a pot, for instance, continues till the subsequent moment is reached, which would lead

to the simultaneous perception of two pots (*i. e.* if the Buddhist wants to be consistent in his theory a pot in one moment becomes the cause of the pot in the subsequent moment Now when the cause and effect synchronize, as is proposed, there should appear two pots simultaneously–an absurd conclusion).

* Again not only the theory of production is untenable but the theory of destruction is also defective in the Buddhistic doctrine. The advocates of momentary flux admit three negative entities, namely (1) cessation of objects dependent on a sublative act of the mind *i. e.* the destruction of objects like a pot resulting from the conscious act of a being *e. g.* hitting a pot with a pestle (2) Cessation of objects not so dependent *i. e.* the natural decay of pillars &c, taking place every moment and (3) space which consists of mere absence of obstruction. By the term " mere " in the clause just preceding the Buddhist desires to exclude the substance whose property is sound from the category of " space ". Because that substance although inferred from absence of an impediment is not in itself the very absence. These three are mere non–entities whose nature is indescribable. The rest of the world consists of positive entities of momentary existence.

The above tenet is irrational as will be presently shown. It is questioned :—

* Vide B. S. II. ii. 22.

Do the two kinds of cessations one depending on the sublative act of the mind and the other not so depending, relate to the series of momentary existences or to the individual entities which constitute the series ? The first view is not tenable. Because a series does not exist apart from its constituting entities, presented in mind either in the relation of cause and effect or otherwise and possessed of the attributes of appearance and disappearance. To assume that a series is a permanent entity apart from its constituents would go against the hypothesis of the Buddhist that every thing is momentary.

The other view is equally unsatisfactory. It is enquired:—Does the last entity the cessation of which is necessary for the cessation of the series produce any effect or not ? If it does not produce any further entity or effects, it turns out to be non–existent because it is devoid of " existence " which the Buddhist defines as the power to bring about practical effects. When the proposed last entity turns out to be non–existent the entity just preceding will also be non–existent, it being non–creative ; and thus all the entities will turn out to be more non–existences; the series constituted by them will much more be devoid of existence. The result being that the two kinds of cessation will have no object for sublation.

If the alleged last entity, creates another entity, it cannot be regarded as the last, and the

series cannot come to an end. All objects are again counter-entities of the destruction occurring in the second moment of their birth. For the above reasons the cessation of objects depending on the sublative act of the mind as also the insensible continual decay of things cannot be established.

Again it is impossible to establish destruction of things disconnected with the previous state of existence and entirely undefinable as is put forth by the Buddhist. Even a thing which has ceased to exist is definable in its character of inherence in subsequent moment. That is the essential nature of a thing which continues or persists even after its so called destruction. The appearance and cessation of the thing which are called its special characteristics are its mere conditions which are invariably indescribable in themselves and have no independent being. Their being or existence is the inherent or persistent substance which being recognized in every form should be regarded as indestructible. It follows then that the conditioned substance being indestructible, the conditions themselves also do not vanish without leaving some trace.

The very substance which is the life of those conditions is found connected in all its forms. It is futile to argue that the recognition, for instance, that this is the selfsame flame of fire has for its object the mere similarity of momentary flickers and not the continuous element of fire, because the very similarity (on which the opponent wishes to explain away everything) cannot be described in the absence of a stable property subsisting in anterior and posterior moments. The similarity cannot be explained on the mere hypothesis that the members (*e. g.*, the flickerings of a flame) belong to the same series, because a series cannot be explained as independent of its members.

The opponent retorts :—Let the destruction of objects like a ball of earth, a pot of earth, be definable, there being the recognition of the inherent substance namely earth. But what is the recognizable form of the continuous substance when a drop of water, falling on a piece of heated slab of stone, is destroyed ? Again what form of seed and sprout is recognized in the subsequent developement of an effect like a tree ? Until this is pointed out the tenet that destruction is undefinable is not vitiated.

To this it is replied :—In cases where the forms of the continuous causal substance are not clearly recognized we should infer the existence of the substance on the strength of its inherence observed in recognizable states. We should therefore infer that water falling on a heated piece of stone is dried up by heat and carried to heavens for the formation of cloud. The sprout and subsequent developements are mere indescribable forms of the seed established on the theory of one substance standing as the material and in-

strumental cause of its effect, which will be described hereafter and which has already been urged against the theory of the rationalist or Naiyâyika in the first chapter of this book. Thus the two kinds of cessation, subjective and objective, are untenable. Their impropriety follows not only on account of the absence of any object to be sublated as is shewn above, but also from the absurdity of cessation of nescience &c.

*To show that absurdity let us ask the Buddhist whether he regards the cessation of Nescience &c., as a result of true knowledge accompanied by its auxiliaries such as control of the senses, and moral vows or as taking place of their own accord. If we take the first view the Buddhist shall have to abandon his position that cessation is devoid of any cause. In the Buddhistic doctrine destruction is regarded as devoid of cause because the thing to be destroyed is no longer an entity its proposed cause being devoid of practical efficiency and hence non-existent.[7] For this very reason the destruction of a pot for instance depending on the sublative act of mind although brought about by the act of hitting with a pestle is not regarded as having for its cause the blow of the pestle inasmuch as it is devoid of being. Hence the Buddhist holds that non-entity is seen flowing from a non-entity which has not the power to produce a positive entity.

* *Vide* B. S. II. ii. 23.

If the other view is held, namely the cessation of Nescience &c., is an insensible form of natural decay as in the case of pots &c., which undergo destruction in course of time, then the teaching of the Buddhistic philosophy that we should contemplate the painful, transitory and insubstantial character of every thing (in order to bring about an end of mundane existence) becomes purposeless. Thus in both the alternatives the theory is defective.

*The tenet which maintains the negative character of space is also bad, for the positive character of space is proved by the Veda which declares that space or ether (Âkâsha) was produced from this Supreme Self. Those who do not believe in the Veda *e. g.*, the Buddhists, should be told that the positive character of ether is inferable from the property of sound.[8] The argument will stand thus :—

Sound, which being possessed of class characteristic is distinct from genus, particularity and intimate relation (which are devoid of common characteristic), is inferred to be a property like scent on account of its being cognized by one of the external senses as also being devoid of touch. It is not the property of soul,[9] because it is cognized by an external sense. Nor is it the property of mind because mental properties are imperceptible (while sound is cognized by an external sense). Again it is not the property

* *Vide* B. S. II. ii. 24.

of earth and the remaining substances inasmuch as it is not cognized in association with their respective properties namely scent &c. It follows therefore that sound being a property and being cognized by a special sense as in the case of scent &c., raises an inference about the existence of a substance which is designated as Âkâsha or ether and which is recognized to be the fifth element.

Again those who hold ether to be a mere negation of obstructing element will have the logical necessity of admitting the want of space for the flying of another bird, when one bird has produced an obstruction while flying. Just as we cannot say that the earth is devoid of a pot by the mere absence of one pot when another is on the earth, so in the presence of one obstruction another bird should have no region to flutter even though there may be the absence of another obstruction. If it be argued that the other bird can fly in that part of the sky which is characterised by the absence of an obstruction, it is replied that the position is not logical. The determination of negation or absence depends upon the determination of the substratum in which the object is denied but it cannot be established as long as the substratum is not determined. Thus the substratum wherein the obstruction is negatived is a positive entity called ether.[10] Or to adopt another mode of refutation, when we say–"Here is a bird"–the term "here" employed in the proposition

expressing the visual perception makes us cognise ether only to be the substratum. Because the cognition cannot refer to any other substance. It is futile to urge that light is implied as a substratum by the term "here" in the proposition referred to because when the proposition relates to the cognition of light itself as—"Here is light"—the term "here" can safely refer to ether as the proposed substratum, (but not to light itself). Again it should not be urged that in the proposition—"Here is light"—the term "here" refers to a portion of enlightened region as substratum and not to ether, because when a triad is perceived in a dark region, ether alone can stand as substratum there being no other light. Thus when the advocates of momentary flux call ether to be a mere negation it is like the meaningless speech of a drunkard.

* Again the Buddhist must admit the permanent character of Self, otherwise there would be the difficulty of explaining the remembrance of an object observed on another day. The Buddhist explains away the difficulty by saying that in his doctrine there is no doer or author as distinct from the act itself and consequently the preception and memory themselves are the perceiver and rememberer; and although these are one and the same they belong to one series of sensations in which the former stands as the cause while the latter as effect and thereby give

* *Vide* B. S. II. ii. 25.

rise to the memory. The Vedântin replies that the explanation is not satisfactory. It would turn the proposition expressing the memory as—"I remember that another saw it" but the explanation cannot account for the proposition—"I who saw it remember the same"—which is based upon the unity of the seer and rememberer; and thus the popular experience will be contradicted by the theoretical explanation offered.

It is futile to object that the recognition of the identity of Self as seer and rememberer is a delusion resulting from the similarity of subjective ideas or thoughts as in the objective flickerings of flame (which is popularly regarded as the same although consisting of a flow of momentary twinkles). Because similarity cannot be explained in the absence of one subject connected with moments of preception and memory:—

The opponent retorts:—"This is like that" is a proposition conveying a complex idea or sensation. Now this complex idea externalizes, as it were, its form, but it does not comprehend the preceding and succeeding moments or their similarity. Thus where is the necessity for admitting one permanent Self cognizing a number of sensations?

To this the Vedântin replies as under:—

He first enquires of the opponent:—Whether the simple ideas determined by "this" "that" and thir similarity expressed in the proposition-

"This is like that"—shine in the region of consciousness or not? They cannot be held as not shining because such a position is contradicted by personal experience. If they do shine, it should be stated whether the forms of those ideas are one with the ideas or different therefrom. They cannot be held as distinct from the ideas, because the Buddhistic Idealist does not admit such a hypothesis. Taking the other view it is further asked:—Whether the idea, which is supposed to have forms identical with it, is one or many? The unity of idea or knowledge cannot explain the variety of forms because the theory which does not admit of the existence of forms as distinct from idea or knowledge necessarily leads to the variety in idea or knowledge itself. Nor can it be held thus the knowledge is not one but many. Because in that case there will not be the possibility of a unique consciousness of the import of a sentence blended with a variety of senses of different terms. It is only when the unique consciousness or knowledge comprehends a variety of senses of terms *e. g.*, "this" or "that" that the comprehension of the multiform character requisite for the shining of similarity in the region of intellect embodied in the proportion—"this is like that"—becomes possible.

Thus there is no other alternative but to admit objects as distinct from mind or knowledge. The comprehension of such an external object connected with a variety of time and re-

ferred to by the terms "this" and "that" (conveying the touch of present and past time when memory and actual experience occurred) is possible only on the assumption of a permanent Self.

The opponent argues:—Out of the hypothetical views suggested above we hold the following:—That "this" "that" and "similarity" shine in the intellect; that these intellectual flickerings are mere forms of knowledge or idea; that knowledge conveyed by the proposition "this is like that" is one; and that the forms being merely superimposed have no reality and consequently do not affect the unity of knowledge.

The Vedântin replies:—

Assuming[11] that those forms appearing as externalized objects are fictitious or unreal, are they distinct from knowledge or one with it? To hold that they are distinct will lead to the assumption of the reality of those forms as in the case of another knowledge. To hold that they are one with knowledge will lead to the simultaneous appearance of numerous objects in the region of the intellect, the opponent not accepting the Vedântic theory of the indescribable nature of the external world.

There is another drawback in the hypothesis of the identity of objects denoted by "this" "that" and "like" and appearing in the region of the intellect, with the uniform knowledge;—namely the objects appearing in the intellect be-

ing one with knowledge will be mutually confounded, and the consequence will be that objects which the popular experience has regarded as distinct from one another will be discarded. Likewise the well-known distinction between the knowledge and the knowable will also vanish. When these distinctions are neglected neither will one's own doctrine be established nor will the doctrine of the opponent be shaken, because then the problems of the eternity or otherwise shining in the mental modifications will not refer to the same object (as is the subject-matter of the discussion). In other words argument which originates from the assumption of two contrary positions with regard to the same subject will not arise (when the well-known distinctions of objects are discarded). To take for instance, if the term "non-permanent" be held as not bearing the popular sense ascribed to it, it may convey the sense of "all pervading" and then there will be no contradiction of it with the term "permanent". In the same way if it be regarded that permanence is a form of one knowledge, and non-permanence of another, there is no opposition, the subject matter, of which the contrary attributes are hypothecated, being held altogether distinct, and thus there would be no room for discussion among thinkers.

By this line of argument the reader should understand that the thesis of the idealist that the objects appearing as "this" or "that" in

the intellect are mere forms of knowledge is refuted *pari passu* in the section treating of the defects of the doctrine of the realist.

The opponent argues:—There *is* the external object. It shines in the intellect in its individual momentary character intuitively. This intuitive or immediate pure perception of the object is what the Buddhist calls the thing-in itself (or self-defined objects). This is the import of the terms existence. (In other words the *esse* is *percipi* or being and perception are one). The mediate complex cognitions which give rise to the false popular experience as "this is a pot" are indeterminate in themselves and shine forth in the region of the intellect in the forms of similarity between their respective characters. These indeterminate mediate cognitions are the back ground on which the difference of opinion among thinkers is based. Now this indeterminate cognition which assumes the form of the object is of two kinds (1) ideal and (2) real.

The Vedântin does not accept the argument and asks:—What are we to understand by the idealization of the external? If by idealization is meant the apprehension of the external, the indeterminate cognition is not of two kinds as will be presently shown.

Idealization may mean (1) that the internal form of knowledge which is inexpressible turns into the external form expressible in language, or (2) that it is joined with external

form or (3) that it is superimposed as the external. It cannot mean the first, because a thing cannot be turned into another, A thousand architects, for instance, cannot turn a pot into a piece of cloth. Nor can the second meaning be accepted because the internal or subjective cannot be joined with the external or objective, for in that case our cognition should assume the form that the idea and the object are united (and not—"a pot exists") but such a cognition never arises (*i. e*, we never feel the combination of the notion with the object but we feel the presence of object alone in our mind). The third sense is equally untenable. It is asked:—Does the superimposition of the internal proceed (*A*) after the apprehension of the external or (*B*) otherwise? If the external is apprehended, which element apprehends the external substratum? Is it apprehended by (*a*) the very indeterminate cognition whose form is to be superimposed or (*b*) by the intuitive immediate cognition arising simultaneously with the indeterminate cognition? If it (the external) be apprehended by the indeterminate cognition, is that external (*a'*) the self-defined object (thing in-itself) or (*a"*) the common characteristic? It cannot be (*a'*) the self-defined object, because it is only through the common characteristic that we apprehend the import of a term expressing a complex or indeterminate conception relating to an object capable of being connected, and not through the individual or self-confiined characteristic, because the self-con-

fined characteristic or speciality being infinite on account of its dissociation with time and space cannot be comprehended by language which depends upon correlations. It is for this very reason that a complex notion or indeterminate cognition which is expressed in language has no reference to the speciality or self-confined character of a thing. The Buddhist's tenet on this subject runs as under :—

"The essence or the true nature of mental notions of pleasure &c., is incomprehensible by means of language, because there is no inherent chain running through them all. They are therefore self-received or intuitively cognized and are inexpressible in language."[12]

The external cannot be (*a*") the common characteristic because complex notion cannot grasp such an external object without apprehending in the first place the individuality or speciality of each. The individuality is impossible to be comprehended in the Buddhistic theory as is just shown. Although in the theory of the Mîmânsakas the individualiry is by itself not the object of the expressive power of language, it becomes the subject-matter of a complex notion expressed in terms of language in as much as it is simultaneously conized with the common characteristic, the direct object of the expressive power of language. But in the Buddhistic philosophy the individuality cannot be expressed in terms of language because his theory is that

each individual is self-defined and becomes the object of intuitive or immediate knowledge only (whereas in the Mîmânsaka's theory each individual is possessed of common characteristic whose apprehension by means of language leads to the simultaneous comprehension of the individuality).

The other view enunciated above *viz.*, (*b*) that the external is apprehended by the intuitive immediate consciousness arising simultaneously with the mediate cognition is also not tenable. Because although the intuitive consciousness simultaneously arising with the mediate cognition may apprehend the external, the mediate cognition cannot superimpose its form on the external inasmuch as it has not apprehended the external. To illustrate the point, the knowledge of silver cannot superimpose the character of silver or an external object in front of us as long as the object itself is not illumined by that knowledge.

The main second alternative (*B*) namely the external is not apprehended before the superimposition is equally untenable. Because in that case the thing would appear as a form of the idea and *not* as an external object. In other words in the absence of comprehension of the external substratum the internal idea alone should appear and not its externalized form.

The superimposition of the nature of cognition on the external is not only impossible on account of the non-presentation of the external substratum but is absurd on account of the im-

possibility of the very appearance of the super-imposition. To explain this, let us see whether this mediate complex cognition (embracing the relative relations of the object) which is supposed as super-imposing its self-conscious, existent and internal form as if it were the external object, makes the super-imposition after first assuming its really existent form or whether it simulaneously assumes its form and super-imposes the same. The first view is untenable, because the cognition being in itself momentary and devoid of all succession cannot embrace the assumption of form and its super-imposition or externalization which occur in succession *i. e.*, the cognition first assumes the form simultaneously with its birth, and then the form is externalized.

The other view that the assumption of form and super-imposition of it on the external by the complex cognition occuring simultaneously is also not valid. What are we to understand by the super-imposition or externalization? Does it mean that the idle form and the external object present themselves as one or that the real distinction between the two is not apprehended as in the doctrine of those who do not admit the existence of essentially false knowledge. The first hypothesis cannot stand, because the presentation of identity of the ideal form and the external object is not possible, the difference between the two-namely the former being self-shining while the latter requiring the light of another for its presentation in the region of con-

sciousness being palpable. The second assumption also cannot serve the purpose. It is enquired on that hypothesis, whether the indiscrimination between the form and the external object gives birth to the false dealings of mundane existence on the assumption that the external is apprehensible or not? The first view is not valid because the ideal form is vivid it being self-cognized while the external (which is held apprehensible) is not clearly presented to mind. Thus the vividity and indistinctness of the ideal form and the external object respectively constitute a perceptible difference and hence there can be no indiscrimination between the two. The second view that the external is not apprehensible in the theory of indiscrimination is equally unsatisfactory. It means that the cognition does no apprehend its distinction from every object of the three worlds; and hence the popular activity will not be definite there being equal indiscrimination every where[13]. The Buddhists assume that activity is based upon the belief of the external world, the internal world being self-presented (*i. e.*, the confusion between the internal and the external is the basis of popular activity and when all the ideas and objects are equally confounded the popular activity will be equally indefinite).

Again the relation of cause and effect also cannot subsist in the four elements which are momentary, because every object is regarded as not existing in the second moment of its birth.

The opponent retorts:—If a thing is sup-

posed to have a power to bring about a particular effect, the accomplishment of the latter cannot be delayed. If such a delay is possible the only inference is that the object has not got the potentiality for the production of that effect. It follows, then, that an object which has the potentiality to bring about as many effects as possible should accomplish, while standing itself in the first moment, those effects whose being appears in the second moment. It should not accomplish the effect connected with the third and subsequent moments by continuing its own existence in the second moment. Hence a thing has no existence in the second and third moments, the existence of a thing being nothing more than its practical efficiency or the power to bring about effects.

To this the Vedântin replies that the opponent is labouring under delusion. We have already established that the relation of cause and effect is impossible to be based on the Buddhistic theory of momentary flux which does not admit of the existence of a permanent principle comprehending the relation of cause and effect. Again the popular activity is impossible to explain on the Buddhistic theory, the consequence of which will be that all settled views will fall to the ground. It is thus enough to discuss questions with one who does not deserve to be argued with. To sum up, then, the doctrines of Vaibhâshika and Sutrântika are unsatisfactory, as they are based on the teaching of Buddha who has deceived the world by propounding (fallacious) means of achieving heaven and absolution.

Section II.

Refutation of the Buddhistic School of Idealism.

—o—

Now the theory of Yogâchâra who advocates the doctrine of Idealism is being described and then refuted. It should not be said that separate refutation of the idealistic school of Buddhism is redundant, its refutation having already been included by parity of reasoning in that of the two schools of Buddhism which advocate the existence of momentary external world. We undertake the refutation separately because Buddha had a special leaning towards the doctrine that the group of sensations is the only element which has been alluded to in the Buddhistic text which decides in the affirmative, on the analogy of a dream in which dealings take place with the help of sensations alone, the question:—Whether the Buddhistic doctrine is explicable or not on the mere assumption of the group of sensations, although a theory of the existence of the external world is propounded by Buddha in view of the predilection of some of his disciples towards the external world. Again there is another reason for undertaking this refutation separately, namely, although we have refuted the substantial basis of sensations in the form of the momentary external objects, the absolute existence of momentary ideas independent of the external world remains still to be refuted. The opponent of idealism might question the propriety of the doctrine as under:—

"The problem of reality is exhausted in the discussion of its four aspects, namely (1) proof or mode of achieving right knowledge, (2) the conscious subject or ego, (3) the object of knowledge, and (4) knowledge itself. In the absence of any of the four aspects no principle can be established. It follows then that the thinker who tries to explain the 'world' on the assumption of the bundle of ideas only must admit these four aspects (in the solution of the problem). Now when a thinker admits proof &c, for the establishment of a principle, he cannot dispense with the object of proof. Thus how can the world be exhausted in the sole category of the group of sensations or ideas?"

The Idealist answers that the objection is not valid. He says that although there are no knower, the knowable, and the mode of knowledge apart from knowledge, the mere division of knowledge into the forms of knowable &c., is fictitiously possible. The form of the knowable &c., belongs essentially to the intellect and is internal. By these internal forms alone superimposed by intellect the popular dealings as proof, the knower and the resultant consciousness are explicable, and hence there is no reality in them.

The Vedântin should not, the Buddhist Idealist continues, urge the objection that the Idealist had per force to accept the Vedânta doctrine inasmuch as the Vedântic Brahman being identical with consciousness becomes the exter

nalized object like the blue &c., in accordance with ideal forms, which is tantamount to saying that cognition itself has the externalized form of blue &c., otherwise non-duality cannct be established. The Buddhist Idealist replies that the Vedântins do not admit *mere* cognition in the form of blue &c., but cognition having for its object the external blue &c., recognized as indescribable in itself. We (Buddhists) on the contrary maintain that blue &c., are the innate forms of cognition itself. This is the difference. Thus the knowable consists of the false externalized form of knowledge or cognition itself. The result of proof is the illumination of such a knowable; and the proof is the power of cognition itself to illumine the knowable form. The fourfold aspects of the theory of knowledge namely proof &c., do not turn cut to be real, even on the assumption of reality of the external world, for Vaibhâshika and Sauntrântika who believe in the existence of the external world regard the practical dealings such as proof, the result of the process of knowledge, the knowable and the process of knowing as purely fictitious.

In the Vaibhâshika's theory of knowledge, the external object is perceptible. The result of the process of knowing is the exclusion of ignorance or imperceptibility of the object. While the power to bring about the removal of ignorance is the means of achieving knowledge. Now proof is the instrument or power just referred to

and the subjective consciousness of the object is the result of the process of knowing. The proof and resulting knowledge should have the same substratum, because if their substrata or spheres differ, the anomaly would be just like the splitting of a Pâlâsha tree when the axe operates on a Khadira tree. It would not do to say that even when the Khadira tree is split the substrata of the axe and the result namely splitting are different inasmuch as the axe has its being in its own parts, whereas the splitting is found in the Khadira tree. Because the axe which is the means of splitting and which is possessed of the necessary operation has for its substratum the Khadira tree with which it comes in contact. Thus the means of Knowledge and the resulting consciousness should have the same sphere of appearance *i. e.*, in the region of intellect, as in the instance of the axe and the splitting.

* Now the[1] means of knowledge and the resulting consciousness cannot be located or have their being in the same region of intellect like a berry in a fountain, because intellect is such as cannot be brought into contact with anything else. The location of the means of knowledge and the resulting consciousness is therefore possible by their unity with intellect itself. If the

* Intellect=Substratum–consciousness.
Proof=Means of knowledge.
Knowledge=Resulting consciousness.
Knowable=The external object which Vaibhâshika and Sauntrântika regard as *real* while Yogâchâra as *ideal*.

means of knowledge and the resulting consciousness are essentially different, they cannot be said to be identical with homogeneous intellect; again if they are held to be identical with homogenous intellect this difference cannot be upheld. It follows then that the so-called distinction of the means of knowledge (proof) and the resulting consciousness (knowledge) is imaginary. It is a futile argument against Buddhistic idealism to say that even though the means of knowledge and the resulting consciousness may not be held as essentially distinct in consequence of their oneness with the true intellect, the external knowable object should turn out to be really existent in consequence of its being proved by those two aspects (namely proof and knowledge) which are essentially real on account of their identity with intellect (the real datum). It is futile because a self-defined external object (thing-in-itself) which has no parts cannot be said as coming into contact with the two real aspects of intellect *viz*, proof and knowledge. That generic aspect of intellect imagined as a factor excluding ignorance is called the resulting consciousness (knowledge) while that aspect of intellect which is supposed to have the power to illumine the object to one's self by the removal of the incompetence of shining of its own accord is called the means of knowledge (proof); while the knowable is the external object itself. Thus when proof and knowledge, which consist respectively of the generic characters of removing (1) the objective

incompetence of self-shining, and (2) the subjective ignorance, are regarded as having their being in the region of intellect, those characters are merely imaginary; and by such imaginary proof and knowledge no reality can be proved and hence the external object turns out to be merely imaginary.

Again in the theory of Sautrântika the external object is inferred from the diversity of the intellectual forms; the proof consists in the similarity of the intellect with the external object; and knowledge or resulting consciousness consists in the intellectual appearance of the object. Now the apparent similarity with the external blue substance, for instance, which exists in the intellect, is an imaginary ideal form excluding the non-blue form. This ideal similarity proves the external object as a reflection proves the object reflected. The proof, then, is an imaginary form of the intellect admitted for the exclusion of the contrary form. The resulting consciousness or knowledge in the generic form is also determined in its special character of blue form of similarity. In this view also the knowable is essentially distinct from knowledge. The generic character of intellect as proof and knowledge being imaginary the division of proof and knowledge is also imaginary.

The Buddhist idealist then sums up and says that even in the schools of Vaibhâshika and Sautrântika who admit the reality of the external world, the division of proof and knowledge

is imaginary; then there is no impropriety if the Idealist explains the whole round of the world on the imaginary distinction in ideal forms only.

The opponent of Buddhistic Idealism argues that the external object like a pillar which is actually perceived, cannot be denied. To such an opponent the Idealist puts the question:— Well, does the external object like a pillar consist of (*A*) atoms or (*B*) a systemetic whole composed of those atoms? If it be the first (*A*), does the knowable pillar become the object of knowledge as (*i*) atoms alone, or (*ii*) as a complex thing presenting a dense form &c? The knowable pillar cannot be perceived in the form of atoms, because the knowledge in which one dense and blue form is presented cannot have reference to atoms which are of opposite character. Knowledge with one form of presentation cannot refer to another, for if the preception be extended like that, every being will be omniscient because every object will be cognized by every form of knowledge. The other view (*A ii*) that the knowledge is a complex thing possessed of density &c., is also not tenable. It is enquired on that hypothesis:—

Are these density, blueness &c., properties (*a*) of knowledge or (*b*) of the external object depending on the condition of presentation at the time of the intellectual appearance? If they belong to the knowledge, it is tantamount to

saying that knowledge or cognition is based on its own form, and thus there being no real external object, we, the idealists, gain our position. The opponent of idealism might say :—let the other view (*b*) be accepted. He then proceeds to describe his view :—

The intellect which keeps in the dark the true nature of an individual atom apprehends at a time a number of atoms, and then some dense form is cognized. This dense form being absent in each individual atom is not the property of an atom like blueness &c.

But when those atoms are presented to mind in the form of a cluster the density becomes the phenomenal property of the external object like connection. The Idealist should not retort by saying that if density is observed in one atom it must be regarded as its essential property, but density cannot be ascribed to a single atom; hence the cognition which assumes the form that the density is in a number of atoms taken together leads us to suppose that it is not an essential attribute but an adventitious adjunt. This conditional character of density implies that its cognition is illusory. This subsidiary objection of the idealist is met by the realist as under:—Those very atoms which were apprehended individually by the mind appear, when there is no intervening space as a dense object when cognized by the mind as one. Those atoms are real and cognition which refers to the real can-

not be held as illusory. Thus blue atoms without an intervening space when cognized as one by the mind are what is called a blue pillar.

To the realist arguing as above the idealist replies:—If the blue atoms without intervention are called a blue substance when cognized by the mind as one, then in such a blue substance there are also present atoms possessed of the properties of taste, scent, and touch and consequently the blue atoms cannot be said to be devoid of intervention. It follows, then, that just as trees with intervening space appear from a distance as a dense forest, so atoms which are possessed of form with intervening space or atoms of different nature give rise to an illusory appearance of a dense object like a pillar.

Let us now take the the latter of the first two views (Vide (*B*) view supra) namely the external object is an organized whole composed of atoms. It is asked :—Are those whole objects like a pillar (*I*) different from atoms or (*II*) one with them or (*III*) both one and different? On the first hypothesis (*I*) have the whole and its constituents (*i*) any relation or (*ii*) not? It cannot be (*I ii*), because in that case the the relation of cause and effect cannot be established. On the (*I i*) hypothesis, is the relation that of (*a*) identity or (*b*) intimate relation? It cannot be (*I i a*), because things, which are essentially different like a horn and a cow, cannot have the relation of identity. The view (*I i b*)

has already been refuted in the section relating to the refutation of the Vais'eshika doctrine.

The second view (*B. II*) that the whole and its parts are one is untenable as has been shewn in discussing the merits of the first main hypothesis (*A*).

The third view (*B. III*) is self contradictory.

It should not be argned by the realist:— "If the external object is not possible either in the form of parts or of the whole let it be so. But there is no objection to the assumption of the external in the form of class and individuals".

The argument is fallacious because if the class and the individual objects are essentially distinct, they will be independent of each other; if they are essentially one, the species will be confounded with class and vice versa; and if they are one and different, the position is self-contradictory. Thus the division of class and species is untenable as that of whole and its parts. It is then established that whatever is presented to mind cannot stand the test of reason; that there is no poof establishing the existence of an entity not presented to mind; and consequently cognitions have no external corresponding substrata.

If the existence of the external world is based on the experience of a variety of cognitions *e. g.*, ideas of a pot, a piece of cloth, it is replied that the external world is an impossibility.

To discuss the point, when we have ideas of variety of objects like a pot, a piece of cloth, are the ideas and the objects one or different?

If they are one, then what was desired by us (Idealists) is gained. If they are different, what is to be understood by the illumination of an object by idea which is different? Does it mean (*a*) that a sensation with regard to the object is produced by the idea as is done by the external senses, or (*b*) that a resulting manifestation is produced by the idea in the object? It cannot be (*a*) for in that case idea being already existent, there is no propriety of the production of another idea or sensation If the production of such a second idea is admitted to be necessary there would be confusion ad infinitum (that second idea requiring a third and so on). It cannot be (*b*), for that position will lead us to the experience of past and future objects *e. g.*, a destroyed pot, a pot which is to come into existence (simultaneously with the experience of the present pot). If the past and future objects[2] are regarded as non-existent there would be no possibility of our experience thereof in the form of resulting manifestation in those objects. We cannot reconcile the impropriety by saying that the substance (pot) is produced now, while the properties (connections of time) are after-creations[3]

The advocate of the essential difference between idea and its object argues:—

Let not the idea produce another sensation relating to the object, and let it not create the the property of manifestation in the object. It will, however, be the means of the popular experience with regard to the object with which it is essentially connected.

It is replied that the essential nature of idea with which the object is said to be connected being only a state of consciousness is common to all the knowable, and consequently there would result omniscient consciousness. We are therefore obliged to regard the perceptibility of an object to mean the presentation of a complex (as opposed to simple *i e.*, devoid of all tinge of the object, but consisting of a pure mood of consciousness) idea associated with the corresponding form of the object like a pot, the popular experience of a pot being based upon knowledge as well as upon the form of the pot.

It is retorted by the opponent of the Idealist:—The form *e. g.*, a pot, does not belong to the idea itself, but a pot-like form is found in the idea corresponding to the external pot. Thus how can the external object be regarded as a mere ideal form?

It is replied that we experience only one form. It is gratuitous to believe that the external object also possesses the same form (as is ideally represented). It should not be said that the assumption of a form in the external object is desirable to account for the variety of cogni-

tions which cannot be explained on the mere form of idea, the latter being common to all knowledge. Because the idealist regards idea itself as explaining the variety of external pot-like forms represented to mind. Even the realist finding that in the absence of an intellectual similarity with the objects in the mind, the inherence of knowledge in instances like the ideas of a pot, a piece of cloth, is not experienced, has to admit special forms like those of a pot in knowledge itself. Now when pot-like forms are admitted as existing in the region of knowledge, the assumption of the real external object becomes purposeless, the popular experience of a pot being explicable on the assumption of ideal form only. It should not be objected that the real external object is needed to super-impose the special form in knowledge, because the *innate variety* of ideal forms is possible even without the real external world as in a dream.

Again the absence of distinction between idea and its object is proved by negative rule that whenever there is distinction the simultaneous appearance of the two is not invariably observed *e. g.* The constellation of twins is comprised of two distinct stars, because they are not invariably seen together. It sometimes happens that when one is concealed by clouds, the other appears. The contrary rule of this absence of invariable simultaneous appearance, namely the rule of invariable simultaneous appearance proves iden-

tity. *e. g.*, the moon is one, because the appearance of another moon due to optical illusion is invariably accompanied by the appearance of the real moon. It has been said in Buddhistic texts:—

"The blue object and its idea are one, because they are governed by the rule of simultaneous appearance; the difference is due to illusory ideas as in the case of the double appearance of the moon which is really one".

The knowledge and the knowable being thus governed by the rule of invariable simultaneous appearance, the external object cannot exist apart from idea or knowledge. The idealist thus sums up his theory that the theory of idealism alone is rational, because the knowable as apart from momentary ideas does not stand the test of examination; and that as the external world can on no other theory be explained neither Brahman of Vedântin in the form of eternal consciousness, nor Nature (Pradhâna) of the Sânkhyas, nor atoms of the Vais'eshikas can be regarded as the cause of the world.

* To the above theory of the Idealist the Vedântin replies that the Idealist is deluded. Mere momentary ideas cannot be established as the final principle, because the perception of the external world cannot be gainsaid or sublated, and because the popular experience differs from dream. These defects in idealism have been summarised in the following couplet.

* *Vide* B. S. II. ii.—28, 29, 30, and 31.

"The external world *does* appear, because the experience is not sublated and differs from the cognition of the dream state; even the expression of the Idealist that the internal appears *as if* it were external (implies that the external exists). Hence idea does not assume the form of the external". (वैयासिक अधिकरणमाला).

To take up the refutation at length, is the negation of the external world based upon (*a*) non-perception or (*b*) is it admitted simply because perception, although admitted, does not refer to the external as its object, or (*c*) is it admitted because there is no proof to establish the external although the latter becomes the object of cognition?

It cannot be the first (*a*) for in view of the very clear universal experience—*e. g.* "This is a pillar"—it is impossible to say that there is no perception of the external. The second view is also unacceptable, because the idea which is cognized by the witnessing soul comprehending mental cognitions has for its object an external thing. No body knows idea itself as a pillar or a wall. All the people know pillars walls &c., as objects of their ideas. It is implied from your own expression—"The internal knowable form appears as if it were an external object"—that people regard the external as different from their ideas, for in the absence of the external world, the external cannot be cited as an example of experience:—"It (Ideal form) looks

like the external". A totally non-existent external thing cannot be cited as an instance, for no body says—" Vishṇumitra is like the son of a barren woman ".

" Well ", the opponent contends, " there is proof disproving the external, and hence this third reason leads to the denial of the external." A pot, a piece of cloth, for instance, the alleged real external objects appear as dense, and not in the atomic forms. A dense or gross object is that which simultaneously comes in contact with various directions, and which is encompassed by variety of special positions. Now when knowledge and object are held to be distinct, the proposed external object will in itself be different, being the substratum of the superimposition of two contradictory properties namely its concealment in one direction, and appearance in the other where there is light of knowledge. Such a fault would not occur on the hypothesis of the identity of knowledge and its object; because in the first place when the object which is regarded as determined by knowledge (*i. e.*, as mere form of knowledge), in the state of being known it is in a revealed state as it is identical with knowledge; and in the second place when it is unknown it is no longer one with knowledge, and thus there is no possibility of attributing two contradictory properties (concealment and revelation) leading to the difference in the knowable object itself. The grossness of an object which is encompassed by a variety of space and

directions at one and the same time can never be apprehended in toto. Even the fruit of the tree emblic Myrobalan (Âmlalaka) lying in our palm cannot be seen from the side which is downwards. Hence one and the same gross object should have two characters revealed and unrevealed-based upon its perception and non-perception. Now these two characters are internal or subjective only, and thus the external object cannot be established ".

It is replied that the position is not acceptable although the possibility of the object being connected with two contradictory properties namely appearance and non-appearance is averted by the assumption of the identity of knowledge and its object; still a piece of cloth connected with different points in space when illumined by one idea reveals its two-fold positions as lying here and there; also motion and absence of motion when viewed from its different positions; finally redness and the contrary when it is seen in a picture. Thus even on the assumption of of the external being one with knowledge, the possibility of the difference in the object due to its being superimposed with contradictory properties is equally a hindrance. Besides when knowledge and its object are held to be one, the defect pointed out with regard to the whole and its part in the original treatise on Vedânta, namely Brahmasûtras, in the section relating to the doctrine of the Vais'eshikas, cannot be avoided

from the Buddhistic Idealism. To describe the defect the following query is asked:—Does the whole differ from the parts or not? If the whole is different from its parts, a further query is is put:—Does the whole reside in every part as whole or by parts? In the same way the faults attaching to parts are:—Is that small particle or atom possessed of parts or not? It can as a logical necessity be proved that the atom is possessed of parts which is a fault in the atomic theory. These three faults, (namely (1) the difficulty of regarding the inherence of the whole when accepted as, a distinct entity, in each part as whole (2) The confusion ad infinitum which might follow on the whole being regarded as a distinct entity and yet partially residing in its parts and (3) the logical necessity of regarding at atom as divisible or possessed of parts by shewing that it must have at least so many sides as there are directions) will attach to the theory of the Idealist. The Idealist does not admit the world like the Vedântin as indescribable on which hypothesis the difficulty of its being rationalized might be regarded as a merit of the theory. But on the contrary he holds that whatever is regarded as *externally* existent by the realist is *internally* real or existent; and on that hypothesis the faults which attach to realism apply to idealism also. It should not be said—"three faults were pointed out with reference to the Vais'eshikas or atomists, and why should they be extended to Idealists"—because it is intended

that just as a big log thrown towards one dog hurts other accompanying dogs also, so the trio of faults pointed out with reference to the atomist extends to Buddhists also one of whom admits the reality of the external, while the other holds the reality of the internal The Idealist might argue:—

Just as in a dream all the dealings occur even without the external objects so what harm is there, if the empirical world goes on in the waking state without those objects. In a dream no body experiences the knowable as apart from its idea, but experiences the same as referring to one's own idea. (*i. e.*, the dream object is simply a modification of mind referred to by the idea as its object), there being no proof to hold that the knowable is distinct from knowledge Besides a syllogism to the effect:—"the empirical idea of blue &c, (of the waking state) which is under dispute has no object apart from itself, it being a cognition *e. g.*, the cognition of the dream state"—prove that the admission of the real external world is gratuitous.

It is replied that the argument is fallacious It will not do to say that the experience of the waking state is explicable like that of the dream state, because the idealist does not admit the existence of the world of the waking state. In the doctrine of the Idealist objects of the dream state are not regarded as existing somewhere and appearing elsewhere, for he does not admit

the theory of appearance of an object located elsewhere. There can be no conception of them in the absence of any mental contact with them The idea itself cannot be regarded as the requisite contact, for in that case there will be an end to all kinds of proof like inference &c, (which depend upon a third thing (*e. g*, fire) and the object with reference to which it is to be proved (*e. g*., a mountain) Nor can those objects be regarded as really existent at the place where they appear (*i e*, in the mind), for they are sublated in the waking state. Again they cannot be held to be totally non-existent, for then they cannot be perceived like the horn of a hare. They are not existent and non—existent at the same time for such a dual contradictory nature is impossible. It should not be stated by the Idealist that in view of the absence of a proper instance indescribable objects are created (and are cognized), and that consequently the empirical world may safely be regarded as purely fictitious like the dream-world. Because as long as the knower exists, the empirical world is not sublated; thus it being different in its character from the dream-world it follows necessarily to be an empirical reality. The empirical dealings cannot be accomplished by the property of knowledge itself consisting of a variety of forms, because such a property in knowledge cannot arise when the external world is not admitted. Besides there is no harm in assuming the existence of empirical objects for the facility of empirical dealings as long as the phenomenal existence continues. It is therefore not reasonable, as long as the phenomenal dealings have not terminated, to deny the external world prior to the rise of the knowledge of Brahman to be described hereafter.

Again what the idealist stated before that the external world does not exist it being not possible to determine the nature of the relation between knowledge and the knowable, is untrue. Because the relation of false attribution to be described hereafter explains the external empirical world.

If the Idealist argues:—"Variety of knowledge is possible even in the absence of the external world, on account of the variety of impressions which have no beginning. It should not be urged against us that impressions are not possible in the absence of a substratum, because the subjective flow of consciousness is the substratum (wherein impressions can lie)".

It is replied that there is delusion in the Idealist. The momentary subjective consciousness, if proposed as a substratum, cannot account for memory occurring after a lapse of time, because the said substratum of impressions put forth as the experiencing subject will have then passed conception.

Again is the impression permanent or momen-

tary ? If it is permanent there will be contradiction with the Idealist's own doctrine If it is momentary, memory cannot be explained.

The following syllogism also negatives the subjective consciousness as the substratum of impressions.

The subjective consciousness is not the substratum of impressions, because it is momentary *e. g.*, objective consciousness.

Again impression is a property. Its substratum is the material cause. Now does the subjective consciousness, put forth as the substratum of impressions, come into being simultaneously with the impression in order to constantly maintain its momentariness, or does it arise prior to the occurrence of the impression ? It cannot arise simultaneously, because two objects occuring simultaneously like the right and left horns of an animal cannot stand in the relation of abode and abiding. The other view is also untenable, because if the abode or substratum, which has come into being prior to the object abiding, continues to exist at the time of the production of the object abiding, there would be a blow to the tenet that the abode (subjective consciousness) is momentary. If it be held to be permanent there would be the fault of contradiction of one's own doctrine as has been already pointed out. All the faults based upon the theory of momentary flux that have been pointed out with respect to the doctrine of Buddhistic realism, should also be applied to the doctrine of Buddhistic Idealism. To sum up then, if a permanent, unique, and unchangeable seer of all objects be not admitted, it is impossible to explain any consistent view with regard to (*a*) the substratum of impressions which depend upon a variety of time, space and instrumentality; (*b*) to the memory and recognition which depend upon those impressions ; and (*c*) to the empirical dealings such as perception &c. We refrain from discussing the subject any longer with a hypocritical thinker.

Section III.

Refutation of the Buddhistic School of Nihilism.

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Thus the reader should understand that we have refuted the two doctrines of Buddhism, one maintaining the reality of the external world, while the other holding an idealistic theory of the world. Now we shall describe the doctrine of Buddhistic Nihilist who was called Mâdhyamika, and then refute it.

To commence with the doctrine, the world consisting of pot &c., is not a mere form of knowledge, for such a view has already been refuted. Again the external world cannot be held as really existing, for it has been alredy shewn that the real external entity is unable to bear the test of

examination conducted on the alternative views of the entity as a mere atom or a cluster of atoms. Again idea or knowledge does not exist, because there can be no knowledge without an object. Finally there is no witnessing soul, there being no proof for its existence. In the absence of the entities to be witnessed namely idea and its object, we cannot determine if there is a witnessing soul. It has been said:—

"Momentary idea cannot be the soul, it being like a flash of lightning a streak of clouds and a twinkling. Nothing else than these ideas is perceived. The Mâdhymikas therefore maintain that the world is unsubstantial or a zero Even in the Veda, which in one of its texts declares that this world was non-existent, this nihilism is propounded. The whole world consisting of knowledge and the knowable is merely conceived out of delusion".

The syllogism adduced by the Nihilist is:—

The world to be explained is unsubstantial, because it cannot stand the test of reason *e. g.*, the idea of water in mirage.

Thus although the Vedântin has refuted the three schools of Buddhism all maintaining in common the theory of momentary flux, yet each holding its distinctive doctrine namely (1) Vaibhâshika holding the view of the presentation of the external object, (2) Sautrântika holding the inferability or representation of the external

world standing as the substratum or type of the ideal reflections or forms, and (3) Yogâchâra maintaining the unreality of the external apart from knowledge, the doctrince of Nihilism has to be answered. According to that doctrine the world is not existent, because it is sublated; it is not unreal or non-existent because it is immediately cognized by us; it is not real and unreal at the same time, because existence and non-existence are contradictory in the same object; nor can it be held to be other than real and unreal at the same time, and thereby indescribable, for the negation of one attribute necessarily leads to the assertion of the opposite attribute. Thus the essence of objects is reduced to non-entity that is to say the world labours under the difficulty of being rationalized, it being unsubstantial on account of its not falling under any of the four hypothetical categories. By the contemplation of the unsubstantial nature of the universe following the train of thought relating to its momentariness, salvation which consists in the annihilation of individuality is attained. By "unsubstantiality" the Nihilist does not mean any positive element, but the absolute negation of the universe.

* To this it is replied that the doctrine is meaningless. The negation of knowledge and its object which is called non-entity is not possible, because both of them are actually cognized

* *Vide* B. S. II. ii. 31, and 32.

All the empirical proofs always refer to positiveness, and establish a real and unambiguous principle cognized in every conception as the underlying existence. A thinker who establishes the irrationality of being and non-being practically asserts an entity which is beyond all proof. Thus to propound a theory that everything is reducable to zero or non-entity is an absurdity for that very proposition is not proveable by any means of right knowledge.

The Nihilist argues:—"Let there be the absence of knowledge and its object even in the waking state as in the dream state, and consequently absolute nihilism follows".

It is replied that the argument is untenable, because although the world of the waking state cannot be supposed to be absolutely real *i. e*, such as cannot be falsified at any time, still it differs from that of the dream state inasmuch as it is not sublated while the dream world is sublated. It follows, then, that the empirical reality of the phenomenal world consisting of knowledge and the knowable is possible and consequently there is no absolute negation. Again just as the seer of the dream remains unsublated (in the waking state), so the substantial seer of the whole of the phenomenal world remains unsublated which means that the universe is not reducible to zero. This point has been touched by Vârtikakâra (Sureshwar) in the following text:—

"Tell us, who can deny the existence of that principle through whose positive character even the Nihilist knows non-entity".

Sage Vidyâranya also declares:—

"The existence of Self follows as a logical sequence from the absence of any delusion occurring without a substratum; even non-entity has a positive witnessing soul otherwise it cannot be asserted".

Again the Nihilist is asked:—

Is your non-entity some principle or not? If you say that it is a principle, you have come to the right path, and unconsciously admit the doctrine of Vedânta. Then there will be difference of words only (you calling that principle to be non-entity, while we calling it to be Brahman) This is the only difference between the doctrine of Vedânta and the doctrine of the Buddha, to wit, firstly that the object according to Vedânta is not a mere form of knowledge (as the Buddhist Idealist holds) but has a phenomenal external existence of an indescribable character; secondly the object is not possessed of a kind of existence consisting of practical efficiency as the two schools of Buddhistic realism maintain but is superimposed upon Brahman, and is consequently not absolutely real, for in that view (*i. e.*, of regarding the world as absolutely real) the Vedic texts declaring non-dualism would be contradicted. This point is touched by

S'rîharaha in his Khandana Khanda Khâdya:—

"This is the difference between the views of the Buddha and Vedântin that the former regards everything as fictitions, whereas the latter holds that idea of fictitiousness with regard to non-self only".

If the Nihilist, however, holds that by "non-entity" is meant no principle but absolute negation, he will not be able to point out any principle the knowledge of which can lead to Salvation (according to his conception); Hence Vâchaspatimis'ra in his Bhâmatî says that as the universal objects cannot be sublated without right knowledge, and as right knowledge is not possible on the Nilihistic doctrine the Nihilist holding no positive principle, he (Nihilist) cannot establish absolute negation.

Hence the Buddhistic doctrine being irrational as examined from its texts as also from its purport, should not be accepted by people to attain absolution.

The *textual* criticism is briefly as under:—

Where the Buddhistic writer should use the term "दर्शन" (system of philosophy) an ungrammatical term "पश्यन्" (seeing) is used. Again in place of "स्थानम्" (position) the present participle "तिष्ठन्" (standing) is used. It is only when verbal forms are to be made that तिष्ठ, and पश्य become the substitutes for the roots स्था and दृश्, and not when nominal forms are to be made

(which are based upon the original roots *e. g.*, स्थान and दर्शन). Again the past participle of the root सिह् (to sprinkle) should be सिक्तम् and not सिक्षम् as is found in Buddhistic texts. The term पोषध is used by Buddhists in the sense of उपवास (fasting) as in the text:—स्नातः शुचिवस्त्राभरणः पोषधं विदधत्ते.

(*i. e.*, A man after bathing and putting on clean garments and ornaments observes a fast). Here पोषध is a bad word for उपवास it being not sanctioned by usage. Although these forms पश्यन् &c., have been shewn to be grammatical by Buddhistic grammarians they are really ungrammatical because they have not been adopted by grammarian like Pânini who has collected all accurate forms some of which are sanctioned by immemorial usage and some are approved by fixed grammatical rules.

Essentially also the doctrine is defective. There is, for instance, a palpable deficiency when the Buddhist denies the existence of soul, and at the same time admits the subjective consciousness as the substratum of impressions having no beginning, and as the foundation for all empirical dealings. Again there is contradiction with his theory of momentary flux when the relation of cause and effect is held to be eternal.

It has been pointed out in Itihâsas and Purâṇas that Buddha foresaw the difficulty of running demons born as Kshatriyas, on account

of their meritorious conduct, and that he propounded a self-contradictory system of philosophy while teaching three conflicting doctrines of Realism, Idealism and Nihilism, in order to bring about the moral ruin of those beings who were staunch atheists although accepting Vedic religion. Otherwise it is impossible to reconcile the inconsistent teaching of Gautama who has been regarded as incarnation of the omniscient Being Vishnu, and who has been well known as the enlightened soul in Itihâsas and Purâṇas.

To conclude, then, with reference to the main subject of enquiry with which the book has started, the real meanihg of a "Philosophical teacher" can not be ascertained from the four schools of Buddhistic philosophy.

Section IV.

Refutation of Jainism.

Having thus refuted the doctrine of Buddhistic monks who do not put on the hinder side of the Dhotar, we proceed to describe and refute the doctrine of Jaina mendicants who move about in a nude condition and who are known by the name of Shrâviks. The followers of Jaina admit in all seven categories :—(1) Soul, (2) non-soul, (3) forward movement of the senses towards there objects, (4) restraint of the activity of the senses, (5) self-mortifiication, (6)

bondage and (7) Release. The classification may still be curtailed, and there would stand only two categories (1) soul and (2) non-soul.

These two categories are described as five-fold entities namely (1) the entity of soul (2) the entity of body, (3) the entity of merit, (4) the entity of demerit, (5) and the entity of space; The Jaina term for "entity" (अस्तिकाय) literally signifies a thing of an indeterminate nature. By the "entity of soul" is meant a class of being of an indeterminate character and not a determinate being, for Jainism does not admit of the existence of a uniform character. The remaining terms should also be construed in the same manner.

In this doctrine also atoms give rise to the world as in the Vais'eshika theory in the order of successive creation of dyads &c., (*i. e.*, distinct objects arising from causes).

The entity of soul is described as a being of the size of the body, consisting of intelligence, essentially aspiring for perpetual rise, and possessed of parts. It is of three kinds :—(1) bound, (2) released, and (3) eternally free. The sage Arhat or Jina proper is the eternally free soul, for he is free from mundane existence by the eternal association of the means of absolution. There are other souls who are free by attending to the prescribed method of achieving absolution :—while there are others who are bound in mundane existence.

The entity of mass or body is six fold namely (*a*) the four elements of earth, water, light, and air, and (*b*) the moveable and immoveable objects of the world.

The entity of merit is inferred from the presence of an internal impression of righteous actions or external movements following the dictates of Jainism *e. g.*, the plucking out of the hair, ascending a heated stone &c. The soul is by nature a being aspiring at perpetual rise. His embodied condition is due to actions which hinder this nature of the soul. Demerit is inferred by the embodied condition of the soul and forms the fourth entity. The entity of space is two-fold (1) space intervening heavenly bodies and (2) space beyond the cosmos. The first kind of space is the vacuum between the fourteen worlds or heavenly bodies situated one upon another. The second is the space which transcends the cosmos and which is called the sphere of the liberated souls. Such is the description of the five-fold division of the two categories of soul and non-soul.

Then follow in description the three categories of (*a*) the external propensity of the senses (*b*) the external restraint thereof and (*c*) self-mortifictation all of which are modes of activity. Now activity is of two kinds rational and irrational. The irrational activity is the external propensity of the senses. The Jaina term for it (आस्रव) etymologically means that which

propels the soul towards the external objects, *i. e.*, the bundle of senses. In this sense the term should be आस्राव. There are others who interpret the term as that which environs the soul *i. e.*, action. The activity of the senses towards the external world leads to evil and is therefore called irrational activity.

The internal restraint and self-mortification are the rational forms of activity. Jina describes the former as:—

The activity which closes the doors of the flow of external propensities is called संवर or self-restraint, which is the cause of absolution, while its opposite (आस्रव) or external propensity is the cause of bondage. This self-restraint is of four kinds:—(1) the restraint of the external five senses (2) the restraint of the internal sensory of mind (3) the firm control of body, mind and speech, and (4) the cultivation of kind and temperate habits *e. g*, careful walking even on a road illumined by the solar rays lest minor insects on the earth may not be trampled, moderate use of food &c.

Self-mortification consists in undergoing physical trouble *e. g*, the plucking of hair, ascending a heated slab of stone, which are calculated as leading to the annihilation of good and bad actions tinged with attachment towards the world which clings to the soul from a time knowing no beginning. This method of under-

going physical trouble is called निर्जर (austerity) because it fully undermines the force of good and bad actions by the experience of pleasure and pain. Thus we have described the three categories of (1) external propensity, (2) internal restraint, and (3) austerity or physical mortification.

Now we describe the nature of bondage which consists of eight kinds of action. Action is either destructive (psychological) or constructive (physiological) The former is of four kinds:— (1) that which hides the intellectual vision; (2) that which hides the true system of philosophy; (3) that which confounds the mind, and (4) that which hinders the moral progress.

If mere knowledge can accomplish an object, the knowledge of silver in a mother-o'-pearl would lead to the attainment of real silver, or again the knowledge of imaginary sweet-balls would lead to attainment of real sweet-meats To think like this is the first kind of destructive action for it is perverse knowledge.

To think that the study of the Jaina system would not lead to absolution is the second destructive action.

The confused state of the mind unable to find out the true method leading to the Summum Bonum out of the various conflicting methods pointed out by sages is supposed to be the result of the third kind of destructive action.

The fourth kind of destructive action is revealed when a man is anxious to have power &c., while making a progress towards absolution, for such a desire hinders the progress.

These are called destructive actions, for they destroy the man's ultimate good. The constructive or Physiological action is also four-fold:— (1) germinal activity (2) cellular activity (3) embryonic activity and (4) physical activity.

The first is the inherent activity of the sperm and the ovum united in the form of an egg. The intra-cellular activity or power of developing a body is the second form of constructive action. The activity of the germ-plasm possessed of the power of development giving rise to the liquid state of the germinal substance and the floating nucleus is called the embryonic activity. The last activity in the germ-plasm is the cause of the foetus or a somewhat organic form evolved by requisite temperature.

The eight kinds of action are described by others in a different way. In the doctrine of the Jainas the soul is supposed to posses the four properties of knowledge, intention, pleasure, and valour. These are revealed in the state of absolution. Those bad actions which hinder the manifestation of these properties in the state of mundane existence are called the four-fold destructive actions. Whereas those which destroy egoism, embodied condition, of the soul are called constructive actions.

All these eight kinds of action are called bondage because they tie down the soul.

Having thus described the category of bondage we shall delineate the category of freedom. Some say that absolution consists in realizing the state of the eternally free soul called Arhat. Others on the contrary maintain that it consists in the existence of the soul in the high extra-cosmic region in a condition free from all impressions of evil, possessed of unblemished knowledge, and unmixed happiness. A third set of Jainas holds that absolution means the eternal rise of the soul consequent upon the removal of bondage brought about by the embodied condition which sticks to the soul from a time which knows no beginning. To support this view it is said that the rise of a being is seen on the expiry of his bondage *e. g.*, a parrot free from a cage, flies or an entire gourd, which has lost the mud thickly applied to it by insertion of it into the water, floats.

Out of the seven categories soul and non-soul are the subject and object respectively. Out of the remaining five the last two namely bondage and freedom are the ends; while the first three, namely external propensity, internal restraint and self mortification are the means. The irrational activity or external propensity of the senses results in bondage; the rational activity is the form of self-restraint and physical mortification

results in absolution. Such are the seven categories of the Jainas.

All these seven categories are proved to be of indeterminate form by the application of a mode of reasoning called the method of sevenfold predication as under:—(1) Perhaps a thing may exist (2) perhaps it may not exist; (3) perhaps it may exist and may not exist; (5) perhaps it may be existent and yet indescribable; (6) perhaps it may be non-existent and at the same time indescribable; and (7) perhaps it may be existent and not existent and indescribable.

Anantavîrya describes these predications in the following stanzas:—

"The predication of being is made when the idea of existence is to be conveyed; the predication of non-being is made when the same thing is desired to be negatived; the joint predication of being and non-being is made when both these characteristics of the object are intended to be conveyed as appearing one after another; when being and non-being are intended to be conveyed simultaneously the form of predication is that of indescribability on account of the difficulty of expression; when being and indescribability are to be conveyed the fifth mode or predication is adopted; when non-being and indescribability are to be conveyed, the sixth mode of predication is adopted; and finally when being, non-being and indescribability are to be conveyed together the seventh mode is adopted".

We give the explanation of these texts :—

When the existence of a pot is to be predicated, the form of the proposition becomes "It may perhaps exist". The term for "perhaps" (स्यात्) although a verbal form conveys the sense of "indefiniteness". This is referred to in the following texts by the Jainas.—

"The expletive (स्यात्)" (perhaps) derived from the root अस् (to be) has a special meaning and is used in sentences as an adjunct of the main verb and conveys the sense of indefiniteness. The use of स्यात् ("perhaps") in sentences modifies the predicate by conveying the sense of कथंचित् (possibly), and thereby the verb does not predicate the absolute character of the subject. The seven alternative predications arising from the use of (स्यात्) standing in the position of कथंचित् suggest the possibility of the popular activity and inactivity for achieving or abandoning an object."

To paraphrase the above, the term स्यात् in the seven alternative predications, which resembles a verbal form derived form अस् (to be,) implies indefiniteness in the main predication although it does not expressly give that sense. If the term स्यात् is not suggestive of "indefiniteness", its use in the predication स्यादस्ति ('may be') would be redundant, because स्यात् and अस्ति both give the present tense of अस् (to be), and there would be an unnecessary repetition of

the verb. When स्यात् is admitted as implying the sense of "indefiniteness" the clause (स्यादस्ति= may be) would mean "possibly it may be existent", स्यात् standing in the position of कथंचित् (possibly-perhaps). There would be thus no tautology. This is what is conveyed by-"Has a special meaning" in the above text. From. "The seven alternative predications &c.," the author of the text proceeds to describe the property of conveying the sense of indenifitiness by the term स्यात्. The object of this seven-fold predication is to explain the activity and inactivity of the people with reference to the same object.

किंवृत्तचिद्विधेः=कथंचिदस्ति कथंचिन्नास्ति इत्यादि रूपात् *i. e.*, the predicate is modified by the use of स्यात् in the sense of कथंचित्, derived from the pronoun किम् plus expletive चित् and thus no characteristic is definitely predicated of the subject. The sevenfold predications become necessary, because if a thing is absolutely or definitely existent, it means that its exists in all it sentirety, in all its modes, in all places and in all times. No body should therefore exert himself to achieve it or withdraw himself therefrom in any way, at any place, and at any time, the thing being already there and unfit to be abandoned. This is what is conveyed in the following text:—

"No activity or inactivity is possible if a thing is absolutely existent or absolutely non-existent. If a thing absolutely exists, it is to be found everywhere and at all times."

When the indefinite or sceptical view of the world is adopted the activity or otherwise of intelligent beings with reference to the objects of the world would be possible, for the objects might then be existent with reference to a particular being in some mode, at some time and at some place.

The Jaina then proceeds to lay down his syllogism:—

The object under dispute is of indefinite or multiform character, because it is an entity *e. g.* a mixed colour.

Thus when existence is to be predicated of a pot, for instance, the form of the proposition is—"It may possibly exist"; when its absence is to be predicated, the form is:—" It may possibly be non-existent. " When existence and non-existence are to be conveyed in succession, the form becomes:—" It might possibly exist and might be non-existent. " When existence and non-existence are to be simultaneously conveyed, the language fails to express such a thought, for language can express characteristics in succession, but the simultaneous existence and non-existence are to be expressed. And as both can not be expressed simultaneously and yet the idea has to be expressed in some way the mode of predication adopted is "It might possibly be indescribable." When the idea to be conveyed is that first predication of being can not be expressed in language simultaneously with its non-being, the form of the predication becomes:—

" It might exist, and yet it might be indescribable". When the idea to be conveyed is that the second alternative predication of non-being cannot be expressed simultaneously with the first predication of being, the form of the predication becomes :—"It might not exist, and yet it might be indescribable." When the idea to be conveyed is that the third form of the complex predication of being and non-being cannot be expressed with absolute being or with being and non-being at a time, the form of the proposition becomes:— " It might possibly exist, might not possibly exist, and might be indescribable."

In the above explanation the result of the fifth, sixth and seventh modes of predication being precisely the same as that of the fourth predication of indescribability another interpretation is adopted (by the Jainas) and thus the original texts of Anantavîrya commencing from. "When being and indescribability are to be conveyed the fifth mode of predication is adopted" -would mean as under:—

The predication of absolute being is the doctrinal view of the Sânkhyas which goes by the name of the theory of existent effect. Taking Sânkhya to be the opponent, the Jaina says that absolute being cannot be described. This opinion of the Jaina is embodied in the fifth

form of predication–" It might be existent (according to the Sankhya) and yet indescribable. " The predication of[1] absolute non-being is the special tenet of the Nihilists who deny everything. With reference to the nihilist the Jaina might adopt the sixth mode of predication.– "It might be possibly non-existent and yet indescribable "–implying that absolute non-being cannot be expressed.

The being and non-being of an object in succession is the tenet of the Vaises'hikas and Naiyâyikas, for they hold that objects like a pot &c have a being preceded and succeeded by non-being or in other words they have anterior and posterior non-existences, they themselves standing as counter–entities thereof. With reference to such a thinker, the Jaina says that being and non-being cannot be expressed, which thought is embodied in the seventh form of predication: "It might exist, might not exist and yet indescribable." The point is that being, non-being, and successive being and non-being admitted by the respective opponents are difficult to be expressed, but they are possible forms of predications. Thus being and non-being are perceived with respect to one and the same object like a pot,. To justify this appearance or contradictory characteristics the assumption of the adjunct of a variety of time will not do, because the same characteristics of being and non-being are found in that time itself. To assume another adjunct

of time for justifying these two characteristics in the former time would lead to confusion ad-infinitum. The indefinite character of all objects is thus palpable. The Jaina proceeds to say that this universal scepticism resulting from the difficulty of establishing a definite view with regard to the existence or otherwise of entities like unity, eternity &c., should not be construed as the adoption of the Vedântic doctrine of Maya, because in Vedânta an empirical reality or existence is ascribed to phenomenal objects which are indescribable (from transcendental stand-point) and which are truly speaking mere entities superimposed upon the absolute Brahman, which stands as the noumenon devoid of all possible attributes and three kinds of limitation, and which consists of eternally pure, intelligent and free substance; (whereas the Jaina does not admit empirical reality of objects nor the absolute reality of any substance, but is a universal sceptic). To sum up, then, the seven-fold predication established by reasoning is applicable to the seven categories enumerated above (and thus a doctrine of absolute scepticism is derived).

In reply to the above it is said that the exposition of the Jaina is no better than the meaningless speech of a mad man long possessed by a demon.

It has been said:—

" This naked mendicant prattling enough in

an incoherent and indefinite manner is verily an evil spirit; thinkers, who argue in as limited a speech as possible, employ the efficaciousc harm of silence in order to check this evil spirit."

In the first place the tenet that bodies arise out of atoms called पुद्गल (molecules whose nature it is to integrate and disintegrate) is refuted along with the refutation of the Jaina doctrine as established above. The theory regarding bondage and freedom, and measure of soul &c is being refuted in order,

To commence the refutation, it may be observed that although it is difficult to establish the existence of external objects by the assumption of an adventitious circumstance like time on account of the logical necessity of assuming another adventitious circumstance with reference to the being and non-being of very time itself, yet it is impossible to set aside the empirical definiteness of being, non-being, difference &c, which are observed in external objects like a pot, its shells, as also in the internal conceptions of class, special characteristic &c., inasmuch as their perceptibility proves their mutual distinctness. If objects are held to be of indefinite or multiform character, it is not possible to ascribe simultaneously the presence of conflicting attributes such as being and non-being held to be essentially real in one and the same substance equally real. The difficulty of their simultaneous presence is just like the simultaneous presence

of cold and heat. When the doctrine of definite uniform character is held, whatever exists is existent in a describable form at *all* times, at *all* places, in *all* its character, and in *all* aspects *e. g.*, in the Vedânta doctrine, the inner self. Whatever is said to be existent in *some* character and in *some* place, (*e. g.*, the world in the Vedânta doctrine) is empirically and not essentially real until the knowledge of Brahman is achieved, where is the impropriety in this view held by the Vedânta? In your doctrine, however, where being and non-being are held to be real properties, the appearance of the substance would follow even at the time of non-existence. If they are held as constituting the essential nature of entities, there would be eternal being and non-being, and consequently a broken pot, for instance, would hold honey (*i. e.*, an absurd conclusion would follow). There would likewise follow the impropriety of activity &c. In our doctrine the activity and non-activity are reconcilable on the theory of empirical reality. The Jaina should not fear essential reality of the world merely from its becoming the object of empirical expression. Because in that case a pearl oyster, mirage &c., would turn out to be real from their being expressed as silver, water &c. Again essential reality of an object cannot follow on its becoming the object of empirical cognition which is excessively firm and remains unsublated. Because on that line of argument the doctrine of body being regarded as self would be

held to be real (the popular experience making no distinction between body and soul). It will not do to say that the discriminate falsify by their knowledge the popular confusion of experiencing body as soul; (and thereby there is no scope for regarding materialism as a true doctrine). Because in that case the infinite world would equally be sublated by the knowledge of the discriminate, and thus there would be no scope for the essential reality thereof. Thus two contradictory properties being impossible to exist in one and the same object, the multiform or indefinite character of the world is possible neither from the empirical nor from the transcendental stand point. On the contrary the definite or uniform character of objects like pot &c., although not essentially applicable to them, holds good in popular experience and is consequently emipri cally real.

Again as being and non-being are opposed to each other, there is a doubt leading to the absence of their simultaneous inherence In an essentially real entity there is no scope for doubt or hypothetical alternatives. Thus when the gymnosophist subjects his entities like (*a*) the establishment of seven categories and five groups (*b*) the fruit of their knowledge namely absolution, (*c*) the knowing subject (*d*) the means of knowing, (*e*) and the objects to be known namely the seven and five kinds of categories and groups, to the hypothetical alternatives of being and non-being he reflects wonderful credit on his position as a philosophical teacher.

Thus whatever exists exists in our opinion, in a definite form. Whatever exists in an indefinite form like the world is a super-imposed entity. There is no scope in the superimposed entity of the world for the division of acceptable and non-acceptable objects. Besides the very establishment of the theory if held to be of a definite form would upset the doctrine.

Again are the categorical objects which are described in groups as well as in details fit to be expressed by all words or by particular words? The first view is not tenable, because although a pot for instance is expressed by the term "pot", it remains unexpressed by terms like a pillar &c. It should not be said that the other view is accepted and not the first. Because on that hypothesis the inexpressibillity of objects (*i. e.*, one of the seven fold predications of every object according to Jainism) would not be possible. If they are inexpressible no word can denote them. To say that they are expressed and are indescribable is a contradiction in terms.

It will not do to argue:—"They are indescribable although they are expressed, in consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining those as existent &c". Because a man who speaks out in one and the same breath the view that objects

are expressible and are yet ascertained and not ascertained; that heaven and absolution are existent and non-existent; that absolution is eternal —has no better reliability than a mad man.

Again one of the tenets of Jainism is that Arhat is an eternally free soul; that some individual souls achieve absolution by the performance of holy acts and that others are in a bound state for want of meritorious acts. Thus this view of souls having those three definite characters must be either of that definite nature or indefinite according to Jaina doctrine. If this view itself is subjected to the hypothetical predications as " possibly existent ", " possibly non-existent", there would be confusion, and the view will not be regarded as reliable it being not ascertainable by the Jaina system itself. Moreover objects like pot &c., being of confused character with one another, according to Jaina doctrine a man desirous of getting cooked rice might proceed to eat fire, and a thirsty man might proceed to fetch earth.

It will not do to say that the difference of objects is held as existent and such a confused activity cannot follow. Because the Jaina in the same breath admits non-difference of objects; and the confused activity is a logical necessity.

Just as the doctrine of indefiniteness is untenable, so the tenet that soul has parts is also objectionable. If the soul is regarded as having parts, he would be of the middle size (*i. e.*,

neither atomic nor all pervading). The middle sized-ness would lead to non-eternal character of the soul which in its turn would lead to the faults of (*a*) the annihilation of good and bad actions and (*b*) the attainment of fruits of good or bad actions by a soul who has not performed them. The result would be that no one would exert himself in consequence of indefiniteness of fruition.

Again a soul of the size of human body cannot pervade the whole body of an elephant the former being of a smaller size. Thus when a human soul is born an elephant, the soul of the latter cannot pervade his whole body. In the same way when the same soul abandons the body of the elephaut and takes birth in the body of an ant, it cannot be accommodated wholly in the body of the ant. Thus the soul cannot be regarded as of the same size as the body. (The difficulty occurs not only in the change of births, but applies to the same life also). A being of small size in his childhood cannot pervade the body of his youth and old age.

The Jaina might argue :—

" Just as the light of a lamp situated in a pot and a large place becomes contracted and expanded respectively, so the soul also possessed of parts may contract and expand his particles in the bodies of the ant and elephant respectively".

But the argument is fallacious. It is enquired :—Are those infinite particles of the soul

accommodated in the same limited space or not? The first view is not possible; the infinite number of particles cannot be accommodated in a limited sphere, and consequently the soul would be existent even outside the body. The other view is equally bad. Even one particle of the soul might explain the sameness of the sphere of the soul's existence and consequently all the particles might not extend beyond the space of one particle. Then the soul would be atomic in size.

The instance of a lamp is inapplicable. The particles of the flame of a lamp have momentary existence, and the flame is an organized object capable of perpetual rise and decay. The soul whose nature is illustrated by the instance, is, on the contrary, held to be an eternal being. Again the infinity of particles in the soul is more ridiculous, for there can be no infinity of particles in a space of the limited size of a body. It will not do to hold that on the attainment of a big body the soul gathers together new particles and on getting a small body he loses some of his particles, and thus the soul's size equal to that of the body is maintained. Because such an assumption would lead to mutability in the soul. The soul who perpetually gathers together his particles and loses them is necessarily a changeable being. His eternal character cannot be maintained on the instance of the sea, because his non-eternal character would follow from his mutability as in the case of a hide. On the assumption of non-eternal character of the soul

the theory of bondage and freedom falls to the ground inasmuch as a being connected with bondage and freedom is virtually held absent.

Again will the Jaina reply the query:

Does the soul consist in atoms or is it an organized entity? On the first view do all the coming and going particles constitute the soul, or does any small particle stand as the soul? It cannot be the first, because the coming and going particles being of unstable nature cannot be the soul just as the body. Besides the nature of those coming and going particles cannot be definitely ascertained in consequence of their indeterminate size. It is, besides, a question whether the fountain of the rise and decay of those particles is to be found in the great elements or in something else. Those particles cannot arise from, and vanish in, the great elements of earth &c., because the soul is not a product of elements. No other fountain of the rise and decay of particles is capable of being proved either as the common substratum of all souls or as a special source for each individual soul.

The other view that one small particle out of a number of them stands as the soul is also untenable. Because unless we know that this particular atom is the soul, there can be no real knowledge of the soul and thus there can be no absolution.

Besides the Jaina holding the view that the soul has parts should answer the query:—

Have those particles of the soul vitality in each of them or do they exhibit vitality together? On the first view each atom being a vital entity there would be no uniformity of action inasmuch as many sentient beings do not work with a uniform motive, and it is thus possible that in consequence of conflicing activity in different directions on the part of numerous sentient atoms the body might collapse. If the other view is held *viz.*, that vitality is exhibited by the soul's atoms taken together, the soul cannot exhibit life in the body of an ant in which he takes birth, for instance, after abandoning the body of an elephant, inasmuch as there would remain in the ant only two or three particles of the soul. There can in fact be no collection of all the atoms of the soul in the body of an ant, most of the particles having dropped. The theory cannot be improved by the assumption of a continuous flow of vital atoms, because we have already refuted the relation of a stream and its particles while dealing with the Buddhistic doctrine by raising hypothetical objection of their eternity and otherwise.

The Jaina might retort:—Let the soul be eternal and atomic in size. It is replied that such a theory cannot explain the realisation of pleasure &c., pervading the whole body. It should not be said that on the analogy of a lamp and its light (the former remaining at one place, while the latter extending over a large area) the realisation of pleasure &c., as pervading the whole body

is possible by the rise of knowledge in the region illumined by the light of soul (situated in one part of the body). Because the Jaina should reply the query:—Is that light a property of the soul or his essential nature? It cannot be the property, because the relation of property and substance depends upon intimate relation, and that Intimate relation has already been refuted, and will, again, be refuted while discussing the theory of the Naiyâyikas. It cannot be the essential nature of the soul, because in that case the soul being coextensive with his radiation will be of middle size and the assumption that he is atomic in size will have to be abandoned. Besides the light of the lamp situated among the group of houses is never beyond visual perception. And when it is held as perceptible, it is a clear experience that the light is also possessed of parts (and thus cannot stand as an instance of the atomic soul).

To turn to the original subject of discussion we find that the term "philosophic teacher" cannot express a definite meaning in accordance with the Jaina doctrine. The system of gymnosophists is thus inconsistent, and we should close our dialogue with an opponent unfit to argue with.

Section V.

Refutation of the materialistic School of Châvâkas.

Let the meaning of "Philosophical teacher"

be determined in accordance with the system of Châr vâka.[1] The teaching of the system is as under :—

According to the followers of this school the essence of the world consists of the four elements of earth, water, light and air which are proved by perception. No other principle is admitted, because they do not admit other proofs like inference &c., (establishing other principles). The advocate of the theory anticipates the objection to the effect that there would be no possibility of the knowledge about the existence of great-grandfathers of a man (and hence the past existence of them would be negatived according to the theory which admits no proof other than perception), because there is no contact of the senses with the object (*viz* forefathers) which is the essential cause for the rise of direct knowledge. It is replied by the advocate that although there is no ordinary form of contact of the object with the senses, the direct knowledge of forefathers is possible by the extraordinary form of intellectual contact. As direct cognition is admitted to be the only proof of an object, the assumption of God, his creation, and the world hereafter is regarded to be purposeless. Again because a man feels with reference to the same substratum the ideas of humanity, whiteness in his physique, and knowledge when he says—"I am a man ; I am white ; I know"–it follows that knowledge, pleasure &c , are located in the body possessed of white complexion &c., and that soul is nothing else but the body consisting of a collection of particles of the four elements having transitory existence. There is no extra physical element either atomic, or extensive or consisting of consciousness. The soul consisting of body is the counter-entity of anterior and posterior non-existences, for we see, for instance, that a body designated as Devadatta is born and then destroyed. The aphorisms of Bṛihaspati, the propounder of this system, are:—(1) Body associated with intelligence is the soul. (2) The fulfilment of desires is the only end of life. (3) Absolution is nothing but death.

It should not be objected:—"that body cannot be the soul, for it is devoid of consciousness. The absence of consciousness in body follows from its being the product of earth like a pot"—because although a pot being the sole product of earth is devoid of consciousness, body attains consciousness it being made up of four elements just as mere powder to be used with betel leaves is devoid of redness but exhibits redness when mixed with chunam and leaves. Again the inference pointed out to prove the absence of consciousness in body is of no avail because it is sublated by perception to the contrary *viz* "I am conscious". The following couplets embody the views of the materialist of this school:—

"The only proof is perception. The essence
"is the collection of four elements. There is no
"absolution other than death. Desire and wealth
"are the ends of life. There is no creator like

"God. The talk of the world hereafter is non-
"sense. If there be a soul apart from body,
"examine the matter as in the case of a pot.
"It will be seen that all notions like short, long,
"childhood, youth &c., relate to body; that exis-
"tence, birth, development, adult life, weakness,
"or old age and death which are the six changes
"of a being relate to the body; that the divi-
"sion of castes and stages of life has reference
"to the body; that the holy rites of birth &c.,
"are performed on the body; and that even the
"holy blessing "Live a hundred of years"—is
"given with respect to the body". It should not be urged against this doctrine that the inadmissibility of the soul taught in the Vedas as apart from the body will imply that the Veda is not a valid proof. Because such a consequence is acceptable to the follower of this school, who regards the Veda to be a mere means for earning livelihood by people who are both intellectually and physically dull. It has been said:—

"Brihaspati declares that Agnihotra (a kind of daily sacrifice), the drinking of Soma Juice and the application of holy ashes in three lines on the forehead are the tricks resorted to for earning livelihood by people who have no intelligence and no power".

Heaven and hell should not be regarded as totally absent, for they are visible as is declared in the following tenet of the materialist:—"What other hell can there be than a life in which a man has to get food without flesh, to sleep without a woman, and to walk on foot". In the Vishṇu Purâṇa (Chapter III Section 18) Mâyâ-moha[2] declares as under:—

"The Vedic texts enjoining animal sacrifices
"cannot lead to righteousness for they enjoin
"slaughter. It is a child's talk to say that obla-
"tions burnt in sacrifical fire bear a fruit. If
"Indra attaining the divine position by numer-
"ous sacrifices has to eat oblations consisting of
"shrubs and fire-wood, the life of a beast is
"better than that of Indra. If an animal slau-
"ghtered in a sacrifice is to get heaven, how is
"it that the sacrificer does not kill his own
"father? If the food taken by a Brâhmana for
"instance, gives satisfaction to a deceased being,
"a relative of a traveller should perform Srâdhha
"only, and the traveller need not carry food
"with him to quench his hunger, for it would
"be a mere burden".

It should not be urged against the doctrine:—"That there can be no production of an organism and its parts, as the four elements cannot combine without a kind of relation like conjunction". Because the upholder of this doctrine regards the pot, for instance, to be nothing more than its halves; the halves in their turn are regarded as nothing more than pieces; the pieces are nothing more than molecules; and the molecules are the final substances, anything else being held as not proved. In other words the holder of this view does not admit any

kind of relation. If the whole and its parts be regarded as real entities, there would be felt double weight in products or wholes, or there should be no absence of knower in a corpse (where the atomic combination persists).

Some materialists hold that the soul consists of as many senses as continue till death, basing their argument on the experience in the form "I see, I smell"—("I" referring to the various senses). Others hold that the external senses are not the soul, for they are the means of indistinct sensibility or ideas. The soul is the internal sensory only, called mind, because it is the means of definite knowledge and is possessed of will, propelling other senses, and because it exists even when the other senses subside. A third set of materialists holds that vital air alone is the soul, because it is uniform at all times, and because Yogins performing meditation in caves of mountains are seen possessed of life even though they have no minds, so to say, all kinds of thought being banished. It has been said:—"Some regard senses to be the soul on the experience—I hear, smell, taste, touch &c". (these being functions of senses) Some go beyond and hold that vital air is the soul basing their doctrine on the experience—"I breathe and live, I am hungry and thirsty" (properties of the vital air.)

* It is replied that the doctrine is absolute-

* Vide B. S. III. iii. 33, and 34.

ly irrational. The tenet of the opponent is that the soul is nothing else bnt the molecules of four kinds of elements which are objectively referred to by the cognition of the ego. As such a soul must be non-existent before birth, the opponent should point out an intelligent principle giving birth to such an element. The opponent cannot explain away the difficulty by saying that as no universal destruction is admitted the production of an aggregate of atoms called body is possible on the operation of the principle of heredity working through a series of parents. Because the opponent is then required to explain how the diversity of bodies originates. Is the diversity due to invisible cause (merit or demerit) or to visible cause? It cannot be the first, because such a view is not possible on the opposite theory which admits of no other proof but perception. Besides it would lead to the assumption of after-death worlds (which is not desired by the opponent). The other view is also untenable. Because without the working of invisible factor (merit or demerit) the diversity found in twins born of parents in whom the same line of heredity operates cannot be explained (on the mere assumption of visible cause); no other cause (*e. g.*, nature) can be adduced by the opponent, for such a thing cannot be known by the proof of perception (which is the only proof admitted). The invisible factor or merit or demerit (which we are obliged to assume) then, is not achieved in this life, and consequent-

ly the merit or demerit achieved in previous birth is proved, which in its turn leads to the antecedent merits or demerits and thus a being connected with a series of lives is established as an eternal principle. No destructive element of such an entity can be established. If such an entity or being is supposed to perish, there would result the faults of (1) destruction of what is done, and (2) the attainment of a fruit by a being who has not worked. It has been said:—

"The soul is either eternal or non-eternal. "The first is a clear and consistent view. On "the other view there would be the annihilation "of action done, and the attainment of fruit "without any previous action".

The opponent cannot ascribe these faults to the doctrine of Vedânta by saying that in that doctrine also God alone determines the means of enjoyment with respect to beings created by Him, not in accordance with the merits or demerits of them, but in accordance with the His will, just as a potter utilizes one pot for the storing of milk, while uses the other for collecting night-soil although both are produced by him. Because (such an arbitary exercise of Will is not admitted by Vedântins), such an assumption in an intelligent principle, as in a non-sentient object, leading to partiality and cruelty in the intelligent principle. When a potter treats his sons with a varying affection without any cause as if they were pots, he is censured

as being partial and cruel. Again the very perception proves that body, senses, vital air, and mind are not the soul, because they are experienced not as "I" or "ego" but as non-ego or as belonging to us. The soul is, therefore, to be regarded as an entity perfect in itself; consisting of eternally pure and conscious substance of thought, being and bliss, different from body senses &c; secondless and the illuminator of being and non-being of body &c.

The opponent retorts:—If the soul is to be regarded as an eternal and uniform substance distinct from body, senses &c., how can we reconcile the cognitions like:—"Devdatta will be born", "Devdatta is dead"—which imply the anterior and posterior non-existences respectively of a being? Besides the direct cognitions like:—"I am fat; I go; Yajndatta stands"—(which imply that the physical organism is the subject)—will be null and void. Thus how can there be the difference between body and soul? Even assuming that they are distinct entities, how can the soul be regarded as devoid of birth and death? The birth and death of the body will bring about the birth and death of the soul. Again one uniform soul cannot operate in a variety of bodies.

It is replied by the Vedântin that the argument is bad. Even one all-pervading soul can exhibit activity everywhere. The Veda accordingly declares:—

"The one God concealed in all beings, pervading every object, standing as the inner soul of all, witnessing all actions, and residing in all beings, is the witnessing, conscious, absolute and conditionless self" (श्वे. श्व. उ. VI. II). The plurality of souls will be refuted while criticising the doctrine of the Naiyâyikas, and (it may therefore be taken for granted here) that each body has not a (real) separate soul. The opponent argues:—

"Although the difference in soul is not possible on account of the difference of bodies the difference in soul will have to be assumed on account of the difference of conditions in the same body such as childhood &c. Otherwise old age cannot be distinguished from childhood, youth &c".

It is replied that experience proves that one soul remains changeless in the present body in all its conditions.

To point out the experience, one recognizes, for instance, that he who saw his parents when a child sees grand-children when old. One cannot recognize an impression which resides in another. Thus just as the difference in conditions like childhood &c., does not change the uniform character of soul, so even after the leaving of this body the soul remains the same in another body. Again although in a dream or in the exercise of occult powers one cognizes the conditions of other bodies, the recognition

of the unity of soul–"I am the same"–remains intact. Recognition, according to Vedântins, means the direct knowledge accompanied by the awakened or vivid impressions. According to the Naiyâyikas and others it means a knowledge in the form of memory comprehending past experience.

The opponent objects that although the conditions of childhood &c., are quite distinct, the conditioned body must be held to be uniform on the maxim that a thing should persist as long as it is recognized. It is replied that such is not the case. We have already pointed out an instance that recognition is possible even on the assumption of the difference in the conditioned body as in a dream or in the phenomenon of animating a number of bodies exhibited by the force of occult powers. By this line of argument the reader should understand that the view that although soul is distinct from body senses &c., it is produced and destroyed along with the body–is refuted. Because in that view although recognition is possible in spite of the difference in conditions, the recognition of the conditioned body is not possible.

If it be objected that although the recognition of conditions of childhood &c., is possible in old age even though they have vanished, there is no recognition of any anterior condition in a being just born, we reply that even though such a recognition is not observed in beings unac-

cumstomed to meditation, an infant just born is observed as feeling pleasure, pain, fear &c., which result from latent impressions of those feelings experienced in previous births. If such anterior impressions of experience were not admitted, we should have the births of children devoid of all attachment and inactive in sucking the mother's breast. The activity of newly born infants to suck the mother's breast is assumed as resulting either from the invisible impression of like actions in previous births or from the consciousness that such an activity is a means for attaining the desired object.

The opponent raises the objection :—

"Let there be one soul connected with his "previous and subsequent bodies in accordance "with the analogy of a being enlivening a num- "ber of bodies by the force of occult powers. "But when all the bodies in the world are re- "garded as being animated by only one soul, "we should have the recognition of the feelings "of all".

The objection is met by saying that such a consequence is accepted by the Vedântin when he holds the soul to be intelllgence determined by ignorance—a view[3] to be described hereafter. Again when the individual soul is regarded by the Vedântin as intelligence determined by each body separately, absolute recognition is not admitted even on the analogy of a being animating a number of bodies on account of occult powers,

because the animating soul only recognizes his self in all the bodies and nothing more (*i. e.*, does not identify himself with the feelings of the other individual souls dominated by the occultist).

Hence a man does not feel the comfort in the head by centralizing himself in the foot in the same body ; nor does he experience pain in the foot by confining himself in the head. But on the contrary he feels himself pervading both the limbs—say the whole body—and then experiences pain in the foot and comfort in the head The experience of plurality of souls is therefore based on the assumption of the false knowledge of confounding body with soul. Consequently cognition as—"I am fat &c.,"—should be regarded as a false piece of knowledge like the cognition of water in mirage, both the cognitions being equally sublated by true knowledge. This line of argument refutes the meaningless tenet of the opponent enunciated above, *viz* :—If there be a soul apart from body, look upon him as dead as a pot etc.

Besides the anterior and posterior non-existences cannot be proved, for there is no experience of those non-existences, because at the time when those so-called negative conditions are to be cognized, the experiencing soul is absent and when the experiencing soul is present the conditions to be cognized are absent. It cannot be argued that the experiencer of those conditions is not

the soul, but something else. Because everything other then Self being non-intelligent falls under the category of non-soul. Again absolute non-existence or mutual non-existence cannot be predicated of Soul because he is the substratum of the super-imposed world consisting of body, senses etc., as will be described on the analogy of the apperance of silver in the mother-o'-pearl. Besides at the time of super-imposition the substratum of Soul inheres in all phenomena and hence there can be no such non-existences. All this will be made clear when we shall discuss the doctrine of appearance or phenomenality later on.

The opponent retorts:—Let merit or demerit which constitutes the invisible factor explaining diversity of life be established. But the assumption of a world hereafter which is of a doubtful nature is gratuitous.

It is replied that the opponent is mistaken. Although such a scepticism *e.g.*, the world hereafter may or may not be, may be put forth, the hypothesis of its existence is better than that of its negation as the former is accepted by a number of thinkers. It has been said in the Nyâya Kusumâñjali :—

"Although the world hereafter may be doubted, the wise should avoid evil (by accepting its existence), for if it ultimately turns out to be unreal nothing is lost, but if it turns out to be real, the non-believer is ruined."

This refutes the opponent's tenet:—"The talk of the other world is false". "Well" the opponent argues, "let there be merit and demerit and the world hereafter, for they stand to reason. But no proof is forthcoming for the existence of God. Can it be perception or inference or comparison or scripture or implication or non-perception? It cannot be the last for that mode of proof is intended for non-entity alone, whereas God is regarded by you to be a positive entity. It cannot be the first, because God is regarded to be indirectly cognizable. It cannot be the second, for you yourself have refuted the inference proving the existence of God while discussing the opinion of the Naiyâyika. It cannot be the third, for God cannot be compared with anything else. Implication cannot be the requisite proof, because nothing remains unexplained in the absence of God. Finally "Word" cannot prove God, because your secondless Brahman is devoid of all property and hence cannot be described by "Word" which asserts a thing by putting forth the properties such as class characteristic etc. It has been said by Vârtikakâra of your school:—"Soul cannot be described by word, for the relations which are the causes of verbal knowledge are property, action and class, and none of these is found in Soul"

To the above objection it is replied that we have already proved the existence of God as a Being, cognized through the Veda alone, and

standing as the material and instrumental cause of the world, when we refuted above the doctrine of the Atomist, by quoting the Vedic text:— "That is God or Self from whom these beings come forth etc". Again we shall prove the existence of God as a being originating the Veda while discussing the doctrine of the Mîmañsakas. The objection that God cannot be established by any proof other than the Veda is not valid for it is an accepted tenet of the Vedânta.

Thus the opponent's meaningless tenet:— "There is no creator like God" is refuted. We refrain from discussing the subject with a hypocrite.

To conclude, then, the doctrine of Châr vâka is not proved and hence the term "Philosophical teacher" remains undetermined as in the other systems.

NOTES.

Chapter II.—Section I.

——:O:——

1. Every object is supposed at least to have three stages :—one of birth ; the second for its stay and the third for its dis-appearance. The fourth stage is of its complete destruction. The Buddhist who admits the universe to be in perpetual flux and who considers it to be always "becoming" and not "being", disallows the existence of objects even for three moments at least. In his opinion the first moment of birth is the only stage of existence. In the second moment the object is undergoing destruction. Hence the existence of an object in the first moment becomes the counter-entity of the non-existence in the second moment.

2. It will be seen that according to the Buddhistic theory "season" is regarded to be the sixth element in the formation of the external world, while "consciousness" is regarded as the sixth element in the production of the internal world.

3. These terms are respectively to be taken in the Buddhistic sense of the material cause of the body namely the first four elements and the embryonic form.

4. According to the Buddhistic theory the subjective phenomena are produced by four causal factors (प्रत्यय) They are :—

(1) Substantial causal factor (आलंबनप्रत्यय).
(2) Antecedent intellectual factor (समनन्तरप्रत्यय).
(3) Dominant Sensational factor (अधिपति प्रत्यय).
(4) Auxiliary factor (सहकारिप्रत्यय).

In the perception, for instance, of a blue colour, we

have these four factors working. The blue substance is the substantial factor; the anterior impression of a blue colour is the intellectual factor; the sense of sight is the dominant factor; and finally light is the auxiliary factor revealing the blue colour.

5. The point is as under :—

The Buddhist has the burden of proving the world. consisting of the internal and external aggregates. The theory of co-operating causes put forth by the Buddhist for proving the aggregates did not stand the test of examination. He therefore resorts to the argument that the series of ignorance &c., which has been duly proved cannot stand in the absence of the aggregates. In other words the formation of aggregates is implied in the admission of the series of ignorance &c. The Vedântin sees through the fallacy, and questions whether by implication is meant that the aggregates are actually produced by the series of ignorance &c., or are merely indicated by the series. If the first hypothesis is admitted, the fallacy of argument in a circle is palpable, for the series of ignorance &c., owes its origin to the world of aggregates of which it is put forth to be the cause. Thus the proposed effect (*viz* the aggregates) is unfit for production from the proposed cause (*viz* series of ignorance &c). The following text explains the impropriety of the other hypothesis of implication.

6. The original is पुद्गल meaning " organism ". As the Buddhist does not admit the existence of a soul, the birth and death refer to the organism or (to use the Buddhistic terminology) to the aggregate (संघात).

7. The point is this. Acording to the Buddhistic doctrine the existence of a thing consists in its practical efficiency *i. e.*, a thing is said to be real or existent if it gives rise to a new entity and not otherwise. A thing to be destroyed is no longer an entity inasmuch as it does not produce a new entity. The destroying factor of such an entity *i. e.*, an entity which is going to be destroyed, is also devoid of real existence, because it does not create a thing. Thus destruction is regarded as causeless in the Buddhistic philosophy.

8 " न " in the 9th line of the text is wrong. It should have been deleted.

9 The text here is full of misprints. It should run as under :—

नचायमात्मगुणो × × × नापि पृथिव्यादिगुण :

10 The gist of the argument is as under :—

The opponent argues that the difficulty pointed out (*viz*) as long as there is the obstruction of one bird the other bird cannot fly, there being actually an obstruction (and not an absence of obstruction)—is fallacious, for the other bird can fly in that part of the sky which has no obstruction. The Vedântin replies that this would be a proper reply in the mouth of one who holds the positive character of space or ether. But the Buddhist regards space to be a mere absence of obstruction. Now the absence of a thing can be determined only when we have the knowledge of the substratum wherein its presence is denied. We can, for instance, say that a pot does not exist on a particular spot. Absolute negation is meaninglesss. Even when we say that the son of a barren woman does not exist, we have the world as substratum for this negation. In the same way the argument of the opponent will prove the existence of a substratum in which obstruction is negatived. This substratum *i. e.*, the space characterised by the presence or absence of obstruction, is the ether and not a mere negation of obstruction as is held by the Buddhist.

11. I should like to take the text as :—

कल्पिताअपि ज्ञानेऽर्थाकारस्तस्माद्भिन्ना अभिन्ना वा ? । आद्ये ज्ञानान्तरवदकल्पितत्वम् । न द्वितीयः, युगपदनेकार्थावभासप्रसंगः, अनिर्वाच्यत्वानंगीकारात् । तथाच–तेनेदामिति–सदृशामिति च × × × × ततश्चान्योन्यभेदेन पदार्था लोकसिद्धा निन्हूयेरन् ॥

The reason is that the portion commencing with तथाच cannot be construed with the first alternative of भिन्नत्व, inasmuch as it discusses the propriety of the other view of अभिन्नत्व The text पदार्थालोकसिद्धया निन्हूयेरन् is evidently a misprint for it gives no intelligible meaning. It should stand as पदार्था लोकसिद्धा निन्हूयेरन्. The whole passage is taken with slight modifications from Ânandgiri's gloss on S'ânkara Bhashya on Brahman Sutra 2-2-25.

The translation follows the text as amended above.

12 Buddhists regard every object as like itself *i. e.*, no object has any similarity with another. This is a logical sequence of the theory of momentary flux. Now language expresses thoughts which are interrelated. We can call a particular animal to be the horse only when we have the conception or notion of the common characteristic of "horse". When every thing is self-centred each object is defined by itself and it cannot be expressed in language which depends upon the assumption of similarity or class-characteristic.

13 If the cognition of "horse", for instance, is based upon the indiscrimination of the ideal form and the animal the difficulty is that the same cognition does not distinguish its form from the remaining objects of the world. Thus a man seeking a horse might approach a cow, or a buffalo—an unsatisfactory logical conclusion on the assumed premiss. The premiss therefore that the external is not apprehensible and the world proceeds on the indiscrimination is wrong.

NOTES.

Chapter II.—Section II.

1. Intellect=Substratum consciousness.

Proof=The means of knowledge.
Knowledge=The resulting consciousness.
Knowable=The external object which Vaibhâshika and Sautrantika regard as *real* while Yogâchâra as *ideal*.

2. Object here does not mean a mere substance but an object of knowledge. In that sense it may mean a property.

3. The point of argument is that if object of knowledge and knowledge are distinct, and if by knowledge is meant the production of the property of manifestation in the object, then we shall have to admit the present being of the so-called past and future objects of knowledge *e. g.*, a destroyed pot &c., otherwise their manifestation (or in other words the corresponding subjective consciousness) will not be possible. We cannot reconcile the position by saying that the substance is now produced whereas properties are not so produced because both become the objects of knowledge and should, according to the hypothesis, be possessed of the necessary present manifestation. It is thus clear that knowledge cannot be regarded as the production of an objective property like manifestation.

NOTES

Chapter II.—Section III.

1. The gist of argument embodied in this stanza is that if the world is a delusion, it must have a substratum, for no delusion is seen without a substratum. The substratum is the witnessing soul. To deny the witnessing soul is impossible, for the very denial of the soul proves the existence of a being which the Vedântin calls the eternal Self. Nothing can be denied until some positive being sees its absence.

NOTES.

Chapter II.—Section IV.

1. The Text should be असत्त्वैकान्तवाद: (and not अनैकान्तवाद:) शून्यवाद्यभिमतोऽसद्वाद: ॥

2. The point in the argument is that if the particles of the soul can be accommodated in the same local area, they can be encompassed in the space of one atom which is tantamount to saying that the soul is atomic.

NOTES.

Chapter II.—Section V.

1. Châr vâka was a demon who obtained a boon from Brahmâ by austerity to the effect that he would have no fear from any being except from an insulted Brâhmaṇa. When Yudhishthira entered Hastinâpura after the conquest of the Kauravas, this demon assumed the form of a Brâhmaṇa and offended other Brâhmaṇas by insulting a righteous king like Yudhishtira. He was killed by the curse of Brâhmaṇas. He is supposed to have taught a thorough materialistic view of the world undermining the science of ethics. His school is called लोकायतदर्शन because the teaching of the system is centralized in the visible world only. For the myth of Châr vâka see Mahâbhârata S'ântiparva Râjadharma Chapter 39. As to the system see Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha.

2. The mythological story is that god Vishnu created a being called Mâyâmoha with a view that he might teach a heterodox system to demons who were desirous of conquering gods by meritorious actions in accordance with Vedic ritual.

3. Vide the present writer's Vedânta Siddhânta Bheda page 27 (Published by the Bombay University).

There is a school of Vedântins holding that the Individual soul is one and consists of intellegence limited by Nescience which extends every where. This only soul called Hiraṇyagarbha animates all bodies and recognizes the conditions of all, just as we recognize pleasure and pain in different parts of our body. The variety of souls is regarded to be a phantom appearing in the mind of that one individual soul.

The point is that on the theory of one individual soul consisting of intellegence limited by Nescience the objection that there would be recognition of various conditions of different bodies is meaningless, for such a knowledge is assumed by the Vedântin with respect to that soul just as we simultaneously cognize pleasure and pain in different parts of our body. When, however, individual soul is regarded as multiform and consisting of intelligence limited by each body the objection is wide of mark for then there is no animation by only one soul and the inner conditions of one cannot be cognized by the other.

CHAPTER III.

Section I.

Refutation of Naiyâyika doctrine of non-sentient character of self and plurality of soul.

——:o:——

As the term "philosophical teacher" gives no definite meaning in accordance with the doctrines of the six heterdox systems, the final solution is sought for in the six orthodox systems.

Let "philosophical teacher" mean the soul possessed of all-pervading measure and recognized by the thinkers of Vais'eshika, Nyâya and Prâbhâkara schools of philosophy. It has been said :—

"Air has nine properties ; light has eleven; earth, water and soul have fourteen properties each ; time and space have five each ; ether has six ; and God and mind have eight properties each".[1] If the Vedântin is anxious to know the nature of soul ; also the nature of the relation of property and substance subsisting between the soul and his attributes ; whether each body is endowed with a separate soul ; whether he differs from God ; if he is different how the theory of bondage and freedom is established-if he is anxious to know all these-he should patiently listen to the teaching summarised below :—

Soul is a substance possessed of the common characteristic of self which is characterised

as the intimate cause of happiness *or* a substance which is the substratum of knowledge. He is of two kinds:—(1) Supreme soul or God and (2) Individual soul or the migrating ego. The Supreme Soul is one and omniscient because he is the substratum of eternal knowledge. God cannot be said (by the Vedântin) to be consisting of knowledge or happiness, or standing as the substratum of happiness. Because knowledge is a property (while God is a substance); so is happiness a property which is produced by meritorious action. As God is free from all restrictions, he is not subject to Vedic injunction (that he should do such and such meritorious action for happiness); if he be regarded otherwise, he will be no better than an individual soul. The old school of the Naiyâyikas therefore holds that God is possessed of eternal knowledge, volition and effort. The new school maintains in addition that God has eternal happiness.

If it be objected:—that there is no proof for the existence of God because perception in both of its internal and external aspects cannot prove the object, God being an entity other than individual soul, and happiness (which are the only objects internally perceived), as also a substance devoid of colour (which is requisite for external perception) and because inference cannot establish the existence of God there being no middle term to base an argument on,—it is

replied that the objection is not valid. We have an argument like this:—

"Products like earth, sprout &c., or the primeval effects are produced by a creator, because they are effects *e. g.*, an earthen pot."

By "creator" we mean a being possessed of (1) the knowledge of the material cause (2) the desire to create an effect thereform, and (3) activity towards the production. By "material cause" is meant an inherent or intimate cause or substance. God is admitted to be omniscent because he is conscious of the minute objects like each and every atom. Again the Veda declares the supreme Being to be conscious of all objects both generally and particularly, and is thus an additional proof.

Individual soul is other than body and senses, is distinct from another like soul, is eternal and all pervading and is confined to each body separately. By "all-pervading" is meant that the thing of which it is predicated should be in contact with each and every "limited entity". By "limited entity" is meant an object possessed of finite measure (*e. g*, an atom). Such objects are (the atoms of) earth water, light and air and the atomic mind itself. By "eternal" is meant that the thing of which it is predicated is incapable of ever becoming a counter-entity of destruction or posterior non-existence. Individual soul described above is mentally cognized by such conceptions

as " I know ; I am happy ; I exist". Again he is inferable as below :—

" Individual soul is different from the rest of objects, because he is a soul ; those which do not so differ are non-soul *e. g.*, earth &c."

As the individual soul is connected with pleasure and pain the fact that he is a doer of actions either enjoined or prohibited and is the experiencer of their fruits follows necessarily. He is essentially non-sentient because he is other than knowledge or intelligence. If this point be not admitted by the Vedântin, the existence of individual soul as a substance possessed of properties like knowledge, happiness, misery, will, effort, merit, demerit, impression &c., is established on the following syllogism :—

" Nine properties commencing with knowledge are non-eternal and at the same time cognized by one sense only *e. g.*, colour. taste &c., Now properties necessarily require a substance for their being. Knowledge cannot be said to be the property of any of the five elements, because they are internally cognized. The properties of earth &c., are not cognized by the internal sensory for such is not our experience. Nor are the properties enumerated belong to time, space, and mind, because they are special attributes. The five properties of time &c., are not special characteristics as they are found in common with all the substances. Thus there is

no substance other than soul of which they can be predicated, and consequently the soul is regarded as a qualified substance and not a conditionless entity there being no proof for the latter. Nor is the individual soul a mixed entity of intelligence or non-intelligence as is held by the Mîmânsaka. Because such a theory would oppose the Vedic text which declares that the soul is devoid of parts in words like—" It is neither gross, nor atomic, it is neither long nor short &c ". Besides there is no proof for the conditionless character of the soul. Thus even on the theory of Prabhâkara the existence of the soul is established on the strength of his becoming the substratum of knowledge, pleasure &c. It has been said :—

" The followers of Prabhâkara and Gautama regard the soul to be a non-intelligent substance like ether. Intelligence is regarded as a property of the soul as sound is of ether. Other properties of the soul are enumerated as :— Volition, hatred, effort, merit, demerit, pleasure, pain and impressions of them. When through the force of merit or demerit the mind and soul are united the properties are sometimes generated in the soul, and at other times vanish when the force of past actions subsides as in deep sleep. As the soul possesses intelligence as a property he is said to be intelligent. He wills, hates and exerts himself; he is the doer of good and bad actions ; and is the experiencer of their

fruits and he is found associated with pleasure and pain. Just as in this world pleasure &c. arise occasionally through the force of past actions, so in another body in a different world the soul feels a desire on account of latent impressions of action. Thus although the soul is all pervading his migrations from a world to another are possible. In proof thereof the advocates of the theory quote the whole body of Vedic literature which enjoins ritual (which would be meaningless had their not been a migrating soul capable of going to heaven &c)."

Neither body, nor senses, nor mind can be put forth as the soul, for such a view has already been refuted. Besides they are cognized not as one's self but as belonging to the cognizer and are consequently non-soul. It should not be objected that even the soul would turn out to be non-soul on this line of argument, there being a cognition-" soul belongs to me". Because such a cognition being expressed by the ignorant, and having a reference to the body is regarded as a piece of false knowledge.

The theory of the Vedântin that the soul is secondless, and consists of eternal self-shining happiness in accordance with the teaching of the Veda; that the soul should accordingly be held to be one and animating all bodies to preserve scientific economy of thought; that to regard plurality of soul is a sacrifice of the uniqueness of thought and is an unproved assumption, for the

Vedas declare "this soul is homogeneous thought and knows no destruction; Brahman (a synonym for self) is one and secondless; there is no variety in this world; Brahman is real and infinite consciousness, it is consciousness and bliss".—Such a theory of the Vedântin is inconsistent for it is opposed to reason. The soul cannot be expressed as knowledge, for the latter is a property and not a substance. Again no body has experience of his soul as mere consciousness, but on the contrary the experience which assumes the form—"I know"—points to the fact that the soul is a substratum of knowledge. There is no cognition like "I am knowledge". By this line of argument the theory of the Sânkhya and Yoga that the soul is a being untouched by any affection like a leaf of lotus is also refuted. The unity of the soul cannot be advocated on the ground of preserving economy of thought, for such a theory is opposed to reason as is shewn below:—

On the theory of the unity of the soul, the knowledge of truth attained by one being through the hearing of the Vedic texts, ratiocination thereon, and meditation should bring an end to *all* mundane existence, in other words there should be mundane existence nowhere. Again the rise of pleasure and pain in one being through the requisite means should lead to the pleasure and pain of all beings. Thus no consistent theory can be based with regard to bondage and freedom on the hypothesis of one

soul animating all bodies. The lack of economy of thought is not a fault when it leads to a definite good result. The texts quoted by the Vedântin in support of the unity of the soul are inapplicable as they relate to God. Thus there is no flaw in the theory enunciated. The Vedântin should not retort by saying that, the texts like:—'Brahman is real and infinite consciousness" which occur in a section of the Upanishad treating of the identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Being cannot be restricted to God only. Because the applicability of such texts to the individual soul is sublated by direct perception "I am doer and enjoyer". It has been said by Vardhamâna Upâdhyaya in his commentary on Khandana Khanda Khâdya:—

"How can your poor Vedic text declaring non-dualism resembling a deer frightened by the opposition of direct experience resembling a hunter, attain confidence even in the forest like Brahman".

According to the maxim laid down in the above quotation the identity of individual soul and Supreme Being is not acceptable. Again such a view of identity is opposed to the aphorism of Gautama which says that souls are many, because on that hypothesis a consistent theory of bondage and freedom can be established.

The Vedântin should not bring the charge of heterodoxy against the Naiyâyika on the

ground that although he poses himself as an orthodox believer in the Veda he does not accept the teaching of the identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Being which is conveyed by the principal Vedanta texts which form the essence of all the Upanishads *e. g.* "That art thou". "I am Brahman," "This soul is Brahman" "Brahman is eternal and infinite consciousness". Because the Naiyâyika accepts the identity in his doctrine for the purpose of meditation, *or* regards those texts as mere laudatory portions of the Veda just as the Mimânsaka regards texts like:—"The sun is a sacrificial post". "The sacrificer is a stone used in the sacrifice". The reason why the Vedântic texts quoted above are regarded as mere laudatory texts is as under:—

That individual soul is different from the Supreme Being follows from direct perception "I am not God", that the difference between the two is inferred by the presence of contradictory properties in them, individual soul having limited knowledge while Providence being omniscient; that the Vedic text:—"Two birds (*i. e.*, individual soul and God) which resemble each other and which are friends live on the same tree; one of them (individual soul) eats the berry (*i. e.*, the fruit of actions) while the other (God) remains content without any food"—declares the difference; that the text of S'rikrishna in the Gîta text:—"There are two beings in the

world; one is destructible, the other is indestructible. The destructible being is the collection of individual beings; while the indestructible is the fictitious Mâyâ. The Supreme Being is different from both and is called the Highest Soul"—declares that individual soul is distinct from God; and that the difference between the world and the individual soul follows from the division of the universe into sentient and non-sentient entities; and finally the fact the the world is full of inherent differences follows from our[2] cognition like:—"A pot is not a piece of cloth".

The above passage also shews that the world is not merely illusory (as is supposed by the Vedântin) because it differs from illusory objects on account of its fulfilling practical efficiency. Again as the aphorism of a sage like Gautama—"The soul is inferred by properties of volition, hatred, effort, pleasure and pain"—cannot be explained on any other theory, we must regard a variety of souls connected with each body, and standing as the substrata of nine properties commencing with knowledge and pleasure.

There is a doctrinal difference between the Vais'heshika and Naiyâyika on the conception of the soul and his absolution. The Vais'eshikas accepting the above conception of the individual soul as an all-pervading being distinct from body, senses &c., and possessed of nine special properties maintains a theory like the following:—

True knowledge is attained by the study of the similarity and dissimilarity of six categories of substance, property, action, common characteristic, speciality and intimate relation. When this knowledge of categories is followed by the intuitive perception of the individual soul (separated from the rest of the world) accompanied by the mental devotion to God, the nine[3] special properties of the individual soul are destroyed in such a way that the destruction is not associated with the simultaneous anterior non-existences of the nine properties, and then absolution is revealed. The truth or essence (of the soul) means the absolute character which in the case of the individual soul is what is described above, namely, that he is an all-pervading substance other than body &c., and becoming the substratum of properties like knowledge. The knowledge of truth or the essence of the soul means the mental perception untinged by doubts as to the possibility of such an entity. Such a mental relation of the nature of the soul is the means of absolution, for the Veda declares:—

"By knowing him a man transgresses mortality; there is no other road leading to absolution;".

The mental relation referred to depends upon the hearing of the Vedic texts as has been said by ancient teachers;—

"One should hear the nature of the soul from the Vedic texts; then one should think of him by arguments pro and con; and then one should meditate upon him. These are the means of realisation". As to the qualification for hearing &c., the Vaisheshika holds, that only the person who has renounced the world and who has been favoured by God is qualified to hear the Vedic texts declaring the nature of the soul. The favour of God is not obtained without the performance of holy actions with a disinterested mood of mind. The disintersted performance of holy actions is possible only when the man knows the true nature of mundane existence. The knowledge of the true nature of the world is not possible without the study of the system of Kaṇâda, for the Veda says:—"A Brahmin becomes disgusted with life when he examines the nature of the world attainable by action".

Thus the knowledge of all the categories is a requisite means of absolution, and consequently the system of Kaṇâda and absolution are related as cause and effect. The relation between the system and the true knowledge is that of operator and operation. Again absolution stands as the effect of true knowledge (the cause). Finally the categories of substance &c., stand with respect to the system in the relation of propounded and propounder. By the knowledge of these four-fold relations an aspirer for absolution is propelled towards the study of the Vaisheshika system.

Those who are in the path of absolution confiding in the truthfulness of the teacher or sage who has realised the truth try to grasp the teaching of the system for the rise of absolution, but do not perform the actions, because the performance of the ritual is meant for the ignorant either desirous of getting fruits of actions or active without an eye towards the fruit. It cannot be said that the Vedic ritual is also meant for the knowers of the essence of self, because the knowledge of truth annihilates false knowledge, which (annihilation) in its turn dispels attachment, hatred &c., which arise out of false knowledge (and which are the impetus for activity) and thereby puts an end to the restriction of the performance of actions. Even if the performance is possible through the force of past impressions of activity, it does not lead to the production of merit or demerit, because the requisite cause of merit or demerit, namely, false knowledge or non-existence of true knowledge, is held to be absent. This point is touched by Vâchaspatimis'ra in his commentray of the Nyâya Bhâshya:—

"Merit and demerit produce a sprout (in the form of pleasure and pain) in the ground consisting of the soul watered by false knowledge".

The Naiyâyikas on the other hand maintain a view like the following:—

There are sixteen categories:—(1) proof, (2)

object of proof, (3) doubt, (4) end or aim, (5) example, (6) deduction, (7) parts of a syllogism, (8) argument, (9) final view, (10) debate, (11) wrangling discussion (12) captious objections, (13) fallacy, (14) logical deceit, (15) futile answer and (16) unfitness to argue with. By the three modes of achieving knowledge *viz.*, naming, defining, and examining the knowable or object of proof falls under twelve classes namely (1) soul (2) body, (3) senses, (4) material group of external objects, (5) knowledge, (6) mind, (7) activity, (8) moral faults, (9) death, (10) result of actions (11) misery, (12) absolution. When the substance called soul is deduced and realised in his two aspects of the individual soul and God by means of hearing of the texts, ratiocination and meditation, the false knowledge is annihilated together with impressions. The destruction of false knowledge leads to the disappearance of attachment, hatred, and delusion which in its turn brings about the cessation of merit and demerit which are the effects of attachment &c.

The order of the cessation of merit or demerit is as under:—

They are of three kinds:—(1) Hoarded impressions of good and bad actions, (2) current actions, and (3) fructified actions. The last comprises those actions which lead to the creation of our present body. The term for fructified action (प्रारब्ध) etymologically means action

the fruit of which is being fully enjoyed. This class of actions is held as destructible by actual experience only in consonance with the Vedic text declaring the possibility of liberation in a living body.[4] As regards the hoarded impression of actions the Vedântin holds the view that it is destructible only by the knowledge of self described above in accordance with the text of Srikrishna in the Gîtâ:—

"The fire of knowledge burns to ashes, oh Arjuna, all the actions". But this view is not correct. The Naiyâyika maintains that hoarded actions are destroyed by experience only through the assumption of a variety of bodies by occult powers, because there is no proof justifying the putting of any restriction (such as, "knowledge is also a means of destruction") of interpretation on the following text other than the one that penance is also a means of destroying action:—

"No action is destroyed without its fruit being experienced a during the period of crores of æons. Any good or bad action done must yield its fruit.

The term "burns to ashes" is metaphorical and conveys the sense that actions are destroyed rapidly by experience.

The current action has no scope with the knower of self in accordance with the text:—

"He is not touched with sin just as a lotus-leaf retains no trace of water."

If it be objected that the current action performed by Yogins would thus turn out to be fruitless, the Naiyâyika replies that it is intended for setting a good example to the people. As a matter of fact, however, the actions of the Yogins are decidedly intended for others in accordance with the Vedic text:—

"The sons of the knower of self get his wealth; his friends take his good actions and his foes get his bad actions".

Thus the hoarded actions are destroyed by the experience of fruits in a number of bodies simultaneously assumed under occult powers following the knowledge of Self; and there being no other action left unexperienced there is no possibility of a fresh birth. The Naiyâyikas then conceive absolution to be a state of freedom from twenty-one kinds of misery in the form of dissatisfaction arising from the destruction of the present body. The rest of the doctrine is similar to that of the Vaisheshikas. It follows then that both the thinkers equally regard absolution to be absolute destruction of pain.

"Absolute or final destruction of pain" means that the destruction is not co-eval with the anterior non-existence of pain having the same being for its substratum as is assumed by the first destruction of pain [5] It is otherwise defined as a kind of destruction of pain which synchronizes with the destruction of all the special

properties of a soul, occurring simultaneously in the same substratum. Again absolution is otherwise defined as an anterior non-existence of pain which terminates in the destruction of all the special properties of a soul. It should not be objected that the anterior non-existence is not an accomplishable object. Because an anterior non-existence is accomplishable through the destruction of the cause. This assumption does not turn accomplished object into something else than anterior non-existence. Because the state revealed on the destruction of the cause does not lead to the production of an effect *viz*, conter-entity and consequently it does not lose its character as anterior non-existence. A thing is said to be the producer of another when it brings about only the essential form of the latter. The anterior non-existence is not a necessary element in the causality of a positive effect inasmuch as its presence does not lead to the production of the effect. If the opposite view be admitted (*i. e.*, if the anterior non-existence were regarded as one of the causes) the effect would turn out to be beginningless. To explain the point, the anterior non-existence (which the Naiyâyika regards as a beginningless non-entity which has an end) which could not produce the effect until now on account of the absence of auxiliary factors should do the same on account of the same absence. The maxim that the man's efforts are confined in the destruction of the cause (the effect of which is to be avoided) has its

import in the fact that the state of anterior non-existence of the effect is maintained. In accordance with this view, the aphorism of Gautama defining absolution :—"The absolution is a state brought out by the non-appearance of the phenomena of false knowledge, faults like attachment &c., activity, birth and pain resulting from the disappearance of each preceding link (*i e.* the disappearance of false knowledge leads to the disappearance of attachment &c., and so on each step further)"—declares that non-appearance of the effect flows from the absence of the cause, and thereby supports the view that absolution is a kind of the anterior non existence of pain [6] (Sc. Vide note) It should not be said that in interpreting the aphorism in the manner suggested *i. e.*, the disappearance of faults leads to the disappearance of activity ; the disappearance of activity leads to the disappearance of birth and the disappearance of birth leads to the disappearance of pain-the term "disappearance" means "destruction" because the advocate of this view of absolution regards "disappearance" as "non-production"[7] or in other words "the anterior non-existence". It should not be objected that we are not aware of a counter-entity (pain) the anterior non-existence of which is upheld to be the absolution. Because (although a particular form of the counter-entity-pain-is not known) we know pain in its generic character as the counter-entity. This view is suported by the instance of penance where also what

is desired is the non-production (anterior non-existence) of pain flowing form the destruction of sin. Even in the empirical world the removal of a disturbing factor like a serpent or a thorn is seen as resulting in the non-production (anterior non-existence) of pain. The wise exert themselves for the removal of causes leading to the production of pain and nothing more.

Some maintain that absolution is the absolute non-existence of pain.[8] Such a non-existence although does not reside in the soul is found in dead matters like stone &c., and is proved in the soul. When it is so proved it turns out to be the destruction (posterior non-existence) of pain with regard to the soul. Such a destruction is known as related with the total non-existence because in the presence of that destruction total non-existence of pain is revealed in the soul. In accordance with this view the Vedic text:—"A man moves about having been absolutely released from pain"—is held to give a consistent meaning.

The above hostile view is wrong. Because the total or permanent non-existence is not an accomplishable thing and cannot therefore be the end of life. To say that the destruction of pain is connected with the total non-existence of pain is simply a technicality (and gives no important sense realisable by all). The Vedic text quoted in support of the view that absolution

consists of total non-existence (*viz*—"A man moves about having been absolutely released from pain") implies that the anterior non-existence (non-production) of pain appears like the total non-existence in consequence of the destruction of causes which lead up to pain.

The opponent of Naiyâyika might retort:—

"The cessation of pain is not an end of life, because it is not the object of sole desire. As people desirous of getting happiness know that at the time of absence of pain happiness does not (necessarily) appear, they would not exert themselves for bringing about non-existence of pain".

It is replied that the argument is wrong, because the opposite view may be advanced with equal force. Why should we not regard that the desire of happiness is not the chief end of life but is based upon the desire to bring about the cessation of pain (the chief end of life)? This view gains support from the experience that people embarrassed with pain although not inclined towards the attainment of positive happiness try to poison or hang themselves with the sole object of attaining mere absence of pain. It is objected:—"The end of life must be a realizable state. When absolution is regarded as a mere absence of pain, it is not a realizable state. Otherwise we should find in the world people exerting themselves for getting the state of unconsciousness as in a swoon".

It is replied that the absence of pain is a realizable state as will be seen from the following Vedic texts and syllogism.

The Veda declares:—

"A man moves about in a state of absolute freedom from pain". "Knowing Him the man transgresses mortality; there is no other road leading to absolution".

The Syllogism is:—

The series of pain is annihilated absolutely, it is a series *e. g.*, a continuous stream of light.

The destruction of the final pain is directly cognized by the mere objective reference to it by the mind when cognizing pain. Besides Yogins have a direct perception of the further future destruction of pain through the occult power.

This view of absolution is again shaken by an objection that cessation of pain cannot be the end of life, because there are equal arguments pro and con applying to both the positive and negative views of Summum Bonum. In other words, just as pain ceases to exist, so pleasure also terminates, and thus both of them have equal causal preparations.

To the above objection it is replied that people who are devoid of all attachment towards mundane existence will exert themselves to ac-

hieve cessation of pain because they are afraid of the bad day of pain and are not bent upon the achievement of a twinkling state of happiness. It is futile to argue that the cessation of pain cannot still be regarded as an end of life, for in the first place the future pain cannot be destroyed; in the second place past pain requires no effort for cessation as it has already ceased; and in the third place the current pain is likely to be destroyed in ordinary course without any effort on the part of the sufferer. Because we have already pointed out that the human activity is desired towards the destruction of the causes of pain (and not towards the actual cessation of pain as is assumed by the objectionist) as in the case of penance. In other words the false knowledge coupled with impressions of evil is the cause of mundane existence and its destruction is brought about by the knowledge of true Self.

In the Bhâshya of Nyâya Sutras it has been said:—

" The disjunction with all the objects of the world, or the absolute cessation is really a quiet state called absolution. In this state even abominable sins vanish. Which sensible man will not like Summum Bonum consisting of the cessation of all pain and its cognition? Just as food mixed with honey and poison is fit to be abandoned, so happiness tinged with pain is not to be sought for, "

By this line of argument the theory of the Vedântin that the absolute soul realises Summum Bonum in his character as consciousness and bliss on the cessation of ignorance resulting from the realisation of secondless Brahman is practically refuted. Because Brahman consisting of self-conscious happiness being eternal, the released and the bound souls (being one with that Brahman) will not be differentiated. Besides such a character of self identical with Brahman exists apart from human effort and therefore can not be regarded as an achievable state. If, however, human effort be regarded as intended for the cessation of ignorance only (and not for the realisation of the absolute character of self), it is objected that the Vedântin cannot satisfactorily explain the nature of the so-called cessation of ignorance. To examine the nature of the cessation of ignorance, the Vedantin is asked:—

Is that cessation one with self or different therefrom ?

If it be one with self, it cannot be regarded as an accomplishable thing. If it be different, is it false (phenomenal) or real ? If it be false, it must fall under the class of Nescience or its products. If it be real, the doctrine of non-duality will have to be abandoned.

There are other drawbacks in the Vedantic theory. In the first place if Brahman realisable through the Veda is real the efficiency of the Veda to produce the knowledge of Brahman, and

the testimony of the verbal knowledge would turn out to be real, and thereby dualism will necessarily follow on account of the real existence of a thing other than Brahman. Then the world consisting of ether &c may turn out to be real and doctrine of duality will be established. In the second place there is no proof for holding self as consisting of consciousness and bliss. The vedic text:—" Brahaman is eternal consciousness and bliss " cannot be put forth as a proof, because the expressed meaning of the text is opposed by perception which shows that consciousness and bliss are cognized as distinct from self as is clear from the cognitions:—" I know; I am happy " and that the identity of them with Brahman is thereby shaken. The text " Brahman is bliss " declares by the termination अ implying " possession " affixed to term आनन्द " (bliss) that Brahman is blissful and not bliss in itself. If आनन्दम् in the text were not regarded as an adjective of ब्रह्म (but as a predicate of it), the neuter gender of आनन्द cannot be satisfactorily explained.[10] It should not be said that the change in gender is an irregularity of vedic grammar. Because there is no proof to hold that view.

In the same way the conception of liberation held by the Mimânsakas holding three sacred staffs is also faulty as is shown above and should not be accepted.

The opponent of Vedântin then concludes the summary of his doctrine and says that the

Vedântin vainly boasts that he has given a blow with a hammer on the head of the opponent in accordance with the maxim of the dawning of a man near the toll-bar which he wanted to avoid at night time for the evasion of the payment of tax, the reason being that the term " philosophical teacher " gives a definite and real sense of a conscious soul in accordance with the doctrine of respectable thinkers like Vaisheshika &c.

The Vedântin replies that the opposite doctrine is worthless. The system of Kanâda is intended for the satisfaction of people with moderate intellectual development. Just as the doctrine that effect is non-existent before its birth is wrong, so the tenets that soul and knowledge are related as substance and property and that souls are numerous, are opposed to the teaching of the Veda and Smṛiti as also to experience.

To commence the refutation, is knowledge distinct from self, or both? If it is distinct, there can be no relation of qualification and qualified between the two, just as a pot (altogether distinct entity from self) cannot be the property of Self. If it be urged that pot &c., are not connected with Self and consequently cannot be the properties thereof; but knowledge is connected with Self and hence it can be the property of Self, it is replied that even the Omniscient Being cannot establish the connection between knowledge and Self.

To take up the discussion, is the proposed

connection a kind of conjunction, or the relation of identity, or the intimate relation? It cannot be the first, because conjunction (according to the opponent's doctrine) subsists between two substances only, whereas in the instance to be established although Self is a substance, knowledge is a property according to the opponent's view. The connection cannot be a kind of identical relation, for although such a relation is admitted by the Mimânsaks, the present opponent (Naiyâyika or Vais'heshika) makes no room for such a relation in his doctrine.

Finally the proposed connection cannot be Intimate Relation, for it cannot be established in any way. Is Intimate Relation *connected* with objects which it unites, by any other forms of connection, or is it *unconnected* with the objects between which Intimate Relation subsists? If the first view is adopted, then the connection connecting Intimate Relation with the objects will require another connection to connect it with Intimate Relation, and so on upto infinity. a conclusion clearly undermining the hypothesis. If the other view is maintained, Intimate Relation having no connection with the objects between which it is said to subsist, cannot in itself be held as proved, and thus it cannot prove the relation of property and substance between knowledge and Self which are different from itself (Intimate Relation).

To avoid this difficulty the opponent cannot

argue that Intimate Relation is connected with the objects not through any other connection, but through its very nature. Because he should answer the question:—Is that inherent form of connection (स्वरूपसंबन्ध) a distinct entity from Intimate Relation, or one with it? If it is distinct, how can the opponent avoid confusion ad infinitum? If it is one with Intimate Relation, there can be no connection between a thing and itself, for connection implies two extremities. A thing cannot be said as belonging to itself, for experience contradicts such a hypothesis. Again to say that a thing becomes its own connection is a proposition vitiated by the fault of self-abiding. Finally the category of Intimate Relation has been fully refuted in the first chapter (to which the attention of the reader is drawn).

Again[11] if knowledge be regarded as indivisible on the strength of consciousness, it is replied that the position is not improved. Because consciousness unconnected with the object cannot prove the object. If it be objected that the consciousness appears connected with the object by the relation of subject and object it is said that the position is not cleared. It is asked:—Is the relation, between a pot and its knowledge cognized by the *very knowledge* itself or by *something else?* On the first hypothesis how can knowledge of a pot which does not refer to itself as an object produce consciousness of its (of knowledge) relation with the object (pot)?

It is a rule that the knowledge of relation touches two related objects, otherwise the cognition should assume the bare form "relation" and not the form:—"This is connected with that." If the cognition were supposed to have the form of "relation" only, it cannot prove the being of two related objects. No relation is devoid of the proof touching two objects. Now if the knowledge of a pot, proposed as the apprehender of its relation with a pot, be regarded as referring to itself as an object, there would be the fault of self-abiding, because there is no proof to shew that a thing can be the object of itself. If it be argued that the thing-in-itself is the proof of the fact that it is the object of itself, it is said that the argument is fallacious. Because if on that hypothesis the objective character of a thing be regarded as identical with the thing-in-itself, the proposition "A thing becomes the object of itself"—would mean the thing itself (and nothing more). And thus no naming of a thing can be established. If, however, the objective character of a thing is distinct from the thing-in-itself there can be no proof of the relation of subject and object between the objective character and the thing-in-itself just as there can be no such relation between a pot and its objective character. This refutes the position of the follower of Prabhâkara that knowledge is self-shining. Now if it be said that the relation between the knowledge

of a pot and the pot is cognized by something else, the confusion ad-infinitum is obvious. Thus on the first main hypothesis that knowledge and Self are distinct entities, the relation of qualification and qualified cannot be established.

On the second main hypothesis that knowledge and Self are identical, there can be no possibility of regarding a relation of qualification and qualified between the two, knowledge being nothing more than Self. A thing cannot be the property of itself. Whiteness, for instance, is not seen to be the property of itself.

The third hypothesis of identity and difference is untenable for it is self-contradictory. Nothing can stand as identical with and different from itself at one and the same time for it is a self-contradictory assumption.

Identity and difference in one and the same object are proved by actual experience, and hence are not contradictory. To illustrate the point, in the proposition—"This is a cow"—the common characterisitic of the cow (गोत्व) is found inherent in or one with the individual animal, and the same characteristic being recognized in other individuals of the same class is perceived as distinct from the first animal. Thus identity and difference in one and the same entity is supported by perception and there can be no discussion on the point.

It is replied to the above that perception is falsified by other means of right knowledge A distinct object sometimes appears as one with another on account of certain defects like the excessive proximity or remoteness. On account of certain defects a flame of light separated though it may be appears as if it were one; also the moon though one appears as if it were two. Thus mere perception which is otherwise explicable cannot shake the contradiction between identity and difference proved by other means of right knowledge.

The opponent retorts:—Intelligence has two aspects:—(*a*) Self-hood and (*b*) consciousness. In its character as Self intelligence does not differ. In its character as consciousness, however, intelligence shews difference. Thus by identical and different aspects of the same entity the unity and diversity are not contradictory. It is replied that in this position also the relation of qualification and qualified cannot be established.

A thing cannot be *distinguished* from the qualified entity by means of a form through which its *identity* is comprehended. Its unity proves that it is Self. A thing cannot be regarded as qualified by that form which is essentially distinct therefrom. We have already pointed this out that an essentially distinct thing cannot become the qualification of another from which it is distinguished *e. g.*, a pot cannot be the qualification of Self. To say that intelligence is both identical and different by its two aspects and there is no contradiction is unreasonable. It is enquired:—Are these forms one with intelligence or different therefrom, or both identical and different? They cannot be regarded as really different from intelligence, for thereby the faults stated above would apply. The same is the case with the remaining two hypothesis of identity, and unity plus diversity. If the untity plus diversity of those aspects is to be based on another set of forms, there would result confusion ad-infinitum. Besides it is no use killing the dead by pushing the argument further in this section for we are going to refute this view of the advocate of unity and diversity later on. The conclusion is that Self is not in any way the substratum of knowledge, but is knowledge itself. By this line of argument existence and bliss are also shewn to be the essential characteristics of Self (and not mere properties). Again the definition that our soul is a substance possessed of the common characteristic of self-hood is fallacious (because Self does not admit of any difference on which common characteristic is based).

Just as the relation of qualification and qualified is difficult to establish between knowledge and soul, so the tenet about the plurality of soul is equally untenable, because it is opposed to reason and the Veda

To discuss the weakness of the tenet the Naiyâyika is confronted with the query:—

How is it that, when all souls are equally all-pervading and are consequently existent inside all bodies, happiness &c., arising out of the causal conditions thereof with respect to one soul are not experienced by the rest? The Naiyâyika cannot meet the objection by saying that pleasure &c., are experienced by that soul in whose organism (body and senses) they originate. Because that set of body and senses arises in the presence of all souls, and in the absence of any special reason it cannot be said as belonging to one soul and not to another (both being epually all-pervading). It will not do to lay down a rule that the ownership of body is determined by the action performed by each soul, which originates the body. Because even action which is produced in the presence of all equally extensive souls through the operation of body and senses cannot be regarded as belonging to one soul and not to all. If it be urged that although all souls have equal claim on the operation of one set of body and senses, the speciality of each set is determined by the variety of connection of mind and soul, it is replied that even that connection is common to all souls. The position will not be improved by saying that the difference in soul is determined by the connection of one mind with the soul who is the owner of it. Because it is impossible to say that a particular mind belongs to a particular soul, when it is connected with all the equally extensive souls. Besides the doctrine of the

plurality of soul is opposed to the following Vedic texts:—

"(1) That art thou; (2) I am Brahman; (3) This soul is Brahman; (4) Brahman is real and infinite consciousness; (5) Brahman is consciousness and bliss; (6) The soul is eternal and all-pervading like ether; (7) One self shines in heaven as stable as a tree; (8) Brahman is actionless, stainless, conditionless, and quiet being devoid of all properties".

Thus even on the assumption of plurality of soul, no satisfactory theory can be established with regard to the experience of pleasure and pain, and bondage and freedom. Even if the theory be established by the straining of reasoning, it is better to admit the unity of soul essentially eternal pure, conscious and free, for two reasons:—(1) That such a theory is in harmony with the teaching of the Veda which declares:—"Oh good boy, there was in the beginning one absolute entity or being; Brahman is verily one and secondless; there is no difference in this world" and (2) that the theory of unity of soul is based upon economy of thought.

Section II.

Refutation of the Naiyâyika continued—the refutation of the Naiyayika conception of mind.

"Well", the Naiyâyika argues, "let there

be unity of soul on the strength of the Veda and economy of thought. But the Vedântin has equal difficulty in establishing a theory of individual pleasure and pain, bondage and freedom". It is replied by the Vedântin that the theory of multiform pleasure and pain and individual bondage and freedom is well established on the diversity of minds which (and not the souls) are regarded to be the substrata of pleasure pain &c. as also on the difference individual ignorance in accordance with the text:—" Indra i.e., divine soul) assumes variety of forms through the variety of his phenomenal powers". The opponent retorts:—" Let the diversity of ignorance account for the phenomenal plurality of ego. But how can mind, which is devoid of parts and atomic, manifest its modifications as pleasure and pain"? The Vedântin solicits patient listening on the part of the opponent and adds that in his doctrine mind is not impartite, but has got parts in consequence of its being a created substance in accordance with the Vedic text:—" God created mind ". Its nature will be described in the fourth chapter while discussing the theory of the origin of the world. The Naiyâyika should not urge the objection that mind on such a hypothesis would turn out to be non-eternal. Because such a consequence is welcomed by the Vedântin who regards every thing other than Brahman to be phenomenal (and hence non-eternal) Again the modifications of mind into a variety of thoughts and sensations like desire, volition &c., are accounted

for on the theory that mind is a substance possessing parts. There is a Vedic text declaring such modifications:—" Desire, will, the impetus from within to do an action, faith, non-belief, patience, impatience, shame, fear, intellect-all these are mind " *i. e*, they are the modifications of mind, and are regarded as mind on the principle of identity of cause and effect as in a pot and its cause earth. Again another text declares that Self reflects every form of mind to shew his individuality.

It may be urged against the above interpretation of the Vedic text that the words " all these are mind " are capable of giving a different sense *viz*:—" Desire &c., reside in soul through the combination of mind and soul". But we learn from the subsequent texts that the soul is not touched by any condition for it is declared that whatever he sees, hears and smells leaves no trace in him. As the latter texts cannot be otherwise explained (*i. e.*, cannot be interpreted satisfactorily if we regard the soul to be the substratum of desire &c), there is no proof to construe the preceding text (*viz*, " Desire &c., are mind ") as referring to the soul (and not to mind). It has been accordingly said by the Vârtikakâra:—

" It is an admitted piece of experience that whatever is seen by the seer in the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping is confined to the respective state and not to another. Thus

whatever is seen leaves no trace in the seer of witnessing soul. The Veda declares with a trumphet that the seer of sin and holy action is neither sinful nor holy".

We have again the testimony of S'rikrishṇa who declares in the Gîta:—

"Desire, hatred, pleasure, pain, body, sensibility, patience all these make up, in brief, the organism which is liable to change."

Besides it is not through the Vedic testimony that mind is held to be of middle size (*i. e.*, neither atomic nor all-pervading) on account of its being possessed of parts, but its middle-sizedness is determined by rational economy of thought as will be presently shewn. Both the thinkers are at one in holding that mind is the cause of pleasure and pain. Now mind should according to Naiyâyika view be the intimate cause of pleasure and pain, and it should therefore be inferred as of the middle size like the sense of sight. There is no middle term by which the atomic nature of mind can be deduced. It should not be urged that in accordance with the view of Prabhâkara the all-pervading nature of mind is inferred from its being an eternal sense like the sense of hearing (which according to the Naiyâyika is held to be eternal ether itself) Because the Vedântin does not accept the eternal character. The Vedic text:—"Ether is produced from Self" shews that ether is

not eternal much less its product, namely the sense of hearing. Thus whatever has a beginning is not all-pervading, and consequently the generalization that whatever is created must be of the middle size is not vitiated by a deviation in the sense of hearing (because the sense of hearing is not eternal but created). Again the rule is that that property which is cognized by a sense, is possessed by that sense as its own property. And thus just as the sense of sight is proved as a product of that substance (namely "light") whose property is cognized by it, so mind also must be regarded as the product of the five elements, because it is possessed of the five-fold properties owing to its being capable of cognizing those properties. The thing to be proved namely "the possession by the sense of those properties which are cognized" does not differ in both the senses, namely sense of sight and mind. It should not be stated that there is a difference between the sense of sight and mind with regard to the above generalization, to wit, elements of different classes cannot create an effect (like a mind, while one kind of substance can create a product of its own sort *e. g*, light producing the sense of sight). Because the objection pointed out is not based upon experience for the latter shews that one kind of cloth is woven out of different kinds of threads such as golden wires interwoven with silk and cotton threads. If such a thing is not regarded as a product or a constituted effect the same

principle will have to be extended elsewhere, and thus there would be the final oblation, as it were, of the theory of the creation of a separate product. Thus mind should be regarded as a pure substance produced out of the five elements in a state prior to their intermixture in the proportion of one half of the principal element and one eighth of the remaining four; possessed of the pure essence predominantly capable of expanding and contracting itself; susceptible of atomic changes; and possessed of the same size as the body. In the Vedântic doctrine pleasure, pain, desire, cognition, &c., are supposed as belonging to mind. Now as those feelings are experienced as extending over the whole body their substratum namely mind should also extend over the whole body. It is objected by the opponent:—

"If mind is not held to be atomic, there is possibility of its simultaneous connection with all the senses, and there would then ensue the simultaneous rise of a variety of knowledge," The Vedântin admits the force of the argument, and says that the rule that one kind of sense produces one form of sensation is common to both the thinkers. Else why should there not be two forms of visual perception by the two eyes simultaneously? But when different senses operate simultaneously different sensations are produced simultaneously and such a consequence is acceptable, for it is supported by experience. A man eating a long and bulging cake for instance, simultaneously experiences sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. Besides even the Naiyâyika cannot avoid the simultaneous experience of taste and smell of jagree connected with the mucous membrane of the tongue which is connected with mind, for he admits the causality of the contact between mind and skin in all forms of knowledge inasmuch as non-admission of such a hypothesis cannot explain the state of sound sleep.[1] There can therefore be no two opinions with respect to the conception of mind as accepted by the Vedântin and proved by the Veda, Smṛiti and reason. Thus it is clear that the view of the Naiyâyika that mind is atomic as also the view of the Mîmânsaka to be described hereafter that mind is all-pervading are erroneous.

The opponent retorts:—

"If desire &c., are the properties of mind, how can we reconcile the experience such as:—"I will; I know"—which points to the fact that desire &c, are properties of the soul"?

It is replied by the Vedântin that the opponent should listen to the Vedântic teaching on the point. Just as a ball of iron as such is incapable of burning anything, but we say that it burns when we identify it with fire (through which it has been heated and which is the real burner); so the experience that the soul is happy is due to the erroneous identification of the soul with mind which is really subject to the modifications of

pleasure and pain. For the detailed discussion on the point the reader is referred to the second chapter of another work of this author called Swarupaprakâsha (*i. e*, "The illumination of Self").

It is again objected:—

"Assuming that pleasure &c., really refer to mind and not to soul, how can mind be the object of direct cognition it being a sensory and as such not amenable to sensuous experience".

It is replied that the objection is based on false assumption. The Vedântin does not regard mind as a kind of sense, for there is no proof thereof. The text of the Gita that "senses with mind as the sixth" should not be pointed out as the proof, for the number "six" can be exp'ained by a thing which is not a sense. There is no rule that the enumeration of senses cannot be completed by putting, in the same train, an object which is not a sense. Because we see in the following line:—"He taught the Vedas with the Mahabhârata as the fifth" that the fifth place is occupied by the Mahabhârata which is not one of the Vedas. Besides the following Vedic texts clearly shew that mind is not one of the senses but a separate element:—

"Objects transcend the senses; the mind transcends the objects; the microcosmic intellect transcends the mind; the macrocosmic intellect transcends the microcosmic intellect; the primeval matter transcends the macrocosmic intellect;

Self transcends the primeval matter. Nothing goes beyond Self He is the final boundary and goal".

If it be objected that in the assumption of mind as *not* a sensory, pleasure &c., would not be directly perceivable they being not resulting from any sense, it is replied that the rule that the direct knowledge flows from the sense does not hold good in the case of God who is supposed to know everything directly without any sense. Besides on the opponent's hypothesis that sensuous knowledge is the only direct knowledge, even inference would be a kind of direct knowledge as it flows from the mind (regarded by the opponent to be a sense). Thus it is established beyond doubt that the phenomena of doer and enjoyer in a living body relate to mind and *not* to the eternal and all-pervading Soul, because the latter being secondless is devoid of all properties. The following Vedic texts declare this absolute character of Self:—

"Self is devoid of properties and parts. The unborn divine self appears different in different bodies through a variety of conditions, just as the unique and effulgent sun passing over a variety of waters appears multiform. Just as the sun, the eye of the whole world, is not touched by the external faults of the eyes of the people so the one soul, who is the inner Self of all creatures, is not touched by the external popular pain".

Even the Smṛiti says:—

" Although the soul is one and pervades all creatures, he appears uniform as well as multiform just like the moon reflected in water".

The opposition with the aphorism of sage Gautama stated above should not be urged, for it is explicable as proving the phenomenal plurality of souls until the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. By this line of argument the view that unity of being is taught by the Veda for meditiation only (and *not* as a final truth) is refuted. The doctrine of the plurality of soul being thus difficult to establish, the tenet of the unity of soul based upon the teaching of the Veda and Smṛiti as also on experience turns out to be acceptable.

Section III.

Refutation of dualism–refutation of the conception of generic difference accepted by the Vaisheshikas and Naiyayikas.

We have thus refuted the doctrine of plurality of soul or difference in spirit. We shall now proceed to refute the difference in non-self or matter also.

Why should there be any doubt with regard to the difference in non-self when it has been already established in the first chapter while refuting the doctrines of creation and

that the material world is the product of Mâyâ?

It is replied that it is not proved that Mâyâ is the cause of the world. We have many Vedic texts pointing that the world is the effect of Brahman. The typical texts are :—

" Oh good boy, in the beginning there was existence. That is Brahman from which these elements or beings come forth. From this or that Self ether was produced. Just as minute sparks originate from fire, so from this self all gods, all worlds, all souls come forth". Again the causality of Brahman is declared in the Brahma Sutras :—

That is Brahman from which the world gets its origin, in which it stays and in which it vanishes" (B. S. I. 1—2).

The opponent retorts :—" Well, we have other texts which shew that the world is the effect of Nescience or Mâyâ. The texts are :—

(*a*) " This world was in the beginning enveloped in death (*i. e.* Nescience with the reflection of Intelligence therein). (*b*) It was then undeveloped. (*c*) Indra (*i. e.* God) becomes multiform through his phenomenal powers or Mâyâ? (*d*) The unborn Mâyâ is one and red white and black in colour. (*e*) Mâyâ should be known as the material cause of the world. (*f*) There was neither existence nor non-existence in the beginning. There was (indescribable) darkness (*i. e.* Nescience). The world was then enveloped

in this causal darkness". Again we have an aphorism shewing that Mâyâ is the cause:—

"The world of the dream state is merely Mâyâ, because its essential nature is not produced by the full requisite causes". (B. S. II. iii. 3).

Now when there is a contradiction between the Vedic texts and aphorism let neither of the two be the cause of the world. Let us then seek for the cause in the Naiyayikas' atoms or the Sânkhyâs' Prakṛiti or nature whichever suits reason. Thus the difference in non-self in the world being established by perception, the Vedânta doctrine of non-duality cannot be proved even though there may be no difference in self or spirit".

To the above the Vedântin replies in a humorous tone that the Naiyâyika bull without horns or tail has, no doubt, given a fatal blow to the advocate of non-duality. The Vedantin asks the following question to the opponent who declares that the difference in the material world is proved by perception which shews objects like a pot and a piece of cloth as distinct entities:—

Does that difference consist in the form of relation between an object to be differentiated and an object from which the first is differentiated (in other words is it a mere distinguishing attribute) or does it consist of altogether a separate principle? The Vaiseshikas and Naiyayikas maintain that the difference is an entity cognized by perception. The Sânkhyas and the followers of Patanjali hold that difference is of two kinds one consisting of the property of an object and the other of the essence of the thing itself. This view is accepted by Madhvas who are known for their dualistic system. The followers of Prabhâkara maintain that difference is identical with the substratum (*i. e.*, has no being other than the substratum) and is cognized by perception. The followers of Bhatta Mimânsaka are of opinion that difference is a kind of mutual exclusion or negative and although one with the substratum is cognized (not by perception) but by non-perception of the thing to be excluded or negatived. The Jainas as well as the followers of the school of Bhatta Bhâskara, and the mendicants called Tridandins (those who carry three staves formed into one in the right hand) hold (that there is no absolute difference or absolute identity between cause and effect), but a relation of identity-in-difference between the two. We shall then take and refute these views in succession.

The Vaiseshika or Naiyâyika is asked:—

Does perception comprehend difference as such *alone* or *through* the *differentiation* of the two objects? It cannot be first, because it is impossible to comprehend difference without the cognition of the two distinguishable objects. On the second view, the following alternatives are suggested:—

1 Do the direct cognitions of the disinguishable objects and of the difference appear one after another *or* II do they appear simultaneously?

If they appear by succession does perception enable us to comprehend the disinguishable objects *after* the comprehension of difference or the reverse? (In other words does the cognition of difference precede the cognition of distinguishable objects or vice versa?) Again on the assumption of simultaneous appearance of the two cognitions, it is asked:—Does perception enable us to comprehend difference and the distinguishable objects by the relation of qualification and qualified as in the case of "Devadatta carrying a staff" (where "Devadatta" is known as the object qualified and "carrying a staff" is known as an attribute) or does it enable us to comprehend them as distinct conceptions having no interrelation like three fingers.

We shall first examine the alternatives of view no 1. The alternative that the cognition of difference precedes that of the distinguishable objects does not hold water. Because when the knowledge of distinguishable objects is regarded to be the cause of the knowledge of difference the latter cannot precede the former and thus the theory of successive comprehension falls to the ground. To avoid this difficulty if it be held that the reverse view–that is–the cognition of distinguishable objects precedes that of difference–is true, the matter requires further examination.

It is asked:—(*a*) Does the cognition of distinguishable objects in *their essential character* of individual objects lead to or determine the nature of difference or (*b*) does it determine difference in its character of apprehending the *generic* nature of objects (*i. e.*, not in this individualized garb, but as a member of a particular genus like "pot" or (*c*) does that cognition which determines difference relate to the object in their *distinguishable* garb *i. e.*, as an object to be distinguished from another and an object from which another is to be distinguished? It cannot be (*a*), because although for instance, we have the knowledge of milk and water mixed together as such, we do not perceive this difference (*i. e.*, although we know that milk and water are essentially these, we have not the direct perception of their difference. To say that it is *infered* is contradictory of the opponent's tenet that difference is *directly* cognized). It cannot be (*b*), because the apprehension of distinguishable objects through their class-characterisitic as pot &c., necessarily requires the knowledge of difference (*i. e.*, as long as we do not distinguish the class of pot from that of cloth we cannot know that a particular object is a pot or a piece of cloth), and consequently there would be the fault of mutual dependence (*i. e.*, the knowledge of difference requires the knowledge of generic character and vice versa). For the same reason the alternative (*c*) is also untenable. The knowledge of one of the distinguishable objects known

as the counter entity or object from which another is to be distinguished requires the antecedent knowledge of difference, because "Counter-entity" means an object which opposes the other and determines the difference between that and itself. Likewise the knowledge of the other object (*i. e.*, the object to be distinguished requires the precedence of the knowledge of difference).

Again is the difference (supposed to be a separate entity by the Naiyâyika) found in an object which is *differentiated* from another or in an object which remains *identical*? It cannot be found in the latter kind of object, for the cognition of difference in such an object would be a piece of delusion as the object is supposed to be identical *i e.*, devoid of all distinction. If in such identical object difference is perceived, it follows that the knowledge of difference is delusion. Now if it be supposed that difference is found in a differentiated object, it is asked[1]:—Does that difference exist in the object differentiated by itself (*i. e.*, the same difference) or by another difference?

On the first alternative there would be the logical fault of self-dependence, because in that case difference will exist in the object qualified by the same difference. On the second alternative the same queries are put:—Does that other difference exist in the identical object or differentiated object? If in identical object, the

knowledge of difference is a delusion. If it exists in a differentiated object and if the differentation of the object is based on the second difference resorted to the same fallacy of self-dependence meets us. If the differentiation of the object is based on the first difference for the explanation of which the second difference was resorted to, then the fault would be of inter-dependence. If, however, in order to explain the existence of the first difference in an object differentiated by the second difference a third difference is resorted to, the position will be that of a circle in which the third difference occupies the middle position connecting the first and second differences. Again to avoid this difficulty if a fourth difference is admitted, there would be the fault of instability of argument or confusion ad infinitum. If the instability of argument is held as acceptable there being no other alternative, then it is enquired:—Do those differences constituting an infinite chain exist in the object in succession or simultaneously? If they exist in succession the following consequences would occur, that is to say, the object would be beginningless; the expression that the object is differentiated would be meaningless because until the subsequent differentiation standing as the effect of the preceding ones is established the object cannot be said as actually differentiated by the subsequent differences; and when the succeeding differences are held as capable of explaining the differentiation the preceding ones become purposeless and

might be eliminated altogether. If on the contrary the simultaneous existence of differences be admitted, the assumption that a difference exists in an *already* differentiated object will have to be abandoned. (Because *all* the differences are engaged at a time in differentiating the object, and no particular difference has a scope for existence in the object in its differentiated character). To avoid this difficulty if it be admitted that one difference exists in the object differentiated by another, then the difficulty of selection occurs *i. e.*, there would be no ground for ascertaining which particular difference (out of infinite differences) *differentiates* the object and which difference *exists* in that differentiated object.

Besides we would allow the assumption of a number of differences had we any consciousness comprehending such a series of differences. We have, however, no such consciousness, and consequently the assumption of infinite differences is not guaranteed by any means of right knowledge.

In order to avoid all these drawbacks if it be held that perception comprehends difference and the differentiated objects simultaneously (Vide supra main alternative No. II) as a connected conception as in the case of Devdatta with a staff where we have the simultaneous appearance of the qualification and the qualified *or* as distinct ideas as in the case of cognition of three fingers, the Vedântin replies that the position is not acceptable. Because with regard to

the latter instance the rule is that the cognition of more than one object at a time is necessarily complex and not simple as is supposed by the opponent. With regard to the former instance which the opponent now presses on the Vedantin, saying that perception enables us to comprehend difference by the relation of qualification and qualified, it may be observed as under :—

What cognition stands as the cognition of the qualification? Is it the cognition of differance or the cognition of the differentiated objects coupled with difference? It cannot be first, because the causal idea and the consequential idea cannot be one and the same (*i. e.*, the cognition of difference which is the effect of the cognition of qualification cannot be one with the latter). It cannot be the other, because the knowledge of the qualifier or form depends upon the knowledge of difference. (*i. e.*, the knowledge of qualifier or form which is assumed to explain the knowledge of difference cannot prove the latter because it itself requires the latter for its on being).

An idea shining in its absolute character in other words, without its being characterised by any form or qualification is never seen as giving rise to the cognition of difference.

Section IV.

Refutation of dualism continued–Refutation of the Sânkhya conception of difference.

Let then difference be two-fold in accord-

ance with the Sânkhya doctrine:—(1) standing as the *attribute* of the object, (2) standing as the *essence* of the object. The former kind of difference consists of the impropriety of mutual concordance or predication of objects *e. g.*, when silver is unfit to be put in concordance with a pearl oyster, it is said to be different from a pearl oyster. Such a difference is the inherent quality of the object, because when the essence of the thing is known, its inherent properties are as a rule known. The other form of difference consists of non-confusiou of objects, and is nothing but the conception of the essence of the thing itself. (*i. e.*, we conprehend the difference of a thing simultaneously with its comprehension. In other words the conception of a separate entity implies that it is distinct from another).

It is objected:—

"Difference is based upon the distinguishable objects and is expressed in the form—this is different from that:—The comprehension of difference requires the comprehension of distinguishable odjects. Then how can difference be known by the mere knowledge of the essence of one entity"?

It is replied by the Sânkhya that difference is in no need of distinguishable objects for its being, because the very essence of colour, taste &c, constitutes the difference of the respective objects from the rest. Such a difference which flows from the essence of the thing requires no

distinguishable objects. In other words difference is non-confusion; and the non-confusion of colour, for instance, from taste is proved by its character as colour. We never observe the non-confusion of colour and taste as depending on some other property than the very essence of the thing, because the essence of colour and taste appears in the intellect in a non-confused or individualized state. The necessity for distinguishable pair of objects is due to the expression of difference in language. To express the point, the terms colour, taste &c are used when we mean to convey the essence of colour &c. When we have in our intellect the relative appearance of other objects we use the terms like difference &c in their relativity. Just as the terms trees &c are employed when the essence of trees &c, is to be conveyed, but when they are conditioned with the situation in one area we use the terms forest &c. To conclude then, there is no proof of the existence of difference as apart from the essence of the thing, the terminology of "difference" (as apart from the 'name' of the thing) having been due to the relativity of distinguishable objects. Again the fact that difference does not exist apart from the essence of the thing is proved by the unconfused appearance of the essence of colour, taste &c., in conditionless knowledge (*i. e.*, knowledge which is not formal but which merely touches the thing as such).

The Vedântin replies:—If any difference in the

form of *attribute* or *property* of objects appears let it so appear. We have nothing to say against such appearance of such difference, for the appearance of multiform world has phenomenally transplanted upon Brahman in the manner to be setforth hereafter is admitted by the Vedântin until the the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. The Sânkhya view, however, that the other kind of difference consists of the essence of objects like pot &c is not acceptable, for it contradicts experience, and would lead to confusion of popular dealings in language as also to absence of duality.

To explain the consequences, just as the whiteness of a pot is expressed as—"the pot is white"—so the difference is cognized as an attribute (and not as essence) of the thing as in the proposition—"the pot is different". We do not cognize difference as the essence of the pot for the proposition does not assume the form "pot is difference" Thus it is a matter of common experience from a child to a learned man that "difference" and "pot" stand in the relation of property and thing. Such an experience is never sublated, for if we set at naught this well known experience we should be obliged to neglect all cognitions. Besides the theory that difference is the essence of the thing is opposed to the general trend of humam experience.

Again if difference is the essence of the thing, "difference" and "pot" (the essence of the thing) should be synonimous and in that

case difference cannot be predicated of a variety of pots, pieces of cloth &c., (just as one pot cannot be the matter of predication of another pot or another object like cloth). It would then follow that all forms of expressions in language would come to an end.

The Sânkhya method of explaining the terminology of "pot" and "difference" as relating to the essence of the thing like "pot" on the twofold aspects of "essence" and "condition" in accordance with the analogy of the usage of "trees" and "forest" is erroneous. There is some distinction in the analogous instance of "trees" and "forest". There the things expressed by the terms "trees" and "forest" owe there terminology as such not to the essence of thing but to their being associated with the conditions of their being in one place (when the object is is called a "tree") and in a number of places in the same local area (when the whole is called a "forest") Again the terms "long", "short" &c., are employed with respect to trees &c., on account of their relative qualities of occupying more or less space, but not on account of the essence of the thing. Again, the terms "father &c., are used with respect to "sons &c.," in their relation of progenitors. In brief, all terms which are not synonimous must have necessarily a distinct significance. Thus if "pot" and "difference" have no separate significance they would be synonimous, and then "difference" cannot be

predicated of a variety of objects, and consequently the linquistic expressions would be stopped. This difficulty of explaining the linquistic expressions (in which difference is actually predicated of a number of objects) otherwise than on the separate significance of "difference" and "a thing" leads us to conclude that "difference" is something else than the essence of the thing like a pot. We have again the following syllogism to base the distinction between "difference" and the "thing":—

"Difference" is an entity other than the import of the term "pot" because it is expressed by a word which is not synonimous with "pot" *e. g.*, the entity expressed by the term "piece". Again:—

The term "difference" is not synonimous with "pot", because it is used in apposition or concordance with the term "whiteness" &c.

There is another flaw in this view of the Sânkhyas. If "difference" is merely the essential nature of "pot" no difference can be proved in the world as the two conceptions of "difference" and "pot" are conflicting, the former conveying the idea of "separation" while the latter of a "compact body". The result of this subtlety of reasoning of the Sânkhya would thereby corroborate the doctrine of non-duality inasmuch as non-confucion (difference) cannot be asserted with respect to objects which mutually

exclude one another. If "pot" is regarded as merely the "difference" the entity of pot cannot be proved, for "difference" conveys the idea of "separateness". The parts of pot would also be separate and so on whereby no finality of element is reached and the world would be a mere non-entity.[1]

Now if it be argued that the unity or compactness of a pot is not opposed to its identity with "difference", in consequence of its being apprehended by one cognition referring to its identity with "difference" the Vedântin requests reply from the opponent on the following question:—

Is the "difference" one throughout the world or many? If there is absolutely one difference, there would be the necessity for accepting the doctrine of non-dualism in asmuchas the whole round of things is identical with that unique difference. On the other hypothesis if the multifrom character of difference is in itself one, the same conseqence of accepting non-dualistic thory will follow on account of all differences merging into one character. If things are not identical with difference there would be the distinction between the difference and the thing. The difference of pot &c, then, would be an entity distinct from the essence of pot &c. To conclude, then, as the identity of "difference" and the thing is opposed to the general trend of human experience and as its assumption must lead to (*a*)

the difficulty of expressing thoughts in language (on account of general confusion of objects) as also to (*b*) the doctrine of non-dualism on the one hand or to that of Nihilism on the other, the theory that "difference" consists of the essence of the thing like a pot is untenable. The real conception of "difference" is that it is a mental entity distinct from the essence of the thing like a pot, is dependent upon the distinguishable objects, and although indeterminable by any proof shines forth as an object of the witnessing intelligence until the knowledge of the unity of self is achieved. Thus there is no scope for the conception that difference is one with the essence of the thing. Nor can we neglect the difference (for it appears in the intellect).

Now let us examine the proposition enunciated by the opponent to the effect that even in conditionless knowledge, difference appears (and consequently it is one with the essence of the thing which is admitted to be the only object presented in that kind of knowledge). It is enquired:—What are we to understand by that "conditionless knowledge"? If it means "knowledge which is inexpressible" by taking "condition" in the sense of "verbal condition" of knowledge, the knowledge of children and mute creatures would be "conditionless knowledge". Now in this view of "conditionless knowledge" although children and the mute creatures have not the knowledge of the *words*

expressing various objects, they can at least have the knowledge of *distinguishable objects e. g.*, this is different from that, and consequently the appearance of difference in the intellect, which depends upon the knowledge of distinguishable objects, becomes possible, and thus there is no opposition to the Vedântic conception of "difference" If however in the phrase "conditionless knowledge" the word "condition" means "differentiating attribute", the conditionless knowledge would mean the consciousness that arises on the first touch of the object with the sense of sight (and not the formal knowledge which requires the knowledge of the relativity of objects). Then to say that "difference" shines forth in such "conditionless knowledge" *i. e.*, "knowledge which is devoid of all distinguishing attribute" is a contradiction in terms and non-sensical. To conclude then "difference" and the "essence" of a thing are not one and the same.

Section V.

Refutation of dualism continued:—

Refutation of the conception of "difference" held by Prabhâkara and Bhatta.

Now the followers of Prabhâkara and Bhatta regard "difference" as a kind of non-entity which in essence is one with the substratum (wherein the non-entity is perceived). The former however hold like the Naiyâyika that "non-entity"

is perceptible; the latter hold that it is comprehended by non-perception Both these views of "difference" are wrong.

This negative view of difference (*i. e.* when we say-a pot is different from cloth-it means that in cloth there is the absence of pot and vice versa) is proved by two modes by the opponent. The first mode is as under :—

The special modification of mind or knowledge as:—"I know the absence of a thing by its non-perception"—is called non-perception. The instrument originating this non-perception is also called non-perception and consists of the absence of definite direct knowledge of the thing (which is that counter-entity of the non-existence to be cognized). Now when at a place which is really associated with the *absence* of a pot, a delusion as to the *existence* of a pot occurs the sense of sight although connected with the absence of a pot does not produce the knowledge that there is no pot. It follows then that in the comprehension of an absence of a thing the requisite instrument is the non-perception of the object in the intellect.[1] In the case of delusion of the existence of a pot where there is really no pot, we have the want of such a non-perception of the counter-entity (pot) (*i. e.* to express it positively we have the appearance, however false it may be, of a pot), and consequently the knowledge of the non-existence of pot does not arise. The sense of sight &c.,—the

instrument of direct knowledge—are necessary for the purpose of comprehending the positive substratum in which an object is negatived as also for the purpose of producing the fitness of non-perception. By "fitness of non-perception" is meant the hypothetical possibility to the effect that had the pot really existed in this place it would have been perceived (by the sight just as the substratum is cognized by the same sense).

The other mode of proving non-existence is that the non-perception described above is merely a help-mate of perception and that it is not a separate proof in itself. The assumption of non-perception as a separate proof, is cumbrous and is disliked by all the followers of Kaṇâda and Gautama.

The Vedântin replies that both the views are equally unsustainable. (It may be oberved that both the opponents regard non-perception as necessary in the rise of the knowledge of non-existence, the first view giving it an independent status, while the other making it a help-mate of perception) (Now just as a delusion of the *existence* of a thing in a place when there is *absence* of it is explained on the assnmption that the requisite instrument of the knowledge of non-existence namely non-perception is not operating there and hence the existence of the thing appears) so the opposite assumption leading to the instrumentality of non-perception in the comprehension of existence is also possible. To

explain the point, where there is *really* a pot, and yet the *delusion* that there is *no* pot the contact of the sense of sight (requisite for the rise of the knowledge of existence according to the admitted theory) operates and still the knowledge of *existence* does not arise, and consequently it may fairly be held that the non-perception of non-existence is the instrument in the comprehension of existence (the absence of such a non-perception of non-existence *i. e.*, the perception of non-existence, explaining the phenomena of the delusion of the non-existence of a pot). Such a consequence (of regarding non-perception as a proof of being) cannot be accepted by the opponents; for it would undermine their established tenet that the perception of a thing is the proof of its being. Besides the consequence which we have pointed out as the hypothetical possibilty against the view set forth that non-perception of a thing is the proof of its non-existence is not established by any means of right knowledge. Non-perception of a thing is neither a help-mate of perception nor an independent instrument for proving non-existence. It should not be urged against the Vedântin that the knowledge of non-existence connot be explained by disregarding non-perception as a help-mate or as a separate proof. Because the Vedântin admits the phenomenal non-existence (of a thing in another and hence its difference from another) determined by the world transplanted upon Brahman by Mâya until

the rise of the knowledge of Brahman (*i. e.*, the Vedântin accepts the phenomenal difference or mutual exclusions or negations as they appear but not in reality).

The conclude then, " difference " is not a mere negation of one thing in another which is essentially one with the substratum; nor is it distinct from the substratum; nor one with the essence of the object itself. But it is indescribable and has a mere phenomenal appearance as will be shown hereafter.

Section VI.

Refutation of the doctrine of the unico-dualism or difference-non-difference.

Let then the effect be different and at the same time non-different from the cause. Let it not be indescribably superimposed upon the cause as is held by the non-dualists, or absolutely distinct from the cause, for there is no proof to establish either of the two views. Now there are many unico-dualists:—

The mendicants of Jainism hold that the whole world is full of differences and non-differences, because it is observed in that unico-dual character. To illustrate the point, the world appears to be one in its character of being which is uniformly predicated of all *e. g*, a pot exists, cloth exists. The same world appears to be multiform in its

character of a variety of objects. This experience of unity and diversity leads us to suppose that the world is unico-dual, but neither multiform nor unique. This unico-dual character is not a property of the thing, for even the property, is (not absolutely one) but multiform. Besides no entity is observed other than this unity-diversity. Everything is therefore unico-dual on the strength of experience. The following syllogism also proves this unico-dualism:—

Everything is indeterminate (*i. e.* niether unique nor different), because it is existent *e. g.*, the god Ganesh (who has a mixture of a human being with that of elephant).

The cause and effect are thus one and different.

To the above theory of Jainism with regard to cause and effect the followers of Bhatta Mimansaka give the following reply:—

The world is not unico-dual, because it is not so experienced and because such an assumption would lead to the cessation of worldly dealings. To explain the two drawbacks, (it may be noted in the first place) that we do not see in essence the unity of a pot and a cart, because they are never put in apposition as:—"A pot is a cart". The unity of objects in their character of being is due to the presence of the category of Sâmânya or common characterisitc running through them all (and not on account of their innate oneness).

Thus everything is not indefinite on account of unity and diversity. In the second place if everything is one with the rest and vice versa there would be the cessation of worldly dealings as will be presently shewn. As a pot is one with a cart according to this theory a man anxious to get water might take a cart. If the opponent says that such an undesirable consequence would not occur as the cart is as the same time not identical with the pot, the follower of Bhatta enquires:—

What are we to understand by the phrase that the cart is not a pot? Does the phrase "non-pot" mean the absence of identity with pot (in cart) or does it convey a separate aspect? If the former (*i. e.*, if cart is a non-pot=in cart there is the absence of the identity with pot) it is further enquired:— Are the being and non-being (predicated of one and the same object) exchangeable with each other *or* distinct from each other *or* of dual character (*i. e.* one & different)? If being and non-being are interchangeable, then the phrase " a cart is the absence (non-being) of the identity with the pot " is equivalent to identity with the pot, and then a man wanting to fetch water might catch hold of a cart, also a man desirous to drink water might catch hold of a streak of burning flame of fire- (both ridiculous consequences flowing from the supposed premiss). If in order to avoid these bad consequences it be held that being and non-being are distinct, then the cart being the non-existence of

the pot is distinct from the pot, and thus everything cannot be said to be indefinite (but definite). If however being and non-being are themselves indefinite (*i. e.* one and different) then the absence of the pot will mean the presence of it, and in the same way the absence of being would be the presence of being and thus being and non-being would be indistinguishable. This would lead to the consequence that neither being nor non being can be expressed in the world whose dealings would thereby be stopped.

Now let us take the alternative view that the phrase—"a cart is a non-pot" means that the cart has a special form like "non-pot" (and not the absence of pot in it). This view implies that one object (cart) has two aspects (one positive and the other negative). Now these two aspects are never cognized as apart from the common characteristic and speciality. A thing is therefore one and different or unique and diverse through the relation of common characteristic and individuality; and not through its very essence.

The argument stated by the Jaina that everything is indefinite on account of existence like god Ganesh is bad. The instance quoted is devoid of the major term inasmuch as god Ganesh is not in essence of indefinite form. The symmetrical arrangement of complex parts leads to the formation of one organized substance (and god Ganesh is therefore possessed of a definite organism). It is futile to argue like this:—"When

god Ganesh is seen possessed of the form as a man and elephant why should there be the assumtion that one organized whole is seen". Because we observe only the common characteristic of limbs only. Now mere cognition of the common characteristic of limbs cannot lead to the supposition of one individual named Maitra to be another named Chaitra (*i. e.* because we see similarity of limbs, it does not follow that the individuality is exhausted. In god Ganesh we see the similarity of features of a human being and elephant. It does not therefore follow that there is no organized being of that sort; just as Chaitra and Maitra are distinct individuals in spite of the similarity of limbs, so god Ganesh is a distinct definite being). It is therefore a false argument to say that everything is indefinte on account of existence. This point has been fully refuted in Chapter II.

The follower of Bhatta then adds that the unico-difference of objects is due (not to their very essence) but to the common chracteristic and speciality as shewn below:—

In the knowledge arising from the proposition:—

"This is a castrated bull" the identity between the individual castrated bull and the genus of bull is perceived on account of concordance of subject and predicate. In the knowledge, however, arising out of the proposition—"This is a black-eyed bull"—the genus "bull"

is cognized as one with the individual black-eyed bull, and as such differs from the castrated individual. Thus by these varying cognitions the class and the individual are known as possessing difference and unity just as the heat and light of fire are cognized by touch and sight.

The opponent of Bhatta Mîmansaka might argue :—

In the instance of fire each property is first cognized separately and then we have the knowledge of an object possessing both the attributes.

It is replied that the same principle may hold good in the identity and difference of generality and speciality (or class and individual). That is to say, the common characteristic or generality is essentially one with the speciality or individuality. It is, however, different from individuality in its character of identity with another individual. In the same way an individual is identical with the common characteristic, but is different when viewed in relation with another individual.

In like manner we know the identity between the cause and effect on account of their concordance as subject and predicate *e. g.* a pot is earth. Besides earth is not cognized as one with the pot (*i. e.* is seen in another form), and consequently both of them differ. It is thus clear that the unity and diversity between cause and effect is established by the very perception. It

follows then that the effect is not an indescribable entity superimposed upon the cause (as supposed by the Vedântins). This line of argument is extended to prove the dual character of unity and diversity with respect to attribute and substance, and the whole and its parts, which are of mixed characters.

Many other thinkers accepting this view of the Mîmânsaka propound unico-dual theories modified according to their respective intellectual calibre. To quote a few of them, (*A*) some hold that the special property of difference appearing in cause and effect is their very essence while the identity is a kind of relation of oneness subsisting between the so-called two objects viz cause and effect. (*B*) Others maintain that difference is an attribute of cause and effect, while identity consists in the absence of that attribute (*C*). A third set of thinkers holds that difference and identity are both positive attributes of an object like colour or taste. All these various thinkers state in support of their respective views the impropriety of concordance as subject and prdicate between cause and effect (which would appear on the hostile hypothesis of absolute unity or absolute difference).

To the above summary of unico-dualism the Vedântin replies that rational thinkers would not accept the hypothesis, because one and the same object cannot be proved as unique and different.

We shall first take the first view (*A*) enunciated in the preceding paragraph.

It is asked:— Is that special property in the form of difference something distinct from the cause and effect or one with them or both one and distinct? If it be distinct, the opponent should point out a relation apart from itself which would connect that special property with its substratum. All thinkers agree on the general definition of relation as a character distinct from the correlated objects and yet residing in them (*i. e.* the special attribute in the form of difference must have a relation apart from itself connecting it with the cause and effect). It should not be said that the attribute is in itself a relation and as such does not require another relation to connect it with the object. Because such a rule will not hold good in the case of conjunction which (according to the opposite view) although a kind of relation requires another relation of identity to connect it with the objects united by it. The Mîmânsaka should not argue:—"The relation of identity stands by itself, and there is no necessity for another relation, just as the Naiyâyika conceives the relation of self-connection."

Such an argument is contradicted by the following syllogisms:—

The relation of identity under dispute requires another relation apart from itself to connect it with its substratum, because it is a

relation or because it is a property *e. g.*, the relation of conjunction.

Again:—

Relation of identity must be dependent upon its substratum through a relation other than itself, because it is not *absolutely* separate from its substratum (*i. e.* it has some kind of closeness or proximity, but is not absolutely cut off) *e. g.* a pot close with the ground (which is not absolutely cut off from the ground and is therefore connected with the substratum by the relation of conjunction). Where there is absolute separation from the substratum there can be no relation. The relation of conjunction cannot be put forth as an instance shewing a flaw in the above rule—that when there is absolute separation there can be no relation—because conjunction is not admitted to be absolutely severed from the conjoined objects and because Intimate Relation put forth as an instance of a nexus between conjunction and conjoined objects has been refuted at length in the first chapter. Just as the Naiyâyika's conception of Intimate Relation is difficult to establish, so the Mîmânsaka's idea of relation of identity is equally not provable. It follows then that identity is not absolutely separate from its substratum.

Let us then hold that identity is one with the substratum. Still the Mîmânsaka must explain:— Whether this oneness of identity with its substratum implies non-separation or absolute

unity?. If it be the first, each identity consisting of non-separateness from the substratum will require another such identity and there would be confusion ad-infinitum and consequently non-duality cannot be established anywhere. If however identity means, as in the second alternative, absolute oneness with the substratum, there would be only one entity, and thus to say that identity is a property is a meaningless speech.

In order to avoid both the difficulties let us assume that identity is both different and non-different from the substratum. Here also if "non-difference" means "identity" and if this "identity" is both different and non-different there would be an infinite chain of such unico-dual identities.

To conclude, then, the first view (*A*) is not rational.

Let us now examine the second view (*B*) namely the difference between cause and effect is a kind of property, and non-difference is its absence.

Do these difference and non-difference reside in one and the same substratum or in separate substrata? If they reside in one and the same substratum, then both difference and non-difference cannot subsist in the same substratum at one and the same time, because positive and negative characters cannot simultaneously subsist in the same substratum. If,

however, difference and non-difference reside in separate substrata, the effect cannot be said to be different from the cause, because neither the cause nor the effect is supposed to contain difference and non-difference together.[1] Thus the second view is untenable:—

The point involved in the third thory (*C*), namely, unity and diversity are positive properties belonging to cause and effect like colour and taste, requires to be clearly set forth. Does it mean that unity and diversity are (*a*) absolutely different from cause and effect or (*b*) inseparable therefrom, or (*c*) both separate and inseparate, or (*d*) neither separate and inseparate. If alternative (*a*) is adopted, does that difference of unity and diversity from the cause and effect is itself separate from those unity and diversity? If so, that other difference or separateness will require another difference and so on to infinity; and thus no difference whatsoever can be established. It has been said by the author of Khandana Khanda Khadya:—

"The faults like the instablity of reasoning undermine the reality of the world (in the doctrine of dualists); they are however friends of the non-dualists inasmuch as they bear out the phenomenality of the world".

If that difference between unity and diversity on the one hand, and cause and effect on the other, is itself non-different, it means that unity and diversity are inseparable from the cause and

effect, and thus they (unity and diversity) cannot be regarded as properties having a being other than that of cause and effect. If that difference between unity and diversity on the one hand and cause and effect on the other is itself both different and non-different from the first pair of unity and diversity, the second pair of difference and non-difference will require a third pair to distinguish it from the first and so on to infinity.

It is thus clear that unity and diversity are not distinct from cause and effect.

Let us take the view (*b*) that they are non-different. In this alternative out of the pair of unity and diversity (difference and non-difference), if diversity is a property, and if it be subjected to the hypothetical alternatives as different and non-different there would be confusion ad infinitum; and if that diversity is (not a property) but the essence of the thing, the theory of unico-dualism or unity and diversity together, would fall to the ground, (because then there would be only a unique or inseparable entity).

Let us now adopt the view (*c*) that unity and diversity of cause and effect are themselves both one and different. Then if the oneness and difference of the first pair of unity and difference are capable of possessing a third pair of unity and diversity there would be confusion ad infinitum.

To avoid all these difficulties, the fourth alternative (*d*) be hold, namely, that unity and diversity of cause and effect are themselves neither different, nor non-different, nor different plus non-different from some thing but are themselves independent perceptible entities in which the round of the worldly dealings is based, then the opponent should answer the query:—

How can unity and diversity be regarded as properties of a thing unless they are connected with the thing?

If any relation subsists between them and the thing, it cannot be the relation of conjunction because, firstly unity and difference are admitted by the opponent (not only between the substances as cause and effect) but in properties and actions also; secondly unity and diversity are not regarded as a substance, and thirdly conjunction is regarded as a property inhering in substances.[2] The proposed relation cannot be intimate connection, for that form of relationship has been already refuted.

If the proposed connection between unity-diversity and the thing be the relation of identity, it is enquired:—Is that identity a kind of relation capable of bearing the strain of separateness (from the substratum) or not? If it be the first, how can the proposed identity (which now means—"a relation involviug separability") be not undermined by the fault of confusion ad infinitum as in the case of Intimate Relation? If it be the second, that is to say, if the proposed

relation of identity between unity-diversity and the thing means inseparability, then the unity-diversity is non-different from or inseparable from the thing and thus the theory of unico-dualism will have to be abandoned.

Now if it be contended that eventhough there is no relation subsisting between unity-diversity and the thing, and yet the former is the property of the latter on the force of actual appearance, we reply that they (unity and diversity) are then imaginary properties, because they appear to the senses without their actual presence in the thing *e. g.*, the appearance of silver in pearl-oyster. Such imaginary being of unity-diversity in the world is acceptable to us (Vedântins).

If it be held that unity-diversity is not really a property, but an independent pair explaining the round of experience, and that the consideration of its being a property is merely conditional or relative, it is replied that in that case unity-diversity should appear to the senses as distinct objects like a pot. If it be said that just as soul is an independent being, and yet appears in his conditioned character as an embodied being, so unity-diversity is an independent entity and yet its appearance is conditional *i. e.*, depending upon something else, we say that the argument is fallacious. Unity-diversity is capable of being cognized by an external sense like sight (while soul is perceptible by the inner

sensory alone). Besides we know for certain that unity-diversity is observed as relating to something like a property and is thus conditional. It follows, then, that as unity-diversity is cognized as property of a thing, and as it is not separately perceived, it, in reality, should be held as an attribute, and as such it requires some connection with the thing. Now no such connection can be established between unity-diversity and the thing. Consequently this view of the Mîmânsaka is worse than that of the Jainas inasmuch as the unico-dualism of other opponents although irrational can any how be explained in some form or another (while this unico-dualism of the Mimânsaka is in no way explicable).

By this line of argument we have refuted the objection formerly raised, namely,—

" The concordance of subject and predicate is not observed in only one object. Nor can it be justified in absolutely distinct objects like horse and buffalo.It follows, then, that the difficulty of explaining the grammatical concordance between cause and effect as—"this pot is earth" —leads us to suppose unity-diversity between cause and effect ".

The opponent questions the Vedântin:— " How do you account for this concordance (which is inexplicable on absolute difference or absolute non-difference, but explicable on the

dual character of difference-non-difference)"? It is replied by the Vedântin that as has been already stated the super-imposition of the effect on the cause accounts for this concordance. The same point will be discussed later on.

It is argued by the opponent:—

" Unlike the false knowledge or super-imposition, this concordance is not sublated; then how can it be said that the concordance is due to the super-imposition "?

The Vedântin replies that just as the idea-" I am a man "-although appearing as reality is sublated by real knowledge of our absolute unity with Self which is devoid of all characteristics this like humanity &c, so this concordance between cause and effect holds good till the rise of the knowledge of Brahman. Besides the sublation due to Vedic texts like:—" Effect is simply an expansion of name. The reality is earth; (cause of a pot)" -is clearly pointed out in standard works and will be shewn in this work also.

The opponent again retorts and points out the acceptability of the doctrine of Bhatta Bhâskara that unity-diversity submits in Brahman and the world. This view is accepted by the modern followers of Ramânuja. The opponent then describes his position:—

Everything is *unique* in its identity with Brahman which is the soul of all in accordance with the Vedic texts-" All this is Brahman.

All this is Self ". Again it is diverse in its character of the knowable, the means of knowledge &c. Otherwise on absolute monism the worldly dealings should stop in consequence of the contradiction of the various proofs like preception (which imply dualism). Besides the ritualistic Veda will be a dead letter (because when there is absoute Brahman the activity of the people in the performance of holy duties leading to variety of fruits will be meaningless).

In the same way on absolute dualism the philosophic portion of the Veda will have no scope and will be neglected. Both these consequences flowing from absolute monism and absolute dualism are not desirable. It is therefore held that, firstly, in order to justify the validity of proofs like perception, secondly to avoid the stoppage of mundane dealings, and thirdly to make a basis for the operations of the ritualistic and philosophical portions of the Veda, everything is said to be *unique* in its identity with Brahman, and different in its character as an object of knowledge, means of knowledge &c. In the same way the cause and effect should be regarded in this world as both identical and different.

To the above it is replied that the theory is irrational because it is difficult to establish the nature of unico-dualism. It is asked:—Is the unity of the world maintained by that very aspect through which it is regarded as diverse

or by any other aspect ? On the first hypothesis the so-called unity and diversity will be one and the same and thus the so-called difference will turn out to be non-difference and consequently there will be no dualism. On the other hypothesis are those two aspects of the world (one pointing to unity and the other to diversity) absolutely distinct from the world or absolutely identical with the world or both ? If absolutely distinct, they (aspects) and the thing (world) cannot be held as property and substance, just as there is no such relation subsisting between those two aspects themselves (which are absolutely distinct). If absolutely identical, there should be the absolute existence of the thing only or of the aspects only ; but there can be no such two entities like the thing and its aspects. If both distinct and identical, it is further enquired :—

Does the unity-diversity of the aspects from the thing arise by one of them or by both ?

If the unity-diversity between two aspects on the one hand and the thing on the other is due to one of the two sides, the same rule should apply to the unity-diversity between cause and effect, and thus there can be no unity-diversity between cause and effect, (although there may be unity-diversity in either cause alone, or effect alone).

If the unity-diversity between the aspects and the thing be due to both the sides, each

side will have its own unity-diversity to account for which another set of sides will have to be admitted and so on to infinity.

Thus unity-diversity cannot be established by argument. The opponent might say that it is established by actual experience. It is replied that it cannot be established by valid experience. Because one means of valid experience-say perception-cannot simultaneously operate upon being and non-being or assertion and negation (*i. e*, difference and non-difference cannot be simultaneously cognized by perception in one and the same substratum). Besides various means of right knowledge cannot co-operate in the production of experience (*i. e.*, it is impossible to suppose that perception enables us to cognize difference while inference operating at the same time enables us to cognize non-difference). Thus even in the popular experience the unity-diversity between cause and effect is grounded (not on valid means of right knowledge but) on the mutual superimposition and is then indescribable.

Another reason pointing to the desirability of accepting unico-dualism- viz- unico- dualism should be resorted to in order to justify the validity of the ritualistic and philosophical portions of the Veda as also of the means of knowledge like perception coupled with the propriety of mundane dealings-is also untenable. The Vedic texts declaring non-dualism are valid means of knowledge as they lead to the knowledge

of the final truth; whereas other proofs on which the experience of duality is based are valid inasmuch as they produce the knowledge of relative reality (or the reality which is sublated by the knowledge of the transcendental position) until the mundane existence is brought to a close. Thus all the popular and Vedic dealings will be explicable. To conclude then, in the world of empiricism also the identity between cause and effect is real, while the difference is due to super-imposition. Thus we have established that the real entity is Brahman consisting of secondless and absolute bliss and intelligence; while the world which consists of a variety of objects classified as the knower, knowable, knowledge &c to be described hereafter, is phenomenal and is superimposed upon that noumenal Brahman through Ignorance.

NOTES.

Chapter III.—Section I.

1. The nine properties of air are:—(1) touch (2) number (3) measure (4) separateness (5) conjunction (6) disjunction (7) remoteness (8) nearness and (9) impression.

The fourteen properties of earth are:—

(1) colour, (2) taste, (3) scent, (4) touch, (5) number, (6) measure, (7) separateness, (8) conjunction, (9) disjunction, (10) remoteness, (11) nearness, (12) weight, (13) liquidity, (14) and impression.

The fourteen properties of water are made up by the omission of scent from the list of properties of earth and by the addition of a new property of stickiness.

The fourteen properties of individual soul are:—

(1) Number, (2) measure, (3) separateness, (4) conjunction, (5) disjunction, (6) knowledge, (7) happiness (8) pain, (9) will, (10) hatred, (11) effort, (12) merit, (13) demerit, (14) and impression.

Time and space have each five properties of—(1) number, (2) measure, (3) separateness, (4) conjunction and (5) disjunction.

Ether possesses six properties of—(1) sound, (2) number, (3) measure, (4) separateness, (5) conjunction, and (6) disjunction.

God has eight properties namely—(1) number, (2) measure, (3) separateness, (4) conjunction, (5) disjunction, (6) knowledge, (7) will, and (8) effort.

Mind has eight properties:—(1) Number, (2) measure, (3) separateness, (4) conjunction, (5) disjunction, (6) remoteness, (7) nearness and (8) impression.

2. I have accepted the reading जगत्परस्परं भिद्यते and not जगत्परमेश्वरभेदस्य for two reasons :—(1) The cognition—"a pot is not a piece of cloth"—implies that the material world is full of differences. It cannot prove the difference between God and world. (2) The difference between God and world requires no separate mention for that difference is implied in the division of the universe into sentient and non-sentient entities which also proves the difference between individual soul and the material world

3. Sometimes feel the loss of some of our spiritual properties as in sleep. But that loss or destruction is associated by the anterior non-existence of like properties which are to come into being. In other words the destruction is followed by the rise of like properties in future. When the soul is on the point of achieving absolution, his properties vanish for ever and as there is no possibility of the rise of like properties in future it is said that the final destruction is not accompanied by the anterior non-existence of future properties. This is what is intended to be conveyed in the technical language of the Vaiśeshikas.

4. If the knowledge of self were regarded as capable of annihilating this class of action, the body which depends upon that action would cease to exist and thus there would be no possibility for liberation in a living state-a conclusion contrary to the teaching of the Veda.

5. Mere suspension of pain differs from the absolute cessation of pain inasmuch as the former is not coeval with the simultaneous disappearance of the special properties of a soul, while the latter is coeval with such disappearance *i. e.*, the final destruction of pain and destruction of all the special properties of soul at a time are synchronous.

Vide तर्ककौमुदी and Mr. Dwivedi's gloss thereon P. 70.

6 (Sc)—which terminates not in the production of the counter-entity of pain but in the destruction of causes leading up to the appearance of pain.

7 In the translator's opinion अनुपपत्ति is a misprint for अनुत्पत्ति. The former is inappropritate in the present context.

8. In the preceding paragraphs absolution is defined (1) as the posterior non-existencc or destruction (ध्वंस) of pain which is not co-eval with the anterior non-exietence (प्रागभाव) or non-production (अनुत्पत्ति) of any form of pain which (anterior non-existence) has a termination in the destruction of all the special properties of the soul. The present paragraph deals with the hostile view that absolution is a kind of absolute non-existence.

9 In the translators opinion अद्वैतसत्यत्वापत्तेश्च is a misprint for द्वैतसत्यत्वापत्तेश्च.

10. The point is that आनन्दम् in the text "आनन्दंब्रह्म" —were regarded as the predicate of Brahman meaning that "Brahman is bliss," "आनन्द" should be in the masculine gender as आनन्दः But the neuter gender of आनन्द (आनन्दम्) shews that it is not a substantive predicated of ब्रह्म but an adjective agreeing with Brahman and implying that Brahman possesses bliss as property.

11 This paragraph is full of metaphysical subtlety andr equires a brief commentary for its comprehension. The reader who has followed the text carefully will know that the refutation of the tenet that self and knowledge are related as substance and property commences with three categorical hypotheses :—(*a*) That knowledge is altogether a distinct entity from self ; or (*b*) that it is identical with self ; or (*c*) that it is one and at the same time different. As there can be no relation of qualification and

qualified between two absolutely distinct entities (*e. g.*, between Self and a pot) the Naiyâyika had to resort to the trick that there is a kind of relation subsisting between knowledge and soul–(Self) which explains how one is the property (qualification) and the other a substance (qualified). Then the form of relation was investigated. Neither conjunction (संयोग), nor identical relationship (तादात्म्य), nor intimate connection (समवाय) could serve the purpose as will be seen from the text preceding the paragraph under comment.

Now the Naiyâyika takes resort to the hypothesis that knowledge is indivisible or devoid of all difference on the strength of the homogeneous appearance of consciousness (अखण्ड) in all forms of cognition. But it is pointed out that such an assumption of homogeneous consciousness having no connection with the object (विषय) cannot prove the existence of the object. An object is said to be proved when it shines in the intellect or in other words when the intellect assumes the form of the object. Thus it becomes necessary to establish a connection between the knowledge of an object like a pot, and a pot itself. Two alternatives are suggested :—(1) That the connection between knowledge and its object is cognized by that very knowledge :—or (2) That another form of knowledge apprehends the connection between the first knowedge and its object. We have four things to consider:—(*a*) Knowledge having a pot for an object (घटविषयकज्ञान) (*b*) a material thing (घट) (*c*) connection (संबंध) between the two and (*d*) the cognition of that connection (संबंधग्रहण) On hypothesis No. 1 the last element (*d*) merges into (*a*), and then the difficulty arises as to how a connection can be cognized without the consciousness of two related objects. In this case the two related things are:—घटविषयकज्ञान and घट. The cognition of the connection (संबन्ध) between the two must refer to both the sides. Now the first side

(घटविषयकज्ञान) being in itself a form of intellect may either refer to it as its intellectual object (विषय) or remain as it is. If it remains as it is (*i. e.*, if it is not intellectually referred to as an object) the cognition that "घटविषयकज्ञान and घट are connected" cannot arise, one of the connected objects (घटविषयकज्ञान) being not an intellectual object (विषय). If घटविषयकज्ञान is intellectually referred to it must be by itself for we have not yet accepted alternative No. 2. Then follows the difficulty of regarding a cognition as capable of apprehending its own nature. As one and the same thing cannot be the subject (विषय) and object (विषय) the घटविषयकज्ञान cannot be the object (विषय) of itself. To say that an idea or cognition by itself proves that it is the object of itself or in other words that idea is self–shining is a meaningless gabble. If we examine the point, we have to assume that an idea has two aspects :—subjective and objective. If the objective side is one with the thing (idea), the position that " An idea becomes the object of itself "—is equivalent to saying that a thing or idea exists. If the objectivity (विषयत्व) of the thing or idea is different from the thing or idea (स्व), there can be no relation of the subjects and object (विषयविषयिभाव) between the thing (स्व) and it objectivity (विषयत्व) just as there can be no such relation between घट and घटत्व. The alternative No. 2 which implies, that the connection between घटविषयकज्ञान and घट is cognized by some other cognition is liable to the fault of instability of reasoning (अनवस्था) for that other cognition will require another to establish its connection with the first and so on.

The passage in the text following the paragraph under comment discusses hypothesis B.

NOTES.

Chapter III.—Section II.

1 The Naiyayika epistemology or theory of knowledge is as under:—

The external object comes in contact with the sense ; the latter touches the mind, which in its turn is connected with the soul, and then knowledge appears. Thus knowledge necessarily requires the contact of mind with some sense. Now in the waking and dream states we have a variety of cognitions some originating from the eye, some from ear &c. The individual soul has, however, a state of daily unconsciousness called sound sleep. This state is accounted for by holding that in that state the mind is cut off from the external sense of touch which extends over the whole skin. This contact of the mind with the skin is supposed to be the generic cause of all sensibility. Its absence leads to the unconscious state. The new school of the Naiyayikas, however, explains the state of sound sleep not by cutting off of the contact of mind and skin, but on the theory that when mind enters the region of the heart called पुरितति the effect of the contact of mind and soul is neutralized and then an unconscious state prevails. Compare:—

मम तु यदा मनः पुरितातिं प्रविशति तदा सुषुप्तिः । यदा निःसरति तदा ज्ञानोत्पतिः, पुरितातिबहिर्देशावच्छिन्नात्मनः संयोगस्य ज्ञानकारणत्वात् । अतएव ज्ञानमात्रे त्वङ्मनः संयोगः कारणमिति मतं निराकुर्वन्ति नव्याः । (सिद्धान्तचन्द्रोदय)

2 The aphorism is:—" Souls are many, for on that hypothesis individual pleasure &c can be accounted for ".

NOTES.

Chapter III.—Section III.

1. The various fallacies referred to in this passage may be thus briefly explained :—The proposition in Sanskrit would stand as :—भेदेन[2] भिन्ने धर्मिणि भेदः[1] वर्तते *i. e.* The *difference*[1] is found in an object qualified by *difference.*[2]

Then the question arises:—Whether (*a*) the *difference*[1] which is predicated of an object is the same as the *difference*[2] which qualifies the object or (*b*) different? If view (*a*) is adopted there is the fault of self-dependence (आत्माश्रय) *i. e.*, one difference cannot inhere in an object unless it qualifies the latter and the same cannot qualify the latter without its inherence. If view (*b*) is adopted then the question arises:—Whether *difference*[2] exists in the identical object or differentiated object? If former the knowledge of difference is a delusion ; if latter the same difficulty of self-dependence occurs.

Again if *difference*[2] is found to inhere in the object differentiated not by itself, but by *difference*[1] the position is that of inter-dependence (अन्योन्याश्रय) *i. e. difference*[2] was resorted to for explaining *difference*[1] and now the latter explains *difference.*[2]

If *difference*[2] is supposed to be existent in the object through *difference,*[3] and if the latter occupies the middle connecting link between *dtfference*[1] and *difference*[2] the position will be that of argument in a circle (चक्रकम्).

If the opponent is not satisfied with *difference*[3] occupying the middle position but suggests *difference*[4] for explaining *difference*[3] there would be an infinite chain of differences, because *difference*[4] will require *difference*[5] and so on. This confusion ad infinitum (अनवस्था) cannot prove that object is differentiated for no final difference differentiating the object can be established.

2. I can make out no meaning from the text भेदज्ञानाजनकत्वस्यावेदितत्वात्."

On the contrary I can bring out a consistent sense from the text भेदज्ञानजनकत्वस्यावेदितत्वात्. I consider the former to be an erroneous text, for निर्विकल्पज्ञान is never known to be the producer of भेदज्ञान. The text as it is would imply

that "निर्विकल्पज्ञान is *not* known to be a *non-producer* of भेदज्ञान" *i. e.*, it is the producer of भेदज्ञान which is nonsense. In the list of errata attached to the original work this mistake is not corrected and hence the translator has added this note lest there may be no confusion in interpretation.

NOTES.

Chapter III.—Section IV.

(1) The gist of the argument is this:—"Difference" conveys the idea of "Separation"; while a pot gives the idea of a "compact body". These ideas are opposed to each other. In spite of this opposition if we adopt the Sânkhya view that "difference" is the same as the essence of pot *i. e.* if pot is the only existent entity the consequence would be that we should have the idea of compactness throughout the world. Now the world consists of objects which are mutually exclusive (अन्योन्यानात्मकत्ववत्सु) and when the compactness runs through them all the consequence would be that there would be no non-confusion (असंकरासिद्धेः) *i. e.*, no difference or no duality. Such a consequence would be consonant with the Vedântic doctrine.

If, however, the pot is merely a difference *i. e.*, not a compact body but a separable being its parts would be infinitesimally divisible, and the world would be reduced to zero. This consequence would support Nihilistic doctrine.

NOTES.

Chapter III.—Section V.

1 We are to distinguish between the result and the instrument. The knowledge that there is no pot is the result and is called "absence of perception". This knowledge arises from the mutual operation which touches the non-existence of the thing. This operation is the instrumental non-perception.

NOTES.

Chapter III.—Section.

1 To illustrate the point if scent belongs to light, light cannot be said to be possessed of scent and earth possessed of light. In the same way if difference and non-difference belong to two entities like cause and effect the effect cannot be regarded as possessed of non-difference. In like manner the cause cannot be said as non-difference because it is possessed of difference only.

2. The point is that conjunction cannot be the nexus between unity-diversity and the thing because conjunction on the opponent's hypothesis is a property subsisting between two substances. Now unity-diversity is not a substance, and then it cannot be connected with the thing conjunction.

Again unity-diversity is admitted by the opponent in the categories of property as well as action. There can be no conjunction between unity-diversity and a property-say-colour, for as has been already said conjunction is assumed as subsisting between two substances.